[Senate Hearing 108-685]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-685
THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
PEACE CORPS, AND NARCOTICS AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 24, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE
CORPS AND NARCOTICS AFFAIRS
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota, Chairman
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BARBARA BOXER, California
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Diaz, Mr. Miguel, director, Americas Program (MERCOSUR/South
America), Center for Strategic and International Studies....... 51
Prepared statement........................................... 54
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut, opening
statement...................................................... 17
``U.S. Casts Wary Eye on Venezuela Vote, Action Promised if
Vote is Rigged,'' article by David R. Sands, The Washington
Times, May 26, 2004........................................ 24
``Democracy in Venezuela,'' press release of Secretary Colin
L. Powell, May 27, 2004.................................... 25
Maisto, Hon. John F., United States Permanent Representative to
the Organization of American States, Washington, DC............ 12
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Lugar...................................................... 75
McCoy, Dr. Jennifer, director, The Americas Program, Carter
Center, and Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA.............. 28
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Florida, opening statement.. 4
Noriega, Hon. Roger F., Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Lugar...................................................... 75
Tissot, Mr. Roger, director, Markets and Countries Group, Latin
America, PFC Energy, Washington, DC............................ 57
Prepared statement........................................... 59
Vivanco, Mr. Jose M., executive director, Americas Division,
Human Rights Watch, Washington, DC............................. 33
Prepared statement with attachment........................... 36
Weisbrot, Dr. Mark, co-director, Center for Economic and Policy
Research, Washington, DC....................................... 61
Prepared statement with attachments.......................... 64
(iii)
THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA
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THURSDAY, JUNE 24, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:08 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Norm Coleman (chairman of the
subcommittee), presiding.
Present: Senators Coleman, Dodd, and Bill Nelson.
Senator Coleman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and
Narcotics Affairs is called to order.
opening statement of senator norm coleman
The political situation in Venezuela continues to represent
perhaps the single most important test of democracy in the
Western Hemisphere today. Venezuela is a highly polarized
society. Supporters and opponents of President Chavez have been
at odds for years. Now we are presented with yet another
deadline: on August 15 there will be a recall referendum on
President Chavez.
The United States has a tremendous interest in what happens
in Venezuela. Venezuela is in our neighborhood. The Western
Hemisphere is, by and large, a community of democracies. We do
not want to see any steps backward in what has been a very
encouraging stride toward democracy in recent decades,
particularly in a country like Venezuela with such a strong
democratic tradition. We cannot afford to see a large exodus of
Venezuelans fleeing their nation. We are interested in
preventing terrorism and drug trafficking in the region. And it
goes without saying that Venezuela is a major energy supplier
to the United States. Another major disruption in Venezuela
will hurt average Americans at the gas pump.
We in the United States may have an interest in what
happens in Venezuela, but it is the Venezuelan people who must
have the opportunity to determine the future of their nation
for themselves. What we in the United States can do is support,
even insist upon, a fair process as guaranteed under the
Venezuelan Constitution and as agreed upon by the Chavez
government and the opposition. We in the United States can
press for respect for universal human rights, such as the right
of free assembly and the right to express one's political views
without fear of retribution.
I also believe America can and should take exception when
President Chavez makes disparaging remarks about our President
and our troops in Iraq. These are times when words matter.
Relations between the United States and Venezuela are in a
difficult state, and I acknowledge that the mutual distrust is
not entirely unrelated to the handling of the 2002 coup
attempt. In spite of these bad feelings, I believe we must
continue to work with the Venezuelans where at all possible to
pursue shared goals. We must cooperate on counter-narcotics and
counter-terrorism issues. We must find ways to work together on
issues of importance to the region as a whole, from trade to
energy to stability. And I reiterate we must get beyond the
hostile rhetoric coming from Caracas.
The August 15 vote will be a decisive moment for democracy
in the Americas. The Venezuelan people will have a chance to
express themselves, thus finding a peaceful way out of a
lengthy crisis, and the rest of the Americas will have a chance
to stand up for democracy. As such, it is absolutely essential
that the process be democratic and credible. It must be
conducted in such a way that procedural problems do not cast
any doubt on the results. To this end, I call upon the
Government of Venezuela to carefully consider three key
elements of this vote.
First, the presence of objective international observers is
a must. To date, the work of the OAS and the Carter Center in
observing the process in Venezuela has added credibility to
events. I urge the Government of Venezuela to invite
international observers, particularly by these respected
groups, to monitor the August vote.
A second concern involves the voting machines which the
Government of Venezuela has announced will be used. The fear is
that the use of untested machines could cast doubt upon the
results. As such, I urge the Government of Venezuela to work
with the international community to conduct the voting in a
manner that will not be open to criticism. The machinery used
must not create more question than the voting was intended to
resolve.
A third concern involves recent announcements regarding the
composition of Venezuela's supreme court. We in the United
States can speak from experience. We all recall an election
here that was so closely contested that it became necessary for
the supreme court to become involved, and in Venezuela, the
courts have already been involved in making key decisions
related to this process.
The concern is that by adding members to the Venezuelan
supreme court, there will be questions raised about its
independence as an institution. During Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's Presidency, we in the U.S. considered increasing
the size of the Supreme Court, but we found it to be a very bad
idea. I would urge the Government of Venezuela to treat any
decision regarding the supreme court with the utmost care, lest
it cast a shadow on the results of the political process.
There are other concerns in Venezuela. Human rights
observers have pointed to political arrests and the use of
excessive force against peaceful protesters. There are
indications that Venezuelans who signed the recall petitions
have been subject to harassment or lost their jobs. And there
are regional issues to consider as well. For example, some
reports suggest that Colombian guerrillas are using Venezuelan
territory for R&R, or worse. In my discussions with the
Venezuelan Ambassador, they have clearly denied that.
When it comes to promoting democracy in the hemisphere, I
believe the United States should not go it alone, and we do not
have to. Through the Organization of American States, the
countries of this hemisphere have made a commitment to uphold
democracy. The OAS is rightly involved in the current political
process in Venezuela and must continue to play an observation
role during the August 15 vote and beyond, as well as a
political role in responding to whatever the results of that
vote may be.
There is also a Group of Friends of Venezuela, working in
connection with the OAS efforts, that has already taken a stand
in support of Venezuelan democracy. This group, which includes
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain, may once again
prove to be a useful multilateral forum for supporting
Venezuelan democracy.
We are wise to begin thinking today about how to support
Venezuelan democracy in the future. But one word of caution.
Venezuela has a tendency to defy conventional wisdom. As the
recent reparos process unfolded, Washington observers were
certain that President Chavez would never accede to its result.
I want to acknowledge here that President Chavez did, indeed,
defy conventional wisdom. He accepted the results of the
reparos and is apparently willing to subject himself to this
democratic referendum. This was a good choice by President
Chavez.
As the political process continues to unfold, it is my
sincere desire that all parties in Venezuela will make good
choices. There is much at stake here, for Venezuela and for
democracy in the hemisphere.
Testifying before the subcommittee today, we have a
distinguished set of witnesses. Our first panel will consist of
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs,
Roger Noriega, and Ambassador John Maisto, U.S. Representative
to the Organization of American States.
Assistant Secretary Noriega is no stranger to this
committee, having served as a staff member for the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee from 1997 to 2001 and from 1994 to
1997 for the House International Relations Committee.
Immediately prior to becoming Assistant Secretary for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, Ambassador Noriega served as our
Representative to the OAS. We are always grateful for the
Assistant Secretary's willingness to appear before this
subcommittee.
Ambassador John Maisto has been our Representative to the
OAS since July of last year. He served as Ambassador to
Venezuela from 1997 to 2000 and as Ambassador to Nicaragua from
1993 to 1996. I look forward to hearing Ambassador Maisto's
remarks about the role of the OAS and member states in
supporting Venezuelan democracy to date, as well as the role
the OAS will play in the upcoming months.
Our second panel will consist of five witnesses. The first
will be Dr. Jennifer McCoy, director of the Americas Program at
the Carter Center. Dr. McCoy has been intimately involved in
the political process in Venezuela for several years. I also
want to note with some pride that Dr. McCoy received her Ph.D.
from the University of Minnesota.
Second we hear from Mr. Jose Vivanco, executive director of
the Americas Division at Human Rights Watch, a position he has
held since September 1994. Mr. Vivanco has also worked as an
attorney for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights at
the OAS, as well as in other human rights promotion
organizations.
Next will be Mr. Miguel Diaz, director of the South America
Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Prior to this position, Mr. Diaz worked in investment banking,
journalism, and as a CIA economist.
Mr. Roger Tissot is director of Markets and Countries Group
for Latin America at PFC Energy where he is responsible for the
Petroleum Risk Manager, a Web-based resource that evaluates
political, economic, and industry-specific risks in leading
oil-producing countries around the globe. Mr. Tissot will
provide the subcommittee with important insight about the role
of the oil sector in Venezuela and in U.S.-Venezuelan
relations.
Finally, we will hear from Dr. Mark Weisbrot, co-director
for the Center for Economic and Policy Research. Dr. Weisbrot
is an economist and writes a regular column distributed by
Knight-Ridder/Tribune Information Services and also writes for
Business Week.com.
Now I would like to acknowledge Senator Nelson for any
opening comments that he might have.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank you for calling this very timely hearing on a timely
subject.
At the end of the day, what we would like to have is a
continuing good relationship with the country of Venezuela, and
there are troubling, intervening incidents and events that seem
to want to prevent that good relationship. I believe that it is
in the mutual interest of the United States and Venezuela to
continue to have that good relationship.
I want to thank everyone who has continued to stand up for
the rule of law, for standing up for democracy, and standing up
for the Venezuelan people in keeping the referendum process
from being derailed, so far. The Carter Center, especially
President Carter and Dr. McCoy, your efforts have been
tireless. You deserve tremendous credit for the reparos process
ending in a legitimate and widely accepted result. I had the
pleasure of running into President Carter, not in Venezuela,
but in Bolivia, and having spoken a little Spanish with him, I
can say that he truly speaks Spanish with a southern accent.
Now, the OAS has been a champ. Secretary General Gaviria
has also risen in my opinion to the occasion. I appreciate his
leadership, as well as the efforts of the Ambassador who is
going to testify to us today.
Secretary Noriega, you have played a key role as well with
some tough and some timely statements.
Whenever given the opportunity, this Senator from Florida
that has a great number of Venezuelans living in my
constituency has tried to deliver a message that was
nonpartisan. Bottom line is that our country will not tolerate
subversion of democracy in Venezuela because it will threaten
stability in the hemisphere.
I want to commend Senator Kerry, and this is not a partisan
statement. Senator Kerry issued a very strong, unequivocal
statement, and it was well-timed and it was effective.
But we have got a long way to go. Under article 72 of the
Venezuelan Constitution, the recall referendum is set for
August 15, and there is a lot of uncertainty surrounding it. In
fact, the only reason the recall is going forward is because of
the intense pressure and the scrutiny brought by the
international community, the glare of the international
spotlight and the tireless efforts of the people that I have
already mentioned. And I hope that that is going to continue.
There are many possible avenues for bumps along the road.
One is the possibility of a manipulated or an inaccurate
tabulation of the election results due to unproven, suspect
technology. I have seen media reports about a Florida company,
and I am concerned about what effect it could have on the
voting machines and the software that goes along with those
voting machines. I have asked the OAS and the Carter Center to
consider these allegations that have been public and to look
closely at this aspect of the referendum as they monitor these
elections.
Now, there are other dangers. President Chavez and
supporters give the appearance that they are attempting to pack
the supreme court with judges sympathetic to their side and to
purge the judiciary of those that they consider opponents. The
supreme court could well be in a position to make critical
decisions related to the recall referendum, including whether
or not the President can run in an election to succeed himself.
There are also the ongoing concerns of harassment of
members of the opposition and voter intimidation and the
hijacking of media to espouse pro-President Chavez views. It is
also going to be interesting to see the amount of money that is
going to be spent in the next 60 days, although that probably
will pale in comparison to the amount of money that is being
spent in this Presidential election year.
When the recall referendum is held, there will need to be,
in the opinion of this Senator from Florida, international
attention and strong, credible monitors, such as the Carter
Center and the OAS, to determine if the elections are free and
fair and if the result is legitimate.
Venezuela has certainly had its problems, and on this
committee we have to be concerned about democracy continuing in
a robust fashion in that country. It is concerning that there
is a movement apparently in the Government of Venezuela to
consolidate and concentrate power and diffuse free institutions
and civil society. I get concerned when I see an alliance
struck with Mr. Morales in Bolivia, a person who is seeking to
expand the drug trade.
And of course, I get concerned when I see the close ties to
Fidel Castro. There is extensive evidence of cooperation
between Cuban and Venezuelan intelligence services and a great
number of Cuban nationals are employed in Venezuela, and they
are not all just employed as doctors.
I have seen evidence that Venezuela has provided safe haven
for the FARC as it crosses the line from Colombia into
Venezuela. At a time when Colombia is making slow, but steady
gains in its long struggle against the drug trade, the last
thing it needs is to have a neighboring power, especially
Venezuela, give assistance to this adversary.
In the defense authorization bill that we passed last
night, there is an amendment that I inserted that was accepted
that will have the State Department give a report by all other
states that are assisting any of the drug trade elements in
Colombia. And that report, of course, will cover what I have
just talked about.
Now, one other thing, Mr. Chairman, that I am quite
concerned about for the future of our relations is that
President Chavez has made some outrageous statements such as
praising Iraqi insurgents who attack American soldiers, Mr.
Ambassador. He has also tried to use his oil supply
relationship to leverage small nations in the Caribbean, in
some cases to get them to oppose U.S. policies. And President
Chavez has threatened to cutoff oil exports to the United
States.
So, Mr. Chairman, if these deteriorating relations between
our governments continue, it is going to be a tragedy with a
longtime ally, and it would represent a reversal of a
longstanding good relationship between the United States and
Venezuela.
So I am very, very grateful to you for calling this
hearing. If there continues to be a threat to Venezuela's
democracy, if we continue to see the siding of the Government
of Venezuela with adversaries to the United States, and if
Venezuela does not continue to abide by its own constitution in
this whole process of the elections, then I worry if we may
eventually reach the point where we have to treat the
Venezuelan Government as an unfriendly government that is
hostile to the United States, and that would sadden me very
much.
My hope is that this knowledge will cause the
administration and the international community to make it clear
to President Chavez that our government and the free nations of
this hemisphere place a high priority on democracy, the rule of
law, and the responsible conduct in international relations and
that any actions to the contrary in the Government of
Venezuela, it will be made clear will have consequences not
only in relations but in the relations with other nations
around the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Before beginning with the testimony, I will note that
Chairman Lugar has submitted a series of questions for
Secretary Noriega and Ambassador Maisto. They will be made part
of the official record.
With that, I will turn to Secretary Noriega.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. NORIEGA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Noriega. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of
all, I apologize for being tardy. I will not offer any excuses.
We thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Nelson, for your
interest and engagement in U.S. policy toward Venezuela. That
is very critical.
I will summarize my written statement, Mr. Chairman, and
submit it for the record.
I want to express my appreciation, first and foremost, for
your clear and thorough statements, both of which I think
reflect a strong bipartisan consensus behind our policy toward
Venezuela, and it reflects an agreement, a meeting of minds
between the executive branch and the legislative branch, which
I think is also very helpful as we pursue our interests.
My statement will seek to update you on the current
conditions and current challenges that Venezuela is facing and
our efforts to help the Venezuelan people strengthen their
democracy and bring a peaceful end to the political unrest in
that country. My colleague, Ambassador Maisto, will address the
important role that the Organization of American States has
played and will continue to play in Venezuela.
Mr. Chairman, the administration's policy in Venezuela has
been and remains to work with our international partners, led
by the OAS, the Friends of the Secretary General, coordinated
by the Brazilian Government, and the Carter Center, to support
the efforts of the Venezuelan people to achieve a
constitutional, democratic, peaceful, and electoral solution to
the current political polarization in that country, as called
for by OAS Resolution 833.
Mr. Chairman, our engagement is entirely consistent with
the commitments that we and the Venezuela Government have made
under the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and it is a
statement of solidarity with the Venezuelan people who, as all
of the people of the Americas, have a right to representative
democracy.
In addition, our bilateral interests are to recover a
cordial, constructive and mutually-beneficial relationship that
Venezuela and the United States had enjoyed for decades.
The stakes are very high for the Venezuelan people, by all
means. In addition to the political turmoil that they are
dealing with, continued social polarization and economic
mismanagement have taken a toll on Venezuela's economy. Living
standards have fallen sharply with per capita income dropping
25 percent between 1998 and 2003. As a result, the proportion
of Venezuelans living in extreme poverty has increased from 21
percent in 1998 to 33 percent in 2002, exacerbating the plight
of those most vulnerable in Venezuelan society.
Foreign direct investment has fallen by almost 65 percent
between 1998 and 2003, reflecting in part an anxiety over the
increasing corruption which is documented by Transparency
International, among other groups.
The world's fifth largest oil producer, Venezuela has
traditionally been considered a reliable energy partner of the
United States, and we have valued that relationship very much.
Nevertheless, the political turmoil has undermined Venezuela's
standing as a reliable supplier of oil. These concerns
underscore the urgent need to reach a peaceful, democratic
resolution to the current impasse.
In a number of areas vital to the health of any democracy,
we have witnessed troubling developments over the past year,
some of which have been referred to already. As noted in the
State Department's Human Rights Report in 2003, the Venezuelan
Government's human rights record has been and remains poor. We
are troubled by what appears to be politically-motivated
tensions, indictments, and arrest orders.
The on-going detention of Baruta municipality Mayor
Henrique Capriles and the indictments of Alejandro Plaz and
Maria Corina Machado of the NGO Sumate are two recent examples
that demand international attention. The Sumate case is
particularly troubling, Mr. Chairman and Senator Nelson,
because these are individuals who are charged with
``conspiring'' against the government for receiving support for
electoral observation and voter education from the National
Endowment for Democracy, which seems to be the only basis for
the charges being brought against them.
As we all know, of course, NED is an independent
organization that enjoys bipartisan support and helps people
around the world in strengthening democratic institutions.
NED's transparent mandate is to fortify democracies, not to
topple governments, and frankly, it is outrageous that the fact
that the groups have received money from this particular
organization would be used to bring criminal charges against
them.
Our international partners and we are disturbed also by the
reports of systematic and brazen intimidation of recall
signatories, including the dismissal of public employees who
signed the recall petition. These types of actions, frankly,
have no place in a democratic process.
Legislation recently passed by the Venezuelan National
Assembly to expand the size of the supreme court, to double the
size, and allows a simple majority of the assembly to appoint
or suspend judges also raises concern. If the public concerns
that we now have about the impartiality of the government-
dominated National Electoral Council are any indication, then
we have ample reason to be concerned about the future
independence of the Venezuelan judiciary.
Freedom of the press faces serious threats as well,
including the rise of physical attacks against journalists and
television stations.
Mr. Chairman, mindful of Venezuela's deep polarization, we
have consistently urged all parties to refrain from violence
and respect freedom of expression of all political views. The
Venezuelan state has a singular obligation, however, to create
the conditions in which all of its citizens can exercise their
constitutional rights and express their views free from fear
and intimidation.
The coming weeks are likely to define the long-term future
of Venezuela. A peaceful, democratic resolution is not only in
the interest of the Venezuelan people, but of the region as a
whole. Such an outcome will allow Venezuelans to move beyond
the social and economic challenges by focusing on a common
commitment to national reconciliation, to economic recovery and
the creation of jobs, to social inclusion, to building an
effective, transparent government with strong democratic
institutions, and to reintegrate Venezuela into the diplomatic
and economic life of the rest of the Americas.
Bilaterally we will continue to maintain good working
relationships with Venezuela, to the extent we can, on counter-
narcotics, for example. However, on counter-terrorism and
military cooperation, among other areas, this cooperation has
deteriorated, something we regret. The Venezuelan and U.S.
militaries historically have had close ties based on a shared
commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human
rights, and we are disappointed that those close bilateral ties
have been undermined.
Mr. Chairman, in closing, throughout this process, the
Venezuelan people, including most Chavez supporters, as well as
the opposition, have demonstrated a commendable civic spirit
worthy of the Venezuelan democratic tradition. The United
States and our international partners stand ready to support
the democratic aspirations of the Venezuelan people, and we
reject and condemn any unconstitutional effort to depose a
democratically-elected government, be it in Venezuela or
anywhere else in the Americas.
We also reiterate our strong support for the important work
of the OAS and the Carter Center. These observer missions enjoy
strong international backing, and I associate myself, Senator
Nelson, with your specific praise for the work of Secretary
General Gaviria and Dr. McCoy, as well as President Carter. The
international community considers their continued participation
and their unfettered access to all aspects of the process as
essential to a credible, free, and transparent resolution of
Venezuela's crisis. And we commend the role that Brazil is
playing, in particular, as a coordinator of the Friends process
to ensure that the international observers have that access.
Mr. Chairman, the American people and the Venezuelan people
share a strong mutual commitment to democracy and we will
defend those shared values in the challenging days ahead. Thank
you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Noriega follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Roger F. Noriega
Good afternoon. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, allow me
first to express the Administration's appreciation for your on-going
interest in, and support for, U.S. policy toward Venezuela.
I appear before you today at a critical moment for Venezuela. For
years one of Latin America's most stable democracies, Venezuela today
is at a crossroads. Deepening polarization over the past three years
has placed enormous strains on the country's democratic institutions.
Amid these challenges, the Venezuelan people have shown an unshakable
commitment to the defense of their constitutional rights and to
pursuing a ``constitutional, democratic, peaceful and electoral
solution'' to the current impasse, as called for in Organization of
American States (OAS) Permanent Council Resolution 833.
OAS Resolution 833, adopted in December 2002, serves as the anchor
of multilateral efforts, in which the United States has played a
prominent role, to strengthen Venezuelan democracy and bring a peaceful
end to the political conflict. The Administration's policy has been and
remains to work with our international partners--led by the OAS, the
Friends of the OAS Secretary General's Mission for Venezuela (comprised
of Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Spain, Portugal and the United States) and
the Carter Center--to support Venezuelans' efforts to achieve a
peaceful, democratic, constitutional and electoral solution to their
political problems. Moreover, we seek a return to the cordial bilateral
relationship we have always had with Venezuela.
My colleague, Ambassador John Maisto, will address in greater
detail the important role the Organization of American States (OAS) has
played, and will continue to play, in facilitating a resolution of the
political impasse in Venezuela, as well as the vital role the OAS is
playing in promoting democracy throughout the Hemisphere. I would like
to offer an update on the current challenges facing Venezuela, and
outline our efforts to help Venezuela and its people strengthen
democracy and bring a peaceful end to the political conflict.
Mr. Chairman, after overcoming a number of formidable hurdles,
which Ambassador Maisto will very shortly review with you, the
Venezuelan people succeeded in advancing an electoral solution that is
consistent with Venezuela's constitution and the May 29, 2003 OAS-
facilitated agreement between the Government of Venezuela and the
democratic opposition. The National Electoral Council (CNE) has
scheduled a recall referendum on President Chavez' continued mandate
for August 15. This announcement is an important step toward realizing
the goals of OAS Res. 833 and a testament to the desire on the part of
a majority of Venezuelans to resolve their differences peacefully.
Throughout this process, the Venezuelan people have demonstrated a
commendable civic spirit worthy of their rich democratic traditions.
Encouragingly, the Venezuelan people have rejected President Chavez'
attempts to cast the U.S. as his adversary. As during the recall
petition drives and the recent ``reparos'' process, international
observation, led by the OAS and Carter Center, will be indispensable to
ensuring a credible, fair and transparent recall election. We are
working with our international partners to support the efforts of the
OAS and Carter Center to increase participation in the observer
missions and to draw international attention to the referendum.
Additionally, through the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), we are providing support for programs to
strengthen democratic institutions, respect for civil society and to
reduce polarization.
Venezuelans today face a difficult economic environment. Continued
social and political unrest combined with economic mismanagement have
taken a toll on the country's economy. Living standards have fallen
sharply, with real per capita income dropping 25 percent between 1998
and 2003. This has occurred despite high international prices for
Venezuela's principal export, oil. The plunge in real income has led to
an increase in poverty. The proportion of Venezuelans living in extreme
poverty surged from 21 percent in 1998 to 33 percent in 2002,
exacerbating the plight of Venezuela's most vulnerable.
At the same time, high inflation has steadily eroded purchasing
power, while price controls have resulted in shortages and lower
quality products. The imposition of strict controls on foreign
exchange, beginning in February 2003, has damaged the country's
productive base. Erosion of public confidence in the Government's
management of the economy has caused the bolivar to drop in value from
564 bolivars per U.S. dollar at the end of 1998 to approximately 3,000
per dollar on the parallel exchange market today. Falling investment--
foreign direct investment fell by almost 65 percent between 1998 and
2003--and continued Government attempts to politicize institutions,
including the Central Bank, have undermined prospects for future
economic growth.
Endemic corruption is also a factor undermining Venezuela's
economic performance. Venezuela today ranks among the worst offenders
in the world on the problem of corruption according to Transparency
International's annual rankings (On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being
``highly clean'' and 0 being ``highly corrupt,'' Venezuela received a
score of 2.4 in 2003). Corruption not only affects investor confidence.
It also breeds financial mismanagement and undermines public trust in
institutions. President Chavez was originally elected in 1998 on an
anti-corruption platform. Yet under his administration, the problem
appears to be worsening.
The world's fifth largest oil producer, oil accounts for about 80
percent of Venezuela's export earnings, 40 percent of government
revenues and 25 percent or more of the country's GDP. Venezuela has
traditionally been a reliable energy partner, and we value our energy
relationship. Despite the strains in our relationship, we maintain a
vigorous, candid dialogue on energy issues with the Government of
Venezuela. Still, the political turmoil has undermined Venezuela's
reputation as a reliable energy supplier. These concerns about the
political conflict's impact on supplier reliability underscore the need
to reach a peaceful, democratic resolution to the current impasse.
The economy is obviously only one of many aspects of life in
Venezuela to be adversely affected by the political impasse. The
importance of a free, open process, whose outcome all Venezuelans can
deem credible, thus cannot be overstated. A peaceful, democratic
resolution to the Venezuela's political crisis would have a favorable
impact in a number of areas vital to the health of any democracy,
including the area of human rights, which has witnessed troubling
developments over the past year. As noted in our 2003 Country Report on
Human Rights Practices in Venezuela, the Government's human rights
record has been and remains poor. Security forces in Venezuela have
been linked to the mistreatment of prisoners and forced disappearances.
Also of great concern is an increased militarization of public
administration, including the use of loyalist military officers in key
political posts and as political candidates, and the growing and
inappropriate involvement of public security forces in partisan
political processes.
Public security forces used excessive force during opposition
demonstration in late February and early March 2004. The opposition
reported 11 deaths, 417 politically motivated arrests and over 1700
injuries. There have been credible reports--amply documented in Human
Right's Watch April 9 letter to President Chavez--of the arbitrary
detention and torture of detainees during this period. There have been
reported threats and reprisals against witnesses and victims of human
rights violations. A failure to maintain impartiality and independence
in key protective institutions contributes to the general impunity and
lack of respect for the rule of law.
Of grave concern in this respect is legislation recently passed
which expands the size of the supreme court from 20 to 32, allowing a
simple majority of the National Assembly--controlled by the pro-
Government party, the Fifth Republican Movement (MVR)--to appoint and
suspend judges. The new law allows the ``Fiscal'' or attorney general
and other public powers to unilaterally suspend judges. And if public
concerns about the impartiality of the government-dominated electoral
council in Venezuela today are any indication, then we have ample
reason to be concerned about the future independence of the Venezuelan
judiciary.
On June 17, Human Rights Watch issued a 24-page report denouncing
what it called the Venezuelan government's ``undermining [of] the
independence of the country's judiciary ahead of a presidential recall
referendum that may ultimately be decided in the courts . . . '' The
report notes the pro-Government legislative majority's ``intention to
name 12 new justices by July and remove sitting justices whom they
identify with the opposition,'' concluding that the ``government is
rigging the justice system to favor its own interests.''
Also troubling are what appear to be politically motivated
detentions, indictments and orders of arrest. The ongoing detention of
Baruta municipality Mayor Henrique Capriles and the recent indictments
of Alejandro Plaz and Maria Corina Machado of the electoral NGO Sumate
are two recent examples that merit international attention. The Sumate
case is especially troubling. The organization's leaders are charged
with ``conspiring'' against the Government for receiving a grant from
the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) for electoral observation
and voter education activities. NED is an independent, private
organization that enjoys wide bipartisan support for its work to help
strengthen democratic institutions around the world. NED is not in the
business of toppling governments. The Venezuela Government's efforts
against Sumate are intended to intimidate and dissuade participation in
the referendum process. Such actions are unacceptable in any democratic
society.
While Venezuela enjoys a diverse, independent media, freedom of the
press faces serious threats, including a rise in physical attacks
against journalists and television stations. The Government has
intimidated the media through strict defamation laws (including
potential prison terms for journalists who show ``lack of respect'' for
government officials); proposals for new legislation which, if enacted,
would violate basic press freedoms; and finally by the misuse of legal
authorities against the media.
Our bilateral relations in a range of areas have suffered due to
unilateral decisions taken by the Venezuelan Government. For four
decades, our relationship with Venezuela was anchored by a common
commitment to democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and
freedom. We were allies in a broader effort to help democratize the
hemisphere, and to spread prosperity and economic opportunity. This
relationship has suffered over the past four years, largely as a result
of President Chavez's opposition to key U.S. security and economic
goals, his penchant for associating himself with dictatorial regimes,
and his anti-U.S. rhetoric. Our bilateral trade relationship has
declined significantly. At the same, joint cooperation on security and
counter-terrorism have deteriorated. Given our long-standing, positive
bilateral relationship, it would be our clear preference to return to
the cooperative, cordial relations that we have traditionally enjoyed
with Venezuela.
Mr. Chairman, mindful of Venezuela's deep polarization, we have
consistently urged all parties to act in accordance with the principles
enshrined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and to honor their
commitments under the May 29, 2003 agreement and the February 2003 non-
violence pledge to refrain from violence and respect the free
expression of different political views. Accordingly, we reject any
violent or unconstitutional efforts to depose a democratically elected
government--be it in Venezuela or in any other country in the Americas.
The Government of Venezuela has a special responsibility to ensure
Venezuelans can express their views free from fear or intimidation.
Like democratic governments everywhere, the Government of Venezuela and
the keepers of public order have a unique obligation to create the
conditions for Venezuelans to exercise their constitutional rights. Our
international partners and we are disturbed by reports of intimidation
against recall signatories by supporters of the Government, as well as
by the dismissal of public employees who signed the recall petition.
These actions have no place in a democratic process.
Some in the Venezuelan Government have sought to portray the
upcoming referendum as a U.S.-Venezuela confrontation. Nothing could be
further from the truth. The referendum is an opportunity--one provided
in the Venezuelan constitution--for Venezuelans to freely choose,
through the ballot box, the course of their country's future. The
Inter-American Democratic Charter, to which Venezuela is a signatory,
clearly states that ``The peoples of the Americas have a right to
democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and
defend it.'' It is crucial that all Venezuelans be allowed to exercise
these rights in a free and fair election witnessed by impartial,
international observers.
The coming weeks and months will bring defining moments for the
future of Venezuela. The ongoing constitutional process--the degree to
which the recall referendum is fair and transparent--will test the
strength of the country's democratic institutions. We all have an
interest in seeing Venezuelans succeed. A peaceful, democratic
resolution is not just in the interest of the Venezuelan people, but
that of the region as a whole. Instability and debilitated democratic
governance in Venezuela poses grave dangers to security and stability
in neighboring countries. Venezuela can still serve as an example of
peaceful conflict resolution in a hemisphere that, in the past, all too
often resorted to violence and force to address political turmoil.
Conversely, the failure to achieve a free and fair referendum process
would deal a severe blow to the democratic hopes of Venezuelans and
their neighbors and present a setback for democracy in the hemisphere.
Finally, a peaceful, democratic outcome will allow Venezuelans to
take on the serious social and economic challenges the country faces in
ensuring that all citizens--not just a privileged minority--can benefit
from the fruits of democracy, free trade and enterprise. After all, the
principal responsibility of any democratic government is ensuring
security, well-being and opportunities for its citizens in an
environment that guarantees the protection of individual freedoms,
human rights and respects the rule of law.
Overcoming the current crisis will empower Venezuelans to focus
their energies on the issues that concern average citizens--national
reconciliation, economic recovery and job creation, social inclusion,
effective, transparent government, strong democratic institutions, and
reintegration in the diplomatic and economic life of the region.
The United States and the international community stand together in
support of the democratic aspirations of the Venezuelan people. As
Secretary Powell said recently in Quito, ``We, the democratic nations
of the Americas, must give the peoples of our hemisphere good reason to
count on their neighbors when their own democracies suffer setbacks.''
We reiterate our strong support for the important work of the OAS and
Carter Center observer missions.
The American and Venezuelan people share a strong, mutual
commitment to democracy, and we will continue to draw on our shared
values in the challenging days ahead.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Secretary Noriega.
Ambassador Maisto, before you begin your remarks, I should
note the presence of Ambassador Alvarez here and thank him for
his attendance.
Ambassador Maisto.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. MAISTO, UNITED STATES PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
Ambassador Maisto. Thank you, Chairman Coleman, and thank
you, Senator Nelson. Thank you both for your warm welcome and
for the opportunity this afternoon to discuss with you the
vital role that the Organization of American States has played,
is playing, and will continue to play in facilitating the
restoration of the political impasse in Venezuela, as well as
the role that the OAS carries out in promoting democracy
throughout the Western Hemisphere.
Mr. Chairman, OAS Resolution 833 of December 16, 2002,
which calls for a ``constitutional, democratic, peaceful and
electoral'' solution, remains the cornerstone of the
administration's multilateral approach to resolving the current
situation in Venezuela. We are actively working with our
international partners, led by the Organization of American
States, the Friends of the OAS Secretary General's Mission for
Venezuela--and they are Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Spain, Portugal,
and of course, ourselves--and the Carter Center, to support the
efforts of the Venezuelan people to find a solution in
accordance with that OAS Resolution 833.
During the OAS General Assembly held just 2 weeks ago in
Quito, Ecuador, Secretary Powell commended the decisive role of
the OAS and the Carter Center in Venezuela, most recently in
the process of signature verification that has led to the
referendum, which is now scheduled for August 15.
While OAS involvement began immediately after the events of
April 11, 2002, it was in May 2003, after months of tenacious
diplomacy in Venezuela by OAS Secretary General Cesar Gaviria,
that a political accord between the Government of Venezuela and
the Opposition Democratic Coordinator was reached, setting
forth the framework for the recall referendum process outlined
in article 72 of the 1999 Venezuelan constitution.
I must underscore, however, that the joint mission of the
OAS and the Carter Center has not had an easy go of it in
Venezuela. Secretary General Gaviria, his chief of staff, and
the OAS mission have been the object of all sorts of unfounded
allegations of bias.
In addition to bearing the brunt of attacks in Caracas, the
OAS and the Carter Center have had to work with consummate
diplomatic skill and political savvy to surmount the obstacles
placed in the path of the recall referendum process.
Late last year, the democratic opposition set out to
fulfill the constitutional requirement for convoking a
Presidential recall referendum. In what international observers
characterized as a generally peaceful, fair process, the
opposition asserted it had collected over 3 million signatures,
600,000 more than the 2.4 million required to trigger a
referendum on the mandate of the President of Venezuela.
Amid charges claiming that the tally was a result of
megafraud, the joint OAS-Carter Center mission concluded that
``the process was completed peacefully and without major
obstacles that would have impeded the free exercise of
constitutional rights.''
President Carter later declared that the ``sovereign
expression of the citizen must be privileged over excessive
technicalities'' in resolving issues surrounding the tabulation
of signatures.
Nevertheless, Venezuela's National Electoral Council
validated only 1.9 million signatures, essentially obliging a
signature appeals process to reconfirm the 1.2 million
signatures questioned by the council.
This follow-on appeals process, known as the reparos and
conducted from May 27 to 31 of this year, allowed Venezuelans
the option of reaffirming or excluding their signatures from
the recall petition. Over 120 international observers
participated in the joint OAS-Carter Center mission to help
ensure a transparent, credible, and fair process.
On June 3, the CNE announced the confirmation of enough
signatures during the reparos process to trigger a Presidential
recall referendum, and that evening the President of Venezuela
said he accepted the results and the referendum would go
forward, now scheduled for August 15.
The coming weeks and months will bring defining moments for
the future of democracy in Venezuela. As during the recall
petition drives and the reparos process, international
observation, led by the OAS and the Carter Center, will be
indispensable to ensuring a credible, fair, and transparent
recall election. This is a view that is widely held not only in
the United States, as we have seen in editorial comment in so
many U.S. newspapers and by interested NGOs, but also
throughout the multilateral community and many governments
throughout the hemisphere and beyond.
We remain in close contact with our international partners
to support the efforts of the OAS and the Carter Center to
increase participation in the observer mission and to draw
international attention to the referendum. Mr. Chairman, only
Venezuelans can resolve political problems in their country.
Our overriding objective in Venezuela is free and fair
elections, conducted on a level playing field, free from fear
and intimidation so that the will of the people can be
determined and respected.
Venezuelan citizens groups, such as Sumate and other
democratic organizations, have played an important role in
contributing to the credibility and transparency of the process
underway.
Respected human rights groups have documented credible
reports of intimidation and harassment of those who signed the
original recall petition, as well as limitations on freedom of
the press, violent repression of opposition demonstrations and
most recently a Human Rights Watch report that speaks for
itself.
Unfortunately, the attacks on democratic civil society
organizations have extended to the floor of the OAS Permanent
Council, where the Venezuelan Permanent Representative, in
addition to attacking the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, its Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression for its
report on Venezuela, the OAS mission in Venezuela, and its
interim director, and U.S. Government officials, launched a
barrage of accusations on March 31 against the National
Endowment for Democracy and its support for Sumate and other
Venezuelan groups.
As U.S. Permanent Representative, I immediately, and also
on the floor of the Permanent Council, rejected these baseless
charges of intervention, pointed out the good work the NED has
performed in a number of Latin American countries, and noted
that not everyone agrees on the value of NEDs work,
unfortunately.
I cited another criticism of NED made by a Latin American
leader, and I quote it. ``Then there is the foreign aggressor
that, for purposes of revenge or disinformation, seeks to help
those who sell out their homeland by spending millions of
dollars on an unacceptable intervention that our people, I am
sure, will reject completely.'' Mr. Chairman, that was a
reaction of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet on January 1,
1988 to an announcement that the U.S. Congress had approved
funding to the National Endowment for Democracy to support a
transition to democracy in Chile.
On April 20, the chairmen of the NED, IRI, and NDI, Vin
Weber, John McCain, and Secretary of State Albright, sent a
joint letter to all OAS Ambassadors rebutting those claims.
I shall conclude, Mr. Chairman, with a citation of the
Inter-American Democratic Charter, which we always carry with
us, which is used in the OAS, and a welcoming and a thanks to
you for the strong statements that reflect bipartisan views and
concerns about Venezuela.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Maisto follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador John F. Maisto
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity this afternoon to discuss with you
the vital role the Organization of American States (OAS) has played, is
playing and will continue to play in facilitating resolution of the
political impasse in Venezuela, as well as the OAS role in promoting
democracy throughout the Western Hemisphere.
THE OAS ROLE IN VENEZUELA
OAS Resolution 833, of December 16, 2002, which calls for a
``constitutional, democratic, peaceful and electoral'' solution,
remains the cornerstone of the Administration's multilateral approach
to resolving the current situation in Venezuela. We are actively
working with our international partners--led by the OAS, the Friends of
the OAS Secretary General's Mission for Venezuela (Brazil, Chile,
Mexico, Spain, Portugal and, of course, the United States), and the
Carter Center--to support the efforts of the Venezuelan people to find
a solution, in accordance with OAS Resolution 833.
During the OAS General Assembly held two weeks ago in Quito,
Ecuador, Secretary Powell commended the ``decisive role'' of the OAS
and the Carter Center in Venezuela, most recently in the process of
signature verification that has led to the referendum, now scheduled
for August 15.
While OAS involvement began immediately after the events of April
11, 2002, it was in May 2003, after months of tenacious diplomacy in
Venezuela by OAS Secretary General Cesar Gaviria, that a political
accord between the Government of Venezuela and the Opposition
Democratic Coordinator was reached, setting the framework for the
recall referendum process outlined in Article 72 of the 1999 Venezuelan
Constitution.
I must underscore, however, that the Joint Mission of the OAS and
the Carter Center has not had an easy go of it in Venezuela. Secretary
General Gaviria, his Chief of Staff, and the OAS Mission have been the
object of all sorts of unfounded allegations of bias.
In addition to bearing the brunt of attacks from the Venezuelan
Government and its supporters in Caracas, the OAS and the Carter Center
have had to work with consummate diplomatic skill and political savvy
to surmount the obstacles placed in the path of the recall referendum
process.
Late last year, the democratic opposition set out to fulfill the
constitutional requirement for convoking a presidential recall
referendum. In what international observers characterized as a
generally peaceful, fair process, the opposition asserted it had
collected over 3 million signatures--600,000 more than the 2.4 million
required to trigger a referendum on the mandate of President Chavez.
Amid charges claiming the tally was a result of ``megafraud,'' the
Joint OAS-Carter Center Mission rejected that notion and concluded
``that the process was completed peacefully and without major obstacles
that would have impeded the free exercise of constitutional rights.''
President Carter later declared that the ``sovereign expression of
the citizen must be privileged over excessive technicalities'' in
resolving issues surrounding the tabulation of signatures.
Nevertheless, Venezuela's National Electoral Council (CNE)
validated only 1.9 million signatures, essentially obliging the
democratic opposition to undergo a signature appeals process to
reconfirm the 1.2 million signatures questioned by the CNE.
This follow-on appeals process, known as the reparos and conducted
from May 27-31 of this year, allowed Venezuelans the option of
reaffirming or excluding their signatures from the recall petition.
Over 120 international observers participated in the Joint OAS and
Carter Center Mission to help ensure a transparent, credible and fair
process.
Of particular significance for the transparency of the process, was
the visit paid to CNE headquarters by President Carter and Secretary
General Gaviria after the process had concluded and before the results
were tabulated.
On June 3, the CNE announced that the democratic opposition had
confirmed enough signatures during the reparos to trigger a
presidential recall referendum. That evening President Chavez said he
accepted the results and the referendum would go forward, now
scheduled, as I noted earlier, for August 15.
The coming weeks and months will bring defining moments for the
future of democracy in Venezuela. As during the recall petition drives
and the reparos process, international observation, led by the OAS and
the Carter Center, will be indispensable to ensuring a credible, fair
and transparent recall election. This is a view that is widely held,
not only in the United States, as we have seen in editorial comment in
so many U.S. newspapers and by interested NGOs, but also throughout the
multilateral community and many governments throughout the hemisphere
and beyond.
We remain in close contact with our international partners to
support the efforts of the OAS and the Carter Center, to increase
participation in the observer missions, and to draw international
attention to the referendum. Our overriding objective in Venezuela is
free and fair elections conducted on a level playing field, free from
fear and intimidation, so that the will of the people can be determined
and respected.
Venezuelan citizens' groups, such as Sumate and other democratic
organizations, have played an important role in contributing to the
credibility and transparency of the process underway.
Respected human rights groups have documented credible reports of
intimidation and harassment of those who signed the original recall
petition, as well as limitations on freedom of the press, violent
repression of opposition demonstrations, and, most recently, Human
Rights Watch stated that ``the biggest threat to the country's rule of
law comes from the government itself.''
Unfortunately, the Government of Venezuela's attacks on democratic
civil society organizations have extended to the floor of the OAS
Permanent Council, where the Venezuelan Permanent Representative--in
addition to attacking the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
its Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, the OAS Mission in
Venezuela and its interim director, and U.S. Government officials--
launched a barrage of accusations on March 31 against the National
Endowment for Democracy and its support for Sumate and other Venezuelan
groups.
I immediately, and also on the floor of the Permanent Council,
rejected these baseless charges of intervention, pointed out the good
work the NED has performed in a number of Latin American countries, and
noted that not everyone agrees on the value of NED's work.
I cited the only other criticism of NED ever made by a Latin
American leader. And I quote: ``Then there is the foreign aggressor
that, for purposes of revenge or disinformation, seeks to help those
who sell out their homeland by spending millions of dollars on an
unacceptable intervention that our people, I am sure, will reject
completely.''
Mr. Chairman, that was the reaction of Chilean dictator Augusto
Pinochet on January 2, 1988, to an announcement that the United States
Congress had approved funding to the National Endowment for Democracy
to support a transition to democracy in Chile.
On April 20, the Chairmen of NED, IRI and NDI--Vin Weber, John
McCain and Madeleine Albright--sent a joint letter to all OAS
ambassadors rebutting the outrageous claims made by Venezuela's
Permanent Representative.
The international community must remain vigilant to ensure that
democratic citizens' organizations in Venezuela are allowed to continue
to freely exercise their constitutional rights and participate in the
electoral process, in accordance with the May 2003, political
agreement.
A peaceful, democratic, constitutional resolution through the
ballot box is not just in the interest of the Venezuelan people. It is
in the interest of the region as a whole, if our hemispheric neighbors,
through their democratic governments, are to preserve regional
stability and consolidate the hard-won democratic gains of the last two
decades.
THE UNITED STATES AND OAS DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS
Thus far this year, the U.S. Permanent Mission to the OAS has
contributed more than $500,000 to OAS election observation missions in
the Western Hemisphere. The OAS this calendar year alone has fielded
missions in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama, in addition
to Venezuela.
We have contributed to these and other such OAS observer missions
over the years--and will continue to do so--because ``the holding of
periodic, free, and fair elections'' is one of the essential elements
of democracy specifically mentioned in Article 3 of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter, to which all OAS member states are bound.
We provide almost $3 million a year to OAS Democracy programs,
including election observation missions, because the United States and
all OAS member states have an obligation to promote and defend the
right to democracy of the peoples of the Americas, under Article 1 of
the Democratic Charter.
This funding goes to OAS programs that teach democratic values and
increase public awareness of the Democratic Charter; to programs that
strengthen political parties and legislative institutions, promote
dialogue and conflict resolution, and foster decentralization and good
governance, to name a few.
THE INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC CHARTER
The Inter-American Democratic Charter was born in the Americas, and
thrives in the Americas. No other region of the world has such an
explicit commitment to democracy.
With the advent of the Charter, no OAS member state can remain a
disinterested spectator to what occurs in our Hemisphere. As an
organization and individually, we are bound by the Democratic Charter
to assist our neighbors when democracy is threatened or at risk.
The Charter is a living, functioning document, referenced
frequently in meetings of the Permanent Council and its committees, and
the General Assembly. All OAS ambassadors treat it like that well-known
credit card: ``Don't leave home without it.''
It is not a stale document gathering dust on a bookshelf. It is the
cornerstone of the Hemisphere's efforts to consolidate democracy and
its institutions, and serves as a model to be duplicated elsewhere in
the world.
The Charter, signed September 11, 2001 in Lima, is a direct result
of the OAS experience in Peru where a democratically elected autocrat,
Alberto Fujimori, used every constitutional (as well as many extra-
legal) means at his disposal to undermine democracy.
Based on the Peru experience, OAS member states understood that
elections alone do not a democracy make. The Inter-American Democratic
Charter recognizes a right to democracy and the obligation of
governments to promote and defend it. It outlines the essential
elements of democracy, and sets forth several tools by which the OAS
can serve to help member states strengthen their democratic
institutions and practices.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee: Whether it be in
Venezuela, where the OAS's patient work is moving the election process
along, or in any other member state that seeks OAS support, the United
States stands ready to work shoulder to shoulder with our partners in
the OAS to promote and safeguard democracy under the Inter-American
Democratic Charter.
Thank you again for this opportunity and I'll be pleased to take
any questions you may have.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Ambassador Maisto.
Before I begin with the questioning, I would turn to
Senator Dodd for any opening comments.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD
Senator Dodd. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman. My apologies to
our witnesses and my colleagues for being a few minutes late in
arriving.
Let me, first of all, thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a
very, very timely hearing. With the votes coming up in August,
this is just a perfect time for us to hear from people who are
knowledgeable about the circumstances in Venezuela. So I am
very, very grateful to you for providing the committee with
this opportunity.
On June 3, as we know, the Venezuelan National Electoral
Council announced the success of a petition for a recall
referendum. Certainly I join--I am sure most do--the Carter
Center and the Organization of American States in
congratulating all of the parties involved, including the
government of President Chavez and those who organized the
referendum, for respecting the constitution and for
strengthening democracy in Venezuela. In President Carter's own
words, the repair process was ``a triumph for the democratic
process in Venezuela, and all the elements of the process
deserve credit.''
The recall referendum constitutes an important development
for a representative government in Venezuela, but it is only
the first of many steps that must be taken. With that in mind,
I urge all of the parties to remain committed to democracy. If
they do, then Venezuela in my view will emerge as a more robust
democracy where strong institutions prevail over demagoguery
and oligarchy.
First and foremost, the government of President Chavez must
respect the electoral rules laid out in the constitution. On
August 15, when Venezuelans vote on the referendum, President
Chavez must ensure that the process is free and fair. If
Venezuelans vote to revoke his Presidency, he must make no
effort, in my view, to impede a new Presidential election. If
Venezuelans affirm his Presidency, there can be no reprisals
against his opponents.
As a report recently released by the Human Rights Watch
makes clear, which Mr. Vivanco will speak about when he
testifies later this afternoon, there is deep concern that
President Chavez could manipulate the electoral process by
rigging the judicial branch oversight. I would hope he and pro-
government members of the National Assembly would reject that
temptation, and I would strongly urge that President Chavez and
members of the National Assembly consider delaying the
implementation of the new law governing the appointment of the
supreme court judges until after the recall process. Once the
recall petition is behind us, there will be time to reassess
whether this new law is likely to achieve its stated goal of
enhancing the honesty and independence of the Venezuelan
judiciary.
Members of the opposition also have an obligation, in my
view, to respect the constitutional process. But in the same
manner that I call upon President Chavez to respect democratic
institutions, I certainly call upon the opposition to respect
the outcome as well, even if the referendum fails to garner the
3.7 million votes needed to recall the President.
I also urge the people of Venezuela to eschew violence. The
recent attack on opposition lawmaker Rafael Marin may have been
an isolated incident propagated by misguided extremists. Or it
might have been a dangerous harbinger of things to come. Let us
hope that it was an isolated incident and that others
understand that using violence as a political tactic is always
deplorable and never democratic.
The Carter Center and the Organization of American States
must have unfettered access to all of the electoral mechanisms.
The presence of well-respected international observers
discourages electoral fraud and provides a measure of
legitimacy. Without this kind of oversight, any outcome will be
suspect.
I have one final concern, Mr. Chairman, for democracy in
Venezuela. As we all know, the foundation of any democracy is a
well-informed citizenry, for which the media are indispensable.
Unfortunately, over the past few years, both private and state-
run media have discarded the mantle of objectivity and plunged
into the abyss of partisanship. The Carter Center is attempting
to rectify this by formulating an agreement between the
government and media owners regarding news reports and
political coverage during the referendum. This agreement, in
conjunction with good faith efforts by both sides to uphold
journalistic principles, will make open debate possible again.
Let me now turn to the role of the United States, if I can,
very quickly.
The last 2 years have been a frustrating time for those of
us seeking improved relations between the United States and
Venezuela, and neither side is wholly without blame. Having
said that, a large measure of responsibility for the erosion in
the bilateral relationship rests with President Chavez. To put
it mildly, he has been his own worst public relations
spokesman. Having said that, the missteps by others, including
the United States, have complicated an already strained
relationship. In the minds of many Venezuelans, the Bush
administration's tacit support for the anti-democratic coup in
April of 2002 cast a very dark shadow over our ability to act
as an honest broker in helping to resolve the political crisis
in Venezuela.
Fortunately, the Carter Center and the OAS have stepped
into the breach to play an important role. Standing up for
democracy means prioritizing the wishes of the many over the
whims of a few, whether it be in Washington or Caracas.
President Carter and Cesar Gaviria have sought to do just that
by supporting the constitutional resolution of Venezuela's
problems.
In the next few weeks, the United States has an opportunity
to regain credibility with the Venezuelan people by acting in
accord with our democratic principles and with our hemispheric
partners in unequivocally supporting the Carter Center and the
OAS efforts.
We have the benefit today of having a number of witnesses
with a deep knowledge of the ongoing events in Venezuela and
about the specifics of the referendum process. I believe that
their testimony, Mr. Chairman, will help members of this
committee better understand what may occur in the coming weeks
and the implications of the various scenarios that could unfold
on the United States economic and foreign policy interests.
I want again to offer a special welcome to Dr. Jennifer
McCoy, who is taking time out of a very hectic schedule to be
here today. Her role at the Carter Center in facilitating many
of the advances in the political process in Venezuela has been
essential, and I commend her for them. I look forward to the
insights that she can provide to this committee as to how we
can be supportive of the ongoing efforts in consolidating
Venezuelan democracy.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your giving me a few
minutes to make these remarks.
Senator Coleman. Thank you very, very much, Senator Dodd.
I think there is, amongst all of us, my colleagues here,
some clear agreement of the importance of the role of the
Carter Center and the OAS in ensuring that the process is
played out fairly. I would ask Ambassador Maisto, what is the
United States doing to ensure that the OAS and Carter Center
international election observers are allowed to observe the
recall referendum on August 15, 2004? What specifically can be
done to make sure that those observers are allowed in?
Ambassador Maisto. Mr. Chairman, the United States has
unequivocally supported both the OAS and the Carter Center in
their past observation efforts from the get-go in Venezuela,
and we continue to do that. The issue, Mr. Chairman, of the OAS
and Carter Center presence in Venezuela has to do with an
invitation from the Government of Venezuela to observe that
election process. As of just before the beginning of this
session, when I checked with the OAS, such an invitation had
not come forth from the Government of Venezuela.
Nevertheless, the OAS is preparing a mission and it is
organizing itself internally as it does in terms of lining up
people to serve on the mission, but until that invitation comes
forward, the OAS is not going to be able to dispatch a mission
to Venezuela.
Senator Coleman. Secretary Noriega, you talked about the
indictment of Sumate's Alejandro Plaz and Maria Corina Machado.
You used the phrase ``troubling and outrageous.'' Is there
anything that we can do to impact that situation? Is there
anything we can do to lend a helping hand?
Mr. Noriega. Certainly. Senator, Mr. Chairman, if I could
comment also on the other question.
Senator Coleman. Please.
Mr. Noriega. I wanted to note that Secretary Powell
beginning at the OAS General Assembly in Quito earlier this
month, has been deeply engaged with our Friends partners,
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain, and has been in
touch with President Carter and the Foreign Minister of Brazil
to encourage contact with the Venezuelan authorities and to
encourage them to extend an invitation and welcome the
international observers.
What we are hearing from them is that there will be a role
for the OAS and other international observers, the Carter
Center and other international organizations that want to
participate as observers. So we are hopeful about that and
believe that the government is moving in a positive direction
in accommodating that important presence.
We believe on the issue of the NED grantees and on the
whole issue of apparent harassment for political purposes of
opposition figures that raising attention in the international
community is extraordinarily important. These groups in various
cases have taken their cases to the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights and Inter-American Court on Human Rights. So
there is a mechanism where the government can be held
specifically accountable.
We think it is very important that we tell the
international community what NED is all about and what our
democracy assistance is all about to give light to any
assertion that somehow this is illegitimate. So bringing those
facts to light is extraordinarily important. Of course, we have
communicated with the Venezuelan Government through our
Ambassador in Caracas, and in particular in contacts with
senior officials in Venezuela, that this is totally legitimate
assistance and that we intend that it would support the efforts
of the Venezuelan people to strengthen their democracy and for
no other reason.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
A great deal has been said in public and private about
President's Chavez's meddling in the affairs of other countries
in the region. Either of you or both can respond. Can you
discuss Chavez's influence in the region and explain the level
of concern these activities elicit among our neighbors in the
hemisphere? I am going to be very specific. Chile, Ecuador,
Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, El Salvador. I would
be interested in your impressions.
Mr. Noriega. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I am sure that you and
other members of the committee are probably picking up the same
sorts of things that we do in our contact with representatives
of other countries in the Americas where they recognize that
the Venezuelan diplomatic representation and other informal
contacts are pretty robust in terms of contact with groups in
these individual countries. President Chavez makes no secret of
his interest in an international Bolivarian movement, and there
are organizations that exist in many countries in Latin
America, including a good number of the ones you mentioned,
that are associated with and receive funding from friends in
Venezuela.
So there are varying degree of whether people are alarmed
by this or just simply concerned or think it is unusual. I have
raised this with various ambassadors, and it is a concern
because these countries want to carry out their democratic
activities in a sovereign way, and there is a lack of
transparency sometimes about what sort of support these groups
may be getting from the Bolivarian allies in Caracas.
Having said that, there are groups, in many cases, that are
not particularly democratic, that are not committed to
democracy. We provide support in a transparent, open way to
people who are committed to democracy in Venezuela, and we
think that is an effective way to advance our values.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
One last question. If President Chavez prevails in the
election, what will U.S. policy be, and how will the Venezuelan
people be able to heal the wounds of a divisive campaigning and
move on? Can we have any impact on that?
Mr. Noriega. I think it is very important that there be
international observation, as you have stated, that will be a
basis upon which we can judge the fairness of any process. Let
me emphasize that we will be making that sort of judgment and
consideration along with our neighbors and not in a unilateral
way. We will base it on the engagement of the OAS and the views
of the international community as they observe the electoral
process. We will respect the outcome, whatever the outcome is.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Let me, if I can, begin with you, Ambassador Maisto. I am
sure many people in the audience here, but others may not be
aware exactly what numbers need to be reached in order for
certain results to occur. This I think can be rather confusing
to some. It is certainly a bit confusing to me. As I understand
it--and you correct me if I am wrong--roughly there are over--
what is it--I think about 12.5 million eligible voters in
Venezuela. You stop me, by the way, if I misstate anything. The
assumption is that about 65 percent of the Venezuelans will
exercise their franchise. Is that a low number, a high number?
What is your experience in that, by the way?
Ambassador Maisto. Senator, it is hard to say. You have
cited averages. But there is such a unique situation going on
in Venezuela right now. I think it is a little difficult to go
anywhere other than the constitutionally-established numbers
that are needed in this next phase.
Senator Dodd. The number we do not know. Certainly my guess
would be no lower than 65, but it could be higher given the
intensity of this issue. Is that a fair statement?
Ambassador Maisto. I would say so, but to be quite frank
with you, I would defer to such people as Jennifer McCoy who
really is on top of this.
Senator Dodd. I will ask Jennifer about that in a minute.
Mr. Noriega. Senator.
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Mr. Noriega. For the recall to be successful, they have to
have a majority plus a number voting si, yes----
Senator Dodd. That exceeds the votes that President Chavez
received in the last election.
Mr. Noriega. Right. They have to get 3.8 million votes.
Senator Dodd. I thought it was a little bit above 3.7
million.
Mr. Noriega. Well, I am relying on Ambassador Alvarez. So
3.7 or 3.8 million.
Senator Dodd. Between 3.7 and 3.8 million.
Mr. Noriega. Yes.
Senator Dodd. That is what I think most people are not
aware of, and that is why I wanted to make that point that this
is not just a majority, but it has to exceed the vote that
President Chavez received in the last election. So that is
important.
Let me ask, if I can, Ambassador Maisto, but certainly,
Secretary Noriega, you can respond as well, and that is about
the Venezuelan military. I wonder if you could give us a sense
of the state of the Venezuelan military and how it is reacting
to these events. The information we are getting here is there
is some division, divided by the participation of certain
elements of the Armed Forces in the April 2002 coup. So you
have got some division within the ranks, to put it mildly. I am
curious as to whether or not the military in Venezuela as an
institution supports the referendum process, No. 1, and does it
appear that the military as an institution will respect the
outcome.
Ambassador Maisto. I think the short answer would be yes,
the Venezuelan military does support the constitutional process
that is underway, and two, that everything I know about the
Venezuelan military indicates that they will support an outcome
that is free and fair and so considered in Venezuela. I would
defer to the Assistant Secretary. I used to follow those things
much more closely than I do right now from my multilateral
perch. But the Venezuelan military is quite institutional and
quite constitutional.
Senator Dodd. Do you want to comment on that?
Mr. Noriega. Mr. Chairman, we along with, for example, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, have expressed some
concern about the increasing involvement of military persons in
political matters in the Venezuelan Government, but they do so
in a transparent way. It is just a concern.
Having said that, I think there may be divisions in the
military, but by and large, I believe and we would certainly
hope that the vast majority of Venezuelan military will respect
the constitution, will respect the results of a constitutional
process, and will respect political rights of the Venezuelan
people.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you, if I can.
First of all, it is my understanding that the administration
was supportive of President Carter and the OAS's efforts to
broker a resolution to the dispute over the validity of certain
signatures. Is that an accurate statement?
Mr. Noriega. Yes, sir.
Senator Dodd. What I am curious about--that process began
on the 27th of May, and I am looking at articles in the press
on the date of the 26th of May in which you are quoted as
suggesting that if Venezuela does not respect the process, they
could be sanctioned by the OAS. In another statement here, they
are quoting you, and if it is not correct, you correct me here.
This was in the Washington Times. You are quoted as saying--
again, this is on May 26th, the day before the actual
verification vote begins--`` `It's very clear to us the
requisite number of people supported the petition,' for a
referendum, Mr. Noriega told the editors and reporters during a
visit to The Washington Times yesterday. `If through some very
tortured bureaucratic process, those signatures are tossed out,
it could have very dire consequences for Venezuelans and for
those who support their rights under the constitution.' ''
My point is this, Roger. This is a process and a way people
are going to begin to verify the next day. So I am curious as
to why you would be making statements, in effect, sort of
determining the outcome of that process a day before it even
begins.
In fact, the next day the Secretary of State on the 27th,
Secretary Powell issued the following statement. ``The
Venezuelan people have reached a defining moment for their
democracy beginning May 28, where more than one million
citizens will have the opportunity to reconfirm their
signatures on petitions calling for a referendum on the tenure
of President Hugo Chavez.'' He goes on and suggests that there
be no violence and so forth, but a very different tone than the
tone you suggest by sort of guaranteeing what the outcome was
going to be before it began. Now, if that is a misstatement----
Mr. Noriega. No, Senator, I do not think it is a
misstatement necessarily. There was a misinterpretation, an
inference. When I was referring to the number of signatures
having been collected, I was referring to the process earlier
in the year where, as it turns out, I was right. A requisite
number of signatures had been collected.
After that process earlier in the year, President Carter
said, quote, ``The sovereign expression of the citizens must be
privileged over excessive technicalities,'' in resolving issues
surrounding the tabulation of the signatures. So I do not think
anything that I said was inconsistent with what he said.
In terms of the timing, the statements that I made were
referring to the earlier collection of the signatures not----
Senator Dodd. That is not very clear in this article.
Mr. Noriega. I think that is right.
Senator Dodd. The day before people are going to show up.
There is no reference in here. You do not talk about previous.
Mr. Noriega. I can get you the entire text and it says
quite explicitly that we were referring to the previous
collection of signatures.
In my statement, the results of the reparos process had to
be respected, which was the process that had not begun, but we
were just simply calling----
Senator Dodd. You understand the paper says--I did not
quote this, but the paragraph before says, ``Roger Noriega,
assistant secretary of state, for Western Hemisphere affairs,
said Mr. Chavez's government faces a `make-or-break exercise'
as selection officials this weekend decide whether to validate
hundreds of thousands of disputed signatures . . . .''
Mr. Noriega. I think that is right.
Senator Dodd. And then it goes on to quote you. So it is
clearly referring to that weekend coming up.
Mr. Noriega. Oh, sure. But I think we are mixing the two
references. I was referring to the earlier process. When I said
that the results had to be respected and when I said that they
had to repair the signatures, I was referring to the process
that was ensuing thereafter. But I do not think it is all that
complicated, but some of the comments are taken out of context.
Senator Dodd. You understand my point, though.
Mr. Noriega. No, not really.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The two articles discussed follow:]
[From The Washington Times--May 26, 2004, Wednesday, Final Edition]
U.S. Casts Wary Eye on Venezuela Vote; Action Promised if Vote is
Rigged
(By David R. Sands)
The United States will push hard for diplomatic pressure against
Venezuela if President Hugo Chavez tries to rig the upcoming referendum
on his rule, the State Department's Latin America point man said
yesterday.
Roger F. Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, said Mr. Chavez's government faces a ``make-or-
break exercise'' as election officials this weekend decide whether to
validate hundreds of thousands of disputed signatures in the referendum
drive.
``It's very clear to us the requisite number of people supported
the petition'' for a referendum, Mr. Noriega told editors and reporters
during a visit to The Washington Times yesterday.
``If through some very tortured bureaucratic process, those
signatures are tossed out, it could have very dire consequences for
Venezuelans and for those who support their rights under the
constitution,'' he said.
In wide-ranging remarks about U.S. policy toward Latin America, Mr.
Noriega defended recent moves to tighten travel and spending
restrictions for Cuba and expressed cautious hope for Haiti's new
interim government.
He also said the war in Iraq and its troubled aftermath had
``brought some difficulties'' for U.S. public diplomacy in many Central
and South American countries.
But he said the Bush administration had been able to establish
productive relations, even with new center-left governments in Brazil
and Argentina.
Mr. Noriega said U.S. officials will be watching closely as
Venezuelan election officials this weekend decide whether to validate
about 800,000 disputed signatures for a referendum on Mr. Chavez, a
populist former military officer who has clashed repeatedly with
Washington.
Anti-Chavez activists complained this week of government
intimidation in the run-up to this weekend's recount. If enough
signatures are validated, Mr. Chavez faces a recall vote in August that
many think he is desperate to avoid. His six-year term is supposed to
end in 2006.
Mr. Noriega said U.S. officials are not contemplating political or
economic sanctions, but his comments still were among the toughest to
date by a senior administration official.
``We will use what multilateral levers we have,'' he said. ``We
have told our partners we think this is a make-or-break exercise to see
whether the state can respect the wishes of the Venezuelan people.''
The Organization of American States [OAS], the Atlanta-based Carter
Center, and a loose alliance of regional powers led by Brazil have
tried to ease the political stalemate in Caracas.
Mr. Chavez, who survived a coup attempt in 2002, has blamed unnamed
Colombian and U.S. forces for seeking to drive him from power, and
Venezuela's political paralysis has become an economic and political
distraction for the entire region, Mr. Noriega said.
Mr. Noriega, a former Capitol Hill staffer and Ambassador to the
OAS, also was a prime architect of recent moves to toughen U.S.
economic pressure on Cuba's Fidel Castro and spell out U.S. policy
toward a democratic, post-Castro Cuba.
He helped draft the commission report endorsed by President Bush
earlier this month calling for increased broadcasting to Cuba, as well
as sharp new limits on the time and money U.S. visitors can spend when
traveling to the island.
He acknowledged that even some U.S.-backed dissidents in Cuba had
criticized the moves as counterproductive, but said the commission
focused tightly on U.S. policy and avoided any direct interference in
Cuban affairs.
``Clearly, we want to see representative democracy and a free-
market economy come to Cuba, but I hasten to add that those will be
decisions the Cuban people must make,'' he said.
He rejected the argument that easing the 40-year U.S. embargo on
Cuba would hasten the end of Mr. Castro's one-man rule.
``If I thought for a moment that a bunch of sun-burned tourists
could help wash away Castro, I might reconsider the embargo,'' he said,
``but I just don't see it happening.''
Mr. Noriega said the situation in Haiti is ``stable'' less than
three months after U.S. officials helped ease out President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide in the face of a violent uprising against his rule.
The United States, earlier this week, pledged a $100 million
economic package to help revive Haiti's devastated economy.
Mr. Noriega said other countries in the region have shown a
willingness to contribute financially and militarily to the new interim
government of Prime Minister Gerard Latortue. Brazil is spearheading a
new international peacekeeping force for Haiti to replace the U.S.-led
mission now there.
``We're frankly not out of the woods on the security situation, but
I do see a willingness to invest in Haiti to jump-start the economy and
plan for new elections,'' Mr. Noriega said.
______
Democracy in Venezuela
BY SECRETARY COLIN L. POWELL
[Washington, DC--May 27, 2004]
The Venezuelan people have reached a defining moment for their
democracy. Beginning May 28, more than one million citizens will have
the opportunity to reconfirm their signatures on petitions calling for
a referendum on the tenure of President Hugo Chavez.
This process will help Venezuelans resolve their differences and
build a better, stronger future for their nation.
I urge the Venezuelan government to honor the wishes of its people
by supporting a fair and credible process that produces prompt results
in an atmosphere free of fear and intimidation. I also call on all
Venezuelans to reject violence as incompatible with the exercise of
democracy.
The presence of Organization of American States and Carter Center
observation missions will promote greater transparency and credibility.
The United States supports a peaceful, democratic, constitutional
and electoral solution to Venezuela's political impasse, as called for
in Organization of American States Resolution 833 and the May 29, 2003
Agreement between the Government of Venezuela and the democratic
opposition. The recent statement of the Friends of the Secretary
General of the OAS for Venezuela calls for such a democratic solution.
We will continue working with the international community to help the
people of Venezuela achieve their democratic aspirations.
Senator Coleman. Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, what is the administration's
view of Venezuela's cooperation on the war on terrorism,
particularly with regard to efforts at securing the border with
Colombia?
Mr. Noriega. Senator, I think you have fairly characterized
what we know about the level of cooperation that we receive
from Venezuelan authorities, particularly on their border with
Colombia. We have raised concerns, I think as you have, with
Venezuelan authorities. Without being too terribly specific in
dealing with sensitive information, we have made it clear that
we believe we could do better, that the Venezuelan authorities
as well could do better in the level of cooperation in fighting
terrorism, securing that border, securing the flow of people,
arms, and other things across the border with Colombia. We have
made it very clear that we want to work with Venezuela, as it
meets its commitments under the U.N. and OAS anti-terrorism
accords, to prevent the spread of terrorism, prevent any
persons moving across borders or goods or items or arms moving
across the border that might involve terrorist groups that
threaten other countries.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Ambassador, there was a recent
editorial by the Chavista political leader Heinz Dederich, and
he allegedly stated that the referendum is a ``all-or-none''
proposition and must be won by any means, and that if Chavez
loses the referendum, it will leave ``the ELN, FARC, and MAS of
Bolivia without support.'' Additionally he allegedly went on to
say, ``Cuba will be in danger.'' He also stated that President
Chavez must defeat the enemies and went on to list the
Democratic Charter of the OAS as one of the enemies of the
regime.
What is the OAS's view of all this? Do you think it is
true? And how will you take it into consideration?
Ambassador Maisto. Senator, I do not know the analyst in
question, but from your quotes, I would say that my colleagues
over at the OAS would find the notion that the Inter-American
Democratic Charter is an enemy of anyone in the hemisphere
rather preposterous. The Inter-American Democratic Charter has
been embraced by all the democratic countries of the
hemisphere, including Venezuela, as the political document that
is the basis for our political action in this hemisphere in the
multilateral arena. It embraces multilateralism with every
country contributing, as best it can. And it is still finding
its way, and it is being applied. It is not perfect and we are
struggling with it all the time, but nobody at the OAS leaves
home without this charter in his or her pocket as we do
business in the organization. It is referred to every day and
any notion, such as the one you cited, would be met, I believe,
with incredulity among the member countries. With regard to the
United States, I just find that notion preposterous.
But what is in question here is what is going to happen in
Venezuela after these electoral processes are completed. There
is going to be a winner and there is going to be a loser. There
is going to be a majority and there is going to be a minority
or several minorities. And it is going to be up to the
Venezuelans to work through this in a democratic structure.
Indeed, members of the community will be prepared to help in
that process. And the charter provides a way to do that.
So we are hopeful in the OAS about the Democratic Charter
and we are hopeful whenever we think about the process that is
going on in Venezuela, thinking about what the OAS and the
Carter Center have contributed already and want to contribute
in the days ahead.
Senator Nelson. What do you expect the OAS to do with
regard to observing for the goal of a free and fair election on
August 15?
Ambassador Maisto. Senator, the OAS is quite proficient in
election observation. Just this year, the OAS has put election
observation teams on the field in Panama, in the Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala. We know that there is a lot
of concern about computers and machines and things like that.
The OAS has an absolutely first-rate team that they field. They
have experts that work for them and experts that they tap.
Senator Nelson. Do you expect to have access to all of the
polling places?
Ambassador Maisto. The rules of engagement for the OAS to
observe elections certainly include access to all the polling
places and all the technical part of it, looking at the
machines, testing them out, et cetera. That is standard
operating procedure in an OAS election observation.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
Secretary Noriega, Ambassador Maisto, there are a lot of
other questions. I know on the second panel some of the
witnesses have some time constraints. I have 19 questions from
Chairman Lugar, everything ranging from questions about
expectations of a second meeting of a Group of Friends, the
position of Secretary Powell in regard to what the Group of
Friends can do to deal with some of these issues. I have
questions about voting machines, and there were mutual concerns
raised in Senator Nelson's opening statement about voting
machines and packing the court and how we respond to that. But
again, in the interest of having a full opportunity to hear
from all the witnesses today, what I will do will be to make
sure that we submit these in writing and would request that you
respond to them as soon as can be done.
Mr. Noriega. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
With that, we will call our second panel. I already
introduced the second panel in my opening statement. We will
proceed from my right to my left, starting with Dr. McCoy, Mr.
Vivanco, Mr. Diaz, Mr. Tissot, and Mr. Weisbrot. Panel members
understand there is a timing system. When the yellow light goes
on, I would like you to conclude your testimony. We will, at
your request, have your entire statement entered as part of the
official record. With that, Dr. McCoy.
STATEMENT OF DR. JENNIFER McCOY, DIRECTOR, AMERICAS PROGRAM,
THE CARTER CENTER, AND GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
Dr. McCoy. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman, for the
invitation here today. As I said to Senator Coleman earlier, I
am continuing in a role as international observer, so I will
limit my remarks to the recall process and not to other aspects
of Venezuelan politics at this time. I was asked to give an
assessment of this, and I want to say it is based on 20 years
of study of Venezuela as a scholar as well as monitoring
elections in Venezuela in 1998 and 2000, and intensive
involvement in the last 2 years at the invitation of the
Government of Venezuela and the opposition to help facilitate
the political crisis there, and most recently observing the
recall process that has already been begun to be discussed this
afternoon.
I would like to start in this brief oral summary just
listing some of the factors that I think help to explain and
help us to understand what has happened so far in the recall
process, to understand some of the delays, the confusions, and
the controversies because this is affecting the entire recall
referendum process. Some of these factors will continue, and I
think it is good to understand these.
The first is that, in fact, this is an unprecedented
process. The National Electoral Council board itself was new,
and there was no law to regulate the process. So the newness,
novelty of the entire process was one of the reasons for some
of the delays and confusions.
Second, we need to keep in mind that this is all occurring
in a politically polarized climate where the stakes are
extremely high, and so you have a National Electoral Council
that becomes the fulcrum of the political dispute within
Venezuela and in fact the negotiations over the procedures
themselves become very political. We have to understand that
every single decision they are taking is as a result of an
intense negotiation within the CNE and under very intense
pressure from all the political parties.
Third, the nature of the signature collection itself was a
hybrid system, neither completely privately conducted by the
political parties nor completely publicly conducted by the
National Electoral Council. And that led to some of the
subsequent confusion and controversy during the verification
period.
Fourth were the cumbersome mechanisms of control and
verification procedures which arose from the distrust between
the parties and the desire to prevent fraudulent signatures. So
that led to the design of an extremely complex set of
procedures, multiple levels of verification, and delays in the
process.
Fifth, there were changes in the procedures during the
verification, which I will not go into here but some of which
is in my written testimony.
Sixth, there were incomplete or vague instructions in the
beginning, some slowness to the decisionmaking, in part due to
the political nature, that resulted in the need to come out
with clarifying instructions throughout the process.
And seventh, the negotiations over the reparos process
itself, which was the correction period that happened at the
end of May. These negotiations occurred at the urging of the
international observers to help to get a consensus among the
political parties and the National Electoral Council on
procedures to conclude that signature collection and
verification process.
So the overall conclusions that we drew, the Carter Center
and the OAS, about the process to date include the following.
The first phase, which was the signature collection, is
that the signatures were collected in an atmosphere mostly free
of violence in which the citizens who wished had the
opportunity to sign, though there was some confusion on the
exact procedures to use, leading to some more of the confusion
during the verification.
On the second stage, which was the verification process, it
was very complex, multiple levels of review, unclear rules that
were inconsistently applied, multiple delays, and a concern for
detecting fraud at times seeming to override a concern to
recognize the good faith of the signers.
The third period, the correction or reparo period--oh, my
goodness, that time went fast.
Senator Coleman. Can you finish?
Dr. McCoy. Let me finish quickly. Let me move to this.
For the future, moving to the recall referendum on August
15, I want to say there are three very important things to
recognize in terms of the progress. It is very significant and
positive that all of the Venezuelan actors are participating
now in a democratic and constitutional process to resolve their
differences. Second, both sides are ready to engage in the
campaign and try to win. Third, if the result is decisive and
the process is transparent, I am convinced both sides will
accept the results.
The concern is going to be if it is a very close result,
both sides will be tempted to argue that there is fraud or
manipulation affecting the outcome. Therefore, it is absolutely
crucial that the greatest transparency possible is provided in
the process to raise the confidence among Venezuelans in the
results. During the questions, I could go into what I see as
the measures needed.
[The prepared statement of Dr. McCoy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Jennifer McCoy
THE VENEZUELA RECALL REFERENDUM PROCESS
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation to testify before this
subcommittee. I have studied Venezuela as a scholar for twenty years,
and have been involved in Venezuela with The Carter Center since 1998,
when we observed the 1998 and 2000 elections. Since June of 2002, I
have been leading the Carter Center's efforts to facilitate dialogue
between the government and opposition, and to monitor the recall
referendum effort begun in November 2003.
OVERVIEW
After the short-lived ouster of President Hugo Chavez in April
2002, the government of Venezuela invited former President Jimmy Carter
to facilitate a dialogue between the government and the opposition
forces. We formed a Tripartite Working Group of the OAS, UNDP, and
Carter Center which sponsored a national Table of Negotiations and
Accords from November 2002-May 2003. Facilitated by Secretary General
of the OAS Cesar Gaviria, and assisted by The Carter Center and UNDP,
the Table produced an agreement in May 2003 which, among other things,
recognized that the constitutional provision for recall referenda on
elected officials could be a mechanism to help solve the bitter
political divisions of the country.
In May of 2003, the country lacked a functioning electoral agency
(CNE) and the National Assembly proved unable to forge a supermajority
to name a new directorate. The supreme court stepped in to do so, and a
brand new CNE board was sworn in on August 27, 2003, acclaimed by all
the parties. One of their first tasks was to rule on the signatures
that had been presented a week earlier by the opposition Coordinadora
Democratica for a recall of the president. The CNE disavowed those
signatures and set to work to devise a set of regulations for this new
procedure in Venezuela. The resulting regulations called for signatures
to be collected in a 2-stage process during the last two weekends of
November--the first weekend for the national legislators (deputies)
sought to be recalled by the government, and the second weekend for the
deputies and the president sought to be recalled by the opposition. The
CNE invited the OAS and The Carter Center to observe the process, and
those two organizations formed a joint mission with two chiefs of
mission, and joint statements, throughout.
The signatures collected in those two weekends were presented to
the CNE for verification (after being organized, photocopied, etc by
the political parties) by December 19. The CNE took a break for
Christmas and began signature verification January 13, 2004. The CNE
announced preliminary results on March 2, with signatures in three
categories: valid, ``observed'', and invalid. The announcement
indicated the opposition had not yet gathered sufficient valid
signatures to trigger a presidential recall, but that there would be a
correction period (reparos) in which nearly 1.2 million signers could
appear again to confirm their signatures. The reparo period occurred at
the end of May, and on June 3, the CNE announced that there would be a
recall vote on the president's mandate (subsequently scheduled for
August 15, 2004), and nine opposition deputies.
The recall vote is scheduled four days before constitutional
trigger date of August 19. If the recall occurs before August 19 and if
sufficient votes in favor of recall are cast, then there should be an
election to choose a person to fulfill the remainder of the President's
term in office (which ends January 2007). The number of votes to recall
an official must fulfill two conditions: a) be at least one more than
the absolute number of votes by which the official was elected in the
first place, in this case 3.7 million; and b) be more than the No votes
cast in the recall. This election, if needed, is likely to occur about
October 15, 2004. If the recall referendum occurs after August 19, and
the president is recalled, then the Vice President fulfills the term.
ASSESSMENT OF THE RECALL PROCESS TO DATE
The process has taken much longer than expected and has had some
controversies, due to a number of factors:
a) Unprecedented nature of the process, novice CNE, lack of a
law to regulate the process. This is the first country of which
I am aware in which a recall of an elected president has been
attempted (Iceland has the provision, but may have never
implemented it). The presidential recall referendum was
introduced into the 1999 constitution and had not yet been used
in Venezuela. The CNE directors were new and had to first
devise a regulation to govern the process, since the National
Assembly had not yet drafted and approved a law to implement
the constitutional provision. All of these factors led to a
steep learning curve, some ad hoc adaptation along the way, and
creation of new rules as the process developed and new wrinkles
were discovered.
b) Politically-polarized nature of the process. The stakes
are extremely high for all sides. The President, of course,
would prefer to stay in office. The opposition has been trying
for at least two years to remove the President from office,
through massive protest marches, calls for resignation,
proposed constitutional amendments, a two-month national oil
strike, and the April 2002 military removal from office. The
deep polarization of the country meant that the normal
compromise and give and take of democratic processes was not
happening. Instead, the point of contact between the opposing
sides was centered within the 5-person CNE as it struggled to
negotiate acceptable compromises on the procedures of the
process, under intense pressure from all sides.
c) Hybrid nature of the process. Part of the political
compromise reached over the procedures was the hybrid nature of
the signature collection process. It was neither a completely
private affair, conducted by the political parties, nor a
completely official affair, controlled by the CNE. This hybrid
nature led to subsequent confusion and controversy during the
verification period.
d) Cumbersome mechanisms of control and verification
procedures. The distrust between the parties and the desire to
prevent fraudulent signatures (which the government suspected
from previous signature collection efforts) produced a complex
set of procedures designed to protect against fraud. These
procedures, both in the collection process and the subsequent
verification, provided for some checks which the CNE did not
have the capacity, in reality, to implement--such as
verification of thumbprints and signatures (neither of them
digitalized in the signature collection nor in the national
identity card system).
e) Changes in procedures during the verification. One
slowdown came after the CNE discovered that some signature
sheets apparently showed the same handwriting for all of the
signer data on that sheet, and in some cases even for the
signatures themselves. This discovery produced a new criterion
in the middle of the verification process to put into
``observation'' all of those signature lines which appeared to
have similar handwriting as at least one other line on the same
sheet. This required a second round of verification of the
names that had already been reviewed, and resulted in some one
million names being questioned under the ``similar
handwriting'' criteria. This group became the bulk of the names
that would go to the correction period in late May, for signers
to confirm that in fact they had signed the petitions and it
was not fraud.
f) Incomplete or vague instructions; slow decision-making;
insufficient training during the verification. The CNE board at
points, took a long time to make decisions and issue
instructions for verification, and many of those instructions
were vague or incomplete, requiring further instructions. The
CNE did try to address some of the delays by enlarging the
teams of verifiers, but the various levels and teams of
verifiers were not always sufficiently trained on the first
attempt. The end result was that the verification phase was
supposed to take 30 days, and in reality took 120 days
(depending on which dates one uses).
g) Negotiations over the Reparo process. At the urging of the
international observers, the CNE entered into discussions with
the political parties in an attempt to devise mutually
satisfactory rules for the correction (reparos) period (which
had not previously been specified). These negotiations took
several weeks, but were important in gaining the acceptance of
the opposition Coordinadora Democratic to participate in the
reparos at all, and in generating clearer rules than had been
generated for the earlier phases of the process.
Conclusions about the Signature Collection, Verification and
Correction Stages: The signature collections were conducted in an
atmosphere mostly free of violence, with citizens who so wished having
the opportunity to sign, though with some confusion on the exact
procedures. The verification process was complex, with multiple levels
of review, unclear rules inconsistently applied, multiple delays, and
with a concern for detecting fraud overriding a concern to recognize
the good faith of the signers. The correction (reparo) period was
conducted in an atmosphere mostly free of violence, with citizens who
so wished having the opportunity, for the most part, to confirm their
signatures or remove their names, and with mostly clear and transparent
procedures.
progress and concerns about the upcoming recall vote of august 15, 2004
Progress:
First, it is very significant and positive that all of the
Venezuelan actors are participating in a democratic and constitutional
process to resolve their differences. After trying a number of
strategies, ranging from civil disobedience to general strikes, the
opposition is now focusing on the recall referendum. The referendum
will help to clear the air regarding the questions raised about the
president's mandate.
Second, both sides are ready to engage in the campaign and try to
win. Both have named a campaign command group; both are engaging in the
effort to turn out as many of their supporters as possible.
Third, if the result is decisive and the process transparent, both
sides will accept the results. If the president loses, I expect he will
accept his loss and go on to the presidential election (either running
himself if allowed by the supreme court, or supporting another
candidate.) If the opposition loses, I expect the parties will focus on
the upcoming governor and mayor elections (September 26) and the
National Assembly elections in 2005.
Concerns:
If the results of the recall referendum are close, both sides will
be tempted to argue that fraud or manipulation affected the outcome.
Therefore, the greatest transparency possible is needed in order to
raise confidence among Venezuelans in the results.
The measures that could help to assure transparency and raise
confidence include:
Audit of the voter's list (REP).
Public simulations to test the new touchscreen voting
machines.
Audit of a sample of the paper receipts from the voting
machines immediately after the close of the polls.
Professional, neutral international observers with full
access to the entire process--reparation, vote, tabulation,
resolution of challenges.
Election workers chosen by lottery and trained sufficiently
well and early.
Voter education on the process and the new machines.
Clear rules on which national identity cards will be
accepted (some confusion during the reparos resulted in some
citizens being turned away.)
Clear media regulations to ensure equal access by both sides
for paid advertising, and equitable and balanced news coverage
of both sides.
Climate of respect and tolerance, particularly within the
public and private news media and among the two campaigns.
BEYOND THE RECALL REFERENDUM
We should not lose sight of the fact that the referendum itself
will not solve the underlying divisions within Venezuela society. It
will help to resolve the question as to the level of confidence that
the Venezuelan people have in the government of Hugo Chavez at this
moment, and it will provide for the citizens to express their will in
this unprecedented exercise of participatory democracy. But it will not
resolve the fundamental differences with regard to the future direction
of the country.
Resolving those differences will take a renewed effort of dialogue
and direct communication among political and social actors to
understand one another's grievance. It will take a concerted effort at
social reconciliation to heal the trauma that divides cities,
neighborhoods and even families. It will take a long time to overcome
the personal hurt and fear that has arisen as a result of some
government supporters being driven out of their homes and not able to
enter restaurants or public places without ``cacerolas'' and
harassment, and opposition members who fear persecution or even
violence from gangs of motorcyclists or ``hordes' of poor people
descending from the mountains to defend their revolutions.
Resolving those differences will also require a concerted national
effort to devise a consensus plan to tackle the serious poverty
problem, which has resulted in the alarming social dislocation of a
society moving from a 25% rate of poverty in the 1970s to a 75% poverty
rate two decades later and the discourse of the haves vs. the have-nots
in the current political debate.
Finally, resolving those differences will require restoring checks
and balances in government, and guaranteeing apolitical space for
whoever loses an election, so that a losing party need not fear
recrimination, vengeance, or a loss of voice and rights in a winner-
take-all political system, and knows it will have a chance to run
again.
Senator Coleman. Thank you very, very much, Dr. McCoy.
Mr. Vivanco, before you begin your testimony, Senator
Nelson has another commitment. I know that he had a question
for Dr. McCoy. So what I will do is, Senator Nelson, why do you
not proceed with the questioning, and then we will go with Mr.
Vivanco's testimony after that.
Senator Nelson. Dr. McCoy, I sent part of our staff down
there to Venezuela to see how things are going and got back a
report that I would like for you to comment on, that with the
issuing of the national ID cards, that some members of the
military and other government organizations are confiscating
these cards from opposition voters to keep them from voting,
and that others who are trying to get registered are being
harassed so as not to be registered. Do you think this is
serious and how would the Carter Center monitor this to make
sure that that is not happening to see that there is a free and
fair election?
Dr. McCoy. We have not had reports about confiscation of
national ID cards in this current period we are talking about,
leading up to the vote. Monitoring any form of intimidation or
harassment is extremely difficult. What we do is ask for
reports and ask for the compilation of as much concrete
evidence as possible from those who are making the complaint.
We also turn those over to proper authorities as well because
we do not have the capacity to investigate. But any kind of
harassment or intimidation we denounce.
Senator Nelson. You have clearly seen the newspaper reports
about the question of the new voting machines. What, if
anything, will the Carter organization do as you try to monitor
the fairness of these elections? And mind you, I come from a
State that is very sensitive about the accuracy of voting
machines.
Dr. McCoy. Well, my State of Georgia is the first State in
the country to use voting machines throughout the State, and I
was very happy with them in the last process that I
participated in.
On these particular machines, the Smartmatic machines, I
personally went with an entire team, including an engineer and
a statistician, some technical people on our team, to receive a
full presentation of the machine. I have been trying to check
into them as much as possible. We were very impressed with the
presentation we received, the security measures that were shown
to us, and the functioning of the machine that we witnessed.
However, just as in the United States, the same
controversies and concerns about the black box of the computer
exists in Venezuela, those questions. So a very important
process is having the paper trail, the paper receipts, which
are provided by these machines. It is my understanding that the
National Electoral Council has decided to carry out an audit on
the evening of the vote, after the vote is completed, of a
sample of the machines that would count the paper trails and
compare those with the results, which is definitely our
recommendation. That I think is very important to bring
confidence and transparency to the process.
Senator Nelson. Well, if Venezuela pulls that off, the
State of Florida is not even doing that with a paper trail. So
maybe Venezuela will teach Florida something.
Dr. McCoy. I hope so.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Thank you, Dr.
McCoy.
Mr. Vivanco.
STATEMENT OF JOSE M. VIVANCO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAS
DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Mr. Vivanco. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
submit for the record my written testimony.
Senator Coleman. Without objection.
Mr. Vivanco. Venezuela is one of the most politically
polarized countries in the hemisphere. It has been in the state
of almost perpetual political crisis for some time now.
Opponents of President Hugo Chavez have sought to remove him
from office on several occasions, through an aborted coup
d'etat in 2002 and through a costly general strike in 2003.
Fortunately, the government and the opposition have since
agreed to address Venezuela's political disagreements within
the framework of the constitution and the rule of law. In
August, the country will hold a national referendum to
determine whether or not President Chavez should remain in
office.
This agreement has been an important achievement for
Venezuela. And it underscores the point that I want to stress
at the outset of my testimony: Venezuela today is a democracy.
It might be an imperfect democracy, a fragile democracy, but it
is nonetheless a democracy.
Human Rights Watch has sought to provide an objective and
impartial perspective on human rights developments in Venezuela
at a time when political tensions have encouraged some to
exaggerate or misrepresent the country's problems.
One issue we have focused on is freedom of the press, not
because it is absent in Venezuela, but because it is a central
point of contention in the ongoing political crisis. Until now,
the government of President Chavez has largely respected press
freedom even in the face of a strident and well-resourced
opposition press. Indeed, as part of the often heated and
acrimonious debate between supporters of the government and its
opponents, the press has been able to express strong views
without restriction.
At the same time, however, many journalists working for
media that support the opposition have been victims of
aggression and intimidation by government supporters. And, to a
lesser degree, journalists working for media sympathetic to the
government have also been subject to acts of intimidation.
Moreover, the government's respect for press freedom could be
threatened by draft legislation introduced last year that would
impose stringent and detailed controls over radio and
television broadcasts, greatly limiting what could be aired
during normal viewing hours. Fortunately, the National Assembly
has not moved to pass the legislation which still requires a
final debate and vote.
A second issue and the main subject of my remarks today
entails threats to the independence of the country's judiciary.
Over the past year, President Chavez and his allies have taken
steps to control Venezuela's judicial branch. These steps
undercut the separation of powers and the independence of
judges. They violate basic principles of Venezuela's
constitution and international human rights law, and they
represent the most serious threat to Venezuela's fragile
democracy since the 2002 coup.
The most brazen of these steps is a law passed last month
that expands the Supreme court from 20 to 32 members. The new
law allows Chavez's governing coalition to use its slim
majority in the legislature to obtain an overwhelming majority
of seats on the supreme court. The law also allows his
coalition to nullify the appointments of sitting justices based
on extremely subjective criteria. In short, Chavez's supporters
can now both pack and purge the country's highest court.
It is this court that may ultimately determine the outcome
of the recall referendum scheduled for August 15. It will have
to decide whether Chavez, should he lose the recall, can run
again in the subsequent election, and it will have to resolve
any legal challenges that arise from the recall vote itself,
which is expected to be hotly contested. Pro-Chavez legislators
have already announced their intention to name the new justices
by next month, in time for the referendum.
Such a political takeover of the supreme court will also
compound damage already being done to judicial independence by
the court itself. The supreme court has summarily fired several
lower court judges after they decided politically controversial
issues, and it has failed to grant 80 percent of the country's
judges security of tenure, which is an essential ingredient of
judicial independence.
President Chavez's supporters in the legislative and
judicial branches have sought to assuage concerns about the
court-packing law by insisting that those wielding authority
over judges and justices will show restraint and respect for
the rule of law. Such assurances are beside the point, however.
A rule of law that relies on the self-restraint of those with
power is not in fact the rule of law.
Chavez supporters justify the court-packing law largely as
a response to pro-opposition rulings in a deeply divided court
such as a highly questionable one that absolved military
officers who participated in the 2002 coup. They also point to
the failure of lower court judges to address allegedly illegal
activities carried out as part of the general strike in 2003
that cost the country billions of dollars in oil revenue and
did enormous harm to the economy. It may be true that some
judges have let opposition members off the hook after they
sought to undermine the rule of law. But Chavez and his
supporters should now be taking steps to strengthen the
judiciary. Instead they are rigging the system to favor their
own interests.
Whether the current crisis is resolved peacefully and
lawfully will depend in large part on the country's judiciary.
It is the courts that must ultimately determine whether
decisions by the country's electoral authorities are valid, as
well as whether the actions of Chavez supporters and opponents
in the streets are legally permissible.
It is not too late for Venezuela to reverse course.
President Chavez's governing coalition in the National Assembly
could still suspend implementation of the new law. And the
supreme court could strike down, on constitutional grounds, the
provisions of the court-packing law that subject the court to
political domination by the governing coalition.
Senator Dodd. Are you getting close to the end there?
Mr. Vivanco. I am close. Just three more paragraphs.
Senator Dodd. As long as it was not written like Ulysses,
we will be fine.
Mr. Vivanco. The international community should do all it
can to encourage Venezuela to protect and strengthen judicial
independence. Unfortunately, however, the ability of the United
States to advocate for democracy in Venezuela was severely hurt
in 2002 when the Bush administration chose to blame Chavez for
his own ouster rather than unequivocally denouncing the coup.
In addition, the Abu Ghraib prison scandal has undermined the
administration's moral authority when it comes to promoting the
rule of law abroad.
If the United States is to have a positive influence in
Venezuela today, it will have to be through the sort of
multilateral diplomacy that the Bush administration endorsed
when it signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001.
The Democratic Charter authorized the OAS to respond actively
to threats to democracy in the region, ranging from coup
d'etats to government policies that undermine the democratic
process, and it identifies judicial independence as an
essential component of a democratic system.
When the United States, Venezuela, and other countries in
the hemisphere signed the Democratic Charter in 2001, the
committed themselves to work together to defend democracy in
the region and to respond to emerging threats before serious
harm is done to a country's democratic institutions. Today
Venezuela faces such a threat and the international community
should engage with the Venezuelan Government to address it.
Thanks a lot.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Vivanco follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jose Miguel Vivanco
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
Thank you for your invitation to address the committee regarding
the human rights situation in Venezuela. I know the committee is most
interested in an exchange of views, so my remarks will be brief. I
would like to submit, for the record, my written testimony.
Venezuela is one of the most politically polarized countries in the
hemisphere. It has been in a state of almost perpetual political crisis
for some time now. Opponents of President Hugo Chavez have sought to
remove him from office on several occasions--through an aborted coup
d'etat in 2002 and through a costly general strike in 2003.
Fortunately, the government and the opposition have since agreed to
address Venezuela's political disagreements within the framework of the
Constitution and the rule of law. In August, the country will hold a
national referendum to determine whether or not President Chavez should
remain in office.
This agreement has been an important achievement for Venezuela. And
it underscores the point that I want to stress at the outset of my
testimony: Venezuela today is a democracy. It may be an imperfect
democracy, a fragile democracy--but it is, nonetheless, a democraoy.
The principle concern of the international commumty with regards to
Venezuela should be to help the country strengthen its democratic
institutions and ensure that it does not suffer another rupture of its
constitutional order, as occurred during the 2002 coup.
Human Rights Watch has sought to provide an objective and impartial
perspective on human rights developments in Venezuela at a time when
political tensions have encouraged some to exaggerate or misrepresent
the country's problems.
One issue we have focused on is freedom of the press--not because
it is absent in Venezuela, but because it is a central point of
contention in the ongoing political crisis. Until now, the government
of President Chavez has largely respected press freedom even in the
face of a strident and well-resourced opposition press. Indeed, as part
of the often heated and acrimonious debate between supporters of the
government and its opponents, the press has been able to express strong
views without restriction.
At the same time, however, many journalists working for media that
support the opposition have been victims of aggression and intimidation
by government supporters. And, to a lesser degree, journalists working
for media sympathetic to the government have also been subject to acts
of intimidation. Moreover, the government's respect for press freedoms
could be threatened by draft legislation introduced last year that
would impose stringent and detailed controls over radio and television
broadcasts, greatly limiting what could be aired during normal viewing
hours. Fortunately the National Assembly has not moved to pass the
legislation, which still requires a final debate and vote.
Another issue we have addressed is abusive practices by state
security forces. In March of this year, in the midst of the most
serious unrest since the 2002 coup, we received credible reports that
National Guard and police officers beat and tortured people who were
detained during the recent protests in Caracas and other Venezuelan
cities. The abuses allegedly committed appeared to enjoy official
approval at some level of command in the forces responsible for them.
A third issue--and the main subject of my remarks today--entails
threats to the independence of the country's judiciary. Over the past
year, President Chavez and his allies have taken steps to control
Venezuela's judicial branch. These steps undercut the separation of
powers and the independence of judges. They violate basic principles of
Venezuela's constitution and international human rights law. And they
represent the most serious threat to Venezuela's fragile democracy
since the 2002 coup.
The most brazen of these steps is a law passed last month that
expands the Supreme Court from twenty to thirty-two members. The new
law allows Chavez's governing coalition to use its slim majority in the
legislature to obtain an overwhelming majority of seats on the Supreme
Court. The law also allows his coalition to nullify the appointments of
sitting justices based on extremely subjective criteria. In short,
Chavez's supporters can now both pack and purge the country's highest
court.
It is this court that may ultimately determine the outcome of the
recall referendum scheduled for August 15. It will have to decide
whether Chavez, should he lose the recall, can run again in the
subsequent election. And it will have to resolve any legal challenges
that arise from the recall vote itself, which is expected to be hotly
contested. Pro-Chavez legislators have already announced their
intention to name the new justices by next month, in time for the
referendum.
Such a political takeover of the Supreme Court will also compound
damage already being done to judicial independence by the Court itself.
The Supreme Court has summarily fired several lower-court judges after
they decided politically controversial cases. And it has failed to
grant 80 percent of the country's judges security of tenure, which is
an essential ingredient of judicial independence.
President Chavez's supporters in the legislative and judicial
branches have sought to assuage concerns about the court-packing law by
insisting that those wielding authority over judges and justices will
show restraint and respect for the rule of law. Such assurances are
beside the point, however. A rule of law that relies on the self-
restraint of those with power is not, in fact, the rule of law.
Chavez supporters justify the court-packing law largely as a
response to pro-opposition rulings in a deeply divided court, such as a
highly questionable one that absolved military officers who
participated in the 2002 coup. They also point to the failure of lower
court judges to address allegedly illegal activities carried out as
part of the general strike in 2003 that cost the country billions of
dollars in oil revenue and did enormous harm to the economy. It may be
true that some judges have let opposition members off the hook after
they sought to undermine the rule of law. But Chavez and his supporters
should now be taking steps to strengthen the judiciary. Instead they
are rigging the system to favor their own interests.
We have seen similar efforts before elsewhere in the region. During
the 1990s, President Carlos Menem severely undermined the rule of law
by packing Argentina's Supreme Court with his allies. In Peru,
President Alberto Fujimori went even further in controlling the courts,
through mass firings and the denial of tenure to judges. Venezuela is
currently pursuing both a court-packing scheme, similar to that of
Menem, and an assault on judicial independence, similar in spirit (if
not in scope) to that of Fujimori. As the experiences of Argentina and
Peru demonstrate, these efforts do not bode well for Venezuela's
democracy.
What makes the developments in Venezuela especially alarming is
their potential impact on the country's already volatile political
situation. Whether the current crisis is resolved peacefully and
lawfully will depend in large part on the country's judiciary. It is
the courts that must ultimately determine whether decisions by the
country's electoral authorities are valid--as well as whether the
actions of Chavez's supporters and opponents, in the streets and
elsewhere, are legally permissible. It is, in other words, the courts
that must ultimately ensure that the political conflict does not result
in the trampling of people's freedom of expression and association, due
process guarantees, and other basic human rights. To do so effectively,
it is imperative that judges and justices be able to act with the
independence and impartiality that are mandated by both the Venezuelan
constitution and international human rights law.
It is not too late for Venezuela to reverse course. President
Chavez's governing coalition in the National Assembly could still
suspend implementation of the new law before any permanent damage is
done. And the Supreme Court could strike down, on constitutional
grounds, the provisions of the court-packing law that subject the court
to political domination by the governing coalition.
The international community should do all it can to encourage
Venezuela to protect and strengthen judicial independence.
Unfortunately, however, the ability of the United States to advocate
for democracy in Venezuela was severely hurt in 2002 when the Bush
administration chose to blame Chavez for his own ouster rather than
unequivocally denouncing the coup. In addition, the Abu Ghraib prison
scandal has undermined the administration's moral authority when it
comes to promoting the rule of law abroad.
If the United States is to have a positive influence in Venezuela
today it will have to be through the sort of multilateral diplomacy
that the Bush administration endorsed when it signed the Inter-American
Democratic Charter in 2001. The Democratic Charter authorizes the OAS
to respond actively to threats to democracy in the region, ranging from
coup d'etats to government policies that undermine the democratic
process, and it identifies judicial independence as an essential
component of a democratic system.
During Venezuela's 2002 coup, the Charter was crucial in mobilizing
member states to join the chorus of condemnation that helped restore
President Chavez to office. The OAS should now use its authority under
Article 18 of the Charter to press the Venezuelan government to suspend
implementation of the court-packing law. The OAS should also offer to
mediate Venezuelan efforts to reach a consensus on how to strengthen
the independence of the judiciary.
International lending agencies could also have a positive influence
on the situation in Venezuela. The World Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank have supported projects aimed at improving the
administration ofjustice in Venezuela--from training prosecutors and
police to developing court infrastructure. The most urgent improvement
needed now is the strengthening of judicial independence and autonomy.
Without that, other improvements may only help a fundamentally flawed
system function more efficiently. To encourage progress where it is
most needed, all future international assistance aimed at improving the
Venezuelan justice system should be made contingent upon Venezuela
taking immediate and concrete steps to shore up the independence of its
judges and the autonomy of its highest court.
When the United States, Venezuela, and other countries in the
hemisphere signed the Democratic Charter in 2001, they committed
themselves to work together to defend democracy in the region and to
respond to emerging threats before serious harm is done to a country's
democratic institutions. Today Venezuela faces such a threat, and the
international community should engage with the Venezuelan government to
address it.
______
[Human Rights Watch--June 2004, Vol. 16, No. 3 (B)]
Rigging the Rule of Law:
Judicial Independence Under Siege in Venezuela
I. SUMMARY
When Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez Frias faced a coup d'etat in
April 2002, advocates of democracy in Venezuela and abroad roundly
condemned the assault on the country's constitutional order. Today
Venezuela faces another constitutional crisis that could severely
impair its already fragile democracy. This time, though, the threat
comes from the government itself.
Over the past year, President Chavez and his allies have taken
steps to control the country's judicial branch, undermining the
separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary in ways that
violate basic principles of Venezuela's constitution and international
human rights law.
The most brazen of these steps is a law passed last month that
expands the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia) from twenty to
thirty-two members. The National Assembly will choose the new justices
by a simple majority vote. With the new Organic Law of the Supreme
Court (Ley Organica del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, LOTSJ), the
governing coalition will be able to use its slim majority in the
legislature to obtain an overwhelming majority of seats on the Supreme
Court. It will also have the power to nuffify existing justices'
appointments to the bench. It will, in short, be able to both pack and
purge the country's highest court.
A political takeover of the Supreme Court will only compound the
damage already done to judicial independence by policies pursued by the
Court itself. The Supreme Court, which has administrative control over
the judiciary, has suspended a program that would reduce the large
number of judges who do not have security of tenure. It has fired
judges after they decided politically controversial cases. And it has
allowed the country's second highest court to shut down by failing to
resolve the legal appeals of its dismissed judges. Depriving judges of
the security of tenure and allowing them to be summarily fired or
prevented from exercising their due process rights violates basic
principles of the Venezuelan constitution and international human
rights law.
Human Rights Watch conducted research in Venezuela in May 2004,
interviewing current and former judges and justices, justice officials,
jurists, legislators, journalists and foreign observers about the legal
and practical implications of these practices, as well as the
justifications that might exist for pursuing them.
The president of the Supreme Court, the attorney general and a pro-
Chavez legislator all sought to assuage our concerns about diminishing
judicial independence by insisting that those wielding authority over
judges and justices would show restraint and respect for the rule of
law. Such assurances are beside the point, however. A rule of law that
relies on the self-restraint of those with power is not in fact the
rule of law.
Several officials stressed the need to understand the attitude of
President Chavez's opponents, many of whom--they argued--are unwilling
to engage in meaningful compromise or subject themselves to the rule of
law. They insisted that judges and even Supreme Court justices decide
cases based on their political convictions rather than the dictates of
the law. As examples they cited the Supreme Court's failure to convict
alleged participants in the 2002 coup and the failure of lower court
judges to address allegedly illegal activities carried out as part of
the general strike in 2003 that cost the country billions of dollars in
oil revenue and did enormous harm to the economy.
It is true that some sectors of the opposition have subverted the
rule of law in their efforts to bring down President Chavez. It might
also be true that some opposition judges allow their political
convictions to interfere with their application of the law. But rather
than take steps to strengthen the rule of law, Chavez's allies and
supporters have instead moved to rig the system to favor their own
interests.
We have seen similar efforts before elsewhere in the region. During
the 1990s, President Carlos Menem in Argentina and President Alberto
Fujimori in Peru succeeded in remaking their judiciaries to serve their
own interests. The changes ensured their influence over the courts and
contributed to a climate of lawlessness that would facilitate the forms
of corruption for which both former presidents face criminal charges
today.
What makes the developments in Venezuela even more alarming is
their potential impact on the country's already explosive political
situation. Tensions have been mounting for months as President Chavez's
opponents have sought a recall referendum to end his presidency. When
the country's National Electoral Council (CNE) disqualified hundreds of
thousands of signatures on a petition to authorize the referendum,
thousands of people joined street protests, which culminated in violent
confrontations with state security forces that left thirteen people
dead, scores wounded, and hundreds more in police detention.
Whether the current crisis is resolved peacefully and lawfully will
depend in large part on the country's judiciary. It is the courts that
must ultimately determine whether the CNE's decisions are valid--as
well as whether the actions of Chavez's supporters and opponents, in
the streets and elsewhere, are legally permissible. It is, in other
words, the courts that must ultimately ensure that the political
conflict does not result in the trampling of people's freedom of
expression and association, due process guarantees, and other basic
human rights. To do so effectivdy, it is imperative that judges and
justices be able to act with the independence and impartiality that are
mandated by the Venezuelan constitution and international human rights
law.
Main Recommendations
The future of Venezuela's judiciary is now largely in the hands of
its highest court. To salvage the autonomy of the judicial branch, the
Supreme Court should strike down, on constitutional grounds, the
provisions of the court-packing law that subject the court to the
political agenda of the governing coalition. To promote the
independence of judges, the Supreme Court, in its administrative
capacity, should reactivate the suspended program that would create
judgeships with security of tenure and ensure full and prompt due
process for judges facing dismissal, especially those accused of
mishandling politically sensitive cases.
The international community can help. In recent years, the World
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank have supported projects
aimed at improving the administration of justice in Venezuela--from
training prosecutors and police to developing court infrastructure. The
most urgent improvement needed now is the strengthening of judicial
independence and autonomy. Without that, other improvements may only
help a fundamentally flawed system function more efficiently. To
encourage progress where it is most needed, all future international
assistance aimed at improving the Venezuelan justice system should be
made contingent upon Venezuela taking immediate and concrete steps to
shore up the independence of its judges and the autonomy of its highest
court.
The Organization of American States (OAS) also has a vital role to
play. The Inter-American Democratic Charter, signed in 2001 by foreign
ministers of Venezuela and thirty-three other democracies, authorizes
the OAS to respond actively to threats to the democratic order of its
member states. It was this commitment to defending democracy that led
the OAS to denounce the aborted coup against President Chavez in April
2002. Today Venezuela's democratic order is threatened in a different
way, as the judiciary's increasing vulnerability to political
manipulation undermines the country's rule of law. Unless concrete
steps are taken immediately in Venezuela to reverse this course, the
secretary general of the OAS should use his authority under Article 18
of the Charter to take actions, with the prior consent of the
Venezuelan government, to assess the situation and possibly seek a
collective response from the OAS.
The ultimate responsibility for the crisis in Venezuela's judiciary
lies with President Chavez and his governing coalition. To prevent
further erosion of the country's separation of powers, the president
should instruct his supporters in the National Assembly to suspend
implementation of the new court-packing law immediately and promote
legislation that would modify those provisions that undermine the
independence of the judiciary. The president should also be prepared to
welcome and collaborate actively with the secretary general of the OAS,
should the organization seek ways to help Venezuela address the crisis
facing its judiciary.
II. INTERNATIONAL NORMS ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The OAS and the Inter-American Democratic Charter
Democracy is indispensable for human rights, and an independent
judiciary is indispensable for democracy. The thirty-four foreign
ministers of the Organization of American States (OAS) recognized these
propositions when they adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter in
2001.\1\ The Charter defines the ``[e]ssential elements of
representative democracy'' to indude ``access to and the exercise of
power in accordance with the rule of law'' and ``the separation of
powers and independence of the branches of government.'' \2\
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\1\ Art. 7, Inter-American Democratic Charter. ``Democracy is
indispensable for the effective exercise of fundamental freedoms and
human rights in their universality, indivisibility and interdependence,
embodied in the respective constitutions of states and in Inter-
American and international human rights instruments.''
\2\ Art. 3, Inter-American Democratic Charter. ``Essential elements
of representative democracy include, inter alia, respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, access to and the exercise of power in
accordance with the rule of law, the holding of periodic, free, and
fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage as an
expression of the sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic system of
political parties and organizations, and the separation of powers and
independence of the branches of govemment.'' (Emphasis added.)
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The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights emphasized this link
between judicial independence and democratic rule of law in its 2003
report on Venezuela:
The observance of rights and freedoms in a democracy requires
a legal and institutional order in which the laws prevail over
the will of the rulers, and in which there is judicial review
of the constitutionality and legality of the acts of public
power, i.e., it presupposes respect for the rule of law.
Judiciaries are established to ensure compliance with laws;
they are dearly the fundamental organs for preventing the abuse
of power and protecting human rights. To fulfill this function,
they must be independent and impartial.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ lnter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the
Situation of Human Rights In Venezuela, December 29, 2003, paras. 150-
1.
It is important to note that the definition of democracy found in
the Inter-American Charter and in the findings of the Inter-American
Commission was informed in large part by recent history. During the
1990s, several countries in the region saw democratically-elected
presidents pursue policies that undermined the separation of powers and
rule of law, and thereby degraded their own democracies. In Argentina,
President Carlos Menem pushed a court-backing law through congress in
1990, expanding the Supreme Court from five to nine members, and
managed to get the new openings filled by his allies. The move assured
him an ``automatic majority''--as it came to be known in Argentina--
that ruled regularly in his favor, often using highly dubious legal
reasoning.
In Peru, President Alberto Fujimori undercut the independence of
the country's judges through mass firings and the denial of tenure, as
well as the passage of laws that circumvented constitutional provisions
aimed at guaranteeing judicial autonomy and restricting executive
power. Fujimori justified these policies as efforts to combat
corruption and inefficiency. But what he succeeded in doing--to an even
greater extent than Menem--was to ensure his own influence over the
courts. The resulting climate of lawlessness in both countries
facilitated the forms of corruption for which both former presidents
face criminal charges today.
Venezuela is currently pursuing both a court-packing scheme,
similar to that of Menem, and an assault on judicial independence,
similar in spirit (if not in scope) to that of Fujimori. As the
experiences of Argentina and Peru demonstrate, these efforts do not
bode well for Venezuela's democracy.
International Human Rights Treaties
In addition to its commitment to democracy under the Inter-American
Charter, Venezuela is party to human rights treaties--including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American
Convention on Human Rights--that require it to safeguard the
independence of its judiciary.\4\ What that obligation entails is made
dear by a series of ``basic principles'' on the independence of the
judiciary endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly.\5\ These
principles indude:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The American Convention on Human Rights (provides that: ``Every
person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a
reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal,
previously established by law, In the substantiation of any accusation
of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his
rights and obligations of (. . .) any other nature.'' (Emphasis added.)
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (art. 14,
para. 1) also indicates the importance of the independence of the
judiciary by establishing that ``All persons shall be equal before the
courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge
against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law,
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. . . . (Emphasis
added.)
\5\ Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, endorsed
by United Nations General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November
1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985.
Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against
judicial appointments for improper motives.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Ibid., art. 10.
The term of office of judges, their independence, security,
adequate remuneration, conditions of service, pensions and the
age of retirement shall be adequately secured by law.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Ibid., art. 11.
Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed
tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the condusion of
their term of office, where such exists.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Ibid., art. 12.
A charge or complaint made against a judge in his/her
judicial and professional capacity shall be processed
expeditiously and fairly under an appropriate procedure. The
judge shall have the right to a fair hearing. . . .\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Ibid., art. 17.
Judges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for
reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to
discharge their duties.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Ibid., art. 18.
All disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be
determined in accordance with established standards of judicial
conduct.\11\
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\11\ Ibid., art. 19.
As this report shows, Venezuela is currently in contravention of
all of these principles. In doing so, it undermines its rule of law and
severely degrades its democracy.
III. BACKGROUND
The Judiciary's Disreputable Past
When President Chavez became president in 1999, he inherited a
judiciary that had been plagued for years by influence-peddling,
political interference, and, above all, corruption. In interviews with
Human Rights Watch, lawyers from across the political spectrum
described a system in which justice had often been for sale to the
highest bidder. Attorney General Isaias Rodriguez recalled how the
country's top administrative court in the past actually established set
fees for resolving different kinds of cases.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Human Rights Watch interview with Attorney General Isaias
Rodriguez, Caracas, May 14, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A 1996 report on the Venezuelan justice system by the Lawyer's
Committee for Human Rights painted a grim portrait of the judiciary:
Rather than serving the constitutional role of defender of
the rule of law and protector of the human rights of Venezuelan
citizens against the government, the courts had often become
highly politicized adjuncts of the parties. They were
manipulated by groups of lawyers, judges, political and
business actors for private economic gain. And court procedures
had become so slow, cumbersome and unreliable that disputants
avoided them at all costs.\13\
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\13\ ``Halfway to Reform: The Wodd Bank and the Venezuelan Justice
System,'' A Joint Report by The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and
The Venezuelan Program for Human Rights Education and Action, 1996,
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/
halfway.htm.
In terms of public credibility, the system was bankrupt. A 1998
survey by the United Nations Development Program found that only 0.8
percent of the population had confidence in the judiciary.\14\ That
distrust translated into public outrage, and in the presidential
election of that year, candidates across the political spectrum--
including Hugo Chavez Frias--promised to clean up the system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ United Nations Development Program, Justicia y gobemabilidad.
Venezuela: una reforma judicial en marcha. Caracas: Editorial Nueva
Sociedad, 1998, p. 143. Cited in Tribunal Supremo de Justicia,
Direccion Ejecutiva de la Magistratura, Unidad Coordinadora del
Proyecto de Modernizacion del Poder Judicial, ``Proyecto pars la Mejora
de la Administracion de Justicia en el Contexto de la Resolucion de
Conflictos en Venezueia,'' p.8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Declaring a Judicial Emergency
Once in office, President Chavez launched an ambitious effort to
reform the Venezuelan state that included holding a referendum to
convene a National Constituent Assembly, which then drafted a new
constitution that went into effect in December 1999. Due to the
overwhelming public consensus that judicial reform was needed, the
Chavez administration initially found support for its efforts in this
area even among its political adversaries.
One of the first acts of the National Constituent Assembly was to
declare that the judiciary was in a state of emergency. It suspended
the tenure of judges and created an emergency commission which it
empowered to suspend judges who faced seven or more complaints or any
type of criminal investigation, or who showed signs of wealth
incommensurate with their salaried income. In the following months, the
emergency commission removed hundreds of judges from their posts.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, Direccion Ejecutiva de la
Magistratura, Unidad Coordinadora del Proyecto de Modernizacion del
Poder Judicial, ``Proyecto pars la Mejora de la Administracion de
Justicia en el Contexto de Ia Resolucion de Conflictos en Venezuela,''
p. 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Political Polarization under Chavez
The consensus around judicial reforms has largely dissolved as the
country has grown increasingly polarized in response to President
Chavez's policies and style of governance. Over the past three years
the mounting political tensions have erupted into violence on several
occasions and there have been three concerted efforts by sectors of the
opposition to remove President Chavez from office: an aborted coup
d'etat in April 2002, a national strike that lasted from December 2002
through February 2003 (and had an enormously negative impact on the
country's economy), and a petition drive held in December 2003 to
authorize a referendum.
The polarization, which pervades Venezuelan society, has found its
way into the Supreme Court as well. All twenty sitting justices were
selected by the National Constituent Assembly in March 2000 through a
2/3 majority vote, which would suggest they had support from people
across the political spectrum. Today, however, it is common wisdom
within the legal community that the Court is deeply divided between
opponents and allies of President Chavez. It is an even, ten-ten split,
with each camp controlling some of the Court's six chambers. The
opposition camp is said to have a majority of seats in the electoral
chamber. The pro-Chavez camp has a majority in the constitutional
chamber, as well as on the six-member Judicial Commission that handles
many of the Court's administrative affairs. Supreme Court President
Ivan Rincon Urdaneta, who is a member of both the constitutional
chamber and the Judicial Commission, is viewed as an ally of President
Chavez.
IV. DISPOSABLE JUDGES
Provisional Judgeships
Venezuela denies its judges one of the most basic safeguards of
judicial independence: security of tenure. While this problem existed
long before President Chavez came to office, it has become particularly
acute as the country has become politically polarized over the last few
years. The vast majority of the country's judges hold provisional or
temporary appointments. The tenuousness of their postings makes them
more vulnerable to external pressures aimed at influencing their
application of the law.
The Venezuelan constitution safeguards judicial independence by
requiring that judges be selected through public competitions and
removed only through legally sanctioned procedures.\16\ The
constitution requires that these procedures provide the judges with due
process (including the right to be heard).\17\ The laws regulating the
procedures for removal require that it be motivated by misconduct on
the part of the judge.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Art. 255, Constitution of the Bolivanan Republic of Venezuela.
``Appointment to a judicial position and the promotion of judges shall
be carried out by means of public competitions, to ensure the
capability and excellence of the participants and those selected by the
juries of the judicial circuits, in such manner and on such terms as
may be established by law. The appointment and swearing in of judges
shall be the responsibility of the Supreme Court of Justice. Citizen
participation in the process of selecting and designating judges shall
be guaranteed by law. Judges may only be removed or suspended from
office through the procedures expressly provided for by Iaw.''
(Emphasis added.)
\17\ Art. 49, Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
``Due process will be provided in all judicial and administrative
proceedings; consequently. . . . 2) Every person has the right to be
heard in any type of proceeding, with the proper guarantees and within
a reasonable time determined bylaw, by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established previously. . . .''
\18\ Art. 3, Ley de Carrera Judicial (1998): ``Judges will have the
benefit of security of tenure in the fulfillment of their office.
Consequently, they will only be subject to removal or suspension in the
exercise of their function in the situations and through the process
determined by this law.'' Art. 40: ``Without prejudice to the criminal
and civil penalties that might be applicable, judges will be dismissed
from their posts, after receiving due process, for the following
causes: . . .'' (The article then lists types of conduct that provide
cause for dismissal.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet only 20 percent of the country's 1732 judges currently hold
permanent appointments and enjoy the rights established in the
constitution. The remaining 80 percent hold positions as
``provisional'' judges (52 percent), ``temporary'' judges (26 percent),
or other non-permanent postings (2 percent).\19\ The provisional judges
hold their posts until a public competition is held to select the
judges who will fill them on a permanent basis. Temporary judges are
appointed to fill temporary openings, such as those created when a
sitting judge takes a parental or sick leave.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ lnformation provided through e-mail correspondence with
Executive Director of the Magistracy, Supreme Tribunal of Justice,
Ricardo Jimenez Dan, May 20, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Judicial Commission of the Supreme Court, made up of six
justices including the Supreme Court president, is in charge of
appointing and removing these non-tenured judges. The commission
maintains that it can summarily dismiss temporary judges, without cause
and without the due process protections afforded permanent judges.\20\
Provisional judges, by contrast, are entitled to the same security of
tenure as permanent judges, at least until the public competition are
held to fill their posts. Yet, as described below, the Judicial
Commission has also summarily fired provisional judges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ The Judicial Commission of the Supreme Court has asserted this
authority explicitly in written responses to appeals filed by judges it
has summarily fired. See note 37 below.
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International human rights monitors have repeatedly criticized
Venezuela's reliance on provisional judges. In 2001, the United Nations
Human Rights Committee expressed its concern that, under the current
system, Venezuelan judges could be removed for merely fulfilling their
judicial duties.\21\ In 2003, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights echoed this concern, observing that ``having a high percentage
of provisional judges has a serious detrimental impact on citizens'
right to proper justice and on the judges' right to stability in their
positions as a guarantee of judicial independence and autonomy.'' \22\
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\21\ Concluding observations by the Human Rights Committee:
Venezuela. 26/04/2001. ``An extended reform process threatens the
independence of the judiciary, given the possibility that judges could
be removed as a result of the performance of their duties, thus
infringing art. 2, paragraph 3, and art. 14 of the Covenant.''
\22\ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ``Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in Venezuela,'' December 29, 2003, paras.
159-177.
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Venezuelan justice officials, judges and jurists of all political
stripes also acknowledge the problem. In interviews with Human Rights
Watch, the Supreme Court president, other Supreme Court justices, the
attorney general, the ombudsman, and current and former judges all
conceded that the prevalence of provisional and temporary appointments
undermines judicial independence.
A major obstacle toward translating this consensus into real change
has been, ironically, the constitutional requirement that judges be
selected through public competitions. When the constitution came into
effect in 1999 there were already a large number of provisional judges
in the country. Figures from 1997 show only 40 percent of judges
holding permanent appointments.\23\ The number of provisional judges
increased considerably after the judicial emergency declared in 1999
led to large numbers of dismissals. (And it has increased further since
then as the judiciary has opened new courts in an effort to increase
access to justice.) Turning this large--and growing--number of
provisional judgeships into permanent ones requires holding public
competitions for each one.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, Direccion Ejecutiva de la
Magistratura, Unidad Coordinadora del Proyecto de Modernizacion del
Poder Judicial, ``Proyecto pars la Mejora de la Administracion de
Justicia en el Contexto de la Resolucion de Conflictos en Venezuela,''
p. 22.
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Toward that end, the judiciary launched a program of public
competitions for judgeships in November 2000. It was the most ambitious
program of its sort that Venezuela had seen, and produced over 200
permanent judges over the next two years.\24\ This addressed only a
fraction of the provisional judgeships, however, and in order to make a
real difference, the program should have been expanded and accelerated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Ibid, p. 23.
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Instead, in March 2003, the program was suspended. Human Rights
Watch received contradictory explanations for what prompted the
suspension. Supreme Court President Ivan Rincon Urdaneta said it was
because the evaluation system had broken down due to a variety of
factors, including efforts by powerful law firms to control some
evaluation committees and the decision of numerous evaluators to
abandon the program.\25\ Others involved in the program dispute this
account. Rene Molina, a former Inspector General of the Judiciary who
helped design the competition program, insists that the ``double-
blind'' procedure for selecting evaluators and administering the
competitions made it virtually impossible for special interests to take
over the committees.\26\ (Molina further recalled receiving pressure
from government officials to rig the competitions in favor of specific
candidates.) The Network of Watchers (Red de Veedores), a
nongovernmental organization that monitored the program, did report
instances of possible collusion between participants and jurors and
various administrative irregularities, but nothing that would justify
suspending the program.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Human Rights Watch Interview with Supreme Court President Ivan
Rincon Urdaneta, Caracas, May 13, 2004.
\26\ Human Rights Watch interview with Rene Molina, Caracas, May
14, 2004.
\27\ Red de Veedores, ``Poder Judicial y Sistema de Justicia en
Venezuela 2002-3.'' Available at http//veedores.org/nodos/veejudicial/
informes/observacionpoderjudicial.htm.
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Critics of the government have suggested that the real motive for
suspending the program was the desire of Judicial Commission members to
continue naming and removing judges at their own discretion. Whatever
the true motive might be, the outcome has been precisely that the
Judicial Commission continues to exercise virtually unchecked authority
to appoint and remove judges.
Judges Summarily Fired
The danger of denying judges secure tenure was apparent earlier
this year when three judges were summarily fired after releasing people
detained during anti-government protests. The fixings occurred on March
2, when Venezuela was in the midst of the most serious unrest it had
seen since the attempted coup against the government in April 2002. An
opposition demonstration on February 27 had turned violent as civilians
clashed with units of the National Guard in central Caracas. Street
protests and confrontations continued through the next week, leaving
thirteen people dead and over 100 wounded. Government forces detained
hundreds of people and, after violently abusing some of them, sought
court orders for their prolonged detention pending prosecution.
Three Caracas judges who received such cases were Miguel Luna,
Petra Jimenez and Maria Trastoy. Luna received the case of two detained
opposition legislators on Saturday, February 28; Jimenez received the
case of a detained man on Monday, March1; and Trastoy received the case
of six other detainees at the end of that same day.
All three judges ruled that the public prosecutors had not
presented sufficient evidence to warrant ongoing detention of the
suspects and ordered their immediate and unconditional release.\28\
Their rulings would all be upheld subsequently by appellate courts.\29\
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\28\ Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Maria Trastoy and
Miguel Luna, May 18, 2004.
\29\ Ibid. Corte de Apelaciones del Circuito Judicial Penal de la
Circunscripcion Judicial del Area Metropolitana de Caracas Sala Quinta,
Actuacion No. SA-5-04-1442, Caracas, April 12, 2004 (upholding ruling
by Petra Jimenez). Corte de Apelaciones del Circuito Judicial Penal de
la Circunscripcion Judicial del Area Metropolitana de Caracas Sala
Quinta Accidental, Actuacion No. SA-5-04-1436, Caracas, AprIl 14, 2004
(upholding ruling by Maria Trastoy).
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All three were dismissed from their posts on Tuesday, March 2. They
received notices from the Supreme Court President Ivan Rincon Urdaneta
informing them that the Supreme Court's Judicial Commission had decided
that morning to nullify their appointments ``due to observations that
were presented before this office.'' \30\ The notices did not reveal
what the ``observations'' had been, nor why they might have warranted
their dismissal.
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\30\ (``. . . en razon de las observaciones que fueron formuladas
por ante este Despacho.'') Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, Sala Plena,
Documents No. TPE-04-0231, Caracas, March 2, 2004 (notification to
Maria del Carmen Tratoy Hombre); Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, Sala
Plena, Oficio No. TPE-04-0231, Caracas. March 2, 2004 (notification to
Petra Margarita Jimenez Ortega).
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When asked about the three judges, Rincon told Human Rights Watch
that they had been temporary judges, who had been in their posts for a
short period, and were not entitled to the administrative procedures
afforded permanent and provisional judges. He insisted, however, that
this did not mean that they had been denied their due process rights,
as they were entitled to challenge the decision through an ``appeal for
reconsideration'' (recurso de reconsideracion) to the Commission. Only
one of the judges had chosen to do so, he said, and that one had been
reinstated. The other two had chosen instead to take their claims to
the press. He said they were working with an opposition political party
and were ``just doing politics.'' \31\
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\31\ Rights Watch interview with Supreme Court President Ivan
Rincon Urdaneta, Caracas, May 13, 2004.
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Rincon's account was inaccurate on several levels. None of the
judges had temporary appointments. Two were provisional judges and
therefore, by his own admission, entitled to the normal disciplinary
procedure.\32\ The third judge, Petra Jimenez, who had an appointment
as a ``special substitute'' (suplente especial), had been serving as a
judge continuously for almost three years.
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\32\ Tribunal Suprenio de Justicia, Direccion Ejecutiva de la
Magistratura, ``Designacion del Martes, 02 de Marzo de 2004.''
Available at http//www.tsj.gov.ve/designaciones/
designacion.asp?fecha_id=93.
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All three judges did in fact challenge their dismissals through
``appeals for reconsideration'' to the Judicial Commission. One of
them, Luna, was indeed reinstated, (though he has since been summarily
fired once again.) The other two, Trastoy and Jimenez, report receiving
no response to their appeals.\33\
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\33\ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Maria Trastoy, May
18, 2004.
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The recourse provided by the appeal process does not change the
fact that these judges were fired without a hearing. They may be able
to present a defense, ex post facto, through the appeals process.
However, this right to appeal is largely meaningless so long as they
are not informed of the reasons for their dismissals (since it requires
them to guess the charges they must defend themselves against)--and so
long as the commission maintains that its decision is entirely
discretionary.
Human Rights Watch obtained a copy of a ruling issued by the
Judicial Commission in response to an ``appeal for reconsideration''
submitted by another judge who had been summarily fired under
questionable circumstances. Mercedes Chocron was removed from her post
as a temporary judge in January 2003 after she attempted to carry a
judicial inspection of a military base where a general was being held
on charges of alleged crimes committed in the context of anti-
government activity. (The purpose of the inspection was to ensure that
the government was complying with precautionary measures ordered by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.) The Judicial Commission's
ruling did not address the reasons for Chocron's dismissal but merely
provided a legal basis for its claim to complete discretion in removing
temporary judges, arguing that this faculty has ``no substantive limit
whatsoever'' and that its reasons ``cannot be questioned or subject to
review.'' \34\
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\34\ Comision Judicial, El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, Magistrado
Ponente: Luis Martinez Hernandez, Exp. No. CJ-2003-0015, 16 de junio de
2003): ``Given that the petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure
[estabilidad] in her post, it Is evident that the [Judiclal Commission]
. . . can freely revoke [her] appointment, which entails the exercise
of a broad and discretional faculty for which there is no substantive
limit whatsoever, since she is not protected by the limits of security
of tenure of a judicial officer. From this perspective the revocation
of the appointment of the petitioner established by the Judicial
Commission cannot be considered a disciplinary act, that is, it does
not consist of the application of a penalty based on an offense, but
rather it consists of an action based on discretionary concerns;
concerns which, consequently, cannot be questioned or subjected to
review.'' (Emphasis added.)
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Second Highest Court Shut Down
The problem of due process for dismissed judges is not limited to
those who are summarily fired by the Judicial Commission. In one case
from 2003, a court was effectively shut down after its judges were
dismissed and the Supreme Court neglected to review their appeals.
Under existing procedures, permanent and provisional judges may be
dismissed by an administrative body within the judicial branch, known
as the Commission of Functioning and Restructuring of the Justice
System, based on charges brought by the Inspector General of the
Judiciary. The judges have an opportunity to defend their record before
the commission. They are allowed five days to prepare their written
defense, and the commission ten days to make its determination.\35\
(The commission sometimes grants the judges more than their allotted
time, and itself often takes more than its allotted time.) The judges
may appeal the commission's decision to the Supreme Court, but in
contrast with the hasty dismissal proceedings, the appeal process can
drag out indefinitely, leaving the dismissed judges in limbo and the
validity of their dismissals in doubt.\36\ The resulting uncertainty is
especially problematic when it involves judges who have handled
controversial cases.
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\35\ Human Rights Watch interview with member of Commission of
Functioning and Restructuring of the Justice System, Laurence Quijada,
Caracas, May 13, 2004.
\36\ One provisional judge, Luis Enrique Ortega Ruiz, filed an
appeal in September 2002 and has yet to receive a response over a year
and a half later, Another provisional judge, Maria Cristina Reveron,
who filed an appeal in April 2002, has yet to receive a response over
two years later.
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The most notorious case of this sort is that of three judges who
were dismissed from the First Administrative Court (Corte Primera de lo
Contencioso Administrativo, CPCA) in October 2003. The CPCA is the
second highest court in Venezuela and has national jurisdiction over
cases involving challenges to administrative actions by the government
(with the exception of those taken by cabinet-level officials, which
are reviewed directly by the Supreme Court). In the year prior to their
dismissal, the CPCA judges had granted numerous appeals challenging
policies and programs of the Chavez government. In several cases the
court ruled on behalf of municipal governments (run by opposition
mayors) who challenged military interference with their own police
forces. In another notable case, in August 2003, it ruled that hundreds
of Cuban doctors sent by the Cuban government to work as volunteers in
poor communities could not practice medicine in Venezuela without being
certified by the Venezuelan medical association.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ ``Corte Venezuela ordena dejar de ejercer medicos Cuba en
Caracas,'' Reuters, August 21, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Chavez publidy denounced the court and its judges on
several occasions. After the August 2003 decision on the Cuban doctors,
for instance, he referred to them as ``judges who shouldn't be
judges,'' and said:
I'm not telling them what I'd like to because we're in front
of the country. But the people are saying it. Go take you're
decision where you want, you can carry it out in your home if
you want . . . Do you think the Venezuelan people are going to
pay attention to an unconstitutional decision, well they're not
going to pay attention to it.\38\
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\38\ Unofficial transcript of radio and televisIon program, ``Alo
Presidente,'' No. 161, Aug. 24, 2003, pp. 22-24.
In September, in a highly unusual move, members of the Directorate
of Services of Intelligence and Prevention (DISIP) arrested the driver
of one of the judges as he was delivering a court document to someone
outside the courthouse. The driver's action violated regulations on the
handling of court documents, though the Supreme Court would rule (after
the driver had spent 35 days in jail) that he had not committed a crime
and order his release.\39\ Two days after the arrest, President Chavez
spoke out against the court, reportedly calling its chief judge a
``criminal.'' \40\ Three days later, a public prosecutor accompanied by
police, reportedly armed with high-power weapons, conducted a surprise
search of the CPCA courthouse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Human Rights Watch interview with Supreme Court Justice Blanca
Rosa Marmol de Leon, Caracas, May 13, 2004.
\40\ Unofficial transcript of address by President Chavez,
September 20. 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two weeks later, the Inspector General of the Judiciary submitted a
recommendation to the Commission of Functioning and Restructuring of
the Judicial System that the five CPCA judges be dismissed on the basis
of an entirely unrelated issue: a determination by the Supreme Court
the previous May that that the CPCA had committed an ``inexcusable
error'' in a decision rendered in 2002. After reviewing the charge and
the judges' defense, the commission ordered the dismissal of four of
the judges (the fifth had already retired and therefore was not subject
to sanction).\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Gaceta Ofidal de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela,
Caracas, November 4, 2003, p. 330, 848.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Three of the judges appealed the decision to the Supreme Court,
filing two appeals the following month. Venezuelan law obligated the
Supreme Court to respond to each type of appeal within specified
periods of time. A ``hierarchical appeal'' (recurso jerarquico), which
they filed on November 13, warranted a ruling within 90 days.\42\ And
the ``nullification appeal'' (recurso de nulidad) filed on November 27
warranted a ruling within three days.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Art. 91, Ley Organica de Procedimientos Administrativos.
\43\ Art. 10, Codigo de Procedimiento Civil.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over half a year later, the Supreme Court has failed to rule on
either of the appeals. When asked why not, Supreme Court President Ivan
Rincon Urdaneta told Human Rights Watch that it was because these cases
were ``not a high priority.'' \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Human Rights Watch interview with Supreme Court President Ivan
Rincon Urdaneta, Caracas, May 13, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are several reasons, however, why the Supreme Court should
consider these appeals to be of highest priority. First is the simple
matter of the due process rights of the dismissed judges. A second is
the fact that, lacking a quorum of judges, the country's second highest
court has ceased to function, leaving a huge backload of unresolved
cases (by one estimate as many as 2000 cases, all involving challenges
to administrative actions by the government). While Supreme Court
President Rincon said the Court intends to fill the vacancies with new
judges, they have yet to do so after over half a year. Moreover, it is
unclear what would happen to the new appointees if the dismissed judges
were to win their appeals.
A final reason the appeals should be treated as high priority is
the extremely controversial nature of the case--and specifically the
perception created by President Chavez's public comments, as well as
the unusually aggressive police actions against the CPCA, that the
dismissal reflected the will of the executive rather than the
application of the law. This perception, which was shared by many of
the people Human Rights Watch interviewed, has only been reinforced by
the Supreme Court's failure to review the legality of the dismissals.
V. SEPARATION OF POWERS UNDER ASSAULT
The National Assembly passed a law in May 2004 that severely
undermines the independence of the country's judicial branch. The new
Organic Law of the Supreme Court (Ley Organica del Tribunal Supremo de
Justicia) changes the composition of the country's highest court, as
well as its relationship to the other branches of government.
The manner in which the law was passed was highly questionable. The
Venezuelan constitution seeks to safeguard the autonomy of state
institutions--including the judiciary--by requiring a 2/3 majority vote
to approve any modification of the legislation (known as ``organic
laws'') that govern their structure and operation.\45\ The National
Assembly appears to have violated this provision with the passage of
the new law. The governing coalition disregarded the requirement that
such laws must be passed with a super-majority of 2/3, passing instead
with a simple majority. Moreover, that majority engaged in irregular
parliamentary maneuvers, which appear to violate the spirit and perhaps
even the letter of the constitution, such as making substantive changes
to the law's text after it had been voted on, and fusing multiple
articles to avoid a full discussion of each one.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Art. 203, Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Power to pack the court
The new court-packing law increases the Supreme Court from twenty
to thirty-two justices, adding two justices to each of the court's six
chambers.\46\ The new justices can be designated with a simple majority
vote of the National Assembly: a nominee who fails to receive a 2/3
majority in the first three votes can be designated by a simple
majority on the fourth vote.\47\ In contrast, the twenty current
members of the Supreme Court also received at least a 2/3 majority
confirmation vote.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Art. 2, Ley Organica del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia.
\47\ Art. 8, Ley Organica del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia.
\48\ While there is disagreement among Venezuelan jurists as to
whether this 2/3 majority was or is actually required by the former or
current Constitution, most agreed that Supreme Court nominees generally
did receive such a vote.
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Proponents of the law have justified this increase as a measure for
alleviating the justices' current workload.\49\ This justification is
dubious, at best. The four justices (as well as one ex-justice) who
spoke to Human Rights Watch all agreed that only two or three of the
chambers have any difficulty keeping up with their caseloads (the
constitutional chamber and the ``political administrative''
chamber).\50\ According to Supreme Court President Ivan Rincon
Urdaneta, the only justification for increasing the number of justices
in the other chambers is to help them handle administrative tasks.
However, it is not difficult to imagine other means to alleviate the
administrative responsibilities of the justices by delegating the work
to their staff. Nor, for that matter, is it difficult to imagine ways
to alleviate the caseload of those chambers with more cases, such as
assigning them more clerks or creating adjunct tribunals to handle
cases in which the jurisprudence is already clearly established.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with National Assembly
member Calixto Ortega, May 6, 2004. Human Rights Watch interview with
Supreme Court President Ivan Rincon Urdaneta, Caracas, May 13, 2004.
\50\ Human Rights Watch interviews with Supreme Court President
Ivan Rincon Urdaneta, Caracas, May 13, 2004, Juan Rafael Perdomo,
Caracas, May 13, 2004, Supreme Court Justice Blanca Rosa Marmol,
Caracas, May 13, 2004, Supreme Court Justice Carlos Martini, Caracas,
May 14, 2004. Human Rights Watch telephone interview with former
Supreme Court Justice Carlos Escarra, May 16, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whatever the justification, however, the impact of the increase on
the judiciary's independence is unmistakable. It will allow the
majority coalition in the National Assembly to radically alter the
balance of power within the country's highest court, ensuring that each
of its chambers is controlled by justices sympathetic to its own
political agenda.
Power to purge the court
The Venezuelan Constitution seeks to guarantee the independence of
justices by granting them a single twelve-year term and establishing an
impeachment process that requires a 2/3 majority vote by the National
Assembly, after the ``citizen branch'' (which consists of the attorney
general, the ombudsman, and the comptroller) has determined that the
justice has committed a ``serious offense'' (falta grave).\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Articles 264-5, Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela. Article 265 states: ``Supreme Court Justices will be subject
to removal by the National Assembly by a super-majority of two-thirds
of its members, after a hearing is granted the affected party, in cases
of serious offenses found by the Citizen Branch, in accordance with the
law.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The new law eliminates this guarantee. While the impeachment of
justices still requires a 2/3 majority vote, the law creates two new
mechanisms for removing justices that do not share this requirement.
One entails suspending justices pending an impeachment vote, the other
entails nullifying their appointments.
The first mechanism is found in a new provision which establishes
that, when the ``citizen branch'' determines that a justice has
committed a serious offense, and unanimously recommends the justice's
dismissal, then the justice will be automatically suspended pending an
impeachment vote by the National Assembly.\52\ The law requires that
the president of the assembly call for a hearing and an impeachment
vote within ten days. However, such deadlines are habitually
disregarded by the assembly, and there is no effective mechanism for
enforcing them. Consequently, if the president of the assembly chooses
not to bring the issue to a vote, the justice could remain suspended
indefinitely.
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\52\ Art. 23, Number 3, Ley Organica del Tribunal Supremo de
Justicia. ``Supreme Court Justices will be subject to suspension or
removal from their responsibilities, in cases of serious offenses, by
the National Assembly, following the petition and determination of
offenses by the Citizen Branch. In case of removal, the [decision] must
be approved by a super majority of two thirds (2/3) of the members of
the National Assembly, following a hearing for the Justice. At the
moment that the Citizen Branch determines that an offense is serious
and unanimously seeks removal, the Justice will be suspended from his
or her post, until the definitive decision of the National Assembly.
Likewise, [the Justice] will be suspended If the Supreme Court declares
that there are grounds to prosecute him or her; in which case, this
measure is different from the suspension sanction established by the
Organic Law of the Citizen Branch.''
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The definition of ``serious offense'' for justices is broad and
indudes highly subjective categories such as ``threaten or damage
public ethics or administrative morale'' and ``made decisions that
threaten or damage the interests of the Nation.'' \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Art. 11, Ley Organica del Poder Ciudadano. ``The following are
considered a serious offense on the part of Supreme Court Justices: 1.
When they attempt to harm [atenten], threaten, or damage the public
ethics and the administrative morale established in the present law. .
. . 4. When they adopt decisions that attempt to harm [atenten] or
damage the interests of the Nation.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The National Assembly has also bestowed upon itself the power to
nullify justices' appointments by a simple majority vote in one of
three circumstances: the justice provided false information at the time
of his or her selection to the court; the justice's ``public attitude .
. . undermines the majesty or prestige of the Supreme Court'' or of any
of its members; or the justice ``undermines the functioning'' of the
judiciary.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Art. 23, Number 4, Ley Organica del Tribunal Supremo de
Justicia: The National Assembly, by a simple majority, will be able to
annul the administrative act by which a Justice is appointed, principal
or substitute, when this person has supplied false information at the
time and for the purposes of his or her nomination, which prevented or
distorted the fulfillment of the requirements established in this law
and in the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; or
when the public attitude of these, which [sic.] aims to harm [atente
contra] the majesty or prestige of the Supreme Court, of any one of its
Chambers, of the Justices of Judicial Branch [sic.]; or when it aims to
harm [atente contra] the functioning of the Supreme Court, one of its
Chambers, or the Judicial Branch.'' (Emphasis added.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This provision is a clear ploy to circumvent the constitutional
requirement that justices can be removed with a 2/3 majority vote of
the National Assembly. Calling this action the ``nullification of
appointment'' cannot disguise the fact that it entails firing the
justice.
What makes the provision particularly dangerous is the fact that
two of the three criteria for ``nullification'' are entirely subjective
and will, therefore, allow the assembly's majority to persecute
justices identified with the political opposition. In fact, one member
of the governing party of President Chavez, Iris Valera, has explicitly
acknowledged this as the law's intent, saying ``the 10 coup-backing
justices (magistrados golpistas) who supported the de facto government
of Pedro Carmona Estanda, should be off the Supreme Court and the new
law passed in the National Assembly will achieve this goal.'' \55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ National Assembly member Iris Varela, quoted by government
news agency, Venpres, May 3, 2004. (``[L]os 10 magistrados golpistas
que apoyaron al gobierno de facto de Pedro Carmona Estanga, deben
quedar fuera del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia y la nueva Ley aprobada
en la Asamblea Nacional, servira para lograr ese proposito.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implications for the referendum
The packing and purging provisions of the new law--which would be
objectionable under any circumstances--are particularly troubling given
the current political context.
The prime target of any packing and purging efforts is likely to be
the electoral chamber of the Supreme Court that, under the Venezuelan
constitution, has jurisdiction over all legal disputes surrounding
electoral activity. The chamber currently contains two members (out of
three) who are identified with the opposition and voted to order the
CNE to count the disqualified signatures on the referendum petition. By
appointing two new justices to the chamber, the governing coalition
will be able to tip the balance its own way. (The electoral chamber
handles the fewest cases and, by all accounts has the least need for
additional justices--which may explain the insistence on expanding the
number of justices in all the court's chambers.)
Simultaneously, justices who fall into disfavor with the governing
coalition could be subject to removal. The attorney general has already
opened investigations into the electoral chamber's handling of the
referendum case. It is unclear whether or not the suspension provision
of the new law would be applicable should the ``citizen branch''
determine that the justices had committed a ``serious offense.'' The
attorney general told Human Rights Watch that he believed that the new
sanction could not be applied retroactively.\56\ In any case, the fact
that the justices are under investigation for their rulings on the
referendum issues sends a clear message that they will face similar
scrutiny--and possible sanction--for any future decisions on this
controversial topic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Human Rights Watch Interview with Attorney General Isaias
Rodriguez, Caracas, May 14, 2004.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
To President Hugo Chavez Frias:
It is critically important that the issues here not be reduced to
partisan wrangling and that the criticisms offered here not be
mischaracterized as partisan attack. Human Rights Watch does not take a
stand on the political conflict currently underway in Venezuela. When
sectors of the opposition launched a coup d'etat in April 2002, we
denounced their actions forcefully--just as we denounce any actions
that jeopardize respect for fundamental human rights anywhere in the
world, regardless of the political persuasion of their perpetrators.
Today the gravest threat to human rights in Venezuela is the
potential political takeover of the Supreme Court made possible by the
new court-packing law. It is not too late, however, for Venezuela to
reverse course and salvage the independence and autonomy of its
judiciary. Toward that end, the president should:
instruct his supporters within the National Assembly to
suspend implementation of the new court-packing law
immediately;
promote legislation that would modify those provisions of
the new law that undermine the independence of the judiciary;
collaborate actively with the secretary general of the OAS,
should the organization seek ways to help Venezuela address the
crisis facing its judiciary (as described below).
To the Supreme Court:
The Venezuelan Supreme Court still has an opportunity to fix the
aspects of the court-packing law that threaten its autonomy. Since the
law was passed last month, the court has received several appeals that
challenge the constitutionality of its most harmful provisions. The
Supreme Court should:
act quickly to review these appeals, paying particularly
close attention to the provisions of the court-packing law that
allow for justices to be removed or suspended without the 2/3
majority vote required by article 265 of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court should take steps to strengthen the independence
of judges. Specifically, it should:
reactivate the program of public competitions for selecting
permanent judges;
cease from dismissing judges without cause and without due
process, regardless of the nature of their appointment;
make it a priority to provide a prompt and impartial review
of the appeals from judges who have been dismissed after
handling controversial cases.
To international lending agencies:
The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank can play a
significant role in strengthening Venezuela's justice system, as is
clear from their involvement in the country to date. The Inter-American
Development Bank provided a loan for $75 million in 2001 for projects
in the Attorney General's Office and Ministry of the Interior and
Justice aimed at improving the efficiency, professionalism and equity
of the criminal justice system.
The World Bank has supported the Venezuelan judiciary in recent
years with a $30 million loan for a project (authorized in 1993 and
completed after multiple delays in 2003) that aimed to modernize the
infrastructure of the judiciary, as well as a $4.7 million loan for a
project (authorized in 1997 and completed in 2000) that aimed to
improve the functioning of the Supreme Court. The Venezuelan judiciary
has since developed a proposal for a third loan from the Bank.
The most pressing issue facing the Venezuelan justice system now is
the threats to its independence and autonomy. Until these threats are
addressed, improvements in other areas may only help a fundamentally
flawed system function more efficiently.
Therefore, international lending agencies interested in supporting
the Venezuelan judiciary should:
direct aid toward efforts to strengthen the independence of
its judges and autonomy of its courts.
suspend all future assistance for justice sector projects
until Venezuela takes concrete steps to address the threats to
judicial independence documented in this report.
To the Organization of American States:
The Inter-American Democratic Charter, adopted by the thirty-four
foreign ministers of the OAS in 2001, recognizes that ``one of the
purposes of the OAS is to promote and consolidate representative
democracy,'' and reasserts the proposition (originally articulated in
the Declaration of Managua for the Promotion of Democracy and
Development) that the organization's mission is not limited to the
defense of democracy wherever its fundamental values and principles
have collapsed, but also calls for ongoing and creative work to
consolidate democracy as well as a continuing effort to prevent and
anticipate the very causes of the problems that affect the democratic
system of government.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Preamble, Inter-American Democratic Charter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Toward that end, article 18 of the Charter establishes that
``[W]hen situations arise in a member state that may affect the
development of its democratic political institutional process or the
legitimate exercise of power,'' the secretary general and the Permanent
Council of the OAS may take steps to investigate and respond to the
situation, ``with prior consent of the government concerned.'' \58\
The current crisis facing the Venezuelan judiciary threatens to
have a profoundly negative affect on the country's democracy. Unless
Venezuelan government takes concrete steps immediately to reverse this
course, the secretary general of the OAS:
should use his authority under Article 18 of the Charter to
engage with the Venezuelan government to address the threats to
its judicial independence that affect the country's democratic
system of government.
------------
\58\ Art. 18, Inter-American Democratic Charter. ``When situations
arise in a member state that may affect the development of its
democratic political institutional process or the legitimate exercise
of power, the secretary general or the Permanent Council may, with
prior consent of the government concerned, arrange for visits or other
actions in order to analyze the situation. The secretary general will
submit a report to the Permanent Council, which will undertake a
collective assessment of the situation and, where necessary, may adopt
decisions for the preservation of the democratic system and its
strengthening?
The Inter-American Charter also authorizes the OAS to act without
obtaining prior consent of the member state [i]n the event of an
unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that senously
impairs the democratic order'' of that state (art. 20). Under such
circumstances the secretary general or any other member state ``may
request the immediate convocation of the Permanent Council to undert ke
a collective assessment of the situation and to take such decisions as
it deems appropriate.''
Senator Dodd [presiding]. Thank you very, very much. The
chairman will be back briefly here. This is not a coup that has
occurred here.
Mr. Diaz, thank you.
STATEMENT OF MIGUEL DIAZ, DIRECTOR, AMERICAS PROGRAM (MERCOSUR/
SOUTH AMERICA), CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Diaz. I would also like to submit for the record my
written testimony.
Senator Dodd. Certainly.
Mr. Diaz. Chairman Coleman and Ranking Member Dodd, I
commend you for calling this timely hearing on a subject of
such importance, namely, the state of democracy in Venezuela
and the threat posed by the government of Hugo Chavez to
Venezuela, to its neighbors, and to the United States.
In my view, Venezuela's democracy, never in great shape to
begin with, finds itself now in intensive care. That is because
over the past 5-plus year that Hugo Chavez has been in power,
the government has weakened the foundations of Venezuela's
democracy by systematically hacking away at the institutional
checks on Chavez's authority. The nongovernmental institutional
checks on government authority have also come under fire, in
many cases literally.
It is also a government that has never seriously pursued a
democratic discourse with the opposition, irresponsibly
painting with one brush stroke most of those who oppose it as
traitors and worse. In recent months, the Chavez government has
crossed over the line by selectively arresting opposition
leaders, torturing some members of the opposition, according to
human rights organizations, and encouraging, if not directing,
its squads of Bolivarian Circles to beat up Members of Congress
and intimidate voters, all with impunity.
In sum, Chavez is an anachronism, a return to a dark past
that many thought Latin America had overcome. It is a
government that lies shamelessly, with the lies getting more
and more preposterous by the day, including lies about the
United States and our role in Venezuela. Misery and
unprecedented strife is what Chavez has brought to Venezuela.
However, I do recognize that Chavez is the byproduct of
Venezuela's dysfunctional democratic history and that he has
succeeded in giving hope to many who have been marginalized
politically and economically in the past. Nonetheless, in
practice, he has done little to improve their lives. In fact,
the rate of poverty growth has accelerated over the 5 years he
has been in power. Chavez may even be sincere about addressing
the many injustices present within the country, but to me what
makes Hugo Chavez a tragic figure is that he had the unique
opportunity, upon his election, of building a consensus to
enable Venezuela to start fresh. But he squandered this
opportunity, instead choosing the politics of resentment and
deceit that goes by the name of the Bolivarian Revolution.
We have seen this story before. History has taught us that
not all who come to power through elections are democrats. How
to deal with the wolves that hide in the sheep's clothing of
democracy, I am afraid, is a question that as a matter of
policy we as a country have not been able to adequately answer.
The good news is that Venezuelans have before them the
opportunity to resolve the question of Chavez in a
constitutional, democratic, and peaceful manner. I believe the
majority of Venezuelans, on both sides of the political divide,
want such a resolution. By the millions, Chavez's foes have
doggedly latched onto the electoral option in pursuit of a
referendum on the President's tenure, and despite the many
legal, quasi-legal and outright reprehensible obstacles put in
their way by the government and its supporters, they have
finally reached this goal. Based on the polls that I have seen,
it looks like Chavez's mandate will be revoked on August 15,
assuming the votes are faithfully tallied.
It is also a relief to see that Chavez's message of
resentment, class warfare, and crass populism has not resonated
with the vast majority of Latin Americans who still put their
trust in the democratic process. Chavez's Bolivarian model is
not seen as a worthy imitation by Latin America's mainstream
political right or political left. Chavez himself is generally
held in low esteem, regarded as boorish, and at best
incompetent. However, I would not be so dismissive of him. I
believe that he poses a grave threat, now more than ever, and
the community of democracies should take him more seriously
than it has up to now.
There are a number of reasons why I believe this to be the
case. Although Chavez's message of resentment does not appeal
to Latin America's democratic majority, his message does
resonate with many of the Latin Americans who are losing faith
in democracy's ability to deliver a better quality of life.
According to polls, the percentage of those who are often
called anti-systemic has been rising with the contraction of
opportunities for economic advancement and the deterioration of
democratic governance.
What makes Chavez frightfully dangerous is that, thanks to
oil, he has a financial wherewithal to support many of the
anti-systemic forces that are festering throughout the region.
Chavez has been reportedly sponsoring forces of questionable
democratic credentials in Bolivia and Ecuador, two countries
that are faltering in their commitment to democracy, where the
balance could be tipped by this kind of intervention. Chavez is
the primary financial support for Castro's government to the
tune of about 78,000 barrels of oil a day, undercutting the
Bush administration's attempt to isolate and ultimately
dislodge that evil regime.
With regards to the United States, Chavez has thus far been
more of a nuisance and less of a real and imminent threat. Now,
this could all change if Chavez decides to disrupt the
legitimacy of the referendum. Disturbingly, there are
indications that that is exactly what he has up his sleeve. If
Chavez does not allow for an on-time, fair, and transparent
execution of the referendum, the consequences for the U.S.
could be serious. For starters, there is the risk that it could
trigger an outburst of violence--some even fear a civil war--
that could potentially drag the U.S. in. The humanitarian and
economic repercussions that such an eventuality could occasion
in terms of refugees flocking to our shores and disruptions of
U.S. business interests are substantial. Moreover, if Chavez is
able to get away with cheating his way into staying in power,
it may encourage others in the region to follow in his
footsteps.
Do I have 2 minutes?
Senator Dodd. You do.
Mr. Diaz. Thank you.
In closing, let me offer some thoughts on what the U.S.
Government and the U.S. Congress, in particular, could do to
avert such an eventuality. As I see it, the basic question that
the U.S. Congress has to answer is whether it is prepared to
make an investment now to ensure that the upcoming referendum
process is transparent and credible to both sides. If the U.S.
Government is not prepared to make this investment, it risks
having to contend with the previously described consequences of
what could result without such engagement.
Although ultimately, the well-being of Venezuela's
democracy rests with Venezuelans themselves, the international
community can make an important contribution in assuring that
the referendum is conducted in a proper fashion. In preparation
for this defining exercise, I would argue that the level of
international engagement in Venezuela must be ratcheted up
substantially and this must begin now, as the National
Electoral Council is already taking steps that put in doubt its
capacity and commitment to do a fair accounting of the votes.
It is also important to put the electoral authorities on
notice that the eyes of the world are upon them and that they
will be accountable to the international community for any
attempt to alter the vote, no matter for which side. The right
to vote is a human right and those who violate that sacrosanct
privilege are human right violators. The moral burden to live
up to the high calling of assuring a free and fair vote should
be even greater considering the likelihood that any perception
of wrongdoing will result in bloodshed. What is important is
not that elections take place, but assuring that the
environment in which they take place is unfettered. After all,
Cuba has elections too, but we know they do not make Cuba a
democracy.
In engaging itself in the issue, the modus operandi of the
United States at all times should be to work in tandem with the
international community. It can do so through the Group of
Friends, through the OAS, and other multilateral mechanisms
available.
Last and most importantly, the United States has to do
more, much more, to assure that the circumstances that led to
the rise to power of someone like Hugo Chavez are addressed,
not just in Venezuela, but throughout the region. Throughout
Latin America, not enough jobs are being created to put food on
the table for too many families. Personal insecurity is
rampant, and the political machinery in many countries is
dysfunctional and rife with corruption. I cannot blame the many
who see Chavez as a savior. They are desperate and deserve
better than the snake oil than Chavez has provided them.
Washington must be more a part of the solution to the troubles
that afflict the region. Democratic institutions need to be
fortified, and in some cases rebuilt entirely. New options for
economic growth need to be explored, and more attention has to
be given to the staggering income inequality that plagues the
entire region. It will not be cheap and it may entail crossing
some interests within our own borders, but in the long term it
will be in the interest of both the United States and Latin
America.
Thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Diaz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Miguel Diaz
THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
REGION AND THE UNITED STATES
Chairman Coleman and ranking member Senator Dodd, I commend you for
calling this timely hearing on a subject of such importance, namely,
the state of democracy in Venezuela and the threat posed by the
government of Hugo Chavez to Venezuela, to its neighbors, and to the
United States. I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute to these
deliberations. Let me underscore that my comments represent my views
only and not those of the Center for Strategic International Studies,
the organization I work for as Director of the South America Project.
In my view, Venezuela's democracy--never in great shape to begin
with--finds itself now in intensive care. That is because over the past
five-plus years that Hugo Chavez has been in power, the government has
weakened the foundations of Venezuela's democracy by systematically
hacking away at the institutional checks on Chavez's authority. Next on
the block is the judiciary, which he is about to hijack by stacking the
Supreme Court with 12 additional pro-Chavez judges. The non-
governmental institutional checks on governmental authority have also
come under fire, in many cases literally. The latter include the labor
unions, the press, and even the church.
It is also a government that has never seriously pursued a
democratic discourse with the opposition, irresponsibly painting with
one brush stroke most of those who oppose it as traitors and even
worse. In recent months, the Chavez government has crossed over the
line by selectively arresting opposition leaders, torturing some
members of the opposition (according to human rights organizations) and
encouraging, if not directing, its squads of Bolivarian Circles to beat
up members of Congress and intimidate voters--all with impunity. This
is a president who comes from the same mould as the likes of Zimbabwe's
Robert Mugabe, whom Chavez described as a ``warrior for freedom'' at a
recent conference of developing world leaders in Caracas.
In sum, Chavez is an anachronism, a return to a dark past that many
thought Latin America had overcome. Let us not forget that Chavez
initially entered the political scene as the leader of a military coup
against a democratically elected government. It is a government that
lies shamelessly, with the lies getting more and more preposterous by
the day, including lies about the United States and our role in
Venezuela. Misery and unprecedented strife is what he has brought to
Venezuela.
However, I do recognize that Chavez is the byproduct of Venezuela's
dysfunctional democratic history and that he has succeeded in giving
hope to many who have been marginalized politically and economically in
the past. Nonetheless, in practice he has done little to improve their
lots. In fact, the rate of poverty growth has accelerated over the five
years he has been in power. According to the U.S. Treasury Department,
extreme poverty has risen from 21% in 1998 to 33% in 2002. In the same
period, per capita income has dropped from US$3,800 in 1998 to US$2,800
in 2003. Chavez may even be sincere about addressing the many
injustices present within the country, but to me, what makes Hugo
Chavez a tragic figure is that he had the unique opportunity, upon his
election, of building a consensus to enable Venezuela to start fresh.
But he squandered this opportunity, instead, choosing the politics of
resentment and deceit that goes by the name of the Bolivarian
Revolution. We have seen this story before. History has taught us that
not all who come to power through elections are democrats. How to deal
with the wolves that hide in the sheep's clothing of democracy, I am
afraid, is a question that as a matter of policy we, as a country, have
not been able to adequately answer.
The good news is that Venezuelans have before them the opportunity
to resolve the question of Chavez in a constitutional, democratic, and
peaceful manner. I believe the majority of Venezuelans, on both sides
of the political divide, want such a resolution. By the millions,
Chavez's foes have doggedly latched onto the electoral option in
pursuit of a referendum on the president's tenure, and despite the many
legal, quasi-legal, and outright reprehensible obstacles put in their
way by the government and its supporters, they have finally reached
this goal. The referendum has been scheduled for August 15. Based on
the polls I have seen, it seems they have a good chance to revoke his
mandate, assuming they are faithfully tallied.
Moreover, it is a real credit to the opposition that, by-and-large,
it has purged from its ranks those few who would have preferred to
resolve this crisis using unconstitutional means. In getting to this
point, credit also should be given to the OAS and the Carter Center for
their hard work and persistence in sticking to their commitment to
monitor the referendum petition process. Without their contribution, I
am afraid the Chavez government would have truncated the process or
stolen it outright.
It is also a relief to see that Chavez's message of resentment,
class warfare, and crass populism has not resonated with the vast
majority of Latin Americans who still put their trust in the democratic
process. Chavez's Bolivarian model is not seen as worthy of imitation
by Latin America's mainstream political right or political left. Chavez
himself is generally held in low esteem, regarded as boorish, and at
best incompetent. However, I would not be so dismissive of him. I
believe that he poses a grave threat--now more than ever--and the
community of democracies should take him more seriously than it has up
to now.
There are a number of reasons why I believe this to be the case.
Although Chavez's message of resentment does not appeal to Latin
America's democratic majority, his message does resonate with many of
the Latin Americans who are losing faith in democracy's ability to
deliver a better quality of life. According to the poll, the percentage
of those who are often called ``anti-systemic'' has been rising in step
with the contraction of opportunities for economic advancement and the
deterioration of democratic governance. The percentage of the
disaffected varies from country to country, with their numbers in the
Andean countries being dangerously high. That explains why, for
example, Chavez has a substantial following in Bolivia and has
practically none in Chile, the latter a country that has been
successful at building consensus and delivering progress and a real
reduction in poverty.
What makes Chavez frightfully dangerous is that thanks to oil he
has the financial wherewithal to support many of the anti-systemic
forces that are festering throughout the region. Currently, the
government has approximately US$24 billion in foreign exchange reserves
available. Chavez has been sponsoring forces of questionable democratic
credentials in Bolivia and Ecuador--all countries that are faltering in
their commitment to democracy, where the balance could be tipped by
this kind of intervention. Chavez is the primary financial support for
Castro's government to the tune of about 78,000 barrels of oil a day,
undercutting the Bush administration's attempt to isolate, and
ultimately, dislodge that evil regime. Chavez, in turn, is getting an
army of teachers, doctors, and sports trainers, many of whom are feared
to be collaborating with the state's increasing repression. It should
be noted that the U.S. has inadvertently bankrolled much of these
activities by buying 54% of Venezuela's oil exports.
There is also a significant amount of anecdotal evidence that
suggests that the Venezuelan government has been, at least, tolerant of
the FARC and the ELN by allowing the country to be used by these groups
as a safe haven. I think it is fair to say that Venezuela has not been
as cooperative as Colombia's other neighbors in helping to corral these
terrorist groups.
With regards to the United States, Chavez has thus far been more of
a nuisance, and less of a real and imminent threat. For a while now,
Chavez has been looking to provoke Washington by engaging in name-
calling and blaming us for his troubles, and the Bush Administration's
Latin American team deserves kudos for not taking his bait. By and
large, his charges have fallen on deaf ears, as he is internationally
discredited.
On the more serious charge that he is hosting Middle East-linked
terrorist organizations, I have yet to see any solid evidence to that
effect. The U.S. intelligence services hopefully have a better idea
than I do of whether these allegations are correct. Just because there
is a substantial Arab population in Venezuela--much like in other South
American countries--does not validate our worst fears. On a broader
diplomatic level, Chavez may be dismissive of some of the regional
initiatives that we have championed, like FTAA, but he is not alone.
However, the alternatives he has put on the table have no gotten any
traction whatsoever in the region either. His uncooperative stance in
the international arena, like the visit to Saddam Hussein that broke
the international isolation of that brutal regime, was unhelpful, and
may have been meant to prick at the U.S., but was in keeping with the
sovereign right of the country to manage its foreign relations as it
sees fit.
Now this could all change if Chavez decides to disrupt the
legitimacy of the referendum. Disturbingly, there are indications that
this is exactly what he has up his sleeve. If Chavez does not allow for
an on time, fair and transparent execution of the referendum, the
consequences for the U.S. could be serious. For starters, there is the
risk that it could trigger an outburst of violence (some even fear a
civil war) that could potentially drag the U.S. in. The humanitarian
and economic repercussions that such an eventuality could occasion in
terms of refugees flocking to our shores and disruptions of U.S.
business interests are substantial. Moreover, if Chavez is able to get
away with cheating his way into staying in power, it may encourage
others in the region to follow in his footsteps, negating the hard won
efforts to keep the region's democracies (albeit with small d) afloat.
Moving forward, let me close by offering some thoughts on what the
U.S. government, and the U.S. Congress in particular, could do to avert
such an eventuality. As I see it, the basic question that the U.S.
Congress has to answer is whether it is prepared to make an investment
now to ensure that the upcoming referendum process is transparent and
credible to both sides. If the U.S. government is not prepared to make
this investment, it risks having to contend with the previously
described consequences of what could result without such engagement.
Venezuelans have shown themselves perseverant in safeguarding their
democratic rights at the cost of many lives over the past few years. I
hope the international community is equally committed to the defense of
those hard-won democratic rights that many in this country take for
granted.
Although ultimately, the wellbeing of Venezuela's democracy rests
with Venezuelans themselves, the international community can make an
important contribution. I would argue that the level of international
engagement in Venezuela must be ratcheted up substantially, and this
must begin now, as the National Electoral Council is already taking
steps that put in doubt its capacity and commitment to do a fair
accounting of the votes. Its decision, for example, to use an untested
electronic voting system of a Boca Raton-based company (Smartmatic)
partly owned by the Venezuelan government is of concern. I am also
troubled by the government's efforts to circumscribe the role of the
OAS and the Carter Center, reports of government raids on independent
media outlets, and the accelerated naturalization of non-nationals on
the basis of suspect criteria in order to give them voting rights.
It is also important to put the electoral authorities on notice
that the eyes of the world are upon them and that they will be
accountable to the international community for any attempt to alter the
vote, no matter for which side. The right to vote is a human right, and
those who violate that sacrosanct privilege are human rights violators.
The moral burden to live up to the high calling of assuring a free and
fair vote should be even greater, considering the likelihood that any
perception of wrongdoing will result in bloodshed. What is important is
not that elections take place, but assuring that the environment in
which they take place is unfettered. After all, Cuba has elections too,
but we know they don't make Cuba a democracy.
In engaging itself in this issue, the modus operandi of the U.S. at
all times should be to work in tandem with the international community.
It can do so through the Group of Friends, through the OAS, and other
multilateral mechanisms available. For starters, I believe Congress
should support the administration in a bipartisan fashion in its
efforts to assure adequate international monitoring of the referendum.
It is also important that Washington speaks with one voice on the
matter, otherwise the Venezuelan government will be apt to exploit
perceived divisions. If the U.S. Congress chooses to directly engage
itself as an observer, it should do so in concert with other countries.
I also believe it is important to try to continue to take the high road
and not succumb to Chavez's bait to try bilateralize the problem.
Lastly and most importantly, the U.S. has to do more, much more, to
assure that the circumstances that led to the rise to power of someone
like Hugo Chavez are addressed, not just in Venezuela, but throughout
the region. The problem is bigger than Hugo Chavez. Throughout Latin
America, not enough jobs are being created to put food on the table for
too many families, personal insecurity is rampant, and the political
machinery in many countries is dysfunctional and rife with corruption.
I cannot blame the many who see Chavez as a savior; they are desperate
and deserve better than the snake oil that Chavez has provided them.
Washington must be more a part of the solution to the troubles that
afflict the region. Democratic institutions needed to be fortified, and
in some case rebuilt entirely, new options for economic growth need to
be explored, and more attention has to be given to the staggering
income inequality that plagues the entire region. It won't be cheap and
it may entail crossing some interests within our own borders, but in
the long term it will be in the best interest of both the U.S. and
Latin America. Thank you for your attention and I look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
Senator Coleman [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Diaz.
Mr. Tissot.
STATEMENT OF ROGER TISSOT, DIRECTOR OF MARKETS AND COUNTRIES
GROUP, LATIN AMERICA, PFC ENERGY
Mr. Tissot. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your invitation to
testify before the subcommittee. I am going to put Venezuela
into the oil context.
Simply put, Venezuela matters because of its substantial
oil reserves, its strategic location and its regional economic
importance.
First, in terms of reserves, Venezuela is the Saudi Arabia
of Latin America. Its reserves are approximately 78 billion
barrels, just below those of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
and the United Arab Emirates. But Venezuela has more oil than
Russia which positioned itself as a potential replacement for
the Middle East.
Before the oil workers' strike of December 2003, Venezuela
produced around 3 million barrels per day. The state oil
company, PDVSA, plans to increase production to reach up to 5
million barrels per day by 2009. Most of Venezuelan output is
exported to the United States. Venezuela captures approximately
12 percent of the U.S. market.
Venezuela's geographic location is of strategic importance.
It takes around 4 to 5 days travel by oil tanker from Venezuela
to the Gulf of Mexico, while oil from the Middle East takes
around 45 days to arrive to the U.S.
Most of Venezuela's oil is exported to the Gulf of Mexico
refineries where PDVSA, through its subsidiary Citgo, has
ownership in various large refineries. These refineries are
specifically built to treat heavy crude oil from Venezuela.
Alternative sources of supply are Mexican Maya crude, which
suffers from capacity limitations, and the Middle East which
takes longer to bring.
So is Venezuela a reliable supplier to the U.S.? There are
three reasons why we believe it is the case.
First, economy. Venezuela's economy is critically dependent
on oil export revenues. While the oil sector accounts for only
22 percent of the economy, over 70 percent of the budget
revenues come from oil earnings. Given that budget expenditures
account for 3 percent of GDP, the indirect dependence on oil is
even greater. The impact of the oil revenues are marked by the
impact of the strike which basically resulted in a decline of
the economy of Venezuela by 10 percent.
Second, the government of President Hugo Chavez is banking
on high oil prices and sufficient oil revenues to fund hugely
expanded social programs. His government sees oil income as the
means toward achieving political objectives. This is also
evident in its cooperation with OPEC. As a result, without oil
exports, the Chavez government will not be able to achieve its
socioeconomic goals.
Third, the Government of Venezuela for strategic reasons
would like to be the energy supplier of choice for the Western
Hemisphere. Through Citgo, it has substantial assets in the
United States, which are directly dependent on Venezuelan crude
oil exports. PDVSA also has substantial agreements with
specific refiners to process Venezuelan crudes exclusively. A
stoppage in exports will severely damage these assets.
So now what about the sustainability of Venezuelan oil and
gas production and exports? The Venezuelan Government has taken
a keen interest in expanding its oil and gas sector. President
Chavez has increasingly called upon foreign direct investment
in the energy sector. Due to the maturity of Venezuela's main
basins and their declining productivity, PDVSA reportedly plans
to spend $38 billion in the 2004-2009 period to increase
production from 3.4 million barrels to 4.9 million barrels per
day.
I should point out that the data provided by PDVSA is not
credible according to many international sources, and it is
believed that the production of Venezuela is currently around
2.4 million barrels per day.
Since we expect OPEC to successfully keep oil prices around
$35 a barrel this year, and certainly over $25 a barrel in the
next several years, the Government of Venezuela and PDVSA will
have sufficient funds to finance most of these projects.
Currently the PDVSA budget is designed to operate at a $20 a
barrel oil, thus providing the development plans a sufficient
cushion. Certainly there are serious concerns that the fiscal
stance of the government is excessively expansionary and that a
sharp fall in oil prices could result in cutbacks in spending,
possibly even by PDVSA.
The government also recognizes that PDVSA, particularly
since the strike in 2003 after which 18,000 workers were fired,
has critical skill deficiencies, which foreign companies can
help to overcome. Since the strike, PDVSA has struggled to
regain productivity levels and there are serious concerns in
the industry whether it will be able to carry out future
development plans even if there are sufficient funds available.
Financial diversions to social programs and the critical
lack of skills could open up substantial opportunities for
foreign oil companies. These opportunities are in what is
called marginal field development, the heavy crude oil, and the
natural gas or LNG projects.
Oil and gas expansions are complex exercises. The
uncertainties in geology, markets, and commodity prices can
inevitably create delays. This is complicated by negotiations
between governments and international oil companies. Despite
this, two issues are clear. First, the Government of Venezuela
is committed to securing foreign direct investment fairly
rapidly.
Senator Coleman. Go ahead and sum up.
Mr. Tissot. Basically the last comment I would like to
provide is the following. We believe that Venezuela would like
to continue being the hemisphere's most important hydrocarbon
supplier and they will, despite signaling problems and
political misperceptions, help us overcome the uncertainties
emanating from the Middle East.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tissot follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roger Tissot
Comments on the status of the oil industry in Venezuela and its impact
on the country's international and domestic politics
PUTTING VENEZUELA INTO CONTEXT
Simply put, Venezuela matters because of its substantial oil
reserves, its strategic location and its regional economic importance.
First in terms of reserves, Venezuela is the ``Saudi
Arabia'' of Latin America. Its reserves are approximately 78
billion barrels, just below those of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. But Venezuela has more oil
than Russia which positioned itself as a potential replacement
for Middle East oil.
Before the oil workers' strike of December 2003, Venezuela produced
around 3 million barrels per day (mmbd). The state oil company, PDVSA,
plans to increase production to reach up to 5 mmbd by 2009. Most of
Venezuelan output is exported to the United States. Venezuela captures
approximately 12% of the U.S. market.
Venezuela's geographic location is of strategic importance.
It takes only 4 to 5 days travel by oil tanker from Venezuela
to the Gulf of Mexico, while oil from the Middle East takes
around 45 days to arrive in the U.S..
Most of Venezuela's oil is exported to the Gulf of Mexico's
refineries where PDVSA, through its subsidiary Citgo, has
ownership in various large refineries.\1\ These refineries are
specifically built for Venezuelan heavy crudes, alternative
sources of supply are the Mexican Maya crude, which suffers
from capacity limitations, and Middle Eastern crudes which take
longer to import. Venezuela also has a 50% equity interest in
Hovensa refinery located in St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Lake Charles (Louisiana) and Corpus Christi (Texas), as well as
the joint Lyondell-Citgo (Houston, Texas).
\2\ Amerada Hess owns the other 50%
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IS VENEZUELA A RELIABLE SUPPLIER TO THE U.S.?
There are three reasons that Venezuela is a reliable supplier to
the U.S. and the Atlantic Basin markets. First, Venezuela's economy is
critically dependent on oil export revenues. While the oil sector
accounts for only 22% of Venezuela's economy, over 70% of budget
revenues come from oil earnings. Given that budget expenditures account
for 30% of GOP, the indirect dependence on oil is even greater. This
was clearly evident during the January 2003 oil strike--the decline in
real GOP during 2003 due to an eight-week oil production stoppage was
nearly 10%.
Second, the government of President Hugo Chavez is banking on high
oil prices and sufficient oil revenues to fund hugely expanded social
programs. His government sees oil income as the means towards achieving
political objectives. This is also evident in its cooperation with
OPEC. As a result, without oil exports the Chavez government will not
be able to achieve its socio-economic goals.
Third, the government of Venezuela, for strategic reasons would
like to be the energy supplier of choice to the Western Hemisphere.
Through Citgo it has substantial assets in the United States, which are
directly dependent on Venezuela's crude oil exports. PDVSA also has
substantial agreements with specific refiners to process Venezuelan
crudes, exclusively. A stoppage in exports will severely damage these
assets.
the sustainability of venezuelan oil and gas production and exports
The Venezuelan government has taken a keen interest in expanding
its oil and gas sector. President Chavez has increasingly called upon
foreign direct investment in the energy sector. Due to the maturity of
Venezuela's principle basins and their declining productivity, PDVSA
reportedly plans to spend $38 billion in the 2004-2009 timeframe in
order to increase production from 3.4 mmb/d \3\ to 4.9 mmb/d.\4\ Other
key objectives of PDVSA's business plans include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Note that as mentioned earlier, PDVSA reported production is
not credible and numerous oil information sources report oil production
in Venezuela as being around 2.4 MMBOD.
\4\ PDVSA 2004-2009 Business Plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aligning PDVSA's goals to the national development plan;
Strengthening exploration and production activities;
Strengthening OPEC's position in the world oil markets;
Improving oil recovery rates;
Improving the value of Venezuelan crude;
Re-defining the internationalization strategy of PDVSA; and,
Using oil investments for local and national development.
Since we expect OPEC to successfully keep oil prices above $35 a
barrel this year, and certainly over $25 a barrel in the next several
years, the government of Venezuela and PDVSA will have sufficient funds
to finance most of these projects. Currently, the PDVSA budget is
designed to operate at US$20 a barrel oil, thus providing the
development plans a sufficient cushion. Certainly there are serious
concerns that the fiscal stance of the government is excessively
expansionary and that a sharp fall in oil prices could result in cut
backs in spending, possibly even by PDVSA. But the government has
maintained relatively good relations with the international oil
companies and is planning to engage them in part of the oil and gas
sector expansion plans.
The government has also recognizes that PDVSA, particularly since
the strike in 2003 after which 18,000 workers were fired, has critical
skill deficiencies, which foreign companies can help overcome. Since
the strike PDVSA has struggled to regain productivity levels and there
are serious concerns in the industry whether it will be able to carry
out future development plans even if there are sufficient funds
available.
Financial diversions to social programs and the critical lack of
skills could open up substantial opportunities for the foreign oil
companies. These opportunities for the private sector will focus on the
development of the marginal fields, expected to reach 530,000 b/d of
production in 2005.\5\ Other investment opportunities include the
development of the extra heavy crude oil from the Orinoco belt,
expected to produce around 579,000 b/d from four projects currently in
operation. These projects tend to offer better terms than the more
conventional oil producing projects and have received investment from
the largest of the U.S. energy companies.\6\ Production sharing
agreements are another option for private companies, although four of
the ten blocks secured under these arrangements have been returned to
PDVSA because of lack of commercial discoveries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ PFC internal estimates.
\6\ ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, and ConocoPhillips.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The government is also pushing for the development of the country's
vast natural gas resources, estimated to be around 148 trillion cubic
feet (tcf). The government passed a gas law which is considered fairly
attractive and interesting for foreign companies. The push for gas
development is based on an energy substitution strategy aimed at
reducing domestic crude oil consumption in order to increase oil
exports. Additional gas production will also be used for Liquified
Natural Gas (LNG) production so as to diversify exports and increase
external earnings. Venezuela plans to become a major exporter of LNG to
the United States and hopes this will be another means of supplementing
its already large oil exports to its North American customer.
The two main LNG projects are the ``Mariscal Sucre'' and
``Plataforma Deltana.'' Mariscal Sucre is a US$2.5-3 billion project
with PDVSA having a 60% equity share. It involves the development of 10
tcf of proven gas from offshore Venezuela and the construction of a
liquefaction facility with a capacity of 4.7 mm tons/year.
The ``Plataforma Deltana'' project includes the exploration and
development of four offshore blocks awarded to BP, ChevronTexaco (2
blocks, one in partnership with ConocoPhillips) and Statoil. PDVSA
carried the initial phase of the project, which included seismic
studies and the drilling of four exploratory wells. The gas resources
of Plataforma Deltana would be commercialized through expansions at
Mariscal Sucre, a Greenfield LNG project dedicated to those reserves,
or a potential joint development agreement with Trinidad allowing the
gas to move to the Atlantic LNG facility.
Oil and gas expansion plans are complex exercises. The
uncertainties in geology, markets and commodity prices inevitably
create delays. This is complicated by negotiations between governments
and international oil companies. Despite this, two issues are quite
clear. First, the government of Venezuela is committed to securing
foreign direct investment fairly rapidly. It feels the competition,
especially in the gas markets, from far flung producers and would like
to take advantage of the country's comparative advantages, It also is
motivated by economic interests, which could be easily served by an
expanding oil and gas sector.
Second, Venezuela an attractive target for foreign company
investment because of the limited number of countries which have its
vast resources and the even fewer number which are open to foreign
investment. International oil and gas companies will invest in
Venezuela and help raise its supplies of crude oil and gas.
Negotiations will be protracted but in the end there is likely to be
substantial investment by private companies, many of whom are U.S.
based, in Venezuela. As a result, Venezuela will remain a critical
supplier to the Western Hemisphere.
The role of PDVSA and the government of Venezuela will be very
important. This role will be enhanced if two requirements are met:
The message coming out of Venezuela regarding sanctity of
supply is totally unambiguous. We strongly believe that
Venezuela is committed to being a responsible supplier to the
full extent of its capabilities. But doubts persist in the
international market and these are reinforced with inflammatory
remarks from public officials. This should stop.
The market requires total transparency regarding Venezuela's
production output levels. This would also go a long way in
allaying uncertainties in the oil markets. Unrealistic
estimates are easy to detect because of ``mirror statistics''
and reduce the credibility of the oil producer.
Venezuelas key role as the hemisphere's critical oil producer is
not just an issue for the immediate future, it has an important role to
play over the medium to long term as well. Here again two requirements
are necessary:
Venezuela needs to provide more clarity on its fiscal
policies. Venezuela's fiscal policies over the last several
years have raised some concern in the International financial
and investment world. Beyond concerns for macroeconomic
stability, the oil and gas industry is concerned that not only
will there not be enough money to maintain current capacity,
but there will be a problem with expanding capacity to meet the
regional demand requirements of the future. Clearly the
government has shown a willingness to engage foreign companies
to invest in expanding capacity as we noted above. We at PFC
Energy have always dismissed talk that the government had a
phobia about foreign investment.
Venezuela needs to provide more flexibility in terms of the
investment regime--specifically, the legal framework
surrounding the oil sector. We think showing greater
flexibility up front will enhance the long-term position of the
government and its contribution to the region's energy
security.
Let me reiterate that we believe the Venezuelans want very much to
play the role of being the hemisphere's most important hydrocarbon
supplier. And, they will--despite signaling problems and
misperceptions--help us overcome the uncertainties emanating from the
Middle East.
Senator Coleman. Thank you very much, Mr. Tissot.
Dr. Weisbrot.
STATEMENT OF DR. MARK WEISBROT, CO-DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH
Dr. Weisbrot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Dodd. Thanks
for the invitation. I would like to enter my written remarks
into the record.
Senator Coleman. Without objection.
Dr. Weisbrot. Thank you.
First, I want to say there have been a lot of allegations
raised here, and I am happy to answer a lot of them. I think
most of them are without substance and can be refuted very
quickly.
The Center for Economic and Policy Research is an
independent, nonpartisan institute. We do not receive any
funding from governments, political parties, or corporations.
We are funded primarily by foundations, large and small, as
well as some individual contributions from U.S. citizens.
On the subject of this hearing, the state of democracy in
Venezuela, there is much public confusion, and I am glad that
Mr. Vivanco has helped set the record straight by stating very
clearly that Venezuela is a democracy, which you do not hear
much here. As Jimmy Carter said on a visit there: ``I believe
that freedom of speech is as alive in Venezuela as it is in any
other country I've visited.''
And the same can be said for freedom of the press,
assembly, association, and other civil liberties. Anyone who
calls the Venezuelan Government authoritarian is in need of a
dictionary, or perhaps needs to see the place. I was there
during the oil strike in December 2002 and witnessed the
government's response to the destruction of its economy by less
than 1 percent of the labor force, the management and some of
the workers in the oil industry. They were striking not for
better wages or benefits, but to overthrow the government. Even
in the United States, which has perhaps the strongest tradition
of protecting civil liberties in the world, a strike of this
nature would be illegal. In this country, the leaders would be
subject to court injunctions ordering them back to work and
jailed if they refused. This did not happen in Venezuela. The
strike lasted for 64 days and sent the economy into a deep
recession.
It is true that there are human rights abuses in Venezuela.
But these are not different from those in the rest of Latin
America and I have not heard any reputable human rights
organization argue that they have worsened under the 5 years of
Chavez's government. Nor have they argued that the government
has engaged in any systematic repression of political dissent.
What then are the major threats to democracy in Venezuela?
The attention here has focused on the Venezuelan Government.
But some of these threats are from other places, including
Washington. Our government has funded and continues to fund
organizations headed by people who are leaders of the military
coup of April 2002. These leaders have received and some
continue to receive funds from the U.S. Congress through the
National Endowment for Democracy. These are people who signed
the actual coup decree of April 12, 2002 and this decree
overthrew the elected President and Vice President, abolished
the General Assembly, the supreme court, and the constitution,
and established a dictatorship. And I have the documents right
here. They were obtained from the Freedom of Information Act,
including the contract between the NED and these individuals.
Should these people and their organizations be funded by
U.S. taxpayers' dollars? Is this the proper function of the
National Endowment for Democracy? These are questions that I
think the U.S. Congress should ask. I think that most Americans
would be against such funding if they were aware of it.
The NED is also funding a group mentioned here today called
Sumate that led the signature drive to recall the President of
Venezuela. We do not allow foreign financing of electoral
campaigns in the United States. Clearly we should not insist on
violating the laws of other countries and their sovereignty and
democracy in ways that we would not permit here.
Our government also undermines democracy in Venezuela by
disregarding the rule of law in that country and encouraging
the opposition to do the same. It must be recalled that the
Bush administration alone in this hemisphere initially endorsed
the military coup in April of 2002. There was strong
circumstantial evidence that our government gave prior approval
or possibly even more support than this, in addition to the
documented stepped-up NED funding to opposition groups in the
months prior to the coup. Senator Dodd asked for an
investigation, and the State Department's Office of the
Inspector General found that ``U.S. warnings to the opposition
of non-recognition of a coup-installed government, economic
actions, and other concrete punitive actions were few and far
between.''
But the administration made no attempt to repair relations
with the elected government after it was restored. Rather it
went on to tacitly endorse the oil strike, in spite of the fact
that it was preparing for a war in the Middle East, likely to
reduce oil supplies at the time. In December 2002, the White
House supported the opposition's unconstitutional demand for
early elections.
I will not go through the statements that Roger Noriega has
made recently because that has already been addressed earlier,
but this is another example of taking sides in disrespect for
the rule of law and the constitutional process in Venezuela.
These are very powerful signals to an opposition that
clearly has some very strong anti-democratic leadership.
Although the focus here is on the Government of Venezuela as a
threat to democracy, it is worth recalling that the opposition
only agreed in May of 2003 to pursue an electoral strategy
after all extra-legal means of overthrowing the government,
including a military coup and several oil strikes, had been
exhausted.
The most powerful opposition leaders have not expressed any
regret for these strategies, but on the contrary have continued
to state openly they will respect the results of the referendum
process only if they win. By contrast, the government has
consistently maintained that it will abide by the results and,
as you know, has done so.
Other arguments have been put forth to portray the Chavez
government as anti-democratic, but they are not very
convincing. Clearly Venezuela is nothing like Cuba, although
Mr. Chavez does have friendly relations with Fidel Castro. It
is not clear why this should be a reason for such bad relations
with the United States. The President of Brazil, Lula da Silva,
and his party have deeper and longer-standing relations with
Castro and Cuba than Venezuela. The Bush administration and
Brazil have agreed to disagree on this issue, and that seems to
be the end of this dispute.
Most recently, Venezuela's General Assembly passed a law
that Mr. Vivanco mentioned allowing the government to add 12
new judges to the supreme court. This would certainly alter the
balance of the court, which now has 20 judges, in favor of the
government. But this is also a supreme court that decided that
the people who carried out the military coup of 2002 could not
be prosecuted. In the United States, I am pretty sure that our
Congress would use its power to impeach a supreme court that
made such a ruling. And of course, the judiciary has never been
independent in Venezuela, less so under previous governments
than the present one. It will not make much progress in that
direction so long as the country remains deeply polarized.
This polarization is a very serious problem and----
Senator Coleman. Dr. Weisbrot, would you summarize your
testimony, please?
Dr. Weisbrot. OK. I have only three sentences left.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
Dr. Weisbrot. Chavez is a polarizing figure who has
contributed to the problem. But Congress should not make it
worse by allowing our government to take sides. We should
normalize our relations with Venezuela, which is a democracy
and has never posed any threat to U.S. security. It has reached
out several times to our government since the coup, only to be
rebuffed. The first step would be to stop funding the recall
effort and people who have participated in a military coup
against Venezuela's elected government.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Weisbrot follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Mark Weisbrot
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee for inviting
me to present these facts and views. The Center for Economic and Policy
Research is an independent, non-partisan policy institute. We are
funded primarily by foundations, large and small, as well as some
individual contributions from U.S. citizens. We do not receive any
funding from governments, political parties, or corporations.
On the subject of this hearing ``The State of Democracy in
Venezuela,'' there is much public confusion. To set the record
straight: Venezuela is a democracy, as much as any country in Latin
America today. As Jimmy Carter said on a visit there: ``I believe that
freedom of speech is as alive in Venezuela as it is in any other
country I've visited.''
The same is true for freedom of the press, assembly, association,
and other civil liberties. Anyone who calls the Venezuelan government
``authoritarian'' is in need of a dictionary, or perhaps needs to see
the place. I was there during the oil strike in December 2002 and
witnessed the government's response to the destruction of its economy
by less than one percent of the labor force--the management and some of
the workers in the oil industry. They were not striking for better
wages or benefits, but to overthrow the government. Even in the United
States, which has perhaps the strongest tradition of protecting civil
liberties in the world, a strike of this nature would be illegal. Here
the leaders would have been subject to court injunctions ordering them
back to work, and jailed if they refused. This did not happen in
Venezuela. The strike lasted for 64 days and sent the economy into a
deep recession.
It is true that there are human rights abuses in Venezuela. But
these are not different from those in the rest of Latin America, and I
have not heard any reputable human rights organization argue that they
have worsened under the five years of Chavez' government. Nor have they
argued that the government has engaged in any systematic repression of
political dissent.
What, then, are the major threats to democracy in Venezuela? The
attention here has focused on the Venezuelan government. It is of
course true, as Americans have long recognized, that any government can
become repressive if its citizens are not vigilant. But Venezuelan
democracy faces other challenges.
Some are from Washington. Our government has funded, and continues
to fund, organizations headed by people who were leaders of the
military coup of April 2002. These leaders have received, and some
continue to receive, funds from the United States Congress through the
National Endowment for Democracy. These are people who signed the
actual coup decree of April 12, 2002, that overthrew the elected
President and Vice President, and abolished the General Assembly, the
Supreme Court and the constitution, and established a dictatorship.
Should these people, and their organizations, be funded by U.S.
taxpayers' dollars? Is this the proper function of the National
Endowment for Democracy? These are questions that Congress should ask.
I think that most Americans would be against such funding if they were
aware of it.
The NED is also funding a group--called Sumate--that led the
signature drive to recall the President of Venezuela. We do not allow
foreign financing of electoral campaigns in the United States. Clearly
we should not insist on violating the laws of other countries, and
their sovereignty and democracy, in ways that we would not permit here.
Our government also undermines democracy in Venezuela by
disregarding the rule of law in that country, and encouraging the
opposition to do the same. It must be recalled that the Bush
Administration, alone in this hemisphere, initially endorsed the
military coup in April 2002. There was strong circumstantial evidence
that our government gave prior approval or possibly even more support
than this, in addition to the stepped-up NED funding to opposition
groups in the months prior to the coup. Senator Dodd asked for an
investigation, and the State Department's Office of the Inspector
General found that ``U.S. warnings [to the opposition] . . . of non-
recognition of a coup-installed government, economic actions, and other
concrete punitive actions were few and far between.''
But the Administration made no attempt to repair relations with the
elected government after it was restored. Rather it went on to tacitly
endorse the oil strike--in spite of the fact that it was preparing for
a war in the Middle East, likely to reduce oil supplies, at the time.
In December 2002 the White House supported the opposition's
unconstitutional demand for early elections.
More recently, the Administration has made a number of statements
that have encouraged the opposition not to respect constitutional
processes. Before the results of the signature gathering process were
decided last month, Roger F. Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs, declared that the ``the requisite number of
people supported the petition'' and warned of ``dire consequences'' if
Venezuela's National Electoral Council did not arrive at the same
conclusion.
These are very powerful signals to an opposition that clearly has
some very strong anti-democratic leadership. Although the focus here is
on the government of Venezuela as a threat to democracy, it is worth
recalling that the opposition only agreed in May of 2003 to pursue an
electoral strategy after all extra-legal means of overthrowing the
government--including a military coup and several oil strikes--had been
exhausted.
The most powerful opposition leaders have not expressed any regret
for these strategies, but on the contrary, have continued to state
openly that they will only respect the results of the referendum
process if they win. By contrast, the government has consistently
maintained that it will abide by the results, and has done so.
A Los Angeles Times reporter interviewed one of the country's most
respected pollsters, from the firm DataAnalysis, Jose Antonio Gil. The
firm's polls are often cited in the U.S. press. According to the L.A.
Times, he could ``see only one way out of the political crisis
surrounding President Hugo Chavez. `He has to be killed,' he said,
using his finger to stab the table in his office . . . `He has to be
killed.'1A''
It is hard to imagine an opposition of this type in the United
States--they would probably be labeled ``terrorist'' here--but these
are the people with whom our government has aligned itself. It is also
difficult to conceive of a media like Venezuela's, if you have never
seen it. Imagine ABC, NBC, CBS, CNN, Fox News and the cable channels,
USA Today and most major newspapers, as well as most radio--all
controlled, in terms of their daily content, by the most fiercely
partisan opponents of the government. They have also abandoned the
norms of modern journalism, becoming organs of a movement to de-
legitimize the government. Two months ago one of Venezuela's most
influential newspapers actually used a doctored version of a New York
Times article to allege that the Chavez government was implicated in
the Madrid terrorist bombing. (See Appendix 1). But the media has never
been censored by the Chavez government.
Other arguments have been put forth to portray the Chavez
government as anti-democratic, but they are not very convincing.
Clearly Venezuela is nothing like Cuba, although Mr. Chavez does have
friendly relations with Fidel Castro. It is not clear why this should
be a reason for such bad relations with the United States. The
President of Brazil, Lula da Silva, and his party have deeper and
longer-standing relations with Castro and Cuba. The Bush Administration
and Brazil have agreed to disagree on this issue, and that seems to be
the end of this dispute.
Most recently, Venezuela's General Assembly passed a law allowing
the government to add 12 new judges to the Supreme Court, which
currently has 20 judges. This would certainly alter the balance of the
court in favor of the government. But this is also a Supreme Court that
decided that the people who carried out the military coup of 2002 could
not be prosecuted. In the United States, I am pretty sure that our
Congress would use its power to impeach a Supreme Court that made such
a ruling. And of course, the judiciary has never been independent in
Venezuela--less so under previous governments than presently. It will
not make much progress in that direction so long as the country remains
deeply polarized.
This polarization is a very serious problem, and of course Chavez
is a polarizing figure who has contributed to the problem. But Congress
should not make it worse by allowing our government to take sides. We
should normalize our relations with Venezuela, which is a democracy and
has never posed any threat to U.S. security; it has reached out several
times to our government since the coup--only to be rebuffed. The first
step would be to stop funding the recall effort and people who have
participated in a military coup against Venezuela's elected government.
* * *
Appendix 1
MEDIA FALLS SHORT ON IRAQ, VENEZUELA
(By Mark Weisbrot)
Distributed to newspapers by Knight-Ridder/Tribune Information
Services--June 6, 2004
http://www.cepr.net/columns/weisbrot/media%20venezuela.htm
Last week the New York Times published an 1100-word note ``From the
Editors'' criticizing its own reporting on the build-up to the Iraq war
and the early stages of the occupation. On Sunday the newspaper's
Public Editor went further, citing ``flawed journalism'' and stories
that ``pushed Pentagon assertions so aggressively you could almost
sense epaulets sprouting on the shoulders of editors.''
This kind of self-criticism is important, because the media played
an important role in convincing the American public--and probably the
Congress as well--that the war was justified. Unfortunately, these
kinds of mistakes are not limited to the New York Times--or to
reporting on Iraq.
Venezuela is a case in point. The Bush administration has been
pushing for ``regime change'' in Venezuela for years now, painting a
false and exaggerated picture of the reality there. As in the case of
Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction and links to Al-Qaeda, the
Administration has gotten a lot of help from the media.
Reporting on Venezuela relies overwhelmingly on opposition sources,
many of them about as reliable as Ahmed Chalabi. Although there are any
number of scholars and academics--both Venezuelan and international--
who could offer coherent arguments on the other side, their arguments
almost never appear. For balance, we usually get at most a poor person
on the street describing why he likes Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez,
or a sound bite from Chavez himself denouncing ``imperialist
intervention.''
Opposition allegations are repeated constantly, often without
rebuttal, and sometimes reported as facts. At the same time, some of
the most vital information is hardly reported or not reported at all.
For example, the opposition's efforts to recall President Chavez hit a
snag in March when more than 800,000 signatures for the recall were
invalidated. These signatures were not thrown out but were sent to a
``repair process,'' currently being tallied, in which signers would get
a second chance to claim invalidated signatures.
The opposition accused President Chavez of trying to illegitimately
deny the people's right to a referendum, and the press here has
overwhelmingly echoed this theme. But some vital facts were omitted
from the story: the disputed signatures were in violation of the
electoral rules, and could legitimately have been thrown out
altogether. Furthermore, these rules--requiring signers to fill out
their own name, address and other information--were well-known to
organizers on both sides and publicized in advance of the signature
gathering process.\1\ These rules are also common in the United States,
including California.
But readers of the U.S. and international press would not know
this. And few would know that the members of Venezuela's National
Electoral Commission--which is supervising the election--was appointed
by the Supreme Court, with opposition leaders applauding the
appointments.\2\
Even worse than most news stories on Venezuela are the editorials
of major newspapers, where factual errors have become commonplace. The
Washington Post has accused Chavez of holding political prisoners and
having ``muzzled the press,''1A1A\3\ and referred to the Electoral
Commission as ``Mr. Chavez' appointees.''1A\4\ All of these allegations
are incontestably false.
According to the U.S. State Department, ``There [are] no reports of
political prisoners in Venezuela.''1A\5\ And far from being
``muzzled,'' the press in Venezuela is one of the most furiously
partisan anti-government medias in the entire world. Two months ago one
of Venezuela's most influential newspapers actually used a doctored
version of a New York Times' article to allege that the Chavez
government was implicated in the Madrid terrorist bombing!1A\6\ But the
media has never been censored by the Chavez government.\7\
To be sure, President Chavez has made himself an easy target by
slinging a lot of fiery rhetoric and accusations at President Bush and
Washington. But even these diplomatic blunders could use some context:
the Bush Administration did, after all, endorse a military coup against
Chavez two years ago.\8\ And the U.S. continues to fund his political
opponents, including leaders of the failed coup and organizers of the
recall effort.\9\ Imagine what Mr. Bush might say about the French
President and government if they did those things to him.
Of course Venezuela has rarely been front page news, unlike Iraq.
But our government's involvement there has already caused considerable
damage and could well push the country to civil war--especially if our
media continues to go along for the ride.
NOTES
\1\ CNE Circular Number 16, dated 25 November 2003: ``In the case
that the signer is illiterate, blind, or of very advanced age, the
signature collection agent should write the first and last names of the
signer, their identification number and date of birth in the
corresponding spaces of each of them, and have the signer stamp their
fingerprint in the space provided, and note proof of the condition in
the space provided.''
The fact that the signer was otherwise required to fill out his/her
own information was well known to the parties and publicized in
advance, with TV commercials, and that forms filled out by people other
than the signers were invalid was also confirmed by Fernando Jaramillo,
Chief of Staff of the Organization of American States and Head of OAS
Mission to Venezuela, in an interview on April 21, 2004.
\2\ ``The five new members of the council represent a cross-section
of Venezuela's political landscape, allaying concerns on both sides
that the deck would be stacked as the country readies for a recall vote
. . . Henry Romas Allup, a prominent opposition voice from the
Democratic Action party, said the Supreme Court's decision represents a
``final blow to the government.'' (Pals, Dow Jones Newswire, 27/9/03)
After the Council made decisions unfavorable to the opposition,
some U.S. newspapers began referring to it as ``government-
controlled.'' (See, e.g., Miami Herald, ``Chavez's rivals need one
thing: a viable leader,'' February 17, 2004)
\3\ ``Eyes on Mr. Chavez,'' editorial, Washington Post, December
13, 2003.
\4\ ``Mr. Chavez's Claim,'' Editorial, Washington Post, May 26,
2004.
\5\ U.S. Department of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices--2003: Venezuela,'' Released by the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, February 25, 2004, http://weisbrot-
columns.c.topica.com/maaci1Vaa7hQ1beQvrSbafp
NFx/
\6\ For the original article, see Tim Golden and Don Van Natta Jr.,
``Bombings in Madrid: The Suspects; Carnage Yields Conflicting Clues As
Officials Search for Culprits,'' The New York Times, March 12, 2004.
For the altered version, see Marianella Salazar, ``Politica: Artilleria
de Oficio,'' El Nacional (Venezuela) March 24, 2004.
\7\ ``There are few obvious limits on free expression in Venezuela.
The country's print and audio-visual media operate without
restrictions. Most are strongly opposed to President Chavez and express
their criticism in unequivocal and often strident terms.'' Human Rights
Watch, ``Venezuela: Caught in the Crossfire: Freedom of Expression in
Venezuela,'' May 2003.
\8\ Peter Slevin, ``Chavez Provoked His Removal, U.S. Officials
Say; Administration Expresses Guarded Optimism About Interim Regime,
Calls for Quick Elections,'' Washington Post, April 13, 2002.
\9\ See Bart Jones, ``Tension in Venezuela; Activist eyes groups'
funding; Brooklyn lawyer says U.S. government funds are aiding those
trying to overthrow president,'' Newsday, April 4, 2004.
The FOIA documents are posted at http://weisbrot-
columns.c.topica.com/maaci1Vaa7hQ2beQvrSbafpNFx/
Several leaders of organizations that received funds from the U.S.
Congressionally-financed National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
actually signed the decree that established the coup government in
April 2002, and abolished Venezuela's General Assembly, Supreme Court,
Constitution, and other democratic institutions. Some are still
receiving funds from NED.
______
A Split Screen in Strike-Torn Venezuela
(By Mark Weisbrot)
Published in the Washington Post--January 12, 2003
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41444-2003Jan11.html
Walking around Caracas late last month during Venezuela's ongoing
protests, I was surprised by what I saw. My expectations had been
shaped by persistent U.S. media coverage of the nationwide strike
called by the opposition, which seeks President Hugo Chavez's ouster.
Yet in most of the city, where poor and working-class people live,
there were few signs of the strike. Streets were crowded with holiday
shoppers, metro trains and buses were running normally, and shops were
open for business. Only in the eastern, wealthier neighborhoods of the
capital were businesses mostly closed.
This is clearly an oil strike, not a ``general strike,'' as it is
often described. At the state-owned oil company, PDVSA, which controls
the industry, management is leading the strike because it is at odds
with the Chavez government. And while Venezuela depends on oil for 80
percent of its export earnings and half its national budget, the
industry's workers represent a tiny fraction of the labor force.
Outside the oil industry, it is hard to find workers who are actually
on strike. Some have been locked out from their jobs, as business
owners--including big foreign corporations such as McDonald's and
FedEx--have closed their doors in support of the opposition.
Most Americans seem to believe that the Chavez government is a
dictatorship, and one of the most repressive governments in Latin
America. But these impressions are false.
Not only was Chavez democratically elected, his government is
probably one of the least repressive in Latin America. This, too, is
easy to see in Caracas. While army troops are deployed to protect
Miraflores (the presidential compound), there is little military or
police presence in most of the capital, which is particularly striking
in such a tense and volatile political situation. No one seems the
least bit afraid of the national government, and despite the
seriousness of this latest effort to topple it, no one has been
arrested for political activities.
Chavez has been reluctant to use state power to break the strike,
despite the enormous damage to the economy. In the United States, a
strike of this sort--one that caused massive damage to the economy, or
one where public or private workers were making political demands--
would be declared illegal. Its participants could be fired, and its
leaders--if they persisted in the strike--imprisoned under a court
injunction. In Venezuela, the issue has yet to be decided. The supreme
court last month ordered PDVSA employees back to work until it rules on
the strike's legality.
To anyone who has been in Venezuela lately, opposition charges that
Chavez is ``turning the country into a Castro-communist
dictatorship''--repeated so often that millions of Americans apparently
now believe them--are absurd on their face.
If any leaders have a penchant for dictatorship in Venezuela, it is
the opposition's. On April 12 they carried out a military coup against
the elected government. They installed the head of the business
federation as president and dissolved the legislature and the supreme
court, until mass protests and military officers reversed the coup two
days later.
Military officers stand in Altamira Plaza and openly call for
another coup. It is hard to think of another country where this could
happen. The government's efforts to prosecute leaders of the coup were
canceled when the court dismissed the charges in August. Despite the
anger of his supporters, some of whom lost friends and relatives last
year during the two days of the coup government, Chavez respected the
decision of the court.
The opposition controls the private media, and to watch TV in
Caracas is truly an Orwellian experience. The five private TV stations
(there is one state-owned channel) that reach most Venezuelans play
continuous anti-Chavez propaganda. But it is worse than that: They are
also shamelessly dishonest. For example, on Dec. 6 an apparently
deranged gunman fired on a crowd of opposition demonstrators, killing
three and injuring dozens. Although there was no evidence linking the
government to the crime, the television news creators--armed with
footage of bloody bodies and grieving relatives--went to work
immediately to convince the public that Chavez was responsible. Soon
after the shooting, they were broadcasting grainy video clips allegedly
showing the assailant attending a pro-Chavez rally.
Now consider how people in Caracas's barrios see the opposition, a
view rarely heard in the United States: Led by representatives of the
corrupt old order, the opposition is trying to overthrow a government
that has won three elections and two referendums since 1998. Its coup
failed partly because hundreds of thousands of people risked their
lives by taking to the streets to defend democracy. So now it is
crippling the economy with an oil strike. The upper classes are simply
attempting to gain through economic sabotage what they could not and--
given the intense rivalry and hatred among opposition groups and
leaders--still cannot win at the ballot box.
From the other side of the class divide, the conflict is also seen
as a struggle over who will control and benefit from the nation's oil
riches. Over the last quarter-century PDVSA has swelled to a $50
billion a year enterprise, while the income of the average Venezuelan
has declined and poverty has increased more than anywhere in Latin
America. Billions of dollars of the oil company's revenue could instead
be used to finance health care and education for millions of
Venezuelans.
Now add Washington to the mix: The United States, alone in the
Americas, supported the coup, and before then it increased its
financial support of the opposition. Washington shares PDVSA
executives' goals of increasing oil production, busting OPEC quotas and
even selling off the company to private foreign investors. So it is not
surprising that the whole conflict is seen in much of Latin America as
just another case of Washington trying to overthrow an independent,
democratically elected government.
This view from the barrios seems plausible. The polarization of
Venezuelan society along class and racial lines is apparent in the
demonstrations themselves. The pro-government marches are filled with
poor and working-class people who are noticeably darker--descendants of
the country's indigenous people and African slaves--than the more
expensively dressed upper classes of the opposition. Supporters of the
opposition that I spoke with dismissed these differences, insisting
that Chavez's followers were simply ``ignorant,'' and were being
manipulated by a ``demagogue.''
But for many, Chavez is the best, and possibly last, hope not only
for social and economic betterment, but for democracy itself. At the
pro-government demonstrations, people carry pocket-size copies of the
country's 1999 constitution, and vendors hawk them to the crowds.
Leaders of the various non-governmental organizations that I met with,
who helped draft the constitution, have different reasons for revering
it: women's groups, for example, because of its anti-discrimination
articles; and indigenous leaders because it is the first to recognize
their people's rights. But all see themselves as defending
constitutional democracy and civil liberties against what they describe
as ``the threat of fascism'' from the opposition.
This threat is very real. Opposition leaders have made no apologies
for the April coup, nor for the arrest and killing of scores of
civilians during the two days of illegal government. They continue to
stand up on television and appeal for another coup--which, given the
depth of Chavez's support, would have to be bloody in order to hold
power.
Where does the U.S. government now stand on the question of
democracy in Venezuela? The Bush administration joined the opposition
in taking advantage of the Dec. 6 shootings to call for early
elections, which would violate the Venezuelan constitution. The
administration reversed itself the next week, but despite paying lip
service to the negotiations mediated by the OAS, it has done nothing to
encourage its allies in the opposition to seek a constitutional or even
a peaceful solution.
Sixteen members of Congress sent a letter to Bush last month,
asking him to state clearly that the United States would not have
normal diplomatic relations with a coup-installed government in
Venezuela. But despite its apprehension about disruption of Venezuelan
oil supplies on the eve of a probable war against Iraq, the Bush
administration is not yet ready to give up any of its options for
``regime change'' in Caracas. And--not surprisingly--neither is the
Venezuelan opposition.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
We certainly have had a wide variety of opinion on this
panel.
Let me just start with Dr. Weisbrot. Are you not at all
troubled by the indictment of Sumate's Alejandro Plaz and Maria
Corina Machado?
Dr. Weisbrot. You know, I am troubled that it is a treason
charge. I do not know. It is very hard to get accurate
information. I am not troubled that the government would, as
our government, declare that funding from foreign sources in an
electoral campaign is illegal. That is true of most countries
in the world.
Senator Coleman. Are you inferring that somehow here we
would infer that was treason?
Dr. Weisbrot. No. Again, if in fact she is ever arrested or
prosecuted for treason, that would be a terrible thing because
that is indeed an extremely harsh and unjustified charge for
someone who receives foreign financing. I would encourage the
government, of course, to make sure--the government, by the
way, is not a dictatorship. The government does not control all
the judges and prosecutors and everybody who might do something
like this.
So I would encourage the government to use all of its
political pressures to stop anything like that from happening,
and I am willing to bet anybody here that nothing like that
will happen. There are all levels of incompetence in any
government, and in this case there is a lot of anger and there
is a lot of polarization. So somebody has decided to
investigate this person for treason. But the real charge is
simply--and the one that we in the United States should be
concerned about because it is our tax dollars--is that she has
received funding for an electoral campaign from a foreign
government.
Senator Coleman. I would think some of us would have some
disagreement regarding concerns about the National Endowment
for Democracy and their efforts to promote small ``d''
democracy.
But let me ask Mr. Vivanco. Dr. Weisbrot is not troubled by
the efforts to stack the court. I think, in reflecting on Dr.
McCoy's comment, the key here is to have two things in order to
heal the division. One is full transparency in the electoral
process, and should, as Dr. McCoy indicated, the process be
close that any review process also have the perception of being
fair. Can you address the impact on that if there were to be a
close election, if in fact the court were to be expanded from
20 to 32 judges with the sense that it is being stacked?
Mr. Vivanco. Your question addressed essentially two
points. One is that if the Venezuelan political establishment--
in other words, if the assembly decided by broad consensus to
change the structure of one of the powers of a state, in this
case, the supreme court, which is supposed to represent an
independent power of the state, according to President Chavez's
constitution, they need to get at least a two-thirds majority
vote. If they want to remove judges, according to the same
constitution, article 265, I guess, requires the same number of
votes, a two-thirds majority. Otherwise you cannot do it.
That was not a problem 2, 3 years or maybe 4 years ago when
President Chavez was incredibly popular and he had those votes
in the assembly. But today in the assembly he has a very slim
majority of only five votes, and with those five votes he has
managed to pass a law that will allow him and his coalition in
Congress essentially, as I said before, to purge and to appoint
new members of the supreme court. It will be a completely
different supreme court with 32 members. Today it is 20 members
and that may have also implications for the referendum. This in
itself is a violation of the principle of the rule of law,
which is that we are governed and the permanent rules that you
cannot just change when you happen to be at that period a
little bit more popular than the opposition.
So in terms of the rule of law, it is a tremendous setback
for Venezuelan democracy. I hope that the government will think
this through and it still is possible to delay the
implementation of this law.
On the other hand, what concerns is is what the members of
the government coalition told us when we were researching this
issue in the assembly that they are planning to pack the court
in July before the referendum. So if this referendum becomes a
very close one, close to call today--nobody knows who is going
to win the referendum on August 15--it is perfectly likely that
the result is going to be essentially discussed--I am not sure
decided, but discussed--the whole issue of the electoral
process, by the court, exactly what has happened in the United
States during the last Presidential elections.
Senator Coleman. Dr. McCoy, do you want to add anything to
that?
Dr. McCoy. Well, just a couple of things. First, there is a
rather lengthy procedure to name new supreme court justices. So
it will take some time. I would be surprised if it happens
perhaps as fast as predicted.
Second, under the current court there is somewhat of a
debate between two of the chambers, the electoral chamber and
the constitutional chamber, over who controls the questions and
the appeals and the challenges on the recall process. So that
has not yet been resolved and that will be ongoing if the
current chamber stays as it is.
Just a third comment I would make. My understanding, though
I am not a legal expert on the laws of Venezuela, is that
historically it has been a 51 percent majority required to name
supreme court justices and that that continues under the
current situation, that the constitution specifies a two-thirds
vote to remove them, but not to name them, although in my
opinion it is always more stable for a democracy to have the
broadest consensus possible in naming such important positions.
Dr. Weisbrot. I can address this too, if you would like.
Senator Coleman. I think I have got your perspective. Let
me just move on. My time is up. So I want to go to one other
issue.
Clearly there is a concern about packing of the court. So I
think we have to understand that. Again, the general principle
here for all--and this is not a debate--is that, one, we have
got a democracy, accept that. We have a process that has to be
accepted, and then we have got to make sure that if this
process is close, that there is transparency in the election
process, and then in any review of the election process there
is credibility. So I do not think we need to discuss it
anymore, but I think that is the general concept.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman. We are short on
time here, which makes it difficult. But thank you all very
much for your presence here today and your participation.
Let me, if I can, very quickly with you, Dr. McCoy. I would
like to go back. I had a short exchange with Secretary Noriega,
and to an audience here in the United States, it may have
seemed like a relatively innocuous thing, the press accounts
here. But I gather this was a fairly big story in Venezuela,
the statements that were made by Secretary Noriega. Is that
correct?
Dr. McCoy. Yes.
Senator Dodd. Was it a fairly big story?
Dr. McCoy. The statement you are referring to of May 26?
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Dr. McCoy. Yes, it was.
Senator Dodd. To what extent did those remarks cause
President Carter and Secretary General Gaviria any concern?
Dr. McCoy. Well, I was in the country at the time; they
were not. What it did was raise questions to me. The press and
the government raised questions to me about what would be our
response and would I condemn such a statement. I stated that
our normal experience is that other governments will wait for
results of an election before making a pronouncement, but in
this case and in most cases we do not comment on particular
statements of individual government representatives and our
position is--what I have always tried to make clear is that the
Carter Center is an independent organization.
Senator Dodd. I understand that. Did President Carter and
Secretary Gaviria approach U.S. administration officials about
the remarks?
Dr. McCoy. Not publicly. They may have privately.
Senator Dodd. And the statement issued by Secretary Powell
on the 27th. Did that reduce the tensions caused by the public
statements by Mr. Noriega?
Dr. McCoy. In my perception it did, yes.
Senator Dodd. Let me ask you this. What is your opinion
about whether or not the opposition and the Chavez government
will respect the outcome of the referendum?
Dr. McCoy. I think that the important thing is that it be a
transparent process. If the results are clear and decisive, I
have no doubt that both sides will accept the outcome. But I
think the chances are it will be a very close result, and there
I think there will be a great temptation among some of the
followers on both sides to fear or to suspect manipulation of
the results. That is why in my testimony I said the
transparency is extremely important and steps to raise
confidence like the audit of the paper trail of the voting
machines, like an audit of the voters' list, like having
international observers, and including having, for example,
regulations for media to have equal access for both sides to
advertising and monitoring of the media. That is one thing, I
think as you mentioned, Senator Dodd, that we are currently
working on. There are ongoing discussions on that issue.
Senator Dodd. I gather President Carter facilitated a
meeting between Gustavo Cisneros and President Chavez. Let me
say for the record here I know Gustavo Cisneros. I have a lot
of respect for him. He is an interesting man. He has a very
healthy and wonderful perspective on Latin America that I have
always found interesting.
My point I want to get at here is he also may have some
strong feelings. And the question I have for you is to what
extent does the Carter Center believe that there is an
independent press in Venezuela. We have heard others comment on
it here, but to the extent that the people of Venezuela have an
opportunity to hear different voices through the media outlets
in that country.
Dr. McCoy. I think one of our concerns is that the media on
both sides have taken a political role so that there is a clear
political stance or bias from both the public stations and the
private stations so that the people may, in fact, be missing
some more neutral or impartial sources. But clearly there is
freedom that we see coming out of both sets of media, the
public and the private, to express views.
Senator Dodd. Would you describe the private media as
independent?
Dr. McCoy. Independent, yes.
Senator Dodd. You addressed the issue of the voting
machines. By the way, thank you for your comments about
Georgia. We are getting a lot of complaints about electronic
voting, and I think Georgia proved how successful electronic
voting can actually be. So I appreciate your bringing that up.
I want to just underscore the points that Mr. Vivanco made
about the courts, and the chairman made reference to it. I
think our own Constitution is instructive. The Constitution of
the United States left up to the Congress to determine the size
of the court, who would sit on it, and the meetings and so
forth. This is not unprecedented. In fact, it has worked rather
well for us. But I do think it is a strong and worthwhile
suggestion that any efforts to fill that court prior to the
referendum I think would be a huge mistake, and my hope is that
they will hear those concerns being raised.
Last, just on the Venezuelan oil issue, let me ask any of
you very quickly here. How would you describe or characterize
Venezuelan cooperation in the oil sector? Has it been a
reliable supplier to the United States? And how would a
disruption in Venezuelan oil supplies impact U.S. oil and gas
prices?
Mr. Tissot. Venezuela, as I presented in my statement,
continues to be a reliable supplier. Despite the political
rhetoric that we hear, Venezuela cannot survive without oil
exports, and its natural market is the United States. There are
substantial U.S. foreign companies investing in Venezuela and
expanding their investment in that country.
Senator Dodd. Can I interrupt you for 1 second, by the way,
and tell you a rumor I have heard? And that is, that the
collection of revenues from the oil sales, a large percentage
of it, is not being reinvested in order to maintain the
infrastructure of the oil industry and that the money is not
being stolen, but it is just being set aside for other
purposes, and that there is a deterioration going on in the
infrastructure of the oil production and gas production. Is
there any truth to that?
Mr. Tissot. The 2004-2009 PDVSA budget includes a $5
million investment which $1.2 million to $2 million are going
to be allocated for social spending, which has nothing to do
with oil investment. So I would agree with you.
The comment to that is PDVSA is the company who would be
impacted. Foreign companies are expected to make the
difference.
Senator Dodd. Does anybody else want to comment on the oil
issue?
Dr. Weisbrot. Sure. I think it has been a reliable
supplier. The only cutoff in recent memory has been during the
oil strike in December 2002 through February 2003. At that time
it did not have as much impact on oil or gasoline prices here,
but it would have a much larger impact now as world supplies
are a lot tighter than they were then.
Senator Dodd. I was unclear earlier when the question was
raised about whether or not the OAS and the Carter Center are
going to be invited to participate as observers in all of this.
Have you been invited?
Dr. McCoy. The National Electoral Council just approved
yesterday the regulations for the international observers, and
I believe it will be approved perhaps formally tomorrow, which
says that the invitations now will come from the foreign
ministry. So we have not received a specific invitation from
the foreign ministry, but we certainly received indications
that we should be expecting one.
Senator Dodd. And also OAS?
Dr. McCoy. OAS as well and some other organizations as
well.
Senator Dodd. Well, I hope that would be the case. If out
of this hearing in a public setting--obviously, the chairman
can speak for himself, but I would urge that those responsible
in Venezuela extend that invitation. I think it would be very,
very important for everyone's concerns in the end that there
are people like yourselves and the OAS to be there to observe
the process. That will say a lot to many of us about the
intentions of those who want to have an outcome here that will
be credible.
I am sorry about the time. But your testimony was all very
helpful, and I appreciate it.
Senator Coleman. We have to go vote.
I want to do just one followup, if I can.
And I agree wholeheartedly with Senator Dodd's remarks. I
hope out of this public discussion, that the message is clear
that the more we can do to raise the level of confidence in the
transparency of this process, the better it is for all
concerned.
I guess, Mr. Diaz, one question to you. Do you foresee the
Group of Friends playing any role in this process, in the
electoral process?
Mr. Diaz. The Group of Friends is being driven in many ways
by Brazil, and I understand that Lula is very concerned about
the recent developments in Venezuela. I do think that they
could play a more significant role than they have played up to
now, but I think their moment has yet to arrive basically. They
have to make themselves heard on August 15. I think that is the
critical day for them to assert themselves.
Senator Coleman. Hopefully that message will be heard too.
I want to thank you all for your testimony. The hearing
record will be held open for 10 days.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:17 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
----------
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Responses of Hon. Roger F. Noriega and Hon. John F. Maisto to
Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Richard G.
Lugar
Question 1. The Organization of American States (OAS) observation
team prepared a report of what they observed during the signature
verification and ``reparo'' stages of the recall referendum process.
Why has that report not been made public? Is it true that the OAS has
dismantled the technical team that spent months in Venezuela observing
the process? If so, why?
Answer. OAS Secretary General Gaviria has decided that the OAS will
release a complete report on its observation effort in Venezuela only
after the recall process is finished. He believes that issuing an
interim report would achieve little and could complicate the OAS's
capacity to carry out its role in Venezuela through the August 15
recall referendum and beyond.
The OAS observation team in Venezuela for the signature
verification and ``reparo'' process was designed to be agile, flexible
and cost-efficient, with the ability to anticipate and respond to
requirements as they arose. The ``reparo'' process was not an election
with voting machines, electronic tabulation processes and other
technical observation requirements, but rather a verification of
signatures of a smaller universe of constituents than a general
referendum or election. The. OAS had approximately 120 observers for
the May 27-31 ``reparo'' process.
Question 2. Has the Venezuelan Government asked the OAS and the
Carter Center to provide election observers for the recall referendum
on August 15, 2004?
Answer. The OAS Secretary General and Carter Center have received
oral invitations from Venezuela's National Electoral Council to observe
the August 15, 2004, recall referendum. The OAS and Carter Center are
now discussing the terms under which they will observe with the
National Electoral Council. The OAS Secretary General and Carter Center
are preparing to field an election observation mission for the August
15 recall referendum.
Question 3. If not, what is the U.S. OAS and Department of State
doing to ensure that OAS and Carter Center international election
observers are allowed to observe the recall referendum on August 15,
2004?
Answer. We have repeatedly underscored the importance of
international observation to the credibility of the recall process in
our public statements. In addition, the Department of State has
maintained fluid, senior-level diplomatic contact with the Group of
Friends of the OAS Secretary General's Mission in Venezuela, and other
interested international partners in support of the OAS and Carter
Center observation missions. Our diplomatic efforts have been
accompanied by public statements from international bodies, including
the Friends Group and the European Union, in support of OAS and Carter
Center observation.
Question 4. Is the U.S. Embassy in Venezuela adequately staffed to
deal with a potential crisis leading up to or as a result of the August
15, 2004 recall referendum?
Answer. Embassy Caracas reports that it is sufficiently well-
staffed to respond to any problems resulting from the referendum.
Embassy Caracas recently lost its press attache and faces a several
month gap in filling the position. Additionally, the Department is
considering a request to add permanently a mid-level officer position
in the political section, given the increase in workload generated by
Venezuela's governance issues.
Question 5. Does the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs at the
Department of State have enough staff to cover Venezuela? How many
staff covers Venezuela issues at the Department?.
Answer. Venezuela is a priority concern for the Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs. Western Hemisphere Affairs Assistant Secretary
Roger F. Noriega and Deputy Assistant Secretary Peter DeShazo are
actively engaged in Venezuela issues. Similarly, the Director and
Deputy Director of the Bureau's Office of Andean Affairs devote a
significant amount of time coordinating policy within the Executive
Branch. Day-to-day developments are covered by one mid-level Foreign
Service Officer who serves as Venezuela Desk Officer. That officer is
supported by a Regional Affairs Officer, who works almost exclusively
on Venezuela. The United States Delegation to the Organization of
American States (USOAS), headed by Ambassador John F. Maisto, former
U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, works very closely with the Desk and the
OAS in support of our policy objectives.
All of these Western Hemisphere Affairs officers are supported by
the issue specific expertise of a wide-range of Department of State
offices assigned to functional bureaus within the Department, who work
on energy, human rights, trade, political-military, and other
portfolios dealing with Venezuela. Western Hemisphere Affairs believes
this staffing pattern is sufficient to manage Venezuela policy.
Question 6. Individuals and organizations that have received
funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) for totally
legitimate and transparent activities in support of both democracy and
the May 2002 Agreement have been prosecuted; what has been the State
Department's position in this regard and how has it been communicated
to the Government of Venezuela?
Answer. We are concerned by the politically-motivated
investigations into individuals and civil society organizations whose
only ``crime'' appears to be receiving support from the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED) for legitimate activities. NED is an
independent, private organization that enjoys wide bipartisan support
for its work to help strengthen democratic institutions around the
world. We have expressed our concern to the Government, underscoring
that such actions are unacceptable in a democratic society.
We have consistently urged the Friends of the Organization of
American States (OAS) Secretary General's Mission for Venezuela to make
public statements decrying the unwarranted persecution of democratic
organizations by the Government of Venezuela. In his April 22 briefing
to the Human Rights Caucus, the Director of the Office for the
Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy in the Department's Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Robert P. Jackson, noted our ``grave
concern [about] a rising number of threats and intimidation directed at
non-governmental human rights defenders by government representatives
and supporters' as well as the Government's harsh rhetoric against
``labor groups, the Catholic Church, and pro-democracy institutions
such as the National Endowment for Democracy.'' The United States will
continue to speak out against the targeting of peaceful, civil society
organizations for political purposes in Venezuela.
Question 7. What is the State Department's position on the
indictment of Sumate's Alejandro Plaz and Maria Corina Machado? What is
the Department doing to bring attention to this issue?
Answer. We are concerned by what appear to be politically-motivated
investigations against the leaders of the civic, electoral non-
governmental organization (NGO) Sumate, Alejandro Plaz and Maria Corina
Machado. While it is our understanding that formal charges have not
been presented in their case, Plaz and Machado are being investigated
for allegedly ``conspiring'' against the Government by receiving a
grant from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) for electoral
observation and voter education activities.
As is well known, NED is an independent, private organization that
enjoys wide bipartisan support for its work to help strengthen
democratic institutions around the world. The Venezuelan government's
efforts against Sumate are intended to intimidate and dissuade citizen
participation in the referendum process. Such actions are unacceptable,
in a democratic society.
Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger F. Noriega
met with Machado on July 9 to commend her and her colleagues' courage
in the face of continued Government harassment and to reiterate our
support for their commitment to a peaceful, democratic solution to the
ongoing conflict. The Department will continue to support Sumate's
democratic activities in Venezuela and to signal to authorities in
Caracas the Administration's intent to monitor Sumate's fate carefully.
We have expressed our concern to the Venezuelan. Government as well as
publicly. We have also raised our concerns about the. Venezuelan
Government's actions against Sumate with international human rights
organizations and the media.
Question 8. While a great deal of emphasis has been placed on an
electoral solution to the Venezuelan crisis it would seem that little
or no time has been spent analyzing the issue of current and future
governability. Could you please outline your top areas of concern with
regards to Venezuela in a post or no referendum scenario?
Answer. We are deeply engaged with the OAS, Carter Center and our
hemispheric partners in supporting national reconciliation in
Venezuela. Achieving a constitutional, democratic, peaceful and
electoral solution to the current impasse will be a key first step
toward allowing Venezuelans to take on the serious economic and social
challenges the country faces. Venezuelans must ensure that all
citizens--not just a privileged few--benefit from the fruits of
democracy, free trade and enterprise. This will involve addressing
economic issues--stimulating economic growth, job creation and
increased opportunity; social issues--fostering national
reconciliation, greater social inclusion and personal security; and
core governance issues--promoting effective, transparent government,
strong democratic institutions and respect for human rights and the
rule of law.
Overcoming the current crisis will empower Venezuelans to focus on
these very important issues. The United States, along with our
international partners, stands ready to assist their efforts.
Question 9. Could you explain what your posture would be in
response to a possible President Chavez victory in the recall
referendum of August 15, 2004?
Answer. Unfettered and effective international observation, led by
the Organization of American States and the Carter Center, will be key
to ensuring the fairness and credibility of the August 15 recall
referendum. As Secretary Powell has stated, the United States, along
with our international partners, will accept the results of a fair,
open, internationally-certified election, which respects the sovereign
expression of Venezuelan citizens, whatever the outcome.
If President Chavez prevails in a fair recall referendum, where
international observers are granted full access, we will seek to work
together on those areas where cooperation has been good--
counternarcotics and energy--and to improve cooperation in that area
where the record is mixed: counterterrorism. Much will depend on the
posture adopted by the Venezuelan Government. Our bilateral relations
in a range of areas have suffered due to unilateral actions taken by
the Chavez Government. Regardless of the winner of the referendum, if
the process is free and fair, strengthening democratic institutions,
respect for the rule of law and human rights, and cooperation on
counternarcotics and regional security issues will remain the anchors
of U.S. policy in Venezuela.
Question 10. The new Organic Law of the Supreme Court, which
expands the number of Supreme Court justices from 20 to 32, allows
President Chavez's governing coalition to use its slim majority in the
legislature to obtain an overwhelming majority of seats on the Supreme
Court. The law also allows his coalition to nullify the appointments of
sitting justices. In short, Chavez's supporters now can purge and pack
the country's highest court. What is the Department's opinion of this
law?
Answer. A strong, independent judiciary is an essential element of
democratic governance. Any steps to diminish judicial autonomy or the
separation of powers undermine democracy. Accordingly, the United
States is seriously concerned about the implications of the new Organic
Law of the Supreme Court. We share the concerns expressed by Human
Rights Watch and other non-governmental organizations, which have
documented the deleterious effects the legislation could have on
judicial independence and democracy in general in Venezuela.
As noted, among the law's major provisions are the expansion of the
Supreme Court from 20 to 32 justices and the empowerment of the
National Assembly to appoint and suspend judges by a simple majority
vote. Already, the pro-Government coalition in the legislature, which
spearheaded passage of the law, has suspended the Supreme Court Vice-
President. As Human Rights Watch has noted, the pro-Government
legislative majority is quickly moving to name new justices and to
remove those not viewed as sympathetic to the Government. We are
bringing this issue to the attention of our international partners and
will continue to follow it closely.
Question 11. Does the new Organic Law of the Supreme Court violate
the basic principles of Venezuela's constitution and international
human rights law? If so, what can the Department of State and OAS do to
highlight the fact that this law is an attempt to control Venezuela's
judicial branch, undermine the separation of powers and the
independence of the judiciary?
Answer. The United States is seriously concerned about the new
Organic Law of the Supreme Court, recently passed by the pro-Government
coalition in the National Assembly. A number of human rights
organizations have voiced their own concerns. In a 24-page report
issued on June 17, Human Rights Watch noted that the ``Venezuelan
government is undermining the independence of the country's judiciary
ahead of a presidential recall referendum that may ultimately be
decided in the courts.''
The Report underscores Venezuela's commitments under the Inter-
American Democratic Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights to
``safeguard the independence of the judiciary,'' adding that the
Venezuelan government is presently in ``contravention'' of
internationally-recognized ``basic principles'' regarding judicial
independence. In its own report in December 2003, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights underlined problems with judicial
independence and impartiality, noting that the ``failure to respect the
constitution fully creates legal insecurity that impedes the
consolidation of the rule of law.''
We have raised the issue with our hemispheric and European
partners, encouraging them to make statements in support of Venezuelan
democracy and to encourage engagement by their own non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). The United States will continue to speak out
forcefully in defense of Venezuela's democratic institutions, including
a strong, independent judiciary, respect for the separation of powers
and the rule of law.
Question 12. Numerous reports point to a massive crisis within the
Venezuelan military. In private, analysts are beginning to confirm that
support for Mr. Chavez is less than previously expected by that
internal infighting, even among pro-government elements, and
operational decay is probably greater than anticipated. Could you
please give us your assessment of the current state of the Venezuelan
Armed Forces and the risk a crisis at its core presents for a
constitutional solution to the current crisis and for the durability of
any democratic solution the Venezuelan people might seek?
Answer. The Venezuelan military, along with civilian law
enforcement, plays a key role in ensuring domestic security and
stability. The Venezuelan Armed Forces' tradition of professionalism,
commitment to democracy and civilian leadership, respect for human
rights, and loyalty to the constitution must be maintained if a
durable, peaceful, and democratic solution to the country's political
crisis is to be achieved.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and other human
rights organizations have noted the growing involvement of Venezuelan
public security forces in internal security matters and partisan
political processes. This presents a disturbing trend. Similarly
upsetting are credible reports of human rights abuses by members of the
National Guard during the February-March 2004 opposition
demonstrations. Any attempts by the Venezuelan military or security
forces to limit free speech, assembly, or association would threaten
the Venezuelan people's efforts to achieve a constitutional solution to
the current impasse. We will continue to monitor the role and status of
the Venezuelan Armed Forces closely.
Question 13. Is Venezuela's military divided along political lines?
Answer. While the Venezuelan Armed Forces have a strong tradition
of professionalism and respect for democracy and human rights, under
President Chavez, it has grown increasingly politicized. We are
troubled by the Government of Venezuela's use of promotions and
assignments to reward officers for their political allegiance and its
efforts to involve the military in partisan political processes.
In his April 22 briefing to the Human Rights Caucus, the Director
of the Office for the Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy in the
Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Robert P.
Jackson, noted United States concern about the ``increased
militarization of public administration, including the use of loyalist
military officers in key political posts and as political candidates .
. .''
We, along with the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
have expressed our concerns regarding the use of the Armed Forces in
political and civil affairs and will continue to monitor the issue
closely.
Question 14. Would the military uphold the constitution if
challenged?
Answer. The United States has consistently urged the Venezuelan
Armed Forces to respect a constitutional, democratic, peaceful, and
electoral solution to the current impasse. We expect and urge the
Venezuelan military to honor its tradition of respect for democracy,
human rights and constitutional rule.
We oppose the use of force and intimidation to thwart the recall
process as well as any attempts to achieve political objectives through
violence or other unconstitutional means.
Question 15. How would you describe U.S./Venezuelan military-to-
military interaction over the years? How would you describe it today?
Answer. The United States and Venezuela traditionally enjoyed a
strong military-to-military relationship anchored in a mutual
commitment to democracy, respect for the rule of law and human rights.
Our once close relationship has suffered over the past four years,
largely as a result of unilateral actions by the Venezuelan
government--including opposition to key U.S. and regional security
goals, association with dictatorial regimes, and anti-U.S. rhetoric.
In May 2004 President Chavez expelled U.S. Military Group personnel
from Venezuelan military headquarters at Fort Tiuna after an almost
fifty-year presence. In response, the U.S. Government has undertaken a
review of the Venezuelan government's military presence in the United
States. That review remains ongoing. The decline of our bilateral
military relationship may have implications for other areas of
bilateral cooperation, including on security and counterterrorism.
Given our historic close ties to Venezuela, especially in terms of
military-to-military contact, it is our clear preference to return to
the cooperative, cordial relations we have traditionally shared.
Question 16. A great deal has been said in public and in private
about President Chavez's meddling in the affairs of other countries in
the region. Can you discuss Chavez's influence in the region and
explain the level of concern these activities elicit among our
neighbors in the Hemisphere. Please especially discuss alleged meddling
in Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay and El
Salvador.
Answer. We have seen reports indicating Venezuelan support for a
range of political groups in the region, including some engaged in
subversive or violent activities. To address the question with the
specificity you have outlined, it would be necessary for the
Administration to brief you or members of your staff in a classified
setting.
We, along with our regional neighbors, are concerned about any
efforts to undermine democratic governments in the hemisphere. For four
decades, the United States and Venezuela were allies in a broader
effort to help democratize the hemisphere, and to spread prosperity and
economic opportunity. The U.S. has made it clear that we expect the
Government of Venezuela to comply with and meet all of the obligations
set forth in the UN anti-terrorism conventions and protocols, the
Organization of American States' treaties, and other international
legal instruments which prohibit support for or providing a safe-haven
to terrorists.
Question 17. With regard to the Venezuelan political crisis, under
what circumstances would the U.S. seek to invoke the OAS's Democratic
Charter?
Answer. The United States fully supports a constitutional,
democratic, peaceful, and electoral solution to the current crisis in
Venezuela in accordance with Organization of American States (OAS)
Permanent Council Resolution 833. Along with our hemispheric partners,
we support the recall referendum as the best mechanism to achieve these
goals consistent with Venezuela's constitution and the Inter-American
Democratic Charter. We expect this process to be fully carried out in
good faith by all sides--including the Government of Venezuela, its
political institutions, and all elements of the democratic opposition.
If any of the parties compromises this democratic process,
undermining the constitutional rights of Venezuelan citizens, we will
consult with our hemispheric partners on the best response. This could
involve invoking the OAS Inter-American Democratic Charter. Adopted by
the democratic countries of the hemisphere, including Venezuela, on
September 11, 2001, the Inter-American Democratic Charter states ``The
peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments
an obligation to promote and defend it.'' Accordingly, any efforts that
impair the democratic order in a member state must be carefully
evaluated.
Question 18. When should we expect a second meeting of Group of
Friends Foreign Ministers?
Answer. The Friends of the Organization of American States (OAS)
Secretary General's Mission for Venezuela have played a key role in
supporting a constitutional, democratic, peaceful and electoral
solution to the current political impasse in Venezuela. First launched
in January 2003, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Spain, Portugal and the United
States comprise the Group of Friends. Brazil has carried out an
important function as the Group's chair and coordinator.
The Friends' Foreign Ministers gathered at an initial meeting in
January 2003. While there is no Friends' Foreign Ministers meeting
planned at this time, we are in regular contact with our Friends'
counterparts. During the recent reparos process, the Friends issued
statements in support of the process.
Question 19. What is the current position of Secretary Powell with
regards to the manner in which this important group of countries should
participate in the search for a solution to this grave crisis?
Answer. Secretary Powell strongly supports the efforts of the Group
of Friends of the Organization of American States (OAS) Secretary
General's Mission for Venezuela to ensure a constitutional, democratic,
peaceful and electoral solution to the current political situation. At
the OAS General Assembly meeting in Quito this past June, Secretary
Powell met with his Brazilian counterpart and with OAS Secretary
General Gaviria. In his public remarks, the Secretary underscored the
important role to be played by the democratic nations of the Americas
when fellow democracies suffer setbacks.
We are in regular contact with Brazil, the Group's chair, and with
the other Friends' countries, as well as OAS Secretary General Gaviria.
As evidenced by Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim's June 17
comments in Sao Paulo, Brazil shares our support for the important work
of the OAS and Carter Center missions in advancing the goals of OAS
Permanent Council Resolution 833.
Since the inception of the Friends Group in January 2003, we have
worked closely with members to issue statements and to coordinate
Friends' meetings in Washington and Caracas. In the weeks and months
ahead, we will continue to work together to support a credible and
transparent recall process..
Question 20. What is the Group of Friends role regarding the recall
referendum? How many times has the Group met since it was organized?
Does it intend to meet before the recall referendum?
Answer. The Group of Friends was established in January 2003 to
support the efforts of the Organization of America States (OAS)
Secretary General to advance a constitutional, democratic, peaceful and
electoral solution to the political impasse in Venezuela, in accordance
with OAS Permanent Council Resolution 833. As noted in our statements,
the Friends support the constitutionally-provided recall referendum as
the best mechanism to achieve the goals of Resolution 833. The Friends
have advocated a fair, open, transparent recall process, which allows
international observers the access necessary to carry out their
functions. The Friends fully support the ongoing efforts of the OAS and
Carter Center missions in ensuring a fair, credible recall referendum.
The Group of Friends Foreign Ministers met in January 2003 when the
Group was first launched. Since then, the Senior Representatives of the
Group of Friends or the Friends Permanent Representatives to the OAS
have formally met four times: March 2003, May 2003, March 2004, and
July 7, 2004. The member countries remain in regular contact.
Question 21. Could you discuss the level of involvement of the
Cuban Government in the internal affairs of Venezuela?
Answer. We are aware of the presence in Venezuela of large numbers
of Cuban teachers, doctors and sports trainers participating in various
Venezuelan Government programs. While we obviously support efforts to
help needy people everywhere learn to read and write and receive
healthcare, we are concerned about the increasingly close ties between
the Venezuelan and Cuban Governments. We hope these ties are limited to
such programs.
We are seriously concerned about reports indicating the presence of
Cuban intelligence personnel in Venezuela. To address this last issue
with greater specificity, it would be necessary for the administration
to brief you or members of your staff in a classified \1\ setting.
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\1\ An additional response of classified information was
subsequently provided.
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The Castro regime has a long, disturbing and often bloody history
of subverting democratically-elected governments throughout the
hemisphere, including through support for terrorist groups. We have
expressed our concern about such close ties to the sole non-democratic
government in the hemisphere at the highest level of the Venezuelan
Government. We will continue to monitor this situation closely.
Question 22. Could you describe Venezuela's current role within the
Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)?
Answer. Venezuela is one of ten members of OPEC. Due to its limited
ability to produce at or above its own production quota, Venezuela has
not been publicly supportive of overall increased oil production by the
group. Venezuela was once considered a price moderate but is now viewed
as a price hawk.
Question 23. Venezuela is reportedly producing close to 2.5 million
barrels per day of oil: could you please comment what the likely impact
would have been on gas prices at the pump if Petroleos de Venezuela had
maintained its goal of reaching 6 million barrels of capacity by 2006?
Answer. Venezuela's goal of reaching 6 million barrels per day by
2006 would require substantial foreign investment. Venezuela was not
receiving that level of investment even before President Chavez assumed
office. Since Venezuela is an OPEC member, other OPEC states would
likely have sought to adjust their own production so as to minimize the
impact of larger Venezuelan production on world oil markets. Still,
world oil market stability would have been greatly advanced had
Venezuela pursued, during the current Chavez Administration, a more
aggressive effort to win foreign investment.
Question 24. Could you describe the importance of gasoline imports
from Venezuela and its offshore refineries in the supply chain of the
U.S. market?
Answer. Venezuela is the third largest oil supplier to the U.S.
market. The U.S. imports between 12 to 14 percent of its daily
petroleum and petroleum products needs from Venezuela. Slightly more
than half of Venezuela's oil exports to the U.S. enter its own U.S.-or
Caribbean-based refinery chain, led by its flagship, wholly-owned
subsidiary, Citgo. Venezuela's role in the gasoline market is probably
most important in that regard. Gasoline exports from Venezuela or the
its Caribbean-based refinery chain help to balance markets
predominately on the east coast of the United States. While Venezuela
is a leading foreign supplier of gasoline, about 90 percent of U.S.
gasoline consumption is domestically refined.
Question 25. Are the conditions placed for investment in Venezuela
oil and gas sector likely to attract foreign capital and technology? If
they are not attractive what is a worse case scenario for Venezuelan
supply?
Answer. Regrettably, Venezuela's hydrocarbons law is not viewed by
the private sector as globally competitive, and until improvements are
made, Venezuela is unlikely to attract substantial new oil investment.
Venezuela's natural gas law is far more competitive, and U.S. and
foreign firms remain engaged with the Venezuela government to develop
opportunities in that area.
Most Venezuelan oil fields are mature and have a steep natural
decline rate, requiring additional investment just to keep output
steady. Major foreign investment underway in the heavy oil sector will
help maintain Venezuelan oil production capability for the short-to
medium-term, but the country will face a serious erosion of productive
capacity if the state oil company, or foreign investors, do not greatly
increase the rate of investment. The worst case scenario would be year-
to-year production declines of upwards of 15 percent should that
investment not take place.
Question 26. How beneficial to Cuba is the crude and products
supply deal they have with Venezuela? Is it similar in terms to other
deals entered by other producers in the world?
Answer. Cuba maintains a beneficial energy arrangement with the
Venezuelan government under President Chavez, which allows the Castro
regime to receive up to 82,000 barrels of oil per day on preferential
terms. This arrangement nets more than $800 million in annual savings
to Cuba. We are concerned about the concessionary terms of an
agreement, which serves only to help prop up an undemocratic regime.
It is our understanding that this kind of arrangement is uncommon.
Few oil producers grant preferential treatment to consumers,
particularly in tight oil markets.