[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE FUTURE OF
AERONAUTICS AT NASA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 16, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-8
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
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______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas BART GORDON, Tennessee
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
DANA ROHRABACHER, California LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
KEN CALVERT, California DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK UDALL, Colorado
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan DAVID WU, Oregon
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRAD SHERMAN, California
JO BONNER, Alabama BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
TOM FEENEY, Florida JIM MATHESON, Utah
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina JIM COSTA, California
DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington AL GREEN, Texas
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
JOHN J.H. ``JOE'' SCHWARZ, Michigan VACANCY
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
VACANCY
VACANCY
------
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
KEN CALVERT, California, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas MARK UDALL, Colorado
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas DAVID WU, Oregon
DANA ROHRABACHER, California MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRAD SHERMAN, California
JO BONNER, Alabama JIM COSTA, California
TOM FEENEY, Florida AL GREEN, Texas
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
VACANCY
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York BART GORDON, Tennessee
BILL ADKINS Subcommittee Staff Director
ED FEDDEMAN Professional Staff Member
KEN MONROE Professional Staff Member
CHRIS SHANK Professional Staff Member
ROSELEE ROBERTS Professional Staff Member
RICHARD OBERMANN Democratic Professional Staff Member
TOM HAMMOND Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
March 16, 2005
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Ken Calvert, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 13
Written Statement............................................ 14
Statement by Representative Mark Udall, Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 14
Prepared Statement by Gregory J. Juneman, President,
International Federation of Professional & Technical
Engineers, AFL-CIO & CLC................................... 16
Prepared Statement by Representative J. Randy Forbes, Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 22
Prepared Statement by Representative Michael M. Honda, Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 22
Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 23
Panel I:
The Hon. Jo Ann Davis, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Virginia
Oral Statement............................................... 25
Written Statement............................................ 26
The Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio
Oral Statement............................................... 28
Written Statement............................................ 29
Discussion....................................................... 57
Panel II:
Dr. J. Victor Lebacqz, Associate Administrator, Aeronautics
Research Mission Directorate, NASA
Oral Statement............................................... 61
Written Statement............................................ 63
Biography.................................................... 69
Dr. John M. Klineberg, Committee Chairman, National Research
Council Panel
Oral Statement............................................... 70
Written Statement............................................ 73
Biography.................................................... 85
Dr. Philip S. Anton, Director, Center for Acquisition and
Technology Policy, RAND
Oral Statement............................................... 86
Written Statement............................................ 87
Biography.................................................... 96
Dr. Mike J. Benzakein, Chairman, Department of Aerospace
Engineering, Ohio State University
Oral Statement............................................... 97
Written Statement............................................ 99
Dr. R. John Hansman, Jr., Director, International Center for Air
Transportation, MIT
Oral Statement............................................... 102
Written Statement............................................ 104
Biography.................................................... 110
Discussion
Aeronautics Planning: Budget vs. Priorities.................... 110
Zero Base Review............................................... 111
Number of Wind Tunnels Needed.................................. 112
Credibility of NASA's Aeronautics Plan......................... 113
U.S. Competitiveness and the Aeronautic Budget................. 115
Workforce at Langley Research Center........................... 115
Plans for Wind Tunnel Closures................................. 116
U.S. Competition............................................... 117
Workforce Retention............................................ 119
Effects of the Budget Proposal................................. 122
Aeronautics Funding Cuts....................................... 123
Hypersonics.................................................... 124
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Dr. J. Victor Lebacqz, Associate Administrator, Aeronautics
Research Mission Directorate, NASA............................. 128
Dr. John M. Klineberg, Committee Chairman, National Research
Council Panel.................................................. 142
Dr. Philip S. Anton, Director, Center for Acquisition and
Technology Policy, RAND........................................ 146
Dr. Mike J. Benzakein, Chairman, Department of Aerospace
Engineering, Ohio State University............................. 149
Dr. R. John Hansman, Jr., Director, International Center for Air
Transportation, MIT............................................ 151
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Statement of Mr. John W. Douglass, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Aerospace Industries Association of America........... 154
Aeronautics Test Program (ATP) White Paper....................... 160
THE FUTURE OF AERONAUTICS AT NASA
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 2005
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ken
Calvert [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
The Future of
Aeronautics at NASA
wednesday, march 16, 2005
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
On Wednesday, March 16, at 10:00 a.m., the Subcommittee on Space
and Aeronautics will hold a hearing on the proposed Fiscal Year (FY)
2006 budget for aeronautics at the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's (NASA).
The budget proposes significant changes in NASA's aeronautic
programs, including, over the next five years, dramatic cuts in funding
and staffing, closure of facilities, and redirection of research
priorities. NASA argues that these proposed changes would enable NASA
to focus on the highest priority areas in aeronautics while freeing up
Agency funds for space exploration programs, the Agency's highest
priority.
NASA has played a role in advancing aeronautics since its
inception. Indeed, NASA was created by expanding the National Advisory
Committee on Aeronautics (NACA), a federal agency created in 1917 to
promote aeronautics. NASA's Langley Research Center in Virginia, one of
its aeronautics centers, dates back to 1917.
Today, aeronautics programs are run by NASA's Aeronautics Research
Mission Directorate (ARMD). No other federal agency supports research
on civilian aircraft. NASA's aeronautics program also conducts most of
the research on air traffic control systems, a responsibility it shares
with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The Aeronautics
Directorate includes three NASA Centers: Glenn Research Center, Ohio;
Dryden Research Center, California; and Langley Research Center,
Virginia.
Overarching Questions
The Committee plans to explore the following overarching questions
at the hearing:
1. What are the trends in civil aeronautics and what should
the U.S. national strategy be for civil aeronautics research
and development?
2. What is NASA's aeronautics research strategy and how well
does it align with the Nation's strategic needs for civil
aeronautics research?
3. Should NASA preserve its inventory of wind tunnels and
propulsion test facilities until a new national strategy can be
developed and funded?
4. How does NASA intend to achieve the workforce reductions it
has proposed without losing essential skills and capabilities?
Witnesses
Dr. Vic Lebacqz is Associate Administrator of the Aeronautics Research
Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. He
was named to his current position since January 2004, after serving
about six months in an acting capacity.
Dr. John Klineberg led a 2004 National Academy of Sciences study
entitled ``Review of NASA's Aerospace Technology Enterprise: An
Assessment of NASA's Aeronautics Technology Program.'' He is retired as
President of Space Systems/Loral, and for 25 years worked at NASA,
including as Director of the Goddard Space Flight Research Center and
the Ames Research Center.
Dr. Philip Anton was the principal investigator of a 2004 report
produced by the RAND Corporation entitled ``Wind Tunnels and Propulsion
Test Facilities: An Assessment of NASA's Capabilities to Serve National
Needs.'' The report was jointly sponsored by NASA and the Department of
Defense. He is a senior scientist at RAND, which is a federally funded
research and development center sponsored by the Department of Defense.
Dr. Mike Benzakein was named Chairman of the Department of Aerospace
Engineering at the Ohio State University in October 2004. From 1967
through 2004 he worked for GE Aircraft Engines and retired as General
Manager of Advanced Technology and Military Engineering.
Dr. John Hansman is a Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Director of the
International Center for Air Transportation.
FY06 Aeronautics Budget Highlights
Over the last decade, funding for NASA's aeronautics research has
declined by more than half, to about $900 million. For FY06, NASA
proposes a relatively small decrease ($54 million, or about six
percent) in aeronautics research and development compared to its FY05
Operating Plan. But the Agency's proposed five-year runout for
aeronautics contemplates substantial funding reductions (20 percent)
for aeronautics research, together with significant cutbacks in its
civil service and contractor workforces.
Civil service personnel and infrastructure costs account for much
of the Aeronautics Directorate's budget, largely because of the
expenses involved in the operation and maintenance of NASA's 31 wind
tunnels.
This is not the case for other portions of NASA, for which grants
and contracts account for much of the cost. As a result, while the
Aeronautics Directorate receives only six percent of NASA's total
budget, it employs 23 percent of the entire NASA workforce and is
responsible for 40 percent of all of NASA's infrastructure costs.
The Aeronautics Directorate comprises three programs--the Vehicle
Systems Program, the Aviation Safety and Security Program, and the
Airspace Systems Program. The Administration's proposed budget for the
next five years for these three programmatic areas is shown below:
Vehicle Systems
Vehicle Systems emphasizes research in traditional air vehicle
design concepts (examples being wing designs and high-speed aircraft),
and for FY06, takes the biggest cut among the three programs (down $109
million compared to FY05, a 19 percent reduction). The proposed budget
would make further reductions in the program in FY07, resulting in a
cut of 33 percent (compared to FY05).
The cuts would be made by narrowing the program's focus beginning
in FY06. The program would concentrate on projects designed to make
significant leaps forward on technology and less on incremental
changes. Specifically, the program would focus on four areas: (1) zero
emissions aircraft--to demonstrate an aircraft powered by fuel cells;
(2) subsonic noise reduction--to demonstrate a 50 percent reduction in
noise compared to 1997 state-of-the-art; (3) high altitude long
endurance (HALE)--to demonstrate a 14-day duration high altitude,
remotely operated aircraft; and (4) sonic boom reduction--to
demonstrate technology that could enable acceptable sonic boom levels.
Research activities proposed for termination in the FY06 Vehicle
Systems program include hypersonics (higher-speed aircraft), rotorcraft
(helicopters), and improvements in engine efficiency.
To conduct its research, Vehicle Systems relies heavily on wind
tunnels and propulsion test facilities. The proposed budget appears to
assume the closure of one or more of these facilities with associated
cutbacks in staff (see below). However, NASA has not released any
information on which facilities it would close or when, or the criteria
on which closure decisions would be based.
In arguing for the proposed changes in the Vehicle Systems Program,
NASA has cited a 2004 National Academy of Sciences report, ``Review of
NASA's Aerospace Technology Enterprise: An Assessment of NASA's
Aeronautics Technology Program,'' led by Dr. John Klineberg. The report
did recommend that NASA reduce the number of research projects it
conducted, stating, ``NASA is trying to do too much within the
available budget and resists eliminating programs in the face of budget
reductions.'' It also concluded that NASA's ``aeronautics technology
infrastructure exceeds its current needs, and the Agency should
continue to dispose of underutilized assets and facilities.'' But while
the Academy report listed individual projects it thought were a low
priority, it did not recommend the elimination of whole categories of
research as NASA has proposed. The report also did not elaborate on its
recommendation concerning underutilized facilities. (A summary of the
report is attached.)
Airspace Systems
Airspace Systems supports research to improve air traffic
management. In conjunction with FAA, NASA is supporting the Joint
Planning and Development Office, which is overseeing the effort to
develop a next-generation air traffic management system. The Airspace
Systems program would receive the largest increase of the programs
within NASA's aeronautics portfolio in the FY06 budget, increasing by
$48 million or about 32 percent. However, the program would still
receive less than it did in FY04, and it would receive less in
subsequent years. The increase in FY06 would be used to provide more
funds for a number of software development projects, whose budgets
would remain flat after that. A number of current projects would be
completed during the out-years, resulting in the drop in overall
funding for the program.
Aviation Safety and Security
The Aviation Safety and Security program conducts research to
prevent the most common types of fatal accidents in aviation, such as
planes colliding with mountainous terrain or other obstacles on the
ground, and eliminating intrusions by other aircraft onto active
runways. It also seeks to develop concepts and technologies to reduce
the vulnerability of aircraft and the National Airspace System to
criminal and terrorist attacks while improving the efficiency of
security. For FY06, NASA proposes to increase funding for this program
by $7.5 million, or about four percent. The program would receive less
funding in the out years.
Personnel
The proposed cuts in the aeronautics budget would be achieved, in
part, by reducing the workforce. NASA has not specified what skills
would no longer be needed because of programmatic changes or how the
personnel cuts might be linked to facilities cuts. It is unclear
whether NASA decided how many employees would be cut based on budget
targets, or whether the Agency decided how many employees would no
longer be needed for programmatic reasons and then calculated how much
money would be saved as a result, or some combination.
Acting Administrator Fred Gregory testified on February 17 that no
one at NASA would be laid off involuntarily before FY07, raising the
question of what NASA would do if buyout offers did not result in the
expected reductions.
Issues
The Committee plans to explore the following issues at the hearing:
What would the impact of the proposed cuts be on American
civil aviation?
This critical question is difficult to answer at this point because
NASA has not made clear exactly what would be cut, particularly in
terms of facilities and job categories.
What is clear is that the cuts would come at a critical time for
the U.S. aviation industry. The sole surviving American manufacturer of
large civil aircraft, Boeing, is facing ever stiffer competition from
its European competitor, Airbus. The two U.S. turbine engine
manufacturers, General Electric and Pratt and Whitney, also face tough
competition. It is not clear what kind of research would be most
helpful to U.S. industry and to U.S. aviation generally. Clearly, the
air traffic control and environmental issues on which NASA intends to
focus would be at the top of any research priority list.
In terms of vehicle systems research, NASA is looking at
eliminating incremental research, but this is the research that
companies are likely to be most interested in as they can quickly adopt
its results. But some experts argue that industry should pay for
shorter-term research on its own.
One example of shorter-term research that NASA is backing out of is
rotorcraft research. This concerns helicopter manufacturers who argue
that helicopters are still an ``immature technology'' for which many
improvements are possible and that foreign competition is increasing.
But NASA has had a mixed record with the kind of far-ranging
research it proposes to focus on. In the past, it has discontinued many
revolutionary technology programs before they were completed. For
example, in the FY06 budget, NASA proposes to end work on hypersonics
(which included a high-profile test late last year of the X-43A
scramjet, which set a new record for speed).
One reason for the uncertainty about what approach NASA should take
is that NASA has no overarching plan for aeronautics, in contrast to
the way the President's Exploration Vision is setting the agenda for
the exploration programs and the way that National Academy of Sciences
priority-setting exercises guide NASA's science programs. NASA is in
the process of funding several efforts to develop an aeronautics
agenda. This month, a study funded by the National Institute of
Aeronautics, a university consortium, is due to make recommendations.
This summer, an internal NASA ``roadmapping'' exercise (which includes
outside advisory committees) is scheduled to lay out a plan for
aeronautics. And in late 2006, the National Academy of Sciences is
expected to complete a ``decadal survey'' for aeronautics (based on
similar surveys done in space science) that would lay out a consensus
on priorities in aeronautics over the next ten years.
What would be the impact of NASA closing wind tunnels?
NASA currently operates 31 wind tunnels, with widely varying
utilization rates. Wind tunnels are very expensive to build and
operate, and their designs are carefully tailored to achieve precise
flow conditions within a narrow range of speed and altitude. No single
wind tunnel is suitable for replicating all flight conditions (e.g.,
high and fast as well as low and slow). Throughout the world, most wind
tunnels are supported by governments. Over the past two decades NASA
has reduced its number of wind tunnels and propulsion test facilities
by one-third.
NASA commissioned a study last year from RAND, which concluded that
NASA should continue to operate 29 of its 31 wind tunnels. RAND
estimated the annual operating cost of all 31 tunnels to be $125-$130
million. RAND argued that while some of the tunnels were not well used
now, they offered capabilities that could be needed in the future and
that would be hard to replicate if the tunnels were shut down. RAND
also argued that while some questions that once needed to be solved
with wind tunnels could now be answered through computer simulation,
many critical questions still required wind tunnels. It also said that
wind tunnel data were sometimes needed to develop computer simulation
software.
In addition to NASA itself, industry and the Department of Defense
use NASA wind tunnels. NASA has increased the fees it charges industry
to use its wind tunnels, now basing charges on the full cost of
maintaining a wind tunnel rather than on the incremental cost of the
specific work being done. Because of increased fees and because of the
age and limitations of some of NASA's facilities, U.S. companies are
more frequently using foreign wind tunnels. This has raised issues
about whether the U.S. should be wary of becoming dependent on foreign
facilities as well as concerns about whether trade secrets may be lost
in using foreign tunnels.
Background
NASA's Aeronautics Research
Virtually every airplane flying today employs technological
innovations developed by NASA. Examples include the high-bypass turbine
engine that provides much greater fuel efficiency and lower noise
emissions than original 1960's-era jet engines; ``fly-by-wire'' control
systems that use computers and wires instead of heavy, maintenance-
intensive hydraulics systems to control an airplane's rudder and wing
flaps; flight management systems such as the ``black boxes'' that
continuously monitor an aircraft's engines, speed, location, and other
critical parameters; and advanced composites made out of materials such
as graphite and epoxy that can be used to replace heavier and more
maintenance-intensive aluminum alloy structures. The Boeing 787, now
under development, will be the first large civil aircraft to use
composite materials in its fuselage.
The U.S. Aircraft Industry
The domestic aeronautics industry has changed substantially over
the last ten to fifteen years through consolidations. Today there is
only one manufacturer of large civil aircraft, Boeing, and just two
turbine engine manufacturers for large civil aircraft, General Electric
and Pratt & Whitney. The U.S. has no domestic regional jet
manufacturers, the fastest growing segment in civil aviation; most are
made in Canada and Brazil. The business jet and general aviation
aircraft industry has a much larger number of producers.
Boeing is this country's largest exporter of manufactured products
(based on dollar value), and there are thousands of suppliers whose
products are found in each jet. Airbus,\1\ a European company and
Boeing's only rival, has overtaken Boeing in terms of winning new
aircraft orders. Parenthetically, earlier this year Airbus unveiled its
new A380 aircraft, a ``super jumbo'' that will be the world's largest
passenger-carrying aircraft (it can seat over 800 in a single-class
layout). The A380's first flight is scheduled for later this spring.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Airbus began over 30 years ago as a government-created and
owned entity with direct investment by the British, French, Spanish,
and German governments. It has since been spun off as a private company
owned by EADS and BAE systems, both European based conglomerates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Earlier this decade, the European Union (EU) identified aeronautics
as part of a continent-wide industrial strategy. The EU produced a
research program document, ``Aeronautics 2020,'' that explicitly states
its objective of becoming the world's leading supplier of aeronautics
goods and services and achieving parity with Boeing. Arguably, it has
met its goal. The EU also has set a goal of taking a leadership role in
developing the design and production of next generation air traffic
management services.
Witness Questions
In their letters of invitation, the witnesses were asked to address
the following questions:
Dr. Vic Lebacqz, NASA--
Please briefly describe NASA's long-term national aeronautics
strategy and goals of the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate with
particular emphasis on the following questions:
How do the funding and programmatic changes in NASA's
FY 2006 budget proposal affect the Aeronautics Mission
Directorate's ability to achieve its goals?
Which wind tunnels is NASA planning to close and when
is it planning to close them? What criteria were used to select
those tunnels? What effect will the Agency's decision to close
wind tunnels and propulsion test facilities have on the ability
of the Mission Directorate to meet its goals? How will NASA
ensure that its workforce retains the skills that are critical
to the Agency achieving its long-term goals?
Dr. John Klineberg, National Academy of Sciences--
Please briefly describe the findings and recommendations of the
National Research Council's review of NASA's aeronautics technology
programs with particular emphasis on the following questions:
Over the next two decades, what are the main
challenges facing the aeronautics industry and our aviation
infrastructure? What are the Nation's most pressing strategic
needs in civil aeronautics?
What role do NASA's aeronautics programs and
strategic plans have in fulfilling the Nation's strategic needs
in civil aeronautics? How effective are NASA's programs in
helping to ensure U.S. industrial competitiveness in civil
aeronautics markets worldwide?
What effect do you believe NASA's proposed budget
(including proposed changes in funding, workforce, and
operation of wind tunnels) will have on its ability to meet the
Nation's strategic needs in civil aeronautics?
What steps, if any, do you recommend NASA take to
better meet the Nation's needs?
Dr. Philip Anton, RAND--
Briefly describe the findings and recommendations contained in your
study and analysis of NASA's inventory of wind tunnels and propulsion
facilities with particular emphasis on the following questions:
What would be the consequence to American aviation of
NASA closing one or more wind tunnels? Are there particular
wind tunnels that it would be especially detrimental to close?
Are there ways NASA could seek outside funding for
its wind tunnels? Are there ways NASA could change its
accounting practices regarding its wind tunnels?
What are the disadvantages of relying on foreign wind
tunnels and how serious are they?
Dr. John Hansman, MIT, and Dr. Mike Benzakein, Ohio State--
Over the next two decades, what are the main
challenges facing the aeronautics industry and our aviation
infrastructure? What are the Nation's most pressing strategic
needs in civil aeronautics?
What role do NASA's aeronautics programs and
strategic plans have in fulfilling the Nation's strategic needs
in civil aeronautics? How effective are NASA's programs in
helping to ensure U.S. industrial competitiveness in civil
aeronautics markets worldwide?
What effect do you believe NASA's proposed budget
(including proposed changes in funding, workforce, and
operation of wind tunnels) will have on its ability to meet the
Nation's strategic needs in civil aeronautics?
What steps should the government take to better
address the Nation's strategic civil aeronautics needs? If
continued research has an important role to play, what should
be its priorities? How do you recommend NASA balance investment
in evolutionary research against revolutionary, high-risk,
high-payoff research?
Attachment
An Assessment of NASA's Aeronautics Technology Programs
National Research Council (2004)
Excerpts from the Executive Summary
The National Research Council Committee and its three subordinate
panels conducted an independent peer assessment of the Vehicle Systems
Program (VSP), the Airspace Systems Program (ASP), and the Aviation
safety Program (AvSP), the three elements of NASA's Aeronautics
Technology Programs. NASA specifically asked the Committee and panels
to address four questions:
1. Is the array of activities about right?
2. Is there a good plan to carry out the program?
3. Is the program doing what it set out to do?
4. Is the entire effort connected to the users?
The Committee's simple answer to the four questions posed by NASA
is that, in general, the Aeronautics Technology Programs are very good
but could be greatly improved by following the Committee's 12 top-level
recommendations.
Top-Level Recommendations:
1. The government should continue to support air
transportation, which is vital to the U.S. economy and the
well-being of its citizens.
2. NASA should provide world leadership in aeronautics
research and development.
3. NASA has many excellent technical personnel and facilities
to achieve its aeronautics technology objectives but should
improve its processes for program management.
4. NASA should eliminate arbitrary time constraints on
program completion and schedule key milestones based on task
complexity and technology maturity.
5. NASA should reduce the number of tasks in its aeronautics
technology portfolio.
6. NASA should pursue more high-risk, high-payoff
technologies.
7. NASA should reconstitute a long-term base research
program, separate from the other aeronautics technology
programs and projects.
8. NASA's aeronautics technology infrastructure exceeds its
current needs, and the Agency should continue to dispose of
under-utilized assets and facilities.
9. NASA should implement full-cost accounting in a way that
avoids unintended consequences harmful to the long-term health
of the aeronautics program.
10. NASA should develop a common understanding with the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) of their respective roles
and relationship.
11. NASA should seek better feedback from senior management in
industry and other government organizations.
12. NASA should conduct research in selective areas relevant
to rotorcraft.
Chairman Calvert. Good morning. I am here to call this
meeting of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee to order.
Without objection, the Chair will be granted the authority to
recess the Committee at any time. Hearing no objection, so
ordered.
Today, we are kicking off my first hearing as Chairman of
the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee. We are beginning our
oversight of the fiscal year 2006 NASA budget, and we will
focus today on the aeronautics research and development
program.
There are a number of areas that I would like for us to
examine through the hearing this year, including the Shuttle's
return-to-flight, issues with the NASA workforce and
infrastructure, NASA's financial management system, and issues
concerning our commercial space industry. Just as important, I
want to ensure that we get back to work on the authorization
bill for NASA.
This is a critical time for the Agency, with a whole host
of issues on its plate. It is important that the Congress offer
guidance for the big decision facing NASA in the near future. I
want to commend the President and his superb choice of Mike
Griffin as the next NASA Administrator. I look forward to
working with him, once he is confirmed, to begin addressing
these issues.
Today, we will begin our oversight of the fiscal year 2006
budget proposed for NASA's aeronautics research and development
program. The Europeans have thrown down the gauntlet, and said
they will dominate aerospace in the world by 2020. The U.S.
aerospace industry has expressed alarm at the reductions of
NASA's aeronautics investment, pointing out that aerospace
products are a huge source of export sales, and a major
contributor to the United States international balance of
trade.
Our nation's preeminence in commercial aircraft is being
seriously challenged by Airbus, and many believe that reduced
aeronautics R&D funding has directly played a role in the cause
of the weakened position and the weakened aerospace industry.
There is a lot of concern that the investment in aeronautics
research and development by this nation has been limping along
for several years, and there is a lack of a national strategy.
Over the next five years, NASA is proposing to reduce its
aeronautics workforce by approximately 2,000 people, and to
shut down a number of its wind tunnels.
The questions that I have are, are these wise decisions for
the Nation? Should NASA develop a national strategy for
aeronautics before these valuable assets and skills are lost?
Does NASA have a human capital strategy, or are these personnel
cuts solely for budget purposes? Do we have a national strategy
for civil aeronautics R&D, and if so, is NASA aligned to
support a national strategy?
The current requested funding levels for the aeronautics
program amount to a little over five percent of NASA's overall
budget. The funding trend is declining at a rather precarious
rate over the next several years. I am hoping that today's
witnesses are able to guide the Subcommittee in addressing what
this nation's aeronautics priorities should be, and how NASA
should address these priorities.
In fiscal year 2006 budget request, NASA offers three
programs in aeronautics R&D area. Of the three, Airspace
Systems and Aviation and Security are funded at a flat level,
and Vehicle Systems received a 20 percent cut, approximately
$100 million. This does not appear to bode well for the Nation
investment in the future of the aerospace industry and our
nation's competitiveness.
I look forward from hearing from our witnesses today on
this important topic. I also want to welcome Mr. Udall in his
new capacity as the Ranking Member on this subcommittee. I look
forward to working with you and this Congress. We have worked
together on other committees, and I look forward to working
with you on this committee. In fact, I think we are on all the
same committees, come to think of it. Yeah.
So, at this point, I would like to recognize Mr. Udall for
his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Calvert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Ken Calvert
Today, we are kicking off my first hearing as Chairman for the
Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee. We are beginning our oversight of
the FY 2006 NASA budget and will focus today on the Aeronautics
research and development program. There are a number of areas that I
would like for us to examine through hearings this year, including: the
Shuttle's Return-to-Flight; issues with the NASA workforce and
infrastructure; NASA's financial management system; and issues
concerning our nascent commercial space industry.
Just as important, I want to ensure that we get to work on the
authorization bill for NASA. This is a critical time for the Agency
with a whole host of issues on its plate. It is important that the
Congress offer guidance for the big decisions facing NASA in the near
future.
I want to commend the President in his superb choice of Mike
Griffin as the next NASA Administrator and I look forward to working
with him once he is confirmed, to begin addressing these issues.
Today, we will begin our oversight of the FY 2006 budget proposed
for NASA's Aeronautics research and development program. The Europeans
have thrown down the gauntlet and said that they will dominate
aerospace in the world by the year 2020. The U.S. aerospace industry
has expressed alarm at the reductions in NASA's aeronautics investment,
pointing out that aerospace products are a huge source of export sales
and a major contributor to the United States' international balance of
trade. Our nation's preeminence in commercial aircraft is being
seriously challenged by Airbus and many believe that reduced
aeronautics R&D funding has directly played a role in the cause of this
weakened position of the American aerospace industry.
There is a lot of concern that the investment in aeronautics
research and development by this nation has been limping along for
several years, and that there is a lack of a national strategy. Over
the next five years, NASA is proposing to reduce its aeronautics
workforce by approximately 2,000 people and to shut down a number of
its wind tunnels. The questions that I have are: Are these wise
decisions for our nation? Should NASA develop a national strategy for
aeronautics before these valuable assets and skills are lost? Does NASA
have a Human Capital Strategy or are these personnel cuts solely for
budget purposes? Should we have a national strategy for civil
aeronautics R&D? If so, is NASA aligned to support a national strategy?
The current requested funding levels for the Aeronautics programs
amount to a little over five percent of NASA's overall budget. The
funding trend is declining at a rather precarious rate over the next
several years. I am hoping that today's witnesses are able to offer
guidance to this subcommittee in addressing what this nation's
aeronautics priorities should be and how NASA should address these
priorities. In the FY 2006 budget request, NASA offers three programs
in the Aeronautics R&D area. Of the three, Airspace Systems and
Aviation Safety & Security are funded at a flat level and Vehicle
Systems received a 20 percent cut (-$100M). This does not appear to
bode well for our nation's investment in the future of the aerospace
industry and our nation's competitiveness.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on this very
important topic.
Mr. Udall. I thank the Chairman. Good morning to everybody
here.
I would like to join the Chairman in welcoming our
witnesses, the first panel in particular, Representative Jo Ann
Davis and Representative Dennis Kucinich, who I am sure will
join us.
I would also like to take the opportunity to say how much I
am looking forward to working with Chairman Calvert and the
other Members of this subcommittee. We have a lot of important
issues to deal with over the next two years, and I am confident
that we will be able to work effectively across party lines to
do the Nation's business.
One of the important issues that we need to address is
topic of this morning's hearing, namely, the future of NASA's
aeronautics program. This year marks the 90th anniversary of
the establishment of the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics, NACA, as it was known, the organization
predecessor of NASA. During its existence, NACA undertook much
of the R&D that made modern commercial and military aviation
possible.
Congress recognized the value of federally sponsored R&D in
aeronautics, and made it one of NASA's core missions when it
established the Agency in 1958. It made good sense then, and it
makes good sense now to have NASA involved in aeronautical R&D.
NASA's R&D in aeronautics and aviation benefits not only--helps
our international competitiveness, but also the quality of life
of our citizens. Research on ways to drastically reduce
aircraft noise and emissions, research into safer and more
secure aircraft, research into new vehicle concepts that could
revolutionize future air travel, and research into ways to
modernize the Nation's air traffic management system, so that
we don't face gridlock in the skies at some point in the coming
decades. All of these are areas of research NASA has been
pursuing.
Yet despite the clear value of such research, NASA
aeronautics program has now reached a crisis point. Coming in
the wake of years of declining budgets, the fiscal year 2006
request, if approved, would further erode the aeronautics
program's capabilities over the next five years. In addition to
the low priority being given to aeronautics in the budget,
NASA's experiment with full cost recovery, an approach that DOD
has tried and abandoned, has jeopardized the continued
viability of an important segment of the Nation's aeronautical
test facilities.
Moreover, while it has been difficult to get definitive
answers concerning NASA's intentions for the workforce at the
Aeronautics Research Centers, it is clear that NASA management
envisions significant numbers of current employees leaving the
program. As one of our witnesses, Dr. Hansman, observes in his
testimony, the workforce actions appear to be motivated by
budget pressures rather than strategic efforts at intellectual
renewal. This, coupled with a perception of declining NASA
priority in aeronautics, could create an atmosphere where it is
difficult to retain and attract the best and the brightest.
All of this troubles me. We seem to be headed down a path
that could result in the loss of a vital national capability if
we aren't careful. The NASA witness at today's hearing will
have the somewhat thankless task of trying to convince us that
things aren't so bad, even though his programs are being cut
year after year. In that regard, I bring an open mind to the
hearing, and I am willing to be convinced that the '06 budget
request for aeronautics is healthy.
But in order to be convinced, I am first going to need to
have a number of concerns addressed. For example, NASA's '06
budget request focuses the Vehicle Systems funding on research
into breakthrough technologies, with the intent of achieving
near-term flight demonstrations of revolutionary and barrier-
breaking technology. That sounds good. However, flight
demonstrations tend to be the most expensive part of the
aeronautical R&D process. Yet, NASA's budget plan indicates
that the Vehicle Systems budget will decline by 43 percent over
the next five years. That doesn't strike me as a credible
approach.
I could cite other examples, but I want to bring my remarks
to a close, so we can hear from our witnesses. I would simply
conclude by saying that I think we really have a
straightforward question of priorities before us. The bleak
outlook for aeronautics at NASA is not an inevitability. It is
a result of policy decisions and prioritizations that Congress
may or may not choose to endorse.
Mr. Chairman, as I close, I would like to ask unanimous
consent that the written testimony submitted by Mr. Gregory
Junemann, of the International Federation of Professional and
Technical Engineers, be entered into the record.
Chairman Calvert. Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Junemann follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gregory J. Junemann
President, International Federation of Professional & Technical
Engineers, AFL-CIO & CLC
Summary:
The International Federation of Professional and Technical
Engineers, which represents more than 8,000 employees at five NASA
Centers, is concerned that the dramatic cuts in NASA's aeronautical R&D
proposed in the FY06 budget, together with the associated ill-conceived
draconian workforce downsizing, will harm NASA's ability to live up to
its responsibility to bolster U.S. global leadership in aeronautics, to
its duty to maintain the safety and security of the air-traveling
public, and to its obligation to help fuel U.S. economic growth and
prosperity. We propose a few specific legislative solutions,
appropriate for the FY06 Authorization bill, as well as an alternate
revenue-neutral funding path better suited for delivering the
President's Exploration Vision while maintaining NASA's intellectual
assets and facilities necessary to meet America's critical future needs
in aeronautics.
Statement:
The International Federation of Professional and Technical
Engineers would like to thank Chairmen Boehlert and Calvert as well as
Ranking Members Gordon and Udall for according us the privilege of
submitting this testimony for the record. The Nation is looking to the
House Science Committee and its Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
to scrutinize carefully NASA's proposed FY06 budget and associated
activities. In particular, in the context of today's hearing on the
future of NASA's aeronautics programs, we ask that the Committee compel
NASA to explain exactly how it expects to meet its responsibility to
foster progress in aviation for the American people while imposing a
nearly one-third cut in funding to the Aeronautics Research Mission
Directorate. What increased risks are the American people being asked
to accept? What constraints on economic growth? What loss in world
leadership and national prestige?
NASA aeronautical R&D has an unquestioned track record of return on
investment and, at less than $1billion dollars annually, is an amazing
bargain; it continues to play a crucial role in the near flawless
safety record in U.S. commercial aviation and in technology innovation
for both civilian and military aeronautics. Unfortunately however, NASA
aeronautics funds are being improperly pilfered to support a chaotic
and hastily planned increase in the Exploration budget. The President's
Vision for Space Exploration contains a budget chart (p. 19) showing a
small short-term decrease in aeronautical R&D of a magnitude far less
than the one currently proposed, and the long-term costs of Exploration
covered by the phase-out of funding to the Shuttle and ISS programs.
NASA must explain to Congress and to the American people such a
divergence from the President's initial plan, and why Aeronautics is
being sacrificed for Exploration when the Vision clearly intended to
use ISS and Shuttle funds for that purpose.
Much of the science and many of the currently implemented
technologies and facilities funded by the Aeronautics budget have
significant impacts on past space missions, and leveraging these
existing assets and expertise will prove invaluable in any cost-
effective yet accelerated Exploration plan. The proposed cutbacks
jeopardize facilities, scientists, engineers, and technicians that
should be available, for example, to test vehicle design and human-
system integration for a Mars mission Entry, Descent and Landing, and
to design airborne ``flyers'' for Mars surveying, to name just two. The
proposed cuts in aeronautical R&D will have unintended consequences for
Exploration in the out-years; such impacts must be evaluated and
prevented before the damage is done.
Additionally, in NASA's Aeronautics blueprint (February, 2002), the
Agency outlines a clear plan for NASA's aeronautical R&D as critical
component of a bold vision of the future of America's civil and
military aviation. This document states some simple facts:
1. Aviation is crucial to U.S. economic health, national
security, and overall quality of life.
2. The Nation is facing continuing serious challenges in
aviation.
3. New technologies are needed to create a new level of
performance and capability.
These facts remain as true today as they were when Administrator
O'Keefe signed off on the blueprint three years ago. Indeed, this view
has been reasserted and extended by the Joint Planning and Development
Office (JPDO)--an interagency task force created in 2003 under the
Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act and charged with coordinating
aeronautics efforts across NASA, FAA, DOD, Commerce, Transportation,
and Homeland Security to ``ensure that the Next Generation Air
Transportation System meets air transportation safety, security,
mobility, efficiency, and capacity needs.'' In their Integrated
National Plan for the Next Generation Air Transportation System
(December 2004), the JPDO lays out an urgent agenda to:
1. Retain U.S. Leadership in Global Aviation
2. Expand Capacity
3. Ensure Safety
4. Protect the Environment
5. Ensure Our National Defense
6. Secure the Nation
Clearly, NASA must play a prominent role in all six of these
efforts (as it is the only Agency with the appropriate broad-based
aeronautical R&D expertise and experience) and any reprogramming of
NASA's aeronautical R&D programs must be evaluated to assure that cuts
do not jeopardize the swift and effective implementation of this
coordinated effort.
Just as clearly, industry and academia alone will not meet the
Nation's needs in aeronautics. It is an inherently governmental
responsibility to drive the long-term R&D needed to create the
revolutionary (and, hence, risky and unprofitable even in the medium-
term) changes needed for aviation in the 21st century. The profit
motive will back the status quo until market conditions change so
dramatically (e.g., the doubling of the number of commercial flights)
that the status quo no longer functions safely and efficiently. Yet,
revolutionary technology change does not occur overnight and hence the
Nation can ill afford to wait until market forces can drive change,
i.e., we cannot wait to act until planes are crashing because of an
overburdened airspace system. Investing in NASA aeronautical R&D will
bolster America's leadership in aeronautics as well as both our
military might and our civilian competitiveness in aircraft design,
production, and operations.
NASA also plays a unique role in responding to the Nation's need to
develop and maintain critical, unique, and--yes--unprofitable test
facilities; as well as the need for the independent, scientifically-
based establishment of evolving standards for design requirements and
safety certification. NASA plays a critical role in supporting the
efforts of its sister aeronautics-related Agencies: the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB). Using its facilities and in-house expertise, NASA assists
the FAA establish and introduce new safety standards and new
operational capabilities and helps the NTSB identify the root causes of
accidents. These key roles provide further justification for continuing
a major governmental role in America's aeronautical R&D. Only NASA has
the expertise, capability, and independence to perform this role
properly and effectively without being compromised by external profit
motives.
In a recent thorough external review of NASA's aeronautics program
conducted by the National Research Council (NRC Review of NASA's
Aerospace Technology Enterprise: An Assessment of NASA's Aeronautics
Technology Programs, 2004), a panel of experts throughout the
aeronautics industry and academia issued a dozen top-level
recommendations. Among these, the first two are: ``(t)he government
should continue to support air transportation, which is vital to the
U.S. economy and the well being of its citizens, and NASA should
provide world leadership in aeronautics research and development.''
That said, in its third recommendation, the NRC gave NASA's rank-and-
file employees a ringing endorsement while warning of problems with
NASA management: ``NASA has many excellent technical personnel and
facilities to achieve its aeronautics technology objectives, but should
improve its processes for program management.'' A large part of this
management problem is the exploding population of technically-detached
managers created by NASA management's inefficient matrixed structure
and its insistence on excessive internal reporting, a permanent state
of re-organization, and other unproductive, non-technical, and overall
inefficient activities.
A full evaluation of all the NRC recommendations is beyond the
scope of this statement, but it is important to note that another
important recommendation was that ``NASA should reconstitute a long-
term base research program, separate from the other aeronautics
technology programs and projects.'' It is troubling that NASA
management has rejected this recommendation and has turned instead in
the opposite direction by implementing a demonstration project approach
to its aeronautical R&D.
The NASA blueprint concludes with the blunt statement that ``the
cost of inaction is gridlock, constrained mobility, unrealized economic
growth, and loss of U.S. aviation leadership.'' This must not be
allowed to occur. NASA can continue to realign itself towards the
President's Exploration Vision, but it must and can do so without
dramatically reducing its aeronautical R&D capabilities. NASA
management's plan to siphon off 30 percent of its aeronautics funds to
support the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) will prevent
NASA from living up to the promise of its own blueprint, to its
responsibility in the JPDO's Next Generation Air Transportation
Integrated Plan, to its duty to maintain the safety and security of the
air-traveling public, and to its obligation to help fuel U.S. economic
growth and prosperity.
The devastating impact of the FY06 budget on the Aeronautics Field
Centers
NASA's FY06 budget proposal contemplates an overall 30 percent
decrease in the aeronautics budget between FY05 and FY07. The immediate
FY06 cuts focus nearly completely on redirecting the Vehicle Systems
Program (VSP), despite the fact that the NRC review stated that ``(t)he
committee evaluated a total of 172 tasks in the VSP portfolio. The
committee determined that more than 80 percent were of good quality or
better, with 30 percent (51 tasks) rated as world-class.'' One has to
wonder what will happen to all that world-class R&D and all those
world-class scientists and engineers given that the proposed cuts far
exceed the 20 percent that one might expect from the above numbers.
However, even more troubling is the fact that, although the remaining
programs (Airspace Systems, Aviation Safety and Security) appear stable
in the overall FY06 budget projections, the current and projected
funding picture is far different at all of the aeronautics performing
Field Centers.
From the data in Associate Administrator Lebacqz's February 16th
briefing to committee staffers, one can generate the following clear
picture of the magnitude of the impacts of the FY06 budget across all
three Aeronautics Field Centers. (Similar impacts are evident at Ames
Research Center but, because it is no longer an official Aeronautics
Center, its detailed numbers were not available in his briefing.)
The elimination over this 18-month period of more than a third of a
Field Center's highly skilled and experienced technical aeronautics
workforce would seem a bit imprudent, as well as contrary to NASA's own
blueprint, the JPDO's Integrated Plan, and the NRC's recent NASA
recommendations. The above numbers also do not address the adverse
impacts on critical facilities (see below).
Legislative Proposals
IFPTE asks that the House Science Committee exercise its oversight
authority by adding the following language into its FY06 Authorization
bill to safeguard NASA's aeronautics capabilities:
1. NASA shall reserve at least six percent of its FY06 budget
for the Aeronautical R&D activities and plan for seven percent
in the FY07 rising to 10 percent in out-year budgets. Among
other things, NASA shall use this increase in funding to
implement the NRC review panel's recommendation to
``reconstitute a long-term base research program, separate from
the other aeronautics technology programs and projects.''
2. NASA shall decrease its management workforce (supervisors
and management officials) by a third in FY06 and plan to reduce
this workforce by a factor of two from the FY05 baseline by the
end of FY07. NASA shall not decrease its technical workforce at
any Field Center by more than 10 percent in any given year and
shall explicitly include any planned technical workforce
reductions of any kind in its annual Workforce Plan submitted
to Congress.
An Alternate Approach to Funding the Exploration Vision and Aeronautics
The modest numbers in Proposal 1 will provide the Associate
Administrator Dr. Lebacqz (or his successor) with adequate funding to
preserve NASA's critical facility infrastructure and intellectual
capital at Ames Research Center, Dryden Flight Research Center, Glenn
Research Center, and Langley Research Center, and to enhance their
ability to deliver to the American people what they need and expect
from NASA--scientific discoveries and technology/operational
breakthroughs.
Proposal 2 will not only allow NASA to re-vector internal funds for
Exploration, Science, and Aeronautics R&D, it will put NASA more in
line with the rest of the high-tech world as far as its management to
technical employee ratio. Currently, the number of scientists and
engineers across NASA for every non-clerical administrative employee is
typically two to three, and this ratio does not even include corporate
overhead from NASA HQ management. Our proposal will go a long way
towards making this overhead ratio closer to a healthy 1:8, typical of
private enterprise.
To generate the additional needed revenue to enable our first
legislative proposal above and NASA's realignment toward the
President's Exploration Vision, NASA should seriously consider reducing
its role in completing the International Space Station (ISS).
Administrator-nominee Dr. Griffin noted in his October 2003 testimony
to the House Science Committee that ``in a human space flight program
focused on `settling the solar system,' construction of a LEO (low-
Earth orbit) space station would not be an early priority.''
Furthermore, he states wisely that ``we must not mortgage our future to
ISS.'' We concur and ask that NASA funding decisions reflect this
reality. Reducing NASA's ISS commitments would also allow it to make a
better effort to meet its requirement not to exceed the cost ceiling of
$25 billion in the NASA Authorization Act of 2000.
In this vein, NASA should admit now that it cannot conduct an
additional 28 Shuttle flights before the end of 2010 and act
accordingly. Significantly reducing the number of Shuttle flights would
free up billions of dollars. NASA needs to wean itself as soon as
possible of its dependence on the Shuttle, an intrinsically risky
transportation system, and on Russian capabilities, a national security
nightmare and a looming treaty violation. As Dr. Griffin stated to the
House Science Committee, ``(r)egarding the Space Shuttle, . . .we
should move to replace this system with all deliberate speed. . .we
must admit to ourselves that it is time to move on.'' NASA should focus
a smaller number of remaining Shuttle flights to address core needs of
the President's Vision: research on the impact of space flight on
physiology and performance, and a manned Hubble repair mission. The
released funds can then be redirected primarily for enhanced support of
the development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and secondarily
for enhanced support of Science and Aeronautics. This general scenario
also puts these three core NASA efforts in a better position should
Congress decide that it must cut NASA's overall budget in FY06 or
later.
This alternate approach:
1. will expedite the Nation's real solution to its current
space-related problems by reinforcing the development of new,
safer, more flexible space transportation systems without
consuming critical long-term R&D funds to meet near-term
milestones;
2. will dramatically reduce the risk of another catastrophic
failure of the Shuttle with its associated loss of life and
national treasure;
3. will minimize U.S. dependence on Soyuz;
4. will minimize ISS cost overruns and NASA's need to extend
ISS's cost ceiling.
The downside will be that this approach may harm NASA's
relationship with its international partners. Of course, as Dr. Griffin
stated with regard to ISS, ``we should do what is necessary to bring
the program to an orderly completion while respecting our international
partnership agreements.'' IFPTE concurs that we must respect our
international partners and must handle any reduced U.S. involvement in
ISS diplomatically, however this respect cannot be allowed to supersede
NASA's duty to protect the American taxpayer, to fulfill the
President's Exploration Vision, and to defend the safety and security
of the air-traveling public. Given that NASA has proposed only a tiny
increase in funding associated with the Exploration Vision and that
Congress appears poised to reduce this increase, Congress should heed
Dr. Griffin's warning that ``(i)f no additional funding can be made
available, it will be very difficult to complete ISS and, at the same
time, embark on the development of those other systems that are
required for a truly valuable and exciting human space flight
program.''
IFPTE's legislative proposals above and the associated proposal to
de-scope NASA's ISS commitments and to accelerate the retirement of
Shuttle are sufficiently generic to allow NASA management considerable
flexibility. They are meant to foster a serious discussion about the
future of NASA and to propose an alternate path that allows NASA to
better meet the challenge of the President's Exploration Vision without
cannibalizing the other critical functions of the Agency.
Critical National Needs Impacted by NASA Aeronautics Cuts
The Nation is facing key aviation challenges: increasing capacity
while maintaining or enhancing safety, reducing noise and emissions,
establishing effective post-911 security, and holding off the serious
challenge by Europe of the U.S. global leadership in aeronautics.
Although the private sector will play an important role in addressing
these challenges, as Mr. O'Keefe's aeronautics blueprint (p. 14) states
``the need for a continuing government role in aeronautical R&T in
support of civilian and military objectives is as strong today as
ever'' and that NASA's role is ``strategic forward-looking breakthrough
research combined with tactical problem resolution in response to
priorities established through close partnerships (with aviation
product developers and process owners).''
A complete evaluation of the programmatic impacts of NASA's
proposed FY06 budget is beyond the scope of this statement. IPFTE urges
the Committee to ask the Center Directors at each of the adversely
affected Centers (Ames, Dryden, Glenn, Langley) to provide a report to
them describing the impacts of the FY06 budget plan on their R&D
activities, their facilities, and their contractor and Civil Service
workforce. There is much more happening on the ground than is being
shown to you in the FY06 budget numbers. The Committee will need this
information to make an informed assessment of the wisdom of NASA FY06
budget plan.
Some make the argument that current technologies in aeronautics are
mature and therefore should be transferred to the private sector.
Current technologies are by definition mature and indeed have been
transferred to the private sector. This argument is specious as it is
future technologies that NASA is working on; these technologies are not
mature and will require continued incubation in a government laboratory
setting as part of a collaborative effort between NASA, industry, and
academia prior to being ready for implementation in the real world. As
Associate Administrator Lebacqz pointed out recently, ``there are
tremendous breakthroughs still to come in aeronautics'' and ``the
facilities to support those breakthroughs or other breakthroughs are
still required'' (Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 7, 2005).
The critical point is that the Nation needs to go beyond current
technologies. The U.S. once was the world leader in aviation. More
civilian airplanes were once made in the U.S. than in the rest of the
world combined. Aviation once played a major role in the Nation's trade
balance. Now Airbus has a larger share of the global market than
Boeing. The Europeans know that government support for Airbus is
crucial and this has been a key reason for their success. Now more
airplanes are being built in Canada and Brazil than in the U.S. The
U.S. is clearly losing its leadership position and our trade deficit
continues to grow. Simply redirecting taxpayer dollars directly to
industry is unwise as it may trigger trade sanctions as an improper
direct subsidy. While NASA in-house R&D activities have a special
relationship with American aviation companies and preferentially
benefit American business, these governmental activities do not cross
the line imposed by the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT).
If the U.S. has any chance of holding its ground, major government
investment in aeronautical R&D is necessary. The U.S. needs to be as
clever as Europe in providing assistance and support for their national
industries without running afoul of the GATT. NASA is poised to lead
that effort, representing the national interest as a whole. The
government must take the lead.
Furthermore, even if current vehicle technologies are considered
``mature,'' human error is still the major cause of aviation accidents.
These accidents cost the Nation a huge amount even when they only
happen in U.S. General Aviation, or to U.S.-made aircraft in other
countries. No single manufacturer or operator will address this
problem. It is a national issue, a national responsibility, a national
priority. The government must take the lead.
The recent quiet on the airline safety and security front is
misleading. As air traffic increases (e.g., potential tripling of
commercial flights over the next 20 years, Unmanned Airborne Vehicles,
micro-jets) and Air Traffic Control support dwindles (e.g.,
synchronized retirements, out-dated equipment), we are going to see
greater delays and greater risks. Without sustained NASA aeronautical
R&D funding, NASA technology innovations will not be there to keep our
airline safety record second to none and to reduce flight delays and
associated economic losses. Although we have not had a major aviation
security failure since September 11th 2001, it is a complete surety
that terrorists will try to strike our aviation system again. Without
sustained NASA aeronautical R&D funding, NASA technology innovations
will not be there to help American stay one step ahead of terrorists.
These are serious national issues that cannot be solved by simplistic
solutions such as privatizing ATC or limiting air traffic. Aviation is
a major component of the U.S. economy and any economic growth will
depend on a reliable transportation system that can scale up to meet
new economic demands. This challenge will not be met by industry alone.
The government must take the lead.
Irreparable Harm to Critical Government Assets
Prior to full-cost accounting, any ill-conceived budget cuts one
year could be remedied the next by simply restoring the research funds.
Unfortunately, full-cost accounting makes management blunders permanent
by destroying laboratory infrastructure and intellectual capital. Once
a facility is closed, it is gone. When the experts who run it are laid-
off, they are gone. Decades of developing unique wind tunnel and
simulator facilities and expertise can be lost in a heartbeat when a
facility is killed or employees are laid-off by a program manager's
shortsighted need to meet near-term milestones. Inadequate attention is
being paid to the big picture and the long-term health of the Agency
and to its facilities and intellectual infrastructure. In a few years,
when these very programs need these same facilities they once spurned,
the facilities will no longer exist and the Nation will need to spend
millions restoring capabilities inferior to the ones we previously had.
As Associate Administrator Lebacqz warned recently, ``if we don't do
adequate ground-testing before we go to flight test, we'll make
mistakes'' (Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 7, 2005). These
mistakes may kill military pilots or civilian passengers or lead to
millions of dollars in expensive last minute design fixes, so this
warning should not be taken lightly.
The serious concern about how NASA is implementing full-cost
accounting is not just Union rhetoric; it is shared by the external
industry and academic experts on the NRC panel that recently reviewed
NASA's aeronautics programs. One of its top-level recommendations was
that ``NASA should implement full-cost accounting in a way that avoids
unintended consequences harmful to the long-term health of the
aeronautics program.'' Especially given the abysmal failure of NASA's
full-cost accounting conversion to provide the accounting transparency
promised Congress and the American taxpayer, we ask that Congress to
use its authority to investigate this serious concern and to compel
NASA to modify those accounting policies and practices that are
adversely affecting NASA's ability to get its technical job done for
the American people.
Thank you again for submitting these remarks into the hearing's
official record.
Chairman Calvert. I thank the gentleman for his opening
statement. Without objection, the additional statements of
other Members will be put in the written record, so we can get
right to the testimony. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative J. Randy Forbes
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on the proposed FY
2006 budget for aeronautics. This is an issue of great importance not
only to the Hampton Roads area of Virginia, but also to our national
security and economic security.
In only the last half century, space exploration and scientific
discovery have brought an unquantifiable richness to human life.
America's space program is a symbol of our success as a scientifically
and technologically advanced nation. I am pleased that President Bush
has devised a plan that seeks to advance human space exploration,
however I am concerned that the FY 2006 Budget proposes cuts to vital
programs that are not related to NASA's Vision for Space Exploration.
In particular, I remain concerned that reduced federal funding for
aviation and aeronautics research and technology in FY 2006 will
jeopardize the Nation's leadership in providing the technologies needed
to develop the next generation aircraft, improve aviation safety and
security, and attract the next generation of aerospace scientists and
engineers. We are in danger of falling behind our competitors in Europe
who have announced that their goal is to dominate commercial aviation
sales by 2020.
In addition, cuts to the NASA Aeronautics budget will have a
profound impact on the NASA Langley Research Center in Hampton,
Virginia, which has a long and proud history of aeronautics research.
NASA Langley's wind tunnels and laboratories, research aircraft and
spacecraft and flight simulators have made significant contributions to
our nation's advances in the aeronautics industry and have the promise
of yielding many more in the future. Like the explorers of the past and
the pioneers of flight in the last century, we cannot identify today
all that we will gain from aviation and aeronautics research; however,
we know from experience that the eventual return will be great. The
greater the investments of today, the greater the rewards for
generations to come.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Honda follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Michael M. Honda
Chairman Calvert and Ranking Member Udall, thank you for holding
this important hearing today. I believe it is essential that, as NASA
undertakes a ``Transformation'' to carry out the President's Vision for
Space Exploration, we remember that NASA stands for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and examine what is happening to
the aeronautics programs within the Agency.
I am very concerned about the lack of Congressional oversight of
this transformation and the fact that NASA has not provided us with
timely information about changes that are taking place, including those
being made as we speak to the aeronautics programs. Full Cost
Accounting has been combined with broad discretionary authority granted
to the Agency in the Fiscal Year 2005 Omnibus Appropriations bill to
create a situation in which the salaries of vast numbers of Civil
Service R&D employees are being moved out of project accounts and into
general operations, which has created an artificial crisis at the
centers and is being used as a reason to undertake large scale
workforce reductions. To date, NASA has not provided us with a detailed
Operations Plan outlining how these changes are being made, and NASA
has not provided requested documentation outlining those ``excess
competencies'' broken down by Center, so that it would be possible to
see what areas NASA management considered to be no longer important to
pursue. It seems that aeronautics programs have fallen in this group,
with the FY06 Budget Request cutting aeronautics programs over 21
percent by FY10, not counting the loss in purchase power due to
inflation. Although aeronautics accounts for only 1/17 of the NASA
budget, it had to absorb close to 1/3 of the total cut made to the
Agency's out-year budget plan.
These decisions seem to fly in the face of a number of
recommendations made by expert panels. A RAND Corporation panel
recommended that ``of the 31 existing major NASA test facilities, 29
constitute the `minimum set' of facilities important to retain and
manage to serve national needs.'' A National Academies committee
concluded that ``although a strong national program of aeronautics
research and technology [R&T] may not, by itself, ensure the
competitiveness of the U.S. aviation industry, the Committee agrees
with earlier studies that without it, the United States is likely to
become less competitive in aeronautics relative to countries with
stronger programs. Aviation is an R&T-intensive industry. . .. Some
aeronautics R&T programs have produced `breakthroughs' that are
immediately usable. . .. More often, aeronautics R&T advances are
evolutionary, and a substantial number of years can pass before the
aviation systems making use of these advances enter service.'' This
last statement is particularly interesting in light of the fact that
NASA is currently saying that it is going to focus only on
``breakthrough'' technologies.
NASA seems to be following a course on aeronautics that has
potentially grave consequences not only for its Research Centers and
those who work there, but also for our nation. I have many questions
that I hope the witnesses can answer, and I look forward to their
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
Chairman Calvert, Ranking Member Udall,
I want to thank you for organizing this important Subcommittee
hearing to discuss The Future of Aeronautics at NASA. I want to welcome
our distinguished panel of witnesses to the Subcommittee on Space and
Aeronautics. Being from Houston, I of course take a particular interest
in the direction that NASA is taking. The truth is that any vision for
NASA starts today, but will likely affect an entire generation of
humanity in terms of its impact.
A number of our recent hearings in the Science Committee have dealt
with the national budget and its impact on scientific research,
development, and discovery. Sadly, the news is almost all bad because
this Administration has put out a budget that puts a squeeze on most of
our vital agencies and programs. NASA, is not an exception to this
budget squeeze. While some would point to the fact that the total NASA
budget of $16.5 billion actually increased by 1.6 percent, the fact is
that despite this small increase many NASA programs have suffered deep
cuts including vital aeronautics research, which suffered a six percent
cut in this latest budget. In fact, over the last decade, funding for
NASA's aeronautics research has declined by more than half, to about
$900 million. Even more troubling is that the proposed five-year plan
for aeronautics contemplates substantial funding reductions of 20
percent for aeronautics research, in addition with significant cutbacks
in its civil service and contractor workforces. If our nation expects
to stay on the cutting edge and leads the world's development of new
technologies it can not afford to leave aeronautics research withering
on the vine without proper funding.
I am also deeply concerned that the proposed budget cuts will hit
NASA's workers the hardest. Downsizing the workforce may reduce the
budget, but it will not succeed in moving NASA forward. The NASA
workers are the heart and soul of the Agency, the ones who put the
vision into action and make discoveries happen. Not only do we lose
these talented individuals by reducing the workforce, but I am certain
that we will scare away potential NASA recruits. The fact that
workforce is being reduced is a sign of instability and our best and
brightest minds may decide to go another path if they feel NASA does
not offer them the opportunity for real development. I hope NASA will
soon provide figures as to how many facilities and workers they plan to
release and the time frame for this downsizing. The uncertainty that is
in the air can not be good for the Agency or for the future of our
nation's aeronautics program.
I have been supportive of President Bush's Vision for Space
Exploration because I firmly believe that the invest we make today in
science and exploration will pay large dividends in the future.
Similarly, I do not want to put a cap on the frontiers of our
discovery, NASA should aim high and continue to push our nation at the
forefront of space exploration and scientific discovery. However, I can
not see how this is accomplished by cutting aeronautics research and
planning for even deeper cuts in the future. The President has stated
that the fundamental goal of his directive for the Nation's space
exploration program is ``. . .to advance U.S. scientific, security, and
economic interests through a robust space exploration program.'' I
could not agree more with that statement; unfortunately, this
President's own budget does not meet the demands of his ambitious
agenda. The United States can not cede our leadership in the area of
aeronautics, especially considering all the practical applications it
has for millions of Americans. While other nations, notably in Europe
are strengthening their work in aeronautics research, we seem to be
satisfied to stay stagnant and I find that unacceptable.
As Members of this committee know I have always been a strong
advocate for NASA. My criticism of the President's budget is intended
only to strengthen our efforts to move forward as we always have in the
area of space exploration and discovery. NASA posses an exciting
opportunity to charter a new path that can lead to untold discoveries.
As always I look forward to working with the good men and women of NASA
as we push the boundaries of our world once again.
Chairman Calvert. I would like to ask unanimous consent to
insert at the appropriate place in the record the background
memorandum prepared by the majority staff for this hearing.
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
Today, we will begin our hearing with testimony, beginning
with Congresswoman Jo Ann Davis, and I think later, Congressman
Dennis Kucinich will be joining us.
They will be followed by the distinguished panel of
experts, led by Dr. J. Victor Lebacqz, NASA Associate
Administrator for Aeronautics. At the table with Mr. Lebacqz
will be Dr. John Klineberg, who led a 2004 Research Council
study entitled ``Review of NASA's Aerospace Technology
Enterprise: An Assessment of NASA's Aeronautics Technology
Program.'' He is retired as a President of Space Systems/Loral,
and for 25 years, worked at NASA, including as Director of both
the Goddard Space Flight Center and the Ames Research Center.
Dr. Philip Anton, who was the principal investigator of the
2004 report produced by the RAND Corporation entitled ``Wind
Tunnels and Propulsion Test Facilities: An Assessment of NASA's
Capabilities to Serve the National Needs.'' The report was
jointly sponsored by NASA and the Department of Defense. He is
a senior scientist at RAND, which is a federally-funded
research and development center sponsored by the Department of
Defense. And Dr. Mike Benzakein, who was named Chairman of the
Department of Aerospace Engineering at Ohio State University in
October '04. From 1967 through 2004, he worked for GE Aircraft
Engines, and retired as general manager of advanced technology
and military engineering. And finally, Dr. John Hansman, who is
the Professor of Aeronautics and Astronomics at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Director of the
International Center for Air Transportation. His current
research interests focus on advanced cockpit information system
and flight crew situational awareness.
Keep in mind, I would like to keep the testimony, spoken
testimony, to five minutes. Any written testimony can be made
part of the hearing record. Once the testimony is received from
all the witnesses, the Members of the Subcommittee will begin
their questions to the witnesses, which we will also limit to
five minutes.
We will start with Congresswoman Jo Ann Davis, who will
lead off today, and hopefully, will be followed by Congressman
Dennis Kucinich, who I am assured will be here shortly. And
then, we will go right to our panel of experts, as soon as the
two witnesses, Members of Congress, complete their testimony.
If those witness could please come to the witness table. And
here is Mr. Kucinich. Which will begin with NASA's Associate
Administrator for Aeronautics, Dr. Vic Lebacqz.
And with that, Congresswoman Davis, you may begin.
Panel I:
STATEMENT OF HON. JO ANN DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
Ms. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Udall,
and other distinguished Members of the Committee. I want to
thank you for the opportunity to speak before your subcommittee
this morning on the future of aeronautics in this country.
I appreciate your holding a hearing on this important
subject, which is truly becoming a matter of national security.
I also appreciate Congressman Kucinich's appearance here this
morning on behalf of NASA Glenn Research Center in Ohio.
I am proud to represent the engineers and technicians at
NASA Langley Research Center, who made United States
aeronautics research and testing the envy of the world for over
88 years. First established as the Langley Memorial
Aeronautical Laboratory in 1917, it was the Nation's first
civil aeronautics research laboratory under the charter of the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the precursor to
the modern-day NASA.
Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt that we have been pioneers
in this highly specialized field for most of the last century.
My concern is that recent and future cuts will simply make us
unable to retain this advantage in the future.
In recent years, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the NASA budget, has seen modest increases.
However, at the same time, the aeronautics programs within NASA
have been dramatically reduced. Over the last decade, funding
for NASA aeronautics research has declined by more than half,
to about $900 million. In addition, the President's budget
proposes to cut aeronautics research by an additional 20
percent over the next 20 years--over the next five years.
I have serious concerns that the United States is losing
critical expertise in aeronautics research and development.
This degradation will have a tragic impact on military and
civilian aviation, which contributes significantly to our
country's national defense and our economy.
The U.S. military has benefited tremendously from NASA
aeronautics research. The single most important benefit of the
Department of Defense and NASA Langley's partnership is in the
application of new technologies to this nation's military
aircraft. Every aviation asset in the military's inventory was
designed with the help of NASA's experts, and NASA conducted
wind tunnel tests for the Department of Defense or their
contractors on the F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, F-22, JSF, B-1, C-
141, C-5, and the C-17, just to name a few.
I think we can all agree that the combined contributions of
these aircraft have been significant in our achievement of
military superiority in the skies. Not only have NASA
researchers made U.S. military vehicles technologically
superior, they have helped determine the capabilities of our
enemies by testing and analyzing foreign warplanes for the
defense and intelligence communities. Without proper funding,
this capability will perish, and will be exceedingly difficult
to restore.
In addition, the U.S. civil aviation industry, which plays
an important role in the U.S. economy, has benefited from NASA
research. This vital sector of our economy employs over two
million Americans, and comprises roughly nine percent of our
country's Gross National Product. This strength is a direct
result of the investment in aeronautics research over the past
several decades. Nonetheless, the industry has been declining
over the past several years, and now, only holds 50 percent of
the world market.
While U.S. aeronautics research and testing programs are
declining, countries in Europe and elsewhere are investing
heavily in aeronautics research. The health of the U.S.
aviation industry depends on aeronautics research and
development, especially long-term research that cannot--that
they cannot and will not perform themselves, in order to
compete on the world market. NASA is the only, and I repeat,
the only federal agency that supports research on civilian
aircraft. Their researchers are working to make our planes and
our skies safer, and I believe that this is a worthwhile
investment of the taxpayer's money.
Given the importance of NASA aeronautics research and
testing, I am very concerned that NASA does not have a coherent
vision for aeronautics programs. Past blueprints and other
guiding documents seem to have been discarded, most likely
because NASA did not have the aeronautics budget to support
them.
As I briefly noted today, the importance of aeronautics
research is obvious. We cannot afford to lose the aeronautical
advantage that is vital to our national defense and to our
economy.
Again, I want to thank you, Chairman Calvert, for holding a
hearing on this important issue, and I am glad you thought it
important enough to be your first hearing of the 109th
Congress. I appreciate all of your work and your staff's work,
and I thank you, also, to the witnesses for being here this
morning.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Davis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jo Ann Davis
Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for the opportunity to speak before your subcommittee
this morning on the future of aeronautics in this country. I appreciate
you holding a hearing on this important subject, which is truly
becoming a national security concern. Also, I appreciate Congressman
Kucinich's appearance here this morning on behalf of NASA Glenn
Research Center in Ohio.
I am proud to represent the engineers and technicians at NASA
Langley Research Center who have made United States aeronautics
research and testing the envy of the world for over eighty-eight years.
First established as the Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory in
1917, it was the Nation's first civil aeronautics research laboratory
under the charter of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics--
the precursor to the modern-day NASA.
Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt that we have been pioneers in this
highly specialized field for most of the last century.
My concern is that recent and future cuts will simply make us
unable to retain this advantage in the future.
In recent years, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) budget has seen modest increases. However, at the same time,
aeronautics programs within NASA have been dramatically reduced. Over
the last decade, funding for NASA's aeronautics research has declined
by more than half, to about $900 million. In addition, the President's
budget proposes to cut aeronautics research by 20 percent over the next
five years.
I have serious concerns that the United States is losing critical
expertise in aeronautics research and development. This degradation
will have a tragic impact on military and civilian aviation, which
contributes significantly to our country's national defense and
economy.
The U.S. military has benefited tremendously from NASA aeronautics
research. The single most important benefit of the Department of
Defense and NASA Langley's partnership is in the application of new
technologies to this nation's military aircraft.
Every aviation asset in the military's inventory was designed with
the help of NASA's experts, and NASA conducted wind tunnel tests for
the Department of Defense or their contractors on the F-14, F-15, F-16,
F-18, F-22, JSF, B-1, C-141, C-5, and the C-17, just to name a few. I
think we can all agree that the combined contributions of these
aircraft have been significant in our achievement of military
superiority in the skies.
Not only have NASA researchers made U.S. military vehicles
technologically superior, they have helped determine the capabilities
of our enemies by testing and analyzing foreign warplanes for the
defense and intelligence communities. Without proper funding, this
capability will perish and will be exceedingly difficult to restore.
In addition, the U.S. civil aviation industry, which plays an
important role in the U.S. economy, has benefited from NASA research.
This vital sector of our economy employs over two million Americans and
comprises roughly nine percent of our country's Gross National Product
(GNP). This strength is a direct result of the investment in
aeronautics research over the past several decades. Nonetheless, the
industry has been declining over the past several years and now only
holds fifty percent of the world market.
While U.S. aeronautics research and testing programs are declining,
countries in Europe and elsewhere are investing heavily in aeronautics
research. The health of the U.S. aviation industry depends on
aeronautics research and development--especially long-term research
that they cannot and will not perform themselves--in order to compete
in the world market. NASA is the ONLY federal agency that supports
research on civilian aircraft. Their researchers are working to make
our planes and our skies safer, and I believe this is a worthwhile
investment of the taxpayers' money.
Given the importance of NASA aeronautics research and testing, I am
very concerned that NASA does not have a coherent vision for
aeronautics programs. Past blueprints and other guiding documents seem
to have been discarded--most likely because NASA did not have the
aeronautics budget to support them.
As I have briefly noted today, the importance of aeronautics
research is obvious. We cannot afford to lose the aeronautical
advantage that is vital to our national defense and economy.
Again, thank you Chairman Calvert for holding a hearing on this
important issue. I appreciate all of your work and your staff's work,
and thank you also to the witnesses for being here this morning.
Chairman Calvert. I thank the gentlelady for her testimony.
Mr. Kucinich, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the
Committee. I am privileged to be here with Representative Jo
Ann Davis on this important matter relating to aeronautics in
the United States.
She pointed out there is no vision for aeronautics. Sitting
right behind you on the wall, come to this committee, are the
words from Proverbs, which says: ``Where there is no vision,
the people perish.'' So, it is important that we are here
talking about the future of aeronautics.
Today, I am going to make the case that aeronautics
research is essential to America's national security, quality
of life, economy, safety, and environment. NASA has played, and
should continue to play, a crucial role in aeronautics. Yet, it
is at grave risk of being undermined as a result of current
efforts to eliminate jobs, facilities, and entire programs. We
must not allow the erosion of aeronautics at NASA.
NASA's contribution to the field of aeronautics to the
Nation and world are profound. A good starting point is
aeronautics' contribution to national security. From further
surveillance--from surveillance systems that monitor aircraft
flight paths, to the development of secure communication
systems, NASA's research has been instrumental in improving our
national security. In addition, NASA's recent successful
hypersonic flight, clocked at about 7,000 miles per hour,
demonstrated that military or civilian aircraft might soon be
able to fly anywhere in the world in less than two hours.
Aeronautical vehicles are a substantial and key part of the
national defense infrastructure.
NASA's aeronautics programs also contribute substantially
to the Nation's economy. The NASA Glenn Research Center in
Brook Park, Ohio, for example, is a cornerstone of Ohio's
fragile economy, and a stronghold of aeronautics research. In
fiscal year 2003, spending at Glenn on contracts and grants
generated over $430 million of earnings for Ohio households.
And studies have shown that it has over a billion dollar impact
on the economy of northeast Ohio. Civil aeronautics is also a
major contributor to this sector's positive balance of trade,
more than any other industry. Aeronautics contributes to a
stronger economy by lowering the cost of transportation,
enabling a new generation of service-based industries like e-
commerce to flourish, and by performing the research that leads
to inexpensive and reliable flights.
Safety has advanced considerably because of NASA's
elimination of wind shear as a cause of airline accidents,
their improved detection of corrosion and cracks, their anti-
icing and deicing research, advanced air traffic management
technology, and others. Again, much of that research came from
NASA Glenn. Other contributions include noise reduction and
emissions eliminations, both of which will be limiting factors
to expansion of air traffic in the future.
Finally, NASA's aeronautics research is important, because
NASA is able to develop long-term, high-risk enabling
technologies that the private sector is unwilling to perform,
because it is too risky or too expensive. In fact, this has
historically been the role of government-sponsored research.
This is true not only with aeronautics, but with pharmaceutical
research, defense research, energy research, environmental
research, and much more. When the government-sponsored basic
research yields information that could lead to a service or
product with profit potential, the private sector transitions
from research to development in order to bring it to market.
While it is not always as simple as this, it is clear that
where there is no basic research, there can be no development.
Where there is no basic research, there could be no
development, and what is happening with this new policy is we
are getting out of basic research in aeronautics.
Yet aeronautics research in NASA is being attacked from
multiple angles. The most recent and most potentially
devastating threats come from the fiscal year 2006 budget
proposal, which would result in major losses of key aeronautics
proposals. The greatest cuts would be felt at NASA Glenn and at
NASA Langley in Virginia, and that is why I am here with
Representative Davis, on behalf of aeronautics. If this dark
vision is realized, we are going to be ceding aeronautic
superiority to Europe. The effects are exacerbated by a recent
shift in the market share for aeronautics to the Europeans. For
example, Boeing is now doing testing in Europe. The European
company Airbus is also fast becoming the leader in aircraft
design with its new A380 being touted as the most advanced,
spacious, and efficient airliner ever conceived. Think about
that when you think about America's traditional role as a
leader in aerospace, and you realize why it is absolutely wrong
for anything that would deter from our mission in basic
research in aeronautics.
We already stand to lose valuable personnel. NASA
aeronautics jobs are good paying jobs that attract people to
areas hosting a center, and keeping them there. But the recent
proposed cuts would eliminate 700 NASA jobs from Glenn, 1,100
NASA jobs from Langley, and those two centers are the
cornerstones of aeronautics research in the United States. An
undetermined number of contractor jobs are at risk. It is
important to understand that threats to job stability posed by
funding losses will encourage the Nation's most talented
scientists and engineers, who now work for the United States of
America, to look elsewhere for work. And some have already
started to do so.
I want to submit the rest of the testimony for the record.
Chairman Calvert. Without objection.
Mr. Kucinich. And ask that the Committee, if they have any
questions, please feel free to ask.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kucinich follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Dennis J. Kucinich
Thank you, Chairman Calvert and Ranking Member Udall, for the
opportunity to testify about The Future of Aeronautics at NASA. Today,
I will make the case that aeronautics research is essential to
America's national security, quality of life, economy, safety and
environment. NASA has played and should continue to play a crucial role
in aeronautics. Yet it is at grave risk of being undermined as a result
of current efforts to eliminate jobs, facilities and entire programs.
We must not allow the erosion of aeronautics at NASA.
NASA's contributions in the field of aeronautics to the Nation and
the world are profound. A good starting point is aeronautics'
contribution to national security. From surveillance systems that
monitor aircraft flight paths, to the development of secure
communication systems NASA's research has been instrumental in
improving our national security. In addition, NASA's recent successful
hypersonic flight, clocked at about 7,000 miles per hour, demonstrated
that military or civilian aircraft might soon be able to fly anywhere
in the world in less than two hours. Aeronautical vehicles are a
substantial and key part of the national defense infrastructure.
NASA's aeronautics programs also contribute substantially to the
Nation's economy. The NASA Glenn Research Center in Brook Park, Ohio,
for example, is a cornerstone of the state's fragile economy and a
stronghold of aeronautics research. In FY03, Glenn spending on
contracts and grants generated over $430 million of earnings for Ohio
households. Civil aeronautics is also the major contributor to this
sector's positive balance of trade--more than any other industry.
Aeronautics contributes to a stronger economy by lowering the cost of
transportation, enabling a new generation of service based industries
like e-commerce to flourish by performing the research that leads to
inexpensive and reliable flights.
Safety has advanced considerably because of NASA's elimination of
wind shear as a cause of airline accidents, their improved detection of
corrosion and cracks, their anti-icing and deicing research, advanced
air traffic management technology, and others. Again, much of that
research came from NASA Glenn. Other contributions include noise
reduction, and emissions eliminations, both of which will be limiting
factors to expansion of air travel in the future.
Finally, NASA's aeronautics research is important because NASA is
able to develop long-term, high-risk enabling technologies that the
private sector is unwilling to perform because it is too risky or too
expensive. In fact, this is historically been the role of government
sponsored research. This is true not only with aeronautics but also
with pharmaceutical research, defense research, energy research,
environmental research and much more. When the government sponsored
basic research yields information that could lead to a service or
product with profit potential, the private sector transitions from
research to development in order to bring it to market. While it is not
always as simple as this, it is clear that where there is no basic
research, there can be no development.
Yet aeronautics research in the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration is being attacked from multiple angles. The most recent
and most potentially devastating threats came in the form of the
Administration's FY06 budget proposal, which would result in major
losses of key aeronautics programs. The greatest cuts would be felt at
NASA Glenn and at NASA Langley in Virginia. If the Administration's
vision for the weakening of aeronautics at NASA is realized, we cede
aeronautics superiority to Europe. The effects are exacerbated by a
recent shift in the market share for aeronautics to the Europeans. For
example, Boeing is now doing its testing in Europe. The European
company Airbus is also fast becoming the leader in aircraft design with
its new A380, being touted as the most advanced, spacious and efficient
airliner ever conceived.
We already stand to lose valuable personnel. NASA aeronautics jobs
are well paying jobs that attract people to areas hosting a center and
keep them there. But the recent proposed cuts could eliminate 700 NASA
jobs from Glenn and 1100 NASA jobs from Langley, the two cornerstones
of aeronautics research. An undetermined number of contractor job are
also at risk. It is important to understand that threats to job
stability posed by funding losses will encourage the Nation's most
talented scientists and engineers to look elsewhere for work. And some
have already started to do so.
The Agency is also considering shutting down several unique and
expensive facilities, without consideration of their income generation
potential through enhanced use leasing. The world-class wind tunnels at
NASA Glenn are a classic example. Allowing private and university
researchers to use them could result in significant income, which would
increase the efficient use of the facilities, and would contribute to
more scientific output. The wind tunnels alone would require tens of
millions of dollars to replace.
We must not allow our dominance in aeronautics to atrophy. Clearly,
NASA's role has historically been critical and can continue to be
critical to our country's prosperity if we have the foresight to make
it so. Make no mistake; it will require a long-term effort. But it will
be worthwhile. In the meantime, it will be imperative that we stop the
anti-aeronautics cuts to the budget.
First, we need to immediately restore and strengthen funding for
NASA aeronautics research that is an economic engine for aeronautics
and aerospace industries. Secondly, we must examine creative approaches
to funding like enhanced use leasing in all NASA facilities. Before
deciding which facilities to mothball, NASA should take into account
the increase in assets enhanced use leasing would bring. Third, the
facilities that require renovation must be funded as such, since it is
cheaper to upgrade than to rebuild the facilities.
Of course, there is much more that needs to be done. I hope this
important dialogue continues and intensifies. The future of
aeronautics, not just at NASA, but in America, is at stake.
Mr. Chairman, I would also like to submit the following resolutions
from various governmental entities as part of my testimony.
Discussion
Chairman Calvert. I thank both of you for your excellent
testimony. If there are no questions for the two Members.
Questions? Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would like to ask our two witnesses to
tell me which part of the NASA budget that they would like to
take the money from in order to bolster this part of the NASA
budget that they are supporting today.
Ms. Davis. Mr. Rohrabacher, what I would like to see is
that there be a separate line item for a national--for
aeronautics, and a separate one for space. I think that right
now, we have a vision for space. We have no vision for
aeronautics. My concern is national security.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Are there any programs in NASA that you
feel are of less priority that we could take the money from, in
order to fulfill the noble objectives that both of you have set
out today?
Ms. Davis. Maybe not from NASA, but I believe the way the
appropriations works, there are other projects within that pot
of money that we can--I have an offset in mind, and I will be
presenting that as an amendment, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You have a part of NASA that has less
priority, that you think that the money could come from?
Mr. Kucinich. Along with you, Representative Rohrabacher, I
have been a strong supporter of the space program, as well as
aeronautics, and I see the connection. Because for example,
with the Shuttle, when the Shuttle goes up, it is a space
vehicle. When it comes back, it relies on aeronautical
technology in order to land. So you know, there always is a
connection. That is why they call it the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, but we are going to take the A out of
that, and it will just be the National Space Administration.
I don't want to see the NASA budget cut anywhere. But the
fact of the matter is, Mr. Chairman, we are looking at more
than a $500 billion budget deficit. This is kind of an odd time
for us to be looking at the one area where we can grow our
economy, and start cutting there. NASA is the path out of a
budget deficit, with the kind of research and development which
the system is capable of doing. So, we shouldn't be looking at
any cuts in any way.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It is very easy to advocate spending more
money. It is very difficult to find prudent ways of trimming
things from the budget. And that is not just for Members of
Congress. I mean, we have witnesses after witnesses after
witnesses, I think I have been here 16 years now, and I don't
remember even one witness who was able to put the lowest
priority. They are always able to say everything we got to
spend the money on, but never can come up with some idea of
where we could, things, perhaps, aren't being spent wisely, and
could be better spent on the program they were advocating
today.
Mr. Kucinich. If I may, to my friend, Mr. Rohrabacher. What
we are doing would be akin to asking a farmer to save money by
throwing away some of his seed corn. Or--I mean, we----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Or maybe, get rid of the whiskey allotment
that he uses for holidays or something like that.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, I think that--there is--NASA can hardly
be accused of spending money like someone who is interested in
self-enjoyment here, but I think----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Kucinich, wouldn't you admit that NASA
is just like every other organization? There has got to be
things that are of less priority, and other things that are of
higher priority.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, we sure haven't found them in
aeronautics. I can tell you that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right.
Mr. Kucinich. And that is why I am here. And I agree--
listen, I am with you on space exploration, but why should
space--why should one come at the expense of the other? Because
the two are together.
Chairman Calvert. I thank the gentleman for his question.
Any other questions for this panel? Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Chairman, I
think Mr. Rohrabacher is exactly right. This should be about
looking at priorities. I just don't believe that aeronautical
research is quite akin to whiskey allotment. And you know, as I
look around this room, I am a strong supporter of the space
program, but probably, I don't know, maybe there is somebody,
but I don't know of anybody that has been in space sitting in
this room, but I know just about everybody here has probably
been on an airplane, and Congressman Davis, I appreciate the
fact that you are here, because I know you serve on the Armed
Services Committee, and I think the Intelligence Committee, and
are you still on the Foreign Relations Committee, there----
Ms. Davis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And you have traveled around the world, and
there are two things that I want to ask you about. One is if
you could elaborate a little bit more on the national security
issue that you raised to us. But secondly, one of the things I
hear over and over again, and Mr. Kucinich touched on this, so
goes our research, so goes the industry. But I hear over and
over again about the difficulties that we are having in
attracting and retaining top flight engineers and researchers,
and when I look at this budget, for Langley, in particular, it
goes from $805 million in '04, $668 in '05, $557 in '06, $479
in '07. I know there is nobody that has been on the ground at
Langley with the personnel more than you.
Can you elaborate a little bit more on, one, the national
security concerns that you have, and secondly, the impact these
budgets are having on the retention of top quality engineers
and researchers?
Ms. Davis. Well, I will tackle the second part of the
question first. And my concern is, with the jobs at Langley,
but not major concern. My major concern is national security.
As you well elaborated, I am on Armed Services and
Intelligence, and International Relations as well. And yes, we
stand to lose a lot of brainpower at NASA Langley and at Glenn.
I had someone in my office the other day telling me that we
are now down to graduating, I think last year in the United
States, 75,000 engineers, out of which 35,000 were Chinese,
while China was graduating a million, Japan was graduating
750,000. That is worrisome to me. It is worrisome to me that we
are turning over our aeronautics and research to other
countries other than the United States.
On a national security level, it bothers me that the JSF
that I mentioned, that was tested at Langley, it is also being
tested in Europe. It bothers me that we will be looking to
other countries to give us the research and development for our
military, for our military aircraft. Today's allies may be
tomorrow's adversaries. I am not interested in the technology
coming from the other countries. I think we need to retain that
superiority here in the United States.
There is a reason NASA Langley is located next door to
Langley Air Force Base, because there has been a partnership
for many, many years, and I just would hate to see us lose
that. And I think that the way we are going, we are heading
down that path, and I think it would be a national tragedy.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Forbes. Mr. Forbes. If I may,
Representative Davis, you are absolutely right. I mean, we have
to look to the future here, of America's defense capabilities,
and if we cede the building of airplanes, to let us say, the
Chinese market, we could be looking at a condition in the
future where we don't have the technology we need to defend
this country, and it is a very serious question.
I mean, one of the first things that happened when I came
to Congress was that a representative of one of the largest
aircraft manufacturers in the world came in our office, and
asked me to vote for the China Trade Bill, which I didn't do.
But they admitted, when I questioned them, that the price of
their entry into the China market was to give China the
prototypes of development aircraft. Now, we have to be
concerned that we are giving up our position of superiority for
the future, and so, I am totally supportive of what
Representative Davis has said.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Kucinich, and I just want to add
to what they said. There was an individual researcher that told
me the other day, he was invited to China to give a talk to a
group of engineers. He felt he would meet with 200 of them when
he went there. There were 5,000 engineers in the room when he
went there, so it is a big concern for us, and thank you both
for being here today.
Ms. Davis. I might say, Mr. Forbes, there is a reason
Marine One is not being totally built in the United States.
Chairman Calvert. I thank the gentleman from Virginia. The
gentleman from California, Mr. Honda.
Mr. Honda. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate your
putting this hearing together, and I appreciate Congresswoman
Davis and Kucinich's comments, and Mr. Chairman, since I won't
be here for the full length, I would like to submit some of my
questions in writing.
Chairman Calvert. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Honda. And hopefully, expect a response in writing,
some time definite point in the future. And I, too, support
both Congresswoman Davis and Congressman Kucinich's position.
And regarding the budget, I think what we did in the NASA
budget is take all the money out of aeronautics and put it into
space. And so, we are messing around with the budget within its
own self, and so, some people would call that a neutral budget
action, but it is really not neutral. It is a deficit, in the
sense that as they have quite well said, it is going to put us
back, and it is not going to allow us to perform the mission
that has been set out for us.
This budget has been set up as a full accounting process,
and looking at FTEs and bottom line, and you force the budget
that way, versus the mission that is stated. If this were a
mission-driven budget, it would look different, and the people
would be treated differently. And I think that that is the big
question that we have before Congress. As to where would you
get the money, well, the budget is not only NASA. The budget
is, in its entirety, a little over $2.5 trillion, in terms of
the President's budget, and I think there has been a lot of
activities on the Floor as to how we look at our budget.
And you know, we had the issue of the Truman Commission,
which looks for waste, and I am sure that we can find some
moneys in that category. I think when Truman did it, they found
over $15 billion. In those days, that was a lot of money. In
today's count, that would be sufficient for what it is that you
are looking for.
And we are looking at other items that won't even show up
to our budget, and I think that that, if we looked at those
supplementals, we might find sufficient funding there. So, the
budget is not just NASA. It is in its entirety, and if our
budget reflects our priorities, this certainly was thinned
back, as Congresswoman Davis and Kucinich is asking, to look at
that, and we analyze, before it is too late, our position on
ASA. Thank you.
Chairman Calvert. Thank you. I will recognize Mr. Bartlett,
and then, we will get right to our panel. The gentleman from
Maryland.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
I just wanted to note--I would like to comment on something
that Congresswoman Davis said. The budget item that we are
talking about today is simply a symptom of a very much larger
problem. The numbers you gave about the number of engineers
that are being trained in our country, and the percentage of
those, nearly half of those, were Chinese, and then, the
numbers being trained elsewhere, is a very alarming trend.
A society gets what it appreciates, and the truth is, in
this country, we do not appreciate academic achievers, bright
young men in our schools are called geeks and nerds, and pretty
girls won't date them, and a really bright girl will play dumb,
so that she can get a date. Now, what do you expect the result
is going to be, when this is the kind of a culture that you
have in your country. Yet, we need to be inviting academic
achievers to the White House, and we need to be praising them
and holding them up at least as much as football players, thank
you.
I am concerned. I am concerned that for the short run, you
are exactly right. Our economic superiority is at risk. We will
not continue this blessed country, where one person out of 22
has 25 percent of all the good things in the world. We aren't
going to continue to be here, unless we turn out scientists,
mathematicians, and engineers of quality in large enough
numbers, and we are not doing it.
Ultimately, you are exactly right. It is a threat to our
military superiority. We will not continue to be the world's
premier military power if we are not turning out scientists,
mathematicians, and engineers of quality in large enough
numbers, and we are not doing it today.
So, thank you very much for bringing this to our attention.
It is a whole lot bigger than aeronautics. That is just a
system of a big problem our society has.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I want to thank
Representative Bartlett for defending all those of us who had
trouble getting dates in high school.
Chairman Calvert. Something told me I knew that all along,
Dennis. I thank the panel, and we will now have our----
Ms. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Calvert.--full panel up. Thank you, Congresswoman
Davis.
Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate your coming out today,
and Mr. Lebacqz, we will start with you. You are recognized for
five minutes. You might turn your mike on, though.
Panel II:
STATEMENT OF DR. J. VICTOR LEBACQZ, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR,
AERONAUTICS RESEARCH MISSION DIRECTORATE, NASA
Dr. Lebacqz. There we go. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a
pleasure to see you again. Members of the Subcommittee, thank
you. It is an honor for me to represent this fantastic agency
to this panel today.
If I might take a moment. Personally, my father was an
immigrant to this country from Belgium, after the first World
War. Came on a scholarship as a geek, went out to Stanford to
get a Ph.D. There, he met my mother, who was a daughter of
Norwegian immigrants, who worked her way across the country
teaching, and also, got a Ph.D. at Stanford in the 1930s. So, I
think that is a function of the fact that this country does
represent opportunity for all, and equality for all. And it is
amazing that one generation after two immigrants can do that,
that their son represents this fantastic agency in front of
you, and I am grateful for the opportunity. I only wish they
were here to share it with me still.
So, let me get on with my testimony. Mr. Chairman, I
request that my full testimony be entered into the record.
Chairman Calvert. Without objection, so ordered.
Dr. Lebacqz. The NASA aeronautics research portfolio is a
vital part of NASA's mission, to pursue the President's vision
for space exploration, both in our continuing development of
new technologies that improve aviation on this planet, and in
our development of aeronautical science platforms to fly on
this planet and those of other planets.
The research in the Aeronautics Research Mission
Directorate supports the NASA strategic plan, and specifically,
strategic objective #12 in our new document, the New Age of
Exploration, and has been formulated with your input, and the
input of federal agencies, industry, and academia, through our
advisory committees.
The President's Fiscal Year 2006 budget fully supports the
aeronautics program priority research in the areas of reducing
aircraft noise, increasing aviation safety and security, and
increasing the capacity and efficiency of the national airspace
system. Our budget request also supports the NASA contributions
to the critical national planning activities that have been
identified by the Interagency Joint Planning and Development
Office.
NASA's Fiscal Year 2006 request for aeronautics research is
$852.3 million, which supports three programs. The Aviation
Safety and Security program protects air travelers and the
public by developing technologies for both the national
airspace system and the aircraft in it. We are focusing on
technologies that can reduce air crash rates and reduce
aviation injuries and fatalities, such as, for example,
synthetic vision systems that allow us to see through fog and
increase the safety of flying in bad weather. Additionally, the
program produces technologies that can reduce the vulnerability
of the national aviation system to terrorist attacks, such as
integrated information technologies to predict trends.
Our second important program is our Airspace Systems
program, which works to enable major increases in the capacity
and mobility of the U.S. air transportation system, through
technology transfer and development. The NASA Airspace Systems
Program has become an essential technology provider for the
FAA's air traffic management long-term research requirements.
We have already transitioned technologies to the FAA to support
air traffic controllers, such as the Traffic Management
Advisor, and we will be having a major demonstration of our
small aircraft transportation system at Danville, Virginia,
this spring, and you are all cordially invited to attend that.
Additionally, it is through our Airspace Systems program
that we support the Interagency Joint Planning and Development
Office that I mentioned earlier. We are honored to lead one of
the eight integrated product teams that will be instantiating
the new national transformed air transportation system for the
JPDO.
Finally, the Vehicle Systems program develops and
demonstrates barrier-breaking vehicle concepts and
technologies, beyond the scope of conventional air vehicles,
which protect the Earth's environment and enables science
missions. To ensure maximum benefit to the taxpayer and to
embrace the President's vision, this program will be undergoing
a transformation in 2006, consistent with the review of the
National Research Council a year ago. It has been refocused
away from many interdisciplinary research and technology
projects toward four specific revolutionary technology projects
that are described in my written testimony.
Today, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. remains a global power in
aviation. 10 years ago, I would have likely said, as did
Representative Davis, the U.S. is the global leader in
aviation. Over the past 15 years, it is true, global
competition has slowly, but steadily, eroded our supremacy in
aviation. 60 years ago, Vannevar Bush wrote in his insightful
report, ``Science, the Endless Frontier:'' ``A nation which
depends upon others for its new basic scientific knowledge will
be slow in its industrial progress and weak in its competitive
position in world trade.''
As I talk about our aeronautics program with our partners
and stakeholders in academia, industry, and the government, and
as you may hear from other members of this panel, and have, in
fact, already heard this morning, there are at least two
distinct philosophies for this nation's investment in
aeronautical research. On the one hand, there are those who
think aeronautics and aviation is a mature industry and market,
one in which government's research role is best scaled back and
left to private industry. This view holds that market forces
will decide the Nation's future as a commercial aeronautics
power. On the other hand, there are those who think there are
many breakthroughs in aeronautics ahead, and worry about the
continuous large investments by foreign governments and
competitors, and the apparent shrinking market share for U.S.
industry. This view holds that federal aeronautical investments
are important for the Nation's future military and economic
security.
Many bipartisan reports, ranging from the President's
Commission on the Future of the Aerospace Industry, to the
National Academies Report, ``Securing the Future of U.S. Air
Transportation: A System in Peril,'' have called for a national
aeronautics policy from both sides of this policy debate.
Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, the time is, in fact, right for a
vigorous national dialogue leading to such a policy.
I thank you again for your attention. I look forward to my
fellow panelists, and I will be glad to answer questions from
you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lebacqz follows:]
Prepared Statement of J. Victor Lebacqz
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Four months ago, on November 16, 2004, a B-52 that was designed in
the early 1950's took-off from Edwards Air Force Base in Southern
California and headed to a test range over the Pacific Ocean. Mounted
underneath the starboard wing was a Pegasus rocket that was designed in
the 1980's. Fitted onto the Pegasus in place of the nosecone was the X-
43A, a small experimental scramjet (supersonic combustible ramjet)-
powered vehicle designed at the Langley Research Center in the mid-
1990's. Over the test range, the B-52 dropped the Pegasus, which
propelled the X-43 into free flight. The X-43A scramjet ignited and
flew at approximately Mach 10, nearly 7,000 mph, setting a new world
record for an air-breathing vehicle, as it flew at an altitude of
approximately 110,000 feet.
This breakthrough provides a promise for the future. The talent and
vision of the people at our NASA Research Centers, joining forces with
our industry team, made this breakthrough a reality, turning visionary
possibilities into incredible realities. As the President said last
January, we are engaged in exploration and discovery, and breakthroughs
such as this are needed to enable the President's Vision for Space
Exploration. Breakthroughs power the future. NASA's job is to envision
the future and make it a reality. This is our history and it is our
future.
I thank you for this opportunity to testify on aeronautics research
at NASA. Our aeronautics research portfolio is a vital part of NASA's
mission to pursue the President's Vision for Space Exploration, both in
our continuing development of new technologies that improve aviation on
this planet, and in our development of aeronautical science platforms
to fly on this and other planets. We are developing technologies to
improve safety, reduce environmental impact and improve the efficiency
of aviation operations. We are developing technologies to permit long-
endurance uninhabited aeronautical vehicles. It is an honor for me to
explain how we are doing so.
The Importance of Aeronautics and Its Role at NASA
Aeronautics is critical to national military and economic security,
transportation mobility and freedom, and quality of life. Air
superiority and the ability to globally deploy our forces are vital to
the national interest. Aviation is a unique, indispensable part of our
nation's transportation system, providing unequaled speed and distance,
mobility and freedom of movement for our nation. Air carriers enplane
over 600 million passengers and fly over 600 billion passenger miles,
accounting for 63 percent of individual one-way trips over 500 miles
and 80 percent of trips over 1,000 miles. Airfreight carries 29 percent
of the value of the Nation's exports and imports and is growing at over
six percent annually. Global communications, commerce and tourism have
driven international growth in aviation five to six percent annually,
well beyond annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. In many ways,
the U.S. has only begun to tap what is possible in air transportation.
The U.S. has over 5,200 public-use airports, but the vast majority of
passengers pass through a little more than one percent of those
airports and only about 10 percent are used to any significant degree.
Aviation and the aerospace industry support over 15 million
Americans in high-quality, high-paying jobs, second only to trucking in
the transportation sector. Driven by technology, annual growth in
aviation labor productivity over the past 40 years has averaged 3.6
percent, compared to two percent for U.S. industry as a whole. Aviation
manufacturing is a consistent net exporter, adding $30 billion dollars
annually to the Nation's balance of trade. Aviation produces and uses a
broad base of technologies--from computing and simulation to advanced
materials--supporting the high technology industrial base of the
country. Defense aviation provides fast, flexible force projection for
the U.S. Our military aircraft are unparalleled globally because they
employ the most advanced technology.
Technological advances in aeronautics over the past 40 years, many
of them first pioneered by NASA, have enabled a ten-fold improvement in
aviation safety, a doubling of fuel efficiency with reductions in
emissions per operation, a 50 percent reduction in cost to travelers,
and an order of magnitude reduction in noise generation. In large part,
the gains we have enjoyed have been due to the efficient transfer of
the benefits of technology to consumers via competitive air
transportation markets.
At NASA our aeronautics program is pioneering and validating high-
value technologies that enable discovery and improve the quality of
life through practical applications. We are investing in the
revolutionary technologies that will ensure the success of our mission.
To ensure maximum benefit to the taxpayer, and to embrace the Vision
for Space Exploration, we are transforming our investment in
Aeronautics Research in order to more sharply focus our investment on
revolutionary, high-risk, ``barrier breaking'' technologies. Toward
this end, the NASA Aeronautics Vehicle Systems Program (VSP) has been
refocused away from research and technology development in multiple
areas toward four specific revolutionary technology demonstration
projects for which there is a clear government research role. These
projects will address critical public needs related to reduction of
aircraft noise and emissions, and enable new science missions. The
revolutionary technologies developed by NASA within the next decade
will form the basis for a new generation of environmentally friendly
aircraft and will enhance U.S. competitiveness 20 years from now.
To fulfill our mission we must also identify the national
facilities that are required to support our programs. Our transformed
aeronautics program will rely on a more focused set of facilities than
exists today. Over the past several years many reviews have been
performed relative to our national aeronautical facilities. There have
been closures and changes. However, more needs to be done to avoid the
perpetuation of marginal facilities through small, evolutionary change.
We are optimistic that looking to the future will provide the framework
necessary to define the facilities, new and existing, that will enable
success in aeronautics.
Roadmapping and the Strategic Plan
NASA is working toward the aeronautics R&D goals as published in
The New Age of Exploration: NASA's Direction for 2005 and Beyond. In
Strategic Objective 12 of this document, we commit to ``provide
advanced aeronautical technologies to meet the challenges of next
generation systems in aviation, for civilian and scientific purposes,
in our atmosphere and in atmospheres of other worlds.'' These
aeronautics R&D goals are based on the NASA Aeronautics Blueprint,
published in 2002. The Aeronautics Blueprint articulates goals for
aeronautics that we believe can achieve the objectives set out in our
Strategic Plan. As we looked forward and examined the issues facing
aviation, we recognized a need for new concepts and new technologies to
break through the current plateau facing aviation. Achieving big
increases in capacity and mobility, while improving safety and reducing
environmental impacts, was not feasible within today's construct and
technology baseline. What we found was that emerging technologies, when
combined with advances in traditional aerospace disciplines, can enable
new system concepts that operate at levels of performance that eclipse
current systems.
We use the Blueprint to help guide and prioritize our investments.
The process we began in 2002 with the publication of the Blueprint--the
framework and emphasis of the Blueprint--is reflected in our current
program restructuring. Next steps include more detailed systems
analysis and technology roadmapping. We are also exploring a way to use
the National Research Council to perform a decadal survey to help us
better understand the Nation's future needs in aeronautics.
NASA has initiated a new roadmapping endeavor to better define all
of our activities. One of these roadmaps is focused on aeronautics. To
this end we have developed a Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)
team, consisting of industry, academia, government, military, and local
government planning representatives, to evaluate and draft strategic
roadmaps that will help guide our long-range goals, capabilities, and
enabling technologies. We intend to deliver the aeronautics roadmap
this fall, and invite you to participate by providing input and
comment. This interaction will help direct future investment decisions
represented in the integrated NASA Strategic Roadmap.
As we begin this process, a broader national dialog on the
aeronautics R&D goals for this roadmap may be appropriate as we enter
the second century of aviation. These discussions should include a
range of stakeholders and customers, including the Congress. This
process could lead to a national consensus for aeronautics R&D goals.
Joint Planning and Development Office
Last year's FAA Reauthorization Bill, VISION-100 (P.L. 108-176),
created the Next Generation Air Transportation System Joint Planning
and Development Office (JPDO) with the goal to develop an integrated,
multi-agency ``National Plan'' to transform the Nation's air
transportation system to meet the needs of the year 2025 while
providing substantial near-term benefits. The National Plan--in
essence, a roadmap for the Next Generation Air Transportation System--
has six overarching goals: (1) Promote economic growth and create jobs;
(2) Expand system flexibility and deliver capacity to meet future
demands; (3) Tailor services to customer needs; (4) Ensure national
defense readiness; (5) Promote aviation safety and environmental
stewardship; and (6) Retain and enhance U.S. leadership and economic
competitiveness in global aviation.
The JPDO--composed of NASA, the FAA, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP), and the Departments of Transportation,
Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security--working in close
collaboration with other public and private sector experts, created and
published the National Plan, entitled Next Generation Air
Transportation System Integrated Plan, referred to as NGATS, that was
delivered to Congress in December 2004.
The NGATS goals and objectives broadly address eight major
strategies. A series of eight Integrated Product Teams (IPT's) are
developing executable roadmaps for each strategy to transform the
National Airspace System. The eight IPT's are focused on such
activities as developing alternative airport concepts and
infrastructure to meet future demand, establishing a more effective and
less intrusive airport security system without limiting mobility or
infringing on civil liberties, creating a more responsive air traffic
system that can accommodate new and changing aircraft vehicle classes
and business models, reducing the impact of weather on air travel, and
harmonizing equipage and operations globally.
NASA has a major role in the JPDO and the Next Generation Air
Transportation System. While NASA is performing aeronautics research
that provides the foundation to enable NGATS and the right strategies,
we are also providing civil servants and direct support to the JPDO.
NASA is providing civil service employees to serve as the JPDO Deputy
Director (SES), Agile Air Traffic System IPT Lead (SES), and a Board
member (SES), as well as 11 other full or part time civil servants.
NASA financial support to the JPDO was $5.4M in FY 2004. This has
increased to $5.6M in FY 2005 and will increase to $10M in FY 2006. We
are also conducting a network-enabled operations (NEO) demonstration of
security and capacity related technologies. This demonstration, jointly
sponsored by NASA, DOD, DHS, and DOT, could prove to be valuable in
integrating government-wide intelligence operations, providing
significant aid to our national security.
In aviation there has never been a transformation effort similar to
this one with as many stakeholders and as broad in scope. The objective
of this plan is to provide the opportunity for creative solutions for
the future of air transportation, our security, and our hope for a
vibrant future. Its success is the first priority of our aeronautics
portfolio.
Aeronautics Research Programs
The research in the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate
programs supports the NASA Strategic Plan, as formulated with your
input and the input of federal agencies, industry and academia. The
President's FY 2006 Budget fully supports the Aeronautics program's
vital research, especially in the areas of reducing aircraft noise,
increasing the aviation safety and security and increasing the capacity
and efficiency of the National Airspace System. The budget request also
supports the activities that have been identified by the Joint Planning
and Development Office. NASA's FY 2006 request for the Aeronautics
Research Mission Directorate is $852.3 million, which is $54 million
less than the FY 2005 budget.
Protecting air travelers and the public is the focus of the
Aviation Safety and Security Program (AvSSP) which develops
technologies for both the National Aviation System and aircraft that
are aimed at preventing both intentional and unintentional events that
could cause damage, harm, and loss of life; and minimizing the
consequences when these types of events occur. Aviation safety focuses
on technologies that can reduce aircraft accident rates and reduce
aviation injuries and fatalities. Aviation security focuses on
technologies that can reduce the vulnerability of the National Aviation
System to terrorist attacks while improving the efficiency of security
measures. The AvSSP Program also develops and integrates information
technologies needed to assess situations and trends that might indicate
unsafe or insecure conditions before they lead to fatalities or damage.
The goal, in short, is to reduce the potential for loss of life in the
National Aviation System. The President's FY 2006 Budget for AvSSP is
$192.9 million, an increase of four percent over the FY 2005 program.
Last year AvSSP demonstrated aviation safety breakthrough
technology that has enormous potential to eliminate the leading cause
of world-wide commercial and general aviation fatalities, Controlled
Flight Into Terrain (commonly referred to as CFIT). Synthetic Visions
Systems performed simulation and flight-test evaluations of low-cost
forward-fit and retrofit technologies for General Aviation aircraft.
Synthetic Vision Systems create an artificial, ``virtual view,'' of an
area based on a detailed terrain database. Although the pilot may not
be able to see the ground through the fog, a computer screen presents
the landing site accurately based on map and terrain information.
Evaluations included technical and operational performance assessments
of improved pilot situational awareness with regard to terrain
portrayal, loss of control prevention, and display symbology. Results
from our demonstration show the efficacy of synthetic vision displays
to eliminate CFIT and greatly improve pilot situational awareness.
Turbulence is a leading cause of in-flight injuries and costs the
airlines at least $100 million per year. To address this issue, AvSSP
has designed and is performing in-service evaluations of a turbulence
prediction and warning system with a major airline that gives flight
crews the advanced warning needed to avoid turbulence or advise
passengers to sit down and buckle up to avoid injury. AvSSP is also
developing safety design and maintenance tools to design safer aircraft
that can, for example, operate more safely in icing conditions, and new
techniques for industry to improve aviation maintenance procedures that
can improve safety and reduce maintenance-related accidents.
Working in concert with other government agencies that have mission
requirements in aviation safety and security, such as the Federal
Aviation Administration and the Transportation Security Administration,
as well as in cooperation with the U.S. aviation industry and
universities, NASA actively pursues technology transfer with these
partners by identifying and addressing user needs and by demonstrating
key attributes of the technologies in relevant user environments,
making use of both NASA and partner facilities and capabilities.
Last year at the Ft. Worth, Texas, and Washington, D.C., Air
Traffic Control Centers, AvSSP demonstrated a prototype of the Rogue
Evaluation And Coordination Tool (REACT), using a live traffic feed
over eight hours. REACT demonstrated the ability to detect aircraft
that are deviating from their expected flight paths using four
detection algorithms. It also predicted incursions into restricted
airspace, with countdown timers. These capabilities will enhance the
public safety by mitigating the potential for catastrophic harm that
might otherwise result from a rogue aircraft.
Transferring technology to enable major increases in the capacity
and mobility of the U.S. air transportation system is the focus of the
Airspace Systems Program (ASP). For example, the Small Aircraft
Transportation System (SATS) has demonstrated the feasibility of pilots
safely landing at non-radar equipped airports under low visibility
conditions. Also, SATS has demonstrated the use of automation to
increase flight-path accuracy and situational awareness, precluding the
need for expensive, ground-based systems. In 2005, we are conducting a
number of SATS demonstrations validating technologies that promote
routine and easy access of general aviation aircraft to the Nation's
under utilized small airports. SATS technologies can help to relieve
the current excessive demands on the Nation's National Airspace System.
We will conduct a public demonstration of our accomplishments in
Danville, Virginia, during June 5-7, 2005. I extend a personal
invitation to all the Members on this committee to attend this SATS
demonstration. The President's FY 2006 Budget for ASP is $200.3
million, an increase of 22 percent over the FY 2005 program.
The Airspace Systems Program has become an essential provider of
the FAA's air traffic management long-term research. The FAA long-term
forecast indicates a steady growth in air travel demand that will
culminate in a doubling of that demand over roughly the next two
decades. NASA's ASP research objectives are planned to meet the FAA's
needs in 2025 though some priority is being given to meet the FAA's
near-term operational support needs.
The Virtual Airspace Modeling and Simulation System, developed by
the ASP, provides a unique and critical capability that is used to
perform simulations and trade-off assessments of future air
transportation system concepts, models, and technologies. This
capability will allow an air traffic management tool concept to be
tested in a non-operational environment before major development
dollars are invested. The JPDO currently is using this capability to
assess the impact of new technologies and to establish the requirements
leading to a transformed national air transportation system.
Last year we successfully completed the Advanced Air Transportation
Technologies (AATT) project that developed Air Traffic Management
decision-making technologies and procedures to enable greater
flexibility and efficiencies of the National Airspace System. In
congested airspace with interdependent traffic flows, a delay at one
center often creates a domino effect that spreads quickly to multiple
centers. Over its five-year life, the AATT project developed and
demonstrated several active decision support tools that would enable
improvements in NAS throughput, user flexibility, predictability, and
overall system efficiency while maintaining safety.
The Vehicle Systems Program (VSP) is developing and demonstrating
barrier-breaking vehicle concepts and technologies, beyond the scope of
conventional air vehicles that protect the Earth's environment and
enable science missions. In FY 2005, the VSP was transformed into a
goal-driven technology development program aimed at the maturation of
technologies to flight. By developing well-defined technological
metrics and goals, the diverse technology development effort was
refocused in over seven different vehicle classes. Considering our
current constrained budget environment, the program will be undergoing
a second stage of transformation in 2006. Three basic tenets govern
this transformation: barrier-breaking demonstrations, sharp focus on
fewer goals, and fully competed awards. The 2004 record-breaking Hyper-
X demonstrations, which I described at the beginning of my testimony,
illustrated that many barriers remain in the second century of flight.
The transformed Vehicle Systems investment will be focused on achieving
these demonstrations through the use of increased competition through
merit-based research selection. The President's FY 2006 Budget for VSP
is $459.1 million.
As part of the transformation of the VSP, we have consolidated our
research to four specific ``barrier-breaking'' technology demonstration
projects:
Subsonic Noise Reduction: Continues the barrier
breaking research for reducing airport noise, a demonstration
of noise reduction technologies for large transport aircraft
will put us halfway to the goal of keeping objectionable noise
within airport boundaries. This demonstration will include
advanced engine and airframe noise reduction approaches as well
as the innovative continuous descent approach to avoid the
objectionable changes in engine speed as an aircraft approaches
the airport.
Sonic Boom Reduction: If nothing is done to break the
barrier of supersonic flight over land, it will take just as
long to fly across the country in the third century of flight
as it did halfway through the first century. The barrier to
high-speed flight is defining a sonic boom level that is
acceptable to the general public, and designing an aircraft to
reach that level. Building on our recent successful flight
validation of the theory that by altering the contours of a
supersonic aircraft, the shockwave and its accompanying sonic
boom can be shaped resulting in a greatly reduced sonic boom
signature on the ground, we plan to demonstrate an innovative
air vehicle that will break the barrier of acceptable
supersonic flight.
Zero Emissions Aircraft: Conventional turbo machinery
powered by fossil fuels can only incrementally address the need
to reduce harmful NOX and CO2 emissions from
aircraft. A breakthrough demonstration of an all-electric
aircraft propulsion system will be the first step towards a
truly emission-less aircraft.
High-Altitude, Long-Endurance, Remotely Operated
Aircraft (HALE ROA): NASA opened the door to high altitude
flight when it successfully demonstrated the Helios. This
legacy will be extended through a series of high-altitude long-
endurance aircraft that will extend duration, range, and
payload capacity. The first breakthrough will be a 14-day
duration aircraft that flies at over 50 thousand feet.
NASA Aeronautics Research Centers: Issues & Implications
Significant NASA organizational and programmatic transformation,
based upon the recommendations of the President's Commission on the
Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy, is essential
for NASA. As discussed above, the transformation of NASA's Aeronautics
Research programs encompasses not only the technical content of those
programs, but also the mechanisms by which those programs will be
conducted. These changes are having major impacts on the people and
facilities at NASA's four centers that perform aeronautics research for
the Agency. NASA is taking proactive steps to manage the impact of
these changes on our people and facilities. In particular, we are
actively involved with several ongoing Agency initiatives, including
the Core Competency Assessment and the Transformation Action Team, to
ensure that we have identified the workforce skill sets that are
critical to our future success. We have also established viable
mechanisms for addressing areas where we anticipate having too many, or
too few, of these skills. The NASA Organizational Model Assessment
Team, established in response to a recommendation of the Aldridge
Commission, identified potential alternate organizational models for
NASA Centers. The Agency is evaluating the possible implementation of
alternate organizational models including: Hybrid organizations,
combining a Government component with an FFRDC, University Affiliated
Research Center, Institute or Government Corporation.
Additionally, the Agency is examining a range of actions to address
our workforce issues. These include: voluntary separations-buyouts; job
fairs and perhaps directed inter-Center workforce rebalancing;
acceleration of Center transformation strategies; preparation of
requests for demonstration personnel authorities; and as a last resort,
preparation for involuntary measures.
Regarding our facilities, we are instituting a ``corporate
approach'' to the management of these key assets, beginning with our
major wind tunnels. NASA, and its predecessor the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics, has long used a variety of wind tunnels to
support research, development, and related activities in both its
aeronautics and space endeavors. External users, particularly DOD and
the aerospace industry, have also used these facilities to meet their
own research and development objectives. During the past decade,
however, the level of demand for most, if not all, of these facilities
has decreased substantially. The reduction in demand within NASA has
been the result of a gradual change in programmatic direction toward
areas such as airspace operations, aircraft safety, and aircraft
security that by and large do not require significant wind tunnel
usage. The reduction in demand external to NASA has paralleled the
decreasing number of new aircraft development projects, both commercial
and military.
As a result, NASA has considerably more wind tunnels than the
Agency's programs require. In an effort to match program requirements
with supporting infrastructure, NASA has, within the last ten years,
closed about half of its wind tunnels. Decisions regarding the
operation, and closure, of specific facilities were made primarily by
the Research Center that operated each respective facility. Recently,
however, the nature and pace of change within and external to the
Agency has made it increasingly difficult for the Centers to manage and
operate such facilities, particularly those with large fixed costs and
uncertain levels of utilization.
Accordingly, on February 4, 2005, ARMD, operating as the
Headquarters Center Executive responsible for the Dryden Flight
Research Center, the Glenn Research Center, and the Langley Research
Center, instituted a new ``corporate management of facilities''
approach, effective immediately. Under this approach, a new
Headquarters office will be responsible for the integrated, strategic
management of all the major wind tunnels within the Agency.
Specifically, this office has been tasked with establishing an overall
strategy for this suite of facilities; for setting cost, pricing, and
top-level facility access policies; for coordinating overall marketing
efforts; for approving test assignments; assessing program and facility
performance; for sponsoring initiatives for improved operational
effectiveness and efficiency; and--with respect to this set of
facilities--for serving as the primary integrated interface with
industry, DOD, and other customers and stakeholders.
In particular, this new approach will enable us to better address
many of the challenges facing the management of these facilities,
including those highlighted by the RAND Corporation in their recently
concluded examination of NASA's wind tunnel and propulsion test
facilities, such as the need for an aeronautics test technology vision,
selective consolidation and modernization of existing facilities,
common management and accounting practices, and a renewed reliance
between NASA and the Department of Defense.
Summary
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify today to share our
accomplishments and the actions we are taking for the future of this
nation in aeronautics research. We are transforming aeronautics at NASA
to emphasize innovations in addressing barriers through high-risk,
high-payoff technologies. Our transformed aeronautics program will
create challenges and opportunities as we pursue the Vision for Space
Exploration. We are excited about this future, and we are anxious to
get on with it.
Biography for J. Victor Lebacqz
Dr. Lebacqz is the Associate Administrator for Aeronautics
Research, one of four Mission Directorates within the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), a position he has held
since July 2003. In this position, he has overall technical,
programmatic, and personnel management responsibility for all
aeronautics technology research and development within the Agency. The
programmatic activities are funded by a $1.0 Billion/year budget that
supports three major NASA programs, which are performed at the four
Aeronautics research centers of Ames, Dryden, Glenn, and Langley.
Personnel oversight of approximately 6,200 civil servants at the four
Aeronautics centers is a concomitant responsibility.
Prior to this appointment, Dr. Lebacqz was the Associate Center
Director for Aerospace Programs at the NASA Ames Research Center, a
position he held since June 2002. In this position, he had overall
management responsibility for the conduct of programs led by Ames for
the Office of Aerospace Technology within NASA. These programs included
Airspace Systems; Rotorcraft; Computing, Information, and
Communications Technology; and Engineering for Complex Systems. They
had a combined value of approximately $250M per year.
Between May 2000 and May 2002, Dr. Lebacqz was Deputy Director of
the Office of Aerospace at the NASA Ames Research Center. The Aerospace
Directorate's research and technology development efforts include
advanced aerospace projects, space transportation and thermal
protection systems, aviation operations systems, nanotechnology,
acoustics, basic and applied aerodynamics, and rotorcraft. The work is
performed in seven subordinate Divisions or Offices comprised of
approximately 280 civil servant employees and 235 contractors, with an
annual budget on the order of $75M. Dr. Lebacqz independently, or in
partnership with the Director, was responsible for all personnel and
financial management activities associated with the Directorate, as
well as the development and transfer to industry and/or other
government organizations of advanced air traffic management and flight
systems technology, and of rotorcraft, low-speed aeromechanics, and
hypersonic aerothermodynamic technologies.
Prior to this position, Dr. Lebacqz was Director of the Aviation
System Capacity Program and the Aerospace Operations Systems Programs,
for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), a
position he held since December 1997. He was responsible for the
technical and programmatic conduct of three systems technology projects
(Advanced Air Transportation Technologies, Terminal Area Productivity,
and Short Haul Civil Tiltrotor) and one base research and technology
program (Aerospace Operations Systems) for NASA. These programs have a
combined value of approximately $725M over five years, and are
conducted at three of the NASA Centers: Ames Research Center in
California, Langley Research Center in Virginia, and Glenn Research
Center in Ohio. They focus on developing technologies to increase the
capacity and safety of the National Airspace System. In their conduct,
he was also responsible for strategic alliances with the Federal
Aviation Administration, and for developing formal relationships with
the FAA's Technical Center and the DOT's Volpe Transportation Center.
Previous to that assignment, Dr. Lebacqz was Chief of the Flight
Management and Human Factors Division at NASA Ames, a position he held
between December 1996 and December 1997. As Division Chief, he had
technical and personnel responsibility for 200 civil servant and
contractor employees, with an annual budget of approximately $35M. He
was specifically responsible for interdisciplinary Division programs in
Air Traffic Management, Aeronautical Human Factors, and Aviation Safety
research. Prior to this appointment, he was Deputy Chief of the same
Division since 1994, during which time his specific responsibilities
also included Rotorcraft Systems. Concurrently, he was Program Manager
of NASA's Rotorcraft Base Research and Technology program from February
1996 until December 1996, with programmatic responsibilities for the
entire NASA rotorcraft program at the same three NASA Aeronautics
Centers.
Between 1991 and 1994, he was Chief of the Flight Human Factors
Branch at NASA Ames. In this position, he was responsible for the
development of human factors programs in crew resource management,
fatigue countermeasures, and air-ground integration. Between 1985 and
1991 he was Chief of the Flight Dynamics and Controls Branch at Ames,
where he was responsible for programs in rotorcraft and VSTOL
stability, control, and handling qualities, and developed helicopter
flight research activities cooperative with the U.S. Army, including
the new RASCAL UH-60 helicopter. Concurrently, he was a lecturer at
Stanford University between 1982 and 1992, teaching the graduate course
``Dynamics and Control of Rotary-Wing Aircraft.'' From 1978 to 1985 he
conducted flight and simulation research at Ames, and, prior to that,
he was with the Calspan Corporation in Buffalo, NY, where he was Head,
Flight Control Section.
His BSE (cum laude), MA, and Ph.D. degrees in Aeronautical
Engineering are all from Princeton University. He is the author or co-
author of over 50 technical reports, articles, or papers, was a member
of the American Helicopter Society (AHS), and is a Fellow of the
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA). For the AHS,
he has been Technical Director for the San Francisco Bay Region (1982-
1983), as well as Technical Chairman for an International Conference on
Flying Qualities and Human Factors in 1993. For the AIAA, he has been
an Associate Editor for the Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics
(1982-1987), a member of the Technical Committee for Guidance and
Control (1988-1991), and the Deputy Director, Aircraft Operations, for
the Aircraft Technology Integration and Operations Technical Group. He
was the Technical Chairperson for the first AIAA Aircraft Technology
Integration and Operations Forum in November 2001.
Dr. Lebacqz has received two individual NASA Special Achievement
Awards, five NASA Group Achievement Awards, six NASA ``Turning Goals
Into Reality'' (TGIR) awards, two NASA Ames Honor Awards (for
excellence in supervision and for mentoring), the U.S. Army
Aeroflightdynamics Directorate Director's Award for Interagency
Cooperation, the NASA Exceptional Service Medal, and has twice been
awarded NASA's Outstanding Leadership Medal. He was named a
Presidential Rank Award Meritorious Executive in 2003. He is listed in
the Lexington Who's Who Registry 2000-2001.
Chairman Calvert. I thank the gentleman. Next, Dr.
Klineberg, you are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN M. KLINEBERG, COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
Dr. Klineberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the
Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today.
I have some prepared--get there on the screen. I am
appearing today as the Chair of the Aeronautics and Space
Engineering Board's Committee to Review the NASA Aeronautics
Program. I have submitted a written report that covers that
in--completely. I am going to try to hit some highlights here,
and I will be as brief as I can.
Chairman Calvert. Your full testimony will be entered into
the record.
Mr. Klineberg. Thank you very much.
Particularly, the process I want to emphasize, we had a
large number of very senior, very experienced people in the
industry who reviewed, at length, the NASA aeronautics program
during 2003, and the names of my fellow panel members are in
the written submittal.
I would just highlight several of the recommendations we
came up with. This first one is something that I am sure this
committee could--will endorse. It says that air transportation
is vital to this country. But behind this statement is--was a
consternation my committee found that NASA, the people in the
NASA aeronautics program did not seem to have a good handle on
why they were doing the work they were doing, and Mr. Kucinich
touched on this earlier, the problem is the vision, the NASA
Vision Statement says that their mission is to understand and
protect the home planet, and that is the aegis, the vision
under which aeronautics is contained in the NASA thinking, and
frankly, that is completely wrong. That is not the vision for
aeronautics. It is an issue of competitiveness, and the
vitality of the air transportation system, and this has to be
understood in NASA. And I will touch on that a little more
later, if I may.
Another one, we said, we looked around, and we said NASA is
the agency that must provide that leadership, and particularly,
in research and development, and I don't think you will find
arguments here, but we needed--we felt we needed to re-
emphasize that, because that leadership role is not always
exercised, and it needs to be exercised in having a strategic
plan and a strategic vision that the rest of the players can
unite behind.
We found NASA remarkably healthy, considering the
tremendous pressures that they have been under, in budget
pressures. And their facilities are world class national
facilities. There are some very, very good people out there,
that are working at it. They need a little focus in those focus
programs, a little more focus, but we found the program still
is salvageable.
They have absorbed, on this chart, they have absorbed a lot
of cuts by decreasing the number of people they have in given
areas. That is a natural tendency, but we felt that unless they
can build up the budget, it is time, now, to look at dropping
research in certain areas, because you simply don't have the
people that can support that activity. At the same time that
they need to focus their systems activities, we saw a real
problem in that they backed away from long-term basic research,
and NASA and NACA before it has traditionally been the home of
a competence in aeronautics that we are worried has
disappeared, as they have no line item and nowhere, place, to
support basic research, unless it is focused on a given system,
and that is not really what aeronautics is about. And that is
my--that was recommendation 7.
This recommendation 8, we recognize that much of NASA
facilities did grow up at a time when there was a very large
industrial base in this country. That has consolidated, and
NASA has to continue to look at consolidating facilities, but
they need to do this carefully, and only close down those
facilities that are truly not needed or redundant in some way.
And the last one I wanted to touch on this morning, is we
felt there could be better, NASA could do a little bit better
in dealing with their customers, the other agencies, the FAA,
DOD, and others. And the second bullet down here is code a
little bit, and I will touch on that in a second, we felt that
we needed some way to involve the NASA Administrator in the
aeronautics enterprise, and one way might be to have him
recognize that aeronautics is, indeed, a very important,
separate function of NASA, and needs to be supported that way.
And essentially, in this way of co-chairing a meeting with
the FAA Administrator is a way to enforce that kind of feeling.
Now, if you will permit me just half a second, I would like to
address the four specific questions I was asked verbally. I
have no charts on that. And I will be as quickly as I can, Mr.
Chairman.
The first question, now, I need to inform you that I have
to take off my hat as the representative of the National
Academies, and I am now speaking to you as a private citizen, a
concerned private citizen, but one with over 45 years
experience in this field. So, I hope what I say will be useful.
The first question was what are the main challenges facing
us over the next two decades, and what are the Nation's most
pressing strategic needs? I know my colleagues will address
this in detail, so I am not going to go into that now, but in
my mind, we are very close to letting the aeronautics
infrastructure become a chokepoint for economic growth in this
country. And not only exports of aeronautical systems and
equipment and subsystems that we have talked about earlier, but
the air traffic system itself in this country is becoming
saturated. We had some relief after 9/11, when the growth in
air traffic slowed temporarily. It is starting to pick up
again, and we are going to get into a point very soon when you
just can't--it will be unreliable. You won't be able to travel
from point A to point B, and for those of us who live in
California and use the Internet, for example, for commerce, and
expect packages to appear at our door, that is going to be--
that will just be a disaster, and this country has got to
support that infrastructure, and we have to start to plan for
the next generation of air traffic control systems, and the
vehicles and systems that will fly in that. And I want to note
here that the National Academies and the ASAB hopes to conduct
a study that will help a bit in this area, by developing what
we call a decadal strategy for aeronautics research, that will
help identify the major issues and what is being done to
address them.
The next question was what is NASA's role, and how
effective are NASA's programs. I think I have touched on that,
because that is what our study did. The mechanisms for NASA
aeronautics have been in place since 1917. They grew a lot
during the Second World War, and they are very effective. And I
think that funding R&D is an effective way for the government
to support this field, and it is much better than government
subsidies, and as I say, we found a good program in place, in
spite of the debilitating budget cuts that have been proposed.
The third question I was asked is what effect will the
proposed budget have on NASA's ability to carry out this
program. I think the budget is a disaster, unmitigated. And if
you look at the aero budget, it has declined by more than half
over the last several years. The five-year runout contemplates
an additional 20 percent reduction in the budget. I think this
program is on its way to becoming irrelevant to the future of
aeronautics in this country, and perhaps--and in the world.
And what do I think NASA should do? I thought a lot about
this. Representative Davis touched on this in her opening
statements. I think somehow, I think NASA aeronautics belongs
in NASA. NASA is an R&D agency, it is kind of special in the
government. I don't believe we need a new organization that
would involve the operational agencies like the FAA or DOD, but
I think NASA itself has to pay attention to aeronautics, and
one thought I have had is that NASA needs two Deputy
Administrators, one for aeronautics and for space, both of
which would have advise and consent screening, and you would
have an Administrator, a Deputy Administrator for NASA
aeronautics, and I think--I approve of the notion of not
allowing transfer across the budget line items. NASA
aeronautics has a very different constituency----
Chairman Calvert. Doctor, if you will summarize.
Dr. Klineberg. I am--the last second, sir.
The--NASA has a different constituency in aeronautics than
space. It is very hard to trade the two off, and it shouldn't
be--we should fix that somehow. So, that concludes my
testimony, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I ran a little bit long,
but I appreciate your attention.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Klineberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of John M. Klineberg
An Assessment of NASA's Aeronautics Technology Program
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Udall, and Members of the Committee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify before you today. My name is John
Klineberg. I have recently retired from my position as the President of
Space Systems/Loral and served for over 25 years in a variety of
management and technical positions with NASA. I appear before you today
in my capacity as Chair of the National Research Council's committee
assessing NASA's aeronautics technology programs. The Research Council
is the operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences, National
Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine of the National
Academies, chartered by Congress in 1863 to advise the government on
matters of science and technology.
In late 2002, the National Research Council was asked by NASA and
the Office of Management and Budget to examine the technical quality of
its aeronautics research and development. The National Research Council
formed our committee under the auspices of the Aeronautics and Space
Engineering Board to respond to this request. Our committee's report
was released in November of 2003.
I am aware that NASA's program has been changing since our report
was issued and that it will continue to change. However, the following
material summarizes the findings and recommendations of our report as
it was issued in November 2003.
OVERVIEW
The National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies
performed this detailed, independent assessment of NASA's Aeronautics
Technology Programs by establishing three panels, one for each of the
component programs within the Aeronautics Technology Programs. The NRC
also established a parent committee, consisting of the Chairman and a
subset of members from each panel. The committee and panels began their
activities in early 2003.
The three subordinate panels conducted an independent peer
assessment of the Vehicle Systems Program (VSP), the Airspace Systems
Program (ASP), and the Aviation Safety Program (AvSP), the three
elements of NASA's Aeronautics Technology Programs. The committee and
panels were asked by NASA to address four questions:
1. Is the array of activities about right?
2. Is there a good plan to carry out the program?
3. Is the program doing what it set out to do?
4. Is the entire effort connected to the users?
The committee developed findings and recommendations at three
different levels. At the top level, it created a list of 12 key
crosscutting recommendations for the overall Aeronautics Technology
Programs on issues that span the entire set of programs. These
recommendations are appropriate for guiding Congress, NASA
Headquarters, and the White House in prioritizing NASA's aeronautics
research and development programs. At the second level of detail, the
committee provided program-level recommendations appropriate for
program and project managers at the NASA Research Centers. Finally, the
committee developed findings and recommendations at the task level that
are designed to assist the individual principal investigators in
improving the quality of their research. These third-level
recommendations are numerous and detailed and are not included in this
document.
OVERALL ASSESSSMENT
The committee's simple answer to the four questions posed by NASA
is that, in general, the Aeronautics Technology programs are very good
but could be greatly improved by following the committee's 12 top-level
recommendations. The array of research activities is about right,
although a few additions and deletions are recommended in various
areas. There are good plans to carry out the programs and they are
accomplishing much of what they were established to do, but with some
changes in the plans for execution results could improve results
significantly. In addition, the programs are reasonably well connected
to the users, but here again the committee recommends some
improvements. These issues--scope, planning, achievement, and ties to
users--are addressed more completely in the specific recommendations
themselves:
Top-Level Recommendation 1. The government should continue to support
air transportation, which is vital to the U.S. economy and the well-
being of its citizens.
A strong national program of aeronautics research and technology
contributes to the vitality of the U.S. aeronautics industry, the
efficiency of the U.S. air transportation system, and the economic
well-being and quality of life of people in the United States. The
government has an important role in assuring the best possible air
transportation system and the development of related technologies that
enable products and services to compete effectively in the global
marketplace. This is consistent with the legislative charter for NASA,
the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended. The Act
specifies that NASA's aeronautics research and technology development
should ``contribute to a national technology base that will enhance
United States preeminence in civil and aeronautical aviation and
improve the safety and efficiency of the United States air
transportation system.''
Top-Level Recommendation 2. NASA should provide world leadership in
aeronautics research and development.
To provide leadership, NASA should develop consistent strategic and
long-range plans to focus the aeronautics program in areas of national
importance. NASA should have well-formulated, measurable, attainable
goals at all program levels. To be meaningful, goals should be based on
a sound evaluation of future needs, technological feasibility, and
relevant economic and other non-technical factors.
Top-Level Recommendation 3. NASA has many excellent technical personnel
and facilities to achieve its aeronautics technology objectives but
should improve its processes for program management.
Many NASA facilities are world class national assets. In addition,
the committee was impressed with the technical expertise of many
program personnel. To maximize these assets, NASA needs to improve its
program management and systems integration processes, including
integration across programs. In particular, NASA should assure clear
lines of responsibility and accountability. The use of matrix and line
management reporting structures sometimes obscures lines of
accountability, and subproject and task-level plans, funding, goals,
metrics, staffing, and responsibility are often difficult to define or
cannot be clearly traced back to a plan or vision for the program as a
whole. Further, NASA should use independent quality assurance processes
for program evaluation, and all projects should be evaluated on a
regular basis to determine whether continued investment is warranted.
Top-Level Recommendation 4. NASA should eliminate arbitrary time
constraints on program completion and schedule key milestones based on
task complexity and technology maturity.
Research priorities, funding, and organizational structure change
during the course of any research and development effort. However, NASA
should resist constant changes and realignments designed to meet
artificial five-year sunset requirements. Several long-term research
efforts have been disguised as a series of five-year projects with
different names so that it is not easy to trace the real progress of
the research. In addition, the continuous reorganization and
restructuring that occur in response to the five-year sunset rule
create an unstable atmosphere that does not permit NASA researchers to
pursue the best path to technology maturation. NASA programs need clear
exit criteria at the task level that specify when research is complete
or ready for transition to industry or other agencies.
Top-Level Recommendation 5. NASA should reduce the number of tasks in
its aeronautics technology portfolio.
NASA is trying to do too much within the available budget and
resists eliminating programs in the face of budget reductions. Often,
there are too many tasks to achieve research objectives in key areas.
This overload may be partly the result of including various research
tasks within more focused efforts. The committee is concerned that
breadth of activities is coming at the expense of depth.
Top-Level Recommendation 6. NASA should pursue more high-risk, high-
payoff technologies.
Many innovative concepts that are critical to meeting aviation
needs in the next decades will not be pursued by industry or the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). NASA should fill this void. The
committee applauds the inclusion of high-risk, revolutionary sub-
projects in many areas and believes the program portfolio could benefit
from additional far-reaching efforts with the potential for high
payoff. This type of research is critical to investigating the
feasibility of innovative concepts and reducing risk to the point where
the concepts are suitable for advanced development and transfer to
industry or the FAA.
Top-Level Recommendation 7. NASA should reconstitute a long-term base
research program, separate from the other aeronautics technology
programs and projects.
The current research is mostly product-driven, with not enough
fundamental work. Fundamental research is crucial for the development
of future products. NASA needs to provide researchers the opportunity
to conduct forward-looking, basic research that is unencumbered by
short-term, highly specified goals and milestones. Historically, NASA
has been a world leader in its core research areas; however, that base
has eroded in recent years as the amount of in-house basic research
diminishes. NASA needs to reassess its core competencies and assure
their support through a base research program.
Top-Level Recommendation 8. NASA's aeronautics technology
infrastructure exceeds its current needs, and the Agency should
continue to dispose of under-utilized assets and facilities.
NASA test facilities create large fixed costs. Some of these
facilities are not unique, and long-term fixed costs could be reduced
through consolidation and deactivation. This should be an ongoing
effort as the needs of the industry change and as validated
computational tools reduce or eliminate the need for some experimental
facilities.
Top-Level Recommendation 9. NASA should implement full-cost accounting
in a way that avoids unintended consequences harmful to the long-term
health of the aeronautics program.
NASA is in the process of transitioning from a net accounting
system to one that uses full-cost accounting. Under the former scheme,
researchers managed only costs directly related to research and
development. In full-cost accounting, all project costs are included in
the project budget, including institutional infrastructure costs such
as: research operations support; direct procurement; direct civil
service workforce, benefits, and travel; service pools; center general
and administrative; and corporate general and administrative. The
committee is concerned that, if not carefully managed, full-cost
accounting could result in (1) the closure of critical infrastructure
and special-purpose facilities that will be needed for future program
execution and (2) a disincentive to use large-scale facilities and
flight tests to fully demonstrate technology readiness. This can easily
occur if the responsibility for preserving institutional capabilities
is delegated to lower level project managers. These project managers
will also tend to avoid full-scale flight tests or wind tunnel tests in
order to conserve their project budgets, since under full-cost
accounting much of the cost of the testing infrastructure will be
billed directly to their projects if they perform such tests. The
testing infrastructure will be underutilized and will not generate the
resources needed to sustain it. The committee recommends that basic
research costs should be carried as a line item and not hidden in
larger projects and. that large infrastructure costs, such as wind
tunnels and full-scale flight testing, should be attributed to the
total program and accounted for accordingly.
Top-Level Recommendation 10. NASA should develop a common understanding
with the FAA of their respective roles and relationship.
NASA's airspace research ultimately benefits manly government,
industry and private organizations with an interest in aviation,
including the Department of Defense (DOD), airlines, manufacturers,
system operators (air traffic controllers, managers, flight dispatchers
and pilots), and the flying public. Practically speaking, however, the
most important customers are the senior managers at the FAA, at other
government agencies, and in industry who decide whether they will take
applied research products from NASA and continue their development to
the point of incorporating them in operational systems. Although much
of NASA's airspace research is applicable to systems acquired and
operated by DOD, other government agencies, and industry, most of it is
intended for application to civil aviation systems acquired, operated
and/or certified by the FAA. In this sense, customers also include the
many other organizations and officials who influence decisions by the
government and industry regarding the advanced development of new
systems for civil application.
NASA and the FAA often collaborate at the technical level but there
is a real need for more effective management coordination. The need for
continued improvement in NASA interactions with its customers is
indicated, in part, by the committee's observation that NASA officials
seem to perceive interactions with the FAA as more effective than do
many FAA managers. NASA officials need to recognize that implementation
decisions rest with FAA management (for systems to be implemented by
the FAA) and advocacy by NASA, when it runs counter to FAA
implementation plans, is not helpful. Problems in this area are
exacerbated by (1) the view of many NASA personnel that the success of
their research is measured only in terms of the extent to which
customers incorporate NASA research in operational systems, and (2)
competition that may arise between NASA and other organizations that
conduct research on behalf of the FAA or other key customers. As as
particular NASA research effort approaches the point where the value of
continued development is contingent on operational implementation, the
prospective user may decide that implementation is not feasible., NASA
should be willing to close out the project that has no future and use
the resources to support other research.
Top-Level Recommendation 11. NASA should seek better feedback from
senior management in industry and other government organizations.
NASA's customers include aircraft manufacturers, operators,
airlines and the FAA. NASA already involves customers in almost all of
its research--for example, in the form of joint efforts with the FAA to
take research products into the field for testing. Some projects, such
as Small Aircraft Transportation Systems (SATS), also sponsor wide-
ranging outreach efforts. Usually, however, customer involvement
earlier in the process would be beneficial. Early involvement would (1)
ensure that researchers understand and are able to respond to user
requirements and concerns as early as possible, and (2) probably
increase customer buy-in. Customers need not and should not be given
veto authority over NASA research, but researchers should be aware of--
and research plans should account for--objections or concerns that
customers raise. This is especially important for research intended to
provide operationally useful products capable of meeting specific
functional requirements, but early consultations with user would also
be beneficial in a base research program. NASA should improve its
relationships with the FAA and other customers by involving them from
the early stages of the research and development process through field
implementation. One method for improving interaction would be for NASA
to convene a yearly meeting, co-chaired by the FAA and NASA
Administrators, with participation by industry executives at the chief
operating officer level and senior managers from other federal agencies
(e.g., Department of Transportation, Department of Homeland Security,
and DOD). Topics should be limited to near-term issues and
implementation plans, and such a meeting should not be held unless the
NASA and FAA Administrators and industry chief operating officers will
commit to personally attending.
Top-Level Recommendation 12. NASA should conduct research in selective
areas relevant to rotorcraft.
Rotorcraft are an important constituent of air transportation. Many
of the research projects currently under way in the Aeronautics
Technology Programs, such as synthetic vision and human factors, would
be directly relevant to rotorcraft, with only minimal additional
investment. NASA could make a significant impact in under-researched
areas of rotorcraft such as decision aids, synthetic vision, pilot
workload, and situational awareness. Further, the existing U.S. Army
programs in rotorcraft technologies and industry research and
development in rotorcraft could be leveraged by NASA to meet civilian
needs in the area. The committee believes that research in civil
applications of rotorcraft will not be conducted elsewhere in
government or industry and that NASA's decision to discontinue
rotorcraft research has left critical civilian needs unaddressed.
Therefore, NASA should consider potential applications to rotorcraft in
its research programs in general aviation and transport aircraft.
SUMMARY
The first two top-level recommendations reiterate the importance of
air transportation and of NASA's role in the research and development
process. Top-level recommendations 3-7 suggest ways the content and/or
structure of the programs could be improved, and 8 and 9 identify near-
term important concerns that should be addressed. The final three top-
level recommendations address the relationships between NASA and its
customers. The committee believes that NASA can improve and strengthen
its Aeronautics Technology Programs by following this advice.
SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT OF THE VEHICLE SYSTEMS PROGRAM
The Vehicle Systems Program contains seven projects:
Breakthrough Vehicle Technologies. Develops high-
risk, high-payoff technologies to dramatically and
substantially improve vehicle efficiency and emissions.
Quiet Aircraft Technology. Discovers, develops, and
verifies, in the laboratory, technologies that improve quality
of life by reducing society's exposure to aircraft noise.
Twenty-First Century Aircraft Technology Project.
Develops and validates, through ground-based experiments, the
aerodynamic, structural, and electric power technologies that
will reduce by 20 percent the fuel burn and carbon dioxide
emissions from future subsonic transport aircraft.
Advanced Vehicle Concepts. Develops advanced vehicle
concepts and configurations to reduce travel time, expand
commerce, and open new markets.
Flight Research. Tests and validates technologies and
tools developed by NASA in a realistic flight environment.
Ultra-Efficient Engine Technology. Identifies,
develops, and validates high-payoff turbine engine technologies
that would reduce emissions.
Propulsion and Power. Researches revolutionary
turbine engine technologies, propulsion concepts, and
fundamental propulsion and power technologies that would
decrease emissions and increase mobility.
The committee noted that VSP has a clear mission statement with a
set of fully linked goals and products, but it believes that NASA needs
a better understanding of the core competencies required to meet these
goals. The committee also believes that the current investment strategy
of VSP appears to be ad hoc, with too many unprioritized projects and
tasks and no apparent methodology to determine which areas will provide
the greatest benefit. The committee recommends that NASA identify and
prioritize technologies with respect to their potential benefit to
aviation.
The committee was concerned that the recent transition to full-cost
accounting will have an unintended effect on certain facilities and
infrastructure that are national assets and will compromise the
research program by reducing the number of full-scale tests for concept
validation.
The committee was concerned that NASA does not always get the
benefit of industry involvement at the appropriate management level and
suggests that NASA re-examine the composition of its advisory groups.
The committee evaluated a total of 172 tasks in the VSP portfolio.
The committee determined that more than 80 percent were of good quality
or better, with 30 percent (51 tasks) rated as world-class. The
committee identified 91 tasks that were good quality, 6 that were
marginal, and 24 that were poor and should be redirected.
SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT OF THE AIRSPACE SYSTEMS PROGRAM
The ASP is organized into four projects:
Advanced Air Transportation Technologies. Develops
air traffic management tools to improve the capacity of
transport aircraft operations at and between major airports.
Virtual Airspace Modeling and Simulation. Develops
models and simulations to conduct trade-off analyses of
concepts and technologies for future air transportation
systems.
Small Air Transportation Systems. Develops and
demonstrates technologies to improve public mobility through
increased use of local and regional airports.
Airspace Operations Systems. Develops better
understanding, models, and tools to enhance the efficient and
safe operation of aviation systems by human operators.
The committee was concerned that NASA's ASP research was generally
too focused on short-term, incremental payoff work. NASA should plan
ASP research based on a top-down understanding of the air
transportation system. Research should focus on areas of greatest
payoff--that is, areas that relieve choke points and other constraints
to a more efficient air transportation system.
The committee noted that many existing airspace research tasks will
not be completed before the expiration of the projects under which they
are currently funded. NASA is establishing a new project, NASA
Exploratory Technologies for the National Airspace System (NAS)--
NExTNAS--to continue some ongoing research tasks and start some new
tasks. The committee recommends that NASA incorporate many ongoing
tasks in the NExTNAS project so they can be completed.
The committee determined that the ASP also should support basic
research relevant to long-term objectives and other research with a
far-sighted vision. More specifically, the committee observed that the
portfolio was primarily directed at improving ground-based air traffic
management. The committee recommends that NASA continue distributed
air-ground research for autonomous separation, with increased effort on
the airborne side.
The committee developed a series of findings and recommendations
regarding the FAA-NASA relationship. First, the committee noted that
two different tools, Research Management Plans and Research Transition
Plans, were being used to facilitate the transition of technology from
NASA to the FAA.\1\ The committee believes that there are worthwhile
elements in the Research Transition Plans that could be included in
Research Management Plans. In addition, NASA and FAA program directors
should vigorously adhere to the Research Management Plan process, with
reviews and updates at regular intervals. If either agency determines
that the research results will not be implemented, the Research
Management Plan should be canceled and NASA should formally reassess
the merits of continuing to develop a product that will not improve the
operation of the NAS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The FAA's Free Flight Phase II Office uses Research Transition
Plans, which are similar to the Research Management Plans used by other
FAA offices.
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The committee also had recommendations about how NASA should
measure the success of its research. Currently, it tends to view
success in terms of the ability to mature technology and get the FAA to
implement it for operational use. Some FAA users, however, believe this
view of success leads NASA to focus too much on implementation issues,
which NASA may not be qualified to address given its limited
operational experience. The committee recommends that NASA and the FAA
develop a common definition of what constitutes the successful
completion of an applied ASP research task. Success of NASA applied
research tasks should not be defined solely in terms of implementation.
SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT OF THE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM
The AvSP consists of three projects:
Vehicle Safety Technology. Strengthens aircraft to
mitigate vehicle system and component failures, loss of
control, loss of situational awareness, and post-crash or in-
flight fires.
Weather Safety Technology. Researches and develops
technologies to reduce the frequency and severity of weather-
related accidents and injuries.
System Safety Technology. Reduces the frequency and
severity of aviation accidents and incidents by proactively
managing risk in a systemwide approach.
The committee found several examples of work of outstanding quality
in AvSP, notably the Aircraft Icing subproject (Weather Safety), the
Crew Training task (System Safety), the Structures Health Management
subtask (Vehicle Safety), the Mode Confusion subtask (Vehicle Safety),
and scale-model development and testing work (Vehicle Safety).
The committee was concerned about recent changes it observed in the
quality of the human factors research in AvSP, partly because the
number of in-house human factors personnel was decreasing and those who
remained were primarily managing the work of contractors. In addition,
the committee noted that human factors work did not appear to be well-
integrated across the program. The committee recommends that AvSP
strengthen in-house human factors research with federal employees who
have outstanding human factors expertise. In addition, NASA should
consider human factors requirements early in the design phase of all
aeronautics technology research projects.
The committee believes AvSP health would be improved if five-year
lifetimes were not imposed on every project. Instead, a project should
endure for the natural lifetime of the research activity, which would
allow basic research efforts to extend beyond five years. In addition,
the committee found the AvSP research portfolio to be too product-
oriented and recommended that it include more basic research.
The committee also found that NASA's existing management structure
obscures the lines of responsibility and accountability within the
program, to the point that it is difficult to trace project,
subproject, and task goals to the vision and goals of the program as a
whole. The committee recommends that AvSP develop a hierarchy of goals
and improve its management processes to create clearer accountability.
The committee believes that several products under development in
AvSP duplicate similar products being developed in industry. The
committee recommends that AvSP improve its user connections and
benchmark its products against similar work performed elsewhere. NASA
should not be working in a specific technical area unless it is leading
the field. An outside advisory committee structure of some sort could
assist AvSP in determining which technical areas it should address.
Finally, the committee noted a large gap in the program portfolio
in the area of rotorcraft. NASA could significantly contribute to
improving rotorcraft safety without substantial additional investment,
particularly in the areas of decision aids, synthetic vision, pilot
training, workload reduction, and situational awareness.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy to take
any questions the Committee might have.
COMMITTEE FOR THE REVIEW OF NASA'S
AERONAUTICS TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
JOHN KLINEBERG, Chair, Space Systems/Loral (retired), Redwood City,
California
RICHARD ABBOTT, Lockheed Martin, Palmdale, California
WALTER COLEMAN, Regional Airline Association (retired), McLean,
Virginia
ROBERT HILB, United Parcel Service, Louisville, Kentucky
S. MICHAEL HUDSON, Rolls-Royce North America (retired), Indianapolis
RAYMOND LaFREY, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, Massachusetts
LOURDES MAURICE, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C.
THEODORE OKIISHI, Iowa State University, Ames
TOD PALM, Northrop Grumman, El Segundo, California
EDUARDO SALAS, University of Central Florida, Orlando
THOMAS SHERIDAN (NAE), Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(emeritus), Cambridge
EDMOND SOLIDAY, United Airlines (retired), Valparaiso, Indiana
ALFRED STRIZ, University of Oklahoma, Norman (from 01/03/2003 to 09/09/
2003)
FRANK TUNG, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (retired),
Boston
THOMAS WILLIAMS, Northrop Grumman, Bethpage, New York
DEBRA WINCHESTER, Raytheon, Marlborough, Massachusetts
PANEL ON THE VEHICLE SYSTEMS PROGRAM (VSP)
THOMAS WILLIAMS, Panel Chair, Northrop Grumman, Bethpage, New York
MARK BALAS, University of Colorado, Boulder
ROBERT GOETZ, Lockheed Martin (retired), Friendswood, Texas
S. MICHAEL HUDSON, Rolls-Royce North America (retired), Indianapolis
STEVEN IDEN, Lockheed Martin, Fort Worth, Texas
SHEILA KIA, General Motors, Warren, Michigan
GARY KOOPMANN, Pennsylvania State University, University Park
HARRY LIPSITT, Wright State University (emeritus), Yellow Springs, Ohio
LOURDES MAURICE, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C.
DUANE McRUER (NAE), Systems Technology, Inc., Manhattan Beach,
California
THEODORE OKIISHI, Iowa State University, Ames
TOD PALM, Northrop Grumman, El Segundo, California
ALFRED STRIZ, University of Oklahoma, Norman (from 01/01/2003 to 09/09/
2003)
MAHLON WILSON, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico
J. MITCHELL WOLFF, Wright State University, Dayton
MICHAEL ZYDA, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California
PANEL ON THE AIRSPACE SYSTEMS PROGRAM (ASP)
FRANK TUNG, Panel Chair, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center
(retired), Boston
CHARLES AALFS, Federal Aviation Administration (retired), Menifee,
California
YAAKOV BAR-SHALOM, University of Connecticut, Storrs
BARRY BERSON, Lockheed Martin, Palmdale, California
WALTER COLEMAN, Regional Airline Association (retired), McLean,
Virginia
WILLIAM DUNLAY, Leigh Fisher Associates, Tiburon, California
ANGELA GITTENS, Miami-Dade International Airport, Miami, Florida
ROBERT HILB, United Parcel Service, Louisville, Kentucky
R. BOWEN LOFTIN, Old Dominion University, Suffolk, Virginia
J. DAVID POWELL, Stanford University (emeritus), Stanford, California
EDUARDO SALAS, University of Central Florida, Orlando
DEBRA WINCHESTER, Raytheon, Marlborough, Massachusetts
PANEL ON THE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM (AvSP)
THOMAS SHERIDAN (NAE), Panel Chair, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (emeritus), Cambridge
RICHARD ABBOTT, Lockheed Martin, Palmdale, California
JAMES DANAHER, National Transportation Safety Board (retired),
Alexandria, Virginia
VALERIE GAWRON, Veridian Engineering, Buffalo
RONALD HESS, University of California, Davis
ADIB KANAFANI (NAE), University of California, Berkeley
DAVID KOHLMAN, Engineering Systems, Inc., Colorado Springs
RAYMOND LaFREY, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, Massachusetts
JOHN McCARTHY, Naval Research Laboratory (retired), Palm Desert,
California
EDMOND SOLIDAY, United Airlines (retired), Valparaiso, Indiana
Biography for John M. Klineberg
Dr. Klineberg recently retired as President of Space Systems/Loral,
a major provider of commercial communications satellite systems and
services, and Vice President of Loral Space & Communications, of which
SS/L is a wholly owned subsidiary. He continues his association with
the company as a member of SS/L's Board of Directors. Before becoming
the President of SS/L in 1999, Dr. Klineberg was Executive Vice
President for Globalstar programs, where he led the successful
development, production and deployment in orbit of the Globalstar
satellite constellation for providing a new generation of telephone
services. Before joining Loral in 1995, Dr. Klineberg spent 25 years
with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in a
variety of management and technical positions. He was the Director of
the Goddard Space Flight Center; Director of the Lewis (now Glenn)
Research Center; Deputy Director of the Lewis Research Center; Deputy
Associate Administrator for Aeronautics and Space Technology at NASA
Headquarters, and a research scientist at the Ames Research Center.
Before beginning his career at NASA, he conducted fundamental studies
in fluid dynamics at the California Institute of Technology and worked
at the Douglas Aircraft Company and the Grumman Aircraft Company. Dr.
Klineberg has received many awards for his outstanding service to NASA
and his significant contributions to the fields of aeronautics and
space systems, including: the NASA Distinguished Service Medal; the
NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal; the NASA Goddard Award of Merit; the
U.S. Government's ranks of Distinguished Executive and Meritorious
Executive; the AIAA Barry M. Goldwater Education Award; and the
Engineer of the Year Award from the University of Maryland. Among his
other activities, he is a member of the Board of Directors of The
Charles Stark Draper Laboratory Inc, Cambridge, MA; a member of the
Board of Directors of Swales Aerospace, Beltsville, MD; a member of the
National Research Council's Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board; an
honorary Board member of the National Space Club; a member of the
International Astronautical Federation; a fellow of the American
Astronautical Society; and a fellow of the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA). He earned his Bachelor's degree in
engineering from Princeton University and his Master's and doctoral
degrees from the California Institute of Technology.
Chairman Calvert. Thank you. Dr. Anton, you are recognized
for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF DR. PHILIP S. ANTON, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, RAND
Dr. Anton. Chairman Calvert, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on
the roles and issues of NASA's wind tunnel and propulsion test
facilities for American aeronautics. It is an honor and a
pleasure to be here.
My comments today are informed by a recent RAND Corporation
assessment of America's needs for wind tunnel and propulsion
test facilities, and NASA's capabilities to serve those needs.
What would be the consequence to American aviation of NASA
closing one or more wind tunnels? When NASA closes one or more
strategically important wind tunnel propulsion test facilities,
it eats away at our aeronautics future. Aeronautics maturity
does not nullify the need for test facilities, but in fact,
relies on the availability and effective use of test facilities
to provide important capabilities.
Are there particular wind tunnels that would be especially
detrimental to close? It would be detrimental to close any 29
of 31 NASA test facilities that serve national needs. Nine
facilities would be especially detrimental to close. In an
attempt to identify which facilities would be especially
detrimental to close, I utilized the data from the RAND study
using the following criteria. The facilities most detrimental
to close are those that serve national needs that can not be
met by any other U.S. facility, regardless of cost, moderate
improvements, or access concerns. It is important to note the
following. If the facilities that did not make this list are
closed, then the testing costs to go to other U.S. facilities
may be much higher, and relying on them may, in the long run,
cost this country more money. Higher testing costs at
alternative U.S. facilities may drive users to cheaper foreign
facilities. The facilities most detrimental to close would
affect any national strategic need from all sectors, NASA
research, civil aviation, military, and space, not just NASA
research needs.
There are nine such facilities meeting these criteria that
would be especially detrimental to close. The Ames 12-Foot
High-Reynolds number pressure wind tunnel, the Ames National
Full-Scale Aerodynamics Complex, the Glenn Icing Research
Tunnel, the Langley National Transonic Facility, the Langley
Transonic Dynamics Tunnel, the Langley 8-Foot Hypersonic High-
Temperature Tunnel, The Langley 20-Inch Mach 6
Tetrafluoromethane and Mach 6 Air, and finally, the Glenn
Hypersonic Tunnel Facility.
Are there ways NASA could seek outside funding for its wind
tunnels? There are outside funding options for NASA, but their
viability is unclear. Possibilities include retainer or
consortia fee from outside users from industry, or opening
NASA's facilities to international users.
NASA could also explore shared funding mechanisms with the
DOD, but that would not reduce the burden on the federal
budget, and begs the question of who in the Federal Government
is responsible for looking out for the long-term strategic
aeronautic needs of the Nation.
Are there ways NASA could change its accounting practices
regarding its wind tunnels? Elimination of full-cost recovery
for test facilities and identifying shared financial support
are recommended options. The full-cost recovery currently
imposed by NASA on centers discourages use and endangers
strategic facilities by causing wide, unpredictable price
fluctuations. Shared support would be relatively small. Even
the total operating costs of about $130 million per year for
these important facilities make up less than one percent of
NASA's overall budget, and are infinitesimal related to the
$32-58 billion the Nation invests annually in aerospace RDT&E.
RAND did identify a few accounting options. NASA Langley
and Glenn tax the research resident programs to supplement user
fees and ensure that test facilities are kept open. In
addition, NASA headquarters could consider creating a line item
in the budget to provide financial shared support for strategic
facilities. The DOD's Major Range and Test Facility Base model,
with direct financial support, is a mature model, and has
served the DOD well.
What are the disadvantages of relying on foreign tunnels,
and how serious are they? Relying on foreign facilities incurs
serious security risks, and unclear access and availability
risks. An assessment performed by the DOD Counterintelligence
Field Activity on foreign test facilities indicated that there
are real security risks to testing in foreign facilities.
In conclusion, the most critical issues are to develop an
aeronautic test technology vision and plan, identify shared
financial support, and stop applying full-cost recovery to wind
tunnels. A national aeronautics policy would greatly inform and
guide an aeronautics test technology plan.
While generally not redundant within NASA, a few of NASA
facilities are redundant with those facilities maintained by
the DOD, and others are redundant with commercial facilities.
NASA should work with the DOD to analyze the viability of a
national reliance plan. Unless NASA, in collaboration with the
DOD, addresses specific deficiencies, investment needs,
budgetary difficulties, and collaborative possibilities, the
Nation risks losing the competitive aeronautics advantage it
has enjoyed for decades.
Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to the debate
regarding this important issue area in aeronautics. I am happy
to answer any questions from the Committee, and I would like to
request that my full testimony be entered into the record.
Chairman Calvert. Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Anton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Philip S. Anton
Chairman Calvert, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank
you for inviting me to testify today on the roles and issues of NASA's
wind tunnel and propulsion test facilities for American aeronautics. It
is an honor and pleasure to be here.
INTRODUCTION
My comments\1\ today are informed by a recent RAND Corporation
assessment of America's needs for wind tunnel and propulsion test (WT/
PT) facilities,\2\ and NASA's capabilities to serve those needs. We
focused on the needs for, and capabilities of, the large (and, thus,
more expensive to build and operate) test facilities in six types of
WT/PT facilities--subsonic, transonic, supersonic, hypersonic,
hypersonic propulsion integration, and direct-connect propulsion--as
well as any management issues they face. RAND conducted this research
from June 2002 through July 2003, followed by refinement of our
findings, peer review, and the generation of study reports. The results
of the RAND study were published in 2004.\3\ The study methodology
involved a systematic review and analysis of national research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and sustainment needs,
utilization trends (historical and projected), test facility
capabilities, and management issues.
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, State, or local
legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
\2\ Throughout this testimony, I use the term ``WT/PT facilities''
to mean wind tunnel facilities and propulsion test facilities. Since
individual facilities within this designation can be either wind tunnel
facilities, propulsion test facilities, or both, ``WT/PT facilities''
serves as a generic term to encompass them all. That being said, when a
specific facility is talked about, for clarity, I refer to it using its
owner/operator, size, and type. As well, the term ``test facilities''
and ``facilities'' can be substituted to mean ``WT/PT facilities.'' Of
course, NASA owns and operates other types of test facilities, but my
conclusions and recommendations do not apply to them unless explicitly
stated doing so.
\3\ See Anton, Philip S., Richard Mesic, Eugene C. Gritton, and
Paul Steinberg, with Dana J. Johnson, Michael Block, Michael Brown,
Jeffrey Drezner, James Dryden, Tom Hamilton, Thor Hogan, Deborah Peetz,
Raj Raman, Joe Strong, and William Trimble, Wind Tunnel and Propulsion
Test Facilities: An Assessment of NASA's Capabilities to Meet National
Needs, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-178-NASA/OSD, 2004,
available at www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG178/; and Anton, Philip S.,
Dana J. Johnson, Michael Block, Michael Brown, Jeffrey Drezner, James
Dryden, Eugene C. Gritton, Tom Hamilton, Thor Hogan, Richard Mesic,
Deborah Peetz, Raj Raman, Paul Steinberg, Joe Strong, and William
Trimble, Wind Tunnels and Propulsion Test Facilities: Supporting
Analyses to an Assessment of NASA's Capabilities to Serve National
Needs, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TR-134-NASA/OSD, 2004,
available at www.rand.org/publications/TR/TR134/.
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While some things have changed since our study concluded
(particularly declines of NASA's research programs and aeronautics
budget and closure of three facilities), our technical assessments and
much of our strategic assessments remain valid.
In addition to leading this study, I have also remained active in
supporting government assessments of issues and options related to WT/
PT facilities. My statements below also reflect analysis and
experiences related to those activities.
Study Activities
To answer these study questions, RAND conducted intensive and
extensive interviews with personnel from NASA headquarters; personnel
from NASA research centers at Ames (Moffett Field, Calif.), Glenn
(Cleveland, Ohio), and Langley (Hampton, Va.), which own and manage
NASA's WT/PT facilities; the staff of the Department of Defense's
(DOD's) WT/PT facilities at the U.S. Air Force's Arnold Engineering and
Development Center (AEDC, at Arnold AFB, Tenn.); selected domestic and
foreign test facility owners and operators; U.S. Government and service
project officers with aeronautic programs; and officials in a number of
leading aerospace companies with commercial, military, and space access
interests and products.
In addition to RAND research staff, the study employed a number of
distinguished senior advisers and consultants to help analyze the data
received and to augment the information based on their own expertise
with aeronautic testing needs and various national and international
facilities.
Finally, the study reviewed and benefited from numerous related
studies conducted over the past several years.
Perspectives on the Study Approach Used by RAND
The analytic method used in the study to define needs did not rely
on an explicit national policy and strategy document for aeronautics in
general or for WT/PT facilities in particular because they do not
exist. Lacking such explicit needs documents, we examined what
categories of aeronautic vehicles the United States is currently
pursuing, plans to pursue, and will likely pursue based on strategic
objectives and current vehicles in use.
Also, as enabling infrastructures, WT/PT facility operations are
not funded directly by specific line items in the NASA budget.\4\ The
study's determination of WT/PT facility needs and the resulting
conclusions and recommendations are therefore not based on the federal
budget process as a direct indicator of policy dictates of facility
need. We determined WT/PT facility need by identifying what testing
capabilities and facilities are required given current engineering
needs, alternative approaches, and engineering cost/benefit trade-offs.
This, of course, can lead to a bias in the findings in that these
assessments may be overly reflective of what the engineering field
determines is important rather than what specific program managers are
willing to spend on testing because of program budget constraints.
Thus, when a needed facility is closed because of a lack of funding,
there is a disconnect between current funding and prudent engineering
need. This indicates that the commercial and federal budget processes
may be out of step with the full cost associated with research and
design of a particular vehicle class, indicating a lack of addressing
long-term costs and benefits.
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\4\ The construction of government WT/PT facilities are, however,
very large expenditures that require explicit congressional funding,
and certain facilities such as the National and Unitary facilities have
associated congressional directives regarding operation and intent.
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Finally, while the study's focus was on national needs and NASA's
WT/PT facility infrastructure, national needs are not dictated or met
solely by NASA's test infrastructure; DOD, U.S. industry, and foreign
facilities also serve many national needs. Our study did look at
technical capabilities of alternate facilities. However, the study was
not chartered or resourced to examine the entire sets of cost and other
data for these alternative facilities to fully understand consolidation
opportunities between NASA and non-NASA WT infrastructures. Based on
our findings, however, such a broader study is important and warranted.
WHAT WOULD BE THE CONSEQUENCE TO AMERICAN AVIATION OF NASA CLOSING ONE
OR MORE WIND TUNNELS?
When NASA closes one or more strategically important wind tunnel and
propulsion test facilities, it eats away at our aeronautic
future.
Closing facilities needed for strategic reasons cuts off the
country's options for research and development of current and future
concepts and vehicles. Even if current budgetary priorities limit on-
going aeronautic research, we should not ``eat our seed corn'' given
that it often takes a decade to build these kinds of major facilities,
more years to fund them; and replacing all these facilities would cost
billions. Does the country want to have a future in advanced
aeronautics, or will it decide to relegate future aeronautic leadership
to foreign countries who are aggressively pursuing our position and its
economic fruits?
To understand why this is so, let me review why this country needs
wind tunnel and propulsion test facilities. In particular, I would
emphasize that this concern applies to strategically important
facilities, not simply all facilities regardless of current need.
Background
Wind tunnel and propulsion test facilities continue to play
important roles in the research and development (R&D) of new or
modified aeronautic systems and in the test and evaluation (T&E) and
sustainment of developmental systems. The Nation has invested about a
billion dollars (an unadjusted total) in NASA's existing large, complex
WT/PT facilities\5\ (some dating from the World War II era), which has
created a testing infrastructure that has helped secure the country's
national security and prosperity through advances in commercial and
military aeronautics and space systems. Replacing these facilities
would cost billions in today's dollars.\6\
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\5\ The Book Value of 26 of the 31 NASA facilities that fell within
the scope of RAND's study amounted to about $0.9 billion dollars based
on data identified in the NASA Real Property Database. The book value
is the simple sum of unadjusted dollars invested in past years in
facility construction or modernization. Because, in many cases, decades
have passed since construction, the book value is significantly lower
than the cost it would take to build these facilities today.
\6\ The current replacement value (CRV) of 26 of the 31 NASA
facilities that fell within the scope of RAND's study totaled about
$2.5 billion dollars based on data identified in the NASA Real Property
Database. The CRV is derived by looking at similar types of buildings
(e.g., usage, size) within the Engineering News Magazine's section on
construction economics. The magazine uses a 20-city average to come up
with rough estimates of how much a building would cost to replace. Most
NASA finance and facilities people believe that this average
underestimates the actual cost of replacing WT/PT facilities, since
they are more complex buildings than the ``similar'' building types
available through engineering economics. Unfortunately, NASA has not
found a better metric to compare buildings across the various field
centers.
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Many of these test facilities were built when the United States was
researching and producing aircraft at a higher rate than it does today
and before advances in modeling and simulation occurred. This situation
raises the question of whether NASA needs all the WT/PT facilities it
has and whether the ones NASA does have serve future needs. In fact,
over the past two decades, NASA has reduced its number of WT/PT
facilities by one-third. More recently, the Agency has closed
additional facilities. In addition, some of the remaining facilities
are experiencing patterns of declining use that suggest they too may
face closure.
Despite Aeronautic Maturity, Test Facilities Are Still Critical
Some argue that the facility testing capabilities that have been
built up over the years are no longer needed. They assert that the
aeronautics industry has matured and that any test capability needs can
be met through computer simulation or other means.
Our research generally confirms industry maturity, but that
maturity relies on the test facility infrastructure. No vehicle classes
have gone away, and for each new design in a class, it will still be
necessary to predict airflow behavior across a range of design
considerations.
Although applied aeronautics encompasses relatively mature science
and engineering disciplines, there is still significant art and
empirical testing involved in predicting and assessing the implications
of the interactions between aeronautic vehicles and the environments
through which they fly. Designers are often surprised by what they find
in testing their concepts despite decades of design experience and
dramatic advances in computer modeling and simulation known as
computational fluid dynamics (CFD). This is, of course, especially true
for complex new concepts that are not extensions of established systems
with which engineers have extensive practical design and flight
experience. But even improving the performance at the margin of well-
established and refined designs--for example, commercial jet liners in
areas such as reduced drag, fuel efficiency, emissions, noise, and
safety (e.g., in adverse weather)--depends on appropriate and
sufficient WT/PT facility testing.
Insufficient testing or testing in inappropriate facilities can
lead to erroneous estimations of performance. Missed performance
guarantees can impose extremely costly penalties or redesign efforts on
airframe manufacturers, overly conservative designs from low
estimations prevent trade-offs such as range for payload, and even a
seemingly small one-percent reduction in drag equates to several
million dollars in savings per year for a typical aircraft fleet
operator.
For engineers to predict with sufficient accuracy the performance
of their vehicles during design and retrofit, they need a range of
capabilities during testing, including high Reynolds number (Rn),\7\
flow quality, size, speed, and propulsion simulation and integration.
These capabilities cannot be met by a single test facility but rather
require a suite of facilities.
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\7\ The Reynolds number is a nondimensional parameter describing
the ratio of momentum forces to viscous forces in a fluid. The Mach
number is a more familiar nondimensional parameter, describing the
ratio of velocity to the sound speed in the fluid. When the flows
around similarly shaped objects share the same nondimensional Rn and
Mach parameters, the topology of the flow for each will be identical
(e.g., laminar and turbulent flow distribution, location of separation
points, wake structure), and the same aerodynamic coefficients will
apply. Airflow behavior changes nonlinearly and unpredictably with
changes in Rn. Thus, it is important to test the flow conditions at
flight (or near-flight) Rn to ensure that the flows behave as expected
and that conditions such as undesired turbulence, separations, and
buffeting do not occur.
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While CFD has made inroads in reducing some empirical test
requirements capabilities, this technology will not replace the need
for test facilities for the foreseeable future. Flight testing
complements but does not replace WT/PT facilities because of its high
costs and instrumentation limitations. The aeronautic engineering
community does not have well-accepted handbooks of facility testing
``best practices'' or even rules of thumb from which to deduce testing
requirements, nor is it possible from historical data to accurately
predict returns on specific facility testing in terms of programmatic
cost savings or risk reduction.
Thus, aeronautic maturity does not nullify the need for test
facilities but in fact relies on the availability and effective use of
test facilities to provide important capabilities. The Nation continues
to need general-purpose WT/PT facilities across all speed regimes, as
well as for specialty tests facilities. These facilities advance
aerospace research, facilitate vehicle design and development, and
reduce design and performance risks in aeronautic vehicles.
ARE THERE PARTICULAR WIND TUNNELS THAT IT WOULD BE ESPECIALLY
DETRIMENTAL TO CLOSE?
It would be detrimental to close any 29 of the 31 NASA test facilities
that serve national needs. Nine facilities--for which no
alternatives exist within the U.S. regardless of cost--would be
especially detrimental to close.
Identifying Facilities Detrimental to Close: A ``Minimum Set''
RAND used four factors to assess which NASA facilities constitute
the minimum set of strategically important facilities: alignment with
national needs, technical competitiveness, redundancy, and usage.
First, facilities in the minimum set must serve national needs.
Thus, facilities that no longer meet national needs are discarded from
consideration out of hand.
Next, the primary NASA facilities that serve national needs are
included in the set. These are the primary facilities that NASA has to
serve each national need. Until the need disappears or analysis can
determine that it is better served outside NASA (see the discussion on
collaboration and reliance below), the Agency should include it in the
minimum set.
Finally, facilities that are redundant to the primary facilities
may or may not be included in the set depending on their technical
competitiveness and utilization.
Nearly All of NASA Facilities Serve Strategic National Needs
We examined how well NASA's portfolio of 31 test facilities aligns
against national strategic needs in each of six categories--subsonic,
transonic, supersonic, hypersonic, hypersonic propulsion integration,
and direct--connect propulsion. Nearly all existing NASA facilities
serve at least one strategic need category important to the Nation's
continuing ability to design aeronautic vehicles. We found very little
overlap and very few gaps in coverage.
NASA's WT/PT facilities have been generally consistent with the
testing needs of NASA's research programs, as well as with those of the
broader national research and development programs. Currently,
redundancy is minimal across NASA. Facility closures in the past decade
have eliminated almost a third of the Agency's test facilities in the
categories under review in this study. In nearly all test categories,
NASA has a single facility that serves the general- or special-purpose
testing needs, although some primary facilities also provide secondary
capabilities in other test categories. We found two noncritical WTs:
(1) the Langley 12-Foot Subsonic Atmospheric WT Lab, which is redundant
to the Langley 14x22-Foot Subsonic Atmospheric WT, and (2) the Langley
16-Foot Transonic Atmospheric WT, which is generally redundant to the
Ames 11-Foot Transonic High-Rn and Langley National Transonic Facility
WTs run in low-Rn conditions.
There are gaps in NASA's ability to serve all national needs. In
most of these cases, though, DOD or commercial facilities step in to
serve the gaps.
Finally, some of NASA's facilities that serve national needs have
been mothballed or closed. While mothballing an important facility is
preferred to abandonment, mothballing involves the loss of workforce
expertise required to safely and effectively operate the facility.
Thus, mothballing is not an effective solution for dealing with long
periods of low utilization, and it puts capabilities at risk.
29 of 31 Facilities Should Be in NASA's ``Minimum Set''
Based on RAND's assessment of national needs, survey data of test
users' strategic needs to produce the kinds of vehicles they research
or develop, technical capabilities within NASA, and usage data, RAND's
study concluded that 29 of the 31 existing major NASA test facilities
constitute the ``minimum set'' of facilities important to retain and
manage to serve national needs. Thus, the test complex within NASA is
both responsive to serving national needs and mostly ``right sized'' to
the range of national aeronautic engineering needs. Closing any of the
29 would be detrimental.
It is important to bear in mind that, while not the case within
NASA, a few of NASA's facilities are redundant when considering the
technical capabilities of the larger set of facilities maintained by
commercial entities and by the DOD's AEDC. All such NASA facilities had
strategic advocacy resulting from unique features such as cost
effectiveness (e.g., due to their smaller size), technical
capabilities, and proximity to researchers. Whether these redundancies
amount to the ``unnecessary duplication'' of facilities prohibited by
the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 was beyond the scope of
RAND's study. Further analysis of technical, cost, and availability
issues is required to determine whether WT/PT facility consolidation
and right-sizing across NASA and AEDC to establish a national reliance
test facility plan would provide a net savings to the government and
result in a smaller minimum set of WT/PT facilities at NASA.
Congress has expressed interest in collaboration between NASA and
the DOD.\8\ NASA and the DOD (through the National Aeronautics Test
Alliance--NATA) have made some progress in their partnership,\9\ but
NASA's recent unilateral decision to close two facilities at Ames
without high-level DOD review shows that progress has been spotty. Some
in industry have expressed an interest in exploring collaborative
arrangements with NASA and hope that RAND's study will reveal to others
in industry the risks to NASA's facilities and the need for industry to
coordinate its consolidations with those of NASA and the DOD. Our study
provides insights into the problem but offers only glimpses into the
wider possibilities and issues surrounding broader collaboration.
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\8\ See, for example, the GAO report on NASA and DOD cooperation
entitled Aerospace Testing: Promise of Closer NASA/DOD Cooperation
Remains Largely Unfulfilled, 1998.
\9\ For example, NATA has produced a number of joint NASA and DOD
consolidation studies.
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Which Are Especially Detrimental to Close?
In an attempt to identify which of those 29 facilities would be
especially detrimental to close, I utilized the data from the RAND
study using the following criteria:
The facilities most detrimental to close are those that serve
national needs that cannot be met by any other U.S. facility
regardless of cost, moderate improvements, or access concerns.
In using these criteria to form a list of those facilities
especially detrimental to close, it is important to note the following:
1. If the facilities that did not make this list are closed,
then the testing costs to go to other U.S. facilities may be
much higher, and relying on them may, in the long run, cost
this country more money, especially in future research programs
that would probably have to spend more on testing in
alternative facilities than they would otherwise. In many
cases, alternative facilities are more sophisticated and have
more capabilities than needed (e.g., they are larger or have
additional technical features that cost more). An analogy would
be to eliminate the ability of a consumer to use a compact
pickup truck, leaving them the only alternative of driving a
semi truck to work despite the fact that the added capabilities
of the semi were not needed in all cases.
2. Higher testing costs at alternative U.S. facilities may
drive users to cheaper foreign facilities, reducing the amount
of domestic facility business and incurring risks discussed
later related to foreign facility testing.
3. Each test facility is unique in some way, so this list does
not consider all technical differences.
4. The facilities most detrimental to close would affect any
strategic national need from all sectors--NASA research, civil
aviation, military, and space--not just NASA research needs.
Therefore, this list in some way assumes that NASA, as a
``National'' agency, still has a role in supporting not just
NASA's own research needs but the Nation's aeronautic needs.
With a lack of a recent national aeronautics policy, it is
difficult to see if there has been an objective, long-term
policy shift away from NASA having a role as a national steward
of government infrastructure, or whether there has been just a
short-term budgetary prioritization forcing NASA to focus on
infrastructure needed for its own current research.
There are nine facilities meeting these criteria based on the data
available from the RAND study that would be especially detrimental to
close:
Subsonic
-- Ames 12-Foot High-Reynolds number pressure wind
tunnel, needed, for example, for high-lift vehicle
research and development such as super-short take-off
and landing commercial and military passenger, cargo,
and tanker transports,\10\
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\10\ This facility is currently closed but is the only U.S.
capability in this category and has been historically important for
civil, space, and military vehicle RDT&E. Currently, however, the
facility has some undesirable features and limitations that render it
unacceptable for both commercial transport and tactical aircraft
development when compared with the two superior facilities in Europe:
the QinetiQ 5-Metre in the United Kingdom and the ONERA F1 in France.
Users are currently using facilities in Europe, particularly the
QinetiQ 5-Metre.
-- Ames National Full-Scale Aerodynamics Complex
(NFAC), needed, for example, for rotorcraft and noise
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reduction research and development, and
-- Glenn Icing Research Tunnel, needed for icing
research and certification testing, for example, to
prevent accidents from flying in icing conditions.
Transonic
-- Langley National Transonic Facility (NTF), needed,
for example, to validate computational models and test
data from lower Reynolds number facilities for
transports and high-dynamic fighters,
-- Langley Transonic Dynamics Tunnel (TDT), needed,
for example, to test for noise problems and dynamic
effects such as the tail buffeting problem not
discovered by the F/A-18A program until flight testing.
Hypersonic (needed to pursue future concepts of
hypersonic transport or space access vehicles and missiles)\11\
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\11\ Note that users in our surveys rated nearly all of NASA's
hypersonic facilities as essential for continued progress. Thus, it is
particularly difficult to identify those that are especially
detrimental to lose given that each facility offers important
capabilities. Because hypersonics is still relatively immature, those
differences are important in resolving the wide variety of challenges
facing the research, development, and production communities.
Nevertheless, the Langley 8-Foot HTT is definitely the most advocated
facility, and the two Langley Mach 6 tunnels and the Glenn HTF offer
significant capabilities not available elsewhere in the U.S.
-- Langley 8-Foot High-Temperature Tunnel (HTT),
needed for a broad range of moderately high Mach
numbers, is the most important hypersonic facility in
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this list,
-- Langley 20-Inch Mach 6 Tetraflouromethane (M6 CF4)
and the companion Langley 20-Inch Mach 6 Air, needed,
for example, to understand real-gas effects,
-- Glenn Hypersonic Tunnel Facility (HTF), needed, for
example, to understand whether combustion byproducts in
other facilities is preventing advances in air-
breathing Ramjet and Scramjet that don't require
carrying oxygen for combustion.
Note that most of these facilities could not be operated as a
commercial venture without shared financial support (as evidence by
their low current utilization and financial difficulties). Nearly all
would be too expensive for industry to build on their own. Thus,
emphasizing the significance of losing them.
ARE THERE WAYS NASA COULD SEEK OUTSIDE FUNDING FOR ITS WIND TUNNELS?
There are outside funding options for NASA, but their viability is
unclear.
The RAND study did not explore in depth the question of outside
funding mechanisms, but there are some obvious candidates for
consideration. Possibilities to explore include retainer or consortia
fees from outside users from industry, or opening NASA's facilities to
international users (assuming we want to make our national capabilities
available to potential economic competitors). NASA is already exploring
some of these options with U.S. industry.
NASA could also explore shared funding mechanisms with the DOD, but
that, of course, would not reduce the burden on the federal budget and
begs the question of who in the Federal Government is responsible for
looking out for the long-term strategic aeronautic needs of the Nation.
ARE THERE WAYS NASA COULD CHANGE ITS ACCOUNTING PRACTICES REGARDING ITS
WIND TUNNELS?
Elimination of full-cost recovery for test facilities and identifying
shared financial support are recommended options.
Why Are Financial Accounting and Shared Support So Important?
The current full-cost recovery (FCR) accounting policy imposed by
NASA on the centers discourages use and endanger strategic facilities
by causing wide, unpredictable price fluctuations in a world where
government and commercial testing budgets are under pressure and are
set years in advance. It appears reasonable to ask users to pay for the
costs associated with their tests (i.e., to pay for the short-term
benefits), but forcing them to pay all operating costs (including long-
term priorities such as the costs for facility time they are not using)
through FCR direct test pricing (as is done at Ames) is ill advised.
FCR has especially serious implications for the financial health of
those facilities that are underutilized (about one-third of the
facilities in general, with variation across the test facility category
types). Average-cost-based pricing, decentralized budgeting, poor
strategic coordination between buyers and providers of NASA WT/PT
facility services, and poor balancing of short- and long-term
priorities inside and outside NASA are creating unnecessary financial
problems that leave elements of the U.S. WT/PT facility capacity
underfunded. With declining usage and FCR accounting, these facilities
run the risk of financial collapse. Identifying shared financial
support will keep NASA's minimum set of facilities from financial
collapse given the long-term need for these facilities.
In the extreme case at Ames, the lack of resident aeronautics
research programs, combined with the center management's strategic
focus toward information technology and away from ground test
facilities, has left Ames WT/PT facilities without support beyond user
testing fees. Thus, Ames WT/PT facilities are vulnerable to budgetary
shortfalls given low utilization. Two Ames facilities are unique and
needed in the United States, yet they have already been closed. One
(the Ames NFAC) is in the process of being transferred to DOD
operation, but the other remains abandoned.
Shared support would be relatively small. Even the total operating
costs of about $130 million per year for these important facilities
make up less than one percent of NASA's overall budget and are
infinitesimal relative to the $32-58 billion the Nation invests
annually in aerospace research, development, test, and evaluation
(RDT&E).
If NASA management is not proactive in providing financial support
for such facilities beyond what is likely to be available from FCR
pricing, then the facilities are in danger of financial collapse. In
the near-term, this market-driven result may allow NASA to reallocate
its resources to serve more pressing near-term needs at the expense of
long-term needs for WT/PT facilities. Given the continuing need for the
capabilities offered by these facilities for the RDT&E of aeronautic
and space vehicles related to the general welfare and security of the
United States, the right-sizing NASA has accomplished to date, the
indeterminate costs to decommission or eliminate these facilities, the
significant time and money that would be required to develop new
replacement WT/PT facilities, and the relatively modest resources
required to sustain these facilities, care should be taken to balance
near-term benefits against long-term risks. Collaboration, reliance,
and ownership transferal options for obtaining alternative capabilities
in lieu of certain facilities are possible, but even if these options
are exercised, many NASA facilities will remain unique and critical to
serving national needs. Key to subsequent analysis of these options is
the collection and availability of the full costs of operating these
facilities as well as the full costs associated with relying on
alternative facilities.
Accounting Options
RAND identified a few accounting options to recovering full
operating costs through user fees.
Taxing Research Programs. NASA Langley and Glenn tax the resident
research programs to supplement user fees and ensure that test
facilities are kept open. However, the ability to keep current
facilities open through those taxing mechanisms are at risk as the
aeronautics research program budgets continue to decline. Also, NASA
Ames currently does not have a resident aeronautics research program to
tax.
Line Item and MRTFB-Like Model. NASA Headquarters could consider
creating a line item in the budget to provide financial shared support
for strategic facilities. The DOD's Major Range and Test Facility Base
(MRTFB) model, with direct financial support, is the most mature and
has served the DOD well. This support has allowed the DOD to keep its
strategic facilities open through times of low utilization. The DOD
Financial Management Regulation provide lessons learned through its
user accounting and management guidelines, essentially charging users
for the direct costs associated with their tests but not the full costs
to keep the facility open for the year.
UK MOD Outsourcing Model. Finally, another accounting and
management option is the facility operations outsourcing model recently
enacted by the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) for its T&E facilities.
Under this model, the MOD identified the T&E facilities it needed
for the future and then privatized the operation of those facilities.
Ownership of the fixed equipment and land were retained by the MOD for
indemnity reasons, but ownership of the movable items was transferred
to a private company, QinetiQ.
Under the model, QinetiQ has a 25-year contract for operating the
facilities. The contract is structured to encourage the company to
implement efficiencies while retaining the long-term health and
availability of the facilities. QinetiQ gets to keep the efficiency
savings realized during the then-current five-year period of the
contract. When the next five-year period is negotiated, the MOD
receives the benefits of the efficiencies by adjusting the period
funding amount to the new efficiency level.
The key to this model was the MOD's access to all facility costs to
ensure that support levels in the contract guarantee the success of
QinetiQ and the facilities. In U.S. parlance, this would require open
full-cost accounting not only of the facilities but also of the
acquisition programs that rely on the facilities.
The model employs shared support for the facilities. In the current
five-year period, the MOD centrally funds 84 percent of facility costs
to keep the facilities' doors open. Sixteen percent of the funding
comes from programs to support direct costs of specific program test
activities. In the past, the MOD had to query programs for how much
they would put in first. Now, the health of the facilities are ensured
and planned for, regardless of the realized utilization in the known-
variable environment.
The MOD implemented the model in 2003, so the long-term success of
it has yet to be established. Nevertheless, some important observations
can be made. The MOD made a conscious, objective decision about which
facilities are strategically important in the long term (25 years, in
this case). The ministry ensured that it accounted for all the costs to
inform its decision. It provided shared support for the facilities to
ensure their long-term health, independent of the yearly utilization.
While not having to perform the actual operation of the facilities, the
MOD provided controls and incentives to realize efficiency and cost
savings while ensuring quality and availability of needed facilities.
NASA could learn from these observations.
Full-Cost Accounting. Finally, while our study recommended that
NASA should change its policy of Full-Cost Recovery (where operators
must recover the full annual costs of operating facilities from the
users regardless of the actual utilization of those facilities), we
applaud NASA's implementation of Full-Cost Accounting (that ensures we
know the full costs of operating activities). It is important to know
the full costs of operations to inform management analysis and
decision-making.
WHAT ARE THE DISADVANTAGES OF RELYING ON FOREIGN WIND TUNNELS, AND HOW
SERIOUS ARE THEY?
Relying on foreign facilities incurs serious security risks, and
unclear access and availability risks.
The RAND study did not explore in depth the policy issues of
relying on foreign wind tunnel, but some observations and references
can be made. It appears that the main disadvantages are security,
access, and availability risks.
As a continuation of my involvement in this area, I have been
briefed on an assessment performed by the DOD Counterintelligence Field
Activity (CIFA) on foreign test facilities.\12\ That report indicated
that there are real security risks to testing in foreign facilities.
``Without tight controls on access and data management, critical
technology is at significant risk for compromise at most, if not all,
of the [foreign facilities that CIFA considered], or in transit to and
from them. Despite contractual security specifications, the designs or
data deployed to these sites is in a virtual sea of potential
collectors whether representing national, commercial or private
interests.'' I commend that report to the committee for its classified
details.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ ``Technology Risk Assessment for European Test Facilities
(U),'' DOD Counterintelligence Field Activity Report, SECRET, CIFA/DA-
218-04, 12 July 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the RAND study did not analyze them in detail, access and
availability are also of concern, especially given an international
competitive environment in aeronautics and tensions that arise
occasionally (even with allies) and the unstable global business of
wind tunnel facility operation. In general, if we rely on foreign
facilities for strategically important capabilities, then we put our
strategic needs at risk. At the very least, the government should
explore reliance agreements to help reduce security risks and establish
long-term agreements to ensure access as well as the long-term
financial and technical stability of those facility operations.
In the course of our study, RAND did find that there is some
reliance on foreign test facilities, particularly on the QinetiQ 5-
Metre subsonic high-Reynolds number wind tunnel. If additional NASA
facilities are closed, the country will be forced to rely more on
foreign facilities for capabilities it cannot find domestically,
including those that are inexpensive alternatives to larger, remaining
U.S. facilities.
CONCLUSIONS
For NASA leadership, the most critical issues are to:
develop a specific and clearly understood aeronautics
test technology vision and plan;
identify shared financial support and stop applying
full-cost recovery to WT/PT facilities;
continue to support developing plans to very
selectively consolidate and broadly modernize existing test
facilities; and
prescribe common management and accounting directions
for NASA's facilities.
This vision cannot be developed apart from other critical national
decisions. It must be informed by the long-term aeronautic needs,
visions, and capabilities of both the commercial and military sectors
supported by NASA's aeronautical RDT&E complexes. A national aerospace
policy would greatly inform and guide an aeronautics test technology
plan.
Given the inherent inability to reliably and quantitatively predict
all needs for RDT&E to support existing programs much beyond a few
months out, the tendency of multi-year surges in aeronautic programs,
and the trends indicating a continuing decline in needed capacity to
support these needs for the foreseeable future, long-term strategic
considerations must dominate. If this view is accepted, then NASA must
find a way to sustain indefinitely and, in a few cases, enhance its
important facilities (or seek to ensure reliable and cost-effective
alternatives to its facilities) as identified in the RAND study.
While generally not redundant within NASA, a few of NASA's
facilities are redundant with those of facilities maintained by the
DOD, and others are redundant with commercial facilities. NASA should
work with the DOD to analyze the viability of such a national reliance
plan because it could affect the determination of the future minimum
set of facilities NASA must continue to support.
NASA should pursue all three testing approaches--facility, CFD, and
flight--to meeting national testing needs; establish the minimum set of
facilities important to retain and manage to serve national needs;
reassess poorly utilized facilities for strategic, long-term needs
rather than eliminate them out of hand; identify financial support
concepts to keep its current minimum set of facilities healthy for the
good of the country; continue to invest in CFD; eliminate the backlog
of maintenance and repair at its facilities; and address hypersonic
air-breathing research challenges.
Unless NASA, in collaboration with the DOD, addresses specific
deficiencies, investment needs, budgetary difficulties, and
collaborative possibilities, the Nation risks losing the competitive
aeronautics advantage it has enjoyed for decades.
Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to the debate regarding
this important issue area in aeronautics. I am happy to answer any
questions from the Committee.
Biography for Philip S. Anton
Dr. Anton directs the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center in
RAND's National Security Research Division (http://www.rand.org/nsrd/
atp.html). This center addresses how accelerating technological change
and modernization efforts will transform the U.S. national security
establishment. It also explores new acquisition and management
strategies and explores ways to maintain core defense technology and
production bases.
Dr. Anton also conducts a wide range of research, including policy
and application research in information technology, cyber security,
information operations, nanotechnology, biotechnology, applied
neuroscience, aeronautics, science and technology trends and effects,
acquisition, and venture capital. His projects include a major study of
wind tunnel and propulsion test facilities for NASA; development of a
methodology for finding and fixing vulnerabilities in information
systems; and an assessment of the global technology revolution through
2015.
Dr. Anton earned his Ph.D. in information and computer science from
the University of California, Irvine, and his B.S. in engineering from
the University of California, Los Angeles.
Chairman Calvert. Dr. Benzakein, we are going to recognize
you for five minutes, and we need to stay on that five-minute
schedule, because we have a vote that is going to be present,
and we are going to recess right after your testimony. So, you
are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF DR. MIKE J. BENZAKEIN, CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF
AEROSPACE ENGINEERING, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
Dr. Benzakein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Members
of the Committee.
I think we need aeronautics technology to create a civil
aviation industry that will bring safe, clean, affordable jet
service to every community. To do that, it will take research
and a new generation of highly trained Americans to create the
vehicles, airports, air traffic management systems to make this
possible. The national needs can be summarized as follows. U.S.
competitiveness, freedom of air travel, flight safety, security
and defense of our nation, protection of the environment,
education of the future workforce.
The U.S. has enjoyed a favorable balance of trade in
aeronautics since--every year since 1970. This is based on the
fact that we own the right technologies, which permits us to
adopt the right market and product strategies. This could
change in the next 10 years. The European Union, as well as
others, have decided to make the necessary investment to
threaten our leadership position in the industry. Europe is
also developing a strong partnership between industry,
government, and academia. It is led by industry and focused on
their needs.
Technology breakthroughs are required for emission,
acoustic, fuel efficiency. We are at the point of diminishing
returns with current technology, and the United States needs to
fund R&D for quantum improvement as we move forward. There is
also a need to triple the current airspace capacity. Last, but
not least, we must address the need for a first-rate aerospace
engineering workforce, as they hold the key to the future.
So, what is NASA's role in the aeronautics agenda? Let me
start by saying that technology developed by NASA has been key
to the success of jet engines, which is the industry I am
coming from. The Energy Efficient program, the Quiet Engine
Program, sponsored by NASA in '80s and the--in the '70s and the
'80s, did identify technologies that found themselves in
product lines, like the GE90 family that powers the Boeing 777
today, and who spawned products like the GEnx, which will power
the 787 at Boeing tomorrow.
Why NASA? The answer is simple. There is no other agency
that can do it. DOD, of course, has the technical expertise in
airframe and engine systems, but their focus is on weapon
systems, as it needs to be. While FAA's mission is similar, it
has neither the expertise nor the infrastructures required.
How effective are NASA programs? They have been effective
in the '70s and '80s. Unfortunately, the critical link to
industry began to break down in the late '90s. The curtailment
of budget dictated by the funding needs of the International
Space Station and other space projects have left the Agency
struggling to identify its mission and agenda in aeronautics.
So NASA's effectiveness in help, ensuring the U.S. industrial
competitiveness in civil aeronautics is unfortunately
diminishing. The intellectual power is there. The facilities
are still there. And so is the will to do it, but the budget is
not. So, this is creating a serious void for this nation as we
look forward.
That brings me to the next subject, the impact of the 2006
budget cuts. I am sorry to say that these cuts are having and
will have serious implications on the ability of NASA to
continue to play a relevant role in aeronautics in the future.
The cuts that were made affect not only the programs that the
industry needs, but cuts into the core of NASA competency and
facilities at centers like Glenn and Langley. These centers
have some unique competencies to the Nation and the world, and
we are going to lose them. In the years ahead, both people and
facilities will be gone, with little chance for recovery.
That takes us back to what is NASA's mission? The
technology that NASA develops in civil aviation will be used by
industry and the FAA. It is therefore paramount that a very
strong partnership exists between NASA and its stakeholders.
This kind of strong partnership exists in Europe, where
industry shapes most of the technology program. The U.S. needs
to learn from this relationship. The end user has to be part of
the process. Is this corporate welfare? The answer is no. The
industry is not looking for NASA to fund the development of
their products, but they do need NASA's help to do the
fundamental research and screening of high-risk concepts before
industry picks it up. The alliance works. It has gotten the
U.S. aeronautics industry its leadership position, and we need
to ensure that it stays there.
So where do we go from here? I believe that aeronautics
needs a national vision and an agenda to move forward. I
believe, also, that the vision and strategy must be developed
in partnership by industry, academia, and the Federal
Government. Aeronautics must have a vision and goals, like
those that NASA has set for returning to the Moon and going to
Mars. So, how do we get this started? Well, we already have.
In response to the Aerospace Commission Report and other
national studies, Congress asked the National Institute of
Aerospace to work with the aeronautics industry and academia to
develop a research plan and budget for the next five years that
would substantially augment ongoing NASA programs. More than
250 of the Nation's aeronautics aviation experts from industry
and academic have developed an integrated budget plan that
contains roadmaps, milestones, and funding requirements for
aeronautics technology to address the Nation's needs in the
years ahead.
The result of this intense effort that has taken place over
the last five months is being summarized in a report to
Congress, which is targeted to be available at the end of the
month.
Chairman Calvert. And Doctor, if you could summarize your
statement, we have to recess very shortly.
Dr. Benzakein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the
Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today,
and to share my views on aeronautics and the roles that NASA
plays. I believe that the opportunities are there, the needs
are there, and the strong partnership between industry, let me
repeat that, I think it needs a partnership to move ahead. And
we need a partnership in industry, academia, and NASA, but we
need a strong, stable support from Congress and the
Administration, and that is the answer.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Benzakein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Statement of Mike J. Benzakein
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
The National Authorization Act for FY 2001 created ``The Commission
on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry'' as a bipartisan
effort to address Congress's concern for America's economic and
national security. The Commission issued an urgent call to the White
House and Congress to increase and sustain significant and stable
funding in long-term research and associated Research, Development and
Technology infrastructure. Some of us have been working to help
Congress respond to that call.
The Importance of Aeronautics
From building the strongest economy in the world to winning the war
on terror, we need aeronautics technology to create a civil aviation
industry that will bring affordable jet service to every community.
Moving people and goods faster, safer, more cost effectively and more
securely to any place in the world in a more environmentally friendly
way will benefit the American public and the American economy. To do so
will take research and a new generation of highly trained Americans to
create the vehicles, airports and air traffic management systems to
make this possible. The national needs can be summarized as follows:
U.S. economic competitiveness
Freedom of air travel
Flight safety
Secure and defend the Nation
Protect the environment
Educate the future workforce
In all partnerships around the world, the U.S. industry must
maintain a leadership position. The U.S. has enjoyed a favorable
balance of trade in aeronautics every year since 1970. In 2003, this
was $27 billion--not an insignificant number. Aeronautics research is
key to maintaining our leadership.
Leadership is based on the fact that we own the right technologies,
which permit us to adopt the right market and product strategies. This
could change in the next 10 years. The European Union, as well as a
number of Asian governments and, most recently, the Canadian
government, are making the necessary investments to threaten our
leadership position in this industry. The European 2020 Vision
unequivocally states that the E.U. wants to be #1 in aeronautics by the
year 2020. They have increased their funding in aeronautics by a factor
of 20 over the last 10 years. To this one can add the individual
European governments' funding (United Kingdom, France, Germany, etc.).
Europe is also developing a strong partnership between industry,
government and academia. In fact, it is led by industry and focused on
their near-term and mid-term needs.
Meanwhile, U.S aeronautics research is focused primarily on more
revolutionary, long term research instead of the need to maintain our
economic competitiveness. We need a balance between long-term and
shorter-term research. In addition as we move forward, aeronautics
research must develop the tools and technologies to provide the
comfort, performance, fuel economy, and reduced emissions and noise
expected by the traveling public. These advanced tools and technologies
require research on airframe and propulsion for both large and small
vehicle systems.
We need to facilitate the ease of travel from point to point with
small vehicles as well as meet the requirement to travel faster around
the globe. Technology breakthroughs are critically needed for acoustics
and fuel efficiency. We are at the point of diminishing returns with
current technologies, and the United States needs to fund R&D for
quantum improvements as we move forward.
There is also a necessity to triple the current airspace capacity
in the U.S. To accomplish this will take close cooperation between the
different agencies of the Federal Government, industry and academia.
The freedom of air transportation and America's ability to advance
economically are lost if the aviation system is not safe, secure and
capable of handling the increasing demand for airspace. It is critical
that the research agenda recognizes current and future system
vulnerabilities based on changing transportation concepts and designs.
Last but not least, we need to educate our workforce. There is an
increased demand for students in Aeronautical Engineering. We need to
interest young people in science and engineering. We have to start at K
through 12, continue through college. We must prepare undergraduate and
graduate students--B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. candidates--for what should be
very exciting careers in aeronautics. We need more U.S. students
pursuing advanced degrees. These young people will be key if the United
States is to maintain its aeronautics leadership in the world.
NASA's Role
So what role should NASA play in the aeronautics agenda? Let me
start by saying that technologies developed by NASA have been key to
the success of jet engines, which is the industry where I have spent
most of my life. The Energy Efficient Engine Program, the Quiet Engine
Program, etc., sponsored by NASA in the 1970's and 1980's identified
technologies that eventually found themselves in product lines like the
GE90 family of engines that powers the Boeing 777 today. They have also
spawned products like the GEnx which will power the Boeing 787
tomorrow. Without this research, GE could not have had the composite
fan blades, the high pressure-ratio core, or the low emission double
annular combustor that put them in a leading position in the industry
today.
Why NASA? The answer is simple: There is no other agency that can
take that role in the United States today. In 1915 Congress created the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA); this organization
was reconstituted as NASA in 1958 as the United States entered the race
for space. From 1915 onward, NACA/NASA has invested in aeronautics
research and technology--an investment in the future of this nation.
Over the years, Industry and Academia have come to depend on NASA's
support to invest in longer-term research--but always with an eye to
providing a benefit to the American public. This investment has been
small compared to the infrastructure it supports and the balance of
trade benefits it brings. DOD, of course, has the technical expertise
in airframe and engine systems, but their focus is on weapon systems as
it should be, and DOD does not have the same priorities as civil
aviation. In fact, DOD has traditionally relied on NASA to provide
noise and emissions breakthroughs that could be adopted by the
military. While FAA's research mission is similar, they have neither
the expertise nor infrastructure required.
How effective are NASA's programs? They have been very effective in
the 1970's and 1980's as I previously said. Unfortunately, the critical
link to industry began to break down in the late 1990's. The
termination of the High Speed Research Program and the Advanced
Subsonic Technology Program marked the beginning of a downslide that
continues today. The curtailment of budgets dictated by the funding
needs of the International Space Station and other space projects has
left the Agency struggling to identify its mission and agenda in
aeronautics. It has valiantly tried. The NASA Aeronautics Blueprint
published in 2002 articulated very well the correct goals of the
Agency. Unfortunately, adequate funding was never there to fulfill
these goals. More important, the funding was never stable enough to
launch and sustain any significant initiatives. So NASA's effectiveness
in helping to ensure the U.S. industrial competitiveness in civil
aeronautics is unfortunately diminishing. The intellectual power is
still there, the facilities are still there, and so is the will to do
it; but the funding is not. This is creating a serious void for this
nation as we look ahead.
Budget Cuts
That brings me to the next subject--the impact of budget cuts. I am
sorry to say that these cuts are having and will have serious
implications on the ability of NASA to continue to play a relevant role
in aeronautics in the future. The cuts have occurred primarily in the
Vehicle Systems Program, which defined technologies for the airframe
and propulsion systems of the future. These technologies are aimed at
ensuring U.S. competitiveness in the years ahead. The cuts that were
made unfortunately affect not only the programs that industry needs,
but cut into the core of NASA competency and facilities at centers like
Glenn and Langley. These centers have some competencies unique to the
Nation and the world, and we are going to lose them. In a few years,
both people and facilities will be gone with little chance for
recovery.
NASA has refocused the Vehicle Systems Program to address four
revolutionary high risk ``barrier breaking'' technologies. They
represent a valiant effort to salvage what is remaining of the vehicle
system programs. However, the funding constraints make even these
programs highly inadequate. Let me take for example the supersonic
airplane program which focuses on the need to reduce the sonic boom. We
need to do it and it is the right thing to do, but it currently focuses
only on changes in airframe configuration. At the same time there are a
flock of technologies dealing with materials, engine emissions and
engine noise, airplane systems, etc., that must be addressed if we want
to have a supersonic airplane program in the future.
That takes us back to what is NASA's aeronautics mission? Before I
speak to this, let me discuss the role of the industry. When DOD
develops technology, it does so for its own use, its own vehicles, its
own weapons systems. The technologies that NASA develops for civil
aviation will be used primarily by industry and the FAA. It is
therefore paramount that a very strong partnership exists between NASA
and its stakeholders. This kind of strong partnership exists in Europe
where industry shapes most of the technology programs. The U.S. needs
to learn from this relationship. The end user has to be part of the
process. Is this ``corporate welfare''? The answer is no. Industry
looks to NASA to screen technologies and help define the key game
changers that are worth pursuing.
Let's take, for example, the NASA Clean Combustor Program. Under
this 1970's NASA program, GE looked at different combustor concepts to
reduce nitric oxides (NOX). GE identified a double annular
configuration as a leading candidate, ran it in an engine and declared
victory. But it wasn't until the mid 1980's that the pressure for low
NOX was such that GE decided to put the double annular combustor into
some of their products. It cost GE over $100 million to make it service
ready for the CFM and GE90 families. I use this example to show that
industry is not looking for NASA to fund the development of their
products, but they do need NASA's help to do the fundamental research
and screening of high-risk concepts before industry picks them up. This
alliance works. It has gotten the U.S. aeronautics industry its
leadership position, and we need to ensure that it stays intact.
The Go Forward Plan
So where do we go from here? I believe that aeronautics needs a
national vision and an agenda to move forward. I believe also that the
vision and strategy must be developed in partnership by industry,
academia and the Federal Government. It should be focused on
aeronautics priorities based in future commercial regulatory
challenges. Challenging aeronautical goals for 2015/2020 need to be
established targeting 85 percent lower emissions, 50 percent lower
noise, 30 percent lower fuel consumption, 3 thruput, etc. Aeronautics
must have a vision and specific goals like those that NASA has for
returning to the Moon and going to Mars. So, how do we get this
started? Well, we already have.
In response to the Aerospace Commission Report and other National
studies, Congress asked the National Institute of Aerospace to work
with the aeronautics industry and academia to develop an aeronautics
research plan and budget for the next five years that would
substantially augment ongoing NASA programs. More than 250 of the
Nation's aeronautics/aviation experts from industry and academia have
developed an integrated budget plan that contains roadmaps, milestones
and funding requirements for aeronautics technology to address the
Nation's needs in the years ahead. It addresses the requirements for:
airspace systems
aviation safety and security
hypersonics
rotor craft
subsonic vehicles
supersonic vehicles
workforce and education
The result of this intense effort that has taken place over the
last five months is being summarized in a report to Congress that is
targeted to be available by the end of this month. The team has worked
hard to balance the short and long-range needs of the Nation. The
short-range needs address technologies for systems and vehicles to be
ready in the years 2015-2020. The long-range needs address requirements
for systems required in the years 2040-2050. In addition to research
requirements, we addressed the need for a strong aerospace workforce,
suggesting coalitions to revamp the way we prepare students for careers
in industry. The proposal is to transform aeronautical engineering
programs to meet industry needs and will require a paradigm shift in
emphasis on the way we educate B.S. students, and will require a
collaboration of all elements that make up the educational system.
As said earlier, this report should be available to Congress and to
NASA by the end of this month. We look to Congress and the
Administration to call for a national vision for aeronautics and hope
that this report will serve as a baseline upon which to build the
aeronautics strategy for the future.
Summary
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify today and to share my views on
aeronautics and the role that NASA plays in aeronautics research. The
partnership between NASA and industry has meant success to the United
States in aeronautics in the past. The budget pressures on NASA are at
the point of potentially creating a technology void in the future. It
is important that this be turned around. The opportunities are there,
the needs are there and a strong partnership between industry, academia
and NASA with strong, stable support from Congress and the
Administration is the answer.
Chairman Calvert. Thank you, Doctor, and Dr. Hansman, we
will have your testimony as soon as we return from this recess.
We will recess until approximately five minutes after the last
vote.
[Recess.]
Chairman Calvert. Our last witness on the panel is Dr.
Hansman. You are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF DR. R. JOHN HANSMAN, JR., DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
CENTER FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION, MIT
Dr. Hansman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity
to speak on the future of aeronautics and NASA. I have some
slides, because a university professor these days should have
to have slides to talk.
[Slide.]
This is a picture that shows the U.S. air traffic density
over the U.S., which shows the dependence of the U.S. economy
on air transportation. This is a little macro scale conceptual
model we use that show the dependence of the economy on the air
transportation system, both the capability of the national
airspace system, our infrastructure, and also, the capability
of the vehicles that are in there.
As people have mentioned today, the U.S. aviation impact is
estimated at about eight percent of the Gross Domestic Product,
roughly 100 million, correction, 10 million jobs, and about
$900 billion per year to the U.S. economy. This shows you the
growth of passenger traffic by region, showing the U.S. is--has
been growing exponentially in passenger traffic as well as
Europe and Asia Pacific. You can see the latent demand, which
hasn't emerged yet, in other parts of the world. This shows you
the freight demand, and shows you that the freight out of Asia
actually exceeded the freight out of the U.S., starting in the
1990s. So, you can see that dependence on the economy.
Talking about challenges and opportunities, I will just
quickly go through one--a few of them. Let me start with flight
delays and the capacity of the air traffic--air transportation
system. Before the attacks of September 11, in the years 2000,
2001, air traffic control delays were an emergent and critical
problem. Even in this body, people were very upset, concerned
about it. The system was close to saturation. The attacks of
September 11 pulled down demand on the system for a few years.
Demand has come back into the system, and you can see, starting
in late 2003 and through 2004, the delays in the system have
actually exceeded historical levels.
The capacity of the system is limited by the--fundamentally
in the U.S., the capacity of the airports and runways, although
it is also the airspace system, the complexity, the people to
run the system, and the technical elements of the system. These
are going to be urgent issues in the future, and we actually
project that the system will go into gridlock, probably in the
summer either of 2007 or 2008, and we will see issues emerging
next summer.
Another factor is the economic instability in the industry.
This shows you the net U.S. airline profits, as a function of
time, starting with deregulation in 1978. You can see that the
industry is cyclic, with about an 11 year cycle. And the
amplitude of the cycle has been growing with time. This is
actually--appears to be a fundamental effect, not directly
attributable to September 11, which exacerbated the situation.
Another clear and emergent issue will be fuel availability
and price of fuel. As you know, fuel at the crude level has
gone over $50 a barrel. This appears to reflect a secular
trend. As fuel prices go up, this will be actually a technical
opportunity to look for more efficient means, more efficient
aircraft, will actually provide an opportunity to renew
aircraft in the system, and also, the aerospace industry,
because of its nature, worrying about efficiency, will provide
a technical conduit for technologies to come out of aviation
into other modes, such as ground vehicles.
Environmental limitations are going to be critical. We
already know the noises are a critical issue which limits our
ability to add airports and runways to the system. Emissions
are becoming a more important problem, both in local emissions,
but also global emissions. Also, interestingly, effects such as
contrails are now starting to be looked at as significant
factors on influencing the global radiative balance and global
warning.
International--this industry is clearly an international
industry, and that is both an opportunity, in terms of future
markets, but it is also, as has been said earlier today, an
issue in terms of challengers. People mention the Airbus A380.
This is the rollout of the A380, expected to fly later this
year. It is an interesting airplane, and again, it is enabled
by some of the technical investments in Europe, but it is not
just Europe. It is--we have significant growth in midsized jets
and regional jets. These are the new airplanes coming out of
Brazil, the Embraer 190 and 170 series. Out of Canada, the CRJ-
900 series, and actually, out of China, on a midlevel, regional
jets, and this is expected to be one of the big growth markets.
We do have innovation in the U.S., in a number of ways, this is
a picture of the Boeing 77. I just note it, because it is in
the Japanese livery, which were the--one of the launch
customers. So, again, points to the issue as this being an
international industry and international markets, which we have
to compete in.
The biggest challenge and my biggest concern is actually in
our intellectual capital, not just in NASA, which was talked
about today, but really, in the country at large. In my
business, you know, we look at students flowing into the
system, go--you know, I actually teach a lot of those what were
called nerds this morning. Okay. And they are not really nerds.
The concern I have is that the talent and experience really
isn't being replaced. Right now, we are getting competition
from other fields, information technology, biotechnology,
bioengineering, and we are also getting, as we know,
international competition, so you know, one has to ask, why
would a young person go into aeronautics, except for their love
of flying or flight?
Another issue that we deal with is changing skill
requirements, so that the skills that we are going to need for
aeronautics in the future are not the same skills that we have
needed in the past. In terms of NASA's role, they have a
critical role in developing the knowledge base, technologies,
and people, and stimulating innovation, fostering growth of
talent, and their critical role in reducing the technical risk
in the systems.
They have been historically invaluable. I actually took off
my bookshelf a book that one of my mentors gave me, which is
Abbott and van Doenhoff, all these guys will know this book,
okay. These were the original work out at NACA, these were the
wind tunnel data of airfoil geometry which are still used
today, and sort of represent the fundamental type of knowledge
we should be generating out at NASA. There currently is, people
have said, sub-critical. The programs are aligned with some of
the future needs, but are inadequate from the core standpoint.
The budget and the trend in the budget is inadequate to
maintain a vital national aeronautics capability that we must
have. The working budget, the amount of money that is really
available for innovation, creativity, and excitement, just
isn't there. Okay. And this will have an adverse impact on the
intellectual capital to meet future challenges. Again, why
would you recommend that your son or daughter go into the
industry?
What can the government do? The government should invest in
aeronautics, for the future, and not coast on the prior
momentum. NASA should take more risks, and should increase
investment in developing opportunities that will attract
excitement and talent to aeronautics. We need a fundamental
research core in the portfolio, and this is going to require
additional investment and collaboration with government
agencies and industry, and there are some efforts, such as the
JPDO, that are a good start.
Chairman Calvert. If the gentleman would summarize his
remarks, we----
Dr. Hansman. That is it.
Chairman Calvert. That is it.
Dr. Hansman. And my written remarks are--hopefully will go
in the record.
Chairman Calvert. Your full written remarks will be entered
into the record, without objection.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hansman follows:]
Prepared Statement of R. John Hansman, Jr.
Chairman Calvert and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on The Future of
Aeronautics at NASA. For most of the past century, the U.S. has led the
world in ``pushing the edge of the aeronautics envelope'' based, in
part, on a strong national aeronautics research strategy. This has
resulted in a vibrant aerospace industry and an unsurpassed air
transportation system which has contributed materially to the Nation's
economic development, geographic structure and quality of life. The
social and economic connectivity provided by our air transportation
system can bee seen in the density of aircraft trajectories over the
U.S. (Fig 1.).
There are, however, indications that the U.S. preeminence in
aerospace has declined. In part this is due to strategic investments
other nations have made, and continue to make, in aeronautics research.
These investments in programs and, more importantly, in people, have
created a strong international civil aeronautics capability. In
contrast the U.S. has systematically decreased it's investment in civil
aeronautics research over the past decade and has underinvested in
fundamental and high risk research to develop the excitement knowledge
and people to shape aeronautics in the future.
I will comment below on the specific questions which you have asked
me to address.
Over the next two decades, what are the main challenges facing the
aeronautics industry and our aviation infrastructure? What are the
Nation's most pressing strategic needs in civil aeronautics?
National Airspace System Capacity--Indications of the capacity
problem can be seen in the delay data of Figure 2. Prior to September
11, 2001, the system was approaching capacity limits at key airports
and other points in the system. Nominal interruptions resulted due to
weather or traffic congestion in non-linear propagation of delays and
loss of reliability in the system. Delays were reduced after September
11 due primarily to reduced traffic. However traffic has returned and
delays in late 2004 have exceed historic levels. This pattern is
expected to continue and it is likely that delays will reach crisis
proportions within the ext few years. It is important to note that key
airports in the system (e.g., LGA and ORD) have had a disproportional
impact on national delays illustrating the importance of getting
maximum capacity from our airports and reducing local environmental
impacts to reduce local community opposition to airport capacity
expansion.
Economic Stability--The economic instability of the aeronautics
industry can been seen in the aggregate profitability of the U.S.
airlines (Fig. 3). The cyclic nature of the industry can be seen with
the cycle period being approximately 11 years. Prior to deregulation of
the industry in 1978 the Airline Industry was cyclic but profitable.
After de-regulation the amplitude of the oscillation has increased.
This pattern is also seen globally. It is unclear what will limit the
growth of this instability, however the implications are significant
both for the industry, the Nation and the world.
Fuel--Another challenge will be the price and availability of fuel.
As can be seen in Fig. 4, the price of fuel recently exceed $50 per
barrel. While this is partly due to short term issues it is expected
that fuel prices will continue to rise as the rate of discovery of new
fossil fuel sources slows. While this is a challenge, it is also a
technical opportunity as it shifts the design criteria to value fuel
efficiency.
International Competition and Markets--International competition
will also be a key challenge over the next few years. As noted above,
international competition to U.S. manufactured aircraft and aeronautics
technologies have increased and the historical U.S. leadership has
diminished. However, the international markets represent the largest
future opportunities for civil aeronautics products and systems. This
can bee seen in Figures 5 and 6 which show the rapid growth in
passenger and freight traffic in North America, Europe, and Asia and
the emergent potential of developing regions such as the Middle East,
Latin America, and Africa.
Environmental Impact--Environmental issues will become increasingly
important challenges to aviation as well as other segments of society.
At the local level, noise and emissions make it difficult to add runway
capacity to meet the traffic demand. On a global scale, increasing
concerns regarding global warming will impose limits on high altitude
emissions and aircraft contrails which impact the earth's radiative
energy balance.
Security and Public Health Threats--The perception as aviation as a
potential social threat mechanism could significantly constrain the
potential benefits from aviation and the aeronautics industry. As
important as the well publicized security concerns is the bio-
propagation of natural health threats as illustrated by the reaction to
the SARs virus in Asia. While these concerns are real the potential to
overreact are significant.
Information Technology and Complexity--On the technology side, one
of the key challenges will be dealing with complexity and criticality
in Information Technology and software systems which are an
increasingly important part of all aerospace systems.
Human Roles--Defining the limits of automation and the role of the
human will be a challenge for civil aviation. Unmanned Air Vehicles
have demonstrated their capability in military applications and are
emerging in civil aviation. The future role of humans both as operators
and controllers will change and become an emergent issue.
Loss of Intellectual Capital--Perhaps the most important challenge
is the potential decline of intellectual capital in the U.S.
Aeronautics enterprise. Much of the historical strength in aeronautics
was due to the knowledge and expertise in our people. Currently we are
not stimulating intellectual renewal at a pace which will maintain or
increase the national capability to deal with the challenges ahead.
What role do NASA's aeronautics programs and strategic plans have in
fulfilling the Nation's strategic needs in civil aeronautics? How
effective are NASA's programs in helping to ensure U.S. industrial
competitiveness in civil aeronautics markets worldwide?
There is clearly an urgent strategic need to invigorate aeronautics
research in the U.S. to meet the challenges of the future. As the
national agency for civil aeronautics research NASA should have a key
role. However the lack of prioritization of aeronautics within NASA
puts this at risk.
Given the limited budget for aeronautics, the aeronautics programs
are generally aligned with a subset of the strategic needs but are
unlikely to be as innovative or as effective as necessary to have a
major impact on U.S industrial competitiveness in civil aeronautics.
I am somewhat concerned that budget pressure and internal
evaluation metrics have created an environment where the aeronautics
research efforts are too short-term focused on products and programs
and not enough on knowledge and capability which are the critical
enablers for the long-term competitiveness.
Regarding the three specific NASA Aeronautics Programs:
The Airspace Systems Program is well aligned with the future
capacity challenges to the National Airspace System (NAS) although
somewhat too focused on developing specific solutions rather than
general capabilities which can be used to address future challenges as
they emerge. It is important to recognize that NASA does not implement
airspace systems and must work collaboratively with the FAA and other
government agencies as well as industry and international agencies in
order to be effective. To this end, I am encouraged by NASA's strong
involvement with the Joint Program and Development Office (JPDO).
The Aviation Safety and Security Program supports the noble goal of
increasing aviation safety. The safety element of the program is based
on a well developed identification of key safety issues. The program
appears to be open to innovation. The one area which appears under-
represented are issues related to critical software and complexity
related emergent safety issues. I am less clear what the appropriate
NASA role is in aviation security and am therefore concerned that the
security element of the program may be diverting scarce resources from
other efforts. Again, I am encouraged that the JPDO will be a mechanism
to clarify the NASA role in aviation security.
The Vehicle Systems Program has been refocused around four
technology demonstration projects (Subsonic Noise Reduction, Sonic Boom
Reduction, Zero Emissions Aircraft, and High Altitude Long Duration
Remotely Operated Aircraft). Each of these programs address expected
future challenges and their priority has emerged from a collaborative
interaction with industry. There is, however, a general concern that
the focus on technology demonstrations comes at the expense of more
fundamental research and core technology development in vehicle systems
and that the national competitiveness in aircraft technologies may
atrophy as a result.
What effect do you believe NASA's proposed budget (including proposed
changes in funding, workforce, and operation of wind tunnels) will have
on its ability to meet the Nation's strategic needs in civil
aeronautics?
I am generally dismayed by the magnitude and trend of the proposed
NASA aeronautics budget. It appears to reflect a lack of commitment of
the Agency to the future of aeronautics.
Given the reduced level of investment in the Aeronautics Theme,
NASA has done a reasonable job at prioritizing facilities and has
recognized the need to align it's workforce to the challenges of the
future. While there is clearly a need to reduce the number of NASA
facilities, this must be done carefully and with a strategic national
perspective. If done correctly the Nation's future strategic needs will
be met.
I am more concerned regarding the ability of NASA to maintain a
talented and enthusiastic workforce with the skills and interest to
meet the challenges in civil aeronautics. The workforce actions, appear
to motivated by budget pressures rather than strategic efforts at
intellectual renewal. This coupled with a perception of declining NASA
priority in aeronautics, can create an atmosphere where it is difficult
to retain and attract the best and the brightest.
I am also concerned that the declining aeronautics budget coupled
with fixed obligations and congressionally mandated earmarks have
reduced the ability of the NASA aeronautics program to pursue
innovative new ideas and emergent research needs.
What steps should the government take to better address the Nation's
strategic civil aeronautics needs? If continued research has an
important role to play, what should be its priorities? How do you
recommend NASA balance investment in evolutionary research against
revolutionary, high-risk, high-payoff research?
I believe that the Nation must recognize the civil and military
importance of aeronautics and commit to maintaining the health and
vitality of the national capability in aeronautics. A vital element of
this capability is a healthy research program which builds core
knowledge, stimulates innovation, builds intellectual capital, creates
opportunity and solves emergent problems in the civil air
transportation system.
I believe that NASA is most effective when it focuses on
fundamental issues and longer-term innovative research and hands of the
results to industry or the operating agencies such as FAA to implement.
To this end NASA must continue to build close ties to industry and
other government agencies. The JPDO has the potential to be a conduit
for this collaboration.
In terms of priority, I would focus on building the knowledge base
and national workforce to address the challenges to civil aeronautics
identified above.
To this end, I would urge NASA to take more risks and to actively
stimulate innovation.
I would also urge NASA to increase the opportunity space in
aeronautics for new faculty and students through an increased focus on
small single investigator, projects or grants. The investment is not
large but the potential for innovation and growth of the Nation's
capability is huge.
Biography for R. John Hansman, Jr.
Dr. Hansman is currently a Professor of Aeronautics and
Astronautics at MIT, where he is Head of the Humans and Automation
Division. He is also the Director of the MIT International Center for
Air Transportation. He conducts research in several areas related to
Air Transportation including air transportation systems, flight vehicle
operations, safety, information technology, human factors and Air
Traffic Control. Dr. Hansman holds six patents and has authored over
200 technical publications. He has over 5,000 hours of pilot in-command
time in airplanes, helicopters and sailplanes, including
meteorological, production and engineering flight test experience. He
holds a Type Rating for Lear Jet 20, 30 and 55 series aircraft. He is a
Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.
Professor Hansman received the 1996 FAA Excellence in Aviation Award,
the 1994 Losey Atmospheric Sciences Award from the American Institute
of Aeronautics and Astronautics, the 1990 OSTIV Diploma for Technical
Contributions.
Discussion
Aeronautics Planning: Budget vs. Priorities
Chairman Calvert. Let's get into the question part of the
hearing. When I was in business, years ago, we would obviously
put together a business plan, and that would drive our number
of jobs, our capital outlays, and our budget.
We would make a determination at that point what would
occur. It seems, sometimes, as I listen through this, that the
job level and the budget is driving the business plan here
some, to some degree. And that the budget right now is the
determining factor.
Dr. Lebacqz, how would you evaluate the '06 aeronautics
budget? Does it match the priorities of the Nation, in your
opinion?
Dr. Lebacqz. Sir, let me start by talking about the way
that NASA develops a business plan, which of course, is
different than you would have done, but is consistent with the
way we developed the budget. We are, in fact, engaged in a road
mapping activity, across the entire Agency. We have developed
18, I believe the number is, strategic objectives for the
Agency, and there are 13 roadmaps that are intended to be long-
term guideposts to achieve those 13--those objectives.
One of those roadmaps is in aeronautics. It is co-chaired
by my Deputy for Technology, who is here behind me, Mr. Terry
Hertz, as well as the Chief Technology Officer of the Boeing
Company, Mr. Jim Jamieson. We use that, in conjunction with a
lot of other guidance that we get from the aerospace, the
President's Commission on the Future of Aerospace, from the
National Research Council, both their prospective studies, such
as ``Securing the Future of U.S. Air Transportation,'' as well
as the reviews of our program that my friend and colleague, Dr.
Klineberg, talked about, to develop the aspects of the roadmap.
From that, in principle, we then derive budgetary requirements
to achieve the goals of the roadmap.
Chairman Calvert. Well, what--before I get into that, why
don't we allow the other panel to answer that question also.
I--Dr. Klineberg, I think you probably answered that question
in your opening remarks, but you can do it again.
Does the aeronautics budget, in your opinion, match the
priorities of the Nation?
Dr. Klineberg. I think you are right, Mr. Chairman, that
the budget is driving the strategic plan, and not the other
way, and I don't think that is right. So, my answer would be
no, that it is not satisfying the needs of the country, because
we haven't really looked hard at what those aeronautics needs
are, separately from the budget, and I think my colleagues have
talked to what some of those needs are, and need to be
addressed.
Chairman Calvert. Dr. Anton.
Dr. Anton. I am probably the most qualified to talk about
the infrastructure needs, and from that perspective, no, there
has not been an identification, as of yet, of assured support
for those facilities that are needed from a national
perspective.
Chairman Calvert. Dr. Benzakein.
Dr. Benzakein. Mr. Chairman, I think we--some of us are
agreed that it looks like the budget is driving the agenda,
which is really, in our opinion, the wrong way to go.
There is unfortunately, and I think some of our colleagues
said the same thing, we do need an aeronautics mission, an
agenda, agreed to. And then, after that, you can put a budget
around it. Here, it seems to say there are that many, that much
funding available, and then, a mission gets wrapped around it.
That is really, in our opinion, in my opinion, the wrong way to
go.
Chairman Calvert. Dr. Hansman.
Dr. Hansman. The simple answer is no.
Zero Base Review
Chairman Calvert. The Navy has just gone through a zero
base review on their operations, the United States Navy, and
they have done quite, for the Navy, quite a radical change,
where how they utilize their personnel, how they utilize their
fixed assets, how they utilize ships, equipment, et cetera. Dr.
Lebacqz, do you see NASA going through that same type of
exercise, in order to get as much efficiency and economy and
productivity out of its working force?
Dr. Lebacqz. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. What we
have done this year, effective the beginning of February, is
focusing on one set of--one part of our infrastructure, which
is our set of wind tunnels. We have corporatized, so to speak,
management of them. I noticed earlier in speech, in some of the
other testimony today, that people would talk about the Langley
such and such tunnel, or the Glenn such and such tunnel. They
are NASA tunnels, and so, we have brought the management of
them back to headquarters, under a program manager, who is
responsible across all of the wind tunnels, for assessing the
pricing policy, assessing the demand, because these are, after
all, demand-driven facilities.
Somewhat similar to other zero base reviews, we are trying
to understand what the demand will be for them from our own
programs, what the demand will be for them from other programs
within NASA, and what the demand for them will be from the
industry, and our colleagues in other agencies. The folks, good
folks at the RAND Corporation, in the study that Dr. Anton
mentioned, talked, provided sort of a process to go through, in
which one can prioritize against a set of criteria the need for
some of these facilities, and as Dr. Anton mentioned, they came
up with roughly 31, or 29, I can't quite get the number
straight in my head, of the NASA facilities that has some need,
and nine of them, in their view, are critical, based on this
process.
We will be doing that again, given the fact that the
environment is different now than it was three years ago, when
the study was initiated. But using the same process, but at a
corporate level, rather than at an individual center level,
because in those cases, one tends to sub-optimize. There are a
number of ways, if I could go on briefly, a number of ways here
that these facilities can be operated differently than they are
now.
One of them is through some kind of shared ownership,
shared pricing. One of them is through transfer of some of them
to other entities that need them. We are investigating that
currently, with one of the big tunnels at the Ames Research
Center, with the DOD, as a matter of fact. Another of them is
to, if we can corporatize how we operate them, operate them
differently than we have. For example, take an idea from the
Navy, of having a cadre of people who are capable of operating
all the facilities, and move them physically, as needed, to the
facility that is required.
So, all of these things are in play, and that is the
purpose of this corporatizing of the program this year. We are
going to identify some money that we will pull out into a
separate program, to give this program manager some leverage.
It is the government. You have got to follow the money, so you
need some leverage.
Number of Wind Tunnels Needed
Chairman Calvert. I want to turn it over to Mr. Udall for
his question, but while we are on the subject of wind tunnels,
and how many wind tunnels we need, and how many tunnels need to
be closed, is that decision based upon utilization, or is that
decision based upon--maybe Dr. Anton, you could answer that
briefly, and how did you arrive at the 28 versus 30 or 29 or
whatever?
Dr. Anton. We found in our research that utilization data
was very difficult to project into the future, and so, we took
a much more strategic look at trying to understand the kinds of
vehicles that----
Chairman Calvert. So, if you have a tunnel that has zero
utilization.
Dr. Anton. Yes.
Chairman Calvert. It still has value in your mind?
Dr. Anton. Yes. The question is what kinds of future
vehicles might need that kind of capability. So, for example,
the hypersonics program in the country has gone down, but----
Chairman Calvert. I understand that from the manager's
point of view, Dr. Lebacqz's point of view, if--going back to
the old business model. If you have zero utilization, but you
have an asset that may have potentiality----
Dr. Anton. Yes.
Chairman Calvert.--how do you manage that asset? And I
guess that is something that has to be worked out, but I am
going to--but I just--trying to understand how you are
determining what has future value to hold, and what should be
closed, or what shouldn't be closed. With that, Mr. Udall.
Credibility of NASA's Aeronautics Plan
Mr. Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this line of
questioning is important to pursue later. I want to just start.
First, I want to thank the panel, and also, ask your
forgiveness for the break in the action, but I appreciate you
being willing to stay with us, because this is a very crucial
area that we are discussing today.
Dr. Lebacqz, your testimony, along with that provided with
other witnesses, makes a persuasive case for the importance of
aeronautics research. I enjoyed looking at your bio. You have a
long and distinguished career in aeronautics research. And as I
mentioned in my opening remarks, you are obligated to put the
best face on what I think is a bleak situation that NASA's
aeronautics program faces.
I have to tell you, I find a real disconnect between the
NASA testimony and the actual situation. The paragraphs of
your--initial paragraphs of your written statement talk about
the great promise of hypersonics, yet the '06 budget eliminates
funding for hypersonics. The testimony talks about the
importance of the Aviation Safety and Security Program, yet
that budget for that program will be lower in 2010 than it was
in Fiscal Year 2004. The testimony makes a strong case for the
critical need to modernize the Nation's air transportation
system, yet funding for Airspace Systems would decline by 22
percent from fiscal '04 levels. Finally, your testimony makes a
case for pursuing flight demonstrations of breakthrough
technologies in four areas, and yet, the funding for the
Vehicle Systems will be 43 percent lower in 2010 than it was in
'04. That is even though, and my understanding, the flight
demonstrations are the most expensive part of the R&D cycle.
I have to confess, the plan doesn't appear credible to me,
and I know what your official position has to be, but speaking
as an experienced professional in aeronautics research, do you
consider it to be a credible and sustainable plan for the long
term? That is my first question.
I want to ask two more. What will the consequences for the
future of NASA's aeronautics program be if the funding and
workforce and infrastructure reductions contained in the five-
year budget plan actually come to pass? And then I would like
to ask the other witnesses if they would like to make any
comments, Doctor, after you make yours.
Dr. Lebacqz. There is a lot of points in your question
there, so maybe I can kind of get at it from the back end
toward the front.
Mr. Udall. I apologize for throwing all that at you.
Dr. Lebacqz. No, that is all right. I am supposed to be a
rocket scientist. I ought to be able to remember it. I just
can't. So, let me start, I think a critical point of your
question has to do with whether the Vehicle Systems program
being shrunk by 40 percent, with these four demonstrations, is
a credible program, in my estimation.
The Vehicle Systems program has been refocused from a
program that was based on a number of disciplinary activities,
and sort of the classic disciplines of aerodynamics, avionics,
materials and structures, propulsion, that were applicable to a
wide range of vehicles, which the four that we have selected
were some. There were, I believe, seven concept vehicles that
we were doing this research for.
So, I believe that, particularly--let me pick the--I didn't
really have a chance to talk about them, one of the
demonstrations is a flight demonstration of reducing subsonic
noise. That actually is a continuation and completion of work
that we had initiated, and I don't think there is any question
but that we will accomplish that in roughly fiscal '08. Another
one of them is the development of high altitude, long
endurance, remotely operated or autonomous vehicles for science
platforms. We have research underway currently, and in fact, we
have built vehicles that are the beginnings of this type of
thing, with the Helios vehicle. I think that one is also doable
within the amount of money that we are talking about.
Because we are not doing research that is applicable to
more than just it, as well as a number of other things, we are
focusing the research on just it. So, I think in general, that
the--that program is credible. I suspect my colleagues won't
agree with me, but I believe that program is credible. But the
concerns that you raised about the Safety and Security program
and the Airspace Systems program, I think are good concerns. We
believe strongly, and in fact, it is interesting, the NASA
aeronautics portfolio, percentage-wise now, compared now to 10
years ago, is almost 50 percent on these systems kinds of
research, airspace systems, systems that provide more security,
more safety in the airplane, and only 50 percent on sort of our
classic vehicle research.
We believe that what we have planned out in those areas is,
will make a significant contribution. We support entirely the
Joint Planning and Development Office, which--the NASA, the
FAA, the DOT, the DOD, the Department of Homeland Security,
Department of Commerce, Interagency Working Group, that has
been our highest priority all along, and will continue to be,
to make sure that the national plan for a transformation of the
national airspace system will occur, and that we have research
to support that.
Maybe I over-answered a long question.
Mr. Udall. I created the problem by asking a long question,
and you did a very nice job of responding to me, the questions
I asked, and the points I made.
Mr. Chairman, I see my time has expired. Perhaps the other
panelists could--if we don't have a second round, you could
respond in writing to my question. But let us see how the
questioning goes from this point on. I think, because Mr.
Forbes is here, I don't want to take from this time.
Chairman Calvert. We are going to have a lot of time for
another round of questions, so--Mr. Forbes, you are recognized.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of the
members of the panel, and the toughest thing, for me, in going
through these budgets, is it is so hard for us to get somebody
to just walk in here and say that building costs $10 million.
We need it, but we can't afford it. So, what we see in the
budget is that we are going to put up a tent, and then, we have
to figure out whether the tent is really going to suffice, or
whether you are just trying to not tell us you are not going to
build the building.
U.S. Competitiveness and the Aeronautic Budget
And when I look at your five-year budget runout for
aeronautics in fiscal year 2006, and I compare that with the
one submitted last year, it looks like we got a $738 million
shortfall from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2009 timeframe.
Now, when I look at our market share dropping in aeronautics,
as we have talked about. 25 years ago, we were at 90 percent.
10 years ago, 70 percent. Today, we are at 47 percent, and we
hear what our friends in Europe are saying, they want to
dominate aviation sales by 2020. Are we just retreating, and
just saying okay, we understand we are going to lose that
battle, and we are not going to go after it? How do these
numbers tell us we are really making a stab to stay
competitive?
Dr. Lebacqz. If I could answer that the way that I did in
my opening statement, I believe we need a national dialogue on
that very issue. We need to decide whether we will have a
policy in aeronautics that is consistent with either side of
the discussion.
Mr. Forbes. But does this budget do that? Does this
budget----
Dr. Lebacqz. This budget is----
Mr. Forbes.--not the dialogue, but does it----
Dr. Lebacqz. This budget is consistent with one side of the
policy issue that I raised.
Mr. Forbes. Which is what side?
Dr. Lebacqz. The side that says that the marketplace will,
in fact, provide the best outcome.
Mr. Forbes. But the marketplace has not done that for the
last 25 years, has it?
Dr. Lebacqz. That would not be up to me answer, sir.
Workforce at Langley Research Center
Mr. Forbes. The other question I would have for you is, has
NASA decided internally that the Langley Research Center in
Hampton is going to be closed?
Dr. Lebacqz. No, sir.
Mr. Forbes. If they haven't, then how do we explain to the
workers there and the people there, when you get these cuts
from 804, $105 million, fiscal year 2005, $668, fiscal year
2006, $557, and fiscal year 2007, $479. How do we communicate
to the engineers and the workforce that we are not trying to
gut the program there, and force these engineers out? Because
that is at least the impression that has come across when you
just look at the raw numbers of the budget.
Dr. Lebacqz. Congressman, as you know, there are four
mission directorates within NASA, of which Aeronautics is one.
Space Operations, there is Exploration Systems, and there is
Science. We have, in Aeronautics, $100 million less in fiscal
'06, and $200 million, roughly, less, starting in fiscal '07
and out. That is less funding for work in aeronautics, and so,
the centers have made an estimate of what that means to people
who work, were working in aeronautics at the centers. But that
does not necessarily mean that those people won't be doing
other parts of the NASA mission. They just won't be working on
this part.
Mr. Forbes. And one last question. As you know, the
detailed NASA budget justification for each program has a
section entitled risk management, which describes the possible
factors that could impede the progress on each project, and I
am concerned by the fact that the following two risks are cited
only for aeronautics programs and no other NASA programs in
this budget. The first one is, it says risk: ``Given the loss
of critical workforce skills, facilities, there is the
possibility that costs and schedule may be impeached.'' The
second one, it says risk: ``Given the possibility that
competing funding requirements draw funding away from research
and development, there is a high probability that project
activities may be de-scoped or eliminated.'' In the first case,
there seems to indicate that NASA believes the centers that
perform this work, which are mostly in Langley and Glenn, will
lose workforce, skills, and facilities, because of these budget
cuts. And the second case, I was hoping you could maybe
enlighten me on what it means when it says competing funding
requirements that draw funding away. What does that refer to?
Does that--I assume it must mean the Space Exploration
Initiative, but----
Dr. Lebacqz. No, sir. I think what that is referring to,
and I am embarrassed that I don't actually know by heart what
you are reading from. I believe what that is referring to is
within our programs, we will use more full and open
competition, collaboratively, among the centers and the
industry than we have in the past. We have tended to use so-
called directed research, that goes to a center, and then, the
center decides to do with it. We will be doing that in a
different fashion, similar to the way that our Science Mission
Directorate, and our Exploration Systems Mission Directorate
operates.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Lebacqz. That is what they are talking about.
Mr. Forbes. My time is up, but maybe, we could submit some
written questions, if Mr. Lebacqz would be kind enough to
answer those for us.
Dr. Lebacqz. Glad to do that, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
Plans for Wind Tunnel Closures
Chairman Calvert. I would like to go back to the subject we
were talking about, and let me preface this by saying that I am
a restaurant operator, so I know zero about operating a wind
tunnel, so you are going to have to help me with this, Dr.
Lebacqz, and the others on the panel. But it would seem to me
that, as we talked about a business plan, as you mentioned, a
strategy, a national strategy on aeronautics, should that--
shouldn't we arrive at that first, prior to making a
determination of which tunnel should stay open and which tunnel
should close, or have you already made a determination which
tunnels should close?
Dr. Lebacqz. We certainly have not made a determination of
which tunnels should close. We are, as I mentioned, trying to
understand the requirements this year, but you are also exactly
correct, sir. That should be best done in the context of a
national policy.
Chairman Calvert. The--going back to the--and the reason, I
guess, that we spend some time on these tunnels is that,
obviously, a significant part of your employee load is to
operate the tunnels. And I suspect that the--it is like an
infrastructure at any major company, depending on your
utilization rate, how many employees do you have, and how much
utilization do you have out of these tunnels?
And that goes back, you know, to laypeople like myself, who
look at this and say, well, you know, you are not getting the
great utilization of this, you are not getting the productivity
out of your employees, but on the other hand, you may have
science of national importance that doesn't meet a traditional
business plan. So, I suspect that that may be the case. But is
there ways that we can operate these tunnels more effectively,
with employees being able to be shifted from one location to
another, as you mentioned? And are you looking into that type
of thing, where you can maximize the number of tunnels that you
are operating, and maximizing the effectiveness, and the, you
know, the productivity of your employee base?
Dr. Lebacqz. Yes, sir. I think, as I mentioned earlier, I
think that is a very interesting model, that it is an analog of
ways that other organizations operate some infrastructure. That
is a reason, again, that we have corporatized the management of
the tunnels, so that we can look at this from an agency point
of view, rather than a center-centric point of view.
U.S. Competition
Chairman Calvert. Maybe some of the others can answer this
question for me. The tunnels that are competing with us, the
Europeans, in this case, how many tunnels do they have? Does
anybody know the answer to that question? I mean, how many--
what are we talking about here, as far as our----
Dr. Anton. Internationally, I don't have a number off the
top of my head. It is probably in the 50 to 100, I would have
to go back and count them.
Chairman Calvert. Internationally, that is worldwide.
Dr. Anton. Worldwide. The larger size.
Chairman Calvert. Now, the primary competition at this--at
the present moment is coming from Europe, I assume. And these
tunnels are operated by the European Union?
Dr. Anton. They are operated by private companies. Some of
them have some relationships with European governments.
Chairman Calvert. Are they subsidized?
Dr. Anton. I don't know the answer to the----
Chairman Calvert. Know the answer to that?
Dr. Hansman. There is a mix of tunnels. Some of them are
actually run by government agencies, such as the French ONERA,
the National----
Chairman Calvert. Which one is Boeing using?
Dr. Hansman. I think that Boeing is doing some tests in
ONERA, and then in the--they are also testing the--I think
there is a Dutch, Netherlands----
Chairman Calvert. Question. Is the Europeans subsidizing
the tunnel that Boeing is using?
Dr. Anton. The 5 Meter is not subsidized. It is a private
entity, and Boeing is doing their subsonic----
Chairman Calvert. It was all private money that went into
building it, all private money that is operating it? All
private money----
Dr. Anton. Only the operation, it used to belong to the UK
MOD.
Chairman Calvert. Was it sold at a less than market price
to the private operation that utilizes it?
Dr. Anton. I don't know the details on that.
Chairman Calvert. Dr. Klineberg, you seem to know the
answer to that question.
Dr. Klineberg. I do, sir, but I am not an expert in that
arena. But I--in the space business, I spent quite a bit in
time in Europe, in consortia, and there are many, many ways
that the governments, the European governments support their
aeronautics and space industry, and you have touched on several
of those, and I think it is a good supposition that--support
them.
Chairman Calvert. I find it--if, in fact, it is the case,
ironic that an American company would be in Europe using a
competitor's technology in order to compete with the same
people. That is just----
Dr. Hansman. Well, I would just like to point out that
there are--sometimes, there are critical tests that you need to
do to get the airplane off the ground, and so, you may be using
that facility because it is the only one available in the
world, and you are reducing your risk. I know----
Chairman Calvert. Is that the case?
Dr. Hansman. That has happened in the past, yes.
Chairman Calvert. Is that the case in the instance that we
are using for comparison, in case of Boeing? Is that why they
are there? Or are they there because of the cost?
Dr. Anton. In terms of the 5-meter, they were driven there
when the Ames facility was rebuilt, and there was no
alternative. Right now, the facility there--they like the
technical capabilities better there than the Ames 12-foot.
Chairman Calvert. They like it better because it is a
better tunnel?
Dr. Anton. They like the shape better, and some other
technical differences. It is----
Chairman Calvert. Again--but I think these are important--
as we move toward a strategy, because at this point, we don't
have one, apparently. And as we make a determination of how
many employees we are going to have, or not have, it seems to
me that these are the kind of questions we are going to need to
get more in depth on, and some answers on, and I know we can't
do that in a hearing context. But it is certainly something I
would like to get more involved in.
Representative Green, you are recognized for five minutes.
Workforce Retention
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, members
of the panel.
I have a special affinity and a kinship with NASA and for
NASA, I suppose. I used to work for NASA. I had the very good
fortune of working for NASA as a co-op student, and it was very
helpful to be there, and to work with some of the scientists
and engineers as they were performing stellar services for our
country, and in fact, for the world. So, I salute you, and I
thank you for coming in, and giving us this very important
information.
We all agree, I am sure, that space travel is inherently
hazardous. A concern that I would want someone to address, and
I am not to sure to whom I should pose the question, but a
concern that I have has to do with the R&D and the exemplary
technical standards that we have adhered to. Are we going to
lose something in the quality of our exemplary work by losing
so many valuable and talented minds?
Dr. Lebacqz. Well, sir, I will have a shot at that. I think
the answer is no. NASA has, as a result of the Columbia tragedy
two plus years ago, instituted a couple of new entities to
ensure, in fact, that we maintain the highest standards of
safety and engineering discipline, and ensure that they remain
within NASA. Excuse me. One of those is the NASA Engineering
and Safety Center, which is, in fact, located at, in NASA
Langley, but is an Agency-wide activity that provides
independent, as-required, engineering and safety analyses of
aspects of, specifically, right now, our return to flight
endeavors.
Additionally, we have, only within the last two months or
so, initiated under our new Chief Engineer, Rex Geveden,
something called the Independent Technical Authority, which
will be the best people at our various centers, who are given,
so to speak, warrants to go and check independently that safety
and engineering standards are, in fact, at the highest quality.
And those people will be retained and maintained throughout any
activities that we do, as long as we are going to be flying
either the Shuttle of any of my airplanes, for that matter.
So, I understand the concern. When people leave, you always
worry about what is leaving, but in those particular--in that
particular area, both of these entities are in place to do our
best to ensure that doesn't happen.
Mr. Green. I greatly appreciate the assurance, and I thank
you, Mr. Chairman, for the time.
Chairman Calvert. If you would like, if any of the other
panel would like to address that issue also. It looked like Dr.
Hansman----
Dr. Hansman. I would just say that I think that we can
manage through loss of some people. My concern is whether new
people are going to be coming in. So, in the future, will there
be opportunities for co-ops, like you had, in aeronautics. Will
we have opportunity path to bring our people in, to have them,
potential for the future? Because my concern is not next year
or two years, my concern is 10 years.
Mr. Green. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Calvert. I thank the gentleman. The gentlelady
from Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. First of all, let me welcome the new
chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee, and we are in the
middle of marking up the bankruptcy bill in Judiciary, so I
appreciate the witnesses understanding that two important
proceedings are going on at once, and if the bells ring, that
means they are saying that my amendments are before the
Committee, and I am not there.
But it emphasizes the importance of this hearing. I have
been a Member of this committee now for a decade. And I believe
my advocacy has been consistent in what I believe is a key
element of the aeronautics industry, the aeronautics
opportunity, which would include, of course, my commitment to
the human Space Shuttle, which is a little distinctive, but
also, my view of the industry, compared to how it is treated in
Europe, which is that it is an industry that is clearly one
that is protected and provided for. I am--want to share some
thoughts with you, and then, allow you to comment on this
thrust that we are in.
In the course of supporting NASA, I have offered several
commentaries that don't pertain directly to its operations, but
it, hopefully, contains--pertains to its embrace. One, if there
is no science with aeronautics or human spaceflight, then what?
I think the two must go hand in hand, and that means that the
International Space Station should be a place of scientific
research and study. Whether it means that we create the next
generation of machines, the next generation of bioresearch,
medical research, homeland security. I think you are well aware
of the reports, although late, about the possibility of having
detected the tsunami after the fact. We understood there might
have been that capability. How tragic and sad, if it was, and
we were not aware.
I remember the debates of saving NASA right after I came to
Congress. The preceding term, NASA's budget passed by one vote.
We turned the corner in 1995, and begin to show that NASA and
its spaceflight meant something to the average citizen, that
there was HIV research, that there was heart disease, there
was--or research dealing with heart disease and stroke and
cancer. In fact, we had a partnership with the Texas Medical
Center. We are not going to continue even with the excitement
of a vision, to find stakeholders, if we do not add R&D, or
make sure that we are combining those efforts. That is my first
point. The second is that we cannot have a good, strong program
without safety.
I hope the Chairman of this committee will read some of the
materials that I will be providing to him. I know that he has
heard me comment on this, and I hope that we will have a
hearing, either in the Full Committee, or in this subcommittee,
simply on the question of safety. Safety cannot be judged or
regulated by the recent newspaper articles, or the lack of
oxygen, or lack of quality of air, or lack of water, or lack of
this or that at ISS. That is how we get our information. There
should be a Gehman's Report similar to what happened in
Columbia VII. In addition, as Columbia VII becomes a backdrop
to safety, have we really answered all of those questions, and
have we truly vetted the space program as it proceeds?
The other aspect of it is generally looking at aeronautics
in general, and to not lose the competitive edge to our
European colleagues on this question of producing the next
state of technology in aeronautics. And under that particular
concept, I would just simply say this. This industry should
begin to look in diversity. Historically black colleges,
Hispanic-serving colleges, minority businesses, to embrace
those entities, so that we can expand the stakeholders, those
who are understanding the industry, and those who can possibly
move it into the 21st Century.
So I would welcome, in my short time that I have, I am not
going to pose questions. I will review your testimony. But in
the short time that I have, I would be interested in, Dr.
Hansman and others, if you would just comment briefly on this--
these concepts that I have offered to you.
Dr. Hansman. Well--thanks. I agree 100 percent. We really
need to maintain the core research and development capability.
That is going to be the heart of our ability to respond to the
problems in the future. I think that safety is clearly a key
issue, and in fact, you can point to contributions NASA has
made to safety issues, such as responding to wind shear and
other aviation weather hazards. I think we need to keep that
going.
And I agree with you 100 percent that investing in our
people, and going to nontraditional sources, to build up the
strength in places like the historically black colleges, in the
aeronautics is a real opportunity that we should take advantage
of.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Doctor, if I may just get the NASA
representatives to comment on the issue. I thank you for
indulging me, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Lebacqz. Yes, ma'am. Let me start with the maintaining
the competitive edge. Competitive edge is a policy issue. If we
have a national policy in aeronautics that says we will, as a
country, invest in this arena as one of our niche areas, to
maintain a competitive edge, then we will be able to do that
more clearly than we are now.
I agree entirely with your concern about where the ideas
come from. In my Mission Directorate, we have put in place this
year something called a Council of Deans, which has deans from
15 engineering schools throughout the country, big ones, little
ones, historically black ones--Tuskegee is one--who are
supposed to help inform me of what our programs need to do to
encourage education in aeronautics in the universities, and
vice versa, I will be informing them of the kinds of curricula
changes they should have to re-engage students in aeronautics.
So, I think that is a critical thing, a fundamental thing, I
did that as soon as I became the Associate Administrator a year
and a half ago.
You asked about Columbia, and whether we are, in fact,
following through, we as an agency are following through on the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board. As I know you have been
told and heard in other hearings, we believe, and are working
assiduously to ensure that we meet every single recommendation
and requirement from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board,
and we will not fly the Shuttle again until we do.
There are a whole host of discussions one can get into
relative to that, but the fact is we are not flying that
machine until we all believe that it is safe. We have gone
through a culture change activity. I think that may have been
breached at a previous hearing, to ensure that people who think
there is an issue with safety are able to raise it without fear
of reprisal. And I believe that that, and that activity has, in
fact, been quite successful. God knows I am getting more emails
than I used to get. So, I think the answer to that question is
pretty clear. As John mentioned, in my programs, in the
aeronautics research programs, our work in aviation safety has
led to assessing wind shear. It has led to these synthetic
vision systems, that will allow us to fly in bad weather, and
be able to see better. It has led to putting turbulence
detectors on commercial aircraft, so that we can sense ahead
whether the airplane is going to be upset, and somebody will be
hurt. That is a fundamental part of what we are doing.
Chairman Calvert. I thank the gentlelady. Appreciate it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
Chairman Calvert. Let us see. I think I am next. Or is it
the gentleman from--Mr. Udall, yeah, I think he did the second
round, and----
Mr. Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I asked, my initial
round, Dr. Lebacqz, his impressions, and I want to turn to the
four of you, I think start with Dr. Hansman, I will restate the
question. We will come across, and--if I get done quickly, you
each should have about a minute, within a five-minute context.
Effects of the Budget Proposal
I had asked what would the consequences be for the future
of NASA's aeronautics program if the funding and workforce and
infrastructure reductions contained in this five-year budget
plan actually come to pass?
Dr. Hansman. I think it is clear, because of the cutbacks,
that the national capability represented by NASA will be
reduced, and I think that--I personally have concerns as to
whether we will be able to meet challenges that are going to
emerge in the future, some of which we can't predict right now.
Mr. Udall. Dr. Benzakein.
Dr. Benzakein. I would agree with that statement. I do
think, in addition to that, I am not sure this is a second
question, but the competency is going down in Vehicle Systems.
You did mention a serious reduction in Vehicle Systems. This is
exactly where Europe is going to give us a very, very strong
competition. But I do think this reduction really drives to the
heart of the problem we have. In addition to that, Europe, in
addition to putting more money on these programs, really has
put together a consortium of university and academia, to really
address that. And the universities is leading this effort in
defining those programs. And that, really, has driven the right
balance between short and long range, which I don't see
happening in this country.
Mr. Udall. You would say that, I was reading the comments
of the EC, the European Commission's multiyear initiative, and
they not only have put words on paper, but they are putting
resources behind their efforts.
Dr. Benzakein. Absolutely.
Mr. Udall. Dr. Anton.
Dr. Anton. I would just like to add that the management
and--efforts that NASA is pursuing, I think make a lot of
sense, and go a long way to helping out. The only question I
guess I would raise with--relative to workforce and
infrastructure is to emphasize the fact that capabilities for
test facilities isn't just a hardware issue. It is also the
workforce issue, and so, there--if we do lose workforce
capabilities, that--there is a degradation in that capability.
You can't just simply just mothball and preserve it in that
level.
So, the question ultimately comes down to how long a range
does NASA, is NASA resourced so that they can look out, and try
to preserve things that maybe not--may not necessarily fit and
support current research programs, but would allow them options
later on to add new programs, as opportunities arise.
Mr. Udall. Dr. Klineberg.
Dr. Klineberg. Yeah. Thank you. I am concerned, also, about
this--the consequences of the infrastructure, but I believe
NASA aeronautics is doing what they can within the budget. If
you will, I would just like to quickly remember an anecdote
from my career in NASA.
Some time in the mid-80s, there was a very clever guy down
at Langley, Richard Whitcomb, who was working in the 7 by 10
tunnel, I believe, which he was responsible for, and he was
filing away the wings, and trying different concepts, and he
came up with the idea that if, instead of having a wing be one
plane, if you put aerodynamic devices at the wingtip, he called
them winglets, you could improve the lift of the commercial
airplanes. The industry was pretty negative about that, gosh,
we can't do that, and we have problems, you know, there were a
lot of reasons not to do that, and you now go to any commercial
airplane in the world, and they have winglets. They have these
things on the tips that vastly improve the efficiency of the
transportation system, reduce the amount of fuel import, all
sorts of public goods, come from that invention that was made
in a tunnel, that was used only for in-house work, was not used
in the way we are talking here, to support industry or specific
programs, and resulted in a breakthrough that was very
important.
And there are many other like that. The problem you are
asking us now, and I think Mr. Anton and John Hansman said it,
is you try to project from the future, make decisions now to
project from the future, is very difficult. Thank you for your
indulgence.
Aeronautics Funding Cuts
Mr. Udall. I see my time is beginning to expire, and I
didn't want to leave Dr. Lebacqz alone in this next round. I am
going to make a comment, and we will see if there is a chance
for you to respond.
As I understand, part of the budgetary problem is that
aeronautics had a sort of almost a third of the cut that the
White House made to NASA's budget plans from--for fiscal year
2006 through 2009, and it is a puzzling allocation, because
aeronautics, as I do the numbers, only represents about one-
seventeenth of the NASA budget. Would you care to comment on
why aeronautics took such a large share of the overall cut?
Dr. Lebacqz. The change in the budget from the fiscal '05
runout to the fiscal '06 request is a difference of a projected
increase of 5.8 percent from '05 to '06 in the '05 runout, and
an actual 2.4 percent. The Agency believed that we should try
to contribute, also, to the reduction in the deficit of the
country, and so, what we asked for was actually less than in
our previous runout. Within that, three Mission Directorates
actually received less money than they had in the runout of the
'05 budget, of which I am one. In our case, our runout was
flat, so receiving less means that we ended up getting less. In
the case of the other two, receiving less was just less than
the request would have been, but was still an increase.
That is about as far as I want to go with answering that
question.
Mr. Udall. Yeah. I----
Dr. Lebacqz. In fact, what I just told you----
Mr. Udall. I appreciate, in conclusion, the hard work you
do, and I still would stick by my statement that you have a
thankless task to come up here to the Hill and justify what I
think are worrisome cuts in a--the sort of endeavors that I
think are equal in importance to the space exploration programs
that we all support, and we have heard, I think, very
eloquently, why. It is national security. It is economic
opportunity. It is maintaining our workforce, exciting young
people to stay in engineering and math and technology fields,
and for all those reasons, I just want to again say I am very
concerned about the direction in which we are heading. I thank
the panel.
Dr. Lebacqz. Thank you, sir, and again, that is why I am
open, we in the Agency are open to a policy dialogue, across
the country. There are certainly a number of areas in which
breakthroughs in aeronautics are still waiting to be found,
including hypersonics, which was one of your original parts of
your question that I never got to, including rapid
demonstrations of transforming the national airspace system
through far more airborne autonomy, and a variety of other
things. So, that is why we need this policy dialogue.
Chairman Calvert. I thank the gentleman. Just a couple of
quick questions before we wrap this up. Dr. Klineberg, in your
study, the National Academy of Sciences, what did they have in
mind when they said ``disposing of underutilized facilities?''
Mothballing, shutting down completely, or what do you mean by
that?
Dr. Klineberg. We were just recognizing budget realities,
and realized those are a very--they are really expensive, some
facilities. And where there were facilities which were truly
duplicative, either of air force capability, or within NASA, we
thought, obviously, those needed to be shut down. But we didn't
look in detail. We urged NASA to do a study, and I know the
RAND Corporation, and my colleague here, Dr. Anton, in fact,
did that study, to take a look at those facilities.
Hypersonics
Chairman Calvert. Dr. Lebacqz, you mentioned hypersonics
just a second ago, and had I ever had him on the Armed Services
Committee, and obviously, this has some--obviously some defense
capability, potentially. How is DOD reacting to this, these
potential cuts? Have you heard from their compadres over there?
What do they have to say about that?
Dr. Lebacqz. I have a meeting this Friday, sir, with Dr.
Sega, DDR&E, on this subject. As you may have read in the Post
this morning, the--DARPA is moving forward with the Falcon
program, which is taking some of the things that we learned
from the X-43, and trying to take them to the next step. But we
will be having discussions with Dr. Sega on this subject.
Chairman Calvert. And how would you describe your
coordination with the Department of Defense, as of late?
Dr. Lebacqz. It is not as good as I would like it to be.
Chairman Calvert. Is NASA still involved, to any
significant degree, in some of the black operations that the
Department of Defense is involved in?
Dr. Lebacqz. I probably can't answer that.
Chairman Calvert. I mean, we are not asking you to describe
the program, just whether or not--is there----
Dr. Lebacqz. Yes. We have. Yes.
Chairman Calvert.--still--okay. Okay. Dr. Griffin, I know,
our new Administrator, is coming on, has very much been
involved in all of this, and we are certainly looking forward
to his involvement in this. Wrapping this up, I am looking
forward to us working toward a vision on aeronautics, as we
move toward these budget cuts. If that is what we are going to
do. And before, I think you are right, we have got to get the--
we can't have the tail wagging the dog here. We are going to
have to work out something that makes more sense, I think.
I certainly appreciate this panel. I certainly appreciate
your spending the time with us today. And with that, we are
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by J. Victor Lebacqz, Associate Administrator, Aeronautics
Research Mission Directorate, NASA
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
Q1. On May 3, 2005, you provided the Committee with a White Paper on
the Aeronautics Test Program that outlines your plans for NASA wind
tunnels in Fiscal Year (FY) 06 and beyond. What steps need to be taken
for this plan to be formally approved and put into effect? When do you
expect that process to be completed?
A1. As part of our FY 2007 budget formulation process, NASA is
considering initiation of the Aeronautics Test Program. The
deliberations within the Administration will culminate in the FY 2007
budget submission to Congress in February 2006.
Q2. The White Paper describes NASA as ``in general, concur[ring]''
with the recommendations of the RAND study of wind tunnels. Yet
clearly, the White Paper plan prioritizes wind tunnels quite
differently than RAND did, as the White Paper apparently considers the
rate of use of a tunnel as the primary classification criteria. Why did
you decide to reject RAND's notion that NASA needed to take into
consideration the uniqueness of facilities and potential future
national needs?
A2. The Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) has, or is
attempting to respond to the RAND study's eight conclusions and six
recommendations, including the development of an aeronautics test
facility plan, providing institutional (shared) funding to alleviate
the full-cost recovery burden from individual customers, maintaining
and investing in a minimum set of test facilities, etc. We diverge from
the RAND study with regards to our current selection of the ``minimum
set'' of ground test facilities that we believe to be important to
sustain for the future of NASA and the Nation's aeronautics needs. RAND
assessed 31 ground test facilities. NASA currently considers six of the
31 to be critical to sustain in full operational status. Ten of the 31
are to be kept in standby and used as needed, two are to be mothballed
because while we agree with RAND regarding their criticality, there is
simply no present or projected future work, four are to be closed, and
the other nine facilities that RAND assessed are to be maintained by
the field centers, without direct financial support from the ARMD.
These nine are mainly small, lab-type, hypersonics and engine test
facilities. During the current hiatus in hypersonics and turbomachinery
research by NASA, the Centers are most likely to not use these
facilities. At the same time, we do not anticipate that anything
irreversible will be done to these facilities which would preclude the
Agency from operating them future.
We assessed and then categorized the facilities based on
utilization, facility uniqueness and future national need. Assessing
both utilization and national need allowed us to consider the needs of
NASA Aeronautics, other NASA mission directorates, DOD, other
government agencies and the U.S. industry. Keeping the National
Transonic Facility in an operational status is an explicit
acknowledgement that the Nation's only flight Reynolds Number wind
tunnel, while not currently utilized by NASA Research Programs, is of
critical national importance. Similarly, many of the facilities that we
will put into standby have unique performance characteristics which
make them indispensable from a national perspective. So while NASA does
not currently need these facilities to meet Aeronautics Research
program requirements, we are committing NASA Aeronautics funding to
sustain these facilities, for the very reasons that RAND recommended.
Lastly, it should be noted that RAND defined nine NASA test facilities
that they deem to be ``detrimental to close.'' All of these nine
facilities are being maintained by NASA in either operational, stand-
by, or mothball conditions.
Q3. The White Paper states that NASA will be running a University
Research Project funded ``at one percent of the `after tax'.'' Please
describe what this means and what level of funding is anticipated for
the University Research Project in FY06. Would you expect the
University Research Project and the $1 million in university funds in
the Aeronautics Test Program to be all the money available for
universities from the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD)?
A3. The tax referred to are the Agency Corporate General and
Administrative (G&A) costs and the Mission Directorate budget required
to fund Mission Directorate operations. Approximately 10 percent of the
FY 2004 aeronautics budget ($106M of the $1,056M aeronautics budget)
went to universities. The estimate for FY 2005 is also projected to be
about 10 percent. For FY 2006, NASA anticipates that approximately 10
percent of $852M (or about $85M) will be with universities. The
University Research Project that NASA is considering would enable NASA
to seek from the university community revolutionary ideas for
aeronautics research that would not otherwise be possible if the
research were tied directly to the individual programs. If implemented,
this project would be part of the $85M.
Q4. How did NASA determine how many employees it would cut from the
ARMD in FY06? Were these cuts made pursuant to any strategy or were
they just a budgetary calculation? How will NASA determine which
employees to cut?
A4. Future ARMD workforce requirements at the NASA Centers were derived
as an integral part of the overall strategy for realigning the
Aeronautics Research program. As in any fiscal year, the process of
projecting future aeronautics-related workforce levels (and facility
needs) at the Centers began with the programmatic requirements
established by the Agency through the annual programming and budget
development process, culminating with the preparation of the FY 2006
President's budget as submitted to Congress. The FY 2006 NASA budget
reflects a major transformation in both the content and conduct of the
Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate's programs. With respect to
content, the ARMD program, in particular the Vehicle Systems Program,
has been transformed to focus on four ``barrier-breaking'' technology
demonstrations, emphasizing higher-risk research where the private
sector will not optimally invest due to risk and anticipated rate of
return (as opposed to more near-term development programs that are
typically the purview of the private sector). With respect to conduct,
ARMD will be placing a renewed emphasis on realizing best value for the
taxpayer's investment through a combination of competition models. One
aspect of the increased use of competition is expected to be a greater
contribution by the private sector to the conduct of NASA's aeronautics
research.
Both of the changes in strategic direction (i.e., content and
conduct) have the potential for a substantial impact on the NASA
workforce. Having established the transformed programmatic
requirements, ARMD--working with the Centers and the Agency's human
capital planning community--quantified the impact on workforce
requirements of the combination of a more focused research effort and
an increased private sector role. This impact was defined both in terms
of numbers of employees and in terms of specific skill mixes required
to implement anticipated programs. Workforce numbers and skills that
did not fall within the revised set of Aeronautics-related program
requirements then became the basis for future human capital actions
including buyouts and reassignments.
Q5. The proposed budget for FY06 reflects a decision to move away from
incremental subsonic research. Has NASA assessed the impact that would
have on the U.S. aircraft manufacturing industry? What is the evidence
that this work would be funded or carried out elsewhere?
A5. To ensure maximum benefit to the taxpayer, we are transforming part
of our investment in Aeronautics Research investment in order to more
sharply focus the investment on revolutionary, high-risk, ``barrier
breaking'' technologies. Toward this end, the NASA Aeronautics Vehicle
Systems Program (VSP) has been refocused away from evolutionary
research and technology development and toward more key revolutionary,
``barrier-breaking'' technology demonstration projects that address
critical public needs related to reduction of aircraft noise and
emissions, and enable new science missions. NASA's assessment is that
the revolutionary technologies developed within the next decade will
form the basis for a new generation of environmentally friendly
aircraft and will enhance U.S. competitiveness 20 years from now. The
work that was terminated to refocus the program is carried out
elsewhere. One example is the recent General Electric Aircraft Engines
announcement regarding the capability of their GEnx aircraft engine.
The following is extracted from GEAE brochures:
``The GEnx engine will achieve dramatic gains in fuel
efficiency and performance with significantly lower emissions
than other engines in its class. And the GEnx is the quietest
large commercial engine we have ever produced.
``And by incorporating our most advanced combustion technology
ever, the result will be an engine that will produce fewer
smog-causing emissions than the maximum allowed by 2008
international standards (94 percent fewer hydrocarbon emissions
and 57 percent nitrogen emissions), while consuming at least 15
percent less fuel than the engines they replace.
``With the use of our unique, super high bypass composite fan
design, these same aircraft are expected to be 30 percent
quieter than today's GE-powered aircraft.''
Q6. You have stated that hypersonics would be one of your top
priorities if money were restored to the ARMD budget. Why is that a top
priority? Are hypersonic aircraft likely to be used for commercial as
well as military purposes? What is the basis for your answer?
A6. A hypersonic technology demonstration is one of several candidates
that would be considered following completion of the current set of
demonstrations identified in the FY 2006 President's Budget Request for
aeronautics research. Examined for many years, hypersonic vehicles
provide the potential for low-cost, reliable access to low-Earth orbit.
NASA's interest is for long-term civilian purposes, however, the
military may find applicability for this type of vehicle. NASA's recent
success with the Hyper-X, in which a scramjet was flight demonstrated
at Mach 7 and 10, is the culmination of this work. However, many
breakthroughs are required before routine hypersonic access to space is
realized. Low-cost reliability means that these vehicles would
accomplish many take-offs and landings; NASA's success to date is
limited to two 10-second flights. Much research and technology work
remains to develop engines and airframes, particularly in high-
temperature materials and propulsion. Due to these challenges, a
hypersonic demonstrator is of potential interest.
Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
Q1. Administrator Gregory's recent testimony to the Science Committee
indicated that NASA has established ``core competencies'' at each of
the NASA Centers that ``must be maintained in order for the Agency's
mission to be achieved.'' I understand that NASA headquarters has had
each of the Centers do an assessment of the ``health'' of their core
competencies, that is, an assessment of whether any core competencies
are at risk of being lost or degraded.
Q1a. What have the aeronautical research Centers--Glenn, Langley,
Ames, and Dryden--reported regarding the health of their core
competencies?
Q1b. Have any of those Centers reported that their core competencies
are at risk? If so, where, and what competencies have they identified
as being at risk?
Q1c. What will NASA Headquarters do in response to those assessments?
Is NASA prepared to request additional funding to deal with the
problem?
A1a,b,c. Of the thirteen approved NASA core competencies located at the
four Research Centers (ARC, DFRC, GRC and LARC), six are associated
with the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate. These are Air
Transportation Management Systems (ARC), Atmospheric Flight Research
and Test (DFRC), Aeropropulsion (GRC) and Aerosciences, Aerospace
Materials and Structures, and Systems Analysis/Engineering and Safety
(LARC). It should be noted that the three Langley core competencies
also provide substantial support to all of the other NASA Mission
Directorates.
Following the identification and assignment of these core
competencies, each Center completed an initial assessment of the health
of each competency. This assessment consisted of an initial estimation
of the minimal investment (in people and facilities) required to
sustain the competency, coupled with programmatic guidance from the
four Mission Directorates regarding anticipated requirements for each
competency. Based on this initial assessment, the Centers reported that
all but one of the six aeronautics-related competencies faced potential
challenges beginning in FY 2005 (the exception being the Systems
Analysis/Engineering and Safety Competency at LARC). In FY 2005, the
primary factor behind a less than fully healthy assessment was the
accommodation of Congressional interest items (necessitating reductions
at the Centers to create funds for out-of-house contract awards); in FY
2006 and out the primary factors were changes in Mission Directorate
requirements.
There are still three important steps remaining in the first round
of the NASA Core Competency activity. First, each of the Mission
Directorates (including ARMD) is engaged in a dialogue with each Center
that has a related performing competency regarding the sizing of the
minimal sustainment level. Second, each of the Mission Directorates
continues, as part of the FY 2007 budget development process, to update
and clarify its anticipated programmatic requirements. Once these first
two steps are completed, the Agency will be able to complete a final
assessment of the projected health of each competency. As the third
step, strategies for dealing with any identified shortfalls in the
suite of NASA core competencies, for example additional Mission
Directorate or Agency investment, will be developed and dispositioned.
Q2. The NASA FY 2006 budget book discussion of NASA's Aviation Safety
and Security program states that ``Given the loss of critical
workforce/skills/facilities, there is the possibility that cost and
schedule may be impacted.''
Q2a. What is the reason for the loss of those critical workforce/
skills/facilities?
Q2b. Are they considered ``excess competencies'' by NASA? If so, why?
A2a,b. The section that is quoted is identifying the risks that the
program may encounter throughout its life cycle. As part of a risk
management plan, the program develops a mitigation strategy for each of
these potential events even though they are not currently an issue that
needs to be actively worked.
Loss of critical capabilities can occur for a myriad of reasons
including personnel turnover and skill mix, which is a normal process
for any long term program, (e.g., retirement, illness, new job
opportunities, etc.) whereas facility issues are normally unique, such
as breakdowns, multiple users vying for the same time, etc.
While the in-house skills and facilities are not excess, it may be
possible to accomplish the mission in an alternative manner if one is
lost or not available.
As an example, the LARC 757 research aircraft is a one of a kind
facility that is used to flight test aeronautical technologies. When
this aircraft encountered an extended safety stand down, the Aviation
Safety Program worked with airlines, aircraft manufacturers, etc. to
install and test NASA technologies on their vehicles. This resulted in
NASA technologies being flight tested without noticeable impact to the
original schedule even though a critical capability was not available.
As a bonus, these technologies were tested in an actual operational
environment, which enhanced the technology transfer process.
Similarly while personnel turnover is a normal activity, outside
forces may result in a significant local loss of personnel that will
have to be mitigated by use of other NASA, academia, or industry
assets. This may result in financial and cost impacts for the program.
Q3. Your budget shows a five-year funding plan for Vehicle Systems
with a focus on four breakthrough technology flight demonstration
projects. Please provide the funding profile for each of the four
Vehicle Systems demonstration projects over the five-year period, as
well as over the life of each project that extends beyond the five-year
period covered in the FY06 request. Please provide the specific
milestones for each project, as well as the specific accomplishments
anticipated at the end of the five-year period and at the completion of
each project.
A3. The Vehicle Systems program will demonstrate revolutionary
technology concepts through flight demonstrators that are beyond the
scope of conventional air vehicles. Preliminary plans are to focus on
the four specific projects that are described. Over the next year, the
program will work with the aeronautics community to define the scope of
the overall program. To initiate this discussion, preliminary
milestones have been developed for planning purposes. These preliminary
estimates are detailed below for each of the four projects.
Estimated budget:
Subsonic Noise Reduction: Continues the barrier breaking research for
reducing airport noise. A demonstration of noise reduction technologies
for large transport aircraft will establish a significant milestone
toward keeping objectionable noise within airport boundaries. The
demonstration will include advanced engine and airframe noise reduction
approaches as well as innovative continuous descent approaches to avoid
the objectionable changes in engine speed as an aircraft approaches the
airport.
Subsonic Noise Reduction will by the end of FY 2008 identify those
technologies that will contribute to a validated 10dB reduction, and by
the end of FY 2009, identify those technologies that will extend that
validated noise reduction to 15dB.
Sonic Boom Reduction: If nothing is done to break the barrier of
supersonic flight overland, it will take just as long to fly across the
country in the third century of flight as it did halfway through the
first century. The barrier to high-speed flight is defining a sonic
boom level that is acceptable to the general public, and designing an
aircraft top reach that level. On recent successful flight validation
of the theory that by altering the contours of a supersonic aircraft,
the shockwave and its accompanying sonic boom can be shaped resulting
in a greatly reduced sonic boom signature on the ground. Work will
investigate the formation of shaped waves and the human response to
shaped waves to allow developing an acceptable regulatory standard. The
Sonic Boom Reduction will culminate with a flight demonstration of a
low boom vehicle by the end of FY 2010.
HALE: NASA opened the doors to high altitude flight when it
successfully demonstrated the Helios. NASA will extend this
accomplishment through a series of high altitude long endurance
aircraft that will extend duration, range and payload capacity. The
first breakthrough will be a 14-day duration aircraft that flies at
over 50 thousand feet prior to the end of FY 2008, followed by a flight
demonstration that will achieve a 30-day endurance flight demonstration
by the end of FY 2010.
Zero Emissions Aircraft: Conventional turbo machinery powered by fossil
fuels can only incrementally address the need to reduce harmful NOX and
CO2 emissions from aircraft. A breakthrough demonstration of
an all-electric aircraft propulsion system will be the first step
towards an emissionless aircraft. NASA intends to conduct zero
emissions flight demonstrations mid-FY 2010.
Questions submitted by Representative Mark Udall
Q1. Why did NASA decide to discontinue rotorcraft research, despite
the National Research Council's recommendation that ``NASA should
conduct research in selected areas related to rotorcraft''?
A1. NASA has transformed the Vehicle Systems Program to focus on key
barrier-breaking demonstrations. While none of the initial set is a
rotorcraft follow-on, the mission directorate continues to monitor
advances in rotorcraft technology and maintains communication with the
industry (through the American Helicopter Society) and the Army in the
event that similar barrier-breaking opportunities arise.
More specifically, the Aviation Safety & Security Program continues
to examine ways to extend fixed-wing aircraft technology development,
such as synthetic vision and weather information systems, to
rotorcraft. This was the specific recommendation of the NRC.
Q2. Please provide the five-year NASA funding profile required to meet
the objectives of the JPDO Integrated Plan. How does that compare to
the five-year funding plan for NASA's Airspace Systems program?
A2. The JPDO is still in the process of developing the integrated
roadmap for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS). The
integrated roadmap should be completed by the end of the calendar year.
Until such time, the specific funding profile required to meet the
NGATS plan is unknown. Once the funding requirements are known, NASA
will review its Airspace Systems Program to ensure appropriate
alignment.
Q3. In 2001 NASA and DOD entered into a joint National Aerospace
Initiative (NAI) that identified hypersonic research as an important
focus for both near-term and long-term efforts. Furthermore, your
testimony at the March 16th hearing showcased NASA's initial
accomplishments in this area of research. Given that, why didn't NASA
request any funding for hypersonic research in FY 2006? Was the reason
budgetary?
A3. The NASA investment in hypersonic research culminated in successful
flight demonstrations at nearly Mach 7 and Mach 10 in FY 2004. In FY
2005, NASA, under an item of special Congressional interest, is
focusing on analyzing and transferring technical information to assist
the Air Force with their X-43C activities. In FY 2006, NASA has no
requirement for a hypersonic vehicle to meet its launch requirements
for the new Exploration Vision and therefore, the Agency terminated its
Next Generation Launch Technology program. With other aeronautics
programmatic priorities in FY 2006, it was not possible to propose
additional hypersonic research in the President's Budget Request.
However, we will continue to assess the Nation's hypersonic
requirements and options for the future.
Q4. NASA apparently is considering closing down additional
``underutilized'' facilities in part to free up funds for the
exploration initiative. Aeronautical test facilities and the
technicians that operate them have been identified as likely targets.
However, a recent RAND Corporation assessment prepared for NASA
concluded that: ``NASA should maintain nearly all of its 31 major wind
tunnel and propulsion test facilities to support research, development,
production, and sustainment by the Nation's aeronautic industry.''
Q4a. Have you reviewed the RAND assessment?
Q4b. Do you agree with it?
Q4c. What is NASA planning to do about the 31 test facilities and
associated workforce cited in the RAND assessment?
A4a,b,c. The RAND project team briefed NASA management at multiple
points during the conduct of the RAND study, including a final briefing
summarizing their findings.
We believe that the RAND team did a commendable job of not only
assessing the current state of, and environment surrounding, NASA's
major aerodynamic and propulsion ground test facilities, but also of
developing and using an assessment method that can be applied as
national and programmatic requirements continue to evolve. In general,
we concur with the RAND team on the basic substance of all of their
findings and recommendations. In particular, we agree with their
findings that ground test facilities (along with computational tools
and flight assets) are still critical components of a research and
technology program; that nearly all of the facilities studied can serve
strategic national needs (but not necessarily NASA needs, a point to
which we will return below); that NASA's portfolio of facilities is in
mixed health; and that NASA should provide some type of shared
financial support to a minimum set of test facilities.
With respect to their specific recommendations, we agree that it is
important to develop an aeronautics test technology vision (although we
would stress that such a vision should be driven by, and an integral
part of, and overall national aeronautics policy); that NASA should
continue to develop plans to modernize facilities; that NASA should
prescribe common management and accounting guidance for these
facilities; and that NASA should work with the Department of Defense to
address the viability of a ``national reliance plan'' for major ground
test facilities. In fact, NASA's Aeronautics Research Mission
Directorate is pursuing implementation of all of these recommendations
as part of the FY 2006 and FY 2007 budget processes.
As mentioned above, however, RAND developed and used a methodology
that can be applied as national and programmatic requirements continue
to evolve. As does any such study of this type, the RAND study began
with, and was grounded in, an assessment of future national
aeronautics-related research and technology requirements, as well as in
an assessment of the total available suite (government, industry, and
academia) of major ground test facilities. As either national and
programmatic requirements or the suite of available facilities changes,
so does the minimum set of facilities that NASA may need to retain. In
particular, NASA's projected programmatic requirements have evolved
substantially since the RAND team evaluated those requirements almost
three years ago. In addition, RAND stated that nearly all of the
existing NASA facilities served national needs, not necessarily NASA
needs. As requirements change, it may be more appropriate to have
operators other than NASA (for example, the DOD) operate specific
facilities that they require, but that NASA may not. Finally, from the
perspective of efficient facility operation, it may make more sense to
operate a somewhat smaller set of facilities at a higher rate of
utilization than it does to operate a larger suite of facilities at
lower utilization rates (assuming, of course, that technical
requirements can be satisfied with either approach). Given these three
factors (i.e., evolving NASA requirements, related national
requirements, and efficient facility operation), an updated application
of the RAND process coupled with these other considerations may well
result in a different optimum set of minimum facilities for NASA than
that recommend by RAND at the conclusion of their study.
Q5. The National Academies panel led by Dr. Klineberg recommended that
``NASA should reconstitute a long-term base research program, separate
from the other aeronautics technology programs and projects.''
Q5a. Do you agree or disagree with that recommendation?
Q5b. If you agree with it, what level of funding is provided for that
base research program for each of the years FY06-10, where is the
funding located, and what is the content of the base research program?
A5a,b. NASA agrees with the intent of the recommendations to ensure
adequate level of funding for long-term research. Each of ARMD's three
programs has approximately 20 percent of the funding in long-term
research. In the outyears, we plan to consolidate this funding into a
new Foundational Technology Program that captures long-term cross-
cutting base research & technology activities as well as those
providing support of ARMD core competencies.
Questions submitted by Representative Michael M. Honda
Q1. How has the percentage of NASA's budget for aeronautics research
changed over the past decade and, in particular, over the last three
years? Your budget presentation numbers to Committee staffers in
February only presented total program dollars. Under Full-Cost
Accounting, how have direct expenditures for each of the NASA
aeronautics programs (i.e., the procurement dollars, civil servant
salary dollars, and contractor salary dollars) at each of the four
centers (Ames, Dryden, Glenn, Langley) changed over the past three
years and how is NASA proposing to change those numbers in FY06 and
outyears?
A1. Please see data in the following graphs and tables:
1. Overall aeronautics funding level history
2. Percentage of NASA budget over the past two decades
3. Overall budget request
4. Four NASA Center breakdown according to preliminary
planning
(Note: HSR and AST in the chart below refer to the High Speed
Research and Advanced Subsonic Technology programs.)
As a percentage of the NASA budget, the Aeronautics budget peaked
during the FY 1993 through FY 1999 time period when the High Speed
Research (HSR) and the Advanced Subsonic Technology (AST) Programs
existed. Both of these focused programs terminated at the end of FY
1999 which resulted in a reduced funding level for Aeronautics.
Note: The Aeronautics budget numbers are not full cost; they do not
include personnel costs, such as salaries and travel and Institutional
CoF
The table below reflects FY 2003 Constant-year dollars (inflated).
Q2. How extensively has NASA consulted with the airlines and with
pilots' organizations on what types of R&D are most crucial to aviation
safety and to the efficiency of operations? How are the airlines'
perspectives represented in the priorities of the Aeronautics Research
Mission Directorate (ARMD)?
A2. From its inception as the Aviation Safety Program in 2000, the
management team of the Aviation Safety and Security Program (AvSSP) has
proactively reached out to the airlines in defining and assessing its
research and development portfolio.
In program and project formulation phases, AvSSP has conducted
well-attended planning workshops that have included all sectors of the
aviation community, including representatives from airlines and the Air
Transport Association, as well as airline pilot unions.
In many of the Program's research activities, project managers
conduct User Needs studies. Through these studies, project managers and
principal investigators conduct focused interviews with product user
representatives to identify user-specific issues and capability gaps.
The product user representatives usually target airline and pilot
representatives. This information is used to formulate specific
research issues and guide and focus research and development
activities.
For program relevance reviews, airline representatives have always
been members of the AvSSP review teams. Currently, the AvSSP relevance
reviews are conducted under the Federal Advisory Committee framework,
with a subcommittee specifically to review the AvSSP.
The AvSSP is a voting member of the Commercial Aviation Strategy
Team (CAST), which is the entity within the U.S. that is defining and
implementing commercial aviation safety enhancements that are projected
to decrease the U.S. fatal accident rate by 73 percent. CAST is chaired
by both an FAA official and an airline representative. Manufacturers
and pilot organizations are also represented on CAST. The AvSSP Program
Manager is a member of the CAST Executive Committee, which manages the
CAST processes and defines the strategic direction of the group.
AvSSP has been successful in achieving airline participation in its
research and development efforts. Through NASA Research Announcements,
research teams were selected that have included airline members.
Currently, NASA technologies are being flown on revenue flights with
two airline partners, Delta and Mesaba (a regional airline).
Q3. In your opinion, what are the aeronautical R&D activities for
which a government laboratory is required or best suited for the job?
For example, how can the private sector analyze flight safety issues
across the industry free of conflicts of interests or promote expensive
long-range developments that cannot be profitable for at least a
decade?
A3. Problems with the environment and other elements of the aviation
infrastructure, such as air system capacity and air traffic control are
not easily addressed by the private sector. The resulting delays, noise
and emissions pollution are not even priced in the marketplace.
Economists term these problems ``externalities'' because, unlike other
costs, no market participant pays for them directly. As a result, the
private sector has inadequate incentive for addressing the very real
challenges associated with aviation. This is the situation at work in
the example of expecting the private sector to analyze flight safety,
or the promotion of long-range activities-neither will be profitable in
the near-term, and there is no obvious single or shared point of
responsibility among the competitors in the marketplace.
Developing, maintaining, and regulating national transportation
infrastructures, as well as other significant areas such as national
security, are the responsibilities of the government. The civil R&D
activities required in this task include air system capacity (which is
a complex ``system of systems,'' including human performance elements,
cockpit design and communications), noise and emissions reduction,
aviation safety, and elements of security. Many NASA stakeholders and
customers believe the government also has responsibility for
maintaining a strong technology base for air and space transportation
to ensure competitiveness of the U.S. economy. New technologies as well
as technology advances in traditional and emerging study areas of
aeronautics, such as power and propulsion, materials and structures,
aerodynamics, etc., will enable the private sector to develop new
capabilities and operating paradigms into products and services that
will compete globally.
This is a multifaceted issue that government can affect as a direct
or indirect result of policy. The aerospace industry remains critically
dependent on technology. Even as NASA's priorities change to meet the
changing needs of society, it still pursues long-term efforts in
aerospace science and technology; efforts that would not be made
otherwise, by the private sector or other government agencies. NASA
continues to play a unique role by connecting research infrastructure
in both the private and public sectors. In this regard, partnerships
remain a critical element in disseminating and applying NASA-developed
technologies.
Q4. How will the proposed reductions in NASA's aeronautics budget help
bolster American's global leadership in aviation? How will the budget
cuts impact NASA's ability to support the Joint Planning and
Development Office's Integrated Plan? In your best judgment, do you
believe the proposed cuts will be good for NASA aeronautics, the
Agency, the JPDO, and the Nation?
A4. NASA's Aeronautics research is vital to the Nation in our work for
the public good to increase safety, reduce adverse environmental
impacts, and transform air transportation. This budget supports NASA's
emphasis to address basic aeronautical barriers confronting our
national aviation system and supports research to pioneer and validate
high-value technologies that enable new exploration and discovery, and
improve the quality of life though practical applications. The
President's FY 2006 Budget supports the Aeronautics program's vital
research in Aviation Safety and Security and Airspace Systems. To
ensure maximum benefit to the taxpayer, we are transforming part of our
investment in Aeronautics Research investment in order to more sharply
focus the investment on revolutionary, high-risk, ``barrier breaking''
technologies. Toward this end, the NASA Aeronautics Vehicle Systems
Program (VSP) has been refocused away from evolutionary research and
technology development and toward more revolutionary, ``barrier-
breaking'' technology demonstration projects that address critical
public needs related to reduction of aircraft noise and emissions, and
enable new science missions. The revolutionary technologies developed
by NASA within the next decade will form the basis for a new generation
of environmentally friendly aircraft and will enhance U.S.
competitiveness in 20 years from now.
NASA has a major role in the JPDO and the Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NGATS). While NASA is performing aeronautics
research that provides the foundation to enable NGATS and the right
strategies, we are also providing civil servants and direct support to
the JPDO. NASA is providing civil service employees to serve as the
JPDO Deputy Director (SES), Agile Air Traffic System IPT Lead (SES),
and a Board member (SES), as well as 11 other full or part time civil
servants. NASA financial support to the JPDO was $5.4M in FY 2004. This
has increased to $5.6M in FY 2005 and is currently planned to increase
to $10M in FY 2006. We are also conducting a network-enabled operations
(NEO) demonstration of security and capacity related technologies. This
demonstration, jointly sponsored by NASA, DOD, DHS, and DOT, could
prove to be valuable in integrating government-wide intelligence
operations, providing significant aid to our national security.
Q5. With a large portion of the aeronautics budget being set aside for
competition among industry, universities, NASA centers, and others for
very large technology demonstrations, how can ARMD assure that the
remaining budget for ``seed corn'' be large enough to sustain a
critical mass of scientists and engineers and to address the Nation's
long-range critical needs?
A5. Approximately 20 percent of each of our current aeronautics
programs is targeted toward basic research that provides the foundation
for the next generation of technology advancements required by NASA's
aeronautics' goals.
Q6. Why is ARMD ignoring the National Research Council's
recommendation to set up a new base long-term R&D program?
A6. NASA agrees with the intent of the NRC's recommendations for long-
term basic research. Each of ARMD's three programs has approximately 20
percent of the funding in long-term research. In the outyears, we are
considering the consolidation of this funding into a new Foundational
Technology Program that captures long-term cross-cutting base research
& technology activities as well as those providing support of ARMD core
competencies.
Q7. How did ARMD participate in NASA's Human Capital planning effort
to target more than 2,000 civil service jobs for elimination by the
beginning of FY07? How was it determined that Dryden, Glenn, and
Langley were to lose more than a third of their aeronautics technical
employees? With such substantial reductions in the number of scientists
and engineers at NASA centers conducting aeronautics R&D projected in
your budget plans, will your programs be able to maintain their current
exemplary technical quality? Will it be possible to reacquire these
lost skills, if this move were to prove unwise?
A7. The process of projecting future aeronautics-related workforce
levels and facility needs at the Research Centers begins with the
programmatic requirements established by the Agency through the annual
programming and budget development process, culminating with the
preparation of (in this case) the FY 2006 President's budget as
submitted to Congress. The FY 2006 NASA budget reflects a major
transformation in both the content and conduct of the Aeronautics
Research Mission Directorate's programs. With respect to content, the
ARMD program, in particular the Vehicle Systems Program, has been
transformed to focus on four ``barrier-breaking'' technology
demonstrations, emphasizing higher-risk research where the private
sector will not optimally invest due to risk and anticipated rate of
return (as opposed to more near-term development programs that are
typically the purview of the private sector). With respect to conduct,
ARMD will be placing a renewed emphasis on realizing best value for the
taxpayer's investment through a combination of competition models. One
aspect of the increased use of competition is expected to be a greater
contribution by the private sector to the conduct of NASA's aeronautics
research. ARMD, working with the Research Centers and the Agency's
human capital planning community, then quantified the impact on
workforce (and facility) requirements of this combination of a more
focused research effort and an increased private sector role. At the
same time, changing requirements from other Mission Directorates either
added to or reduced the total workforce projection, resulting in the
final numbers inherent in the FY 2006 budget submit.
Although there are numerous human capital management changes
associated with implementing a change of this magnitude, including some
near-term issues associated with buyouts and other workforce transition
mechanisms, we believe that the Research Centers will retain the
quality technical workforce required by ARMD for successful execution
of its future programs. As part of the final phase of the ongoing NASA
Core Competency exercise, NASA will address any issues of potential
loss of skills that may be required by other Agency programs in the
future.
Q8. How are you planning on safeguarding your critical aeronautics
facilities (wind tunnels, simulators, virtual control tower, etc.. .
.)? In particular, how are you coordinating with Admiral Steidle to
save ``dual-use'' facilities that support both aeronautics and space
exploration efforts? For example, recently, at Ames, dozens of contract
employees who have worked at the Vertical Motion Simulator were let go
(some had extremely specific valuable expertise and experience having
worked there for decades) leaving the facility all but shutdown. Why is
this being allowed to happen given the historical support of this
unique facility for aeronautics testing of human-system control
interactions, for shuttle pilot training, and the likely future
critical need for CEV development work?
A8. Recognizing the importance of major test facilities to both NASA
and the Nation, the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate is
considering a new approach to the management of major ground test
facilities. Through an Aeronautics Test Program (ATP), ARMD would plan
to make a strategic investment in such facilities--in some cases to
ensure continued operational availability and in some cases to ensure
that a minimal level of funds are available until future users require
those facilities. Discussions with other current and potential users,
including but not limited to the Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate, have been an integral part of the investment process.
Through the ATP, NASA would be able to ensure that critical facilities
are available for an additional period of time while future
requirements develop. With respect to the Vertical Motion Simulator
(VMS) at Ames, contract layoffs during FY 2005 have been required in
order to accommodate decisions made regarding Congressional earmarks.
Future requirements for the VMS are being defined as part of the
ongoing budget process.
Q9. Is NASA able to provide the stable, predictable funding of
individual long-range R&D studies necessary for success? What
percentage of time are NASA scientists and engineers expected to devote
to conducting R&D versus program planning, reporting, advocacy, and
proposal writing? Under this environment, how do you foresee NASA's
ability to continue despite the GS wage penalty to recruit the best and
the brightest who used to come to NASA to avoid these hassles in the
private sector and academia and to focus instead nearly exclusively on
cool R&D? If individuals or groups of entrepreneurial scientists and
engineers are responsible for teaming and finding their own ``seed
corn'' or for finding their own niche in a large external proposal as
well as performing the R&D itself, what then is the role of management?
A9. As part of the transformation of the aeronautics research program,
the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate is in the process of
establishing a ``foundational technology'' effort that will provide the
long range ``seed corn'' for future breakthrough demonstrations. At the
moment, the foundational technology effort comprises three components--
basic research and development, university-based fundamental and
applied research, and a strategic investment in major aeronautics test
facilities. The combination of these investments will enable ARMD to
support a stable, ongoing effort in longer-term R&D.
Q10. By setting aside a large portion of the aeronautics budget for a
very small number of large demonstration projects in which corporations
will play a large role, is not ARMD prejudging which areas of industry
should prosper over others? How is such an approach consistent with
free and open competition? Furthermore, consider an analogy to NIH's
successful campaign to eradicate polio, in which NIH chose to support a
wide array of long-range, science-driven studies to discover the polio
virus, how it infests humans, and how it could be stopped from doing
so, rather than striving to develop more technologically-advanced iron
lungs. What evidence is there that large government investment in a
small number of expensive demonstration projects is the best approach
to stimulating bona fide technology breakthroughs?
A10. By focusing the Aeronautics Research program on breakthrough
demonstrations, NASA will actually be expanding--not limiting--the
areas in which others might invest. These demonstration efforts will
address technologies and concepts that are still too unproven or risky
to attract attention and capital from the private sector or other
interested parties. It should also be noted that the selection of the
demonstrations themselves has been, and will be, guided by inputs from
a wide variety of sources, including the National Research Council.
NASA feels it can continue to attract the best and brightest to perform
aeronautics research. The demonstration projects offer opportunities
for scientists and engineers to be part of breakthroughs, such as our
recent success on the X-43A program. And, as noted in Questions 5 and 6
above, the long-term basic research offers opportunities for high-risk
research that may lead to future demonstrations. NASA has had success
in advancing the state-of-the-art in aeronautical research and
technology using both focused demonstrations and a broader, more
fundamental research effort. And, NASA plans to continue pursuing both
avenues through the combination of the barrier-breaking demonstrations
and a fundamental technology investment. The ARMD Program as submitted
in the FY 2006 budget simply shifts the balance between the
breakthrough and the fundamental to optimize the government's
investment.
Q11. Four of the five Field Centers that are reporting extreme
workforce distress have had a tradition of focusing on aeronautics. Why
do you think that your centers and Ames are planning such dramatic
workforce downsizing? Does it not worry you that these Centers are
planning on losing more than a third of a workforce that has dedicated
their lives to primarily to aeronautics, many of whom have been and
continue to be world-class contributors to NASA's mission? How is this
consistent with the ``NASA family'' value that management has been
touting? Do you believe this course of action is best for the future of
NASA aeronautics, the Agency, and the Nation?
A11. This question was addressed in #7 above.
Q12. Are you not worried that the increase of direct NASA funding to
aircraft manufacturers, such as Boeing, or other aeronautics industry
entities that may result from NASA's ``competition'' for aeronautics
R&D work will violate the GATT? If not, why not?
A12. The objective of increased competition is to ensure the best value
for the taxpayers' money. The aeronautics research that will be
completed targets technologies that are ``beyond the horizon'' of the
aeronautics industry. Since the results are available equally to all of
industry, it is not a violation of GATT.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by John M. Klineberg, Committee Chairman, National Research
Council Panel
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
Q1. The National Academy of Sciences study recommended that NASA
``dispose of underutilized facilities.'' What did the Academy mean by
that? Should NASA consider any factors other than current utilization
in deciding which wind tunnels to maintain? Do you believe that NASA
needs to close down at least some of its wind tunnels to maintain a
viable research program given the budget outlook?
A1. Our committee completed its report in November 2003, before the
latest round of budget cuts. At that time we already were concerned
that NASA was trying to do too much within the available funding. For
this reason, we recommended that NASA ``continue to dispose of
underutilized facilities,'' meaning that they should continue to look
at their facilities, particularly those that were not unique, with the
goal of consolidation or deactivation as a way to reduce long-term
fixed costs.
We specifically recommended that NASA not use current utilization
as the only consideration in deciding which facilities to close. In our
comments about full-cost accounting, we stated the following: ``The
committee is concerned that, if not carefully managed, full-cost
accounting could result in (1) the closure of critical infrastructure
and special-purpose facilities that will be needed for future program
execution and (2) a disincentive to use large-scale facilities and
flight test to fully demonstrate technology readiness.'' As a result of
item (2), we cautioned that: ``The testing infrastructure will be
underutilized and will not generate the resources needed to sustain
it.''
Given the budget outlook, it is evident that NASA needs to do
everything possible, including placing some of its wind tunnels in
stand-by mode, to attempt to maintain a viable research program. It is
very possible that they already have decommissioned all the facilities
that are appropriate to close. My personal concern, as I stated in my
testimony to the Committee, is that the current reduced funding levels
may have put NASA very close to the point at which ``This program is on
its way to becoming irrelevant to the future of aeronautics in this
country and in the world.''
Q2. If the budget for aeronautics is limited, is it more important for
NASA to fund long-term, high-risk research or to continue with
incremental subsonic research? Should improving air traffic control be
the top priority for NASA's research program?
A2. This critical issue was not addressed by our National Academies
Committee. The NASA Administrator, the Associate Administrator for
Aeronautics, the program managers at NASA headquarters and their
counterparts at the field centers, working in conjunction with the
various aeronautics advisory committees, all are responsible for
addressing this question.
Our committee did not set priorities among the various parts of the
program. We were chartered to assess NASA's Aeronautics Technology
Programs at their then (FY 2003) funding level, which we did by
performing an in-depth examination of the various technical elements to
identify strengths and weaknesses. We attempted to answer the following
four questions:
1. Is the array of activities about right?
2. Is there a good plan to carry out the program?
3. Is the program doing what it set out to do?
4. Is the entire effort connected to the users?
Our conclusion was that ``in general, the Aeronautics Technology
programs are very good but could be greatly improved by following the
committee's 12 top-level recommendations.''
I believe our committee would agree that the answer to the question
of priorities is that it is important to pursue both long-term and
short-term research. We need to continue to improve the reliability,
safety and cost effectiveness of subsonic transports and the
effectiveness of the air traffic control system. And we also need to
investigate ``innovative concepts that are critical to meeting aviation
needs in the next decades.''
NASA should develop advanced technology that addresses today's
critical problems in air transportation. NASA also should establish the
technical foundation for future improvements that may be beyond the
time horizon of the industry or the FAA.
Q3. How high a priority should research on hypersonics be? If NASA
aeronautics research were flat funded in Fiscal Year (FY) 06, that is,
given $54 million more than the President has proposed, where would you
put that money?
A3. Our National Academies Committee did not address these issues, of
course, since they are primarily directed at decisions concerning
NASA's FY 2006 aeronautics budget.
The Committee did conclude, however, that hypersonics was an
appropriate area for research and that it was an example of the high-
risk, high-payoff technologies that NASA should pursue. The Hyper-X
sub-project also was identified as one of the best planned activities
in the entire program. The Committee's support for research in this
area was not so much because we were convinced in the potential
viability of a hypersonic-cruise airplane, but because we believed that
hypersonics serves as an important focus for innovative thinking about
advanced concepts in propulsion, aerodynamics, structures, materials,
controls, handling qualities, etc.
As to where to put the additional funds, an increase of $54
million, even if it does not fully restore the FY 2006 run-outs to the
earlier program, is a very substantial change. I would recommend that
NASA be allowed to re-plan the aeronautics program to the new funding
level with the goal of reducing some of the onerous disruptions
previously contemplated.
Questions submitted by Representative Mark Udall
Q1. Some have argued that aviation is a mature industry and thus the
Federal Government should no longer invest in aeronautics R&D. Do you
agree or disagree with that conclusion?
A1. I personally do not believe that aviation is a mature industry. In
fact, I would argue that it is an industry that will change
dramatically in the near future if it is to remain viable. Commercial
air transportation is so vital to the economic well-being of this
country that it cannot be allowed to become a major inhibitor of
increased productivity.
The pressures for change are there, for example in the financial
problems currently experienced by all major airlines, problems that are
becoming worse as the price of jet fuel increases. Air travel also has
become less enjoyable for the traveling public, with long lines for
security at airports, fewer on-time arrivals and more frequent delays
because of air traffic congestion. The entire commercial air
transportation system seems to be headed for eventual gridlock.
On the manufacturing side, Boeing, our single remaining commercial
aircraft provider and the largest exporter of U.S. products, is facing
serious competition in the world market from a subsidized European
competitor and may not be able to be profitable in building commercial
transport aircraft. And our jet engine manufacturers, Pratt and General
Electric, need the revenue from the service business and the sale of
derivative stationary power plants to remain in business. A viable air
transportation system will not be possible unless all of its components
have the opportunity for dramatic improvement.
The solutions are complex. We need to develop advanced transport
aircraft of various sizes and different capabilities that are
considerably more fuel efficient, easier to maintain, and more
environmentally friendly than the current fleet. We need to develop
aircraft that can be operated by one or two on-board personnel
supervising the control system of a semi-autonomous vehicle, rather
than operated by highly-trained (and costly) pilots and crew as we do
today. And we need transport aircraft that are as part of an efficient,
safe, secure, weather-independent and predictable world-wide air
traffic control system. Aeronautics R&D certainly can help provide the
foundation for these improvements.
Q2. Your panel recommended that ``NASA should conduct research in
selective areas relevant to rotorcraft.'' Why did your panel make that
recommendation? What areas did the panel consider to be worthy of
research by NASA?
A2. Our committee was unhappy to learn that NASA had abandoned all
rotorcraft research because the OMB apparently had decided that because
the Army is a major beneficiary of such work, the research should be
funded as part of the DOD budget. This is a narrow point of view and
ignores the difficulty of having an operational organization be
responsible for R&D. As a result, rotorcraft research in this country
has suffered in recent years.
The committee felt that rotary wing aircraft are probably the
aeronautical vehicle system most in need of substantial technology
advancements in structures, materials, aerodynamics, displays, controls
and handling qualities if they are to become more efficient, safer and
more reliable. These areas of disciplinary research deserve attention
by NASA.
The committee made several specific suggestions in the report, as
follows: ``Rotorcraft are an important constituent of air
transportation. Many of the research projects currently underway in the
Aeronautics Technology Programs, such as synthetic vision and human
factors, would be directly relevant to rotorcraft with only minimal
additional investment. NASA could make a significant impact in under-
researched areas of rotorcraft such as decision aids, synthetic vision,
pilot workload, and situational awareness. Further, the existing U.S.
Army programs in rotorcraft technologies and industry research and
development in rotorcraft could be leveraged by NASA to meet civilian
needs in this area.''
This recommendation was stated in another section of the report as
follows: ``NASA led many of the revolutions in rotorcraft design that
we now find in the commercial and military sectors. Unfortunately,
however, the NASA plans reviewed by the panel had no focused rotorcraft
activities. If the U.S. rotorcraft industry is to remain competitive in
the international marketplace, NASA leadership and innovation will be
required to respond to the European and Asian products now entering the
market.''
Q3. Your testimony states that ``. . .NASA's decision to discontinue
rotorcraft research has left critical civilian needs unaddressed.'' Can
you provide some specific examples of critical needs that will be
unaddressed?
A3. This question is answered, in part, above. In addition, some
examples are contained in on of the Committee's specific
recommendations in the report, as follows: ``The Aviation Safety
Program should reincorporate rotorcraft research into its program. The
research should consider the most effective approaches for reducing the
workload of rotorcraft pilots and improving their ability to conduct
safe, low speed, low altitude rotorcraft operations in obstacle-rich
environments and in adverse weather.''
Rotorcraft have many specific civilian applications, such as in
medical emergencies, highway traffic monitoring and control, police
assistance of all kinds and logging in remote regions. One of their
major uses, in this era of increasingly limited energy supplies, is in
the maintenance and supply of off-shore drilling platforms throughout
the world. Many aspects of these civilian operations are not address by
technology activities that focus only on military requirements.
Q4. What will be the impact of OMB's directive to NASA eliminating
federal research in subsonic transport aeronautics?
Will it be possible to make major breakthroughs in noise and fuel
consumption and aviation safety and security research in the future
without being able to treat the subsonic transport aircraft as an
integrated system?
A4. Our committee completed its report in November 2003 and therefore
did not review NASA's response to this latest round of budget cuts. At
that earlier time, however, we already were concerned about the lack of
funding for important areas of research that could provide major
breakthroughs to enable the air transportation system of the future.
The committee made the following recommendation in the report:
``Many innovative concepts that are critical to meeting aviation needs
in the next decades will not be pursued by industry or the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). NASA should fill this void. The
committee applauds the inclusion of high-risk, revolutionary sub-
projects in many areas and believes the program portfolio could benefit
from additional far-reaching efforts with the potential for high
payoff. This type of research is critical to investigating the
feasibility of innovative concepts and reducing risk to the point where
the concepts are suitable for advanced development and transfer to
industry or the FAA.''
Q5. Did your panel consider hypersonics research to be an appropriate
activity for NASA to pursue? Why or why not?
A5. Our committee believed strongly that hypersonic research was an
appropriate area for NASA research and that it was very much in keeping
with one of the top-level recommendations, that ``NASA should pursue
more high-risk, high-payoff technologies.''
One of the major activities in hypersonics was singled out for
praise as follows: ``The Hyper-X sub-project shows some of the best
planning seen across all the programs reviewed by the committee. The
NASA planning reflects the high-risk aspect of this task by providing
for three vehicles and anticipating possible loss. The first flight
test was not successful because a rocket booster failed, demonstrating
the wisdom of the contingency aspect of this plan.''
The committee continued its uncharacteristic praise as follows:
``The sub-project is well connected programmatically to its
antecedents, another of its notable features. Indeed, many of the
detailed aspects to be investigated are directed at answering key
questions surrounding hypersonic flight. By virtue of careful
consideration of this background and good planning, the goals of the
sub-project are realistic and the risk associated with it has been
mitigated. The ultimate goal is to demonstrate positive net thrust of
the scramjet; this is a laudable, though difficult, goal that the
committee hopes can be achieved.''
Q6. Is NASA's establishment of a focused effort in four breakthrough
technology demonstration projects fully responsive to the findings and
recommendations of your panel regarding NASA's overall Vehicle Systems
program? Are the goals of the demonstration projects achievable under
the Vehicle Systems five-year budget plan?
A6. Again, our committee completed its report in November 2003 and
therefore did not review NASA's response to the latest round of budget
cuts. The ground rules we established for our committee precluded us
from recommending an increase in funding for NASA so that we could
focus on providing an independent review of the technical quality of
the work being conducted. At that time, however, we already were
concerned that NASA was attempting to do too much within the available
budget, and for this reason we recommended that NASA attempt to improve
its processes for program management, reduce the number of tasks in its
technology portfolio and consolidate or deactivate underutilized
aeronautics facilities.
The current budget is considerably reduced from the one we reviewed
and as such makes continued progress even more difficult. As I said in
my oral testimony before the committee: ``This program is on its way to
becoming irrelevant to the future of aeronautics in this country and in
the world.''
Q7. Your panel recommended that ``NASA should reconstitute a long-term
base research program, separate from other aeronautics technology
projects and programs.''
What would such a base research program consist of, and does the
restructured aeronautics R&D program contained in NASA's FY 2006 budget
request adequately address your panel's recommendation?
A7. The committee's concern about NASA's base research program was of
such magnitude that it was addressed in three top-level
recommendations, as follows: NASA should eliminate arbitrary time
constraints on program completion. . . NASA should pursue more high-
risk, high-payoff technologies. . . and NASA should reconstitute a
long-term base research program, separate from the other aeronautics
technology programs and projects.''
This last recommendation was further elaborated as follows: ``The
current research is mostly product-driven, with not enough fundamental
work. Fundamental research is crucial for the development of future
products. NASA needs to provide researchers the opportunity to conduct
forward-looking, basic research that is unencumbered by short-term,
highly specified goals and milestones. Historically, NASA has been a
world leader in its core research areas; however, that base has eroded
in recent years as the amount of in-house basic research diminishes.
NASA needs to reassess its core competencies and assure their support
through a base research program.''
We have not been briefed on NASA's FY 2006 budget request to be
certain that this recommendation has been adequately addressed. We
suspect that, because of the very serious fiscal constraints imposed on
the program, there is no longer adequate funding for NASA to pursue
those technologies that have a high risk of unsuccessful completion
(high risk/high payoff) and that the industry is unwilling to fund on
its own. Unfortunately, over the past two decades the industry has
reduced its investment in basic research, which serves at the seed corn
for future technology opportunities. The committee was very concerned
that NASA aeronautics is following this same path.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Philip S. Anton, Director, Center for Acquisition and
Technology Policy, RAND\1\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, State, or local
legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
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Questions submitted by Representative Mark Udall
Q1. Is aeronautics mature?
A1. Parts of aeronautics are mature while others are evolving. Some
aeronautic sectors have shown marked reductions in new vehicle
development rates, and the aeronautic engineering discipline is
relatively mature compared to where we were decades ago. However, we
have not exhausted all aeronautic design opportunities, and aeronautic
engineering discipline maturity relies on the test infrastructure that
America has developed.
Some have argued that aeronautics is a ``mature'' industry and thus
the Federal Government should no longer invest in aeronautics R&D or
test infrastructures.
Earlier in my testimony I noted that the aeronautics industry has
matured, but the question of industry maturity consists of two major
components: market maturity (i.e., whether aeronautic vehicle designs
have stagnated), and engineering maturity (i.e., the degree to which
engineers know how to research, design, and produce new aeronautic
concepts).
While some aeronautics markets are mature in that they are ``no
longer the subject of great expansion or development'' \2\ in raw
design numbers, other markets are expanding to explore continued
evolutionary development or even revolutionary concepts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The definition of maturity offered for an industry, market, or
product by The American Heritage College Dictionary, third edition,
1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There has been a marked decline in the number of new major civil
and military aircraft designs since the 1950s.\3\ However, the U.S. and
foreign countries are continuing to push the design envelopes in the
vehicles it is developing (including efficiencies, noise reductions,
capacity increases, increased aeronautic performance, reductions in
takeoff and landing length requirements, and hybridization of vertical-
takeoff-and-landing capabilities with traditional jet flight.) Also,
the U.S. is exploring new vehicle types and concepts. For example, many
unmanned air vehicles and unmanned combat air vehicle concepts are
being researched, developed, and produced. Military concepts for larger
vertical-takeoff-and-landing (VTOL) and super-short take-off-and-
landing (SSTOL) transport require continued R&D. Interests in
commercial supersonic business jets require additional R&D for vehicle
designs and sonic boom reduction. Air-breathing hypersonic concepts
employing ramjet and scramjet engines are in their infancy yet hold
potential for space access, aerospace planes, and military missiles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See, for example, Figure 2.1, p. 15, of Anton et al., Wind
Tunnels and Propulsion Test Facilities: An Assessment of NASA's
Capabilities to Serve National Needs, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND
Corporation, MG-178-NASA/OSD, www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG178/,
2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The aeronautics community itself has been grappling with the
question of how many potentially valuable opportunities await our
examination. Professor Ilan Kroo of Stanford University, for example,
laid out the data that seems to indicate a lack of innovation giving
the appearance of maturity, but he also outlined some innovative
concepts that indicate the field has significant expansion and
development opportunities.\4\ Also, the NASA Blueprint\5\ discusses a
number of R&D concepts that NASA is considering. Other aeronautic
trends and interests are listed in the RAND Corporation's study on test
facilities.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See Kroo, Ilan, ``Innovations in Aeronautics,'' 2004 AIAA
Dryden, Lecture, #AIAA-2004-1, 42nd AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting,
Reno, NV, January 5-8, 2004.
\5\ www.aerospace.nasa.gov/aboutus/tf/aero-blueprint/
(last accessed 4/20/05).
\6\ See, for example, Chapter 2 of Anton, et al., Wind Tunnels and
Propulsion Test Facilities: Supporting Analyses to an Assessment of
NASA's Capabilities to Serve National Needs, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND
Corporation, TR-134-NASA/OSD, www.rand.org/publications/TR/TR134/,
2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are technical challenges in many of these concepts, but that
is the nature of R&D, requiring careful consideration, exploration, and
engagement on these challenges to understand their ultimate viability
and benefits.
Thus, U.S. aeronautics industry ``maturity'' (lack of great
expansion or development) is less a question of needs and opportunities
and more a question of national intent, investment levels, and policy.
For example, the cost to produce new vehicle designs continues to rise,
and that has a constraining effect on development rates but not
absolute cessation of development opportunities.
Conversely, while only parts of the aeronautics industry are
relatively mature, the discipline of aeronautics engineering shows a
level of maturity. In particular, while we do not have complete,
closed-form understanding of the aeronautic physics in which our
vehicle components operate, we know how to use test techniques to
experimentally explore the new physical realms in which new vehicle
concepts operate. This is especially true for revolutionary new
concepts that are not extensions of established systems with which
engineers have extensive practical design experience, computational
models, and flight experience. Even improving the performance at the
margin of well-established and refined designs depends on appropriate
and sufficient testing at wind tunnel and propulsion test facilities.
Thus, aeronautic engineering discipline maturity relies on the test
infrastructure that America has developed.
Q2. Did the DOD attempt to use, and then abandon, full-cost recovery
for its test facilities? If so, why?
A2. The Air Force experimented with recovering full costs from users
during 1969 to 1972 but found the policy to be detrimental to their
facilities, causing unstable and unpredictable pricing and resulting in
significant drops in usage despite need.
NASA has recently required full-cost recovery of full operating
costs from the users of its aeronautical test facilities. The DOD tried
a similar approach long ago, but it rather quickly went back to an
approach that established a budget line to provide funding for its test
facilities, with users just being charged for the costs of their tests.
Conceptually, setting test prices to cover all costs is not
recommended because it can discourage use and endanger strategic
facilities. This approach does give users more information about the
full costs for conducting their tests at a facility. If this cost is
too high, users can respond by seeking an alternative source of
services if it is available; alternatively, users may avoid important
testing or test in inferior facilities and obtain degraded or even
misleading data. The approach would lead to good outcomes if the
alternative facilities are a better value over the long term and
strategically important resources are retained. Unfortunately, this
approach leads to poor outcomes if a facility is a better long-term
value but low near-term utilizations and resulting higher near-term
prices mask the long-term value of the facility. The approach is also
bad when the remaining users cannot afford the costs to keep open
strategic facilities needed in the long-term.
When the Air Force experimented with recovering full costs from
1969 to 1972, AEDC found that their prices became inherently unstable
and unpredictable because large infrastructure-driven costs had to be
spread over an annually variable customer workload base.\7\ Also, test
customers were not given time to adjust their budgets to accommodate
increases in testing prices. As a result, the test workload decreased
dramatically (see the ``Industrial Funding'' era in Figure 1 below).
This, in turn, drove up overhead costs and initiated a positive
feedback loop that continued driving up prices and driving away users.
AEDC found that testing decisions were being made based on near-term
cost considerations rather than strategic considerations to reduce
long-term program risks through testing. The resulting reduced testing
loads and reduced income caused significant detrimental effects on
AEDC's facilities, including the loss of skilled people, loss of
independent analysis and evaluation capabilities, decreased investments
for the future, and reduced facility readiness through the loss of
maintenance resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See Anton et al., Wind Tunnels and Propulsion Test Facilities:
An Assessment of NASA's Capabilities to Serve National Needs, Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-178-NASA/OSD, www.rand.org/
publications/MG/MG178/, 2004, pp. 60-62, for a discussion of this
topic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The financial collapse at AEDC was only halted when shared support
through direct budget authority was restored to AEDC. Combined with the
need to better account for the full costs of test facilities, the DOD
established the Major Range and Test Facilities Base (MRTFB) and
advocated that users need to see the cost they impose on a facility
while not being asked to pay for unused and underutilized capacity at
strategically important test facilities they use. Since 1972 (when
direct budget authority was reinstated at AEDC), reimbursements
consistently paid for less than half of total operating costs. Thus,
over many decades, the DOD has found it vital to provide shared support
for its facilities despite fiscal pressures in various eras.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Mike J. Benzakein, Chairman, Department of Aerospace
Engineering, Ohio State University
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
Q1. If the budget for aeronautics is limited, is it more important for
NASA to fund long-term, high-risk research or to continue with
incremental subsonic research? Should improving air traffic control be
the top priority for NASA's research program?
A1. The NASA aeronautics expenditures need to maintain a balance
between short- and long-term research. It is also important for NASA to
explore new ideas and concepts that might come to fruition in 20 to 50
years. It is important for NASA to address the needs of commercial
aviation and the flying public. This requires technologies that need to
be available five to ten years from now to permit cleaner, safer and
more efficient travel. It is also essential for the Nation to maintain
its preeminence in commercial aviation, a position which is coming
under competitive pressure from Europe.
Improving air traffic control should be a high priority for NASA's
research program. It is needed as we move forward, and the air traffic
volume is growing. It should be one of the top priorities at NASA in
conjunction with subsonic and supersonic research, hypersonics,
rotorcraft, and aviation safety and security. The recommendations for a
NASA Aeronautics Program have been submitted in a report to the United
States Congress in April of this year by the National Institute of
Aerospace. This report summarizes the work performed by a team of 250
scientists and engineers from industry and academia who have worked
intensely to define the needs of the Nation.
Q2. How high a priority should research on hypersonics be? If NASA
aeronautics were fat funded in Fiscal Year (FY) 06, that is, given $54
million more than the President has proposed, where would you put that
money?
A2. Hypersonics is on NASA's list of priorities. It needs to be
addressed. It comes however, after subsonic and supersonic research,
and air traffic control. I see the first application of hypersonics to
be military. So DOD should take the lead in funding that research. If
$54 million in additional funding became available, I would put those
dollars in subsonic and supersonic airframe and propulsion research.
Questions submitted by Representative Mark Udall
Q1. Some have argued that aviation is a mature industry and thus the
Federal Government should no longer invest in aeronautics R&D. Do you
agree or disagree with that conclusion?
A1. Is aviation a mature industry? It depends on how you define
``mature''; if you mean ``experienced,'' yes it is. We have come a long
way over the last 50 years. Tremendous progress has been made in every
facet of aeronautics both in the commercial and military fields. Does
this mean that further major breakthrough technology developments are
not in the cards? The answer is a resounding NO! Significant progress
is required in every aspect of aeronautics. Let me just list a few
areas.
1. Air traffic Management
2. Safety
3. Noise
4. Pollution Control
5. Fuel Burn
6. Maintainability
Every forecasting indicates that the world will be adding over
20,000 commercial airplanes to the system by the year 2020. We are
close to gridlock today. To avoid long delays and jeopardizing the
safety and convenience of the flying public, we need to have a better,
more efficient airspace system.
Noise is getting to be a barrier to growing airports and
improvements are needed in the aircraft and engine design. The same
goes for Aircraft emissions which are growing significantly as air
traffic grows. They require further research in clean combustion
systems. We need more fuel efficient engines to reduce CO2
and its threat to Global Warming. This is just for subsonic airplanes.
When we go to supersonic airplanes, we have not even scratched the
surface. Beyond the noise and emission challenges, flying at supersonic
speeds for sustained periods of time brings up the need for a plethora
of technologies that are yet to be developed. The challenges are
similar to the one faced in the military world when one goes to the
Long Range Strike Fighter and other applications. The Hypersonic World
is also out there and this is just the beginning.
So there is a lot to be done in the ``mature'' industry. There is a
lot to be done also on the education side to ensure that we properly
train the work force, the engineers, and the scientists in the U.S. so
they can face these technology challenges.
So the need is there. Should the Federal Government invest in
Aeronautics R&D? The answer is YES. The question is often asked: Why
does not the industry pick up the effort? The answer is that the
industry is geared to perform the development of new products. This
investment is large (10 fold the amount of R&D effort described above).
The industry is focused on products it wants to bring to market in the
next five to 10 years. The Federal Government needs to invest in
technologies that will be needed in 10 to 20 years. It needs to
evaluate a number of technologies, do the screening so that the
industry could pick up the winners and develop them into products. In
summary, I believe that Aviation has made tremendous progress over the
last 50 years. There is a lot yet to be done and the Federal Government
has a key role to play in Aeronautics R&D.
Q2. In 2001 the European Commission announced a multi-year initiative
in aeronautics with ambitious goals. To quote the ``Vision 2020''
report, the goal of that initiative is that: ``In 2020, European
aeronautics is the world's number one. Its companies are celebrated
brands, renowned for the quality of products that are wining more than
50 percent shares of world markets for aircraft, engines, and
equipment. . . The public sector plays an invaluable role in this
success story. . . Crucially [European governments] are coordinating a
highly effective European framework for research cooperation, while
finding programs that put the industry on more equal terms with its
main rivals.''
Q2a. How seriously do you take the European Initiative in aeronautics
R&D?
Q2b. Do you believe that the NASA aeronautics budget request for FY06
and the outyears is a sufficient response to the European Initiative?
A2a,b. In the last month, I have been to Europe twice to visit European
industry and European universities. I can assure you that the European
initiative in aeronautics R&D is serious, very serious indeed. They
have a detailed plan outlining their goals, the technology barriers as
well as the research programs they need. These programs are funded and
on their way. There is an excellent collaboration between industry,
academics and European governments. The programs are led by the
industry. They are focused and results oriented. I believe that the EU
community has put in place the elements of a program to give them the
leadership in aeronautics in the next decade.
I do not believe that the NASA Aeronautics Budget request for FY06
and the outyears represents an adequate response to the European
Initiative. It does not come close to facing the needs of the Nation in
Aeronautics. As I mentioned in my testimony, I believe that aeronautics
needs a national vision and an agenda to move forward. I believe that
its vision and strategy must be developed in partnership by industry,
academia, and the Federal Government. As related in my testimony, the
National Institute of Aerospace, at Congress' request, has chartered a
task team of scientists and engineers to examine the subject and define
some specific recommendations. This work has been completed and is
summarized in a report that was delivered to the Chair and Ranking
Member of both Appropriation Subcommittees last week . I believe that
the type of effort outlined in this report is what is required in the
next five years to address the aforementioned European Initiative.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by R. John Hansman, Jr., Director, International Center for
Air Transportation, MIT
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
Q1. ``If the budget for aeronautics is limited, is more important for
NASA to fund long-term, high-risk research or to continue with
incremental subsonic research? Should improving air traffic control be
the top priority for NASA's research program?''
NASA should have a balanced portfolio of near and long term focused
research. As with any portfolio the long-term research can and should
be higher risk with high future payoff while the near-term research is
focused on well identified needs.
I would point out that many of the high payoff areas are likely to
be in subsonic vehicles which will always constitute the vast majority
of our aircraft. Breakthrough technologies which enable more efficient,
cleaner, safer and more accessible aircraft operations would have
enormous benefit.
Air traffic control is clearly an area of urgent national
attention. NASA has an important role in the national strategy to
improve air traffic control and has been a strong member of the JPDO.
Consequently, air traffic control should be one of the key priorities
at NASA but this should not be to the exclusion of air vehicle or air
safety research.
Q2. ``How high a priority should research on hypersonics be? If NASA
aeronautics were flat funded in Fiscal Year (FY) 06, that is, given $54
million more than the President has proposed, where would you put that
money?''
A2. Hypersonics research is in the long-term, high-risk category where
the impact would most likely to be in military or space applications. I
believe that it is wise to have some capability in hypersonics but for
civil aeronautics would put this at a lower priority than other areas.
Given the modest increase over the President's proposed aeronautics
budget, I would invest part in improved engine efficiency research
which will have strong leverage in fuel and environmental benefits.
Given the emergent fuel shortages I would also look for opportunities
for NASA research to have spinoff applications to automobiles and other
vehicles. I would also invest in a program of small scale (single
investigator) aeronautics innovation grants to stimulate new ideas and
enthusiasm across a range of technologies.
Question submitted by Representative Mark Udall
Q1. ``Some have argued that aviation is a mature industry and thus the
Federal Government should not longer invest in aeronautics R&D. Do you
agree or disagree with that conclusion?''
A1. I disagree with both the premise and the conclusion.
Aviation continues to be a dynamic and evolving industry. There are
rich and exciting opportunities for vehicle systems driven by potential
advances in propulsion, information technology, materials, micro
technologies, complex systems engineering, aerodynamics, navigation,
human-machine integration and many other areas. We can expect new
vehicle configurations new operating paradigms and new industries to
emerge if we maintain a healthy aviation industry.
The aviation industry will also need to grow to a new level of
maturity to meet the challenges of the future. For example, increasing
fuel prices will drive a new round of technical development to improve
fuel efficiency. Aviation based innovations will have impact and
applications in other vehicle classes such as automobiles.
Environmental considerations will also stimulate innovation and the
need for a deeper understanding of approaches to minimize environmental
impact. Low emission and functionally silent aircraft are real
possibilities. The increased demand and reliance for air transportation
services coupled with airport and roadway congestion will drive the
need for new classes of vehicles and new operating paradigms to improve
the safety, efficiency and capacity of aviation.
These are only a few of the obvious applications. In all
likelihood, the most exciting opportunities are yet to be discovered. I
hope that we can create an environment where our students have the
skills, motivation and environment to create them.
Appendix 2:
----------
Additional Material for the Record
Prepared Statement of John W. Douglass
President and Chief Executive Officer,
Aerospace Industries Association of America
Introduction
Chairman Calvert, on behalf of the Aerospace Industries Association
of America, or AIA, I wish to thank you, Representative Udall, and
Members of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee for the opportunity
to testify on the enduring connection between aeronautics research and
American national interests. AIA represents more than 100 regular and
170 associate member companies, and we operate as the largest aerospace
manufacturing trade association in the United States. With more than
607,000 engineering and production workers, we also have a long history
in the management of aeronautics issues.
I will begin with a summary of both the strategic benefits and the
resource deficiencies in the aeronautics programs of NASA. After this
overview, I will discuss two key policy challenges in the aeronautics
arena: the need for equity in the support of mid-term and breakthrough
aviation technologies and the critical project of air traffic
management modernization. My testimony will then turn to an assessment
of the aggressive aeronautics programs of America's main civil aviation
competitor abroad: the European Union. Finally, I will close with a few
suggestions on the focus of a potential United States Aeronautics
Policy.
The National Value of Aeronautics Investment
The November 2002 bipartisan report of The Commission on the Future
of the United States Aerospace Industry concluded that continued public
investment in aeronautical research and development remained vital to
America's leadership in the global aviation industry (one which
generated a $31 billion trade surplus in 2004) as well as our national
security. In cultivating new generations of safe, high-performance
aircraft, aeronautics programs strengthen the country's commercial and
military power by stimulating innovations in:
information technology;
air traffic management;
climate and terrain analysis;
aerial navigation and surveillance;
clean energy sources;
new materials;
advanced technologies for design and manufacturing
development; and
aircraft noise and emissions control.
Aeronautics research subsequently reduces the cost of doing
business in a globally-integrated economy while supporting the Defense
Department's requirement for forces that can deploy to any point on the
planet or track our enemies from distant command centers. Recent budget
decisions, however, do not reflect the strategic importance of
aeronautics to the Nation.
During the last two decades, NASA's budget has doubled from
approximately eight billion dollars to a proposed $16.5 billion for FY
2006. In contrast to this steady top line growth, the Agency's
aeronautics funding has declined from a FY 1994 high point of $1.5
billion to less than $853 million today. NASA expenditures already
claim a modest 0.7 percent of all Federal Government spending, with
aeronautics receiving only six percent of that amount, or $717.6
million, by 2010 if the current plan remains unchanged.
Complicating these trends, NASA's transition to a full cost
accounting system in FY03 significantly reduced direct aeronautics
research spending by transferring administrative costs previously
absorbed in the Agency's headquarters budget to each one of the mission
directorates (please refer to Appendix A). Even before the adoption of
full cost accounting, the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate
(ARMD), with its single-digit share of the budget, employed only 15
percent of Agency personnel yet sustained 40 percent of the Agency's
facilities and infrastructure and therefore pays a disproportionate
share of NASA's administrative costs.
The ability of NASA to intensify the research and testing of
advanced aeronautics concepts--and to reduce its overhead--ultimately
depends on congressional leadership. AIA recommends, Mr. Chairman, that
Congress restore NASA's funding available for aeronautics research to
the levels seen prior to the 2003 move to full cost accounting (please
refer to Appendix B for historical aeronautics funding trends). In
doing so, Congress should instruct the Administration to report each
year on efforts to ensure that full cost accounting does not divert a
disproportionate share of resources from research to administrative
functions.
It is critical that Congress also direct the administration to
provide NASA with increases without jeopardizing space exploration
programs. In 2004, when NASA submitted its first four-year budget
incorporating the Nation's new Vision for Space Exploration (VSE),
officials proposed aeronautics expenditures of $942 million for FY
2009. Barely one year later, the FY 2009 figure now stands at $727.6
million. This reversal indicates that judgments of policy, not a
presumed financial trade-off between aeronautics and exploration,
underlie the decisions about NASA's long-term budget. It also signals
that the Administration has yet to recognize the full socio-economic
value of progress in aeronautics.
Striking the Right Balance Between Near-Term and Breakthrough Research
An expansion of aeronautics research capabilities, Mr. Chairman,
must occur for NASA to continue the development of both mid-term and
breakthrough aeronautics and air transportation technologies.
NASA's FY 2006 proposal responds to the 2004 recommendation of the
National Research Council that the government sponsor basic research on
``high-risk, high-payoff'' aviation initiatives. Towards this end,
NASA's Vehicle Systems, Airspace Systems and Aviation Safety Programs
each embrace the goal of tripling aviation system capacity and reducing
passenger travel times by one-half during the next twenty years.
At the same time, NASA continues to support future industry needs.
Durable, low-cost composite materials, lower fuel consumption, and
automated safety and maintenance monitors, all supported in their
initial phases by government aeronautics research, will become standard
features of most jetliners by 2015.
But to enhance its industry support mission, the Agency should
revitalize its turbine development programs. AIA regrets that NASA
recently had to cancel its Ultra Efficient Engine Technology (UEET)
work since this project centered directly on the improvement of engine
efficiency and the reduction of fuel burn. The Agency should strongly
consider the restoration of UEET since our successful experience in the
1980s with its predecessor, Energy Efficient Engines, demonstrates
industry's ability to turn NASA's basic turbine research into working
technology that conserves fuel and reduces emissions.
Administration officials have paid a similar lack of attention to
rotorcraft technology. In the past 25 years, the United States has
developed one new medium-lift helicopter while Europe has deployed
three. More importantly, the lack of a vigorous NASA rotorcraft program
means that the Nation continues to miss opportunities to test vertical
lift applications for new modes of public transportation.
NASA must therefore plan investments in aeronautics technologies
intended for system-wide transportation improvements while working with
industry on aircraft innovations driven by safety and market factors.
The current budget request outlines laudable objectives such as
subsonic noise and supersonic boom reduction in addition to the testing
of a high-endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. But the decline in year-
to-year ARMD budgets, unless reversed, will cripple NASA's ability to
conduct basic research across the spectrum of aeronautics and confine
the Agency's work to only a handful of projects with the highest levels
of financial and operational risk.
Air Traffic Management Modernization: Keystone of Mobility, Security,
and Growth
Our greatest aeronautics challenge in the second century of flight
centers on the effort to modernize the National Airspace System.
American commercial aviation stands at an unprecedented point in
history. Rising fuel prices, Internet-generated business, foreign
trade, the September 11th attacks and the need for dramatically
improved airport security, have imposed new demands on an air
transportation system designed more than 40 years ago. A 2004 report by
the FAA revealed that in the next 20 years, 20 more U.S. airports will
handle at least 500,000 arrivals and departures on an annual basis.
Furthermore, aircraft now carry 27 percent of the Nation's imports and
exports.
Delays, however, follow insufficient capacity, and lost time in the
aviation sector means lost money. In 1994, 81 percent of all domestic
flights took off on time yet NASA reported that delays of 15 minutes or
more still cost the aviation industry 2.3 billion dollars. By 2000, the
on-time rate had deceased to 72 percent, and the Aerospace Commission
estimated that the cost of delays to the entire economy could exceed
$30 billion each year.
Economic and national security factors make it essential that the
FAA-led Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), created by Public
Law 108-176, succeed in its mission of building the Next Generation Air
Transportation System.
The House Science Committee, as well as the House Transportation
and Infrastructure and the Senate Commerce Committees, have the charge
of overseeing this complex project. With several government
organizations involved, Congress must require interagency cooperation
and accountability, particularly between NASA and the Air Force, on
JPDO technology sharing and personnel assignments. AIA urges the
Administration to continue in proposing clear and adequate budgets for
the JPDO to reduce the risk of program delays.
NASA's budget request wisely includes a $48 million increase in
Airspace Systems--the Agency's office that supports the development of
ATM situational awareness tools--and directs $10 million to the JPDO.
With ongoing support from Congress and JPDO agency stakeholders, AIA
believes that a fully transformed air transportation system will become
operational by 2025. Our public safety, mobility, and world economic
leadership demand nothing less.
The Role of Aeronautics in the International Community
Based on the achievements of United States aerospace companies, the
European Union (EU) and other foreign governments continue to develop
aeronautics programs to build global economic and technological
capabilities and to challenge the U.S. for leadership in the industry.
In January 2001, the European Commission approved the plan entitled
European Aeronautics: A Vision for 2020. This document adopts the
multilateral objective of ``a world-class European aeronautics industry
that leads in global markets for aircraft and engines.'' EU officials
take an integrated, strategic view of aerospace and aeronautics. Vision
2020 notes that trade, investment, tourism, and political ties to
emerging markets all depend on a vibrant air transportation industry.
The Europeans also have a clear sense of the business issues at stake;
their plan states that ``without European aeronautics, air travel would
be almost completely dominated by U.S. aircraft.''
Vision 2020 declares that the time and expense associated with
airliner development goes ``beyond the reach of one company and of the
budgets of most single nations.'' As a result of this assessment,
European leaders announced in March 2002 the goal of increasing total
R&D spending to three percent of European GDP by 2010, with the
aeronautics share claiming $2.6 billion. Fourteen years ago, the EU's
aeronautics budget amounted to just $45 million.
NASA's current budget submission moves in the opposite direction of
the Europeans, with cuts in aeronautics programs of almost 25 percent
over the next four fiscal years even though the Agency focuses on vital
public interest research: initiatives that make air travel more quiet,
secure, and reliable. EU companies and governments, unlike NASA,
restrict international access to their aviation R&D and concentrate
heavily on product-specific improvements to expand civil market share.
The spending commitments of the EU, however, should remind us of the
enduring public benefits of aeronautics--from safe forms of
transportation to the expansion of export industries--and the
corresponding need for Congress and the Administration to adequately
fund government-wide aeronautics activities.
Conclusion: Envisioning a United States Aeronautics Policy
As it prepares to consider the FY 2006 NASA Authorization Bill,
Congress has a unique opportunity to frame a national aeronautics
policy to guide the aviation investment and reform strategies of the
Federal Government. The policy should confirm the multi-dimensional
benefits of aeronautics research to the United States in this age of
the information economy and expanding military air power. Future fleets
of secure and efficient aircraft, enabled by new technologies, will
stimulate higher volumes of travel and investment, as well as capital
and cargo flows, in an aviation sector that already accounts for about
11 million American jobs. Furthermore, the JPDO, by relying on
aeronautics communications technologies, has the challenge of improving
the speed and precision of airborne operations for civil and military
users alike.
For these reasons, a United States Aeronautics Policy would yield
long-term benefits to the Nation and should instruct the appropriate
government agencies to develop comprehensive strategies for high risk,
basic aviation research as well as energy, environmental, and
navigational programs to support air vehicles in development. We
believe that the policy, to ensure interagency coordination, should
also require NASA, FAA, and the Defense Department to hold regular
joint meetings on their common aeronautics research objectives.
The Nation would be strengthened by such a policy since the
instruments of aeronautics improve some of the basic elements that
define American security and prosperity in the early 21st Century:
cost-effective mobility over vast distances; geographical analysis for
a safe landing or enemy surveillance; and an expanded air systems
capacity for our growing international trade commitments.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for permitting AIA to submit these views
for the record of the Subcommittee's hearing.
AERONAUTICS TEST PROGRAM (ATP)
White Paper
INTRODUCTION
The NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) proposes
to start the Aeronautics Test Program (ATP), funded at $26M in FY06 and
increasing to $31.4M by FY11. The purpose of the ATP is to ensure the
strategic availability of a minimum, critical suite of wind tunnels/
ground test facilities which are necessary to meet Mission Directorate,
Agency and National needs and requirements. In addition, the ATP will
be responsible for the strategic and business management of the
aeronautics wind tunnels/ground test facilities at Ames Research
Center, Glenn Research Center and Langley Research Center. It will be
the responsibility of the ATP Manager to ensure funding so as to
provide the appropriate levels of maintenance and investments in the
ATP suite of facilities. The scope of the ATP is limited to the
management of large aeronautics ground test facilities including
subsonic, transonic, supersonic and hypersonic wind tunnels, propulsion
wind tunnels and jet engine test cells.
BACKGROUND
There have been 13 major wind tunnel/facility studies performed
during the past 15 years (see Appendix A), which have addressed the
many issues surrounding the Nation's major aeronautical ground based
test facilities. These studies were performed mostly at the behest of
decision-makers within the senior management of various government
organizations due to insufficient data being available which would
justify the level of testing infrastructure being maintained by the
U.S. Government and in the Nation. In general, many of these studies
came to the same conclusion, wherein they recognized the importance of
aeronautical ground based test facilities, wind tunnels and air
breathing propulsion test facilities, to the future of this country's
aeronautical industry and national security.
The RAND Study, which is the last of the 13 studies listed in the
Appendix, is also described in more detail in a later section. In
implementing the Aeronautics Test Program, the ARMD has sought to
appropriately respond to a common thread from many of these studies,
including the RAND study. In recognition of the importance of NASA
ground test facilities to the Nation's economic future and to national
security, many of these studies challenged NASA to sustain key parts
its existing test capabilities and capacity. The ATP is being
structured to accomplish that goal.
AERONAUITCS TEST PROGRAM STRUCTURE (WHAT IS FUNDED?)
Five categories of facilities have been established under which the
facilities in the ATP suite have been placed. Broadly, these categories
relate to the utilization and agency/national importance of the
facilities. An explanation of the five categories along with the
identification of the facilities within each category is as follows:
Category I. Facilities for which substantial ARMD program usage is
forecast and/or facilities for which ARMD is proposing to assume a
national stewardship role. The intent with respect to Category I
facilities is to provide a high level of confidence to internal and
external users that a Category I Facility will be in operation and
available for the foreseeable future. The Category 1 facilities are
the:
Ames Unitary Wind Tunnel
Glenn Icing Research Tunnel
Glenn 9 15 Subsonic Tunnel
Langley National Transonic Tunnel
Category II. Facilities that NASA (other than ARMD), DOD, and
industry require now or may require in the future to carry out research
and for developing vehicles. ARMD makes a two year commitment to
facilities placed in this category, in order to properly assess the
current environment and to not make unilateral decisions that would
adversely effect other mission directorates, the DOD, or the Nation.
The Category 2 facilities are the:
Langley Transonic Dynamics Tunnel
Langley Hypersonics Complex
Langley 20-Foot Vertical Spin Tunnel
Glenn Propulsion Systems Lab 3 & 4
Langley 14 22 Subsonic Tunnel
Glenn 10 10 Supersonic Tunnel
Langley 8-Foot High Temperature Tunnel
Category III. Facilities that are currently not required but are
viewed as part of a robust ground test capability. The Category III
facilities are the:
Glenn Hypersonic Test Facility
Ames 12-Foot Pressure Tunnel
Category IV. Facilities that are not utilized and/or not viewed as
components of a future ground test capability. The Category IV
facilities are the:
Langley 16-Foot Transonic Tunnel
Ames National Full-Scale Aerodynamic Complex
Ames 7 10 Subsonic Tunnels #1 and #2
Langley 22-inch Mach 20 Tunnel
Langley Low Turbulence Pressure Tunnel
Langley Unitary Supersonic Tunnel
Category V. Facilities that are defined as laboratories and as such
are not recommended for inclusion in the ATP. These facilities are to
be maintained by the Field Centers. Category V facilities are the:
Glenn Aero-Acoustic Propulsion Laboratory
Langley 0.3-meter Transonic Cryogenic Tunnel
Langley Jet Exit Facility
Langley 20-inch Supersonic Wind Tunnel
All categorization decisions and investment decisions will be
revisited annually as part of the budget cycle. The operations of the
facilities in Categories I, II, and III above in their levels of
readiness is funded at $18.4M in FY06. Other activities in the ATP
include prioritized maintenance of the Category I and II facilities at
$4.3M, facility upgrades and test technology development funded at
$1.0M, program office expenses at $1.3M and a university research
component which will solicit work from university principle
investigators and will require the use of the ATP facilities to
accomplish proposed research goals, funded at $1.0M. The ATP is
summarized in Figure 1.
The Aeronautics Test Program is being setup under the umbrella of
the Foundational Technology Program. The Foundational Technology
Program's purpose is twofold. The first is to fund basic and applied
research in order to develop the technological foundation for the next
wave of aeronautics barrier breaking technology demonstration programs.
The second is to sustain the core competencies at the NASA Research
Centers that are required to implement the current research program and
the next wave of research programs. In addition to the ATP, the
Foundational Technology Program also includes University Research
Project. The University Research Project will provide funding for the
same basic and applied research activities as described above, but with
the stipulation that all available funding be performed in academia, so
as to ensure that the ARMD avails itself of the widest possible range
of research ideas and activities. This project is to be funded at one
percent of the ``after tax'' (after ensuring that corporate and mission
directorate general and administrative costs have been covered)
Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate available budget guideline.
THE RAND STUDY
In November 2004, the RAND Corporation's National Defense Research
Institute concluded an in-depth examination of the Nation's wind tunnel
and air-breathing propulsion testing needs and the issues surrounding
NASA's role in meeting those needs. The final report, entitled, ``Wind
Tunnels and Propulsion Test Facilities--An Assessment of NASA's
Capabilities to Serve National Needs,'' was released in February 2005.
At the highest level, the RAND Study concluded that despite aeronautics
maturity, that test facilities are still critical. Specifically, RAND
concluded that:
NASA's wind tunnel and propulsion test capabilities
remain critical tools for research and production in U.S.
aeronautics
Making users fund all costs can discourage use and
endanger strategic facilities
Capabilities are generally consistent with national
needs, but some investments are needed
Redundancy is minimal across NASA, and total
operating costs are relatively modest
Many facilities operate at less than full capacity
Utilization is not the overriding metric for
determining a facility's value
Establishing and supporting a minimum set of
important facilities can ensure that long-term needs are not
endangered by short-term gains
National consolidation and coordination of test
facility investments is the next challenge.
The study recommended that NASA should:
Develop a long-term, funded aeronautic test
facilities vision and plan
Use shared funding of annual full costs
Maintain and invest in minimum set of NASA facilities
Continue efforts to adopt consistent management
processes and procedures across all three Centers
Make sure near-term decisions (e.g., to mothball or
close facilities) have financial gains relative to the long-
term capability risks
Work with the DOD to analyze the issues associated
with national consolidation.
In general, NASA concurs, and is taking steps to implement these
recommendations. First and foremost, NASA is changing our approach to
the strategic management of these important capabilities by
implementation of the ATP. During the past several decades, decisions
regarding the operation and closure of specific facilities were made
primarily by the NASA Center that operated each facility, based on the
assumption that the Center was in the best position to assess customer
demand, or lack thereof, for any given facility. More recently, the
nature and pace of changes within and beyond the Agency have made it
increasingly difficult for the Centers to manage and operate such
facilities--particularly those with large fixed costs and uncertain
levels of utilization. There has been a growing concern that Centers
were being forced to make investment (and potentially, divestment)
decisions that were suboptimal with respect to overall Agency direction
and interests.
Thirty-one NASA ground test facilities were assessed within the
scope of the RAND study. Of those 31, twenty-nine were considered be
the ``minimum set'' that should be retained by NASA in order to serve
the Nation's interests in aeronautics research and development and
product test and evaluation. Furthermore, of those 29, nine were
identified were identified as being, ``especially detrimental to
close.'' This is because no alternatives to these nine facilities exist
within the U.S., regardless of the cost. Figure 2 shows the 31 RAND
facilities with both the ``minimum set'' of 29 and the ``detrimental to
close'' subset of 9. The figure also identifies the relationship
between the RAND study facilities and the ATP suite of facilities.
FACILITY COSTS EXPLANATION
The implementation of the ATP by the NASA ARMD, is meant to
stabilize the current environment that NASA finds itself in as the NASA
Aeronautics R&D budgets continue to decline and as the Agency continues
to implement full-cost accounting and management. The less than 100
percent utilization in nearly all of NASA's large ground test
facilities has created a situation wherein the NASA Aeronautics
Research Programs are being required to pay facility fixed costs even
if the utilization of a given facility is less than (and in some cases
well less than) 100 percent of the calendar year. In the many cases
where the fixed costs include full staffing of the facility, these
costs being borne by the program are substantial and have a measurable
effect on the available procurement dollars to the aeronautics research
programs. The ATP attempts to pay for a large percentage of the fixed
costs of its Category I facilities. For the Category II facilities, the
ATP will encourage cost savings by staffing and operating these
facilities only when in use and by placing the facilities in stand-by
during non-use time periods. Category III facilities, for which there
is no projected usage, will be mothballed starting in FY06, and the
only incurred costs will be those associated with activities required
to place the facility in mothball status. Should a customer have a need
for a Category III facility, that customer will be expected to bear all
costs of bringing the facility back to active status, of facility
operations, and of returning the facility to it's mothballed state.
There are no incurred costs at the ATP level for Category IV and V
facilities, which are to be either closed or maintained locally,
respectively.
As calculated by RAND in doing their previously described study,
the annual operating cost of the 31 facilities that they assessed was
$125M to $130M, annually, in FY03 dollars. The ATP funding as mentioned
previously is funded at $26M starting in FY06. The breakdown of that
funding is summarized in Figure 1. Definitions as noted below are for
explanatory purposes.
1. Annual Operating Cost--The operations and maintenance costs
of a ground test facility on an annual basis. Includes
staffing, utilities, and other consumables.
2. Fixed Operating Cost--This is cost incurred in order to
keep a facility open and ready for business, but does not
include the cost of test operations, per se.
3. Personnel Cost: Civil Servant and Contractor--These costs
attempt to capture the direct and indirect personnel associated
with facility and test operations.
4. Mothball-to-Operational Costs--Mothball costs are generally
only those costs required to ensure facility safety. Since
minimal investment is required, both the time and costs
associated with moving a facility from mothball to active
status can be substantial, depending upon the complexity of the
system. Typically reactivation times are order-of magnitude-
wise measured in months.
5. Standby-to-Operational Costs--A facility maintained in
stand-by condition is one whose subsystems (electrical,
mechanical, facility control, and data) are regularly
maintained, or even exercised. As such, a small level of
staffing is required while a facility in stand-by. The level of
activity is less than would be incurred as part of the fixed
costs associated with an active facility. The level of effort
to bring the facility from stand-by to active status is order-
of-magnitude wise measured in weeks.
APPENDIX
OTHER (PAST) MAJOR FACILITY/WIND TUNNEL STUDIES
The major studies are listed below with a brief description of each
along with important conclusions.
1. The National Facilities Study, April 29, 1994: The
objectives of the Study were to: 1) determine where U.S.
facilities do not meet the national aerospace needs; 2) define
new facilities required to make U.S. capabilities world class;
3) define where consolidation and phase out of existing
facilities is appropriate; and 4) develop a long-term national
plan for world-class facility acquisition and shared usage.
2. ``Assessing The National Plan for Aeronautical Ground Test
Facilities,'' National Research Council, 1994 reviewed and
validated the National Facilities Study recommendations for new
national test capability.
3. ``Goals For A National Partnership In Aeronautics Research
and Technology,'' National Science and Technology Council,
1995. This report assessed the status of the U.S. aeronautics
research infrastructure.
4. Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board
Cooperation Initiative, May 1996, developed 34 recommendations
including the recommendation to create six NASA-DOD major
facilities alliances to improve cross agency coordination and
to develop costs savings and efficiencies. The alliances
created were:
National Wind Tunnel Alliance
Air Breathing Propulsion Test Facilities
Alliance
National Rocket Propulsion Test Alliance
Space environmental simulation facilities
Alliance
Arc Heated Test Facilities Alliance
Hypervelocity Ballistic/Impact Range Testing
Alliance
In addition this study noted that the U.S. Government had
closed approximately 40 percent of its major wind tunnels and
air breathing propulsion test facilities since 1993.
5. The National Wind Tunnel Complex Project Archive, July
1996, describes a major new state-of-the-art subsonic/transonic
test capability that would have replaced several existing
facilities in the U.S. This complex was not built because of
financial considerations.
6. ``DOD Aeronautical Test Facilities Assessment,'' March
1997. The study looked at DOD's future aeronautical development
program needs for wind tunnel testing and computational fluid
dynamics.
7. ``Assessment of Asian Wind Tunnels,'' Sverdrup Technology,
Inc., June 1999.
8. The National Aeronautical Test Alliance (NATA) was
implemented in May 2000. This is a NASA/DOD alliance that was
created to coordinate activities between NASA and DOD thus
moving toward a more national view point for wind tunnels.
9. National Wind Tunnel Strategic Plan--Report on 912c Wind
Tunnel Study by DOD Test Environments Reliance Panel and NASA,
September 2000. This study reviewed previous wind tunnel
studies and provided conclusions from those studies.
10. ``Competitive Assessment of the U.S. Large Civil Aircraft
Aerostructural Industry,'' U.S. International Trade Commission
Publication 3433, June 2001. Part of the study addresses the
importance of the supporting infrastructure to the aircraft
industry.
11. Final Report of the Commission of the Future of the United
States Aerospace Industry, November 2002. This report noted
that the aerospace research infrastructure is aging and that
the U.S. needs to make investments in this infrastructure to
successfully carryout this country's research programs.
12. ``Securing the Future of U.S. Air Transportation--A System
in Peril,'' National Research Council, 2003. This report does
not directly address the aerospace research infrastructure but
does describe the expected directions of air systems
development and hence provides a basis for planning the
experimental requirements for the future.
13. ``Wind Tunnel and Propulsion Test Facilities--An
Assessment of NASA's Capabilities to Serve National Needs,''
RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 2004. Reviewed this
country's wind tunnels and air breathing propulsion test
facilities, and made a recommendation of which facilities they
considered as important to this country's future.