[Senate Hearing 108-729]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-729
IRAQ--POST TRANSITION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 22, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 28
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared
statement...................................................... 30
Gompert, Mr. David C., distinguished research professor, Center
for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense
University, Washington, DC..................................... 11
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Schlicher, Hon. Ronald L., Iraq Coordinator, Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC...... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Biden...................................................... 30
(iii)
IRAQ--POST TRANSITION
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 22, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in SD-
419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, and Biden.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR, CHAIRMAN
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. The committee meets today to
review United States activities in Iraq since the transfer of
sovereignty to the new interim Iraqi Government. Iraqis are
again responsible for their own future, and the magnitude of
the task that remains cannot be overstated. The next few months
will be critical as the new government must establish security,
continue to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure, and prepare the
Iraqi people for national elections scheduled for January 2005.
The ongoing insurgency imperils prospects for development
of a peaceful, stable, and democratic Iraq. Meddling by foreign
terrorists and some of Iraq's neighbors, such as Iran and
Syria, also will stretch the new Iraqi Government's
capabilities. The United States must continue to use every tool
at our disposal to accelerate stabilization and reconstruction
in Iraq and to strengthen the nascent Iraqi Government.
I want to pay tribute to Ambassador Bremer for his
dedicated service during the past year. Our Nation is grateful
for his leadership and the work of all civilian and military
personnel who have risked their lives in Iraq in service to our
country. The United States and multinational forces in Iraq
must now reinforce Iraq's fledgling security capabilities and
provide the equipment, training, and support needed to create
effective police, civil defense, border security, and military
forces.
I was pleased to learn at the recent Istanbul summit that
our NATO allies are responding to Prime Minister Allawi's
request for assistance to train and to equip Iraq's security
forces. To reinforce international participation in Iraq, the
United Nations needs to move boldly to bring back its resources
and its expertise. Other nations also need to move swiftly to
reduce Iraq's overwhelming debt and to follow through on their
commitments to provide assistance.
The United States must continue to clearly outline our
long-term plans in Iraq to build confidence among the Iraqis
and the American people that the transition will succeed. The
arrival of Ambassador Negroponte in Iraq surely marks a new
beginning for United States-Iraq relations. Secretary Powell
briefed members of our committee before the Independence Day
recess on the new embassy operations in Baghdad, and they
represent an undeniable commitment to the future of Iraq.
One area of serious concern is the pace of U.S. assistance
to the interim Iraqi Government. As of July 13, reports
indicated that of the $18.4 billion appropriated for Iraq last
November by the Congress, only $6 billion has been obligated,
and only $458 million has been expended. The new U.S. Embassy
is attempting to accelerate assistance, but at the same time it
intends to initiate a reevaluation of existing assistance
programs. Such a study may be necessary, but it must not serve
to further delay United States assistance.
Ambassador Negroponte has asserted that the United States
needs to construct a new embassy building in Iraq. I agree with
his assessment. A United States Embassy that occupies the
former regime's palace has severe symbolic disadvantages.
Beyond symbolism the facility was not constructed to be an
embassy. Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman testified
before our committee in May that a new embassy could cost more
than $1 billion. The administration did not include these funds
in the fiscal year 2005 budget request, but indicated they
might be included in a supplemental. The sooner we identify the
costs, the more quickly funds can be requested and construction
can begin, demonstrating our good intentions to the Iraqis.
Most Iraqis are optimistic about the future. Even before
the transfer of sovereignty, polls conducted by Oxford Research
International and the International Republican Institute found
that about three-quarters of the Iraqi people believed that
they were either about the same or better off than before the
war. Oxford found that 64 percent of Iraqis expect that their
lives will be better a year from now.
In 7 months, Iraqis are scheduled to hold elections for a
275-member National Assembly. This assembly would then
undertake the weighty duty of writing a constitution for Iraq.
The Independent Elections Commission of Iraq, selected through
a collaborative process with the United Nations, was confirmed
in May. Members of the Commission completed a United Nations-
sponsored training session in Mexico.
The election plans call for setting up as many as 30,000
polling stations, recruiting and training as many as 150,000
election workers, and ensuring accurate voting results of about
13 million people. This is an incredibly daunting prospect. The
committee would be very interested in our witnesses' views on
whether the election plan can be executed effectively. If this
is an unrealistic plan, do other options exist that might
advance the formation of a permanent Iraqi Government?
Today we are most fortunate to have a panel that has been
deeply engaged in policymaking with respect to Iraq. We welcome
Ambassador Ron Schlicher, the Iraq Coordinator at the United
States Department of State, and Mr. David Gompert, who worked
in Iraq as Ambassador Bremer's senior adviser for national
security and defense. Gentlemen, we look forward to your
insights and a chance to engage you in questions and answers
about United States policy in Iraq.
I'll ask you to testify in the order that I introduced you,
and that would be first of all Ambassador Schlicher.
STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD L. SCHLICHER, IRAQ COORDINATOR, BUREAU
OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Schlicher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good
morning, and thank you for the opportunity to appear today
before the committee to discuss our progress in Iraq and the
early achievements of the Iraqi Interim Government following
the transition of power from the Coalition Provisional
Authority.
I am happy to report to you today that the Iraqi Interim
Government is off to a strong start. Led by President Ghazi al-
Yawer and Prime Minister Allawi, the interim government is
looking out for the best interests of the Iraqi people. Those
interests which coincide with the interests of the United
States include increasing security in Iraq, improving the
economy, affirming the place of Iraq as a peaceful, lawful,
democratic, and responsible member of the international
community, and very importantly, as you mentioned, sir, in your
opening remarks, laying the groundwork for national elections
to give all Iraqis a voice in their future.
An important step toward that future is scheduled next week
in Iraq. The Interim Government is sponsoring a national
conference of 1,000 delegates from across Iraq who will meet in
Baghdad to promote national reconciliation and appoint the
interim National Council. Delegates to the conference will
include representatives of political parties, academics and
professionals, members of various civil society groups, tribal
leaders, and members of the conference's preparatory committee,
which has already been at work to make the conference happen.
More than half of the delegates will be selected from the
provinces of Iraq in an attempt to ensure that all voices are
heard, and right now in the provinces the work of the
provincial councils selecting those members is very much
underway.
Members of the conference in turn will appoint 100 Iraqis
to form the interim National Council. This Council will serve
throughout the period of the Interim Government, which will end
by next January when elections are held for a transitional
National Assembly. The transitional government that will be
formed by this assembly will be charged with the vital task of
drafting a permanent constitution for Iraq.
The interim National Council will broaden the base of
support of the Interim Government, it will act in an oversight
and advisory role for the Interim Government, and it will have
the authority to veto decisions of the Interim Government by a
two-thirds vote. It will also, of course, help shape the
process of the coming elections.
Through next week's conference, the National Council and
the other institutions of the Interim Government, the Iraqi
people are beginning to assume responsibility for and, of
course, the burden of managing their own affairs in a manner
consistent with the rule of law and with the obligations of a
sovereign member of the international community.
It's very clear, sir, that Iraqis are anxious to assume
that responsibility and to assert their sovereignty. They do
not hesitate to say so. In fact, they are vigorously exercising
their newly won right of free speech in community meetings, in
cafes, in mosques, and in farm fields up and down the Tigris
and the Euphrates. And in doing so, the Iraqi people have made
clear that their top concern is the restoration of security and
the defeat of the insurgents and terrorists who want to
undermine stability and undermine the path forward toward full
democracy.
In response, while the Interim Government has taken a hard
line against violence, it is also reaching out to all Iraqis
willing to participate peacefully in that political process.
For example, there are reports that the Interim Government is
considering issuance of an amnesty law that would provide an
opportunity for those who wish to give up the path of violence
and join the supporters of a free and democratic Iraq. We
welcome all of these efforts at national reconciliation, and of
course, any final decision on an amnesty will be an Iraqi
decision.
However, we have been clear with the Interim Government
that we believe that those responsible for causing the death of
Iraqi civilians and security forces or members of the U.S. or
Coalition armed forces should face justice.
Even as the Interim Government reaches out to those Iraqis
who are willing to participate in the political process, they
have very aggressively attacked crime and terrorism. Prime
Minister Allawi has issued a decree authorizing the Interim
Government to exercise certain limited powers in particular
emergency situations in order to give the government more tools
to meet the demands of Iraqis for safer streets.
In recognition of the lessons learned from the Saddam era,
however, the decree also includes important procedural
safeguards that will prevent it from being abused to infringe
on the civil rights that Iraqis are only now beginning to
enjoy. U.S. Embassy officials consulted on these issues when
asked by the Interim Government as part of our commitment to
support that government with advice and assistance. Deputy
Secretary of State Armitage, during his recent trip to Baghdad,
made that commitment clear to Foreign Minister Zebari when he
said, the message here in the United States is quite simple.
There is a sovereign government in Iraq. Our job is to support
that government to the absolute extent that we can, and we're
going to do it.
During our consultations with the Iraqis, they have made
clear that they want the troops and the multinational force in
Iraq, ours and those of our partners, to work with them to
provide basic security until the Iraqis can do that job
themselves. The multinational forces are doing just that, and
in a manner consistent with the exercise of full sovereignty by
the Iraqi Government.
But the ultimate success of the Interim Government, of
course, depends on the support of the Iraqi people, and Iraqis
are showing that they are behind it. Throughout Iraq,
courageous citizens are taking positions at all levels of their
country's new government as cabinet members, as local
administrators, as local council members, and as civil
servants. All too often we hear of attacks against government
officials, including many of whom those of us who served in
Iraq were privileged to know as friends.
But the Iraqis do not back down. Young men continue to line
up outside recruiting stations to join the security forces.
They are being attacked and many have been killed, but they
continue to step forward. They understand very well that their
future is on the line and that with our help they're willing to
fight for it.
Despite the difficult security environment, important
progress has been made toward rebuilding Iraq. The relief and
reconstruction of Iraq is a very ambitious project after the
degradation of that country's infrastructure over the past 24
years. Of the $21 billion in 2003 and 2004 assistance, over
$8.4 billion has been obligated. These funds have helped us
sustain economic activity and hope since the first days of the
war.
This money, Mr. Chairman, is making a tangible difference
in the lives of Iraqis. More than 30,000 Iraqis are now working
as the direct result of our assistance. We have immunized over
3 million children under the age of 5, vaccinated 700,000
pregnant women, and updated the skills of 2,500 primary health
care providers in 700 positions. Hospitals and clinics have
been refurbished, medicines are being equitably distributed for
the first time in many years, schools are being repaired,
teachers trained, new curricula developed. Students are now
free to exercise critical thought and learn new ideas in the
universities. Attendance in the 2003-2004 school year was as
high as or higher than pre-war levels. Over 8 million new
textbooks have been distributed around the country. And now,
with the sovereign government in place and a U.S. Embassy team
on the ground, we are consulting more closely with the Iraqis
about their reconstruction priorities and reviewing the
original spending plan for our assistance to make sure it
accords with the emerging needs and priorities in Iraq.
Under Ambassador Negroponte's leadership, the Iraqi
Reconstruction and Management Office, known as IRMO, and the
Embassy's country team are reviewing current assistance plans.
We anticipate the initial work on this review will be completed
by the end of July. The new team on the ground in Baghdad will
seek to assure that our allocations and commitments of
resources track with evolving Iraqi needs and support the
efforts of the Interim Government to establish the security, to
establish prosperity, and to establish democratic practice.
We look forward to sharing with you the results of this
review, Mr. Chairman, and I would also note in line with your
own remarks, sir, that part of that review will be the search
for greater speed in getting the assistance to those who need
it most, and the other part of it will seek to identify how the
maximum number of employment opportunities can be generated.
Our assistance remains vital to the Iraqi Government, which
is committed to the modernization of the economy and
establishing the services and institutions that will raise the
standard of living for all Iraqis. In fact, the standard of
living has already shown lots of signs of improvement. Shops
are full of consumer goods, household income is growing,
inflation is at reasonable levels for a post-conflict economy.
Many Iraqis are beginning to see an improvement in their lives.
We estimate that per capita household income will likely double
this year over last year's figure.
In the financial sector, the currency swap was viewed as a
resounding success. Based on the surprising stable value of the
dinar this year, we believe Iraq is poised to begin needed
reforms to its financial system as well.
Now, without a doubt, the Interim Government faces very
critical, very major challenges, both on the security front and
on the economic front. Among the economic challenges I've also
mentioned the infrastructure. I've also mentioned in passing
persistent unemployment in the range of 10 to 30 percent, in
some cases more. The Interim Government has determined that the
top economic priority for them is job creation, and so, again,
our review of assistance will be strongly focused on how to
maximize employment opportunities for Iraqis.
We've also been consulting actively with our coalition
partners as we consider new ways to speed up their assistance
as well to the Iraqi people and what better ways can new
projects be identified, what better means of coordination can
be effected to meet these goals.
The Interim Government has also been very assertive and
very active with other governments in reclaiming Iraq's place
in the region and in the international community. It has begun
to establish formal diplomatic and economic relations with
countries throughout the world. It has taken steps to assure
the world that its goals are clearly different from those of
Saddam. For example, the government recently declared that Iraq
will be a country free both of weapons of mass destruction and
the means of their delivery.
In response to the Iraqi Government's outreach, the
international community is increasingly embracing the new Iraq.
The U.N. Security Council recognized the transfer of authority
to the Interim Government in its unanimous adoption of Security
Council Resolution 1546. We were very pleased with Secretary
General Kofi Annan's appointment of the Pakistani Ambassador to
the United States, Ashraf Qazi, on July 12 as his new Special
Representative for Iraq. We hope that Ambassador Qazi, who has
so ably represented Pakistan here in Washington, will move
expeditiously to reestablish the UN's full role and presence in
Iraq.
We and the Interim Government are working hard with friends
and allies to facilitate the creation of the U.N. security
force called for in Resolution 1546. The U.N. has much to offer
as Iraq gears up for the national conference and for elections
next January. Indeed, Carina Perelli, the head of the U.N.
Electoral Assistance Mission to Iraq, and her team are already
offering their immense expertise on the elections process. U.S.
and international NGOs, many of whom have been on the ground
now for months, are also stepping up their assistance to
support the political process. We have pledged our full support
for all of these efforts and to those of the Iraqis to move
deliberately and steadily toward the elections, and in
particular, sir, we have been coordinating closely with Ms.
Perelli, both on the mechanics of the elections, the steps that
we'll need to assure proper training for the elections, and
we've been consulting with her on what security requirements
for those elections will be necessary.
Sir, you mentioned Ambassador Negroponte and the
establishment of the Embassy. We have indeed stood up the
Embassy in Baghdad and we have opened up our four regional
offices in Mosul, in Kirkuk, in Hillha, and in Basra. To ensure
that we were right-sized, we reviewed our goals in Iraq prior
to the transfer and we aligned our mission planning in
accordance with those prior studies.
Now, based on that review, in the near term we will have
approximately 1,000 Americans under the authority of Ambassador
Negroponte. And I can assure you that every one of them is very
busy and will remain very busy. The embassy, of course, has
traditional sections like a political, an economic, a consular,
and a management section. But unlike most embassies, it also
contains temporary organizations, such as the liaison officers
to various Iraqi ministries and other government agencies, the
IRMO, which I mentioned early is another of these temporary
organizations. It has the responsibility of assisting
Ambassador Negroponte in setting and monitoring reconstruction
policy. IRMO will also provide consultants to the Iraqi
ministries, those ministries which identify their own needs.
There will also be approximately 50 State Department and
IRMO staff in the regional offices, I mentioned earlier, and in
teams embodied in the military commands at the division level.
Sir, this is just one example of the partnership between the
Departments of State and Defense in Iraq. We understand that
such cooperation is vital to our success in Iraq, as indeed it
is around the world. The Departments planned jointly for the
organization of U.S. activities in Iraq following the
assumption of sovereignty by the Iraqis, recognizing the fact
that our roles, our missions, our resources, and our
responsibilities must be complementary.
The ongoing security situation makes the closest
partnership between the U.S. military commander and Ambassador
Negroponte critical to our success. Ambassador Negroponte and
General Casey are already collaborating very closely, as indeed
the President has charged them to do. Ambassador Negroponte
made clear to you here in the committee his commitment to do so
during his confirmation hearing. Effective integration of all
U.S. civilian and security operations will remain vital as we
move ahead in meeting our goals in Iraq.
These efforts, sir, underscore the commitment of the United
States to assist the Iraqi Government as it builds an
independent, secure, democratic, prosperous, and united Iraq.
We share the interests of Iraqis in a better future for their
country because we know that a free and democratic Iraq will
mean a more secure region for the United States and more
security for the United States. As President Bush said
recently, democratic governments do not shelter terrorist camps
or attack their neighbors. When justice and democracy advance,
so does the hope of lasting peace.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you again for
the opportunity to testify about our progress to date in Iraq
and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Schlicher follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ronald L. Schlicher
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before the Committee today to discuss our
progress in Iraq and the early achievements of the Iraqi Interim
Government following the transition of power from the Coalition
Provisional Authority.
The Iraqi Interim Government is off to a good start. Led by
President Al-Yawer and Prime Minister Allawi, the interim government is
looking out for the best interests of the Iraqi people. These
interests, which coincide with those of the United States, include:
increasing security in Iraq, improving the economy, affirming the place
of Iraq as a peaceful, lawful, democratic and responsible member of the
international community, and laying the groundwork for national
elections to give all Iraqis a voice in their future.
An important step toward that future comes next week. The interim
government is sponsoring a national conference of 1,000 delegates from
across Iraq who will meet in Baghdad to promote national reconciliation
and appoint the National Council. Delegates to the conference will
include representatives of political parties, academics and
professionals, members of civil society groups, tribal leaders, and
members of the conference's preparatory committee. More than half of
the delegates will be selected from the provinces, in an attempt to
ensure that all voices will be heard.
Members of the conference will appoint 100 Iraqis to form the
Interim National Council. The council will serve throughout the period
of the interim government, which will end by next January when
elections are held for a Transitional National Assembly. The
Transitional Government that will be formed by this Assembly is charged
with the vital job of drafting a permanent constitution. The Interim
National Council will broaden the base of support for the interim
government, it will act in an oversight and advisory role, and it will
have the authority to veto decisions of the interim government by a
two-thirds vote. It will also help to shape the process of the upcoming
elections. Through next week's conference, the National Council, and
other institutions of the interim government, the Iraqi people are
beginning to assume the responsibility for--and the burden of--managing
their own affairs in a manner consistent with the rule of law and with
the obligations of a fully sovereign member of the international
community.
It is clear that Iraqis are anxious to assume that responsibility.
They do not hesitate to say so; in fact they are vigorously exercising
their newly-won right of free speech in community meetings, cafes,
mosques, and farm fields up and down the Tigris and Euphrates. And in
doing so, the Iraqi people have made clear that their top concern is
the restoration of security and the defeat of the insurgents and
terrorists who want to undermine stability and the path forward to
reconstruction and full democracy. In response, while the interim
government has taken a hard line against violence, it is also reaching
out to all Iraqis willing to participate peacefully in the political
process.
For example, there are reports that the interim government is
considering issuance of an amnesty law that would provide an
opportunity to those who wish to give up the path of violence and join
the supporters of a free and democratic Iraq. We welcome these efforts
at national reconciliation; and any final decision on an amnesty will
be an Iraqi decision. However, we have been clear with the Interim
Government that we believe that those responsible for causing the death
of Iraqi civilians and security forces or members of the U.S. or
Coalition armed forces should face justice.
Even as it reaches out to Iraqis willing to participate in the
political process, the interim government has aggressively attacked
crime and terrorism. Prime Minister Allawi has issued a decree
authorizing the interim government to exercise certain limited powers
in particular emergency situations in order to enhance the ability of
the government to meet the demands of Iraqis for safer streets. In
recognition of the lessons learned from the Saddam era, the decree
includes procedural safeguards that will prevent it from being abused
to infringe on the civil rights Iraqis are only now beginning to enjoy.
In addition, the interim government has assumed legal custody of
Saddam Hussein and some of his top advisors. Iraqis themselves are
taking responsibility for the judicial process to hold them accountable
for the atrocities they committed against the Iraqi people. The open
and fair trials of Saddam Hussein and his supporters and staff in Iraq
will be a vital part of the reconciliation process that is necessary to
move beyond the traumas of the past and begin unifying society under
the rule of law.
U.S. Embassy officials consulted on these issues when asked by the
Interim Government, as part of our commitment to support that
government with advice and assistance. During these consultations, the
Iraqi authorities have made clear that they want the Multi-National
Forces in Iraq (MNF-I)--ours and those of our partners--to work with
them to provide basic security until Iraqis can do the job themselves.
The multinational forces are doing just that in a manner consistent
with the exercise of full sovereignty by the Iraqi Government.
But the ultimate success of the interim government depends on the
support of the Iraqi people, and Iraqis are showing that they are
behind it. Throughout Iraq, courageous citizens are taking positions at
all levels of their country as cabinet ministers, local administrators,
council members, and civil servants. All too often we hear of an attack
against government officials, including many of whom those of us who
served in Iraq are privileged to call friends. But the Iraqis do not
back down. Young men continue to line up outside recruiting stations to
join the security forces. They are being attacked, and many have been
killed, but they continue to step forward. They understand that their
future is on the line, and with our help, they are willing to fight for
it.
Despite the difficult security environment, important progress has
been made toward rebuilding Iraq. The relief and reconstruction of Iraq
is an extraordinarily ambitious project after the degradation of that
country's infrastructure over the past 25 years. Of the total $21
billion in 2003 and 2004 assistance, $8.3 billion has been obligated.
These funds have helped to sustain economic activity--and hope--since
the first days of the war.
This money is making a tangible difference in the lives of Iraqis.
More than 30,000 Iraqis are now working as a result of our assistance.
We have immunized over three million children under the age of five,
vaccinated 700,000 pregnant women, and updated the skills of 2,500
primary health care providers and 700 physicians. Hospitals and clinics
have been refurbished; medicines are being more equitably distributed.
Schools are being repaired, teachers trained, and new curricula
developed. Students are now free to exercise critical thought and learn
new ideas. Attendance in the 2003-2004 school year was as high as, or
higher, than pre-war levels. Over eight million new textbooks have been
distributed around the country.
Notwithstanding the periodic attacks on pipelines, average daily
oil production and exports have nearly returned to pre-war levels.
Daily megawatt hours of electricity produced countrywide are averaging
the levels reached this time last year and they, too, are rising
despite attacks.
And now, with the interim government in place and a U.S. Embassy
team on the ground, we are consulting more closely with the Iraqis
about their reconstruction priorities, and reviewing the original
spending plan for our assistance to make sure it accords with emerging
needs and priorities. Under Ambassador Negroponte's leadership, the
Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO) and the Embassy's
Country Team are reviewing current assistance plans. Ambassador William
Taylor, who in September will take over as the head of IRMO, is on the
ground in Baghdad to help lead the review. We anticipate the initial
work will be completed by the end of July. The new team on the ground
in Baghdad will seek to assure that our allocations and commitments of
resources track with evolving Iraqi needs and support the efforts of
the interim government to establish security, prosperity and democratic
practices. We look forward to sharing with you the results of this
review.
Our assistance remains vital to the government, which is committed
to the modernization of Iraq's economy and to establishing the services
and institutions that will significantly raise the standard of living
for all Iraqis. In fact, the standard of living has already shown signs
of improvement. Shops are full of consumer goods that were unavailable
last year, and with household income growing and inflation at
reasonable levels for a post-conflict economy, many Iraqis are
beginning to see an improvement in their lives. We estimate that per
capita household income will likely double this year over last year's
figure. In the financial sector, the currency swap was viewed as a
resounding success. Based on the surprisingly stable value of the dinar
this year, we believe Iraq is now poised to begin needed reforms to the
financial system. Electricity production, while still below summer
requirements, is available throughout most of the country, while under
the former regime it mostly went to Baghdad and the central region. The
recent build-up of stockpiles in gasoline and some other refined
petroleum products is encouraging.
Without doubt, the interim government faces critical economic
challenges. The country's infrastructure has been devastated by the
catastrophic policies of the former regime. Persistent unemployment is
in the range of 10 to 30 percent or more. The interim government has
determined that the top economic priority is job creation, and our
review of U.S. assistance is strongly focused on how to maximize
employment opportunities for Iraqis. We have also been consulting
actively with our coalition partners as we consider new ways to speed
assistance to the Iraqi people through new projects and better
coordination. We look forward to the time when the UN, the World Bank
and other donors can begin working directly inside Iraq.
The interim government has also been working with other governments
to reclaim Iraq's place in the international community. It has begun to
establish formal diplomatic and economic relations with countries
throughout the world. The new government has taken steps to assure the
world that its goals are clearly different from those of Saddam. For
example, the government has declared that Iraq will be a country free
of both weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery.
In response, the international community is increasingly embracing
the new Iraq. The United Nations Security Council recognized the
transfer of authority to the interim government by unanimously passing
Resolution 1546. We are pleased with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's
July 12 appointment of Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Ashraf
Jehangir Qazi as his new Special Representative of the Secretary
General for Iraq. We hope Ambassador Qazi, who has also ably
represented Pakistan at the UN, will expeditiously move to reestablish
the UN's presence in Iraq. We and the interim government are working
hard with friends and allies to facilitate the creation of the UN
security force called for in Security Council Resolution 1546. The UN
has much to offer as Iraq gears up for the National Conference and
elections by next January. Indeed, Carina Perelli, the Head of the UN
Electoral Assistance Mission to Iraq, and her team, among others, are
already offering their immense expertise on the elections process. A UN
team is already on the ground in Baghdad to assist with the National
Conference next week. U.S. and international NGOs, many on the ground
now for months, are also stepping up their assistance to support Iraq's
emerging political process. We have pledged our full support for all of
these efforts and those of the Iraqis to move deliberately and steadily
down the road of democracy.
To manage vital U.S. interests in Iraq, we have stood up the U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad and formalized the development of four regional
offices. To ensure we were ``right-sized,'' we reviewed our goals in
Iraq and then aligned our mission planning with them. Based on that
review, in the near term, we will have approximately 1,000 Americans
under the authority of Ambassador Negroponte. I can assure you that
every one of them will be very busy. The Embassy has traditional
sections such as political, economic, consular, and management, but
also contains temporary organizations, liaison officers to Iraqi
ministries, and other government agencies. IRMO will be one of the
temporary organizations and have responsibility for assisting the
Ambassador to set reconstruction policy. IRMO will also provide
consultants to Iraqi ministries. About 140 people from the Department
of State will be assigned to Embassy Baghdad. There will be
approximately 50 State Department and IRMO staff at the regional
offices and in teams embedded in military commands.
This is just one example of the partnership between the Departments
of State and Defense in Iraq. We understand that such cooperation is
vital to our success in Iraq, as it is around the world. The
departments planned jointly for the organization of U.S. activities in
Iraq following the assumption of sovereignty by the Interim Iraqi
Government, recognizing the fact that our roles, missions, resources,
and responsibilities are complementary.
The ongoing security situation makes the closest partnership
between the U.S. military commander and the Chief of Mission (COM)
critical to our success. As is standard worldwide, the COM, under the
guidance of the Secretary of State, will have full responsibility for
the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG Executive
Branch employees in Iraq, except for those under the command of the
U.S. area military commander, and employees seconded to an
International Organization.
The COM and the MNF-I Commander General Casey are already
collaborating closely as the President has charged them to do.
Ambassador Negroponte made clear his commitment to do so during his
confirmation hearing before this committee. Effective integration of
all U.S. civilian and security operations will remain vital to success
in Iraq. The Department of State and Department of Defense have
completed Memoranda of Agreement or general administrative support and
security to help build our close cooperation.
These efforts underscore the commitment of the United States to
assist the Iraqi Government as it builds an independent, secure,
democratic, prosperous and united Iraq. We share the interest of Iraqis
in a better future for their country, because we know that a free and
democratic Iraq will mean a more secure United States. As President
Bush said recently: ``Democratic governments do not shelter terrorist
camps or attack their neighbors. When justice and democracy advance, so
does the hope of lasting peace.''
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to testify about
our progress in Iraq, and I look forward to answering any questions you
may have.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador
Schlicher, for that very comprehensive and reassuring
statement. We look forward to questioning you after we have
heard from our next witness, Mr. David Gompert. Would you
please proceed?
STATEMENT OF DAVID C. GOMPERT, DISTINGUISHED RESEARCH
PROFESSORS, CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY,
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Mr. Gompert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning to
the committee. I should state that while I spent over 6 months
in Iraq, I currently speak only for myself. I am not here to
speak for U.S. policy or attempt to defend U.S. policy. What
I'd like to do, if you would give me 5 or 10 minutes for it, is
to share with you my analysis of three aspects: first, the
current very difficult security situation and why we find
ourselves in this difficult security situation; second,
problems in dealing with that security situation that I think
are in most need of attention; and third, my analysis of the
prospects for the next 6 months or a year.
On the security environment today, which is undoubtedly in
my view more severe than it was when I arrived in Iraq about 7
months ago, I think one has to begin with the threat. The
threat today is much more sophisticated than it was when Saddam
Hussein was captured. The remnants of the Saddamist security
organizations are mostly hardened killers, experienced hardened
killers, but having been decapitated as an organization, they
have become more cellular and more networked and more embedded,
more dispersed, fluid, urban, and this is a very difficult
threat to defeat militarily without very strong public support.
Second, the international professional terrorist threat,
and I'm now talking about the really hard core pros, not all
the foreign fighters, but the professional terrorists. They've
had a year, over a year now, to plan, prepare, infiltrate,
organize in the country, network, bring in their own well-
developed weapons, in particular the suicide bomb, kidnaping,
and assassination techniques. They too, as we know not only
from Iraq but from other parts of the world, as they disperse,
as they network, as they move, are extremely difficult to
defeat militarily.
In fact, I would say that the current threat, this
particular combination, cannot be defeated militarily without
much stronger support from the Iraqi people than we experienced
certainly during my 7 months in Iraq. Why did we not receive
that public support? And I believe we did not receive it in
sufficient abundance and in sufficient timeliness to have made
a difference in dealing with these threats.
I would say there were two reasons. First, animosity toward
foreign control, there's no question about it. By the time I
got there in December, there was little hint of appreciation
for liberation and Iraqis throughout the country and at all
levels either expressed or strongly implied to me in our
encounters resentment over the fact that they were under
foreign occupation and foreign control, and therefore, they
were not about, the vast majority of them, to extend themselves
and risk themselves to turn in or turn on the Saddamist killers
and the foreign terrorists.
But the other factor has to do with the level of
disappointment and dissatisfaction throughout the Iraqi
populace with the state of their lives. Clearly, they felt they
were better off no longer being oppressed and they saw a
brighter future, there's no question about that. But I also
think, and it's not inconsistent with those observations, that
they were quite disappointed with the state of their lives and
the lack of progress in the quality of their lives in the year
following the war. I think they had excessive expectations
about what we were going to be able to do.
But I think the most important thing to realize is that we
as a country underestimated the problems of Iraq, the
difficulties of Iraq, perhaps because we were so focused on the
threat that it posed. We saw it as far more robust than it was.
This was a country, even though the regime itself was strong
and could have clung to power for some time through brutality,
the country itself was in a very advanced stage of
deterioration and rot. It was true of the physical
infrastructure, it was true of the human capital through
declining education and health services, it was true of the
bureaucracy which was incompetent, top-heavy, corrupt, hollow,
it was true of the state involvement in the economy, which
ruined just about everything that it touched, and through the
state-owned enterprises, and it was true of the security
apparatus, both the institutions and the forces themselves,
again top-heavy, ineffective, feared, but in an advanced stage
of rot in my view.
So we were involved not only in facing a massive
reconstruction, but really trying to build something
fundamentally new in the country as a whole, and our partners
were really unprepared for the immensity of that task. So we
got a slow start, the CPA well into its existence was trying to
get up to somewhere close to the full complement of people that
it needed. You've already talked about the slowness through, I
think, a business as usual attitude about RFPs and contracts
and the like; CPA was slow to deliver resources. And I also
think, with hindsight perhaps, not sufficiently attentive to
the importance of massive and urgent labor-intensive
reconstruction projects to soak up that unemployment.
So I do want to state for the record that this is despite
the heroic efforts of people like Ron Schlicher and the
Coalition Provisional Authority and the strong leadership of
Ambassador Bremer. We simply were not prepared for the enormity
of the reconstruction, and as a consequence, instead of
millions of Iraqis being employed in big housing and
infrastructure reconstruction projects, they were unemployed,
they were dissatisfied with the level of services, they did not
see the infrastructure improving, the education and access to
health were not improving. And who did they blame? They blamed
the foreign governing authority.
So we had the combination of our lack of legitimacy because
we were a foreign occupier and this dissatisfaction with the
quality of lives and the pace at which those were improving,
and those are not conditions in which we, CPA, or our military
could expect the kind of very brave and active and widespread
public support that is absolutely essential to defeat those
threats that I described.
Now, in this context, there were two particular problems. I
believe they are now being addressed more effectively than they
were during the period when I was in Iraq. Two particular
problems concerning--addressing the security difficulties. One
has to do with the Iraqi security forces and the other has to
do with intelligence.
With regard to the Iraqi security forces, during my tenure
we were in a constant tug-of-war between two different
concepts. One was to get as many Iraqi security forces, both
police and military, what was then called the ICDC, it is now
the National Guard, get as many as possible into the country,
into the cities, in support of our troops and providing
security on the streets of Iraq. That concept on the one hand,
and on the other hand a belief that we had to take the time and
make the investment to produce well-led, well-trained high
performance specialized forces that were capable of standing up
to the kinds of threats that we saw.
Had we resolved that contest between those two concepts, I
think we would have had much better Iraqi security forces by
the time of the April crisis than we did. By April, we had far
too few properly led, specialized, high performance, trained
security forces to make a difference, and of the forces that we
had many of, namely the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and the
police, they were definitely not up to the task.
I believe that this tension between numbers and quality is
being resolved and it's being resolved at a minimum by the
decisiveness of the current Iraqi Prime Minister by showing a
preference for high performance, quick reaction intervention
forces and counter-terrorism forces, which I think are
indicated by the threat.
The second problem that we experienced and our forces
experienced and Iraqi forces experienced was poor intelligence.
At the risk of appearing to pile on the intelligence community
these days, I have to say that in Iraq not only did we have the
failure at the strategic level, to understand prior to the war
just how seriously deteriorated Iraq had become, but also in
the piece that followed or in the security situation that
followed, I believe we were poor, we have been poor at getting
actionable intelligence quickly from those in a position to
acquire it into the hands of people who can do something about
it. This is to a large degree because we haven't had adequate
support from the Iraqi people. That's where the intelligence
has to originate.
But second, because we were operating in islands of
different intelligence communities, both within the coalition
and on the Iraqi side, we weren't really able to get actionable
intelligence, as I indicated, into the hands of Iraqi police,
Iraqi security forces, or our own coalition forces in time to
act on these very sophisticated, embedded, and always moving
threats. That too I believe is being improved with the Prime
Minister's decision to create an internal intelligence service,
which is, of course, sensitive given the abuses of the past.
But, this will bring the intelligence capabilities much closer
to the police and the security forces that require the
intelligence.
Now, it may surprise you that my outlook for the future is
actually upbeat, guardedly upbeat. And that's not because the
threat is going to disappear or be defeated soon. As I said,
this is a threat that can't be defeated by military means
alone. The violence will continue because the threat now is
using more sophisticated, deadlier weapons and methods. So we
have to expect that the threat is going to persist, both the
international professional terrorists and the remnants of the
Saddamist security organizations, and it will continue at least
through the election and no doubt beyond.
But it's important to recognize that these enemies are
actually not winning. They are not achieving their objectives.
When you look at it not measured by the level of violence,
however important that is, but instead, are the enemies of free
Iraq achieving their objectives, the answer is that they are
not. They have given their best shot, and despite that, we had
the interim constitution, we had the appointment of the Interim
Government, we had the transfer of authority, we have the
conference, we will have the elections, and these are the
battles that the enemy has failed to win despite its violence.
The aim of security looking forward is to protect that
political process in the belief that that political process
itself will produce sufficient legitimacy that the government
can count on the support of the people. So the stronger the
political process, the more difficult it will be for the
enemies to prevail, and in turn, what we need to do now, in
particular with Iraqi security forces supported by our own, is
to provide an environment in which they can't derail that
process.
I see positive developments taking place. I believe that
these careful emergency powers actions that are under
consideration by the Interim Government are very wise and they
will be done with great care, again, in view of Iraqi fears of
abuse. The emphasis on a domestic intervention force within the
Iraqi armed forces, high performance force is important,
emphasis on counter-terrorism capabilities, on quality rather
than numbers, the creation of the domestic intelligence
service--we still have to see the details--is important.
I also believe, as Ambassador Schlicher said, that the
apparent inclusiveness of the Iraqi Interim Government is
increasing its legitimacy even though it wasn't elected. Its
emphasis on job creation first and foremost in the
reconstruction process, these are all very positive.
I think just to close, Mr. Chairman, that what we need to
do is to deliver all the support they required. To take our
cues as to what the priorities are not from what we think, but
from what the Iraqi Government thinks. We may not agree with it
every time, but they have to take that responsibility. We
should respond to their priorities after they've received our
advice. We should keep our hands off the steering wheel, but we
should be very vigilant that the political process continues as
the Interim Government has pledged to do. I think it is
particularly important that these elections take place on time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Gompert. We
really appreciate the remarkable testimony from both our
witnesses. I want to start the questioning by indicating that
we'll have a first round with 10 minutes for each Senator. I'll
start the questioning by commenting, Ambassador Schlicher, you
have really spelled out the process, and I have not seen this
in this great detail before. I want to highlight that a
conference of 1,000 delegates is to meet in Baghdad this coming
week. Is that your testimony?
Ambassador Schlicher. Yes, sir. Our indications from Dr.
Fuad Masoum, who's the head of the preparatory committee of the
national conference is that at this point he certainly still
plans to convene the conference next week. There are huge
logistical challenges in doing that, but so far he's holding to
that timetable.
The Chairman. And enough preparatory action has gone on in
all the sectors that you described so that the thousand persons
who have come, if not perfectly representative of the country,
are at least representative of the different religious,
geographical groups, occupational groups, and all the rest? The
Iraqis looking at these 1,000 delegates might conceivably
identify them as a reasonably representative group?
Ambassador Schlicher. Yes, sir. That's certainly the
guiding impulse, and they are casting a very, very wide net. As
I have mentioned, the members of the preparatory committee are
seeking delegates from the provinces. The provinces are in the
process of selecting right now, members of women's groups,
members of NGOs, members of political parties, the former
members of the Iraqi Governing Council, and the guiding idea is
to seek maximum participation and buy-in in the new system.
The Chairman. Is there coverage of these selection or
appointment procedures in the local Iraqi press? If you were
out there in the countryside, would you have any idea who is
going to Baghdad on your behalf?
Ambassador Schlicher. I think certainly as the provincial
processes are underway this week, in many ways Iraq is a series
of small towns, even in huge cities like Baghdad, so I think
that particularly through this week's provincial process, the
word is going to get out. We certainly hope that that makes
excitement and anticipation bloom.
The Chairman. Now, it may also make a security problem
bloom.
Ambassador Schlicher. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What kind of security is going to be provided
for these 1,000 persons? This is a pretty large movement of
people in a country in which movements in some cases are
difficult, if not dangerous. So what is your feel for how this
is going to physically happen?
Ambassador Schlicher. I know the preparatory committee has
been in very, very active touch with the Interim Government,
and on some issues with the coalition forces and the embassy on
the logistics. It is a very huge challenge, but I know that
they're actively engaged in everything from hotel rooms to
passes to convoys, et cetera, et cetera. So a very intense
effort is underway, and of course, a part of that planning
effort is trying to stave off the predictable sorts of security
incidents that might accompany the conference.
The Chairman. Just to pick up Mr. Gompert's point, our
major mission is to provide security for this democratic
process. This is a big step up at this point, and a lot of
people are involved, well beyond the interim group of cabinet
ministers and what-have-you.
We'll know at least next week whether they got there. We
will see who arrives and how well-received they are at that
point. But you go on to point out that this group is going to
then appoint 100 people from the 1,000 to form this interim
National Council. It has real power. By a two-thirds majority
it can overrule Prime Minister Allawi, for example. We've
talked elsewhere about Allawi's emergency orders and decrees
and so forth. I gather from what you were saying that it's
contemplated that after these 100 advisors get appointed, they
meet somewhere and they are monitoring the cabinet officials,
including the Prime Minister and the President of the country.
Is that your view?
Ambassador Schlicher. Yes, sir. Their powers are spelled
out in the annex to the Transitional Administrative Law that
was promulgated shortly before the demise of the CPA.
The Chairman. And has that been accepted by all the parties
involved now, or is it going to be debated as to whether that
still prevails?
Ambassador Schlicher. At this point, it's still regarded as
the law of the land. Whether a body once constituted will
continue to think that, we believe so, but who knows? Democracy
can be very unpredictable.
I would note that this interim council that's being stood
up, it has powers that fall short of those of a legislature,
with the thought being that full legislative powers should, of
course, await an elected parliament. But it does have very
important powers like the right of veto. It has the right to
interpolate the ministers of the government. It has the right
to review the 2005 Iraqi budget, and it has the right to fill
any vacancies that might arise in the Presidency, that is, the
President or the two Vice Presidents. So those are serious
sorts of powers, which are intended, I think, to show Iraqis
that a serious process is beginning and underway, and to make
interest more keen, to whet interest in that electoral process
that's coming down the pike.
Sir, I would note that the security arrangements that are
being made for the international conference are an important
subset of more general security arrangements that are taking
place. There's very strong security arrangements in place, of
course, for the Interim Government, for the Iraqi election
commissioners who are charged with the important task of
preparing for the elections, for these folks. And, of course,
when they choose the council, the council will have its own
arrangements as well, so security is a very intensely worked
issue.
The Chairman. Well, indeed it will be. As both of you have
pointed out, the security issue is important in order to
protect these officials so they can proceed, as well as to
protect all of these registration efforts. This vigorous
attempt to find as many as 30,000 polling places or 150,000
election workers will be a prodigious feat. I understand it is
still the plan. Is that true as far as you can tell?
Ambassador Schlicher. Yes, sir. And the U.N. has certain
sorts of estimates and time lines that it's made along these
lines. It certainly is very ambitious, and as someone who
anticipates working intensely on it for the next 6 months, I
see a lot of work, but we've already begun that work. We've
sent teams here from Washington, from State, and from the Joint
Chiefs, to have a preliminary look at what the U.N. thinks its
security requirements are going to be on the State side of the
House. We've also talked to them about what those training
requirements are going to be, and in fact, we intend to engage
the election team again in New York next week, because we want
to be as well prepared as we can to meet these huge challenges.
The Chairman. Mr. Gompert pointed out that the Iraqi people
were unhappy with the occupying power. Likewise they are
unhappy with unemployment, with the lack of promise that came
there. It appears to me that the delivery of the services and
the contracts and what have you we have involved is still
tediously slow. The explanations are that, after all, we have
laws in our country, we have contracts, we have procedures. I
think we all understand that. Congress has provided a lot of
the hurdles there.
But at the same time, the impelling need for jobs, for
orientation of this money in these same localities that are now
sending these representatives to Baghdad, is just of the
essence. think that's apparent to you. The question is,
physically, how are we going to move it along so that we have
some benefit? The Congress had the debate. We passed the $18.4
billion. But the fact is, not a whole lot has happened.
Disappointingly little. Despite the obligations, the
performance is very, very minimal.
Now, I would just say simply that this is a part of our
task in support of this situation. It seems to me that the
Prime Minister has a security problem. He's trying to hire
people to combat the vicious killers that you both have
described accurately. They're still out there. Although the war
may be going well for them, it isn't over and won't be. All the
way through this refined democratic process, we have people
being killed, shot all the time.
In the meanwhile, if there is not some delivery by Allawi
or President Yawer or what-have-you in terms of more economic
prosperity, they have the same problem we have as political
people in our country. It's a jobs issues, it's an economy
issue, quite apart from the esoterica of democracy.
I simply make these points in passing because I appreciate
your outlining very specifically what the blueprint is. I
appreciate Mr. Gompert's realism as to what our experience was
through failure, failure on our part, on our intelligence
community's part, the administration's part, to have very
little understanding of what Iraq was really like at that
point. We all know a whole lot more now, and so we better get
it right this time through.
It appears to me that there's a good blueprint. We've been
surprisingly lucky, I think, with the leadership, arising as it
did with Allawi and Yawer and others. They have miraculously
stayed alive, and I say that advisedly, in a very tough
business, which both of you have been involved in day by day.
We very much appreciate this chance to review things at this
point, for our benefit and our colleagues, and likewise for the
American people.
I recognize my colleague now, Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you, gentlemen, thank
you for appearing before us this morning. I'd like to move
along the same lines that the chairman has just addressed. I
noted in your testimony, Ambassador Schlicher, you use the
numbers of $8.3 billion has been obligated, $21 billion, 2003,
2004, that was appropriated. I want to address that in a
moment, but part of the question I'm going to ask is to
reconcile your numbers with a sheet I have here from the
Defense Department update on how much money has been spent and
obligated. And according to this, as of July 13, from the
Defense Department, $458 million has been spent of the $18.4
billion, and they claim that about $6 billion has been
obligated.
So there is discrepancy in these numbers and yours which I
want you to address and explain why that is. To the point,
there's a story in the Los Angeles Times today, which you've
probably seen, and the headline is, ``State Department
Criticizes Focus of Iraq Effort.'' The agency which has taken
the reins on the reconstruction program in Iraq says money
needs to shift from big projects to job creation, what the
chairman was just talking to you about. ``The Pentagon's $18.4
billion Iraqi reconstruction plan puts too much emphasis on big
ticket construction projects and not enough on creating jobs
for the regular Iraqis, State Department officials who have
taken control of the program have concluded.''
Then it goes on and develops about reprogramming money,
because as you know it's earmarked for certain programs. So
within the context of that entire universe, sort all this out
for us. Are we making progress? And reconcile those numbers for
me as well.
Ambassador Schlicher. Yes, sir. Let me give it a stab,
please. The information that I have before me is that in fiscal
2003 money, that of the $2.5 billion of 2003 money, $2.4
billion has been obligated and $1.4 billion disbursed. For
fiscal 2004, of the $18.4, my information is that $6 billion
has been obligated, and at this point, $500 million disbursed.
Those add up to the $18.4 out of the total of $21. So I'm not
sure which date, sir, these are, the DOD numbers you have are
July 13, so I hope that helps answer the question. But if it
doesn't, I'll certainly get you an answer.
Senator Hagel. All right. Well, let's not quibble over a
billion or two here and there, but let's stay focused on what's
been spent. Why out of $18.4--so let's deal with that universe,
the $18.4 billion--why in your opinion has--let's say a half a
billion, I'll add a few tens of millions to it that's already
been spent--according to these numbers from the Defense
Department of July 13, $458 million has been spent from the
total $18.4 billion. And the other part of that is, did we make
a mistake on so-called big ticket items, not trying to get the
money down to the job? And I'm going to want Mr. Gompert to
respond to this too because he was there. He obviously alluded
to some of this in his testimony.
Ambassador Schlicher. Well, sir, you yourself and the
chairman have alluded to some of the reasons that have been
advanced as rationales for why the money hasn't moved quickly
enough, which is a judgment that all of us certainly share, and
that's in fact the impetus behind Ambassador Negroponte and the
new team's review. And part of that review, of course, as I
mentioned to the chairman, is going to be how can we speed up
the actual delivery of assistance, and how can we maximize the
creation of jobs, both of which are in our interest?
As far as major construction projects go----
Senator Hagel. Excuse me. Can you stop for a moment and
address your question? That's the question I'm addressing to
you. How can we do that? How are we going to do that? What
plans are in place to do that? We know the problem, we know the
challenge, we know what we didn't do. Now how are we going to
fix it?
Ambassador Schlicher. Well, sir, I hope that I can answer
you in detail when I know what the results of the review are
going to be. But I think that one thing that needs to happen in
that regard is that we need to find out what are the projects
that we can put on board immediately that have no unnecessary
lead time and jobs that can create--or projects that can create
Iraqi jobs immediately.
I personally have some experience in the field in Iraq with
the CERP program, which was flexible enough to give local
commanders and local officials the ability to treat local
problems very quickly. So I hope that we will come up with some
new projects that cut out all of the middle steps that have to
be undertaken if projects are large and infrastructure-related.
I hope that we will be able to find ways to give Iraqi
contractors contracts more speedily and directly as well, and
see if that can cut down some of the lead time.
But, sir, I also don't want to prejudge what the review is
going to be out there, because I'm not part of it.
Senator Hagel. Well, Ambassador Schlicher, you can
understand some frustration here, and quite honestly, some
significant concern when I hear you say three times in the last
20 seconds, well, I hope, I hope we'll find an answer, I hope
we'll be able to come up with a program, I hope. Then you
continue to ask more questions, well, what, how, review. That
doesn't instill a great amount of confidence in what we're
doing over there.
And I know you don't have all the answers. I know it's not
all your responsibility. But surely in preparation for this
hearing this morning, someone would have, I would assume, have
given you something to tell us as to how we're going to fix
this problem.
Now, what Mr. Gompert has told us, and we heard from other
people who had been there, there are stories out in papers this
morning on all this, as there are daily, on how we are failing
and how we are losing the people, and so we know what the issue
is, security, obviously all the pieces are critical here, but
we know what we must do. And to have you say, well, I hope
we'll find a way, I hope we'll get at it, I hope the review
will show something, that's not good enough.
Mr. Gompert, would you respond to some of this?
Mr. Gompert. Yes, Senator Hagel. There is one measure that
I think deserves a great deal of attention, and that is job
training and job placement. I'm confident that jobs will be
created as we inject these resources, and as the Iraqis
themselves have the revenues from oil, there will be ample
resources injected into that economy to get jobs going. I
happen to think, though it's not my field and it wasn't my
responsibility, that construction, housing construction,
infrastructure construction, attacked in a really strategic way
would have required, demanded jobs and soaked up a lot of that
unemployment.
But as of now, I would say, as the requirement for jobs
will begin to grow, it is very important that we link supply
and demand, and that is actually not a big ticket item. Job
training and job placement actually is done not for billions
but for tens of millions or hundreds of millions on a
nationwide scale. I think that job training and job placement
program was slow to get started, as were so many other things,
for the reasons I've indicated. It needs resources, it needs
energy, and it needs focus, particularly in those areas of
unemployment that we know feed directly into the security
problem, namely ex-militia and ex-army.
And before I left, I was involved in setting up a veterans
administration, the principal purpose of which is not just to
send out pensions, but to get these veterans, hundreds and
hundreds of thousands of veterans otherwise staying home in
anger, get them trained and get them targeted toward the jobs
that I believe will be created. So I would invite the committee
to direct attention to this relatively small item in the
budget, but huge leverage item.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Before my time runs out, I want
to stay with you, Mr. Gompert, on comments that you made
initially here in the last few minutes, and you opened with an
analysis of where you think we are today, the difficulty ahead,
terrorism, what's happened as we have seen terrorism break up,
as you noted, I think, these cellular units, in a much more
dangerous, I think those were your words, way than we have
previously anticipated or seen.
Would you take that down a little further? Are we talking
about a decentralization of these terrorist networks and then
they use our involvement in Iraq, our presence in Iraq, as
training grounds, as focuses, as recruiting tools? Expand on
what your point was in the opening comments. Thank you.
Mr. Gompert. I don't think Iraq is just an opportunity for
the international terrorists. I think it's a big challenge. I
think it is very important for these groups to derail the
political process and to prevent the emergence of a free,
pluralistic, and democratic Iraq. So they're not there just
because our troops happen to be there. They're not there simply
to defeat our troops or to kill our troops or to cause us to
leave, which I think by now they know they can't do. They are
there to prevent the political process from continuing and they
are absolutely committed to that.
This makes the next 6 months especially critical and
dangerous, because as the chairman has pointed out, and
Ambassador Schlicher has pointed out, we have critical
political developments coming up, the conference, the creation
of the council, the run-up to the elections. These are the
targets of these terrorists and the remnants of the Saddamist
organizations. These are the targets, and they will resort to
very significant violence, and we should be prepared for it.
We told the Iraqis time and time again, the violence will
occur, we know this about terrorism. And we now know it about
terrorism in Iraq. So as we face these--the various steps in
this political process over the next 6 months and beyond, we
should brace ourselves for the violence that will occur, and we
should support the Prime Minister above all, who means to move
forward despite these threats and despite the violence that
will occur. So continuing down that road in the face of that
violence, I believe is the key to building the legitimacy, to
creating the public support, to putting together a strategy
that will defeat these terrorists and the insurgents. I hope
that's responsive.
Senator Hagel. Well, it is, and it's helpful and I
appreciate that. And I would go back to something that you
emphasized, Mr. Gompert, as well as Ambassador Schlicher, and I
think it is the key, it's the essence, and it's what we're
talking about here this morning, whether it's economic
development, it's jobs, it's quality of life, and that is the
people. If we lose the people, we lose. As you said, Mr.
Gompert, this is not going to be won through military
involvement, and if we lose the people, we lose. We've learned
that throughout history.
So I appreciate your focus on that, each of you, what
you're doing and your colleagues. Thank you. Mr. Chairman,
thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome,
gentlemen. Just following up on what Senator Hagel said, if we
lose the people, as Mr. Gompert said, lose the support of the
Iraqi people, certainly as Senator Hagel said, through history,
whether it's our own experience recently in Vietnam or the
Soviets' experience in Afghanistan, we're in trouble.
And I was there in October and I was surprised how freely
we could move about in Baghdad and Mosul. Mr. Gompert, you
went, I believe, in December for 6 months, just got back. Do I
have that right? And certainly the trend is against us. We now
have tried to go back to Iraq in May, was not allowed for
security reasons, and those that have been recently just go
right to the green zone, so obviously the trend is not with us,
and that all goes back to losing the support of the Iraqi
people. They're turning against us.
And that's my question. Certainly when I was there in
October, the violence was from a minority of the people. If
we're losing the support of the Iraqi people, I'll ask Mr.
Gompert, are they turning violent, just the Iraqi people
against us?
Mr. Gompert. That's not the way I would diagnose it,
Senator. The problem is that in order to defeat very
sophisticated but relatively small threats of the sort that
we're facing, not a broad-based insurgency, not at all, but the
threats are so sophisticated and so embedded that it requires
not just a sympathetic public, sympathetic to the Iraqi
Government and to us, but a very active and courageous one
willing to take steps, such steps as reporting on insurgent and
terrorist presence, turning against very dangerous people,
withholding cooperation despite threats, in turn cooperating
with the police and with the Iraqi army and with our security
forces.
So we're actually asking a lot more of the Iraqi people,
particularly in the Sunni heartland, than we can expect, unless
they see a legitimate government, unless they see the quality
of their lives improving, and I believe that's been the problem
to date. But I do not see in this deteriorating security
situation a more expansive, extensive insurgency. I see some
increase in indigenous terrorism. As the international
professional terrorists became embedded, they brought, they
recruited, they proselytized, they brought their methods and so
on. But talking about the threat becoming more sophisticated I
think is really the way to think about it rather than it
becoming more extensive. I hope that's helpful.
Senator Chafee. Yes, thank you. And as we look ahead, you
said the next 6 months are critical, and if we're not
successful at the end of this 6-month period, then what?
Mr. Gompert. Well, I think that situation could get worse.
If the insurgents and the terrorists manage to defeat this
political process by derailing the important upcoming steps in
that process, then you could have a larger political problem
and a larger security problem, because the sects and the
ethnicities of Iraq have agreed on a federal structure, they've
agreed on a bill of rights, they've agreed to work together,
they've agreed on the kind of institutions and the political
calendar. So there is broad agreement on the way forward, but
if the insurgents and the terrorists are able to disrupt that
way forward and derail it, then those fundamental agreements
could begin to be in danger, agreement on federalism, for
example, agreement on institutions that enables the majority
Shia and the two minorities to envision a pluralistic system in
which they could work together.
Those basic understandings and deals that were done over
the last year and were done in the transfer of authority to the
Interim Government, they could begin to get shaky.
Senator Chafee. Do you think it's worth it to, if we know
through the democratic process and elections being called, that
even if a fierce adversary, an al-Sadr or someone were going to
be elected, to stick to it?
Mr. Gompert. First of all, I think that it is right for the
Interim Government to be as inclusive as possible. I think the
advantages of being inclusive--I'll answer your question if I
may just in this way--by being inclusive and by letting
democracy absorb as much of the hopes and fears and differences
and difficulties of the society as a whole, it really does
isolate the extremists who are against the system.
So I do believe that the Prime Minister's effort to be
inclusive are important. I think that same principle should
apply to the election process, that rather than attempting or
encouraging the Interim Government to attempt to exclude or in
some way condition the electoral process so that it would be
impossible for more radical elements to be elected, I think at
this particular stage, legitimacy demands inclusiveness, and
that means taking some risks that the election will produce
victors who we may not like.
The alternative, that is to attempt now to engineer it so
that that can't happen I think would ruin the opportunity that
exists for the creation of broad-based legitimacy, which I
think is key to security.
Senator Chafee. Well, thank you very much. Ambassador
Schlicher--Ambassador, is that right?
Ambassador Schlicher. Ron is best.
Senator Chafee. You certainly have----
Ambassador Schlicher. Thank you, sir.
Senator Chafee. What country?
Ambassador Schlicher. I wish I got to pick.
Senator Chafee. But you have a lot of experience in the
region, Tunisia, Jerusalem, you were involved in the Egyptian-
North African affairs, you were a consular officer in Damascus,
in Beirut, so you have a lot of experience in the region. Can
you talk regionally about what's happened and how what we're
doing regionally is important to our success in Iraq?
Ambassador Schlicher. Yes, sir. And one important thing
that's been happening regionally lately is the efforts of
Allawi and his government himself, which of course we and the
international community are supporting, to integrate the new
government more completely in the region. This was helped
greatly, of course, by the early passage of 1546. But also, the
Allawi government has moved smartly and set as its first
diplomatic priority establishing the best possible relations
with the other countries.
The Arab League has been very helpful in this regard. The
Egyptians have been very helpful in this regard. The
Organization of the Islamic Conference had a summit in Istanbul
shortly after the Interim Government took over, and they
welcomed the new government, they helped establish its
acceptance and legitimacy in the Islamic world. And there have
been a series of six meetings of the neighboring countries of
Iraq, most recently one this week in Cairo attended by Foreign
Minister Zebari, so that's been a high priority of theirs.
Diplomatically, we, of course, have had an intense series
of consultations with all different countries in the region
about particular ways that they could help in the process of
getting the Interim Government off to the right start. And I
think that Allawi is pleased with his progress so far, we're
pleased generally speaking with the diplomatic reactions of the
neighboring states.
There are, of course, neighboring states there that present
particular challenges and difficulties, especially with regard
to border security. I would note that the Iraqis have been
actively pursuing diplomatic means of addressing that as well.
Recently, Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh made a visit to
Damascus to discuss this issue, Minister of State Adnan al-
Janabi was in Damascus last weekend. This subject and frozen
Iraqi assets were on the agenda. And Prime Minister Allawi is
in the process of doing a regional tour right now, and he will
be in Damascus on Friday. So we hope and we expect that with
continued pressure we are going to solve a lot of the problems
that still exist on border security. Briefly, sir, I hope that
helps.
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you. Gentlemen, I wasn't absent for
lack of interest. The Judiciary Committee has a very important
bill on DNA testing that I'm an author of and I had to be in
that committee, and I apologize.
Mr. Gompert, you succeeded in Iraq--I know you're no longer
in the government--one of the most competent guys that I know
in government, Walt Slocombe. And I want to lay out for you,
and we only have a few minutes, I know, we're going to vote
shortly, but in my 10 minutes, I'm going to lay out a thesis
and I'd like you to respond to it, tell me where you think it's
right, wrong. And Ron?
Ambassador Schlicher. Yes, sir?
Senator Biden. You can call me Joe if you want to. You jump
in on this one. But it relates to the security situation, the
prospects of it getting better. I think, Mr. Gompert, you made
it real clear, and I think you're dead right, that ultimately
what is needed here for there to be anything beginning to
approach success is the active and courageous cooperation of
the Iraqi people.
Now, those of us who do foreign policy as a major part of
our occupation, we like to make things sounds really
complicated all the time to people. I don't think we
intentionally do that, but we tend to do that. And it seems to
me, I've spent a lot of my professional life dealing with
foreign policy issues, but equally as much dealing with
criminal justice issues, the mob here in the United States of
America, the drug cartels, and I can either take the blame or
occasionally some of the credit for the major pieces of anti-
crime legislation we've written.
The reason I mention this is as follows. It seems to me the
situation, whether it's Samara, whether it's Baghdad, whether
it's Basra, Mosul, wherever it is, is the same exact thing that
exists in any large city in the United States of America
dealing with a major drug cartel, the mob, and/or a crime wave.
I've spent hundreds and hundreds of hours in my career in
hearings with your counterparts who are experts in criminology
and the criminal justice system, the psychology of what makes
people cooperate with authorities.
And there's one basic bottom-line rule, and I posit there
is not a single difference between someone, in Baghdad, and
someone living in West Philly, if they believe they can't walk
outside their house without fear of something very bad
happening to them. If they believe that if they cooperate with
the authorities to deal with the bad guys who own their
neighborhood, they in fact will not cooperate. As a matter of
fact, they will, by their acquiescence, cooperate with the bad
guys.
So we went through this whole thing on a crime bill, and I
know the foreign policy experts out there are saying, well,
what are we talking about domestic policy for here? Iraq is big
time stuff. But it's the same exact thing in my view. And we
don't seem to get it, and with all due respect, Walt didn't
seem to get it and I don't think that Bremer got it, and I'm
not sure we have it yet. And it's this: that there has to be a
credible--not certainty--but a credible prospect that if in
fact someone in the neighborhood turns in the drug dealer on
the corner to the cop once the drug dealer makes bail, he's not
going to come down and burn down their house and literally
eliminate them, which for those of you that do only foreign
policy, happens every day in every city of the United States of
America where there is a major drug problem.
So what we found out is you have to flood the zone with
forces and you have to flood the zone with cops, and you have
to flood the zone with cops who get to know the people on the
block. That's what community policing is all about. Now, I'm
not suggesting we have community policing overnight in Iraq,
but here's my thesis. The reason why I don't have any real hope
at the moment is we have no genuine training program underway
in Iraq. We have a training program for cops and it's getting
better, and we have a training program for the military, but
there is no realistic prospect. There is no reasonable prospect
that we are going to have a credible force available, trained
Iraqis, for months and months, I would argue for at least a
year.
So my thesis goes on in that I believe that somehow we've
got to convince people that the government is legitimate. The
government's legitimacy relates as much to security that
government can provide as it does to projects it can deliver,
and the projects it can deliver relates to the security. The
only real projects we're getting done are the ones that are
being done in Sadr City and the 1st Cavalry is doing them.
There's others, don't get me wrong, but they're usually
military-related. They're usually--there are notable
exceptions--but in the most difficult areas of Iraq, where the
projects that are changing attitudes and will change attitudes
are actually coming to fruition, is where there is U.S.
military around, available, and/or doing it. .
So, here's my question. I think you're the first person to
testify before us to state what is obvious, there is no shot of
this working without the active cooperation and courage of
average Iraqis. Samara today, news account, the town is empty
now, 300,000 people, several tribes in there, are fleeing, one
of them vowing revenge for the wedding killings, whether it was
a wedding or whether it was whatever, but vowing that anyone
who cooperates with not only us, but even with the new
government, could be targets.
So what is it we do now? Or how long will it take to level
with the American people? How long is it going to take before
we're in a position or the government's in a position to be
able to provide to a neighborhood in any town in the triangle,
stick there for a moment, the probability that if they
cooperate, they will be safe? Because in my experience in the
total of three trips I've made to Iraq in the last year and a
half, two since the war, they believe that the Iraqi people
signing up to be cops and signing up to be military are good
people, they'd much rather them be them than us. But they don't
believe they possess the capacity at this point or even the
capability at this point.
So what is it that we do? What is it we do in concrete
terms and what timeframe, and I know you don't have exact
timeframes, but as a very informed guy, what do you think the
timeframes are we're talking about? Mohammed walks out his door
and he knows that there's an al-Qaeda cell across the street or
he knows that there is in fact part of an insurgency that's
planning an attack and he sees them backing up a pick-up truck
with 17 rocket launchers because we didn't confiscate them,
because we didn't have the troops there to be able to take care
of the ammunition dumps, and he sees them backing them into the
garage, or backing them into the backyard and burying them.
What does it take? What do we have to do to get to the point
that there's some probability other than him being a totally
courageous, democratic patriot, that he's going to get on his
motor scooter, his bicycle, his car, or his cell phone, and
contact somebody, and say, by the way, across the street?
What's it going to take and what's the timeframe? Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gompert. I agree with your analysis of the nub of the
problem. That's a very good way of depicting it. It will take
large numbers of police who are much better led and much better
trained than the average Iraqi police even today. But it will
also take high performance military forces to be able to move
in if the police can't handle it, or in fact to get the police
in in the first place, because in some of these cities the
police aren't even there.
Now, just a quick word on how we got here and then the next
6 months. We had 80,000 police, mostly re-treads from an old
police organization that was ineffective, incompetent, not
dreaded as much as just ridiculed, and instead of changing that
out as quickly as we could with large flows of highly trained
and well-led new police, we tried to upgrade it in place. And
that didn't work because the police, not only with their day-
to-day corruption, but also in April when we had the crisis,
they collapsed. All those who faced violence, or many of them,
ran or went to the other side.
So one thing we can do and must do is place the priority
squarely on quality of police and end this debate over what's
more important, having lots of policemen or having well-led,
proper policemen who can address exactly the problem that you
identified.
Senator Biden. I absolutely, positively agree with you.
Mr. Gompert. The second problem we have, and this is
peculiar, if not unique to Iraq, is that in some of these
cities, the security situation is so bad and the fighters, some
foreign fighters, most of them from the old Saddam security
organizations, so numerous, so professional that the police
either can't get in or won't stay in or can't stand up to them,
even if those police are well-trained and well-led.
And for that, all we've had so far is the U.S. Army and the
U.S. Marines, and when it's really bad, as it was in Fallujah,
you bring in the Marines, who of all of our forces are probably
the best at urban warfare, and you saw the results and you saw
what we had to do as a consequence, so what you don't want to
do is end up in urban warfare because the police are
inadequate. You don't want our forces in urban warfare and you
don't--and so far we haven't had any Iraqi military forces that
can move in to that environment. So the second part of the
problem is placing equally sharp focus and high priority on
what I'd call the well-led, specialized, high performance,
quick response Iraqi army forces----
Senator Biden. I agree.
Mr. Gompert [continuing]. Who can then come in to support
those well-led, well-trained policemen. How long will it take
before it all comes together? Six months at a minimum.
Senator Biden. I really appreciate your candor. I
absolutely agree with you. I'm not being solicitous. I agree
exactly with what you said. I am just baffled why it is not
self-evident to the administration.
Now, I just got back from visiting along with two of my
colleagues--just, now it's a month--the training center in
Jordan. Our trainers, our U.S. person in charge of all the
training, the Canadian who's No. 2, a really tough mounted
policeman from Canada, and the head of the Jordanian police
force said, this is not worth it, this is not anything. Eight
weeks of training, don't know what happens to them, no vetting
before they come.
So I think unless we get there, unless we make this the
greatest priority, I don't know how--I really--I'm an
optimistic guy, but my optimism fades very rapidly, and I don't
get a sense, Mr. Secretary, I don't get a sense from my
friends, our friends at Defense, our friends in the White
House, that this is viewed as honestly and as urgently as I
think it should be, and based on what you say, maybe you think
it is. But maybe you have something really good to tell me to
make me feel better as we go vote, but I don't get a sense it's
there yet.
We had an opportunity to push very hard on our European
friends 10 months ago on this. We had an opportunity to press
hard again now. Again, I just don't see it happening, and now I
see the Europeans backing away, being irresponsible in my view,
not stepping up to the ball when they should. They have all
reasons to say why it's our fault and why they shouldn't, but
they got to get over it. Even if every bit of it's true, they
got to get over it, they got to get over it.
I thank you for you candor, and Ron, if you have anything
you want to say, fine. I think I'm well out of my time.
Ambassador Schlicher. Yes, sir. As somebody who's spent
most of his career actually watching street politics in the
Arab world and trying to figure out what that meant in policy
terms, I agree with you completely. The success of the
enterprise is going to depend on what the average Iraqi thinks
is his situation. I also agree with Dave's remarks on the need
for high quality training of the police.
I hope as we move forward with NATO participation and
training of police forces there that there will be additional
opportunities. We have to keep doing what we've been doing in
the training programs, but do it better and in a more focused
way.
Another part of the equation, if you're the Iraqi, that
average Iraqi, is going to be what is your government doing
about it. And I think in that regard that the steps that Prime
Minister Allawi has undertaken on security have been welcomed
by his people. There are several examples of a new
assertiveness in local Iraqi forces going in and trying to
clean up things. You may have read about a big sweep last week
of criminals. There was another one this week. The reportage
from Baghdad is that that's been very well received, so I hope
that as Allawi's security strategy succeeds, it will take care
of part of the very fundamental problem, sir, that you've
identified.
Senator Biden. If I can use a football analogy, this is
blocking and tackling. I'd go out and I'd try to get one squad,
a second squad, a third squad, place them in one city, I mean,
just build the blocks here, because I think, David, you're
right, it's got to be serious people who can shoot straight,
who are as well equipped.
If I can end with a little story just so you know it just
doesn't happen there. When in the middle of the crime bill, we
were trying to pass it, I got picked up by the fourth ranking
member of the Chicago Police Department. I'm riding along, he
has a captain in the car with him. I'm saying, what's it like
out here? It was about how outgunned our police are. And he
said, well, let me give you an example, Senator. He said,
captain, tell him. The captain's driving the car taking me to
this event. And he said, well, last night I was coming home, I
had my colleague with me, then he went through this thing, and
he said, I got a call there was a major drug deal apparently
going down on one of the piers in Lake Michigan, so we drove
in, got into this alley, came through, opened up, got out of
our cars in the usual form like Starsky and Hutch, the doors
open, the cops get out.
He said, literally, this is a true story, all of a sudden,
he said, everybody freeze, we shined the lights on them, they
popped open their trunk, took out high-caliber weapons that
could literally blow our car away. We said, no problem, got in
the car and we backed out. You got to have the same firepower.
You got to have the same capability.
[The opening statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Opening Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, today marks the first hearing of this committee since
two important transfers occurred. The first was the transfer of
sovereignty on June 28. The second was the transfer of the lead role
within our own government from the Defense Department to the State
Department. I hope this fresh start will increase the prospects for
success in Iraq.
While the State Department is now in the lead, the Defense
Department still plays a critical role in managing the 140,000 American
troops in Iraq and in training Iraq's security services.
Thus, I am disappointed that the Defense Department did not respond
to your invitation to provide a witness. The American people don't
expect the different branches of government to march in lockstep, but
they do expect us to work together on the challenges of the day.
Mr. Chairman, the administration must start leveling with the
American people about what is happening in Iraq.
This committee has heard its fill of rosy scenarios. Today, I hope
we will hear a dose of reality. We expect to hear the hard truth, not
just the good news--and I am glad there is some good news--but the
whole picture.
You have an obligation to tell it to us straight and the American
people have a right to hear it.
If the American people believe they have been misled, then their
support for what will be an enormous, dangerous, costly, and lengthy
American presence in Iraq will continue to erode.
Let's be clear about what is happening in Iraq. We have handed over
sovereignty. But we have not handed over capacity--that is, the ability
for the Iraqi Government to do the things that people everywhere expect
of a government--to provide law and order, to supply electricity and
clean water, and to set the foundation for an economy that creates
jobs.
The Iraqi people desperately want their Interim Government to
succeed. But if it cannot deliver, their patience will disappear, and
U.S. troops will bear the brunt of their anger. I know that Prime
Minister Allawi is aware of the urgency of the situation.
The central question is this: what can we do to help Iraq stand on
its own?
This must not be solely a U.S. responsibility. The international
community, through a unanimous vote of the U.N. Security Council, made
clear that Iraq is the world's problem, not just our own, and called on
member states to act.
We must demand that the world's major powers, Iraq's neighbors and
leading international organizations like NATO answer the call.
Based upon my recent trip to Iraq with Senators Daschle and Lindsey
Graham, I believe we need to focus on six key tasks:
First, we must radically overhaul the program to train and equip
Iraqi security services, including the police and the army. General
Petreaus is the right man for the job. But we must support his efforts
by providing more personnel and resources, and by recruiting more
countries to do training, especially for Iraqi police.
The last year could and should have been spent developing effective
training programs. Instead, the administration chose to focus on
quantity, not quality. They skimped on the training, and put as many
people in uniform as quickly as they could. As a result, the so-called
Iraqi security services--police, army, and national guard--are hollow
forces.
Second, we must commit to defeat the insurgency and provide
security for Iraq's elections, which will require a surge in troops
before the elections, more MPs and civil affairs experts from our
allies, and more special forces and intelligence assets from the United
States.
Our commanders told us that they plan to overlap outgoing and
incoming forces around election time to help provide additional
security. But elections will be a massive undertaking, with up to
30,000 polling places, and will require additional forces from other
nations.
Third, we need to provide--as called for in Resolution 1546--a
special brigade to protect the U.N. mission in Iraq. I understand there
has not been much success in raising this force.
Fourth, we must do a better job of spending the $18.4 billion that
Congress appropriated last Fall.
Our commanders told us that creating jobs and improving electricity
supplies, sewage treatment, and fresh water will have a direct bearing
on Iraqi support for the insurgency. It is bordering on negligence that
only $458 million of the $18.4 billion--or about 2\1/2\ percent of the
total--has been spent to date.
Fifth, we need to deploy an army of technical experts to help
Iraq's government build its institutional capacity. Many countries
bemoaned the plight of the Iraqi people during the 1990s. Now is the
time for them to offer their money, skills, and personnel to help those
same people.
Sixth, we must ensure that other nations deliver on their financial
pledges and push for debt relief. Thus far, of the $13 billion pledged
by other nations and organizations (of which two-thirds are loans) only
about $1 billion has been delivered, and none has been spent.
The administration appointed Secretary Baker to persuade other
nations to reduce Iraq's crushing debt burden. I'd appreciate an update
today on where things stand with his efforts.
June 28 provided a new beginning. We have huge challenges ahead. I
look forward to hearing how the administration plans to tackle these
challenges.
The Chairman. Well, let me conclude the hearing at this
point, unless--all right. We're in the second half of the vote.
Go ahead.
Senator Chafee. I suppose I should have asked this question
first of Ambassador Schlicher, but there was an article in The
Nation about some of the morale in the State Department, and it
says, I'll just read it, ``the State Department officers gripe
about the agency becoming irrelevant, particularly on Middle
East policy. One past Foreign Service official who served in
the Middle East Bureau and continues to work with officers
there notes, `there has been a huge drop in the morale of those
folks working in our embassies in the Middle East. I think they
feel nothing is getting through substantively, that the
administration is not on receive mode, but just wants to give
instructions on matters it may not understand, as well as folks
in the field.'
``Current and former State officials point to what happened
to Ron Schlicher, a career diplomat, who has been consul
general in Jerusalem until the White House yanked him and
reassigned him as Ambassador to Tunisia. Reporting out of
Jerusalem, said one Department official, was truthful and
accurate, but it did not suit the White House.''
Are you free to comment honestly or is your career----
Ambassador Schlicher. I would comment, sir, that I am not
familiar with this article or its author, but I would say that
he certainly doesn't know what my story is. My story is that I
was assigned to do Iraqi matters and to go to Baghdad, and my
morale in Baghdad, actually it improved, because I thought we
were part of something extremely important that was going on
for the sake of Iraq and for the sake of our nation. And
although my morale in terms of having to work 12 or 14 hours a
day here, that part of it's not pretty good, but I feel
extremely strongly that I and the 50 or so people who work with
me on Iraq are absolutely dedicated to the task. We feel that
we have input into the process, and I would say that the only
real problem we have is that there aren't enough hours in the
day to do everything that we need to do.
Senator Chafee. The reason I asked the question is we've
heard this morning about the great difficulties we're in in
Iraq, and I think Mr. Gompert said we're not going to defeat
our adversaries militarily. We're in a world of hurt in Iraq,
and if the administration isn't on receive mode, I think it's
going to make it even more difficult. That's the reason I bring
that up, and you've certainly spoken on the record, so thank
you.
The Chairman. We thank you for your testimony. I think
there were good questions. I would just summarize for my own
part by saying I share Senator Biden's feelings about the
security situation. I hope that this review that's occurring
with regard to dispensing the money and getting jobs out there
will proceed. It is exasperating that we are still reviewing it
at this stage.
Senator Chafee was in a similar position, formerly as a
mayor who had responsibility for security and jobs. Probably
some more mayors or sheriffs are needed in this process. I say
that respectfully. At the State Department and at the Defense
Department, we need some people that actually understand the
street, understand governance. And we've got to get on with it.
Success has to be ours and for the Iraqis in this respect.
We've got 6 months, and while this training is going on,
all of the democratic procedures we outlined today have to
occur. This is a daunting prospect, but one that has to occur.
We're going to have to devote the resources to it to make sure
it occurs, in order to ensure the protection of the process.
Because that finally is our objective for the whole war, as a
matter of fact, it comes down to whether there can successfully
be a change of governance in that area successfully, and
security established for us in the war against terror, and for
the Iraqis.
So we understand that you hear our urgency and our pleas.
We appreciate the hearing and your testimony. The hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m, the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
----------
Additional Statement Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold
I thank the chairman and the ranking member for holding this
hearing, and I thank all of the witnesses for being here today.
This hearing is an important opportunity for the committee and the
American people to gain some clarity about the U.S. strategy in Iraq
today. Over 900 American troops have been killed in Iraq. Nearly 6,000
have been wounded. Well over a hundred billion taxpayer dollars have
been dedicated to this effort to date. The American people continue to
bear a tremendous burden in Iraq, even after the transfer of
sovereignty that occurred late last month.
Moreover, directing so much military and political attention, so
many taxpayer dollars and so many intelligence assets toward Iraq means
that we have less to devote elsewhere, at a time when we confront
global threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. We need a strategy for stabilizing Iraq that also eases
the burden on this country and frees up resources to devote to other
important national interests. And we need to ensure that this strategy
strengthens international cooperation rather than undermining our
relationships around the world.
----------
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Responses of Hon. Ronald L. Schlicher to Additional Questions for the
Record Submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question 1. In June, the Security Council created a United Nations
protection force for Iraq. I am unaware, as of this week, of any
contributions to this force. Can you please update us on the status of
this force? Where do you expect the soldiers to come from? If
insufficient forces are made available would the United Nations accept
American military protection or private security contractors?
Answer. UN Security Council Resolution 1546 notes the creation of a
distinct entity under unified command of the multinational force to
provide security to the UN in Iraq. It also calls upon member states
and relevant organizations to provide resources, including troops to
this entity. Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi and the UN Secretary General
Kofi Annan have been working to secure troop contributions for the UN's
security when it returns to Iraq in the near future. Security for the
UN is essential to enabling the UN to contribute to the vital work that
lies ahead in Iraq. The United States supports Prime Minister Allawi
and the UN Secretary General's efforts. Discussions are ongoing, but to
date, no contributions have been received. In the interim, the
Multinational Force in Iraq, specifically the United States, will be
prepared to provide protection for the UN.
Question 2. The United Nations has a team of election advisors
headed by Carina Perelli working in Iraq. By most accounts, the current
security situation must improve in order to permit elections by January
2005. Prime Minister Allawi hinted that elections might be postponed,
though he quickly backtracked from these remarks. How are elections
preparations proceeding? How is planning being coordinated between the
United Nations, U.S. officials and Iraqis? Could elections be held
given current security conditions?
Answer. National Elections for the Transitional National Assembly
must be held no later than January 2005. The United States is holding
to this target date. The Iraqis, U.S. officials, UN officials and MNF-I
meet regularly to discuss elections-related issues, and there is an
ongoing dialog among all parties to ensure that elections goals are
met. These discussions include security preparations for elections.
The members of the Independent Election Commission of Iraq (IECI)
that will administer the elections have been selected. They currently
are setting up the administration for Iraq's first genuinely sovereign
and representative elections in January 2005. They have returned from
UN-sponsored training in Mexico and have begun preparations for the
elections, including establishing offices, hiring staff, consulting on
election regulations and developing training programs for elections
workers. The IECI continues to work with the handful of UN electoral
experts currently on the ground in Baghdad. The USG is funding
assistance to political parties and groups expecting to participate in
the elections, and programs to educate voters about the electoral
process.
Question 3. Ambassador Ashraf Qazi has been chosen as Kofi Annan's
envoy to Iraq. What will his role in Iraq be? How large a staff will he
have? When do you expect him to arrive in Iraq?
Answer. Ambassador Qazi's role will be to oversee UN activities in
Iraq. We expect that he will be focused on the UN's support for the
political process, in particular facilitating UN support for the
preparations for and holding of elections by January 2005. The size of
his staff will be a decision for Ambassador Qazi to make, and I refer
you to him for an answer to that question. We expect Ambassador Qazi to
arrive in time for the National Conference.
Question 4. International donors have pledged at least $14 billion,
mostly in loans, to Iraqi reconstruction, but as of late May only about
$1 billion worth of funds had been committed and little, if any had
been spent. Although an Iraqi Strategic Review Board has been created
to approve and prioritize projects, a June 25 audit by the CPA
Inspector General found that ``no process was developed for tracking or
coordinating internationally funded projects with other CPA
reconstruction efforts.''
With the opening of the American Embassy in Baghdad, what steps are
being taken to improve the coordination of international reconstruction
efforts?
How much international reconstruction money has been spent?
What mechanisms and criteria have the Iraqi Strategic Review Board
and the Ministry of Planning implemented to ensure transparent and
accountable decision making?
Answer. Of the $32 billion in pledges for 2004-2007 at the Madrid
Donors' Conference, $13.584 billion was from non-U.S. sources. Of this,
$5.55 billion was pledged by the World Bank and IMF in lending
programs. The remaining $8.034 billion was pledged by 36 countries and
the European Commission. Currently, the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG)
is in discussions with the World Bank and the IMF regarding the IIG's
interest in their lending programs.
As of June 30, 2004, of the $8 billion in non-U.S. donor
assistance, other donors had disbursed over $1.15 billion of their
pledges, according to our estimates. Therefore, 6 months into a 4-year
pledge, about 1/8 has already been disbursed.
$826 million of this $1.15 billion in disbursements has been in the
form of deposits to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for
Iraq (IRFFI), which is comprised of UN and World Bank trust funds. The
remaining $321 million has been disbursed for bilateral projects and
non-IRF trust funds. The UN and World Bank trust funds are now starting
implementation of their initial IRFFI projects. Disbursements and
implementation have been complicated by the security situation in Iraq,
but nonetheless are continuing.
The IRFFI plays an important role in helping international donors
channel their resources and coordinate their support for reconstruction
and development activities in Iraq. Close coordination is achieved
through a joint Donor Committee and a unified UN/World Bank Facility
Coordination Committee. The Donor Committee oversees the activities of
the Facility and has held meetings in Abu Dhabi in February and Doha in
May that helped speed up the commitment of pledges made in Madrid. The
next Donor Committee meeting is scheduled for October in Tokyo. The
Facility Coordination Committee serves as the administrative body for
the World Bank and UNDG to work together to ensure coherence.
The UN and World Bank trust funds in the IRFFI work in close
partnership with the Iraqi national authorities, principally the Iraqi
Strategic Review Board (ISRB) and the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and
Development Cooperation (MoPDC). The MoPDC serves as the Interim Iraqi
Administration's primary liaison with the IRFFI. The ISRB is currently
conducting an extensive series of workshops, drawing together sector
experts from various Iraqi Ministries, the private sector and academia.
In addition, an inter-ministerial committee--consisting of members from
ten Ministries, drawing from their official programs as well as from
discussions held under the committee's auspices--is preparing a draft
National Development Strategy. This participatory approach should
enhance governance, accountability and transparency.
The Department of State holds frequent teleconferences with
international donors. In addition, since the opening of U.S. Embassy
Baghdad on June 28, the Department has stepped up official
consultations with the World Bank, the IMF, the UN, and other
international agencies, and is committed to improving the overall
coordination of international reconstruction efforts in Iraq.
Question 5. How rigorous is the typical training program for army
and police officer recruits? Are these training programs rigorous
enough to prepare the Iraqis to effectively confront well-armed and
well-organized insurgent forces?
Answer. Army basic training is 8-weeks and includes cadre-led
recruit training and squad and platoon level training. If there is a
new unit being established, initial training will continue up to and
include battalion level collective training in actual operations, with
advisor oversight, for an additional two months. If the recruit is a
replacement at an established unit, he will have the required
fundamental skills needed after that 8-week basic training course to
integrate into that established unit and quickly receive the additional
specialized training for the other skills required. We believe that the
army basic training course is rigorous enough to prepare the new
recruit for military duty in the Iraqi armed forces.
Police recruits attend an entry-level 8-week Iraqi Police Service
(IPS) basic police skills training program. While it is short in
comparison to most U.S. programs, the overwhelming need for police
officers in the postwar period required an accelerated training
program. This training is also consistent with programs the U.S. has
delivered elsewhere, specifically at the Kosovo Police Service School.
It is designed to be complemented by a field training and evaluation
program whereby on-the-job instruction is furnished by both
international police liaison officers and specially trained Iraqi field
instructors. Finally, we do not see the IPS as the force of choice to
confront a well-armed and well-organized insurgent force; the Iraqi
National Guard and MNF are on-call to support that mission. We,
therefore, believe that the length of the current program strikes a
proper balance between placing additional police on the streets and the
requirement to provide rigorous initial training to support the IPS'
intended policing mission.
Question 6. June 9th, an agreement was signed to disband nine
prominent militias by next year. What progress has been made in this
effort? What role, if any, does the U.S. have in facilitating this
agreement? What are the contingency plans in the event that this
agreement is not fulfilled?
Answer. The United States strongly supports Iraqi efforts to ensure
that all armed groups are brought into compliance with Iraqi law.
Coalition Provisional Authority Order 91, ``Regulation of Armed
Forces and Militias within Iraq,'' was promulgated by CPA and announced
by then-Prime Minister-designate Allawi on June 7th, 2004. This Order
implemented Article 27 of Transitional Administrative Law, which
prohibits armed forces and militia not under the command of the Iraqi
Government except as provided by Iraqi federal law. Since the transfer
of governing authority to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) on June
28, the United States has provided technical assistance and advice to
the IIG when requested. Iraqi officials, led by the Iraqi Transition
and Reintegration Committee, have had the authority and responsibility
for overseeing the execution of the Order.
On July 14, U.S. Secretary of Veterans Affairs Anthony Principi
traveled to Iraq and met with Prime Minister Allawi, Defense Minister
al-Sha'lan and Director of the Iraqi Veterans Agency General al-Obeidi.
Secretary Principi reiterated the United States' willingness to provide
technical assistance to assist the Iraqi Veterans Agency, including in
implementing the vocational training and job creation programs that are
important parts in the plan to reintegrate militia members into Iraqi
civilian society.
Question 7. As of July 13th, only $458 million of the $18.4 billion
P.L. 1O8-106 supplemental funds for Iraq had been spent. The
contracting process is being restructured since State is now the lead
department in Iraq.
What are the lessons learned from the experience of the Program
Management Office, the CPA's contracting body?
How are these lessons being implemented? What assurances do you
have that things can be accelerated?
To what extent is ongoing violence in Iraq slowing down the
reconstruction?
Answer. There is no question that the security situation in Iraq
represents the largest challenge to the vital reconstruction effort,
but the Secretary has stated publicly his commitment to moving forward
as quickly as possible, working in conjunction with the Iraqi
authorities, on the reconstruction of Iraq. Ambassador Negroponte has
directed a comprehensive review of IRRF spending priorities and
procedures. Since the return of sovereignty to the Iraqis on June 28,
the new U.S. Embassy has endeavored to learn from the experience of the
Coalition Provisional Authority--recreating what was successful and
developing new practices of our own. In this manner, the Embassy has
established the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) in Baghdad
to coordinate and oversee our effort. The Army's Project Management
Office has been recapped as the Project Contracting Office, and will
work under the overall direction of the IRMO. Together with the other
implementing agencies, and with their counterparts in Washington, these
new offices are providing coordinated, daily oversight of assistance
goals to ensure timely implementation of our over-arching policy goal
in Iraq. Moreover, this direct monitoring and coordination will improve
the assistance and contracting process, and allow the flow of
assistance and contracting, which has already begun to accelerate, to
continue to do so.
As stated at the outset, the security situation in Iraq has
presented obstacles to reconstruction, and will continue to be an issue
for the foreseeable future. Despite these complications, the vital
process of rebuilding Iraq will continue. This process of
reconstruction will help to lay the foundation for the secure and free
Iraq that we are working to build with the new Iraqi authorities.
Question 8. When does the administration expect to receive funding
from Congress for construction of new Embassy facilities?
Answer. While the administration has not yet made any final
decisions, we anticipate that funding for the new embassy facilities
will be included either in a FY 2005 supplemental request or the FY
2006 budget submission which will be submitted to Congress next year.
Question 9. What is the current estimate of budgetary requirements
to operate Embassy Baghdad in FY 05?
Answer. Our estimate of the operating costs for the new mission in
FY 2005 is approximately $1.1 billion. This does not include the
capital facility costs for a new embassy compound. We continue to work
to develop more precise FY 2005 requirements including revised
estimates for logistics support and security contracts. The largest
components to support the U.S. Mission are logistics support and
security contracts, up to $800 to $900 million annually.