[Senate Hearing 108-824]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-824
TRANSPORTATION AND BORDER SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 9, 2003
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CONRAD BURNS, Montana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas Virginia
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
GORDON SMITH, Oregon BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois RON WYDEN, Oregon
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BARBARA BOXER, California
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Robert W. Chamberlin, Republican Chief Counsel
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Gregg Elias, Democratic General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 9, 2003.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Breaux...................................... 4
Statement of Senator Dorgan...................................... 31
Statement of Senator Hollings.................................... 2
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 26
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 28
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Statement of Senator McCain...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Smith....................................... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Statement of Senator Wyden....................................... 3
Witnesses
Ridge, Hon. Tom, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security...... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Tom Ridge by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 77
Hon. Ernest F. Hollings...................................... 53
Hon. Frank Lautenberg........................................ 52
Hon. John McCain............................................. 35
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 74
TRANSPORTATION AND BORDER SECURITY
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
The Chairman. The Committee meets today to examine issues
relating to transportation and border security. I welcome
Secretary Ridge, who is here to update the committee on the
Department of Homeland Security's ongoing homeland security
efforts and progress made in organizing the new department.
I would like to congratulate Secretary Ridge for the job
that he has done. He has gained the confidence of the American
people in the very difficult task that he has undertaken since
September 11th, and I know that he has major challenges ahead,
many of which he will describe to us this morning.
Secretary Ridge, I would just like to mention one aspect of
your responsibilities this morning and as you know, it is not
often that I discuss issues that relate to my home State. But I
did have the privilege of accompanying Deputy Under Secretary
Asa Hutchison, another outstanding public servant, to the
Arizona-Mexico border a few weeks ago, with other Members of
the delegation, including Senator Kyl and House Members. And I
invite you to come when things calm down a bit because I think
it is important for you to be able to see long, long distances
of border which are unsecured between our two countries.
There are many dimensions to this problem, ranging from the
incredible healthcare costs that our healthcare facilities on
our border and across the State are forced to bear, to the
human tragedy of 134 Mexican citizens dying in the desert
trying to cross into the United States last year, to the plight
of the ranchers and citizens who live down there who are
constantly subjected to an incredible situation where people in
SUVs are just driving through the fences and across their
property. Some of them are drug smugglers, some of them we have
no idea who they are.
And I know you agree with me that one of our first
responsibilities is to secure our borders.
And may I just add an additional comment. If it were just
securing our borders, then I think your task would be easy. But
like the case with drugs, we are creating a demand. There are
jobs that Americans will not do, so Mexican citizens will try
to come across, and Central Americans and others, will try to
come across our borders so they can be able to feed themselves
and their families. This consequently argues for amnesty
programs, guest worker programs, et cetera. And I think that
this has to be a priority of the Congress and the
Administration, because I do not believe, as we have proven in
the war on drugs, that we are ever going to keep people from
crossing our borders as long as there is an incentive for them
to come across.
But I do not have to tell you, Mr. Secretary, the potential
this has for the ability of people with evil intentions to come
into the United States of America and do bad things. So, I hope
that you will join me in your appreciation, I know you do, and
maybe make a few comments today about that necessity. But it is
not simple, because of this demand that is going on which is
creating the trafficking, not only of drugs but of human beings
and perhaps other things.
And in addition to that, I think it is important to praise
the work our very brave Customs, INS, and Border Patrol agents
are doing. We have had people killed, we have had gunfights
down there. We have had people with AK-47s. Recently there were
some smugglers that painted vehicles exactly like Border Patrol
vehicles so they could help disguise their intentions. And they
are in a war down there, and at great risk, and they are
performing heroically, and we are all proud of them.
So, I do not usually make that long an opening statement,
but I do think that it is a very serious issue. I am sure that
there are equal challenges along our northern border, but it is
one that I think we need to address if we are going to assure
the American people that we are indeed providing them with
homeland security.
And I thank you for coming today, and I thank you for your
continued willingness to serve the Nation.
Senator Hollings.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator Hollings. Let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, and join
in your commendation of our distinguished Secretary. I'm
looking forward to working with him.
Mr. Secretary, you are the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for
the terror war, and in that light we have just, for example,
appropriated $180 million for those Code Oranges and so forth,
just for the rest of this fiscal year. We find no money in the
04 budget for those particular alerts back at the local State
level.
Otherwise, with the Coast Guard. By law, we've found--well,
the Coast Guard has estimated some $4.8 billion necessary to
comply with the requirements of homeland security.
Otherwise, the States have $1.2 billion requested right
there before the Coast Guard, but we don't have the monies to
do those things. And yet at the same time, we have the
President in the White House this morning, he's just steaming
to get tax cuts and spending to stimulate the economy, whereas
we've got required spending over here that we're not providing
for. We could easily provide for the troops in the terror war,
namely your troops that we're not providing for, rather than
causing a deficit, that loss of revenue, that waste of
increasing the deficit and the high interest costs.
I just don't understand why we just don't calm down and say
wait a minute, we've already required--by the way, it's
bipartisan, like port security. We passed it 100 to nothing,
all Republicans, all Democrats. Chairman Breaux here has all
the hearings all over the country, and Admiral Loy was joining
in, Administrator Bonner from Customs. There's a lot of work
that has been done, but they're looking for the help in
Washington because by June, you're supposed to have those
security cards.
We argued with the unions ad nauseam, and we finally got
them to come around, they've agreed to it, we've got the
requirement, and they've got to have that card by June. They
don't see your department responding.
Otherwise, you've got to comply by July of next year with
not only the assessments but the compliance of all these,
particularly the 55 major ports. You only provide in your
budget for some 13 assessments. Instead of a 6-day or 6-week
war, we're going to have a 100-year war for the terror war at
that rate. And I just can't understand why we're just
determined to lose the revenue that could easily be spent to
stimulate the economy with your terror war, and I need to say
it, everybody agrees on it, it's required by law. And I'll get
my chance to ask some questions.
But I welcome you, because I think you are going to be able
to get around Ridge, I think he's headed to Indiana or
whatever, to go back home. Or not Ridge, what's his name?
Staff: Daniels.
Senator Hollings. Daniels, Mitch Daniels, yeah, that
fellow. I think you are with us but you can't get past him. But
get that new fellow Johnson or something that's coming on, and
let's start working and doing the Lord's work.
You are the chairman of the joint chiefs in this terror
war, and we're not backing the troops. We're not backing the
troops and the troops are out there struggling.
The Chairman. May I say, Mr. Chairman, Senator Hollings,
that's quite a promotion from a former Sergeant, as Secretary
Ridge was.
Senator Wyden.
STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I too
want to welcome an old friend, Tom Ridge, and have a number of
areas I want to talk with him about, but I want to mention one
specifically that I hope our colleague will talk about in his
opening statement.
That is this question of privacy. The American people
clearly want their Government to fight terrorism ferociously,
and at the same time to do it in a way that doesn't gut our
civil liberties, our basic freedoms. And I'm very concerned
when you look at some of the programs that have been rolled out
recently, the total information awareness program, the CAPPS II
program with respect to airline screening, that our Government
is not striking the right balance.
For example, in the homeland security legislation, it calls
for the establishment of a privacy officer. I'm not clear as to
whether even that person has been named at this point, and
perhaps you can enlighten us on it.
But what concerns me is, I want to make sure that privacy
issues are dealt with up front, that they don't just become an
afterthought and basically after all the policies are made,
then somebody says well, holy Toledo, we ought to think about
civil liberties questions at some point before we roll
everything out. And if you could, address your approach with
respect to privacy.
There will be other issues that I want to ask you about,
particularly some of the reports of waste and mismanagement,
and I'll get into that in questions. But I'm particularly
concerned about how we're going to strike a balance between
pulling out all the stops to fight terrorism and protecting our
citizens, while at the same time being sensitive to these
questions of privacy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Breaux.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having these
hearings. Mr. Secretary, thank you for coming before the
Senate.
We had made an effort last week when the Appropriations
Supplemental Bill was on the floor to try and spell out in
greater detail how the funds were going to be spent for
homeland security. There were many who felt that, I think the
President had requested $1.5 billion for counterterrorism, I
think the Committee mark was about $1.35 billion, but the
concern that some of us had was that it was not really
designated as to where it was going to go.
As an example, I think with regard to the Coast Guard, the
President requested $580 million and the Committee included
$580 million for the Coast Guard, but $400 million of it was
going to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM overseas. There were many of
us who felt that we have some obligations right here at home.
We looked at, as Senator Hollings said, port security
problems right here at home in all the major ports. They are
immense. And while I know it is necessary to have money for the
Coast Guard's involvement in Iraq, it is also critically
important to have enough money involved in the Coast Guard here
in America's defense, and I think that it is not sufficient
what we have.
And I think the other thing is not that anyone mistrusts
you or the Department, but I mean, some of them likened it to
the fact that we were just going to take $1.35 billion and toss
it up in the air in the general direction of homeland security,
and hope that it falls down in the right places. And there are
many in Congress who felt that we have the obligation to
appropriate funds, but we also have an obligation to help
direct where those funds that we are asking the taxpayers to
pay are going to be spent. This is an age old argument about
who decides where the money is going to be spent.
I mean, we lost that fight. I hope that you will pay
attention to the debate and look at what we were encouraging
these monies to be spent for. It may be that you would agree
with us totally, and that's fine. But what we have basically
given you is a lot of money to spend on homeland security. And
as many of us had felt that certain amounts should be allocated
clearly to the Coast Guard, the border security, to the Bureau
of Customs, et cetera, we were trying to say here's what these
various departments, or agencies within your department needed.
So, we hope that that debate is noticed, and hopefully we can
work together on that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. General Ridge.
[Laughter.]
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM RIDGE, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Ridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
Chairman McCain, Senator Hollings, and my former colleagues,
distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to join you this morning to describe the efforts of
the Department of Homeland Security to secure our Nation's
transportation systems, borders, and ports of entry. And thank
you for the opportunity to hear your concerns, many of which
you have addressed in your opening remarks, and I suspect will
get into a little deeper during interrogation and questioning.
And thank you for the opportunity to discuss with you the
substantial challenges that the Department and Congress face in
the months and years ahead as we set up the Department and work
together to secure America.
We at the Department of Homeland Security are committed to
working closely with the Congress of the United States, State
and local Governments, as well as private industry, to address
these challenges and ensure that America's future is both
prosperous and secure.
In protecting our systems of commerce and transportation,
we basically face a two-pronged challenge. Safeguard our
homeland, but at the same time ensure that the free flow of
people, goods and commerce is not disrupted. The Department of
Homeland Security is leading the effort to reach this objective
but it will not be achieved strictly within the new Department.
It will require, from our view, a sustained and coordinated
effort by Government and private partners. It will require
investment by all parties, the development of new approaches,
and the application of new technologies. It will require us to
make difficult decisions, critical assessments, and work to
find the elusive balance point between the substantial and
measurable costs of security and the even more substantial and
immeasurable costs of insecurity.
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11th, we have made
significant strides to protect the national transportation
system. Congress created the Transportation Security
Administration and empowered it to manage transportation
security in all modes of transportation. TSA will play a
strategic role in developing the national transportation system
security plan, a key portion of the national strategy for
homeland security.
Two other key components within the Department include the
United States Coast Guard as lead in the maritime domain, and
the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection in dealing directly
with the movement of people, goods and cargo across our
borders.
In February, Admiral Loy appeared before this Committee and
provided you with a comprehensive overview of TSA's progress on
aviation security. I would like to add several recent
successes.
Under the purview of the FAA, approximately 95 percent of
the 6,000 commercial airliners will have hardened cockpit doors
as of today. On February 25th, we initiated the Federal Flight
Deck Officer Program. The first training session will begin
next Monday at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.
Additionally, we continue to make progress in deploying
explosive detection systems at the few remaining airports where
not all baggage is screened using this technology.
We continue to develop the next generation of computer
assisted passenger prescreening system, and I suspect this will
be a matter of discussion with the individual Members of the
Committee, but particularly Senator Wyden, I think you're
referring to that, and it's a critical discussion that we have.
That's one of the things about the democracy in which we live,
these discussions are transparent, they're public, and very
appropriately so. And I would just assure you that while we
have not identified a privacy officer publicly, we've got a
good one in mind and we are just making sure that all the paper
work is in order before we submit her name to you and to the
public.
We will continue to work with the TSA and the CAPPS II
program because we think it's a critical element in their
system of systems of protection, and we believe it will
effectively enhance the screening of airline passengers, moving
the screening further from the gate, but at the same time
safeguarding their civil liberties.
Along our Nation's coasts and in our seaports, the Coast
Guard, TSA, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the
Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration, and the
St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, all play a role to
provide increased security at our ports. These efforts were
furthered with the passage of the Maritime Transportation
Security Act last November. I assure you we will be taking
steps to ensure that the Act is implemented in an integrated
and timely manner.
The Coast Guard and TSA continue their progress on
conducting port security assessments in coordination with our
Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection. TSA, in conjunction with the Coast Guard and MARAD,
awarded an initial round of $92 million in port security grants
last summer to 51 different seaports.
In the cargo container security arena, the Department is
providing security for the nearly 6 million containers that
enter our ports each year by partnering with other countries
and the private sector to push our zone of security outward. We
would like to push that perimeter of safety further and further
offshore.
One program to implement this strategy includes the
Container Security Initiative, or CSI, which identifies high
risk cargo containers and partners with other Governments to
prescreen those containers at foreign ports before they are
shipped to America.
The Department has been working with and will continue to
work closely with the Department of Transportation and the many
stakeholders in the railroad industry to enhance rail security.
We will leverage the industry's relationships and regulatory
structure that the Federal Railway Administration has long
developed. As an example of this cooperation, TSA and the FRA
recently collaborated in reviewing Amtrak's security plan and
advised this committee of the results of that review.
The Department of Homeland Security is following a similar
approach for mass transit security, including rail, inner city
buses, and ferries. Security in these modes presents a
continuing challenge due to the general lack of security, as
well as the public's desire and the public's need for the
freedom to move through each mode of travel.
Highway security is an additional challenge that we are
beginning to address, and cooperation with the Federal Highway
Administration and the States is absolutely critical. The
enhancement of the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of
2002 assists this effort by protecting information that is
voluntarily submitted to the Federal Government.
The thousands of miles of pipeline throughout America
represent another unique challenge. In order to secure a vast
network, the communications between our Federal, State and
industry partners has been streamlined. The TSA and the
Department of Transportation's Research and Special Programs
Administration continue to focus on implementing coordinated
risk based protocols to ensure operators are putting security
practice into place at critical facilities.
Mr. Chairman, transportation security is a collaborative
effort, and must be a collaborative effort between our
Department, other Federal agencies, State and local
Governments, the private sector, as well as individual
Americans. Together we have made great advances in securing our
transportation systems while protecting civil liberties and
insuring the free flow of people and commerce. But clearly
clearly, we recognize as you do that more needs to be done.
The Department of Homeland Security is dedicated to
accomplishing the objectives set forth in the President's
national strategy. This strategy provides the framework to
mobilize and organize the nation. We are proud of our efforts
thus far and are eager to press forward with the mission of
building a safer and more secure future for our country.
This concludes my prepared statement. I certainly thank you
for the opportunity to speak before you, and look forward to
the continuing opportunity as well as responsibility that we
have in the Department to shape the new Department, with the
assistance and collaboration and input from our colleagues in
the legislative branch who were so instrumental in accepting
the President's proposal and creating the Department in the
first place. So I am very pleased to be here, and look forward
to responding to questions that you might have.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Ridge follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tom Ridge, Secretary,
Department of Homeland Security
Good morning Chairman McCain, Senator Hollings and other
distinguished Members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to be here
with you this morning to discuss the efforts of the Department of
Homeland Security to secure our nation's transportation systems,
borders and ports of entry. Thank you for providing the opportunity to
discuss the Department's efforts on these fronts.
As the President has stated, ``the United States government has no
more important mission than that of protecting the homeland from future
terrorist attacks. The threat to America takes many forms, has many
places to hide, and is often invisible. Terrorists wish to attack us
and exploit our vulnerabilities--as we saw in the attacks of 9/11--
because of the freedoms we hold dear.'' Your good efforts last year
significantly advanced our ability to meet the terrorist threat by
creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We at the
Department are committed to working closely with you, the Congress,
state and local governments, and private industry to continue this
effort and ensure the security of the Homeland.
The Department was created in order to bring the 22 agencies with a
homeland security mission under one roof, to focus their activities,
achieve efficiencies and eliminate redundancies. DHS has a two-pronged
challenge in the transportation and border arenas--protecting the
homeland while ensuring that the flow of goods and commerce that makes
our economy strong is not disrupted. This is crucial in the
transportation sector, where changes in the environment can have
significant impact on local, regional and even national economies.
Because we recognize this reality, DHS is fostering a communicative
approach with our state and local, and private sector partners. We
routinely engage in discussions with those potentially affected by
heightened enforcement measures, and are developing partnerships with
public and private sector entities to tap their extensive expertise and
technological resources to advance our security mission without unduly
impacting commerce. Much must be done in the months and years ahead,
and fostering these partnerships will prove invaluable in achieving our
goals and protecting the homeland.
Mr. Chairman, you have asked me here this morning to discuss the
security of our transportation sector, borders, and ports of entry. As
you are keenly aware, since the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the Federal
Government has taken great strides toward effectively protecting the
national transportation system, including our ports and borders. We now
have all of the key component agencies under one roof to manage this
effort effectively. The U.S. Coast Guard and Bureau of Transportation
Security (BTS), including the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
and the Transportation Security Administration, will all play key
roles, as will the new Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate.
The U.S. Coast Guard, reports directly to me and serves as lead
agency in the maritime security domain, and the BTS Directorate is
working to ensure the safe and secure passage of people, goods and
cargo across our borders. The Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection (IAIP) Directorate supports the effort to secure our
transportation sector by undertaking vulnerability assessments and
mitigation measures for critical infrastructure components of our
transportation system, ports and borders. IAIP will utilize requested
funding to work across infrastructure sectors and address the highest
priority assessment and mitigation initiatives. The Science and
Technology (S&T) Directorate will support this effort by assessing and
developing technologies that will meet our security needs.
TSA will continue to focus on aviation security and work with other
DHS organizations to develop and implement an effective transportation
security program in other areas. TSA has been and will continue to work
closely with the Department of Transportation and its constituent
Operating Administrations. I want to personally thank Secretary Mineta
for the devotion that he has shown toward ensuring that this endeavor
succeeds.
I am aware that ADM Loy appeared before this Committee in early
February, and provided you with a comprehensive overview of the
progress that TSA has made in the area of aviation security. I refer
you to his detailed written testimony to describe those efforts. Since
his appearance though, I would like to add several additional
successes. Under the purview of the Federal Aviation Administration,
approximately 95 percent of 6,000 passenger airlines will have hardened
cockpit doors by April 9, 2003. Those that do not have the hardened
doors will not fly. On February 25, the Federal Flight Deck Officer
(FFDO) program was initiated to permit the arming of pilots. The first
training session will begin next Monday at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center (FLETC), also within the BTS Directorate, leading to
the first group of deputized pilots. After reviewing the effectiveness
of the training program for this initial class, TSA will begin regular
training in July and will be able to train more pilots this fiscal year
based on what funds are available. The President has requested $25
Million for this program in FY04.
In the General Aviation arena, on April 1, the so-called ``12-5''
rule took effect. It applies to operators of aircraft with a maximum
certificated takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or more in scheduled or
charter service, carrying passengers, cargo, or both. The 12-5 Rule
requires the implementation of a standard security program to include
restricted access to the flightdeck and a fingerprint-based criminal
history records check on flight crewmembers.
As you are aware, TSA did meet the 12/31/02 deadline to screen all
checked bags for explosives and is using electronic screening, or other
congressionally approved methods. Now, as TSA reports to you each month
in a classified report, the agency continues to make progress in
deploying electronic explosives detection systems at the few remaining
airports where 100 percent electronic screening was not in place by
January 1. We fully intend to meet the revised deadline of December 31,
2003 to install necessary remaining electronic EDS machines.
We continue to address the additional security issues that exist in
the aviation sector. As an example, TSA is in the process of developing
a strategy to ``right-size'' its workforce. In some airports there is
overstaffing and in other locations understaffing. The staffing needs
of the more than 400 commercial airports must be harmonized, even as
TSA works to also develop a model workplace.
We recognize the threat of Man Portable Air Defense Systems
(MANPADS) to commercial aircraft. We have completed preliminary
vulnerability assessment maps of all major airports in the United
States and sent interagency teams to 22 of the largest airports to
provide detailed vulnerability assessments. In conjunction with other
Federal law enforcement agencies, we are reviewing the results of these
vulnerability assessments and working through our Federal Security
Directors with airport authorities and local law enforcement agencies
to identify specific areas of concern and to minimize the risk around
the airports. That translates to more effective surveillance including
more frequent and focused patrols keyed to available intelligence. TSA
has also developed training materials and guidelines for identifying
and reporting possible MANPADS threats, and TSA is distributing this
information to its Federal Security Directors to share with airport
security officials and local law enforcement officials. We will
continue to work closely with these officials in order to ensure that
any and all information concerning this threat is quickly shared and
that our efforts to prevent a missile attack are well coordinated. I am
aware of calls for the immediate installation of countermeasures on all
commercial aircraft. An interagency working group has been developing
the appropriate strategy to address this continuing threat. The group
is exploring all tactical and technical solutions to the MANPADS
threat.
I would also like to address an issue that has received much
attention lately--the development of the next generation of the
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II). TSA staff
has previously met with some of the Members of this Committee, and
staff to most of this Committee's personal offices, to highlight, to
the extent possible in an open briefing, what CAPPS II is, and is not.
TSA has also met with advocates of privacy rights and civil liberties
to listen to their concerns and gather their input, and will continue
to do so.
Our goal is for CAPPS II to enhance the screening of airline
passengers. CAPPS II will not degrade the civil liberties of Americans.
TSA will rarely see the background information checked by the computer.
TSA will have access to this information in the extremely rare
instances that a particular traveler has been identified as having
known links to terrorism. TSA will only see the aggregated threat
assessment of the data used to determine whether, based on current
information on foreign terrorist activities, the passenger is a
possible terrorist threat to civil aviation security. This assessment
will be synthesized into easily understood color codes--Green, Yellow,
and Red, which will be transmitted to TSA only shortly before the
passenger's flight, and purged from the computer immediately after the
passenger's flight is completed.
Not only will the CAPPS II system improve aviation security, but
the system will reduce the likelihood of innocent persons being
misidentified or confused with similarly named persons who may have
foreign terrorist links. CAPPS II will dramatically reduce the number
of passengers required to undergo additional screening at airports as
``selectees'' under the current CAPPS system. DHS and TSA will continue
to work with this Committee as CAPPS II is further developed.
As a final note in the area of aviation security, I would like to
address the need for additional efforts in the air cargo security
arena. Recognizing that this is an area of that needs to be addressed,
the President requested a total of $30 million for an air cargo
security pilot program in FY2004. Of this amount, $20 million is
requested for the design and development of a random, risk-weighted
freight screening process and the expansion of the TSA ``known''
shipper program. An additional $10 million is requested for further
research and development to explore new air cargo technologies. As ADM
Loy advised you in his February 5 testimony, TSA has established a
working group that is using a threat-based and risk-managed approach,
in coordination with the cargo industry.
I would now like to turn to the other 80 percent of the
transportation sectors, maritime and surface transportation. Their
reach is vast. There are 3.9 million miles of public roads, which
account for 2.7 trillion miles of travel by car and truck each year.
There are 11.2 million trucks and almost 2.4 million rail cars coming
into the U.S. each year. There are 120,000 miles of rail owned by the
major railroads accounting for 700 million rail freight miles annually.
There are 2.2 million miles of pipelines. Mass transit accounts for 9
billion commuter trips each year. The United States has 25,000 miles of
commercial navigable waterways. Finally, there are 51,000 port calls
made by 7,500 foreign flag ships to our 361 ports.
The Department has adopted a risk management approach as a
cornerstone policy for developing risk-based regulatory standards for
the various modes of transportation. Under this approach, there are
three primary elements of good risk management: a threat assessment, a
vulnerability assessment, and a criticality assessment. In support of
its risk-based regulatory approach, the Department, through IAIP, the
Coast Guard, and BTS will continue to develop consistent vulnerability
templates not only across the various transportation modes, but also
across all critical infrastructure sectors, such as utilities and food
and water supply. The very long-term goal of future security standards
will be to link vulnerability model-generated relative risk to the
homeland security advisory system (e.g., the color coded threat
system).
DHS's plan for maritime homeland security has three major
components:
Container security, to facilitate trade while improving
security;
Coast Guard operations, to ensure the safety of our ports
and waterways; and
Vulnerability assessment and mitigation, to target
resources to the highest priority assessments and protective
measures across infrastructure sectors.
The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), which Congress
passed last year, addresses each of these components. The MTSA provides
a framework for ensuring the security of maritime commerce in our
domestic ports. Among other security measures, it requires:
Vessel and facility security and response plans
Foreign port assessment to ensure supply chain security
Implementation of a system to collect, integrate and
analyze vessel, cargo and crew information
Certain vessels in U.S. waters to carry automatic
identification systems
Development of credentials to ensure only known and trusted
transportation workers are permitted access to our maritime
transportation system's sensitive areas
The Coast Guard, BTS and our industry partners are working hard to
meet the requirements of MTSA to improve the security of our maritime
transportation system. However, resourcing this initiative will require
a public-private partnership to define responsibilities clearly and
enable us to use our limited resources wisely. Implementing MTSA is
part of the Department's comprehensive maritime strategy, which
implements the maritime component of the President's plan.
In addressing container security, excellent groundwork was laid in
the establishment, after 9/11, of a multi-agency Container Working
Group (CWG). The Coast Guard, BTS components of TSA and BCBP, and the
Office of the Secretary of Transportation currently participate in the
CWG, in addition to a large number of private sector participants
including, in part, the American Trucking Association, the Association
of American Railroads, the World Shipping Council, the Pacific Maritime
Association, the National Association of Waterfront Employees, the
Marine Transportation System National Advisory Council, and the
International Mass Retailers Association. The CWG's charter focuses on
addressing key components of the process through which a container is
packed, secured, loaded, and transported to the United States, ensuring
the integrity of the shipment at all points in the international
transportation chain.
The result of this effort is to improve the overall security of
containers by: establishing security standards and criteria for
identifying high-risk containerized cargo (including trucks),
implementing a prescreening process to target containerized cargo
before it is shipped to the United States; developing and deploying
technology to prescreen identified high-risk containers; developing
procedures and deploying technology to secure containers as they are
transported to the United States; and improving cargo security during
domestic transportation, particularly high consequence cargoes.
Also in the cargo container security arena, the Department is using
an approach to ensure the security of the nearly 6 million containers
that enter our ports each year that involves partnering with other
countries and the private sector to push the zone of security outward
by utilizing advance information to pre-screen all containerized cargo
and ultimately inspect 100 percent of containerized cargo that is
determined to be ``high-risk.''
One program to implement this strategy is the Container Security
Initiative, or CSI, which identifies high-risk cargo containers and
partners with other governments to pre-screen those containers at
foreign ports, before they are shipped to our ports and ensure they are
not tampered with between ports. The BTS Directorate administers CSI,
and within BTS, the Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol has the policy
and operational lead, and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (BICE) and TSA participate by providing data that is
reviewed by BCBP's Automated Tracking System (ATS), a sophisticated,
rules-based system that sorts and processes vast quantities of
information to pick up ``red flags'' and ensure that 100 percent of all
high-risk ocean-going cargo is subjected to inspection. The U.S. Coast
Guard not only provides data to support the CSI initiative, but also
participates on an operational level, by interdicting vessels
determined to be carrying high risk cargo before they reach our ports.
The Department's efforts to provide additional security in the
maritime arena also facilitate the sharing of information and expedite
the movement of legitimate goods into our ports and across our borders.
For example, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-
TPAT, administered by BCBP, involves the trade community--U.S.
importers, customs brokers, carriers, shippers, and others--to protect
the entire supply chain, against potential exploitation by terrorists
or terrorist weapons. The more than 2,000 companies that participate in
C-TPAT perform comprehensive self-assessments of their supply chain and
agree to make security improvements based on guidelines developed
jointly with the trade community. Those companies then receive
expedited processing through our land border crossings, through our
seaports, and through our international airports. This partnership
enables us to spend less time on low-risk cargo, so that we can focus
our resources where they are needed most--on higher risk cargo.
Operation Safe Commerce (OSC), a cooperative effort between the
Federal Government and the non-federal sector that includes some of the
top seaport ``load centers'' in the United States--Seattle/Tacoma, New
York/New Jersey, Los Angeles/Long Beach. Its purpose is to explore
commercially viable options that support cargo management systems that
keep pace with expanding trade, while protecting commercial shipments
from threats of terrorist attack, illegal immigration, and contraband.
Using $28 million in grants, being administered by TSA, to the
designated load centers, OSC will analyze existing supply chains and
current security practices, and provide a test-bed for potential
solutions and improvements in the security and movement of container
cargo. OSC will ultimately develop procedures, practices, and
technologies that help secure and monitor cargo from point of origin to
point of destination. These pilot projects will provide a proof of
concept that will ultimately improve the security of the international
and domestic supply chain.
The BCBP's Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) will use computer
technology to assist with the targeting of high-risk cargo and expedite
the vast majority of low-risk trade. One important, fully integrated
component of ACE is the International Trade Data System (ITDS), an e-
Government strategy designed, developed, and deployed as an integrated,
government-wide system for the electronic collection, use, and
dissemination of the international trade transaction data required by
the various trade-related federal agencies. ITDS will simplify and
streamline the regulation, promotion, and analysis of international
trade. It will also enhance enforcement of international trade and
transportation regulations and laws, while improving commercial
functionality to importers, exporters, carriers, and brokers through
unified business processes. There are over 100 agencies to be
integrated through ITDS with ACE, of which 48 have been identified as
having admissibility and export control responsibilities at the border.
Through ACE, the ITDS will be capable of linking the government's
law enforcement and other databases into one large-scale relational
database that tracks all commerce crossing our borders. ITDS will bring
together critical security, public health, public safety, and
environmental protection agencies under a common platform, and allow
businesses to report data through the use of a single, harmonized data
set.
Successful targeting of high-risk goods transported through other
transportation modes is as important as successful targeting of high-
risk goods transported by sea. As with oceangoing cargo, good
information received early in the process is key to successful
targeting and to the application of sound risk management principles.
With the Trade Act of 2002, Congress recognized the importance of such
advance information by mandating presentation of advance manifest data
on all transportation modes, both inbound and outbound. The Department
is in the process of working through the consultative process called
for in the Trade Act of 2002 to determine the most appropriate advance
manifest requirements for cross-border shipments by land, rail, and air
cargo. Once the rules for cross-border shipments for land, rail, and
air cargo are in place, we will be able to carry out the same national
targeting strategy for those modes that we currently employ with
respect to sea cargo.
DHS is in a unique position to use other innovations, including
both new and off-the-shelf technologies, to improve security and
enhance commerce across the modes. The Department deploys a range of
technology to effectively inspect people and goods entering our
maritime and land ports, including Non-Intrusive Inspection
Technology--large-scale x-ray and gamma-ray imaging systems, portal
radiation monitors, and a mixture of portable and handheld technologies
to include personal radiation detection devices that greatly reduce the
need for costly, time-consuming physical inspection of containers and
provide us a picture of what is inside the container for detecting
weapons of mass destruction, explosives, chemicals, and contraband. The
right equipment and systems access increases the number of inspections,
minimizes risks to our personnel, and enables more effective
processing.
The Coast Guard serves as the lead federal agency for port
security. Since 9/11/01, Coast Guard has conducted more than 36,000
port security patrols, 3,600 air patrols, and 10,000 vessel boardings.
It has launched two new programs to ensure the security of our ports:
Sea Marshals, which are Coast Guard officials placed on commercial
ships entering ports to prevent them from being hijacked, and Maritime
Safety and Security Teams, which are deployable fast-response units to
protect ports.
Implementing and enforcing a security regime aligned with
international standards is also of paramount importance in this effort.
For that reason, the Coast Guard successfully gained adoption of
amendments to the Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS) Convention and the
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code at the
International Maritime Organization (IMO). These very important
agreements contain strong, comprehensive, worldwide measures to enhance
maritime security around the world.
The adopted ISPS Code substantially strengthens security measure of
ships on international voyages and port facilities serving them. It
requires ships on international voyages and port facilities serving
these ships to (1) conduct a security assessment, (2) develop a
security plan, (3) designate security officers, (4) perform training
and drills, and (5) take appropriate preventive measures against
security incidents.
The United States is on record as enthusiastically supporting July
2004 as the implementation date of the new SOLAS amendments and the
ISPS Code. The ISPS Code has a Part A--or mandatory--Section, and a
Part B--or guidance--Section. The Department's intent is to mandate
both Parts A and B to meet the requirements of MTSA.
Finally, DHS is focused on vulnerability assessment and mitigation
in the maritime environment. The Coast Guard is working to conduct port
vulnerability assessments at the top 55 economically and militarily
strategic ports. This effort has been underway since August 2002, and
will be continued, in cooperation with BTS, and the Directorate of
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), the
organization within DHS that has overarching responsibility for
critical infrastructure protection.
Given the risk, importance and visibility of the Radiological
Dispersal Device (RDD/''Dirty Nuclear Bomb'') and the Improvised
Nuclear Device (IND), the Department of Homeland Security will also
continue the excellent work begun by the Office of Homeland Security
and the National Security Council's RDD/IND Working Groups. The efforts
of these working groups will move forward as a joint effort under DHS/
HSC/NCS. I have directed Under Secretary Hutchison to coordinate the
RDD/IND efforts currently underway in various regions of our country.
These Federal, State, and Local RDD/IND efforts will be integrated into
a Defense in Depth network across all modes of transportation from our
borders inland. By coordinating current efforts, expanding our program
to include modes of transportation that have been overlooked and then
physically networking the system together, DHS will greatly increase
the probability of stopping the RRD/IND threat through a Defense in
Depth posture. However, Defense in Depth alone is not enough when
dealing with a threat with this level of consequence. Therefore, DHS is
also working with our Federal, State, and Local partners to improve
preparedness, prevention, detection, response, mitigation, and recovery
through training, equipping and coordinating from a broad perspective
that only DHS can bring to the table.
Moving to the land side of the equation, the approach we are taking
to ensure the security of the containerized cargo coming into our ports
is very similar to that used to ensure the security of goods and cargo
coming across our borders and traveling throughout the country. In the
area of rail security, the BTS Directorate's TSA has been working with
and will continue to work closely with the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) of the Department of Transportation, and the many
stakeholders in the railroad industry to leverage industry
relationships and regulatory structure that FRA has long developed.
Now, BTS in cooperation with IAIP will establish transportation
security regulatory guidelines for the rail sector along the principles
of the threat based and risk management approaches that I have already
discussed. These guidelines will be based on critical rail
infrastructure risk assessments, and input from the FRA and industry.
Amtrak's security plan was recently reviewed in this fashion, and this
Committee was apprised of the results of that analysis. We have also
reached an agreement with the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency
(CCRA), the Canadian National Railway (CN), and the Canadian Pacific
Railway (CP) to implement a process for targeting, screening, and
examining rail shipments transported into the United States from Canada
by two major cross-border rail carriers. This is a major step forward
in addressing the potential terrorist threat for rail shipments coming
into the United States from Canada.
DHS is following a similar approach in addressing mass transit
security needs including rail, inter-city buses, and ferries, and over-
the-road buses. Again, existing relationships, assets, and authorities
of the DOT Operating Administrations such as the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) will be utilized by BTS (through TSA) and IAIP.
There is much that we can do to enhance security, including assessing
vulnerabilities, improving security at critical access points, acting
on specific threat intelligence, monitoring conditions, improving
emergency communications, increasing law enforcement presence where
needed, or when the national threat level is increased, and developing
contingency and response plans.
Providing for security on the Nation's highway system is an
additional challenge we are now beginning to address. Cooperation is
essential not only with the Federal Highway Administration but with the
state Departments of Transportation throughout the country. IAIP is
beginning efforts to assess critical bridge and tunnel vulnerabilities.
The enactment of the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002,
part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, will assist this effort not
only in the area of highways, bridges, and tunnels, but in all areas of
critical infrastructure vulnerability by protecting information that is
voluntarily submitted to DHS and other federal agencies.
One area in which we have made progress is the Free and Secure
Trade, or FAST, program, administered through the BTS Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection. Through FAST, importers, commercial carriers,
and truck drivers who enroll in the program and meet agreed-upon
security criteria are entitled to expedited clearance at the Northern
Border. Using electronic data transmission and transponder technology,
we expedite clearance of approved trade participants to focus our
security efforts and inspections where they are needed most--on high-
risk commerce--while ensuring that legitimate, low-risk commerce faces
no unnecessary delays. Similar programs including NEXUS and SENTRI are
being used to expedite the processing of people on the Northern and
Southern borders, by enabling pre-screened travelers to use dedicated
lanes at various ports of entry, including Blaine, Washington; Buffalo,
New York; Detroit, Michigan; Port Huron, Michigan; El Paso, Texas; and
San Ysidro, California.
Security for the transport of hazardous materials, including
explosives, over the Nation's highways by truck requires coordination
of complex laws enacted under the Safe Explosives Act (included as part
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002) and the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
Under the Safe Explosives Act, additional restrictions on the carriage
and receipt of explosives fall under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives unless the Department of
Transportation regulates the area. Under the provisions of Section 1012
of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Department of Transportation is charged
with the responsibility of overseeing issuance by the states of
hazardous materials endorsements to Commercial Drivers Licenses (CDL).
BTS through TSA, determines whether a CDL holder poses a security risk
that warrants denial of the license, and will work with DOT to ensure
this is taken into consideration for approval of a CDL license. This
requires conducting Department of Justice background checks on the many
HAZMAT drivers throughout the country. The Department together with
DOT, acting through the Research and Special Programs Administration
(RSPA) and the FMCSA, are collaborating on a series of regulations that
will provide uniform standards for the conduct of background checks and
threat based security determinations.
These regulations will end the uncertainty within the trucking
industry as to what standards and rules will apply to the
transportation of explosives. Because I know a number of Members have
expressed concern about the timeframe in which the rules are being
developed, it is important to note that despite the complexity of the
statutory requirements governing their issuance, and the sheer volume
of background checks the governing statutes will require, we are
seeking to ensure maximum security with minimal economic impact. These
rules are in the process of final review within the Administration, and
we hope to issue them in the near future.
To keep pipelines secure to the maximum extent possible, the
communication process has been streamlined with our Federal, State and
industry partners to ensure that security information and threat
warnings are available on a real-time basis. BTS, IAIP, and DOT
continue to focus on implementing a coordinated, appropriate set of
protocols based on threat assessments for inspectors to use to verify
that operators are putting security practices into place at critical
facilities. Again, the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002
will provide an added tool in assisting federal agencies, including
DHS, to receive and assess critical infrastructure information from
state and local governments and from the private sector.
Mr. Chairman, as you well-know, transportation security is a
collaborative effort between the Department of Homeland Security, other
federal agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and
individual Americans. Together we have made great advances in securing
our transportation systems, protecting civil liberties, and ensuring
the free flow of people and commerce, but we recognize that more needs
to be done and we will continue to make progress every day. The
Department of Homeland Security is dedicated to accomplishing the
objectives set forth in the President's National Strategy for Homeland
Security. This strategy provides the framework to mobilize and organize
the nation--Federal, state and local governments, the private sector,
and the American people--in the complex mission to protect our
homeland. We are proud of our efforts thus far and are confident that
our transportation systems, ports and borders are more staunchly
protected than ever before.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I thank you for the opportunity to speak before you
today.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Ridge.
I think it is generally accepted that the efforts we've
made on airport security have been largely successful. Would
you agree with that?
Secretary Ridge. Yes, I would.
The Chairman. Secretary, I wish we could convince the
traveling public that the enhanced measures at the airports,
beginning with the hardened cockpit doors, the new TSA, and the
baggage screeners, and the technology and the people at the
airports, perimeter security, additional air marshals, that the
commercial aviation is far safer and more secure today than it
was on September 10, 2001. Do you believe we have made that
same progress as far as railway stations are concerned?
Secretary Ridge. I do not. I think one of the big
challenges we have at the outset, Mr. Chairman, is that the
Congress in setting up very appropriately the TSA, sent a very
strong signal that the highest priority, almost in a
prescriptive sense, was aviation security. But clearly,
Congress also----
The Chairman. Which is understandable, given the events of
September 11.
Secretary Ridge. Absolutely. But I think Congress was also
clear that it's an intermodal transportation system that they
sought TSA to work to secure, and Admiral Loy and I are
committed to making sure that in the following months and years
ahead, that we restore some of the balance, continue to work on
aviation, but we've got rail freight, we've got pipelines,
we've got highways, and we've got considerable additional
transportation infrastructure that we need to secure.
The Chairman. What about port security?
Secretary Ridge. Mr. Chairman, I believe that we've made a
great leap, a monumental difference with the support of
Congress and some of the initiatives undertaken within the
Department of Homeland Security by individuals and agencies
even before they were grafted in the Department.
The enhanced security with the Coast Guard and the
continued commitment of Congress to the Deep Water acquisition
program that will provide additional infrastructure vessels and
technology and the like, the 2004 budget enables them to hire
and bring in an additional 2,000 men and women. They have
clearly enhanced security at the ports.
The cargo security initiative, where through a targeting
process, a nonintrusive technology in cooperation of our
partners overseas, we can identify and actually inspect some of
this cargo for security purposes before they even load the
ships.
The 24-hour rule that gives us the passenger lists and the
cargo manifests, so we can do some of this targeting. And the
enhanced sea marshal program, additional inspections of high
interest vessels.
So again, we have done a great deal. Is there more to do?
Certainly. The Maritime Security Act talks about vulnerability
assessments. We are in the process of doing that, and obviously
down the road there will have to be physical enhancements at
our domestic ports as well.
The Chairman. I know that you know that there has been some
money wasted because of the rapidity with which the TSA had to
be set up. I hope you will work with Mr. Meade, the IG of the
Department of Transportation. He has identified some of these
areas. We regret when a single dollar is wasted. There has been
some waste and some abuse, and I hope that you can come back to
us at a certain time and make sure that these have been
remedied and won't happen again.
Could I talk about the border a second?
Secretary Ridge. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I don't think that I have the knowledge or
expertise that a lot of your experts do. I do believe that I
have some knowledge because of my involvement and visits and
information that I've received from a broad variety of sources.
But it seems to me, that particularly on our southern border,
although we need to hire additional personnel and some of that
activity is already taken, that we really are going to have to
take advantage of the high tech capabilities that our military
has proved so effective.
I don't think we will ever have enough vehicles of people
to patrol the 200-mile border between Arizona and Mexico. But I
do believe that a UAV could do a very good job in that respect.
And I believe that some of the other technology that we have,
that the military has developed--you know, there's a great cry
now that they want to send the military to the border. People
think that is an answer, and obviously it's not, for a variety
of reasons. But I do believe that we could take advantage of a
lot of the technology that has been developed by the military,
particularly as far as surveillance is concerned, and use that
equipment to great effect.
And I don't want to keep beating on this issue, but when
you meet the guy that's been running a wildlife refuge on the
U.S.-Mexico border for 18 years that says Senator, I can tell
you that I no longer have control of your wildlife refuge, and
a park ranger is shot and killed at the Organ Pipe National
Monument by some people who are coming through illegally, this
gets to be a huge problem. And one of the effects of it has
been, and a bit understandably, is vigilante groups forming
because they believe that the Government is not doing it, so
therefore they will, and some of them are even arming
themselves. That sets up a potential for a very dangerous
situation, as you know.
So I hope, maybe you could comment on that aspect of border
security. And my understanding is that your next priorities are
rail and port security, after aviation and airport security. Is
that basically correct?
Secretary Ridge. Correct. Senator, your recommendation, or
your reminder, that there exists some technology that has a
military application that has a surveillance application at the
borders is a suggestion and a recommendation that we're taking
very seriously in the new Department.
Our science and technology unit, just recently stood up,
will be looking at the available technologies of the UAVs out
there. I had a good conversation with the Undersecretary for
Border and Transportation Security, Asa Hutchison. Because if
we can take this technology, it certainly--and the eyes over
the horizon, we obviously have to change tactically and
operationally how we use the additional manpower that Congress
has given us the past couple of years.
But I think one of the advantages of the new Department is,
one, at the border there is a single chain of command. As you
know, we've got some of the INS and Customs and AFS people
together. Border Patrol is an integral part of our operation.
But, I think that we need to equip them with this kind of
technology if our expectations legitimately are risen due to
combat terrorism. And we want them to cover more territory.
And you point out the humane side of being able to identify
some of these men, women and children trying to work their way
to this country for understandable reasons. And so your
suggestion about the technology is one that we take seriously
and we have begun the process of looking at the application,
hopefully with a pilot or demonstration project sometime this
year.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Hollings?
Senator Hollings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, like the Tale of Two Cities, you've got the
best and the worst. Let me cover first the worst, and that's
the Immigration Administration. And I'm not being critical
because you only have an acting director there, but years back
I even called the President and asked for a replacement.
It's not a money problem. You can ask Senator Gregg or any
of the others, we have been on that appropriations Subcommittee
for years, and you keep pouring money, and it's one grand
bureaucratic snarl. Get your hard nosed general or admiral like
Loy, get your tough fellow like yourself, and get that thing
cleaned up. I mean, you've got a cancerous operation there.
Everybody will agree. That's a bipartisan comment.
On the other hand, you've got the finest in the United
States Coast Guard. To tell you how uninformed I was, I came up
here in 1966 and saw all that brass up on the hall over in the
Dirksen Building at the time and I said you all are mistaken,
the Armed Services is back down on the next floor. And then
when Chairman Magnuson got ready to give the promotions for the
Coast Guard, he said where are they, and I'd sent them down to
the wrong place. So I've learned to take care of the Coast
Guard over the years.
And there's an ongoing little conspiracy. You begin being
underfunded. You will find that Chairman Ted Stevens now, and
Senator Inouye and myself, we've served on that Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee for the last 30-some years, and we
have to take out of that 050 defense, and transfer $350,000,000
back to the Coast Guard. We've been doing that for years,
because we just don't have--you're underfunded right this
minute.
And they're doing, like Admiral Collins says, the finest
job they possibly can, but taking all of those personnel, ships
and everything else and putting them in the gulf just--in the
newspaper, I think it was Monday, he had a column in there to
the effect that he's 68 percent cut now from his drug task,
from his fisheries task and everything else of that kind. So
he's doing an outstanding job, but we just haven't put the
money to it.
With respect to the ports, you've got the GAO report, and
rather than reading the whole thing, I mean, you had just this
present year a $697 million need and only appropriated some $93
million. So we've got to play catch-up ball financially with
respect to the Coast Guard.
With respect to the Immigration Service, you've got to
catch up administrator-wise as a personnel thing.
And you've got a difficult thing. You left the other day
when Secretary Rumsfeld was there, and I was telling him he
didn't have to worry about a money supplemental because
everybody is going to give him the money. What he needed was a
personnel supplemental. He's got 12 peacekeeping, now he's
added the war in Iraq, and he's taking all of my National
Guardsmen, Reserve and everything else, and he's got them, and
then you're trying to grab them.
Last week when you had Code Orange, the Republican governor
of South Carolina had to get parole officers to put around the
ports. I mean, these folks are out there struggling and they
need money, and let's use the revenues that we're going to cut,
and give it to Secretary Ridge. That's my main thrust, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
obviously you have a tremendous amount on your plate and going
back to----
The Chairman. Senator Wyden, before--did you want to
respond?
Secretary Ridge. Just----
Senator Hollings. I've got a list of questions.
Secretary Ridge. If I just might, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I think the way Congress restructured the INS
in the new Department of Homeland Security is an appropriate
prelude to doing more and doing better. As you know, we now
have a Citizenship and Immigration Affairs Services unit. We've
got an extraordinary individual who's going to task that, head
that unit, Eduardo Aguerri, who himself is a naturalized
citizen, understands the process, and is the kind of hard
charging leader that is necessary to bring not only discipline,
but I think respect back to a group of people who have
historically worked pretty hard, but you know, their successes
are never celebrated but their failures are certainly
publicized.
So we know we've got some work to do there. But by in
large, I think most of those people go to work every single day
trying to do a good job. It's just our responsibility to help
empower them, sometimes with more people and with better
technology, and perhaps even some decision making authority at
a lower level that heretofore didn't exist.
The Congress has also helped us. I think we're in our
second if not third year toward our goal of the six-month
standard, that all immigration benefits regardless of kind be
handled within six months. And I think you gave us $100 million
last year, we're looking for that same installment in 2004.
So you did that, and then you gave us an opportunity on the
enforcement side, and we've got some good people that are going
to manage that.
So one, I think that you've given us a good structure and
you've been supporting us with the appropriate dollars, and
hopefully in the months ahead you can say you're beginning to
see a noticeable and a very positive change.
The Coast Guard in the 2004 budget, Senator, there's a
request for a 10 percent increase. It will enable Admiral
Collins to attract, and I'm sure he will be able to attract
2,000 more men and women. You and I have the same high regard
for this extraordinary agency, I think probably one of the most
undervalued under appreciated assets in the Federal Government.
They can do from top to bottom, from the raw recruit to the
leadership. They are cross trained. You put the same people on
the same vessel, and depending on the day, they can do five or
six different things, and they do them well.
I think that you're going to find that the supplemental
will give us--again, I know Senator Breaux talked a little bit
about it--one of the reasons we came up looking for about $600
million for the Coast Guard is we felt that about $400 million
was needed because of the deployment of ships and crew, and the
need to bring in about 6,000 reservists during Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM. But about $200 million was for the additional port
security during this period of time.
You've also given us the money and we have begun some
procurement of about 700 more small fast boats to use for our
port security, the contract was just a couple days ago. So
again, I look forward to working with you to continue to
support this extraordinary organization.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, you've got your hands full, an enormous
amount on your plate, and having worked with you for a lot of
years, I know how you tackle these issues in a professional
way, and I appreciate it.
My concern about the CAPPS II program is really highlighted
even by what we've talked about this morning. The CAPPS II
program is arguably one of the biggest background checks this
country has ever had. I mean every time you get on a plane,
you're going to go into this color coded system, green, yellow
and red, and as far as I can tell, the major decisions are now
being made on CAPPS II without a privacy officer being on deck.
And that in effect reflects my concern.
What I've always wanted is to make sure that these privacy
issues are dealt with up front, that the privacy officer is at
the table, you know, making the case for how we're going to
fight terrorism aggressively and at the same time be sensitive
to civil liberties. And yet, these decisions are being made now
without the privacy officer being in place.
When do you think such a person--you touched on in your
opening statement would be on deck as the law envisions?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, I would think that we would be
able to make an announcement in the next week or two, and I
think the individual will be well recognized to you and you
will be comforted by the individual's experience and background
in this arena.
I should also tell you, however, that Admiral Loy and I
share the notion that when a Department has a privacy officer,
it is our responsibility to integrate that office and those
individuals at the front end as we begin to discuss programs
and policies. Because we did not have the privacy officer on
deck yet, Admiral Loy a couple weeks ago convened a group,
several groups from the community of interest on privacy
matters, groups from the political right, political left, you
name it, a broad spectrum of individuals representing national
organizations concerned with privacy, to sit down, listen to
their concerns, address them or at least show how in the pilot
that we are presently developing, those concerns were
addressed, and to identify those areas where we may have to
continue to do some work before we implement the pilot program.
So, I would be very pleased to provide very specific
information as to who participated in those meetings, and look
forward to the introduction of the privacy office to you and
your colleagues in Congress, because I think you will be very
well satisfied.
Senator Wyden. Now, what was published in the Federal
Register with respect to the program originally, that was done
back in January, I think it's fair to say does not resemble
what you have described on page 4 in your testimony. For
example, you talk on page 4 about how data would be purged from
the computers immediately after the passenger's flight ended.
Secretary Ridge. Right.
Senator Wyden. And the notice back in January said, that
some of this data could be kept for 50 years, which certainly,
you know, struck people as a bit far fetched.
When do you think there would be a new notice in the
Federal Register so that the public could weigh in again on any
other proposed revisions? For example, I want to see--again, in
your statement you talk about TSA will rarely see the
background information checked by the computer. One of the
things that's concerned me is what happens if the information
is inaccurate, because there has certainly been a lot of
inaccurate information in private sector databases and we have
seen problems stemming from that.
So, my question here is, when would there likely be a new
Federal Register notice on CAPPS II so that the public could
have another shot to comment?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, I can't give you a certain date,
but before there would be, there is a new federal notice, it
would be my intention to have the program initially as
designed, without the personal and professional involvement of
the privacy officer to review it before there's any additional
public communication.
I think it's critical to the credibility of the pilot
program. We think that the approach that is being developed
will significantly enhance aviation security. We believe
strongly that it can be done in a way that safeguards the
rights of the individual passengers. We are aware that from
time to time the sources of information that we would be using
that are commercially available may not have, may not always be
either complete or totally accurate, and trying to basically
set up an algorithm or a system somehow that accepts that
possibility and deals with it in a private nonintrusive way is
certainly a part of the challenge we have with the system.
Senator Wyden. Let me see if I can get one other question,
but know that I'm anxious to work you on this. As you know,
with the support of Chairmen McCain and Hollings, I was able to
add legislation----
The Chairman. The Secretary has to leave in about a half
hour, so please make it quick.
Senator Wyden. May I ask one other question?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Wyden. All right. One other question with respect
to waste and inefficiency. This week the Los Angeles Times
published a very disturbing story about possibly $250 million
worth of waste at the TSA. And my concern is that given the
fact that we've got this on the record with respect to TSA,
your department is embarking essentially on very much the same
sort of challenge, how to deal with tackling these issues in a
very quick way with relatively few kind of precedents to deal
with.
How are you going to prevent at your agency similar kinds
of problems that they saw at TSA involving hundreds of millions
of dollars?
Secretary Ridge. Well, first of all, Admiral Loy has
withheld substantial payment to some of the--or to at least one
of the contractors of which I'm aware, pending discussions with
regard to their use of some of these dollars.
Secondly, through our Undersecretary of Management, we look
to establish our own acquisitions review committee and own
auditing committee. And you know, there are some agencies
within the Federal Government, DoD and others, that employ
practices and have boards that we can look to for assistance,
or at least for a template as we design an internal auditing
mechanism ourselves.
It was prompted, I think in large measure, by the speed
required by meeting the mandates. That doesn't excuse it. That
does explain in part why they ran out and secured contractors,
probably with--again, I don't know the specific details of any
or single one or all the contracts, but if you've got to get
equipment in place and baggage screeners in place, and
personnel screeners in place, and you've got less than a year
to do it and you don't have the resources because at the same
time you're setting up your own new department, you rely on
contractors.
And if we find that they've taken advantage of the contract
language and have misused those dollars, we will fight to
regain every penny. And as I said before, Admiral Loy has
withheld payment pending our inquiry of their request for final
payment.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Smith.
Senator Smith.
STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON SMITH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary,
welcome.
The Chairman. Senator.
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I would ask an opening
statement be included in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Senator Smith. And I apologize for my late arrival. I found
myself, Mr. Chairman, delayed in my departure from home glued
to the television set, watching what I think is truly an
historic moment, the coalition of the willing. And right now,
Saddam Hussein's statue has a rope around it, an American tank
is filled with cheering Iraqis who are for the first time
tasting freedom. And I for one am thankful that we have a
military as capable as this and a Commander in Chief that had
the courage not to listen to Hollywood or the New York Times,
or the French.
[Applause.]
Senator Smith. Some have predicted for every--that this
action would create 100 Osama bin Ladens. I think today on the
streets of Baghdad there are tens of thousands of new freedom
fighters. It's a great American moment, and I celebrate that.
You are part of an Administration now tasked with not just
winning a conflict abroad but keeping us safe at home, Mr.
Secretary. And I think we have just come through a supplemental
last week where we were struggling to know just what your
Department needed. Senator Hollings had an amendment, and I
think well motivated, to add more money to port security. I
think what I want to know is what's enough and what's too much,
what is wise and what is unwise?
And my question is, is what's coming out of conference, are
you a part of that and is it enough to protect our ports?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, we sent up a dollar amount that
we thought was very appropriate for the needs, the short-term
needs, because we took a look at the dollars that are available
in many instances from previous appropriations, including the
2003 budget. If you add it on to the request for the
supplemental, and being of an optimistic sort, believing that
Congress will get its appropriations bills completed this year
by the end of the year, and looking at the budget request that
I believe when it comes to Homeland Security at a very minimum,
the Congress will honor, that in that continuum of those
dollars available to mayors and to governors and to others,
there was 7 to $8 billion.
There were sufficient dollars for us to begin some of the
critically needed demonstration and pilot programs that we need
as we tackle some rather unique challenges with infrastructure
protection both publicly and privately held.
You've given us some reprogramming authority that we've
begun to use already under the 2003 budget, to commence
research in dealing with weapons of mass destruction
countermeasures, dealing with means of technology of detection
for biochem agents.
So I think in the scheme of things as we set up the
Department, looking at the flow of funds that we would have
available to use this year, and to begin to develop our
partnerships with the rest of the country, we felt it was
adequate.
We knew that we were on perilous ground and as a former
Member of Congress, knew we were on perilous ground looking for
a little flexibility on some of the appropriations, because as
I well know, the Congress takes and holds very appropriately
and very dearly its constitutional authority and responsibility
to oversee the expenditure of every dollar. Therefore, there's
a much stronger preference to the legislative branch to say to
the executive branch, tell us specifically what you need and
we'll give it to you.
Well, we tried to provide some of that specific information
but at the same time, I think obviously we were looking for 4
or $500 million to deal with unanticipated needs in the next
month or two.
Senator Smith. And did you get that? Are you getting that?
Are you confident you'll have sufficient funds?
Secretary Ridge. We will deal with the dollars. I think
we're going to get the dollars we wanted, probably not going to
have quite the flexibility that we wanted. But again, when you
set up the Department of Homeland Security, you gave us a
little transfer authority and we do have a little wiggle room.
And to the extent that we will be able to use it appropriately
under the authority Congress has given us, it's our job to make
it work.
Senator Smith. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate knowing that,
and I want you to know, we want to know what you actually need,
because I think there is a lot of will on the part of the
Congress to get you that. And obviously, we hope you won't ask
for what is surplus. We've got to be careful with our budget.
Secretary Ridge. Right.
Senator Smith. But I would hope you would use these
resources to address the tension that will exist between
providing increased security in our ports without sacrificing
efficiency in our ports.
Portland, Oregon would cease to be a port if we make it so
difficult to trade that its commerce is choked off. So whatever
you can to do work with our trading companies to make sure--
because I know they are committed to security as well, so I'm
pleading with you to look for opportunities to provide for the
security of the American people without sacrificing the
efficiency of American commerce.
Secretary Ridge. That's our challenge, and I think working
with Congress we will be able to meet it.
If I might just comment, Senator, your colleagues Senator
Breaux and Hollings also talked a little about the dollar
figure. And what I would like to share with you and with the
Chairman and other Members of the Committee, I do think that
it's one thing to say to our first responders and to our
governors and our mayors, here's a sum of money, and feel
comfortable about the dollar amount.
I do think that it will be important for the Department to
work in a bipartisan way with the Congress to see to it,
particularly around the 2004 budget, that the formula by which
billions of dollars are presently allocated to states and
locals is reviewed and modified so that it can reflect the
threat and vulnerability in the critical infrastructure
responsibilities that states and mayors have. So I think a lot
of the dollars we're going to distribute through a formula
that's been in existence for three or four years through the
Office of Domestic Preparedness, but I've talked in both
chambers and to leaders of both parties, I think it would do us
all well if we sat down and thought reflectively, is there a
better way to get these dollars out, and to target them more
specifically to meet the needs of the country.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Gordon Smith, U.S. Senator from Oregon
Thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this very timely and important
hearing on the status of transportation and border security. I would
like to welcome Secretary Ridge before us today.
Secretary Ridge, I want to commend your efforts as you merge 22
agencies into ``one'' Department of Homeland Security to provide a
unified structure capable of responding to current and future threats.
As your Department works to provide the necessary federal funding for
airport and seaport security, I want to emphasize the importance for
your Department to address the specific security and funding needs at
the local level.
I also wanted to bring to your attention some specific issues that
are important to me and my state of Oregon:
(1) Trade industries in Oregon are very serious about their sense
of duty to make our homeland safer and they are working diligently to
prepare and implement the proposed security legislation, particularly
on cargo security. As you continue the regulation process
(specifically, the electronic transmission of cargo information prior
to arrival as required in the Trade Act of 2002) in order to implement
it without delay, it is imperative that your agency continue to work
with the trade industry and implement a realistic business model that
provides an efficient flow of commerce to the United States, while
keeping our shores safe and secure.
(2) Mr. Secretary given your background in state government, I know
that you are keenly aware of the need for training at the state and
local level and hope you agree that there is a significant need for
training the men and women who lead our nation's first responders. I
believe you are aware of a program in Oregon called the National Center
for Disaster Decision Making which trains senior civilian leaders (like
mayors, governors, emergency management officials) to address critical
decisions during a crisis and encourage your Department to provide the
necessary funding to continue this important partnership with NCDDM.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Breaux.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having the
hearing, and thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being with us. I too
would join others in an unanimous statements about the good job
that you're doing and the support that we have for the
importance of your tasks.
I share with Senator Smith the good news out of Iraq, the
men and women and the good work that they are doing there.
However, I do feel that after that conflict over there is over,
we are going to be much more vulnerable over here because
people who are unsuccessful in Iraq will look to the United
States as an opportunity to get revenge and to do more types of
terrorist activity over here, and unconventional types of
warfare. So your duties and your responsibilities, and all of
our responsibilities, are going to increase after the war over
there is over, and we have to fight the fight here in this
country against terrorist type of activities. I'm very pleased
that you are at the helm of the ship.
With regard to port security, this Congress has instructed
the Coast Guard to be the lead agency in coming up with port
security plans for every major port in the United States. It is
my understanding that work is ongoing but that the Coast Guard
in fact is behind schedule. Can you bring us up to date on
where we are with those port security plans?
Secretary Ridge. I think your information is accurate with
regard to, and I think Senator Hollings mentioned it as well.
The Coast Guard has been tasked, therefore the Department of
Homeland Security has been tasked with port vulnerability
assessments. We've taken a look at the immediate larger 55
strategic ports. I can't tell you whether or not they're on
Admiral Collins' time table. I do know that he wants to
accelerate that time table.
You have given--well, you haven't done it yet, but in the
2004 budget, we have a request in the area of information
analysis and critical infrastructure protection for a sum in
excess of, I think $800 million. And if we could add or--some
of those dollars we want to direct to the Coast Guard so they
can speed up their vulnerability assessments pursuant to the
responsibilities given to them under the Maritime
Transportation Security Act.
Senator Breaux. That's exactly what we were trying to do in
the supplemental, which was not successful. They say some of
that money needed to be directed to domestic port security and
operations here. And apparently you're requesting now in the
2004 budget money for increase in domestic operations?
Secretary Ridge. Well, what was done I think, and I think
it's a fairly good decision, TSA wanted some critical
infrastructure vulnerability, the Coast Guard wanted it, and we
just aggregated the sum. I think it's in excess of $800 million
that would go to that. And then based on needs, et cetera, we
would sit down with these different leaders of the different
units and allocate some of these dollars so they can continue
their vulnerability assessment studies.
Senator Breaux. Well, it's high priority and it really
needs to get done.
Maybe you can clear up for me the conflict between the law
establishing the Department of Homeland Security that provides,
the Border and Transportation Security Directorate will be
responsible for, among other things, Number 2, for securing the
borders, the territorial waters, the ports, the terminals, the
waterways, and air, land and sea transportation systems of the
United States. I think Asa Hutchison and Admiral Collins have
both indicated that the Coast Guard is the lead federal agency
for maritime homeland security. The law seems to say border
patrol, sea transportation, maritime waterways, terminals.
I mean, I'm not sure we gave a very clear direction. I
think the intent certainly was to have the Coast Guard do the
ports, waterways, and sea security. Is that your understanding?
Secretary Ridge. That's correct. That is our understanding.
It is the lead agency, but they have a collaborative
responsibility to work with the Border and Customs Protection.
Senator Breaux. But you've got to have someone in charge.
Is that the Coast Guard?
Secretary Ridge. The primary responsibility for ports and
maritime domain awareness is the Coast Guard.
Senator Breaux. Yeah, because they could cooperate with
everybody but if everybody is in charge, as I've said, nobody's
in charge.
Secretary Ridge. Nobody's in charge if everybody's in
charge.
Senator Breaux. I've heard some terrible rumors which I
hope you can disavow me of, that the Department of Homeland
Security has been discussing plans to move the 8th District
Coast Guard from New Orleans to somewhere else. And also, the
17th Coast Guard District out of Aleut, Juneau, and Alaska. I
will assure you that if those rumors are true, you're going to
be in for a real dogfight. Are they true or not?
Secretary Ridge. We've had to deal with a lot of rumors
these past months, and I don't believe there is any validity to
either one of those.
Senator Breaux. I won't even go any further, thank you.
I think that--oh, my last question.
Secretary Ridge. You know, where that may have come up, and
I want to--there had been an inference, because we have talked,
Senator, about the need to reorganize some of these units that
come into the Department out there on a regional basis, because
we don't believe you can secure the homeland from Washington,
DC So as we take a look at some of the agencies that are
working, for command and control purposes and coordination
purposes, we are thinking in terms of regions.
But that is, in that context there may have been some
people who interpreted that as meaning that we were going to
move Coast Guard infrastructure and personnel from present
venues. And I assure you, that is not in the plan.
Senator Breaux. Well, I appreciate that. I agree with the
regional concept out of Washington is a good concept, I agree
with that.
Final question. Admiral Loy had told us at one time that
they were discussing and actually promoting the concept of a
frequent flyer card for airline passengers that fly on a
regular basis that have submitted themselves to some type of a
security background check.
I cannot tell you, I mean it must be my face or something,
Mr. Chairman. I mean, every time I'm there, my luggage is
completely totally looked through and searched. And I would
never ever say, look, I'm a Member of the United States
Congress, don't do this. I mean, I just sit there and bear it
but never say anything about it. But it seems like it's sort of
a waste of time if we're spending a lot of time doing those
type of investigations with people who would clearly hopefully
pass a security check.
Is there anything that we're doing in that regard to try
and speed up so that we really are spending the time in areas
that we need to and less time on things that perhaps would not
be a priority to this type of security card or frequent flyer
type thing?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, the program that you referred to,
we talked internally as a trusted traveler program, where
passengers who fly regularly come forward, share information
about them. Reasonable people can draw conclusions that chances
are very very good that these individuals are not terrorists or
a threat to aviation security in any way. That will give us an
opportunity to focus our technology and our human resources on
those people and that luggage that we don't know anything
about. So that is an initiative that is presently being worked
within the Department.
Senator Breaux. I would encourage you to continue. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Senator Hutchison.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly
concur with the line of questioning of Senator Breaux, both on
the trusted traveler program, which we have discussed would be
a great way to expedite lines.
And also, I talked to Admiral Loy about getting the ability
for accompanying people to take a passenger inside the
terminal, now that things seem to be settling down. As long as
longer lines aren't formed, it would be, I think, a comfort to
passengers to be able to take someone in and have a meal.
Now I know some airports have meal capabilities outside,
but some don't. So, I hope that you will be looking at allowing
people to be accompanied. It would make traveling a better
experience.
I wanted to talk particularly about the explosion detection
equipment situation for checked baggage. We had a deadline of
last year, and most airports were able to meet the deadline for
screening checked baggage. However, there were a few that
didn't, and Congress passed a law that gave a one-year
extension to those that were designated by Admiral Loy. Now
many of those airports are trying to make the investments that
would allow them to meet the deadline of this year, and they
have not been able to get letters of intent from Admiral Loy.
I would like to ask you if the Department is going to be
helpful to these airports to meet the deadline, or do you think
that it's not a priority to meet the deadline, and what are you
going to do?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, it is very much a priority of the
Department and of Admiral Loy's, I believe right now. When it
comes to aviation security, there isn't a higher priority,
because we still have the mandate to get it done in a certain
period of time.
I would just share with you that he has been, or we have
been working together, taking a look at what assets we might be
able to provide him within the Department, as well as working
with OMB and others to see if we can secure the necessary
fundings so we can get those letters of intent out.
So it's a very high priority, we're working on it as you
and I are speaking today.
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you. I put language in the
Senate Supplemental Appropriations Bill that said the TSA would
be empowered to issue Lois or report to the Committees of
jurisdiction why they are unable to do so. I would like to ask
you if you support that and would think that would be a good
thing, to either give you the power to do it, or tell us why
you can't.
Secretary Ridge. Well, I think, Senator, that language
reflects both the intent of the pre-existing legislation and
the requirement imposed on us, and I think you ratify it with
that language. Because if we don't get the job done, we're
going to be accountable to you, and our first goal is to get it
done in a timely way and meet the requirements from Congress.
Obviously you hold us accountable if we don't, but it's
something that Admiral Loy is very very much, personally
involved in, well aware of the financial commitments that some
of the larger airports have to make, and their ability to go to
the market to borrow the dollars necessary to install the
equipment is contingent upon getting the letter of intent.
We're making every reasonable, and I think appropriate effort
to accomplish this task here in the very near future.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you. I very much appreciate you
saying it is a priority, because it certainly is for this
Committee.
I'd like to switch gears, if I could, to the border
security. With the passage of the Border Security Act last
year, non-immigrants are required to have a biometric visa, and
I'd like to ask you how that program is working. And the fees
have been increased now from $65 to $100 for the machine
readable visas and I just would like to ask you if you think
it's working, if the increase in fees has slowed down the
number of people able to get that visa, and is it something
that we're looking at for the long term?
Secretary Ridge. I cannot answer specifically today whether
the additional fee has had any impact on visa applications, and
I will get back to you with that information.
I will tell you in a larger context, the whole entry-exit
system that Congress has mandated and we certainly embrace, it
was an initiative the President embraced, will be--it's the
right thing to do. It's a technological challenge. You've given
us a couple of mandated time frames. The entry-exit system says
for seaports and airports, we have to have that system in place
with that biometric identifier by the end of the year and at
the 50 largest land crossings by the end of next year, and the
balance of the system by the following year.
So we have, Asa Hutchison has pulled together an
integration team from the other subunits within his department
that have to focus on this, including a technology component.
There's some policy issues that are relevant that ultimately, I
think, end up being discussed within the executive branch and
with the legislative branch.
You know, we do have countries that are visa waiver
countries, we don't require visas. But we are going to require
biometric identifiers. So it's conceivable that sovereign
countries out there that are visa waiver countries may or may
not have a biometric identifier of the kind that we want on
their passport. So there's some discussion, and some decisions
have to be made by this government as to whether or not visa
waiver countries, that whole process will continue to exist.
So as we identify the programmatic challenges, the
technological challenges, we will engage in very serious and
necessary discussions with you and your colleagues who have
promoted this approach, which I think Americans embrace. The
notion that we need to know that the folks who come into our
country are those who they say they are, they stay here for
whatever time they are privileged to stay. And we are a nation
of immigrants, so we want to continue to be open and welcoming.
But when the time is expired, that we monitor the exit.
Additional challenges with the migration from Mexico. We
need to think about that. Post 9/11, the borders with Mexico
were backed up, commercial traffic, pedestrian traffic. Now we
do get some fingerprints from visa applicants from Mexico, but
we have to be conscious of the fact that if you have several
hundred million citizens going back and forth across the border
on a daily basis for school, for work, for play, for family
reasons, do we want every single person on every single day,
every single occasion they cross, to be stopped so that we can
confirm their biometric identifier? Do we take the 40 people
out of the passenger bus, stop it and identify it?
So we have some real challenges here that I'm confident
that working with Congress we can address. But the entry-exit
is a good system, it's necessary. We've mandated and made some
time tables, but we have some policy issues we have to work
through, and we do.
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I
want to say, I think that exercising caution rather than
opening things up at this point in the security of our country
is the wise thing to do. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Lautenberg.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Chairman, I don't know how much
time Secretary Ridge has got, but----
The Chairman. You have five minutes.
Senator Lautenberg. Okay. So I would ask, therefore, Mr.
Chairman, that my full statement be included in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Senator Lautenberg. And I would just make this point. And
that is, it's obvious we've come a long way, and I commend you,
Mr. Secretary, for the work you're getting done even as you
build this organization. It's going to be recorded in history
because I'm sure it will get done, but how it gets done is
going to be a very interesting study. But keep going, and don't
weaken along the way here.
We are concerned not only in the State of New Jersey, which
by any measure is a highly vulnerable place, the transportation
hub that we are, whether it's on highways, whether it's
aviation, with Newark Airport being one of the largest in the
country, or huge port activity, one of the largest container
ship transfer stations in the world. So we've got to pay
attention to those other modes of transportation as well, and I
hope that we will have a chance to discuss that at another
time.
But it points out a problem that we have, and I was looking
at a previous Committee hearing, at the list prepared by ODP of
the distribution of the funds thus far. And what we found as I
looked at it is there's a strange anomaly, a difference in the
way states are allocated funds, because we go from--this is by
way of example and not to pick on any state, but the equivalent
of $9.78 per person security grants to the State of Wyoming,
but only the equivalent of $1.69 per person to the State of New
Jersey, when the average is $1.98 throughout the country.
And now if you consider the risks of the two places, the
risk exposure, it's pretty obvious that New Jersey is a place
that has to be wary. We lost 700 of our citizens on 9/11.
So, I would ask, and I understand that by sheer coincidence
I interviewed a fellow who works for you in the elevator, we
happened to be there at the same time, and I mentioned this. He
was very quick. He's at the White House. And he said that it's
a problem that you're looking at to try and assess more
clearly, the needs and the exposure in a particular state or
particular area.
And I wonder if I can just ask you, is that a fact and is
that in the loop?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, the Office of Domestic
Preparedness that previously had been in the Department of
Justice had a formula that we don't believe is the appropriate,
provides the appropriate distribution for counter-terrorism,
anti-terrorism prevention dollars. And I talked to the leaders
of both parties in both chambers. I think this is an
opportunity for the Congress to work together in a bipartisan
way to fashion a different distribution mechanism.
The formula as it exists now does not take into
consideration critical infrastructure whether it's private,
whether they're federal, whether they're national icons. The
formula doesn't really take in threat or vulnerabilities. So I
think it's an appropriate time for us, we had talked, thought
about trying to do something like this in the supplemental, but
I think this is going to be--it may be a little contentious
because some people obviously with a new formula are going to
get a little bit more, and some people are going to get a
little bit less. And when you're appropriately down here, you
fight for as much as you can for your state or your community.
So I suspect that reconstituting the ODP formula or coming
up with something new is something that we hope to achieve some
bipartisan support and get it done and then attached to the
2004 appropriations. So, we make a permanent change so that
distribution reflects the reality of the needs of communities
to combat terrorism.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, Mr.
Secretary.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank Lautenberg,
U.S. Senator from New Jersey
Mr. Chairman, I think we have come a long way in bolstering
aviation security since September 11th, although I would note that we
still have to complete the task of deploying explosive detection
equipment at a number of airports.
But I am very concerned that we are not doing enough to protect
other modes of transportation--particularly surface transportation--and
port security.
This is a major problem in my home State of New Jersey.
New Jersey contains many vital elements of our nation's intermodal
transportation system which are vitally important to the national
economy. For instance:
Port Newark is one of the biggest container ports in
America, handling $82 billion worth of cargo in 2001;
The Northeast Rail Corridor serves 23.9 million people on
the only high-speed rail line in the country;
The I-95 corridor is a vital passenger and freight link for
vehicular traffic spanning the length of the East Coast;
Hazardous materials move in and out of New Jersey's ports,
through pipelines, and over our roads and freight rail lines.
Millions of people live near these facilities, which are
vulnerable to a terrorist attack.
The State of New Jersey has had to step up security in a number of
ways, like putting more police officers on patrol on trains and
increasing K-9 patrols to detect explosive devices. These tasks cost
the State money--money the State doesn't have because of the current
fiscal crisis.
Since the war with Iraq began, New Jersey has spent an additional
$125,000 each day to deploy National Guardsmen and women and State
Police at the State's bridges, tunnels, airports, ports, nuclear power
plants, and railways to help increase security levels.
These are just a few of the vulnerabilities and problems that
concern me. I hope that Secretary Ridge will agree that while we have
made some improvements with regard to transportation and border
security, we still have a long way to go.
I hope that Congress and the Administration can work together to
ensure that DHS has the resources it needs to carry out this vital
mission properly.
The Chairman. I thank you, Senator Lautenberg, and I would
like to add my voice to that. We've got to prioritize on your
estimate of the basis of the threat, as opposed to any
artificial formula, and I look forward to working with you on
that. I think the Senator from New Jersey makes a very
important point, and we would certainly appreciate your input
into that process.
And by the way, there's an additional area of concern that
you have. As you know, we passed an appropriations bill that
was entitled to fight the war on Iraq and homeland security.
You might have a big problem down at the South Pole, because we
put $10 million in for the South Pole, and you might want to
consider that area of concern because we had to add $10 million
to the Supplemental Appropriations Bill for the South Pole.
Those penguins might have an al Qaeda cell down there, who
knows?
So, I thank you for coming, Secretary Ridge, and Senator
Hollings would like to make a comment.
Senator Hollings. The National Security Council under
President Truman instituted for international threats, were the
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State. Now Condelleeza Rice
is not near as steeped in domestic homeland security as you as
a former governor, and the Chief Law Enforcement Officer for
years there in Pennsylvania.
I hope you are meeting with the National Security Council
whenever they meet, because in fact we had an amendment that
just missed by two votes that were absent at the particular
time, to by law put you on the National Security Council. So,
there is no use to have all of this and have your knowledge and
awareness and everything else like that, and still treat the
National Security Council like we don't have a terror war here
at home. And I hope you continue to meet with that council.
The Chairman. I see that--I know your time is limited.
Senator Dorgan arrived. Senator Dorgan, would you like to make
a couple of comments or ask a question?
STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, I recognize that there's
nothing quite so annoying as someone coming in at the last
minute but I have been over, we have been marking up an energy
bill in the Energy Committee and I was unable to be here.
Senator Wyden, I think, raised one of the issues that we've
talked about with respect to some waste issues, and I know
you're taking a look at that. I think this is an agency that is
at some high risk and is going to require a lot of attention on
those issues.
Mr. Ridge, I am pleased at the President's choice. I mean,
I think you are the right person in the right place here, and I
look forward to working with you.
I did want to mention, if I could, just one point, and that
is border security. The 4,000-plus mile border we share with
Canada is a big old border and we have had few resources up
there for a long time. We've now added some more, but
terrorists will look for the weakest link to get into this
country. I want to work with you, both using resources, human
resources and also technology, because I think a country has to
control its borders, especially given the kind of threat of
terrorism we have, and I want to work with you on that. I think
it's a daunting challenge.
But, Mr. Chairman, you know on the southwest border, we've
had something like 10,000 border patrol, and on the northern
border we had 500. Well, the reason for the 10,000-500 is
because for years we were dealing with immigration and drugs
and so on, and we had that difference in resources.
But with respect to terrorists, they will find the weakest
link and we have to control our borders. I know that you have
had a lengthy hearing, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for
offering me a moment to say a few words and just say to Mr.
Ridge, I'm glad you are where you are and I look forward to
working with you on these border issues especially
Secretary Ridge. Mr. Chairman, if I might comment. First of
all, the Congress has provided resources, I think under the
Patriot Act, to boost the border patrol at the northern border
up to about 1,600. And I think with funding, we're about 80 to
85 percent there. So we're working toward, I think, the very
appropriate increase in manpower.
Senator McCain and I have had an interesting discussion
about the application of some military technology in a
nonmilitary but in a surveillance kind of way, these unmanned
aerial vehicles. We think Asa Hutchison and the Border Patrol
people think there's a good application there.
Interestingly enough, the Coast Guard in its deep water
acquisition program, has a--and I have to be careful how I say
this, but an Osprey like device that actually lifts off the
Coast Guard cutter and is eyes over the horizon as well.
So we think more technology will be critical to enhance
security and frankly, making the manpower that you put on the
border even more effective.
And finally, I think you should know and if you care for a
more detailed briefing, we would certainly be prepared to
provide it, several months ago when I was in the office, while
I was in the White House as assistant to the President, the
President directed our shop to look at the border issues and
develop smart border agreements with our friends to the north
and the south. And my counterpart, Deputy Prime Minister John
Manley and I have worked well over a year on a 30-point accord
that enhances security but also tries to facilitate commerce
and the legitimate flow of goods and people.
There are tremendous improvements we made already, running
some demonstration programs based on information shared by
passengers as well as supply chain security measures, so that
we have dedicated land. So if we know something about you, we
know something about the contents of your truck, and as a
private sector company you've agreed to certain protocols,
based on information risk at the border.
We've begun that same kind of initiative with the
government of Mexico, and I will be meeting with my counterpart
Santiago Creel, Minister Creel in a couple of weeks, to further
the collaborative effort that I think all three of us need to
significantly to work on to secure our own perimeters.
We've made a lot of progress. We still have more work to
do, but I think we need to engage the governments of both
Canada and Mexico in order to maximize our effectiveness at the
border.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Secretary, that's very helpful. Did
someone ask whether--on television, on the news this morning
they indicated that the Administration or you are looking at
the potential of reducing the threat level indication at this
point. Has the threat diminished at this point?
Secretary Ridge. There was an article. I was asked
yesterday at a briefing with regard to the urban security
initiative, whether or not we were prepared to reduce the
threat level and to phase back Liberty Shield. I said we do
have plans in place to pull back on Liberty Shield, we have a
sequencing arrangement but we're not prepared to do it yet,
it's just the kind of assessment we make on a daily basis, and
until such time as not only the intelligence community, but
there's a consensus among the different agencies that we can
pull back on security, we're going to keep it orange and keep
Liberty Shield at full force.
Senator Dorgan. Is the threat lessening at this moment, in
your view?
Secretary Ridge. Not enough to, in our judgment, and again,
it's an assessment we make every day, and it's never a single
day's assessment that causes us to pull back. But we monitor
the information we get from multiple sources, and I'm confident
sometime in the future we will reduce and then eliminate
Liberty Shield, and adjust the national threat warning system,
but not today.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thanks for your courtesy.
The Chairman. Thank you, Secretary Ridge, and we hope to
work with you in the future.
[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Hon. Tom Ridge
General Questions
Question 1. What are the greatest challenges facing the Department
of Homeland Security today?
Answer. The Department has made great strides in the few months
since its creation. However, our main challenges consist in ensuring
that the flow of commerce is not disrupted by steps we take to prevent
terrorist attacks, reduce vulnerabilities, and improve our ability to
respond; determining how best to leverage available resources to
address the security gaps; ensuring smooth integration of departmental
components while maintaining the quality of services provided by those
components; and ensuring that proper coordination is taking place with
departmental components and the variety of federal, state, local and
private industry partners with whom we share responsibility for
ensuring the security of the homeland.
Question 2. The Department of Homeland Security has received a
great deal of criticism over the last several weeks from Members of
Congress regarding the lack of justification accompanying its FY 2004
budget request as well as the FY 2003 supplemental request.
a. Why has the Department had such difficultly providing this
information to Congress?
Answer. We are trying to provide information to the Congress in
a timely manner. The transition of the 22 disparate DHS
components under one DHS umbrella occurred after the release of
the FY 2004 President's Budget. DHS is a new organization; we
are still evolving. Several organizations did not exist prior
to the creation of the Department. Moving forward for the mark-
up of the FY 2004 Appropriations bill as well as the FY 2005
budget, we hope to be able to work with Congress in a
collaborative manner to effectively manage and fund this
organization.
b. Have any budgetary savings been realized yet as a result of
the consolidation of the agencies in the new Department?
Answer. It is too early to assess any real cost savings due to
the transfer of the 22 separate agencies under the DHS umbrella
on March 1st. As with any type of consolidation, we do
anticipate cost savings from shared services between the
organizations. We will be constantly reviewing and reassessing
areas of improvement and cost savings and will reflect those
types of savings in future budgets to Congress.
Question 3. As part of the transition to the DHS, incoming agencies
identified numerous problems areas that would require new agreements
with other federal agencies to resolve such problems. For example,
prior to moving the DHS, the Transportation Security Administration
determined that it would need a new agreement with the Federal Aviation
Administration to continue their existing working relationship. While I
understand such an agreement has been signed, I understand very few
others have been signed. What is delaying the completion of memorandums
of understanding between DHS and other federal agencies?
Answer. The Department is actually making quite a bit of headway in
establishing memoranda of understanding with other federal agencies and
departments (a list is included below). However, as you can imagine,
the issues and questions that must be resolved as the Department takes
on its new statutory responsibilities are quite complex and these
agreements should not be reached in haste. We are working very
cooperatively with other federal agencies, some of whose
responsibilities have been given to DHS (for example, the Departments
of State and Transportation), on both a programmatic and operational
level until we can complete the drafting of such memoranda as are
necessary. In addition, the Department has entered into a number of
MOUs with other executive branch departments that provide
administrative services to various DHS components. Most of these
departments are former parental agencies of DHS components. The
services provided under these MOUs include such things as payroll
processing, and IT support. These MOUs are effective until the end of
the fiscal year and include MOUs with the following departments:
Agriculture; EEOC; GSA; HUD; DOJ; State: Commerce; Energy; HHS;
Interior; OPM; DOT; Treasury; and DoD.
a. What agreements have been completed and what remains to be
done in this area?
Answer.
MOU between DHS, DOJ and CIA
Signed by Secretary Ridge on 2/28/2003, Attorney General
Ashcroft on 3/4/2003 and CIA Director Tenet on 3/4/2003.
Subject: MOU between the Intelligence Community, Federal Law
Enforcement Agencies, and The Department of Homeland Security
concerning Information Sharing.
MOU between DHS and DOJ/FBI
Signed by Secretary Ridge on 2/28/2003 and Attorney General
Ashcroft on 3/4/2003.
Subject: MOU between DHS and DOJ/FBI regarding the Domestic
Emergency Support Team (DEST) Program.
MOA between DHS and USDA
Signed by Secretary Ridge on 2/28/2003 and Secretary Veneman
signed but not dated.
Subject: MOA between DHS and USDA to transfer certain
agricultural import and entry inspection functions to the
Secretary of Homeland Security from the Secretary of
Agriculture.
MOA between DHS and DOE
Signed by Secretary Ridge on 2/28/2003 and Secretary Abraham
on 2/28/2003.
MOA between DOE and DHS establishes a framework for DHS to
access the capabilities of various DOE assets.
MOA between DHS and HHS
Signed by Secretary Ridge on 3/5/2003 and Secretary Thompson
on 2/28/2003.
MOA between HHS and DHS concerning cooperative arrangements to
prevent, prepare for, and respond to terrorism and major
disasters.
MOU between DHS and DOJ
Signed by Deputy Secretary England on 4/17/2003 and Deputy
Attorney General Thompson on 5/13/2003.
Subject: MOU INTERPOL: Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
between Department of Homeland Security and Department of
Justice pertaining to U.S. membership in the International
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and related matters.
MOA between DHS and DOJ
Signed by Secretary Ridge and Attorney General Ashcroft--both
signed on 5/13/2003.
Subject: Memorandum of Agreement between the DOJ and DHS
concerning terrorist financing investigations.
MOA between DHS and DoD
Signed by DHS Under Secretary Janet Hale on 5/1/2003 and
Samuel Cox on 4/21/2003.
Subject: MOA between DoD and DHS for DoD personnel support
services to DHS.
MOU between DHS and USDA
Signed by Secretary Ridge and Secretary Veneman on 6/6/2003.
Subject: MOU between DHS and USDA relating to the transfer of
the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) from USDA to DHS
on 6/1/2003.
TSA and FAA signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on February
28, 2003. The MOA sets out the general principles of
cooperation and consultation that will serve as a guide to
relations between TSA and FAA. In addition, in a February 27
letter to TSA Administrator James Loy, Secretary Mineta
established that the principles in the TSA/ FAA MOA should
guide the interagency relationship in the case of the other
modes. Admiral Loy responded and agreed. The MOA construct
allows us to retain this DOT connection and coordination. As we
move forward, TSA and DOT will benefit from continued close
cooperation in the areas of security-related legislation,
rulemaking, and budget development.
Question 4. One of the lessons learned from the terrorist attacks
of September 11th was that there needs to be greater communication and
coordination between agencies responsible for border security
enforcement.
a. How will you use the new mandate of the Department of
Homeland Security to ensure this takes place?
Answer. The creation of the Department and inclusion of
agencies responsible for border security has provided us with a
tremendous opportunity to improve communication among those
agencies, first and foremost, by bringing them into the same
organizational umbrella. Specifically, having officials from
both the Coast Guard and the agencies within the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate at the table as policies
and programs regarding border security are developed has been
enormously helpful in ensuring better communication and
coordination among those agencies. In addition, one of the
first steps undertaken by Under Secretary Hutchison after his
confirmation was to reorganize the agencies within the Border
and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate with
responsibility for border inspections and investigations. That
reorganization has resulted in the creation of U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), which includes inspectors from the
legacy Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service
(including the Border Patrol), and Animal and Plant Heath
Inspection Service, and personnel from the Border Patrol; and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which contains
investigators from Legacy Customs and INS and the Federal
Protective Service. The goal of this reorganization is to align
the functions of each component agency with its counterparts in
the other, streamline operations and communications and
coordinate closely with other DHS components like the Coast
Guard. The ultimate goal is to provide ``one face'' at our
ports of entry to those seeking to enter or transport goods and
to federal, state and local officials from border communities
to the north and south.
b. Have you developed new strategies to increase the
coordination of the DHS with state, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies, in order to ensure greater cooperation in
stemming the illegal crossings of the border?
Answer. The U.S. Border Patrol, now part of the CBP, has
developed a strategy for coordinating with state, local and
tribal law enforcement.
The Office of Border Patrol works closely with other state and
local law enforcement through Project North Star, and
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and Integrated
Marine Enforcement Teams (IMETs). IBET(s) have established
working groups and coordinated their efforts with Project North
Star, in identifying various cross border issues, to include
training, carrying firearms, communications and inter-
operability, and intelligence. Other concerns include human
resources, increased infrastructure, low volume Ports of Entry,
and sovereignty issues. One example of coordination with state
and local law enforcement was the CBP Offices of Border Patrol
and Field Operations coordinated with New York law enforcement
officers to incorporate 120 New York State Troopers into border
security efforts at and between the ports. State Troopers will
serve in a supporting role to front line activities. Along the
Southwest Border, Border Patrol participates in High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) units, multi-agency efforts to
coordinate, share information and conduct joint enforcement
operations to thwart drug trafficking.
In addition Border Patrol continues to develop and strengthen
working relationships and cooperation between Border Patrol and
Native American law enforcement personnel. Border Patrol agents
have been working with Native Americans on an ad hoc basis
since the Patrol was established more than 75 years ago, and
the Office of Border Patrol (OBP) is proud of its tradition of
working with Native American tribal police towards border
security. In January 2002, the USBP sponsored the first ever
U.S. Border Patrol--Native American Border Security Conference.
Since the January Conference, USBP Sectors have been actively
engaged in supporting the Native American Law Enforcement
Agencies that fall within their areas of responsibility (AOR).
Border Patrol sectors have established sector liaison officers
who set up and maintain a regular scheduled meeting with their
Native American counterpart(s). A key initiative in these
meetings is the emphasis on our commitment to better liaison,
cooperation, training, intelligence and resource sharing.
Border Patrol has also conducted IBET operations with the
Turtle Mountain Tribal Police in North Dakota and with the St.
Regis Mohawk Tribal Police in New York. Of special note is the
work towards an initiative with Tribal law enforcement to
create a Mobile Training Team (MTT) to include BORTAC, the
Border Patrol Advanced Academy, and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs Indian Police Academy. The MTT will provide a more
consistent training program when responding to requests for
training on Native American Lands. BORSTAR training has been
planned for the Tohono O'odham Nation this summer on search,
rescue, trauma and desert survival techniques.
Surface and Maritime Questions
Question 1. Several sectors of the transportation industry have
suggested that federally mandated security regulations are not
necessary and that ``voluntary compliance'' would serve the same
purpose. I also note a recent Washington Post article that reports the
Administration is pursuing ``voluntary compliance'' to increase
security at our nation's chemical plants.
a. Do you believe ``voluntary compliance'' can work to
sufficiently increase security in the various transportation
modes and in industries such as chemical manufacturing?
Answer. Our experience in implementing Operation Liberty Shield
security procedures has shown that ``voluntary compliance'' can
work to increase security in the various transportation modes
and in industries such as chemical manufacturing. However, such
a voluntary system raises concerns that sustainability,
consistency, coordination, and accountability may not be
sufficiently addressed. DHS believes that a performance based
regulatory approach may be more effective in addressing these
additional national security concerns than a voluntary
compliance approach. However, in addition to establishing a
more traditional regulatory framework, DHS is committed to
working with industry to explore additional avenues for
achieving these same performance thresholds, including
voluntary compliance.
b. If ``voluntary compliance'' is used as a means to increase
security, should federal funding be used for improvements to
meet voluntary standards or should ``voluntary compliance'' be
the sole responsibility of those industries?
Answer. To carry out Congressional mandates for port, bus and
transit security, and first responder training and preparedness
among others, DHS has issued a series of grants to support
voluntary efforts to enhance security. Subsequent efforts to
enhance security (whether voluntary or mandatory) may involve
both industry investment and limited federal assistance.
c. Do you currently have the authority needed to establish
guidelines for ``voluntary compliance'' in relation to homeland
security?
Answer. DHS has been provided authority under the Homeland
Security Act, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA) and the Maritime Transportation Security Act, to issue
performance based security guidelines for voluntary compliance.
Question 2. Concerns have been raised regarding DHS's progress on
the development and issuance of the Transportation Worker
Identification Cards which have become known by the acronym ``TWICSs''.
Specifically, concerns have been raised on how the background check for
a TWIC will be coordinated with the issuance of professional licenses,
such as merchant mariner documents, which are processed by the Coast
Guard, and commercial drivers licenses, which are processed by state
departments of motor vehicles. Further concerns have been raised on how
DHS will coordinate these efforts with other agencies, such as ATF, who
has regulatory responsibility over explosives, including aspects of
explosives transportation, to the extent that the Department of
Transportation has not preempted the field.
a. Under DHS's plan, who is going to be required to carry a
TWIC?
Answer. While the program is still under development, TSA
believes that a Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) may be required for those individuals requiring
unescorted physical and logical access to secure areas of the
national transportation system.
b. How does DHS's plan coordinate background checks, and
specifically who will have to have a background check in order
to receive a TWIC?
Answer. Any individual that receives a TWIC card would receive
a background check. DHS will ensure that any background check
is not unnecessarily redundant of checks already performed.
c. What are the costs associated with a background check and
issuance of a TWIC and how does DHS's plan pay for these costs?
Answer. At this stage, costs and possible cost-sharing options
are still being developed. TSA will evaluate the costs
associated with background check and credentialing (TWIC)
requirements as part of the TWIC technology evaluation and
prototyping phases, and will ensure that costs are minimized.
Question 3. U.S. Customs is in the process of installing cargo
imaging equipment at certain ports and border crossings. The Vehicle
and Cargo Inspection System, known as VACIS (pronounced ``vakis''),
allows Customs to examine freight cars, trailers, and containers for
contraband, weapons, and other potentially dangerous goods. Customs
plans to deploy 9 rail VACIS systems at the southern border to cover
100 percent of the southern border rail traffic, and 9 VACIS systems at
the northern border to cover 90 percent of the rail volume entering the
U.S. from Canada.
a. What is the overall policy with respect to installation of
VACIS? Does DHS plan to install VACIS at all ports and truck
border crossings?
Answer. CBP proposes to continue deploying multiple large-
scale, non-intrusive inspection (NII) systems, including
Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) units to the large
cargo and passenger vehicle crossing points on the northern
border.
There are currently five Rail VACIS units deployed on the
southwestern border and three additional systems are slated for
deployment by the end of calendar year 2003. These eight
systems will provide CBP with the capability to screen 100
percent of the rail traffic arriving in the United States from
Mexico.
On the northern border with Canada, Rail VACIS units will be
deployed to nine locations, providing CBP with the capability
to screen up to 90 percent of the rail traffic arriving in the
U.S. from Canada. All nine systems should be operational by the
end of April 2004. The technology will further enhance the
security of rail shipments bound for the United States while
ensuring trade continues to flow between the two countries.
There are currently 23 rail crossings on the U.S.-Canada border
and the volume of rail traffic varies significantly by port or
crossing. Nine of the crossings account for approximately 90
percent of all rail traffic arriving in the U.S. from Canada.
We will assess the need to deploy VACIS equipment to the
remaining rail crossings with Canada, which will cover the last
10 percent of rail traffic, once the initial equipment
deployment is complete.
b. What are the advantages of VACIS and do you think it is the
magic bullet for cargo security? What other measures are
necessary to ensure vehicle and cargo security?
Answer. There is no magic bullet. At our borders, we currently
deploy multiple technologies to support our layered inspection
process. Because of the risk that an adversary can defeat any
single sensor or device, we do not rely on any single
technology or inspection process. Instead, CBP uses various
technologies in different combinations to substantially
increase the likelihood that contraband, including a nuclear or
radiological weapon or weapons grade material will be detected.
The Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) is just one of
several large-scale NII systems in our inventory. VACIS units
use gamma-ray-imaging technology to quickly perform thorough
examination of conveyances without having to resort to the
costly, time-consuming process of manual searches or intrusive
exams by methods such as drilling and dismantling. Mobile VACIS
units can screen conveyances in both a stationary and moving
mode. They provide greater flexibility because they can be
quickly and easily re-deployed from one location to another.
CBP also uses computerized tools such as the Automated
Targeting System, Automated Manifest System and Automated
Commercial System to manage its targeting and examination
workloads. Additionally, CBP has put forth regulatory and
legislative initiatives such as the 24-hour rule and the Trade
Act of 2002 to support the receipt of accurate advance arrival
data.
CBP, through its Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
(C-TPAT) initiative, is informed about a business entity's
activity to secure its supply chain and take advantage of that
knowledge by expediting the review and movement of the
legitimate cargo. CBP is also working with TSA to award grants
under the Operation Safe Commerce program that will provide
additional information on how best to ensure intermodal supply
chain security.
c. Canada is also installing VACIS systems at the border. How
are our efforts being coordinated with Canada? I hope we are
not duplicating the effort and costs of installing this
equipment.
Answer. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has been working
very closely with the Canadian government and with Canadian
rail companies on a plan for the deployment of Rail VACIS and
other non-intrusive inspection technology at rail crossings on
the Northern border. CBP is working to finalize this plan and
implement its provisions as quickly as possible.
This initiative will substantially enhance the targeting,
screening, and physical examination of rail shipments entering
this country from Canada, while simultaneously facilitating the
flow of legitimate rail cargo.
Question 4. Last year, I co-sponsored legislation with Senator
Durbin to improve the security of driver's licenses. As you know,
today's patchwork of state laws and procedures for the issuance of
driver's licenses make it all too easy to obtain a valid license using
fraudulent feeder documents or to pass off a fake license as a
legitimate one. The extent of the problem became painfully clear
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when we learned
that a number of the terrorists held valid state-issued driver's
licenses or identification cards. Our bill, which we plan to
reintroduce, is specifically aimed at making the license more tamper-
proof and tightening up the type and verification of documents that can
be used to obtain a license.
a. What do you think needs to be done to improve driver's
license security and how should this be accomplished?
Answer. Most aspects of driver licensing remains the
responsibility of each state. While Congress has required that
commercial drivers (trucks and buses) comply with federal
standards for commercial driver skills, knowledge, and safety
oversight, states continue to decide the form and duration of
their respective licenses. The Department of Homeland Security
is committed to working with State Departments of Motor
Vehicles and driver representative associations to develop
appropriate security procedures for drivers' licenses.
b. The Administration indicated last year in its National
Strategy for Homeland Security'' that it believes the effort to
improve driver's license security should be led by the states,
not the Federal Government. With 50 different jurisdictions
trying to reach a consensus, is this realistic? Individual
states are tightening up their processes, but progress is not
being made across state lines. Senator Durbin and I have
proposed that, similar to the Administration's approach, the
Federal Government should work in consultation with the states.
However, we believe the effort needs to be led by the Federal
Government. What are your views?
Answer. I agree that the Federal Government needs to work in
concert with the states and representative associations to seek
uniformity where appropriate.
Question 5. As you know, in January I requested that the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) review Amtrak's security plan, and its investment
plan for security. I made the request because I had concerns about
certain elements of the plan developed by Amtrak's previous president,
including proposals to expand Amtrak's aviation unit and to install six
cameras on every interlocking on the Northeast Corridor. Unfortunately,
TSA and FRA provided comments on a revised Amtrak plan that Amtrak has
since discredited as the wish list of a particular Amtrak official [not
Amtrak President David Gunn]. I would appreciate it if TSA could remain
involved in helping- Amtrak develop a credible and affordable plan. The
Committee is awaiting a revised plan that can be used as the basis for
security legislation. Can I count on TSA's assistance?
Answer. On February 6, 2003, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) received a revised Security Investment Plan from
Amtrak and provided comments to Senator McCain on this ``updated'' plan
in a letter dated February 28, 2003. In the letter, TSA and the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) agreed that security improvements are
needed to help Amtrak protect its infrastructure, equipment,
passengers, and employees.
TSA and the FRA continue to work closely with Amtrak to develop a
meaningful, system-wide security plan that focuses on prevention,
response, restoration of services, and restoring public confidence.
Amtrak provided TSA with the final security plan on April 10, 2003
and TSA, in coordination with the FRA, is currently reviewing this
plan.
Question 6. Depending on how DOT, TSA and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) interpret the Safe Explosives Act, all
railroad and trucking company personnel could conceivably be required
to go through a background check. The cost to the rail industry alone
could be over $20 million. UPS for example, could face a bill over $17
million if it has to have all employees checked. I am concerned that
carriers will simply refuse to handle explosives rather than incur this
kind of cost. In your view, what criteria in terms of the types and
amount of sensitive products, including hazardous materials, should
govern whether a transportation employee should have a background
check?
Answer. With its passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress
determined that certain commercial drivers who have histories of
violent crimes should not be allowed to transport hazardous materials
(HAZMAT). In addition, Congress enacted the Safe Explosives Act and
determined that certain individuals (such as aliens, those receiving
dishonorable discharges, renunciants) should be prohibited from
transporting explosives, unless the Department of Transportation
regulates such transportation.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), in coordination
with the Department of Transportation and the Department of Justice
will publish rules and statements of policy that establish the criteria
for determining the individuals who must undergo a criminal history
background records check, the status or crime that is disqualifying,
and procedures for appealing or waiving this security assessment. These
regulations apply only to placarded amounts of HAZMAT, which represent
the thresholds determined by the Research and Special Programs
Administration to constitute a significant security threat.
Question 7. I am concerned that Congress, in the interest of
passing security legislation quickly, has in several instances created
conflicting or overlapping requirements.
Answer. For example, the USA PATRIOT ACT in 2001 established a
requirement for a background check for motor carriers transporting
hazardous materials, including explosives. The Safe Explosives Act,
however, establishes specific disqualifications for ``possessing''
explosives, including the transportation of explosives, by all modes.
The provisions are not consistent. The same trucker who would be
disqualified from handling explosives under the terms of the Safe
Explosives Act could, under the USA PATRIOT Act, still handle other
equally dangerous hazardous materials.
In addition, while the Homeland Security, which transferred the
Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service from the U.S. Agriculture
Department to DHS, was being written, the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act was being enacted requiring
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to monitor food imports for
signs of bioterrorism. This has resulted in the FDA promulgating
reporting requirements for food importers that closely mirror
requirements promulgated by the Directorate of Border and
Transportation Security, which now houses the Animal & Plant Health
Inspection Service.
a. What conflicts has DHS experienced and do you have
recommendations for Congress about how these should be
corrected?
Answer. In its initial months, DHS has encountered a number of
statutory conflicts which affect its ability to carry out
various Departmental missions. Among these are various
technical issues created by the recent enactment of the
Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296. DHS desires and
appreciates Congress' willingness to work with the
Administration to further the enactment of appropriation
legislation to address these and other conflicts which the
Department discovers.
b. What actions are being taken to work these issues out
cooperatively with the Administration?
Answer. The Department's Secretarial staff currently is working
in cooperation with the various operational elements of DHS to
determine any existing statutory conflicts which affect the
Department's ability to carry out its various missions. In all
cases, the Department favors resolving these conflicts
cooperatively within the Administration, such as through using
existing statutory and regulatory authority. The Department is
exploring the potential for such internal resolutions with the
help of contacts in various executive branch offices, including
the White House and its Homeland Security Council and Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), as well as other executive branch
departments.
c. Can we expect the Administration to submit legislative
recommendations to correct the areas that cannot be addressed
cooperatively within the Administration?
Answer. In the event that any statutory conflicts cannot be
addressed within the Administration, the Administration will
submit legislative recommendations to Congress which will
correct such conflicts. One example are technical issues
created by the enactment of the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-296, including gaps in statutory authority, or other
conflicts created by the Act. In order to address these
conflicts, the Department has prepared and cleared with OMB a
list of recommended statutory changes to the Act, or to other
provisions of law affected by the Act. These recommendations
are now available to Congressional staff, and we understand
that they will be included in a legislative vehicle in the near
future. The Administration will continue to supplement these
changes with further recommendations as they become apparent.
Question 8. The Maritime Transportation Security Act, under the
leadership, of Senator Hollings, was signed into law late last year.
Since that time the Administration, led by the U.S. Coast Guard, has
completed negotiations on an international agreement on maritime and
port security. The new law, along with the international agreement puts
in place a framework to enhance security on our waterways and at our
seaports. However, it remains unclear today which agency with the
Administration is leading efforts to secure our nation's ports. Can you
tell the Committee what agencies are involved in these efforts and how
their actions are being coordinated with DHS and between DHS and the
Department of Transportation?
Answer. The Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration and
U.S. Customs and Border Protection are participating jointly in
developing a delegation of authority under the Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA) that will determine lead and support roles in
maritime security. The Maritime Administration also has certain
responsibilities under MTSA.
The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for Maritime Homeland
Security and with assistance from U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
the Transportation Security Administration, and the Maritime
Administration, is developing regulations under the MTSA. As the
designated Federal Maritime Security Coordinators, Coast Guard Captains
of the Port will ensure comprehensive Area Maritime Security Plans are
developed and executed in U.S. ports in accordance with the MTSA. TSA
is providing a planning role with respect to how MTSA implementation is
consistent with security requirements in other transportation modes.
Due to the complexities involved, a number of other federal, state,
and local partners will also be involved in securing the nation's
ports. State and local agencies, as well as private stakeholders, will
be members of the Area Maritime Security Committees to integrate and
coordinate the collective planning and resources. DHS will continue to
coordinate with DOT to ensure the entire transportation system,
including intermodal links, is secure.
Question 9. I understand the Coast Guard estimates the private
sector costs for compliance with the requirements of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act to be $4.4 billion, with annual costs of
$500 million. Since the September 11 attacks, Congress has provided a
total of $348 million for port security grants. While the
Administration's fiscal year 2004 budget requests $38 million for
Department Directorate of Border and Transportation Security grants,
subsidies, and contributions and $51 for the Department's Directorate
of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection for the same
purpose, it is unclear what these requests are for. Additionally, it is
unclear whether or not these lines items will fund the maritime and
port security grants to be awarded in accordance with the Maritime
Transportation Security Act.
a. Is this $4.4 billion figure accurate? If so, what is it
based on?
b. How much is the Administration requesting for maritime and
port security grants for fiscal year 2004? Which agencies or
directorates will be managing these funds?
c. While I understand these funds will not directly be
administered by the Coast Guard, what role does the Coast Guard
play in awarding these grants? Can you explain how the awarding
of these grants will be coordinated with Port Security
Assessments being identified but the Coast Guard as part of
your ongoing assessments?
d. In light of this $4.4 billion backlog, do you think the
Administration's request is adequate to address these
vulnerabilities?
Answer. The $4.4 billion estimate appears to be taken from an
analysis published in the Federal Register on December 30, 2002
and only represents the initial cost estimate of implementing
MTSA for facilities. Since that publication, the Coast Guard
has received public input on the cost estimates and expects to
revise the initial estimates in its MTSA Interim Final Rules,
which should be published on July 1, 2003. Implementing the
Interim Rule will affect about 5,000 facilities. The first year
cost of purchasing and installing equipment, hiring security
officers, and preparing paperwork is an estimated $1.125
billion. Following initial implementation, the annual cost is
approximately $656 million. Over the next 10 years, the cost
would be present value $5.399 billion. The first year cost of
implementing all of the provisions of the interim rule
(vessels, facilities, OCS facilities, ports, and automatic
identification system) is approximately $1.507 billion.
Following initial implementation, the annual cost is
approximately $884 million, with costs of present value $7.348
billion over the next 10 years. A further detailed breakdown of
the costs will be provided in the Interim Rules.
DHS is currently developing a plan to assess security for all
critical infrastructure, including ports, and to determine the
appropriate federal, state, and industry role in correcting any
security deficiencies.
Question 10. Much of the focus on the Coast Guard since September
11th has been on its homeland security role. This role is vital, but we
must not forget that we rely on the Coast Guard for many important
other functions such as search and rescue, drug enforcement,
interdicting illegal aliens, enforcing our fisheries laws and
regulations, and protecting our environment. The challenge is to strike
the proper mission balance. Section 888 of the Homeland Security Bill
mandated the Coast Guard be transferred to the new Department as an
intact entity and its non-homeland security missions be adequately
protected. Additionally, the Act required the Coast Guard report
directly to you, the Secretary, and not the Under Secretary for Border
Transportation Security. This was designed to ensure the Coast Guard's
non-homeland security missions did not get lost in the shuffle as that
directorate wrestles with our country's many border and transportation
security challenges.
a. With this in mind, what steps are being taken to ensure the
Coast Guard's non homeland security missions are adequately
fulfilled and the Coast Guard will continue to accomplish these
missions at the levels expected by the American people?
b. What steps are being taken to ensure these missions will be
adequately funded in the future and the infrastructure which
supports them is properly maintained?
c. How has this language in Section 888 proven to be too rigid
and is it preventing the Coast Guard from carrying out its
missions? Is it impeding cooperation with the other agencies in
the Department?
d. Do you believe modification to this language will be needed
and when do you think recommendations will be submitted to
Congress?
Answer. Although the Coast Guard does have capacity, capability
and operational tempo challenges to sustain mission balance, it
will continue to emphasize all of our missions. At the end of
the day, the Coast Guard is focused on performance-based
results and not only resource hours. The perspective through
the performance lens illustrates that its non-Homeland Security
missions are not suffering. The Fiscal Year 2003 Report/Fiscal
Year 2004 Budget in Brief (BIB) provides documentation of the
Coast Guard's high performance levels across its mission
spectrum. For example, in Fiscal Year 2002 USCG seized the
third highest cocaine total in our history, interdicted or
deterred illegal immigration by sea at a rate of 88.3 percent
(which exceeded its target of 87 percent), reduced the volume
of oil spilled per million gallons shipped to 0.6 gallons (well
below its target of 2.5 gallons), and continued to reduce the
number of maritime worker fatalities to 4.3 per 10,000 workers
which is below its target of 8.7.
A necessary first step is base-lining our maritime Homeland
Security (MHS) requirements to help balance our other missions.
To accomplish this, the Coast Guard has focused on a Strategy
Deployment Plan (SDP) for implementing the maritime component
of the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security.
Various components of our Maritime Security Strategy Deployment
Plan are under development, with the first component to be
completed in April/May of 2003.
These MHS requirements will roll into a comprehensive blueprint
to achieve overall mission balance. Coast Guard's existing
strategic planning process and performance plans will serve as
the cornerstone of an integrated approach emphasizing three
general areas of effort: Preserving Non-MHS missions,
Conducting MHS missions, and maintaining military readiness to
conduct
Aviation Questions
Question 1. At most airports, TSA met the requirement to screen 100
percent of checked baggage by using explosives trace detection
equipment or EDS installed in airport lobbies. These methods of
screening are less efficient and require more screening staff than
integrated EDS machines. What plans does TSA have for integrating EDS
into baggage systems at the largest airports?
Answer. TSA's current imperative is to ensure that sufficient
systems are in place to screen for explosives at locations where
electronic screening systems are not fully deployed, and the agency is
using the LOI tool to accomplish this goal. The LOIs TSA has
implemented or is developing involve the largest airports in the
Nation. Beyond these airports, we continue to assess the need for
additional LOIs.
Question 2. THE DOT/IG has raised concerns about who will bear the
ultimate cost of integrating EDS machines into baggage systems at
airports. Do you expect the Federal Government to fund the conversion,
as it is their responsibility to ensure that the process is being done
effectively?
Answer. As with other homeland security areas, DHS believes the
cost of aviation security must be a shared responsibility. This holds
true for putting some EDS in-line with baggage systems, and in fact the
Congress supported this concept by providing TSA with LOI authority
that mandated airport contributions.
Question 3. One of the most significant issues dealing with the
integration of the TSA into Department of Homeland Security was the
concern that the security aspect of aviation travel needed to be
formulated in conjunction with the policy aspect of aviation to ensure
that aviation safety was not being adversely affected. What steps will
you take to ensure that DOT is consulted on security issues?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has worked
closely with all of the DOT modal administrations, including the FAA,
to identify transportation security challenges and ensure that security
and safety are simultaneously addressed in a manner that does not
detract from either. First, TSA and FAA signed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) on February 28, 2003. The MOA sets out the general
principles of cooperation and consultation that will serve as a guide
to relations between TSA and FAA. TSA and DOT will benefit from a
continued close cooperation in the areas of security-related
legislation, rulemaking, and budget development. The MOA construct
allows us to retain this DOT connection and coordination. Also, Deputy
Secretary Jackson's memorandum accompanying the executed TSA/FAA MOA
notes that Secretary Mineta is committed to naming a senior official
within the Office of the Secretary to serve as DOT's primary liaison to
TSA. Furthermore, there is extensive day-to-day coordination between
TSA and FAA at the working level to ensure that aviation security
initiatives do not compromise safety. We routinely invite FAA to TSA
meetings, and vice versa. Where appropriate, we coordinate cross-agency
on memoranda, position papers, and letters when responsibilities
overlap. TSA and FAA also hold a bi-weekly executive-level meeting
where interagency issues can be raised and addressed promptly.
Question 4. The Airlines have asserted that the security fee
imposed upon them is unfair. They assert that ports and borders are not
faced with these security fees. Does DHS have a position on the
imposition of a user fee to fund its operation?
Answer. DHS does not believe that it is unfair to impose security
fees on airlines and passengers. The passenger fee, mandated by the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), imposes a charge of
$2.50 per passenger enplanement paid by the passengers. Air carriers
collect this fee from passengers and remit it to TSA. The air carrier
fee, also authorized by ATSA, is charged to individual air carriers
based on each air carrier's costs related to screening passengers and
property in calendar year 2000.
Question 5. Does DHS have a position on repealing the airline
passenger security fee?
Answer. DHS continues to believe that security is a shared
responsibility and the fee should stand.
Question 6. One of the biggest complaints this Committee heard from
Admiral Loy was that the earmarks in the appropriations bill took away
his discretion to deal with the problems TSA was facing. What will DHS
do to combat this problem?
Answer. DHS will make every effort to work with Congress and
Committee staffs to provide timely and comprehensive information on
budget requests. However, once earmarks are enacted, DHS will make
every effort to accommodate them within our funding availability.
Border Questions:
Question 1. The Federal Government's efforts to reduce illegal
border crossings in California and Texas have created a funnel effect
through Arizona. The U.S. Border Patrol estimated that over 25,000
people were arrested for attempting to cross the border in Arizona
during the month of October 2002 alone. These individuals were
fortunate to survive--last summer 134 individuals were reported to have
died in the desert attempting to enter this country. What will you do
to ensure our borders receive needed attention from the Department of
Homeland Security?
Answer. Border Patrol has initiated Operation West Desert which is
designed to augment the Tucson Sector's border safety efforts. The
Border Patrol enhanced operational effectiveness and intensified life-
saving efforts through a sector-wide coordinated and proactive
enforcement strategy focusing all available resources on high-risk
areas during the summer months. Plans include detailing additional
BORSTAR agents (in newly outfitted BORSTAR Hummer vehicles), extra
Horse Patrol units in the west desert of Arizona, rescue beacons and
hot weather kits. In addition, the Shadow Wolves will receive an
abbreviated BORSTAR search and rescue course. The national Tactical
Unit, known as BORTAC, has also deployed special tactically and
medically trained agents to reinforce the deterrent efforts in this
busy corridor. Tucson Sector continues to work with the Mexican
government to develop a cohesive strategic plan to address the Sonoran
Desert problems, provide training, and develop, in concert with Mexican
government, public service announcements for Mexican television and
radio distribution.
Question 2. Prior to September 11, the President and Members of
Congress were very close to developing a comprehensive immigration
reform package. I believe that the only way we are ever going to
improve security at our borders and truly address the downstream
problems associated with the flow of undocumented immigrants is to
enact such reform. Do you agree that comprehensive immigration reform
is necessary as a matter of homeland security?
Answer. Creation of the Department of Homeland Security, including
the separation of immigration services from immigration enforcement
functions, and subsequent action taken by the department to align
inspections and enforcement functions within two new agencies in the
Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate--U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)--
are very significant immigration reform steps that have already been
taken. Until the effectiveness of the new alignment of our immigration
enforcement and services resources can be adequately assessed, it would
be premature to suggest that additional immigration reform measures be
taken.
Question 3. As you know, many Native American tribal lands line our
borders. What actions has the Department taken to ensure coordination
with tribal governments? Additionally, what federal programs or grants
are available to tribal governments to promote border protection and
security?
Answer. Eleven of the 21 Border Patrol Sectors encompass Native
American lands that either straddle or are adjacent to a U.S. border.
Where appropriate, Border Patrol sectors have identified a liaison
agent to work with Tribal law enforcement as well as local
representatives of the Department of the Interior. These sectors have
set up and maintain a regular scheduled meeting with their Native
American counterparts. A key initiative in these meetings is the
emphasis on our commitment to border security, better liaison,
cooperation, training and resource sharing. OBP has provided Officer
Survival training to the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Police, to include
Ground Fighting, Advance Pistol and Tactical Pistol training. OBP has
established an equipment-sharing program with the various tribal
police, and has worked with the Kickapoo Tribal Council to place two
remote video surveillance towers on their property. Tucson Sector is
continuing progress on the joint Tohono O'odham Substation/USBP
Processing Facility. Del Rio Sector is creating a sister-post of the
Border Patrol Explorers, hosted by the Kickapoo, which will jointly
train with the BP Explorer Post. HQ Border Patrol has also identified a
liaison agent at the HQ level who works with tribal law enforcement and
the Department of the Interior. The Border Patrol is working with
Native American law enforcement agencies to provide the level of
support requested, and to maintain the best working relationships
possible. The second annual U.S. Border Patrol--Native American Border
Security Conference is scheduled to occur October 7-8, 2003. The
purpose of the conference is to enhance border security and foster
communication with the Native American communities.
Question 4. Last August, a park ranger was killed at the Organ Pipe
National Monument in Arizona. This park is experiencing increased
illegal immigration, drug and human smuggling, and is quickly becoming
the most dangerous portion of our nation's border. Given the diverse
nature of the lands that line the border, how does DHS plan to
coordinate between the numerous federal agencies with lands along the
border, including the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Park Service, the
Forest Service, and the Department of Defense?
Answer. The control and security of our borders is a complex
problem, and will continue to challenge us in the future. Everyday, our
agents put their lives at risk enforcing law in extreme environments
and under severe conditions. Coordination and cooperation along the
border between federal agencies such as Fish and Wildlife, National
Park Service, Forest Service and Department of Defense is very
important and efforts are underway in that regard to curb illegal
immigration and drug smuggling. Coordination and communication with
state and local law enforcement, Tribal land officials, and the general
public has also been a major focus for Border Patrol. Officials of
Border Patrol, Park Service, Fish and Wildlife and the Forest Service
are joining together as appropriate through meetings, intelligence
sharing and special operations to develop law enforcement strategies
and solutions in that area. Department of Defense personnel have
provided valuable support during special operations to Border Patrol
through the coordination efforts of the Border Patrol Special
Coordination Center. The safety of undocumented migrants, law
enforcement agents, and the public is of paramount importance. As an
example of efforts to increase safety, Tucson Border Patrol Sector has
instituted border safety initiatives along the Arizona border and has
worked to reduce the number of injuries and deaths among those who
continue to enter illegally, and law enforcement officials who enforce
laws in that area. There are plans to provide a coordinated and
proactive enforcement strategy focusing all available resources on
high-risk areas in their sector this summer. Representatives of the
various agencies charged with stewardship of America's public lands met
with Border Patrol representatives in Tucson, Arizona on September 4th
to further discuss and formulate cooperative efforts in order to
mitigate environmental degradation, while deterring the risk of further
degradation brought on by the trafficking of contraband and illegal
aliens through these sensitive ecological systems.
Question 5. A dangerous sentiment is developing among some citizens
of Arizona, that the Federal Government is failing with regards to
border security. The situation has become so tenuous that a number of
citizen militia groups have taken up arms to defend the borders
themselves. Various local governments and citizen groups such as the
Bisbee City Council and Border Action Network have expressed their
concern over the actions of these groups. What is being done to ease
the fears of the residents along the border and improve enforcement
efforts?
Answer. CBP has no specific authority to prohibit private citizens,
groups, or landowners from being near the border. All sworn agents do
have the commitment via their oath to civil and due process rights.
Also residents have their own property rights. CBP realizes the
potential for inappropriate action or violations from these groups.
Agents that patrol in areas that these groups may be are provided
information as to the group's whereabouts, history and potential for
encounters. Our focus has been to communicate to those residents who
witness illegal activity. We have encouraged these members of the
community to call the witness illegal acts. CBP has specific units in
certain sectors that prioritize calls from rural residents. These
units' liaison and patrol in areas where residents are noticing an
increase in illegal border traffic. Town hall meetings, civic events
and specific outreach activities provide a context for residents to
communicate with Border Patrol Agents. Furthermore the agents, stations
and sectors of the Border Patrol supported by headquarters are
upgrading deterrence levels and border security with planning, tactics
and hard work. The increase of control levels and subsequent reduction
of illegal crossings at the border will prevent the perceived need for
residents or outside groups to patrol the border. Sectors have also
coordinated a response for when local residents or any non-law
enforcement officer detains a suspect to turn over to a Border Patrol
Agent. The coordination involves notifications to local and federal
investigators and prosecutors. These law enforcement partners are
afforded an opportunity to verify that the detention did not violate
the rights of the illegal aliens. As an illegal alien is processed for
removal they are given the opportunity, if they choose to speak to a
Consular Official of their country of citizenship. These reasonable
safeguards bolster border patrol observations and the Agent's
interview, to ensure no violations of civil or criminal statutes have
occurred. In March of this year two members of Ranch Rescue were
arrested on assault charges after an illegal alien whom they detained
near Hebbronville, Texas, said they struck him. Although this case is
under investigation the safeguards described above proved to assist
victims and the prosecuting and investigating agencies in determining
if charges are warranted. Ultimately our active liaison with border
communities and increasing control levels brought by agents and the
resources agents need to patrol the border effectively will prevent
groups from finding areas or sympathetic land owners' property to
patrol. Protecting the rights of all those involved in these scenarios
is equally important.
Question 6. The Omnibus Appropriations bill provided increased
funding for important technology programs such as the Entry-Exit System
and the INS Chimera IT system, which is to serve as the backbone for
the system and to coordinate between the various law enforcement
agencies. Both of these systems make important strides in increasing
the coordination and technology available to the Department of Homeland
Security. What steps will you take to ensure the money allocated for
this technology is managed properly and that the systems are
interoperable and communicating effectively?
Answer. It is important to point out that the Chimera system is, by
statute, intended to contain multi-agency data. Effective communication
and Interoperability of that system, with other systems, including the
Entry-Exit System, are paramount to the success of the DHS mission. The
DHS structure includes a provision for shared immigration services, a
Chief Information Officer and a department Office of Information
Technology to ensure interoperability and proper management. In
addition, the Border and Transportation Security Directorate has
established a program office specifically dedicated to implementing the
Entry-Exit (now called U.S. VISIT) system in accord with statutory
requirements.
Question 7. The Arizona Republic ran an article on the serious
labor concerns among those in the Border Patrol. According to T.J.
Bonner, President of the National Border Patrol Council, thousands of
Border Patrol agents are considering leaving the Border Patrol for new
jobs. The potential loss of Border Patrol agents poses an imminent
threat to national security.
a. What steps will you take to try to ensure that this does not
occur to avoid a sudden loss of Border Patrol officers?
Answer. The Office of Border Patrol (OBP) has taken aggressive
steps to deal with attrition of Border Patrol Agents in
response to FY02's record attrition (18 percent). First and
foremost, OBP was successful in coordinating efforts to raise
the journeyman level to a GS-11 (was GS-9). OBP recently
convened a retention focus group made up of field
representatives. Several key recommendations from the group
have been implemented in the field and will serve to enhance
future retention. OBP has also focused recruitment efforts on
targeting and attracting applicants who would like to make the
Border Patrol a career choice. These efforts have begun to pay
dividends. For example, the current FY03 attrition rate has
dropped to 11 percent. The Border Patrol offered reinstatement
to former employees who left the agency during the earlier
Federal Air Marshal Service hiring phase and over two hundred
employees have applied for reinstatement back to the Border
Patrol.
Question 8. As you know, our southern border has been used by
illegal drug traffickers for many years. And as with illegal
immigration, improved security in other parts of the southern border
have funneled illegal drug traffickers through the less populated parts
of Arizona, causing substantial disruption to our Tohono-O'Odham
Nation. What are the Department's plans for coordination with the DEA
to stem the trafficking of illegal drugs over the Arizona border?
Answer. Coordination with Tribal land officials has improved in
recent years along the Southwestern and Northern Borders. The Border
Patrol has begun a project to build a facility on the Tohono O'Odahm
Nation in southern Arizona. The Tohono O'Odahm Police Department
(TOPD), and the Border Patrol will be collocated at this facility which
will serve as a processing center for the Border Patrol. This
processing facility will provide the Border Patrol greater access to
the border as well as an opportunity to work closely with the TOPD.
Where appropriate, Border Patrol sectors have identified a liaison
agent to work with Tribal law enforcement as well as local
representatives of the Department of the Interior. These sectors have
set up and maintain a regular scheduled meeting with their Native
American counterparts. A key initiative in these meetings is the
emphasis on our commitment to border security, better liaison,
cooperation, training and resource sharing. HQ Border Patrol has also
identified a liaison agent at the HQ level who works with tribal law
enforcement and the Department of the Interior. The Border Patrol is
working with Native American law enforcement agencies to provide the
level of support requested, and to maintain the best working
relationships possible. Border Patrol has developed a strong working
relationship with the DEA over the years along the border. Joint task
forces and special operations are commonplace along the border, and
coordination between the agencies has produced substantial detection,
apprehension and prosecution of illegal drug trafficking.
Question 9. Another downstream effect of the increased numbers of
illegal aliens has been auto theft. According to the Arizona Auto Theft
Authority, Arizona has the highest per capita auto-theft rate in the
country. Many of these vehicles are used for smuggling drugs and
illegal aliens across the border. What, if anything is being done to
address this problem?
Answer. Customs and Border Protection has installed automatic
license plate readers (LPRs) at the majority of our land border
crossings. These LPRs are designed to automatically capture and
transmit license plate data from vehicles processed at the land border
to the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS).
Any vehicle that has been reported stolen to the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) will be automatically referred as a possible
NCIC stolen vehicle record match to U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Border Patrol checkpoints, positioned several miles into the United
States along major routes of egress from the border area, have been
highly successful in recovering stolen vehicles from the organized
criminal smuggling elements. CBP and ICE, within DHS's Border and
Transportation Security Directorate, work closely with state and local
agencies in identifying, locating, and recovering stolen vehicles.
Question 10. As I mentioned, our border states and counties are
experiencing a health emergency because of the burden of uncompensated
emergency care for undocumented immigrants. Every day, undocumented
immigrants arrive at our emergency rooms in need of urgent medical
attention and under federal law, our hospitals are required to treat
them. As you are aware, immigration is principally a federal
responsibility, however, border security personnel (Border Patrol)
routinely avoid reimbursing hospitals and ambulance services for their
costs. How will DHS address this critical problem?
Answer. Immigration is principally a federal responsibility.
Emergency medical care for sick and injured persons in the United
States who are unable to pay is an indigent health care issue. Indigent
health care responsibility takes place at three levels-the federal,
state and local levels. At the federal level, money is disbursed to pay
for indigent medical care at the other levels, normally taking place
through the Department of Health and Human Services. States and
localities have devised a multitude of indigent care systems and
multiple ways of financing these systems. The most efficient roles for
the Department of Homeland Security to exercise with regard to
immigration are the administration of immigration services to
facilitate legal immigration and the enforcement of laws and
regulations regarding illegal immigration. The payment of indigent
health care costs by the Department of Homeland Security would detract
from its primary responsibilities with regard to immigration.
An analogy is that state and local police agencies have the
responsibility of enforcing traffic laws within their jurisdiction.
They regularly encounter traffic accidents that occur because traffic
laws were violated and people were injured as a result. The primary
responsibility of officers at the scene is to activate local emergency
medical service systems and get injured people the care they need.
Later, after care is provided, if the person treated is unable to pay,
it is an indigent care matter and indigent care mechanisms are searched
for the proper source of payment. The law enforcement agencies are not
made responsible for payments because it would detract from their
abilities to carry out their primary responsibilities.
The Border Patrol does pay for the emergency medical treatment of
injured persons who are in its custody at the time treatment is sought.
Question 11. Another problem occurs when undocumented individuals
are released form hospitals. Hospitals in my state have told me that
the Border Patrol refuses to pick up the undocumented immigrants and
return them to Mexico, or simply release the patient. Beyond the unfair
burden this practice poses on hospitals, it is clearly a serious
security concern. How will DHS address this security concern?
Answer. Hospitals outside of the near border area where the Border
Patrol operates should place calls to offices of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. When a hospital calls the Border Patrol about a
patient ready for release who has been determined to be fit for travel,
the station supervisor will dispatch an agent if it would not leave a
critical area uncovered. The station pulls an agent off of his regular
patrol duty and sends the agent to determine the patient's alienage and
deportability. If determined to be an illegal alien and likely to
abscond during removal proceedings, the station takes the subject into
custody for processing. The purpose of the response is the removal of
persons determined to be illegal aliens who a doctor finds to be
medically fit to travel from the United States; it is not to pay
indigent medical bills.
Question 12. The former INS maintained a written policy that
regarded sick or injured aliens encountered by INS officials,
instructing them not to take the undocumented aliens into custody to
avoid responsibility for their health care. Rather, the INS agent was
instructed to take sick or injured alien to a country public hospital
where, under federal law, the hospital must treat the alien. This
places the Federal Government's responsibility for border patrol on the
shoulders of local government and the local taxpayer. What course of
action do you intend to take to remedy this situation?
Answer. The written policy referred to is a 1987 policy memorandum
from the Western Regional Director and applied to the Western Region.
It does instruct agents not to take obviously sick or injured persons
into custody. There is no written policy that covered the entire legacy
INS. The unwritten policy for the legacy INS and the current policy for
former INS officers is not to arrest or make a determination of
citizenship of anyone who is in obvious need of emergency medical care
and does not pose a safety risk. If an injury requires transportation,
agents call local emergency medical personnel, without regard to
citizenship or immigration status. In very remote areas, the Border
Patrol may assist EMS in transporting the individual out of rough
terrain, but only in extreme emergencies do agents transport injured
aliens to medical facilities.
Question 13. A number of environmental issues have come to my
attention in relation to our borders. How will DHS coordinate with the
Environmental Protection Agency and other federal agencies on myriad
environmental issues associated with the border?
Answer. The enforcement activities of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) are proactive in nature and focus on striving to
prevent terrorist-related activities from occurring in the United
States. CBP communicates and coordinates openly with many other federal
agencies, including the National Park Service and the Environmental
Protection Agency, to assess statutory requirements and develop
enforcement strategies, including appropriate operational procedures
for environmentally sensitive areas. CBP relies heavily upon the
expertise and guidance of those other agencies, and views such
communication and coordination as essential to the successful
completion of its enforcement mission in environmentally sensitive
border areas. Like all Federal agencies, CBP adheres to NEPA--the
National Environmental Policy Act.
Science and Technology Questions
Question 1. One major issue of controversy during the consideration
of the Homeland Security Act concerned the creation of university-based
centers for homeland security. What steps are you taking to guarantee
that university-based research centers are established on a merit-
review process?
Answer. The university-based centers will be evaluated in a peer-
review process. DHS(S&T) is working with the National Science
Foundation to use their capabilities and processes for this purpose.
Question 2. One of the responsibilities for the Under Secretary for
Science and Technology in the Department of Homeland Security is the
establishment of a system for transferring homeland security
technologies to federal, state and local governments, and private
sector entities. The Department of Homeland Security will establish a
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA).
a. Could you please submit to the Committee a prioritized list
of research areas that the HSARPA will pursue after it has been
established?
Answer. The research activities that we will conduct in HSARPA
cut across the priorities for DHS(S&T). Thus, the research
activities planned include:
Biological Countermeasures--This includes remediation
technologies, and development of the next generation of
environmental sensors
Chemical Countermeasures--This includes remediation
technologies and development of facilties monitoring and
response systems
High Explosives Countermeasures--Included here are activities
designed to detect at range large quantitites of high
explosives (i.e. truck bombs)
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures--Included here are
new concepts for actively probing for the presence of fissile
material, and for taking advantage of long residence times in
ship containers to passively detect fissile material
Critical Infrastructure Protection--Included here is reaching
out to the academic community to develop and test methodologies
for systematically revealing interdependencies among
infrastructures
Support to DHS Components--Included here are activities
supporting conventional missions of the Department, such as
advanced biometrics, and advanced techniques for monitoring the
border.
Rapid Prototyping Program--Organizationally, the technology
clearinghouse is managed under HSARPA. Thus, the TSWG BAA, and
rapid prototyping activities occur here
IT Infrastructure--Included here is developing advanced
scalable techniques for organizing extant disparate databases
and conducting queries of same efficiently
b. How do you intend to utilize the research of the Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency and the federal
laboratories in a way to ensure the efficient transfer of their
research to the state and local governments and the private
sector?
Answer. Technology transition is a key goal for the DHS S&T
Directorate. We are taking a multilayered approach. First, we
involve the user community at the outset of any project we
undertake in order to develop program goals, and as the program
matures, system requirements and operational concepts. Second,
we will engage in demonstrations periodically through the
development process to generate feedback from the user and to
retire technical risk. Finally, and unlike DARPA, HSARPA will
engage where appropriate in pilot deployments of the
technology, where operators use the equipment in an operational
setting while DHS S&T provides technical support and funds the
operations and support costs. This pilot deployment concept
retires operational risks to the user, provides insight for
product improvement, and allows the user to fund for
procurement and support costs with the system at an appropriate
level of maturity.
Question 3. How are you integrating the border security technology
needs into the Department's research agenda?
Answer. The S&T Directorate has a ``customer-supplier''
relationship with the Border and Transportation Security Directorate.
In order to fulfill this mandate, S&T has a Director for Border and
Transportation Security Programs in its Plans, Programs, and Budget
office. That person and staff have as their primary responsibility to
work with BTS to understand their needs and requirements and develop a
research and development agenda aimed at addressing them. Recently, a
strategic planning workshop was held in Baltimore with the various
operational elements within BTS to initiate the development of this
agenda. With regard to border security, S&T is also providing systems
engineering advice to Under Secretary Hutchison and Secretary Ridge for
the Entry-Exit Program. The S&T Directorate is also, for example, using
funds in FY04 for advanced biometrics research, and for developing
means to identify potential threats crossing our borders or in our
airports.
Furthermore, S&T staff, including the Acting Director for Federal
Laboratories and the Border and Transportation Security portfolio
manager, continue to meet with Applied Technology and Laboratory
officials from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and TSA's Chief
Technology Office staff to discuss ongoing and planned projects,
technology capabilities and needs. Visits of S&T personnel, including
Under Secretary McQueary, to two of CBP's laboratories have served to
further educate S&T personnel on CBP's scientific/forensic border
operations.
Recommend G-OCC add MDA
Question 4. Do you feel that three years is a sufficient amount of
time for the Homeland Security Institute to accomplish the
responsibilities of threat and vulnerability assessments as identified
in the Homeland Security Act of 2002?
Answer. We expect that there will be a long-term need--one which
will exceed three years in length--for the sort of high analytic
quality, unquestioned objectivity, and ability to assess proprietary
data and sensitive government information analysts in the Homeland
Security Institute will possess.
Question 5. In your efforts to establish a technology clearinghouse
institute for the Department as required by the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, have you consulted with other federal clearinghouses to
determine how best to leverage the Department's resources with their
efforts?
Answer. In fact, DHS has partnered with the Technical Support
Working Group, an extant federal clearinghouse operated by the
Departments of State and Defense, to carry out the mandate.
Question 6. Has a time-line been developed for the activities as
required in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 for the Science and
Technology Directorate?
Answer. A detailed timeline has not been developed. However, it is
our intent that all mandated activities will be carried out as
required.
Question 7. First responders have received well deserved attentions
since September 2001. One issue of importance to first responders, such
as police, firefighters, and emergency medical services is
communications interoperability. What programs and strategies does the
Department of Homeland Security have to deal with the issue of public
safety communications interoperability?
Answer. Primary responsibility for developing interoperability
policy and priorities lies with the SAFECOM program which has recently
been transferred to DHS. The mission of SAFECOM is to improve
communications and communications interoperability among local, state,
tribal, and federal public safety agencies. Since an overwhelming share
of the nation's communications infrastructure is owned and operated at
the local and state level, SAFECOM is focusing a great deal of
attention on addressing the issue at those critical levels. At the same
time, SAFECOM will be working to address the need for improved
communications interoperability among federal agencies and among local,
state and federal agencies where appropriate.
The SAFECOM program, in concert with local and state public safety
associations through the Coalition for Improved Public Safety
Communications, is developing a ``systems architecture roadmap'' to
address this critical issue. As part of this ``roadmap,'' SAFECOM is
initiating short and medium term initiatives to pave the way for
achieving the longer term objective of enabling public safety agencies
to communicate with other public safety agency when needed, and
simultaneously developing long term initiatives to prepare for the
future. To implement these initiatives, SAFECOM will leverage already
existing federal programs addressing the issue, most critically the
``first responder'' grants funds administered by the Office for
Domestic Preparedness and other federal agencies, the Public Safety
Wireless Network, and the National Institute of Justice's AGILE
program. SAFECOM drafted consistent technical guidance for nearly $150
million in interoperability grants jointly awarded by EP&R and the
Department of Justice during FY 2003.
Among other initiatives that SAFECOM is initiating are: identifying
and assisting in the implementation of short-term ``patch'' solutions
such as cross-band repeaters; identifying governance models that
directly involve the first responders themselves; best practices to
improve interoperability; identifying and, where appropriate,
developing relevant standards; and the research, development, testing,
and evaluating of technologies that can improve communications
interoperability. At the same time, SAFECOM, in concert with the public
safety community, will work with the Federal Communications Commission
to address spectrum management and allocation for public safety
agencies.
Additionally, the Standards program within DHS(S&T), working in
consonance with Project SAFECOM, is currently developing a
communication interoperability workshop with participation from NIST,
IEEE, NASA, DOD, IAB, and others. The goal is to plan for integration
and coordination of ongoing efforts in various activities of the
Federal Government and to work with the private sector and Standards
Development Organizations to develop a suite of uniform performance
standards for existing COTS technologies. Another goal is to also
provide consistent advice to technology developers on requirements for
second-generation equipment and protocols.
Finally, in coordination with the Directorate of Science and
Technology, the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) will provide
funds to assist State and local agencies evaluate and acquire
interoperable communication technologies.
Question 8. Currently, the United States Fire Administration (USFA)
administers the $750 million Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program.
The USFA was formerly a part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
and is being transferred to the Emergency Preparedness and Response
Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security. The
Administration's FY 2004 budget proposes to incorporate the Assistance
to Firefighters Grant Program into the $3.5 billion First Responder
Initiative, which would be run by the Office of Domestic Preparedness
(ODP) in the Border and Transportation Security Directorate. What is
the Administration's rationale for moving this grant program from USFA
to ODP?
Answer. For years, the nation's emergency preparedness and response
community have been urging the adoption of a `one-stop-shop' for
Federal preparedness assistance. The Department of Homeland Security
agrees that such a step is critical to the improved administration and
coordination of its disparate grant programs. The FY 2004 Budget took
the first step by proposing the consolidation of Fire Grants into the
Office for Domestic Preparedness, and will soon submit a plan for
consolidating these and other grants into State and Local Coordination
Office, which will also include ODP. This office will be the focal
point through which state and local first responder funds will be
administered, often in coordination with subject matter experts on
other DHS agencies. This proposal will not affect the location of the
U.S. Fire Administration within the Emergency Preparedness and Response
Directorate, and USFA will continue to assist ODP in administering
these funds. The Administration does believe that maximum grant amount
should be raised for large metropolitan areas so that they make more
effective investments in their preparedness and response capabilities.
a. I have introduced S. 321, the Firefighting Research and
Coordination Act. This legislation is cosponsored by Senator
Hollings and six other senators. It would conduct the basic
research that is required for equipment standardization;
authorize the revision of the Federal Response Plan to account
for incidents like those that occurred on September 11;
authorize the U.S. Fire Administration to develop model mutual
aid plans for use by State and Local governments and report on
a credentialing system for volunteers; and authorize new
courses at the National Fire Academy to utilize new technology
and tactics in response to terrorist attacks. What
recommendations would you have for this legislation as Congress
considers it?
Answer. The Administration appreciates the goals of the
Firefighting Research and Coordination Act (S. 321), and notes
that this legislation was largely incorporated into a recently
enacted reauthorization of the U.S. Fire Administration (S.
1152), that was signed by the President in December.
b. Senator Dodd has introduced S. 544, the Staffing for
Adequate Fire and Emergency Response Firefighters Act of 2003.
This legislation would authorize a $7.7 million grant program
from Fiscal Year 2004 to Fiscal Year 2010 to allow local fire
districts to hire firefighters. What is the Administration's
position on this legislation?
Answer. We believe that the hiring of local personnel such as
firefighters should be remain as a local matter and
responsibility. Offering $1 billion in Federal grants for the
hiring of new personnel leaves these new positions highly
vulnerable once the grant has expired.
We agree that fire departments across the nation, volunteer and
career, are in need of federal support to prepare for their
critical role in Homeland Security. However, the Department
believes SAFER grant program risks diverting funds and
attention from the more critical role of the Federal Government
to provide fire departments with assistance for equipment,
training, and exercises to improve their response capabilities
for major incidents. Such investments can be made on an annual
basis without jeopardizing local budgets.
c. This year the Commerce Committee will consider
reauthorization of the U.S. Fire Administration. Do you have
recommendations for provisions that should be added to this
legislation?
Answer. As noted earlier, legislation reauthorizing the U.S.
Fire Administration (S. 1152) was enacted by Congress last
Fall, and was signed by the President in December.
______
Response to Written Questions submitted by Hon. Frank Lautenberg to
Hon. Tom Ridge
Question 1. You have gone on record before the Committee on
Governmental Affairs this year that ``Amtrak and freight Railroads are
at considerable risk of terrorist attack'' and that you ``look forward
to working with Congress to support legitimate security enhancements.''
Over 25 million people a year take Amtrak, our nation's intercity rail
carrier, and hundreds of million more ride commuter railroads every
weekday. What has the Department done to improve the security of rail
transportation for both intercity travel and commuter service?
Answer. DHS is working with the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) and governmental and industry stakeholders to establish best
practices and national standards, develop security plans and
regulations, better assess security vulnerabilities and identify needed
security enhancements to the rail system and related infrastructure.
DHS's focus is on developing a national rail security program centered
on prevention, response, recovery, restoration of services, and
restoring public confidence.
Some specific initiatives include:
1. Coordinating information and threat sharing through the
Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(ISAC) managed by the Association of American Railroads (AAR),
including deploying DHS personnel to the ISAC;
2. Identifying the gaps in antiterrorism training among rail
personnel;
3. Working with AAR, FRA and rail carriers to conduct a pilot
project to identify certain bridges that are critical to the
rail transportation system;
4. The Chlorine Initiative, which includes a system security
review of Chlorine supply chain, threat/risk/vulnerability
assessments, developing a prototype to address other hazardous
materials, and recommending best practices and performance-
based standards;
5. The Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Project, a
cooperative effort for minimizing risk of illicit trafficking
of an RDD;
6. The Food and Feed Stock Security Standards Initiative to
develop food security standards in cooperation with the Food
and Drug Administration and the U.S. Department of Agriculture;
and
7. Developing security standards for intermodal containers.
Question 2. The Northeast Rail Corridor is a transportation asset
like no other in the country--it links almost 24 million people in a
number of major cities and provides access to freight and commuter
lines from here all the way to Boston. Since the Department's creation,
what has the Department done to improve security on the Corridor?
Answer. TSA has been in continuous contact with Amtrak's Chief of
Police and other Amtrak security officials to discuss the current
threat and intelligence. Routine communication with these key
stakeholders is paramount to providing the Chief of Police the
flexibility to focus police officers' attention and presence on areas
where the system is most vulnerable.
TSA is working with the FRA and governmental and industry
stakeholders to establish best practices and national standards,
develop security plans and regulations, better assess security
vulnerabilities and identify needed security enhancements to the rail
system and related infrastructure. In addition, TSA is developing a
national rail security program that focuses on prevention, response,
recovery, restoration of services, and restoring public confidence
Question 3. Current funding formulas for homeland security
assistance to states only take into account--beyond the minimum
guarantees--population share. This produces strange results: we award
the equivalent of $9.78 per person in security grants to the State of
Wyoming, but only the equivalent of $1.69 per person to New Jersey.
This is even below the average of $1.98. While states in the interior
of the U.S. enjoy certain security comforts, states like New Jersey are
subject to higher security risks. We have to worry about the Port of
Newark, the Northeast Rail Corridor, the New Jersey Turnpike, countless
petrochemical facilities and nuclear facilities--and it's not just the
people who live in New Jersey that are exposed to these risks, but also
those who live nearby or are traveling through, or receive freight
traveling through. Why did the Department choose to use population
share as the basis in which to distribute the remaining (after minimum
guarantees of 0.75 percent and 0.25 percent were allocated to states
and territories) funds. How can the funding mechanism be changed to
more equitably consider such risk factors like population density and
infrastructure location?
Answer. The formula used to determine funding distribution to each
state and territory was largely mandated by Congress as defined in the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Pub. L. No. 107-56). Further, the Department
of Justice's Office of Justice Programs has been using this type of
formula since the late 1960s.
There has been a growing concern regarding this formula used to
allocate grant funding through ODP. Homeland security preparedness
needs differ across the nation, and addressing the conflict between
funding the highest threat areas and distributing funds on a wider
basis is complicated. Among other factors, during the last ODP
nationwide assessment process, states and local jurisdictions reported
significant vulnerabilities and threats across the country in all types
of jurisdictions.
Starting in FY04, the Department will seek to make changes in how
it distributes funding to the states. Each state will continue to
receive a base amount as part of the ODP State Homeland Security Grant
Program. However, the Department will also use factors other than
population share, such as threat and risk assessments, to make
determinations on the allocation of these funds. Furthermore, the
Department has made aggressive use of the Urban Area Security
Initiative to ensure that urban areas and infrastructure at greater
risk, in New Jersey and elsewhere, are funded adequately.
______
Response to Written Questions submitted by Hon. Ernest F. Hollings to
Hon. Tom Ridge
Question 1. The Coast Guard has tremendous new responsibilities for
homeland security. After TSA, it is the largest single agency to be
moved to DHS. Yet in the FY2004 budget request, only 25 percent of the
Coast Guard's operating budget is aimed at the homeland security
mission--i.e., protection of our ports, our coastline, and our
waterways.
a. How can that possibly be sufficient, Particularly when with
each new elevation of the homeland security level, Coast Guard
assets are pulled into a high operating tempo, significantly
increasing their operational costs and more quickly wearing out
their assets?
Answer. The Coast Guard's Ports, Waterways, and Coastal
Security (PWCS) mission was redefined as a result of the
increased post-September 11, 2001 homeland security
responsibilities. PWCS is not, however, a new mission, nor is
it the Coast Guard's only homeland security mission. Section
888 of the Homeland Security Act defines Homeland Security
missions as follows:
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS)
Drug interdiction
Migrant interdiction
Defense readiness
Other law enforcement
Thus, while the fiscal year 2004 budget includes approximately
$1.2 billion for the PWCS mission, a larger view of the request
shows that approximately $2.1 billion, or 44 percent, of the
Operating Expenses budget is attributable to Homeland Security
missions.
Due to the unique multi-mission nature of the Coast Guard, any
funding applied toward Homeland Security missions also
contributes to successes with Non-Homeland Security missions.
The Coast Guard's annual Operating Expenses appropriation works
towards the attainment of Homeland Security Advisory System
(HSAS) levels of Green, Blue and Yellow. The costs associated
with Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and LIBERTY SHIELD, including the
subsequent HSAS increase to Orange, were addressed via the
Fiscal Year 2003 Wartime Supplemental. Initiatives within the
Fiscal Year 2004 budget will bolster the Coast Guard's homeland
security capabilities and capacities, which will mitigate the
impacts of future elevations of the HSAS threat level on the
Coast Guard resource allocation across all missions.
b. What is the increase in costs, per day, for each elevation
in threat advisory level?
Answer. Based on Operation LIBERTY SHIELD requirements, the
Coast Guard estimates that it cost $1,600,000 per day to move
from the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) level Yellow
to Orange and that it will cost an additional $100,000 per day
to move from HSAS level Orange to Red.
Question 2. The FY2003 supplemental calls for $180 million dollars
for heightened Coast Guard operations associated with the code Orange
that went into effect when the U.S. went to war with Iraq. Precisely
how much of the FY2004 budget is targeted for these ``peaks'' of
security activity?
Answer. The Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2004 request does not contain
resources directed only to the ``peaks'' of security activity. Rather,
the Fiscal Year 2004 request will increase the Coast Guard's overall
capacity and capability to perform all of its legislatively mandated
missions. Building capacity equates to our need for continued personnel
(both Active Duty and Reservists) and asset growth to increase our
organic presence while capability speaks to improving the operational
effectiveness and readiness of our assets and infrastructure.
The multi-mission resources in the Fiscal Year 2004 budget are
critical to the implementation of the President's National Strategy for
Homeland Security and to the sustaining of the Coast Guard's high
standards of operational excellence across all mission areas. Every
Homeland Security dollar directed to the Coast Guard will contribute to
a careful balance between our safety and security missions, both of
which must be properly resourced for effective mission accomplishment.
The Fiscal Year 2004 budget reflects steady progress in our effort to
meet America's maritime safety and security needs. This new funding
will positively impact our performance in all assigned goals while the
increased capacity and capability will enable us to manage future
``peaks'' of security activity with minimal disruption to our non-
Homeland Security missions.
Question 3. What part of the FY2004 budget is specifically aimed at
replacing capital assets that are being more heavily used during these
periods of increased security?
Answer. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2004 budget submission includes
funding to both replace and supplement capital assets used to prosecute
increased operational tempo since September 11, 2001. The fiscal year
2004 $500 million Deepwater request will directly contribute to
replacement or conversion of legacy assets while increasing capability
over the life of the project. Fiscal year 2004 projects aimed at
supplementing increased operational tempo include requests for
additional Coastal Patrol Boats and the Response Boat Medium project.
These projects will not replace current assets but rather increase the
capacity and capability to perform our enhanced Homeland Security
mission as well as sustain our non-Homeland Security missions.
Question 4. The costs of securing our seaports and harbors are high
but not impossible to cover. The Coast Guard has published estimates
and held public meetings to discuss the costs. Considering the need for
over $6 billion dollars, $1.4 billion for this first year alone, why
has the Administration not made any move to meet this need in the
budget?
Answer. The Coast Guard initially estimated that the cost to
industry to implement the port security requirements required by the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 would be $1.3 billion in
the first year and $6.0 billion over the first 10 years. In the final
rules published on October 22, 2003, the Coast Guard revised these
estimates to be $1.4 billion and $7.3 billion respectively.
For FY 2004, DHS requested substantial resources across the
Department for maritime transportation security, including resources in
the Coast Guard for ports and maritime security; in CBP for cargo
security; in IAIP for vulnerability assessment, intelligence, and
infrastructure protection; and in EP&R/FEMA for emergency response. The
Coast Guard was appropriated over $1.5 billion in support of the Ports,
Waterways, and Coastal Security mission in FY 2004. In addition, $62
million was appropriated specifically for U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's Container Security Initiative and $14 million was
appropriated for CBP's Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT). Finally, $125 million was appropriated for port security grants.
While clearly there is a governmental role in providing port
security, owners and operators have a shared responsibility to provide
port security measures. The requirements contained in the final
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) implementing rule are
intentionally performance based to allow innovative and cost-effective
solutions by industry to improve security with minimum capital outlay
and burden on legitimate use of the maritime transportation system. In
light of this, and the many additional initiatives that have been
undertaken by the Federal Government to improve maritime security, DHS
believes that the Administration's request is adequate.
Question 5. The Coast Guard has many ties to programs within the
Department of Transportation, including important regulatory programs,
such as hazardous materials transport. The Coast Guard also provides
many services to other Department of Transportation agencies. For
example, the Coast Guard maintains the LORAN-C navigation systems used
for air navigation. How will you ensure that such programs are not
disrupted?
Answer. A joint Coast Guard-Department of Transportation (DOT) team
outlined the Coast Guard's continuing role as DOT's Maritime Safety and
Security component, and its lead role in DOT maritime transportation
issues through a series of formal and informal agreements to ensure no
loss in effectiveness by either agency. Memorandums of Agreement cover
operational areas, such as hazardous materials compliance and response
activities, LORAN-C navigation, domestic icebreaking, Recreational
Boating Safety, and the Crisis Coordination Center. The Coast Guard and
DOT will continue other programs under existing agreements or through
informal working relationships.
Question 6. Can you give an update on all Memorandum of
Understanding between your Department and DOT, and the division of
responsibility within your Department, including shared jurisdiction,
for the various components of the MTSA?
Answer. The Department is very pleased to date with its working
relationship with the Department of Transportation and its agencies.
There is inevitable overlap in safety and security, but DHS and the
other agencies worked together well before the March 1 transfer and
continue to do so. This will be critical to our success in port
security where the programs and interests of at least four entities:
TSA, the Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the
Maritime Administration, intersect. Due to the long integration of the
Coast Guard with the Department of Transportation, DOT and the Coast
Guard concluded a series of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with
respect to administrative services.
The U.S. Coast Guard, under the Maritime Transportation Security
Act (MTSA), is the agency responsible for the National Maritime
Transportation Security Plan (TNMSP). TSA is responsible for ensuring
that the NMSP is consistent with the National Transportation System
Security Plan (NTSSP) and is complementary with the plans developed for
the other modes of transportation.
TSA, the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and
the Maritime Administration are working together to develop regulations
under the MTSA. In addition, TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard are
developing a MOU between the two agencies that will address, among
other things, respective roles and responsibilities. Our overarching
goal is to define our strategic relationship with an aim towards
identifying and leveraging our respective core competencies,
capabilities, resources, and authorities to enhance the transportation
security of the United States, and to achieve national performance
goals for ports, waterways, and coastal security.
Question 7. Please provide a list, with accompanying description,
of all MOUs or MOAs that have been completed or are being negotiated
between DHS and other Departments?
Answer.
MOU between DHS, DOJ and CIA
Signed by Secretary Ridge on 2/28/2003, Attorney General Ashcroft
on 3/4/2003 and CIA Director Tenet on 3/4/2003.
Subject: MOU between the Intelligence Community, Federal Law
Enforcement Agencies, and The Department of Homeland Security
concerning Information Sharing.
MOU between DHS and DOJ/FBI
Signed by Secretary Ridge on 2/28/2003 and Attorney General
Ashcroft on 3/4/2003.
Subject: MOU between DHS and DOJ/FBI regarding the Domestic
Emergency Support Team (DEST) Program.
MOA between DHS and USDA
Signed by Secretary Ridge on 2/28/2003 and Secretary Veneman
signed but not dated.
Subject: MOA between DHS and USDA to transfer certain agricultural
import and entry inspection functions to the Secretary of Homeland
Security from the Secretary of Agriculture.
MOA between DHS and DOE
Signed by Secretary Ridge on 2/28/2003 and Secretary Abraham on 2/
28/2003.
MOA between DOE and DHS establishes a framework for DHS to access
the capabilities of various DOE assets.
MOA between DHS and HHS
Signed by Secretary Ridge on 3/5/2003 and Secretary Thompson on 2/
28/2003.
MOA between HHS and DHS concerning cooperative arrangements to
prevent, prepare for, and respond to terrorism and major disasters.
MOU between DHS and DOJ
Signed by Deputy Secretary England on 4/17/2003 and Deputy
Attorney General Thompson on 5/13/2003.
Subject: MOU INTERPOL: Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between
Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice pertaining to
U.S. membership in the International Criminal Police Organization
(INTERPOL) and related matters.
MOA between DHS and DOJ
Signed by Secretary Ridge and Attorney General Ashcroft--both
signed on 5/13/2003.
Subject: Memorandum of Agreement between the DOJ and DHS
concerning terrorist financing investigations.
MOA between DHS and DoD
Signed by Under Secretary Janet Hale on 5/1/2003 and Samuel Cox on
4/21/2003.
Subject: MOA between DoD and DHS for DoD personnel support
services to DHS.
MOU between DHS and USDA
Signed by Secretary Ridge and Secretary Veneman on 6/6/2003.
Subject: MOU between DHS and USDA relating to the transfer of the
Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) from USDA to DHS on 6/1/2003.
In addition, the Department has entered into a number of MOUs with
other executive branch departments that provide administrative services
to various DHS components. Most of these departments are former
parental agencies of DHS components. The services provided under these
MOUs include such things as payroll processing, and IT support. These
MOUs are effective until the end of the fiscal year and include MOUs
with the following departments: Agriculture; EEOC; GSA; HUD; DOJ;
State: Commerce; Energy; HHS; Interior; OPM; DOT; Treasury; and DoD.
Question 8. In addition to these Memoranda, the Coast Guard has
identified approximately 100 other relationships and service
interlinkages with DOT. What types of services formerly provided by DOT
will Coast Guard absorb?
Answer. Continuity of Coast Guard support was accomplished through
a series of agreements with the Department of Transportation (DOT).
These agreements govern the scope and duration of the services provided
by DOT. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is working to ensure
continuity of services as these agreements expire. As DHS's
organizational structures and capabilities continue to form, we will
have a better understanding of the types of services DHS will provide
either on a department-wide basis, a reimbursable basis, or those
services which the Coast Guard will absorb.
a. What are the resource impacts of this shift?
Answer. We will be better able to assess resource impacts as
the Department's organizational structures and capabilities
develop.
Question 9. The law establishing DHS provides that the new Border
and Transportation Security directorate will be responsible for ``(2)
securing the borders, territorial waters, ports, terminals, waterways,
and air, land, and sea transportation systems of the United States''.
Yet the Commandant of the Coast Guard has testified that the Coast
Guard ``is the lead federal agency for Maritime Homeland Security,''
and you have testified that the Coast Guard is the lead federal agency
for port security. How do you intend to resolve the potential conflict?
Answer. The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for Maritime
Homeland Security. The local Coast Guard Captains of the Port are the
Federal Maritime Security Coordinators as delineated in the MTSA of
2002 and are responsible for ensuring unity of effort among not only
the other DHS agencies, but also other federal, state and local
governments and the maritime industry. Coordination of port security
efforts will be accomplished through the Area Maritime Security
Committees led by the Captains of the Port.
Question 10. Is the Coast Guard actively negotiating a memorandum
of understanding with the Transportation Security Administration or the
Border directorate on the authority of each with respect to maritime
security, or will legislation be necessary to address these conflicts?
Answer. Legislation will not be necessary to address specific
agency responsibilities. The Secretary of DHS has delegated lead agency
responsibility for each section of the MTSA of 2002 to the Coast Guard,
TSA, and CBP as appropriate. MOUs among these agencies are in process
to lay out the detailed responsibilities.
Question 11. The Coast Guard has an intricate network of
relationships with state and local authorities, yet the new department
will establish a separate office and its own network of contacts for
coordination with state and local authorities. How will this new DHS
office function vis-a-vis the Coast Guard?
Will these two networks be merged?
Will regional/district offices of the Coast Guard be moved to
join DHS offices?
Which ones?
Answer. A truly secure homeland requires close coordination between
local, state and federal governments. The Coast Guard will continue to
work with the Office of State and Local Government Coordination to
ensure that close coordination takes place with state and local first
responders, emergency services and governments in safeguarding the
homeland. The Office of State and Local Government is charged with
coordinating, simplifying and consolidating government relations on
issues related to America's state and local agencies. It also
coordinates federal homeland security programs and information with
state and local officials. We expect that the current network of state
and local relationships that have been developed by the Coast Guard
will be enhanced by this department wide endeavor. We do not foresee a
wholesale restructuring of the Coast Guard's field structure but will
likely implement marginal change to align our structure with the
Department to ensure unity of purpose and unity of effort. We stand
ready to optimize synergies between the diverse entities within the
Department as the organizational structure is developed.
Question 12. How will other potential conflicts of authority be
resolved, such as between the Coast Guard's role in the International
Maritime Organization, and the new international office within DHS?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Reorganization
Plan, issued on November 25, 2002, outlined the steps to be taken by
the Secretary to organize the Department, including the delegation or
assignment of functions transferred to the Department to permit the
Department to carry out the functions transferred under the plan. Since
March 1, 2003, the Coast Guard has worked closely with the various
elements of the Department to ensure development of interconnected and
complementary systems that are reinforcing rather than duplicative. We
will continue to work towards resolution of potential conflicts of
authority to ensure greater accountability and unity of effort in
addressing critical homeland security missions.
The Coast Guard serves as the head of the U.S. delegation to the
International Maritime Organization (IMO and other Federal agencies
play active roles as part of the delegation when issues are more
appropriately addressed by their participation). This role has not
changed with transition to DHS. The Coast Guard will continue to clear
all policy issues through the Administration and partner with other
agencies on issues brought before the IMO.
Question 13. The MTSA requires U.S. agencies to agree on what
documentation for foreign seafarers is necessary to allow access from
vessels that are in the United States. A press report indicates that an
officer of a U.S. shipping agency is being charged with providing
forged visas. What steps are being taken to investigate and certify
that individual international seafarers are legitimately allowed into
the United States?
Answer. All commercial vessels greater than 300 gross tons are
required to provide an advance notice of arrival (ANOA) to the National
Vessel Movement Center (NVMC) 96 hours prior to entering a port or
place in the United States. As part of the ANOA, the vessel must
provide details concerning the crew, passengers, and cargo. The
National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC), a joint intelligence
center consisting of the Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center
and Office of Naval Intelligence personnel, screens the names of the
crew and passengers through law enforcement and counter-terrorism
databases. The NMIC compiles and analyzes the results of those queries
along with any other intelligence data and provides it to the
appropriate Captain of the Port. The Coast Guard also actively works
with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to ensure crew members'
documents are reviewed before and during each port visit.
Coast Guard personnel board certain vessels prior to entry and
other vessels after they arrive at the dock. These boardings provide an
opportunity to make an up-close observation of the vessel, cargo,
documentation and crew. During these boardings, licenses and seamen's
documents are further examined for accuracy.
On the international level, the Coast Guard has been working with
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International
Labor Organization (ILO) to develop a comprehensive regime for the
credentialing of crewmembers that will include an enhanced seafarer
identification credential containing a ``hard'' biometric indicator. In
March 2002 the Governing Body of the ILO agreed to have the June 2003
International Labor Conference consider amendments to the Seafarers'
Identity Documents Convention (ILO No. 108). In support of this effort,
the IMO issued a resolution titled, ``Enhancement of Security in Co-
operation with the International Labor Organization'' which was adopted
by the Conference on Maritime Security on December 12, 2002. The Coast
Guard has been working with the Department of State, Maritime
Administration, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection and others to support the work of ILO.
Question 14. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
mandates a system for tracking vessels coming to the United States or
that will be transiting our waters, in much the same way as we track
aircraft in our airspace. The Coast Guard does not have the
infrastructure or the funding to meet this mandate. Your budget only
requests one million more to enhance our infrastructure to allow vessel
movements to be tracked. What plans are in place to make this system a
reality?
Answer. The Coast Guard intends to install shore-based tracking
systems in nine critical ports and waterways that are now covered by
Federal Vessel Traffic Services (VTS). In order to expand this
surveillance to other areas, the Coast Guard is developing a plan to
establish a network of receiver sites to track vessels equipped with an
Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmitter.
The viability of this network is dependent on vessels of interest
being outfitted with an AIS and an extensive shore-side infrastructure
that covers the nation's navigable waters. The Coast Guard is about to
release a rulemaking that will mandate the carriage of AIS on board
those vessels identified in the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002. This mandatory carriage will be phased in beginning with the
ports covered by a federal VTS and eventually extending nationwide to
include all coastal regions.
In addition, the Coast Guard is working through the IMO to develop
a mandatory international requirement for ship's long range
identification and tracking. Similar to AIS, this will require ships to
carry equipment that sends the appropriate signals to allow countries
to identify and track them when they are bound for the ports of that
county or on innocent passage near the countries coast except at
distances greater than provided for by AIS.
Question 15. Customs has initiated the Container Security
Initiative (``CSI''), in order to secure agreements with foreign
nations to mutually work on law enforcement, share information on cargo
shipments, and ultimately to perform inspections at foreign ports.
While I applaud this effort, I have some concern that its
implementation may be difficult. For example, with respect to cargo
information, most nations do not police to any great extent the
shipment of exports, so if we rely on their export data for law
enforcement are we getting good information?
Answer. Our U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI) teams use data
systems connected to our Automated Targeting System to target
containers destined for the United States, while our foreign
counterparts conduct similar targeting using their own systems. Prior
to September 11, 2001, most countries, including the United States,
focused on risk management processes targeting imports rather than
exports. Some foreign CSI partners have recognized the need to change
their laws to get sufficient legal authority to receive export data
prior to departure and enhance their ability to inspect goods prior to
departing their country.
While we agree that implementation is a complicated, multi-step
process, part of the process will be building in checks and balances to
ensure that we are confident in the information we are receiving. To
that end, in order to be eligible to participate in CSI, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (BCBP) encourages present foreign CSI
participants, and will require future hosts to have the ability to
inspect cargo originating, transiting, exiting, or being transshipped
through their countries. Host nations must commit to establishing risk
management systems to identify potentially high-risk containers, and
automating those systems. These should include mechanisms for
validating threat assessments and targeting decisions, and identifying
best practices. Additionally, foreign hosts must commit to sharing
critical data, intelligence, and risk management information with BCBP
in order to do collaborative targeting, and developing an automated
mechanism for these exchanges.
Question 16. Under the CSI program, have foreign nations been
willing to provide us with screening equipment to screen cargo which is
being exported from their nation to be imported in the United States,
if so, which nations have provided equipment for our law enforcement
use?
Answer. U.S. law enforcement officers do not screen or inspect
cargo in foreign ports. U.S. CSI teams are only allowed to observe the
host nations' screenings and inspections. However, one of the
eligibility requirements for participation in CSI includes having non-
intrusive inspectional (NII) equipment available (including gamma or X-
ray imaging capabilities) for conducting inspections. This equipment
must be in place at a foreign port prior to deploying a U.S. CSI team
to that port. This is necessary in order to meet the objective of
quickly screening containers without disrupting the flow of legitimate
trade and is for the foreign government's use, not U.S. law enforcement
use.
Question 17. Under the CSI program has the United States put any
screening equipment in foreign ports, and if so in what ports? If not,
do we envision the purchase of screening equipment for use at foreign
ports?
Answer. Under CSI, the United States does not supply screening
equipment in foreign ports, nor does BCBP envision purchasing screening
equipment for use at foreign ports (see above #16). If inquiries are
received from foreign ports regarding NII equipment, CBP will provide
information to the foreign government about NII equipment used in U.S.
ports, but CBP will not give recommendations on vendors.
Question 18. How many imported cargo containers are physically
screened by x-ray in U.S. seaports, and what percent of total container
imports does this represent? Please also provide the total amounts of
cargo containers that undergo similar x-rays in foreign ports through
the CSI program?
Answer. As this information is of a sensitive nature, I would be
glad to provide this information to you or your staff in a more
appropriate setting.
Question 19. How many Customs personnel are stationed in foreign
seaports with the CSI program, and where are they stationed, and what
are the plans for stationing personnel in FY 2004?
Answer. Currently there are 73 personnel deployed in foreign
seaports. Twenty-three (23) ports were? operational by the end of FY
2004 (the original 20 initial ports and the three Canadian ports). We
anticipate that 17-20 additional ports could be operational by the end
of FY04 in Europe and Asia.
Question 20. Please provide, for the record a complete list of
cargo screening equipment at use in U.S. seaports, and also the list
where new equipment will be stationed during fiscal year 2004?
Answer. There are currently 49 large-scale NII systems deployed to
our nation's seaports on both coasts. The systems include the Mobile
Truck X-ray, the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS), Mobile
VACIS and Mobile Sea Container Systems.
We anticipate deploying 16 additional large-scale NII systems to
seaports on both coasts by the end of 2004. The systems will include
Mobile VACIS units, Pallet Gamma-ray systems and Mobile Sea Container
Systems.
Question 21. What steps are being taken to bolster the current
cargo security programs that are now part of DHS, to ensure that we
have verifiable concrete expectations for enhanced security?
Answer. Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) is a key step toward insuring
there will be future improvements in cargo security programs. This
program will help to assess vulnerability and mitigation strategies in
the intermodal shipping container supply chain. Competitive grants will
be provided at the three largest container load centers in the United
States (Los Angeles/Long Beach, Seattle/Tacoma, and New York/New
Jersey). OSC will follow containers across critical interfaces within
the transportation sector, providing valuable information for improving
security in all transportation modes. A cost/benefit analysis will be
performed on the results. Through an interagency review process,
involving CBP, the Coast Guard, the Department of Justice, the
Department of State, the Department of Transportation, and others,
effective measures will be identified to mitigate risk.
Question 22. Also, what steps are being taken to bring together
various cargo security requirements under the Secure Systems of
Transportation Program?
Answer. DHS components, including CBP, TSA and USCG are working
with governmental and industry stakeholders to establish best
practices, develop regulations, and set national standards for Secure
Systems of Transportation (SST). The lead efforts in this endeavor are
the Container Working Group, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT) and Operation Safe Commerce (OSC). Through these
programs, DHS and DOT (add others) are working to improve the security
of international and domestic supply chains by evaluating industry
standards and procedures, identify strengths and weakness in the supply
chain, and developing appropriate regulatory guidelines.
Question 23. While I am generally supportive of the C-TPAT program,
I have some serious reservations that the program will not be all that
effective if we do not ensure that participant companies are regularly
audited and removed from the program unless they are in compliance.
Currently, the program is voluntary, in that shipper, carriers, and
ports agree to be bound to a code of conduct for their security
practices. Well right now, the C-TPAT program is a paper program. What
are you going to do to make sure this program is more than just a paper
program?
Answer. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is sending
teams of CBP officers to validate supply chain security procedures of
C-TPAT participants. In addition, the security procedures of these
companies will be reviewed on a regular basis and updated or changed as
events warrant. Companies that continue to reflect poor security may be
removed from the C-TPAT program.
Question 24. How many auditors are proposed to audit the practices
of C-TPAT participants?
Answer. Ten CBP officers are currently traveling to C-TPAT
companies to conduct C-TPAT security validations. CBP is working to
increase the number of personnel conducting these validations. One
hundred of the 157 C-TPAT positions requested in the FY 2004
President's Budget will be used to enhance these efforts.
Question 25. Have you considered the possibility of third party
private sector auditors to supplement Customs or TSA personnel to
enforce C-TPAT program elements?
Answer. Once we open C-TPAT enrollment to the foreign sector of the
supply chain, CBP may use the Business Anti Smuggling Coalition (BASC)
to conduct audits of the foreign-based companies. BASC is a business-
led, CBP-supported alliance created to combat the smuggling of drugs
and implements of terror in commercial cargo.
Question 26. In the Omnibus Appropriations Act, a provision was
inserted which would require the transfer of $25 million in INS fees to
the TSA, in order to implement Section 70113 of the MTSA. I inserted
this transfer of funds to the TSA because I am concerned that the
agencies in DHS are not working together to come up with a system for
the evaluation of vessels, cargo, crew, and passengers entering into
the United States. For instance, it is my understanding that the Coast
Guard's Maritime Intelligence Center, which had been the Center for a
coordinated maritime information program had included a Customs
presence, however, Customs is now pursuing it's own cargo information
strategy, and this is just occurred since we passed the MTSA. Please
indicate whether the INS fees have been transferred to the TSA?
Answer. Although the Department has not transferred these funds, we
agree with the purpose of this provision, namely to ensure that
vessels, cargo and conveyances are subjected to the most rigorous
threat analysis possible. We are working to identify the best tools to
accomplish this goal, and anticipate that the DHS components of CBP,
the Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration, and the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate will
collaborate closely to augment our existing maritime targeting and risk
analysis tools,
Question 27. Can you tell me what steps are you intending to take
to start to coordinate all of the maritime information on vessels,
cargo, crew and passengers into one system?
Answer. The following information outlines the initial steps taken
to coordinate all of the maritime information on vessels, cargo, crew,
and passengers into one system.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is currently working on a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Coast Guard to implement its 96
hour Notice of Arrival (NOA) rule.
CBP will give the Coast Guard access to CBP's Vessel Manifest
System (VMS), and the Coast Guard will give CBP access to its Ship
Arrival Notification System (SANS) and Marine Information for Safety in
Law Enforcement (MISLE).
Question 28. Are you planning to coordinate the Coast Guard's plans
to monitor vessel movements into this system, and under what time frame
can we envision that vessel movements will also be monitored by the
system mandated in Sec. 70113?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection has formed a working
group with the Coast Guard and TSA to discuss and implement data
exchange to address the issue of capturing information into one system.
A timeframe for completion of the system has not yet been determined.
Question 29. What steps have been taken to incorporate private
sector shipping expertise, and private sector commercial shipping
information systems into the evaluation of maritime threats?
Answer. The evaluation of terrorism threats in the maritime domain
requires a multi-layered strategy. No single system, approach, or
methodology can adequately assess a threat landscape that is as varied
and as without historical context for terrorist activity as that of the
commercial maritime environment.
Recognizing this reality, DHS has taken steps to implement a multi-
layered strategy to incorporate private sector support in developing
effective risk management. These steps include:
Supplementing CBP's AMS pre-arrival information with the
collection of global container movement information. This
action assists in closing the gap on information necessary to
detect transshipment risk through document exploitation in the
Automated Targeting System (ATS).
Aggregating all-source commercial maritime data and
information from ocean carriers, port operators, terminal
operators, and maritime data portals, and subjecting such
commercial data to analytical methods best suited to
identifying and recognizing patterns of suspicious container
movements on a global basis.
Developing methods and systems to evaluate global
commercial shipping information against classified intelligence
for detection of known bad actors.
Incorporating this multi-dimensional approach into the
creation of an Indication & Warning capability to identify risk
early in the container shipment's history to monitor suspicion
over time.
Question 30. A critical public safety issue is the need to have
interoperable communications capabilities to ensure that first
responders are able to exchange vital information in the event of an
emergency. What steps is DHS taking to improve the interoperability of
communications systems for emergency personnel at the federal, state
and local level?
Answer. The SAFECOM program is the Department's principal vehicle
for addressing interoperability problems for first responders, in
concert with the grant funding available through the Office for
Domestic Preparedness. The mission of SAFECOM is to improve
communications and communications interoperability among local, state,
tribal, and federal public safety agencies. Since an overwhelming share
of the nation's communications infrastructure is owned and operated at
the local and state level, SAFECOM is focusing a great deal of
attention on addressing the issue at those critical levels. At the same
time, SAFECOM will be working to address the need for improved
communications interoperability among federal agencies and among local,
state and federal agencies where appropriate.
The SAFECOM program, in concert with local and state public safety
associations through the Coalition for Improved Public Safety
Communications, is developing a ``systems architecture roadmap'' to
address this critical issue. As part of this ``roadmap,'' SAFECOM is
initiating short and medium term initiatives to pave the way for
achieving the longer term objective of enabling public safety agencies
to communicate with other public safety agency when needed, and
simultaneously developing long term initiatives to prepare for the
future. To implement these initiatives, SAFECOM will be leveraging
already existing Federal programs addressing the issue, most critically
the ``first responder'' grants funds administered by the Office for
Domestic Preparedness, the Public Safety Wireless Network, and the
National Institute of Justice's AGILE program.
Among other initiatives that SAFECOM is initiating are: identifying
and assisting in the implementation of short-term ``patch'' solutions
such as cross-band repeaters; identifying governance models that
directly involve the first responders themselves; best practices to
improve interoperability; identifying and, where appropriate,
developing relevant standards; and the research, development, testing,
and evaluating of technologies that can improve communications
interoperability. At the same time, SAFECOM, in concert with the public
safety community, will work with the Federal Communications Commission
to address spectrum management and allocation for public safety
agencies.
Additionally, the Standards program within DHS's Directorate of
Science and Technology, working in consonance with Project SAFECOM, is
currently developing a communication interoperability workshop with
participation from NIST, IEEE, NASA, DoD, IAB, and others. The goal is
to plan for integration and coordination of ongoing efforts in various
activities of the Federal Government and to work with the private
sector and Standards Development Organizations to develop a suite of
uniform performance standards for existing COTS technologies. Another
goal is to also provide consistent advice to technology developers on
requirements for second-generation equipment and protocols.
Finally, in coordination with the Directorate of Science and
Technology, the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) will provide
funds to assist State and local agencies to evaluate and acquire
interoperable communication technologies.
Question 31. Has DHS prioritized by mode its planned efforts to
secure the transportation system? If so, what is that prioritization?
Answer. The Department has the responsibility to make
recommendations for prioritization of protective measures across all
infrastructures. It is the intent of the Department to include the
transportation systems in an overarching system that allows the
allocation of resources based on a combination of threat, vulnerability
and a resultant risk analysis. Areas of interest that may be attacked
by a terrorist must be assessed based on availability of the target and
the consequences of attack. The different transportation modes all pose
different vulnerabilities and attractiveness as a target and thus the
prioritization must be operationally oriented, not stove-piped by
sector.
Question 32. There are no widely accepted standards or guidelines
for physical, procedural, and personnel security that cut across all
transportation modes. How is the Department of Homeland Security
dealing with the need for a standardization methodology that would work
in all transportation modes and when will the methodology be
implemented?
Answer. Consistent guidelines and standards will be developed for
physical security and for personnel certification/training. The vision
for the Standards program within DHS is that personnel working to solve
similar problems will be directed to purchase similar suites of
equipment or technologies. These people would then be directed to
obtain a level of training and certification consistent with the
equipment and technologies needed to perform a specific function.
Therefore, ability of a specific standard or guideline to eventually
cross-cut transportation modes will be defined by the similarity of
functions performed--and of the sites or facilities. Standard operating
procedures will be addressed by the entity managing the specific
transportation mode.
The approach for developing standards for training and personnel
certification has just begun. Physical security standards work has not
yet been initiated by DHS. However, we expect to leverage ongoing
efforts in physical security standards development and equipment
certification.
Question 33. The TSA is in the process of developing a risk-based
analysis model for identifying critical infrastructure gaps and risks.
This modeling will also be used for identifying security threats for
the transport of hazardous materials. Once TSA's analysis is completed
and the model has been tested and found viable, they will provide their
analysis to each modal administration identifying significant risks
within the transportation infrastructure. Although, TSA is developing
this risk-based model, they are extremely understaffed and are still in
the early stages of development and implementation. For example, risk
threat assessment pilot studies have only occurred in two areas in the
New York Metropolitan area and the results from these studies have not
been completed or released to state and local authorities. When will
this risk-based analysis model be totally operational and be
implemented throughout the United States?
Answer. TSA has initiated pilot vulnerability programs across
various transportation modes and will use the results of the
vulnerability assessments to establish transportation security
standards. The timeline for completion of vulnerability assessments
across all 14 critical infrastructure sectors (of which transportation
is one sector) will be developed and executed by the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate. TSA and IAIP
are currently coordinating TSA's vulnerability assessment strategy for
the transportation sector.
Question 34. We held a hearing last year and Secretary Mineta
testified that the TSA budget, because of various earmarks was not
sufficient. I told him to get us the numbers on what he needs. How much
money does TSA need to complete the installation of EDS machines?
Answer. DHS is currently assessing how much funding is necessary to
complete EDS installations. This depends on the number of in-line
systems that the Federal Government should undertake, and this is still
being determined.
Question 35. You were provided $50 million for the development of
next generation EDS machines, how is that money being spent and what
progress is being made?
Answer. TSA has planned a two-phase R&D program to identify and
develop next generation EDS technology.
First Phase: TSA will direct approximately 85 percent of
allocated R&D efforts towards a program, known as the Phoenix
Project, which is a low risk program that addresses
evolutionary growth of present technology. The project will
focus on:
1. Life cycle extension of existing systems;
2. Combining technologies (such as a combination of X-ray with
quadruple resonance or X-ray diffraction technology); and
3. Emerging technology and products that are within a two to
three year window for producing viable systems.
Second Phase: TSA will direct approximately 15 percent of
R&D efforts to a project, known as Manhattan II, which is a
higher risk, longer-range project with potentially greater
payoff. This is a five to ten year project that will challenge
industry to develop the next generation of EDS technology.
Question 36. You will need the funding stream provided by the
security fee if TSA is going to function properly. The airlines paid
for security before 9/11, and the security fee is one of the few
sources through which the TSA's new security regime is now funded. Both
the House and Senate agreed to provisions that would only allow for a
six-month hiatus of the security fee, and Senator Stevens supports this
position. Do you support, as the FY03 Supplemental suggests, that
security fees on passengers be restored in FY04? If not, where will the
money come from to pay for security improvements?
Answer. DHS continues to support the airline passenger fee.
Question 37. Now that TSA has successfully implemented a new
program for airport screeners and has begun to address aspects of port
security, what will your Agency do to address security in the rail
industry?
Answer. DHS is working with the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) and governmental and industry stakeholders to establish best
practices and national standards, develop security plans and
regulations, better assess security vulnerabilities and identify needed
security enhancements to the rail system and related infrastructure.
DHS is developing a national rail security program that focuses on
prevention, response, recovery, restoration of services, and restoring
public confidence.
Some initiatives include:
1. Coordinating information and threat sharing through the
Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(ISAC) managed by the Association of American Railroads (AAR),
including deploying DHS personnel to the ISAC;
2. Identifying the gaps in antiterrorism training among rail
personnel;
3. Working with AAR, FRA and rail carriers to conduct a pilot
project to identify certain bridges that are critical to the
rail transportation system (Upon identification TSA will lead a
team to conduct vulnerability assessments on these critical
assets.);
4. The Chlorine Initiative, which includes a system security
review of Chlorine supply chain, threat/risk/vulnerability
assessments, developing a prototype to address other hazardous
materials, and recommending best practices and performance-
based standards;
5. The Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Project, a
cooperative effort for minimizing risk of illicit trafficking
of an RDD;
6. The Food and Feed Stock Security Standards Initiative to
develop food security standards in cooperation with the Food
and Drug Administration and the U.S. Department of Agriculture;
and
7. Developing security standards for intermodal containers.
Question 38. What aspects of rail security should be addressed
first?
Answer. There are several important elements in rail security.
These include:
Infrastructure Security at Tunnels and Bridges.
Enhancements are necessary to improve infrastructure security
at tunnels and bridges, including better fencing, enhanced
lighting, and video surveillance.
Hazardous materials. Currently large amounts of hazardous
materials and dangerous goods are transported by rail
throughout the country, traversing large urban centers and
rural towns. These materials could be used as weapons by
terrorists. They also are vital to U.S. commerce, and
disruptions in the supply chain may have an adverse economic
impact.
Securing Major Stations. Amtrak operates four major
stations, which have high volumes of passenger traffic because
they are used by Amtrak, commuter and subway travelers, as well
as many tourists and shoppers. These stations include Union
Station in Washington, DC; Philadelphia 30th Street Station;
Chicago Union Station; and New York Penn Station. Additionally,
there are several other large stations Amtrak serves that may
require additional security enhancements.
Nuclear/radiological materials. Additional regulation may
be necessary to reduce the likelihood that terrorists will use
them as weapons of mass destruction.
Food and livestock. These commodities are vital to the
economy and health of the Nation.
Intermodal cargo containers. Millions of containers enter
the country each year. These containers could be used to
transport a multitude of dangerous items, including weapons of
mass destruction.
Question 39. What is DHS's plan to continue coordination, through
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) and TSA, with
Amtrak and the freight railroads in times of heightened security?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration is working with
the Association of American of Railroads (AAR), railroad police
departments, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and the
American Short Line Railroad and Regional Association to fully
integrate the freight railroads into its planning and intelligence
cycle. Through the 24-hour Surface Transportation Information Sharing
and Analysis Center supported by the AAR, TSA is working closely with
the AAR to share and disseminate threat information and intelligence to
railroad police departments and FRA.
IAIP and TSA are also working to develop the concept of a center in
which government/industry would work together to (1) assess
vulnerabilities of sectors to cyber and physical attacks; (2) recommend
plans to eliminate vulnerabilities; (3) develop systems for identifying
and preventing attempted major attacks; (4) plan for alerting,
containing and rebuffing an attack; and (5) rapid reconstitution of
minimum essential capabilities after an attack. IAIP and TSA will
continue to foster this partnership with industry to ensure the flow of
information is timely provided to the entities that can protect the
nation's rail transportation system.
Question 40. Railroads are viewed as less vulnerable than other
modes primarily because trains operate on fixed routes, making a train
hijacking seem like a remote avenue for possible terrorism. However,
the rail industry handles about half of all hazardous material
transportation in this country, over a rail network of approximately
130,000 route miles, more than three times the route miles in the
Interstate Highway System. The rail system also hauls military
equipment over about 30,000 miles of designated routes under the
Security of Strategic Rail Corridor Network (STRACNET). How will DHS,
particularly IAIP and TSA, coordinate with local law enforcement for
protection of rail operations during times of heightened security?
Answer. IAIP has the overall responsibility for infrastructure
protection within DHS and TSA will continue to coordinate all such
efforts to ensure that the Department has complementary and streamlined
programs in place to protect the infrastructure. The Infrastructure
Coordination Division within IAIP maintains close ties with all
Industry Security Advisory Councils (ISAC) on a routine basis and
during times of heightened threats. TSA and the Infrastructure
Protection Division work closely to craft recommendations for industry
to take protective measures and coordinate with state and local
officials as needed. Additionally, the Transportation Security
Administration is working with the Association of American of Railroads
(AAR), railroad police departments, the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA), and the American Short Line Railroad and Regional Association to
fully integrate the freight railroads into its planning and
intelligence cycle. Through the 24-hour Surface Transportation
Information Sharing and Analysis Center supported by the AAR, IAIP and
TSA are working closely with the AAR to share and disseminate threat
information and intelligence to railroad police departments and FRA.
Question 41. U.S. and Canadian authorities have been working to
implement a high-tech system to screen rail cargo at our northern
borders. Nine cargo-inspection units, using gamma rays to scan cargo
containers, are to be installed this year. According to an April 9
article in the Wall Street Journal, the rail industry in both countries
has been concerned that the new system will delay shipments by several
hours, causing railroads to lose their competitive edge against trucks
for fast delivery service.
a. When will the first cargo-inspection unit begin operating?
Answer. The first Rail VACIS system on the Northern Border was
deployed to International Falls, Minnestota in July 2003.
b. When will all nine units be operating?
Answer. We expect eight Rail VACIS units to be operational by
January 2004. We are currently evaluating other sites for
deployment of Rail VACIS.
c. Will the nine cargo-inspection units replace the mobile
scanners now being used at rail crossings at the Canadian
border, or will they used in addition to the mobile scanners?
Answer. Rail VACIS units deployed to the U.S./Canada border
will be in addition to the large-scale Non-Intrusive Inspection
(NII) systems already in place at northern border ports of
entry.
d. What is the agency doing to ensure that security delays of
rail shipments crossing the Canadian border are minimized?
Answer. Our rail security program is a vital component U.S.
Customs and Border Protection strategy to keep America and the
American people safe, as well as to facilitate the flow of
trade between Canada and the United States.
NII technologies such as the VACIS systems are viewed as force
multipliers that enable us to screen or examine a larger
portion of the stream of commercial traffic while facilitating
the flow of legitimate trade and cargo.
NII systems, in many cases, give the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection the capability to perform thorough examinations of
cargo without having to resort to the costly, time consuming
process of unloading cargo for manual searches, or intrusive
exams of conveyances by methods such as drilling and
dismantling.
e. Will similar cargo-inspection units be placed along the
Mexican border? If so, when?
Answer. Seven Rail VACIS units are currently deployed to U.S.
ports of entry along the border with Mexico. One additional
system will be deployed on the southwest border by the end of
2004, for a total of eight Rail VACIS systems on the U.S./
Mexico border.
Question 42. The Federal Railroad Administration has increased its
security activities, using its safety inspection team to review
security readiness at passenger terminals and working with freight
railroads to identify security concerns. The FRA took the lead role in
addressing rail security in the field on behalf of the Department of
Transportation while the new TSA focused its attention on aviation
security. How does DHS see its role in rail security vis-a-vis actions
already taken by FRA?
Answer. TSA and IAIP continue to work closely with the FRA to
establish best practices and national standards, develop security plans
and regulations, better assess security vulnerabilities and identify
needed security enhancements to the rail system and related
infrastructure. Any national rail security program will focus on
prevention, response, recovery, restoration of services, and restoring
public confidence.
Question 43. In the absence of a Memorandum of Agreement between
the two agencies, what will be the relationship between DHS and FRA
regarding rail security?
Answer. DHS will have the lead in security-related matters
involving the rail industry, but will work closely with the FRA to
establish best practices and national standards, develop security plans
and regulations, better assess security vulnerabilities and identify
needed security enhancements to the rail system and related
infrastructure.
Question 44. Last week, the Associated Press reported that nine
derails have disappeared from three rail yards in east Texas since mid-
January. Derails are portable hinged-type blocks used to prevent trains
from entering main lines when they have no authority to do so. However,
secretly placed in a strategic location on a main line, a derail could
derail a freight train operating at 79 mph, possibly carrying hazardous
materials, or an Amtrak train traveling at 125 mph, possibly carrying
hundreds of passengers. When the derails in east Texas were reported
missing by the rail industry, a U.S. Marshall in Shreveport, La.
expressed concern about the possible security implications. However, a
rail industry spokesman later dismissed the missing derails as probably
``stolen and sold for scrap metal.'' What is DHS's response to reports
of suspicious circumstances generated at the local level?
Answer. The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate (IAIP) is the DHS' focal point for receipt, through its
Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), and analysis of suspicious
circumstances information, through its Information Analysis (IA)
branch. In the case of the missing derails, for example, this
information was received by the HSOC, which contacted local authorities
and DHS components for additional information, if available, and IA
searched available databases for similar instances in other areas. At
the same time, railroad experts were contacted to determine the nature
of the threat from derails, and to place this theft in context in terms
of occurrences, e.g., How widespread? How often? The results of this
review confirmed the industry spokesman's assessment.
a What does DHS do to ensure that localized suspicious
circumstances are in fact not more widespread?
Answer. IAIP and the HSOC use a standard approach upon receipt
of information regarding suspicious circumstances, which first
requests all additional information about a specific incident.
Information is cross-leveled within IAIP and to applicable DHS
components, as well as outside the Department as appropriate.
IAIP also searches available databases, and uses all
information obtained in order to place incidents in situational
context to determine if there is some plausible explanation for
unusual activity, or whether a trend connected to other
locations has emerged. All incidents are data-based in IAIP to
support subsequent queries and trend identification. Analysis
of suspicious incidents is a dynamic process that seeks to
determine if the incident is ``normal'' within one area but not
in another, and to develop a sense of situational awareness.
Question 45. How will DHS address security concerns in the rail
industry in circumstances where the industry believes the concerns are
not warranted?
Answer. The rail industry has taken the lead in developing security
plans to address emerging security concerns post September 11, 2001.
While the rail plan was developed to address security challenges
particular to that specific industry, TSA must address security
concerns that affect intermodal security as well. TSA and IAIP will
continue to work with the rail industry to ensure that critical
industry security factors are integrated into any multi-sector critical
infrastructure security plan.
Question 46. Does DHS see the security needs of the passenger rail
industry as very different from the security needs of the freight rail
industry? If so, will agency resources be expended on one more than the
other?
Answer. Railroad miles traveled and the potential for human injury
are the key ways in which rail freight security risks differ from rail
passenger security risks. However, rail passenger trains usually use
the same routes used by freight railroads. DHS is undertaking
assessments of critical vulnerabilities across our transportation
system. Results of these assessments will serve as the baseline for any
future security requirements across maritime and land modes.
Given the vast infrastructure comprising passenger and freight rail
systems, any security enhancements for either system must be the
product of careful risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis.
DHS will develop security standards that, to the extent possible,
incorporate industry best practices, new technologies, and innovations
to create a more uniform level of security across modes, while ensuring
minimal disruption to our transportation system. This risk-based
approach will require close interaction with affected industries and
close cooperation in the execution of any requirements.
Question 47. In Washington, Amtrak and commuter trains operate
through tunnels under Capitol Hill. What has DHS done to ensure that
these tunnels are properly secured? How secure are the tunnels? What
more must be done to fully secure the tunnels and how soon must it be
accomplished?
Answer. TSA has worked closely with CSX, Amtrak, and Virginia
Railway Express to evaluate continually the security of these tunnels.
The Virginia Avenue Tunnel is owned by CSX. CSX has posted security
guards around the clock at each end of the tunnel since September 11,
2001. CSX is currently installing intrusion technology at both ends of
the tunnel to replace the security guards. The system is currently
under test. Video feed from the system will be monitored by a police
communication center in Jacksonville, Florida, and will be accessible
by local CSX police officers via a secure internet connection. Amtrak
Police and U.S. Park Police will serve as back up for CSX Police. The
system has already detected trespassers on board a train that had
stopped while entering the tunnel.
Question 48. Amtrak and commuter trains in and around New York
travel through tunnels under the rivers surrounding Manhattan. These
tunnels were equipped in World War II with emergency doors that could
close off segments of the tunnels in case of a breach. These doors
reportedly are no longer operable. Nevertheless, the danger from a
tunnel breach is more heightened now than it has been in the past 50
years, and a tunnel breach could have catastrophic results for lower
Manhattan, as well as the transportation system for the entire New York
metro area. What does DHS know about the state of these doors? How soon
will the doors be made fully operable? Should Amtrak receive emergency
funding to ensure the doors are operable in the immediate future?
Answer. Amtrak has employed a contractor to evaluate the status of
the doors and detail the repairs needed. The doors provide access for
all four of the East River Tunnels connecting Amtrak's Pennsylvania
Station with Queens. In addition, the gates for the two North River
Tunnels (under the Hudson River), which connect Amtrak's Pennsylvania
Station to New Jersey, are recessed in the area above the tunnels. None
of these doors, or flood gates, has been operable since the 1970s. The
contractor performing the evaluation was scheduled to begin work the
week of April 21, 2003. The Administration will consider any funding
request for Amtrak at the appropriate time.
Question 49. The Secretary mentioned in his testimony that Amtrak's
security plan has been reviewed, and that the results of that analysis
have been shared with the Committee. Please submit a copy of that
analysis for the record of this hearing. Please be sure to note
appropriate security level.
Answer. TSA has provided review comments for several versions of
Amtrak's Security Investment Plan.
The TSA and the FRA reviewed the version of Amtrak's Security
Investment Plan that accompanied a letter from Senator McCain dated
January 13, 2003. On February 6, 2003, TSA received a revised Security
Investment Plan from Amtrak and provided comments to Senator McCain on
this ``updated'' plan in a letter dated February 28, 2003.
TSA was recently advised in a letter from David L. Gunn, Amtrak
President and Chief Executive Officer, informing TSA that the Security
Investment Plan TSA received on February 6th was not Amtrak's final
security plan, which had changed significantly in the last month.
Amtrak provided TSA with the final security plan on April 10, 2003, and
TSA, in coordination with the FRA, is currently reviewing this plan.
Question 50. Since September 11th and the start of the Iraq War,
the transport of hazardous materials has become a likely target for a
terrorist attack. How is the Department of Homeland Security dealing
with this threat, and what processes has it put in place to deal with a
possible release of lethal chemicals in a very populated area?
Answer. With respect to the transport of hazardous materials, DHS
has several initiatives planned and underway. Industry stakeholders are
being solicited to participate in the Information Sharing Analysis
Center (ISAC) to formulate industry-wide security standards and
incident management strategies. In compliance with the USA PATRIOT Act,
TSA is providing regulatory guidance for conducting criminal background
checks for commercial drivers and rail workers involved in the
transport of hazardous materials. TSA is also working with FMCSA to
carry out the HAZMAT safety permits program funded in the fiscal year
2003 appropriations legislation. Finally, TSA also has begun a rail
hazardous materials initiative focused on conducting a system security
review of chlorine shipments from origin to destination to identify
potential security gaps. This review will be followed by development of
a prototype to address security of bulk hazardous materials.
The Department of Homeland Security, Emergency Preparedness and
Response Directorate has longstanding relationships with other Federal
agencies that participate in the National Response System. The National
Response System provides a coordination, planning, and response
structure for addressing the release of hazardous materials into the
environment. The National Response Team (NRT), chaired by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), provides a forum to coordinate
Federal aspects of the National Response System and support to State
Emergency Response Commissions and Local Emergency Planning Committees.
The National Response System response under the National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) does not require
a Presidential declaration of emergency or disaster, but can be
assimilated into a response under the all-hazard Federal Response Plan
(FRP) as one of the FRP's 12 Emergency Support Functions. The
Department of Homeland Security is currently engaged in developing a
National Response Plan to link these and other response structures even
more closely through a single National Incident Management System, as
required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 5.
One of FEMA's contributions to preparedness for hazardous materials
releases at the community level has been to coordinate a locally
focused program integrating an initial needs assessment, capability
development through plan review and training, validation of plans and
training through full-scale mass casualty exercises, and a final
assessment. That program, the Comprehensive Hazardous Materials
Emergency Response Capability Assessment Program (CHER-CAP), has
provided opportunities for partners such as EPA, the Department of
Transportation (DOT), and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
along with EP&R's own U.S. Fire Administration (USFA), to work together
to aid communities nominated by States for participation, from small
communities to large cities such as Boston. The program traditionally
has relied on limited funding from an interagency agreement with EPA
for use as seed money to attract other public and private participation
in the community. However, EP&R is planning to make CHER-CAP an all
hazard program, to address not only hazardous materials--where we would
like to retain and enhance existing interagency partnerships--but also
other hazard scenarios affecting local communities.
The Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) program was
transferred into the DHS Emergency Preparedness and Response
Directorate on March 1, 2003, along with other elements of the former
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Emergency Response.
MMRS is a planning effort in the 122 largest metropolitan jurisdictions
to create an integrated medical response to a WMD terrorist attack,
including one that involved hazardous materials transportation. A key
aspect of this planning is to enable a jurisdiction to manage the event
for 36 to 48 hours until State/Federal resources are deployed. This
planning activity is accomplished by integration and coordination of
all of the jurisdiction's response capabilities:
Police, Fire, EMS, Public Health, Emergency Management, and
Hospitals.
Plans for integration into the response those State and
Federal resources that may be provided.
Equipment and pharmaceuticals that can be acquired under
the contract, with the exclusion of any materials acquired
under other federal programs.
Training of response personnel.
FEMA also has published ``Are You Ready?'' a document written
specifically for the public to help them cope with disasters of all
types, including hazardous materials transportation accidents. The
publication, which is available on the FEMA website and through many
local government offices, tells the public what steps they can take to
prepare for a hazardous materials accident, what to do if they witness
a hazardous materials accident, and what procedures to follow if they
have been evacuated during a hazardous materials accident.
In addition, the U.S. Fire Administration has worked to
enhance the operational security awareness among the emergency
response community through several communication methods that
transport incidents in all modes may be initiated as a
terrorist act.
Finally, USFA is partnered with the International Association of
Fire Chiefs through the Fire Service HAZMAT Cooperative Agreement.
Through this partnership the USFA and the IAFC deliver the IAFC
Homeland Protection and Security Weekly, which relates pertinent
information to the emergency response community. This includes both
training opportunities and information exchange.
The Response Division's Strategic National Stockpile has several
ways of dealing with the release of lethal chemicals, depending in part
on the type of chemical released. On multiple occasions, the SNS has
demonstrated its ability to rapidly deploy 50 tons of pharmaceuticals,
nerve agent antidotes, and other life-saving medical supplies to the
scene of a national emergency. It has then followed its initial
shipment with large and continuous quantities of specific items that
state/local authorities need to deal with the emergency. The SNS also
has the demonstrated ability to rapidly purchase and deliver products
from the private sector that the SNS does not stock. On September 11,
2001, for instance, it purchased large quantities of respirators for
workers at ground zero to protect them from breathing harmful dust
released when the World Trade Center Twin Towers collapsed.
In cases such as the release of organic phosphates, which affect
the nervous system and require immediate action, antidotes must be
available faster than the SNS is able to deliver them. The SNS is
currently piloting a program for prepositioning government-owned, nerve
agent antidotes with state and local authorities so that they will have
the supplies that they need in the event of a chemical release. The
SNS' ownership of these items allows it to specify and monitor the
condition under which supplies are kept to ensure their efficacy and
the ability to extend their useful life--a major cost saving.
Question 51. Since the TSA and DHS have not issued guidelines for
security risks within the transportation infrastructure we are seeing
local municipalities developing their own ordinances and laws that may
or may not be circumvented by a federal standard once one is developed.
Although DHS has worked with DOT modal administrations to implement new
security measures and new regulations for the transport of hazardous
materials, some municipalities have taken steps to require even more
stringent requirements. For example, the City of Baltimore's new
``Hazardous Materials Security law'' is believed to be the first of its
kind in the nation and increases the screening criteria for
transportation providers. How will the Department of Homeland Security
integrate state and municipal laws into their macro perspective of
security threat abatement strategies?
Answer. DHS is working with DOT and governmental stakeholders to
ensure that proposed federal regulations consider regulations already
in place at the state and local level. For example, should a National
Transportation Security Exercise Program be considered, the Department
would examine the applicability of other federal, state or local
programs already in place to determine whether they meet or exceed the
requirements of the new federal program, and determine how those
existing programs would appropriately be incorporated or augmented into
that new program's requirements.
Question 52. The transportation of high-level radioactive waste and
spent nuclear fuel should be a high security priority. What additional
processes has the Department of Homeland Security initiated above the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Transportation
requirements to secure these highly visible and dangerous products?
Answer. DHS continues to consult with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the Department of Transportation regarding initiatives
to secure the transport of hazardous materials to ensure DHS
initiatives are in alignment with national efforts. Currently, TSA is
establishing standards and regulations for background security checks
for commercial drivers with hazardous materials endorsements. These
efforts will increase security for all levels of radiological
materials. Furthermore, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does
detect, identify and validate the legitimacy of this type of shipment
if it crosses the Nation's border. CBP would then secure or detain such
materials for the purpose of identifying their legitimacy.
Question 53. What parameters has the Department of Homeland
Security put in place to rectify security threats that could breach
pipeline infrastructure?
Answer. During September 2002 the U.S. Department of
Transportation's Office of Intelligence & Security, the Research and
Special Programs Administration's (RSPA) Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS), the Department of Energy, State pipeline safety agencies, and
pipeline industry representatives developed the Pipeline Security
Contingency Planning Guidance. This guidance recommended security
measures for pipeline operators to invoke at each threat level. The
Department is reviewing the guidelines to determine the applicability
of each measure at the various threat levels based on current
intelligence. If necessary, the Department would work with OPS to
revise the guidelines to better address vulnerabilities present at each
threat level.
IAIP is also working closely with industry to determine ``best
practices'' for pipeline operators to follow at each threat level.
These ``best practices'' could become a basis for any future DHS
standards.
Question 54. Has the pipeline industry assisted in the development
of security plans for their infrastructure, or has the Department of
Homeland Security instituted requirements for the industry to follow?
Answer. During September 2002 the U.S. Department of
Transportation's Office of Intelligence & Security, the Research and
Special Programs Administration's (RSPA) Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS), the Department of Energy, State pipeline safety agencies, and
pipeline industry representatives published Pipeline Security
Contingency Planning Guidance. Under this guidance it was recommended
that pipeline operators develop a security plan to coincide with
recommended measures at each threat level.
The Department in conjunction with the OPS, is in the process of
meeting with two natural gas and two liquid companies to discuss and
test their critical infrastructure security plan and procedures. The
four companies (Colonial Pipeline, Exxon Mobil, CMS Energy, and
Williams) will act as a test bed for newly drafted Security Audit/
Review Protocols. The audit/review process is the first of a series of
Security Audits/Reviews of critical pipelines and facilities.
Upon completion of the four pipeline operator security plan
reviews, TSA will meet with industry representatives and RSPA/OPS to
discuss the protocols and make revisions as deemed necessary. TSA, in
conjunction with RSPA/OPS, will then continue to review the security
plans and procedures of other critical pipeline operators utilizing the
revised protocols.
At this time, the Department of Homeland Security has not
promulgated requirements for industry to follow. The TSA plans to
determine ``best practices'' for the pipeline industry to follow and
will base proposed regulations on those ``best practices.''
Question 55. TSA--How many Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) employee
positions are authorized for each office at TSA? How many of these are
currently staffed?
Answer. In its first year, TSA's primary goal was to meet statutory
deadlines for meeting passenger and baggage screening requirements. At
the same time, the agency experienced an extremely rapid staffing
buildup as it achieved legislatively-mandated levels. TSA is now
conducting a comprehensive review of its organizational configuration.
The review is designed to ensure that the responsibilities of each
organizational component are clear and that redundancies are identified
and eliminated. This review will form the basis for the revision of
authorized staffing ceilings for all major components of TSA. We will
advise you of the revised staffing ceilings once they are finalized.
Question 56. If TSA is now planning to gear up security programs
for transportation modes other than aviation, why is it reducing its
FTE request for 2004?
Answer. The Department's strategy to deal with critical
infrastructures, including those in the transportation sector, is to
identify critical assets, conduct vulnerability assessments of those
assets and work with the entities with responsibility for mitigating
identified vulnerabilities--whether they be the federal, state, local
or private owners of those assets--to develop appropriate security and
response plans for those assets. TSA plans to take action to assess the
need for standards and regulations in other security areas. However,
the FY 2004 Budget assumed that some functions of TSA's offices would
no longer be necessary in light of the establishment of DHS and similar
resources of other organizations.
Question 57. How will the Department of Homeland Security transfer
FY02, FY03 and FY04 funds to the local and state agencies that
desperately need this funding to compensate them for heightened levels
of security threats and their future response activities?
Answer. It is important to note that there is a clear distinction
between support for operational security costs and investments in state
and local preparedness and response capabilities. DHS has only provided
operational funding relating to the heightened security costs during
Operation Liberty Shield. It would be impracticable to provide
``compensation'' every time the threat level is revised.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office for
Domestic Preparedness (ODP) share your goals of providing funds to
states in a timely, efficient, and effective manner. ODP has made great
strides in allocating and awarding terrorism preparedness funds. In
Fiscal Year (FY) 2002, through the State Domestic Preparedness Program
(SDPP), $315.7 million was available and applied for by each of the 56
U.S. states and territories for equipment acquisition and exercises to
enhance the ability of first responders to react to incidents of
domestic terrorism at the local level. As such, states were required to
provide at least 80 percent of the funds allocated for equipment
purchases to local agencies. States could use the remaining equipment
funds to support broader domestic preparedness activities, such as
state first responder teams that support local units of government. As
of October 2003, the last month for which ODP has complete information,
states had obligated $173,741,709 or 55 percent of these FY02 funds.
As you know, Congress provided $1 billion for the continuation of
ODP's prevention, preparedness, and response efforts in the FY 2003
Omnibus Appropriations Act (Public Law 108-7), including $566,295,000
for the State Homeland Security Grant Program, Part I and $100 million
for the Urban Areas Security Initiative, Part I. ODP received an
additional $2.2 billion through the FY 2003 Emergency Wartime
Supplemental Appropriations Act (Public Law 108-11), including $1.3
billion in State Homeland Security Grants, $200 million in State
infrastructure protection grants, and $700 million for continuation of
the Urban Areas Security Initiative.
To facilitate the award of these funds, Congress provided language
in both of the appropriations bills that directed states to apply for
funds within 30 days of the grant announcement and required ODP to make
awards within 30 days of receipt of a state's application. Pursuant to
this language, ODP has worked to make funds available much more quickly
than in past grant programs it has administered. For instance, ODP made
applications for State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) funds
under the Fiscal Year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act available on
March 7, 2003--15 days after the act was signed into law. Under the
terms of the SHSGP application, applicants were required to submit
their application by April 22, 2003. All 56 eligible applicants
submitted applications, with 54 applicants submitting applications
between April 15th and April 22nd. Thirty-five applications were
received on April 22nd, the last day of the solicitation period. Once
received, applications were approved and funds awarded on a rolling
basis. Forty-four applications or 78 percent of applications received
were approved in less than four days. Similarly 44 applicants, or 78
percent of those who applied, were awarded funds within 15 days of
submitting their applications. By May 8th, 49 of 56 awards (87 percent)
had been completed. By mid-July, ODP had awarded all 56 awards.
Additionally, applications for State Homeland Security Grant
Program, Part II (SHSGP, Part II) funds under the Fiscal Year 2003
Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act were made available on April
30, 2003--14 days after the act was signed into law. Under the terms of
the application, applicants were required to submit their applications
by May 30, 2003. Again all 56 eligible applicants (the states,
territories, and the District of Columbia) applied. Of the 56
applications submitted, 33 applications were submitted between May 28th
and May 30th. Seventeen applications were submitted on May 30th--the
last day of the solicitation period. As in the first round of Fiscal
Year 2003 SHSGP award applications, applications for SHSGP, Part II
funds were received, approved, and funds awarded, on a rolling basis.
Fifty-one applications (91 percent) were approved within 7 days of
submission. Similarly, 41 applicants, or 73 percent of those who
applied, were awarded funds within 21 days of submitting their
application. By June 4th, 51 of 56 awards (91 percent) had been
completed. By early July, ODP had awarded all 56 awards.
In the FY 2004 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act
(Pub. L. No. 108-90), Congress provided $4.037 billion for the Office
for Domestic Preparedness. As part of this, Congress provided $1.7
billion for continuation of the State Formula Grant Program, $500
million for Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Grants, and $40
million for the Citizen Corps program. ODP recently announced the $2.24
billion Homeland Security Grant Program, which combines funds from the
State Formula Grant Program, Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention
Program, and Citizen Corps Program. As of December 2003 all states have
applied for HSGP funds. ODP will award these funds after the states
provide updated state homeland security strategies, which are currently
due December 31, 2003. In the FY 2004 appropriations act, Congress also
provided $725 million for continuation of the Urban Areas Security
Initiative. DHS and ODP selected through a classified formula 50 urban
areas, including 30 mass transit systems, for receipt of FY 2004 UASI
funds.
______
Additional Questions Submitted by Hon. Ernest F. Hollings to
Hon. Tom Ridge
Response to the following questions submitted by Hon. Ernest F.
Hollings was not available at the time this hearing went to press.
DHS Management
The Washington Post reported April 10 that DHS is having a
difficult time reporting the number of employees who work for the new
Department. While it is understandably difficult for DHS to have a
precise account of staffing only one month 22 separate agencies jointed
together to create the new Department, the numbers issued in recent
weeks by the Department itself range from 170,000 to 210,000, a
difference of some 40,000 employees.
Question 1. When will the Department be able to provide a
reasonably accurate count of employees working in the Department this
year?
According to information recently provided by DHS to the Senate
Appropriations Committee, the Land and Maritime Division of TSA was
authorized 23 FTEs and 81 staffing positions in 2002. In 2003, the Land
and Maritime Division was authorized 165 FTEs, encompassing 225
positions. To date, the Division is staffed by 84 workers. For 2004,
DHS has requested authorization for 125 FTEs of this Division.
Question 2. If TSA is now planning to gear up security programs for
transportation modes other than aviation, why is it reducing its FTE
request for 2004?
Railroad Security
Railroads are viewed as less vulnerable than other modes primarily
because trains operate on fixed routes, making a train hijacking seem
like a remote avenue for possible terrorism. However, the rail industry
handles about half of all hazardous material transportation in this
country, over a rail network of approximately 130,000 route miles, more
than three times the route miles in the Interstate Highway System. The
rail system also hauls military equipment over about 30,000 miles of
designated routes under the Security of Strategic Rail Corridor Network
(STRACNET).
Nevertheless, the FBI received information last October that
terrorists were possibly planning to strike the rail industry through
destruction of bridges and key segments of track. Aware of the unique
vulnerabilities, the railroad industry has done an admirable job of
instituting on-going security measures. The industry developed a four-
level alert system of alertness, employing additional terrorism
countermeasures with each succeeding alert level. When the FBI issued
its warning to the rail industry last October, the industry reacted by
raising the alert level and taking additional precautions particularly
in vulnerable locations, such as in tunnels and on bridges.
More recently, Operation Liberty Shield was initiated nationwide to
coincide with the beginning of the war with Iraq and the heightened
``Code Orange'' threat level. As a part of that initiative, DHS
requested state governors to provide National Guard protection of rail
infrastructure, such as selected rail bridges. Railroads, including
Amtrak, were asked to upgrade security measures at key rail hubs and
other major rail facilities. Freight railroads were asked to monitor
shipments of hazardous material and increase surveillance of trains
carrying this material.
Question 1. Now that TSA has successfully implemented a new program
for airport screeners and addressed other aspects of aviation security,
what will TSA, now a part of DHS, do to address security in the rail
industry?
Question 2. What is DHS's plan to continue coordination, through
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) and TSA, with
Amtrak and the freight railroads in times of heightened security?
Question 3. How will DHS, particularly IAIP and TSA, coordinate
with local law enforcement for protection of rail operations during
times of heightened security?
Question 4. Amtrak reports that every day spent under the Code
Orange threat level costs the railroad $18,000 for additional security
measures. What costs does the rail industry incur when the threat level
is heightened by DHS to Code Orange? What is the daily breakdown of
those additional costs? Are there differences in the costs between
freight and passenger operations?
Secretary Ridge acknowledged at the hearing that not enough has
been done to secure railroad stations. The Secretary indicated that now
that aviation security has been largely addressed, the Department will
shift its attention to securing other modes of transportation,
including rail.
Question 1. What does DHS believe needs to be done to secure the
rail industry?
Question 2. What aspects of rail security should be addressed
first?
Question 3. Has DHS prioritized by mode its planned efforts to
secure other transportation modes? If so, what is that prioritization?
U.S. and Canadian authorities have been working to implement a
high-tech system to screen rail cargo at our northern borders. Nine
cargo-inspection units, using gamma rays to scan cargo containers, are
to be installed this year. According to an April 9 article in the Wall
Street Journal, the rail industry in both countries has been fearful
that the new system will delay shipments by several hours, causing
railroads to lose their competitive edge against trucks for fast
delivery service.
Question 1. When will the first cargo-inspection unit begin
operating? When will all nine units be operating?
Question 2. Will the nine cargo-inspection units replace the mobile
scanners now being used at rail crossings at the Canadian border, or
will they used in addition to the mobile scanners?
Question 3. What is the agency doing to ensure that security delays
of rail shipments crossing the Canadian border are minimized?
Question 4. Will similar cargo-inspection units be placed along the
Mexican border? If so, when?
Relationship with FRA
The Federal Railroad Administration has increased its security
activities, using its safety inspection team to review security
readiness at passenger terminals and working with freight railroads to
identify security concerns. The FRA took the lead role in addressing
rail security in the field on behalf of the Department of
Transportation while the new TSA focused its attention on aviation
security.
Question 1. How does DHS see its role in rail security vis-a-vis
actions already taken by FRA?
Question 2. In the absence of a Memorandum of Agreement between the
two agencies, what will be the relationship between DHS and FRA
regarding rail security?
Question 3. Does DHS plan to issue regulations covering rail
security? What areas of rail security does DHS believe need regulating?
Missing Derails
Last week, the Associated Press reported that nine derails have
disappeared from three rail yards in east Texas since mid-January.
Derails are portable hinged-type blocks used to prevent trains from
entering main lines when they have no authority to do so. However,
secretly placed in a strategic location on a main line, a derail could
derail a freight train operating at 79 mph, possibly carrying hazardous
materials, or an Amtrak train traveling at 125 mph, possibly carrying
hundreds of passengers. When the derails in east Texas were reported
missing by the rail industry, a U.S. Marshall in Shreveport, La. became
concerned about the possible security implications. However, a rail
industry spokesman later dismissed the missing derails as probably
``stolen and sold for scrap metal.''
Question 1. What is DHS's response to reports of suspicious
circumstances generated at the local level?
Question 2. What does DHS do to ensure that localized suspicious
circumstances are in fact not more widespread?
Question 3. How will DHS address security concerns in the rail
industry in circumstances where the industry believes the concerns are
not warranted?
Question 4. Does DHS see the security needs of the passenger rail
industry as very different from the security needs of the freight rail
industry? If so, will agency resources be expended on one more than the
other?
Amtrak Security
Since September 11, air travel has been made much more secure due
to passenger and baggage screening and tightening of security in and
around airports. Passenger rail travel, however, presents a different
set of security challenges and necessarily must take a different
approach. Train stations are open facilities, and they need to remain
so to accommodate the millions of commuter rail travelers who use the
stations everyday. Amtrak trains travel over hundreds of bridges and
through numerous tunnels posing a unique vulnerability to rail travel
that deserves extra protection.
Question 1. In Washington, Amtrak and commuter trains operate
through tunnels under Capitol Hill. What has DHS done to ensure that
these tunnels are properly secured? How secure are the tunnels? What
more must be done to fully secure the tunnels and how soon must it be
accomplished?
Question 2. Amtrak and commuter trains in and around New York
travel through tunnels under the rivers surrounding Manhattan. These
tunnels were equipped in World War II with emergency doors that could
close off segments of the tunnels in case of a breach. These doors
reportedly are no longer operable. Nevertheless, the danger from a
tunnel breach is more heightened now than it has been in the past 50
years, and a tunnel breach could have catastrophic results for lower
Manhattan, as well as the transportation system for the entire New York
metro area. What does DHS know about the state of these doors? How soon
will the doors be made fully operable? Should Amtrak receive emergency
funding to ensure the doors are operable in the immediate future?
Question 3. The Secretary mentioned in his testimony that Amtrak's
security plan has been reviewed, and that the results of that analysis
have been shared with the Committee. Please submit a copy of that
analysis for the record of this hearing.
Hazardous Materials Transportation Security
Question 1. Since September 11th and the start of the Iraq War, the
transport of hazardous materials has become likely targets for a
terrorist attack. How is the Department of Homeland Security dealing
with this threat, and what processes has it put in place to deal with a
possible release of lethal chemicals in a very populated area?
Question 2. Since the TSA and DHS have not issued guidelines for
security risks within the transportation infrastructure we are seeing
local municipalities developing their own ordinances and laws that may
or may not be circumvented by a federal standard once one is developed.
Although DHS has worked with DOT modal administrations to implement new
security measures and new regulations for the transport of hazardous
materials, some municipalities have taken steps to require even more
stringent requirements. For example, the City of Baltimore's new
``Hazardous Materials Security law'' is believed to be the first of its
kind in the nation and increases the screening criteria for
transportation providers. How will the Department of Homeland Security
integrate state and municipal laws into their macro perspective of
security threat abatement strategies?
Question 3. The transportation of high-level radioactive waste and
spent nuclear fuel should be a high security priority. What additional
processes has the Department of Homeland Security initiated above the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Transportation
requirements to secure these highly visible and dangerous products?
Risk-Based Analysis Modeling
Question 1. The TSA is in the process of developing a risk-based
analysis model for identifying critical infrastructure gaps and risks.
This modeling will also be used for identifying security threats for
the transport of hazardous materials. Once TSA's analysis is completed
and the model has been tested and found viable, they will provide their
analysis to each modal administration identifying significant risks
within the transportation infrastructure. Although, TSA is developing
this risk-based model, they are extremely understaffed and are still in
the early stages of development and implementation. For example, risk
threat assessment pilot studies have only occurred in two areas in the
New York Metropolitan area and the results from these studies have not
been completed or released to state and local authorities. When will
this risk-based analysis model be totally operational and be
implemented throughout the United States?
Standardization of Security Protocols Across all Transportation Modes
Question 1. There are no widely accepted standards or guidelines
for physical, procedural, and personnel security that cut across all
transportation modes. How is the Department of Homeland Security
dealing with the need for a standardization methodology that would work
in all transportation modes and when will the methodology be
implemented?
Pipeline Security
The security of the nation's liquid and gas pipeline infrastructure
is critical to America's economy and energy stability. A terrorist
attack on pipeline infrastructure could be catastrophic to the health
and well being of the surrounding public and severely damage the local
economy.
Question 1. What parameters has the Department of Homeland Security
put in place to rectify security threats that could breach pipeline
infrastructure?
Question 2. Has the pipeline industry assisted in the development
of security plans for their infrastructure, or has the Department of
Homeland Security instituted requirements for the industry to follow?
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Hon. Tom Ridge
Question 1. According to press reports and the EPA, the President
intends to follow a program of chemical industry voluntary compliance
and self-policing, as he did when he was Governor of Texas. I consider
myself one of that industry's best friends in Congress, but I do not
think that this is a prudent policy choice. I met with industry leaders
in my state after the September 11th attacks, and I was dismayed at the
seeming unwillingness of many of these very intelligent people to see
their plants, and the freight railroads that serve them, as potential
targets of future terror attacks. It occurred to me that their views
were not really about safety and security at all, but in essence, were
driven by cost-containment. What are you willing to do as Secretary of
Homeland Security, what steps might your department be willing to take,
and what policies are you willing to advocate for, to adequately
address the security needs for our nation's chemical plants and the
nearly 150,000 miles of our freight rail network?
Answer. We are currently working with both industries to enhance
efforts already underway to identify their critical assets, the
vulnerabilities of these assets and protective measures that are
appropriate for threat environment. We are also identifying ``high
value targets'' that are current priority for resources to immediately
implement protective measures to reduce vulnerabilities. DHS will work
with industry as well as local government officials to develop security
buffer zone planning modules for chemical sites and rail bridges that
were identified during Operation LIBERTY SHEILD.
a. A ballpark estimate of the total costs involved would
certainly be in the tens of billions of dollars, and quite
possibly in the hundreds of billions. Are you prepared to go to
the President and tell him that your department's budget must
be increased to make up at least a share of these costs?
Answer. The budget request addresses best known protection
needs for all infrastructure sectors, both physical and cyber.
We are not planning to request an increase.
Question 2. Let's assume that the President prevails, and chemical
plant security is left to the companies themselves with little or no
guidance or regulation from the Federal Government. If this does come
to pass, I will be very concerned that matters besides safety could
creep into the decision-making process when security measures are being
considered. Are you, as Secretary of Homeland Security, concerned that
some plant manager, struggling to run his or her piece of a huge and
highly competitive corporation more efficiently, might scrimp a little
on security to improve the bottom line? If not, why not?
Answer. As the result of recent cooperative efforts with the
American Chemical Council (ACC) and the Chlorine Institute, DHS has
recognized a proactive effort within the chemical industry to address
security needs. Following the guidelines of the ACC, chemical companies
are conducting rigorous self-assessments and developing mitigation
plans, resulting in a set of best practices that fits the needs of the
chemical industry. This demonstrates a good-will effort that is based
in the recognition of terrorist activities and public responsibility,
and suggests a tendency that includes security in the profit equation.
If this effort is encouraged and supported, DHS could be reasonably
confident that a satisfactory security profile would result.
Question 3. Have you and your staff analyzed the transportation of
various chemicals by truck, rail, and barge, and come away confident
that everything that has to be done to make this activity safe has been
done?
Answer. The need for this effort is recognized and plans are being
developed in cooperation with the chemical and rail industries to
conduct this analysis.
a. I recognize that many of the most highly dangerous chemicals
manufactured in this country and transported by rail and truck,
such as chlorine, are also absolutely necessary to our way of
life. I acknowledge that the chemical industry is knowledgeable
about the manufacture of these chemicals and the railroad
industry is knowledgeable about transporting them. However, if
you support the President's decision to allow industries
involved with these products to self-police, explain to the
Committee the basis for your confidence that either of these
industries currently possesses or can rapidly acquire the
relevant technical and practical knowledge of terrorist threats
and capabilities to adequately protect the health and lives of
millions of Americans living or working near chemical plants or
largely unprotected railways?
Answer. We are concerned with the state of private industry's
ability to measure the risk of exposure outside of its fences.
One of the basic functions of IAIP is to correct this
situation. In addition, past efforts to measure the effects of
chemical releases have been based on safety and emergency
preparedness assumptions, rather than terrorist activities.
Future efforts in this area, led by IAIP, will move to
appropriately refocus those efforts. This, combined with
training and identification of best practices, is intended to
ensure that industry can implement appropriate preventive
measures and security programs.
Question 4. IAIP/State & Local (?)--This is not, strictly speaking,
a question about transportation security; but it is another area which
your undoubtedly difficult role as Secretary makes you the point person
for the Administration. I would like to ask you a few questions about
other critical infrastructure--like municipal water and sewer systems--
that despite not fitting into the topic of today's hearing, are
vulnerable and important to safeguard all the same. Currently, the
Administration has provided nothing in the way of grants or technical
assistance to improve the security of these facilities, but we know
that if a terrorist breached the minimal security at a rural water
system in West Virginia and contaminated a town's water supply, CNN and
MSNBC would be carrying the story worldwide in the next few hours. The
end result would be Americans, no matter where they live, would begin
to fear what was coming out of their faucets. What policies have you
advocated for to protect municipal water supplies in this country?
Answer. The IAIP Directorate, in cooperation with the Environmental
Protection Agency and other relevant agencies, works to protect U.S.
water utilities by conducting threat assessments of the sector and
providing warning products directly to them when required.
This is accomplished by monitoring national level intelligence
sources, including the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, for
international and domestic threats against the nation's water supply
and wastewater treatment facilities. IAIP also collects water industry
physical and cyber incident reports to constantly review for
assessment. IAIP has analysts with ``sector expertise'' and a trusted
information-sharing relationship with the private sector which allows
us to make rapid assessments of all threats against the water sector.
Part of this communication structure with the private sector includes
close and constant interaction with the Water Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (ISAC) which also provides the means for dissemination
of warning products.
The need for this effort is recognized and plans are being
developed in cooperation with the water industry.
Question 5. Assuming you recognize the potential severity of the
problem, will you encourage the President to work with Congress to
develop programs to provide grants, as well as technical assistance, to
municipalities to dramatically improve the security of these
facilities?
Answer. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for
Domestic Preparedness (ODP) has worked with all fifty-six states and
territories to assess overall threats, vulnerabilities, capabilities
and needs, and to develop comprehensive homeland security strategic
plans for addressing the shortfalls identified. This process was
completed in November of 2002. ODP used the information to develop
tailored state assistance plans that match ODP, and to the extent
possible, other federal resources to the needs identified by the states
for equipment, training, exercises and technical assistance. ODP also
used this information to hone its programs to better meet the specific
needs identified by the nation's emergency responders as part of this
process. States will be required to update this information by December
31, 2003, to ensure that funding continues to be appropriately
targeted.
ODP also worked directly with the Transportation Security
Administration, Coast Guard, Customs, the Maritime Administration,
Federal Highway Administration, and the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey (PANYNJ) to develop a process specifically tailored to the
needs of large, multi-modal transportation agencies that will allow
them to develop resource allocation plans that maximize scarce
preparedness dollars.
In addition, as part of the FY 2003 supplemental funding, Congress
has appropriated an additional $200 million for grants to address
critical infrastructure protection.
Question 6. Mr. Secretary, having served on the Committee on
Veterans' Affairs in the House, I am sure you understand, as I do, the
enormous resources contained within the VA medical system, the largest
integrated health care system in the Nation. Yet, while VA shares the
federal responsibility for preserving public health during domestic
crises as a partner, along with DoD, FEMA and HHS, in the National
Disaster Medical System (NDMS), I remain concerned that our Federal
Response Plan does not always make the best use of each support
agency's potential resources and particularly VA. Please tell me what
formal mechanism has been put in place by the Department of Homeland
Security to fully integrate the medical resources of both VA and DoD
into the NDMS planning and activation processes?
Answer. Currently there are agreements between the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA),
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and Department of
Defense (DoD), which describe the structure, functions and governance
of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). DoD and the VA have
responsibility to provide patient movement, bed counting and definitive
care. DoD and the VA are also named as support agencies within the
Emergency Support Function (ESF--#8) within the Federal Response Plan
(FRP) and provide a variety of support during disasters and
emergencies.
DHS has a number of agreements in place with the VA for the
maintenance and purchase of pharmaceuticals. DHS also utilizes DoD and
VA personnel to support field response activity and operation support
centers.
DoD's and VA's statutory responsibilities to provide services to
veterans, active duty personnel, and reserve forces precludes them from
making all of their resources available to support the NDMS. For
example, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have severely limited
the availability of DoD resources such as medical personnel and
strategic airlift capabilities.
Question 7. How is DHS making certain that our first line
responders are aware of these resources, and what guidance is given
first line responders about when and how they can tap into them to
prevent unnecessary delay during a national crisis?
Answer. DHS conducts periodic Regional Interagency Steering
Committee (RISC) meetings with state emergency management officials and
regional NDMS representatives to discuss federal medical response
capabilities. It is through this mechanism that the states are trained
in the Federal Response Plan (FRP), the various Emergency Support
Functions (ESFs) and the federal disaster declaration process. States
in turn provide training and awareness on available resources to local
emergency management organizations.
Question 8. Testimony before the Joint Intelligence Committees'
Inquiry on the September 11th attacks indicated that significant
information in the possession of intelligence and law enforcement
agencies was not fully shared with other agencies and that intelligence
on potential terrorist threats against the United States was not fully
exploited. Congress took several steps to address this issue. For
example, the Aviation and Security Act sought to improve this
information sharing by creating a Transportation and Oversight Board to
coordinate critical intelligence and data sharing among federal
agencies. I am very interested in the work of this Board. How would you
characterize the process of implementation of the Board?
Answer. The Transportation Security Oversight Board (TSOB) was
initiated under the leadership of Secretary of Transportation Mineta
and Deputy Secretary of Transportation Michael Jackson. As Director of
the Office of Homeland Security, my office was one of seven Departments
and offices that comprised the original membership of the Board. The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the TSOB from the Department
of Transportation to the Department of Homeland Security. We are
currently working with the Transportation Security Administration in
the Border and Transportation Security Directorate to convene the first
meeting under my stewardship.
Question 9. To follow up, how would you characterize the Board's
effectiveness?
Answer. The TSOB has been effective in raising timely and cross-
governmental issues that require extensive coordination from various
agencies within the executive branch. At the last several meetings, the
Board has discussed the standup of the Transportation Security
Administration and the progress being made on critical issues, such as
transportation credentials and intelligence matters.
Question 10. Could you tell the Committee how the work of the Board
is going, and how you think we in Congress can help you in this
activity?
Answer. The first meeting of the Board under Department of Homeland
Security leadership is currently being planned. The Department looks
forward to Congress's continued support and interest in the activities
of the Board.
Question 11. I hope you will agree with me that TSA should not and
cannot function independently of other DHS security functions and the
intelligence community. Without revealing sensitive information, can
you give the Committee examples of how DHS is coordinating its
activities--both among its component agencies, and with the law
enforcement and intelligence communities?
Answer. DHS has two coordinating points in its Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate in which such
activities are managed. The IAIP is the primary focal point for both
receipt of incoming information and intelligence related to threats to
the homeland, as well as the focal point for output of information
usable by a wide variety of federal, state, local and private
customers. The first is the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC)
which is a 24-hour operation. It is staffed by representatives from DHS
component organizations, the Intelligence Community, DHS headquarters,
and selected other agencies, e.g., FBI, State and local law
enforcement. Representatives in the HSOC have connectivity to their
respective organizations. The HSOC is the primary initial entry point
for information into DHS and one of the primary exit points for
information back out to DHS and its wide customer base, e.g., State
Homeland Security Advisors, State and local officials, local law
enforcement, and the Intelligence Community. The other coordination
point is the Fusion Office of the IAIP which is not a sustained 24-hour
operation. That office is responsible for conducting detailed analysis
of threat information, mapping threats to capability and potential
impact, and it is this analysis which serves as the basis for
particular warnings, advisories, preventive and protective measures and
other information issued by the IAIP to DHS partners.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. Tom Ridge
Question 1. What assistance can Whatcom County and other border
areas like it expect from the Department?
Answer. To date, the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) has
trained 52 responders from Whatcom County, WA. In addition, $186,732 in
equipment money has been allocated to Whatcom County by the state from
ODP's FY99 State Domestic Preparedness Program grant to Washington.
ODP has worked with all 56 states and territories to assess overall
threats, vulnerabilities, capabilities and needs, and to develop
comprehensive homeland security strategic plans for addressing the
shortfalls identified. This process was completed in November 2002. ODP
used the information to develop tailored state assistance plans that
match ODP, and to the extent possible, other federal resources to the
needs identified by the states for equipment, training, exercises and
technical assistance. ODP also used this information to hone its
programs to better meet the specific needs identified by the nation's
emergency responders as part of this process. States will be required
to update this information by December 31, 2003, to ensure that funding
continues to be appropriately targeted. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2003,
Congress appropriated over $566 million for grants to state and local
jurisdictions, $39.74 million of which is allocated specifically to
cover costs associated with updating and implementing the needs
assessments and strategies for each state.
ODP also worked directly with the Transportation Security
Administration, Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the
Maritime Administration, Federal Highway Administration, and the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) to develop a process
specifically tailored to the needs of large, multi-modal transportation
agencies that will allow them to develop resource allocation plans that
maximize scarce preparedness dollars.
In addition, as part of the FY 2003 supplemental appropriations
funding, ODP will be distributing an additional $200 million in grants
to address critical infrastructure protection.
Question 2. The effects of immigration and border related crimes
have long been felt on the southern border, straining the budgets and
resources of prosecutors' offices located in that area. The Federal
Government has provided funding to assist these communities because, as
one Washington State prosecutor pointed out to me, border security
benefits not just the communities along the border, but the entire
nation. I will soon introduce legislation that would provide similar
funding for reimbursement of prosecutors in northern border counties.
Will the Department support this effort?
Answer. The Administration will consider the legislation once it
has been thoroughly reviewed.