[Senate Hearing 108-756]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-756
LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
TO
RECEIVE TESTIMONY REGARDING ISSUES RELATED TO LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE
WASTE
__________
SEPTEMBER 30, 2004
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
______
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico, Chairman
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BOB GRAHAM, Florida
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee RON WYDEN, Oregon
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
CONRAD BURNS, Montana EVAN BAYH, Indiana
GORDON SMITH, Oregon DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JIM BUNNING, Kentucky CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
JON KYL, Arizona MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
Alex Flint, Staff Director
Judith K. Pensabene, Chief Counsel
Robert M. Simon, Democratic Staff Director
Sam E. Fowler, Democratic Chief Counsel
Clint Williamson, Professional Staff Member
Jonathan Epstein, Legislative Fellow
C O N T E N T S
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STATEMENTS
Page
Akaka, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from Hawaii.................. 2
Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from New Mexico................ 4
Domenici, Hon. Pete V., U.S. Senator from New Mexico............. 1
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, U.S. Senator from California............. 3
Gelles, Christine, Director, Office of Commercial Disposition
Options, Office of Environmental Management, Department of
Energy......................................................... 5
McGinnis, Edward G., Director, Office of Global Radiological
Threat Reduction, National Nuclear Security Administration,
Department of Energy........................................... 8
Nazzaro, Robin M., Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
Government Accountability Office............................... 14
Pasternak, Alan, Ph.D., Technical Director, California
Radioactive Materials Management Forum......................... 27
APPENDIXES
Appendix I
Responses to additional questions................................ 39
Appendix II
Additional material submitted for the record..................... 51
LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:47 a.m. in
room SD-366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Pete V.
Domenici, chairman, presiding.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETE V. DOMENICI,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. I want the
witnesses to know that when we arranged this hearing we
certainly had no way of knowing what a difficult floor
situation we had and the difficulty we have with reference to
our time. There is a bill on the floor which you all have read
about, that is extremely difficult, on the reform of the CIA.
Some of us, maybe Senator Bingaman, maybe I, will have to
excuse myself.
So we want to start by asking you, by first suggesting to
you, that you prepared terrific testimony. It has been reviewed
and we want you to abbreviate your testimony so that a few
questions can be asked. If you do that, it will be extremely
helpful.
I have a detailed explanation of this problem and what you
are going to tell us and various views. I do not think I am
going to read it. I am just going to say that I am very--I feel
very good about the fact that we are having hearings about an
issue that is not a tomorrow issue; it is an issue that will
not be here for a few years. But we do not want to wait to try
to solve it until the date when our hospitals and all those who
produce the kind of wastes that we are talking about here has
no place to go except on-site. So we want to pursue with some
degree of earnestness in advance some solutions to this. That
is why we are here.
So with that, I will put my statement in the record so as
to abbreviate my remarks. They are very exciting remarks.
Anybody that does not get to hear them, you certainly have been
shortchanged this morning. Nonetheless, we will call on Senator
Bingaman, and certainly what I have said does not apply to you,
Senator.
[The prepared statements of Senators Domenici, Akaka, and
Feinstein follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
U.S. Senator From New Mexico
This oversight hearing of the Energy and Natural Resources
Committee on the disposal of low-level radioactive waste shall come to
order.
The purpose of this hearing is to both evaluate and learn from a
recent report issued by the Government Accountability Office on the
potential disposal shortage for low-level radioactive waste in this
country. While not an immediate problem, we must now pay close
attention to prevent a potential future crisis.
The GAO found that low-level radioactive waste disposal volumes
increased 200 percent between 1999 and 2003, primarily due to this
waste being shipped to commercial disposal facilities by the DOE.
In 2008, which is not very far off, the Barnwell disposal facility
in South Carolina is set to close to all states outside of its compact,
some 34 states. The generators in these states will not have a disposal
facility to send their waste. An example is that universities and
hospitals that deal with nuclear medicine will have to find and pay for
storage space on their campuses and buildings away from students,
faculty and staff. One can only imagine that further regulatory expense
and burden will be placed on these institutions as wastes build up with
no where to go. This is something we need to prevent.
I just referred to a ``compact,'' let me explain that term. In
1980, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act,
which required states to dispose of their own low-level waste. This act
encouraged states to form interstate compacts, or regional associations
of states, for the purpose of low-level radioactive waste disposal. The
thinking was that this legislation would enable states to create
additional low-level waste sites to prevent a possible shortage of
disposal space. There were three disposal sites for low-level waste in
1980, today, there are still three. This act in 1980 was supposed to
prevent the situation we are facing in 2008--a shortage of disposal
space.
Furthermore, I am concerned as I am sure my colleagues are that the
GAO had to rely on information from the three commercial disposal
operators after they discovered that the information from the national
low-level radioactive waste database, maintained by DOE and financed by
tax payer money, was inaccurate and unreliable.
We will also conduct oversight today on another GAO report
requested by my colleague Senator Akaka. This report deals with DOE
programs to ensure recovery and safe disposal of radioactive sources to
assure that they do not become threats to public health and safety
through either carelessness or overt actions.
Testifying today is Ms. Christine Gelles, Director of the Office of
Commercial Disposition Options in the Office of Environmental
Management at the DOE;
Mr. Edward McGinnis, Director, Office of Global Radiological Threat
Reduction in the National Nuclear Security Administration in the DOE;
Ms. Robin Nazzaro, Director of the Natural Resources and
Environment Team in the Government Accountability Office. Ms. Nazzaro,
your team is the author of the reports, we will be curious to discuss
your findings today;
and
Dr. Alan Pasternak, the Technical Director of the California
Radioactive Materials Management Forum. Dr. Pasternak, I believe you
testified before this committee on October 8, 1985, on the issue of
low-level radioactive waste disposal, welcome back.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, U.S. Senator From Hawaii
I thank Chairman Domenici for scheduling this timely hearing on the
security and disposal of low-level radioactive waste. There are a
number of concerns and issues which need to be addressed regarding the
various types of low-level radioactive waste, and I look forward to
hearing the testimony of the witnesses today.
Since September 11, 2001, we have faced the possibility that a
terrorist could use a so-called ``dirty bomb'' in an attack against the
United States. A dirty bomb combines conventional explosives with
highly radioactive materials. If set off in the downtown of a major
city, it could contaminate a wide area with radiation and cause death
and destruction. Panic and substantial economic damage could also
result.
As ranking member on the Subcommittee on Financial Management, the
Budget, and International Security of the Committee on Governmental
Affairs, I asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to
investigate what actions were needed to ensure continued recovery of
unwanted sealed radioactive sources. They completed an excellent
report, ``Nuclear Proliferation: DOE Action Needed to Ensure Continued
Recovery of Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources,'' GAO-03-483, in April
2003, focusing on greater-than-Class-C (GTCC) sealed sources.
GTCC radiological sources are the ``high end'' of the continuum of
low-level radioactive waste. In other words, Class A, B, and C wastes
can generally be disposed of at existing commercial disposal
facilities. But wastes that exceed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
criteria for Class C, known as greater-than-Class-C wastes, are potent
enough that they generally cannot be disposed of at existing
facilities. GTCC wastes must meet progressively more stringent
requirements for disposal.
GAO found a pattern of inconsistency in the 17 years since the
enactment of P.L. 99-240, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments of 1985. The Act required the Department of Energy to
provide a facility for disposing of all GTCC radioactive waste,
including GTCC sealed sources that are no longer wanted by their
owners. There is no permanent disposal site yet. Although DOE has said
that the facility will be up and running by 2007, it seems unlikely as
they have yet to select a potential site, let alone begin construction.
In 1999 DOE created the Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP) to
recover unwanted GTCC sealed sources and temporarily house them at Los
Alamos National Laboratory. According to GAO, approximately 10,000 GTCC
sealed sources from about 160 sites across the U.S. have been recovered
to date. While this is an achievement, the job is not done.
Approximately 8,000 sources still remain in insecure facilities.
At the time of the GAO study, the OSRP could not recover any
additional GTCC sealed sources containing plutonium-239, one of the
most highly radioactive and potent sources of radioactivity, because
Los Alamos did not have space to meet DOE's security standards for
storing these sources.
Since GAO released the report, DOE found room to store
approximately 250 of the 400 sources containing plutonium-239
documented in the report. However, the number of known sources needing
storage has doubled since 2003. As a result, there are still many
holders of unwanted sources containing plutonium-239, most of which are
universities, that must properly secured until space becomes available.
In May 2003 I introduced S. 1045, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Act of 2003, and would like to acknowledge the support of my
cosponsors, Senators Bingaman and Landrieu. The legislation would
require DOE to report to Congress on the current situation and future
plans for the disposal of GTCC radioactive waste and the cost and
schedule to complete an environmental impact statement and record of
decision on a permanent disposal facility for GTCC radioactive wastes.
Finally, it would require DOE to deliver to Congress a plan to provide
for the short-term recovery of GTCC radioactive waste until a permanent
facility is available. This legislation parallels the recommendations
of the GAO report. Its provisions are critical to being able to secure
sealed sources.
As Congress works diligently this week to restructure the
intelligence community, it must be acknowledged that there are many
pieces to the homeland security puzzle. We must continue to work on
national security efforts not detailed in the 9/11 Commission Report to
ensure the security our homeland, including finding ways to secure
radioactive sources in this country that could be used by terrorists.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses on
this topic.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senator From
California
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today. I would
especially like to welcome Dr. Alan Pasternak from the California
Radioactive Materials Management Forum.
I am interested in several issues being raised today:
Are there adequate disposals for low-level radioactive
waste?
Is it safe to store the waste on-site at the facilities that
create the waste (such as hospitals, universities, and
industrial facilities)?
Is the Department of Energy doing enough to track, package,
secure, and dispose of Greater than Class C waste?
I am particularly concerned with what I have learned about Greater
than Class C (GTCC) waste, which includes radioactive waste from
medical isotopes and other industrial uses. I am concerned because this
waste is not being safely secured--it appears that the Department of
Energy has not abided by the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments of 1985.
The Act required the Department of Energy to provide a facility for
disposing of all GTCC radioactive waste. There is no permanent disposal
site yet. Although DOE has said that the facility will be up and
running by 2007, it seems unlikely as they have yet to select a
potential site, let alone begin construction.
Approximately 8,000 sources of GTCC are still in non-secure
facilities. At least 150 sealed sources of plutonium-239, one of the
most highly radioactive and potent sources of radioactivity, are not
housed in a secure facility.
Given what we all know about the threats that our nation faces from
al Qaeda, I am extremely concerned that the lack of adequate security
may create a real vulnerability in our nation's homeland security
efforts. I look forward to hearing from the Department of Energy on
this specific issue.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN, U.S. SENATOR
FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Bingaman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I will also just put my statement in the record, with one
exception. I did want to mention that Senator Akaka, who is not
able to be here today, has presented a bill, S. 1045, which
proposes to strengthen the program to collect sealed sources
which are greater than class C. This is a bill that I have been
interested in. I would be interested in hearing from the
witnesses about DOE's plans for disposing of the non-defense
greater than class C waste and their views on this legislation.
I know Senator Akaka wanted us to ask specifically about that
bill in his absence.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bingaman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jeff Bingaman, U.S. Senator
From New Mexico
Let me thank the witnesses for coming to today's hearing and taking
time today to testify.
Low-level radioactive waste is a topic that is important for
cleaning up our former atomic weapon sites and in insuring that there
is a disposal path for our nuclear power industry and the many isotopes
and sealed sources used commercially.
The GAO notes that in 2003, 12 million cubic feet of low-level
waste were permanently disposed of--a 200 percent increase since 1999.
99 Percent of the volume was class A waste, material that will decay in
about 100 years, but 78 percent of that was from DOE clean up program,
or roughly 9.2 cubic million feet. The DOE program is slated to
continue its clean up operation well past the year 2035--so I would
like to know if the DOE knows the total volume of low-level waste they
expect to generate and whether it will impact the commercial disposal
operations.
I would like to know the administration's opinion of a bill Senator
Akaka has submitted to this committee, S. 1045, which proposes to
strengthen the program to collect sealed sources which are Greater Than
Class C. I believe his bill can help strengthen this very important
program in a post 9/11 world.
With respect to this collection program, I would like to know DOE's
plans for disposing of the non-defense Greater Than Class C waste, for
which the NRC requires a geologic repository unless a waiver is
granted.
With that let me welcome the witnesses and I look forward to their
testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Bingaman.
I also want to say Senator Akaka has been very interested
in pursuing this whole issue and asked for one of the major
studies that led to one of the panelists being here. We thank
him for that, because he has been on top of the issue.
I am going to start in the order that you all are listed in
my information agenda. So we are going to start with the
Director of the Office of Commercial Disposition Options of the
Office of Environmental Management, Department of Energy, Ms.
Christine--GELL-ess?
Ms. Gelles. Very good.
The Chairman. Wow. You do not know how badly I handle
names, so it must be that you have a very easy name.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Proceed, please.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE GELLES, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL
DISPOSITION OPTIONS, OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Ms. Gelles. Certainly. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator.
I am happy to be here today to discuss with you the Department
of Energy's perspective on the recent Government Accountability
Office report, ``Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Disposal
Availability Adequate in the Short Term, but Oversight Needed
to Identify Any Future Shortfalls.''
I am a career employee with the Office of Environmental
Management, serving since December 2003 as the Director of the
Office of Commercial Disposition Options. My office's functions
include the statutory responsibilities assigned to the
Department of Energy in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Act of 1980, as amended. Specifically, the Department is
required to provide continuing technical assistance to the
States and the compacts. Currently, this assistance is provided
through the collection and dissemination of commercial low-
level radioactive waste disposal information in an on-line data
base known as the Manifest Information Management System or
MIMS.
Our interactions with the States and regional disposal
compacts are conducted primarily through our association with
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum, Incorporated, an
independent, not-for-profit organization whose members include
the States and regional compacts.
Additionally, my office maintains contacts with commercial
firms to ensure that a wide range of waste treatment and
disposition options are available to support the Department's
efforts to accelerate the cleanup of the former weapons
complex. The Department currently utilizes commercial disposal
for some low-level and mixed low-level waste streams in cases
that it determines to be cost effective or in the best interest
of the Department.
We believe the GAO's report presents a fair appraisal of
the current status of commercial low-level radioactive waste
disposal. We agree that disposal capacity for commercial low-
level waste is sufficient in the near term and that there are
significant uncertainties regarding capacity for Class B and C
low-level waste after 2008, the forecast date in which the
Barnwell facility in South Carolina is scheduled to cease
receiving non-compact waste. We continue to monitor the status
of commercial disposal capacity consistent with our statutory
responsibilities because this capacity supports our accelerated
cleanup objectives.
During their review, the GAO determined that the
information contained in the MIMS data base was unreliable and
the report included a recommendation that the Secretary of
Energy halt dissemination of information contained in the MIMS
database as long as it included data that they characterized as
having ``internal control weaknesses'' and that represented
``shortcomings in its usefulness and reliability.'' The
Department disagreed with that recommendation and has kept the
information available to the public with a cautionary notice
and a reference to the GAO report posted on our Internet web
site. It is our belief that halting dissemination of this
information would evoke sharp criticism from the States and
compacts because many of them find the information useful to
support their operations. Further, a majority of the users do
not appear to agree with the GAO's conclusions about the
quality of the data. Strong support for the Department's
activities in the MIMS data base was expressed as recently as
March 2004 in a resolution from the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Forum.
In response to the GAO recommendations, we are taking steps
to fix erroneous data as described in the letter that we sent
to you on September 2, 2004. We are working with the
responsible commercial disposal site operators to identify and
update those records by the end of this calendar year. Just
last week, members of the forum pledged their assistance to
identify inaccuracies in the existing data and will support our
ongoing efforts to validate the data. We intend to keep our
cautionary notice posted while we complete these improvements.
These actions will correct the deficiencies in the MIMS data
base and ensure that we continue to support the needs of the
States and regional disposal compacts.
At this time I would like to add one thing to the testimony
submitted to the committee. It regards the other GAO report
reviewed in this hearing, ``DOE Action Needed to Ensure
Continued Recovery of Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources.''
Mr. McGinnis, the witness from the National Nuclear Security
Administration, will address most of the actions taken by the
Department to respond to GAO's recommendations in the report.
However, I would like to briefly discuss GAO's recommendation
that the Department initiate a process to develop a permanent
disposal facility for greater-than-Class-C radioactive waste
and that the Secretary develop a plan that assigns
responsibility for developing the facility, as well as other
considerations.
As Mr. McGinnis reported in his written testimony, the
Office of Environment, Safety and Health has initiated
development of an environmental impact statement under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), to analyze the range
of reasonable disposal alternatives. Yesterday the Department
determined that the Office of Environmental Management would
have the programmatic lead for the Department's
responsibilities in this area. Accordingly, Environment, Safety
and Health will also assume the lead in the preparation of the
environmental impact statement, although the Office of
Environment, Safety and Health will continue to be involved in
an advisory capacity, as is the Department's usual practice in
the preparation of NEPA documents. This is an important and a
challenging assignment and we look forward to working with this
committee in doing our best to fulfill it in a responsible and
thoughtful fashion.
I would be happy to answer any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gelles follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christine Gelles, Director, Office of Commercial
Disposition Options, Department of Energy
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am happy to be here
today to discuss with you the Department of Energy's perspective on the
recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report Low-Level
Radioactive Waste, Disposal Availability Adequate in the Short Term,
but Oversight Needed to Identify Any Future Shortfalls. I am a career
employee in the Office of Environmental Management, serving since
December 2003 as Director of the Office of Commercial Disposition
Options.
My office's functions include the statutory responsibilities
assigned to the Department of Energy in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act of 1980, as amended. Specifically, the Department is
required to provide continuing technical assistance to the States and
compacts. Currently, this assistance is provided through the collection
and dissemination of commercial low-level radioactive waste disposal
information in an on-line data base, known as the Manifest Information
Management System or MIMS. Our interactions with the states and
regional disposal compacts are conducted primarily through our
association with the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum, Inc., an
independent non-profit organization whose members includes states and
compacts.
Additionally, my office maintains contacts with commercial firms to
ensure that a wide range of waste treatment and disposition options are
available to support the Department's efforts to accelerate the cleanup
of the former weapons complex. The Department currently utilizes
commercial disposal for some low-level and mixed low-level waste
streams, in cases that it determined to be cost effective and in the
best interest of the Department.
The GAO initiated this review in August 2003, shortly before the
implementation of the Office of Environmental Management's
reorganization and the formation of the Office of Commercial
Disposition Options. Therefore, other EM personnel were involved in the
earliest phases of the report. However, since December 2003, my staff
and I worked closely with GAO staff throughout the completion of the
review and the compilation of this report. We believe the report
presents a fair appraisal of the current status of commercial low-level
radioactive waste disposal. We agree that disposal capacity for
commercial low-level waste is sufficient in the near term, and that
there are significant uncertainties regarding capacity for Class B and
C low-level waste after 2008--the forecast date for when the Barnwell
facility in South Carolina will cease to receive non-compact wastes. We
continue to monitor the status of commercial disposal capacity,
consistent with our statutory responsibilities, because this capacity
supports our accelerated cleanup objectives.
During their review, the GAO staff determined that the information
contained in the MIMS database was unreliable, and the report included
a recommendation that the Secretary of Energy halt dissemination of
information contained in the online database as long as it contained
what was characterized as ``internal control weaknesses'' and
``shortcomings in its usefulness and reliability.'' The Department
disagreed with the recommendation, and has kept the information
available to the public, with a cautionary notice and reference to the
GAO report posted on the Internet web site. It was our belief that
halting dissemination of this information would evoke sharp criticism
from states and compacts because many of them find the information
useful to support their operations. Further, the majority of the users
do not appear to agree with the GAO's conclusions about the quality of
the data. Strong support for the Department's activities on MIMS was
expressed as recently as March 2004 in a resolution from the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Forum.
We also disagreed with GAO's suggestion that the database be
expanded to include additional information, such as waste inventories
at commercial generator sites or volume reduction. The Department does
not have access to this information, and it is not apparent that the
users of the MIMS system agree that the information is needed. Such
modifications to the system would be costly to obtain and validate and
would provide questionable value to the users.
In response to the GAO report recommendation, we are taking steps
to fix the erroneous data as described in a letter from the Acting
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management to you on September 2,
2004. We are working with the responsible commercial disposal site
operators to identify and update those records by December 31, 2004.
Just last week members of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum pledged
their assistance to identify inaccuracies in the existing data and
support ongoing efforts to validate data. We intend to keep our
cautionary notice posted on the Internet web site until these efforts
are complete. These actions will correct deficiencies in the MIMS and
ensure we continue to support the needs of the states and regional
disposal compacts.
I would be happy to answer any questions you have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We now have Senator Larry Craig, who has been interested in
all matters nuclear, and we thank him very much for his
presence. Do you want to make any comments, Senator?
Senator Craig. I am here to listen.
The Chairman. Fine, OK.
We are going to now go to you, Mr. McGinnis. Your position
is the Director of the Office of Global Radiological Threat
Reduction of the NNSA, Department of Energy.
Mr. McGinnis. That is correct.
The Chairman. Would you please abbreviate your testimony.
As I indicated, we are aware of it and we have some questions
for you. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD G. McGINNIS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF GLOBAL
RADIOLOGICAL THREAT REDUCTION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. McGinnis. I will do so. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
members of the committee, for the opportunity to testify on the
Department of Energy's radiological recovery efforts within the
United States. With your permission, I would like to submit my
statement for the record and just make a few remarks.
First let me just say that DOE's radiological source
recovery program has made significant progress in its efforts
to accelerate and expand. This progress clearly shows how the
Department has effectively addressed and exceeded constructive
recommendations made by the Government Accountability Office in
its April 2003 report.
Before I briefly describe some of our accomplishments, I
would like to say a few words about the radiological threat we
are addressing. The threat posed by radiological materials in
the United States against national security is real and needs
to be addressed, which is why Secretary Abraham, this
administration, and Congress have taken important steps to
increase the threat reduction efforts with greater priority,
increased funding, and expanded authority.
A lesson learned from 9/11 is that common tools used in our
society, such as commercial airliners, can be used by
terrorists in devastating ways. Radioactive materials used in
medicine, industry, and educational research are no exception.
The effects of a so-called dirty bomb in public places are well
documented and describe substantial economic impacts, depending
on the isotope and other related factors. These impacts would
likely result in cleanup costs and area denial for extended
periods of time.
Use of radioactive sources are widespread and include
cancer treatment, blood and food irradiation, education,
research, oil exploration, and other applications. Given their
widespread use, strong oversight by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the Department of Energy's recovery of high-risk
radioactive sources is critical.
The GAO provided a fair and balanced review of the DOE's
off-site source recovery program, which has contributed to
substantial improvements. The GAO's five recommendations are:
giving higher priority to the off-site source recovery program,
ensuring adequate resources for the program, providing storage
space for plutonium 239, strontium 90, and cesium 137,
initiating the process to develop a disposal facility for
greater-than-class-C wastes, and ensuring the continued
recovery of greater-than-class-C sources.
I am pleased to report that DOE has completed action on
three of these recommendations. Regarding the remaining two, we
have completed action to store plutonium 329, strontium 90, and
we are in the process of completing work to store cesium 137.
The recommendation concerning greater-than-class-C disposal has
already been addressed by my colleague Ms. Gelles.
I would also like to highlight a few of the program's
accomplishments very quickly. Most recently, the program was
able to recover rapidly 470 abandoned sources from a bankrupt
company in Pennsylvania. This was the largest and most
complicated recovery undertaken to date. Additionally, DOE
exceeded an aggressive congressional target of recovering 5,000
high-risk sources in just 18 months. Overall, the program has
recovered more than 10,000 high-risk sources to date.
These and other activities were possible due to the
Secretary of Energy's reallocation of $3.5 million on an urgent
basis. One notable recovery involved four large excess and
unwanted strontium 90 sources containing more than 60,000
curies which were in the Houston area. DOE worked closely with
the NRC, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, as well as the State of Texas, to
remove these sources just prior to the Super Bowl.
DOE is working with DHS, NRC, and other agencies to develop
further risk-based source recovery priorities. This resulted in
the removal of 68 sources from 55 locations in the Boston and
New York City areas in the month leading up to the national
conventions. Most importantly, this included the program's
first recovery of large cesium 137 sources from high schools.
As part of the Office of Global Radiological Threat
Reduction's efforts to expand its scope and leverage its
international threat reduction experience, we are working with
the DHS radiological pilot effort. We recently participated in
security enhancements of a number of New York City medical
facilities having large radioactive sealed sources and provided
DHS with recommendations.
Finally, the overall office is carrying out radiological
threat reduction activities in approximately 40 countries and
as part of the Secretary's newly established global
radiological--global threat reduction initiative. This includes
security enhancements to radioactive sources that are being
used in hospitals and industrial facilities.
This concludes my remarks and I would be happy to take any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McGinnis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward G. McGinnis, Director, Office of Global
Radiological Threat Reduction, National Nuclear Security
Administration, Department of Energy
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, for giving me
the opportunity to testify on the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts
to recover excess and unwanted radioactive sources within the United
States. In April 2003, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
issued a report (GAO-03-483) on DOE's efforts to recover radioactive
sources inside the United States. I am proud to report that the DOE
radioactive source recovery program has effectively addressed, and in
some instances exceeded, these recommendations by accelerating and
expanding its recovery activities.
Before I describe our progress in responding to GAO's
recommendations, I would like to say a few words about the radiological
threat and why we are accelerating and expanding our efforts. The
intent of terrorists to acquire radioactive materials for use in a
radiological dispersal device is a real threat to the American public
and needs to be addressed. One of the many lessons learned from the
attacks of September 11, 2001 is that some of the most common tools
used in our daily lives, such as commercial airliners, can be used by
terrorists in serious and, in some cases, devastating ways. Radioactive
materials, in particular, are used routinely for a variety of medical,
industrial and educational purposes. Cobalt-60 is used in hospital
teletherapy units to treat cancer patients; cesium-137 is used in blood
irradiators, food irradiators and educational research; the oil
industry uses americium-241 for well-logging sources; and strontium-90
is used as remote power supplies. Should terrorists acquire and use
these materials in a radiological dispersal device or so-called ``dirty
bomb'' in public and commercial areas, the impact could be significant,
depending on which isotope in what quantity were used and how
effectively it was dispersed. Likely health and safety impacts would be
modest, but economic costs are the real concern and could impose
significant burdens on our society. Given the reality of this
situation, Secretary Abraham, this Administration and Congress have
taken important steps to increase radiological threat reduction efforts
by giving them greater priority, increasing their funding and expanding
DOE's authority in this area.
This Committee, and Congress as a whole, provided critical support
to DOE's radiological threat reduction efforts both domestically and
internationally. Key Congressional action that has helped make our
efforts possible includes: the establishment of legal authority for DOE
to collect particularly high-activity and high-risk radioactive sources
(Greater-Than-Class-C) within the United States via the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act; emergency appropriations after
the terrorists acts of ``9/11'' for the accelerated domestic recovery
of radioactive sources; authorization and appropriations to carry out
dirty bomb threat reduction efforts internationally; and most recently,
emergency supplemental funding for DOE to carry out radiological threat
reduction work in Iraq, which resulted in the successful removal of
nearly 1,000 high-risk radioactive sources from that country.
I would also like to applaud the GAO for developing such a useful
and constructive report and set of recommendations. The GAO staff did a
very fair, balanced and competent review of the DOE's Off-Site Source
Recovery Program. Their efforts helped us make significant improvements
to the program.
GAO RECOMMENDATIONS AND DOE ACTIONS
The GAO report made five specific recommendations, and I would like
to briefly go over them and how DOE has responded. First, I am pleased
to report that DOE has carried out three of the recommendations, is
very close to carrying out the fourth, and has initiated plans to
address the remaining recommendation.
1. The GAO's first recommendation states that unwanted Greater-
Than-Class-C sealed sources could be used as weapons of terror.
Therefore, the Secretary of Energy should determine whether the
priority given to the Off-Site Source Recovery Project is commensurate
with the threat posed by these sealed sources.
In November 2003, the Secretary of Energy created the Nuclear and
Radiological Threat Reduction Task Force under the National Nuclear
Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation. The existing Off-Site Source Recovery Program was
transferred from the Office of Environmental Management to the NNSA and
was made a key element of this Task Force. The Secretary then directed
the Off-Site Recovery Program to realign its scope and mission to
reflect the security threats posed by radioactive sources within the
United States and to accelerate and expand its recovery efforts. In May
2004, the Secretary announced the creation of the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative, and the Nuclear and Radiological Threat Reduction
Task Force, including the source recovery program, was given even
greater importance as a key element of this Initiative. To ensure long-
term organizational and resource priority, the Secretary turned this
Initiative into the Office of Global Threat Reduction, which is now
managed by an Assistant Deputy Administrator within the NNSA. As part
of these changes, the Off-Site Source Recovery Program became the
cornerstone of what is now called the U.S. Radiological Threat
Reduction program (USRTR), which is one of the two key pillars of the
Office of Global Radiological Threat Reduction. The second pillar is
the International Radiological Threat Reduction program, which has
initiated radiological threat reduction efforts in 40 countries in
Europe, Asia, Africa, and Central America. While the program name and
headquarters organization have changed, the recovery operations and
dedicated Off-Site Source Recovery Program personnel at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory and other locations remain at the core of this
highly successful program. These two pillars of the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative were the focus of the successful Partners'
Conference recently held in Vienna, Austria, and clearly demonstrate
the Secretary of Energy's commitment to ensure that this Initiative is
given high priority.
2. The GAO's second recommendation was that the Secretary should
ensure that adequate resources are devoted to the project to cover the
costs of recovering and storing these sealed sources as quickly as
possible.
The Secretary has taken a number of critical funding steps to
ensure the Department's recovery efforts are fully covered. First and
foremost, the Secretary nearly tripled the Off-Site Source Recovery
Program's budget from $1.96 million in fiscal year (FY) 2004 to a
budget request in FY 2005 of $5.6 million. In addition, the Secretary
directed that an additional $3.489 million be provided on a fast-track
basis to the USRTR program during FY 2004 to respond to an unexpected
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) request to recover 470 sources
from a bankrupt licensee in Pennsylvania, as well as a number of
additional recovery efforts. The Secretary's proposed five-year budget
for the recovery program also reflects important increases, including
$8.75 million in FY 2006, $8.80 million in FY 2007, $8.86 million in FY
2008, $8.92 million in FY 2009, and $9.53 million in FY 2010. With
these funding levels, the Secretary of Energy has clearly demonstrated
his commitment to provide the necessary funds and resources for this
program to carry out its important mission.
3. The GAO also recommended that the DOE ensure that unwanted
Greater-than-Class-C sealed sources containing plutonium-239,
strontium-90, and cesium-137 are properly secured to prevent their use
in dirty bombs. In the case of sources containing plutonium-239, which
can be used in nuclear weapons, we further recommend that the Secretary
of Energy take immediate action to provide storage space for these
sources at a secure DOE facility and establish milestones by which
progress can be measured to ensure that the storage space is provided
as soon as possible.
Two of the three items in this recommendation have been carried
out, and the third is in progress. In FY 2003, the USRTR program
developed the necessary storage space at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory and at the Nevada Test Site to secure sources containing
plutonium-239. The program began receiving plutonium-239 sources in
early FY 2004, and has recovered more than 260 plutonium-239 sources.
These sources were manufactured in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s and
loaned and/or leased to colleges and universities around the country by
the Atomic Energy Commission. Due to the fact that they on loan, they
remain the property of DOE. The USRTR program will continue to recover
these sources until they have all been returned to the Department.
The program in early FY 2004 also developed the necessary storage
space at the Los Alamos National Laboratory for strontium-90. In
February 2004, the USRTR program recovered four large strontium-90
sources in the form of radio isotopic thermoelectric generators, which
totaled over 60,000 curies. The USRTR worked closely with the NRC, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the State of Texas to remove these sources from the
Houston area just prior to the Super Bowl.
The program originally planned on developing cesium-137 storage
during the second half of FY 2004, but these plans were interrupted by
the need to respond to the NRC's emergency request concerning the
bankrupt licensee in Pennsylvania with almost 470 sealed sources as
well as some operating issues at one of our national laboratories.
Consequently, there was a slight delay in developing cesium-137
storage. However, in August 2004, the USRTR successfully tested a
capability to recover and recycle cesium-137 whereby storage is not
required. This involved two large cesium-137 Gammator irradiator
sources that were recovered from high schools in New York and New
Jersey and recycled by private industry. The USRTR plans to continue to
explore and utilize this recycling capability where possible and make
storage a high priority for early FY 2005. The prospect of a continuing
resolution based on an FY 2004 appropriation of only $1.9 million may
delay the programs' ability to address this issue. The USRTR program is
able, however, to address cesium-137 through recycling and expects to
carry out this GAO recommendation in early FY 2005 based on our FY 2005
funding request.
4. The GAO also recommended that the Secretary of Energy initiate
the process to develop a permanent disposal facility for Greater-Than-
Class-C radioactive waste to carry out the requirements of Public Law
99-240. To help manage the process, the Secretary should develop a plan
that would, at a minimum, assign responsibility for developing the
facility; establish milestones by which progress can be measured;
evaluate potential disposal options; estimate costs and schedules; and
address legislative, regulatory, and licensing considerations.
DOE is in the initial phase of a process to identify disposal
options for Greater-Than-Class-C radioactive waste and ultimately
select an option or options to be implemented. The first step will be
to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement under the National
Environmental Policy Act to analyze the range of reasonable disposal
alternatives. This will include an analysis of waste inventories and
long-term disposition alternatives and resource requirements as well as
an assessment of legislative, regulatory and licensing requirements,
responsibilities and needs. The Department's Office of Environment,
Safety and Health is in the process of laying out a path forward to
satisfy DOE's National Environmental Policy Act responsibilities and
select a disposal alternative or alternatives. DOE has had informal
meetings with other Federal agencies to identify their interest in
participating in the NEPA process with the DOE. The EIS will provide
the basis for DOE to develop cost and schedule estimates and
implementation plans for developing disposal capacity.
It is important to note that NNSA's sealed source recovery effort
is not wholly dependent upon developing a new disposition path. There
is a very capable commercial industry that can and has served as an
effective pathway for disposition, interim storage and/or recycling for
re-use. For example, the NNSA has determined that plutonium-239 sources
addressed by the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction Program are
eligible for disposal at DOE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New
Mexico. Secondly, cesium-137 and cobalt-60 sources recovered earlier
this year from a bankrupt commercial firm do not exceed the class C
waste designation and have been disposed of at a commercial radioactive
waste facility.
The use of commercial pathways makes sense for many reasons. They
provide a potential and significant economy of cost because they use
existing infrastructure, which eliminates the need for certain types of
new storage facilities. They reduce the overall demand for new high-
risk sources by maximizing the use of each source that is produced and
introduced into the market. These actions are part of the Department's
efforts to diversify its storage and disposition pathways, which
ultimately result in savings to the U.S. taxpayer.
5. Finally, the GAO recommended the development of a plan to ensure
the continued recovery of Greater-Than-Class-C waste until a disposal
facility is available.
I am pleased to inform you that the Department does have a plan to
recover Greater-Than-Class-C sources beyond the current projections for
the availability of a disposal facility, which is reflected in the
NNSA's five-year plan that extends to 2010. The USRTR program is
working vigorously to plan and carry out these efforts.
revised scope of the department's radiological recovery efforts
The U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction Program is not only working
with the NRC, but it is also beginning to work with the Department of
Homeland Security and other agencies to determine which radioactive
sources should receive highest priority for recovery. From a
radiological security and threat reduction perspective, the levels and
types of radioactive isotopes that are considered Greater-than-Class-C
sources do not include the full range of radioactive sources that DOE's
recovery program considers high-risk from the standpoint of their being
used effectively in a radiological dispersal device. Based in part on
DOE's significant experience in recovering and securing high-risk
radioactive sources overseas, via its International Radiological Threat
Reduction Program as well as on its re-examination of the scope of
radioactive sources that should be addressed due to security concerns,
DOE is in the process of expanding from three isotopes in mid-2003 to
ten.
Already, 68 sources were removed from 55 locations in the Boston,
Massachusetts, and New York City areas during the months leading up to
the national conventions, including large cesium-137 Gammator
irradiator sources from a high school in Long Island, New York, and
another in Parsippany, New Jersey. The Global Threat Reduction
Initiative sister programs also worked with DHS' Radiological Pilot
Project office and local agencies in conducting security assessments of
a number of New York City medical facilities that utilize large
radioactive sealed sources. .
In conclusion, since November 2003, when the USRTR program moved
under the NNSA, it has exceeded the goal set by Congress of recovering
5,000 sources in eighteen months. It has recovered four large
strontium-90 sources from the Houston area prior to the Super Bowl,
responded to an emergency request from NRC to recover more than 470
sources from a bankrupt licensee in Pennsylvania, and passed the 10,000
source mark in terms of sources recovered since the program's
inception. We believe this is an impressive record and the GAO audit
recommendations helped NNSA to focus on what was necessary to achieve
these successes.
I would be more than happy to answer any questions that you may
have.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Normally we would proceed right to you, Ms.
Nazzaro, but we are going to ask Senator Bingaman if he would
take a couple, ask a couple of questions, because he is on an
extremely tight schedule. So you will be right after his
questions.
Senator Bingaman.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I did just really have one question that I wanted to ask
Mr. McGinnis before I left. This is related to Senator Akaka's
bill, S. 1045. It is his view that this legislation would help
strengthen the source collection program in the DOE. Have you
had a chance, has the administration had a chance, to review
this bill and do you have a position on it that you could state
for us today?
Mr. McGinnis. Well, I would defer to my colleague Ms.
Gelles, as I am in the National Security Administration side of
the house. We focus on the secure removal of the sources. I can
tell you that our goals are to recover and securely store
greater-than-class-C sources that are declared excess as
rapidly as possible. I think we all have that common goal.
So from the standpoint of reducing the threat from dirty
bombs, we are moving forward in that area to secure and store
on an interim basis sources, of which I have said we have
recovered about 10,000 already.
Senator Bingaman. Ms. Gelles, did you have any wisdom you
could give us about this particular bill Senator Akaka has
proposed.
Ms. Gelles. Senator, I am sorry, I am unable at this time
to provide the Department's position on the draft legislation,
but we will be happy to provide that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department understands the importance of the issues raised in
S. 1045. The Department believes that the designation of the Office of
Environmental Management to deal with the disposal of greater-than-
Class-C (GTCC) low-level radioactive waste for which DOE is
responsible, including preparation of an environmental impact statement
that will evaluate the factors associated with various disposal
options, addresses the issues and concerns raised in S. 1045. The
Department affirms that the decision-making process on disposal options
for GTCC low-level radioactive waste will not impede on-going and
future efforts by the National Nuclear Security Administration to
recover and store radioactive sealed sources that are declared excess
and pose a security threat.
Senator Bingaman. That would be a big help.
That is all I had, Mr. Chairman. Thank you again for having
the hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Let me ask any of you that would like to volunteer. Could
you for us and for the record and for the press that is here
just tell us what we are talking about when we talk about low-
level radioactive wastes? Anything radioactive is ominous as
people look at it. I do not mean that for real, but could you
tell us what it is? What makes up this universe called ``low-
level radioactive waste''?
Yes, sir, Alan, Mr. Pasternak, do you want to try it?
Mr. Pasternak. Yes, let me take a stab at it. In my written
testimony there is the statutory definition of ``low-level
radioactive waste.'' It is defined as waste that is not high-
level waste, waste that is not transuranic waste. To that
extent it is defined by what it is not. But to be more
specific, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has very specific
regulations that describe class A, class B, and class C wastes,
and than anything above that is greater-than-class-C.
So you look to the statute and you look to the regulations
to find out what it is. It is generated by----
The Chairman. Where does it come from?
Mr. Pasternak. It comes from nuclear power plants, it comes
from universities, hospitals, industries, including the
pharmaceutical and biotech industries, which use radioactive
materials in their research. It is used even I think in the
construction industry, sealed sources. The use of radioactive
materials is ubiquitous.
The Chairman. Now, before we go on let me just ask:
Normally when we think of radioactive waste we think about
nuclear power plants and we think about that kind of thing, or
nuclear weapons. Essentially, the real concern we have about
the expiration date is that the medical facilities of our
Nation that produce huge quantities of this waste, if they do
not have a place to send this they are going to have a problem
of what they do with it and they will have to keep it on-site,
which would not be something that would be a very good
situation for the United States.
How much, generally speaking, of this waste comes from
treatment of people medically and for their health, for health
reasons? Does anybody have an idea?
Mr. Pasternak. I do not think much of it comes from
treatment. Certainly some of it does. It is from the
manufacture of the radiopharmaceuticals, it is from the
research. The shortage of disposal capacity has already had
some effect in research. I know of one major institution in
California that no longer does large animal research because
they cannot get rid of the carcasses.
But in terms of quantities, whether you measure by
radioactivity or you measure by volume, the major producers are
the nuclear power plants and industries. It is a little bit
hard to separate out medical and university because if it is
from a university that has a medical department it is
categorized as academic, not medical. So it is a little hard.
The Chairman. OK, let us go to you, Ms. Nazzaro. Would you
please proceed.
STATEMENT OF ROBIN M. NAZZARO, DIRECTOR, NATURAL
RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Nazzaro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Craig.
I do have some numbers for you, Senator Domenici, on the
volume of wastes. If you put academic and medical together it
is .5 percent. So as was stated by Mr. Pasternak, 87, almost
88, percent comes from the utilities and almost 10 percent
comes from industry.
The Chairman. OK. Thank you very much. I should have asked
you.
Ms. Nazzaro. In the sake of time, you asked us to look at
six issues, so I will forego any background and just give you
our findings on the six issues from the two reports that cover
disposal of class A, B, and C waste as well as the greater-
than-class-C waste. We identified several changes that might
affect disposal availability. Most notably, one facility plans
to close its doors to most States by mid-2008, but new options
might counter the shortfall. We also identified changes in
Federal agency monitoring of waste management, including the
fact that DOE no longer provides technical assistance to the
States and its annual reporting to the Congress on waste
disposal was terminated in 2003.
Disposal volumes grew to about 12 million cubic feet in
2003, an increase of 200 percent over 1999. Class A wastes
accounted for 99 percent of that volume, which came primarily
from DOE's cleanup program. The Envirocare facility disposed of
almost all of the class A wastes, while Barnwell disposed of
almost all of the B and C wastes. We relied on data from the
disposal operators, as Ms. Gelles identified, because the data
base that DOE maintained did not include the DOE waste shipped
for commercial disposal and had other deficiencies. The timing
and volume of wastes needing disposal in the future, however,
is uncertain and will depend largely on waste disposal
decisions by DOE and the Nuclear utility companies.
However, there appears to be enough disposal availability,
at least to mid-2008. Disposal availability for class A waste
is not a problem because Envirocare has enough capacity for
more than 20 years. Capacity at Richland and Barnwell is more
than sufficient to serve the needs of the 14 States they serve.
However, after mid-2008 South Carolina plans to terminate its
access to Barnwell for the remaining 36 States that now rely on
this facility for disposal of their B and C wastes.
Nevertheless, any disposal shortfall is unlikely to pose an
immediate problem because users of radioactive materials can
continue to minimize waste generation, process them into safer
forms, and store the waste. While these approaches can be
costly, we did not identify any other widespread effects.
The act has not resulted in the development of additional
regional disposal capacity. Several reasons account for this,
including decreased commercial waste generation, adequate
disposal capacity, the rising cost of developing disposal
facilities, and public and political resistance in States
designated to host these facilities.
Regarding the greater-than-class-C waste, DOE's lack of
progress in providing a permanent disposal facility was the
focus of our message. As an interim step, DOE is collecting and
storing this material, as Mr. McGinnis mentioned. However, this
effort has experienced a number of problems, including
inadequate capacity to store certain isotopes.
To better manage waste disposal, as noted by Ms. Gelles, we
recommended that the Secretary of Energy halt dissemination of
the information in their national data base. We do not question
the usefulness of the data base. However, we would like to see
them strengthen internal controls over the data reliability and
validity. We also suggested that the Congress may wish to
consider directing NRC to report to it if waste disposal and
storage conditions should change enough to warrant
consideration of new legislation. Regarding DOE's effort to
secure the greater-than-class-C materials, we made a number of
recommendations to better address national security risks posed
by these materials. To date over 10,000 sources have been
recovered. DOE is also planning to conduct the initial
environmental analysis required to develop the permanent
disposal facility.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement and I would be
happy to respond to any questions you or Senator Craig may
have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Nazzaro follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director Natural Resources and
Environment, Government Accountability Office
Low-Level Radioactive Waste--Future Waste Volumes and Disposal Options
Are Uncertain
WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY
Low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) management concerns persist
despite the LLRW Policy. Act of 1980, as amended, which made states
responsible for providing for disposal of class A, B, and C LLRW and
made the Department of Energy (DOE) responsible for the disposal of
greater-than-class-C LLRW. This testimony is based on GAO's June 2004
report, which examined the adequacy of disposal availability for class
A, B, and C wastes, and GAO's April 2003 report, which assessed
recovery efforts involving greater-than-class-C waste. This testimony
examines (1) changes in LLRW disposal availability since 1999, (2)
recent LLRW disposal volumes and potential future volumes, (3) any
current or anticipated shortfalls in disposal availability, (4) the
potential effects of any such shortfalls, (5) the effectiveness of the
Act in developing regional disposal options for class A, B, and C
wastes, and (6) the status of DOE's effort to dispose of greater-than-
class-C waste.
WHAT WE RECOMMEND
The reports recommended that DOE improve its database and the
management of greater-than-class-C wastes. DOE is implementing most of
these recommendations. In addition, GAO suggested that the Congress may
wish to consider directing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to report
if LLRW conditions change enough to warrant legislative intervention.
WHAT GAO FOUND
GAO's June 2004 report identified several changes since 1999 that
have affected, or might affect, LLRW disposal availability and federal
oversight. Specifically, one disposal facility plans to close its doors
to most states, but new options are evolving that might offset this
shortfall.
According to data from the three commercial disposal facility
operators, annual LLRW disposal volumes have increased in recent years.
In conducting this assessment, GAO relied on data from the operators
because DOE's national LLRW database was unreliable. The timing and
volume of future waste needing disposal are uncertain because of the
difficulty in forecasting disposal shipments from DOE and nuclear
utilities.
At current LLRW disposal volumes, disposal availability for class A
waste is not a problem in the short or longer term. Disposal
availability appears adequate until mid-2008 for class B and C wastes
when, if disposal conditions do not change, most states will not have a
place to dispose of these wastes.
Nevertheless, users of radioactive materials can continue to
minimize waste generation, process waste into safer forms, and store
waste if there are no disposal options for class B and C wastes after
2008. While these approaches are costly, GAO did not identify other
immediate widespread effects.
The Act has not resulted in the development of additional regional
disposal capacity for class A, B, and C wastes. Factors limiting
further development include less waste, adequate disposal capacity,
rising development costs, and public and political resistance in states
designated to host these facilities.
DOE has not yet provided a facility for the permanent disposal of
greater-than-class-C waste, but it is collecting this material to
address security concerns in the interim.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, we are pleased to be
here today to discuss our past and ongoing work on the management of
low-level radioactive waste (LLRW). LLRW is an inevitable byproduct of
nuclear power generation and of government, industrial, academic, and
medical uses of radioisotopes. LLRW includes items such as rags, paper,
liquid, glass, metal components, resins, filters, and protective
clothing that have been exposed to radioactivity or contaminated with
radioactive material. States' management of LLRW continues to be a
concern despite two-decade-old federal legislation addressing the need
for disposal. Under the LLRW Policy Act of 1980, as amended (the Act),
each state is responsible for providing for disposal of LLRW generated
within the state, either by itself or in cooperation with other states,
with the exception of waste produced by the Department of Energy (DOE)
and the nuclear propulsion component of the Department of Navy. The aim
of the Act was to provide for more LLRW disposal capacity on a regional
basis and to more equitably distribute responsibility for the
management of LLRW among the states. As an incentive for states to
manage waste on a regional basis, the Congress consented to the
formation of interstate agreements, known as compacts, and granted
compact member states the authority to exclude LLRW from other compacts
or unaffiliated states.\1\
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\1\ Generators of LLRW located in compact or unaffiliated states
that do not have their own disposal facility can contract with a
disposal facility in another compact if this compact allows them to do
so.
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The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for
licensing LLRW disposal sites and has divided the wastes covered by the
Act into categories of increasing levels of hazard exposure, beginning
with class A, followed by class B and C.\2\ There are currently three
commercial LLRW disposal facilities where these wastes can be disposed
of--the Chem-Nuclear Systems facility in Barnwell County, South
Carolina, the Envirocare facility in Tooele County, Utah, and the US
Ecology facility in Benton County, Washington. DOE is responsible for
disposing of a fourth category of LLRW, known as greater-than-class-C
waste. This latter waste is not generally acceptable for disposal near
the surface like the other three waste classes.
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\2\ Radioactive waste is classified by type of radionuclide (e.g.,
americium-241) and concentration of radioactivity (often measured in
curies per gram).
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Our testimony today is based on two reports: (1) our June 2004
report in which we examined the adequacy of LLRW disposal availability
for class A, B, and C wastes;\3\ this report updated a 1999 report, in
which we found that states were not developing new disposal facilities
and that within 10 years the only facility available to waste
generators in most states for class B and C wastes could be full,\4\
and (2) an April 2003 report addressing the status of DOE's program to
dispose of greater-than-class-C waste.\5\ As you requested, our
testimony examines the findings and conclusions of these reports and
offers a perspective on the effectiveness of the Act. Specifically, our
testimony examines (1) changes in LLRW disposal since 1999 that we
identified in our 2004 report, (2) recent LLRW disposal volumes and
potential future volumes, (3) any current or anticipated shortfalls in
disposal availability, (4) the potential effects of any such
shortfalls, (5) the effectiveness of the Act in developing regional
disposal options for class A, B, and C wastes, and (6) the status of
DOE's effort to dispose of greater-than-class-C material.
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\3\ GAO, Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Disposal Availability
Adequate in the Short Term, but Oversight Needed to Identify Any Future
Shortfalls. GAO-04-604 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2004).
\4\ GAO, Low-Level Radioactive Wastes: States Are Not Developing
Disposal Facilities, GAO/RCED-99-238 (Washington, D.C.: Sept 17, 1999).
\5\ GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Action Needed to Ensure
Continued Recovery of Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources. GAO-03-483
(Washington, D.C. April 15, 2003).
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In summary:
In June 2004, we identified several changes since 1999 that have
affected, or might affect, LLRW disposal availability and federal
oversight. These changes include South Carolina's decision to close the
Barnwell facility to non-compact states by mid-2008, issuance of a
license for the Envirocare facility to accept class B and C wastes
pending approval by the Utah legislature and governor, the potential
licensing of a new facility in Texas, and the state of Nebraska's
litigation settlement with the Central Interstate Compact for reneging
on its compact obligations to build a new facility. We also identified
changes in federal agency monitoring of LLRW management. DOE no longer
has appropriated funds to provide technical assistance to the states,
and the annual requirement that DOE report to the Congress on LLRW
disposal was terminated effective 2003. Furthermore, in the late 1990s,
NRC decreased its involvement in LLRW because no disposal sites were
being developed.
Annual LLRW disposal volumes have increased in recent years;
however, the timing and level of future volumes needing disposal are
uncertain. According to data provided by the three commercial LLRW
disposal facility operators, disposal volumes grew to about 12 million
cubic feet in 2003, an increase of 200 percent over 1999. Class A waste
accounted for 99 percent of the disposal volume--DOE's cleanup program
generated about 78 percent of the total class A waste. The Envirocare
facility disposed of 99 percent of the nation's class A waste disposed
of in commercial facilities in 2003 while the Barnwell facility
disposed of 99 percent of the class B and C wastes that went to
commercial disposal. We relied on data from these operators because the
national LLRW database maintained by DOE lacked data on the
department's waste shipped for commercial disposal and had other
deficiencies. Even if the data problems are resolved, uncertainties
will remain regarding the timing and volume of LLRW needing disposal in
the future, which will largely depend on the disposal decisions made by
DOE and nuclear utility companies.
There appears to be enough disposal availability to serve the
nation's needs at least until mid-2008, when generators in many states
might have a shortfall in disposal availability for their class B and C
wastes. Disposal availability for class A waste is not a problem in the
short or longer term, provided that the Envirocare facility continues
in operation. According to Envirocare, the disposal facility can take
20 years or more of such waste under its current license. Capacity at
the Barnwell and Richland facilities, which are licensed to accept all
three classes of LLRW, is more than sufficient to serve the needs of
the 14 states within the compacts served by these facilities. However,
South Carolina has enacted legislation to terminate non-compact states'
access to this facility after mid-2008. This action will affect the 36
states that currently rely on Barnwell to dispose of their class B and
C wastes but are not members of the Atlantic compact.
Users of radioactive materials can continue to minimize waste
generation, process waste into safer forms, and store waste if there
are no disposal options for class B and C wastes after 2008. These
approaches, however, can be costly, with a higher financial burden on
some licensees than others. Notwithstanding these business costs, we
did not identify other effects of any shortfalls in disposal
availability that might have wider implications.
The Act has not resulted in the development of additional regional
disposal capacity for class A, B and C wastes. As we previously
reported, several reasons account for this lack of progress: decreased
waste generation, adequate disposal capacity, the rising cost of
developing disposal facilities, and public and political resistance in
states designated to host these facilities.
We reported in April 2003 on DOE's lack of progress in providing a
permanent disposal facility for greater-than-class-C waste. DOE created
the Off-Site Source Recovery Project as an interim step toward meeting
its obligation under the Act. The project provides secure storage for
material that could be particularly attractive for use in a
radiological dispersion device, or ``dirty bomb.'' As we reported, the
project has experienced a number of problems. For example, we noted
that DOE had inadequate capacity to store certain isotopes,
particularly sources containing plutonium-239 that in sufficient
quantity could be used to fabricate a crude nuclear weapon. Such
sources, in some cases, were not being securely stored and most holders
of the material expressed their desire to dispose of it as quickly as
possible.
The two reports discussed in this testimony contained a number of
recommendations. In our June 2004 report on disposal availability, we
recommended that the Secretary of Energy halt the dissemination of
information in its national LLRW database as long as the database has
shortcomings in its usefulness and reliability. DOE decided to leave
the database online but has added a notice to users of the database
regarding inaccuracies and is taking steps to identify and update
erroneous data. Our report also suggested that the Congress might wish
to consider directing NRC to report to it if LLRW disposal and storage
conditions should change enough to warrant consideration of new
legislation to improve the reliability and cost-effectiveness of
disposal availability. Our April 2003 report on DOE's Off-Site Source
Recovery Project recommended that DOE (1) determine whether the
priority given to the recovery project was commensurate with the threat
posed by greater-than-class-C sealed sources, (2) provide, as soon as
possible, storage space for sealed sources containing the isotopes
plutonium-239, strontium-90, and cesium 137 with the appropriate level
of security, and (3) initiate the process to develop a permanent
disposal facility for greater-than-class-C radioactive waste, develop a
plan to help manage this process, and develop a plan to ensure the
continued recovery and storage of greater-than-class-C sealed sources
until such a disposal facility is available. As a result of our
recommendation, DOE moved the program and realigned management
responsibility for the project out of the Office of Environmental
Management and into the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
in order to better address the national security risks posed by these
materials.\6\ To date, over 10,000 sources have been recovered, but
more still need to be collected. In addition, DOE has added more
storage space and is again recovering sources containing plutonium-239.
DOE is also planning to conduct the initial environmental analysis
required to develop a permanent disposal facility for this waste.
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\6\ NNSA has combined the recovery project with other
nonproliferation activities under the U.S. Radiological Threat
Reduction Program.
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BACKGROUND
The disposal of LLRW is the end of the radioactive material life
cycle that spans production, use, processing, interim storage, and
disposal. In general, the life cycle starts with the procurement of the
radioactive isotopes that have medical, industrial, agricultural, and
research applications. The isotopes come in either sealed or unsealed
sources. While a metal container shields a sealed source, unsealed
sources remain accessible in a glass vial or other type of container.
Common uses of this radioactive material are in radiotherapy,
radiography, smoke detectors, the irradiation and sterilization of food
and materials, gauging, and illumination of emergency exit signs. In
the course of working with these materials, other material, such as
protective clothing and gloves, pipes, filters, and concrete that come
in contact with them will become contaminated. The nuclear utility
industry generates the bulk of this LLRW through the normal operation
and maintenance of nuclear power plants, and through the
decommissioning of these plants. Some sealed sources can be recycled
for other uses that require less radioactivity. Once these materials
have served their purpose, they become LLRW. Specialized companies or
those licensed to use these materials can reduce the volume and
sometimes the radioactivity level of the waste through processing
before it is either put into a licensed interim storage or a disposal
facility. After a period of storage, some LLRW can decay to the point
that it is safe for disposal in regulated landfill sites. During the
life cycle, there will also be some loss of radioactive materials to
abandonment, misplacement and theft. Figure 1 diagrams the life-cycle
process for radioactive materials.*
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* All diagrams are available in committee files.
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In the 1960s, the Atomic Energy Commission began to encourage the
development of commercial LLRW disposal facilities to accommodate the
increased volume of commercial waste that was being generated. Six such
disposal facilities were licensed, two of which, the facility in
Washington State, licensed in 1965, and in South Carolina, licensed in
1971, remain open today.\7\ Each of these facilities is located within
the boundaries of or adjacent to a much larger site owned by DOE. The
third facility in Utah is about 80 miles west of Salt Lake City. Utah
initially licensed the Envirocare facility in 1988 to accept naturally
occurring radioactive waste. In 1991, Utah amended the license to
permit the disposal of some LLRW, and the Northwest Compact agreed to
allow Envirocare to accept these wastes from non-compact states. By
2001, the facility was allowed to accept all types of class A waste.
Because of its higher radioactive content, greater-than-class-C waste
cannot be disposed of in these commercial disposal facilities. Instead,
the Act requires DOE to provide a facility for disposing of all
greater-than-class-C radioactive waste.
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\7\ Under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission, four other
commercial disposal facilities were licensed in the 1960s, including
facilities in Illinois, Kentucky, Nevada, and New York.
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Currently, 10 compacts include 43 states: the Appalachian,
Atlantic, Central, Central Midwest, Northwest, Midwest, Rocky Mountain,
Southeast, Southwestern, and Texas compacts. Seven states, as well as
the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, are unaffiliated. Figure 2
shows the state LLRW compacts and unaffiliated states.
SINCE 1999, LLRW DISPOSAL AVAILABILITY AND FEDERAL OVERSIGHT HAVE
CHANGED
In June 2004, we identified a number of important changes that had
occurred since our 1999 report; these changes have affected, or might
affect, future disposal availability for these wastes and federal
oversight of states' LLRW management. Changes that might have
implications for long-term disposal availability include the following:
In 2001, South Carolina enacted legislation restricting the
use of the Barnwell disposal facility to generators in the
three-member Atlantic compact after mid-2008. In the past, the
state legislature has changed its position on restricting
access to this facility, both closing and reopening the
facility to non-compact member states over the years.
In 2001, Envirocare received a license from the state
regulatory authority to accept class B and C wastes pending
approval by the Utah legislature and governor. Currently, the
state has imposed a moratorium on approving the use of this
license until February 2005, after a review of the
recommendations of a hazardous waste regulation and policy task
force. The task force is expected to issue its final report by
November 2004. Granting approval for Envirocare to use its
class B and C wastes license could help to alleviate a
shortfall in disposal availability for class B and C wastes.
In 2003, Texas enacted legislation designating a geographic
area in the state as acceptable for a new LLRW disposal
facility, and the state regulator developed a license
application process for this facility. In August 2004, a
private company submitted a license application to the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality for approval to construct
and operate a disposal facility 30 miles west of Andrews,
Texas. Current projections by the state of Texas suggest that
the earliest a facility could be licensed is 2007. Non-compact
states' access to this facility has not been determined. If the
Texas facility were allowed to accept waste nationally, it
would mitigate a potential shortfall in disposal availability
for class B and C wastes.
In 2004, the Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit affirmed a
federal district court decision that Nebraska, as a designated
host state, is liable for $151 million in damages for reneging
on its obligations to the Central Compact to. build a disposal
facility. Since the issuance of our June 2004 report, the
Central Interstate Compact voted to accept a settlement with
Nebraska for $141 million plus interest. Under the settlement,
if Nebraska and other compact members negotiate access to the
proposed disposal facility in Texas, the amount Nebraska would
have to pay would be reduced to $130 million plus interest.
The remaining changes affect federal agency guidance and oversight
of LLRW management by the states. These include the following:
In 2001, DOE significantly diminished its involvement in
guiding and overseeing LLRW management by the states. DOE's
reporting requirement on LLRW management, as originally
required by the Act, terminated effective May 2000. In
addition, DOE's technical assistance activities under the Act
have essentially ended after a period of shifting emphasis and
decline.
Since the late 1990s, NRC has decreased its direct
involvement in states' LLRW management because no new disposal
sites were being developed and more states have taken on the
responsibility for the regulation of radioactive material from
NRC.
ANNUAL LLRW DISPOSAL VOLUMES HAVE INCREASED,
BUT FUTURE VOLUMES ARE UNCERTAIN
Annual LLRW disposal volumes have increased significantly in recent
years, primarily the result of cleaning up DOE sites and
decommissioning nuclear power plants. To obtain disposal volume
information, we relied on data from the three commercial disposal
facility operators because the Manifest Information Management System
(MIMS)--the online commercial disposal LLRW database maintained by
DOE--is not as up-to-date as the facilities' data and has other
deficiencies. Future disposal volumes remain uncertain and will depend
largely on waste disposal decisions by DOE and nuclear utility
companies.
LLRW Disposal Volumes Have Increased Significantly Since 1999
Since the beginning of 1999, disposal volumes have steadily
increased to over 12 million cubic feet in 2003, an increase of over
200 percent. Class A waste accounted for 99 percent of all waste
disposed of at the three commercial disposal facilities. The Envirocare
facility received 99 percent of this class A waste, and about 78
percent of this class A waste came from DOE clean up sites. According
to Envirocare, DOE has increased its shipment of waste to the facility
from about 36,000 cubic feet in 1994 (6.6 percent of the class A waste
disposed) to almost 9.3 million cubic feet in 2003 (77.8 percent of the
class A waste disposed). In contrast, disposal volumes of commercial
class B waste declined 47 percent, from about 23,500 cubic feet in
1999, to about 12,400 cubic feet by 2003. Commercial class C waste
disposal volumes were more volatile, changing as much as 107 percent in
a single year. The total annual disposal volume of class C waste
alternately rose and fell between 1999 and 2003, with the annual total
reaching over 20,000 cubic feet in 1999, falling as low as about 11,000
cubic feet in 2002, then rising to over 23,000 cubic feet in 2003. Of
the total class B and C wastes disposed of in commercial facilities in
2003, 99 percent went to Barnwell.
Concerns about the Completeness and Reliability of National LLRW
Database
Because of concerns about data completeness and reliability, we did
not use the database that DOE maintains and operates for the LLRW
community and public when we determined recent disposal volumes. Nor
did we use other information in this database to analyze sources of
LLRW by state, compact, and generator type because of shortcomings in
its usefulness and reliability. Instead, we relied on data supplied to
us from the three commercial disposal operators for our analysis
because these data include DOE waste volumes sent for commercial
disposal, are more up to date and are the primary source data input
into MIMS.
With respect to data completeness, even though DOE ships large
quantities of LLRW to a commercial disposal facility, this information
is not captured in MIMS. Also, other types of information, such as the
storage of waste and volume of waste reduction, are not collected in
this database. The consensus among the compact and unaffiliated state
officials we surveyed was that they could more effectively regulate and
monitor LLRW in their compacts and states if MIMS offered more
comprehensive and reliable data. Despite these shortcomings, these
officials have sometimes used MIMS data as a convenient source of
information for public, media, and stakeholder inquiries, as a means of
monitoring LLRW within their compact or region, and as an external
check on the LLRW interstate shipment data reported to compact and
state regulators by the disposal operators.
We also identified shortcomings in the reliability of the MIMS
database. We found inconsistencies between what the disposal facility
operators claimed had been disposed of at their facilities and what was
recorded in this database. For example, excluding waste generated by
DOE, the volumes of LLRW reported to us by Envirocare for 1999 to 2003
totaled 10.4 million cubic feet, compared to the 15.7 million cubic
feet reported in MIMS. There were also problems with other kinds of
data in MIMS. States and compacts have also identified discrepancies
that undermine the data's usefulness, particularly regarding the state-
specific information on the origins of waste. For example, Tennessee,
which is the base of operations for companies that transport and
process the waste from generators in other states prior to disposal,
reports that it is erroneously recorded in MIMS as the state of origin
of this waste.
The data DOE puts into MIMS comes from the three commercial LLRW
disposal facility operators in electronic format. DOE pays each
operator varying amounts of money to extract data from the records
accompanying shipments of LLRW that provide information on the volume,
radioactivity level, source, and other information about the waste.
These records are called manifests, and NRC requires their use to track
shipment of radioactive materials. The disposal operator then transmits
some of this information to DOE for entry into MIMS. Each disposal
facility operator is responsible for ensuring the validity of these
data, but DOE's contracts with these operators leave to them what
steps, if any, should be taken to validate the data. DOE takes no
responsibility for verifying the accuracy of the data supplied by the
disposal facility operators. Furthermore, while DOE takes some steps to
ensure that it accurately uploads operator-supplied data into MIMS, it
does not perform other systematic quality checks on the data, such as
``reasonableness'' checks, cross tabulations, or exceptions reports. As
a result, the lack of consistent and comprehensive internal controls,
such as controls over information processing, undermine our confidence
in the data output in MIMS for several types of information, including
sources of waste coming from states, compacts, and generator types.
We recommended in our June 2004 report that the Secretary of Energy
halt dissemination of information in DOE's national LLRW database as
long as the database has shortcomings in its usefulness and
reliability. DOE subsequently decided to leave the database online but
has added a notice to users of the database regarding inaccuracies and
is taking steps to identify and update erroneous data.
Uncertainties Surround Projecting Future LLRW Disposal Volumes
Notwithstanding problems obtaining comprehensive and reliable LLRW
disposal data, uncertainties remain concerning the timing and volume of
LLRW needing disposal in the future, which largely will depend on the
disposal decisions made by nuclear utility companies and DOE, as well
as on possible changes in regulatory standards for what constitutes
LLRW. For example, officials at DOE told us that projections for sites
now being cleaned up have not proven very accurate, and have tended to
significantly overestimate waste volumes that would require disposal as
LLRW. They cited several reasons for this difficulty: records from
``legacy'' sites--former nuclear weapons production sites that DOE is
cleaning up--have not proven to be reliable; the decay rate of known
buried radioactive wastes have often been higher than expected so
wastes that were expected to need disposal as LLRW can instead be
legally classified as radioactive waste mixed with nonradioactive but
hazardous wastes and sent to less expensive disposal facilities;
contractors have become more innovative and skilled in sorting and
segregating hazardous and mixed wastes from LLRW so that a higher
percentage of wastes can be disposed of as hazardous or mixed wastes
rather than LLRW; and some debris and material from site cleanup
projected to be LLRW has no appreciable radioactivity when generated
and can therefore be disposed in sanitary landfills or other non-LLRW
disposal facilities. There are some indications that the volume of DOE
cleanup waste likely to be sent to commercial LLRW disposal facilities
could currently be at or near a peak and could soon rapidly decline as
cleanup at some DOE sites winds down and as cleanup activity shifts to
other DOE sites that have considerable on-site disposal capacity. As a
result, DOE officials expect the use of commercial LLRW disposal
facilities will start declining after 2006 and will stay comparatively
low until another anticipated spike in 2014. DOE officials stressed,
however, that ``high confidence numbers'' are not yet available because
the department is still in the process of reorganizing and developing
new baselines for its accelerated cleanup projects, and it does not
have a management system in place to develop corresponding waste
projections.
Potential changes to the threshold at which waste is classified as
LLRW are currently under consideration and could affect the amount of
waste needing disposal in the future. The National Research Council and
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are separately studying this
issue and considering possible changes that might affect the future
management of LLRW. The National Research Council is studying the issue
because members of its Board on Radioactive Waste Management are
concerned that the statutes and regulations governing LLRW management
may be overly restrictive in some cases, leading to excessive costs and
other burdens on the waste generator and, in other cases, may lead to
an exaggeration of the potential risks posed by these materials. EPA is
examining its existing waste regulations and has begun soliciting
public comment as it considers new rulemaking in this area
Specifically, EPA is exploring an option with NRC to establish a
regulatory framework that allows some of the lower activity radioactive
waste to be disposed of at non-LLRW disposal facilities. Finally, and
in a similar vein, government and industry LLRW stakeholders have
discussed harmonizing U.S. standards with the prevailing international
standards for LLRW under consideration by the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Such a change could prompt U.S. regulators to consider
raising the threshold at which the radioactivity of waste would trigger
regulation as LLRW and would allow for lower activity LLRW to be
disposed of under other regulatory regimes.
LLRW DISPOSAL AVAILABILITY APPEARS ADEQUATE UNTIL MID-2008
Disposal availability appears adequate to serve the nation's needs
at least until mid-2008, when many states might lose disposal access
for their class B and C wastes. Disposal availability for class A waste
is not a problem in the short or longer term. According to Envirocare
representatives, their disposal site, which accepted over 99 percent of
the nation's commercially disposed of class A waste in 2003, has enough
capacity to accept this waste at the current volume levels for more
than 20 years. The Richland facility has about 21 million cubic feet of
capacity remaining for all classes of waste, which is more than enough
to accommodate the LLRW coming from the 11 states in the Northwest and
Rocky Mountain compacts until the expected closure of this facility in
2056. The Barnwell disposal facility has about 2.7 million cubic feet
of remaining capacity, most of which has been set aside for waste from
generators in the Atlantic Compact until 2050. Barnwell also appears to
have enough disposal capacity to continue accepting class B and C
wastes from other states until mid-2008, when it is scheduled to close
to all but the three Atlantic compact states. According to the Director
of Disposal Services at Chem-Nuclear Systems, the operator of the
Barnwell facility, there should be enough space at the facility to
accommodate the typical 20,000 to 25,000 cubic feet of class B and C
wastes accepted at this facility in recent years. This representative
told us that many generators have already contracted to dispose of
their B and C wastes in the short-term, and any generator outside of
the Atlantic Compact anticipating a need to dispose of these wastes
could still contract for the necessary space until mid-2008.
A number of factors support the likelihood that disposal space for
class B and C wastes will be available at Barnwell until mid-2008, if
disposal volumes do not exceed anticipated levels. Based on current
space commitments at this disposal facility under the conditions of the
volume caps set by the South Carolina legislature, there remains
between 24,500 to 44,500 cubic feet of uncommitted space until 2008.
The amount of space available depends on whether Atlantic Compact
generators use all of their set-aside space through 2008. In addition,
utilities are likely to take more aggressive efforts to ensure
sufficient space for class B and C wastes at Barnwell. Industry
officials said utilities might consider several initiatives and
conditions that could alleviate the diminishing disposal availability
for class B and C wastes. For example, utilities could send class A
waste to Envirocare rather than Barnwell to save the remaining space at
Barnwell for class B and C wastes. In addition, utilities might
increase waste reduction efforts and storage.
After 2008, disposal availability for the class B and C wastes
generated in the 36 states outside the Northwest, Rocky Mountain, and
Atlantic compacts is more uncertain. Disposal availability for these
states will depend on a number of possibilities, including extending
access to Barnwell beyond mid-2008 or creating new disposal options for
these classes of waste. The Barnwell facility has opened and closed to
non-compact member states before and could again. Given the
difficulties of attracting class A waste to Barnwell because of the
high disposal fees, and the fairly consistent level of class B and C
wastes shipped to this site each year, the facility might not even
reach its volume cap of 35,000 cubic feet per year after 2008. In
addition, the set-aside of 2.2 million cubic feet for Atlantic Compact
generators through 2050 may be negotiated downward, freeing up
additional space at this disposal facility. It is also possible that
new disposal options will become available in the future that could
alleviate any disposal crisis for class B and C wastes. Finally,
regardless of the outcome, representatives of the Nuclear Energy
Institute, the policy organization of the nuclear energy industry, said
that utilities, the greatest generator of class B and C wastes, can
store these wastes on site if they have no disposal option.
ANY LLRW DISPOSAL SHORTFALL AFTER MID-2008
UNLIKELY TO POSE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM
If after mid-2008, there are no new disposal options for class B
and C wastes, licensed users of radioactive materials can continue to
minimize waste generation, process waste into safer forms, and store
waste pending the development of additional disposal options. These
approaches, however, can be costly, with a higher financial burden on
some licensees than others. Notwithstanding these business costs, we
did not identify other effects of any shortfalls in disposal
availability that might have wider implications.
LLRW Minimization and Storage Can Lessen Effects of Any Disposal
Shortfall
The licensed users of radioactive materials that must eventually
dispose of their LLRW have employed a variety of techniques to both
minimize and process this waste to reduce its volume before storage and
eventual disposal. These techniques include substituting nonradioactive
materials for radioactive materials, separating radioactive materials
from nonradioactive materials, recycling, compaction, dilution, and
incineration. For example, it is reported that most large research
institutions make concerted efforts to find suitable and appropriate
alternatives to the use of radioactive materials. One university
official told us that such efforts have reduced LLRW generation at his
institution by 30 percent in the last 5 years. The Electric Power
Research Institute is encouraging nuclear utilities to use vendor
volume reduction programs for resins, the single largest component of
class B and C wastes, to reduce volume. Some licensees have used
processors to super-compact class A waste to achieve up to a 5,000
percent reduction in volume, or to reduce this waste to ash through
incineration, albeit increasing the concentration of radioisotopes.
In addition to minimizing LLRW, licensees can decide to store this
waste when no disposal option is available to them. In order to obtain
a license to possess radioactive materials, entities must demonstrate
the technical capability to safely manage them. These entities give
various reasons for storing waste, including allowing short-lived
radioactive materials to decay to innocuous levels to avoid the need
for disposal in a more expensive LLRW facility, the prohibitively high
cost of disposal for some licensees, and concerns about the potential
liability of sending the waste to a disposal site. Universities and
biomedical companies generally rely on storage for decay for their
LLRW, although finding space within large research institutions in
urban settings is more difficult. The high cost of LLRW disposal can
also pose financial problems for some licensees. Over the last 25
years, disposal costs have risen from $1 per cubic foot of LLRW to over
$400 per cubic foot, with projections of well over $1,000 per cubic
foot in the future. For some LLRW, the Barnwell disposal facility now
charges $1,625 per cubic foot. These disposal costs can reach hundreds
of millions of dollars for utility companies that are decommissioning
their nuclear power plants. NRC reported to us that the cost to fully
decommission a plant could run as high as $675 million. Finally, some
licensees will not send their LLRW to disposal facilities because they
are concerned that the mixing of their waste with other waste might
draw them into litigation if the disposal site should ever require
cleanup under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980, as amended (commonly referred to as
Superfund).
While NRC policy favors disposal rather than storage over the long-
term, since the mid 1990s the Commission has allowed on-site storage of
LLRW without a specified time limit as long as it is safe. The
Commission took this approach in part because LLRW can be stored and
the states were not developing any new disposal facilities. NRC's and
Agreement States' (that is, states that have taken over the
responsibility for regulating radioactive materials from NRC) license
and inspection programs help ensure the safe management of stored LLRW.
However, some licensees are concerned that a fire, flood, or earthquake
might cause an unintended radioactive release. If an emergency ever
should arise from stored LLRW, NRC has authority under the Act to
override any compact restrictions to allow shipment of LLRW to a
regional or other nonfederal disposal facility, if necessary under
narrowly defined conditions, and to eliminate an immediate and serious
threat to the public health and safety or to the common defense and
security. Since September 11, 2001, the perception of the risks posed
by potential use of stored LLRW by terrorists has increased. A recent
report found that at least a few radioisotopes of greatest security
concern are classified as LLRW. According to the report, while
radiological dispersal devices, such as a dirty bomb, are not weapons
of mass destruction, they could cause mass disruption, dislocation, and
adverse financial consequences associated with decontamination and
rebuilding. NRC officials told us that as the volume and duration of
stored LLRW increases so might the safety and security risks.
LLRW Minimization and Storage Can Be Costly
Waste minimization and storage can alleviate the need for disposal,
but they can be costly. The licensees that we interviewed provided many
instances of the high cost of managing LLRW. For example, one
university recently built a $12 million combined hazardous and
radioactive waste management facility, of which two-thirds is devoted
to processing and temporarily storing class A waste. A medical center
official took us to a small (12, 12,) LLRW interim storage
and processing room that cost the institution about $150,000 to
construct to meet stringent health and environmental standards. Costs
are also associated with operating storage facilities. Representatives
from one university system told us that the system spends about
$100,000 annually to maintain its interim storage building in a remote
area of the state. Added to the cost of building and operating a
storage facility is the cost of securing it. Such costs have been
accounted for in higher utility rates, university overhead charges,
drug prices, and medical treatments. These costs of doing business are
more difficult for some entities to absorb than others. Representatives
from several biotechnology companies told us that the industry,
particularly the smaller start-up companies, are not prepared for the
financial cost of storing and securing LLRW.
No Other Widespread Effects Detected of Shortfall in LLRW Disposal
Availability
Notwithstanding the cost of minimizing and storing LLRW, we did not
detect widespread national impacts on LLRW generators that have
resulted or might result from any disposal shortfalls. In a survey we
administered to compact and unaffiliated state LLRW officials regarding
documented effects on LLRW generators of any restricted disposal
availability, the officials raised few concerns. We then sought
information from a broader constituency to determine whether any
problems were occurring. We collaborated with medical researchers at
the University of Texas to seek information from two overlapping groups
involved in LLRW management: the approximately 2,000 subscribers of the
RadSafe Listserv, a listserv for radiation safety officers, and the
approximately 6,000 members of the Health Physics Society, a scientific
and professional organization whose members specialize in occupational
and environmental radiation safety. We sought information on any known
cases where there have been or might be adverse effects on research
activities and clinical practice stemming from costs or difficulties
related to the storage and disposal of LLRW. Specifically, we e-mailed
questionnaires asking if these factors have caused or might cause a
discontinuance or disapproval of any research or clinical endeavors to
RadSafe listserv subscribers and placed a notice in the Health Physics
Society's newsletter asking for volunteers to answer the same questions
we sent to the listserv subscribers. We obtained an extremely low
response rate to these questionnaires--14 responses from listserv
subscribers and 6 from Health Physics Society members. Because these
were a nonprobability sample surveys, the results are not generalizable
and can only be used for anecdotal purposes. Of these respondents, only
two said that the difficulties associated with LLRW had adversely
affected research or clinical practice. Several respondents cited the
challenges of dealing with LLRW but also noted that they work around
the difficulties through waste minimization, including substituting
nonradioactive materials for radioactive materials when possible, and
on site storage as needed. The survey results provided no evidence of
any widespread effects on research activities and clinical practice
stemming from costs or difficulties related to the storage and disposal
of LLRW in the last 5 years. Other published information was largely
consistent with our findings.
Owing to the uncertainties regarding future disposal availability
and the safety and security of storing waste, our report suggested that
the Congress may wish to consider directing NRC to report to it if LLRW
disposal and storage conditions should change enough to warrant
consideration of new legislation to improve the reliability and cost
effectiveness of disposal availability.
THE ACT HAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED GOAL OF PROVIDING
MORE REGION DISPOSAL CAPACITY
The Act has not effectively facilitated the development of
additional regional disposal capacity for class A, B, and C wastes.
Although a nuclear industry association estimates that expenditures may
now have reached approximately $1 billion on various facility
development efforts, only one new commercial LLRW disposal facility has
been developed since passage of the Act--the Envirocare facility--and
this facility was not developed at the instigation of the compact in
which it operates. As we reported in 2004, the conditions dampening any
impetus to developing new disposal facilities for class A, B and C
wastes have not changed since 1999. These conditions include a
combination of factors: significant decreases in commercial LLRW
generation, available capacity at the three existing facilities to meet
national disposal needs, and rising costs of developing disposal
facilities. Developing new LLRW disposal facilities also encountered
public and political resistance in states designated to host these
facilities.
DOE HAS NOT PROVIDED A DISPOSAL FACILITY FOR GREATER-THAN-CLASS-C
WASTE,
BUT IS COLLECTING THIS MATERIAL
In our April 2003 report, we provided information on DOE's efforts
to recover and dispose of greater-than-class-C sealed radioactive
sources. As you know, since September 11, 2001, there has been a great
deal of concern about the control of sealed sources containing
radioactive material that are used in medicine, agriculture, research,
and industry throughout the United States. The radioactive material in
these sources is encapsulated, or sealed, in metal--such as stainless
steel, titanium, or platinum--to prevent its dispersal. The small size
and portability of the sealed sources make them susceptible to misuse,
improper disposal, and theft. If these sealed sources fell into the
hands of terrorists, they could be used as simple and crude but
potentially dangerous radiological weapons, commonly called dirty
bombs.
Certain sealed sources are considered particularly attractive for
potential use in dirty bombs because, among other things, they contain
more concentrated amounts of radioactive material such as americium-
241, cesium-137, plutonium-238, plutonium-239, and strontium-90.
Applications of greater-than-class-C sealed sources include portable
and fixed gauges used by the construction industry for testing the
moisture content of soil, medical pacemakers, medical diagnostics and
treatments, gauges used for petroleum exploration, and government and
private research and development. While a study by the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory estimates that there currently could be about
250,000 to 500,000 greater-than-class-C sealed sources in the United
States, the actual number of greater-than-class-C sealed sources that
are no longer wanted is not known because no one kept track of this
information.
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985\8\
requires DOE to provide a facility for disposing of all greater-than-
class-C radioactive waste, including greater-than-class-C sealed
sources that are no longer wanted by their owners. A permanent disposal
facility has not yet been developed, but in the interim, DOE created
the Off-Site Source Recovery Project that, since fiscal year 1999, has
been recovering unwanted greater-than-class-C sealed sources from their
owners and temporarily storing them at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory in New Mexico. NNSA officials told us that, to date, the
project has recovered over 10,000 sealed sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Pub. L. No. 99-240.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In April 2003, we reported that DOE's Off-Site Source Recovery
Project faced three problems that could hinder future recovery efforts.
First, we reported that DOE's Office of Environmental Management, which
was responsible for the Off-Site Source Recovery Project at the time of
our report, had a questionable long-term commitment to the project. The
project did not receive full funding because of other higher-priority
projects, and officials from the Office of Environmental Management
told us that they would have liked responsibility for the project to be
placed in another DOE office because of inconsistencies between the
mission of the project and the main mission of the Office of
Environmental Management to accelerate the cleanup and closure of
contaminated DOE weapons development facilities.
Second, we reported that the Off-Site Source Recovery Project was
unable to recover any additional sealed sources containing plutonium-
239 (which, in sufficient quantity, could be used to fabricate a crude
nuclear weapon) because there was no more space at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory that met DOE's security standards for storing these
sources. As a result, about 150 holders (mostly universities) of over
400 unwanted sources containing plutonium-239 were forced to retain
them and keep them properly secured until space became available. In
some instances, sealed sources at these facilities were stored in
unlocked and open rooms, and most holders expressed their desire to
dispose of the sources as quickly as possible. In addition to
plutonium-239, at the time of our report, DOE had not approved a means
for temporarily storing sources containing strontium-90 and cesium-137.
Finally, we reported that, as of February 2003, DOE's Office of
Environmental Management had not made progress toward providing for the
permanent disposal of greater-than-class-C radioactive waste, and it
was unlikely to provide such a facility by fiscal year 2007 as it had
planned because it is not a priority within the office. Specifically,
the office had not begun the first step in developing a disposal
facility--completing an appropriate analysis as required by the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and its implementing
regulations. Such an analysis would likely take the form of an
Environmental Impact Statement. Officials from DOE's Office of
Environmental Management told us that funding had been provided in
fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to conduct an environmental analysis, but
these funds had been reallocated to other priorities.
Our April 2003 report recommended that DOE determine whether the
priority given to the Off-Site Source Recovery Project was commensurate
with the threat posed by greater-than-class-C sealed sources and ensure
that adequate resources are devoted to the project to cover the costs
of recovering and storing these sealed sources as quickly as possible.
In addition, we recommended that DOE take immediate action to provide
secure storage space for unwanted sealed sources containing plutonium-
239, strontium-90, and cesium-137. Furthermore, we recommended that DOE
initiate the process to develop a permanent disposal facility for
greater-than-class-C radioactive waste as required by the LLRW Policy
Amendments Act and develop a plan to ensure the continued recovery and
storage of greater-than-class-C sealed sources until such a disposal
facility is available.
DOE has made progress addressing the problems we identified.
Specifically, to address the problem of the low priority given to the
Off-Site Source Recovery Project within the Office of Environmental
Management, DOE transferred the project to NNSA in October 2003. Now
renamed the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction Program, the project is
managed by NNSA's Office of Global Radiological Threat Reduction and is
part of NNSA's larger efforts to secure potential dirty bomb material
worldwide. The project has also experienced funding increases following
the transfer. According to NNSA officials, the project was appropriated
nearly $2 million in fiscal year 2004 and received an additional $3.5
million that was transferred by the Secretary of Energy from the Office
of Environmental Management. In addition, the project completed
spending from an additional $10 million that the Congress appropriated
in August 2002 as part of the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United
States.\9\ In total, the project spent about $8 million in fiscal year
2004. In our view, funding for this effort must be sustained for the
foreseeable future to continue progress in the recovery of material
that potentially could be fabricated into dirty bombs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Pub. L. No. 107-206.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With regard to the continued recovery of sealed sources containing
plutonium-239, NNSA completed the security requirements for accepting
additional plutonium-239 at Los Alamos National Laboratory. NNSA
officials also told us that additional storage capacity has become
available at the Nevada Test Site for additional plutonium-239 storage.
The project began recovering plutonium-239 sources in November 2003. As
of September 2004, the project has recovered over 260 sources
containing plutonium-239. Although the project estimated at the time of
our report that there were over 400 unwanted plutonium-239 sources,
NNSA officials told us that about 400 additional excess sources have
been identified that will be recovered. Recovered sources are stored at
Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Nevada Test Site until they are
eventually shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New
Mexico, for permanent disposal. According to an NNSA official, these
shipments are due to begin in April 2005.
According to NNSA officials, the project started recovery of large
strontium-90 sources in February 2004 and has recovered four of the six
known large strontium-90 sources in the United States. The project
plans to recover the remaining two large strontium-90 sources in fiscal
year 2005. For cesium-137 sources, NNSA officials told us that they are
currently working to find commercial partners to leverage existing
disposal and recycling options for this material and to securely store
cesium-137 sources in the interim.
Finally, in response to our recommendation that DOE initiate the
process to develop a permanent disposal facility for greater-than-
class-C radioactive waste, DOE transferred the responsibility for
developing the environmental analysis from the Office of Environmental
Management to DOE's Office of Environment, Safety, and Health. DOE
plans to publish an Advance Notice of Intent to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement. This Environmental Impact Statement
will evaluate disposal options and other considerations. However, DOE
has been unable to tell us when the Advance Notice of Intent will be
published or when DOE expects to complete the Environmental Impact
Statement.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Committee
may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Pasternak, would you proceed.
STATEMENT OF ALAN PASTERNAK, PH.D., TECHNICAL DIRECTOR,
CALIFORNIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS MANAGEMENT FORUM
Mr. Pasternak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Craig, Senator
Craig. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. This
hearing is very timely.
I would like to take a moment to thank the members of this
committee and former members of this committee for their
efforts on behalf of the California proposed facility at Ward
Valley over a number of years between 1993 and 1999, when
transfer of that land to the State of California was held up by
the administration and the Interior Department. Certainly,
Senator Domenici, your speech at Harvard in 1997 I thought was
right on point.
Going back to Senator Bennett Johnston and Senator Frank
Murkowski, efforts by the former chairmen are much appreciated,
Senator Craig's efforts, also those of Senator Kyl and Senator
Feinstein, to get the Interior Department to move during that
period of time.
The national picture as we see it is this. Disposal
capacity for low-level radioactive waste is limited and
dwindling. On the Nation's present course, by July 1, 2008,
public and private organizations and most government agencies
that use radioactive materials from 34 to 36 States, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico will have no place to
dispose of their more radioactive categories of low-level
radioactive waste, categories B and C. In this business, July
1, 2008, is tomorrow. It takes a long time to develop a new
disposal facility.
Also at that time, July 1, 2008, only one facility will
have monopoly control over disposal of the most voluminous and
least radioactive category of low-level waste from these
States. That of course is the Envirocare facility, which does
not take sealed sources and does not take biological wastes,
which is a serious concern to the biotech industry and it is I
think one of the points unfortunately that the General
Accounting Office missed.
In addition, we are not so optimistic about the present
situation. Capacity at Barnwell is diminishing. There is a
table at the end of my written testimony provided by the State
of South Carolina which shows that in fiscal 2007 and fiscal
2008, years in which there are caps of 40 and 35,000 cubic feet
respectively, the remaining capacity is under 9,600 cubic feet
because of commitments already made and the Atlanta Compact
set-aside. So space at Barnwell is already tight.
Cal Rad Forum, an association of radioactive material users
in the four Southwestern Compact States--California, Arizona,
and the Dakotas--has long been a supporter of the Policy Act.
It was designed to stimulate development of new facilities by
encouraging States to form interstate compacts for disposal on
a regional basis. In this way it was hoped that a few States
would not bear the perceived burden of performing this service
for the entire country.
Indeed, the Policy Act was in response to threats from the
States of Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina in 1979 to
close their disposal facilities. However, in the 24 years since
enactment of the Policy Act no new facilities consistent with
the requirements of the act, that is fully licensed to dispose
of waste classes A, B, and C, have been developed. The Utah
facility, as I mentioned, is licensed to receive only a subset
of class A wastes, the least radioactive category. It does not
accept sealed sources or biological wastes.
With the exception of the State of Texas, all State
programs for development of new disposal facilities in the
United States have stopped. In fact, in the 24 years the only
State to ever issue a license was California, a fact that we
take some pride in. Cal Rad forum sponsored the siting
legislation. We supported the compact legislation. We defended
the license in court.
But we were disappointed that the Clinton administration
would not transfer the Federal land at Ward Valley to the State
of California, and of course more recently in 2002 action by
the legislature and ex-Governor Davis is what caused us to
change our position concerning the Low-Level Waste Policy Act.
The legislature, at the urging of Governor Davis, passed a law
saying California is not going to build a Ward Valley, a
facility at Ward Valley.
We have some recommended actions that the Congress might
consider to resolve the problem. We would hope that the basis,
the record, the 24 years of noncompliance, would encourage the
Congress to take action to resolve the problem.
In the near term, the use of the Department of Energy's own
disposal facilities for this purpose might find support in the
conclusions of a DOE inspector general's report in 2001 that
the Department of Energy's disposal facilities are
underutilized. The report found that DOE's Nevada and Hanford
facilities are being used at less than 50 percent capacity.
A long-term national solution might include congressional
authorization for the development and operation of one or two
low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities, possibly by
the Department of Energy or by a commercial developer, on
Federal land under direct regulation by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
At this point I want to say that we do not advocate repeal
of the act. We advocate its amendment. The States of South
Carolina and Washington have fulfilled their responsibilities
under the act. Should their ability to continue to restrict
access from outside their compacts, outside the Northwest, the
Rocky Mountain, the Atlantic Compact, be eliminated, those
States might choose to close those facilities. We are not in
support of repeal, but we are in support of amendment. Those
States should be allowed, and compacts, those States and
compacts should be allowed to continue to operate as they have
under the act, and any other State that is serious about
pursuing development of a facility under the terms of the act
ought to be able to do so.
We fully support the NRC's regulations at title 10 CFR, 10
CFR 61. Those regulations have proved very good and enhance
safety and they have solved the problems that have existed in
the past.
I would like to mention briefly four concerns we have about
the General Accounting Office report. We have a greater sense
of urgency about this issue in both the near term and the long
term than we found in the report. I mentioned the fact that
Envirocare does not accept sealed sources or biological waste.
There is another problem. The Federal Government, the
Department of Energy, and in particular the Navy, the nuclear
Navy, does depend on commercial facilities. After July 1, 2008,
Norfolk Naval Shipyard will not be able to send radioactive
waste to Barnwell. This is a problem and I think it is a point
that the GAO missed, although in my conversation with Mr.
Feehan I understand that they understand that.
We are concerned about the speculation in the GAO report
that this thing might happen or that thing might happen. Maybe
Envirocare will be licensed to accept B and C wastes. But in
May of this year a legislative task force in the State of Utah
already recommended against the legislature's acceptance of B
and C wastes at Envirocare. A final report will be developed by
this November.
Finally, we do not view storage as a panacea, as an option
in place of disposal. NRC policies encourage disposal of waste
and not indefinite storage. Furthermore, in the case of a
business, a company, a biotech company for example, that wants
to terminate its license, that wants to move on to a larger
facility and terminate its license at the old facility, storage
is obviously not a solution. They have to clear the site of all
radioactive waste.
Finally, I would invite the committee's attention to the
comments of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the GAO
report These comments I felt for a regulatory agency which is
often reluctant to get involved in a policy issue, these were
very, very strong comments. The agency says: ``It is now time
for GAO to explore alternatives further because the future
availability of disposal capacity and the costs of disposal
under the current system remain highly uncertain and low-level
waste generators need predictability and stability in the
national disposal system.''
They point to the fact that nearly 20 years of experience
under the act has demonstrated the difficulties in siting and
licensing a facility. Not one new facility has developed in
this time under the act.
Therefore, we believe it is in the national interest to
begin exploring the alternatives that would potentially provide
a better legal and policy framework for new disposal facilities
for commercial generators of low-level radioactive wastes.
Mr. Chairman and Mr. Craig, I would be happy to respond to
any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pasternak follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alan Pasternak, Ph.D., Technical Director,
California Radioactive Materials Management Forum
THE NATIONAL PICTURE
Disposal capacity for low-level radioactive waste is limited and
dwindling. On the nation's present course, by July 2008, public and
private organizations and most government agencies that use radioactive
materials in thirty-four to thirty-six states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico will have no place to dispose of their more
radioactive categories of low-level radioactive waste. Also at that
time, one facility will have monopoly control over disposal of the most
voluminous (and least radioactive) category of low-level waste from
these states.
Cal Rad Forum believes it appropriate for Congress to revisit the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act and fashion a solution that
assures all users of radioactive materials in the U.S. access to safe
disposal facilities.
Today, only three facilities in the U.S. accept so-called
``commercial'' low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) for permanent
disposal. Two of these facilities are fully licensed; one is not.
Organizations that rely completely on these disposal facilities include
universities, utilities with nuclear power plants, industries including
biotech and pharmaceutical companies, medical centers, and state and
federal agencies not including the U.S. Department of Energy or its
laboratories. (DOE uses one of these facilities--Envirocare of Utah--
and also operates its own disposal facilities.) These disposal
facilities are in the states of Washington, South Carolina, and Utah.
Disposal capacity is limited despite Congress' intent in enacting the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act in 1980 (Public Law 96-573) and
the Amendments Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-240). The Policy Act was
designed to stimulate development of new facilities by encouraging
states to form interstate compacts for disposal on a regional basis. In
this way, it was hoped that a few states would not bear the ``burden''
of performing this service for the entire country. Indeed, the Policy
Act was in response to threats from the States of Washing-ton, Nevada,
and South Carolina in 1979 to close their disposal facilities. However,
in the twenty-four years since enactment of the Policy Act, no new
facilities, consistent with the requirements of the Act, i.e., fully-
licensed to dispose of waste classes A, B, and C, have been developed.
The Utah facility is licensed to receive only a subset of Class A
waste, the least radioactive category of LLRW, and was created and
operates outside of the compact system.
What is low-level radioactive waste?
The statutory definition of low-level radioactive waste is set
forth in Section 2 (Definitions), Title I--Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Public Law 99-240--Jan. 15, 1986 (Act):
``(9) Low-level radioactive waste.--The term `low-level radioactive
waste' means radioactive material that
``(A) is not high-level radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, or
byproduct material (as defined in section 11e.(2) of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(e)(2))); and
``(B) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, consistent with existing
law and in accordance with paragraph (A), classifies as low-level
radioactive waste.''
LLRW is waste generated by the use of radioactive materials in
industrial, academic, research, medical, and governmental activities,
nuclear power generation, and facility and site decontamination. LLRW
consists of radioactively contaminated clothing, tools, laboratory
equipment, machinery, filters from nuclear power plants, rubble and
dirt, etc.
What is disposal?
``(7) Disposal.--The term. `disposal' means the permanent isolation
of low-level radioactive waste pursuant to the requirements established
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under applicable laws, or by an
agreement State if such isolation occurs in such agreement State.''--
P.L. 99-240, Section 2 (Definitions).
What are state and federal responsibilities for disposal of low-level
radioactive waste?
State and federal responsibilities for disposal of LLRW are set
forth in Section 3 of the Act:
``Section 3(a)(1) State Responsibilities. [Quoted in part]--Each
State shall be responsible for providing, either by itself or in
cooperation with other States, for the disposal of
``(A) low-level radioactive waste generated within the State (other
than by the Federal Government) that consists of or contains class A,
B, or C radioactive waste as defined by section 61.55 of title 10, Code
of Federal Regulations, as in effect on January 26, 1983;
``(B) low-level radioactive waste described in subparagraph (A)
that is generated by the Federal Government except such waste that is--
--
``(i) owned or generated by the Department of Energy;
``(ii) owned or generated by the United States Navy as a result of
the decommissioning of vessels of the United States Navy; or
``(iii) owned or generated as a result of any research,
development, testing, or production of any atomic weapon; and
``(C) low-level radioactive waste described in subparagraphs (A)
and (B) that is generated outside of the State and accepted for
disposal in accordance with sections 5 or 6.''
Section 3 goes on to describe federal disposal responsibilities in
Section 3(b)(1). These include greater than Class C low-level waste,
low-level waste owned or generated by the Department of Energy, waste
owned or generated by the United States Navy as the result of de-
commissioning of vessels of the United States Navy, and low-level waste
owned or generated by the Federal Government as a result of any
research, development, testing, or production of any atomic weapon.
It should be noted that in addition to its statutory
responsibilities the federal government, through the Department of
Energy's Off-Site Source Recovery Program at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory, has taken on the responsibility to collect and safeguard
sealed radioactive sources that would otherwise be orphaned.
Today's situation for disposal of low-level radioactive waste:
Barnwell, South Carolina; Richland, Washington; and Envirocare
of Utah (Clive, Utah).
1) The low-level radioactive waste disposal facility at Barnwell,
South Carolina\1\ is the regional disposal facility for the Atlantic
Compact. On July 1, 2008, use of the South Carolina disposal facility
will be restricted to the three member states of that Compact: South
Carolina, New Jersey, and Connecticut. South Carolina law also
establishes annually decreasing limits on waste volumes that can be
accepted for disposal prior to July 1, 2008. (Please see chart on page
7.) The South Carolina Senate recently rejected a proposal to raise the
volume cap for fiscal year 2004-2005 by 100,000 cubic feet of Class A
waste in exchange for a payment of $6 million by the facility operator.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Operated by the Chem Nuclear subsidiary of GTS Duratek and
regulated by the State of South Carolina which is an Agreement State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, in addition to the three states of the Atlantic Compact,
users of radioactive materials in thirty-six states which are not
members of the Northwest, Rocky Mountain, or Atlantic Compacts rely on
Barnwell as the only facility where they can dispose of their Class B
and Class C (more radioactive) wastes. The low-level wastes sent to
Barnwell from these thirty-six states account for 93% of the
radioactivity (measured in curies) disposed of by users of radioactive
materials in all states at all three disposal facilities.\2\
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\2\ Manifest Information Management System . Figures are for FY 2003, 7/1/02 to 6/30/03.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2) The Richland, Washington facility\3\ is the regional disposal
facility for the Northwest Compact. In 1993, under provisions of the
Act, use of this facility was restricted to the eight member states of
the Northwest Compact, and, subsequently, by contract, the three states
of the Rocky Mountain Compact were granted access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Operated by US Ecology, Inc. and regulated by the State of
Washington which is an Agreement State under the Atomic Energy Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3) The disposal facility at Clive, Utah\4\ accepts only a subset of
Class A waste, the least radio-active category, from all states except
those in the Northwest and Rocky Mountain Compacts. This facility is
not licensed to dispose of sealed sources or biological tissue waste. A
proposal to expand the license to include waste Classes B and C was put
on hold in 2001 when it failed to gain the approval of the Governor and
Legislature as required by Utah law. A legislative Task Force is
considering the Class B and C disposal issue. On May 18, 2004, the Task
Force made a preliminary recommendation against Utah's acceptance of
Class B and C waste. A final recommendation is expected in November
2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Operated by Envirocare of Utah and regulated by the State of
Utah, which is an Agreement State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the exception of Texas, all state programs for development of new
disposal facilities in the U.S. have stopped.
In 24 years, the states have not demonstrated the political will
necessary to implement the Policy Act and develop new disposal
facilities. Since enactment of the federal Policy Act, only one state
has issued a full license (waste Classes A. B. and C) for a new
disposal facility. In 1993, The California Department of Health
Services (California's Agreement State Agency) issued a license for a
disposal facility at a remote location on federal land in the Mojave
Desert called Ward Valley. The facility has never been built. Ward
Valley was intended as the regional disposal facility for the
Southwestern Compact (Host State California, Arizona, North Dakota, and
South Dakota). On September 12, 2002, California Governor Gray Davis
signed into law a prohibition on the development of the Ward Valley
regional LLRW disposal facility.
Summary of the national low-level radioactive waste disposal problem:
Beginning July 1, 2008, when use of the South Carolina facility is
restricted to the Atlantic Compact, organizations that use radioactive
materials in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and at least
thirty-four, and possibly thirty-six states, which are not members of
the Northwest, Rocky Mountain, or Atlantic Compacts will have no place
to dispose of their Class B and C low-level waste. These are the more
radioactive categories of low-level waste whose disposal is a state
responsibility. At that time, only the Utah facility will accept a
subset of their Class A low-level waste--not including biological
tissue wastes or sealed sources. While about 97% of the low-level waste
volume from these thirty-six states goes to Utah, the remaining 3%, by
volume, currently disposed of at Barnwell, contains over 99% of the
radioactivity from these states.
Even prior to July 1, 2008, space at the Barnwell disposal facility
will be very limited, especially in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 as shown
in the chart on page 7. (See ``Remainder'' entries after allowing for
the ``Committed'' volumes and the Atlantic Compact ``Set asides.'')
This is due to the declining statutory volume caps.
Litigation against compact Host States
Failure by Compact Host States to fulfill their obligations to
develop regional disposal facilities has resulted in two lawsuits by
Compact Commissions and one by a facility development company.
The Central Interstate Compact Commission sued Host State Nebraska
alleging bad faith and political manipulation of the State's regulatory
decision to reject a license application to develop a disposal facility
in Boyd County. The Commission asked for recovery of monetary damages
and appointment of a special master to complete the review of the
license application. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Nebraska's attempt
to seek refuge in the doctrine of sovereign immunity. At trial, the
federal District Court in Nebraska found against the State and awarded
the Commission $151 million. However, the judge declined to involve the
court in an attempt to complete the proposed disposal project as
requested by the Compact Commission. Nebraska appealed the damages
award, however the Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
judgment including a finding of ``bad faith.'' The State of Nebraska
and the Central Inter-state Compact Commission recently settled the
suit for $141 million. Evidently, Nebraska would rather forfeit $141
million than build a disposal facility.
In May 2002, the States of Alabama, Florida, Tennessee, and
Virginia joined the Southeast Compact Commission in a lawsuit against
Host State North Carolina for its failure to develop a disposal
facility. The Supreme Court has taken original jurisdiction of this
lawsuit.
In May 2000, the State of California's licensee for development and
operation of a low-level waste disposal facility sued the State seeking
recovery of monetary damages. Trial was earlier this year, and the
trial court denied the claim. The court declined to reconsider its
decision, and the licensee filed a notice of appeal to the State
Appellate Court.
None of the lawsuits described above is likely to lead to
development of a new disposal facility.
Recommended action to avoid the coming crisis in low-level waste
disposal: Amend the Policy Act to provide a role for the
federal government in assuring availability of safe disposal
capacity for low-level radioactive waste.
In 24 years, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act has yielded
10 interstate compact commissions, three lawsuits, and no new disposal
facilities. Based on the states' track record, Congress and the
Administration might reasonably conclude that the states have failed to
provide the necessary disposal infrastructure and are unlikely to do
so.\5\ Hopefully, a conclusion that the states won't do the job and
that the nation does not need ten low-level waste disposal facilities
would lead to a decision to amend (not repeal) the Act and that the
federal government should assume responsibility for disposal of
``commercial'' low-level radioactive waste--at least for those thirty-
six states not in compacts with existing regional disposal facilities,
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Near-term use of the
Department of Energy's own disposal facilities for this purpose might
find support in the conclusions of a DOE Inspector General's report
that the Department's disposal facilities are under-utilized.\6\ The
report found that DOE's Nevada and Hanford facilities are being used at
less than 50 percent capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See, for example, the Audit Report, ``National Low-Level Waste
Management Program,'' DOE/IG-0462 by the U.S. Department of Energy,
Office of Inspector General's Office of Audit Services, February 2000.
\6\ ``Utilization of the Department's Low-Level Waste Disposal
Facilities,'' DOE/IG-05-5, May 25, 2001. 5
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A long-term national solution might include Congressional
authorization for the development and operation of one or two LLRW
disposal facilities, possibly by the Department of Energy or commercial
entities, on federal land, under direct regulation by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
Although ten interstate compacts have received congressional
consent, the nation does not need ten disposal facilities for LLRW. (In
addition, seven states are not members of interstate compacts.) There
never was an economic justification for the Policy Act. Regional equity
was both the rationalization for the Act and an incentive to develop
new disposal facilities. But this incentive (carrot) has not been
sufficient to inspire the political will necessary to do the job. When
the U.S. Supreme Court struck-down the ``Take Title'' provision, the
Act lost its ``stick.'' Furthermore, volumes of commercial (non-DOE)
LLRW have declined since 1980. Economics justifies a few disposal
facilities each with large capacity rather than many facilities each
with small capacity.
The States of South Carolina and Washington have provided disposal
capacity consistent with the requirements of the Policy Act and their
compact obligations. Any amendment to the Act should allow these States
and their compacts to continue to do so. As well, Texas or any other
state that pursues development and operation of a disposal facility
pursuant to the Act should also be able to do so.
SAFETY OF LLRW DISPOSAL
Comprehensive regulations of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Disposal of LLRW has been carried out safely and justifies current
and future use of near surface disposal pursuant to the NRC's
regulations at title 10 part 61 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The
still-operating disposal facilities at Barnwell, SC and Richland, WA
have operated safely for many years. Such problems as have occurred at
old facilities, e.g., migration of tritium due to disposal of liquid
wastes at the Beatty, NV disposal facility which was closed in 1993,
are addressed by the current regulations. These regulations, adopted in
1982, are comprehensive. Among the issues addressed are disposal site
selection criteria, facility design, waste classification, waste form
and packaging (e.g., requirements for solidification of liquids),
financial assurances, and long-term post-closure institutional
controls.
The recent report by the U.S. General Accounting Office contains errors
and understates the urgency of the problem.
A report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (``Low-Level
Radioactive Waste: Disposal Availability Adequate in the Short Term,
but Oversight Needed to Identify Any Future Short-falls,'' GAO-04-604,
June 2004) understates the urgency of the LLRW disposal situation in
both the short term (prior to July 1, 2008) and the long term. The
report also contains significant errors. For example, the report fails
to recognize that the Envirocare facility in Utah is not licensed to
dispose of biological tissue waste. The report also misstates federal
law by saying that States are not responsible for disposal of waste
produced by the nuclear propulsion component of the Department of the
Navy. Disposal of wastes owned or generated by the Department of Energy
and from the decommissioning of naval vessels is a federal
responsibility.\7\ But wastes from the Navy's operating fleet are
disposed of at commercial facilities (e.g., Barnwell, SC). After July
1, 2008, the Navy and other federal agencies, state governments along
with commercial organizations and public institutions that generate
radioactive waste outside of South Carolina, New Jersey and Connecticut
will not be able to dispose of their radioactive waste at Barnwell, SC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See P.L. 99-240, Sections 3(a)(1) and 3(b)(1) as discussed on
page 2 of this testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The GAO report speculates that various solutions to the LLRW
disposal problem may develop without action by the Congress. For
example, the report speculates that the Envirocare of Utah facility
might be licensed to dispose of Class B and C wastes. But, last May, a
task force of the Utah Legislature issued a preliminary recommendation
against B and C disposal. (A final task force report is due in
November.)
Underlying the GAO report's conclusions is the mistaken belief that
storage of wastes is an adequate alternative to disposal. While
temporary storage of low-level waste can be and is being safely
performed, only disposal is a permanent solution. Furthermore, in the
case of de-commissioning of facilities where radioactive materials have
been used, on-site storage is obviously not even a temporary option as
the wastes must be removed from the site and safely disposed of.
Facility decommissioning is a frequent occurrence, particularly in the
industrial sector. NRC policy is that radioactive wastes should be
disposed of and not stored indefinitely.
The need for Congress to revisit the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Act is urgent.
Time is of the essence. July 1, 2008 and the end of disposal in
South Carolina for LLRW from thirty-six states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico are not far off. It took California thirteen
years from enactment of enabling legislation in 1983 to issue the Ward
Valley license (1993) and successfully defend the license and the
Environmental Impact Report in State Courts (1996).
Assurance that future disposal capacity will be available is vital.
Lack of such assurance has already curtailed some uses of radioactive
materials in research. In Cal Rad's view, the comments of the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the GAO report (Appendix V of the
Report) are on point and are probably the most valuable part of the
report:
``The current report is a sequel to GAO's 1999 report, ``Low-
Level Radioactive Wastes: States Are Not Developing Disposal
Facilities'' (GAO/RCED-99-238). That report concluded that none
of the States' or compacts' efforts to develop new disposal
capacity had been successful and the state efforts to do so had
``essentially stopped.'' This earlier report also examined
alternatives to the current system for development of new
disposal capacity in the U.S., but did not recommend any of
them. Appendix II of the current report updates these alter-
natives. We believe that it is now time for GAO to explore
these alternatives further because the future availability of
disposal capacity and the costs of disposal under the current
system remain highly uncertain and LLRW generators need
predictability and stability in the national disposal system.
We acknowledge that the potential approval for Envirocare to
accept Class B and C wastes and licensing of a LLRW disposal
facility in Texas could significantly improve the current LLRW
disposal system in the U.S. At the same time, the nearly 20
years of experience under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (LLRWPAA) has demonstrated the
difficulties in siting and licensing a LLRW facility. Not one
new facility has been developed in this time under the LLRWPAA.
Therefore, we believe it is in the national interest to begin
exploring the alternatives identified in Appendix II that would
potentially provide a better legal and policy framework for new
disposal facilities for commercial generators of LLRW.''
The nation's low-level waste disposal infrastructure is inadequate
and, without action by Congress, will become much worse. Beneficial
uses of radioactive materials by industries, re-search and medical
institutions, utilities and agencies of state and federal governments
are jeopardized by the current and projected future inadequate disposal
infrastructure. Lack of disposal capacity could stop or impede some
research, medical, and industrial uses of radioactive materials and
have a detrimental impact on the quality of life and health.
BARNWELL VOLUME PROFILE--SEPTEMBER 2004
[Cubic Feet]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Site cap.................................... 50,000 45,000 40,000 35,000
Committed................................... 23,600 23,600 22,400 22,300
Set asides.................................. 8,000-11,000 8,000-11,000 8,000-11,000 5,000-9,000
Remainder................................... 15,000-18,400 10,400-13,400 6,600-9,600 3,700-7,700
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: State of South Carolina Budget and Control Board.
Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Craig, do you have any questions.
Senator Craig. I do have one. Ms. Nazzaro, do you think it
is a problem that DOE is sending more of its low-level wastes
to commercial disposal sites like Envirocare in Utah?
Ms. Nazzaro. DOE did account for a large portion of the
class A waste. However, they are paying the costs that they
have negotiated for this service.
Senator Craig. Well, the problem in this context--are they
using up sites that would be otherwise used by commercial
generators?
Ms. Nazzaro. No.
Senator Craig. Are they using up capacity?
Ms. Nazzaro. No.
Senator Craig. OK.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Craig. That is all I have now. Thank you.
The Chairman. To any of you, but I want to start with GAO:
Your 2004 report found that there should be no apparent problem
with capacity to dispose of class A wastes for at least 20
years as long as the Envirocare disposal facility remains in
operation. The primary disposal concerns for the future is
therefore the class B and C. How much of the waste is generated
annually and by which type of generator? Should we be taking
action today to avert a potential disposal crisis for B and C
wastes by mid-2008, given the long lead time that is necessary
to site, license, and open LLRW disposal facilities?
Given the prevalence of low-level radioactive waste storage
today, do we currently have a safety and security problem?
Ms. Nazzaro. To address your first question as to how much
of the waste is the B and C waste, 1 percent of the waste that
was disposed of in 2003 is B and C waste and 99 percent of that
went to Barnwell. In the last 5 years, 88 percent of the B and
C waste that went to Barnwell came from utilities, which we
feel has secure storage facilities. I myself visited some of
the sites and saw adequate security of the storage facilities.
Where there seems to be more of a concern is certainly in
the academic and medical community, and as I stated earlier
that only accounted for .5 percent or 800 cubic feet. On an
annual basis that would be a small closet, like five by four by
eight. So we are not talking a lot of waste.
As to the issue on the security, at your direction, we are
currently undertaking a study to look at the safety and
security of stored waste. One of the issues is that we do not
know how much stored waste there is and where that waste is.
The Chairman. Well, I do not want to start a battle here
between the GAO and the testimony of Mr. Pasternak, but I do
want to say to you I have given up--I started addressing the
GAO two main problems about 10 years ago, 12 years ago. After 3
years I decided to let somebody else take it over, and that is
the argument I had. They did.
But the two issues we had then was: one, why should the GAO
be making policy recommendations when that was not their charge
under Congress's charter; the second one was whether they were
really doing studies that were relevant and giving objective
findings or whether they were doing studies that some
Congressman or Senator wanted and coming up with remarks or
comments that pleased that Congressman, either Senator or House
member.
To get the attention, we caused an effort around here to
reduce the funding, which occurred. We were at that point
amazed, incidentally, at the breadth of activity and where you
were located. It turned out you were all over the world. But I
want to tell you that I will review the concerns that you have
about their studies and we will have our committee staff do
that, because what we want are facts. We do not want the GAO
telling us what the policy should be. We ought to get that from
people who are involved in putting these things together, not
the GAO, which is auditing.
So I am not going to ask you to comment on that. If you
feel compelled to, Ms. Nazzaro, I will let you.
Ms. Nazzaro. All I will do is direct you to an appendix in
our report that does talk about options. We did not want to go
so far, as you say, to make a policy recommendation, but there
are options in our report for the Congress to consider. We
discussed retaining the compact legislation, to repeal the
compact legislation, or to turn this responsibility over to the
Department of Energy, and we present some pros and cons for
each option.
Our major concern with the Department of Energy is that
there is a number of items that would need to be resolved
before DOE could take on this responsibility. It is not clear
whether DOE is authorized to take on that responsibility, who
would be responsible for the disposal costs, would DOE keep the
funds or would this money return to the Treasury, who would
license or regulate such a facility, and would DOE be in
competition with existing facilities. This could actually
affect the viability of some commercial entities.
We know there is excess capacity at some of the DOE
facilities, particularly Hanford and the Nevada test site.
However, these States have objected in the past to the
disproportionate burden that has been placed on them or would
be placed on them should such an action take effect.
The Chairman. Mr. Pasternak, would you like to comment?
Mr. Pasternak. Yes, I would, Mr. Chairman.
We are mindful of the fact that Nevada and Washington have
what is probably perceived to be an excessive burden in this
area, which is one reason we suggest that the use of DOE
facilities might be only a short-term solution. I believe there
are DOE disposal facilities in other States as well and I
cannot recall at the moment which States they are, so maybe
they are worth looking at.
The long-term solution again we suggest is for the
development of a facility somewhere on Federal land, under
direct regulation by the NRC, by the Federal Government. In our
view this is really a matter of political will. The States have
not demonstrated the political will. California had the
political will for a while and lost it in the year 2000. I
think it is a matter of political will.
We do not need ten disposal facilities. We have ten
compacts. We need B and C, we need additional B and C disposal.
We need class A that can accept all kinds of class A, including
sealed sources and biological tissue waste, which Envirocare
will not accept now. As I think I mentioned, the fact that they
cannot has already affected certain kinds of research.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I have about 12 additional questions. They are directed at
each of you, two or three of them directed at GAO. I am going
to put them in the record.
I want to say that, even though these hearings are early,
next year we intend to address it. We do not want to wait much
longer. We have our own problem with will. You know, you have
got to get started pretty early to develop the will on this.
I would think that we do have a few more people up here
that are not so afraid of these kind of issues. I like your
suggestion. It is a practical one. We have a lot of public
land. I am not talking about harming very desirable public land
at all, nor are you. That is, not a wilderness, it is not
beautiful areas. We have huge amounts of property that are just
ordinary land right next to private land.
Mr. Pasternak. If I might interject, Ward Valley was not
pristine wilderness either. It is the site of a large
substation and power lines. It was not pristine wilderness.
The Chairman. Now, I am going to submit these questions for
the record and I am going to ask, in terms of you, Mr.
Pasternak and the GAO, I am very interested in getting
assurance from you that as we work on the legislation that you
will participate with us, including recommendations as to who
we ought to ask to give us field observations about this.
Mr. Pasternak. Absolutely. It would be a privilege to do
so.
The Chairman. And I think the sooner the better, because
your Utah, what you talked about in Utah, Senator Craig and I
were just talking about that and we do not want a preemptive
situation where nobody is left, and that has occurred in the
past.
Senator Craig.
Senator Craig. Mr. Chairman, let me certainly support what
you have just suggested, because in your case, Mr. Pasternak,
where you do not want to see repeal of the Low-Level Waste
Policy Act for the States. Obviously, the development is not
going forward. My question is ultimately what do we do. How do
we cause this to be encouraged? I think you have made some
proposals, and that is the dilemma we are going to face. We
have an obvious issue out there that must get resolved.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I want to thank personally on our side Clint
Williamson of our staff for all the time he spent on putting
this together, and Jonathan Epstein on the minority side spent
a lot of time. He is sitting right here. We want both of their
names in the record as having spent a lot of time.
This is not an issue for them that they wake up every
morning saying: My, is it not wonderful I have this issue. It
is a little bit difficult, and it is pretty far off. So I am
sure they are doing this because they have been kind of ordered
to. Nonetheless, you have to do some of those things around
here.
Thank you very much. We will continue on at a later date.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
APPENDIXES
----------
Appendix I
Responses to Additional Questions
----------
Government Accountability Office,
Natural Resources and Environment Team,
Washington, DC, October 22, 2004.
Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to respond to your letter of
October 4, 2004, concerning questions submitted to the record for your
Committee's September 30, 2004, hearing on low-level radioactive waste
(LLRW). Your questions and our answers are below.
This concludes our response to your questions and those of the
other senators. If you desire further elaboration or clarification,
please contact me at (202) 512-3841.
Sincerely yours,
Robin M. Nazzaro,
Director.
[Enclosures.]
Questions From Senator Domenici
Question 1. Your June 2004 report found that there should be no
apparent problem with capacity to dispose of class A waste for at least
20 years, as long as the Envirocare disposal facility remains in
operation. The primary disposal concern for the future is therefore
with class B and C wastes.
How much of this waste is generated annually and by which type of
generator?
Answer. No national data are available on the volume of LLRW
produced annually. As we indicated in our June 2004 report,\1\
according to data provided by the three commercial LLRW disposal
facility operators, disposal volumes of class B wastes declined 47
percent, from about 23,500 cubic feet in 1999, to about 12,400 cubic
feet in 2003. Class C wastes disposal volumes were more volatile,
changing as much as 107 percent in a single year. The total annual
disposal volume of class C waste alternatively rose and fell between
1999 and 2003, with the annual total reaching over 20,000 cubic feet in
1999, falling as low as about 11,000 cubic feet in 2002, then rising
over 23,000 cubic feet in 2003. Our analysis using MIMS data between
1999 and 2003 indicated that about 88 percent of the commercially
disposed class B and C wastes at Barnwell came from utilities. The
remaining 12 percent of these wastes were distributed among the other
generators: 0.5 percent was attributed to academic and medical, 2
percent to government, and 9.5 percent to industry waste generators. As
an illustration, the volume of disposed class B and C wastes from
academic and medical generators averaged about 160 cubic feet per year,
enough to fill only a 4, 5, 8, closet annually.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Disposal Availability
Adequate in the Short Term, but Oversight Needed to Identify Any Future
Shortfalls, GAO-04-604 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2. Should we be taking actions today to avert a potential
disposal crisis for class B and C wastes by mid-2008, given the long
lead-time necessary to site, license, and open a new LLRW disposal
facility?
Answer. Even if most states do not have disposal access for their
class B and C wastes after mid-2008, we found an immediate crisis would
not occur because licensed users of radioactive materials can continue
to minimize waste generation, process waste into safer forms, and store
on-site waste pending the development of additional disposal options.
However, disposal is still the preferred management approach for LLRW,
and therefore a disposal option for class B and C waste must be
available in the long-term. Our June 2004 report discussed four
situations that might have implications for long-term disposal
availability. What we currently know is that (1) South Carolina has not
shown any shift in its decision to close the Barnwell disposal facility
to non-compact member states by mid-2008; (2) the Utah legislative task
force is expected to recommend that Envirocare not be approved to use
its license to accept class B and C wastes, but the final decision
rests with the Governor and legislature; (3) licensing the Texas
disposal facility could occur as early as 2007, but Texas has not
decided whether any non-compact states will be allowed to use this
facility if it is opened; and (4) Nebraska and the Central Interstate
Compact have settled their legal dispute, but uncertainties remain
regarding the development of any new disposal facility.
Although no shortfall in disposal availability appears imminent,
uncertainties remain about future access to disposal facilities. Even
with the prospect of new disposal options, there is no guarantee that
they will be developed or be available to meet national needs for class
B and C waste disposal. Therefore, continued federal oversight of
disposal availability and the conditions of stored waste is warranted.
Thus, we suggested that the Congress consider directing the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to report to it if LLRW disposal and
storage conditions should change enough to warrant congressional
evaluation of alternatives to ensure safe, reliable and cost effective
disposal availability.
Question 3. Given the prevalence of LLRW storage today, do we
currently have a safety and security problem?
Answer. We are currently examining for the Committee the safety and
security of stored LLRW. NRC and the Agreement States have licensing
and inspection programs for assuring that stored waste is safe.
However, since September 11, 2001, the perception of the risks posed by
potential use of stored LLRW by terrorists has increased. NRC officials
told us that, as volume and duration of stored LLW increases, so might
the safety and the security risks. Further, as NRC indicated in its
comments to our June 2004 report, it is taking actions to identify
radioactive materials of concern, including LLRW, and to enhance their
safety and security. According to NRC, once implemented, such actions
will adequately ensure the safety and security of radioactive
materials, including stored LLRW. We plan to explore these issues
further in the course of our current work for the Committee.
Question 4. I understand that while you reported problems with the
reliability and usefulness of DOE's MIMS database and recommended that
DOE stop its dissemination of MIMS data until these problems are
corrected, DOE has no plans to do so.
What is your reaction to DOE's position?
Answer. We are disappointed that DOE has not taken the necessary
actions to halt dissemination of information contained in its online
national LLRW database as long as the database has internal control
weaknesses and shortcomings that adversely affect its usefulness and
reliability. In commenting on our report, DOE did not address the
internal control weaknesses or the reliability of the data. Instead,
DOE focused on the use of these data by state and regional compacts.
DOE asserted that halting dissemination of these data would evoke sharp
criticism from these users. However, as noted in our June report, we
surveyed these users and found a consensus that they could more
effectively regulate and monitor LLRW if MIMS offered more
comprehensive and reliable data. As such we stand by our recommendation
that the Secretary of Energy halt dissemination of information from the
MIMS database until the internal control weaknesses and shortcomings
are corrected.
Question 5. GAO suggests in the report that Congress consider
directing NRC to report to it when conditions in waste disposal and
storage might change enough to warrant congressional intervention.
Do you still feel that this is appropriate?
Answer. Yes. In our response to agency comments to the June 2004
report, we explained why we disagreed with NRC's position that it would
be outside its mission to undertake such reporting. We noted that NRC
is responsible for overseeing the use, storage, and disposal of
radioactive materials and that NRC and Agreement state agencies have
licensing and inspection programs to monitor the safety and security of
stored waste. We also noted that NRC has begun to establish an interim
database for sealed sources, some of which become LLRW. As such, we
concluded that NRC is the most appropriate agency to determine when
congressional assessment of legislative options to ensure disposal
availability for LLRW. In addition, NRC's strategic plan for fiscal
years 2004 through 2009 calls for it to ``assess the key issues
affecting the safe management of civilian low-level waste disposal to
ensure that potential disruption in access to the three licensed
disposal sites does not adversely affect licensees' ability to operate
safely and decommission their plants safety.'' This assessment can only
be achieved by monitoring waste levels. This type of monitoring is in
line with the International Atomic Energy Agency's position that sound
and responsible waste management requires not only appropriate
technical and administrative infrastructure but also the establishment
of comprehensive and up-to-date waste inventories.
Question 6. Annual low-level disposal volumes have increased
significantly in recent years, primarily the result of cleaning up DOE
sites. The GAO states in its report that it chose to rely on disposal
data from the three commercial disposal operators because the database
does not include DOE waste volumes sent to commercial disposal and it
is not up to date. In a letter to me dated September 2, 2004, from DOE,
the MIMS Internet site states that the database ``currently contains
some inaccuracies identified during a review by the [Government
Accountability Office].''
In your testimony, you stated that the MIMS database should be up
to date on December 31, 2004. Why is it taking so long, the GAO report
was released in June, the MIMS website on Monday and Tuesday of this
week still said there were still inaccuracies?
Answer. The reference to the December 31, 2004 completion date to
correct MIMS was provided in the DOE testimony. We defer to DOE to
respond to this question.
Questions From Senator Bunning
Question 1. In its report, the GAO indicated that the Department of
Energy's low-level waste database was unreliable.
What are the requirements for DOE with its database?
Answer. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, as amended,
directed DOE to develop a computerized database to monitor the
management of LLRW (sec. 7(1)) but did not specify what should be
included in this database. However, in section 7(2), the Congress
required the Secretary to annually prepare and submit to it a report
addressing issues that, in our opinion, could only be addressed through
a more comprehensive national LLRW database than DOE developed. For
example, the report was to summarize the (1) data on the total amount
of low-level waste shipped for disposal on a yearly basis, (2)
proportion of such wastes subjected to volume reduction, (3) average
volume reduction attained, (4) proportion of wastes stored on an
interim basis, and (5) interim storage and final disposal volume
requirements anticipated for the following year, on a regional basis.
The only data MIMS captured are the volume, waste class, and generator
of low-level waste that is accepted for disposal at the three
commercial disposal facilities.
Question 2. Why is DOE's database so unreliable?
Answer. The MIMS database is unreliable primarily because DOE does
not have consistent and comprehensive internal controls to provide
confidence in the reliability of the data. For example, DOE has taken
no responsibility for verifying the accuracy of the data supplied by
the disposal facility operators to be entered into the MIMS database.
Such verification efforts would likely uncover errors in attribution of
LLRW generation to states, compacts, and generator types. No government
agency should be providing data to the public that has not been tested
for its reliability and validity.
Question 3. What effect has this had on predicting future waste
needs?
Answer. MIMS is not a useful tool for estimating future waste
streams because it only records the LLRW that is shipped for disposal
and does not include DOE waste. To be useful in estimating future
disposal capacity needs, MIMS would need to include the volumes of LLRW
generated and stored and it would need to include DOE waste since DOE
accounts for such a large percentage of the waste volume.
Question 4. GAO found some of the problems with determining future
waste disposal needs resulted from the difficulty of forecasting DOE's
and nuclear facilities' disposal shipments.
How could DOE and nuclear facilities improve the forecasting of
their disposal shipments?
Answer. In our report, we discussed the uncertainties regarding the
timing and volume of LLRW needing disposal in the future, which largely
will depend on the disposal decisions made by nuclear utility companies
and DOE. We noted that the pace of nuclear power plant decommissioning
has been slower than expected and thus the amount of LLRW generated has
decreased. The current economics of electricity generation has made it
more desirable to keep nuclear plants in service and, as a result, only
a small number of plants are expected to be decommissioned in the next
20 years or more. Moreover, we noted that the nuclear power industry
has aggressively minimized the amount of LLRW it produces from plant
operations. Our report also found that the volumes of DOE waste will
likely start declining after 2006 and stay comparatively low until
another anticipated spike in 2014. DOE officials stressed, however,
that ``high confidence numbers'' are not yet available because the
department is still in the process of reorganizing and developing new
baselines for its cleanup projects, and it does not have a management
system in place to develop corresponding waste projections.
Question 5. Many facilities with low-level waste are concerned that
if any of the remaining disposal facilities close, their main problem
will be lack of price competition.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Answer. Regardless of any future closure of disposal facilities,
there is essentially no price competition today. As we reported in
June, Envirocare of Utah received 99 percent of class A waste and
Barnwell received about 99 percent of the class B and C wastes that
were sent to commercial disposal in 2003. As long as there are no time
limits on LLRW storage, licensees will compare the cost of waste
minimization and storage against the cost of disposal in deciding if or
when to get rid of their LLRW. In general, the higher the disposal
fees, the more incentive to minimize and store LLRW. Disposal operators
thus have some limits on the level they set for disposal fees because
they need to receive a certain volume of LLRW in order to retain a
financially viable commercial operation.
Question 6. If so, how will this affect cleanup at DOE facilities?
Answer. The lack of price competition for commercial disposal of
LLRW does not appear to be a factor for DOE. We have been told that DOE
is able to achieve price volume discounts on the class A waste it ships
to Envirocare of Utah. We were also told that if it is more cost
effective for DOE field managers to ship class A site cleanup waste to
a commercial disposal facility, considering full life cycle costs, they
are allowed to do so. If a commercial facility should raise its
disposal fees so that it is no longer cost effective for DOE, DOE can
always use its own disposal facilities. We understand that capacity at
the two DOE disposal facilities does not appear to be an issue in the
short or longer term.
Questions From Senator Akaka
Question 1. In your opinion, is the FY 2005 budget request of $5.6
million for the Off-Site Source Recovery program (OSR) sufficient to
continue the progress in collection of the GTCC sources that you noted
in your testimony?
Answer. In a September 2004 meeting, the director of the National
Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Global Radiological
Threat Reduction told us that $5.6 million would be sufficient to
recover the high-priority sources it has identified for recovery in
fiscal year 2005. This amount represents nearly a three-fold increase
from the about $2 million DOE asked for in its fiscal year 2004 budget
request. However, $5.6 million is less than the nearly $8 million NNSA
actually spent on the program in fiscal year 2004. The additional
funding above DOE's $2 million request was the result of two transfers
by the Secretary of Energy totaling $3.5 million from the Office of
Environmental Management to NNSA. In addition, the program completed
spending approximately $2.5 million that remained from the $10 million
appropriated to the program by the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act
for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the
United States, Public Law 107-266.
We have not independently analyzed the Office of Global
Radiological Threat Reduction's fiscal year 2005 recovery plans or its
estimated costs for conducting these recoveries. Without such an
analysis, we are unable to say whether $5.6 million would be sufficient
to complete the program's planned recoveries or whether additional
material needs to be recovered beyond what NNSA currently plans.
Question 2. In your testimony, you stated that the DOE Office of
Environmental Management (EM) did not sufficiently prioritize the
creation of a permanent disposal site for GTCC radioactive waste. You
also noted that DOE transferred this responsibility to the Office of
Environment, Safety, and Health. In her testimony at the hearing, Ms.
Gelles stated that DOE had decided to transfer the responsibility back
to EM.
Do you believe this is the best place for this responsibility?
Could you explain why or why not?
Answer. In our April 2003 report,\2\ we reported that DOE had not
made progress toward providing a permanent disposal facility for
greater-than-Class-C radioactive waste, as required by Public Law 99-
240. Specifically, DOE had not decided which office within the agency
would begin the first step in developing such a facility, completing
the appropriate National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis,
which would likely be an environmental impact statement. DOE had also
not provided funding or produced a timeline for completing the NEPA
analysis. DOE's Office of Environmental Management had identified
funding for completing the Environmental Impact Statement in fiscal
years 2002 and 2003. However, the office redirected the funding to
other higher priority projects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Action Needed to Ensure
Continued Recovery of Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources, GAO-03-483
(Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Designating the Office of Environmental Management as the
responsible office for conducting the NEPA analysis partially addresses
our concern that DOE had not assigned responsibility to develop a
permanent disposal facility. However, we believe it is equally
important that the Office of Environmental Management provide necessary
funding and develop a plan that would establish milestones by which
progress could be measured; evaluate other potential disposal options;
estimate costs and schedules; and address legislative, regulatory, and
licensing considerations.
Questions From Senator Feinstein
Question 1. Where will waste from California go once Barnwell,
South Carolina, stops accepting waste from California (and other)
states in 2008?
Answer. If South Carolina follows through with plans to restrict
access to the Barnwell disposal facility after mid-2008 and no new
disposal capacity is made available, waste generators in California
will have no alternative commercial disposal facility for their class B
and C wastes. However, as we reported in June, licensed users of
radioactive materials can continue to minimize waste generation,
process waste into safer forms, and store waste pending the development
of additional disposal options. These approaches can be costly, with a
higher financial burden on some licensees than others.
Question 2. Your June report suggests no current problem with
disposal availability. In my state, a report prepared in 2000 by the
former President of the University of California at the request of the
Governor reached the following conclusions: ``Significantly diminished
waste streams from California [since enactment of the Low-Level Waste
Policy Act in 1980]--a ten-fold decrease in volume and an over fifty-
fold decrease in radioactivity--have made the development of a disposal
facility appear less urgent and the projected disposal costs at such a
facility less attractive.''
I gather that your study is generally consistent with that
conclusion about the current adequacy of national disposal capacity and
the diminished need for numerous new sites?
Answer. As reported in June 2004, we found that disposal capacity
is adequate in the short term, but we did not assess the need for more
disposal facilities for reasons other than capacity, such as to
possibly increase the reliability and cost-effectiveness of the LLRW
disposal system. Our 1999 report did find similar characteristics of
LLRW disposal conditions as you indicated from the 2000 California
report. We reported that the impetus to develop new disposal facilities
has been dampened by a combination of factors, including significant
decreases in LLRW generation, available capacity at the three existing
facilities to meet national disposal needs, and rising costs of
developing disposal facilities. We also reported that the development
of new LLRW disposal facilities encountered public and political
resistance in states designated to host these facilities. Two changes
have occurred since 1999 that we noted in our 2004 report: (1) the
increase in waste from DOE's site clean-ups disposed of at the
Envirocare of Utah and (2) the possibility that Texas might be the
first compact host state to license and open a disposal facility. A
representative of the company that recently applied for a license to
open a Texas facility told us that provisions to accept DOE waste at
this facility are necessary to make it a financially viable operation.
Question 3. Your study indicates in recent years volumes have gone
up a bit, but largely due to DOE sending its wastes to commercial
disposal sites instead of using DOE facilities.
If a commercial capacity problem were to develop, wouldn't the
decision of DOE to send its wastes to non-DOE waste facilities have the
effect of reducing capacity available for commercial wastes?
Answer. DOE waste currently sent to a commercial disposal facility
is not affecting disposal availability for non-DOE waste. DOE only
sends its waste to Envirocare of Utah, which can only accept class A
waste. We reported that Envirocare has the capacity for more than 20
years of disposal under its current license, which takes into
consideration the waste volumes it receives from DOE. We are not aware
of any DOE plans to dispose of its class B and C wastes at Barnwell. As
such, DOE is not reducing disposal capacity for other waste generators
that ship to this facility.
______
California Radioactive Materials Management Forum,
Lafayette, CA, October 26, 2004.
Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the California Radioactive
Materials Management Forum, I want to thank you for the opportunity to
appear before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on
Thursday, September 30, 2004 to present testimony concerning disposal
of low-level radioactive waste.
Thank you also for your letter of October 4, 2004 and the
opportunity to respond to your questions and those of Senators Akaka
and Feinstein, submitted for the record. The questions and our
responses are attached.
Members of Cal Rad look forward to working with you, Committee
members, and Committee staff as you consider means to assure access to
safe, reliable low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities for
commercial, institutional, and governmental organizations that use
radioactive materials.
Sincerely,
Alan Pasternak,
Technical Director.
[Enclosures.]
Questions From Senator Domenici
In 1980, with the creation of the compact system, the thinking at
the time was that additional low-level waste disposal sites would be
created to keep a shortage of disposal space from occurring.
That doesn't seem to be the case as highlighted in the GAO report.
Though Envirocare will be able to handle the nation's Class A level
waste for the foreseeable future, there are real concerns about where
the Classes B and C level waste, the more dangerous waste, for 34
states will go.
In your view, is the compact system working or not working?
What are the consequences of inadequate storage options for
radioactive waste? Are public health and safety problems created when
generators have to store their wastes on-site for long periods of time?
In your experience on the issue of low-level waste, what role, if
any should the Congress consider in the oversight of LLRW?
RESPONSE
In our view, the compact system is not working as intended by
Congress.
The compact system works only for the ``fortunate fourteen.'' These
are the eight states of the Northwest Compact region, the three states
of the Rocky Mountain Compact region, and the three states of the
Atlantic Compact region. Organizations that use radioactive materials
and generate low-level radioactive waste in the Northwest and Rocky
Mountain Compact regions have access, and will continue to have access
for the foreseeable future, to the Richland, Washington disposal
facility. Similar organizations in the Atlantic Compact have, and will
continue to have, access to the Barnwell, South Carolina disposal
facility. Operation of these two disposal facilities precedes passage
of the Policy Act.
However, on the nation's present course, organizations that use
radioactive materials in the other thirty-six states will have no
disposal option for the more radioactive classes of their low-level
waste (waste Classes B and C) as of July 1, 2008 when access to
Barnwell will be restricted to the Atlantic Compact states.
Furthermore, there will be only one facility to which they can send a
subset of their Class A waste--Envirocare of Utah. This raises problems
of reliability and monopoly control of disposal costs for these wastes.
Furthermore, the Envirocare facility is not licensed to dispose of
sealed sources or biological tissue wastes.
Since enactment of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act in
1980, not a single new facility--licensed to dispose of waste Classes
A, B, and C--has been developed. This, despite Congressional consent to
ten interstate compacts. Furthermore, all state programs to develop new
disposal facilities have ceased with the exception of the program in
Texas for the Texas Compact (Texas and Vermont). Should Texas be
successful, the number of states where users of radioactive materials
lack access to disposal capacity for Class B and C waste would fall to
thirty-four.
The consequences of inadequate disposal options for low-level
radioactive waste are serious. Lack of disposal options requires users
of radioactive materials to spend money and effort to store their waste
on-site for an indefinite period of time. The waste must eventually be
disposed of when the facility--nuclear power plant, university or
industrial lab, manufacturing plant, or medical or other research
institution--is decommissioned. At the time of facility clean up and
decommissioning continued on-site storage is, of course, not an option.
On-site storage can interfere with facility operations,
particularly if storage space is limited. The added costs of storage
may affect costs to ratepayers and other consumers. Current limitations
on disposal options have already curtailed some medical research
activities.
In its comments on the General Accounting Office report issued last
June, the U.S. Nuclear Commission noted that ``. . . the future
availability of disposal capacity and the costs of disposal under the
current system remain highly uncertain and LLRW generators need
predict-ability and stability in the national disposal system.'' The
NRC calls for exploration of alternatives that ``. . . would
potentially provide a better legal and policy framework for new
disposal options for commercial generators of LLRW.''
From a public health and safety point of view, while low-level
radioactive wastes can be safely stored, it is clearly preferable for
these wastes to be disposed of at a central, regulated facility than
stored at numerous facilities many of which are in urban neighborhoods.
Indeed, NRC policy favors prompt disposal of LLRW over indefinite
storage. More handling and surveillance activities occur when waste is
stored on-site, and these may result in greater occupational exposure
to radiation.
The Policy Act, as enacted in 1980 and amended in 1985, provided
both a ``carrot'' and a ``stick'' to encourage development of new
disposal facilities. Interstate compacts were given the authority to
limit access to their regional disposal facility to the member states
of the compact. The Act also included a ``take title'' provision
requiring states that failed to provide access to disposal facilities
to take title and possession of waste generated within their borders.
However, in 1992 the Supreme Court struck down the take title provision
thereby re-moving the ``stick.''
Given the current situation of limited access to disposal
facilities for LLRW, the scheduled loss of access to disposal
facilities for the more radioactive classes of LLRW generated in 34-36
states, the 24-year failure of the states to develop a single new
disposal facility as called-for in the Policy Act, and the cessation of
efforts in the states (with only one exception) to develop new
facilities, it seems appropriate for Congress to revisit the Policy Act
and fashion a scheme in which the federal government takes such action
as will assure the availability of adequate disposal capacity for
commercial, institutional, and governmental users of radioactive
materials. A national solution for what is now a national problem seems
to us advisable.
The nation does not need ten or more LLRW disposal facilities as
envisioned in 1980. It does need some additional disposal capacity,
especially for Class B and C waste. Cal Rad has suggested that Congress
might make existing U.S. Department of Energy disposal facilities
available for permanent disposal of commercial waste--perhaps as an
interim solution. For a long-term solution, we have suggested that one
or two LLRW disposal facilities be developed under the aegis of the
federal government, on federal land, and regulated by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. We believe these steps can be taken without up-
setting the ability of the two existing regional disposal facilities at
Richland, Washington and Barnwell, South Carolina to continue operating
under the compact system. As well, any state, such as Texas, that
wishes to take advantage of the provisions of the Policy Act should be
able to do so.
Questions From Senator Akaka
In your testimony you stated that a recent GAO report (GAO-04-604)
understates the urgency of the problem of storing and disposing of low-
level waste, in part because of an underlying belief that storage is an
adequate alternative to disposal.
With respect to GTCC waste, do you believe that a similar urgency
exists to recover and dispose of such wastes?
Can you please provide your opinion of S. 1045, a bill to
strengthen DOE's capabilities to dispose of all GTCC wastes.
RESPONSE
It is our understanding that most, if not all, Greater-Than-Class-C
waste consists of some sealed sources and some of the decommissioning
wastes from nuclear power plants. We also understand that eventually
GTCC waste will be disposed of at Yucca Mountain, and Cal Rad supports
this ultimate solution. In the meantime, the Department of Energy's
Off-Site Source Recovery Project fills an important need for recovery
and safeguarding of sealed sources of all classes: A, B, C, and GTCC.
One reason this project is important is that the Envirocare disposal
facility at Clive, Utah does not accept any sealed sources for
disposal.
S. 1045 notes that the Off-Site Source Recovery Project, which is
run by the Los Alamos National Laboratory, is slated to end in 2010.
Cal Rad Forum recommends that this DOE project be continued at least
until the Yucca Mountain disposal facility is in operation and
provision has been made for disposal of sealed sources of all waste
classes.
Question From Senator Feinstein
Where will waste from California go once Barnwell, South Carolina
stops accepting waste from California (and other) states in 2008?
RESPONSE
On the present course, come July 1, 2008, there will be no disposal
facility at which to dispose of the more radioactive categories of low-
level radioactive waste (Waste Classes B and C as defined by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission) from California and 33-35 other states
and only one facility--Envirocare of Utah--to which a subset of Class A
waste (least radioactive) can be sent for disposal. The Envirocare
facility is not licensed to dispose of biological tissue waste or
sealed sources.
While most of the low-level waste volume produced in California and
other states is Class A, by far most of the radioactivity is contained
in the relatively small volume of Class B and C waste.
Organizations that use radioactive materials in California, in all
generator categories, currently send Class B and Class C waste to the
Barnwell, SC disposal facility. These include academic, government,
industry, medical, and utility users of radioactive materials. Most of
the Class B and C wastes are from utilities and industry.
Wastes for which there is no permanent disposal option will have to
be stored, usually at the site where the wastes are generated. These
sites include universities, industries, medical centers, government
facilities and nuclear power plants. Access to only one facility
(Envirocare) for disposal of a subset of Class A waste raises issues of
reliability and monopoly control of disposal costs for those wastes.
Had the proposed Ward Valley, California project been allowed to
continue to completion, that is where California's low-level
radioactive waste, along with LLRW from Arizona, North Dakota, and
South Dakota, would have been disposed of. The proposed Ward Valley
disposal project had received a license from the California Department
of Health Services, a favorable joint federal-state Environmental
Impact Report/Environmental Impact Statement from the state and the
U.S. Bureau of Land Management, a favorable Supplemental EIS from the
BLM, two favorable biological opinions from the U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service with concurrence of the California Department of Fish & Game,
and a favorable review by a panel appointed by the National Academy of
Sciences. In addition, California's Courts up-held the Department of
Health Services' license and decision to certify the EIR. Unfortunately
the Ward Valley disposal project fell victim to a lack of political
will.
______
[Answers to the following questions were not received at
the time this hearing went to press.]
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington, DC, October 4, 2004.
Ms. Christine Gelles,
Director, Office of Commercial Disposition Options, Office of
Environmental Management, Department of Energy, Washington, DC.
Dear Ms. Gelles: I would like to take this opportunity to thank you
for appearing before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources on Thursday September 30, 2004, to give testimony regarding
issues related to low-level radioactive waste.
Enclosed herewith please find a list of questions which have been
submitted for the record. If possible, I would like to have your
response to these questions by Monday, October 18, 2004.
Thank you in advance for your prompt consideration.
Sincerely,
Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman.
[Enclosures.]
Questions From Senator Domenici
Question 1. Annual low-level disposal volumes have increased
significantly in recent years, primarily the result of cleaning up DOE
sites. The GAO states in their report that they chose to rely on
disposal data from the three commercial disposal facility operators
because the database does not include DOE waste volumes sent to
commercial disposal and is not up to date.
In a letter to me dated September 2, 2004, from the DOE, the MIMMS
internet site states the database:
``currently contains some inaccuracies identified during a
review by the General Accounting Office (GAO).''
In your testimony you stated that the MIMMS database should be up
to date on December 31, 2004. Why is it taking so long, the GAO report
was released in June, the DOE MIMS website on Monday and Tuesday of
this week still said there were still inaccuracies?
How are you going to guarantee that the MIMMS database is kept up
to date?
Question 2. In your testimony you state, ``the Department currently
utilizes commercial disposal for some low-level and mixed low-level
waste streams, in cases that it determined to be cost effective and in
the best interest of the Department.''
Where is this waste coming from? What commercial facilities are you
sending it to? Are you tracking the waste?
Questions From Senator Bunning
Question 1. In its report, the GAO indicated that the Department of
Energy's low-level waste database was unreliable. What are the
requirements for DOE with its database? Why is the DOE's database so
unreliable? What effect has this had on predicting future waste
disposal needs?
Question 2. The GAO found some of the problems with determining
future waste disposal needs resulted from the difficulty of forecasting
DOE's and nuclear facilities' disposal shipments. How could the DOE and
nuclear facilities improve the forecasting of its disposal shipments?
Question 3. Many facilities with low-level waste are concerned that
if any of the remaining disposal facilities close the main problem they
will face is lack of price competition. Do you agree with this
assessment? If so, how will this affect cleanup at DOE facilities?
Questions From Senator Akaka
I understand that the Off-Site Source Recovery Program (OSR) was
transferred to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in
November, 2003. Some of the activities, however, such as the
identification of a disposal facility and the environmental assessments
necessary to use the facility, remain with other parts of the
Department.
Question 1. I understand from your testimony that on September 29th
the day before the hearing, the Department designated Environmental
Management as being the lead entity for ensuring the safe disposal of
greater-than-Class-C (GTCC) radioactive waste, transferring it from the
Office of Environment, Safety and Health. Can you provide any formal
record of the decision to transfer the responsibility back to
Environmental Management?
Question 2. Can you please provide details on how the work is
proceeding on the environmental impact statement (EIS)?
Question 3. At the FY 2005 budget hearing on February 10, 2004, the
Department testified that the FY 2005 $3 million budget request for the
environmental assessment, plus the availability of prior year funds
that were obligated for the assessment, were adequate to complete the
EIS. Is it still the case that you will be able to complete the EIS
with these funds?
Question 4. Will the Department be exploring disposal alternatives
as part of the EIS [e.g. existing facilities vs. new facilities or
commercial options]?
Question 5. Can you please provide the Department's views on S.
1045? [The same question is asked of Mr. McGinnis, since part of the
Off-Site Recovery program was transferred to NNSA.]
Questions From Senator Feinstein
Question 1. Where will waste from California go once Barnwell,
South Carolina stops accepting waste from California (and other) states
in 2008?
Which federal entity has oversight responsibility for Greater than
Class C radioactive waste?
Question 2. What steps are being taken to both track and securely
store GTCC waste? Since Los Alamos can no longer accept some of the
most highly radioactive waste, where will the waste go?
______
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington, DC, October 4, 2004.
Mr. Edward McGinnis,
Director, Office of Global Radiological Threat Reduction, National
Nuclear Security Agency, Department of Energy, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. McGinnis: I would like to take this opportunity to thank
you for appearing before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources on Thursday September 30, 2004, to give testimony regarding
issues related to low-level radioactive waste.
Enclosed herewith please find a list of questions which have been
submitted for the record. If possible, I would like to have your
response to these questions by Monday, October 18, 2004.
Thank you in advance for your prompt consideration.
Sincerely,
Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman.
[Enclosures.]
Questions From Senator Domenici
Question 1. In April 2003, the GAO released a port, GAO-03-483,
Nuclear Nonproliferation, DOE Action Needed to Ensure Continued
Recovery of Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources addressing the issue of
sealed sources containing greater than class C waste. In April 2003,
the GAO reported that the exact number of unwanted greater-than-Class-C
sealed sources in the United States was unknown as no one kept track of
this information.
Is someone keeping track or taking an inventory now?
Question 2. Also, in the same report, the GAO, stated that after
more than 17 years after the enactment of The Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, DOE had not made progress toward
providing for the permanent disposal of greater-than-Class-C
radioactive sealed sources, as required by the act.
Has the DOE been able to determine the volumes of greater-than-
Class-C waste in the United States? Has the DOE been able to designate
where the greater-than-Class-C waste will be disposed of?
Question 3. In your testimony for the disposal of waste you say
that ``the use of commerical pathways makes sense for many reasons.
They provide a potential and sigficant economy of cost. They use
exisiting infrastructure, which eliminates the need for certain types
of new storage facilties . . . '' and so on.
Do you work with the commerical facilities to ensure there is
adequate disposal space for the wastes you recover? Is the NNSA
concerned that the commerical faciltiies may run out of room after
2008?
Questions From Senator Akaka
First of all, let me say that I greatly appreciate Secretary
Abraham's response to the GAO report I requested in 2002 on the DOE's
program to secure and dispose of GTCC sources of nuclear material. I am
pleased to see the increased commitment to securing GTCC sources of
radioactive waste through a transferring of the OSR program to NNSA and
the larger budget requests for FY 2005 and the outyears. My concerns
come from the growing black market in radioactives, especially
plutonium-239. Many of the sources are not well-secured. The sealed
sources need to be identified, secured, and disposed of as quickly as
possible. The NNSA is taking steps in the right direction. I have
several questions for you on the subject.
Question 1. I am concerned about the plutonium-239 isotopes. Will
the storage space that the United States Radiological Threat Reduction
Program has identified at Los Alamos and Nevada be adequate to secure
all the known sources of plutonium-239? If not, what are the backup
plans?
Question 2. I noted your endorsement of developing disposition
paths through the commercial sector, including interim storage and
recycling for reuse. What are the downsides or obstacles to pursuing
commercial disposal, and particularly recycling, of GTCC waste?
Question 3. You stated in your written testimony that the OSR
program's budget for FY 2004 was $1.96 million. But it is my
understanding that supplemental funding, in addition to the $3.4
million you mentioned in your testimony, enabled OSR to work with a
much larger operating budget in FY 2004.
Question 4. Can you please provide the program's total operating
budget for FY 2004.
Question 5. Can you please provide the Department's views on S.
1045. [same question is asked of Ms. Gelles.]
Questions From Senator Feinstein
Question 1. Where will waste from California go once Barnwell,
South Carolina stops accepting waste from California (and other) states
in 2008?
Which federal entity has oversight responsibility for Greater than
Class C radioactive waste?
Question 2. What steps are being taken to both track and securely
store GTCC waste? Since Los Alamos can no longer accept some of the
most highly radioactive waste, where will the waste go?
Appendix II
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
----------
Health Physics Society,
Los Alamos, NM, September 29, 2004.
Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman, Energy and Natural Resources Committee, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Domenici: The Health Physics Society, a scientific
nonprofit organization of radiation safety professionals, appreciates
that the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee is conducting a
hearing on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Oversight. The Health Physics
Society strongly believes that nuclear technologies enrich the quality
of life for our society but the beneficial uses must be balanced
against any potential detriment that the waste streams associated with
these technologies may pose to human health or the environment.
Accordingly, I am forwarding a statement on issues related to
management of low-level radioactive waste that the Health Physics
Society feels will be of use to your Committee as it provides oversight
in this area.
I respectively request the attached ``Public Witness Testimony For
The Record by the Health Physics Society'' be entered into the record
of the Committee hearing on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Oversight.
Sincerely,
Raymond A. Guilmette, Ph.D.,
President.
[Enclosure.]
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bingaman, and distinguished members of
the committee, the Health Physics Society (HPS) appreciates the
Committee's conduct of a hearing on Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Oversight and greatly appreciates the opportunity to submit testimony
sharing some of our observations and recommendations regarding the
current national policy governing the disposition of Low-Level Waste
(LLW).
The HPS strongly believes that nuclear technologies enrich the
quality of life of our society. These technologies are used to diagnose
medical illnesses without the need for invasive surgeries, treat
cancers, conduct research, develop new kinds of pharmaceuticals,
preserve our food supply, and generate over 20 percent of our nation's
electricity from commercial nuclear power plants. These plants emit
essentially no air pollution or greenhouses gases. There is, however,
waste associated with these beneficial uses. As a matter of national
policy, we believe that the beneficial uses that these technologies
provide to our society must be balanced against any potential detriment
that these waste streams may pose to human health or the environment.
We have reviewed the information contained in the recent report
(GAO-04-604)\1\ issued by the Government Accountability Office to your
Committee in June 2004 and agree with the majority of its contents. We
also believe that the current shortfalls in LLW disposal options are
not attributable to any deficiencies in science or technology, but
rather to the failure to garner the political resolve required to
implement the Low-Level Waste Policy Act of 1980 (LLWPA), as amended in
1985, as directed by Congress.
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\1\ GAO report to the Chairman on the Energy and Natural Resources,
U.S. Senate titled ``Low-Level Radioactive Waste, Disposal Availability
Adequate in the Short Term, but Oversight Needed to Identify any Future
Shortfalls,'' (GAO-04-604), issued June 2004.
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The Nation Needs Predictable Long-Term Disposal Options
for Class B and C Wastes
As you are aware, Congress enacted the LLWPA to distribute more
equitably to each state the responsibilities for developing disposal
capacities for LLW generated within each state's borders. Moreover,
this legislation encouraged states to enter into regional interstate
compacts with the intent that a single disposal facility would be
licensed by a host state, and thereafter, could be used for disposal of
LLW by any one of its member states. At the time Congress passed this
legislation, only Washington, Nevada and South Carolina had commercial
facilities licensed for LLW disposal. Since that time, however,
deadlines established for creating a network of new disposal sites have
since passed without opening a single new LLW disposal facility.
Three facilities are currently authorized to dispose of LLW in the
United States. Of these, only two facilities are authorized to dispose
of waste streams comprising the vast majority of the radioactivity in
waste generated in this country (Class B and C low-level waste).\2\ One
of these commercial facilities, located in Richland, Wash., prohibits
access to any state other than the 11 states belonging to the Rocky
Mountain and Northwest Compacts.\3\ Additionally, because of actions
taken by state legislators in South Carolina, access to its Barnwell
facility will be strictly limited to the three member states of the
Atlantic Compact\4\ after 2008. Until then, the 36 states that do not
belong to these three compacts may dispose of LLW at Barnwell. After
the 2008 deadline, the 36 states will be forced to find costly and
less-than-optimal alternatives for disposal of Class B and C low-level
waste. Accordingly, many users of radioactive materials have developed
plans, or have already constructed facilities, for safe interim storage
of the wastes as a hedge against losing access to disposal sites.
However, the construction, operation and security of such facilities is
costly--placing a particular burden on academic, research and medical
institutions both in the public and private sectors.
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\2\ Low-Level Radioactive Wastes are categorized into Class A, B
and C waste as defined in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part
61.55. The basis for this classification is dependent on the
concentrations and identity of specific radionuclides comprising the
waste stream. Class A is the least radioactive and least concentrated
level, while Class B and C have higher levels and concentrations.
\3\ The 11 Member States of the Northwest and Rocky Mountain
Compacts include Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington and Wyoming.
\4\ The Atlantic Compact includes Connecticut, New Jersey and South
Carolina.
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It is important to note that Class B and C wastes are largely
composed of materials from nuclear power plants, including such items
as used filter media and equipment and hardware that are no longer
serviceable. These wastes also include materials from academic,
government, industry, fuel cycle facilities and medical facilities--
primarily in the form of expended radioactive sources. The volumes of
Class B and C wastes are a small fraction (less than 0.5 percent) of
the overall volume of disposed waste.
No significant health and safety impacts are expected to arise in
the near-term as a result of limited availability or shutdown of
disposal options for Class B and C wastes. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) and its Agreement States will continue to maintain
oversight of waste management practices to assure protection of public
health and the environment. The Agreement States include the 33 states
that have delegated authority from the NRC to regulate certain types of
radioactive material. In addition, the NRC has the authority to enable
safe disposal of radioactive materials on a contingent basis, if
required. But ultimately, universally available options for permanent
disposition of the wastes will still be required.
The HPS believes that the Compact approach created by the LLWPA has
been unsuccessful, despite some good efforts, such as a proposed
facility in Texas. In fact, it appears to the HPS that, in general, the
LLWPA has unnecessarily restricted access to available disposal sites
and impeded open commercial development of additional disposal
facilities. The HPS encourages the Committee to continue to seek
information and ideas on how it could more effectively implement, amend
or replace the LLWPA to improve access to existing facilities and
develop new waste disposition options.
Lack of Disposal Options May Impact Existing Federal Programs
to Safeguard Sealed Sources
In August 2003, GAO reported to the Senate actions needed to
improve the security of sealed radioactive sources.\5\ The HPS commends
the efforts of each federal agency that has undertaken significant
improvements to impose more stringent security measures to safeguard
the control of sealed sources. The additional measures include
implementing a federal program for disposing and protecting orphan
sources that exceed specific thresholds. It should be noted that many
of these sealed sources were orphaned because of the excessive cost of
disposal at LLW sites. Because of the levels of radioactivity contained
in many of the sealed sources, they must be disposed of as Class B and
C waste. After 2008, nuclear facilities in 36 states will be unable to
dispose of sealed sources in their possession. The HPS believes that
the lack of disposal options for sealed sources may lead to an increase
in the number of orphan sources in states that do not have access to
either the Rocky Mountain or Northwest Compacts. Therefore, the HPS
encourages the Committee to seek additional information to ensure that
the existing federal programs for safeguarding high-risk sealed sources
are able to carry out this mission.
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\5\ GAO Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on
Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee
on Government Affairs titled ``Federal and State Action Needed to
Improve the Security of Sealed Radioactive Sources'' (GAO-03-804),
issued August 2003.
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Despite Long-Term Disposal Options for Class A Wastes,
Lack of Competition Results in Excessive Costs for Many Licensees
The HPS believes that although long-term disposal options for Class
A waste are available, lack of competition results in excessive cost to
waste generators. As noted in the GAO report GAO-04-604 waste
generators are required to dispose of Class A waste at sites in
Barnwell, S.C., Richland, Wash., or Clive, Utah. Excessive costs
resulting from the limited disposal options have impeded the use of
nuclear technologies that provide significant benefits to society.
Consequently, the HPS recommends that the Committee seek additional
information from industry, regulatory agencies and other stakeholders
pertaining to disposal of Class A waste. Additionally, the HPS
encourages the Committee to support rulemaking initiatives, which would
allow access to as many as 20 Subtitle C hazardous waste disposal sites
controlled by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) for
more cost-effective means for disposal of Class A waste.
As the GAO report notes, the current regulatory framework results
in excessive and overly restrictive requirements for disposal of Class
A low-level waste. A re-examination of certain aspects of this
framework may yield new approaches that would increase the number of
sites that may safely dispose of Class A low-level waste. In fact,
several of these alternatives provide a safe means of disposing of
Class A low-level waste in a risk-informed and graded manner. These
proposals do not require further legislative actions, but could be
implemented within the existing regulatory framework. The HPS believes
that such a risk-informed, graded approach is consistent with the
recommendations specified by the National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurements (NCRP) Report 139, ``Risk-based
Classification of Radioactive and Hazardous Chemical Wastes,'' issued
in December 2001. This report incorporates the following principles:
1) The classification system is generally applicable to any
waste that contains radionuclides, hazardous chemicals, or
mixtures of the two
2) Wastes that contain hazardous substances are classified
based on consideration of health risks to the public that arise
from waste disposal
3) The waste classification system includes an exempt class
of waste.
Implementation of the conceptual approaches contained in NCRP
Report 139 should allow land disposal of limited concentrations of
radioactive materials at sites that are designed and authorized to
contain both hazardous chemicals and radionuclides at a regulated
disposal site. The HPS believes that the guiding principals outlined in
this report are germane to this hearing and should be considered for
seeking solutions to find safe, as well as more efficient and cost-
effective means for disposing of LLW.
HPS Supports an Integrated Framework for Management
and Disposal of Low-Activity Radioactive Waste
The GAO report cited studies being conducted by the National
Research Council and EPA that consider necessary changes to current LLW
thresholds. The GAO noted that changes to this system are under
consideration that could affect the amount of waste that must be
disposed of in the future.
In November 2003, the EPA published an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPR), ``Approaches to an Integrated Framework for
Management and Disposal of Low-Activity Radioactive Waste,'' that
sought input on a wide range of issues related to the possible use of
facilities regulated under RCRA for disposal of certain quantities of
radioactive materials.\6\ Although the EPA requested comments on the
most effective use of RCRA Subtitle C facilities for disposal of Low-
Activity Mixed Waste (LAMW), they also requested comment on a variety
of wastes regulated under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). These wastes
include certain wastes governed by the AEA, certain waste generated by
the extraction of uranium and thorium, a variety of wastes
characterized as Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring
Radioactive Materials (TENORM), and certain types of decommissioning
wastes.
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\6\ Federal Register, ``Approaches to an Integrated Framework for
Management and Disposal of Low-Activity Radioactive Waste: Request for
Comment; Proposed Rule, Volume 68, Number 222,'' Nov. 18, 2003.
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The EPA acknowledges that some wastes regulated under the AEA are
excluded from regulations as ``unimportant quantities'' (i.e., source
materials containing less than 0.05 percent uranium or thorium), while
others are regulated down to the last atom. Additionally, the EPA
acknowledged that the current practice of LLW disposal resulted in
costly waste management practices and appeared to have an adverse
impact on the health care industry to levels that were less than
optimal. To address these issues, EPA solicited stakeholder input to
find solutions needed to minimize the current practice of imposing dual
regulatory authority for controlling disposal of the these types of
regulated wastes.
Although the EPA requested comments on a variety of issues as
specified in the ANPR, the following three questions appeared most
important:
1) How can the disposal of LAMW be simplified?
2) Is it feasible to dispose of other Low-Activity
Radioactive Wastes (LARW) in hazardous waste sites?
3) What non-regulatory approaches might be effective in
managing LAMW and other LARW?
To minimize dual regulatory authority, the EPA acknowledged that
such an integrated framework would also require changes to regulations
established by the NRC and Agreement States under the AEA. In fact, the
EPA noted a similar regulatory approach that has previously been
successful in eliminating dual regulations.\7\ This approach required
deferral of EPA's authority under RCRA, thus allowing disposal of mixed
wastes at sites regulated by the NRC, under Title 10 Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 61. The EPA believed that such a rulemaking was
justifiable since adequate protection of human health and the
environment was ensured under the existing NRC standards. The EPA also
stated that both agencies could pursue a similar and compatible
rulemaking to further harmonize the management of certain regulated
waste streams outlined in the proposed rulemaking. Should such a
rulemaking go forward, it would afford the same level of protection.
This approach would also reduce the regulatory burdens imposed by two
separate regulatory regimes, the EPA said. To support this objective,
the EPA would consider proceeding with a rulemaking that would allow
disposal of waste streams that contain certain concentrations of
radioactive materials at one of the 20 existing RCRA-regulated
facilities. However, for this approach to succeed, the NRC must defer
its authority under the AEA to allow disposal of licensed materials at
sites regulated under RCRA, Subtitle C.
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\7\ Federal Register, ``Storage, Treatment, Transportation and
Disposal of Mixed Wastes, Final Rule (40 CFR 266) and Hazardous Waste
Identification Rule, Revisions to Mixture and Derived-From Rule, Final
Rule (40 CFR Parts 261 and 268), Volume 66, Number 95,'' May 17, 2001.
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In April 2004, the HPS submitted comments on this rulemaking
initiative, commending the EPA for its leadership in embarking on this
important task.\8\ As noted in our comments, we believe that disposal
of LAMW and LARW at the RCRA sites that follow the mandated engineering
design, waste treatment and disposal practices, will ensure protection
of public health and the environment. In addition to addressing the
necessary radiation standards successfully employed to protect human
health and safety, our April comments addressed technical issues
regarding the movement and fate of radioactive and hazardous materials
in the environment. We noted that the movement of radioactive materials
in the environment would generally share the same parameters as the
chemical compounds of which they are a part, except to the extent that
radioactive decay hastens their degradation. We included reference to a
report by the California Office of Environmental Health Hazard
Assessment that concluded that biodegradation of many RCRA hazardous
waste constituents, comprised of heavy metals, are on the order of over
200,000 years, and thus, comparable to many of the long-lived
radionuclides. As such, we suggested a concept based on the half-live
of chemicals and radionuclides should be considered to better shape the
definition of LAMW and LARW.
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\8\ Letter from President Ken Kase to EPA, Air and Radiation Docket
(Docket ID No. OAR-2003-0095), dated April 23, 2004.
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NRC Rulemaking Promotes a Safe Approach for Controlling
the Disposition of Solid Materials
The HPS supports the rulemaking for ``Controlling the Disposition
of Solid Materials'' under consideration by the NRC. The HPS also
supports the rulemaking under consideration by the NRC to adopt dose-
based criteria that would allow for the unrestricted release of sources
considered inherently safe.\9\ Moreover, we support establishing dose
criteria that would limit individual doses to an effective dose rate of
one millirem per year. Establishing dose constraints at such levels are
consistent with the recommendations specified in NRCP Report 116,
``Limitation of Exposures to Ionizing Radiation.''
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\9\ The HPS provided testimony on this matter before the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Clean Air,
Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclear Safety on March 9, 2000.
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The HPS also supports use of the annual dose limit and the derived
screening criteria contained in the American National Standard
Institute/Health Physics Society (ANSI/HPS) Standard N13.12, ``Surface
and Volumetric Radioactivity Standards for Clearance'' (ANSI/HPS
N13.12, 1999). This standard was developed for ANSI under the direction
of the HPS Standards Committee. The standard received consensus
approval through ANSI Committee N13 in August 1999. Moreover, our
recommendation is in keeping with the intent of Public Law 104-113
``National Technology and Transfer Act of 1995'' and OMB Circular A-119
``Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary
Consensus Standards.''
This position is fully consistent with similar standards adopted by
the European Community to support commerce across international
borders. The International Atomic Energy Agency developed these
radiological criteria,\10\ specifying the concentrations of radioactive
materials that are considered inherently safe. The basic radiological
criteria used by the IAEA to derive radionuclide concentrations for the
clearance of materials limited individual doses at an annual effective
dose rate of 1 millirem. As a result, international radiological
criteria for the release of solid materials are equally as protective
to members of the general public as those specified in ANSI/HPS N13.12
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\10\ IAEA Safety Series No. 115 International Basic Safety
Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety
of Radiation Sources, February 1996.
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The NRC has requested comments on this rulemaking initiative that
also pertains to establishing levels of radioactivity that would be
unsuitable for unrestricted release, but appropriate for disposal
(i.e., ``Conditional Release'') at sites regulated under RCRA, Subtitle
C. In fact the NRC held a public workshop with stakeholders to address
the matter in May 2003.\11\ During comments on this rulemaking, the HPS
encouraged the NRC to conduct early consultations with other federal
and state government agencies in support of disposals at RCRA
facilities.\12\ The HPS believes that these early consultations would
better harmonize the relevant regulations and instill more public
confidence in the regulatory oversight of LLW disposal.
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\11\ The NRC requested comments on scope of proposed rulemaking is
the Federal Register, ``Rulemaking on Controlling the Disposition of
Solid Materials: Scoping Process for Environmental Issues and Notice of
Workshop,'' Volume 68, Number 40, February 28, 2003.
\12\ Letter from the HPS to the NRC, Rulemakings and Adjudications
Staff, June 13, 2004.
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Should the EPA decide not to proceed with its rulemaking as
described in the ANPR, other alternatives should be explored to allow
disposal of radioactive materials at RCRA sites within the existing
regulatory framework.\13\ Over the past several years, the NRC and EPA
have implemented a Memoranda of Understanding that addresses instances
where these two regulatory agencies have dual and overlapping
authority.\14\ This interagency process also could facilitate similar
successes whereby the NRC could promulgate a ``Conditional Use'' rule,
which would allow disposal of AEA materials at RCRA Subtitle C sites.
Under such a rule, the NRC would defer its authority to EPA to ensure
that such waste disposals were conducted in accordance with RCRA,
Subtitle C standards.
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\13\ Currently, disposal of licensed materials under the AEA are
disposed of at RCRA Subtitle C/D sites on a case-by-case basis in
accordance with 10 CFR 20.2002.
\14\ T.S. Tenforde, ``Future Role of the NRCP in Radiation Health
Protection,'' Health Physics, Volume 87, Number 3, pp. 312-317,
September 2004.
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A Non-Regulatory Alternative to Commercial LLW Disposal for Certain
Radioactive Materials Should Be Considered
The HPS believes that solutions pertaining to non-regulatory
approaches\15\ to more effectively manage LARW are a sound regulatory
policy. An approach that involves use of uranium mill tailings for
disposal of a select type of Class A LLW (i.e., certain fuel cycle
materials) is a logical alternative that should be considered to help
ease the LLW dilemma. This approach was jointly proposed by the Fuel
Cycle Facilities Forum (FCFF) \16\ and the National Mining Association
(NMA) \17\ as an example of a non-regulatory approach as addressed in
EPA's ANPR.
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\15\ Non-regulatory approaches should be viewed as statutory
actions that exist within the scope of an existing framework. Non-
regulatory approaches should not be viewed as removal of such wastes
from regulatory control or ``deregulation of LLW.''
\16\ The Fuel Cycle Facilities Forum is a consortium of fuel cycle
companies whose primary purpose is to provide a forum for addressing
regulatory, technical and operational issues associated with the
decommissioning of facilities currently or formerly involved in the
processing of special nuclear materials and source material (primarily
uranium and thorium).
\17\ The National Mining Association (NMA) represents producers of
most of America's coal, metals, industrial and agricultural minerals;
manufacturers of mining and mineral processing machinery and supplies;
transporters; financial and engineering firms; and other businesses
related to coal and hard rock mining. NMA has member companies who are
NRC licensees with uranium mill tailings facilities.
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Disposing of high volume, low activity wastes in uranium mill
tailings impoundments offers a number of practical advantages, and the
existing regulatory framework can support such an approach. Existing
mills have sufficient capacity to accept most, if not all of the fuel
cycle industry's low-activity, high-volume waste well into the
foreseeable future. Federal statutes require that mill tailings
impoundments be turned over to the Department of Energy for long-term
custodial care in perpetuity, at no cost to the government. In
addition, federal statutes also require that mill tailings sites be
protected for up to 1,000 years with no active maintenance and only
passive controls, thereby providing greater protection than that
offered by RCRA disposal facilities and existing commercial LLW
disposal sites. This disposal alternative can be pursued within the
context of existing legislation and federal regulations.
The NRC has a policy regarding the direct disposal of certain
radioactive materials at uranium mill tailings facilities. These
facilities normally contain waste generated from the processing or
concentration of source material, known as 11e.(2) byproduct material.
The existing policy and guidance that allows for disposal of non-
11e.(2) material in mill tailing piles should be amended, and the NRC
needs to liberalize its waste acceptance criteria for non-11e.(2)
materials disposed in licensed uranium mill tailings impoundments. The
FCFF and NMA are pursuing a joint initiative to propose to the NRC
active regulatory, political, and economic consideration of using
uranium mill tailings facilities for direct disposal of waste streams
that are similar to uranium recovery wastes.\18\
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\18\ In response to the EPA's ANPR, the FCFF and the NMA jointly
submitted a White Paper that espouses the merits of disposal of non-
11e.(2) materials in Mill tailings impoundments, and provides a
complete and compelling regulatory basis for the option.
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Beginning in 1992, the NRC developed a policy for the direct
disposal of non-11e.(2) byproduct material in such facilities. In a
1998 white paper, the NMA proposed that the NRC liberalize what types
of non-11e.(2) materials could be appropriately disposed of in licensed
uranium mill tailings impoundments. The NMA recommended that the agency
develop generic waste acceptance criteria for such materials. The
current joint FCFF-INMA initiative attempts to build on the record
developed by the NRC and on the NMA white paper to further refine the
debate on this issue.
The history of LLW disposal and the history of the proposed use of
mill tailings impoundments for non-11e.(2) disposal lend credibility to
the argument that the existing policy on non-11e.(2) materials should
be revisited and lays the foundation for this innovative approach. The
FCFF/NMA white paper proposes regulatory, political and economic bases
for generic waste acceptance criteria that could be debated in the
regulatory marketplace among all relevant stakeholders, and
subsequently serve as the basis for a technically sound disposal
alternative for a large volume of low-activity waste throughout the
United States.
A fundamental concern associated with the direct disposal of non-
11e.(2) byproduct material in uranium mill tailings impoundments is
that, if such material contains RCRA hazardous wastes, it could then
subject the entire impoundment to regulation by EPA or delegated states
under RCRA. A similar type of jurisdictional overlap might occur if any
non-11e.(2) byproduct material containing Naturally Occurring
Radioactive Material (NORM) subject to state regulation is disposed of
in a mill tailings impoundment. This potential for dual or overlapping
jurisdiction raises questions about the eventual transfer of custody of
mill tailings to DOE, the long-term custodian. The Uranium Mill Tailing
Radiation Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA) requires Title II licensees to
transfer custody of their uranium mill tailings facilities to DOE upon
license termination, and DOE is required by Section 83 of the AEA to
take the mill tailings and other property necessary for the proper
disposal of 11e.(2) byproduct material. Since UMTRCA contains no
provision requiring that DOE take custody of, or title to, materials
other than 11e.(2) byproduct material, disposal of other materials
could, without congressional action, pose an impediment to license
termination and transfer of custody to DOE as the long-term steward.
Although DOE is only required to take title to and custody of
11e.(2) byproduct material under UMTRCA, the department has the
authority to accept custody of AEA wastes other than 11e.(2) byproduct
material under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1980, including non-
11e.(2) byproduct material, provided that
1) NRC requirements for site closure are satisfied
2) transfer of title and custody to DOE is without cost to
the federal government
3) federal ownership and management of the site is necessary
or desirable to protect public health and safety and the
environment.\19\
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\19\ 42 USC Sec. 10171(b).
Several categories of wastes have already been proposed for
disposal in uranium mill tailings impoundments including: secondary
process wastes generated during the capture of uranium in side-stream
recovery operations; sludge and residues generated during treatment of
mine water containing suspended or dissolved source material; NORM, and
TENORM. Some fuel cycle facilities have expressed an interest in
seeking NRC approval to dispose of special nuclear materials in
existing tailings impoundments once the NRC addresses the issue
presented in the referenced joint FCFF/NMA white paper. To address
these and other issues, the NRC began its inquiry into this matter
around a decade ago.
Under the regulations supporting UMTRCA, non-11e.(2) byproduct
materials that are disposed of in tailings impoundments would be
subject to stringent, ongoing and long-term oversight by the NRC and
DOE with regard to both radiological and non-radiological hazards,
making these facilities particularly appropriate disposal sites.
Moreover, this superior protection would be achieved without the
creation of new disposal sites. This approach is also philosophically
consistent with the NRC's requirement ``to avoid proliferation of small
waste disposal sites and thereby reduce perpetual surveillance
obligations.'' In addition, this approach would be consistent with
long-standing policies favoring disposal over storage of LLW wastes.
Recommendations
The HPS encourages the Committee to consider the following six
recommendations as it deliberates on the most effective means to
address issues pertaining to LLW disposal:
Continue to receive information and ideas on how the LLWPA
might be more effectively implemented, or amended or replaced,
to improve access to existing facilities and develop new waste
disposition options.
Ensure that the existing federal programs for safeguarding
high-risk sealed sources have disposal capabilities to allow
them to carry out this mission.
Take a broad look at the manner in which hazardous chemicals
and radioactive materials are classified with regard to with
the principles specified in NCRP Report 139. Adoption of this
recommendation is needed to support a consistent risk-based
system for the safe disposition of all hazardous substances.
Provide the necessary support for the EPA to continue with a
rulemaking for an ``Integrated Framework for Management and
Disposal of Low-Activity Radioactive Waste,'' as outlined in
their Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
Support NRC actions to promulgate a rule on Controlling the
Disposition of Solid Materials. Moreover, should EPA decide not
to proceed with such a rulemaking, the Committee is encouraged
to seek additional information on possible regulatory
alternatives to allow use of RCRA Subtitle C sites for disposal
of materials regulated under the AEA.
Encourage the use of non-regulatory approaches that allow
for the safe disposal of LLW within an existing regulatory
framework.
Conclusions
The HPS agrees with the majority of the information contained in
the GAO report pertaining to management of low-level waste in the
United States. The HPS agrees that the Low-Level Waste Policy Act needs
to be more effectively implemented, or amended or replaced, to improve
access to existing facilities and develop new waste disposition
options. We believe that although disposal capacity for Class A low-
level waste is sufficient for the foreseeable future, lack of
competition currently results in costly waste management practices that
impede the use of nuclear technologies that enhance the quality of life
of those in our society. Consequently, we believe that several
alternatives under consideration by the EPA and NRC may more
effectively allow for the safe disposal of certain types of Class A
low-level waste.
______
Statement of Joe F. Colvin, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Nuclear Energy Institute
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the
committee's continued active oversight of issues relating to civilian
use of nuclear technologies and welcome the opportunity to provide the
industry's perspective on issues raised in the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO's) June 2004 Report on low-level
radioactive waste.
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) represents 260 corporate members
in 13 countries. They include companies that operate nuclear power
plants, design and engineering firms, fuel suppliers and service
companies, companies that manage and dispose of low-level radioactive
waste, companies involved in nuclear medicine and nuclear industrial
applications, radionuclide and radiopharmaceutical companies,
universities and research laboratories, and labor unions.
Nuclear technologies offer significant benefits to society.
America's nuclear power plants produce 20 percent of the nation's
electricity. More than 30 million medical procedures a year use nuclear
technologies for diagnosis or therapy, accounting for about one in
three hospital admissions. Critical industries use radioactive
materials as power supplies, for making measurements and to analyze and
test new components and devices. Low-level waste (LLW) is a normal
industrial byproduct of these beneficial uses.
The GAO report on low-level waste (GAO-04-604) provides an
excellent review and update of the situation on the availability of
disposal sites for LLW. The report concludes that the availability is
currently adequate, but that the situation could change in the future.
As a result, we agree that Congress must remain actively involved in
the oversight of the issue.
There are steps that should be taken now to facilitate effective
oversight. For instance, we concur with the GAO recommendation that the
Department of Energy should ensure that the Manifest Information
Management System (MIMS) database contains accurate data. DOE should
continue to disseminate the information from MIMS as the agency
improves the system.
However, we disagree that it is necessary for the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to report to Congress on LLW disposal and
storage conditions to ensure that safe, reliable and cost-effective
disposal is available. The NRC is a regulatory agency whose expertise
and mission focus is on ensuring the safety and security of licensee
activities through oversight and inspections. The NRC is not well-
suited to study what amounts to future projections related to broad
programmatic issues--a responsibility that could dilute the agency's
focus on safety and security.
Given that the GAO has studied LLW disposal twice in recent years
(1999 and 2004) and has developed an excellent institutional capacity
for the subject, we believe that Congress should--at an appropriate
future time--request the GAO to perform an updated evaluation.
Low-level waste disposal is currently market-driven within the
``compact'' framework that Congress provided for in the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act as amended in 1985. This framework allowed
states to form regional compacts for managing their LLW. Producers of
LLW have disposed of their waste safely and securely in several areas
of the country. Washington, South Carolina and Utah have operating LLW
disposal sites.
The Texas state legislature recently authorized the creation of two
waste disposal facilities that will be licensed as one site. On Aug. 4,
2004, Waste Control Specialists LLC submitted a license application for
a facility in Andrews County, Texas.
The resolution of two issues is essential with regard to the long-
term disposal of the country's LLW: to have adequate access to Class B
and C disposal facilities and to address the possibility of a single
site for Class A waste by 2008.\1\ The market has time to respond to
these developments, and we have strong reason to believe that it will.
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\1\ Low-level radioactive wastes are categorized as Class A, B and
C waste, depending on the concentration and type of radionuclides in
the waste. Based on these criteria, Class A is the lowest rating, and
Class C is the highest.
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If the market does not respond or if there are impediments that
legislative changes to the Low-Level Waste Radioactive Policy Act could
address, then it would be appropriate for this committee to consider
action in close consultation with those industries that generate LLW
and must address these disposal options.
Disposal of greater-than-Class-C waste is only a problem for
decommissioning power plants and is (by law and regulation) tied to DOE
actions. Most likely these actions will be linked to progress on the
nation's used nuclear fuel repository (for high-level radioactive
waste) at Yucca Mountain, Nev., and should not be the focus of
oversight on the LLW issue. Although disposal of greater-than-Class-C
waste is a separate issue, we recommend continued congressional
oversight of DOE's progress in this sector.
Finally, we encourage the committee to support initiatives
permissible within the current legislative framework that will enable
safe alternative means for LLW disposal. Two such initiatives include
an NRC-proposed rulemaking on the safe disposition of solid radioactive
material\2\ and an advance notice of proposed rulemaking by the
Environmental Protection Agency for the management and disposal of
LLW.\3\
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\2\ Federal Register, ``Rulemaking on Controlling the Disposition
of Solid Materials: Scoping Process for Environmental Issues and Notice
of Workshop,'' Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Feb. 28, 2003.
\3\ Federal Register, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking:
``Approaches to an Integrated Framework for Management and Disposal of
Low-Activity Radioactive Waste: Request for Comment,'' Nov. 18, 2003.
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NEI looks forward to working with the committee to ensure that the
management and disposal of LLW continues to protect public health and
safety.
______
Statement of Alan J. Fohrer, Chief Executive Officer,
Southern California Edison
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources
Committee, on behalf of Southern California Edison (SCE), I would like
to thank you for this opportunity to express SCE's concern about the
current lack of reliable disposal options for low-level radioactive
waste. I am the Chief Executive Officer of SCE, a California-based
investor-owned electric utility. SCE serves 12 million customers in 450
communities, including almost 300,000 businesses in Southern
California. We own a wide variety of electric generation facilities,
including hydropower, coal, natural gas, and nuclear. As an owner and
operator of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in San
Clemente, California, we are especially concerned about low-level
radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal.
In June, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) released a report
that asserts that (1) there is no disposal shortfall for Class A low-
level radioactive waste (LLRW), and (2) that there will be no shortfall
for disposal of Classes B and C wastes until mid-2008 when South
Carolina will restrict access to the Barnwell disposal facility to
Atlantic Compact members only. At that time, the GAO report states that
Class A waste disposal will be adequate with the existing license for
the Envirocare facility; and that the storage of B and C wastes at the
hundreds of sites where the waste is being generated is an acceptable
alternative until disposal capacity becomes available. (pages 18-19).
We are here today because we disagree with these conclusions. We
believe that that the Low-Level Waste Policy Act (The Act) and
amendments thereto have not resulted in adequate disposal capacity for
LLRW. One of the purposes of the Act was to permit states to band
together to provide a local site for the disposal of LLRW. The reality
is that such regional facilities for disposal of LLRW have not been
created and we are concerned about the long-term lack of disposal for
LLRW. We have reason to be concerned as we look at the operational
units at SONGS that will need to be decommissioned in the future. Unit
1 has been shutdown since 1992 and is currently being decommissioned.
Units 2 and 3 are due to cease commercial operation in 2022. To date,
SCE has removed approximately 15 million pounds of LLRW from Unit 1. We
estimate that we have roughly 86 million pounds to remove from Unit 1
before decommissioning is complete.
U.S. Ecology, the private company selected to build a LLRW within
California, spent roughly $90 million in an effort to develop a LLRW
disposal facility at Ward Valley, without success. Ward Valley is not
unique. In fact, the GAO report states that ``Despite estimates by a
nuclear industry association that expenditures may now have reached
approximately $1 billion on various facility development efforts, no
new commercial LLRW disposal facility has been developed since passage
of the Act, except for the Envirocare facility, which was not developed
at the instigation of the compact in which it exists'' (page 9). As a
company obliged to meet our public utility obligation to safely dispose
of LLRW over the long-term, we find this especially disturbing.
Planning for the inevitable disposal of LLRW must begin now. The
GAO based its assessment of the adequacy of disposal on the assumption
that few plants will undergo decommissioning over the next 20 years
(page 16). In reality, all of the plants will go through this process
sooner or later, generating significant volumes of all classes of LLRW.
In California's case, efforts to identify a potentially suitable
site started in 1982. After nine years of extensive site
characterization and scientific studies, the California Department of
Health Services issued a license. The federal government did not
transfer the designated site to California, stymieing the process. The
final blow was in 2002, twenty years after work began, when California
passed legislation (AB2214) prohibiting the use of the most favorable
site--Ward Valley--from being used as a low-level radioactive waste
disposal facility. Concurrently, the Governor issued an executive order
prohibiting disposal of wastes from decommissioned facilities that have
terminated their licensees and are no longer regulated at Class III
landfills. This blanket prohibition is imposed regardless of whether
the wastes originated in areas previously used for licensed activities.
Years of litigation continue to this day, with the California Appellate
Court ruling in March 2003 that the company performing the siting and
characterization studies could not recover costs from California.
Last year, Texas succeeded in finally garnering enough support to
enact legislation allowing for siting and operation of a commercial
LLRW disposal facility. Assuming things go smoothly, the earliest that
the facility could begin to accept LLRW for disposal is 2008. Under
current law and Compact status, only generators from Texas, Maine, and
Vermont would be allowed to ship LLRW to that facility.
Class A Disposal
We concur with the GAO's conclusion that disposal capacity for
Class A waste will generally be available. After June 30, 2008, the
only licensed low-level disposal facility that accepts Class A waste
for some 36 states will be a privately operated facility--Envirocare of
Utah. Unfortunately, Envirocare does not accept all forms of Class A
waste. Moreover, we expect that costs to dispose of LLRW at Envirocare
will continue to rise.
Mixed wastes have never been comprehensively addressed under the
current LLRW process. The majority of the planning for low-level waste
disposal explicitly has excluded mixed wastes at proposed compact
facilities. Mixed wastes contain both hazardous and radioactive
constituents (typically Class A) and are subject to regulation by both
EPA and the NRC. Recognizing the deficit in disposal options for mixed
waste, in November 2003 EPA and the NRC initiated efforts to resolve
the issue by evaluating the possibility of allowing mixed wastes to be
disposed of at Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle C
landfills. These landfills are designed and permitted for disposal of
hazardous wastes. As it is currently being considered, allowing mixed
wastes to be disposed of at a RCRA-C facility would rely on both the
RCRA-C facility operator pursuing the flexibility once it has been
developed (at least 3-5 years hence), and on the State in which the
RCRA-C facility is located adopting this new federal option.
Classes B and C Disposal
The existing availability of disposal access for Classes B and C
waste is limited and requires significant allocation of resources. GAO
notes in its report (footnote 17 on page 18) that even though the
Barnwell site in South Carolina is still technically accepting all low-
level radioactive wastes, including Classes B and C, there is limited
space and that space continues to dwindle.
There are no readily apparent options to resolve the lack of access
for disposal of B and C wastes after mid-2008. GAO states on page 5
``Unless South Carolina changes its position, or additional disposal
capacity is made available, there will not be disposal options for
class B and C wastes generated within these [36] states in the longer
term.''
The GAO discussed the fact that South Carolina has in the past
opened and closed and reopened the Barnwell facility to out-of-compact
waste. However, given that current South Carolina law prohibits
disposal of LLRW except to those in the Atlantic Compact (Connecticut,
New Jersey, and South Carolina) after June 30, 2008, it is not
reasonable to consider Barnwell a viable long-term disposal option.
In May 2004, the Utah Hazardous Waste Regulation and Tax Policy
Legislative Task Force adopted a motion recommending that state
lawmakers not approve the disposal of Class B and C waste within the
state, which includes disposal at Envirocare. It is, therefore, not
reasonable to assume that disposal of Classes B and C wastes at
Envirocare will be a viable long-term disposal option.
Additionally, the GAO noted the possibility of the in-development
Texas LLRW site being available for out-of-compact waste. Texas law
already restricts the proposed facility's non-compact waste by limiting
out-of-state waste to only a small fraction of the total waste
deposited each year. It is unreasonable to assume that the Texas LLRW
will be a viable long-term disposal option.
Finally, there are transportation-related challenges, particularly
with regards to logistics, that make shipments to Barnwell problematic
from the West Coast. Some of the low-level waste to be disposed of
during decommissioning SONGS 1 will be in the form of large components.
The transportation of such large components can be inordinately
expensive and logistically complex. If there is no realistic option for
regional disposal, then these large components will have to be
transported over long distances.
General Comments
There are impacts associated with loss of access to disposal
facilities, some more significant than is portrayed in the report. GAO
asserts that they could not detect widespread effects other than costs
incurred for extended on-site storage and management. Even if that were
true, resources are not infinite. After 2008, when generators in at
least 36 states no longer have access to a disposal facility for
Classes B and C waste, it will become impossible to fully decommission
a facility and terminate the license as long as wastes are stored on-
site. Pharmaceutical companies and research universities in California
are already finding themselves unable to expand their operations or go
about normal business progression because of license termination
issues. This situation will only worsen once disposal access is lost.
Even if GAO's assertion was true, the resources required for on-site
storage and waste-management are limited.
Waste minimization and on-site storage may help to alleviate the
lack of disposal capacity but are not long-term solutions nor do they
represent viable alternatives for all LLRW. Some medical and research
facilities can successfully address part of the LLRW disposal problem
by storing the waste on-site until the radioisotope has decayed away to
non-detectable levels. This approach is limited by definition to those
radioisotopes with relatively short half-lives and cannot be used by
the majority of LLRW generators, including SCE. Waste minimization
techniques such as volume reduction, source substitution, and changes
in manufacturing processes have contributed to steadily decreasing
volumes of LLRW for disposal over time, but these techniques are also
limited. In many instances, the industry relies on the radioactive
properties to achieve its purpose--nuclear power, for example, relies
on the fission process to generate heat and provide electricity to the
customer. Source substitution is therefore not always an option. Even
volume reduction is limited--care needs to be taken as supercompaction
of Class A wastes can produce Class B wastes, restricting where the
final waste can be sent for disposal.
On-site storage. The GAO report contends that LLRW which cannot be
disposed of at a licensed disposal facility can be kept on the site
where it was generated. While the NRC currently allows on-site storage
without a time limit, this is in part because the NRC recognizes that
there is not always a disposal alternative. However, the absence of a
time frame for on-site storage does not indicate that the NRC believes
permanent LLRW storage where the waste is generated is a feasible long-
term plan. The practical effect of licensees being forced to store
waste on-site due to the lack of access to a licensed disposal facility
is that licensees will be unable to fully decommission the site and,
therefore, cannot terminate their operating license or its attendant
obligations.
Regardless of which agency tracks volumes of LLRW that has been
shipped and/or disposed of, this administrative mechanism does nothing
to improve safe disposal options. The GAO spent a considerable amount
of space in the report discussing the validity and discrepancies in the
MIMS database. While there are errors in the database, many of which
were identified and corrected, the focus of the GAO on the inclusion of
DOE waste and criticism of DOE's program misses the point of the
study--namely, that there is, and will continue to be, commercial LLRW
that requires available disposal capacity.
Conclusions
There is currently no clear path forward that provides predictable
and stable disposal options. As a consequence, entities such as SCE,
which generate LLRW as a by-product of beneficial uses of radioactive
materials, face regulatory limbo. This perpetual limbo will adversely
affect the ability of nuclear utilities to maintain or increase the
output of low-cost, low-emission electric generation. The result will
be higher costs and lower reliability for electric consumers across the
board.
The NRC in its comments on the draft report urged GAO to explore
alternatives to the current system for developing new facilities. The
same comment was made on the GAO's 1999 ``Low-Level RadioactiveWastes--
States Are Not Developing Disposal Facilities'' GAO/RCED-99-238. The
GAO did note that the National Research Council and the EPA (in concert
with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) are studying various aspects of
LLRW management. The National Research Council has a panel evaluating
regulatory and management issues associated with all forms of low
activity waste (including NORM, LLRW, DOE waste, source materials,
tailings, etc.) That study may make recommendations regarding changes
to the regulatory framework but any changes would probably require
considerable Congressional action and are many years distant. The EPA
activity that is evaluating the possibility of low activity waste
disposal in RCRA facilities (or other methods) is also in its infancy,
and if any action is taken at all, it will probably only begin with
mixed waste management.
While there is no immediate crisis for disposal of low-level
radioactive waste, the reality is that years of planning and
environmental studies are required before a facility can begin to
accept waste for disposal. In California, over a decade of site
characterization, testing, and environmental studies that identified
the most scientifically suitable site were trumped by litigation,
concerted efforts by anti-nuclear organizations, and lack of
implementation, at both the state and federal levels. We cannot rely on
unknown solutions to this inevitable problem or defer such solutions to
some indeterminate future date. We must now adopt a workable process
for safe and responsible disposal of low-level radioactive wastes.