[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS AT U.S. PORTS
OF ENTRY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,
AND HOMELAND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 15, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-38
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, Chairman
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
ELTON GALLEGLY, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California ZOE LOFGREN, California
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
CHRIS CANNON, Utah MAXINE WATERS, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
RIC KELLER, Florida ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DARRELL ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona ADAM SMITH, Washington
MIKE PENCE, Indiana CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
STEVE KING, Iowa
TOM FEENEY, Florida
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
Philip G. Kiko, Chief of Staff-General Counsel
Perry H. Apelbaum, Minority Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
TOM FEENEY, Florida MAXINE WATERS, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
RIC KELLER, Florida WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
Jay Apperson, Chief Counsel
Michael Volkov, Deputy Chief Counsel
Elizabeth Sokul, Counsel
Katy Crooks, Counsel
Jason Cervenak, Full Committee Counsel
Bobby Vassar, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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MARCH 15, 2005
OPENING STATEMENT
Page
The Honorable Howard Coble, a Representative in Congress from the
State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security............................... 1
The Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security........................ 3
WITNESSES
Mr. Jayson P. Ahern, Assistant Commissioner, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection
Oral Testimony................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Rear Admiral Larry Hereth, Director of Port Security, United
States Coast Guard
Oral Testimony................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Peter J. Scrobe, Vice President, American International
Marine Agency, on behalf of the International Cargo Security
Council
Oral Testimony................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Mr. Jeff Keever, Deputy Executive Director, Virginia Port
Authority
Oral Testimony................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Robert C. Scott, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, and
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security....................................................... 47
Response to Questions for the Record submitted by Commissioner
Jayson Ahern, U.S. Customs and Border Protection............... 48
Response to Questions for the Record submitted by Rear Admiral
Larry Hereth, Director of Port Security, U.S. Coast Guard...... 58
Response to Questions for the Record submitted by Peter Scrobe,
Member of International Cargo Security Council................. 70
Response to Questions for the Record submitted by Jeff Keever,
Deputy Executive Director, Virginia Port Authority............. 72
Statement submitted by the Retail Industry Leaders Association
(RILA)......................................................... 79
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS AT U.S. PORTS
OF ENTRY
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TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2005
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:02 p.m., in
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard Coble
(Chair of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Coble. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. The
Subcommittee will come to order.
Today, the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, convenes a very
important oversight hearing of the Department of Homeland
Security to examine the security of the nation's seaports and
the cargo entering these ports.
I have long contended that protecting our nation's seaports
is a vital aspect of the overall war on terror. Press reports
have indicated there's a lack of cargo inspections taking place
at our ports of entry. This Subcommittee is concerned about
these reports and looks forward to hearing the Department's
response to these accounts and the plans to assure adequate
inspections to protect our ports and the cargo entering the
United States are taking place.
Today's hearing will focus on the efforts of three vital
entities charged with protecting our nation's seaports from
hostile threats. First, we will hear from the two primary
agencies within the Department of Homeland Security charged
with protecting our ports, that is the United States Coast
Guard and the United States Customs and Border Protection.
The United States Coast Guard is the nation's leading
maritime law enforcement agency and has broad multifaceted
jurisdictional authority. As part of Operation Noble Eagle, the
Coast Guard is at a heightened state of alert, protecting more
than 361 ports and 95,000 miles of coastline, which is
America's longest border. The Coast Guard utilizes both
Maritime Safety and Security Teams as well as Port Security
Units to protect our seaports.
Maritime Safety and Security Teams were created in direct
response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and
are a part of the Department of Homeland Security's layered
strategy directed at protecting our seaports and waterways.
MSSTs provide waterborne and a modest level of shoreside anti-
terrorism force protection for strategic shipping, high-
interest vessels, and critical infrastructure. MSSTs are a
quick response force capable of rapid nationwide deployment via
air, ground, or sea transportation in response to changing
threat conditions and evolving maritime homeland security
mission requirements.
The Coast Guard Port Security Units, the PSUs, are Coast
Guard units staffed primarily with selected Reservists. They
provide waterborne and limited land-based protection for
shipping and critical port facilities, both within the
continental United States and in other theaters.
We will also hear from Customs and Border Protection. The
CBP anti-terrorism mission is not limited to the physical
examination of cargo when it arrives in United States ports.
The CBP, or the Customs and Border Protection, is also using
intelligence from a number of sources to identify high-risk
shipments in order to concentrate its inspection resources on
them. For example, under bilateral agreements as part of the
Container Security Initiative, CBP inspectors work in nearly 20
foreign ports to help ensure the security of U.S.-bound cargo
before it disembarks.
Additionally, in November of 2001, the CBP established the
National Targeting Center to serve as the national
clearinghouse for targeting imported cargo for inspection.
Among other tasks, the NTC interacts with law enforcement and
the intelligence community to disseminate intelligence alerts
to the ports. NTC, furthermore assists, in conducting research
on incoming cargo, attempts to improve the targeting of cargo,
and manages a National Targeting Training Program for CBP
targeters.
Next, we will hear testimony from a local port authority,
the Virginia Port Authority. The VPA has led the nation in
radiological testing at its seaports and has successfully
employed radiological monitoring equipment since December of
2002. In just this past year, in cooperation with Customs and
Border Protection, VPA deployed some of its equipment to
national security events, including the Presidential
inauguration.
Finally, we will hear testimony from a representative from
the International Cargo Security Council. The International
Cargo Security Council is a professional association of cargo
transportation and security professionals from the entire
spectrum of cargo security. One of ICSC's goals is to improve
cargo transportation security through voluntary Government/
industry efforts.
In order to further this effort, ICSC is a leading
proponent of encouraging industry to partake in CBP's Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. C-TPAT is a joint
Government/business partnership where companies agree to
improve the security in their supply chain in return for fast-
lane border crossings and other important incentives. It is
important to recognize that cargo and port security require the
multi-layered approach in order to deter and detect all
vulnerabilities and hostile cargo.
I am pleased that we have this representation here before
us today and I look forward to their testimony, and I apologize
to all of you. I normally don't give an opening statement this
lengthy, but I think the subject matter at hand requires some
detail.
And prior to introducing our distinguished witnesses, I am
pleased to recognize the distinguished gentleman from Virginia,
the Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, Mr. Bobby Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm pleased to join you
in this hearing on law enforcement efforts at our ports. The
development of the Department of Homeland Security in the wake
of the 9/11 tragedies brought about a shift of several law
enforcement agencies from one Department to another with
changes and reorganizations of their responsibilities in some
cases.
There has been a significant change in responsibilities of
the Federal law enforcement entities to communicate,
coordinate, and cooperate with State and local law enforcement
entities. As a result, some confusion exists in the public and
Congress and among the various Federal and State agencies as to
where the oversight responsibilities for these operations
reside.
I am of the opinion that we should seek to clarify any such
confusion by first asserting our jurisdiction over all Federal
law enforcement entities and then working with those entities
to insist their coordination and cooperation with each other
and with State and local law enforcement entities.
So I'm pleased to join you in this first of a series of
hearings that we'll be conducting in this regard and commend
you for your foresight and leadership in this matter.
I'm particularly pleased to have Jeff Keever, the Deputy
Director of our Virginia Port Authority, as one of our
witnesses today. Our ports are a vital part of the nation's
economy, handling over two billion tons of freight each year,
and the Port of Virginia is the seventh-largest U.S. port in
terms of general tonnage, handling annually--in terms of
general tonnage handled annually and the second largest on the
East Coast.
Operating alongside the nation's largest Naval base,
assisting missions of the Defense Logistics Agency and the U.S.
Transportation Command, security has always been a big job for
the Port of Virginia. Secure, smooth, and efficient operations
are not only critical to the deployment of our troops around
the globe, but is also why the port has maintained a robust
annual growth rate of more than 9 percent over the past few
years.
As part of its focus on security, the Port of Virginia
checks 100 percent of the containers leaving the port for
radiation detection and monitoring equipment before they leave
the port on trucks. And as a result of its successful
cooperation with the U.S. Customs agencies, there has not been
a theft at the port for about 8 years. That's quite a record in
security when you consider that estimates of thefts from other
ports across the U.S. range as high as $30 billion annually.
Yet despite the fact that our ports have risen to the
challenges, their ability to continue to meet them in a world
of changing threats and circumstances will depend in large
measure on our assistance and support. I'm concerned, Mr.
Chairman, that we have not been as diligent in supporting our
seaports as we have with our airports and our other border
crossings. It appears that we have left much of the
responsibility to the ports themselves compared to what we have
done to assist our airport and border crossing operations.
I expect that we'll hear about details of what we can do
from our witnesses, so I look forward to their testimony and to
working with you, Mr. Chairman, in clarifying our oversight
responsibilities for the various law enforcement entities and
strengthening our ports so that they can do their vital job in
securing and sufficiently moving cargo and people. Again, I
appreciate your leadership in this manner.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman from Virginia.
I ask unanimous consent that all Members of the
Subcommittee be allowed to introduce their opening statements
and be made a part of the record, and we're pleased to have the
distinguished gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake, joining us, as
well.
Gentlemen, it's the practice of the Subcommittee to swear
in all witnesses appearing before it, so if you all would
please stand and raise your right hands.
Do each of you solemnly swear that the testimony you are
about to give this Subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Ahern. I do.
Admiral Hereth. I do.
Mr. Scrobe. I do.
Mr. Keever. I do.
Mr. Coble. Let the record show that each of the witnesses
has answered in the affirmative.
You may be seated, and I am now pleased to introduce our
distinguished panel. We do, indeed, have four distinguished
witnesses with us today.
Our first witness is Mr. Jayson P. Ahern, Assistant
Commissioner at the Office of Field Operations of the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection. As Assistant Commissioner, Mr.
Ahern manages an operating budget of $2.2 billion and directs
activities of more than 25,000 employees. Moreover, he oversees
the programs and operations of 20 field operation offices, 317
ports of entry, and 14 pre-clearance stations in Canada and the
Caribbean. Prior to this position, Mr. Ahern served as Director
of Field Operations for the Southern California Customs
Management Center. Mr. Ahern is a graduate of Northeastern
University and has completed the intensive program at Harvard
University.
Our second witness is Rear Admiral Larry Hereth. Rear
Admiral Hereth is currently serving as the Director of Port
Security in the Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental
Protection Directorate at the United States Coast Guard
Headquarters. As Director of Port Security, he oversees all
aspects of the Coast Guard port security mission and has
directed the development of the maritime security regulations.
Previously, he served as Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard
Marine Safety Office in San Francisco Bay, as well as commanded
a unit in Turkey. He is also a recipient of the Department of
Transportation Security's Gold Medal Award. Rear Admiral Hereth
is a graduate of the United States Coast Guard Academy and
earned his M.B.A. from the Florida Institute of Technology.
Mr. Peter Scrobe is our third witness, who is a member of
the International Cargo Security Council and former Chairman of
Government Affairs Committee at ICSC. Mr. Scrobe has been in
the marine insurance industry for 30 years. He is currently an
Advisory Board Member of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and
Vice President of the American International Marine Agency Loss
Control Services Worldwide. Additionally, Mr. Scrobe is an
active consultant to the Department of Homeland Security
through the Homeland Security Institute. Previously, Mr. Scrobe
has worked to develop the marine loss control operations for
American International Marine Agency. Mr. Scrobe received his
undergraduate degree at the Herbert H. Lehman College.
I'm going to confess my geographic ignorance, Mr. Scrobe.
Where is that?
Mr. Scrobe. In New York.
Mr. Coble. It's in New York. And Admiral, if I may ask, I
didn't know we had an installation in Turkey. Was that----
Admiral Hereth. It was a long time ago.
Mr. Coble. It's good to know I'm up to speed now, and I'm
now pleased to recognize Mr. Bobby Scott, who has requested
permission to introduce our fourth distinguished witness.
Mr. Scott. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Jeff Keever has served at the Port of Hampton Roads since
1977, when he joined the staff at the Hampton Roads Maritime
Association and the Hampton Roads Shipping Association. After a
brief absence, he returned to those associations and was named
Executive Vice President of the Hampton Roads Maritime
Association and the Hampton Roads Shipping Association. In
November of last year, he joined the Virginia Port Authority as
Deputy Executive Director, the agency's number two position. He
frequently represents the VPA's interests in the Virginia
General Assembly as well as the port's customer base around the
world.
He is a former President of the Hampton Roads Foreign
Commerce Club, the Hampton Roads Traffic Club, and the
Propeller Club. He is past Chairman of the Virginia Conference
on World Trade. He serves as a member of the Board of Directors
of the Virginians for Better Transportation, Virginia District
Export Council, and served on the board of the Virginia Chamber
of Commerce.
He was honored in 2001 by the Hampton Roads Maritime
Association when he received the prestigious Distinguished
Service Award, and he also received the Society of Maritime
Industry's Distinguished Service Award in February 2004.
He received his B.A. in political science at the University
of Richmond and has two children, a daughter and a son, who
attend Norfolk Academy.
Mr. Coble. I thank you, Mr. Scott.
Gentlemen, it's good to have you all with us. Now, I am
advised that we will have a House floor vote in approximately 1
hour. We try to operate here, gentlemen, under the 5-minute
rule. We impose that rule against ourselves, as well, and so
when we question you all, if you could be terse in your
response, that will help speed things along.
When you see the amber light illuminate in your face, you
will know that you're running out of time. That will be about--
I'll give you about a minute to go from that. So if you could,
confine your statements to the 5 minutes. We have your written
statements. They've been examined. They will be reexamined.
Mr. Ahern, we will start with you.
TESTIMONY OF JAYSON P. AHERN, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, U.S.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
Mr. Ahern. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Scott.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify and update
you on the advancements the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
continues to make in the areas of targeting and inspecting
cargo.
Automation, electronic information, and technology are
critical tools to facilitate the progress we have and will
continue to make with regards to securing the nation's
seaports. These tools help push our borders outward and
reinforce the components of CBP's layered defense.
CBP continues to develop its layered risk management
approach to safeguarding U.S. borders from threat by land, air,
and sea. Automated manifest information allows us to screen
shipments through our targeting systems and 100 percent of
identified high-risk shipments are inspected. CBP's multi-
layered strategy incorporates legislative and regulatory
initiatives, international and trade organizational priorities
and partnerships, improved automation support, new detection
technologies, and enhanced personnel training, and a
combination of local and national targeting expertise.
CBP recognizes that no single strategy is 100 percent
effective, so the focus is on layering multiple initiatives and
partnerships together to accomplish its mission. Although these
layers are closely interwoven and no one layer is more
important than the others, I would like to focus on those most
closely associated with the targeting and inspection of sea
cargo. An adversary may circumvent any single defense, so CBP
does not rely on one enforcement strategy, facilitation
program, or inspection process or technology. We employ these
layers in combination to substantially increase the likelihood
of a nuclear or radiologic weapon and a weapon-grade material
will be detected.
CBP is committed to collecting the most reliable data
possible. We demonstrate this commitment by working hard on new
legislation and regulations and establishing a proactive
manifest compliance program. The Trade Act requires manifest
data to be transmitted to CBP before the arrival of shipments
to facilitate the advance targeting so necessary. In the sea
cargo environment, manifest data is required 24 hours prior to
lading on a vessel overseas. The scope and the reliability of
this data is reinforced by the publication of the Trade Act
final rule on December 5 of 2003 that mandates the trade to
provide advance electronic cargo information for all modes of
transportation.
The Automated Targeting System, known as ATS, is a
flexible, constantly evolving system that integrates
enforcement and commercial databases. It is a targeting tool
that helps CBP focus its inspectional efforts on the high-risk
cargo. ATS analyzes electronic data related to individual
shipments prior to arrival and ranks them in order of risk
based on the application of algorithms and rules. The scores
are then divided into thresholds associated with further action
that CBP must take relative to documentation review, use of
technology, or physical inspection.
The National Targeting Center, the NTC, has made
significant progress since it began around-the-clock operations
on November 10 of 2001 and began the task of reorienting our
narcotics-based targeting methodologies and technologies for
anti-terrorism and national security missions. By January of
2003, NTC staff relocated to a state-of-the-art facility in
Northern Virginia that accommodates representatives from all of
CBP. We broadened the scope of CBP targeting and NTC now has
on-site liaison officers from the United States Coast Guard,
the Transportation Security Administration, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, the Federal Air Marshals, the Department
of Agriculture, and the NTC has also provided targeting
expertise to the Department of Homeland Security Operations
Center, the Terrorist Screening Center, and the National
Counterterrorism Center to support the timely and accurate flow
of information pertaining to national security and terrorist
activity.
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, known as
C-TPAT, also came into being as a result of the tragic events
of September 11. CBP began to work with the trade to devise a
strategy to protect the global trading network or supply chain
against the exploitation by terrorists from loading docks in
foreign environments to the ultimate destinations here in the
United States.
Participation in C-TPAT has grown exponentially, and today,
membership stands at 8,816 members, 4,600 of those that are
certified members. Currently, we have enrollment from the
importing community, carrier community, broker and freight
forwarders community, consolidators, marine port authorities,
and terminal operators.
The Container Security Initiative is an effort by CBP to
secure ocean-borne traffic by placing CBP officers alongside
host country customs officers to ensure that all shipments that
pose a risk are identified in inspection at foreign ports of
lading. Currently, CSI is in 34 ports in Canada, Europe, Asia,
and Africa.
Non-intrusive inspection technology is another cornerstone
of our layered strategy, and technologies deployed in our air
and seaports include large-scale gamma imaging devices and also
radiation detection capabilities, and I'll speak more of that
when we get into the question and answer period.
In conclusion, CBP's targeting and inspection programs
depend upon one another to operate at full potential. We're
constantly looking at ways to improve and make them stronger.
CBP works very aggressively with the trade and other Government
partners to legislate improvements regarding data timeliness
and quality, which augments the abilities of highly-trained
personnel to use cutting-edge technology for targeting,
detecting and securing terrorists and implements of terrorism
destined for the United States.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to
answer your questions later.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Ahern.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ahern follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jayson P. Ahern
Good afternoon Chairman Coble, members of the Subcommittee. Thank
you for this opportunity to testify and update you on the advancements
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) continues to make in the areas
of targeting and inspecting cargo.
Automation, electronic information and technology are critical
tools that facilitate the progress we have, and will continue to make,
with regards to securing the nation's seaports and the cargo that
traverses them. These tools help CBP push our borders outward and
reinforce the components of CBP's layered defense.
DHS continues to develop its layered, risk management strategy for
safeguarding U.S. borders from threat by land, air and sea. CBP's
multi-layered responsibilities under this strategy incorporate
legislative and regulatory initiatives, international and trade-
organization partnerships, improved automation support, new detection
technologies, enhanced personnel training, and a combination of local
and national targeting expertise. DHS recognizes that no single
solution is 100% effective, so the focus is on layering multiple
initiatives and partnerships together to accomplish its mission. Today
I would like to focus on CBP activities associated with the targeting
and inspection of sea cargo.
National Strategy for Maritime Security--Policy
directive to integrate and align all U.S. Government maritime
security programs.
Trade Act--Legislation that requires advance,
detailed, and accurate information for targeting shipments
before arrival to the United States.
Advanced Trade Data Initiative (ATDI)--CBP effort to
gather and analyze specific information already available from
commercial supply chain participants.
Smart Box Initiative--Test and Evaluation effort to
assess commercially available container security devices.
Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology--Advanced
inspection equipment to screen shipments rapidly for WMD,
nuclear or radiological materials, terrorist weapons, and other
contraband.
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT)--A public-private partnership program for securing global
supply chains.
The Automated Targeting System (ATS)--The premier
tool employed by CBP personnel to identify high-risk targets in
the cargo environments; targeting rule sets are in production
for sea, truck, and rail cargo. CBP anticipates deployment of
ATS Air Cargo Targeting during the second quarter of the 2005
calendar year.
The Container Security Initiative (CSI)--Cooperative
arrangements with trading partners to push our borders outward
by inspecting high risk containers prior to loading, and;
The National Targeting Center (NTC)--A single
location for targeting technology and subject matter expertise.
An adversary may circumvent any single defense, so CBP does not rely on
any one enforcement method, facilitation program, inspection process,
or technology. CBP employs these ``layers'' in combination to
substantially increase the likelihood that potential terrorist threats,
including a nuclear or radiological weapon or weapons grade material,
will be detected.
TRADE ACT
CBP is committed to collecting the most reliable data possible. We
demonstrate this commitment by establishing a proactive manifest
compliance program. The Trade Act requires manifest data to be
transmitted to CBP before the arrival of certain shipments to
facilitate advance targeting. In the sea cargo environment, manifest
data is required 24 hours prior to lading on the vessel overseas. The
24 Hour Manifest Rule, along with proactive monitoring of the manifest
data by CBP, is improving the timeliness and quality of the data which,
in turn, increases CBP's early detection capabilities. This improvement
is key to CBP's targeting success in the sea environment at both
domestic and foreign locations.
The scope and reliability of this data is reinforced by the
publication of the Trade Act Final Rule on December 5, 2003, that
mandates the trade to provide advance electronic cargo information for
all modes.
Additionally, when entry information is provided later in the
supply chain, ATS is able to factor this information into the risk
assessment. Entry data supplements manifest data, and is some of the
most detailed and accurate information available for targeting.
CBP continues enhancing its data quality by testing additional data
sources such as booking and stow plan data through our ATDI. We are
also collaborating with our Trade Support Network to identify
additional data sources that can be effectively and efficiently
integrated into our targeting and research process.
ADVANCED TRADE DATA INITIATIVE (ATDI)
The goal of the ATDI is to gather and analyze specific information
already available from commercial supply chain participants in advance
of, and in addition to, the 24-Hour Rule and entry data currently
collected.
The ATDI has four ultimate goals:
Identify the true port of origin and all stops along
a shipment's transit to the United States
Identify all parties associated with the shipment
Determine the veracity of commodity descriptions
Improve CBP risk management and targeting
Recently we completed Phase I of the ATDI, which demonstrated the
ability to capture, analyze, and evaluate advance trade data provided
by consenting U.S. importers via an ocean carrier portal (i.e., ocean
carrier data contained in bills of lading, booking confirmations, and
shipment status messages). In Phase II, which runs through April 2005,
we plan to add additional data sources.
SMART BOX INITIATIVE
In January of 2004, CBP began Phase 1 of the CBP Smart Box
Initiative. This initiative, which is one of a number of DHS Research,
Development, Testing and Evaluation programs for container security,\1\
involves five C-TPAT partners both large and small. These partners have
agreed to incorporate enhanced container security measures to evaluate
the efficacy of off-the-shelf technologies with an added electronic
Container Security Device as well as an International Standards
Organization compliant mechanical seal affixed to each container.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Other efforts include the Advanced Container Security Device
program in the Science and Technology Directorate and Operation Safe
Commerce in the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness.
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Securing containers is essential in achieving DHS's vision of a
comprehensive supply chain security program. A terrorist must not be
able to open a container in transit to introduce a weapon of mass
destruction or other threat without DHS being aware of the attempt.
Results of Phase 1 will further allow CBP to define design and
performance standards for the operational use of such technology, an
effort we will undertake cooperatively with the Science and Technology
Directorate's Container Security Program, including the Advanced
Container Security Device (ACSD) program. The Department's goal in the
Smart Box Initiative and the ACSD effort is to identify viable and cost
effective container security devices that detect tampering and alert
government and the trade when tampering does occur so we can initiate
appropriate response mechanisms to determine whether a potential threat
may have been introduced.
NON-INTRUSIVE INSPECTION AND RADIATION DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES
Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology (NII) is another cornerstone in
our layered strategy. Technologies deployed to our nation's sea, air,
and land border Ports of Entry that focus on radiation technology
include large-scale X-ray and gamma-imaging systems, as well as a
variety of portable and hand-held technologies.
NII technologies are viewed as force multipliers that enable us to
screen or examine a larger portion of the stream of commercial traffic
while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade, cargo, and passengers.
As of February 2005, 164 large-scale NII systems have been deployed
to Ports of Entry. These include Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems
(VACIS), Mobile VACIS, Rail VACIS, Truck X-ray, Mobile Truck X-ray,
Mobile Sea Container Systems, and Pallet Gamma-ray Systems.
As noted above, CBP is also deploying nuclear and radiological
detection equipment, including Personal Radiation Detectors (PRD's),
Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM's) and Radiation-Isotope Identifiers
(RIID's).
CBP has deployed 441 RPMs nationwide. 54 are deployed
to International Mail and Express Consignment Courier
Facilities, 215 are deployed to Northern border land crossings,
54 are deployed to seaports, and 118 are deployed to the
Southwest border.
Additionally, CBP has deployed 10,534 PRDs and 418
RIIDs nation-wide. Used in combination with our layered
enforcement strategy, these tools provide CBP with a
significant capacity to detect nuclear or radiological
materials. Equally as important, NII technology has been
instrumental in increasing the number of containers that are
inspected by CBP.
CBP is actively engaged in the establishment of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, a jointly-staffed, national office established to
develop a global nuclear detection system and acquire and support the
deployment of the domestic portion of that system to detect and report
attempts to import or transport a nuclear device or fissile or
radiological material intended for illicit use. This office will
integrate the research, development testing and evaluation of next-
generation detection capabilities with the acquisition and deployment
of these technologies to the field to ensure the most advanced
capabilities are being used to protect our borders.
CUSTOMS-TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM (C-TPAT)
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) also came
into being as a result of events of September 11th. CBP began to work
with the trade to protect the global trading network or supply chain
voluntarily and cooperatively. It was built upon the successful
experience of U.S. Customs in promoting industry partnerships to
improve security and deter narcotics smuggling.
The program began in November 2001, working with industry to
develop reasonable guidelines that reflected the consensus (at that
time) of what good security practices entailed. C-TPAT has provided a
forum for the business community and CBP to exchange anti-terrorism
ideas, concepts, and information to further secure the entire supply
chain. This has been a learning experience for both industry and
government.
Participation in C-TPAT has grown exponentially. In the first year
C-TPAT enrolled 1000 members. As of March 10, 2005, C-TPAT membership
stands at over 8,800 members, with 4,775 of those being certified
partners (approved security profile and vetted by CBP) and 455 having
been validated (physical verification by CBP Officers of security
measures and practices in place) by CBP. Another 493 validations are
underway. Current C-TPAT enrollment sectors include importers,
carriers, brokers/freight forwarders/consolidators, marine port
authorities and terminal operators, and Mexican foreign manufacturers
CBP seeks to ensure that its partners are honoring their
commitments through a validation process. CBP cannot afford to offer
the expedited commercial processing benefits that are part of C-TPAT
for partners who are not holding up their end of the bargain. As a
result, we are now sending specially trained CBP teams of C-TPAT Supply
Chain Specialists all over the globe to visit the partners, their
vendors, and their plants to verify that these steps have been taken.
C-TPAT is now moving to the next level and will be transitioning
from its current set of recommended practices to minimum requirements
that participants must meet for membership. As part of this program,
CBP will further leverage the role of the importer to extend these
supply chain security requirements throughout their supply chains.
Specific enhancements to the security of the container, various
facility and access controls, and requirements that business partners
of importers adhere to similar requirements are also proposed. Through
the natural evolution of the program, C-TPAT will be significantly
strengthened, and, when combined with other security layers, will
greatly enhance the confidence we have in the security of the oversees
component of C-TPAT supply chains.
ATS
The Automated Targeting System (ATS) is a flexible, constantly
evolving system that integrates enforcement and commercial databases.
It is a targeting tool that helps CBP focus its inspection efforts on
high-risk cargo. ATS analyzes electronic data related to individual
shipments prior to arrival and ranks them in order of risk, based on
the application of algorithms and rules. The scores are divided into
thresholds associated with further action by CBP, such as document
review and inspection.
CBP works constantly to enhance and refine the ATS. The data that
feeds the ATS is substantial, and the scope and reliability of this
data is reinforced by the Trade Act Final Rule that mandates advance
electronic cargo data inbound and outbound for all modes of
transportation.
Although advance manifest data is a major component of what is
analyzed, ATS also sorts through intelligence and data contained in
Government law enforcement and trade databases. ATS is also able to
access and analyze entry data when it is available. Entry data is some
of the most detailed and accurate information available for targeting.
CBP will continue to look for ways to improve the quality of the data
that feeds the ATS; however, it should be noted that the ATS can detect
anomalies in both accurate and false data. Such anomalies are strong
indicators of deception.
Although constantly evolving, ATS is a proven targeting tool. Using
advance manifest data, CBP has made several seizures overseas under the
CSI initiative that included gas masks, tank periscopes and firearms.
CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE (CSI)
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) came into being as a direct
result of the events of 9-11. CSI is another layer in CBP's defense,
the purpose of which is to push our nation's borders outward. 34 CSI
ports are currently operational. These 34 operational ports are made up
of ports from the original 20 largest ports, shipping the greatest
volume of containers to the United States, and expansion ports added
after the initial 20 ports were identified. These original 20 ports are
points of passage for approximately two-thirds of the containers
shipped to the U.S.
CSI fosters greater security via:
Enhanced targeting through foreign government and
trade partnerships and better data;
Potential Department of Energy (DOE) involvement in
radiation detection at overseas ports, and;
Interdiction of threats before they reach the U.S.;
CSI also uses both automation and advanced inspection technology as
force multipliers. For example, CSI has requisitioned Personal
Radiation Devices (PRD's) to be deployed as CSI locations become
operational. Additionally, CSI has requisitioned Radio-Isotope
Identifier Devices (RIID's) for deployment to operational CSI ports
with host country approval.
NATIONAL TARGETING CENTER (NTC)
The National Targeting Center (NTC) has made significant progress
since it began round the clock operations on November 10, 2001 and
began the task of re-orienting narcotics based targeting methods and
technologies for anti-terrorist and national security concerns. By
January of 2003, NTC staff relocated to a state of the art facility in
Northern Virginia that accommodates representatives from all CBP legacy
disciplines, agriculture, customs, and immigration, as well as
personnel from the Office of Border Patrol, the Office of Intelligence,
and the Office of Information Technology.
Broadening the scope of CBP targeting, NTC has developed on-site
liaison officers from the U.S. Coast Guard, the Transportation Security
Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Federal Air
Marshals, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Food and Drug
Administration, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The NTC has
also provided targeting expertise to the Department of Homeland
Security Operations Center, the Terrorism Screening Center, and the
National Counter-Terrorism Center to support the timely and accurate
flow of information pertaining to national security and terrorist
activity.
CONCLUSION
CBP's targeting and inspection programs depend on each other to
operate at full potential, and we are constantly looking for ways to
make them stronger. CBP works aggressively with trade and government
partners to legislate improvements regarding data timeliness and
quality, which augments the abilities of highly trained personnel to
using cutting edge technology for targeting, detecting and securing
terrorists, or implements of terrorism destined to the U.S. Thank you
again, Chairman Coble, and the members of the Subcommittee for this
opportunity to testify. I would be happy to answer any questions you
may have.
Mr. Coble. Gentlemen, I gave you all some faulty
information. Our amber light is not working, and I'm told the
amber light is now working. Okay. Admiral, we'll put you on
notice. You won't be keelhauled if you violate, but that'll at
least let you know the ice is getting thin on which you're
skating.
Admiral Hereth. Yes, sir, I understand.
Mr. Coble. It's good to have you, Admiral.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL LARRY HERETH, DIRECTOR OF PORT
SECURITY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
Admiral Hereth. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Scott. I
look forward to discussing the Coast Guard's role to secure our
ports and cargo chain today.
The marine transportation system, as you know, is a key
asset that annually handles about 50,000 port calls from
vessels, over 8,000 foreign vessels. This system contributes
greatly to the U.S. gross domestic product, with nearly $750
billion worth of goods moving across our docks annually. A
variety of reports have underscored the value of the marine
transportation system to our economy and quality of life in the
United States. The consequences of an attack shutting down our
ports would be significant, so clearly, this is a system we
must protect.
This, however, is a big challenge. Our underlying
assumption has been that since trade is global and terrorism is
global, we need a global solution to the problem. Our intention
is to identify and intercept threats beginning as far from our
shores as possible with additional protective measures added as
vessels get closer to our homeland. Therefore, it's imperative
that our efforts involve both domestic and international
security regimes.
We have made excellent progress, both domestically and
internationally, so far, but realize that there is much more to
do. Internationally, we built a coalition of 148 countries
under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization
that have all adopted and implemented a security regime similar
to MTSA in record time. This multilateral approach gives us
more consistency among our trading partners and ensures that
security must become a standard practice or a vessel operator
will be faced with serious and costly delays.
To complement these new security standards, we worked in
parallel with the International Standards Organization to
develop an implementation guide to eight companies as they put
into practice this major change. I am pleased to report an
excellent initial success. Presently, only one out of 100
vessels that we board and inspect require us to take major port
State control actions.
Cargo security is one of the principal components of
maritime security. Customs and Border Protection has had a lead
role in cargo security and the Coast Guard works to align our
respective agency roles and responsibilities regarding
international trade.
When cargo is moved on the waterborne leg of the trade
route, the has oversight of the cargo's carriage requirements
and the care needed for that cargo while it's on the vessel or
within the port facility. CBP has authority over the cargo
contents and container improvements. Using the information
provided through the Coast Guard's 96-hour notice of arrival
rule and CBP's 24-hour cargo loading rule, we can act to
control vessels, and thus their cargoes, that pose an
unacceptable risk to our ports. With Coast Guard officers
posted at CBP's National Targeting Center, we have improved
agency coordination and our collective ability to take
appropriate action when notified of a cargo problem.
The Coast Guard has worked hard to coordinate all our
regulatory and policy developments with CBP. We meet regularly
to discuss policy. We participate in interagency regulation
development teams and sit on various other interagency
committees. We also coordinate the work of our various Federal
advisory committees so that we all understand the trade
community's concerns and priorities.
The Coast Guard has fully supported CBP's initiatives. We
also agree with CBP's view that international compliance and
the establishment of international standards are needed to help
gain global compliance and applaud their leadership to engage
the World Customs Organization and the International Standards
Organizations to leverage their efforts.
We thank you for the opportunity to testify and answer
questions today. I'd be happy to engage in a discussion at the
appropriate time, sir.
Mr. Coble. Admiral, you set a record. Rarely do people beat
the red bell. You walk off with the gold medal. [Laughter.]
[The prepared statement of Admiral Hereth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Larry Hereth
Mr. Coble. Mr. Scrobe.
Mr. Scrobe. Do I get his excess time, sir? [Laughter.]
Admiral Hereth. I just wanted to listen to your counsel.
TESTIMONY OF PETER J. SCROBE, VICE PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL MARINE AGENCY, ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CARGO SECURITY COUNCIL
Mr. Scrobe. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Scott. I'm
Vice President of AIMA, American International Marine Agency,
which is a managing general agent for member companies of
American International Group. On behalf of the International
Cargo Security Council, ICSC, and myself, I'd like to thank you
for giving us the opportunity to speak here today. Although we
have several minutes, we could spend hours discussing this
subject matter. I'd also like to thank John Hyde of Maersk Line
and Randall Mullet of CNC for their input.
For many years, we have worked with Congress, particularly
on what was the original Crime Bill of 2000, which ultimately
became the MTSA of 2002. It was long, hard work with Government
and law enforcement to prevent cargo crime and protect the
supply chain to this country by criminals and terrorists that
would seek us harm.
Annual cargo crime losses are estimated domestically at $10
to $20 billion per year, $30 to $50 billion internationally,
and therein lies the problem since there is no accurate
recording of loss data. Although many believe the numbers to be
much higher, this lack of a true data system contributes to our
inability to properly analyze the magnitude of the problem,
which impacts local businesses, jobs, and the economy at large,
as well as to correctly allocate resources and identify
anomalies that may indicate terrorist activity. We truly
believe that cargo crime is the equivalent of economic
terrorism.
Over the past several years, and since September 11,
Customs and Border Protection have instituted the C-TPAT and
CSI, and additionally, the port authorities have undertaken the
public-private partnership with OSC, Operation Safe Commerce.
Under the MTSA, the ISPS Code, which is a global initiative
directly supervised by the Coast Guard, has, according to many
carriers and port personnel, tightened port security due to
reporting requirements, particularly here in the States.
C-TPAT was a tremendous start and raised awareness with
importers and exporters by helping them and their providers to
better understand the actual workings of the global supply
chain and the effort involved with the entire process. Although
voluntary in nature, the desired result was to allow for fast
and secure movement of cargo. It has, in my opinion, enhanced
the quality and security of the supply chain, but according to
many has not yet shown the speed and fast tracking which would
allow cargo to move into the country, and it's not due to C-
TPAT itself but to congestion at many of the ports, such as
Long Beach. This congestion, according to many experts, will
worsen with expectation to double in the next 10 to 20 years.
This also has to do with the fact that larger ships of 8,000 to
12,000 tons will be built and coming into the States soon.
It is important to note that, with regard to cargo crime,
ports have been less of a problem for theft of containers and
trailers that we have seen. The majority of thefts and
hijackings occur during the inland transit phase and usually
prior to reaching final destination within the country. Mr.
Chairman, I believe that various law enforcement agencies, in
particular the multi-jurisdictional Cargo Task Forces, would
also echo these same comments.
During consideration of the original Crime Bill of 2000,
language to address intermodal aspects, enhance sentencing
guidelines, creation of multi-jurisdictional Cargo Task Forces,
and creation of a separate category for cargo crime in the
Uniform Crime Reporting System, UCR, database was,
unfortunately, not ever considered. To that end, Congressman
Stearns has introduced bill H.R. 785, which the ICSC and the
AIMU, American Institute of Marine Underwriters, strongly
supports. This bill has also been considered as part of a
National Strategy as adopted in February 2005 by the Cargo
Summit in Tallahassee, Florida. The summit consisted of private
sector, law enforcement, and government representation from
around the country. We ask that the Committee carefully review
and act on this responsible and worthwhile legislation this
year.
Over the past 5 years, there have been many studies,
including ``Best Practices'' by the Volpe Center, and
``Contraband, Organized Crime, and the Threat to Transportation
and Supply Chain Function,'' an FIA study sponsored by ICSC and
Brown Williamson. Each were produced prior to September 11, but
they are still viable in order to protect the supply chain. I
urge you, Mr. Chairman and all Members of the Committee, to
review these important documents.
As I mentioned earlier, discussion on this topic could go
on and on. This past December, at the Department of Homeland
Security Cargo Summit, Secretary Loy indicated he has heard the
various industries' concerns. Many of these concerns voiced
were the potential for over-reaction, over-legislation by
Government that might actually threaten the supply chain more
than a terrorist attack. Further, although there have been
discussions on a private sector-Government partnership, it has
not become a reality of true sharing but appears to be more of
a one-way street.
Problems will also be inherent in a Government that is
looking for one critical magic bullet in solutions in devices
and technology. We don't believe there is a magic bullet, but
do believe that a working and proven process with the
enhancement of these devices will work.
Thank you for your time. I'll answer questions later.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Scrobe.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Scrobe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter J. Scrobe
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,
Good afternoon, I'm Peter J. Scrobe, Vice President of American
International Marine Agency, a Managing General Agent for Member
companies of the American International Group, Inc.
On behalf of the International Cargo Security Council (ICSC) and
myself, I would like to thank you for giving us the opportunity to
speak today. I would say that although we only have several minutes to
present, we could discuss this extremely important subject matter for
hours. I would also like to thank Mr. John J. Hyde, Maersk Line and C.
Randall Mullet, CNF, for their input.
For over 10 years, we have worked with Congress on what was
originally the Crime bill of 2000, and ultimately became the Maritime
Transportation Act (MTSA) of 2002. The private sector has worked long
and hard with government and law enforcement to prevent cargo crime and
protect the supply chain to this country by these criminals and
terrorists that would seek to harm us.
Annual cargo crime losses are estimated at $10-20 billion
domestically and $30-50 billion internationally. Therein lies the
problem, since there is no accurate recording of cargo loss data.
Although many believe the numbers to be much higher, this lack of a
true data system contributes to our inability to properly analyze the
magnitude of the problem, which impacts local businesses, jobs, and the
economy at large, as well as to correctly allocate resources, and
identify anomalies that may indicate terrorist activity.
CARGO CRIME IS THE EQUIVALENT OF ECONOMIC TERRORISM!
Over the past several years and since Sept. 11th, 2001, Customs &
Border Protection have instituted: C-TPAT (Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism), and the CSI (Container Security Initiative).
Additionally, the Ports Authority have undertaken the public/private
partnership with OSC (Operation Safe Commerce). Under the MTSA, the
ISPS Code which is a global initiative directly supervised by the USCG
has, according to carriers and port personnel, tightened port security,
due to reporting requirements, particularly here in the US.
C-TPAT was a tremendous start, and has raised awareness with
Importers/Exporters, by helping them and their providers to better
understand the actual workings of the global Supply Chain, and the
effort involved with the entire process. Although voluntary in nature,
the desired result was to allow for fast and secure movement of cargo.
It has, in my opinion, enhanced the quality and security of the Supply
Chain but according to many has not yet shown the speed in which cargo
would move into the country, primarily, due to the heavy congestion at
the ports. This congestion, according to experts, will probably worsen
with an expectation to double in the next 10-20 years.
It is important to note that, with regard to cargo crime, the ports
have been less of a problem for theft of containers and trailers. The
majority of thefts and hijackings occur during the inland transit phase
and usually prior to reaching final destination. Mr. Chairman, I
believe that various law enforcement agencies, in particular, the
Multi-Jurisdictional Cargo Task Forces would also echo these same
comments.
During consideration of the original Crime Bill of 2000, language
to address inter-modal aspects, enhanced sentencing guidelines,
creation of Multi-Jurisdictional Cargo Task Forces and creation of a
separate category for Cargo Crime in the Uniform Crime Reporting System
(UCR) data base, was unfortunately not ever considered. To that end,
Congressman Stearns (R-FL) has introduced Bill HR 785, which the ICSC,
and the AIMU (American International Marine Underwriters) strongly
supports. This bill has also been considered as part of the ``National
Strategy'' as adopted in February, 2005 by the ``Cargo Summit'', in
Tallahassee, FL. The Summit consisted of the private sector, law
enforcement and government representation from around the country. We
ask that the Committee carefully review and act on this responsible and
worthwhile legislation, this year.
Over the past five years, there have been many studies, including,
``Best Practices'' (Volpe Center) and ``Contraband, Organized Crime and
the Threat to the Transportation and Supply Chain Function'' (FIA
Study-ICSC and Brown Williamson). Each were produced prior to Sept. 11,
and they are still current in their content and viability to protect
the Supply Chain. I urge you Mr. Chairman, and all members of the
Committee to review these important documents.
As I mentioned earlier, discussion on this topic could go on and
on. This past December at the Department of Homeland Security Cargo
Summit, Secretary Loy indicated--``he has heard the various industries'
concerns''. The concerns voiced significantly were the potential for
over reaction and legislation by government that might actually
threaten the Supply Chain more so than a terrorist attack. Further,
although there have been discussions on a private sector government
partnership, it has still not become a reality of true sharing, but
more of a one way street.
Also, problems will be inherent in a government that is looking for
one ``magic bullet'' solution in devices.
The ICSC doesn't believe that there is such a ``magic bullet''
device. In the end, we believe that any number of devices, working in
an established and proven process will enhance the securing of the
Supply Chain and further protect it from terrorists and criminals
alike.
And the ever present question--who will be footing the bill?
I would leave the Committee with one final thought. We are here to
assist and work with the public sector and we are asking for you to
assist us in making the Supply Chain as secure as possible. It is only
through true partnership that success can be met.
Once again, thank you for allowing me to attend and speak on
this extremely important subject matter.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Keever.
TESTIMONY OF JEFF KEEVER, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, VIRGINIA
PORT AUTHORITY
Mr. Keever. Good afternoon, and thank you, Mr. Chairman and
Congressman Scott. It's a privilege to appear before you today
to discuss the Virginia Port Authority's experience with port
security.
The Port of Virginia is the seventh-largest container
facility in the United States and the second-largest facility
on the East Coast in terms of general tonnage. The Port of
Virginia is designated as a strategic port by the U.S. Maritime
Administration, and as such, must be ready to support wartime
mobilization and onload of military equipment for deployment
overseas. In addition to the three Virginia Port Authority
marine terminals, the Port of Virginia contains over 80 private
port facilities covered by the Maritime Transportation Security
Act, including coal and petrochemical terminals, commercial
shipyards, and a wide range of other facilities.
To date, VPA has received $11.4 million in port security
grants. VPA has contributed an additional $11 million of its
own funds to complete the required security enhancements. The
$11.4 million in port security grants received by VPA to date
fall far short of what is needed. VPA has identified three
high-priority projects that are necessary to mitigate serious
shortfalls in our security posture. These three projects
require at least an additional $12.5 million.
The Port of Virginia has been successfully employing
radiation monitoring equipment since December 2002 and has led
the nation in radiation monitoring at seaports. The radiation
detection equipment ensures that 100 percent of all import
containers leaving the terminal by truck are monitored and any
detection of radiation is resolved before the container leaves
the VPA terminal. There is no Federal policy or regulation
requiring any marine terminal or operator to conduct radiation
monitoring. VPA's current program was self-initiated well
before there was a national program and no other port in the
nation has done likewise. CBP is responsible for monitoring
inbound cargo for radiation and has a multi-year program to
deploy radiation monitoring equipment at all land, sea, and air
ports of entry.
The Port of Virginia has enjoyed a longstanding, productive
relationship with the Federal agencies on the front line of
port security, the Coast Guard and CBP. Both are still
stretched thin and coping with significant equipment
challenges. For example, the Coast Guard does not have the
proper equipment to board and inspect vessels in all weather
conditions. CBP also faces personnel and equipment challenges.
CBP is forced to rotate its limited number of vacuous cargo
inspection systems among multiple ports and facilities. A
suspect container that must wait for days to be inspected is a
latent threat to homeland security.
The solution is to ensure that CBP has the the resources it
needs. Congress must ensure that adequate resources are
dedicated to guaranteeing the security of the nation's
seaports. MTSA-mandated security measures are far beyond what
the port industry would need to implement for the security of
their own facilities. In short, the port industry has been
mandated by Federal law to protect the nation against terrorist
attacks.
Although Federal law placed significant responsibility for
homeland security on the shoulders of the port industry, the
Federal Government has not provided the funding stream
commensurate with the financial burden the port industry must
bear to implement MTSA, which is unique in all of U.S. homeland
security. The aviation and ground transportation industries
have not been required to meet similar mandates. The safety of
commercial aviation has been federalized, the burden taken off
the aviation industry, and over $11 billion spent for airline
passenger screening and security.
Similarly, CBP bears full responsibility at land ports of
entry. For example, the Ambassador Bridge connecting Detroit,
Michigan, with Windsor, Ontario, is a major land port of entry
and a critical link in the supply chain for the cluster of
automobile factories around Detroit, yet neither the auto
industry nor the trucking industry has been addled with the
cost of providing security for this port of entry. Only the
maritime port industry has been compelled, under threat of
fines and Coast Guard sanctions, to bear the high cost of
protecting the nation against terrorists.
The port industry is doing the best it can with the
resources it has. The American Association of Port Authorities
has recommended that funding for the Port Security Grant
Program be increased to $400 million per year, which we
support. Security funding could be earmarked from the over $25
billion collected in Customs revenue from duties and
importation fees each year.
The Virginia Port Authority's experience with port security
and radiation monitoring offers important lessons for enhancing
U.S. homeland security. Much progress has been made, but much
more remains to be done. America's ports take their
responsibilities seriously and are dedicated to doing the best
they can to protect the nation. They have earned your respect.
Thank you, and I'll be happy to answer any questions you
may have.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Keever.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Keever follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeff Keever
Good Afternoon Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
Committee. It is an honor and a privilege to appear before you today to
discuss the Virginia Port Authority's experience with port security and
radiation monitoring.
As you have heard from Commissioner Bonner, combating the smuggling
of illegal and potentially dangerous cargo into the United States is a
daunting task due to the sheer magnitude of cargo entering the country
every year; however, it is critical to the success of America's
homeland security strategy. But just as important is the protection of
America's ports against terrorist attacks. About 8,100 foreign flag
ships and 9,200 U.S. flag vessels make almost 60,000 arrivals in the
361 U.S. commercial ports annually. These ports contain approximately
3,200 maritime facilities that could be targeted. Despite the
magnitude, they must remain national priorities if our country is to be
protected from devastating loss in terrorist attacks.
OVERVIEW OF THE PORT OF VIRGINIA
The Virginia Port Authority (VPA) is an agency of the Commonwealth
of Virginia, reporting to the Secretary of Transportation. VPA's state-
owned port facilities are known collectively as The Port of Virginia
and include three marine terminals in Hampton Roads: Norfolk
International Terminals (NIT), Portsmouth Marine Terminal (PMT), and
Newport News Marine Terminal (NNMT). VPA also owns the Virginia Inland
Port (VIP), an intermodal rail facility located near Front Royal,
Virginia. These terminals are operated by Virginia International
Terminals (VIT), the non-profit, non-stock corporate operating
affiliate of VPA. Additionally, VPA hosts a number of private
corporations on its terminals.
The Port of Virginia is the seventh largest container facility in
the United States and the second largest facility on the East Coast in
terms of general tonnage. In 2004, VPA handled 1.81 million TEUs of
containerized cargo, an increase of 9.9% from 2003. Containerized cargo
handling at The Port is projected, conservatively, to grow by 9% in
2005. Additionally, VPA handled 14 million tons of general (non-
containerized) cargo in 2004, a 6.25% increase over 2003. Also in 2004,
The Port of Virginia received calls from more than 2,000 ships
delivering or picking up containers and other general cargo.
The Port of Virginia functions as a major economic engine. In
Hampton Roads, only the military rivals The Port in employment and
contribution to the regional economy. But The Port does not only
benefit the Hampton Roads region--over eighty businesses have located
distribution centers throughout the state to take advantage of
proximity to The Port, benefiting many local economies. According to a
1999 economic impact study by Martin Associates, overall activity at
The Port translates into 165,000 port and port-related jobs, $762.5
million in business revenues, and $60.7 million in state and local
taxes throughout the Commonwealth. In 2003, the Bureau of Economic
Statistics reported that The Port of Virginia plays a part in over
180,000 jobs, with salary and wages in excess of $5 billion.
The Port of Virginia is designated as a Strategic Port by the U.S.
Maritime Administration (MARAD) and as such, must be ready to support
wartime mobilization and on-load of military equipment for deployment
overseas. Because Hampton Roads is a major logistics node for the U.S.
Armed Forces, the Defense Logistics Agency and U.S. Transportation
Command move a substantial amount of containerized cargo and military
vehicles through the VPA Terminals to and from Europe and the Middle
East every week.
In addition to the three VPA marine terminals, The Port of Hampton
Roads contains over eighty private port facilities covered by the
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), including coal terminals,
petrochemical terminals, commercial shipyards and a wide range of other
facilities. The City of Norfolk has become a burgeoning cruise ship
destination and has recently launched construction of a $40 million
terminal that will greatly increase the number of cruise ships and
passengers visiting Hampton Roads. The cruise ship business is growing
rapidly. About 50,000 passengers visited Norfolk in 2003, around
100,000 visited in 2004, and another 114,000 are expected in 2005. The
number of passengers could increase to 200,000 or more after the new
terminal is complete.
Hampton Roads is not only a major commercial port, but also home to
the largest concentration of U.S. Naval forces in the world. Two of
VPA's marine terminals are located near major U.S. Navy facilities--NIT
shares a fence line with Naval Station Norfolk, home to 5 aircraft
carriers, 11 submarines and about 50 other naval vessels. PMT is
adjacent to Norfolk Naval Shipyard and Norfolk Naval Hospital. The
headquarters of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, U.S. Joint Forces Command and
NATO Allied Command Transformation are located across the street from
NIT. NNMT is located near Northrop Grumman Newport News Shipbuilding,
the only shipyard in the nation capable of building nuclear powered
aircraft carriers. Northrop Grumman also overhauls aircraft carriers
and other naval vessels. The Hampton Roads region is also home to eight
other Navy bases, three Army bases, and a major Air Force base.
Hampton Roads is also a major urban area. Its 16 cities and
counties have a total population exceeding 1.574 million, making it the
6th largest urban area in the nation.
THE VIRGINIA PORT AUTHORITY'S EXPERIENCE WITH PORT SECURITY
VPA's guiding principle for security is that a state port authority
has a higher level of responsibility than a private port facility
operator. That is VPA has a moral obligation to maintain high standards
of security in order to protect the citizens of the Commonwealth of
Virginia--and the American people in general--from the threat of
terrorism. VPA must also be mindful of the importance of its
contribution to the economy of the Commonwealth. We have a duty to
foster commerce, trade and economic development in the Commonwealth of
Virginia by promoting maritime commerce and freight shipment. This
means that VPA must be competitive with other ports and strive to
achieve the highest possible levels of productivity and efficiency.
Thus, like every port authority, VPA is confronted with the challenge
of reconciling its security responsibilities with its economic
responsibilities.
Port Security After September 11, 2001. VPA had an aggressive
security program well before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
The Port Authority Police, sworn law enforcement officers of the
Commonwealth of Virginia, have been highly effective at preventing
crime on VPA's three marine terminals. Indeed, VPA has not had an
incident of cargo theft in well over eight years. This is mostly due to
the fact that the Port Authority Police verify that U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) have properly cleared all cargo departing the
terminals by truck and released for delivery. Police verification
provides typical cargo processing operations with an additional and
independent layer of anti-theft protection.
As Hampton Roads is home to the largest concentration of U.S. Naval
forces in the world, VPA understood that its security efforts were
integral to Navy and Coast Guard efforts to keep The Port secure. The
Port of Virginia is a designated Strategic Port and therefore, is
required to meet Federal security requirements related to mobilization
and deployment of the U.S. Armed Forces and has had years of experience
working with various Federal agencies on port security matters.
Following the al-Qaeda attack on the USS Cole in October 2000, VPA
worked closely with the U.S. Navy to ensure that our security measures
and operations complemented and supported enhanced Navy force
protection efforts. The result was a close working relationship with
the Coast Guard Captain of The Port and the Navy's regional program
managers for port operations and security.
VPA redoubled its security efforts from September 11, 2001 onward.
VPA coordinated with the local U.S. Coast Guard Captain of The Port to
increase security procedures at its terminals immediately after the
terrorist attacks. In addition, a comprehensive security assessment was
immediately undertaken and completed by the end of the year. This
security assessment was published in February 2002--nine months before
the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) enacted legislation
requiring such assessments. This assessment identified priority
security enhancements for which VPA began requesting Port Security
Grants when that program was established in 2002. This initial security
assessment was refined in a second Facility Security Assessment
conducted in 2003 based on MTSA requirements and the Coast Guard
Maritime Facility Security Regulations (33 CFR, Chapter 1, Subchapter
H, Part 105).
For port authorities, fulfilling their responsibilities for
homeland security is much more complicated than merely being in
compliance with MTSA and the International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code (ISPS). A number of other Federal and state policies,
programs and guidelines related to homeland security and emergency
preparedness impact them as well.
VPA Participation in the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism. VPA is a certified participant in the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). VPA signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with CBP on March 11, 2003 to participate in C-TPAT as a
Port/Terminal Operator. The required Security Profile was submitted to
CBP on April 8, 2003, and in April 2004, a CBP Validation Team met with
the VPA Director of Police and surveyed NIT. Based on the findings of
the Validation Team and documentation provided by VPA outlining
security enhancements then in progress, CBP validated VPA compliance
with C-TPAT security standards on July 1, 2004.
Personnel Identification Programs. VPA anticipates that its
security program will be impacted by and have to adapt to three
emerging personnel identification programs: the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Transportation Workers Identification Credential
(TWIC), the CBP US-VISIT Program, and the International Labor
Organization (ILO) revised Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention.
The TWIC program entails the development of a secure, uniform
credential for transportation workers, including longshoreman, truck
drivers and all marine terminal personnel, potentially including all
persons with access to cargo shipping data. TSA has not published a
timeline for TWIC implementation, but the program will likely commence
in 2005. The technology required by TWIC may include significant access
control upgrades as well as the installation of 2-stage gates. These
enhancements will require a major capital outlay commitment on the part
of VPA, and may also negatively impact operating efficiency while
upgrades are being made.
The US-VISIT program uses biometrics--digital fingerprint scans and
digital photographs--to check visitors entering the U.S. against a
database of known criminals and suspected terrorists. In 2004, CBP
began implementing US-VISIT entry procedures at 115 airports, 14
seaports and the 50 busiest land ports in the nation. CBP has indicated
that US-VISIT will be expanded to all air, land and maritime ports of
entry as well. Although CBP is responsible for implementing US-VISIT,
CBP will require support from Port Authority Police and modifications
to VIT terminal operating procedures to ensure that crew and passengers
aboard ships arriving at VPA terminals cannot circumvent CBP
procedures.
The ILO Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention significantly
upgrades the identification documents that seafarers are required to
carry and includes the use of biometric technology similar to that used
by TWIC and the US-VISIT program. Although CBP has not explained how
the new Seafarers' Identity Documents will relate to the US-VISIT
program, VPA anticipates that its procedures for controlling the
movements of ships' crewmembers on its terminals will be impacted by
the manner in which CBP elects to use the Seafarers' Identity
Documents.
Emergency Preparedness Guidelines. VPA, and all port authorities,
must also support state homeland security and emergency preparedness
policies and guidelines, which are in turn driven by Federal policies
and guidelines. VPA's emergency response plans and procedures must be
compliant with the recently-published National Incident Management
System (NIMS) and National Response Plan (NRP), and our training
program must be consistent with the Homeland Security Exercise and
Evaluation Program (HSEEP) published by the Office for Domestic
Preparedness (ODP). Implementation of NIMS, NRP and HSEEP requires
additional VPA funds. It is important to note that, for port
authorities, implementation of these state security programs is
separate from compliance with Federal programs such as MTSA and the
Coast Guard security emergency response training and readiness
requirements.
VPA must also comply with rapidly changing Federal and state
programs related to public safety and emergency preparedness
communications interoperability. Federal initiatives, guided by Project
SAFECOM, are being implemented in the Commonwealth of Virginia by the
Office of Commonwealth Interoperability and the State Agency Radio
System (STARS) project. The existing Port Authority Police
communications and information systems predate these emerging Federal
and state interoperability requirements and will require significant
upgrades to ensure that VPA can coordinate effectively with Federal,
state, and local agencies in Hampton Roads during a significant port or
regional emergency.
Federal Port Security Grants. The initial security assessment
conducted in 2001 identified approximately $40 million in security
enhancements for the VPA terminals. These recommendations were modified
in the 2003 Facility Security Assessment to ensure that VPA security
investments and requests for Port Security Grants would be focused on
compliance with MTSA and the Coast Guard Maritime Facility Security
Regulations.
To date, VPA has received $11.4 million in Port Security Grants, as
follows:
These funds have supported upgrades to fences and gates,
installation of a closed circuit television perimeter surveillance
system, enhanced access control for gates and critical buildings,
command center enhancements, and other upgrades. In addition to funds
received as Port Security Grants, VPA has contributed an additional $11
million of its own funds to complete the required security
enhancements.
The $11.4 million in Port Security Grants received by VPA to date
falls far short of what is needed. VPA has identified three high
priority projects that are necessary to mitigate serious shortfalls in
VPA's security posture. These three projects require at least an
additional $12.5 million:
Upgrades to Port Authority Police Communications
System. Upgrades are required to comply with Federal SAFECOM
interoperability standards. These standards are being
implemented in Virginia by the Office of Commonwealth
Interoperability and the STARS program, and are required for
completion of The Port's Integrated Security System. The
enhanced communications suite, which uses digital trunking
technology and dedicated frequencies, will ensure that the Port
Authority Police can effectively coordinate with Federal, state
and local law enforcement and emergency response agencies in
the event of an emergency. Total system cost is estimated at
$1.5 million.
Command and Control Architecture. A system must be
developed which will integrate internal and external voice/
data/video communications, police dispatch and radio systems
with the command center alert and display system. This
integrated system is required for compliance with MTSA and
Coast Guard Maritime Facility Security Regulations, emergency
response, real-time information exchange for maritime domain
awareness, mandatory implementation of the National Incident
management System (NIMS) and National Response Plan (NRP),
credentialing and implementation of the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) and US-VISIT Program,
compliance with the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
(C-TPAT), and implementation of Federal and Commonwealth of
Virginia continuity of operations requirements. Total cost is
estimated at $10 million.
Cyber Security. VPA and VIT information technology
(IT) systems are vulnerable to a range of cyber threats that
could defeat terminal and cargo security efforts. The threat is
much more than just viruses and worms. Terrorists or other
criminals could use cyber attacks to forge shipping documents
to facilitate smuggling, circumvent CBP by releasing containers
designated for inspection, divert delivery of containers from
legitimate businesses to terrorist or criminal front companies,
identify container contents for theft or pilferage, forge
visitor passes or other identity documents to gain access to
terminals, or disrupt security systems and port facility
operations. VPA must implement a cyber security system that
will thwart such cyber threats while avoiding unnecessary
interference with business processes. Additionally, the system
must allow VPA to identify attempted cyber attacks for
reporting to CBP (to help detect smuggling) and other Federal
agencies. Total cost is estimated at $1 million for 2006, and
considerable additional funding required to maintain the
system's effectiveness in the future.
THE VIRGINIA PORT AUTHORITY RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING PROGRAM
Immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, VPA
identified radiological and nuclear devices as a significant potential
threat to its terminals, adjacent naval bases, The Port and the Hampton
Roads region. VPA initiated planning for a radiological monitoring
system and began meeting with radiation detection equipment vendors in
November 2001 to identify appropriate systems for testing at the VPA
terminals. The Department of Energy provided technical advice on
radiological monitoring for VPA.
VPA also consulted with the U.S. Navy at Naval Station Norfolk,
which had extensive experience with radiological monitoring and
response procedures, and which was the first defense installation
assessed in the Sandia National Laboratory's study of ``unconventional
nuclear threats'' to U.S. military bases. Sandia's assessment of
terrorist options for carrying out a radiological or nuclear attack in
Hampton Roads provided valuable insight for VPA's planning.
Initial Goals, Research and Testing. VPA's initial goal was to
protect The Port against radiological or nuclear attack. Placing
radiation sensors at the entrance to the harbor was considered but
quickly rejected because the technology available at the time would not
provide reliable detection and the Port Authority Police lacked
jurisdiction in the areas of the harbor where the sensors would be
placed. The second alternative considered was a radiation monitoring
system that would detect radiological or nuclear devices before they
were offloaded from ships. This system included an initial test of
radiation sensors placed on the spreader bars used to lift containers
off vessels.
Testing of radiation sensors on spreader bars commenced in January
2002 and continued through June 2002. Those tests revealed that
attempting to detect radiation in containers using sensors on the
spreader bars of cranes was not feasible for three reasons:
1. Background radiation varied widely over land, water and
vessels, making it difficult to set the system's sensitivity
alarm threshold at a level that ensured reliable detection
while avoiding excessive false alarms. Additionally, when
radiation was detected, it was not possible to readily
determine if the radiation source was in the container to be
lifted or in an adjacent container.
2. None of the sensors tested proved capable of standing up to
the shock and vibration of container handling operations.
Excessive sensor failure rate made the cost of placing sensors
on spreader bars prohibitive.
3. The development protocols for responding to the detection
of radiation involved numerous operational issues that could
not be easily resolved at the port level. Thus, even if the
radiation monitoring equipment functioned properly, it was
extremely difficult for VPA to develop effective procedures for
dealing with detection of radiation in a container that was
still on a vessel, especially since the Port Authority Police
lacked jurisdiction over the vessel.
By October 2002, the Port of Virginia received a $1 million Port
Security Grant and had already invested approximately $660,000 of its
own funds to test and install radiation detection equipment. Because it
was VPA's goal to deploy an operational system rather than conduct a
long-term research and testing program, the failure of the tests of
radiation sensors on spreader bars led VPA to initiate an alternative
approach that could be implemented near-term.
Testing and Implementation of a Workable Solution. VPA determined
that a viable alternative was to provide protection to the rest of the
nation by monitoring containers for radiation before they departed the
VPA terminals for shipment to their destinations around the country. A
disadvantage of this approach was a lack of protection at the terminal
itself. A container housing a radiological or nuclear device would
arrive at a VPA terminal and not be detected until it passed through
radiation monitoring equipment at terminal exits. However, it was
determined that it was unlikely that terrorists would attack a
container terminal with a radiological device. Given the enormous
effort required to acquire the radioactive material, ship it to the
United States undetected, and assemble a radiological dispersal device,
such an attack probably would be reserved for higher priority targets
guaranteed to cause a large number of casualties and psychological,
economic and symbolic damage. The greatest risk was believed to be from
inadvertent detonation of such a device at the terminal, or the
terrorist group electing to ``use it rather than lose it'' upon
learning that CBP had intercepted their attempt to smuggle it into the
country. Hence, emphasis was placed on developing effective response
protocols to these situations.
In November 2002, VPA began testing a radiation detection portal at
one of its exit gates. This test was successful and VPA decided to
deploy truck portals at all three of its marine terminals.
Concurrent with testing radiation detection equipment, in February
2002 VPA began working with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the
Department of Energy's Radiological Assistance Program, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Maritime Administration to develop
effective response protocols. These discussions developed answers to
questions such as who VPA should notify when radiation was detected,
what agencies would respond, and who was responsible for placing a
radiological or nuclear device in a safe condition and removing it for
proper disposal. These discussions were later expanded to include
state, regional and local agencies that would be involved in a
radiological emergency. This was pioneering work--at the time, there
was no Federal program in existence such as that being implemented by
VPA, and thus there were no existing response protocols that VPA could
turn to for guidance.
VPA's effort to develop response protocols culminated in CBP and
VPA signing a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for response to
detection of radiation--the first of its kind in any U.S. seaport. The
SOP was developed with support from CBP's Laboratory Support Services
(LSS) and the Department of Energy's Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory. Initially developed only for the truck portals, the SOP was
amended in November 2003 to include the rail portals as well.
Training and Practice Exercises. VPA recognized early on that
extensive training and frequent practice exercises would be essential
for effective implementation of the radiation monitoring program. Port
Authority Police were trained in the use of the radiation detection
equipment and procedures for responding to detection of radiation. This
training was required to meet CBP standards in order for the VPA
radiation monitoring program to be certified by CBP and placed in
operation. VPA held its first radiological emergency field exercise
(FTX, also referred to as an ``operations-based'' exercise) on November
19, 2003. It exercised Federal, state and local first responders in the
Hampton Roads region in basic procedures for responding to the
detonation of a radiological dispersal device in a shipping container
on a VPA terminal. It was an invaluable exercise for identifying
equipment, training, procedural and communications deficiencies that
needed to be addressed by the participating agencies. However, it did
not fully exercise the VPA-CBP radiological SOP.
In December 2003, VPA pointed out the need for a follow-on exercise
in a presentation on its radiological monitoring program to Federal
officials from TSA and CBP, and state officials including the
Governor's Assistant for Commonwealth Preparedness and his deputy. In
January 2004, TSA proposed a tabletop exercise to familiarize Federal,
state and local emergency management personnel and first responders
with the VPA-CBP radiological SOP and to exercise the national response
to detection of a radiological device in a seaport. Planning for this
critically important exercise commenced in February 2004 but had to be
suspended in June 2004 due to lack of funds.
On March 1, 2005, VPA received an ODP State Homeland Security Grant
from the Virginia Department of Emergency Management to conduct the
long-delayed tabletop exercise (discussion-based exercise) later this
year. It will be held in conjunction with the Radiation Pilot Program
Office (RPPO) multi-port radiological exercise so that national
radiological defense efforts benefit from the VPA exercise as well.
The original plan for the VPA radiological exercise had envisioned
a tabletop exercise in the Fall of 2004, followed by a major field
exercise (operations-based exercise) in the Spring or Fall of 2005. The
major field exercise will involve significant participation by Federal,
state and local emergency management personnel and first responders.
Because the tabletop exercise was postponed, the major field exercise
has not been scheduled, but remains a high priority for the Hampton
Roads region.
Documented Success. The Port of Virginia has been successfully
employing radiological monitoring equipment since December 2002 and has
led the nation in radiological monitoring at seaports. The radiation
detection equipment ensures that 100% of all import containers leaving
the terminal by truck are monitored and any detection of radiation is
resolved before the container leaves the VPA terminal. In 2004, the VPA
truck portals detected radiation in containers and trucks on over 1,000
occasions. All were resolved in cooperation with the CBP Port Director.
VPA is currently in the final stages of testing and gaining CBP
certification for a rail portal that will monitor containers departing
NIT by train. In cooperation with CBP, the Port Authority Police has
deployed radiation detection equipment to National Special Security
Events such as the 2004 Republican National Convention and the 2005
Presidential Inauguration.
There is no Federal policy or regulation requiring any marine
terminal operator to conduct radiation monitoring. VPA's current
program was self-initiated well before there was a national program and
no other port in the nation has done likewise. CBP is responsible for
monitoring inbound cargo for radiation, and has a multi-year program to
deploy radiation monitoring equipment at all land, sea and air ports of
entry. Currently, VPA remains the only seaport in the country
performing radiation monitoring on cargo entering the nation's
interior.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE VIRGINIA PORT AUTHORITY EXPERIENCE
The Port of Virginia has enjoyed a long-standing, productive
relationship with the Federal agencies on the front lines of port
security--the Coast Guard and CBP. Both agencies are represented by
outstanding, dedicated leaders in Hampton Roads--leaders who make a
concerted effort to understand port and shipping industry concerns and
constraints. This spirit of partnership and cooperation is vital for
the success of the nation's port and cargo security efforts. CBP's C-
TPAT program and the Coast Guard's Area Maritime Security Committees
are prime examples of partnerships that work.
Inter-Agency Cooperation. Both CBP and the Coast Guard have
recognized that measures to enhance port and cargo security must
facilitate commerce, not hinder it. Unreasonably impeding the flow of
cargo or increasing the cost of moving it through America's ports would
cause unacceptable losses for America's factories and retailers in an
era of just-in-time delivery. The thousands of containers entering the
United States every day have replaced the warehouses of yesteryear. In
fact, the stream of containers across the world's oceans could be
viewed as warehouses in motion. Security measures that impede their
flow or raise shipping costs would quickly destroy the spirit of
partnership and replace it with an adversarial relationship detrimental
to both sides. Rather than support CBP and the Coast Guard, the port
and shipping industries would be forced by economic pressure into a
minimal compliance posture that could potentially make it much easier
for terrorists to circumvent port and cargo security efforts.
CBP and the Coast Guard face additional challenges as well.
Although both have received significant increases in funding and
personnel since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, they are
still stretched thin and coping with significant equipment challenges.
For example, the Coast Guard does not have the proper equipment to
board and inspect vessels in all weather conditions, day or night. The
result is that vessels must wait for conditions to improve before the
Coast Guard can conduct its inspections. This delays vessel arrivals,
disrupts the flow of cargo, and causes backlogs of ships awaiting
berths at terminals. Like most ports, VPA relies on the Coast Guard for
waterside security and it is essential that the Coast Guard be properly
equipped to carry out that mission.
CBP also faces personnel and equipment challenges. One such
challenge that has negatively impacted VPA is that CBP is forced to
rotate its limited number of VACIS(r) cargo inspection systems among
multiple ports and facilities. Although VACIS(r) is vehicle-mounted, it
is not easily and quickly moved, causing cargo to back up on marine
terminals awaiting the VACIS(r) machine for inspection of flagged
containers. This delay not only threatens to degrade CBP cargo security
efforts, but also negatively impacts ports, which must cope with the
resulting congestion. A suspect container that must wait for days to be
inspected is a latent threat to homeland security, which could
potentially escape CBP's notice. The solution is to ensure that CBP has
the resources it needs to conduct inspections in a timely manner
without impeding the flow of cargo through America's ports. Congress
must consider earmarking part of CBP's budget to ensure that adequate
resources are dedicated to guaranteeing the security of the nation's
seaports.
Port Security Funding Issues. With regard to the security of
maritime facilities, the most obvious and important lesson that VPA can
offer is that effective port security does not come cheaply. MTSA
created a mandate for port authorities and port facility operators to
implement extraordinary security measures. The Coast Guard Maritime
Facility Security Regulations require stringent security measures for
port facilities, with emphasis on perimeter security and surveillance,
credentials and access control, and training and exercises.
Implementing these security measures and meeting these mandates
requires a significant financial commitment. In addition, failure to
meet MTSA and Coast Guard standards can result in considerable fines or
a ban on vessels calling on a non-compliant facility.
MTSA-mandated security measures are far beyond what the port
industry would need to implement for the security of their own
facilities based on a risk management approach. Clearly, the intent of
MTSA is to protect the nation from terrorist attacks--both attacks
facilitated by smuggling weapons of mass destruction through seaports
and attacks intended to cripple the American economy by forcing large-
scale closure of seaports. In short, the port industry has been
mandated by Federal law to protect the nation against terrorist
attacks.
Although Federal law placed significant responsibility for homeland
security on the shoulders of the port industry, the Federal government
has not provided the funding stream commensurate with the financial
burden the port industry must bear to implement MTSA. VPA, like the
rest of the port industry, has shouldered the financial burden to
comply with the Federal mandate; however, this results in negative
impacts for both the economy and the security of the United States.
The MTSA mandate and the financial burden it places on the port
industry is unique in all of U.S. homeland security. The aviation and
ground transportation industries have not been required to meet similar
mandates. The safety of commercial aviation has been Federalized--the
burden taken off the aviation industry--and over $11 billion spent for
airline passenger screening and security. Unlike America's seaports, an
international airport does not have to shoulder the financial burden of
Federally-mandated security standards. Similarly, CBP bears full
responsibility at land ports of entry for keeping terrorists and their
weapons out of the United States. Private transportation operators--
trucking and rail companies--have not been forced to bear this cost.
For example, the Ambassador Bridge connecting Detroit Michigan with
Windsor, Ontario is a major land port of entry and a critical link in
the supply chain for the cluster of automobile factories around
Detroit. Yet neither the auto industry nor the trucking industry has
been saddled with the cost of providing security for this port of
entry. Only the maritime port industry has been compelled, under threat
of fines and Coast Guard sanctions, to bear the high cost of protecting
the nation against terrorists.
This is not good for the port industry, the American economy or
homeland security. The port industry is doing the best it can with the
resources it has, but much more remains to be done and it simply cannot
be accomplished in a timely manner unless the Federal government is
willing to fund a greater portion of the port security financial
burden. The American Association of Port Authorities has recommended
that funding for the Port Security Grant Program be increased to $400
million per year. VPA wholeheartedly supports this position. Security
funding must be earmarked from the over $25 billion collected in
customs revenues from duties and importation fees each year. These fees
come largely from our nation's seaport operations. In Virginia alone,
it is estimated that over one-half billion dollars in customs revenues
were collected in 2004.
If the Federal government is not willing to pay for the level of
security that it has mandated for the nation's ports, then it should
rethink the security requirements imposed under that mandate. The
current approach sets blanket standards and requirements for all port
facilities, regardless of size, type, likelihood of being attacked or
potential consequences of an attack. For example, a container terminal
and a pier for loading or unloading cement must both implement the same
measures as a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal. This blanket
approach can only be justified by asserting that each and every port
facility is equally likely to be attacked by terrorists and would
generate the same consequences in terms of loss of life and loss to the
American economy. The result of the blanket approach is that efforts
are being made and costs are being incurred which contribute very
little to homeland security.
There is an alternative approach that would enhance homeland
security at much less cost than the current approach. Congress should
direct the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Coast Guard,
by amending MTSA if necessary, to adopt a focused approach to port
facility security. Under this approach, port facilities would be
differentiated based on size, type, likelihood of being attacked and
potential consequences of an attack, and the security standards they
must meet would be tailored to their status based on these factors.
Smaller facilities (those less likely to be attacked and those that
would not result in catastrophic loss if attacked) would have less
stringent--and less costly--security requirements. For container
terminals, the emphasis would be on security measures that prevent
smugglers from being able to circumvent CBP efforts to keep terrorist
weapons out of the country. Port facilities that handle large
quantities of explosive or hazardous materials, such as LNG, petroleum
and chemical terminals, would focus on measures to prevent terrorists
from gaining access to the terminals in order to cause catastrophic
damage to storage and piping systems.
By permitting limited Federal funding to be focused on specific
measures that will do the most to improve port security and relieve the
port industry of having to implement--at great cost--measures that
accomplish very little, this focused approach would achieve a greater
level of homeland security at much less cost than the current approach.
Funding Sources for Security Operating Expenses. A second serious
funding issue is that Port Security Grants can only be used to fund the
procurement and installation costs of new security equipment and
systems. Port Security Grants cannot be used to cover the increased
cost of personnel, operations, maintenance and training resulting from
compliance with MTSA and Coast Guard regulations. These costs must be
borne solely by port authorities and port facility operators.
VPA's security program costs $6 million per year, which includes
almost $1 million in overtime for the Port Authority Police--a cost
difficult to avoid given the manpower-intensive security procedures
mandated by the Coast Guard regulations. Prior to the MTSA mandate, VPA
spent well under $4 million per year and enjoyed a decade without an
incident of cargo theft on any of its terminals. This clearly
illustrates the difference in cost between a security program designed
to meet a port's crime prevention requirements, and a homeland security
program designed to protect the security of the American people.
VPA is developing a long-range security budget that seeks to
sustain compliance with MTSA and Coast Guard requirements in a cost-
effective manner. VPA is also making an effort to meet MTSA exercise
requirements at the least cost, such as by participation in Federal
exercises and seeking State Homeland Security Grant Program funds for
exercises that contribute to Commonwealth emergency preparedness as
well as meeting MTSA requirements. However, despite these efforts to
carefully manage security costs, VPA will still face increased costs
for meeting Federally-mandated security requirements over the long
term.
Currently, the only Federal support for annual operating expenses
is compensation for overtime incurred when DHS sets Homeland Security
alert Level Orange or higher; however, this compensation is not
sufficient. Compliance with MTSA has significantly increased annual
operating expenses, including maintenance of the high technology
security systems required for effective compliance with MTSA, training
and exercise expenses, and all the personnel and other operating
expenses incurred by ports for security.
Congress should work with DHS to amend the Port Security Grant
Program to permit a portion of those funds to be applied to annual
operating expenses for security. This is particularly important for
port authorities like VPA, which are public agencies. Most port
authorities, including VPA, require funding from tax revenues to
supplement income from port revenues. This means that the added cost of
MTSA requirements is a tax burden on states hosting ports--which are
hard pressed to meet those costs--even though the enhanced security
benefits all states.
A formula could easily be developed that permits port authorities
to apply for grants to cover a portion of their annual operating
expenses for security, based on the security enhancements they have
been required to make in order to comply with MTSA.
In the near term, funds for capital investments in enhanced
security equipment and systems should not be reduced to provide funds
for annual security operating expenses: the vulnerabilities that must
be corrected are too great. The best solution would be to determine the
funds that port authorities need to help defray the annual cost of MTSA
compliance and increase funds appropriated for the Port Security Grant
Program. Over time, as capital investments in enhanced security systems
and equipment begin to meet requirements, a larger portion of Port
Security Grant Funds can be shifted to cover annual operating expenses
for security.
Distribution of Security Grant Funds. The third major Port Security
Grant Program issue arises from the manner in which available funds are
distributed. As described above, VPA has only received about a third of
the funds it needs to implement the security upgrades required for
effective MTSA compliance. As a result, VPA has been forced to spend
more of its own funds on port security than it has received from the
Federal government. This is harmful for The Port of Virginia and the
economy of the Commonwealth of Virginia. VPA has been required to
divert funds to port security, which would otherwise have been invested
in port development--bringing additional business to the port and
increased employment in Hampton Roads and throughout Virginia.
The DHS Inspector General recently released a report that addresses
the types of projects in other ports for which Port Security Grants
have been provided. While not wishing to critique these projects, VPA
is without question one of the Strategic Ports that has suffered from a
lack of port security grant funds, or stated differently, a lack of
Federal appropriations for our nation's security.
Consolidation of the Port Security Grant Program into the much
larger Targeted Infrastructure Protection (TIP) Grant Program as
proposed by DHS in its Fiscal Year 2006 budget request will not
alleviate any of these problems. If anything, the TIP Grant Program
will make it more difficult to receive grant funds because ports will
be competing will all forms of ground transportation--rail, trucking
and mass transit--as well as with other critical infrastructures such
as the energy industry and chemical plants. Additionally, if DHS
distributes TIP grant funds via the states, there is little likelihood
that the formula used to allocate grants among the states will reflect
port security requirements. This scenario would serve only to shift the
competition for grant funds from the Federal to the state level,
forcing port authorities and other port facility operators to compete
with state agencies and local governments seeking TIP grant funds as a
means of compensating for the overall 37% reduction in homeland
security grants proposed by DHS in Fiscal Year 2006.
Radiological Monitoring. VPA has been conscientiously sharing its
lessons with Federal agencies and other ports. VPA submitted a report
to TSA in March 2003 covering the outcome of its extensive testing of
radiation sensors and the operational issues identified during those
tests. That report was followed by several briefings to various Federal
and state officials in 2003 and 2004. The DHS RPPO was briefed on the
VPA radiation monitoring program, response protocols and lessons
learned in May 2004, providing RPPO with valuable insight for their two
pilot programs in New York and Charleston. RPPO members and other
Federal officials have visited NIT to inspect VPA radiation monitoring
equipment.
Three lessons learned by VPA during its three and one-half years of
testing and operational experience with radiological monitoring are
particularly important. First, radiation monitoring is particularly
difficult in the port and maritime environment. Despite the claims of
suppliers, radiation equipment does not perform well in harsh
environments when background radiation is highly variable, when
radiological and nuclear devices must be distinguished from the
numerous legitimate sources of radiation encountered every day, and
when the manner in which cargo is shipped today--in sealed containers
carried in large numbers on large vessels--offers ample opportunity for
terrorists to shield and mask a radioactive shipment. Careful research
and testing is required to make sure the right radiation detection
equipment is procured and that it is deployed and employed properly.
Even the best equipment will fail if not placed in the right location
or if not used properly for its intended purpose.
Second, effective protocols for responding to detection of
radiation are critically important but difficult to develop. Response
procedures are complex, involving a large number of Federal, state and
local agencies. Additionally, the procedures for responding to
detection of radiation in a shipping container are much different from
other radiological emergencies because authorities have time to plan
and execute precautionary measures in case efforts to disarm the
radiological device fail and it detonates. For example, state and local
authorities must decide whether a precautionary evacuation of residents
near the terminal is warranted.
Third, radiological emergency exercises are crucial for protecting
America's ports and port communities. If national strategy is to make
every effort to halt terrorist radiological or nuclear devices in
America's ports, then those ports should be given high priority in
national exercise plans. For Hampton Roads, the VPA radiological
monitoring program potentially increases risk to the Port's local
communities. Port communities are literally on the front lines in the
effort to protect America's heartland against the threat of
radiological and nuclear terrorism. These communities must be ready for
that threat, which can only be achieved through demanding training and
exercises.
All of these lessons are applicable to every U.S. land, air and sea
port of entry in which CBP will be monitoring inbound containers and
cargo for radiological and nuclear devices. They also shed light on the
challenges that DHS will face as it establishes the newly created
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to better coordinate the national
effort to protect America against radiological and nuclear devices.
CONCLUSION
Security is clearly one of the most important issues facing U.S.
ports now and in the future. Striking the right balance between the
pursuit of commercial interests and the need to ensure the public's
safety presents an enormous challenge to all stakeholders in the
maritime industry--from citizens to businesses, shippers, railroads,
truck lines, and ultimately to ports.
We believe that The Port of Virginia is among the ports that lead
the nation in facilitating safe trade, but we are also aware that
future ongoing security programs and needs will become a financial
burden and will compete with expansion and development expenditures
that are crucial to keeping commerce moving through the Port.
Security costs will certainly continue to rise, and it is critical
that we work toward a common framework to address the issue of
security-related expenses and ensure that security does not become a
competitive issue between ports. The ship lines argue, and rightfully
so, that charging them for security is unfair because the cost should
be shared by cargo owners, truckers, rail carriers, stevedores and
others who use ports. If you extend that logic, you see that the entire
nation benefits from ports, even people who live thousands of miles
away from the coast.
Federal Port Security Grants have certainly helped to improve port
security, and we feel that additional funding in the future is
appropriate and essential. Nonetheless, the fact is that Federal
security grants will never cover all security costs incurred by ports,
and until this issue is resolved, ports will continue to be put in an
untenable position.
The Virginia Port Authority's experience with port security and
radiation monitoring offers important lessons for enhancing U.S.
homeland security. Much progress has been made enhancing the security
of America's ports since September 11, 2001, but much more remains to
be done. Now is not the time for complacency. As the leaders of the
U.S. intelligence community testified before Congress last month, the
terrorist threat to America is growing and it is not a matter of if,
but when, they attempt to attack our nation with weapons of mass
effect. America's ports are on the front line of the efforts to protect
the United States against that threat. They take their responsibility
seriously and are dedicated to doing the best they can to protect
America. They have earned your support. I urge you not to let them
down.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will
be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Coble. We've been joined by the distinguished gentleman
from Texas, Mr. Gohmert, and since only Mr. Scott, Mr. Gohmert,
and I are here, we can probably have a second round, but we're
going to have to go vote first. I think I'm going to go ahead
and ask my questions now. I think I can get my 5 minutes in
before I go over there. I want to see how many votes there are
going to be. I assume there's only one--one vote. So let me ask
my questions, we'll come back, and I'll recognize Mr. Scott at
that point.
Mr. Ahern, what resources and capabilities have been added
by Customs and Border in order to reduce the vulnerability of
ports and port facilities?
Mr. Ahern. What we continue to build upon is our layered
strategy. As we look at increasing the security supply chain,
we now have over 8,800 companies involved with C-TPAT and it's
our determination that we need to get as deep as we possibly
can in the supply chain, do verifications and validations in
those environments. So that's part of the strengthening
mechanism we're building upon our current program with Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. So we're building upon the
existing layers that we have.
We're also looking at expanding beyond the current 34 ports
that we have for the Container Security Initiative. As we take
a look at--you know, we certainly rolled out initially to the
top 20 megaports, making sure that we had over two-thirds of
the Sea containers in those 20 ports. We then went to strategic
locations and also locations where countries had the political
will and the abilities to engage with us and support us in this
binational program for container security.
As we look beyond the 34 ports, we now are down to the
point where every one of the ports that remain that we would be
targeting to deploy our resources is 1 percent--less than 1
percent of the universe of containers that come in from those
locations. So we're now picking very specific and strategic
locations based on threat and based on intelligence as we
deploy there.
The other thing we're looking at now tagging as a part of
this is global standards. Commisssioner Bonner, through the
World Customs Organization, is challenging 164 members of the
WCO to globalize the standards. We believe very strongly there
should be one set of data elements required from carriers and
from individuals involved with transmitting information to the
Government agencies that would then have the ability to analyze
that through a national targeting-type centralized targeting
center, use expert-type rules as we build through the automated
targeting system, and then make good risk-based determinations.
We also believe countries involved with this should also have a
similar supply chain type of security program, as well, to
complement that.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Ahern, are crew members of cargo vessels
vetted against terrorist watch lists?
Mr. Ahern. We do have a program that we're actually working
collaboratively with the Coast Guard where we're getting
information in advance, electronically conveyed. I'm sure Rear
Admiral Hereth would like to talk about the 96-hour rule and
how we're getting it through the ENOA process.
Mr. Coble. All right. Why don't you pick up on that,
Admiral.
Admiral Hereth. Yes, sir. All the crew members for every
foreign vessel that comes to the United States are vetted
through the system against the databases prior to entry. As you
know, there's a 96-hour notice of arrival requirement now on
the books for all vessels coming to the United States greater
than 300 gross tons, all the large vessels. We vet all those
crew members and take action. That information is passed to the
local Coast Guard field unit for action as the vessel
approaches the United States.
Mr. Coble. I'll tell you, let's suspend right now. I've got
a couple minutes left to go. We will return imminently, so you
all rest easy in the meanwhile.
[Recess.]
Mr. Coble. Okay, Admiral, you pick up where you were. We'll
resume now. Or do you remember where you were?
Admiral Hereth. Yes, sir. I believe the question was on
notice of arrival, and----
Mr. Coble. Right.
Admiral Hereth.--we do receive vessel, cargo, and crew
information 96 hours in advance, and all that information is
vetted through a variety of systems and databases to look for
anomalies. We work in conjunction with CBP, looking for any
potential problems and then act on those problems at the local
field operations level.
Mr. Coble. Okay. Mr. Scrobe, by adding cargo crime to the
Uniform Crime Reporting, how will that address this issue?
Mr. Scrobe. First of all, I think there would be much more
accuracy and allow for better information and deployment of
resources, there's no doubt about it. It would also give us a
true number and be able to point out anomalies, like I said
before, about where there may be terrorist activities involved.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Keever, what areas do you see a need for
improvement in strengthening the cooperative efforts among the
Federal Government, local port authorities, and the private
sector?
Mr. Keever. Mr. Chairman, I think what would strengthen
that would be a steady Federal funding stream to ensure
adequate funding for our nation's security at seaports.
Mr. Coble. Let's see. My two colleagues are not here, so
let me add one. I still have a little time left.
Admiral, let me come back to you. Since 2001, the Coast
Guard has been a member of the intelligence community.
Describe, if you will, how this membership has directly or
indirectly supported the Coast Guard's port security efforts.
Admiral Hereth. Yes, sir, I'll be glad to. Let me just add
one thing to what Mr. Keever said, if you would, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coble. Okay.
Admiral Hereth. I'd like to just say that the relationships
between the Federal agencies, State and local and private
sector are key to preventing an incident on the waterfront and
to ensure that there's good collaboration occurring on all the
port authorities. We've established these Area Maritime
Security Committees around the country. Presently, there's 43,
one in each major port area around the country, and we think
that's a powerful way in which to draw the stakeholders
together to talk about security in their back yard and address
vulnerabilities and address potential threats as they're
changing.
Now let me jump over to your question, sir. The
intelligence community membership of the Coast Guard is an
absolute key in our mind. It feeds direct operational,
actionable information directly to our field operatives
throughout the country so they can act on it and queue up
resources in a way that allows us to deal with our limitations,
but allows us to focus on the highest-risk targets, and those
targets are constantly changing depending on the safety,
environmental protection, and security challenges that face us.
And so it's really important that we have a good intel arm
of the Coast Guard constantly focused on gathering information,
staying connected to the intel community and all the members,
and leaning on that direct access to information that we can
then pump immediately out to our field operational commanders.
Mr. Coble. I thank you, Admiral. My time has expired.
I recognize the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to ask all of
our witnesses----
Mr. Coble. Mr. Scott, if you'll suspend just a moment, I'm
told that there will be another vote in about 30 minutes, so I
think, if Bobby and Louie and I are the only three here, we may
do another round. Go ahead, Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. I'd ask all of our witnesses whether
or not all of the ports--obviously, all of the ports don't have
the same level of risk--whether or not the present formula
allocates the funding for port security grants in an
intelligent way.
Mr. Ahern. If you'd like, I'd begin first. I would first
state that within Customs and Border Protection, we don't have
any grant authority that we actually deal with State and local
governments or port authorities for granting money.
But in answer to your question about the risk presented at
different ports, I would tell you that certainly, we take a
look at risk from a national perspective, and it's not
necessarily the ports of arrival here in the United States, we
believe, as far as--it's the origin of that supply chain and
the beginning of that transit of cargo or seaborne containers
coming into the United States. So we believe strongly that a
lot of the emphasis should continue to be placed at the point
of stuffing, at the point of lading in the overseas, and I
believe it still needs to be complemented by a very strong port
security structure here in the United States, as well, to make
sure that we have good safe and secure environments when an
offloading occurs of a container cargo vessel coming into this
country.
Mr. Scott. Does anybody else want to comment?
Admiral Hereth. Yes, sir. I would just have to agree with
you that we think that risk is the right dimension to focus on.
Risk has a lot of variables, though, and all dimensions of risk
need to be considered, not only the threat to a piece of
infrastructure, but also the consequences of the loss of that
infrastructure or the loss of that system, and so throughout
the process, in our support to TSA that had original grant
authority for port security grants and now our Office of
Domestic Preparedness, we have supported that initiative,
supported those initiatives, and supported the concept of risk-
based approach to grants. Let me just stop there.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Scrobe?
Mr. Scrobe. Quite honestly, Mr. Scott, we don't really deal
with grants or issues on this, so----
Mr. Keever. Congressman Scott, we have been the recipient
of four grants and the process has served the Port of Virginia
well. The concern we have is that the existing, or the next
round of grants has been delayed, and, of course, that delays
us being able to implement the next phase of security, or level
of security that we'd like to implement in Virginia. So the
grant process has served us well thus far.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Keever, the seaports are pretty much left to
their own device on security whereas airports and water patrol
and borders get substantial underwriting from the Federal
Government. Should ports have much more of the cost of security
borne by the Federal Government?
Mr. Keever. Congressman, as I indicated, we have spent
$22.4 million on security in Virginia. Half of that has been of
our own money, the other half from grants. It appears that this
is being handled somewhat differently than aviation and border
crossings, and to have a steady funding stream from the Federal
Government to provide for the adequate security at seaports, we
think would be essential to ensuring the security of our
nations. The burden has been placed squarely on the shoulders
of the maritime security.
Mr. Scott. Well, and the port security grants can be used
for procurement and installation purchases. Can you use it for
personnel?
Mr. Keever. Unfortunately, it's only for the procurement of
capital expenditures, and in Virginia, our cost of security has
risen from $4 million annually pre-9/11 to over $6 million
post-9/11, and those costs will continue to rise. It's very
manpower-intensive, labor-intensive to continue to monitor
these security levels that have been put in place, and that
would be helpful if the grants could be modified to provide for
the O&M costs of security.
Mr. Scott. So after you buy new equipment, you're pretty
much on your own for the personnel, for the ongoing costs?
Mr. Keever. Absolutely.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, if we're going to have another
round, I'd just defer now.
Mr. Coble. We've been joined by the distinguished gentleman
from California, Mr. Lungren. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm sorry I
was late. We were at a briefing on the Homeland Security
Committee about homeland security, and so now I'm here.
The panelists may not know it, but I used to represent two
ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, where I grew up. I've been
gone for 16 years. I'm 400 miles away now, so I don't have
those ports, but I still have an interest in those ports.
What strikes me as we go to all these homeland security
briefings and meetings and exercises is we can't--we don't have
enough money to do everything that we would like to do. And
I've said before, when you try and do everything, you end up
not doing anything very well. The ports seem to be a major
concern that we have, I think rightly so. But now we come down
to the question of paying for it.
Mr. Keever, what's wrong with the concept some have brought
up that we sort of use a user fee, a per-container cost that
would go directly into that security cost?
Mr. Keever. A uniform user fee across the board that could
be applied at all ports would certainly be a concept that could
be helpful in a Federal funding stream. One concern that we
have is that not all cargo moving in and out of this country
moves in containers. There are break-bulk and bulk and tanker
vessels that carry, a variety of cargo that would have to be
considered where some sort of a user fee would have to be
applied uniformly without economically disadvantaging that type
of commodity moving through the U.S.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Ahern, are you allowed to venture an
opinion on that?
Mr. Ahern. I would say it's probably safer for me not to
comment on user fees and the---- [Laughter.]
Mr. Lungren. See, here's the problem. We've got a tough
budget. We've got this. No one wants to give up what they
already have. Everybody can point to the inadequacies we have
in Border Patrol, what we are doing on the ports and so forth,
and I'm trying to figure out, if we're really serious about
this, how we go about paying for it because it's going to cost
money.
Admiral, if you might respond to this question, what do we
say to the average citizen about port security? I mean, I can't
honestly tell anybody that even if we spent the entire Federal
budget, we could ensure absolutely that we would have total
security in our ports. The only way we could have total
security in our ports is to get rid of the commerce, which sort
of defeats the purpose but allows the terrorists to win by
indirection what they can't win by direction. We rely on the
commerce that goes through our ports. We're proud of it. The
whole idea about ``just in time'' in our economy is predicated
on the assumption that our ports are going to be open, working,
and available to people.
So short of closing them down, I can't guarantee 100
percent. But what can we say? What can we--what could you tell
me to say to some folks at my next town hall meeting when they
ask me about the threat that is, the threat that remains to the
United States with respect to our ports and what we are capable
of doing in terms of applying some modicum of security to our
ports?
Admiral Hereth. Yes, sir. I would pick up on your theme
of--first of all, I think we deserve to be proud of a
transportation system that provides such a huge benefit to the
quality of life and our economic system of the United States,
and then reflect on the fact that port security is something
that we have to collaborate on. It's not one organization, one
agency, one company that's going to solve all the problems and
prevent an incident from occurring. And if we recognize the
value of the system to the United States and emphasize that
it's everybody's responsibility and that we have to collaborate
on it, then I think we can explain the systems that are in
place to do that.
We have put--an immense change has been laid out there and
industry has responded very well past this first year law, this
big implementation period of MTSA throughout the country. And
actually, the international code now is implemented throughout
the world. To put those new standards into place at port
facilities on our vessels throughout the United States and
throughout the world is a significant state of progress.
Couple that with the intense developments on the
intelligence system looking for prevention of problems, looking
at changing threat streams so that we can respond and hopefully
deter an act of terrorism before it occurs.
And then thirdly, I think part of the implementation of
those systems, one of our threads of important must-haves was
to develop a culture of security. So we now have security
officers on vessels, in companies, and on facilities around the
country. That's a whole network of eyes and ears out there of
people that should be able to inform the intelligence system
and the agencies about potential problems, and we get constant
threat streams about pre-incident surveillance kinds of
activities and other things that might be a concern that are
brought into the system that we need to then be able to connect
the dots and act and feed information out to those that own the
infrastructure so we can better protect it.
So I think the good news is that we've done--we've taken a
number of steps forward. We have a lot of people now that are
charged with security responsibilities around the country. And
if we work together as system, companies, organizations, and
agencies, I think we'll have a good chance of preventing an
incident in the maritime mode of transportation, and then
underscoring how important that is.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman.
I think we have time for a second round. Gentlemen, 2 days
after 9/11--I may have told Mr. Scott this--a reporter asked me
what my greatest fear was regarding a subsequent attack, and
I'm sort of extending Mr. Lungren's comment. I said my greatest
fear is that I fear that the next attack will be by water,
harbor or port, and you four gentlemen are in a position, and
hopefully we in the Congress are in a position to make efforts
to make that less likely, but they're vulnerable by their very
nature.
Mr. Scrobe, what voluntary steps has your industry
undertaken to improve cargo security? I don't think we've
touched on that yet.
Mr. Scrobe. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, is that most
importers and exporters, from the insurance perspective, and
when we look at our importers and exporters, the first thing we
ask them, are you C-TPAT compliant, which means that they have
a working knowledge of what their system supply chain is all
about. And I think most of the members within the ICSC do have
that, and I think that was a major step moving forward. It
gives more eyes to see what was going on at the borders and
outside our country, which I think is the first step, like
these gentlemen have mentioned before.
Mr. Coble. Admiral, you've touched on this, but I'm going
to give you a chance to do it more fully if you want to.
Understanding that the Coast Guard has law enforcement
responsibilities, what is its law enforcement role in
protecting United States ports?
Admiral Hereth. Yes, sir. We see the Coast Guard as the
nation's major maritime law enforcement agency, operating both
all around the country and instituting protective measures on
the waterfront throughout the maritime mode of transportation.
We have significant statutory authority in title 14 of the
U.S. Code that gives us law enforcement authority. That's also
recognized in a number of statutes, the Magnussen Act, the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act that has now a security element
to it, and, of course, the Maritime Transportation and Security
Act of 2002. So, yes, sir, we see ourselves as a law
enforcement agency. We train people to those skills and we're
out there every day.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, sir.
The gentleman from Virginia?
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Admiral Hereth, you mentioned the 96-
hour rule where the crew has to--you get the list of the crew.
How do you know the names on the list are actually the names of
the people on the ship?
Admiral Hereth. We check them out, sir. Part of our----
Mr. Scott. What do you mean? You check what out?
Admiral Hereth. When we receive the names, we--they're
required to provide the name and passport number. All that
information is vetted through against databases that we use in
collaboration with a number of different agencies, law
enforcement agencies and others, and then we have boarding
teams that actually go on board those vessels as they approach
the United States, and our control effort is centered around
the implementation date around this first----
Mr. Scott. Let's say you verify the person has a passport
and then you check the passport----
Admiral Hereth. Against that individual, and if it looks
like the individual, that's what we're looking for. There is an
initiative internationally to improve the biometrics and the
documents that international seafarers use and we are fully
supportive of adopting that as a new standard. We're trying to
work out the biometric challenges, though.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Mr. Keever, you do a radiological check on
all cargo that goes through. Do you get many hits?
Mr. Keever. Yes, sir, Congressman. This past year, in 2004,
our radiological monitoring devices scored 1,000 hits, and
while that seems fairly significant, we move approximately
20,000 containers through our gates weekly. So it's a small
percentage of what goes through there. A number of those are
hits that are non-cargo hits and CBP is not involved in that.
We quickly move the containers out of the way for not to impede
the flow of commerce. But we did receive about 1,000 this past
year, yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. And was the cargo movement significantly
impacted?
Mr. Keever. No, sir. We've developed standards to quickly
move the affected container out of the flow, the traffic flow
pattern, so that the other cargo can continue to move through,
and we have some standard operating procedures in place with
CBP if we receive a positive hit.
Mr. Scott. There's been a proposal to fold the Port
Security Grant Program in the Targeted Infrastructure
Protection Grant Program. Do you have any concerns about that?
Mr. Keever. We do, Congressman. By folding the Port
Security Grants into the TIP would force ports to then compete
with local, State, and other Government agencies for grant
money and, therefore, make the available funds for ports
diminished. So it would give us a lesser of a playing field.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. And I guess one final question, and
whoever wants to answer it. With a port, you've got a lot of
different agencies floating around. What are the various
challenges in coordinating activities with all of the different
law enforcement agencies on the port and what do we do to make
your life easier?
Mr. Keever. Well, I'll take a stab at that. We certainly
have a good working relationship with CBP and Coast Guard. We
have our own Virginia Port Authority police force that are
sworn officers, as well as on the local level and the State
level. The cooperation that exists through the Area Maritime
Security Committee, as the Admiral referred to earlier,
certainly has improved the communication among those agencies
and we continue to do what we can to work together in a
cooperative manner.
Mr. Ahern. I would add to that, also, as far as I would
certainly go back to March 1 of 2003 when the Department of
Homeland Security was created and we actually then had Customs
and Border Protection, where we took all the different agencies
that were operating within a port of entry, put them under a
single leadership with single procedures so that when we do
have changes in alert levels, we have the ability to have one
organization responsible for that.
We also now have the other responsible agencies for port of
entry--Coast Guard is one of our counterparts, certainly within
the Department of Homeland Security. So we have better
coordination just by our design and by our leadership. I think
that's very critical.
There's been many entities involved with coordination of
Port Security Councils as well as initiatives at our port, as
well, for domain awareness.
Mr. Scott. Is there a satisfactory level of cooperation
that we don't need--there's no problem for us to address?
Mr. Ahern. I think, certainly, there's always room to
continue to improve, and certainly, we're still in a maturing
process 2 years into our relationship in the Department of
Homeland Security. But I would say it's not problematic. I
think we've laid an excellent foundation we continue to build
upon as we move forward in the future.
Admiral Hereth. Sir, let me just add that, again,
underscoring the importance of the area committees to present a
collaborative body in which all the stakeholders can meet and
talk about security in their backyard is a very important theme
to continue to foster and continue to focus our efforts around.
We're now in the process of mining best practices out of
those area committees and intend to share those around the
country, so I think it has to be viewed as a continuing
process. We can't rest on our laurels. We've made good progress
to this point, but a continuing discussion within those kinds
of bodies is very important to making sure that we prevent an
incident in the future.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman's time has
expired.
Mr. Lungren earlier said that he'd been 16 years away from
this place. The other day on the elevator, the operator looked
at him and said, ``Well, you haven't been riding my elevator in
the last few months.'' [Laughter.]
Dan replied, ``Well, I've only been away for 16 years.''
[Laughter.]
So I want to say to Dan, this Committee has missed you more
obviously than the elevator operator has.
Mr. Lungren. I appreciate that. [Laughter.]
Mr. Coble. I recognize the gentleman now.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the Chairman. I'm just glad she
remembered who I was. [Laughter.]
And maybe I don't look that much older. I appreciate that.
Commissioner Ahern, can you tell me what the separation of
ICE from CBP does to make you more effective with the ports?
Mr. Ahern. I would tell you that certainly we have a very
strong relationship with Immigration and Customs Enforcement
today, and we have principally the investigators there to
follow up on crime or interdiction that actually occurs at the
port of entry from an investigative standpoint. When the
Department was created, certainly, an investigative arm did go
to Immigration and Customs Enforcement. So we still do have a
very strong relationship and a liaison between our two agencies
and we're under one Directorate within Border Transportation
and Security, as well.
Mr. Lungren. Isn't it kind of strange to have your
investigators separated from your cops, to use an analogy to a
police department?
Mr. Ahern. Well, that certainly is one point of view that
was led to. Unfortunately, the separation that occurred on
March 1----
Mr. Lungren. Well, I guess my question is, can you show me
how that separation enhances the job that you do with respect
to port security?
Mr. Ahern. If I could actually suggest that I defer
answering that question until July of this year, because the
Inspector General's Office will actually be doing a review of
the ICE-CBP separation----
Mr. Lungren. I understand that, but I was just wondering if
you could give me any idea that you have why it enhances our
port security.
Mr. Ahern. I think----
Mr. Lungren. I mean, if you can't, that's fine, as well,
but I'd just like----
Mr. Ahern. I think it's appropriate to wait for the July
review to be concluded, sir.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. You started to answer this somewhat. Mr.
Keever answered it. But Admiral, I'd like to ask this. One of
my observations when I was Attorney General was the fact that
there was at times a less than what I would consider to be a
mutual respectful situation that existed between local law
enforcement and the FBI, for instance. In some cases, it was
good. In some cases, it was bad.
What is the level of cooperation that you have with local
law enforcement? I come from a perspective in California where
our ports have a distinct legal status. The Port of Long Beach,
for instance, while the Port Commissioners are appointed by the
mayor and the city council, the entity then is an independent
entity that has some allegiance to the State as well as some
allegiance to the locality and so they have, as you know, some
of their own security, but there's also the City of Long Beach
and there's the City of Los Angeles and there's the County of
Los Angeles. If we were to have a major detonation in the
harbor, it wouldn't just affect the port. It would affect the
cities involved.
So what is the state of cooperation that you believe exists
right now with your folks, the ports that you are directly
working with, but the surrounding legal entities that you find
yourselves involved with?
Admiral Hereth. Yes, sir. I would respond by saying I was
Captain of the Port out in San Francisco in the Bay area during
9/11 and the relationship we had with local law enforcement and
State law enforcement organizations was tremendous. I think
it's only gotten better in the 2 years since I've left San
Francisco, well, more than 2 years.
Mr. Lungren. Not because you left San Francisco Harbor. We
wouldn't want to suggest that.
Admiral Hereth. The organizations that have been put
together in terms of the Area Maritime Security Committee, the
local exercise programs, the changes in some of the response
protocols through the development of the National Response Plan
and the National Incident Management System have all, I think,
been favorable and fostered the development of a cohesive
effort by State, local, and Federal law enforcement--State,
local, and Federal law enforcement communities.
I would add that that's only going to continue to get
tighter as we try to work for more defined prevention plans,
whether it's a buffer zone protection plan around key
infrastructure, and there's a variety of initiatives under
HSPD-7 to do that. But it all suggests that the law enforcement
communities have got to work together and lean on one another
as they try to prevent incidents in a port area complex. There
are many different players, as you know, that need to be
involved in making sure an incident is prevented, and if
something does happen, then a proper response from the law
enforcement standpoint.
Most often, most of the port communities I've been at, and
I've been stationed probably 10 years on each cost now, most of
the port communities don't have all the resources they would
like, and so the law enforcement communities have to band
together to mount a proper response, in most cases, as you
cascade on the resources and depending on the size of the
incident.
The good news is we feel--the Coast Guard as an
organization feels very comfortable working with the port
communities on a broad variety of issues, and we've done that
with our Harbor Safety Committees, our Area Pollution Response
Committees, and now our Area Maritime Security Committees, and
so it's a natural thing for us to reach out and pull in other
agencies because we're resource limited, as many other agencies
and organizations are, and so it's natural for us to draw into
the mix and discussion with port authorities and local law
enforcement authorities a game plan to help prevent incidents,
and then if someone does happen, to be able to respond
efficiently to one.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, Admiral. I'm going to use that
phrase that you used, ``resource limited,'' when some people
come and ask for different grants and programs. [Laughter.]
These last few weeks--that's a great phrase. I'm going to
keep it.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman.
I thank Mr. Scott and Mr. Lungren for your input today.
Gentlemen, I thank you all for your testimony. The Subcommittee
very much appreciates it.
In order to ensure a full record and an adequate
consideration of this very important issue, the record will
remain open for additional submissions for 7 days. Also, any
written questions that a Member wants to submit should be
submitted within that same 7-day time frame.
This concludes the oversight hearing on law enforcement
efforts at our ports of entry. Thank you for your cooperation,
and the Subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement Congressman Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to join you for this hearing
on law enforcement efforts at our ports. The development of the
Department of Homeland Security in the wake of the 9/11/01 tragedies
brought about a shift of several law enforcement agencies from one
department to another with changes and reorganizations of their
responsibilities in some cases. There has also been a significant
change in the responsibilities of federal law enforcement entities to
communicate, coordinate and cooperate with state and local law
enforcement entities. As a result, some confusion exists in the public,
in the Congress and among the various federal state and local agencies
as to where the oversight responsibility for these operations resides.
I am of the opinion that we should seek to clarify any such
confusion by first asserting our jurisdiction over all federal law
enforcement entities and then working with those entities to assist
their coordination and cooperation with each other and with state and
local law enforcement entities. So, I am pleased to join you in this
first of a series of hearings we will be conduction in this regard, and
commend your foresight and leadership in the matter.
I am especially pleased that we have Jeff Keever, Deputy Director
of our Virginia Port Authority as one of our witnesses here today. Our
ports are a vital part of the nation's economy, handling some 2 billion
tons of freight each year. The Port of Virginia is the seventh largest
U.S. port, in terms of general tonnage handled annually, and the second
largest on the East Coast.
Operating alongside the nation's largest Naval base, and assisting
the missions of the Defense Logistics Agency and the U.S.
Transportation Command, security has always been job one for the Port
of Virginia. Secure, smooth and efficient operations is not only
critical to the deployment of our troops around the globe, but it is
also why the port has maintained a robust annual growth rate of more
than 9% over the past few years. As a part of its focus on security,
the Port of Virginia checks 100% of the containers leaving the port
with radiation detection and monitoring equipment before they leave the
port on trucks. And as a result of its successful cooperative
relationship with U.S. Customs, there has not been a theft at the port
in about 8 years. That's quite a record of security when you consider
that estimates of thefts from ports across the U.S. range as high as
$30 billion annually.
Yet, despite the fact that our ports have risen to the challenges,
their ability to continue to meet them in a world of changing threats
and circumstances will depend in large measure on our assistance and
support. I am concerned, Mr. Chairman, that we have not been as
generous and diligent in supporting our seaports as we have with our
airports and our land border crossings. It appears that we have left a
much larger share of that responsibility to the ports themselves,
compared to what we have done to assist our airport and border crossing
operations.
I expect we will hear more about the details of what we can do from
our witnesses. So, I look forward to their testimony and to working
with you, Mr. Chairman, in clarifying the oversight responsibilities
for the various federal law enforcement entities, and in strengthening
our ports to do the vital job of securing and efficiently moving cargo
and people. Again, I appreciate your leadership on these important
matters. Thank you.
----------
Response to Questions for the Record Submitted by Commissioner Jayson
Ahern,U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1. Are the port facilities more secure since 9/11? What has CBP
done since the 9/11 attacks to improve this security?
Answer: After the 9/11 attacks, CBP developed and implemented a
defense-in-depth layered enforcement strategy. As part of this
strategy, CBP developed numerous anti-terrorism and security
programs and systems to identify and select high-risk cargo
shipments, travelers, and conveyances. CBP understands that any
single program or system can be defeated.
While we cannot physically examine all containers, we do review
virtually 100 percent of all cargo shipments that arrive in the
United States. This is possible through the 24-Hour Rule
implemented by CBP in December 2002, which requires advance
information for inbound vessel containerized and break-bulk
shipments. The 24-Hour Rule, and later the implementation of
the Trade Act of 2002, requires carriers to provide advance,
electronic cargo declarations 24 hours before the cargo is
laden aboard the vessel at a foreign port. Implementation of
these regulations represented a significant change in the flow
of information. This change allowed the United States to
identify threats earlier in the maritime transportation process
by being able to prescreen containerized cargo prior to being
laden on board vessels destined to the United States.
Cargo manifest information provided to CBP is then reviewed
electronically through the Automated Targeting System (ATS).
Through ATS, CBP implemented threshold targeting which uses
numerous rules that work in combination to vet shipment
information from manifest and entry data, prioritize
``unusual'' shipments, and generate mandatory targets for
shipments that exceed a specified score threshold. While the
targeting rules primarily utilize historical shipment data to
identify anomalies, all entities declared in the shipment data
are also vetted against enforcement records.
Access to this data and the ability to vet it prior to lading
supports another layer of CBP's strategy, the Container
Security Initiative (CSI). Announced in January 2002, CSI is
currently operational in 36 foreign ports--ports shipping the
greatest volume of containers to the United States. CSI
addresses the threat to border security and global trade posed
by the potential for terrorist use of a maritime container. CSI
proposes a security regime to ensure all containers that pose a
potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at
foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for
the United States. CBP Officers are stationed abroad to work
together with their host government counterparts. Their mission
is to target and pre-screen containers, utilizing the ATS and
other available data, and to develop additional investigative
leads related to the terrorist threat to cargo destined to the
United States. Through the CSI, CBP is pushing our Nation's
zone of security beyond our physical borders by working with
nations from around the world to target, screen, and inspect
high-risk containers that are bound for the United States.
After the events of 9/11, CBP began to leverage and expand
existing industry partnerships. CBP developed the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism program (C-TPAT). C-TPAT aims at
strengthening the international supply chain, from point of
stuffing, through the CBP clearance process. Working in
partnership with CBP, importers, brokers, carriers, port
operators, and other C-TPAT members (partners) who initiate
actions which further secure their supply chain receive
measurable benefits from CBP, such as reduced inspections and
expedited clearance times. C-TPAT members, now over 9,000, also
report benefiting from the increased supply chain security by
realizing more efficient supply chains, improved asset
utilization, reduced total costs, revenue growth, and reduced
pilferage.
To enhance our strategy at our borders, we have leveraged
advanced non-intrusive inspection technology to examine a
larger portion of the stream of commercial traffic while
facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. This
technology includes large-scale, non-intrusive inspection
imaging systems, radiation portal monitors, radiation isotope
identifier devices and personal radiation detection devices.
With the help of these programs and systems, CBP officers can
concentrate on searching for anomalies. The anomalies could
range from discrepancies noted in the shipment information,
irregular importer activity, discrepancies in the density of a
commodity, radiation emanations not consistent with the
commodity, detection of irregularities within a container
shipment, etc. Once an anomalous shipment is detected, our CBP
officers can then physically search the shipment and determine
whether the shipment has implements of terror or not.
2. What steps have been taken to increase coordination and
cooperation with other DHS agencies, specifically the Coast Guard, to
increase security of cargo arriving at US ports?
Answer: CBP has implemented several initiatives to increase
coordination and cooperation with other DHS agencies,
specifically the Coast Guard. These efforts include:
Establishing agency liaisons at CBP's National
Targeting Center (NTC) to streamline targeting efforts in
homeland security. Agencies represented at the NTC include:
Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and the Food and Drug Administration.
CBP and Coast Guard have coordinated efforts to
address industry in various forums to discuss port and cargo
security. These forums include the Departmental Advisory
Committee on the Commercial Operations of Customs and Border
Protection and Related Functions, National Maritime Security
Advisory Committee and various maritime conferences.
CBP and Coast Guard have developed joint protocols
and integrated operations such as targeting and conducting
enforcement boardings in order to eliminate duplication of
effort and leverage each other's capabilities and expertise.
Critical U.S. Government work hours are now redirected and
delays to industry have been reduced.
CBP and the Coast Guard have been actively engaged in
coordinating response protocols to address the threat of a
nuclear or radiological weapon of mass destruction that could
be smuggled into our country. CBP and the Coast Guard utilize a
common radiological technical reachback (i.e., CBP's
Laboratories and Scientific Services) to determine if a
shipment contains illicit nuclear or radiological materials.
This shared capability also provides for a thorough vetting of
suspected shipments through both CBP's and the Coast Guard's
information databases and watch lists.
CBP and Coast Guard, with support from TSA, are
conducting joint assessments of foreign ports to evaluate the
port's level of compliance with International Ship and Port
Facility Security Code (ISPS) requirements. During these joint
site assessments, CBP addresses cargo security issues in CSI
port operations or conducts site surveys of designated future
CSI ports.
CBP managers participate in the Coast Guard led Area
Maritime Security Committees addressing port and cargo security
measures and contingency planning.
DHS Agencies are also working in concert with the Department of
Defense, in response to the National Security Presidential
Directive - 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive -13
(NSPD-41/HSPD -13), to develop a coordinated approach to
securing the maritime domain which would assign specific
responsibilities to appropriate agencies to ensure uniformity
and avoid duplication.
Also in response to the NSPD-41/HSPD -13, CBP and Coast Guard,
and other component DHS agencies, are working toward enhancing
maritime domain awareness (MDA) and developing a common
operating picture (COP) to better utilize information and
maximize efficiencies and resources. Through MDA and COP,
communication and coordination channels between CBP and Coast
Guard are strengthened.
3. How would you describe the level of cooperation from the
private sector thus far in implementing C-TPAT? What hurdles or
obstacles need to be overcome in order to more fully implement the
program?
Answer: Developed immediately after the 9/11 attacks, C-TPAT
has grown from seven initial members to over 9,000 partners
(members) as of April 2005, with an annual growth rate of
approximately 3,000 new partners each year. The tremendous
growth of the program is a clear indication of the significant
level of cooperation from the private sector, and their
commitment to partner with CBP to secure the international
supply chain.
Moreover, C-TPAT members are conditioning contractual business
relationships with service providers and vendors on
participation and/or adherence to C-TPAT security guidelines,
which is another strong sign of the level of cooperation from
the private sector.
Staffing for this program was significantly increased in FY
2005 (120 new positions provided for conducting validations),
which will allow CBP to conduct validations of all high-risk
supply chains. CBP believes that the staffing increases and
program adjustments made in FY05 (i.e., a modified validation
approach that places emphasis on the importer and carrier
sectors, maximizes resources and increases efficiencies) are
sufficient to address the level of validations necessary of all
high-risk supply chains.
4. How would you rate the success of the Container Security
Initiative thus far? To what extent do you see it expanding to other
overseas ports in the future?
Answer: To date, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) has
been successfully implemented at 36 foreign seaports. The
program has effectively extended our borders in regards to
inspecting high-risk cargo destined for the United States.
Prior to September 11, 2001, there was no program in place that
applied the principals and security standards for maritime
cargo that CSI employs today. Through CSI, a risk assessment is
performed on every oceangoing container coming to the United
States from a CSI port before it is loaded on a vessel.
Additionally, CSI has been instrumental in enhancing port
security. Through CSI, many foreign ports that previously did
not utilize or possess non-intrusive inspection (NII) equipment
now have either purchased their own NII equipment, or have
access to such equipment. This has resulted in an increase in
the effectiveness and efficiency of our targeting and
examination process for inbound containers to the United
States. Because of CSI, the probability of a terrorist
organization exploiting the maritime environment to introduce
weapons of mass destruction or disrupt the international supply
chain is diminishing.
In addition to the current 36 operational ports, future CSI
ports will be identified based on their strategic importance to
international trade and volume of container traffic to the
United States. Foreign ports with a large number of
transshipped containers destined to the United, or ports
located in countries with identified terrorists organizations,
may be candidates for CSI expansion. CSI plans to be
operational in 40 ports by the end of CY05 and 50 ports by the
end of CY06.
5. Do you feel that CBP has adequate law enforcement authorities
to adequately address the security needs of our Nation's seaports?
Answer: Congress has always empowered CBP Officers with broad
border search authority. Under CBP or customs border search
authority, searches of persons, conveyances, baggage, cargo,
and merchandise entering the United States are allowed without
a search warrant and without suspicion of criminality (see 19
USC 482, 1499, 1581, 1582). CBP Officers may routinely perform
border searches to ensure compliance with all applicable laws
bound of course by the reasonableness requirement of the 4th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
In addition to these authorities, CBP has been empowered by
certain legislation that has enhanced our abilities to secure
the seaports. For example, the Maritime Transportation Security
Act of 2002 (MTSA) provides authority, in coordination with
U.S. Coast Guard, to safeguard the public and protect vessels,
harbors, ports, facilities, and cargo. Also, the Trade Act of
2002 ((PL 107-210) as amended by the MTSA of 2002) requires the
electronic transmission of cargo information arriving and
departing the United States for vessels (also includes air,
rail and truck). The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform
Act of 2002 required that electronic manifests for all vessel
crewmembers and passengers be received by CBP up to 96 hours
prior to arrival. These manifests are run against law
enforcement databases, to include the terrorist watch lists.
6. Does CBP currently have adequate staffing and funding to
ensure that 100% of hazardous cargo entering the United States is
screened and intercepted when needed?
Answer: CBP employs a layered enforcement strategy to ensure
that potentially dangerous merchandise does not enter the
United States. Part of this strategy includes a requirement for
key information on all cargo importations to be electronically
transmitted to CBP prior to arrival at U.S. ports of entry. The
information is then screened by automated targeting systems
and, if determined to be a potential threat to U.S. residents
or commerce, the importation is subject to further review by
CBP Officers. We are confident that our layered enforcement
strategy effectively intercepts hazardous cargo entering the
United States.
7. Please describe the level of cooperation that occurs between
the federal government, local port authorities and commercial shippers
to ensure the security of cargo entering U.S. seaports?
A. Do you feel that it is adequate to address security
vulnerabilities?
B. What improvements can be made to bolster these
cooperative efforts?
Answer 7: The tremendous growth of C-TPAT over the last three
years is a strong indication of the private sector's commitment
to partnership with CBP to secure the international supply
chain.
C-TPAT is not a regulatory program, but works through
partnership with the trade community which leverages corporate
strength and influence to push back security enhancements
throughout the international supply chain, beyond the
regulatory reach of the U.S. Government.
Working in partnership with CBP, importers, brokers,
carriers, port operators, and other C-TPAT members (partners)
who initiate actions that further secure their supply chain
receive measurable benefits from CBP, such as reduced
inspections and expedited clearance times.
As the program has grown and evolved, there has been
a demonstrated need for more clearly defined, baseline security
criteria as a condition of membership. After months of dialogue
with the trade community, revised security criteria for
importers were announced on March 25, 2005.
The implementation plan is cognizant of concerns
raised by the trade, and provides for a gradual, phased in
approach to allow the trade additional time to enhance their
security measures.
Phase one pertains to the physical supply chain.
Phase two relates to internal supply chain management
practices, while phase three addresses business partner
requirements.
The Maritime Transportation and Security Act of 2002
(MTSA) required the establishment committees in our Nation's
seaports to facilitate communication and coordination efforts
of port stakeholders, including other federal, local and state
agencies, industry and the boating public. These groups, called
Area Maritime Security Committees, are tasked with
collaborating on plans to secure their ports so that the
resources of an area can be best used to deter, prevent and
respond to terror threats. The USCG Captain of the Ports,
acting as Federal Maritime Security Coordinators (FMSC), are
responsible for developing Area Maritime Security (AMS) plans
and establishing a local AMS committee.
The USCG, CBP, fellow federal, state and local representatives,
and other maritime area partners participate on the USCG led
AMS Committees to address maritime security issues. This
coordination and cooperation is vital to our efforts to secure
cargo entering U.S. seaports.
Answer 7 (A-B): While progress has been made, there is more
work to be done:
CBP will utilize a risk management approach and
optimize all available resources.
CBP will continue to work through international
forums such as the World Customs Organization to implement a
security framework that increases the security of the
international supply chain.
CBP will continue to work with other countries to
internationalize the CSI principles and increase the amount of
cargo, bound for the United States, that is inspected by those
countries prior to departure.
CBP will continue to work with the Department of
Energy on the Megaports Initiative to provide foreign ports
with radiation detection equipment.
CBP will collaborate with the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate in the development of an Advance
Container Security Device and the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office in their research and development of radiation detection
technologies.
CBP will continue to strengthen its partnership with
the private sector through C-TPAT, by sharing information with
certified members more extensively, and developing more
effective approaches to raising security standards, as well as
facilitation benefits.
8. What nonintrusive technologies does CBP utilize to ensure that
the stream of commerce is not unduly interrupted?
Answer: Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technologies deployed to
our Nation's sea, air and land border ports of entry include
large-scale X-ray and gamma-imaging systems as well as a
variety of portable and hand-held technologies to include our
recent focus on radiation detection technology.
NII technologies are viewed as force multipliers that enable us
to screen or examine a larger portion of the stream of
commercial traffic while facilitating the flow of legitimate
trade, cargo and passengers.
As of mid-April 2005, CBP has 166 large-scale NII systems
deployed to our Nation's air, land and seaports of entry. The
systems include the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System
(VACIS), Mobile VACIS, Truck X-ray, Mobile Truck X-ray, Rail
VACIS, Mobile Sea Container Examination Systems, and the Pallet
Gamma-ray system.
CBP is also moving quickly to deploy nuclear and radiological
detection equipment, including Radiation Portal Monitors
(RPMs), Radiation Isotope Identifier Devices and Personal
Radiation Detectors to our ports of entry. RPMs are very
sensitive pieces of technology that allow us to seamlessly scan
conveyances for nuclear and radiological materials.
9. How are CBP officers trained? Please describe the level and
extent of this training.
Answer: Customs and Border Protection has established a
comprehensive training plan for our officers. Carrying out the
Nation's homeland security mission requires a workforce with
necessary skills and proficiency to fight terrorist threats
while effectively carrying out our traditional missions of
interdicting drugs, intercepting illegal immigrants, and
facilitating legitimate trade and travel. CBP was faced with
the need to bring three distinct mandates together under the
position description of one officer. The goal is to train the
new CBP Officer to not only be equally competent in all of the
former, individual areas of responsibility, but also to be
better able to meet the expanded mission priority of anti-
terrorism.
With the significant increase in the knowledge required for the
CBP Officer, it was recognized that in order to not overwhelm
the CBP Officers, it was necessary to develop a progressive
roll out of training that allows officers sufficient time to
assimilate the information into strong job task competencies,
while building in sufficient personnel deployment controls to
assure that the work was performed in a successful and timely
manner.
The critical tasks required of the CBP Officer were identified
and an instructional systems design approach was applied to
build logic, simplicity, and progression into the training
required to meet the wide diversity of duties performed by a
CBP Officer. This diversity was further delineated as it
relates to new hires as opposed to the incumbent workforce who
were transferred from the legacy agencies.
From this perspective, training for new hires was divided into
three major units: a 20 day pre-academy, a 73 day basic CBPI
Academy at Glynco, Georgia and INPORT training which includes
37 modules of specific training to be delivered upon the
students' return from the Academy, and prior to completion of
their probationary period.
Training for all incumbent officers is ongoing. It incorporates
many training methodologies to assist legacy officers in
expanding their competencies within the new mission focus. The
incumbent training also provides for in-service training of all
officers on new or modified procedures or newly identified
terrorist threats.
Currently, there are 37 different training modules being rolled
out to cross train the front line CBP Officer and the
Agriculture Specialists at air, land and seaports across the
country. Twenty of these training modules are complete and
available to the field in a variety of delivery methods. It is
our goal to have the remaining 17 built and delivered to the
field by December 2005.
Training has been built and will be delivered in structured
stages so that training can be learned and absorbed before
moving on to the next module. Cross Training will be delivered
``just in time'' based on operational needs of the agency. It
is not our intention to roll out all training modules to all
people, all at once.
There is a legitimate need to be sensitive to timing and
delivery of training modules. Modules are staged based upon
Headquarters ability to build quality training material and
trainers, and the fields' ability to deliver the training as
well as maintain effective port operations.
We are working towards creating an agency-wide law enforcement
and national security culture, establish unified primary
inspections at all United States ports of entry and conduct
secondary inspections focused primarily on combating terrorism
as well as the traditional missions inherited by Customs and
Border Protection. To do this well and effectively, we have a
built a comprehensive training plan to guide our efforts.
A very stringent 20-day pre-academy and 73-day basic academy
training curriculum has been developed for the new CBP Officer.
This training gives them the foundation that they need to work
in the primary setting upon their return to the port, while
also giving them a basic understanding of what occurs in the
secondary environments. The ultimate goal is to train the new
CBP Officer to not only be equally competent in all of the
former, individual areas of responsibility, but also to be
better able to meet the expanded mission priority of anti-
terrorism. Their Academy training is then followed by a
rigorous 2-year on-the-job training program with approximately
40-45 weeks (depending on environment - air, land or sea) of
structured training courses. They are given training in stages
in order to absorb it and be afforded time on the job to
perform the duties and become proficient.
We do have several courses which we consider to be advanced
training and they would include those that involve analytical
capabilities and the counter-terrorism response units in our
secondary areas. CBP is currently exploring the possibility of
having additional areas and courses designated as specialized
training classes.
10. What steps does CBP undertake that passengers and crew are
adequately screened at seaport entries? Does CBP coordinate with the
Terrorist Screening Center?
Answer: CBP rigorously screens watch list names from airlines
and ships (both crews and passengers), destined to the United
States transmitted in advance as mandated by law, through two
systems, the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) and
Automated Targeting Systems (ATS). IBIS and ATS employ
different algorithms to produce potential matches which require
additional vetting either prior to or upon arrival.
Likely or positive matches are first coordinated with the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which serves as the
government repository for watch list information, under HSPD-6,
for the screening of names across all agencies of the United
States Government. The TSC affirms the hit as a match, not a
match or inconclusive. Both matches and inconclusive findings
result in notification to the Counterterrorism Watch (CT Watch)
at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which directs
the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) squads around the United
States. In a collaborative manner, decisions about both
identification and admissibility are made between CBP and JTTF
agents, though CBP alone exercises the authority to admit or
refuse non-citizens at a Port of Entry (POE). Identification in
advance, coordination with the TSC and CT Watch, and
admissibility of all terror watch list cases at POEs are
resolved through the CBP's National Targeting Center, which
channels all field-level hits and maintains close communication
with both TSC and CT Watch. In this way, there is a single CBP
entity with awareness of all such hits at the more than 300
POEs in the United States, Canada, the Caribbean and Ireland.
11. Is there much overlap of responsibilities and duties with
regard to port/cargo security between agencies in DHS? If so, is this
overlap necessary? If so, why is the overlap necessary? If not, what,
if anything, can be done to prevent this overlap?
Answer: Internally, CBP is addressing border unification and
has implemented harmonized policies such as vessel boarding and
the inspection of goods and travelers. This allows for more
efficient use of resources as the functionality of legacy
agencies, immigration, customs and agriculture, is now being
carried out through a single streamlined process.
In regard to overlap between DHS agencies, DHS continues to
evaluate this issue. In the maritime environment, these roles
and responsibilities will be further defined under the NSPD-41/
HSPD-13.
12. Does each agency within DHS (or just CBP) have clearly
defined responsibilities and duties in regards to port/cargo security?
Answer: Under the delegation of authority for MTSA of 2002, DHS
has defined agency responsibilities for port/cargo security.
The Coast Guard is the lead agency for waterborne/vessel and
port facility maritime security issues. CBP is the lead agency
for international cargo. TSA is the lead for Surface and
Intermodal cargo security issues.
13. Is it possible to delegate some of your responsibilities and
duties to other government agencies, especially at the state and local
level, or perhaps even private agencies? Does C-TPAT impact DHS's
delegation of responsibilities and duties?
Answer: CBP has unique border search authority and
responsibility for the admissibility of goods and people
arriving into the United States. This accountability is not
something CBP would look to divert to other agencies or the
private industry.
A voluntary, incentives-based program, C-TPAT works through
partnership with the trade community, which leverages corporate
strength and influence to push back security enhancements
throughout the international supply chain, beyond the
regulatory reach of the U.S. Government. In light of CBP's
authority and responsibilities, this unique partnership is not
one that could or should be delegated.
14. With regard to the trade act, how do you know the manifest
data that is being transmitted to you 24 hours before shipment is
authentic? Does CBP know the manifest data's point of origin? Does CBP
know who is responsible for the manifest? Does CBP attempt to track any
documents accompanying the manifest data?
Answer: The Trade Act requires that vessel carriers or
automated Non-Vessel Operating Common Carriers (NVOCCs) provide
CBP with an approved electronic equivalent of the vessel's
Cargo Declaration (Customs Form 1302), 24 hours before the
cargo is laden aboard the vessel at the foreign port. The
current approved system for presenting electronic cargo
declaration information to CBP is the Vessel Automated Manifest
System (AMS). CBP has a multi-layer approach that involves the
Automated Targeting System, Automated Commercial System and
randomly selected vessel audits to validate cargo information
with different enforcement processes. CBP electronically
captures and retains the party transmitting the information to
CBP by system identifiers and Standard Carrier Alpha Codes
(SCAC) that are required in the transmissions. Automated
parties are not required to have an office at each location of
load to transmit that cargo information. In fact, most
automated carriers have centralized office locations that are
responsible for the transmission. There are many documents
which make up a complete manifest in addition to the cargo
declaration, which include: vessel entrance and clearance
statements, ship's stores, crew effects, crew list, and customs
and immigration forms which are presented at time of arrival.
Vessel and cargo information is recorded in CBP systems.
15. Is there any warning system in place alerting the appropriate
agency when any manifest or inventory data is altered?
Answer: The CBP automated systems track modifications and
amendments to data that is transmitted. The automated system
used by CBP also allows officers to mark cargo declaration
information transmitted to CBP as reviewed. If the cargo
information is changed after the review has occurred, the
automated system will show the cargo information as not
reviewed.
16. Can you use the automated targeting system (ATS) to
preemptively try and find ``high risk'' cargo or known terrorists on
board vessels? Do you do any kind of ``date mining'' with other
government and private databases to try and preemptively prioritize
cargo, ports, and personnel on board vessels?
Answer: The CBP Automated Targeting System (ATS) is designed to
and does pre-emptively target high-risk cargo and known
terrorists on board vessels. The CBP cargo system collects
electronic data from a variety of government and trade systems
on all manifested cargo shipments. This is completed prior to
the arrival of the vessel. Each shipment is risk-scored against
the Terrorist Screening Center data base, law enforcement and
violator data bases, as well as historical trade data. All
high-risk shipments are examined by CBP Officers.
CBP continues to enhance its existing ATS program by leveraging
ATS to integrate data elements from CBP systems and other
commercial databases. CBP's cargo systems include commercial
entry declarations, manifest, export, and enforcement
databases. The CBP Passenger system includes all crew and
passenger manifests via vessel (or aircraft) crossing the
international border. Passenger and crew manifests are
transmitted to CBP in advance of vessel arrival, and CBP works
closely with the Coast Guard in assessing the risk posed by
cargo vessel crew.
CBP uses this integrated data to risk assess and score existing
cargo, crew, and passenger data. These scored events are
evaluated against a pre-determined threshold to determine the
intensity of CBP's interdiction. CBP also utilizes the Trend
Analysis and Analytical Selectivity Program (TAP) to analyze
and identify anomalies in trends and profiles of entry summary
data. Based on operational risk assessment, comparison to
historical crossing data, and matching against the Terrorist
Screening Center data base and other law enforcement systems,
an appropriate operational plan is developed and implemented.
17. How many private port facility operators are certified in C-
TPAT? Approximately how many total private port facility operators are
in the United States?
Answer: C-TPAT maintains statistics on a variety of enrollment
sectors, but does not maintain the specific number of private
port facility operators certified in C-TPAT. However, the
following information is available: as of April 15, 2005, there
are 26 certified Marine Port Authorities and Terminal Operators
in the C-TPAT program.
CBP contacted the Federal Maritime Administration to obtain
information on the total private port facility operators in the
United States, but has not yet received that information.
18. How are federal funds currently distributed to ports
throughout the United States? Any comment on Mr. Keever's suggestion
that port security would be enhanced at a lesser cost by adopting a
``focused'' approach? According to page 23 of Mr. Keever's testimony,
``under this approach, port facilities would be differentiated based on
size, type, likelihood of being attacked and potential consequences of
an attack, and the security standards they must meet would be tailored
to their status based on these factors.''
Answer: Federal funds are distributed through Port Security
Grants (PSG) which are administered by the Office of Domestic
Preparedness (ODP) branch of DHS. Seaports submit applications
to be granted funds to enhance seaport security and these
requests are reviewed by ODP. Seaports are presently
differentiated based upon size, type and relative risk factors.
19. What are some ways you can secure our ports and cargo without
an increase in funding or personnel?
1. What about the creation of joint task forces to
prevent duplication of responsibilities and duties by
other agencies?
2. What about delegating responsibilities and duties
to other agencies; including local, state, and other
federal government agencies, or even private companies?
Answer 19:
CBP will utilize a risk management approach and
optimize all available resources.
CBP can continue to work through international forums
such as the World Customs Organization to implement a security
framework that will increase supply chain security of cargo in
foreign countries.
CBP can continue to work with other countries to
internationalize the CSI principles and increase the amount of
cargo, bound for the United States, that is inspected by those
countries prior to departure.
CBP will continue to work with the Department of
Energy with the Megaports Initiative to provide foreign ports
with radiation detection equipment.
CBP will collaborate with the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate in the development of an Advance
Container Security Device and the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office in their research and development of radiation detection
technologies.
CBP will continue to foster partnerships with the
industry and continue to strengthen voluntary, incentive-based
programs such as C-TPAT.
Answer 19 (1):
CBP has various liaisons represented at the National
Targeting Center (NTC) to streamline targeting efforts in
homeland security. Agencies represented at the NTC include:
U.S. Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration,
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and the Food and Drug Administration.
CBP often integrates operations with the USCG to
target high-risk conveyances and crew and conduct joint
enforcement boardings in order to eliminate duplication of
effort and leverage each other's capabilities and expertise.
In order to increase security at U.S. ports, CBP and
the Coast Guard have been actively engaged in coordinating
response protocols to address the threat of a nuclear or
radiological weapon of mass destruction that could be smuggled
into our country. CBP and the Coast Guard utilize a common
radiological technical reachback (i.e., CBP's Laboratories and
Scientific Services) to determine if a shipment contains
illicit nuclear or radiological materials. This shared
capability also provides for a thorough vetting of suspected
shipments through both CBP's and the Coast Guard's information
databases and watch lists.
CBP and U.S. Coast Guard, with support from TSA, are
conducting joint assessments of foreign ports to evaluate
levels of compliance with International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code (ISPS) requirements. During these joint site
assessments, CBP addresses cargo security issues in Container
Security Initiative port operations, or conducts site surveys
of designated future CSI ports.
At the field level, CBP has representation on the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Joint Terrorism Task Force as
well as other multi-agency task forces addressing maritime
security issues at the state and local level.
Answer 19 (2):
CBP has unique border search authority and responsibility for
the admissibility of goods and people arriving into the United
States. This accountability is not something CBP would look to
divert to other agencies or the private industry.
20. Please list your top three priorities in securing our ports
and cargo? Can you envision a way to accomplish these priorities
without additional funding or personnel?
Answer: CBP's top three priorities:
1) Increase CBP's ability to access and evaluate advanced
electronic information on cargo, travelers and conveyances in
order to accurately identify and interdict those that pose a
high risk to our Nation's security.
2) Partner with Foreign Governments and Trade Industry - Align
security practices and develop security frameworks with foreign
governments and continue to build partnerships with industry to
improve supply chain security.
3) Utilize and Explore New Technology - Utilize NII
technologies as a force multiplier to enable CBP to screen or
examine a larger portion of the stream of commercial traffic
while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and cargo.
Also, continue to evaluate new technologies that will increase
the efficacy of examinations, the security of the end-to-end
supply chain, and to integrate information to enhance targeting
efforts.
The following are ways in which CBP can support seaport
security:
CBP will utilize a risk management approach and
optimize all available resources.
CBP can continue to work through international forums
such as the World Customs Organization to implement a security
framework that will increase supply chain security of cargo in
foreign countries.
CBP can continue to work with other countries to
internationalize the CSI principles and increase the amount of
cargo, bound for the United States that is inspected by those
countries prior to departure.
CBP will continue to work with the Department of
Energy with the Megaports Initiative to provide foreign ports
with radiation detection equipment.
CBP will collaborate with the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate in the development of an Advance
Container Security Device and the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office in their research and development of radiation detection
technologies.
CBP will continue to foster partnerships with the
industry and continue to strengthen voluntary, incentive-based
programs such as C-TPAT.
21. Does the type of container inhibit inspection in any way? If
so, how? Would a uniform container requirement help ease the burden of
inspection?
Answer: CBP continues to strive to enhance our inspection
capabilities through the evaluation and adoption of emerging
technologies. CBP is currently able to scan a container
efficiently and is not inhibited by the type of container.
22. How often is a cargo vessel coming into the United States
required to take a physical inventory of its cargo? After the cargo
vessel takes a physical inventory of its cargo, is the cargo vessel
required to report its findings to anyone?
Answer: CBP requires that all cargo on board a vessel destined
for a U.S. port of call whether or not to be discharged in the
United States be transmitted in the Automated Manifest System
to CBP. CBP does perform random validations of cargo
transmitted to CBP compared to the cargo being discharged at
the port of call.
----------
Response to Question for the Record submitted by Rear Admiral Larry
Hereth, Director od Port Security, U.S. Coast Guard
SECURITY ASSESSMENTS
QUESTION:
Port facilities and vessels across the nation were required to
submit a security assessment and a security plan to the Coast Guard to
identify aspects of each port facility and vessel that were deemed
vulnerabilities by July 1, 2004.
(a) According to a report entitled Secure Seas, Open Ports some
9500 vessels have submitted assessments and plans earlier this
year. Has that number changed? What is the number as a
percentage of vessels doing business in our ports?
Additionally, the Report states that 2500 facilities submitted
both a security assessment and a security plan earlier this
Year. What is that number as a percentage of port facilities in
the United States?
(b) How do these assessments and security plans help the Coast
Guard's law enforcement responsibilities?
ANSWER:
The Coast Guard has reviewed and approved security plans for
approximately 10,900 vessels. This number includes all vessels required
to operate under approved security plans in accordance with the
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) including approximately
1600 additional vessels required to comply under the new regulations
designating ammonium nitrate as a Certain Dangerous Cargo. MTSA applies
to almost all ships carrying packaged or bulk cargo. The rule excludes
most of the U.S small passenger vessels because the rule applies to
only those that have Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) certificates and
those carrying more than 150 passengers.
Over 3,000 facilities have submitted security assessments and plans
and currently operate under approved Facility Security Plans. This
number includes all facilities, including port facilities, required to
operate under approved security plans in accordance with MTSA as
defined in 33 CFR, part 105.
These requirements support the Coast Guard's law enforcement
responsibilities by requiring the use of facility and vessel security
plans as a strategy to reduce maritime risk by establishing separate
measures and protocols focused on preventing transportation security
incidents and improving response if an incident occurs. Vessel and
facility security plans must identify the qualified individual having
full authority to implement security actions and also detail provisions
for establishing and maintaining
Physical security
Passenger and cargo security
Personnel security
Additional security measures necessary to deter a
transportation security incident.
WHAT HAS THE CG DONE TO IMPROVE SECURITY SINCE 9/11
QUESTION:
Are the port facilities and coastal areas more secure since 9/11?
What has the Coast Guard done since the 9/11 attacks to improve this
security?
ANSWER:
Our port facilities and coastal areas are significantly more secure
now than they were prior to 9/11. Since 9/11, we've made great progress
in securing America's waterways, while continuing to facilitate the
flow of commerce. It is a complicated effort with broad strategic
implications. To execute this strategy, we continue to focus on the 4
pillars of our maritime security strategy:
Enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA),
Creating and overseeing a domestic/international
maritime security regime,
Increasing/enhancing operational presence, and
Improving our response and recovery posture.
These pillars guide our transformation of Coast Guard authorities,
capabilities, and capacity, with an eye toward reducing risk and
preserving an appropriate mission balance. There is no doubt that work
remains, but there is also no doubt that we continue to improve
maritime homeland security each and every day. Although certainly not
all inclusive, a few examples follow:
Enhance global MDA
Before 9/11 there was no mandatory ship-tracking
requirement; the Coast Guard has since forged an international
agreement to accelerate the requirement for Automatic Identification
System (AIS) capability that went into effect in December 2004.
Simultaneously, we have initiated a major acquisition project to
implement nationwide AIS capabilities allowing for deployment of
immediate capability including AIS shore stations in VTS ports,
outfitting NOAA buoys offshore, and testing AIS receiving capability
from a low-flying satellite. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2006 budget
requests $29.1 million to further deploy AIS capability throughout the
U.S.
Create & oversee maritime security regime
Before 9/11 we had no formal international or domestic
maritime security regime for ports, port facilities, and ships - with
the exception of cruise ships. Partnering with domestic and
international stakeholders, including the International Maritime
organization, a comprehensive domestic security regime (Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA)) and an international security
convention (International Ship and Port facility Security (ISPS) Code)
we established July 1, 2004. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2006 budget
fully supports continued enforcement of MTSA regulations and ISPS code.
Deployed field intelligence support teams to better
collect and disseminate maritime threat information.
Increase/enhance operational presence
Since 9/11, the Coast Guard has implemented several
initiatives that have considerably increased operational presence,
enhancing the Coast Guard's ability to protect the U.S. maritime
domain, and prevent terrorists attacking. Initiatives include:
Established 13 new Maritime Safety and
Security Teams,
Deployed over 80 new small boats (RB-S) and
boat crews,
Provided radiation detection capabilities to
our boarding teams,
Acquired 15 Coastal Patrol boats ( the Coast
Guard's 110' and 87' Cutters) and 4 Patrol Coastals
(These are the Navy's PC-170s which were transferred to
the Coast Guard. Patrol Coastal is the Navy equivalent
to the Coast Guard's Coastal Patrol) to increase
operational presence in our ports.
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2006 budget continues to
invest in initiatives focused on improving the quantity and quality of
Coast Guard presence including:
Continued implementation of Airborne Use of
Force for Coast Guard helicopters,
Permanent establishment of an enhanced MSST,
14 additional RB-S allowances, and
Continued implementation of the Deepwater
program including production of the third national
Security Cutter, and design of the first offshore
Patrol Cutter.
Improve response & recovery posture
Since 9/11, the Coast Guard has begun establishing Sector
commands. Sectors streamline command-and-control, provide unity of
command, and one-stop shopping for port stakeholders and will have long
term positive impacts on Coast Guard response and recovery posture.
The Coast Guard is currently deploying Rescue 21 to
replace the existing out-dated National Response System. Rescue 21 will
serve as the Coast Guard's primary communications system and will
greatly improve interoperability with other Federal, State, and local
agencies for the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2006 budget request $101
million to continue deployment of the Rescue 21 system.
CARGO SECURITY COORDINATION
QUESTION:
What steps have been taken to increase coordination and cooperation
with other DHS agencies, specifically CBP, to increase security of
cargo arriving at U.S. ports?
ANSWER:
DHS operating elements have exchanged liaison officers to
facilitate information sharing for critical processes including among
the Coast Guard's (CG) Intelligence Coordination Center Customs &
Border Protection's (CBP) National Targeting Center, enabling timely
and effective information sharing and analysis of cargo and vessel
targeting data. As part of this effort, the CG and CBP have worked to
harmonize their advance information requirements such that the advance
notice of arrival information for vessels and cargo is not redundant
and allows both agencies to coordinate the identification and tracking
of high risk cargo and/or vessels. Similarly, efforts are underway to
ensure that results from the Coast Guard's International Port Security
(IPS) program are available and considered as part of cargo targeting
practices. The IPS program visits foreign ports in order to assess port
compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security
(ISPS) code, share best practices and help raise global port security
postures. The CG's IPS program is also leveraging partnerships with
CBP's Container Security Initiative (CSI) in order to coordinate visits
and assessment results and provide as comprehensive a picture as
possible of foreign port security. At the local level, the Area
Maritime Security Committees are the primary mechanisms for government
agency cooperation and coordination on port security matters. The CG
Captain of the Port and CBP Port Directors are prominent members of
these committees. Each provides agency staffs to participate on
subcommittees and workgroups that serve to coordinate cargo
inspections, joint vessel boarding operations, information sharing,
contingency planning, and security plan exercises.
Though the Coast Guard coordinates with ICE on many issues, cargo
security is primarily a CBP function but not one of ICE's. ICE is a
member of Area Maritime Security Committees and as such is involved in
the overall security discussions.
BIGGEST CHALLENGES RELATED TO MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY
QUESTION:
What are the biggest challenges you're facing related to maritime
homeland security?
ANSWER:
The Coast Guard's overarching goal related to maritime homeland
security is to prevent terrorist attacks within, or exploitation of,
the U.S. maritime domain. Doing so requires a risk-based approach to
identifying and intercepting threats well before they reach U.S. shores
by conducting layered, multi-agency security operations while
strengthening the security posture of strategic economic and military
ports. Specific challenges to conducting these operations are:
Coast Guard Recapitalization
Readiness of Coast Guard surface and air fleet is a
continuing challenge. The Coast Guard lost 742 Cutter days (10%
of fleet availability) in 2004 due to major equipment
casualties; the 110-foot patrol boat fleet suffered 20 hull
breaches in the last three years; cutters and aircraft employ
technology from the 1960's.
In 2004, the Coast Guard was forced to begin an
immediate re-engining of its HH-65 helicopter fleet because of
an increased rate of in-flight engine power losses (329/100,000
flight hours, while the FAA/Navy standard is 1/100,000 flight
hours).
Despite spending over 50% more than budgeted amounts
on maintenance and repair of legacy assets, the major Coast
Guard Cutter fleet is forced to operate with degraded
operational capability nearly 60% of the time.
Continued recapitalization of surface and air fleet
through the Deepwater acquisition is critical to current and
future readiness. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
submitted the Revised Deepwater Implementation Plan to
Congress, on March 25, 2005, which updates the program to
include critical post-9/11 mission requirements and important
new capabilities: airborne use of force, Department of Defense
(DOD)/DHS interoperability, and enhanced cutter interdiction
capabilities.
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2006 budget proposes
significant investments in recapitalizing the Coast Guard to
ensure the Coast Guard is equipped to meet its mission demands.
Initiatives include:
- $966 million for the Deepwater program will fund
production of the third National Security Cutter,
design and long lead materials for the first Offshore
Patrol Cutter, six legacy cutter mission effectiveness
projects, continued acquisition of Vertical Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles, and complete re-engining of the Coast
Guard's fleet of operational HH-65 aircraft;
- $101 million for continued nationwide deployment of
Rescue 21 - recapitalization of the Coast Guard's
national distress and response communications system;
- $22 million to continue the replacement of the Coast
Guard's aging and obsolete 41-foot utility boat fleet
with the Response Boat-Medium; and
- $39.7 million to replace deteriorating shore
facility infrastructure necessary to support the Coast
Guard's operational assets.
Coast Guard Operational Presence & Response Posture
The Coast Guard continues to strive to increase
operational presence and response posture to reduce the risk of
a maritime terrorist attack and to improve the Coast Guard's
ability to minimize impacts on the maritime transportation
system in the event an attack occurs. The Coast Guard's fiscal
year 2006 budget provides resources for several initiatives
focused on enhancing Coast Guard operational presence and
response posture including:
- $19.9 million to arm Coast Guard helicopters at five
Coast Guard air stations, significantly improving the
Coast Guard's ability to stop maritime threats;
- $10.1 million to enhance cutter boat response by
replacing obsolete cutter boats and failing small boat
davit systems;
- $11 million for 14 additional response boat-small
allowances and Liquefied Natural Gas screening
personnel to improve presence in key U.S. ports; and
- Reallocation of $20.8 million of base resources to
permanently establish an Enhanced Maritime Safety and
Security Team to help fill gaps in U.S. maritime
counterterrorism capabilities.
Maritime Domain Awareness
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is absolutely
essential to both maritime security and defense operations and
is the lynchpin to identifying threats as early and as far from
the homeland as possible.
Absent actionable cueing intelligence information, we
hope to disrupt terrorists' planning and execution of
operations, thereby deterring attacks, stalling them, or
affecting their timing. Effective and integrated intelligence
information analysis and dissemination assists in focusing the
right effort against the right threat in the right location(s).
Recognizing the impossibility of defending
against every vector of attack, external and internal,
to the 3.4 million square miles of U.S. Maritime
Exclusive Economic Zone, we must improve our level of
awareness and knowledge of all maritime activities.
Only then will we be able to facilitate decision making
and enable an early and effective response.
In response to NSPD 41/HSPD 13, the Coast
Guard, on behalf of DHS, is leading the effort in
concert with DOD to develop a National Plan for MDA.
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2006 budget
continues the Coast Guard's aggressive implementation
of comprehensive MDA capabilities. Initiatives include:
- $29.1 million to continue nationwide implementation
of Automatic Identification System capability.
- $5.7 million to deploy the Common Operational
Picture throughout Coast Guard regional command
centers;
- $16.5 million to provide additional C130H maritime
patrol aircraft flight hours and establish a forward
operating location to increase aircraft time on-
station; and
- $7 million to improve radiological/nuclear detection
capabilities in conjunction with the DHS Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office.
RESOURCES & CAPABILITIES TO REDUCE PORT VULNERABLITY
QUESTION: What new resources and capabilities have been added by
the Coast Guard in order to reduce the vulnerability of ports and port
facilities?
ANSWER:
Before the events of 11 September 2001, the Coast Guard had limited
mandatory ship-tracking requirements. Since then, the Coast Guard has
led the international maritime community in accelerating the
requirements for vessels to carry Automatic Identification System (AIS)
equipment. These international requirements, along with more extensive
domestic requirements, went into effect in December 2004.
Simultaneously, the Coast Guard initiated a major acquisition project
to acquire shoreside AIS capability to improve Maritime Domain
Awareness (MDA). Initial efforts under this project have allowed the
Coast Guard to deploy AIS shore stations in various major ports and
other coastal areas, outfit offshore National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration weather buoys with AIS, and develop AIS receiving
capability from a commercial low earth orbit satellite.
Before 9/11, the Coast Guard had no formal international or
domestic maritime security regime for ports, port facilities, and ships
- with the exception of cruise ships. Through partnering with domestic
and international stakeholders, both a comprehensive domestic security
regime and an international security convention are now in place. Both
have been in force since July 1, 2004.
In addition, the Coast Guard has increased and enhanced its
operational presence by:
Establishing 13 new Maritime Safety and Security
Teams,
Deploying over 80 new small boats (RB-S) and boat
crews,
Providing radiation detection capabilities to
boarding teams,
Deploying field intelligence support teams to better
collect and disseminate maritime threat information, and;
Acquiring 15 Coastal Patrol boats and 4 Patrol
coastal vessels.
Upgrading sensors for command and control in New
York, Boston, Miami, Charleston, Hampton Roads, and San Diego.
Establishing a national maritime Common Operational
Picture.
Developing maritime asset tracking technology for
federal, state, local vessels.
Expanding information sharing between the Coast
Guard, other DHS components, Department of Defense, and other
federal, state, and local agencies.
Before 9/11, Coast Guard prevention, protection, and response
activities were coordinated by multiple commands in a single geographic
location. Since 9/11, the Coast Guard has begun combining Group and
Marine Safety Office commands into Sectors to streamline the Coast
Guard's command-and-control structure, provide unity of command, and
one-stop shopping for port stakeholders, and enhance the Coast Guard's
response and recovery posture.
To further reduce maritime risk, the Coast Guard:
Established Area Maritime Security Committees
Reviewed and approved security plans for
approximately 3,000 facilities and over 10,900 vessels, and;
Completed port security assessments at the 55 U.S.
ports previously identified as militarily and economically
strategic.
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2006 budget proposes continued
investment in reducing vulnerabilities within U.S. ports by focusing
resources to further enhance MDA and increase operational presence and
response posture; critical elements of the Department of Homeland
Security's Maritime Security Strategy.
NOA ACCURACY
QUESTION:
Under 33 CFR 160; subpart C, all vessels entering a U.S. port or
place must provide a notice of arrival (NOA) 96 or 24 hours, whichever
is applicable, prior to entering the designated port or place. Any
vessel that fails to provide an NOA within the timeframe specified in
the NOA regulation will be denied entry into port. The NOA must include
among other requirements: A list of crew including nationality and
their primary position on board; the name of the owner and operator;
and vessel cargo information (i.e. general description of cargo on
board other than Certain Dangerous Cargo (CDC) and/or list and amount
of CDC carried). What steps have been taken to ensure the accuracy of
security information provided by vessels as it relates to Notice of
Arrival data?
ANSWER:
To ensure vessels comply with the Notice of Arrival (NOA)
regulation the Coast Guard (CG) developed a strict enforcement policy
that directs that no vessel shall be permitted to enter the designated
U.S. port or place until all required information has been submitted to
the CG within the time frames stipulated by the regulation. Upon
receipt of the NOA information, the CG's Intelligence Coordination
Center (ICC) vets the information against various databases to
determine any anomalies with regard to vessel, cargo and people. CG and
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers at CBP's National
Targeting Center also assist in the vetting process. Lastly, CG and CBP
personnel verify the validity of people, cargo, and vessel information
during at sea and dockside boardings. Since July 1, 2004, every vessel
arriving from a foreign port has been boarded at least once to verify
compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
and to check the accuracy of their notice of arrival.
DOES THE CG HAVE ADEQUATE RESOURCES FOR MTSA?
QUESTION:
Does the Coast Guard have adequate resources (personnel and
funding) to continue enforcement efforts under MTSA?
ANSWER: The Coast Guard was appropriated approximately $101 million
in fiscal year 2005 to implement the Maritime Transportation Security
Act of 2002 (MTSA). The fiscal year 2006 budget includes an additional
$31 million for annualization of MTSA work, providing the Coast Guard
with the resources required to enforce MTSA on an annual, going-forward
basis.
MDA ENHANCEMENT OF PORT AND VESSEL SECURITY
QUESTION:
It is my understanding that the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
provides information regarding the maritime environment that could
adversely affect America's security, safety, economy, or environment.
Does MDA provide intelligence and information for law enforcement
efforts to protect our ports? What are the Coast Guard's MDA efforts
that demonstrate how the different initiatives under MDA enhance port
and vessel security?
ANSWER:
MDA, an effective understanding of anything associated with global
Maritime Domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or
environment of the United States, is a critical element of the Coast
Guard's maritime security strategy. The Coast Guard has a number of
efforts implemented and in progress designed to improve the effective
understanding of the maritime environment to support operational
commanders in targeting operational assets toward identified potential
threats. These efforts involve:
Improved partnering between federal state, local agencies and
maritime industry - The Coast Guard leads and coordinates Area Maritime
Security Committees in all major ports. In some ports, the Coast Guard
already hosts or participates in interagency command centers; a concept
of operations being considered for expansion. Additionally, the Coast
Guard is designing technologies that will improve partnering efforts
such as a web client that will share the Coast Guard's Common
Operational Picture with other waterborne agencies as well as make
other important information available to industry, and ``blue force''
asset tracking that will allow all enforcement vessels to be aware of
each others location and to be tracked by the local command center.
Long Range Vessel Tracking - The Coast Guard is pursing several
initiatives to ensure we are able to track vessels that are more than
24 miles from U.S. shores. These include developing a universal
reporting requirement through the International Maritime Organization,
agreements made directly with other seagoing nations regarding vessels
registered within their states, obtaining intelligence and other
information from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the national
intelligence community, and working with DOD to explore and support new
technologies that would provide improved capabilities. Additionally, we
have contracted for a satellite to be launched in late 2006 that will
carry an AIS (Automatic Identification System) receiver which will
allow the Coast Guard to monitor the positions of cooperating major
cargo vessels in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The Coast Guard
has also deployed AIS receivers on oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico,
contracted receipt of AIS data from vessel operations from the Aleutian
Islands, and are deploying AIS receivers on offshore National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration data buoys to enhance long range
tracking capabilities.
Short Range Vessel Tracking - The Hawkeye port sensors and
operations test bed that the Coast Guard is operating in Miami in
conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology directorate is one example of the progress made with short
range tracking. Information gained through this prototype effort is
being applied to improve operations at the 11 ports where existing
surveillance capabilities exist including Vessel Traffic Systems, and
to develop standards and criteria for implementation of surveillance in
other port and coastal areas. Additionally, the Coast Guard has
deployed AIS capabilities enabling the monitoring 70% of compliant
vessels on international voyages. To further leverage AIS technology,
the Coast Guard has initiated a major systems acquisition, the
Nationwide AIS project, to install capabilities to monitor 100% of the
nation's navigable waterways, transform the supporting infrastructure
from a patchwork of ad hoc connections to a reliable network, and to
add historic and enforcement information to vessel tracks before
displaying them in the Common Operational Picture. The Coast Guard's
fiscal year 2006 budget requests $29.1 million to continue deployment
of the Nationwide AIS system.
Information Fusion - The Coast Guard has several efforts underway
to improve our ability to correlate information from various dispersed
data bases and across levels of security. These include improvements to
automated features that are a part of our Common Operational Picture, a
cooperative effort with the states to allow enforcement officials
access to recreational vessel registration information, and a multi-
year effort with the Naval Research Lab to automate an number of
laborious and time consuming analytical functions.
Intelligence - The Coast Guard and Navy continue to build an
effective joint intelligence partnership to enhance maritime domain
awareness. The Coast Guard's Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) is
co-located with the Office of Naval Intelligence, which comprises the
National Maritime Intelligence Center. The ICC's COASTWATCH gathers and
analyzes information on ship notice of arrival reports on vessels,
people, and certain dangerous cargoes approaching U.S. ports.
Additionally, the Coast Guard operates Maritime Intelligence Fusion
Centers under each Area Commander, providing actionable intelligence to
operational commanders and agency partners. Field Intelligence Support
Teams operate in 29 U.S. ports and have increased the collection and
reporting of intelligence and information. Through its Coast Guard
Investigative Service branch, the Coast Guard Intelligence Program
participates in Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Forces, and joint agency operations to share
intelligence information with other local and federal agencies.
These Maritime Domain Awareness initiatives will allow the Coast
Guard to better screen the people, cargo and vessels operating in the
maritime domain and to discern the legitimate from the illegal owners/
operators of vessels. It will also give us the ability to detect, and
interdict suspected targets further from our shores, reducing America's
maritime risk.
EFFICIENCIES GAINED RELATED TO CUSTOMS LAWS
QUESTION:
What efficiencies have been gained by the Coast Guard in the
performance of your duties relating to Customs laws since the standup
of the Department of Homeland Security? How does the Coast Guard work
with law enforcement agencies outside of the Department of Homeland
Security to protect the ports and vessels?
ANSWER:
The Coast Guard, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are improving law
enforcement in the port through a variety of coordination initiatives.
Officers of the Coast Guard, ICE, and CBP are all ``customs officers''
pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930 and, as such, share unique search,
seizure, and arrest authorities that enhance cooperative efforts. CBP's
border search authority, combined with the authority of customs
officers to carry firearms and to make warrantless arrests for any
federal violation occurring in their presence, vests customs officers
with the broadest law enforcement authority in the United States.
Moreover, customs officers are authorized to stop vehicles, and board
vessels and aircraft without a warrant to perform customs inquiries and
border searches. ICE special agents also have the authority to seek and
obtain search warrants, court orders authorizing the interception of
communications, administrative summonses, and are authorized to conduct
undercover investigative operations in the enforcement of law. Any
merchandise or conveyance involved in a customs violation is generally
subject to civil forfeiture and may be seized by customs officers
without a warrant. Cooperative vessel arrival screening, joint boarding
and investigations, coordinated cargo screening, and aerial patrol
scheduling are examples of activities that create efficiency and
effectiveness.
Since the stand up of the Department of Homeland Security, the
Coast Guard has established 43 Area Maritime Security Committees, which
serves as the primary mechanisms for government agency security
cooperation and coordination in America's ports. Each committee is
comprised of Federal, State, and local agencies, law enforcement and
security agencies, and other key port stakeholders. The committees
develop and maintain local area maritime security plans, which provide
a framework for communication and coordination amongst all of the
appropriate federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to carry
out port security missions.
Coast Guard Operational Commanders also coordinate Ports,
Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) law enforcement operations
afloat and ashore, to the greatest extent possible, with appropriate
international, federal, state, and local authorities. If a potential
PWCS threat or incident appears to exceed the capability of available
Coast Guard resources, the Coast Guard seeks assistance from
appropriate services and agencies. In 46 U.S.C. 70119, Congress
explicitly authorized any State or local government law enforcement
officer who has authority to enforce State criminal laws to make an
arrest for violation of a security zone regulation under the Magnuson
Act, or a security or safety zone regulation under section 7(b) of the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act, or a safety zone regulation prescribed
under section 10(d) of the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 by a Coast Guard
official authorized by law to prescribe such regulations if: (1) such a
violation is a felony; and (2) the officer has reasonable grounds to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing
such violation. This authority has helped the Coast Guard leverage the
capabilities and willingness of State law enforcement partners in order
to help augment our collective presence within and around security
zones.
ADEQUATE LEGAL AUTHORITY?
QUESTION:
Does the Coast Guard have adequate legal authority to provide the
necessary security in our ports?
ANSWER:
Yes. The Coast Guard has the necessary legal authorities to ensure
the security of our nation's ports and waterways. We are constantly
examining our authorities, and when it is determined that changes are
necessary in order to meet our maritime security responsibilities they
will be proposed as part of new legislation.
ADEQUATE NBC WEAPONS TESTING EQUIPMENT
QUESTION:
Does the Coast Guard have adequate equipment to inspect cargo for
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons at sea? Does such mobile
inspection equipment even exist? If so, how much does the equipment
cost? How difficult would it be to have the Coast Guard inspect vessels
at sea?
ANSWER:
The Coast Guard (CG) has deployed varying levels of equipment to
aid in the detection of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Each
of these threats is unique and the capabilities to detect them vary
according to the threat. Below is a summary of CG capabilities:
Rad/Nuc - The CG has some capability to detect, localize,
characterize and identify radioactive/nuclear (Rad/Nuc) materials
through the use of personnel portable search tools. The current CG
program is summarized below:
CG policy and procedures have been developed to
provide guidance for conducting operations involving the
detection of radiological and nuclear materials.
Designed around the concept that during the course of
conducting traditional missions, Maritime Inspectors and
Boarding Team members wearing Personal Radiation Detectors
(PRDs) may discover the presence of a radiation source.
Certain trained members may further investigate by
using hand-held isotope ``Identifinders'' to rapidly assess and
classify the source. Information gained is transmitted to the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Laboratory and Scientific
Services to ensure proper diagnosis. If doubt still exists,
Department of Energy Radiological Assistance Program teams are
called to assist.
When intelligence indicates an elevated threat, the
Coast Guard has the ability to conduct wide area searches using
RadPacks - radiation sensors, larger than the PRD, with
increased sensitivity and range - carried in a backpack worn by
a boarding team member. RadPacks decrease the time needed to
search large ships.
The Coast Guard's Radiation Detection Program
increases our organic capability and is specifically designed
for the maritime interdiction of radiological and nuclear
materials.
1300 PRDs ($2,650 each), 250 Identifinders ($16,955
each), and 38 RadPacks ($30,100 each) have been distributed to
the field.
Chemical - Current technology precludes detection of chemical or
biological threats prior to release. CG capability to detect chemical
threats is limited to post-release detection with portable equipment.
Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) provided to
Maritime Inspectors and Boarding Team members includes
GasAlertClips (detects oxygen deficient environments),
GasAlertMicro (gas monitor tests for oxygen, carbon monoxide,
hydrogen sulfide and lower explosion limit), and Hazmat Strips
(alerts crews to potential presence of weapons of mass
destruction agents).
National Strike Force units possess various portable
chemical detection instruments for air, liquids, and solids and
the ability to respond to most chemical incidents (with
appropriate PPE).
Biological - Available technology precludes detecting Biological
threats prior to release. CG Strike Teams are equipped with the
necessary PPE to operate in a contaminated environment.
Future Plans:
The CG will continue to develop long-range, standoff
radiation detection capabilities through research and
development efforts coordinated with interagency partners.
Fielding additional radiation detection equipment
(identifinders and backpacks) in Fiscal Year 2005, with funds
appropriated in prior years..
Implement a maintenance and logistics support plan to
support field personnel.
As part of the DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
proposal, the CG's 2006 budget request includes an additional
$7 million for improved Rad/Nuc detection capabilities,
including:
Enhanced Rad/Nuc detection & response
capability for Coast Guard Strike Teams, E-MSST
(Chesapeake), and MSSTs (San Diego and New Orleans).
Equipping our 378-foot and 270-foot cutters
with Specific Emitter Identification (SEI) equipment -
improving vessel detection and identification
capability.
The Department of Homeland Security recently approved
the revised the mission needs statement of CG Deepwater
recapitalization project to provide for Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Equipment (CBRNE) capabilities among
all our aircraft and major cutters. The reality of this change
will begin in 2007 with the delivery of the first National
Security Cutter equipped with stand-off detection capability
and capable of operating for extended periods of time in
contaminated environments.
DELEGATING AUTHORITY TO OTHER AGENCIES
QUESTION:
Is it possible to delegate some of your responsibilities and duties
to other government agencies, especially at the state and local level,
or perhaps even private agencies? Does C-TPAT effect the Coast Guard's
delegation of responsibilities and duties?
ANSWER:
No. The Coast Guard has a mandatory duty, pursuant to 14 U.S.C.
Sec. 2, to carry out law enforcement and assistance duties and, among
other things, to promulgate and enforce regulations for the promotion
of safety of life and property at sea. Thus, the transfer of Coast
Guard ``responsibilities and duties'' to other federal agencies (or
private entities), as a general proposition, is not consistent with
federal law.
Pursuant to 14 U.S.C. Sec. 141(b), the Coast Guard has authority
to request and receive law enforcement assistance from other government
agencies under certain circumstances. However, the Coast Guard's law
enforcement authority cannot be transferred to, or used by, an
assisting entity. Accordingly, each entity providing assistance must do
so within the bounds imposed by relevant federal law, and the entity's
own legal authority and policy, which in certain circumstances may
permit the assisting agency to enforce federal law. For example, in
implementation of merchant mariner credentialing program, the Coast
Guard is working with the Transportation Security Administration for
interoperability between the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential program and the merchant mariner credentialing.
The President, pursuant to the Magnuson Act and 33 C.F.R. Sec.
6.04-11, authorized Coast Guard Captains of the Port (COTP) to enlist
the aid and cooperation of federal, state, county, municipal, and
private entities to assist in the enforcement of regulations issued
pursuant to 33 C.F.R. Part 6. A request for assistance under 14 U.S.C.
Sec. 141(b) or 33 C.F.R. Sec. 6.04-11, and the acceptance of it, have
no effect on the assisting entity's existing law enforcement powers. In
other words, the assisting entity's organic legal authority and policy
will dictate the scope of assistance it may provide. No law enforcement
power is implied with, or derived from, the request for assistance from
the Coast Guard.
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is an
initiative focused on self-security (by private firms) of the
commercial supply chain. This initiative does not afford a legal basis
for the Coast Guard to delegate any authority, function or
responsibility to any other federal agency or non-federal entity.
CROSS TRAINING WITH INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES
QUESTION:
Are you currently involved in any cross-agency training or training
of international agencies with similar missions? Do you think it would
be beneficial to send Coast Guard personnel overseas (and to other
agencies within the United States) to assist in training?
ANSWER:
The Coast Guard's International Port Security Program (IPSP)
participates with the Maritime Administration in providing IPSP
Training to Latin American nations through the auspices of the
Organization of American States. In addition, the program participates
with the Transportation Security Administration in the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation Forum in a similar fashion. IPSP Program personnel
have also acted as instructors at International Maritime Organization
(IMO) regional training sessions, and are investigating whether or not
participation in the Secretariat of Pacific Countries (a regional body
involving the small independent Pacific Islands) is feasible. The
program is working with the U.S. Trade Development Agency to identify
potential training for countries in Africa. This training is beneficial
to maritime security worldwide and should be continued.
Furthermore, while not strictly training per se, the Coast Guard
provides technical expertise in port security to U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) in the Container Security Initiative port
assessments, the Department of Energy in their Proliferation Security
Initiative port assessments, and the Department of State in their
Maritime Needs Assessments.
AUTHORITY TO BOARD VESSELS
QUESTION:
Can the Coast Guard board a vessel and do an inspection or do you
first need some kind of indication of an illegal activity? What kind of
factors indicating illegal activity are necessary before you may board
a vessel at sea and do an inspection? In light of 9/11 and increased
terrorist threat, do you feel at all burdened by this standard?
ANSWER:
No indications of illegal activity are necessary for a Coast Guard
boarding because 14 U.S.C. Sec. 89 \1\ permits, inter alia, Coast
Guard ``commissioned, warrant, and petty officers . . . at any time
[to] go on board . . . any vessel subject to the jurisdiction or to the
operation of any law, of the United States.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 14 USC Sec. 89 is the principal source of Coast Guard maritime
law enforcement authority
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It provides:
A. The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations,
inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high
seas and waters over which the United States has
jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and
suppression of violations of laws of the United States. For
such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers
may at any time go on board of any vessel subject to the
jurisdiction or to the operation of any law of the United
States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the
ship's documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and
search the vessel, and use all necessary force to compel
compliance. When from such inquiries, examination,
inspection, or search it appears that a breach of the laws
of the United States rendering a person liable to arrest is
being, or has been committed, by any person, such person
shall be arrested or, if escaping to shore, shall be
immediately pursued and arrested on shore, or other lawful
and appropriate action shall be taken; or, if it shall
appear that a breach of the laws of the United States has
been committed so as to render such vessel, or the
merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of, or brought
into the United States by, such vessel, liable to
forfeiture, or so as to render such vessel liable to a fine
or penalty, and if necessary to secure such fine or
penalty, such vessel or such merchandise, or both, shall be
seized.
B. The officers of the Coast Guard insofar as they are
engaged, pursuant to the authority contained in this
section, in enforcing any law of the United States shall:
(1) Be deemed to be acting as agents of the particular
executive department or independent establishment charged
with the administration of the particular law; and
(2) Be subject to all the rules and regulations promulgated
by such department or independent establishment with
respect to the enforcement of that law
C. The provisions of this section are in addition to any
powers conferred by law.
SECURING OUR PORTS WITHOUT INCREASING FUNDING
QUESTION:
What are some ways you can secure our ports and cargo without an
increase in funding or personnel?
(a) What about the creation of joint task forces to prevent
duplication of responsibilities and duties by other agencies?
(b) What about delegating responsibilities and duties to other
agencies, including local, state, and other federal agencies,
or even private companies?
ANSWER:
(a) The Coast Guard maximizes the effectiveness of its operational
efforts through a risk-based approach to identify and intercept threats
before they reach U.S. shores; through layered, multi-agency security
operations nationwide, and through partnership with port officials and
the private sector. The Coast Guard is employing this risk-based
approach, including the emphasis on close coordination with other
agencies and stakeholders, at the international, national, regional,
and local level. These partnerships include maritime industry
organizations, such as the International Council of Cruise Lines, the
Passenger Vessel Association, and the American Waterways Operators. The
Coast Guard also has a maritime community watch program called Americas
Waterway Watch (AWW) designed to help citizens report suspicious
activities. While personnel and other costs are incurred in
establishing and maintaining AWW and the various other agency and
industry partnerships, the resource demands are small relative to the
benefits gained.
The Coast Guard also coordinates public and private maritime
security efforts through Coast Guard led port-level Area Maritime
Security (AMS) Committees. These Committees provide a forum for
bringing the perspectives and capabilities of member organizations
together to ensure that risks are identified, prioritized, and
addressed while continuing to facilitate the safe and efficient flow of
commerce. The primary purpose of AMS Committees is to develop an AMS
Plan that will serve as a framework for communication and coordination
among port stakeholders. These committees support formal coordination
arrangements, such as the Joint Terrorism Task Forces developed and led
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The committees also provide an
avenue to organize task forces to conduct security related missions
such as joint vessel boardings and other operations.
(b) The Coast Guard, as the lead Department of Homeland Security
agency for maritime security, shares many port security
responsibilities and duties with other federal, state and local law
enforcement agencies as well as public and private stakeholders. This
is consistent with the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
(P.L. 107-295) which places primary responsibility for protection of
privately owned port infrastructure on the owner/operator and requires
owners of regulated vessels and facilities to conduct vulnerability
assessments and produce individual security plans. Some private
companies are hiring professional security services to assist with plan
development, access control, security patrols and physical protection
services. These responsibilities and duties are outlined in the AMS
plan and coordinated through specific sub-committees of the AMS
Committee. Further, the Coast Guard has agreements with a number of
states detailing how each party will support the other's maritime law
enforcement missions, including state and local enforcement of Coast
Guard established safety and security zones. While the Coast Guard
cooperates on port security with others as appropriate, the Coast Guard
is not authorized to delegate its responsibilities, duties, or law
enforcement authority to any other individual or organization, whether
governmental or private.
TOP 3 CARGO SECURITY PRIORITIES
QUESTION:
Please list your top three priorities in securing our ports and
cargo? Can you envision a way to accomplish these priorities in
securing our ports and cargo? Can you envision a way to accomplish
these priorities without additional funding or personnel?
ANSWER:
The top three priorities in securing America's ports and cargo are
improving threat identification, reducing the vulnerability to
terrorist acts, and mitigating the potential consequences of an actual
terrorist incident.
The Coast Guard has taken, and continues to take action to address
these priorities and further our collective national security
interests. Through the provisions of the Maritime Transportation
Security Act, the commencement of critical security programs such as
Maritime Domain Awareness and the Integrated Deepwater System, and
implementation of the Coast Guard's maritime security strategy,
America's ports and cargo are becoming less vulnerable to acts of
terrorism. Continued investment in these programs through full support
of the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2006 budget, and strong interagency
cooperation to further these efforts is critical for their success.
The Coast Guard maximizes the effectiveness of its operational
efforts and existing resources through a risk-based approach to
identify and intercept threats before they reach U.S. shores; through
layered, multi-agency security operations nationwide, and through
partnership with port officials and the private sector. These
partnerships include maritime industry organizations, such as the
International Council of Cruise Lines, the Passenger Vessel
Association, and the American Waterways Operators. The Coast Guard also
has a maritime community watch program called America's Waterway Watch
(AWW) designed to help citizens report suspicious activities.
The Coast Guard also coordinates public and private maritime
security efforts through Coast Guard led port-level Area Maritime
Security (AMS) Committees. These Committees provide a forum for
bringing the perspectives and capabilities of these organizations
together to ensure that risks are identified, prioritized, and
addressed while continuing to facilitate the safe and efficient flow of
commerce.
While personnel and other costs are incurred in establishing and
maintaining AWW, AMS Committees, and the various other agency and
industry partnerships, the resource demands are small relative to the
benefits gained.
The Coast Guard continues to guide its efforts by implementing
policies, seeking resources, and deploying capabilities through the
lens of our maritime security strategy. However, continued risk
reduction to America's ports and cargo is contingent upon Coast Guard
readiness and capacity. Without these building blocks, implementation
of maritime security strategies will not be sustainable.
----------
Response to Questions for the Record submitted by Peter Scrobe, Member
of International Cargo Security Council
1.) Yes, through education and training programs, specifically
with the US Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA) - Global Maritime
Transportation School (GMATS) and various seminars.
2.) The ICSC through seminars, conferences, and training w/USMMA
GMATS.
3.) It varies based on industry groups and requirements
associated therewith. Many believe we are headed in the proper
direction, but much more needs to be accomplished.
4.) Enhancing the CSI program and continuing to push our borders
overseas. Also, there is need to utilize existing technology (such as
VACIS type) and other similar type equipment. Better allocation of
resources and funding thereof. Incorporate risk management approach
with minimum standards included.
5.) It is believed that among ``friendly'' nations, there is a
mutual cooperation to provide necessary security, but still requires
our (US) presence. On the private sector side, the ICSC has recently
opened a European Chapter which appears to be growing steadily.
6.) Again, there is a need for the US to continue pushing out our
borders. Continue to work on processes and phase in technology for
support (more than one form of technology may provide the necessary
requirements).
7.) The potential of a WME. There is, in my opinion, the need for
constant vigilance and all parties pertaining to the Supply Chain
continuing to focus on and upgrade security. This question should also
be addressed, in more detail, by members of the Carriers and Port/
Terminal personnel.
8.) We believe it has brought a greater awareness to all parties
in the ``Supply Chain''. The C-TPAT document should continue to be
strengthened to further enhance the process.
9.) Original figures in the early '90's, ranged from $3-10
billion in losses domestically and has steadily increased to the
numbers indicated today. There have been studies completed by the FBI,
Rand Group (for the hi-tech industry - o/o/a 1995) and the FIA Study
(2000 - funded by NCSC and Brown & Williamson) which assisted in, in
part, to qualify the numbers. There must be a data base to record cargo
crime to better get a true handle on the severity, where the losses are
occurring, the type product(s) being stolen and the ability to properly
allocate resources (funding as well as manpower).
10.) Clearance by being C-TPAT certified, unfortunately, doesn't
control port and terminal congestion. Although it may allow for
document clearance, it doesn't get the shipment ``out the door'' any
quicker.
11.) A Multi Jurisdictional Task Force (MJTF) is one that is made
up of various law enforcement personnel, such as the TOMCATS of Miami,
FL. The TOMCATS, MJTF consists of: Miami Dade, FBI, C&BP, FDLE, DEA,
etc. and is headed by Lt. Edward Petow of the Miami-Dade Police Dept.
It provides for greater cooperation, sharing of information, and the
ability to respond to any situations that might arise. In addition,
this group offers educational programs within the state of FL., as well
as to other law enforcement agencies throughout the country and has
been attended by overseas law agencies, too. The TOMCATS are thought
of, by numerous individuals, including this writer, the template for
establishing a MJTF.
12.) The Tallahassee Summit was held for the second year, by
Sheriff Ed Dean, and attended by Gov. J. Bush, local and state
officials and, as well, by the private sector, government and law
enforcement sectors from around the country. At that Summit, there was
a ``National Security White Paper'' drafted and approved by all that
attended. Please advise if you need a copy of this document.
13.) It is, in my opinion, that an increase in spending for
enhanced security is unavoidable.
1. a Multi Jurisdictional Task Force will supplement those
agencies already working.
2. it is possible, in my opinion, provided the
responsibilities are spelled out. There will, most likely, be
costs associated therewith.
14.) A.
1. continue expanding our borders.
2. better allocation of existing resources (including
funding) and technology, such as (x-ray type equipment), etc.
3. better communication and sharing of data amongst law
enforcement, government and the private sector.
B. No, in my opinion, there is always a cost associated with
any measures/equipment to be implemented, however, with better
sharing of data and resources, the allocation of necessary
resources would save time, cost overruns and duplication.
15.) To my basic knowledge and understanding of VACIS type
equipment - no.
16.) To my understanding, through CSI, shipments are recorded and
the container information and units are checked as they go on board. If
there are any additional inventories performed on board, I would
recommend contacting port/terminal and/or carrier personnel for
additional details.
----------
Response to Questions for the Record submitted by Jeff Keever, Deputy
Executive Director, Virginia Port Authority
1) In your testimony you mention that ``in 2003, the Bureau of
Economic Statistics reported that The Port of Virginia plays a part in
over 180,000 jobs, with salary and wages in excess of $5 billion.''
Understanding the importance our Ports play in our economy, what do you
believe would be the effect on our economy if one of our ports suffered
a terrorist attack? Would it be a local effect or national effect?
A: The effect on our economy of a terrorist attack on one of our
ports would depend on five factors: the specific port that was
attacked, the nature of the attack, the government response to the
attack, the shipping industry response to the attack, and the public
reaction to the attack.
The specific port that was attacked. Obviously an
attack on a major port will have greater impact on the nation's
economy than an attack on a minor port. If the port that was
attacked primarily serves a regional market, the direct
economic impact will be largely limited to that region.
The direct consequences of the attack. This could
vary widely, in both scope and duration of the consequences.
The worst case would be an attack with a nuclear weapon, which
could result in the loss of a port for years. But even an
attack that did not use any type of weapon of mass destruction
could close a port entirely for weeks to months, such as by
sinking a large vessel or dropping a bridge span to block a
shipping channel. An attack on a large oil terminal or other
large petrochemical facility could cause significant damage and
economic loss. Terrorists might also attack a port facility in
order to cause mass casualties in the surrounding community
through release of a large quantity of hazardous chemicals. But
terrorist attacks on many other types of port facilities would
not cause catastrophic consequences.
The government response to the attack. If the
Federal government were to react to an attack on a port in the
same way it reacted to the 9/11 attacks - that is, by shutting
down all U.S. ports until the government could verify that no
other ports were threatened - the loss to the American economy
would be devastating. The economic loss resulting from the
Federal government closing all ports in response to an attack
would be orders of magnitude greater than the direct economic
loss resulting from the attack itself. Clearly, Federal policy
should be to minimize the impact of a single attack on the rest
of the maritime transportation system and thus minimize the
economic damage resulting from Federal policy.
The same phenomenon could happen on a smaller scale within a
port if an attack on a single facility were to result in the
Coast Guard shutting down the entire port. In a large port the
overall economic loss from closing the entire port would be
much greater than the direct economic impact of the attack on a
single facility.
The manner in which state and local agencies respond to an
attack on a port can also impact the resulting economic loss if
they impede rapid recovery from the incident. Minimizing the
impact of an attack on a port - thus denying terrorists the
satisfaction of causing widespread, lasting economic loss -
requires a concerted effort by government agencies at all
levels, working in close partnership with the maritime
industry, to rapidly restore normal operations in the affected
port.
The shipping industry response to the attack. The
shipping industry's goal is to keep cargo moving as
expeditiously as possible. In an era of just in time delivery,
their customers demand no less. If a port suffers an attack,
they will divert cargo to other ports. At a minimum, this will
cause loss to the economy of the effected port. But it could
cause wider loss if the diversion of cargo causes delivery
delays and backlogs at other ports. The worst case would be if
an attack on a single facility in a port causes a loss of
confidence in the security of all the other facilities in that
port, causing shipping to be needlessly diverted to other
ports.
The public reaction to the attack. If a terrorist
attack on a port were to result in significant loss of life in
the surrounding community, the public and their elected
officials could well demand assurances of protection against
further attacks that would be difficult to meet. This could
delay recovery from the attack and cause broad disruption of
maritime transportation should such public concerns become a
national issue.
2) Your written testimony states that ``the Port Authority
Police, sworn law enforcement officers of the Commonwealth of Virginia,
have been highly effective at preventing crime on VPA's three marine
terminals.'' What is the law enforcement function in securing ports?
A: The law enforcement function in securing ports is similar to
the role of law enforcement in homeland security in general: to deter,
detect, prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. They ensure that only
authorized individuals enter the terminals, and prevent theft or
pilferage of shipping containers and other criminal acts on the
terminals. They provide security procedure and threat awareness
training to all persons working on the terminals. They maintain
compliance with the Coast Guard Maritime Security Condition (MARSEC)
currently in force. Although many of the functions could be performed
by security personnel who are not sworn law enforcement officers, there
is an inherent advantage to having a dedicated police force serving the
port authority. Sworn law enforcement officers have much greater
authority to control movement and behavior of persons on the terminals,
including as a last resort use of force (in compliance with
Commonwealth of Virginia policies on use of force by state law
enforcement agencies).
3) According to your testimony, ``Although CBP is responsible for
implementing US-VISIT, CBP will require support from Port Authority
Police . . .'' Could you explain the type of support the police will
provide?
A: First and most importantly, the Port Authority Police deny
terrorists opportunities to circumvent U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) immigration control procedures. That is, they prevent
individuals from departing vessels via the terminals unless they have
been properly cleared by CBP. This is a critically important function
that every port facility must carry out because CBP does not have
sufficient agents to post a 24-hour guard around all of the ships that
call in U.S. ports every day. This is an excellent example of the
manner in which the port industry has been compelled by the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) to perform a wide range of functions
to protect the nation as a whole from terrorist attacks.
The Port Authority Police also provide logistical and
administrative support to CBP, including office space and parking on
the terminals. CBP has not yet informed the port industry of the
details on how US-VISIT will be implemented at the thousands of port
facilities that receive vessels from overseas, but it undoubtedly will
impact port facilities in some way and certainly will not relieve them
of their responsibility for preventing individuals on ships arriving
from overseas from CBP immigration control procedures.
4) Where is the Port of Virginia in its implementation of its
upgrades to comply with Federal SAFECOM interoperability standards?
Please explain the importance of interoperability to port security.
A: The Port of Virginia is still in the early planning stages of
upgrading its communications system. It is our intent to request a
Round Five Port Security Grant to fund this upgrade, which will be
costly and thus beyond out means to accomplish in a timely manner.
VPA priorities for enhancing its security program have been driven
by the overriding requirement to achieve and maintain compliance with
MTSA and the Coast Guard Maritime Facility Security Regulations (33
CFR, Chapter 1, Subchapter H, Part 105). Neither MTSA nor the Coast
Guard Maritime Facility Security Regulations require compliance with
SAFECOM, which was launched more recently and had not produced
authoritative, comprehensive standards that could be acted upon prior
to 2005.
VPA has identified a need to upgrade its aging communications
system, which is hard pressed to meet the greatly increased Port
Authority Police communications requirements resulting from MTSA and
the Coast Guard Maritime Facility Security Regulations. One of the
priority requirements in planning for the communications system upgrade
is to enhance interoperability with the Federal, state and local
agencies with whom the Port Authority Police work on a daily basis and
in emergencies. To achieve that, we are closely following the strategic
plan and interoperability standards being developed by the Virginia's
Commonwealth Interoperability Coordinator and the opportunities to
integrate Port Authority Police communications into the Statewide
Agencies Radio System (STARS), led by the Virginia State Police. Both
of these Commonwealth of Virginia programs are guided by SAFECOM, which
will ensure that the Port Authority Police attain the required level of
interoperability with Federal and local agencies as well.
5) Please describe the cooperative security efforts the VPA uses
to ensure that the stream of commerce is not unduly interrupted.
A: There are many cooperative efforts that contribute to enhancing
security without unduly impeding the flow of commerce:
Providing office space on the terminals for CBP
agents.
Operating radiation portals that in other ports are
operated by CBP and sharing specialized radiation detection
equipment with CBP.
Briefing arriving vessels on VPA security
procedures.
Providing training on VPA security procedures to
persons requiring access to VPA terminals.
Designing entry and exit control procedures to avoid
traffic backups at terminal gates.
Many of these examples may appear to be small matters, but
collectively they make a big difference in the flow of commerce.
As I stated in my testimony, some of the most serious impediments
to the flow of commerce are caused by the inadequate resources provided
to CBP and the Coast Guard to accomplish their missions. This results
in vessels being delayed entering port while they await Coast Guard
boarding and inspection, and containers piling up on the terminals
while they await CBP inspection. Such delays are costly for shippers
and their customers, and ultimately represent a drain on the American
economy. No one questions the need for such security measures, but the
agencies that execute them must have the resources they need to carry
them out without impeding commerce.
6) Does your office regularly interact and share information
about shippers and cargo with other port authorities?
A: The Port Authority Police does not have jurisdiction over
cargo other than its responsibility to prevent theft and pilferage
while it is on the terminals. CBP is responsible for preventing
contraband from being smuggled into the country and would be the agency
responsible for sharing law enforcement information related to shippers
and cargo with other agencies.
If the Port Authority Police have suspicions about a shipment, or
are informed of anything suspicious about a shipment by an individual
working on a terminal, after securing the area, they notify CBP. This
has actually happened and in at least one case that we know of resulted
in CBP intercepting a shipment of illegal drugs. It would be CBP's
responsibility to share information related to that incident with other
port authorities. The Port Authority Police would not do this because
they do not have the comprehensive information gathered by CBP and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement in their investigation of the
suspect shipment.
7) You said in your testimony on page 5, ``VPA's guiding
principle for security is that a state port authority has a higher
level of responsibility than a private port facility operator,'' how
so? What kind of effect would increasing a private port facility
operator's responsibilities have on the private port in terms of cost?
Is it possible to increase the private port facility operator's
responsibilities without increasing funding to that private port
facility?
A: A state port authority has a higher level of responsibility
than a private port facility operator because a state port authority is
accountable to the citizens of the state and their elected officials
for protecting their investment in the port and meeting their
expectations for the port's performance. That means ensuring that the
port contributes to the state's economy through robust growth in its
port business and striving for maximum efficiency and productivity. It
also means having an effective security program, both to protect the
lives of the state's citizens and to prevent a terrorist incident from
interfering with commerce through the port. Very importantly, it means
striking a careful balance between growth and productivity on the one
hand and security on the other. Neither can be pursued at the expense
of the other - the citizens for whom the port authority is a public
servant deserve no less.
Increasing a private port facility operator's responsibilities
would, at a minimum, increase the cost of that facility's security
program. The amount of that increase would depend on the nature of the
increased responsibilities. It could also impede the flow of cargo
through a terminal, thus reducing that terminal's productivity and
competitiveness. It could cause problems with labor relations if a
private company is tasked to perform quasi-governmental or quasi-law
enforcement functions with questionable statutory authority. Similarly,
it could incur significant liability risks that would not be incurred
by a government agency. All of these problems illustrate the need to
draw a clear distinction between security measures that a private port
facility operator should have in place as prudent business practices,
and the much more extensive security measures required by MTSA intended
to protect the nation from terrorist attacks. Effective homeland
security is a daunting task even for the Federal agencies that exist
for that specific mission; attempting to shift their responsibilities
to private port facility operators that are not capable of carrying out
those tasks would only result in serious deterioration of port
security.
The manner in which MTSA has been implemented over the last two
years shows that it is possible to increase a private port facility
operator's responsibilities without increasing funding to that private
port facility. But the port industry's experience with MTSA clearly
shows that doing so is highly undesirable, even counterproductive.
Imposing statutorily mandated security requirements - requirements that
must be complied with under threat of severe sanctions for non-
compliance - without providing the funding needed to effectively
implement MTSA does not produce effective port security. Overall, the
port industry is struggling to do the best it can to bear the burden of
the unfunded mandate imposed on it by MTSA, but this can hardly be
described as wise national policy. MTSA was passed to protect the
entire nation from the potentially widespread consequences that could
result from a terrorist attack on the maritime transportation system.
In the realm of national defense, the financial burden of protecting
our nation from foreign aggression is placed on the nation as a whole.
In the realm of homeland security, the financial burden of protecting
commercial aviation from terrorist attacks and preventing terrorists
from exploiting land transportation to enter the United States is
placed on the nation as a whole. Only the maritime industry has been
forced, under threat of sanctions, to bear the cost of protecting the
nation from terrorist attacks.
8) Please list and describe the type of responsibilities and
duties entrusted to your port authority police? Do these
responsibilities and duties overlap with any other agency - public or
private - at VPA?
A: MTSA assigned the Port Authority Police responsibilities and
duties similar to those of law enforcement in homeland security in
general: to deter, detect, prevent and respond to terrorist attacks.
But those responsibilities and duties are on top of a broad range of
responsibilities similar to those of corporate security organizations
that protect their businesses against criminal acts. Port Authority
Police responsibilities and duties include, but are not limited to:
Ensuring that only authorized individuals enter the
terminals. This consists of perimeter security, access control
at gates, and a credentialing and badge system.
Preventing theft or pilferage of shipping containers
and other criminal acts on the terminals. This consists of
verifying that containers departing the terminals have been
properly cleared for release and monitoring the terminals for
indications of criminal activity.
Preventing all types of criminal acts on the VPA
terminals, such as robberies, burglaries vandalism and other
such crimes - similar to the responsibilities of local law
enforcement agencies.
Providing security procedure and threat awareness
training to all persons working on the terminals. This is
required by MTSA and the Coast Guard Maritime Facility Security
Regulations.
Maintaining compliance with the Coast Guard Maritime
Security Condition (MARSEC) currently in force.
Conducting drills and exercises as required by MTSA
and the Coast Guard Maritime Facility Security Regulations.
Supporting CBP cargo and immigration operations on
the terminals.
Maintaining compliance with supply chain security
requirements of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
(C-TPAT).
Maintaining compliance with Commonwealth of Virginia
emergency preparedness and continuity of operations
requirements for state agencies.
Conducting routine public safety functions similar
to those of local law enforcement agencies, such as traffic
control and responding to accidents. The Port Authority Police
also have mutual aid agreements with the police departments of
the cities in which VPA terminals are located, which enables
them to assist with emergencies near the terminals (such as
traffic accidents on the busy roads outside the terminals).
These Port Authority Police responsibilities and duties overlap
with those of a number of public agencies and private companies, but
only because such overlap is dictated by MTSA and other Federal and
state policies. For example, the Coast Guard, the Virginia State
Police, the Port authority Police and the respective local Police
Department all have law enforcement jurisdiction on VPA terminals. In
practice, though, these agencies are not conducting redundant
operations on a day-to-day basis. And in a major terrorist incident
such overlapping jurisdiction could well be an advantage in responding
to an emergency with sufficient resources. There is also overlap with
private companies that have facilities on the VPA terminals. Like VPA,
those private facility operators must comply with MTSA and the Coast
Guard Maritime Facility Security Regulations. The VPA Director of
Security has worked closely with the facility security officers of
those private facilities to coordinate and align their plans and
procedures with VPA's in order to achieve an effective overall security
posture and minimize redundancy.
One of the potentially most serious areas of overlap is in the
responsibilities of federal agencies in the event of a major terrorist
incident on a marine terminal. VPA has had to address this in the
course of developing response procedures for detection of radiation in
a shipping container by the VPA radiation monitoring system. The
question is who is in charge, or who takes the lead among Federal
agencies? At least eight Federal agencies can point to statutes or
policy documents that give them responsibility for all or part of a
terrorist-related radiological emergency on a port facility: CBP, the
Department of Energy, the Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland
Security (DOE response teams are supposed to be placed under DHS
control), the FBI, the Maritime Administration (MARAD), the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Federal Emergency
Response Agency (FEMA). At the working level, local representatives of
these agencies make it clear that they will focus on their specific
responsibilities and not engage arguments over who has overall control
of the situation. That is reassuring, but does not resolve the issue.
The response to a radiological emergency can be complex, causing the
response procedures of these various agencies to conflict with each
other and requiring an authority that understands these diverse
response plans to resolve procedural issues. Additionally, all of these
agencies have headquarters that could well take a different view of who
is in charge and override the collegial approach of their on-scene
representatives. The solution is a Federal policy document that
resolves this issue; but neither the National Response Plan (Including
its radiological emergency annex) nor the National Incident Management
System provides definitive guidance.
9) What are some ways you can secure our ports and cargo without
an increase in personnel?
A: I can only speak to VPA's experience. We have attempted to
achieve MTSA compliance without an increase in Port Authority Police
personnel. This is driven by funding: we simply cannot afford large
increases in personnel and the Federal government is not willing to
fund them, even though it was Federal law that mandated the
requirements we are trying to meet. Some of the security requirements
imposed by MTSA and the Coast Guard Maritime Facility Security
Regulations are extremely manpower intensive, such as the requirement
for random vehicle and bag checks at entrance gates. VPA has attempted
to leverage technology wherever possible to reduce manpower
requirements so that Port Authority Police personnel can be reassigned
to MTSA tasks for which there is not a readily available technological
solution. For example, installation of a closed circuit television
system for perimeter surveillance reduces the requirement for police
officers on perimeter patrols, making them available for other duties.
Another example is to achieve as much automation in access control as
possible, thus reducing manpower requirements at the terminal gates.
Our goal would be fully automated, unmanned gates, but the Coast Guard
Maritime Facility Security Regulations currently do not permit this. We
will be working with the Coast Guard to achieve minimum manning on our
gates consistent with MTSA security requirements.
1) What about the creation of joint task forces to prevent
the duplication of responsibilities by other agencies?
A: VPA is a member of the FBI's Tidewater Joint Anti-
Terrorism Task Force and the Coast Guard's Area Maritime
Security Committee. Duplication of responsibilities has not
been a serious issue for VPA because Port Authority Police
jurisdiction is limited to the VPA terminals. For example, the
Port Authority Police does not have boats patrolling the
harbor, which is the responsibility of the Coast Guard, the
Virginia Marine Police and city police departments. Wherever
overlapping responsibilities across Federal, state and local
agencies exist, joint task forces or other cooperative
approaches to coordinating their efforts toward the common goal
of effective port security would certainly be called for.
2) What about delegating responsibilities and duties to other
agencies; including local, state and other federal government
agencies, or even private companies?
A: VPA itself does not have authority to delegate its port
security responsibilities and duties to other Federal, state
and local agencies. Our goal is to have effective working
relationships with those agencies and to ensure that all of our
security and emergency response plans are synchronized and
mutually supporting. Please see my answer to question 7 above
concerning delegation of responsibilities to private companies.
Although VPA has contractors that assist it with various
aspects of its security program, it has not delegated any of
its port security responsibilities to them. VPA is accountable
to the Coast Guard for compliance with MTSA and the Coast Guard
Maritime Facility Security Regulations, and would face drastic
sanctions for non-compliance. This strict regulatory
environment precludes delegation of responsibilities.
10) Please list your top three priorities in securing our ports
and cargo? Can you envision a way to accomplish these priorities
without additional funding or personnel?
A: My top three priorities for securing America's ports and the
cargo passing through them would be as follows:
Fund all port security requirements imposed on the
port industry by MTSA and the Coast Guard Maritime Facility
Security Regulations that are designed to protect the nation
from terrorist attacks; in other words, all requirements beyond
those that a prudent business would take to protect itself from
normal criminal activity. The port industry does not have the
resources required to protect the nation. We are willing to
carry out our responsibilities to the best of our abilities,
but the Federal government must live up to its responsibilities
for homeland security as well.
Provide the Federal agencies responsible for port
and cargo security, especially CBP and the Coast Guard, with
the resources they need to carry out their missions. I have the
utmost respect for the hard working men and women of these two
agencies. They are doing the best they can with the resources
they have, but they are stretched thin and face a significant
challenge carrying out their responsibilities without impeding
the flow of commerce.
Enhance the management of the Port Security Grant
Program. Develop a more rigorous allocation system that ensures
funds are provided for purposes that provide the greatest
enhancement to port security, rather than the current practice
of spreading grants as widely as possible. Preserve the
positive aspects of the current Port Security Grant Program,
such as the evaluation of grant proposals by experts in the
Coast Guard, CBP and MARAD, and continue to provide the grants
directly to port authorities, port facility operators, and
other state and local agencies directly responsible for port
security. Because the Port Security Grant Program supports
implementation of a unique statutory requirement imposed on a
single industry, do not merge port security grants with other
grant programs that are not tied to implementation of statutory
mandates, which would greatly increase the competition for
scarce grant funds and thus exacerbate the financial burden
that has been placed on the shoulders of the port industry.
Similarly, the Port Security Grant Program should not be
treated in the same manner as grant programs supporting state
and local first responders. The allocation procedures used for
those programs are not appropriate for an industry governed by
a statutory mandate, and would result in loss of the expert
review process now in place. Amend the Port Security Grant
Program to permit a portion of those funds to be applied to
annual operating expenses for security. Compliance with MTSA
has significantly increased annual operating expenses,
including maintenance of the high technology security systems
required for effective compliance with MTSA, training and
exercise expenses, and all the personnel and other operating
expenses incurred by ports for security.
The only possible way to reduce, or avoid future, costs is to
update the CFR 105 requirements to a more ``tailored'' made
requirements - a risk based approach. For instance, a predominately
container facility, such as VPA, compliance should be against
regulations based on the threat and vulnerability to a container
facility. E.g., Significantly reduce the requirement for vehicles
inspection entering the facility. [A container facility sees a high
number of ``tractor-trailers'' are required within the regulations to
inspect the cab, yet leave the 40 feet of cargo ``un-inspected'' due to
a practical way to accomplish.] Where a petro-chemical facility might
be prudent to have a higher standard, as one might argue the threat or
vulnerability to the petro-chemical facility is entering vehicles.
11) Does the type of container inhibit inspection in any way? If
so, how? Would a uniform container requirement help ease the burden of
inspection?
A: This question should be directed to CBP for a complete answer.
VPA does not inspect containers and would only open one in an
emergency, such as suspected or actual release of hazardous material or
some other emergency in which opening a container would be necessary to
protect human life. Containers are already standardized in terms of
dimensions and construction for maximum efficiency of intermodal
transportation. There is one type of container that presents unique
challenges: marine portable tanks (tanks build to the same dimensions
as regular shipping containers). I recommend that you ask CBP about the
challenges of inspecting for contraband hidden in a marine portable
tank full of the various liquid cargoes carried in them.
12) How often is a cargo vessel coming into the U.S. required to
take a physical inventory of its cargo? After the vessel takes a
physical inventory of its cargo, is the cargo vessel required to report
is findings to anyone?
A: This question should be directed to the US Coast Guard and CBP
for a complete answer. VPA does not have the authority to direct such a
physical inventory and has no knowledge of a vessel destined for a VPA
terminal ever having been directed to conduct such an inventory by the
Coast Guard or CBP. I also recommend that you refer this question to
the International Cargo Security Council, the Chamber of Shipping of
America, the Intermodal Association of North America, the Maritime
Security Council and The Waterfront Coalition. I am sure they would
tell you that conducting a physical inventory of the cargo in hundreds
of containers on a vessel would be impossible and that the master of a
vessel has no responsibility for verifying that the contents of the
containers matches the shipping documents for those containers.
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Statement submitted by The Retail Industry Leaders Association
On behalf of the Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA), we
welcome the opportunity to submit written comment for the record for
this important oversight hearing on port security. Safe and secure
seaports are an important element in building efficient and
technologically advanced supply chains that can move cargo quickly to
distribution centers, stores, and factories across the nation. Any
delays can seriously disrupt the supply chain and harm the U.S.
economy.
The Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA) represents the
nation's most successful and innovative retailer and supplier
companies--the leaders of the retail industry. Retail is the second
largest industry in the U.S., employing 12 percent of the nation's
total workforce and conducting $3.8 trillion in annual sales. RILA's
retail and product supplier companies operate 100,000 stores,
manufacturing facilities and distribution centers in every
congressional district in every state, as well as internationally. They
pay billions in federal, state and local taxes and collect and remit
billions more in sales taxes. They are also leading corporate citizens
with some of the nation's most far-reaching corporate social
responsibility initiatives.
RILA and its members have played a critical leadership role in
shaping supply chain security efforts. From partnering with U.S.
Customs & Border Protection and the Department of Homeland Security to
testing different pilot projects, RILA and its members are committed to
ensuring the safety and security of their supply chains not only to
protect their cargo, but also their customers and the individuals
associated with the movement of their cargo.
Since the tragic events of September 11th, a great deal of work has
gone into improving the security of the supply chain. What we ask
members of Congress and the Administration to understand is that the
supply chain is a very complex system and that variations exist among
companies and between industries. While there have been a number of
initiatives and regulations put in place since September 11th, there is
still a lot that needs to be done.
Members of Congress and the Administration must realize that there
is no ``silver bullet'' solution when it comes to supply chain
security. There is no one technological or procedural solution that
will magically make every supply chain safe and secure from
infiltration. RILA strongly believes that the layered approach that the
government is currently using is the best way to prevent a terrorist
attack within the supply chain - and we urge Congress to continue on
this wise course. There is of course a role for technology but it needs
to be integrated carefully into the system and must be consistent with
international standards. If a particular technology cannot work
worldwide, then it cannot work effectively in our international supply
chain. Technology should be reliable and result in virtually no false
positives or false alarms. Even a 1% failure rate could be disastrous.
Security Actions to Date
As members of the subcommittee are aware, there have been a number
of regulations and programs that have been put into place to increase
supply chain security. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) along
with the U.S. Coast Guard have taken the lead on a number of these
efforts.
CBP is now enforcing both the ``24 Hour Rule'' and the ``Trade
Act'' which require the submission of manifest information in advance
of cargo arriving in the U.S. For ocean bound cargo, the information
must be submitted before the container is even loaded onto the vessel
at the foreign port. These new regulations have enabled CBP to better
utilize information and better identify ``suspect'' cargo through its
Automated Targeting Center.
In addition, CBP has also developed a number of new programs
through partnerships with the trade community as well as foreign
Customs agencies. The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT) was the first true private-public partnership to enhance supply
chain security. Many of RILA's members were the first to join the C-
TPAT program and helped to develop the program. Many of these same
companies continue to work with CBP to further enhance the C-TPAT
program. CBP has also been partnering with RILA members and other C-
TPAT members to test ``smart box'' technology, container security
devices and the collection of advanced trade data.
CBP has also worked with foreign Customs agencies through the
Container Security Initiative as well as working to develop an
international framework for supply chain security through the World
Customs Organization.
CBP has many other tools at its disposal including the use of non-
intrusive inspection technology such as the Vehicle and Cargo
Inspection Systems (VACIS) and Radiation Portal Monitors which are
being deployed at ports nationwide.
The U.S. Coast Guard is now responsible for enforcing the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) as well as the International
Maritime Organization's International Ship and Port Facility Security
(ISPS) Code. In fact, the U.S. Coast Guard was instrumental in the
development of the ISPS Code, which closely resembles the MTSA. These
new regulations call for increased security at port facilities as well
as ocean vessels.
While CBP and the Coast Guard have taken the lead on supply chain
security and port security efforts, there are other agencies that are
involved as well. The Food and Drug Administration is now enforcing the
Bioterrorism Act (BTA), which protects the nation's food supply from a
terrorist attack.
Future Action
There is still a great deal of work that needs to be done on supply
chain security. However, this cannot be done overnight. As stated
earlier, the supply chain is a very complex system that companies
continuously seek to refine and improve. Cargo security legislation and
regulations should include a thorough analysis and recognition of
commercial implications including the potential impact of delays and
congestion on the national economy. RILA believes that there are
several issues that Congress should consider as it moves forward with
initiatives to secure the global supply chain.
Container Inspections
Many in Congress have talked about the physical inspection of 100%
of cargo containers. RILA strongly believes that 100% physical
inspections are not necessary or economically viable. Physically
inspecting every box is simply impossible. Members need to consider
infrastructure issues such as marine terminal congestion, warehouse
space shortages, trucking demands and highway congestion.
Such an approach would result in an enormous increase in congestion
at U.S. seaports and have a tremendously negative impact on the U.S.
economy. Rather, a more effective approach would be for CBP to continue
to focus on inspecting 100% of the cargo that is deemed suspicious by
the National Targeting Center.
Balanced Policy
Policy developed by the Department of Homeland Security, Congress
or other agencies should balance the need for security and the need to
allow the free flow of legitimate commerce. Security requirements
should not become a barrier to trade.
Technology
There is no single technological solution for supply chain
security. The government should not rush to require the use of ``smart
containers'' or ``electronic seals''. These technologies are still
extremely expensive and are not yet 100% accurate. Technology should
not be considered as the only solution. It should be considered as a
part of the overall strategy. Successful security includes a
multilayered approach. We know of few if any technologies that have
been independently tested by entities that do not have a conflict of
interest in selling such technology. No only does the technology need
to be reliable but because of the expense we need to ensure that the
technology considered will improve the probability of detecting a
security risk (i.e. WME or WMD). By way of example, if you could design
a foolproof container door intrusion device, all the terrorist would
have to do is cut a hole in the side of the container for purposes of
placing a bomb inside. An operation such as this might only take 20
minutes or less depending on the expertise of the bad guy. We need to
ensure that the money we spend provides more than simply ``feel good''
measures.
Government Coordination
There needs to be a better-coordinated approach not only between
federal government agencies, but also those at the state and local
level. If an incident occurs, everyone needs to be on the same page as
to how to respond. In addition, Congress and the Administration need to
ensure that the various agencies involved in homeland security do not
duplicate ongoing efforts.
Likewise, each country has an interest in ensuring that the global
supply chain is kept safe. A major terrorist incident in the U.S. will
not impact just one port or one city or even one country. The impact
will be felt around the globe.
Therefore cooperation among governments is important. But
government's active collaboration with the private sector is extremely
critical. Supply chain security is simply too complicated for the
public sector to tackle the problem without partnering with private
industry. This is a good example of the whole being greater than the
sum of its parts.
Business Continuity/Contingency Planning
There is a need for the Administration to focus on business
continuity/restoration plans in the event of a terrorist attack. To
date, most of the attention has been on prevention. Now there needs to
be an equal focus on the steps that will be taken to keep the global
supply chain operational in the event of an attack. The trade needs to
know who is in charge, how they will make decisions, whether and which
segments of the supply chain will be closed and how those decisions
will be communicated to the trade. One of the terrorist's main goals is
to disrupt the world economy. Therefore, it is imperative to have plans
in place, which will reduce the disruptive effects of any terrorist
incident.
Conclusion
A great deal of work has been done over the past two years to
ensure the safety and security of cargo entering and leaving U.S.
ports. There are still many areas for future work. However, through
partnerships with U.S. government agencies such as CBP and through
increased partnerships with their suppliers, both merchandise and
transportation providers, RILA's members have accomplished a great deal
to ensure the security of their supply chains. They are continuing to
learn what works and what doesn't around the world. These lessons must
be taken into consideration as new regulations and policies are
discussed.
We thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to submit written
testimony for the record and stand ready to continue to work with both
Congress and the Administration on improving the security of U.S. ports
and the global supply chain. If you have any questions, please contact
Jonathan Gold, Vice President Global Supply Chain, or Paul T. Kelly,
Senior Vice President, Federal and State Government Affairs.