[Senate Hearing 108-709]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-709
A REPORT ON LATEST ROUND OF SIX-WAY TALKS REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN
NORTH KOREA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 15, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Brownback, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from Kansas, material submitted
for the record:
``The Hidden Gulag, Exposing North Korea's Prison Camps,''
Executive Summary, David Hawk, U.S. Committee for Human
Rights in North Korea...................................... 25
``Auschwitz Under Our Noses,'' by Anne Applebaum, The
Washington Post, Feb. 4, 2004.............................. 27
Trafficking in Persons report, U.S. Department of State,
information on North Korea................................. 29
Carter, Hon. Ashton B., former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy; Professor of Science and
International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.............................. 33
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared
statement...................................................... 19
Kelly, Hon. James A., Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State;
accompanied by: Mr. Joseph R. DeTrani, Special Envoy for
Negotiations with North Korea and U.S. Representative to the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, KEDO,
Washington, DC................................................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Pritchard, Hon. Charles L., Visiting Fellow, The Brookings
Institution, Washington, DC.................................... 41
Prepared statement........................................... 46
U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, statement
submitted for the record....................................... 56
(iii)
A REPORT ON LATEST ROUND OF SIX-WAY TALKS REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN
NORTH KOREA
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 15, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 9:35 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the
committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Brownback, Biden, Feingold,
and Bill Nelson.
opening statement of senator richard g. lugar, chairman
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
Today the committee once again turns its attention to North
Korea. I am especially pleased to welcome Assistant Secretary
of State James Kelly, who will provide an update on the latest
round of six-party talks, as he did earlier this year during
our March 2 hearing on North Korea. Secretary Kelly is
accompanied today by Mr. Joseph DeTrani, Special Envoy for
Negotiations with North Korea and U.S. Representative to the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, KEDO.
The world acknowledges the importance of the six-party
talks in providing regional stability and preventing another
war on the Korean Peninsula. The North Korean regime's drive to
build nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
poses a grave threat to American national security. We are
concerned about the transfer of North Korean weapons,
materials, and technology to other countries or to terrorist
groups. In addition, we must remain vigilant to avoid a
miscalculation that could lead unintentionally to war.
The purpose of today's hearing is to provide Secretary
Kelly and Special Envoy DeTrani an opportunity to provide a
clear account of events in Beijing. They were the leaders of
the United States delegation in the Plenary and Working Group
sessions. I am very pleased by their willingness to visit with
the committee in an open session.
As we meet, events are developing rapidly in northeast
Asia. President Bush originally envisioned a strategy
incorporating a multilateral approach to addressing North
Korea's nuclear programs, with a goal of forging a united front
with South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China. However, in an
effort to scuttle the six-party process, North Korea has
accelerated bilateral dialog with its neighbors on a myriad of
issues.
South Korea recently engaged in high level military-to-
military discussions with North Korea and reached agreement on
a number of issues. Kim Jong-il has displayed a new flexibility
with the Japanese on the abduction issue, and it appears that
Japan and North Korea may normalize relations within a year.
The Chinese continue providing massive assistance to North
Korea, and the Russian Foreign Minister recently returned to
Moscow from a high-level visit to Pyongyang.
While I appreciate the inclination of countries within the
region to respond to initiatives from Pyongyang, these
initiatives have not diminished the necessity of eliminating
North Korea's nuclear programs. And I am hopeful that the
leadership of Japan, South Korea, Russia, and China will
continue to work with the Bush administration in a multilateral
context for a peaceful resolution of this matter.
Both North Korea and the United States presented detailed
proposals in Beijing. Secretary Kelly and Special Envoy DeTrani
exhibited appropriate flexibility by engaging in occasional
bilateral interaction with North Korean officials.
I also extend appreciation to administration officials for
continuing to raise human rights issues with the North Koreans.
This committee is committed to the resolution of ongoing human
suffering in North Korea's gulags and prison system.
In addition to Secretary Kelly and Special Envoy DeTrani,
the committee will hear from Dr. Ashton Carter of the JFK
School of Government at Harvard. As one who was deeply involved
in launching the Pentagon's Counter-Proliferation Initiative
some 10 years ago when he was Assistant Secretary of Defense in
the Clinton administration, he knows that negotiations are only
the first step in a successful counter-proliferation process.
We have asked Dr. Carter to consider the administration's
proposal to the North Koreans and to reflect on the kinds of
strategies and programs necessary for freezing, disabling, and
dismantling North Korea's nuclear programs. I am particularly
interested in his analysis as to whether and how we might apply
programs like the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
program to North Korea. Is such a program feasible and what
would be involved in its implementation? Under what
circumstances, if any, might North Korea agree to open itself
to unfettered inspections of its nuclear program?
Ambassador Jack Pritchard is with us today as well. He has
extensive background on several fronts related to North Korea,
and will specifically address the energy portion of the United
States' proposal. He served as Ambassador and Special Envoy for
Negotiations with North Korea and U.S. Representative to KEDO.
During his 5 years on the National Security Council staff,
Ambassador Pritchard was involved in negotiations with North
Korea. He accompanied the Secretary of State, Ms. Albright, on
her visit to Pyongyang in 2000.
We look forward to engaging our distinguished witnesses on
the situation in North Korea and U.S. policy options toward the
peninsula. It is a special privilege to have these four
remarkable Americans before us in open session so that all
Americans may be the beneficiaries of this hearing and their
wisdom and consideration.
When the ranking member, Senator Biden, arrives, I will
recognize him, of course, for an opening comment. I ask my
colleague, Senator Hagel, if he has an opening comment that he
would like to make.
Senator Hagel. Well, I have just been overtaken by events.
Senator Biden. No.
The Chairman. Please continue while Senator Biden is
collecting his thoughts.
Senator Biden. I associate myself with my friend's remarks
before he makes them.
Senator Hagel. I have no formal statement, Mr. Chairman,
other than to acknowledge once again your efforts to enlighten
our country and this institution on some of the most critical
policy issues that we are dealing with.
I appreciate, as you have noted, our witnesses and their
service to our country and look forward to their testimony.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Biden.
opening statement of senator joseph r. biden, jr.,
ranking member
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing which is going to give us an update on our
country's efforts to convince the North Koreans to abandon
their dangerous pursuit of nuclear weapons and the path that
they are on.
I am anxious to hear from our witnesses today, particularly
Secretary Kelly.
At the recent third round of talks, the United States, for
the first time in my understanding, put forward a reasonably
comprehensive and detailed road map for how the crisis might be
resolved. The U.S. plan reportedly offers various incentives to
North Korea: multilateral security assurances, fuel oil,
sanctions relief, and the promise for eventual diplomatic
normalization, provided--a big caveat--that North Korea pledges
to verifiably dismantle its nuclear programs and then follows
through on that commitment.
I must note, Mr. Chairman, that the United States has not
presented any proposal addressing North Korea's export of
ballistic missiles, but perhaps that will come at a later date.
North Korea promised to study the U.S. proposal and also
presented a freeze proposal of its own.
Obviously, an awful lot of hard work remains to be done if
we are to reach out and get accord here, and it is not clear,
for instance, in my view how any deal would be verified and by
whom. North Korea still has not admitted to the existence of an
uranium enrichment program, a program that has to be abandoned
if we are to forge this new relationship.
But the exchange of views in Beijing represented progress
in my view, and I hope we can now get to the real meat of these
negotiations.
Mr. Chairman, it has been more than 3 years since the
Secretary of State proclaimed the United States' intention to
``pick up where the Clinton administration left off'' and work
to eliminate North Korea's--and that is a quote ``pick up where
the Clinton administration left off'' and work to eliminate
North Korea's nuclear program and to curtail its destabilizing
export of ballistic missile technology.
Unfortunately, the White House overruled Secretary Powell
and adopted a posture in my view of benign neglect. Even after
learning of North Korea's attempts to develop uranium
enrichment capacity in the summer of 2002, the administration
took more than 2 years to resolve its internal divisions and
settle on an approach for dealing with North Korea. North Korea
has used this time apparently to quadruple its stockpile of
plutonium, and therefore perhaps its nuclear arsenal,
progressing from an estimated one to two nuclear weapons to
perhaps as many as eight or more. North Korea has been busy
modernizing and upgrading its ballistic missile force, although
it has not flight-tested any new long-range missiles. The
bottom line is that we now confront a much more dangerous
adversary than we did in 2001.
I am not at all certain--and I want to make the point
clearly. A little humility is in order here. I am not certain
that if the administration listened to your suggestions and
mine and others' to do what they finally have done, have
bilateral discussions with North Korea, which was proposed over
2 years ago by this committee, that we would necessarily be in
any better shape. I do not know that. I cannot look back and
suggest that. But I am certain that the approach taken was not
productive.
But we are where we are. As former Defense Secretary
William Perry reminds us, we must deal with North Korea as it
is, not as we would wish it to be.
So I commend the administration for finally putting
together a decent proposal to test North Korea's intentions,
and I hope North Korea will respond positively at the next
round of talks scheduled in September.
Fortunately, North Korea's neighbors share a commitment of
achieving a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, and I am pleased that
the administration has begun to listen more closely to the
advice that has been offered, consistently offered, by the
South Korean and Japanese allies and by our Russian and Chinese
negotiating partners. Together we might convince North Korea to
change its course, although I am not betting next year's
tuition on that. I understand this is going to be very
difficult.
Mr. Chairman, I hope North Korea will not squander this
chance to improve its relations with its neighbors, to trade
false security offered by its nuclear weapons for a very real
security that would come from integration into one of the
world's most dynamic economic regions, and normalization of
relations with South Korea, Japan, and the United States.
Convincing North Korea to completely and verifiably
dismantle its nuclear weapons program and its missile program
is not going to be easy. North Korea is a weak and isolated
state. The North's leaders consider weapons to be the ultimate
guarantor of the regime's survival, and they are obviously
reluctant to give them up. But in reality, the North's nuclear
program is a giant albatross around its neck, a waste of
resources, strains relations with its neighbors, and
jeopardizes the regional peace and security. I hope that the
leadership of North Korea will come to realize, through the
multilateral talks now underway, that North Korea will choose a
path of peace and integration over a path of confrontation and
isolation, although I am not prepared, as I said, to bet
tuition on that.
I thank the chairman for his dedication to this issue, look
forward to hearing the witnesses, and am delighted that we have
at least moved to this point where there is a prospect of
knowing what the full offer on the table is with us for North
Korea. Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. I look forward to hearing our witnesses.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you, Senator Biden, for your
leadership on this issue, and likewise for the bipartisan way
in which we have approached a very serious issue for our
country. It is in that spirit that the hearing is held this
morning. We are grateful for these witnesses in open session.
I would like to call now, first of all, upon Secretary
Kelly, to be followed by any comments that Mr. DeTrani might
have. Would you please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES A. KELLY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,
BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY: JOSEPH R. DeTRANI, SPECIAL ENVOY FOR
NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA, AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, KEDO
Mr. Kelly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senators, for
this timely opportunity to meet with the committee again to
discuss the efforts the United States and like-minded countries
to deal with the threat of North Korea's nuclear ambitions.
I have a much longer statement for the record, and I will,
with your permission, sir, present only an abbreviated version
here orally.
The Chairman. The statement will be published in full, and
that will be true for each of the submitted statements by our
witnesses today.
Mr. Kelly. I will focus my remarks on these four topics: a
brief overview of the DPRK's longstanding determination to move
ahead with its nuclear weapons programs; second, the Bush
administration's commitment to multilateral diplomacy; third,
an explanation of the proposal that the U.S. tabled at the
third round of the six-party talks last month and of the
proposal tabled by the DPRK; and last, the opportunity the DPRK
has now to improve its relations with the international
community and to reap the full rewards of trade, aid, and
investment, and what North Korea's neighbors and the
international community expect in return.
North Korea's nuclear programs are a longstanding threat.
As I detail in the full statement, the DPRK leadership decades
ago set out on a path to acquire nuclear weapons. That effort
led to mounting tensions with the United States and the
international community.
In 1993, after North Korea announced its intention to
withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for the
first time, the United States and North Korea began high-level
talks that culminated in the Agreed Framework of 1994. That
agreement obligated the DPRK not to produce fissile material at
its declared nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and its preface
stated that its purpose was ``an overall resolution of the
nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.''
The Agreed Framework did not, as we learned later, end the
North Korean nuclear arms programs. By the fall of 2002, our
intelligence community assessed that North Korea was pursuing a
covert program to produce enriched uranium and had been
pursuing it for a number of years, even as it negotiated with
senior American officials to improve relations.
I led a delegation to Pyongyang in October of 2002 to
confront the North Koreans with our assessment that they have a
uranium enrichment program. Instead of taking the opportunity
we had afforded them to begin walking back their covert uranium
enrichment program, the North Koreans escalated the situation,
expelling International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors,
reactivating the 5-megawatt reactor at the place called
Yongbyon, and announcing its withdrawal from the NPT. If the
DPRK, as it has declared, has finished reprocessing its 8,000-
plus existing spent fuel rods, it could have produced enough
fissile material for several additional nuclear weapons.
The United States has adhered to two basic principles to
resolve this threat. First, we seek the complete, verifiable,
and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear programs, nothing
less. We cannot accept another partial solution that does not
deal with the entirety of the problem, allowing North Korea to
threaten others continually with the revival of its nuclear
program. Second, because the North's nuclear programs threaten
its neighbors and the integrity of the global nuclear non-
proliferation regime, the threat can best be dealt with through
multilateral diplomacy.
I can report some progress to you on both counts. I have
reported to you before on earlier trilateral and six-party
discussions, all of which set the stage for our third round of
discussions last month in Beijing. These were useful and
constructive.
The working group met June 21 and 22 and the plenary for 4
days after that. Over the course of that time in Beijing, the
United States met directly with all of the parties, as we have
at all of the sessions of the six-party talks.
In addition to the United States' proposal other parties
put forward constructive proposals, which I have outlined in
the prepared statement. We had not expected breakthroughs and I
have none to report to the committee.
Under the U.S. proposal, developed in close coordination
with the Republic of Korea and Japan, the DPRK would, as a
first step, commit to dismantle all of its nuclear programs.
The parties would then reach agreement on a detailed
implementation plan requiring, at a minimum, the supervised
disabling, dismantlement, and elimination of all nuclear-
related facilities and materials; the removal of all nuclear
weapons and weapons components, centrifuge and other nuclear
parts, fissile material, and fuel rods; and a long-term
monitoring program. This would include North Korea's uranium
enrichment program, which the DPRK continues to deny.
We envisage a short initial preparatory period of perhaps 3
months' duration to prepare for the dismantlement and removal
of the DPRK's nuclear programs. DPRK actions would be
monitored, subject to international verification.
Under our proposal, as the DPRK carried out its
commitments, the other parties would take some corresponding
steps. These would be provisional or temporary in nature and
would only yield lasting benefits to the DPRK after the
dismantlement of its nuclear programs had been completed.
Now, the steps would include: Upon agreement of the overall
approach, including a DPRK agreement to dismantle all nuclear
programs in a permanent, thorough, and transparent manner,
subject to effective verification, non-U.S. parties would
provide heavy fuel oil to the DPRK. Upon acceptance of the DPRK
declaration, the parties would provide provisional multilateral
security assurances, which would become more enduring as the
process proceeded. Begin a study to determine the energy
requirements of North Korea and how to meet them by non-nuclear
energy programs, and begin a discussion of steps necessary to
lift remaining economic sanctions on the DPRK and on steps
necessary to remove the DPRK from the list of state sponsors of
terrorism.
Secretary Powell told the North Korean Foreign Minister, at
the ASEAN regional forum in Indonesia on July 2, that the U.S.
proposal aimed to go forward on the dismantlement of North
Korean nuclear programs and that there is an opportunity for
concrete progress.
The DPRK proposal restated its goal of a freeze for
rewards, including energy assistance, lifting of sanctions, and
removal from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism. We are
continuing to study the North's proposal. As I noted, it is
clear we are still far from agreement.
Our initial assessment is that the DPRK proposal lacks
detail and is vague on a number of key elements. Still, there
are some positive elements and positions that have been staked
out. The DPRK claimed that the freeze would be the first step
on the path to nuclear dismantlement, not an end to itself, and
on that point we agree.
We and other parties have questions about the DPRK
proposal, including what the scope of the freeze and
dismantlement would be. We will continue to seek answers
through the six-party process. To that end, the parties agreed
to hold the fourth round of talks by the end of September and a
working group meeting in the interim as soon as possible to
prepare for the fourth round.
Mr. Chairman, the six-party talks offer North Korea the
opportunity to improve its relations with the United States and
Japan, to end its self-induced political and economic
isolation, and to harness the benefits of normal international
trade and aid, including establishing relationships with the
international financial institutions.
Although I remain optimistic on where the talks could lead,
I personally could not say at this point that the DPRK has,
indeed, made the strategic calculation to give up its nuclear
weapons in return for real peace and prosperity through trade,
aid, and economic development.
I believe that diplomacy is the best way to overcome North
Korea's nuclear threat and that the six-party process is the
most appropriate approach. Our aim is to fully and finally
resolve the nuclear program, not to implement half-measures or
sweep the problem under the rug for future policymakers to deal
with. We are pursuing this course patiently and are committed
to its success.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DeTrani, who
does not have a statement, and I look forward to responding to
the questions that you and the committee will offer.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. James A. Kelly
dealing with north korea's nuclear programs
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this timely opportunity to meet with
the committee again to discuss the efforts of the United States and
like-minded countries to deal with the threat of North Korea's nuclear
ambitions.
I will focus my remarks on these four topics:
A brief overview of the problem. of the DPRK's long-standing
determination to move ahead with its nuclear weapons programs,
and why previous efforts to achieve a nuclear-free Korean
Peninsula did not succeed;
The Bush Administration's commitment to multilateral
diplomacy to achieve the full denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, through the Six-Party Talks;
An explanation of the proposal the U.S. tabled at the third
round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing last month, and of the
proposal tabled by the DPRK; and
The opportunity the DPRK has now to improve its relations
with the international community and to reap the full rewards
of trade, aid and investment--and what North Korea's neighbors
and the international community expect in return.
North Korea's Nuclear Programs
North Korea's nuclear programs are a longstanding threat. The DPRK
leadership decades ago set out on a path that would allow it to acquire
nuclear weapons. After conducting research throughout the sixties and
seventies at a reactor provided by the Soviet Union, the DPRK began
construction in 1979 of the 5-MWe reactor at Yongbyon, from which it
could extract and reprocess plutonium. That reactor became operational
in 1986.
In 1985, while construction was going on at Yongbyon, international
pressure convinced North Korea to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. However, it was not until 1992 that it finally signed a
comprehensive safeguards agreement and within months the IAEA found
evidence of inconsistencies in North Korea's declarations. I should add
that throughout the 1990s the IAEA continued to find the DPRK in
noncompliance of its safeguards agreement.
Also in 1992, the DPRK reached an agreement with the Republic of
Korea for a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons, but the North
never moved to implement it.
By 1993, IAEA pressure for additional inspections led North Korea
to announce its intention to withdraw from the NPT. As tensions
mounted, the United States and North Korea began high-level talks that
culminated in the Agreed Framework of 1994. That agreement obligated
the DPRK not to produce fissile material at its declared nuclear
facilities at Yongbyon and its preface stated that its purpose was ``an
overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.''
The Agreed Framework left resolution of pre-1993 discrepancies,
especially quantities of plutonium that the DPRK might have recovered,
for the distant future, linked to construction progress on the light
water reactors provided under the Agreed Framework. The Agreed
Framework did not, as we learned later, end the North Korean nuclear
arms programs. By the fall of 2002, our intelligence community assessed
that North Korea was pursuing a covert program to produce enriched
uranium--in violation of the Agreed Framework, the North-South Joint
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the DPRK's Safeguards Agreement
with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In fact, we determined
that North Korea had been pursuing the program for a number of years,
even as it was negotiating with senior American officials to improve
relations.
By the way, our negotiator for the Agreed Framework, Ambassador
Robert Gallucci, had left the North Koreans in no doubt that that any
uranium enrichment program would violate the Agreed Framework.
Ambassador Gallucci testified before Congress in December 1994 that the
Agreed Framework required the DPRK to implement the North-South Joint
Denuclearization Declaration, which precludes any reprocessing or
enrichment capability. ``If there were ever any move to enrich,'' he
told this committee, ``we would argue they were not in compliance with
the Agreed Framework.''
I led a delegation to Pyongyang in October 2002 to confront the
North Koreans with our assessment that they have a uranium enrichment
program. DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju told us that the
hostile policy of the U.S. Administration had left North Korea with no
choice but to pursue such a program. When I pointed out our assessment
that North Korea had been pursuing such a program for years, he had no
response.
Instead of taking the opportunity we had afforded them to begin
walking back their covert uranium enrichment program, the North Koreans
escalated the situation. In December 2002, they expelled IAEA
inspectors and began to reactivate the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon.
In January, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT. And on
several occasions in 2003, it declared it had finished reprocessing its
8,000-plus existing spent fuel rods. If that is indeed the case, it
could have produced enough fissile material for several additional
nuclear weapons. Since then, the DPRK has stated it is strengthening
what it calls its nuclear deterrent capability.
Multilateral Solution to a Multilateral Problem
The United States has adhered to two basic principles to resolve
this threat from the DPRK. First, we seek the complete, verifiable and
irreversible dismantlement of the DPRK's nuclear programs--nothing
less. We cannot accept another partial solution that does not deal with
the entirety of the problem, allowing North Korea to threaten others
continually with a revival of its nuclear program. Second, because the
North's nuclear programs threaten its neighbors and the integrity of
the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, the threat can best be
dealt with through multilateral diplomacy.
I can report some progress to you on both counts.
Late in 2002, Secretary Powell began talking with countries in East
Asia about a multilateral forum to make clear to the DPRK it must end
its nuclear arms programs. He succeeded in persuading the Chinese, who
in March 2003 took with them to Pyongyang the idea of five-party talks.
The North Koreans resisted, but eventually agreed when the Chinese
suggested trilateral talks in Beijing be held with the U.S., North
Korea, and China.
After we consulted with our South Korean and Japanese allies, to
ensure that they supported the idea and assured them they would be in
future talks, we participated in the trilateral talks in Beijing April
23-25. By the way, it was at that forum that the North Koreans pulled
me aside to say that they have nuclear weapons, will not dismantle
them, and might transfer or demonstrate them. I strongly cautioned them
against any escalation.
After those trilateral talks, we kept our promise and insisted that
the next round of talks should include South Korea and Japan. We also
supported Russia's inclusion. The Chinese did some more persuading, and
the North Koreans agreed to participate in Six-Party talks. The first
round was held in Beijing August 27-29, 2003.
The other five parties all told North Korea very clearly in plenary
session that they will not accept North Korea's possessing nuclear
arms. In response, the North Koreans threatened that they would
demonstrate nuclear weapons. The North Korean belligerence at the Six-
Party talks had the effect of isolating them. It was a useful first
step in the difficult process of ensuring the complete, verifiable and
irreversible dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear arms program.
The second round of Six-Party talks was in February 2004. The
parties agreed to regularize the talks, and to establish a working
group to set issues up for resolution at the plenary meetings. At the
second round of talks, the ROK offered fuel aid to the DPRK, if there
were a comprehensive and verifiable halt of its nuclear programs as a
first step toward complete nuclear dismantlement.
The third round of talks, held late last month in Beijing, were
useful and constructive. The working group met June 21-22, the plenary
June 23-26. Over the course of that time in Beijing, the U.S. met
directly with all of the parties. We held a two-and-a-half-hour
discussion with the DPRK delegation. Some press accounts indicated
that, during that meeting, the North Korean delegation threatened to
test a nuclear weapon. The North Koreans said that there were some, not
identified, in the DPRK who wanted to test a nuclear weapon and might
presumably do so if there was not progress in the talks. The comment
did not contribute to the comity of the meeting or to any atmosphere of
trust.
In addition to the United States' proposal, the ROK put forward a
concrete, detailed proposal to achieve a denuclearized Korean
Peninsula. The ROK proposal was consistent with the U.S. approach, but
I will leave it to our South Korean ally to describe its proposal in
more detail if it chooses. North Korea, too, participated actively in
the plenary, offering a proposal for what it describes as the first
step toward full denuclearization--a freeze of its nuclear-weapons
related programs in exchange for compensation from the other parties.
The Japanese also had constructive ideas, strongly supporting proposals
that would lead to the timely and comprehensive denuclearization of the
Peninsula subject to international verification, and expressing a
willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK when it is
verified that the DPRK is actually on the road to denuclearization. The
PRC, as host, played a role in bringing the parties to Beijing for the
third round and vigorously sought agreement on the basic principles
that would underlie any agreement on denuclearization. The Russian
delegation, under the new leadership of Ambassador Alekseyev, also
sought to promote agreement among all the parties, and offered details
of their thinking. We had not expected breakthroughs and I have none to
report to you. That said, all of the parties, including, in my view,
the DPRK, went to Beijing prepared for substantive discussions.
While each party is pursuing its own interests in the talks, all
have publicly embraced the goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. I
thought it was significant that Chairman Kim Jong Il discussed the
talks when he met with Prime Minister Koizumi last month, affirming
North Korea's commitment to them. That said, proposals offered by the
parties differ very considerably in substance, as I will detail now.
The U.S. Proposal
The proposal the U.S. presented was developed in close coordination
with the Republic of Korea and Japan. Under the U.S. proposal, the DPRK
would, as a first step, commit to dismantle all of its nuclear
programs. The parties would then reach agreement on a detailed
implementation plan requiring, at a minimum, the supervised disabling,
dismantlement and elimination of all nuclear-related facilities and
materials; the removal of all nuclear weapons and weapons components,
centrifuge and other nuclear parts, fissile material and fuel rods; and
a long-term monitoring program.
We envisage a short initial preparatory period, of perhaps three
months' duration, to prepare for the dismantlement and removal of the
DPRK's nuclear programs. During that initial period, the DPRK would:
Provide a complete listing of all its nuclear activities,
and cease operations of all of its nuclear activities;
Permit the securing of all fissile material and the
monitoring of all fuel rods, and;
Permit the publicly disclosed and observable disablement of
all nuclear weapons/weapons components and key centrifuge
parts.
These actions by the DPRK would be monitored subject to
international verification.
At this juncture, I'll emphasize that, for the DPRK's declaration
to be credible and for the process to get underway, the North would
need to include its uranium enrichment program and existing weapons, as
well as its plutonium program. As of now, the DPRK is denying that it
has a program to enrich uranium, and it speaks of an existing ``nuclear
deterrent'' but has refrained from stating publicly that it has
``nuclear weapons.''
Under our proposal, as the DPRK carried out its commitments, the
other parties would take some corresponding steps. These would be
provisional or temporary in nature and would only yield lasting
benefits to the DPRK after the dismantlement of its nuclear programs
had been completed. The steps would include:
Upon agreement of the overall approach, including a DPRK
agreement to dismantle all nuclear programs in a permanent,
thorough and transparent manner subject to effective
verification, non-U.S. parties would provide heavy fuel oil to
the DPRK.
Upon acceptance of the DPRK declaration, the parties would:
> provide provisional multilateral security assurances, which
would become more enduring as the process proceeded. North
Korea's rhetoric on this issue notwithstanding, I would like to
point out that it is reasonable to conclude that security
assurances given through the multilateral Six-Party process
would have considerably more weight than would bilateral
assurances;
> begin a study to determine the energy requirements of the
DPRK and how to meet them by non-nuclear energy programs;
> begin a discussion of steps necessary to lift remaining
economic sanctions on the DPRK, and on the steps necessary for
removal of the DPRK from the List of State Sponsors of
Terrorism.
Secretary Powell told the DPRK Foreign Minister, at the ASEAN
Regional Forum in Indonesia on July 2, that the U.S. proposal aimed to
move forward on the dismantlement of the DPRK's nuclear programs, and
that there is an opportunity for concrete progress.
The DPRK Proposal
The DPRK proposal restated its goal of a freeze for rewards,
including energy assistance, lifting of sanctions, and removal from the
list of countries sponsoring terrorism. We are continuing to study the
North's proposal. As I noted, it is clear we are still far from
agreement.
Our initial assessment is that the DPRK proposal lacks detail and
is vague on a number of key elements. The scope is narrow in terms of
the facilities covered and it ignores pre-2003 plutonium, nuclear
weapons, and the uranium enrichment program. North Korea would exclude
the IAEA from verification, seeking to create a new verification regime
from the Six-Party talks participants. This unprecedented approach
would be hard to set up and carry out.
Still, there are some positive elements in positions the DPRK
staked out. The DPRK claimed that the freeze would be the first step on
the path to nuclear dismantlement, not an end to itself, and on that
point we agree.
The DPRK also confirmed that whatever would be included in the
freeze would also be included in the commitment to dismantlement
further down the line.
Specifically, the DPRK said it would freeze all facilities related
to nuclear weapons and the products that resulted from their operation,
refrain from producing more nuclear weapons, transferring them, and
testing them. The DPRK delegation clearly identified the 5-MWe reactor
as a nuclear weapons facility. While they said they wanted to maintain
a civil nuclear program, they also acknowledged that most of their
nuclear programs are weapons-related.
We and other parties have questions about the DPRK proposal,
including what the scope of the freeze and dismantlement would be.
Again, inclusion of the DPRK's uranium enrichment program is critical.
We will continue to seek answers through the Six-Party process, though
we have made clear all along that we are not talking for the sake of
talking and that we expect tangible progress to be made. To that end,
the parties agreed to hold the fourth round of talks by the end of
September and a working group meeting in the interim as soon as
possible to prepare for the fourth round.
North Korea's Choice
Mr. Chairman, the Six-Party talks offer North Korea the opportunity
to improve its relations with the United States and Japan, to end its
self-induced political and economic isolation, and to harness the
benefits of normal international trade and aid, including establishing
relationships with the international financial institutions.
We have outlined what is necessary to transform our relations with
the DPRK, just as we have with another nation long isolated in the
international community, Libya.
President Bush in his February 11 remarks to the National Defense
University called on other governments engaged in covert nuclear arms
programs to follow the affirmative example of Libya. The Libyan case
demonstrates, as President Bush has said, that leaders who abandon the
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means will
find an open path to better relations with the United States and other
free nations. When leaders make the wise and responsible choice, they
serve the interests of their own people and they add to the security of
all nations.
We have discussed Libya's example with our North Korean
counterparts, and we hope they understand its significance.
Of course, to achieve full integration into the region and a wholly
transformed relationship with the United States, North Korea must take
other steps in addition to making the strategic decision to give up its
nuclear ambitions. It also needs to change its behavior on human
rights, address the issues underlying its appearance on the U.S. list
of states sponsoring terrorism, eliminate its illegal weapons of mass
destruction programs, put an end to the proliferation of missiles and
missile-related technology, and adopt a less provocative conventional
force disposition.
Against the backdrop of the Six-Party talks, the DPRK is
undertaking measures in response to its disastrous economy. It is too
soon to evaluate the nature or impact of these steps, but we hope they
will serve as a foundation upon which to build improved economic
relations with other countries in the future. By addressing the world's
concerns about its nuclear programs and other issues, the DPRK would
have both new resources and opportunities to pursue policies for
peaceful growth in the region that is already perhaps the world's most
vibrant, East Asia.
The international community ultimately will gauge the results of
the Six-Party talks to assess the seriousness of the DPRK's professed
willingness to give up its nuclear weapons programs. Although I remain
optimistic on where the talks could lead, I personally could not say at
this point that the DPRK has indeed made the strategic calculation to
give up its nuclear weapons in return for real peace and prosperity
through trade, aid and economic development. My hope is that the
serious and extensive discussions with the United States, the Republic
of Korea, Japan, China and Russia will convince the DPRK that a truly
denuclearized Korean Peninsula is its only viable option.
I believe that diplomacy is the best way to overcome North Korea's
nuclear threat and that the Six-Party process is the most appropriate
approach. Our aim is to fully and finally resolve the nuclear problem,
not to implement half measures or sweep the problem under the rug for
future policy makers to deal with. We are pursuing this course
patiently and are committed to its success.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. DeTrani and I
look forward to responding to your questions.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Kelly.
We have two distinguished panels today and we have a number
of interested Senators. So I am going to suggest our first
round of questions be limited to 7 minutes to each of us, and
we will see how that proceeds. There may be opportunities for
further questions if Senators wish to pursue that.
Secretary Kelly, I would begin by following through your
reasoning today that the North Koreans might be willing to
engage in a freeze of activities. As you say, many questions
are still to be raised.
Is there an overall feeling on your part or among the group
of six that there is a possible formula for the dismantlement
and destruction of the weapons, in return for assurances of
non-aggression, some degree of fuel oil, which you have
mentioned, heavy oil, perhaps other energy resources? There is
some now being provided, as you have testified before, by the
Chinese, in substantial amounts. There has been some measure of
nutrition, even going beyond that provided by the World Food
Program of the U.N. and other humanitarian efforts, with a more
substantial regularization of both aid and potential trade. Is
this conceivably on the horizon as a strategy for the regime in
North Korea, that they would be prepared ultimately, perhaps
not this month or the next month, but down the trail, to move
to that kind of framework?
Mr. Kelly. Mr. Chairman, I think that is very much on the
possible horizons. It is one of the strengths of the six-party
talks that, as all of the parties take their individual
positions, there is a unanimous agreement on the goal of
denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. In particular, the
other colleagues, the four other countries involved, made clear
to North Korea what these opportunities can be in the future.
And other countries do too. In particular, the EU, the British,
Australia, a host of other countries have joined us in seeking
to persuade North Korea that its real security is best served
by turning from nuclear weapons. But as I said, it is not clear
that that choice has yet been made.
The Chairman. What sort of possibilities could the British,
the EU, and others outside the six offer? Do you know that they
have been involved in talks or public proposals of any sort?
Mr. Kelly. I think these are not so much in terms of public
or specific proposals, but simply on the very low level of
development assistance that has come. Over the last 10 years,
there has been a considerable opening of North Korean contacts
with European and other countries. That really did not exist at
all 10 years ago, and also with South Korea and Japan. It is
very clear, for example, with Prime Minister Koizumi's recent
visit to North Korea, that he had serious concerns about
abduction issues. But he made clear that the resolution of the
nuclear issue was absolutely crucial to normalization of the
relationship of Japan and the development of economic
cooperation, which is a kind of code word for very substantial
direct aid.
The Chairman. Have the United States' relations with the
Chinese continued to strengthen because of mutual interests in
this area?
Mr. Kelly. I will leave to others to judge whether our
overall relationship has strengthened, although I think it is
in pretty good shape. But China is always pursuing its own
interests, and they rarely coincide exactly with those of ours.
I think they share our determination that nuclear weapons have
no role on the Korean Peninsula, but their pace and enthusiasm
for pursuing the solution is not exactly the same as ours.
The Chairman. I believe that at a previous hearing you
testified that one of the byproducts of the six-party talks was
considerable visitation among the other five, or among those
that are in Asia, even beyond the six-party talks. They have
been thinking about Asian security, about the fact that Asia
has never had a NATO or some organization of formal character.
Such might be useful and, in fact, necessary in the future.
This is not the purpose of the six-party talks. It is to deal
with the nuclear dilemma in North Korea. Can you comment any
further upon what you perceive to be the development of our
overall strategy for organization of security in Asia arising
from these contacts?
Mr. Kelly. The six-party talks are definitely a step
forward. It is absolutely unprecedented to have any kind of a
multilateral security dialog in Northeast Asia. In fact, the
whole process is in its infancy, even though it is some 10, or
I guess 11 years old now, that the ASEAN regional forum has
proceeded. This in turn is giving a little more strength to the
ASEAN regional forum as well. So we have got people talking to
each other. We have very active participation within the six-
party talks of each of these parties, and each one of the
parties has a very direct and national interest in a
satisfactory outcome to this. So there are, I think, some
possibilities for broadening it in the future, but for now the
focus is on the nuclear weapons issue on the Korean Peninsula.
The Chairman. Are there current indications of humanitarian
crisis in North Korea beyond those that unfortunately are
normal, namely a lot of very hungry people?
Mr. Kelly. I would say that is about right, Mr. Chairman.
There continue to be lots of hungry people. There have been
economic changes. I would not go so far as to call them reforms
in North Korea. These are creating new groups and new sets of
winners and losers. It is not at all clear what that outcome is
going to be, but there certainly are many people in need and a
completely rusted-out industrial structure.
The Chairman. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
There is a security dialog going on, obviously, but it also
seems to be bilateral. The North Koreans and the South Koreans
have decided not to wait around, and the North and the Japanese
have apparently decided not to wait for outcomes. I mean, they
are bilateral. The Prime Minister of Japan has indicated he
hopes to have normalization of relations--correct me if I am
wrong--with North Korea within a year, if I am not mistaken. I
think that is what I heard. And the South Koreans have stepped
up considerably their effort to deal bilaterally with the North
regardless of what we are doing. It seems that way anyway. That
is the impression.
So my question is, first of all, is the impression correct?
And second, if it is, why is that occurring?
Mr. Kelly. It is occurring because of the variety of
contacts that have developed over the years. Yes, Prime
Minister Koizumi hopes to begin the process of normalizing the
relationship with Japan and North Korea.
Senator Biden. He has begun that. Not he hopes to. He has
begun that.
Mr. Kelly. He has not begun it. He has made it clear that
without resolution of the nuclear weapons issue, that it will
not occur.
Senator Biden. No, no, but my question is there is a
question of beginning and ending. He has begun it. He said that
in order to end it, he has to--the idea that it is static like
our position has been, static--Korea you must do the following
things before we do anything--that is not the position that has
been taken by Tokyo.
Mr. Kelly. Or the position by the United States, Senator.
Senator Biden. It has not been our position?
Mr. Kelly. It is not our position.
Senator Biden. It has not been our position?
Mr. Kelly. It has been erroneously reported. It has never
been our position that North Korea has to do everything before
we do anything.
Senator Biden. No, I understand that. But it said they had
to do a number of things. In the past, we made it pretty clear
that there would be no action taken by us at all unless there
were certain preconditions met by North Korea. Now your
statement--and correct me if I am wrong. I may be wrong. It
sounds as though that we are ready to phase in a negotiating
structure that we were not prepared to do before. Or am I wrong
about that?
Is something different here? I guess what I am trying to
get at here is it seems as though the atmosphere has changed.
Is it because all of a sudden North Korea has had an epiphany,
or is it because South Korea and Japan are worried you guys are
taking them down a road they do not want to get on and they are
going to go on their own path? I want to just be as blunt as we
can here. What is the deal? What has happened? Has anything
changed?
Mr. Kelly. What has changed I think is that North Korea has
come to accept that the six-party process is what is going to
resolve the issue and that it is one that they cannot really
escape. I think they recognize that dealing with the United
States is not sufficient, that there are going to have to be
arrangements with the other countries.
I might add, Senator Biden, that the Japanese in particular
and the South Koreans in particular have been completely
steadfast as we would want our allies to be during the six-
party talks. The commitment to complete denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula is very solid with all of these things.
Now, the bilateral discussion----
Senator Biden. That has always been their position. Right?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir, and it has not changed or weakened at
all.
What we have got is a much deeper and broader set of
contacts with North Korea that very much serve to convince
them, or we expect will serve to convince them, that their
interests are in bringing this nuclear weapons issue, not to
mention the other important issues, to a full resolution.
Senator Biden. I want to talk about the other issues. In
your testimony you included a long list of actions in addition
to eliminating the nuclear weapons program that North Korea has
to take to achieve ``a wholly transformed relationship with the
United States, including issues relating to human rights, state
sponsorship of terrorism, other WMD programs, missile
proliferation, and conventional force disposition.'' Now, that
might suggest--and I want to know whether it does--that even
complete nuclear disarmament would not get North Korea much
from the United States other than security assurances. It also
seems a bit different from Dr. Rice's statement that ``North
Korea will be surprised to see how much will be possible if it
gives up its nuclear programs.''
Have you spelled out to the North Koreans just what aspects
of a transformed relationship can be expected from each of
these steps in addition to the process laid out for disarmament
of its nuclear program? In other words, where do diplomatic
relations, Nunn-Lugar-type assistance, trade relations,
economic assistance fit into the various cycles of improvement
of all these outstanding issues?
Because it seems to me you are--and I am not suggesting you
should or should not, but you have moved the goalposts a little
bit. Anybody listening to this hearing would assume we are
talking about nuclear disarmament and their missile program.
But we are back to where the President was at the outset, and
it is consistent that at the very beginning he threw in its
conventional forces. There had to be negotiation on that. Now
is that a precondition for any significant change in our
position that conventional forces, as the President said 2
years ago, have to be moved out of range of Seoul and so on,
the redisposition of the conventional forces? What is the deal
here?
Mr. Kelly. The deal is that the six-party talks are focused
on the nuclear weapons issue. The full dimensions of a possible
future relationship--and I very much agree with Dr. Rice's
statement about the things that are potentially possible--
recognize that there are other serious issues that are going to
have to be resolved. The nuclear weapons issue is the most
immediate and, I would argue, the most serious individual
issue. Ballistic missiles, conventional forces, human rights
issues are of concern.
Senator Biden. Do all of those have to be resolved for us
to get to the point to give security assurances?
Mr. Kelly. No, sir.
Senator Biden. Now I got it. So I will conclude, Mr.
Chairman.
The U.S. proposal in Beijing--and this is what I am trying
to figure out, whether it really represents any change at all.
It seems as though it did. The Beijing proposal seems to
represent a change from past practices. The administration,
based on your testimony and what I think was said in Beijing at
the last meeting, has accepted the notion that North Korea
should be offered explicit incentives in exchange for a
commitment for nuclear disarmament.
Previously the administration has called that blackmail.
Previously in testimony before this committee we were told
flatly that any--any--offer of explicit incentives in return
and exchange for disarmament constituted blackmail.
Now, am I correct? Have there been explicit incentives laid
on the table for the North Koreans that suggest they are
available if they in fact commit to verifiable nuclear
disarmament?
Mr. Kelly. What we have done, Senator Biden, is to fill in
the details of the framework that has really always been out
there. There is a question about rewards for illegal and
treaty-violating activity, and we certainly do not propose to
offer such rewards. But we do----
Senator Biden. Excuse me. What does that mean? I am
confused what you mean. Is an incentive not a reward? Are you
making a distinction between----
Mr. Kelly. It means that we are not in negotiations
multilaterally or bilaterally to offer sufficient money. When
the former President of South Korea visited North Korea in June
of the year 2000, it now turns out that payments well in excess
of $100 million were made immediately before that and
facilitated that process. The United States has no intent of
joining with any such thing now or in the future.
Senator Biden. Non-aggression is not a reward. Security
assurance is not a reward. When you talk reward, you mean only
money.
Mr. Kelly. No. There can be other tangible parts of
rewards. But incentives or benefits that recognize the change,
particularly the multilateral context of this, makes that
particularly useful. The United States may not offer tangible
benefits, but our allies may see fit within their relationships
to provide----
Senator Biden. Security assurance is not a tangible
benefit?
Mr. Kelly. Security assurance is not a tangible benefit. A
security assurance is a condition that would convince anyone
that disarming is in their interest.
Senator Biden. No, I got it. I am just trying to understand
the vocabulary. There are revenue enhancements and tax
increases. This is Washington. I am talking to the State
Department. I have got to know the vocabulary, and I understand
the vocabulary now. Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Secretary Kelly, welcome. Mr. DeTrani, thank you for
appearing this morning.
The first question. Do you believe the U.S. Presidential
election has any influence or bearing on the willingness of
North Korea to negotiate or come to any agreements?
Mr. Kelly. It is not at all clear that this is the case,
and in fact North Koreans have said that it is not. But who
knows what they dream. What we have repeatedly told them--and I
very much believe it--is that no American administration is
going to accede to a nuclear-armed North Korea.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
How big a part is human rights in the process? You have
mentioned it a couple of times in your remarks in response to
the previous questions. Centerpiece of negotiation, part of
many dynamics? Where would you put human rights?
Mr. Kelly. I would put human rights as part of the larger
part of our future relationship with North Korea in the same
category with other problems which would include ballistic
missiles, conventional forces, other weapons of mass
destruction. Human rights are a very important issue, but the
principal and almost entire focus of the six-party talks has
been on the nuclear weapons issue. So whether it be Japanese
abductions or human rights issues, the list of terrorist
states, these are items that we are going to have to address in
great detail later on.
Senator Hagel. How stable do you think Kim Jong-il's regime
is?
Mr. Kelly. I do not know, Senator Hagel, and I do not think
anybody around here knows. It is obviously a lot more stable
than many people thought 10 years ago, but it is a strange kind
of stability in which the economy seems to get worse and worse,
more and more hungry people, deaths continue, Koreans in
considerable numbers seek to leave the place. But there is a
unique authoritarian police state that exists there and it has
so far managed to survive.
Senator Hagel. What lessons do you think, if you think
there are any lessons, that we can learn or apply from Iraq to
our current dealings with North Korea?
Mr. Kelly. Iraq is a very different situation. North Korea
does not have the panoply of U.N. resolutions violated that
Iraq had. It is in many ways as difficult or more difficult an
intelligence target. It has, once again, a particular location
in that South Korea, its 47 million people and some 13 million
to 15 million people that live in the Seoul area are literally
within artillery range of the demilitarized zone. So the stakes
of possible combat and the potential for loss of life is in my
view even greater than it was in Iraq.
Senator Hagel. What lessons, if any, do you think the North
Koreans have taken from the current situation in Iraq? Start
with our invasion of Iraq. Do you think that has an effect on
their negotiating position, how they see the world, how they
see the United States?
Mr. Kelly. It would just be speculation to say what they
have done other than some rhetorical points that keep turning
up in the propaganda one way or another. In particular, the
North Koreans try to say that all their nuclear weapons
aspirations have somehow sprung up over the last 2 or 3 years,
and that simply is not the case.
Senator Hagel. Do you see a role for the United Nations in
the negotiations in North Korea? And the next follow-on
question would be, is there a role anywhere in the near future
in North Korea for the United Nations?
Mr. Kelly. There could be and probably should be a role for
the United Nations Security Council with respect to North
Korea, although as long as the multilateral process is
proceeding along, it is likely that China in particular will
not be very interested in having the Security Council pursue
it. It is obvious that there is great sensitivity in Pyongyang
to United Nations involvement in that. So at the moment, the
Security Council is seized of the matter, which means it has
been sitting on it for a couple of years.
Senator Hagel. You mentioned some of the conditions
regarding North Korea's nuclear capacity and verification you
have mentioned a couple of times obviously is a key component.
Is it your sense that we, in fact, can design a verifiable
monitoring regime for North Korea? I assume it is, and if you
could elaborate on that.
By the way, Mr. DeTrani, if you have any comments on this,
you are welcome to join in.
Mr. Kelly. I am going to ask Joe DeTrani to join me on this
answer.
The answer is, of course, yes, a verification regime can be
developed. This is very much the task that the working group
has before it. But key to this, once again, is this choice by
the North Koreans to meaningfully turn away from nuclear
weapons. A solution that has inspectors racing around that
country trying to dig holes is not going to be the solution
that we need. And in the end dismantlement and removal of the
nuclear weapons program is going to be essential to its
resolution.
Senator Hagel. Well, that is obviously why I asked the
question because you have just said it and we all understand
it, and this is the real world. It seems to me this is a key
component of anything, and it is probably the most difficult
component. The reality of it is something I know you are
dealing with, and Mr. DeTrani is going to amplify on your
points.
But I think the more we all can understand this and where
we are going, it not only deals with an expectation dynamic--
that is part of, I think, our problem that we have today in
Iraq--but expectations are important not only to the people who
live there, but the guarantor of a country's security like we
are right now in Iraq. What did we expect 15 months ago where
we are today? Now is the time to lay that out as much as we can
in our dealings with North Korea, which you know I know, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. DeTrani.
Mr. DeTrani. Sir, I just want to add something, Assistant
Secretary Kelly, that that is part of what we do in the working
group. We look at all the issues. Indeed, verification is a
critical issue because there is so much we do not know about
North Korea, and there has to be a commitment on their part to
move toward denuclearization rather than, as Mr. Kelly
indicated a few minutes ago, to have a covert uranium
enrichment program. That is not the spirit. We would need
cooperation on their part. We would need transparency on their
part, and down the road we are looking at the IAEA and others
who have a great deal of expertise in North Korea to
participate in a process of that nature. But it would have to
be a strategic decision taken by Kim Jong-il at the highest
levels to commit to denuclearization and not to come up with,
if you will, a covert program to ensure they have a nuclear
card in the longer term.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Feingold.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold
I thank Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden for holding this important
hearing, and I thank Assistant Secretary Kelly, Mr. DeTrani, and all of
the private witnesses for being here today.
It seems that every few months, we have another hearing focused on
North Korea and the North Korean pursuit of nuclear weapons. Each
hearing is a reminder of how serious this issue is. Each hearing is an
opportunity. to reflect on North Korea's alarming history of
proliferation. And as time passes between each hearing, North Korea has
increasing opportunities to develop its nuclear weapons program, and
potentially to provide nuclear know-how or technology to others. Yet,
as time passes, it is not at all clear that the United States gains any
particular negotiating leverage.
What is fundamentally different about the situation in North Korea
today as opposed to the situation in North Korea a year ago--besides
the likelihood that the North Koreans now possess more nuclear weapons?
North Korea's nuclear defiance is an urgent national security issue.
But since October of 2002, the administration has failed to effectively
address this problem, and I believe has failed to make this issue the
priority that it should be. I hope that the last round of talks created
some new momentum, but given the gravity of the situation before us and
the amount of time that has passed, I am not satisfied with the faint
wisps of fragile hope to be found in the latest rhetoric. I am
interested in concrete progress that advances our security.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you
again, Secretary Kelly.
We have been dealing with this aspect of this issue for
over a year and a half now. I wonder if you could just say a
little bit about what good time does for us. Is it not the case
that as time passes, North Korea could be adding to its nuclear
arsenal? And what do you see as any additional leverage that
the United States gains as time passes?
Mr. Kelly. Time is certainly a valid factor in this.
Obviously, it would be better to reach an agreement sooner. We
do not know the details, but it is quite possible that North
Korea is proceeding along developing additional fissionable
material and possibly additional nuclear weapons. The idea is
that we have to have an agreement that in fact really ends this
program, and that is the challenge of peaceful solutions
through diplomatic means.
Senator Feingold. Are you confident that North Korea cannot
transfer nuclear capacity or know-how to other actors while we
wait for the next round of talks, Mr. Secretary? On what would
you base that confidence?
Mr. Kelly. I do not have any such confidence. I would note
that after a remark of April 2003 by a North Korean
interlocutor that it might be possible for them to transfer
nuclear material or weapons, that they have gone quite the
other direction and, in fact, in response to specific
questions, have repeatedly stated that they would not transfer
nuclear weapons or fissionable material to any other
destination outside of their country. But that assurance, like
all the assurances from North Korea, has, unfortunately, not an
unlimited value.
Senator Feingold. I assume that part of the North Korean
strategy at these talks is to drive a wedge between other
parties at the talks. How do they try to do this? Have they had
any success at it? You could interpret the bilateral efforts of
South Korea and Japan to suggest that they may have had some
success in this regard. Could you comment on that?
Mr. Kelly. Senator Feingold, I do not see the bilateral
efforts that Japan and North Korea have and that South Korea
and North Korea have as undercutting our efforts in any
respect. I see them as enhancing our efforts. This is something
that did not exist at all 10 years ago, and I think it very
much puts us in a broader dimension of how to do it.
Yes, sir, there have been some attempts, particularly in I
think the first round of the six-party talks, but they have not
worked. The fact is if there was any change in atmosphere in
the talks, it was because the self-isolation that was so
obvious in the first two rounds of the six-party talks was
something that North Korea was trying to avoid, but they really
could not entirely avoid it.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Finally, how do North Korean officials react when human
rights issues are raised, if you would characterize their
reaction to discussion of these issues for me?
Mr. Kelly. They refuse to discuss them. Because our focus
in these particular talks is on the nuclear weapons issue, we
have not pressed the issue beyond that.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for your answers.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Feingold.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to the
witnesses.
Maybe I will ask Mr. DeTrani since he has not had a chance
to weigh in here much.
Secretary Kelly said in his prepared statement that the
proposal the United States presented was developed in close
coordination with the Republic of Korea and Japan. So it begs
the question, why not in close coordination with Russia and the
PRC?
Mr. DeTrani. Sir, certainly Russia and the PRC were
consulted on the proposal that the United States presented at
the last round. We have had very intense discussions with the
Republic of Korea and with the Government of Japan all along,
certainly with the People's Republic of China and the Russian
Federation also.
So let me say I think we could categorize it that way
because the Republic of Korea has been very forthcoming in
proposing things. They have actually put proposals in front of
us where they have said, we would like to move on it. They have
been a bit more proactive in saying we need to put something on
the table and being very definitive. The same for the
Government of Japan. It does not mean, however, sir, that the
People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation have not
been forward-leaning. It is just that we have had more concrete
proposals by both those governments which fit in very nicely
with our game plan where we wanted to present a road map.
Knowing that North Korea is moving toward economic reforms,
knowing that they are looking for, if you will, international
legitimacy, we thought this was the time to pull all the pieces
together.
Senator Chafee. The meetings, of course, are being held in
Beijing. How important is China to our success here?
Mr. DeTrani. Extremely important, sir. Extremely important.
China is in many ways the key to success. They have a very,
very close working relationship with the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea. As we speak, their Minister of Defense is
visiting in Beijing. They have had high-level visits going back
and forth, Kim Jong-il into Beijing, and they have had senior
Chinese officials into Pyongyang. So China is very critical and
they have been facilitating the six-party process in a very
effective way, sir.
We continue to ask for more assistance. We continue to ask
the People's Republic of China to better convince the DPRK that
they need to be more forthcoming in these talks. The
relationship is close with the PRC.
Senator Chafee. My experience in dealing with officials
from the PRC is that the top priority for them is cross-strait
relations and certainly the sale of arms to Taiwan. About the
same time these talks were going on, Condoleezza Rice was over
there saying the United States will continue to sell arms to
Taiwan. As you look at our efforts to denuclearize North Korea,
to have this dynamic injected--and you just said that China is
key. So by virtue of that word, we are not going to have
success without their cooperation. At the same time, we are
kind of battling over this issue. But I will ask Mr. DeTrani. I
would like to have you answer.
Mr. DeTrani. Sir, I am going to ask Assistant Secretary
Kelly. But my quick response to that would be in all the
discussions I have had with the PRC and Jim Kelly in all our
meetings, Taiwan has never been mentioned in any of our
discussions as we work the North Korea issue. But I will look
to Assistant Secretary Kelly to elaborate.
Mr. Kelly. That is a big issue in the full bilateral
relationship, but when it comes to the six-party talks, the
Chinese are not posing that as a tactical issue in any respect.
I would also add, sir, that we consult very closely with
China and Russia, but we have a 50-year alliance with the
Republic of Korea and with Japan. We have a longstanding
practice of consulting with them on scores, if not hundreds, of
issues. That is really why the proposal was more carefully
developed with them.
Senator Chafee. I myself just think it is hard to believe
that knowing how strongly they feel about this, that it is not
a factor. At the same time we are asking for their cooperation,
we are not listening to them on this issue. But you have a
different point of view and I respect that.
Mr. Kelly. We are listening to them, Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. On the sale of arms to Taiwan?
Mr. Kelly. Oh. Well, sir, we have something called the
Taiwan Relations Act since 1979 that requires the U.S.
Government to provide, after its own assessment, necessary
defensive arms to Taiwan. Our relationship with China is based
on the three joint communiques and on the Taiwan Relations Act
which is the U.S. law.
Senator Chafee. Well, thank you. I will switch gears a
little bit.
You said that we are going to, in return for the
denuclearization, do three things: provide for some
multilateral security assurances, begin a study to determine
the energy requirements and to meet them by non-nuclear energy
programs, and begin discussions of steps to lift the economic
sanctions. In the middle of those three, what specifically can
we talk to them about on their energy needs? Help them build
dams? Get natural gas from Russia? What specifically non-
nuclear energy can we offer them?
Mr. Kelly. North Korea has a huge energy insufficiency and
problem, and it is operating in every respect. It is operating,
for example, Senator, with a grid that was put up by the
Japanese in the early part of the last century.
The light water reactor project that is now in full
suspension but that was a part of the Agreed Framework, among
its many anomalies is there was no way to connect the reactors,
if they had ever been completed, with the rest of North Korea.
So there are many non-nuclear aspects, ranging all the way from
wind power to Russian or other natural gas to South Korean
support for other kinds of non-nuclear power generation. There
is a very broad panoply, and it has not been adequately studied
and I think it would be helpful if that occurred.
Senator Chafee. Mr. DeTrani, have we gotten far enough to
think about what specifically we could help them with in their
non-nuclear energy needs?
Mr. DeTrani. Sir, we have discussed this in the working
group sessions. We get into these various issues. So we have
talked about natural gas, coal-fired plants, et cetera as
opportunities ahead for them. I think the North Koreans see it
in that light.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kelly, are you ready to put economic assistance on the
table to get rid of their nukes?
Mr. Kelly. No, sir.
Senator Nelson. Tell me why.
Mr. Kelly. We should not give in to a pricing contest, and
moreover, this is a global concern and this has got to be
resolved in a multilateral way, and a unilateral U.S. bid is
simply going to result in other bids and then an inability to
check the results.
Senator Nelson. That could certainly be done
multilaterally.
Mr. Kelly. Economic assistance from many different sources
is absolutely in prospect. That is what Dr. Rice was referring
to, I believe, when she said that they would be surprised at
all the things that would occur. From the discussions I have
had with people all around the world, the world loves a
reformed sinner, and there would be many who would be receptive
to helping North Korea's development if it turns away from
nuclear weapons and perhaps some of its other activities as
well.
Senator Nelson. Well, sometimes the sinner can be
encouraged more to reform if there are the incentives that you
are talking about. Economic assistance is one of those. Energy
supplies are another. Clearly the Chinese have an opportunity
to be part of that multilateral effort in either extending or
withholding their energy supplies. I recall they cut them off
there for about 3 days running at one point to underscore a
point.
What do you think about the Chinese? You used the words
``the pace and enthusiasm of China is lacking.'' Tell us about
that.
Mr. Kelly. I did not say it is lacking. I think I meant
that it is different from our own. China wants North Korea to
end its nuclear weapons program, but it also wants a stable
situation on the Korean Peninsula. So it tends in the direction
of positive incentives, and it is not yet clear whether
positive incentives will work.
Senator Nelson. Well, we have let all of these negotiations
drag out. I understand and commend you for everything that you
are doing, and your poker face is probably excellent as you
deal with the Chinese.
But let me ask you, what should we do? How are you going to
respond if North Korea tests a nuclear weapon or a new long-
range ballistic missile?
Mr. Kelly. The United States would respond with its allies,
as has been the case for all these years. Our alliances with
Japan and North Korea have to do with the possibility of
hostilities. A nuclear test would certainly be a remarkable
development in northeast Asian security, and I do not think I
could or should speculate on exactly what the United States
would do. But I know there would be a very strong reaction from
all of the countries involved in the six-party talks, for sure,
including China were such a thing to occur.
A long-range ballistic missile test is something that the
North Koreans have even again recently pledged to the Japanese
that they would not do. So this also would be a very
significant development if it were to occur.
Senator Nelson. Well, as you project to the future, how
long are we going to continue to allow North Korea to develop
nuclear weapons?
Mr. Kelly. We do not allow North Korea to develop nuclear
weapons, Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Well, they are developing them.
Mr. Kelly. And the day is never going to come, I very much
hope, and it will certainly never come in this administration
that we will accept or accede to North Korea as a nuclear
weapon state. I know that Japan and the Republic of Korea have
the very same view.
Senator Nelson. Of course, it is the policy of the United
States that we do not allow North Korea to develop nuclear
weapons, but by the delays that have occurred, they are
developing nuclear weapons.
Well, let me just conclude with this, Mr. Chairman. When do
you think it would be appropriate to take North Korea's
defiance of the international protocols, the resolutions, and
the laws to the Security Council?
Mr. Kelly. As I mentioned earlier, Senator, it would be
appropriate for it to go to the Security Council now. The
International Atomic Energy Agency made a report to the
Security Council at the time in 2003 when the DPRK withdrew
from the NPT. There is not a consensus in the Security Council,
however, to bring it at this time, but that could occur at any
moment when other countries than just the U.S.--it is not
within our power to bring items to the Security Council only
because we wish it.
Senator Nelson. In a couple of weeks, I expect to be with a
delegation meeting with President Hu in Beijing. What would you
like me to ask him?
Mr. Kelly. I think that you can simply ask him to explain
to you and to other Senators in his own way what China's views
are on this. Dr. Rice was in China last week, I think spoke
with President Hu about this very issue. I think you and the
other Senators will find China's views very interesting,
especially after they finish the Taiwan lecture that they will
give you.
Senator Nelson. I have heard that several times.
Mr. Kelly. You will hear it again, sir, I am afraid.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Brownback.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for holding this hearing and for your focus on North Korea.
Secretary Kelly, welcome. I appreciate all your great work
in this area. I really appreciate what the administration is
doing in holding a light up on what is happening in North Korea
and not just taking kind of an easy answer, let us put a band
aid on this and let us move on, because we have done that
before and it has failed and it has been a great problem. So I
appreciate the difficulty of what you are doing and I
appreciate you are attempting to get real answers in this.
I do, though, want to raise a series of questions about who
we are dealing with in Kim Jong-il and this regime and what we
know. You know this regime very well. You have been more
successful than anybody about getting truth out of them, to
admit things that we have alleged for years and that they have
said.
It is a terrorist state by our own definition. It is a
charter member of the ``axis of evil'' by our definition. By
the numbers I have, they have killed about 10 percent of their
own population over the last 10 years through starvation,
deprivation, about 2 million of a 22 million population, a
little under 10 percent. If you have different figures on any
of this, correct me as we go through it.
They operate a gulag system. For that, Mr. Chairman, I
would like to enter into the record at this point the summary
of a report on David Hawk's `The Hidden Gulag, Exposing North
Korea's Prison Camps,'' which I know the Secretary is familiar
with.
The Chairman. It will be included in the hearing record.
[The summary referred to follows:]
The Hidden Gulag
exposing north korea's prison camps
(David Hawk, U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)
[Following is the Executive Summary of the full report that was
released October 22, 2003]
executive summary
This report describes a number of penal institutions in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) administered by two
different North Korean police agencies: the In-min-bo-an-seong
(People's Safety Agency) \1\ and the more political Kuk-ga-bo-wi-bu
(National Security Agency). The report outlines two distinct systems of
repression: first, a North Korean gulag \2\ of forced-labor colonies,
camps, and prisons where scores of thousands of prisoners--some
political, some convicted felons--are worked, many to their deaths, in
mining, logging, farming, and industrial enterprises, often in remote
valleys located in the mountainous areas of North Korea; and second, a
system of smaller, shorter-term detention facilities along the North
Korea-China border used to brutally punish North Koreans who flee to
China--usually in search of food during the North Korean famine crisis
of the middle to late 1990s--but are arrested by Chinese police and
forcibly repatriated to the DPRK.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Before 1998, called the Sa-hoe-an-jeon-bu (Social Safety
Agency).
\2\ A Russian-language acronym for Glavnoe Upravlenie Lagerei, the
``general administration of [slave labor] camps.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Both police agencies above are involved with both repressive
systems detailed and categorized in the following pages. And both
systems involve extreme phenomena of repression that, to the
researcher's knowledge, are unique to North Korea: guilt-by-
association, lifetime sentences of hard labor for three generations of
individuals related to the purged political prisoners who are sent to
the gulag with no judicial process whatsoever; and forced abortions for
detained North Korean pregnant women forcibly repatriated from China or
the murder of their newborn infants.
Introduction. The introduction of this report outlines the
methodology, sources, and information-base used in creating the report
and contains a glossary of terms related to North Korean repression.
Part One. Part One of this report begins by describing the
phenomena of repression associated with the North Korean kwan-li-so,
most descriptively translated as ``political penal-labor colonies.'' In
the kwan-li-so, tens of thousands of political prisoners--along with up
to three generations of their families--are banished and imprisoned
without any judicial process for usually lifetime sentences. Their
sentences entail slave labor in mining, logging, and farming
enterprises in the valleys of mountainous areas in north and north-
central North Korea. The kwan-li-so are described as colonies because
they are sprawling encampments, twenty or more miles long and ten to
twenty miles wide, containing multiple, enclosed, self-contained
sections, or ``villages,'' for different categories of prisoners. Some
of the sections are for the political prisoners; others are for the
families of the presumed political offenders, so that purged political
prisoners have no contact with their imprisoned parents, grandparents,
or children.
The existence of the political forced-labor camps is denied by the
DPRK. Part One of this report also describes how the outside world has
come to know about these political penal-labor colonies, and what is
known about who the prisoners are.
One of the kwan-li-so, No. 15, at Yodok in South Hamgyong Province,
is unique in that it has a re-education section, from which small
numbers of prisoners can be released. At least four such prisoners have
been released from Yodok, fled North Korea, and were interviewed for
this report. They are profiled, along with a description of Kwan-li-so
No. 15 drawn from their accounts. Only one former prisoner is known to
have escaped from the kwan-li-so. He is profiled along with his account
of No. 14 and No. 18, where he was imprisoned. A former guard at
several kwan-li-so defected to South Korea. His story is told along
with his description of Kwan-li-so No. 22. With the exception of Kwan-
li-so No. 18, the political penal-labor colonies are administered by
the Kuk-ga-bo-wi-bu (National Security Agency).
Formerly there had been a dozen kwan-li-so, but these have been
consolidated into six or seven colonies. This consolidation and what is
known about the closed camps is briefly described. Within the last
several months, commercial satellite photographs of several kwan-li-so
have become available. Several such photographs are contained in this
report, with specific buildings identified by the former prisoners.
Part One of this report goes on to describe the second component of
the North Korean gulag: a series of smaller penal-labor camps and
penitentiary-like institutions called kyo-hwa-so. In the kyo-hwa-so, as
in the kwan-li-so, prisoners are compelled to perform hard labor--
virtually slave labor--under dreadfully harsh conditions, in mining,
logging, textile manufacturing, or other industrial projects, such as
brick- or cement-making. However, these prisoners are subjected to a
judicial process and given fixed-term sentences according to the DPRK
criminal code, after which they can be released. The kyo-hwa-so are
administered by the In-min-bo-an-seong (People's Safety Agency).
The majority of kyo-hwa-so prisoners are imprisoned because they
have been convicted of what would be in any society felony crimes. But
some prisoners are ``political'' in that they are convicted for actions
that would not be normally criminalized: one woman interviewed for this
report, for example, described being convicted of disturbing the
``socialist order'' for singing, in a private home, a South Korean pop
song.
A major phenomenon of repression associated with the kyo-hwa-so is
the shockingly large number of deaths in detention from slave labor
under dangerous circumstances and from starvation-level food rations.
Former prisoners interviewed for this report explain that many of their
fellow captives did not expect to survive long enough to complete their
sentences--and that thousands of them did not survive. States, of
course, have the right to deprive duly convicted criminals of liberty
and remove them from society. States do not have the right to deprive
prisoners of their right to food, or to work them, literally, to death.
Eight former kyo-hwa-so prisoners were interviewed for this report.
Their stories, and their accounts of seven different prison-labor
camps, are described in Part One.
Part Two. Part Two of this report describes a series of detention
facilities, administered by North Korean police forces, that are
located in areas along the North Korea-China border and used to
interrogate and punish North Koreans forcibly repatriated from China.
These facilities are called ka-mok (police-station jails) or ku-ryu-
jang (detention-interrogation facilities, typically inside a police
station). The two types of penal-labor facilities in this system are
called ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae (labor-training camps) and jip-kyul-so
(detention/forced-labor centers). Provincial jip-kyul-so are referred
to as do-jip-kyul-so.
The jip-kyul-so detention centers are facilities where both
repatriated North Koreans and low- or misdemeanor-level criminals are
held for up to six months of hard labor, for example brick-making or
local construction projects. It should be noted that many technically
illegal misdemeanor offenses are famine-motivated, for example taking
food from state storehouses or state farm fields; not showing up at
one's assigned workplace (when the North Korean production-distribution
system broke down and enterprises were no longer in production or
paying wages, many workers stopped going to their assigned jobs);
unauthorized private enterprise; unauthorized trading or economic
activity; leaving one's assigned village without authorization; or
leaving the country without authorization.
The ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae labor-training camps are even shorter-
term, more localized detention/forced-labor facilities. One former
detainee stated that, unlike the jip-kyul-so detention centers and the
kyo-hwa-so prison-labor facilities, the ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae do not
appear in the North Korean statute books. Rather, they are ad hoc
measures initiated by local authorities to cope with the overflow of
famine-related misdemeanor arrestees. Another former detainee mentioned
that all inmates in one labor-training camp were former repatriates who
were being isolated from the common-crime detainees in the provincial
detention center, so that the repatriated detainees could not tell the
common-crime detainees about the prosperity and personal freedoms
available in China.
When first repatriated from China, North Koreans are questioned in
the police jails and detention facilities about why they went to China,
what they did there, and when. More ominous questions follow, revolving
around whether the individual being questioned had any contact with
South Koreans while in China, which is deemed a political offense.
(Many North Koreans do have contact with South Koreans there, as this
part of northeast China, formerly known as Manchuria, is frequented by
South Korean businessmen, students, tourists, missionaries, and refugee
and humanitarian aid workers.) Fearing transfer to a kwan-li-so or kyo-
hwa-so,\3\ or even execution, repatriated North Koreans typically deny
having had any contact with South Koreans or exposure to South Korean
radio stations, television programs, movies, or music while in China.
But such denials often are not deemed credible by the North Korean
police, who literally attempt to beat the truth out of the repatriated
detainees. When the police are satisfied, the repatriates are
transferred to the jip-kyul-so police detention centers or ro-dong-dan-
ryeon-dae labor-training camps. This report tells the stories of nine
North Koreans forcibly repatriated from China, and the police
interrogations, detentions, and mistreatments these Koreans were
subjected to upon repatriation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Three former repatriated persons interviewed for this report
were so transferred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two phenomena of extreme repression are associated with the
treatments meted out to repatriated Koreans. First, the jip-kyul-so,
despite the shortness of sentences served there, are characterized by
very high levels of deaths in detention from inadequate food combined
with excessively hard labor--most seriously affecting those detainees
lacking nearby relatives to bring them extra food. (Many detainees,
when they become too emaciated or sick to perform hard labor, are given
sick-leave or release so that they can recover or die at home, reducing
the number of deaths in detention.) Second, in at least three places of
detention along the North Korea-China border cited by persons
interviewed for this report, North Korean women who were pregnant when
repatriated were subsequently subjected to forced abortions, or if the
pregnancy was too advanced, were allowed to deliver their babies only
to have them killed immediately after birth (based on the possibility
that the Korean women had been impregnated by Han Chinese men).
Part Three. Most of the prisoners and detainees interviewed for
this report were tortured, many horribly and repeatedly. Part Three of
this report summarizes the methods of torture endured or witnessed by
the former prisoners and detainees interviewed. It also summarizes the
testimony of eight former detainees who themselves witnessed or have
firsthand knowledge of forced abortions and ethnic infanticide.
Part Four. The concluding section of this report, Part Four, makes
various recommendations to the DRPK, to China and South Korea, as North
Korea's closest neighbors, and to other U.N. Member States in the
international community. In regards to the last, this report includes
recommendations that all intergovernmental contact with North Korea
should include discussion of improvements of human rights conditions.
Further, it makes the case for incorporating human rights conditions in
any comprehensive approach to the multiple crises that North Korea
faces with nearby and other states--security-related, political-
diplomatic, and humanitarian.
Specifically, any security and cooperation agreement for the Korean
peninsula should require that all parties, including North Korea,
demonstrate respect for human rights, including the rights of refugees
who have fled North Korea, encourage human contact, promote the
reunification of families, and provide for the free flow of
information. Additionally, verified improvements in North Korea's human
rights situation should be included in any comprehensive approach to
the Korean crises involving foreign aid to or investment in North
Korea. Any multilateral or bilateral arrangements involving foreign
investment in extraction or production enterprises in North Korea for
export to world markets should preclude the utilization of forced,
slave, or prison labor, or the evolution of a situation where
privileged workers in exclusive export zones produce for world markets,
while production for domestic consumption is based on prison, forced,
and slave labor.
Senator Brownback. I also would like to include in the
record an article by Anne Applebaum, who is an authority on
gulags, about ``Auschwitz Under Our Noses,'' where she talks
about the gulag system in North Korea being very akin to Nazi
Germany's gulag system.
The Chairman. That will be included.
[The article referred to follows:]
[From The Washington Post--Feb. 4, 2004]
Auschwitz Under Our Noses
(By Anne Applebaum)
Nearly 60 years ago last week, Auschwitz was liberated. On Jan. 27,
1945, four Russian soldiers rode into the camp. They seemed
``wonderfully concrete and real,'' remembered Primo Levi, one of the
prisoners, ``perched on their enormous horses, between the gray of the
snow and the gray of the sky.'' But they did not smile, nor did they
greet the starving men and women. Levi thought he knew why: They felt
``the shame that a just man experiences at another man's crime, the
feeling of guilt that such a crime should exist.''
Nowadays, it seems impossible to understand why so few people, at
the time of the Auschwitz liberation, even knew that the camp existed.
It seems even harder to explain why those who did know did nothing. In
recent years a plethora of respectable institutions--the Vatican, the
U.S. government, the international Jewish community, the Allied
commanders--have all been accused of ``allowing'' the Holocaust to
occur, through ignorance or ill will or fear, or simply because there
were other priorities, such as fighting the war.
We shake our heads self-righteously, certain that if we'd been
there, liberation would have come earlier--all the while failing to see
that the present is no different. Quite a lot has changed in 60 years,
but the ways in which information about crimes against humanity can
simultaneously be ``known'' and not known hasn't changed at all. Nor
have other interests and other priorities ceased to distract people
from the feelings of shame and guilt they would certainly feel, if only
they focused on them.
Look, for example, at the international reaction to a documentary,
aired last Sunday night on the BBC. It described atrocities committed
in the concentration camps of contemporary North Korea, where, it was
alleged, chemical weapons are tested on prisoners. Central to the film
was the testimony of Kwon Hyuk, a former administrator at a North
Korean camp. ``I witnessed a whole family being tested on suffocating
gas and dying in the gas chamber,'' he said. ``The parents, son and a
daughter. The parents were vomiting and dying, but till the very last
moment they tried to save the kids by doing mouth-to-mouth breathing.''
The documentary also included testimony from a former prisoner, who
says she saw 50 women die after being deliberately fed poison. And it
included documents smuggled out of the country that seemed to sentence
a prisoner to a camp ``for the purpose of human experimentation.''
But the documentary was only a piece of journalism. Do we really
know that it is true? We don't. It was aired on the BBC, after all, an
organization whose journalistic standards have recently been
questioned. It was based on witness testimony, which is notoriously
unreliable. All kinds of people might have had an interest in making
the film more sensational, including journalists (good for their
careers) or North Korean defectors (good for their cause).
The veracity of the information has been further undermined by the
absence of official confirmation. The South Korean government, which
believes that appeasement of the North will lead to reunification, has
already voiced skepticism about the claims: ``We will need to
investigate,'' a spokesman said. The U.S. government has other business
on the Korean Peninsula too. On Monday Secretary of State Colin L.
Powell told a group of Post journalists that he feels optimistic about
the prospect of a new round of nuclear talks between North Korea and
its neighbors. He didn't mention the gas chambers, even whether he's
heard about them.
In the days since the documentary aired, few other news
organizations have picked up the story either. There are other
priorities: the president's budget, ricin in the Senate office
building, David Kay's testimony, a murder of a high school student,
Super Tuesday, Janet Jackson. With the possible exception of the last,
these are all genuinely important subjects. They are issues people care
deeply about. North Korea is far away and, quite frankly, it doesn't
seem there's a lot we can do about it.
Later--in 10 years, or in 60--it will surely turn out that quite a
lot was known in 2004 about the camps of North Korea. It will turn out
that information collected by various human rights groups, South Korean
churches, oddball journalists and spies added up to a damning and
largely accurate picture of an evil regime. It will also turn out that
there were things that could have been done, approaches the South
Korean government might have made, diplomatic channels the U.S.
government might have opened, pressure the Chinese might have applied.
Historians in Asia, Europe and here will finger various
institutions, just as we do now, and demand they justify their past
actions. And no one will be able to understand how it was possible that
we knew of the existence of the gas chambers but failed to act.
Senator Brownback. You know people that have come out and I
know you have met with some that have come out of the gulag
system, as I have. We think there are somewhere around 150,000-
200,000 people in the North Korean gulag system. They operate
that type of horrific system.
They have lied or at least misled us in incredible ways on
nuclear negotiations in the past. The 1994 agreement--I believe
quoting Secretary Powell, ``the ink was not even dry and they
were looking for other sources of nuclear material.'' I have
that from one of the top defectors that came out, and I believe
it is in the public knowledge or realm at this point in time.
So this is not a trustworthy regime to negotiate with on
nuclear issues given past performance in the 1994 signed
agreement.
They are arms merchants for virtually every evil regime in
the world.
They are drug runners as a government. I held a hearing on
that.
Counterfeiting money, other items, a number of places, U.S.
currency.
Human traffickers. I have got the State Department
Trafficking in Persons report of June 2004, and Mr. Chairman, I
would like for this to be entered into the record, the page on
North Korea. Just to read it very briefly, if I could. ``Source
country for persons trafficked for the purpose of forced labor
and sexual exploitation. The DPRK operates forced labor prison
camps to punish criminals and repatriated North Koreans.
Imposes slave-like labor conditions on its prisoners.'' This is
a State Department document.
[The page of the report referred to follows:]
NORTH KOREA (TIER 3)
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) is a source
country for persons trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and
sexual exploitation. The D.P.R.K. operates forced-labor prison camps to
punish criminals and repatriated North Koreans. Thousands of North
Korean men, women, and children are forced to work and often perish
under conditions of slavery. Many nations provide humanitarian
assistance and food to the North Korean people, but deteriorating
economic conditions continue to pressure thousands into fleeing to
China, Russia, and Mongolia. The North Koreans' illegal status in other
nations increases their vulnerability to trafficking schemes and sexual
and physical abuse.
The Government of North Korea does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making
efforts to do so. The government does not recognize trafficking as a
problem and imposes slave-like labor conditions on its prisoners.
Prosecution
There are no reports that the D.P.R.K. prosecutes traffickers.
Protection
The Government of North Korea makes no effort to protect
trafficking victims.
Prevention
There are no reports of any government anti-trafficking efforts.
Senator Brownback. Kidnapers in Japan. Maybe they are
starting to get those cleared up.
Chemical weapons tests on prisoners. Now, this is only
according to the BBC and several other documents coming out. So
in my estimation, it has not risen to the level of proof yet,
but I quote here from this Anne Applebaum story of a former
administrator of a North Korean camp. `` `I witnessed a whole
family being tested on suffocating gas and dying in a gas
chamber,' he said. `The parents, son and a daughter. The
parents were vomiting and dying, but till the very last moment
they tried to save the kids by doing mouth-to-mouth breathing.'
'' Chemical testing on their own people.
They are, as I stated at the outset, a charter member of
the ``axis of evil.'' This is Kim Jong-il's regime that we are
negotiating with.
Can you really negotiate with this group? We have this
track record of what they have or are doing.
Mr. Kelly. There is no way to put a good face on the DPRK
and there is nothing you said, Senator Brownback, that I have
any evidence to deny. To the best of my knowledge, everything
you said there, or at least the vast majority of it, is
absolutely unchallenged and widely known.
Can we negotiate with them? We do not intend to negotiate
with North Korea ourselves. We believe that the multilateral
process, that the international community is very much involved
in this, and that is why we want the six-party talks or other
international fora to take that lead.
With that said, is it possible for us to be a party to any
negotiations? The answer, sir, is that it is. I had the honor
to work for the late President Reagan and he put it best:
``Trust but verify.'' If there is the verification, if there is
a dismantlement, even then we may not be 100 percent sure, but
I certainly would feel much more comfortable if the kind of
quantities, that I believe are there, of nuclear materials were
removed from North Korea.
Senator Brownback. And I would too.
But let me finish on this point. With all these human
rights abuses at the extraordinary level, comparing their gulag
with Hitler's concentration camps, tier 3 trafficking, chemical
weapons tests on their own people, 10 percent of their
population dying in the last 10 years, if we provide resources
from here for something in North Korea in exchange for their
dropping of nuclear weapons, completely verified nuclear
weapons dropping, we see it, we take it out of the country or
the Chinese, with us watching, take it actually physically out,
it is dismantled, and you are still giving money to a country
operating a gulag, operating trafficking, operating chemical
weapons tests on its own people?
That is the heart of the North Korea Freedom Act that we
have put forward that I have talked with you about is that I
cannot in good conscience say, we are going to fund something
in here, and recognize we will get a verifiable nuclear weapons
removal, when all the rest of this is going on. And we know it
is going on and it is right there in front of our eyes and we
just cannot deny it.
I really would plead with you that you tell the North
Koreans that Congress is requiring you to put the human rights
issues in this portfolio. I know they do not want to talk about
it. I would not want to talk about it if I were Kim Jong-il or
anybody in his regime, given their track record. But this is
horrific.
I have spoken to you privately about that and I will
continue to do so. I really hope that we can put that issue in
there rather than us saying we will fund this for the nuclear
weapons, given the level of other things that are going on in
that regime.
Mr. Kelly. Senator, we are not seeking funds and we have no
plans to provide funds. The one possible exception might be the
Nunn-Lugar money precisely for dismantlement of nuclear
weapons. But we are not seeking funding. We are not looking to
bribe North Korea to end its nuclear weapons state. We see this
as a very important objective, but then we have made clear that
the normalization of our relations would have to follow these
other important issues. Human rights is co-equal in importance,
perhaps even more important than conventional forces, chemical
weapons, ballistic missiles, matters of that sort.
Senator Brownback. Thank you for your work on this. I do
not want to demean it because I think you have done very
important work. But there is a level of frustration with what
is there too.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Brownback.
I have one question. I know the distinguished ranking
member has another question.
Let me just state it this way. Has the United States
clearly expressed to North Korea what actions on their part
related to the export or trade of nuclear-related materials
would have the equivalence of crossing a red line with the
United States and our allies?
Mr. Kelly. I do not know whether that is the assessment or
not. We have not talked about red lines in any direct fora.
Obviously, North Korea knows that the threat of transfer of
fissionable material or nuclear weapons would be an extremely
serious matter, or at least I expect that they know it and we
have made that clear. But exactly what the response would be
has got to remain with all options on the table.
The Chairman. Do our partners around the table share that
view of the seriousness of that export?
Mr. Kelly. I believe they do, Mr. Chairman, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. I have one last question, Mr. Chairman. It
has been prompted by the exchange between Senator Brownback,
who has done an incredible amount of work on this issue. I want
to make sure I understand.
If there was a complete, verifiable disarmament of the
nuclear program, abandonment of a nuclear program by North
Korea, as I understand your statement, we would sanction non-
U.S. participation by the other five that would provide heavy
fuel oil, that upon acceptance by the DPRK of a declaration,
the parties, including us, would provide multilateral security
assurances which would become more enduring as the process
proceeded. We would participate in a study to determine the
energy requirements. We would begin a discussion with others of
the steps necessary for lifting economic sanctions and the
steps necessary for removal for the DPRK from the list of state
sponsored terrorism. So they are the things we would be
prepared to do either sign on to others providing and not
object to and what we would participate in considering. Is that
correct?
Mr. Kelly. That is the nature of the proposal that we
offered in the last session. It may be possible that some
things would be added to that, but essentially, sir, you have
described it accurately.
Senator Biden. So these things, as we have proposed it, if
it were accepted, could go forward notwithstanding the fact
there was no alteration of North Korea's conduct relative to
the human rights abuses cited by my colleague, Senator
Brownback.
Mr. Kelly. We have not made that a condition for solving
the nuclear weapons issue, but we made it clear that it is an
issue that would have to be dealt with in terms of a
normalization of our relationship at some time in the future.
And when and how that sort of talk could begin--after all, that
was the presentation that I was taking to North Korea in the
early part of 2002.
Senator Biden. By the way, I have no doubt that the
President and the Secretary of State and all the administration
feels extremely strongly about these human rights abuses and I
have no doubt that there would be no normalization absent
remedying this, full normalization. But so I am not confused
anyway, we are making a distinction here between the full
normalization of relationships and what would flow from a
dismantlement of verifiable assurances that they were no longer
engaged in their nuclear program, that they are distinct. They
may overlap. They could be the same. But some things can move
forward based upon total verifiable disarmament of nuclear
capability, but the whole of the relationship cannot be mended
without other things occurring, as well as disarmament. Is that
a fair statement?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir. And this is really the start of the
nuclear dismantlement process that our proposal addresses in
some detail. There is much more detail that is going to have to
be filled in for this to succeed.
Senator Biden. I thank you very much.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one more
question?
The Chairman. Yes, Senator Brownback.
Senator Brownback. I very much appreciate, Senator Biden,
you getting to the bifurcation of the issue there.
Secretary Kelly, I am sure you have talked about this a
lot, about putting the human rights issues on the table now to
get them in the negotiations. It sure seems to me that that is
really the key in driving this. When we look at past
negotiations with the Soviet Union at another time, it was the
set of human rights issues at the front end of it that really
drove the radicalized change in the regime and in the country.
And these are critically important.
I understand the difficulty, but why not put these in the
first tranche and not on the bigger package of normalized
relations when you have such a horrific set and such a useful
tool actually to talk about with them?
Mr. Kelly. Human rights issues are out there, and the work
you have done, Senator, the reports that you cite are a part of
this. This is not completely ignored in other parts of the
world, although I do not think it receives the attention that
it really needs to. So the movement of refugees into China and
on to South Korea and other countries is something that goes
on. There is this in the background.
Whether or not we should make the nuclear issue co-
dependent and co-equal with the human rights issue is really a
question of tactics as to what would come first. In our
consultations with the allies and partners, they feel that it
is best to try to get movement on the nuclear weapons issue
first if only because of the additional progress that is being
made in developing ever-greater amounts of fissionable
material.
Senator Brownback. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Brownback.
Mr. DeTrani, I understand that you discuss regularly the
human rights issues. Will you describe what you are doing?
Mr. DeTrani. Mr. Chairman, that is correct. We usually are
in a working group, and certainly when we have direct contact
with our North Korean colleagues, we get into the whole panoply
of the issues, in addition to the nuclear issue. We do speak
about what you just spoke about, Senator Brownback. And
certainly human rights is right on top of the list there. Our
North Korean counterparts are very much aware of this, sir,
understanding that these issues, certainly the human rights
issue, have to be addressed as we move toward normalization.
And we see the DPRK looking toward normalization as the
ultimate goal for international legitimacy, what it means for
the economic reforms, and so forth. So the word that was used
this morning--``incentive''--there is an extreme incentive out
there for them to move on all these issues, indeed, to include
the human rights issue. With more transparency and the greater
knowledge we have about these, the more pressure on them to
rectify some of this very unfortunate behavior.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. I thank both of you for
your testimony today. We are looking forward to inviting you
again because these negotiations will continue. We really
appreciate your availability. Obviously the committee is very
supportive of your work as you proceed on behalf of our
country. Thank you for coming.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the committee. We
really appreciate the support and the intense interest that you
and so many other Senators have had at every step of this way.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
I would like to call now Dr. Carter and Ambassador
Pritchard to the witness stand.
We welcome the Honorable Ashton B. Carter, former Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, now
Professor of Science and International Affairs at the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in
Cambridge, Massachusetts. His testimony will be followed by
that of the Honorable Charles L. Pritchard, Visiting Fellow of
The Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.
Dr. Carter.
STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY; PROFESSOR OF
SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF
GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee, for inviting me to appear before you today to speak
about the implementation of a possible agreement with North
Korea for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible
dismantlement, that is, CVID, of its nuclear weapons program.
As you know, I was very much involved in the original Nunn-
Lugar program, which was a very successful effort established
by you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Nunn. It accomplished CVID in
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus and also diminished,
dismantled, and secured a large portion of the nuclear weapons
legacy of the Soviet Union inherited by Russia. These very same
methods, Nunn-Lugar methods, are at work today in Libya, in
Iraq, and in securing highly enriched uranium around the world.
We all hope that something similar can be done in North Korea.
I would like to share with you nine recommendations about
how we might do that. But before I get there, I do not want to
put the cart before the horse. I have to say that in my
estimation, we are a long way from an agreement with North
Korea on CVID. I do not know whether at this point North Korea
is susceptible to a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis
at all. President Bush is correct to give diplomacy a try
before moving to other more coercive paths, but I think we have
to look at it as only a try.
The alternatives to diplomacy are dangerous because they
could spark a violent war on the Korean Peninsula.
Additionally, they cannot be fully effective unless others join
us in implementing them. For example, economic penalties cannot
be effectively imposed on North Korea, if diplomacy fails,
unless China, South Korea, and Russia agree not to undercut
those penalties. We need international support on either path,
whether diplomatic or more coercive. This is not a matter of
getting a permission slip from anyone; it is a matter of making
our policy more effective. And we are not going to get that
support for a more coercive path unless and until the
diplomatic path has been tried and has been shown to have
failed.
The last time I appeared before this committee, I called
for a total overhaul of U.S. counter-proliferation
capabilities. I argued that President Bush was absolutely right
when he said that keeping the worst weapons out of the hands of
the worst people was the highest national security priority for
any American President. But I also pointed out that U.S. policy
in recent years has focused mostly on the worst people and far
too little on the worst weapons. We have waged a war on
terrorism but have not yet begun a parallel war on weapons of
mass destruction. In fact, the only major action taken against
weapons of mass destruction was the invasion of Iraq, which was
an action I supported, in the firm conviction that Saddam
Hussein's weapons of mass destruction would be found after the
war. But it turns out that pre-war intelligence falsely
overstated Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities.
Meanwhile, as all eyes were on Iraq, North Korea and Iran
plunged forward with their nuclear programs. Efforts to secure
materials in Russia and worldwide proceeded at their pre-9/11
bureaucratic pace, and the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of Defense and the intelligence community continued
to give inadequate attention to overhauling their counter-
proliferation programs to deal with the age of terrorism.
The most adverse of all these recent developments in
counter-proliferation has taken place in North Korea. The North
quadrupled its stock of plutonium in the most significant
proliferation disaster since Pakistan went nuclear in the 1980s
under the scientific leadership of A.Q. Khan. Letting North
Korea go nuclear would represent a security catastrophe for the
United States in no fewer than five ways.
First, it would weaken deterrence on the Korean Peninsula
and make destructive war there both more likely and more
destructive.
Second, it could lead to a domino effect of proliferation
in East Asia, as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and others
reconsider their decisions to forego nuclear weapons.
Third, it would undercut the global nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty regime.
Fourth, North Korea might well sell plutonium as it sells
ballistic missiles.
And fifth, if North Korea collapses, we will need to worry
about where its plutonium goes during the upheaval.
These last two points alone illustrate why a nuclear North
Korea is unacceptable to U.S. and international security,
because they show that proliferation to states is also a
potential route to sub-state nuclear terrorism.
For these five reasons, the United States must put stopping
the nuclear program first in its priorities in dealing with
North Korea, above reducing North Korea's conventional forces,
and above transforming its repressive political system and
backward economic system. Strategy is about priorities. These
other objectives remain important U.S. goals, but the Bush
administration is correct to put nuclear CVID at the center of
its negotiating strategy.
Unfortunately, the U.S. negotiating position has
deteriorated significantly since the crisis began in late 2002,
when North Korea's plutonium program was unfrozen and its
uranium enrichment program revealed. For the 8 preceding years,
the 8,000 fuel rods containing several bombs' worth of weapons
grade plutonium were at Yongbyon, where they could be
inspected--or, for that matter, destroyed--and were months away
from being converted into bomb form. Now they are out of
Yongbyon, location unknown, and presumably at least some of
them have been reprocessed to extract bomb-ready plutonium.
The U.S. position among other parties in the region has
also taken a turn for the worse. South Korea and China have the
power to reward and coerce North Korea--they possess carrots
and sticks that are at least as potent as ours--if they can be
persuaded to wield them in the nuclear diplomacy. But in the
absence of a clear U.S. negotiating strategy, each of these
partners has begun to go its own way.
In South Korea, a younger generation seems to have lost its
strategic bearings entirely, wishing away the North Korean
threat and even going so far as to make the astonishing
suggestion that the United States is the greater threat. The
older generation of South Korean leaders has done too little to
educate the younger generation about the South's actual
interests and responsibilities. The United States has
exacerbated this situation through 3\1/2\ years of delay in
formulating a negotiating strategy, and by its clumsy handling
of its plans to rebase U.S. forces on the peninsula.
China should apply its full weight to pressuring North
Korea to agree to a reasonable U.S. negotiating position. But
in the absence of a clear U.S. position, China has also been
looking the other way as North Korea advances its nuclear
program. In fact, China and South Korea appear to be
collaborating closely. This is a symptom of a larger trend in
East Asia, where China's power and influence grow and regional
states find themselves tempted to align with China and move
away from the United States. Our government's near-total focus
on the Middle East has kept us from countering this trend
toward the erosion of the U.S. strategic position in East Asia.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I therefore
approach my assigned task in this hearing with grave doubts.
But in the spirit of hope, allow me to make some observations
on how the Nunn-Lugar method might be applied in implementing a
denuclearization agreement with North Korea.
First, Nunn-Lugar-like assistance with CVID is a reasonable
carrot for the United States to offer North Korea. This Nation,
always loath to bribe North Korea, and burned once in the
Agreed Framework by North Korean cheating, can hardly be
expected to give North Korea large tangible rewards for
stepping back from the nuclear threshold. It is likely that
South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan will do so but not the
United States.
But the U.S. can reasonably offer two carrots. The first is
an intangible: namely, a pledge not to attack North Korea if it
foregoes nuclear weapons. This simply makes explicit what
should be our policy anyway. The second is Nunn-Lugar-like
assistance with CVID. Such assistance, like the Nunn-Lugar
program in general, should be seen as an investment in our own
security, not a reward to North Korea. Secretary of Defense
Bill Perry used to call the Nunn-Lugar program in the former
Soviet Union ``defense by other means.''
Second, while CVID must be the end state prescribed in any
agreement, as a practical matter this state will be approached
in stages. Recall that the Agreed Framework also prescribed
CVID of North Korea's plutonium infrastructure. Its uranium
provisions were not verifiable and, sure enough, North Korea
cheated on them. The problem with the Agreed Framework's
plutonium provisions was not that it did not have the right
goal, or that it approached that goal in stages. The problem
was that implementation never progressed beyond the first
stage, the so-called freeze. We need to make sure any new
agreement does not get stuck in an early stage of
implementation. The agreement will need to build in penalties
to North Korea for stalling. On our side, Congress especially
will need to support the implementation of the agreement over
time and over successive administrations until CVID is
achieved. With the Agreed Framework, first Congress and then
the Clinton administration betrayed signs of buyer's regret
soon after the agreement was signed, and this played into the
hands of North Korea's desire to stall at the freeze stage.
Third, the United States should begin program design for
CVID now. The program design should include technical
objectives and milestones, supply and construction plans,
estimated costs, and a program management structure giving
clear authority and accountability to a single U.S. official.
This last point is important. Over the history of the Nunn-
Lugar program, its projects have been implemented by Defense,
State, Energy, and Commerce. These Departments have developed
expertise in these types of projects and it would be imprudent
not to exploit it for the North Korea program. But we cannot
confront North Korea with the same bureaucratic chaos with
which the states of the former Soviet Union still contend.
The program design should be shown to the North Koreans and
their input solicited. Doing so will smooth things down the
road if an agreement is reached, and it might even whet their
appetite for such an agreement in the first place.
Obviously a program plan can only be notional at this stage
and will need to be refined as we learn more about North
Korea's nuclear infrastructure. Without a specific program
plan, it is difficult to estimate costs. But a reasonable
estimate would be that the North Korea Nunn-Lugar program would
be a factor of ten smaller than the former Soviet Union
program--that is, tens of millions of dollars per year for a
10-year period.
Fifth, by far the preferable role for congressional
oversight is to review the program plan in advance as it
considers the overall wisdom of any agreement the executive
branch reaches with North Korea. To the extent possible, we
should avoid a situation in which every stage of implementation
and every needed appropriation for assistance becomes a mini-
crisis in U.S. politics. The North will exploit such crises to
stall and re-bargain the agreement. The result will be to the
U.S. disadvantage in the long run. Well-intentioned but totally
counterproductive congressional restrictions have greatly
damaged the denuclearization effort in the former Soviet Union.
To yield results that are complete, the ``C'' in CVID, and
irreversible, the ``I'' in CVID, the Nunn-Lugar concept for
North Korea, like that for Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus,
should cover all portions of the nuclear infrastructure:
weapons and materials, production and storage facilities, R&D
centers, and the scientists and workers who populate it.
Seventh, verification, the ``V'' in CVID, will be aided by
a Nunn-Lugar approach. A cooperative effort in which the United
States is deeply involved, on the ground and in person with
North Korean technologists, will give important insights and
confidence to complement formal verification measures and
national intelligence collection.
Eighth, while in principle other nations in the six-party
talks could also provide Nunn-Lugar type assistance to
implement an agreement, it is probably preferable that the
program to implement the agreement be U.S. only. The United
States has the expertise of the existing Nunn-Lugar program
under its belt, an enormous incentive to see CVID succeed, and
a disinclination to provide other types of assistance to North
Korea that China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan might provide.
Ninth and finally, elimination of chemical and biological
weapons and ballistic missiles can be added to the agreement
and to the resulting Nunn-Lugar program, though with lesser
priority than nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons are not much
more destructive, pound for pound or liter for liter, than
conventional weapons and hardly deserve the mass destruction
designation. Biological weapons are a true weapon of mass
destruction, but the United States must formulate strong
counters against biowarfare and bioterrorism irrespective of
North Korea, and these countermeasures, if taken, will likely
provide comparable protection against North Korean bioweapons.
And ballistic missiles are a poor way for an attacker to spend
money unless they carry nuclear and biological warheads. So our
concerns about missiles end up being derivative of these
weapons. For these reasons I think it is safe to sequence these
other weapon types after nuclear weapons from a purely military
perspective.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, let me close by
stressing that policymaking and implementation are different
processes requiring different skills. Too often our policy is
brilliant, but when it comes to spending the taxpayers' money
on complex and novel technical projects, especially in foreign
lands, our performance is less than brilliant. Joint military
operations are, fortunately, an exception to this observation.
But when one considers the fumbling in the early years of the
Nunn-Lugar program in the former Soviet Union, to which I can
attest personally, the first year of the Coalition Provisional
Authority in Iraq, the first 3 years of the U.S. Homeland
Security program, one can easily see that successful
implementation is not always assured even when the policy
objectives are crystal clear. The complexity of a North Korea
CVID program based on the Nunn-Lugar precedent, together with
the inimitable qualities of the North Korean Government, mean
that implementation will require stamina and finesse on the
part of both the executive and legislative branches.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Carter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ashton B. Carter
implementing a denuclarization agreement with north korea
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
me to appear before you to discuss the implementation of a possible
agreement with North Korea for the complete, verifiable, and
irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of its nuclear weapons program. I was
deeply involved in the Nunn-Lugar program from 1991 to 1996, a very
successful effort established by the Chairman of this Committee and
Senator Nunn. The Nunn-Lugar program accomplished CVID in Ukraine,
Kazakstan, and Belarus, as well as the dismantlement and securing of a
large portion of Russia's nuclear weapons legacy from the Soviet Union.
Currently the methods it pioneered are also at work in Iraq and Libya,
and in securing highly enriched uranium around the world.
We all hope something similar can be accomplished in North Korea. I
must begin, however, by warning that in my estimation we are a long way
from an agreement with North Korea on CVID. I do not know whether at
this point North Korea is susceptible to a diplomatic solution to the
nuclear crisis at all. But President Bush is correct to give diplomacy
a try before moving to other, more coercive paths. The alternatives to
diplomacy are dangerous because they could spark a violent war on the
Korean Peninsula. Additionally, they cannot be fully effective unless
others join us in implementing them. For example, economic penalties
cannot be imposed on North Korea unless China, South Korea, and Russia
agree not to undercut them. This needed international support is not a
matter of a ``permission slip,'' it is critical to making U.S.-led
policy effective. We will not get this support unless the diplomatic
path has been tried and been shown to have failed.
The last time I appeared before this Committee I called for an
overhaul of U.S. counterproliferation capabilities. I argued that
President Bush was dead on when he said that keeping the worst weapons
out of the hands of the worst people was an American president's
highest national security priority. The worst weapons are nuclear and
biological; the worst people are rogue states and increasingly
terrorists. But I also pointed out that U.S. policy in recent years has
been focused mostly on the worst people and far too little on the worst
weapons. We have waged a war on terrorism but have not yet begun a
parallel war on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The only major
action taken against WMD was the invasion of Iraq, an action which I
supported in the firm conviction that Saddam Hussein's WMD would be
found after the war. But it turns out that pre-war intelligence falsely
overstated Iraq's WMD capabilities. Meanwhile, as all eyes were on
Iraq, North Korea and Iran plunged forward with their nuclear programs;
efforts to secure nuclear materials in Russia and worldwide proceeded
at their pre-9/11 bureaucratic pace; and the Department of Homeland
Security, Department of Defense, and Intelligence Community continued
to give inadequate attention to overhauling their counterproliferation
programs to deal with the age of terrorism.
The most adverse of all these recent developments in
counterproliferation has taken place in North Korea. The North
quadrupled its stock of plutonium, in the most significant
proliferation disaster since Pakistan went nuclear in the 1980s under
the leadership of scientist A.Q. Khan. Letting North Korea go nuclear
represents a security catastrophe in no fewer than five ways. First, it
would weaken deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and make war there both
more likely and more destructive. Second, it could lead to a domino
effect of proliferation in East Asia as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and
others reconsider their decisions to forego nuclear weapons. Third, it
would undercut the global Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.
Fourth, North Korea might sell plutonium, as it sells ballistic
missiles. And fifth, if North Korea collapses we will need to worry
about where its plutonium goes during the upheaval. These last two
points alone illustrate why a North Korean nuclear program is
unacceptable to U.S. and international security, because they show that
proliferation to states is also a potential route to sub-state nuclear
terrorism.
For these five reasons, the United States must put stopping the
nuclear program first in its priorities when dealing with North Korea--
above reducing North Korea's conventional forces, and above
transforming its repressive political system and backward economic
system. Strategy is about priorities. These other objectives remain
important U.S. goals, but the Bush administration is correct to put
nuclear CVID at the center of its negotiating strategy.
Unfortunately, the U.S. negotiating position has deteriorated
significantly since the crisis began in late 2002, when North Korea's
plutonium program was unfrozen and its uranium enrichment program
revealed. For the eight preceding years, the 8,000 fuel rods containing
several bombs' worth of weapons grade plutonium were at Yongbyon, where
they could be inspected (or, for that matter, destroyed) and were
months away from being converted into bomb form. Now they are out of
Yongbyon, location unknown, and presumably at least some of them have
been reprocessed to extract bomb-ready plutonium.
The U.S. position among other parties in the region has also taken
a turn for the worse. South Korea and China have the power to reward
and coerce North Korea--they possess carrots and sticks--that are at
least as potent as ours--if they can be persuaded to wield them in the
nuclear diplomacy. But in the absence of a clear U.S. negotiating
strategy, each of these partners has begun to go its own way.
In South Korea, a younger generation seems to have lost its
strategic bearings entirely, wishing away the North Korean threat and
even going so far as to make the astonishing suggestion that the United
States is the greater threat. The older generation of South Korean
leaders has done too little to educate the younger generation about the
South's actual interests and responsibilities. The United States has
exacerbated this situation through three and a half years of delay in
formulating a negotiating strategy, and by its clumsy handling of its
plans to rebase U.S. forces on the peninsula.
China should apply its full weight to pressuring North Korea to
agree to a reasonable U.S. negotiating position. But in the absence of
a clear U.S. position, China also has been looking the other way as
North Korea advances its nuclear program. In fact, China and South
Korea appear to be collaborating closely. This is a symptom of a larger
trend in East Asia, where China's power and influence grow and regional
states find themselves tempted to align with China and move away from
the United States. Our government's near-total focus on the Middle East
has kept us from countering this trend towards the erosion of the U.S.
strategic position in East Asia.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I therefore approach my
assigned task in this hearing with grave doubts. But in a spirit of
hope, allow me to make some observations on how the ``Nunn-Lugar
method'' might be applied to implementing a denuclearization agreement
with North Korea.
1. Nunn-Lugar assistance with CVID is a reasonable ``carrot'' for
the United States to offer North Korea. This nation--always loath to
``bribe'' North Korea, and burned once in the Agreed Framework by North
Korean cheating--can hardly be expected to give North Korea large
tangible rewards for stepping back from the nuclear threshold. It is
likely that South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan will do so, but not
the United States. But the U.S. can reasonably offer two carrots. The
first is an intangible: namely, a pledge not to attack North Korea if
it foregoes nuclear weapons. This simply makes explicit what should be
our policy anyway. The second is Nunn-Lugar-like assistance with CVID.
Such assistance, like the Nunn-Lugar program in general, should be seen
as an investment in our own security, not a reward to North Korea.
Secretary of Defense Bill Perry used to call the Nunn-Lugar program in
the former Soviet Union ``defense by other means.''
2. While CVID must be the end-state prescribed in any agreement, as
a practical matter this state will be approached in stages. Recall that
the Agreed Framework also prescribed CVID of North Korea's plutonium
infrastructure (its uranium provisions were not verifiable, and sure
enough North Korea cheated on them). The problem with the Agreed
Framework's plutonium provision was not that it did not have the right
goal, or that it approached that goal in stages. The problem was that
implementation never progressed beyond the first stage, the so-called
``freeze.'' We need to make sure any new agreement does not get stuck
in an early stage of implementation. The agreement will need to build
in penalties to North Korea for stalling. On our side, Congress
especially will need to support the implementation of the agreement
over time and over successive administrations until CVID is achieved.
With the Agreed Framework, first Congress and then the Clinton
administration betrayed signs of ``buyer's regret'' soon after the
agreement was signed, and this played into the hands of North Korea's
desire to stall at the ``freeze'' stage.
3. The United States should begin program design for CVID now. The
program design should include technical objectives and milestones,
supply and construction plans, estimated costs, and a program
management structure giving clear authority and accountability to a
single U.S. official. This last point is important. Over the history of
the Nunn-Lugar program, its projects have been implemented by Defense,
State, Energy, and Commerce. These departments have developed expertise
in these types of projects, and it would be imprudent not to exploit it
for a North Korea program. But we cannot confront North Korea with the
same bureaucratic chaos with which the states of the former Soviet
Union still contend.
The program design should be shown to the North Koreans and their
input solicited. Doing so will smooth things down the road if an
agreement is reached, and it might whet their appetite for such an
agreement in the first place.
4. Obviously a program plan can only be notional at this stage and
will need to be refined as we learn more about North Korea's nuclear
infrastructure. Without a program plan, it is impossible to estimate
costs. A reasonable estimate would be that the North Korea Nunn-Lugar
program would be a factor often smaller than the former Soviet Union
program--that is, tens of millions of dollars per year for a ten year
period.
5. By far the preferable role for Congressional oversight is to
review the program plan in advance as it considers the overall wisdom
of any agreement the executive branch reaches with North Korea. To the
extent possible, we should avoid a situation in which every stage of
implementation and every needed appropriation for assistance becomes a
mini-crisis in U.S. politics. The North will exploit such crises to
stall and re-bargain the agreement. The result will be to the U.S.
disadvantage in the long run. Well-intentioned but totally
counterproductive Congressional restrictions have greatly damaged the
denuclearization effort in the former Soviet Union.
6. To yield complete (the C in CVID) and irreversible (the I in
CVID) results, the ``Nunn-Lugar'' concept for North Korea, like those
for Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus, should cover all portions of its
nuclear infrastructure: weapons and materials, production and storage
facilities, R&D centers, and the scientists and workers who populate
it.
7. Verification (the V in CVID) will be aided by a Nunn-Lugar
approach. A cooperative effort in which the United States is deeply
involved, on the ground and in person with North Korean technologists,
will give important insights and confidence to complement formal
verification measures and national intelligence collection.
8. While in principle other nations in the Six-Party talks could
also provide Nunn-Lugar-type assistance to implement an agreement, it
is probably preferable that the program to implement the agreement be
U.S.-only. The United States has the experience of the existing Nunn-
Lugar program under its belt, an enormous incentive to see CVID
succeed, and a disinclination to provide the other types of assistance
to North Korea that China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan might
provide.
9. Elimination of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic
missiles can be added to the agreement and to the resulting Nunn-Lugar-
like program, though with lesser priority than nuclear weapons.
Chemical weapons are not much more destructive, pound for pound or
liter for liter, than conventional weapons and hardly deserve the
``mass destruction'' designation. Biological weapons are a true WMD,
but the United States must formulate strong counters against biowarfare
and bioterrorism irrespective of North Korea, and those
countermeasures--if taken--will likely provide protection against North
Korean bioweapons. Ballistic missiles are a poor way for an attacker to
spend money unless they carry nuclear or biological warheads, so our
concerns about missiles end up being derivative of these weapons.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, let me close by
stressing that policymaking and implementation are different processes
requiring different skills. Too often our policy is brilliant but when
it comes to spending the taxpayers' money on complex and novel
technical projects, especially in foreign lands, our performance is
less than brilliant. (Joint military operations are fortunately an
exception to this observation.) But when one considers the fumbling in
the early years of the Nunn-Lugar program in the former Soviet Union
(to which I can attest personally), the first year of the Coalition
Provisional Authority and ``stability operations'' in Iraq, and the
first three years of the U.S. Homeland Security program, one can easily
see that successful implementation is not always assured even when the
policy objectives are crystal clear. The complexity of a North Korea
CVID program based on the Nunn-Lugar precedent, together with the
inimitable qualities of the North Korean government, mean that
implementation will require stamina and finesse on the part of both the
executive and legislative branches.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Carter.
Ambassador Pritchard.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES L. PRITCHARD, VISITING FELLOW, THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Ambassador Pritchard. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
the opportunity to speak here today. I am very pleased that
this committee has taken the lead in educating the American
public on such a critical issue.
You have asked me to address the energy component of a
theoretical resolution of the current nuclear crisis on the
Korean Peninsula. While I am not an energy expert per se, I did
have the opportunity to serve as the U.S. Representative to the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization for about 2\1/
2\ years. So I am going to use that as a springboard to move
forward to answer your question. But first, I thought I would
review a little bit why energy is so important in this
particular situation and why I think it is going to be critical
in the resolution of anything that we are able to achieve.
In 1985, the former Soviet Union was able to get the North
Koreans to agree to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
in exchange for the concept that Moscow would sell to North
Korea four light water reactors [LWRs] for the provision of
energy. That particular reactor that went into the NPT was a 5
megawatt reactor that Mr. Luse and I visited this past January.
It is now back on line. It originally came on line in 1986 and,
as we later found out, was taken off line for several months
between 1989 and 1990 while the North Koreans removed several
hundred spent fuel rods and ultimately extracted enough
plutonium to create perhaps one or two nuclear weapons.
That same reactor was ultimately covered in the 1994 Agreed
Framework which froze the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. It
was shut down and the spent fuel rods removed and safely stored
under IAEA supervision. As part of the negotiated deal, the
United States pledged to organize under its leadership a
consortium to finance and to supply two light water reactors
and provide interim fuel in the form of heavy fuel oil until
the first light water reactor came on line. In practice, the
South Koreans pledged to finance 70 percent of that light water
reactor operation while the Japanese pledged a dollar amount of
$1 billion. It did not quite add up to 100 percent, but it was
close. For our part, for the United States' part, we pledged to
organize and to supply the heavy fuel oil that was calculated
by what was going to be the foregone amount of energy that the
North Koreans would lose by freezing their nuclear facilities,
both the 5 megawatt and what they calculated was under
construction at the time, a 50 megawatt reactor and also a 200
megawatt reactor. That amount was set at 500,000 metric tons of
fuel oil per year.
Following Assistant Secretary Kelly's trip to Pyongyang in
October of 2002 to confront North Korea over their secret
highly enriched uranium program, I led an effort as the U.S.
Representative to KEDO, upon instructions, to suspend KEDO's
provision of heavy fuel oil to North Korea until there was a
resolution of the HEU program. We later then suspended the
construction on the two light water reactor programs.
What happened in rapid succession after that was the North
Koreans' response to that November 2002 suspension of heavy
fuel oil was for the North Koreans to declare that the United
States had effectively killed the Agreed Framework and they
then began to toss out the IAEA inspectors, as you know, and
began to restart their 5 megawatt reactor in January 2002,
unfreezing their facilities at Yongbyon. Their initial
rationale that they provided me was they needed to provide
energy as a replacement for the heavy fuel oil that had been
suspended.
In this latest round of six-party talks, North Korea is
reported to have demanded that the United States, at the point
that the freeze goes into effect, take part in energy aid of
some 2 million kilowatts, in addition from removing them from
the list of state sponsors of terrorism and lifting the
economic sanctions as part of its reward for freeze program.
This gap, I would point out, between the United States and
others may simply be termed as something that would be
predictable at this stage of negotiations and not something I
would be extremely concerned about. North Korea is attempting
to devalue the U.S. offer while they increase the demand that
it is making for its own settlement. But more importantly, it
highlights the important role that energy plays in any
settlement, particularly from a North Korean point of view.
What I also need to do at this point is to point out to
you, before we get any further into this discussion on energy,
that there are several private and quasi-official efforts
proceeding in the area of possible provision of energy to North
Korea. One of these efforts involves the United Nations
Secretary General's Special Envoy to North Korea. I will leave
it to him to explain how, if at all, his efforts have been
coordinated in the ongoing multilateral talks and how it may or
may not support a negotiated settlement.
What is clear, Mr. Chairman, is that North Korea has a
severe energy shortage that has affected all aspects of
national and individual life. Industrial capacity is down.
Electricity for agricultural use is insufficient. Basic
necessities of life, such as heating and electricity, are
unreliable. This was the same situation that U.S. negotiators
used as leverage in 1994 that led to the Agreed Framework and
it is the same situation that can provide U.S. negotiators a
similar level of leverage today.
Energy that was supplied to North Korea, as a result of the
Agreed Framework, was both short- and long-term. It was
controlled and reversible in the event North Korea reneged on
its commitments. As I mentioned earlier, we suspended further
deliveries of near-term energy assistance in the form of heavy
fuel oil in November 2002 and later suspended the longer-term
energy assistance in the form of LWR projects in December this
past year. It is appropriate that future deliveries of energy
that are part of a diplomatic resolution of the current crisis
likewise be phased and tied to North Korean performance of its
objectives and obligations.
That being said, the situation today requires full
consideration be given to all variables we face. For example,
it would be easy from an American point of view to declare the
Agreed Framework dead, ending any and all support of the LWR
project at Kumho. I believe that would be short-sighted. While
personally I do not envision any scenario in which the current
LWR project is completed as originally contemplated and the
keys of an operational LWR nuclear facility turned over to
Pyongyang, I do think we must look further down the road to a
point in time when reunification of North and South Korea is a
reality. My assumption is that when the time comes, a reunified
peninsula would be ruled by a democratic government allied to
the United States. That reunified nation, let alone the
projected needs of the current Republic of Korea, will have
vastly greater energy requirements. It stands to reason that
some of that energy may well be supplied by nuclear facilities
yet to be built. In that regard, I can see value to preserving
the current LWR work at Kumho or even advancing it under a
formula that keeps control in the hands of the ROK or some
other international entity until reunification occurs.
Since I have mentioned KEDO and the LWR project, let me
continue on that theme, if I may. I must confess that when I
worked on the National Security Council for about 5 years, I
functioned as the deputy to Ambassador Chuck Kartman who first
as the chief negotiator and concurrently as the U.S.
Representative to KEDO urged me to be more fully involved with
KEDO. I viewed that as a tar pit and did my best to stay away
from it to my regret, for as you know, I succeeded him in that
job as U.S. Representative to KEDO.
What I learned very quickly, once in that job in May 2001
and had reinforced over the next 2\1/2\ years, is that KEDO has
an extremely strong international staff composed of experts
from each of the consortium's countries, the United States and
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the European Union. I worked
closely with each of the consortium board members, as well as
its executive director, Ambassador Kartman. I have concluded
that KEDO as an organization is well placed to transition with
minimal effort to an organization that could contribute to the
procurement and distribution of non-nuclear forms of energy
assistance to North Korea as a part of a diplomatic resolution
to the current nuclear crisis.
KEDO has years of experience in purchasing HFO on the world
market and having it delivered to North Korea. It has
negotiated tough protocols with Pyongyang requiring
internationally acceptable behavior and the development of
responsible internal regulations governing conduct and the
rights at the LWR site at Kumho. Equally important, the KEDO
staff has established a professional, non-political
relationship in doing business with its North Korean
counterparts. Moreover, the North Koreans have had 9 years of
experience in dealing with KEDO. They have developed confidence
in the ability to work with its people, both from a policy and
operational standpoint. In addition, they have established a
bureaucratic counterpart to KEDO with enough standing in their
own system to get decisions carried out.
Before KEDO can be restructured as a tool of six-party
diplomacy, the EU needs to be brought into the current nuclear
resolution process, if only on an informal basis. As a voting
member of the board of directors, having EU approval for the
future transition of KEDO is essential. Any organization, in my
opinion, that was created to replicate KEDO's expertise would
be an unnecessary waste of time and energy.
Having established that a key element in the provision of
energy to North Korea already exists, let me turn to potential
energy packages that could be considered.
When talking about energy assistance to North Korea, you
have to expand your initial thoughts that normally turn to coal
or oil to all aspects of the energy system that would be
beneficial and therefore of value to North Korea. First of all,
North Korea's infrastructure is obsolete and inefficient. Basic
upgrades from insulating homes and businesses, to grid
improvements, rehabilitation of old plants and mines, to
construction of new power plants would play an important role
in the equivalent delivery of energy assistance to North Korea.
I think that is important.
Natural gas has been mentioned earlier. Natural gas via
pipeline from Russia is another possibility, but one that could
be part of a longer-term package. However, that has been thrown
around as though it is an easy remedy. The cost involved might
very well be prohibitive in a shorter-term solution and
therefore might necessarily be part of a longer-term solution
and very well might need to be part of a government commercial
mix or simply an entirely commercial venture.
For negotiating reasons, a phased approach providing energy
assistance is best. Near-term provision of energy could easily
come in the form of heavy fuel oil, and that is what I believe
is probably the most wise thing to do. I do not think it is
wise for the United States to exclude itself from participation
in the provision of HFO, as was explained in the U.S. proposal
today. Nor do I think North Korea would find such a proposal
acceptable. North Korea has the capacity to handle and convert
HFO to electricity if provided on a scheduled basis.
One of the problems that we have had in the past with HFO
is the delivery. We have had problems finding the money,
getting the money on time, purchasing, having it delivered.
Usually it came at the end of the calendar year and it came in
great quantities. It overwhelmed the North Korean system. They
were unable to plan and use the HFO efficiently. So any effort
to provide HFO ought to be done on a scheduled and regular
basis. It would be the most efficient thing to do.
In addition to HFO, pilot projects designed to repair
existing mines and conventional power plants could be
undertaken. One novel idea is the first construction of a new
conventional power plant could occur at Kumho, which is the
site of the current LWR project. The infrastructure at Kumho
already exists. I was there in August 2002, and I can tell you
it is a world-class facility. Moving forward on another project
using those existing facilities would save time and effort
rather than replicate them someplace else.
Longer-term projects that could be phased in as progress is
made in fulfilling non-proliferation obligations would include
transmission grid rehabilitation. As Assistant Secretary Kelly
mentioned, their grid system was created by the Japanese at the
beginning of the last century. It is dilapidated. They lose up
to perhaps 25 percent of their energy just through the
transmission over that grid system. Increases in natural gas
pipeline construction, modernization of existing facilities,
and construction of hydroelectric power plants should be
considered.
A long-term rehabilitation of the energy infrastructure
would be enormously important to South Korea. When
reunification takes place, the cost of bringing North Korea up
to minimum South Korean standards will be enormous. Any
opportunity for Seoul to get started in infrastructure
rehabilitation in North Korea before reunification would be a
welcome head start.
Key to any longer-term energy assistance, as Assistant
Secretary Kelly has pointed out, would be a serious energy
needs survey of North Korea. I would say that that survey must
be validated by South Korea.
All the programs I have mentioned have costs that have to
be calibrated to the value that the six parties must agree upon
in connection with the elimination of North Korea's nuclear
program. I do believe energy assistance will be an important
component in the eventual resolution of the nuclear crisis.
If I may, let me just reiterate and perhaps expand a bit on
some of the things that I just said in way of conclusion.
First, I think we already have an organization in existence
that could be used on short notice and that is KEDO. It
requires only that we find a way in which the European Union is
brought in in some way to the current six-party process,
whether it is as an observer or not. It has an added benefit
that Senator Brownback might find acceptable in that the
European Union probably, even though it is embryonic, has had
far better success in discussing with North Korea matters of
human rights and humanitarian affairs. They could bring that
dimension into the current process as well.
I do believe the United States should be involved. I cannot
imagine that we would want an organization that would have an
independent voice in how HFO is purchased and delivered that
does not include the United States. We would lose our influence
and leverage. I do not think, as I mentioned earlier, that
North Korea would accept anything less. It shows a less than
full commitment by the United States and it is one in which I
think on principle we ought to be involved in.
I do believe HFO is the initial way to go, and it ought to
be phased. And I also believe that it ought not to exceed the
500,000 metric tons that was originally part of the Agreed
Framework. As you do recall, the 500,000 metric tons was geared
to the plutonium portion of the nuclear program. The fact that
the North Koreans have cheated on that program, to suggest that
we would do more because there is an HEU component does smack
as though we are purchasing the HEU component rather than have
the North Koreans acknowledge their violation of the Agreed
Framework. So I do think the initial limitation should be no
more than 500,000 metric tons of fuel oil.
And I think we need to look beyond, as I mentioned, the
short term to infrastructure development. That certainly would
be of long-term assistance to South Korea. It would help in our
development of our relationship with South Korea.
The energy survey that I mentioned needs to be done. I
think it needs to be done concurrent at the initial phase, not
later at some date prior to the dismantlement or during the
dismantlement, but an initial phase in which the North Koreans
would be able to ascertain the intentions of the United States
and understand that we were serious about the longer-term
benefits of energy provision that would flow their way.
Finally, if possible, in the longer term, I would look to
expand the participation to include China and Russia. Right
now, the Chinese have their own bilateral assistance of energy
to North Korea. It would be better if a portion of that were
included in the resolution of this nuclear issue.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pritchard follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Charles L. Pritchard
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to speak today on an
important topic. I am also pleased to see this committee take the lead
in educating the American public on such a critical issue. I have been
asked to address the energy component of a theoretical resolution of
the current nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
While I do not claim to be an energy expert, per se, I had the
privilege of serving as the United States Representative to the Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) from May 2001 until
the end of August 2003. In that capacity and from my previous
experience of working the North Korean issue from the National Security
Council staff, I have had the opportunity to talk to a number of more
qualified people about what an energy component to an overall
settlement might look like.
I propose to provide you today with some thoughts on what might be
possible and to point out problems that will have to be addressed along
the way. First, let me briefly review how energy has come to play such
a prominent role in past and future dealings with North Korea.
In exchange for agreeing to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
in December 1985 and put its 5 MW(e) reactor under international
supervision, Moscow promised to sell Pyongyang four Light Water
Reactors (LWRs) for energy purposes. The existing reactor went on line
in 1986 and, as we learned later, was shut down for a few months in
1989 and 1990 while the North Koreans removed hundreds of spent fuel
rods and extracted enough plutonium for 1 or 2 nuclear weapons. This 5
MW(e) reactor was covered in the October 1994 Agreed Framework which
was designed to freeze and eventually eliminate North Korea's fissile
material production program. The reactor was shut down and its spent
fuel rods removed and safely stored under IAEA supervision. As part of
the negotiated deal, the United States pledged to organize under its
leadership a consortium to finance and supply 2 LWRs and provide
interim Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) until the first LWR came on line. The
practical breakout of responsibilities resulted in South Korea and
Japan agreeing to build and principally fund the LWRs while the United
States provided Heavy Fuel Oil. The amount of HFO was related to the
notional electrical output of the facilities that North Korea was to
freeze. That amount was set at 500,000 metric tons per year.
Following Assistant Secretary Kelly's trip to Pyongyang in October
2002 to confront North Korea over their secret Highly Enriched Uranium
(HEU) program, I led an effort as the U.S. Representative to KEDO, upon
instructions, in November 2002 to suspend further deliveries of HFO by
KEDO pending resolution of the HEU issue. In response to that
suspension, Pyongyang declared that the United States had effectively
killed the Agreed Framework and then proceeded to unfreeze their
nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. Part of Pyongyang's initial rationale
for restarting its 5 MW(e) reactor in January 2003 was for the
production of energy to replace the now suspended HFO.
In the latest round of Six Party Talks, North Korea is reported to
have demanded that the United States, at the point that the freeze goes
into effect, take part in energy aid of two million kilowatts, in
addition to removing them from the list of states sponsoring terrorism
and lifting economic sanctions as part of its ``reward for freeze''
proposition.
This gap between what the United States and others may be prepared
to provide as part of an initial step toward complete resolution of the
current nuclear crisis and what the North Koreans are demanding can be
described as routine and predictable at this stage of diplomacy. North
Korea is attempting to devalue the U.S. proposal while increasing the
price it is demanding for settlement. But more importantly, it
highlights the important role energy will play in any settlement.
I must point out now before we get much further into the discussion
of energy that there are several private and quasi-official efforts
proceeding in the area of possible provision of energy to North Korea.
One of these efforts involves the United Nations Secretary General's
special envoy to North Korea. I will leave to him or others to explain
how, if at all, his efforts have been coordinated with the on going
multilateral talks and how it may or may not support a negotiated
settlement.
What is clear is that North Korea has an energy shortage that has
affected all aspects of national and individual life. Industrial
capacity is down, electricity for agricultural use is insufficient and
basic necessities of life such as heating and electricity are
unreliable. This was the situation that gave U.S. negotiators certain
leverage in 1994 that led to the Agreed Framework and it is the same
situation that can provide U.S. negotiators a similar level of leverage
today.
Energy that was supplied to North Korea as a result of the Agreed
Framework was both short- and longer-term. It was controlled and
reversible, in the event Pyongyang reneged on its commitments. As I
mentioned earlier, we suspended further deliveries of near-term energy
assistance (HFO) in November 2002 and later suspended work on the
longer-term energy assistance (the LWR project). It is appropriate that
future deliveries of energy that are part of a diplomatic resolution of
the current crisis likewise be phased and tied to North Korean
performance of its obligations.
That being said, the situation today requires full consideration be
given to all the variables we face. For example, it is easy from an
American point of view to declare the Agreed Framework dead, ending any
and all support for the LWR project at Kumho. That would be short-
sighted. While I personally do not envision a scenario in which the
current LWR project is completed as originally contemplated and the
keys to an operational nuclear facility turned over to Pyongyang, I do
think we must look further down the road to a point in time when
reunification of North and South Korea is a reality. My assumption is
that when that time comes, a reunified peninsula will be ruled by a
democratic government allied to the United States. That reunified
nation, let alone the projected needs of the current Republic of Korea,
will have vastly greater energy requirements. It stands to reason that
some of that energy might well be supplied by nuclear facilities yet to
be built. In that regard, I can see value to preserving the current LWR
work at Kumho or even advancing it under a formula that keeps control
in the hands of the ROK or some other international entity until
reunification occurs.
Since I have mentioned KEDO and the LWR project, let me continue on
that theme. I must confess that when I worked on the National Security
Council staff for several years and functioned as Ambassador Charles
Kartman's deputy in negotiations with the DPRK, he tried his best to
get me involved in KEDO. To my regret, I resisted his wise counsel, for
in May 2001, I succeeded Ambassador Kartman as the U.S. Representative
to KEDO.
What I learned very quickly then and had reinforced over the next
two and half years is that KEDO has an exceedingly strong international
staff composed of experts from each of the consortium's member
countries: the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the
European Union. I worked closely with each of the consortium's Board
Members as well as its Executive Director, Ambassador Kartman. I have
concluded that KEDO, as an organization, is well placed to transition
with minimal effort to an organization that could contribute to the
procurement and distribution of non-nuclear forms of energy assistance
to North Korea as part of a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear
crisis.
KEDO has years of experience in purchasing HFO on the world market
and having it delivered to North Korea. It has negotiated tough
protocols with Pyongyang requiring internationally acceptable behavior
and the development of responsible internal regulations governing
conduct and rights at the LWR site at Kumho. Equally important, the
KEDO staff has established a professional, non-political relationship
in doing business with its North Korean counterparts. Moreover, the
North Koreans now have nine years of experience dealing with KEDO. They
have developed confidence in their ability to work with its people,
from both a policy and operational standpoint. In addition, they have
established a bureaucratic counterpart to KEDO with enough standing in
their own system to get decisions carried out.
Before KEDO can be restructured as a tool of Six Party Diplomacy,
the EU needs to be brought into the nuclear resolution process, even if
only on an informal basis. As a voting member of the Board of
Directors, having EU approval for the future transition of KEDO is
essential. Any organization that was created to replicate KEDO's
expertise would be an unnecessary waste of time and energy, in my
opinion.
Having established that a key element in the provision of energy to
North Korea already exists, let me turn to potential energy packages
that could be considered.
When talking about energy assistance to North Korea, you have to
expand your initial thoughts of oil or coal to all aspects of the
energy system that would be beneficial, and therefore of value, to
North Korea. First of all, North Korea's infrastructure is obsolete and
inefficient. Basic upgrades from insulating homes and businesses, to
grid improvements, to rehabilitation of old plants and mines to new
constructions of power plants would play a role in the equivalent
delivery of energy assistance to North Korea. Natural gas via a
pipeline from Russia is another possibility but one that could be part
of a longer-term package. However, the cost involved may dictate that
it be a mix of government-commercial if not an outright commercial
venture.
For negotiating reasons, a phased approach to proving energy
assistance is best. Near-term provision of energy could easily come in
the form of Heavy Fuel Oil. North Korea has the capacity to handle and
convert HFO to electricity, if provided on a scheduled basis. In the
past, North Korea complained that U.S.-provided HFO inevitably was
unpredictable and arrived in quantities too large for them to handle
efficiently. In addition to HFO, pilot projects designed to repair
existing mines and conventional power plants could be undertaken. The
first construction of a new conventional power plant could occur at
Kumho, the site of the current LWR project. The infrastructure at Kumho
already exists, thus shortening the time that otherwise would be
required to begin such a project.
Longer-term projects that could be phased in as progress is made in
fulfilling nonproliferation obligations would include transmission grid
rehabilitation, natural gas pipeline construction, the modernization of
existing power plants, and construction of hydroelectric power plants
throughout the country. The longer-term rehabilitation of the energy
infrastructure is of enormous importance to South Korea. When
reunification takes place the cost to bring North Korea up to minimum
South Korean standards will be enormous. Any opportunity for Seoul to
get started in infrastructure rehabilitation in North Korea before
reunification would be a welcome head start. Key to any longer-term
energy assistance would be a serious energy needs survey of North Korea
validated by South Korea.
All of the programs I have mentioned have costs that have to be
calibrated to the value that the Six Parties must agree upon in
connection to the elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
I do believe energy assistance will be an important component in the
eventual resolution of the nuclear crisis.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear
this morning and look forward to answering any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador
Pritchard.
In this round of questions, Senators will have 10 minutes.
I will commence my part of that questioning by commenting that,
Secretary Carter, you mentioned at the outset, before you got
into the constructive phase of your program, a certain degree
of pessimism about how the negotiations are proceeding. You put
that on the record, but you said that even notwithstanding
this, down the trail things still may get better.
On the other hand, without underscoring it, you mentioned
the fact that we might not be successful. There could be
military action, economic sanctions, in other words, some
activity on the part of our government or others because of the
seriousness of the proliferation problem. You have listed five
crises that occur if things remained in the status quo. That is
an ominous overtone, but nevertheless one based on your own
experience.
In view of that, I am struck by the fact that you suggested
that if a so-called Nunn-Lugar approach was to be adopted here,
one thing that we might think about would be the careful design
of that program now, as a part of the negotiations, if there is
a North Korean Nunn-Lugar program. We have a pretty good idea
of who does what in this situation. We acknowledge the
importance of the continuity of such a program. It ought not to
go through all the hazards of the programs with regard to
Russia or the Newly Independent States which you point out,
from your own experience, and which I know from my own, led to
many congressional restrictions. There were pauses during which
there was no activity at all for a while, followed by waivers
by the President to get it all going again. The problem of
dealing with the North Koreans in this matter is that they
might very well take advantage of these intervals, or of the
lack of decision, the lack of continuity on our part. Having
gone down that trail before, understanding hazards of something
that starts from scratch, we need not go through all of that
this time.
It is important that we have the organization all set up.
The North Koreans can look at it. In the negotiating situation,
as it stands, we are discussing the fact that at the end of the
trail there may be some of these discussions. This would
pertain likewise to the energy component. But the specifics of
this are not very clear for us or for them. So as a result,
this is almost bound to cause more delay in the negotiations as
the parties try to flesh it out.
To pick up a subject that you have talked about, Ambassador
Pritchard, with KEDO, we have an entity that people have heard
about and has worked. However, if we eliminate KEDO, what
happens if fuel comes again, heavy fuel or otherwise?
Let us take the worst case scenario, as I think through
your testimony, regarding the six-party talks, assume
negotiations do not work. Time goes on and there comes from one
source or another more evidence that nuclear weapons are being
formed in whatever form and, furthermore, that there may be
proliferation.
Is there not some value in having these designs set up in
light of the point you make, Ambassador Pritchard, of how this
might ultimately be integrated into the energy components or
programs of South Korea?
For example, let us say that at the end of the day the
North Korean regime is in fact overthrown. Now, many have said,
this would be a catastrophe, because if Iraq was a problem, in
terms of lack of planning about what happens the day after,
then North Korea, in its current status of starving people,
with a total lack of energy needs for development and so forth,
would be in even worse shape. Physically, who does what? In
either case, war or peace--preferably peace, because you have
the credibility of planning--there is real value in having
these designs physically available. They show that we have done
our homework. They demonstrate the concentration of American
and international expertise as we bring the process along. It
brings a new dimension, to these negotiations, as opposed to us
simply hoping at the end of September that people will be in a
better mood than they were in when we last met.
Does this thinking strike any chords with either of you?
Dr. Carter. It certainly does with me, Mr. Chairman, both
on the up side and on the down side. I am referring to the
formulation that former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry used in
the North Korea policy review, in which I participated. We
talked of the upward path and the downward path for North
Korea; that is, painting for them a portrait of how things get
better for them if they forebear in the nuclear area, but also
of how things can get worse for them, and distinctly worse, if
they do not. The essence of diplomacy of the kind in which we
are engaged is to create the fork in the road in which they
need to choose that upward path or the downward path. The more
vividly we can portray both of those paths, the more effective
our diplomacy will be. So on the upward path, I absolutely
agree with you that the more we can show them what a Nunn-Lugar
ingredient of a solution might be, what an energy ingredient of
a solution might be, the better will be our test of whether
they are willing to give up their nuclear weapons.
And as you point out, even if diplomacy does not succeed,
the North Korean regime is not going to be around forever, but
the plutonium is, or essentially forever, because plutonium
lasts 24,000 years. So even if Kim Jong-il's regime goes away,
we still have the problem of safeguarding the material his
regime made. So the plans that we devise now would be pertinent
in that scenario also.
I think painting the downward path vividly is important as
well. Economic sanctions are on that path. As you know 1994 was
the year of my first acquaintance, within the Department of
Defense, with the North Korean previous nuclear crisis. We did
consider, in different circumstances from today, I will grant,
military action against North Korea's nuclear program,
specifically a strike upon the Yongbyon complex at that time,
because we felt that the consequences of North Korea going
nuclear were so grave that they were worth the risk attendant
upon military action in the Korean Peninsula. And I do not
think that is something that ought to be taken off the table by
the United States now.
If I may just make one other comment. Another thing you
said, with which I agree absolutely and to which I alluded in
my statement, is that threat reductions, stability operations--
these are things that we are not very good at. We are
tremendously good at joint military operations. I am very proud
that we are, and that is the paramount capability that we have
for action overseas. But when it comes to doing other things,
we do not always accomplish them very well. Your idea, in the
matter of stability operations, and also threat reduction, to
learn from our experience and bottle, so to speak, the
experience we have in the former Soviet Union for Nunn-Lugar,
and in Bosnia and Iraq for stability operations, for the
future, is terribly important. Otherwise, every time we do this
kind of thing, we are going to stand up all over again and fall
down all over again and have to pick ourselves up. I completely
agree with that point you made also.
The Chairman. Do you have thoughts?
Ambassador Pritchard. Mr. Chairman, I could not agree with
you more in terms of the preparation that needs to be there. It
will help in the negotiations. It will help in the long run.
What is striking about the six-party talks is that any kind
of element of concrete that has been put forward we have taken
as a very positive sign. The North Koreans likewise are looking
for anything, whether it is a negative concrete or a positive
concrete likewise.
Two years ago when I had the job as Special Envoy, I went
to see Senator Nunn, thinking ahead of the process of how Nunn-
Lugar might apply to North Korea, to pick his brains on how it
could be applied, thinking along the lines that you are now.
Unfortunately, that was subsumed by the HEU revelation and we
were not able to move anywhere. But I think that was a mistake.
We should have done so early on.
I would also say as an example of standing up KEDO or any
kind of mechanism, whether it is Nunn-Lugar or something else,
shows the North Koreans there is a long-term prospect in place.
It gives them the incentive to continue to either cooperate or,
in this case, one of the things that is missing that was asked
of Assistant Secretary Kelly was the establishment of red
lines. There have been no discussions with the North Koreans
about what would occur should the North Koreans transfer
fissile material or technology. That ought to be established
early. It should have been established 2 years ago and it is
not too late to do so now to put in place the concrete nature
of the downward path that we might ultimately be faced off
with. I hope we are not, but it needs to be there.
The Chairman. I appreciate those answers. Let me just say
that it has certainly been the thrust of our committee efforts
to think about structures for nation-building for procedures
that we need to follow. We will continue to pursue this in our
modest way, in the hope that we can spur activity by the
administration.
Likewise, we are appreciative of the fact that for the
first time, a year ago, the Nunn-Lugar funds were available, at
least $50 million, for application outside the former Soviet
Union. So even though theoretically thoughts have arisen about
having these programs somewhere else, inexplicably until this
time, it was very, very difficult for all of our colleagues in
the Senate and the House to agree that this program might be
useful somewhere else. That has finally come about, mercifully.
Even if the endeavor would be more modest than it was in
Russia, it could still be expensive. You are suggesting,
Secretary Carter, a 10-year period of time, or at least some
period that requires some continuity of thought and some
bipartisan cooperation through several administrations,
Congresses, and so forth, if our foreign policy in this very
critical area is to be effective.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. I will be brief,
gentlemen. I know we have kept you a long time.
Ambassador Pritchard, if the United States does not want to
assist North Korea's energy sector, are the other parties of
the six-party talks capable of putting an enticing enough
package on the table in return for North Korea's nuclear
disarmament?
Ambassador Pritchard. The answer is probably not in terms
of the overall package in the long term of the total removal of
the North Korean--certainly----
Senator Biden. The total removal of North Korean?
Ambassador Pritchard. Nuclear program.
Senator Biden. So then this is a non-starter.
Ambassador Pritchard. Well, let me suggest the initial
phase, in terms of provisions of heavy fuel oil or interim
energy, Japan and South Korea are capable of doing. There are
other ways in which to skin this cat, when you take a look at
the value of energy, when you take a look at rehabilitation
efforts, not simply the provision of concrete coal or other
things that would be of significant value, the rehabilitation
of mining, new construction. Others can do that.
Senator Biden. But the bottom line is, are you saying that
if Secretary Kelly's position, as he stated it here today, were
a concrete position held by this administration, that we will
not participate in providing any of the energy needs of North
Korea in return for a commitment, as I understood it, for total
disarmament of the nuclear capability, then what is there
that--I mean, is this not a non-starter?
Ambassador Pritchard. If I may, sir. There are two parts to
that, one of which is the absolute. Could the others come up
together with absolute packages of energy that might be able to
entice in absolute terms North Korea to do x, y, or z?
Senator Biden. Not x, y, or z. Total disarmament is
specifically my question.
Ambassador Pritchard. Theoretically perhaps. I would tell
you as a negotiator that it is a non-starter from a North
Korean point of view----
Senator Biden. That is what I am saying.
Ambassador Pritchard [continuing]. That the lack of U.S.
commitment and involvement in this process, allowing others to
do this, where the only commitment from a North Korean point of
view in the 1994 Agreed Framework in terms of the provision of
benefits was the U.S.----
Senator Biden. Provision of energy. I am just trying to
focus specifically. I asked Secretary Kelly are we prepared to
provide for what I called incentives and he was calling
incentives in the nature of fuel or money. And he said no, we
are not prepared to do that. We will not reward them for doing
the right thing, which is to disarm or end their nuclear
program. So if your expert opinion is there is no reasonable
circumstance in which the North Koreans would be prepared to
agree to forego their nuclear program and nuclear capability
because they could not get a sufficient commitment on their
energy needs, absent a U.S. commitment as part of their energy
needs, then this is a non-starter in your view.
Ambassador Pritchard. It is a non-starter, but it is not
solely linked to energy. It is the commitment by the United
States to be part of the process and it is simply insufficient
for a North Korean to accept that the only U.S. commitment is
the provision of a security guarantee.
Senator Biden. No. They said they would do other things.
They said they would consider other commitments.
But at any rate, I do not want to beat this to death. I was
just trying to get a sense of this.
Secretary Carter, you have criticized the Bush policy, as I
have I might add, toward North Korea as being ineffective,
lacking carrots and sticks. How do you view this latest round
of negotiations, particularly the new U.S. proposal as laid out
and as articulated by Secretary Kelly today? Is it good, bad,
indifferent? Is it sufficient? How would you characterize it?
Is it still ineffective policy?
Dr. Carter. Senator, it is not even possible to say whether
the policy has been effective or not, because in my
observation, the administration has been divided within itself
for the last few years.
Senator Biden. Well, that is clear.
Dr. Carter. That is the basic reason why a proposal has not
been tabled up until now.
Senator Biden. Well, they tabled the proposal, though.
Dr. Carter. Now they have a proposal tabled.
Senator Biden. How about the present proposal? Is it an
effective proposal? Is it the way you would be moving? Given
the circumstances as they have unfolded in the last 2\1/2\
years, notwithstanding what I happen to believe are your
legitimate observations of the mistakes made and the
opportunities lost, notwithstanding that, tomorrow the
President of the United States or a future President of the
United States says to you, Carter, you are in charge of this
policy. What do you do now today? You are in charge. What do
you do relative to North Korea or the five other parties that
is not being done now, or is what has been recently tabled a
sufficient and the appropriate starting point from this day
forward?
Dr. Carter. I do not know whether it is sufficient, but I
think it has the right ingredients in it, namely on our part
the offer of, first of all, the security assurances, which I
think are very significant to North Korea, coming from us. They
are intangible. As I said, I think there is something we should
be prepared to offer, and I think we have substantial leverage
with that.
Second, the provision of Nunn-Lugar type assistance with
dismantlement, as I said, is not a reward but is a defense by
other means, as I quoted from Bill Perry to characterize that
kind of assistance.
When you get to what else we, the United States, might
offer that is tangible, I think it is still not clear in this
proposal, and it was not clear to me anyway from the testimony
just given.
Senator Biden. Would you put forward----
Dr. Carter. Let me just finish that thought.
One of the strengths, Senator Biden, of the six-party talks
and in the past of working with our allies was that together
the portfolio of things that we, being different countries with
different proclivities and different historical traditions and
so forth, are willing to offer North Korea, and also the
penalties that we can impose, are different for all our
different negotiating partners. That is a strength of the six-
party approach. So it may be that Japan, it may be that South
Korea, it may be that Russia, it may be that China are prepared
to do things in the energy field that the United States, at the
end of the day, is not prepared to do. That is fine. They can
still be part of the deal. I am not prepared to say now that if
the United States is not the provider of energy assistance,
that energy assistance will not be an effective part of this
package.
So I am comfortable with the mix of ingredients that are in
here, as you characterized. I absolutely agree. I regret that
years have passed and we have not been exploring this path. I
think this is a reasonable mix of things to put in an initial
package before North Korea. Whether they will go for it, as I
said, at this point I am not sure.
Senator Biden. Right. I think we are all in that same
position.
Let me conclude with one more question, Mr. Chairman. I
remember early on when the Clinton administration concluded the
original deal, the Agreed Framework, with North Korea talking
to then Secretary of Defense Perry, and I asked him what the
most important element was, and he said staying on the same
page as the South Koreans and the Japanese. It struck me as
both self-evident and elusive, that notion. I had not thought
of it in those terms. I just subconsciously assumed that was
necessary, but I did not think of it in terms of a need for a
proactive and sometimes difficult undertaking.
Are we on the same page now, do you think? Is this
administration now on the same page as Tokyo and Seoul as it
relates to North Korea?
Dr. Carter. I do not think we have been fully on the same
page in the last few years. I hope this begins to put us on the
same page. You are right. Bill Perry was right. No American
policy toward North Korea can succeed unless it has the support
of at least Japan and South Korea. Both in the carrots area and
in the sticks department, as I mentioned earlier, we are
stronger if we are working with them, because they have carrots
and they have sticks that we do not have, and as a phalanx, we
are a more powerful force in dealing with----
Senator Biden. And conversely our ultimate stick does not
have much stick if it is clear that Japan and South Korea do
not support it.
One of the things that I find interesting, after having had
the honor of serving with seven Presidents, is that Presidents
or administrations never like to acknowledge that they are
changing course on anything. But it seems to me that one of the
benefits of the six-party talks has been that the South Koreans
and the Japanese have basically said, hey, we ain't continuing
down this road you have been going. We are going to start to
explore outside these six-party talks a different and emerging
relationship with North Korea, which it seems to me was a bit
of an epiphany for this administration and brought us to the
point we are now of having tabled something that has the
elements that in my view should have been tabled on day one.
I draw some sense of optimism about not what North Korea
will or will not do, based on the time squandered and how far
behind the 8 ball we are now, but on the notion that at least
we seem to be over, within this administration, what was an
extremely difficult ideological conflict that was taking place
which was to even think about guaranteeing security. No matter
what a member of the ``axis of evil'' did, they were still per
se evil, and how can you sign an agreement or sign onto a
multiparty agreement that provides security assurances for an
evil empire?
That seemed to me to be the ultimate difficulty this
administration faced. They knew any part of any agreement, any
possibility of an agreement with North Korea required a
security assurance, and how do you do that? How do you do that
if you have already decided--whether or not they have nuclear
weapons, no matter what they do, the people in power are bad
guys? I hope this reflects that that debate has been settled
within the administration, but I do not know.
Dr. Carter. May I comment on one thing you said?
Senator Biden. Yes, please respond.
Dr. Carter. I also believe that the fact that our partners
and allies were beginning to stray and seek their own separate
channels to North Korea was a factor that lent urgency to the
need for us to--I will not say change course--but to chart a
course in these negotiations which we had had difficulty doing.
So both for that reason, and because of the paramount reason,
which is that North Korea is reprocessing plutonium, it is
urgent to chart this course and get on with it; to do the
experiment of seeing whether North Korea can, in fact, be
persuaded diplomatically to give up its nuclear program.
Senator Biden. I thank you both very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you again, Senator Biden.
We had good questions raised by our colleague, Senator
Brownback, about human rights, as well as an assertion by
Assistant Secretary Kelly that this is an extremely important
point. However, there are priorities with regard to all of
this, in the context of the nuclear problem. Nuclear
proliferation is the prime focus of our negotiators. I mention
this because reference has been made to our experiences with
the former Soviet Union, and then the successor states. Many
times during the Nunn-Lugar debates, people would bring up, how
can you possibly think about sending assistance of any sort,
technical or money, to a regime that has caused the loss of its
own people? How can you deal with this?
That is going to be a recurring problem. Regarding the
Soviet Union, we decided that we should deal with this in terms
of our security, so that warheads and missiles that are aimed
at us, 13,000 of them would not be aimed at us. It is a tough
call. As you can see in our own dialog today, we have different
points of emphasis, although you always hope it all comes out
in the same way.
Being on the same page with South Korea and Japan is an
optimum situation. Dr. Carter mentioned that the young people
in South Korea are not really on the same page with us, and
might not be for a while. In other words, in the timeframe of
how we all get to the same page, some very bad things could
occur. Now, that does not call for unilateral action on our
part. But I appreciate the problem of our negotiators, who are
trying to move along in the six-party talks with a high degree
of unity, which I think they are attempting to achieve.
Having said that, our committee has, as it was indicated
earlier today by my friend, Joe Biden, been spurring our
negotiators for some time to move toward the position that
apparently they now have. So there is some satisfaction in
seeing that kind of movement. We are grateful to our
negotiators for coming to the committee in public session. But
the fact is we have had today a hearing about very serious
American diplomacy in a public session with very well informed
people from the past administrations as well as the current
one.
So I call upon that as an achievement of sorts in itself.
We have heard some very good ideas that we might pursue,
including these designs that you have suggested about the
explicit nature of what might be more credible in terms of our
own negotiating procedure. Perhaps we can assist our own
negotiators in trying to formulate some of those ideas even
further in concrete terms that will be helpful to us.
I thank both of you very much for your testimony, for your
excellent papers, and for your forthcoming responses. We look
forward to visiting with you both again.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
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Statement Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
part three
summary of torture and infanticide information provided by former
prisoners and detainees interviewed for this report
I. Torture Summary
According to almost all of the former-prisoner testimony
gathered for this report--from All Lamada's 1967 Sariwon prison
testimony to the post-2000 testimonies of North Koreans forcibly
repatriated from China--the practice of torture permeates the North
Korean prison and detention system.
Former Detainee #1 was beaten unconscious for hunger-
related rule infractions in 1997 at the Nongpo jip-kyul-so (detention
center) in Chongjin City. He also reported that detainees there were
beaten with shovels if they did not work fast enough.
Former Detainee #3 reported the use of an undersized
punishment box at the Danchun prison camp in which camp rule-breakers
were held for fifteen days, unable to stand-up or lie down. He also
reported that beatings of the prisoners by guards were common.
LEE Young Kuk reported that he was subjected to
motionless-kneeling and water torture and facial and shin beatings with
rifle butts at the Kuk-ga-bo-wi-bu interrogation/detention facility in
Pyongyang in 1994, leaving permanent damage in one ear, double vision
in one eye, and his shins still bruised and discolored as of late 2002.
KANG Chol Hwan reported the existence of separate
punishment cells within Kwan-li-so No. 15 Yodok, from which few
prisoners returned alive.
Former Prisoner #6 reported that prisoners were beaten to
death by prison workunit leaders at Danchun Kyo-hwa-so No. 77 in North
Hamgyong Province in the late 1980s.
AHN Myong Chol, a former guard, reported that all three of
the kwan-li-so at which he worked had isolated detention facilities in
which many prisoners died from mistreatment, and that at Kwan-li-so No.
22 there were so many deaths by beatings from guards that the guards
were told to be less violent.
Former Detainee #8 reported that male prisoners were
beaten by guards at the Chongjin jip-kyul-so in mid-2000.
Former Detainee #9 reported that detainees at the Onsong
ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae (labor-training camp) were compelled to beat each
other.
KIM Sung Min reported that in 1997 at the Onsong bo-wi-bu
(National Security Agency) detention center, his fingers were broken
and he was kicked and beaten on the head and face until his ears, eyes,
nose, and mouth bled.
RHYU Young II saw, in 1997, that out of six persons in an
adjacent cell in the bo-wi-bu interrogation facility where he was
detained in Pyongyang, two were carried out on stretchers, two could
walk only with the assistance of guards, and two could walk out by
themselves. Detainees who moved while they were supposed to be sitting
motionless and silent for long periods were handcuffed from the upper
bars of their cells with their feet off the floor. Detainees who talked
when they were supposed to be sitting motionless and silent were
compelled to slap and hit each other.
Former Prisoner #12 reported that at Hoeryong kyo-hwa-so
in the early to middle 1990s, minor rule-breakers were beaten by their
cellmates on the orders of the guards, and major rule-breakers were
placed in a 1.5-meter-square (16.5-feet-square) punishment cell for a
week or more.
LEE Min Bok reported being beaten ``many times'' on his
fingernails and the back of his hands with a metal rod during
interrogation at the Hyesan detention center in 1990. He also reported
that at the Hyesan In-min-bo-an-seong (People's Safety Agency)
detention facility, where he was subsequently held, prisoners were
compelled to beat each other. Lee witnessed one prisoner, KIM Jae Chul,
beaten to death.
Former Detainee #15 reported that he was beaten with
chairs and sticks at both the Hoeryong and Onsong In-min-bo-an-seong
jails in early 2002.
LEE Soon Ok reported that she experienced beatings,
strappings, and water torture leading to loss of consciousness, and was
held outside in freezing January weather at the Chongjin In-min-bo-an-
seong pretrial detention center in 1986. Her account of beatings and
brutalities in the early to middle 1990s at Kaechon women's prison,
Kyo-hwa-so No. 1, (in her prison memoirs) are too numerous to detail
here.
JI Hae Nam confirmed the existence of miniature punishment
cells at Kyo-hwa-so No. 1 and reported that beatings and kicking of
women prisoners were a daily occurrence in the mid-1990s. She also
reported beatings, during interrogation or for prison regulation
infractions, in late 1999 at the Sinuiju bo-wi-bu jail, where she was
required to kneel motionless, hit with broomsticks, and required to do
stand-up/sit-down repetitions to the point of collapse, in her case in
thirty to forty minutes.
KIM Yong reported that he was beaten at the bo-wi-bu
police jail at Maram and was subjected to water torture and hung by his
wrists in the bo-wi-bu police jail at Moonsu in 1993.
KIM Tae Jin reported that he was beaten, deprived of
sleep, and made to kneel motionless for many hours at the bo-wi-bu
police detention/interrogation facility in Chongjin in late 1998/early
1999.
YOU Chun Sik reported that he was kicked, beaten, and
subjected to daylong motionless-sitting torture at the bo-wi-bu police
jail in Sinuiju in 2000. He described the motionless-sitting as being
more painful than the beatings.
Former Detainee #21 reported that she was beaten
unconscious in mid-1999 at the In-min-bo-an-seong (People's Safety
Agency) ku-ryu-jang (detention/interrogation facility) at Onsong, where
detainees were beaten so badly that they confessed to doing things they
had not done. Women were hit on their fingertips. She witnessed one
very ill woman who was compelled to do stand-up/sit-down repetitions
until she died.
Former Detainee #22 reported that he was beaten with
chairs at Onsong bo-wi-bu (State Security Agency) police jail in late
2001, and beaten even worse at the Chongjin In-min-bo-an-seong
detention center in early 2002.
Former Detainee #24 reported that there were beatings at
the bo-wi-bu police jail in Sinuiju in January 2000.
Former Detainee #25 reported that one woman, a former
schoolteacher who had been caught in Mongolia and repatriated to China
and North Korea, was beaten nearly to death at the Onsong In-min-bo-an-
seong detention center in November 1999, and then taken away either to
die or, if she recovered, for transfer to Kyo-hwa-so No. 22.
Former Detainee #26 was made to kneel motionless at the
Onsong bo-wi-bu police jail in June 2000 and was made to sit motionless
for six days at the Hoeryong bo-wi-bu police jail in July 2001.
Former Detainee #28 reported that prisoners were beaten to
death at the Kyo-hwa-so No. 12 at Jeonger-ri in North Hamgyong Province
in 1999.
II. Ethnic Infanticide Summary
There are sporadic reports of forced abortions and baby killings at
the kwan-li-so, where, except for a very few privileged couples, the
prisoners were not allowed to have sex or children. There are also
sporadic reports of forced abortion and baby killings at the kwan-li-
so, where sex between prisoners is prohibited.
And there are sporadic reports of killings of pregnant women who
were raped or coerced into sex by prison guards. However, this report
focuses on the forced abortions and baby killings directed against and
inflicted on women forcibly repatriated from China, because of the
ethnic and policy components of those atrocities.
CHOI Yong Hwa assisted in the delivery of babies, three of
whom were promptly killed, at the Sinuiju do-jip-kyul-so (provincial
detention center) in mid-2000.
Former Detainee #8 witnessed six forced abortions at
Chongjin do-jip-kyul-so in mid-2000.
Former Detainee #9 witnessed ten forced abortions at
Onsong ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae (labor-training camp) in mid-2000.
YOU Chun Sik reported that four pregnant women at the bo-
wi-bu (National Security Agency) police station in Sinuiju were
subjected to forced abortions in mid-2000.
Former Detainee #21 reported two baby killings at the
Onsong In-min-bo-an-seong (People's Safety Agency) police station in
late 1999.
Former Detainee #24 helped deliver seven babies who were
killed at the Backtori, South Sinuiju In-min-bo-an-seong police
detention center in January 2000.
Former Detainee #25 witnessed four babies killed at Nongpo
In-min-bo-an-seong police detention center in Chongjin in late 1999,
and another six pregnant women subjected to forced abortion.
Former Detainee #26 witnessed three forced abortions and
seven babies killed at the Nongpo jip-kyul-so (detention center),
Chongjin City, in May 2000.