[Senate Hearing 108-868]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-868
REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DETENTION AND INTERROGATION OPERATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 7, 11, 19; JULY 22; SEPTEMBER 9, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
----------
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Allegations of Mistreatment of Iraqi Prisoners
may 7, 2004
Page
Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense................... 5
Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.... 11
Smith, Lt. Gen. Lance L., USAF, Deputy Commander, United States
Central Command................................................ 13
Brownlee, Hon. Les, Acting Secretary of the Army................. 15
Schoomaker, Gen. Peter J., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army....... 16
Allegations of Mistreatment of Iraqi Prisoners
may 11, 2004
Cambone, Hon. Stephen A., Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence................................................... 96
Smith, Lt. Gen. Lance L., USAF, Deputy Commander, United States
Central Command................................................ 102
MG Antonio M. Taguba, USA, Deputy Commanding General for Support,
Coalition Forces Land Component Command........................ 102
Continue to Receive Testimony on Allegations of Mistreatment of Iraqi
Prisoners
may 11, 2004
Alexander, LTG Keith B., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2;
Accompanied by MG Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., USA, Deputy Chief of
Staff, J-2; and MG Thomas J. Romig, USA, Judge Advocate General 391
Allegations of Mistreatment of Iraqi Prisoners
may 19, 2004
Abizaid, GEN John P., USA, Commander, United States Central
Command........................................................ 565
Sanchez, LTG Ricardo S., USA, Commander, Multi-National Force--
Iraq........................................................... 568
Miller, MG Geoffrey D., USA, Deputy Commander for Detainee
Operations, Multi-National Force--Iraq......................... 574
Warren, COL Marc L., Staff Judge Advocate, CJTF-7................ 574
(iii)
The Department of the Army Inspector General Report on Detention
Operation Doctrine and Training
july 22, 2004
Brownlee, Hon. Les, Acting Secretary of the Army; Accompanied by
GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, USA, Chief of Staff of the Army; and
LTG Paul T. Mikolashek, USA, Inspector General of the Army..... 680
The Investigation of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade at Abu
Ghraib Prison, Iraq
september 9, 2004
Kern, GEN Paul J., USA, Commanding General, United States Army
Materiel Command; Accompanied by LTG Anthony R. Jones, USA,
Deputy Commanding General, Chief of Staff, United States Army
Training and Doctrine Command; MG R. Steven Whitcomb, USA,
Special Assistant to the Commander, United States Central
Command; MG George R. Fay, USA, Deputy Commander, United States
Army Intelligence and Security Command; and MG Antonio M.
Taguba, USA, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, Readiness, Training, and Mobilization................. 1049
The Report of the Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense
Detention Operations
september 9, 2004
Schlesinger, Dr. James R., Chairman, Independent Panel to Review
Department of Defense Detention Operations..................... 1313
Brown, Dr. Harold, Member, Independent Panel to Review Department
of Defense Detention Operations................................ 1317
ALLEGATIONS OF MISTREATMENT OF IRAQI PRISONERS
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FRIDAY, MAY 7, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:45 a.m. in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John
Warner (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain,
Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Talent, Chambliss, Graham,
Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Lieberman, Reed, Akaka,
Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and
Pryor.
Other Senators present: Senator Bill Frist.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; Regina
A. Dubey, research assistant; Ambrose R. Hock, professional
staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member;
Elaine A. McCusker, professional staff member; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Paula J. Philbin,
professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member; Scott W.
Stucky, general counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Kenneth M. Crosswalt, professional
staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member;
Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Jeremy L.
Hekhuis, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority
counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; Michael J. McCord,
professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, minority
counsel; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Bridget Ward,
Nicholas W. West, and Pendred K. Wilson.
Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling and
James B. Kadtke, assistants to Senator Warner; Christopher J.
Paul, assistant to Senator McCain; Mark Powers, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Darren M. Dick, assistant to Senator Roberts:
Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Derek J.
Maurer, assistant to Senator Collins; Lindsey R. Neas,
assistant to Senator Talent; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Aleix Jarvis and Meredith Moseley,
assistants to Senator Graham; Christine O. Hill, assistant to
Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator
Cornyn; Sharon L. Waxman and Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistants to
Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans and Erik Raven, assistants to
Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator
Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn
Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey
and Dan Shapiro, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric
Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; William Todd Houchins,
assistant to Senator Dayton; Todd Rosenblum and Rashid
Hallaway, assistants to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant
to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator
Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. The Committee on Armed Services meets
today in the first of a series of hearings to receive testimony
regarding the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners by some--I
repeat, some--elements and certain personnel of the Armed
Forces of the United States in violation of U.S. and
international laws.
Testifying before us today is the Secretary of Defense, the
Honorable Donald Rumsfeld. He is joined by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers; Acting Secretary
of the Army, Les Brownlee; Army Chief of Staff, General Peter
Schoomaker; and Central Command (CENTCOM) Deputy Commander,
Lieutenant General Lance Smith. We welcome each of you today.
I have had the privilege of being associated with, and,
more importantly, learning from, the men and women of the Armed
Forces for close to 60 years of my life, and I can say that the
facts I now have, from a number of sources, represent to me as
serious an issue of military misconduct as I have ever
observed. These reports could also seriously affect this
country's relationships with other nations, the conduct of the
war against terrorism, and place in jeopardy the men and women
of the Armed Forces wherever they are serving in the world.
This mistreatment of prisoners represents an appalling and
totally unacceptable breach of military regulations and
conduct. Most significantly, the replaying of these images day
after day throughout the Middle East, and indeed the world, has
the potential to undermine the substantial gains towards the
goal of peace and freedom in various operation areas of the
world, most particularly Iraq, and the substantial sacrifice by
our forces, as well as those of our allies, in the war on
terror.
Let me be as clear as one Senator can be. This is not the
way for anyone who wears the uniform of the United States of
America to conduct themselves. This degree of breakdown in
military leadership and discipline represents an extremely
rare--and I repeat, rare--chapter in the otherwise proud
history of the Armed Forces of the United States. It defies
common sense. It contradicts all the values we Americans learn,
beginning in our homes.
Members of the committee, as we conduct this hearing, I
urge you that we take every care that our actions, our words,
and our individual and collective conduct in this hearing not
reflect unfairly on the 99.9 percent of our uniformed personnel
who are performing remarkable tasks and, in some cases, making
the ultimate sacrifice of life and limb to win the global war
on terrorism.
Each of us on the committee has nothing but the strongest
support for our brave men and women in uniform and their
families. What we seek for the American people through this and
following hearings, is only to strengthen and honor their
efforts, not in any way to detract from them and their
accomplishments.
I would point out that while some systems have failed, we
are here today because of a courageous enlisted man and his
lieutenant, whose American values compelled them to step
forward and inform their superiors. They did the right thing.
As this committee performs its constitutional duties in
hearings and oversight, we are working in the same spirit as
those two soldiers.
Questions before us today are: Who knew what, and when?
What did they do about it? Why were Members of Congress not
properly and adequately informed?
In my 25 years on this committee, I have received hundreds
of calls, day and night, from all levels, uniformed and
civilian, of the Department of Defense (DOD), when they, in
their judgment, felt it was necessary. I'd dare say that other
members on this committee have experienced the same courtesy. I
did not receive such a call in this case, and yet I think the
situation was absolutely clear and required it, not only to me,
but to my distinguished ranking member and other members of
this committee.
Members of the committee, our central task here today is to
get all the facts in this difficult situation, no matter where
they lead, no matter how embarrassing they may be, so that we
can assess our response and, in the end, make sure that such
dereliction of duty as in this case never happens again in the
proud history of our country.
Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The abuses that were committed against prisoners in U.S.
custody at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq dishonored our
military and our Nation, and they made the prospects for
success in Iraq even more difficult than they already are. Our
troops are less secure and our Nation is less secure because
these depraved and despicable actions will fuel the hatred and
fury of those who oppose us.
General Taguba's investigation, as reported, paints an
alarming picture of abuse and humiliation of Iraqi prisoners.
It has enraged people here at home and throughout the civilized
world. Humiliating and sexually abusing prisoners has nothing
to do with the effective internment or interrogation of
prisoners. In fact, such actions are counterproductive to those
goals.
As we seek to bring stability and democracy to Iraq and to
fight terrorism globally, our greatest asset as a Nation is the
moral values that we stand for. Those values have been
compromised.
To begin the process of restoring them, the people
involved, who carried out or who authorized or suggested that
we should ``loosen prisoners up'' or, ``make sure they get the
treatment'' must be held accountable. So must anyone up the
chain of command be held accountable who had command
responsibility over the interrogation and security of
prisoners, and who knew, or should have known, of these abuses
and looked the other way.
General Taguba's finding that, ``personnel assigned to the
372nd Military Police (MP) Company were directed to change
facility procedures to set the conditions for military
intelligence interrogations,'' is bolstered by pictures that
suggest that the sadistic abuse was part of an organized and
conscious process of intelligence-gathering. In other words,
those abusive actions do not appear to be aberrant conduct by
individuals, but part of a conscious method of extracting
information. If true, the planners of this process are at least
as guilty as those who carried out the abuses.
The President's legal counsel, Alberto Gonzalez, reportedly
wrote, in a memorandum, that the decision to avoid invoking the
Geneva Conventions ``preserves flexibility'' in the war on
terrorism. Belittling or ignoring the Geneva Conventions
invites our enemies to do the same, and increases the danger to
our military service men and women. It also sends a disturbing
message to the world that America does not feel bound by
internationally accepted standards of conduct.
The findings of General Taguba's report, as reported on a
public Web site, raise a number of disturbing issues. For
example, how far up the chain was there implicit or explicit
direction or approval or knowledge of these prisoner abuses?
Why was a joint interrogation and detention facility at Abu
Ghraib established in a way which led to the subordination of
the MP brigade to the military intelligence unit conducting
interrogation activities? What was the role played by the
military intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
and any other intelligence units in requesting or suggesting
abusive activities? How is it in our Nation's interest to have
civilian contractors, rather than military personnel,
performing vital national security functions such as prisoner
interrogations in a war zone? When soldiers break the law or
fail to follow orders, commanders can hold them accountable for
their misconduct. Military commanders don't have the same
authority over civilian contractors.
Finally, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, I join our
chairman in expressing deep dismay that when you briefed
Senators in a classified session last week on events in Iraq,
just hours before the story broke on television, you made no
reference to the impending revelations. Executive branch
consultation with Congress is not supposed to be an option, but
a longstanding and fundamental responsibility.
It is essential that our Nation, at the highest levels,
apologize directly to the victims and to the Iraqi people, as a
whole, for these actions. But words alone are not sufficient.
Prompt and decisive action, which establishes responsibility
and holds people accountable, is essential here. It will also,
hopefully, convince the world that our free and open society
does not condone, and will not tolerate, this depraved
behavior.
Chairman Warner. I'll ask our witnesses to rise. [Witnesses
sworn.]
The complete statements of all witnesses will be placed
into the record. The committee will now receive the opening
remarks of the Secretary, followed by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs. I'm not certain if others desire some recognition for
opening remarks; if so, indicate to the chair. Then we'll go
into a 6-minute round of questions by each member.
Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,
in recent days there has been a good deal of discussion about
who bears responsibility for the terrible activities that took
place at Abu Ghraib. These events occurred on my watch. As
Secretary of Defense, I am accountable for them, and I take
full responsibility. It's my obligation to evaluate what
happened, to make sure that those who have committed wrongdoing
are brought to justice, and to make changes, as needed, to see
that it doesn't happen again.
I feel terrible about what happened to these Iraqi
detainees. They're human beings, and they were in U.S. custody.
Our country had an obligation to treat them right. We did not,
and that was wrong. So to those Iraqis who were mistreated by
members of the U.S. Armed Forces, I offer my deepest apology.
It was inconsistent with the values of our Nation. It was
inconsistent with the teachings of the military to the men and
women of the Armed Forces. It was certainly fundamentally un-
American.
Further, I deeply regret the damage that has been done.
First, to the reputation of the honorable men and women of the
Armed Forces, who are courageously, responsibly, and
professionally defending our freedoms across the globe. They
are truly wonderful human beings, and their families and their
loved ones can be enormously proud of them. Second, to the
President, Congress, and the American people; I wish I had been
able to convey to them the gravity of this before we saw it in
the media. Finally, to the reputation of our country.
The photographic depictions of the U.S. military personnel
that the public has seen have offended and outraged everyone in
the DOD. If you could have seen the anguished expressions on
the faces of those in our Department upon seeing those photos,
you would know how we feel today.
It's important for the American people and the world to
know that while these terrible acts were perpetrated by a small
number of U.S. military personnel, they were also brought to
light by the honorable and responsible actions of other
military personnel.
There are many who did their duty professionally, and we
should mention that, as well. First, Specialist Joseph Darby,
who alerted the appropriate authorities that abuses were
occurring. Second, those in the military chain of command who
acted promptly, on learning of those abuses, by initiating a
series of investigations--criminal and administrative--to
assure that abuses were stopped and that the responsible chain
of command was relieved and replaced.
Having said that, all the facts that may be of interest are
not yet in hand. In addition to the Taguba Report, there are
other investigations underway, and we'll be discussing those
today. Because all the facts are not in hand, there will be
corrections and clarifications to the record as more
information is learned.
From the witnesses, you will be told the sequence of events
and investigations that have taken place since the activities
first came to light. I want to inform you of the measures
underway to improve our performance in the future.
Before I do that, let me say that each of us at this table
is either in the chain of command or has senior
responsibilities in the DOD. This means that anything we say
publicly could have an impact on the legal proceedings against
those accused of wrongdoing in this matter. So please
understand that if some of our responses to questions are
measured, it is to assure that pending cases are not
jeopardized by seeming to exert command influence, and that the
rights of any accused are protected.
Now, let me tell you the measures we're taking to deal with
this issue. First, to ensure we have a handle on the scope of
this catastrophe, I will be announcing today the appointment of
several senior former officials who are being asked to examine
the pace, the breadth, the thoroughness of the existing
investigations, and to determine whether additional
investigations or studies need to be initiated. They're being
asked to report their findings within 45 days of taking up
their duties. I'm confident that these distinguished
individuals will provide a full and fair assessment of what has
been done thus far, and recommend whether further steps may be
necessary.
[Clarifying information provided by the DOD follows:]
Charter for Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention Operations
was signed on May 12, 2004. It allots a timeframe to provide advice
``preferably within 45 days'' after beginning the review. The panel has
announced that it will present its final report on August 18, 2004,
with the caveat that it could be modified at a later date to reflect
the results of reports or investigations completed after that date.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Second, we need to review our habits
and our procedures. One of the things we've tried to do in the
DOD since September 11 is to try to get the Department to
adjust our procedures and processes to reflect that we're in a
time of war and that we're in the information age. For the past
3 years, we've looked for areas where adjustments were needed,
and we've made a great many adjustments. Regrettably, we've now
found another area where adjustments may be needed.
Let me be clear. I failed to recognize how important it was
to elevate a matter of such gravity to the highest levels,
including the President and the Members of Congress.
Third, I'm seeking a way to provide appropriate
compensation to those detainees who suffered such grievous and
brutal abuse and cruelty at the hands of a few members of the
United States Armed Forces. It's the right thing to do.
I wish we had known more, sooner, and been able to tell you
more, sooner. But we didn't. Today, we'll have a full
discussion of these terrible acts, but first let's take a step
back for a moment. Within the constraints imposed on those of
us in the chain of command, I have a few additional words.
First, beyond abuse of prisoners, there are other photos
that depict incidents of physical violence towards prisoners,
acts that can only be described as blatantly sadistic, cruel,
and inhuman. Second, there are many more photographs and,
indeed, some videos. Congress and the American people and the
rest of the world need to know this. In addition, the photos
give these incidents a vividness--indeed, a horror--in the eyes
of the world. Mr. Chairman, that's why this hearing today is
important. That's why the actions we take in the days and weeks
ahead are so important.
However terrible the setback, this is also an occasion to
demonstrate to the world the difference between those who
believe in democracy and in human rights, and those who believe
in rule by terrorist code. We value human life. We believe in
individual freedom and in the rule of law. For those beliefs,
we send men and women of the Armed Forces abroad to protect
that right for our own people and to give others, who aren't
Americans, the hope of a future of freedom. Part of that
mission, part of what we believe in, is making sure that when
wrongdoings or scandals do occur, that they're not covered up,
but they are exposed, they are investigated, and the guilty are
brought to justice.
Mr. Chairman, I know you join me today in saying to the
world, ``Judge us by our actions. Watch how Americans, watch
how a democracy, deals with wrongdoing and with scandal and the
pain of acknowledging and correcting our own mistakes and our
own weaknesses.''
After they have seen America in action, then ask those who
teach resentment and hatred of America if our behavior doesn't
give the lie to the falsehood and the slander they speak about
our people and about our way of life. Ask them if the resolve
of Americans in crisis and difficulty and, yes, in the
heartbreak of acknowledging the evil in our midst, doesn't have
meaning far beyond their hatred.
Above all, ask them if the willingness of Americans to
acknowledge their own failures before humanity doesn't light
the world as surely as the great ideas and beliefs that made
this Nation a beacon of hope and liberty for all who strive to
be free.
We know what the terrorists will do. We know they will try
to exploit all that is bad, and try to obscure all that is
good. That's their nature. That's the nature of those who think
they can kill innocent men, women, and children to gratify
their own cruel will to power. We say to the world, ``We will
strive to do our best, as imperfect as it may be.''
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee--thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
In recent days, there has been a good deal of discussion about who
bears responsibility for the terrible activities that took place at Abu
Ghraib. These events occurred on my watch. As Secretary of Defense, I
am accountable for them. I take full responsibility. It is my
obligation to evaluate what happened, to make sure those who have
committed wrongdoing are brought to justice, and to make changes as
needed to see that it doesn't happen again.
I feel terrible about what happened to these Iraqi detainees. They
are human beings. They were in U.S. custody. Our country had an
obligation to treat them right. We didn't do that. That was wrong.
To those Iraqis who were mistreated by members of the U.S. Armed
Forces, I offer my deepest apology. It was un-American. It was
inconsistent with the values of our Nation.
Further, I deeply regret the damage that has been done:
First, to the reputation of the honorable men and
women of our Armed Forces who are courageously, skillfully and
responsibly defending our freedom across the globe. They are
truly wonderful human beings, and their families and loved ones
can be enormously proud of them.
Second, to the President, Congress, and the American
people. I wish we had been able to convey to them the gravity
of this was before we saw it in the media;
Third, to the Iraqi people, whose trust in our
coalition has been shaken; and finally
To the reputation of our country.
The photographic depictions of U.S. military personnel that the
public has seen have unquestionably offended and outraged everyone in
the Department of Defense (DOD).
If you could have seen the anguished expressions on the faces of
those of us in the Department upon seeing the photos, you would know
how we feel today.
We take this seriously. It should not have happened. Any wrongdoers
need to be punished, procedures evaluated, and problems corrected.
It's important for the American people and the world to know that
while these terrible acts were perpetrated by a small number of the
U.S. military, they were also brought to light by the honorable and
responsible actions of other military personnel. There are many who did
their duty professionally and we should mention that as well:
First the soldier, Specialist Joseph Darby, who
alerted the appropriate authorities that abuses of detainees
were occurring. My thanks and appreciation to him for his
courage and his values.
Second, those in the military chain of command who
acted promptly upon learning of those activities by initiating
a series of investigations--criminal and administrative--to
ensure that the abuses were stopped, that the responsible chain
of command was relieved and replaced, and that the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ) was followed;
Third, units singled out for praise in General
Taguba's report for the care they provided detainees in their
custody and their intolerance of abuses by others;
Finally, the Central Command (CENTCOM) chain of
command for taking action and publicly announcing to the world
that investigations of abuse were underway.
The American people and members of the committee deserve an
accounting of what has happened and what's being done to fix it.
Gathered today are the senior military officials with
responsibility in the care and treatment of detainees.
The responsibility for training falls to the U.S. Army. The
responsibility for the actions and conduct of forces in Iraq falls to
the combatant commander. The ultimate responsibility for the DOD rests
with me.
Each of us has had a strong interest in getting the facts out to
the American people.
We want you to know the facts. I want you to have all the
documentation and the data you require. If some material is classified,
we will ensure members get an opportunity to see it privately.
Having said that, all the facts that may be of interest are not yet
in hand. In addition to the Taguba Report, there are other
investigations underway. We will make the results of these
investigations available to you. But because all the facts are not in
hand, there will be corrections and clarifications to the record as
more information is learned. If we have something to add later, we'll
do so. If we find something that we've said that needs to be corrected,
we'll correct it.
From the other witnesses here, you will be told the sequence of
events and investigations that have taken place since these activities
first came to light.
What I want to do is inform you of the measures underway to remedy
some of the damage done and to improve our performance in the future.
Before I do that, let me make one further note: As members of this
committee are aware, each of us at this table is either in the chain of
command or has senior responsibilities in the DOD. This means that
anything we say publicly could have an impact on legal proceedings
against those accused of wrongdoing in this matter. Our responsibility
at this hearing, and in our public comments, is to conduct ourselves
consistent with that well known fact. So please understand that if some
of our responses are measured, it is to ensure that pending cases are
not jeopardized by seeming to exert ``command influence'' and that the
rights of any accused are protected.
Now let me tell you the measures we are taking to deal with this
issue.
When this incident came to light and was reported within the chain
of command, we took several immediate actions. These will be discussed
in detail by others here today, but let me highlight them.
General Sanchez launched a criminal investigation
immediately.
He then asked for an administrative review of
procedures at the Abu Ghraib facility. That is the so-called
Taguba Report.
These two investigations have resulted thus far in criminal or
administrative actions against at least 12 individuals, including the
relief of the prison chain of command and criminal referrals of several
soldiers directly involved in abuse.
The Army also launched an Inspector General (IG)
review of detainee operations throughout Afghanistan and Iraq.
That review continues.
The Army has initiated an investigation of Reserve
training with respect to military intelligence (MI) and police
functions.
General Sanchez also asked for an Army Intelligence
review of the circumstances discussed in General Taguba's
report and that is ongoing.
I also asked the Navy IG to review procedures at
Guantanamo and the Charleston Naval Brig.
As these investigations mature, we will endeavor to keep you
informed. But there is more to be done.
First, to ensure we have a handle on the scope of this catastrophe,
I will be announcing today the appointment of several senior former
officials who are being asked to examine the pace, breadth, and
thoroughness of the existing investigations, and to determine whether
additional investigations need to be initiated.
[Clarifying information provided by the DOD follows:]
Charter for Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention Operations
was signed on May 12, 2004. It allots a timeframe to provide advice
``preferably within 45 days'' after beginning the review. The panel has
announced that it will present its final report on August 18, 2004,
with the caveat that it could be modified at a later date to reflect
the results of reports or investigations completed after that date.
They are being asked to report their findings within 45 days of
taking up their duties. I am confident these distinguished individuals
will provide a full and fair assessment of what has been done thus
far--and recommend whether further steps may be necessary.
I will encourage them to meet with Members of Congress to keep them
appraised of their progress. I look forward to their suggestions and
recommendations.
Second, we need to review our habits and procedures. One of the
things we've tried to do since September 11 is to get the DOD to adjust
its habits and procedures at a time of war, and in the information age.
For the past 3 years, we have looked for areas where adjustments were
needed, and regrettably, we have now found another one.
Let me be clear. I failed to identify the catastrophic damage that
the allegations of abuse could do to our operations in the theater, to
the safety of our troops in the field, the cause to which we are
committed. When these allegations first surfaced, I failed to recognize
how important it was to elevate a matter of such gravity to the highest
levels, including leaders in Congress. Nor did we anticipate that a
classified investigation report that had not yet been delivered to the
senior levels of the DOD would be given to the media. That was my
failing.
In the future, we will take whatever steps are necessary to elevate
to the appropriate levels charges of this magnitude.
Third, I am seeking a way to provide appropriate compensation to
those detainees who suffered grievous and brutal abuse and cruelty at
the hands of a few members of the U.S. military. It is the right thing
to do. I'm told we have the ability to do so. So we will--one way or
another.
One of the great strengths of our Nation is its ability to
recognize failures, deal with them, and to strive to make things
better. Indeed, the openness with which these problems are being dealt
is one of the strengths of our free society. Democracies are imperfect,
because they are made up of human beings who are, by our nature,
imperfect. Of course, we wish that every person in our Government and
our Armed Forces would conduct themselves in accordance with the
highest standards of ethics. But the reality is some do not.
One mistake we have made during our initial investigation into
these charges, for example, was failing to sufficiently call to your
attention the information made public in the CENTCOM press release
regarding the investigations they had initiated back in January. We
also failed to sufficiently call your attention and brief you on the
preliminary findings of the criminal investigation announced on March
20 by General Kimmitt. I am advised the Army has had periodic meetings
to inform congressional staffs.
There are indications that the information provided was penetrating
at some level, however. On January 20, for example, CNN reported that a
criminal investigation division (CID) investigation was being conducted
into allegations of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, and mentioned the
possible existence of photographs taken of detainees.
Nonetheless, I know that we did not fully brief you on this subject
along the way and we should have done so.
I wish we would have known more sooner and been able to tell you
more sooner. But we didn't. For that, I apologize.
We need to discuss a better way to keep you informed about matters
of such gravity in the future.
The fact that abuses take place--in the military, in law
enforcement, and in our society--is not surprising. But the standard by
which our country and our Government should be judged is not by whether
abuses take place, but rather how our Nation deals with them. We are
dealing with them forthrightly. These incidents are being investigated
and any found to have committed crimes or misconduct will receive the
appropriate justice. Most of the time, at least, the system works.
None of this is meant to diminish the gravity of the recent
situation at Abu Ghraib. To the contrary, that is precisely why these
abuses are so damaging--because they can be used by the enemies of our
country to undermine our mission and spread the false impression that
such conduct is the rule and not the exception--when, in fact, the
opposite is true.
Which is why it is so important that we investigate them publicly
and openly, and hold people accountable in similar fashion. That is
exactly what we are doing.
Questions
When we first were told about these activities and saw those
photographs, I and everyone at this table was as shocked and stunned as
you were.
In the period since, a number of questions have been raised--here
in Congress, in the media, and by the public. Let me respond to some of
them.
Some have asked: Why weren't those charged with guarding prisoners
properly trained?
If one looks at the behavior depicted in those photos, it is fair
to ask: what kind of training could one possibly provide that would
stop people from doing that? Either you learn that in life, or you
don't. If someone doesn't know that doing what is shown in those photos
is wrong, cruel, brutal, indecent, and against American values, I am at
a loss as to what kind of training could be provided to teach them.
The fact is, the vast majority of the people in the United States
Armed Forces are decent, honorable individuals who know right from
wrong, and conduct themselves in a manner that is in keeping with the
spirit and values of our country. There is only a very small minority
who do not.
Some have asked: Hasn't a climate allowing for abuses to occur been
created because of a decision to ``disregard'' the Geneva Conventions?
No. Indeed, the U.S. Government recognized that the Geneva
Conventions apply in Iraq, and the Armed Forces are obliged to follow
them. DOD personnel are trained in the law of war, including the Geneva
Conventions. Doctrine requires that they follow those rules and report,
investigate, and take corrective action to remedy violations.
We did conclude that our war against al Qaeda is not governed
precisely by the Conventions, but nevertheless announced that detained
individuals would be treated consistent with the principles of the
Geneva Conventions.
Some have asked: Can we repair the damage done to our credibility
in the region?
I hope so and I believe so. We have to trust that in the course of
events the truth will eventually come out. The truth is that the United
States is a liberator, not a conqueror. Our people are devoted to
freedom and democracy, not enslavement or oppression.
Every day, these men and women risk their lives to protect the
Iraqi people and help them build a more hopeful future. They have
liberated 25 million people; dismantled two terrorist regimes; and
battled an enemy that shows no compassion or respect for innocent human
life.
These men and women, and the families who love and support them,
deserve better than to have their sacrifices on behalf of our country
sullied by the despicable actions of a few. To that vast majority of
our soldiers abroad, I extend my support and my appreciation for their
truly outstanding service.
One final thought:
Today we'll have a full discussion of this terrible incident and I
welcome that. But first, let's take a step back for a moment.
Within the constraints imposed on those of us in the chain of
command, I want to say a few additional words.
First, beyond abuse of prisoners, we have seen photos that depict
incidents of physical violence towards prisoners--acts that may be
described as blatantly sadistic, cruel, and inhuman.
Second, the individuals who took the photos took many more.
The ramifications of these two facts are far reaching.
Congress and the American people and the rest of the world need to
know this.
In addition, the photos give these incidents a vividness--indeed a
horror--in the eyes of the world.
Mr. Chairman, that is why this hearing today is important. That is
why the actions we take in the days and weeks ahead are so important.
Because however terrible the setback, this is also an occasion to
demonstrate to the world the difference between those who believe in
democracy and human rights and those who believe in rule by the
terrorist code.
We value human life; we believe in their right to individual
freedom and the rule of law.
For those beliefs we send the men and women in the Armed Forces
abroad--to protect that right for our own people and to give millions
of others who aren't Americans the hope of a future of freedom.
Part of that mission--part of what we believe in--is making sure
that when wrongdoing or scandal occur that they are not covered up, but
exposed, investigated, publicly disclosed--and the guilty brought to
justice.
Mr. Chairman, I know you join me today in saying to the world:
Judge us by our actions. Watch how Americans, watch how a democracy
deals with wrongdoing and scandal and the pain of acknowledging and
correcting our own mistakes and weaknesses.
After they have seen America in action, then ask those who preach
resentment and hatred of America if our behavior doesn't give the lie
to the falsehood and slander they speak about our people and way of
life. Ask them if the resolve of Americans in crisis and difficulty--
and, yes, the heartache of acknowledging the evil in our midst--doesn't
have meaning far beyond their code of hatred.
Above all, ask them if the willingness of Americans to acknowledge
their own failures before humanity doesn't light the world as surely as
the great ideas and beliefs that first made this Nation a beacon of
hope and liberty to all who strive to be free.
We know what the terrorists will do. We know they will try to
exploit all that is bad to obscure all that is good. That is the nature
of evil. That is the nature of those who think they can kill innocent
men, women and children to gratify their own cruel will to power.
We say to the enemies of humanity and freedom: Do your worst,
because we will strive to do our best. I thank you Mr. Chairman. My
colleagues each have a brief statement.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
You and I have had the privilege to know each other for
many years. We've enjoyed a close working relationship. I want
to say, I found that statement to be strong and, in every
sense, heartfelt by you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. General Myers.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Myers. Mr. Chairman and Senator Levin, I would like
to express my deep regret at being here under these
circumstances. The incidents of prisoner abuse that occurred at
Abu Ghraib prison are absolutely appalling. The actions of
those involved are unconscionable and absolutely unacceptable.
Since Brigadier General Kimmitt's public announcement of
the allegations back in January, the commanders' response to
the problems highlighted in these investigations has been
timely and thorough. Just as a backdrop, we must also realize
that our commanders had been handling some enormous challenges
in Iraq, including the fighting that had intensified in
Fallujah and in Najaf, the temporary plus-up of troops, which
was a decision that was pending, and the departure of the
Spanish brigade, all at the same time that they were dealing
with some of these reports. Despite these extraordinary events,
our commanders did exactly the right thing in a timely manner.
I have great confidence in them, as should the American public
and the citizens of Iraq.
I've been receiving regular updates since the situation
developed in January, and I've been involved in corrective
actions and personally recommended specific steps. Again, I'm
confident that the commanders are doing the right things.
One of the military's greatest strengths comes from the
fact that we hold our service men and women accountable for
their actions. Our military justice system works very well. I
took an oath to support the Constitution, and with that comes
the responsibility to ensure that all military members enjoy
the full protections of our Constitution, to include the due
process of a fair judicial system. After all, it is respect for
the rule of law that we're trying to teach and instill in
places like Afghanistan and Iraq. So, as the Secretary said, we
are now in the middle of a judicial process regarding detainee
abuse. Because of my position, I have to be careful to not say
anything that can be interpreted as direction or pressure for a
certain outcome in any of these cases.
Moreover, we have to understand that a fair judicial system
takes time to work. I know you all understand that. No one is
stalling or covering up information, but it's absolutely
essential to protect the integrity of our judicial system. I
have complete confidence in our military justice system. The
accused will receive due process. Those found guilty will
receive punishments based on their offenses.
When I spoke to Dan Rather, with whom I already had a
professional association, concerning the ``60 Minutes'' story,
I did so after talking to General Abizaid, and I did so out of
concern for the lives of our troops.
The story about the abuse was already public, but we were
concerned that broadcasting the actual pictures would further
inflame the tense situation that existed then in Iraq, and
further endanger the lives of coalition soldiers and hostages.
Again, it's useful to remember the context here. We were in the
midst of some very heavy fighting in Fallujah and other places
in Iraq, and some 90 hostages had been taken. It was a very
delicate situation that we were trying to resolve.
Since the story of the photographs was already public, I
felt we were on good ground in asking him to hold off airing
the actual photos. As we are now seeing, the photos are having
a very real, very emotional worldwide impact. I would identify
myself with the Secretary's remarks on having seen more of them
than I wish to have seen. They have had quite an impact on me.
This situation is nothing less than tragic. The Iraqi
people are trying to build a free and open society, and I
regret they saw such a flagrant violation of the very
principles that are the cornerstone of such a society.
I am also terribly saddened that the hundreds of thousands
of service men and women who are serving, or who have served,
so honorably in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere would have
their reputation tarnished and their accomplishments diminished
by those few who don't uphold our military's values. I know our
service men and women are all suffering unfairly with a
collective sense of shame over what has happened. Their
credibility will be restored day by day as they interact with
the Iraqi people, and I'm confident that our dedicated service
men and women will continue to prove worthy of the trust and
respect of our Nation and of the world. We continue to be very
proud of them. As always, I thank you, on their behalf, for
your steadfast support.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General. That was a good
statement.
Secretary Brownlee, do you wish to----
Mr. Brownlee. I think General Smith's going next.
Chairman Warner. You defer to General Smith?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Fine, thank you.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. LANCE L. SMITH, USAF, DEPUTY COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
General Smith. Senator Warner, Senator Levin, members of
the committee, I wish to start by thanking you for the
opportunity to testify before this committee concerning the
mistreatment of Iraqi detainees.
The more than 250,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines who have served in the CENTCOM area of responsibility
(AOR) over the past year have faced numerous challenges in
prosecuting the global war on terror and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Throughout
these operations, they have worked to better the lives of the
people of Afghanistan and Iraq, to bring progress and stability
to these countries. Their efforts, however, have been put at
risk by the reprehensible actions of a few. These few have
acted in a manner that is inconsistent with the proud history
of the American soldier. There is no excuse for their actions,
nor do I offer one. Their unprofessional and malicious conduct
has caused considerable harm to our attempts to win the trust
and confidence of the Iraqi people. Unfortunately, it has also
facilitated the efforts of our enemy to malign our national
intent and character, and gives weight to the charge of
American hypocrisy.
When the allegations of abuse and improper conduct of U.S.
forces against legally detained Iraqis were brought to light by
a soldier on January 13, 2004, our leadership in Iraq prudently
informed us of what they knew and immediately initiated a
criminal investigation. That investigation has resulted in
preferral of charges against six service members, three of
which have, thus far, been referred to courts-martial, and we
are still investigating further allegations of criminal
misconduct.
At the request of the Commander, Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-
7) on January 24, CENTCOM directed the conduct of a broader
administrative investigation, now known as the Taguba Report,
with the mandate to make a comprehensive examination of our
detainee operations in Iraq in order to detect any systemic
problems, and, if problems were identified, to take necessary
steps to rectify the situation and hold accountable all those
responsible who failed in their duties. That investigation is
near completion, and we have already made significant progress
in implementing its recommendations, but we have more ahead of
us.
Information flow up and down the chain of command was
timely, and will continue to be. Commanders regularly brief
their superiors as these investigations progress. The first
public release of information on the Criminal Investigation
Division (CID) investigation happened in January, and was
reported by the media. The interim results of the Taguba Report
were briefed to me in late March as the investigation made its
way through command channels en route to approval by the
Coalition Force Land Component Commander on April 6, and formal
adverse administrative action by the CJTF on May 1. The
investigation is ongoing.
Some have asked why it took so long for the allegations to
make it up the chain of command. One needs to look at this as a
legal proceeding. Once the allegations were made, the
investigation was initiated immediately. Evidence was gathered,
people were questioned, and a number were removed from their
posts. As with any prosecution, materials and evidence were
kept within the investigatory chain, for obvious reasons: to
maintain confidentiality, to protect individual rights, and to
allow the investigation to proceed without danger of exposure
to those being investigated.
The actions of the chain of command in Iraq in conducting
the investigations connected with detainee abuse or
mistreatment have been swift, circumspect, and proper. They
have carefully uncovered facts, analyzed evidence, and gauged
the context of the situation, all the while under the stress of
ongoing combat operations, and ever mindful of protecting the
rights of the accused. Commanders are taking action both to
ensure justice is done and to ensure that this kind of
deplorable conduct is never repeated.
With regards to the question of whether this abuse is
systemic, the investigations underway should better inform us
on that. At this point, we don't know, and that's part of what
we're trying to determine by conducting investigations. When we
have answers, we will provide them.
The Taguba Report, in fact, highlights three units for
praise for their performance of military detention duties. That
is a hopeful sign that these abuses are not widespread, and I
don't believe they are.
The vast majority of coalition and U.S. forces have shown
great humanity and restraint in this, and have acted with
courage and compassion. The situation at Abu Ghraib is not
representative of the conduct of U.S. and coalition forces. It
is a distasteful and criminal aberration, and will absolutely
not be tolerated. We deeply regret that these egregious actions
occurred, and we are taking the necessary steps to preclude
similar incidents in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General.
Secretary Brownlee, we need to move on, but we certainly
recognize that you might have a few opening remarks.
Mr. Brownlee. Okay, sir. I'll go fast, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. LES BROWNLEE, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
Mr. Brownlee. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, and
distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to be here today to offer testimony on actions
taken by the Army in response to the appalling abuse of
detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. I join the Secretary of
Defense in apologizing to those detainees who were abused
there.
Let me begin by outlining the range of investigations into
detainee abuse. From December 2002 to present, the CID has
conducted, or is continuing to conduct, investigations into 35
cases of abuse or death of detainees held in detention
facilities in the CENTCOM theater. Twenty-five of these are
death cases, and 10 involve assault. The CID investigates every
death in our custody.
Of the 25 death investigations, the CID has determined that
12 deaths were due to natural or undetermined causes, 1 was
justifiable homicide, and 2 were homicides. The 10 remaining
deaths are still under investigation.
Additionally, 42 other potential cases of misconduct
against civilians occurred outside the detention facilities and
are currently under investigation by the Army CID or by the
responsible units.
On February 10, 2004, I directed the Inspector General (IG)
of the Army to conduct a functional analysis of the
Department's internment, enemy-prisoner-of-war (POW), and
detention policies, practices, and procedures. I directed this
inspection to determine if there might be systemic problems
relating to the planning, doctrine, or training in the
detention facilities operating within the CENTCOM theater.
Phase 1 of this assessment is oriented on current operations in
the CENTCOM AOR, with assessment-team visits to 16 detention
facilities. Phase 2 of the IG assessment will encompass visits
to defense facilities worldwide, including previously-visited
facilities, to ensure compliance to established standards.
Preliminary findings indicate that leaders and soldiers are
aware of the requirement and expectation to treat detainees
humanely, and that it is their duty to report incidents of
abuse. To date, the majority of the abuse cases indicate the
underlying cause has been twofold: an individual failure to
adhere to basic standards of discipline, training, and Army
values; and leadership failures to provide oversight and
enforce standards.
To date, the Army has taken numerous actions to improve the
training for MPs and military intelligence (MI) soldiers. The
Army is retraining select MP soldiers to serve as correctional
specialists. We have incorporated detainee lessons learned from
operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan into the MP school
curriculum, and have deployed MP training teams to our combat
training centers. In response to a request from the CJTF-7, the
Army deployed integrated multi-discipline mobile training teams
to oversee and conduct comprehensive training in all aspects of
detainee and confinement operations in-theater.
Additionally, the Chief of the Army Reserve has directed
his IG to conduct a special assessment of training for Reserve
personnel on the law of war, detainee treatment, ethics, and
leadership. All Reserve component MI soldiers are now required
to mobilize at the intelligence school at Fort Huachuca so they
can receive the latest instruction on tactical questioning
before deploying.
Finally, the Army is improving the training of MP and MI
personnel at our combat training centers by incorporating
detainee holding situations into the tactical scenarios.
These improvements were initiated for the later-deploying
OIF, or OIF-2 units, and will be fully implemented for all OIF-
3 deploying units.
The reported acts of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib are
tragic and disappointing, and they stand in sharp contrast to
the values of our Army and the Nation it serves. For these
incidents to reflect negatively on the courage, sacrifice, and
selfless service of the hundreds of thousands of dedicated men
and women who have volunteered to serve our Nation in uniform
would be a tragedy, as well. Our soldiers, over 300,000 of whom
are deployed in over 120 countries around the world, most in
Iraq and Afghanistan, have provided the opportunity for freedom
and democracy for over 46 million people who have never
experienced it before, while, at the same time, providing
protection to the American people.
Mr. Chairman, we will find out how and why this happened,
and ensure that those individuals determined to be responsible
for these shameful and illegal acts of abuse are held
accountable for their actions.
I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today. I
thank you and the members of this distinguished committee for
your continuing support of the men and women in our Army, and I
look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Warner. Secretary Brownlee, your statement is very
helpful, and a significant contribution to this hearing.
General Schoomaker.
STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMY
General Schoomaker. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin,
distinguished members of the committee, I'll be brief.
As the Chief of Staff of the Army, I am responsible for
training and equipping our soldiers, as well as growing our
Army leaders. I am also responsible for providing ready and
relevant land power capabilities to the combatant commanders
and the joint team. Although not in the operational chain of
command, I am responsible for our soldiers' training and
readiness; therefore, I take it personally when any of them
fall short of our standards.
To put it in perspective, what we are dealing with are the
actions of a few, as has been pointed out. These are conscious
actions that are contrary to all that we stand for. This is not
a training issue, but one of character and values. Our Army
values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor,
integrity, and personal courage are taught to our soldiers from
the moment that they enter the training base. There's no
question that potential consequences are serious, but we must
not forget that these are a few among a great many others who
are serving with great honor and sacrifice, as has been pointed
out.
We must be careful how we proceed, as it will affect the
morale and the safety of a great majority of our soldiers who
are meeting the standards and are daily placing themselves in
harm's way. I promise you, they, too, take this personally.
I am reminded that, in the report by Major General Taguba,
he spoke of several soldiers and units who were challenged by
the same set of demanding circumstances at the same place, and
they did what was right. The inexcusable behavior of a few is
not representative of the courageous and compassionate
performance of the overwhelming majority of our soldiers who
serve with pride and honor.
We are currently undergoing an extensive investigation of
every allegation. The system works, and will result in fairness
and justice. We will also learn and adapt. Our Army has already
taken corrective actions. Our soldiers are performing with
distinction, and I am proud of them all. We owe them our
confidence. Our Army is taking this very seriously, and will
meet the standards that our Nation expects, as we have for 229
years.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General. That statement on
leadership reflects your own strong record of leadership, and
we're fortunate to have you at the helm of the United States
Army today.
We'll proceed with questions now. Colleagues, recognizing
that almost the full membership of the committee is present,
the chair will have to cut the time to 5 minutes.
Mr. Secretary, I was particularly impressed by your phrase,
``We're going to watch American democracy in action, as the
President and all others address this problem swiftly, in
accordance with the rule of law and American values.'' In the
meantime, however, it's obvious to all of us that the impact of
the facts of this case as they are unfolding is affecting our
relationship with other nations, our foreign policy. So I ask
you, what is that impact, as best you can assess it today?
Second, will the impact of this situation affect, in any way,
the transition that I and others support to take place on June
30? Will it have any impact on other nations in the coalition
to consider their continued participation at this time, and the
chances of adding additional nations? Lastly, does it have any
impact on the force levels that you anticipate, together with
your on-scene commanders of CENTCOM, in the near future?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, those are tough
questions. I'm afraid no one has the ability to know precisely
what will unfold. We have seen no shift in coalition countries,
in answer to your first question.
About future coalition countries, I think the key
determinative there is whether or not we are successful in
getting an additional United Nations (U.N.) resolution, in
which case I think we will get additional countries to
participate. It certainly will not have any effect on the
determination to have sovereign responsibility assumed by
Iraqis by June 30.
I would just say one other thing. We have been enormously
disadvantaged by false allegations and lies for the better part
of a year--and, indeed, before that, with respect to
Afghanistan--by terrorists and terrorist organizations alleging
things that weren't true. So we have taken a beating in the
world for things we were not doing that were alleged to be
done. Now we're taking a beating, understandably, for things
that did, in fact, happen.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, sir.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add to that. I
just returned from a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Military Committee meeting, and had the chance to talk to
several of the countries that have major military units inside
Iraq. They were very strong, in every case, about seeing this
through, and seemed undeterred by any of the recent events.
They were looking forward, and we were talking about the future
and about their steadfastness in seeing this mission through.
Chairman Warner. General, I direct my next question to you,
because the Department of the Army has been in the forefront.
CENTCOM, as we all know, is composed of officers--men, women--
of all branches of the Services. I would anticipate that you
have consulted with your colleagues, not only on the Joint
Chiefs, but particularly in CENTCOM, and that you are making,
or have made and will continue to make, an assessment as to the
possible personnel increase in the number of men and women of
the Armed Forces, most particularly in Iraq, and perhaps
elsewhere in the world. This story continues to reflect very
deeply the thinking and actions of others.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, absolutely we will. We should
not underestimate that impact. It was that impact of the
pictures--the report of pictures was already out there. But the
actual pictures possibly coming out on a news program, that
prompted my call to try to delay their release. I thought those
pictures, at that particular time, would have a particularly
bad effect on our troops, perhaps resulting in death to our
forces.
I think we have a lot of troops in Iraq right now, after
talking to General Smith and others, that are probably walking
with--they're involved in combat, but they're walking with
their heads just a little bit lower right now because they have
to bear the brunt of what their colleagues up in Abu Ghraib
did. It's going to take, as General Schoomaker said, good
leadership and everything else we can do to get them back up on
the net, because they are engaged in some very important work.
As I said in my statement, I continue to think that the way
we'll win their trust will be soldier by soldier, patrol by
patrol, like we're winning the war over there, and we're just
going to have to stay at it.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. My time is expired.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld, I was struck by one of the photographs
from the prison depicting three naked prisoners in a lump on
the floor being overseen by a number of soldiers, while other
soldiers in the cell block were assisting or were going about
their business without any apparent interest in or concern
about the obvious abusive treatment. It occurred to me that the
conduct that we were witnessing and watching was not the
aberrant conduct of a few individuals, but was part of an
organized and conscious process to extract information.
This picture reinforces the Taguba Report, which quotes
Sergeant Davis as saying that he witnessed prisoners in the MI
hold section, Wing 1A, ``being made to do various things that I
would question, morally.'' He quoted the MI folks as saying,
``loosen the guy up for us, make sure he has a bad night, make
sure he gets the treatment.'' He further stated that the wing
belonged to MI, and it appeared that MI personnel approved of
the abuses.
Now, in the Taguba Report itself, General Taguba says the
following, and this is his finding, that ``military
intelligence interrogators and other U.S. Government agency
interrogators''--which I assume includes CIA--``actively
requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for
favorable interrogation of witnesses,'' and that personnel
assigned to the MP company and brigade were ``directed to
change facility procedures to set the conditions for military
intelligence interrogations.''
My question to you is, what were those changes that were
made, and was it proper to make changes of the kind that
General Taguba refers to?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The conclusions you seem to have drawn
in your question, Senator Levin, are issues that I believe are
probably all being addressed in an investigation that was
initiated last month. I think it's called the Fay
Investigation--possibly you, General Smith, who have been
involved in this, would want to comment.
General Smith. Sir, there has been an investigation that
was initiated in mid-April by Major General Fay, and it is to
look into exactly those allegations.
Senator Levin. All right.
Secretary Rumsfeld, would you agree that people who
authorized, or suggested, or prompted the conduct depicted in
the pictures that we've seen, as well as those who carried out
the abuses, must be held accountable? That anybody who
authorized, knew about, prompted, or suggested, in the
Intelligence Community or otherwise, that conduct must be held
accountable? That's my very direct question to you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The pictures I've seen depict conduct
and behavior that is so brutal and so cruel and so inhumane
that anyone engaged in it or involved in it would have to be
brought to justice.
Senator Levin. Would that include anybody who suggested it,
prompted it, or hinted at it directly or indirectly? I just
want to know how far up this chain you're going to go. Are you
going to limit this to people who perpetrated it, or are we
going to get to the people who may have suggested it or
encouraged it?
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is exactly why the investigation
was initiated, and that is why it's being brought forward.
We'll find what their conclusions are, and I'm sure they will
make recommendations with respect to prosecution.
Senator Levin. But in terms of the standard, does anybody
who recommended or suggested, directly or indirectly, that
conduct in order to extract information--in your judgment, if
that occurred, are they also violative of our laws and
standards?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Certainly, anyone who recommended the
kind of behavior that I've seen depicted in those photos needs
to be brought to justice.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Levin. My time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I come to this hearing with a deep sense of sorrow and
grave concern. Sorrow after the shock and anger of seeing these
pictures for the first time, that so many brave young Americans
who are fighting and dying are under this cloud. I attended the
memorial service of Pat Tillman, a brave American who
sacrificed his life recently. He and others, unfortunately, at
least in some way, are diminished by this scandal.
I'm gravely concerned that many Americans will have the
same impulse I did when I saw these pictures, and that's to
turn away from them. We risk losing public support for this
conflict. As Americans turned away from the Vietnam War, they
may turn away from this one unless this issue is resolved, with
full disclosure, immediately.
With all due respect to investigations ongoing and panels
being appointed, the American people deserve immediate and full
disclosure of all relevant information so that we can be
assured and comforted that something that we never believed
could happen will never happen again.
Now, Mr. Secretary, I'd like you to give the committee the
chain of command from the guards to you, all the way up.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think General Myers brought an
indication of it, and we'll show it.
Senator McCain. Thank you. I'd like to know what agencies
or private contractors were in charge of interrogations. Did
they have authority over the guards? What were their
instructions to the guards?
Secretary Rumsfeld. First, with respect to the----
General Myers. We did not bring it.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, my.
General Myers. Yeah, oh, my, sir.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It was all prepared.
General Myers. It was, indeed.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Do you want to walk through it?
Senator McCain. Well, anyway, who was in charge? What
agency or private contractor was in charge of the
interrogations? Did they have authority over the guards? What
were the instructions that they gave to the guards?
General Myers. I'll walk through the chain of command and--
--
Senator McCain. No, you can just submit the chain of
command for the record, please.
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Secretary Rumsfeld. General Smith, do you want to respond?
Senator McCain. No, Secretary Rumsfeld, in all due respect,
you have to answer this question, and it could be satisfied
with a phone call. This is a pretty simple, straightforward
question.
Who was in charge of the interrogations? What agencies and
private contractors were in charge of the interrogations? Did
they have authority over the guards? What were the instructions
to the guards? This goes to the heart of this matter.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It does, indeed. As I understand it,
there were two contractor organizations. They supplied
interrogators and linguists. I was advised by General Smith
that there were maybe a total of 40.
Senator McCain. Now, were they in charge of the
interrogations?
General Smith. Yes, sir. There were 37 interrogators that
were----
Senator McCain. I'm asking who was in charge of the
interrogations.
General Smith. They were not in charge. They were
interrogators.
Senator McCain. My question is, who was in charge of the
interrogations?
General Smith. The brigade commander for the MI brigade.
Senator McCain. Did he also have authority over the guards?
General Smith. Sir, he had tactical control over the
guards, so he was----
Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, you can't answer these
questions?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I can. I thought the purpose of the
question was to try to make sure we got an accurate
presentation, and we have the expert here who was in the chain
of command.
Senator McCain. I think these are fundamental questions to
this issue.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Fine.
Senator McCain. What were the instructions to the guards?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There are two sets of responsibilities,
as your question suggests. In one set, you have the people who
have the responsibility for managing the detention process.
They are not interrogators. The MI people, as General Smith has
indicated, were the people who were in charge of the
interrogation part of the process. The responsibility, as I
have reviewed the matter, shifted over a period of time, and
the General is capable of telling you when that responsibility
shifted.
[Clarifying information provided by the DOD follows:]
The overall responsibility for the Baghdad Central Confinement
Facility (Abu Ghraib) was transferred from the 800th MP Brigade to the
205th MI Brigade by a CJTF-7 Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) on November 18,
2003. In accordance with the order, the units operating at Abu Ghraib
came under the tactical control of the 205th MI Brigade for security of
detainees and FOB protection. The MP, however, retained responsibility
for detention operations.
Senator McCain. What were the instructions to the guards?
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is what the investigation that I
have indicated has been undertaken is determining.
Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, that's a very simple,
straightforward question.
Secretary Rumsfeld. As the Chief of Staff of the Army can
tell you, the guards are trained to guard people. They are not
trained to interrogate, and their instructions are to, in the
case of Iraq, adhere to the Geneva Conventions. The Geneva
Conventions apply to all of the individuals there, in one way
or another. They apply to the POWs, and they're written out,
and they're instructed, and the people in the Army train them
to that. The people in the CENTCOM have the responsibility of
seeing that, in fact, their conduct is consistent with the
Geneva Conventions. The criminals in the same detention
facility are handled under a different provision of the Geneva
Conventions. I believe it's the fourth, and the prior one is
the third.
[Clarifying information provided by the DOD follows:]
Detaines who are criminals, persons who attack the force and
civilians who are security threats are called ``civilian internees''
and are protected persons under Geneva Convention IV. Geneva Convention
IV applies to all categories of civilian personnel we have detained in
Iraq.
Senator McCain. So the guards were instructed to treat the
prisoners, under some kind of changing authority, as I
understand it, according to the Geneva Conventions.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
To the people in the Middle East, and too often today, the
symbol of America is not the Statue of Liberty, it's the
prisoner standing on a box wearing a dark cape and a dark hood
on his head with wires attached to his body, afraid that he's
going to be electrocuted. Now, these incidents of torture and
abuse have resulted in a catastrophic crisis of credibility for
our Nation.
Since the beginning of the war, the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) has provided the Pentagon officials
with reports of abuses at this prison, saying that some of them
were tantamount to torture. They issued serious complaints
during the inspection of the prison in October 2003 and at
several other times.
The State Department and the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) appealed to you to stop the mistreatment of the
military detainees. Secretary Powell raised this issue at
Cabinet meetings and elsewhere, pleading with officials from
your Department, Mr. Secretary, to see that detainees were
properly cared for and treated, and your Department failed to
act.
The military leadership put the troops in charge of the
prison. They weren't trained to do the job, and they assigned
far too few guards to the prison that were required to do the
job right. They relied on the civilian contractors to perform
military duties, as I understand it, including the
interrogation of Iraqi prisoners. As Senator Levin pointed out,
the top-level DOD officials directed guards at the prison to
set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation
of the detainees, a decision that directly resulted in the
abuses.
The military leadership failed to respond in a systematic
way even after it initiated the 35 criminal investigations into
alleged mistreatment of detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan, 25
of these investigations involving deaths. I know that Secretary
Brownlee referred to this.
In particular, in December 2002, military doctors at the
Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan ruled that two Afghan men in
U.S. custody died from blunt-force injuries. No one in the
military has been held accountable for those homicides.
You and your senior leadership have shown, I believe, a
disregard for the protection of the Geneva Conventions in
detainee operations. In January 2002, you were asked why you
believed the Geneva Conventions do not apply to detainees in
Guantanamo. You replied that you did not have the slightest
concern about their treatment, in light of what occurred
September 11.
According to The New York Times, you have known about the
graphic photographic evidence of abuse in the Abu Ghraib prison
since mid-January. You told President Bush about these reports
of abuse shortly thereafter. Yet, rather than work with
Congress to deal with the problem together, you and other top
DOD officials have apparently spent the last 3 weeks preparing
a public relations plan.
Can you tell us what exactly you did tell the President
about these reports of abuse in late January, and what did he
say? What did you do about it, and why did month after month
after month have to pass before anything happened? Then we find
out that the pictures came out, and the President is, indeed,
angry.
Secretary Rumsfeld. First, Senator Kennedy, your statement
that other agencies of government were concerned about
detainees and the DOD failed to act is simply not correct.
Senator Kennedy. This wasn't brought to your attention by
the State Department?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll respond. I did not say that. I
said your statement that the DOD----
Senator Kennedy. It was brought to you then by the State
Department. We don't want to parse words. Was this brought to
you by the State Department? I mentioned Secretary Powell. The
question is whether this was brought to you, and when did you
know it? You gave us a laundry list in your presentation about
the timeline on it. I'm trying to find out, because it's been
published that you were notified about this and advised to do
something about it a series of times and nothing was done.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It's not correct to say nothing was
done. You're making a set of conclusions that are just simply
not accurate. We have had numerous discussions, interagency, on
detainees. All in all, there have been some 43,000 people who
were captured or detained in Iraq, of whom 31,850 have already
been released. That is a big task for the Army to undertake.
The actions of the ICRC--you said they came in and indicated
concerns about the Abu Ghraib prison. That's correct. The
prison officials began the process of making corrections, and
General Taguba's report found that a number of those things
were already underway, in terms of corrections. When he made
his study, a number of additional things and corrections were
made. So it seems to me that the ICRC report was helpful, and
that the military command, as I understand it, undertook a
series of corrections.
Now, with respect to when we were knowledgeable of this,
the situation was this. Specialist Darby told the CID that he
had information about abuses in the prison. I believe it was on
the 13th or 14th of January. By the 15th or 16th, an
investigation had been initiated, and CENTCOM's public affairs
people went out and told everyone in the world that there were
allegations of abuse, and they were being investigated. Again,
by mid-March, when some criminal--I don't know the legal term,
but some criminal actions were initiated--the CENTCOM's public
affairs people went out again and announced that not only were
there allegations of abuses, but they listed the types of
abuses. This was to the world; everyone knew it. CNN was there
asking questions. That is the time frame when General Myers and
I were meeting with the President and discussing the reports
that we had obviously heard because--they weren't hiding
anything. They disclosed it to the world.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I mean, in no
way, to diminish the seriousness of what has occurred here, but
it seems very clear to me that the task before Congress is to
determine whether or not these abuses are the result of flaws
in the system or if this was a matter, as has been indicated,
of individuals who simply broke the rules.
With that in mind, I'd like to know, Mr. Secretary, were
any of the abuses that occurred in Iraq encouraged, condoned,
or permitted by DOD regulations or policy? Were any local or
unit-levels in effect that would have encouraged, condoned, or
permitted these abuses?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Certainly not to my knowledge. When one
looks at the abuses and the cruelty, the idea that you would
have regulations that would permit, condone, or encourage that
type of thing is just not comprehensible. General Smith is the
deputy at CENTCOM, under General Abizaid, and he is responsible
for the management of the guidance and instructions. He can
respond if you'd like.
Senator Roberts. No, I think you've answered the question,
at least to the degree that I want it answered right now. I
want to move on.
I do have the privilege of being the chairman of the Senate
Intelligence Committee. Three days ago, we had a hearing. We
had the MI representatives there. We had the CIA there. They
indicated, at that particular time, that they did not know and
had no evidence of any direction on the part of intelligence
personnel at this prison suggesting that they commit these
abuses at the behest of the military interrogators, who asked
the MP to ``soften up'' the detainees to prepare them for the
interrogation. This gets back to the opening statement by
Senator Levin and the question by Senator McCain.
Let me remind everybody that, as we speak, we have men and
women in uniform engaged in combat in Najaf, and basically when
we interrogate people, it is to get information from the
prisoners, in terms of force protection and in terms of the
mission in Iraq, to find out precisely what's going on. It's a
very important mission. It was a closed hearing, but I said at
the time that I would be stunned--and I've said it to the
press--that anybody in MI would condone these kind of
activities. This criteria is ingrained, in terms of their
training. It's black and white.
So my question to you is--and I think it is going to result
in the Fay Report here--is there any truth to the allegations
made in the press and by some of the accused MPs that they did
commit these abuses at the behest of the military
interrogators?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I've read the same allegations and
comments that you have. That is what the criminal
investigations are looking at, among other things. We will, at
an early date, know what the answers are to those questions.
Senator Roberts. Can you give me a time frame on when the
Fay Report will be completed?
General Smith. Sir, it should be completed in the next
couple of weeks, if he does not ask for an extension. Part of
the problem is, that unit has redeployed back to Germany, and
so there is traveling back and forth involved.
Senator Roberts. That would help answer the question that
was asked by Senator McCain as to actually who was ``in
charge'' of that prison. I put the ``in charge'' in quotes. You
had the intelligence, and then you also had the MPs, in terms
of the maintenance of the unit, and then it seems to me that
there's another command that you mentioned, in terms of the
contractors.
I think Senator McCain's question is right on. Who was
really in charge? I think you have a tri-part system here. Is
that being fixed? Will that be recommended by the Fay Report?
General Smith. Sir, that's already been fixed with the
appointment of Major General Geoff Miller as the----
Senator Roberts. He's the person that straightened out
Guantanamo Bay down in Cuba.
General Smith. Sir, he is there doing that right now. He
has been there since the middle of April.
Senator Roberts. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this
timely and important hearing. I apologize for my voice. I've
been struggling with a bout of laryngitis.
I share your outrage over the atrocities that have emerged
from the Abu Ghraib prison. I believe Congress has the
responsibility to demand a public accounting and a public
explanation from the leadership of the DOD. I'm sure this is
only the beginning of a long and painful process, but I am glad
that you've taken the first steps to begin a necessary public
examination of the massive policy failure that led to this
catastrophe.
Among the many aspects of this situation that are so
troubling to me is why the President and his advisors are only
now publicly condemning the prisoner abuses in Iraq, when
apparently the DOD has known about them for months. I do not
recall hearing a peep out of either of you, Secretary Rumsfeld
or General Myers, about this before CBS broke the silence.
Why did it take the televised broadcast of graphic photos
of prisoner abuse, a broadcast General Myers has acknowledged
he tried to suppress, to galvanize the leadership of the DOD to
express its outrage over the situation?
Why was a report that described sadistic, blatant, and
wanton criminal abuses by American soldiers left to languish on
a shelf in the Pentagon unread by the top leadership until the
media revealed it to the world? Why wasn't Congress appraised
of the findings of this report from the DOD instead of from CBS
News?
Mr. Secretary, it was President Truman who was said to have
displayed the famous sign on his desk, ``The buck stops here.''
I served with President Truman. He was an honorable man. He did
not shirk his responsibility.
I see a very different pattern in this administration. I
see arrogance and a disdain for Congress. I see misplaced
bravado and an unwillingness to admit mistakes. I see finger-
pointing and excuses.
Given the catastrophic impact that this scandal has had on
the world community, how can the United States ever repair its
credibility? How are we supposed to convince not only the Iraqi
people, but also the rest of the world, that America is,
indeed, a liberator and not a conqueror, not an arrogant power?
Is a presidential apology to the King of Jordan sufficient? I
ask you that question.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, the facts are somewhat
different than that. The story was broken by CENTCOM, by the
DOD, in Baghdad. General Kimmitt stood up, in January, and
announced that there were allegations of abuses and that they
were being investigated. He then briefed reporters. I think it
was March 20. There's a timeline up here. By March 20, he went
back out again and said that these had been filed.
The idea that this was a story that was broken by the media
is simply not the fact. This was presented by CENTCOM to the
world so that they would be aware of the fact that these had
been filed. What was not known is that a classified report with
photographs would be given to the press before it arrived in
the Pentagon.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, we'll put my timeline in the
record and compare it with yours.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Senator Byrd. My question is, is a presidential apology to
the King of Jordan sufficient?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I guess that's for the
President and Congress and others to decide. There have been
many apologies. There have been apologies by every person at
this table today. Any suggestion that there is not a full, deep
awareness of what has happened and the damage it has done, I
think, would be a misunderstanding.
The report that we're talking about is sitting right there
on the floor. It is--I don't know--what, 2-feet high?
Senator Byrd. Did you read it?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I read the executive summary, which is
50 to 75 pages, and I looked at some of the annexes and
appendices and references. I have been briefed on it in full,
as have the people at this table, and you can be certain of
that.
Senator Byrd. The ICRC claims that it made reports of
prisoner abuse in Iraq throughout 2003. I understand that those
reports are confidential, by mutual agreement. Secretary
Rumsfeld, how do we know that there isn't a broader problem
here? We have heard reports of prisoner abuse from more than
just the Abu Ghraib prison. Will you ask the ICRC to waive its
confidentiality agreement on those reports, and make public all
pertinent reports on U.S. military-run prison facilities,
including those in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo, and
elsewhere?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We will certainly be happy to provide
the committee with all the reports that we have. I think the
issue of the ICRC allowing one of their reports to be made
public is an issue for them, because they worry that they will
not be told the truth when they go into countries where there
are dictatorships and where people are systematically punished
and tortured, and people do not want to talk to them if the
ICRC gets a reputation for making their report public. So we
will be happy to give you our reports, on a confidential basis
that is respectful of the ICRC's stipulations.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Byrd. May I just follow with a postscript?
Chairman Warner. All right, Senator.
Senator Byrd. With all due respect to you, the matter is
far deeper than that. The American people need to know what's
in those reports. When the ICRC supplies the DOD with those
reports, Congress should have that material.
Secretary Rumsfeld. We'd be happy to give it to you.
Senator Byrd. Very well, thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, first of all I want to thank
you for holding this committee hearing. I know there was some
discussion about the format and everything, but I think it's
the right thing to do to have this as an open hearing. I want
to also thank the panel for agreeing to come here and testify
before us in an open hearing. That's the strength of America,
that we're willing to come out in a public manner and talk
about our strengths and weaknesses, and lay out how we're going
to deal with those. As somebody who has participated in this, I
think that we are sending a good message to the world that we
are open; that we are not a perfect people, but we do our best.
I just wanted to make that statement before I asked any
questions.
The thing that I heard in your testimony, Mr. Secretary--
and I think it needs to be elaborated on--is this issue of
command influence. I know that as the facts become evident,
that prosecutors of misconduct in the military have a real
concern about command influence. I would like you to elaborate
more on that, or maybe some other panel members might elaborate
on that, and how that might affect a case for prosecution. You
mentioned you had six courts-martial, I believe, and I wondered
if you would share that with the committee.
Secretary Rumsfeld. We are continuously advised by lawyers,
counsels, that there are two issues that create a tension. One
is the importance of having integrity in the criminal
prosecution process, and that people in the chain of command
that conceivably, over time, would be called upon to make a
judgment about the decisions at the lower levels do not inject
themselves into that process early or in a way that would lead
people to believe that their comments were influencing the
outcome of some of those criminal decisions or other decisions.
Therefore, people in the chain are in a difficult position. To
the extent we have a discussion like this about what's taken
place, we can be certain that the defense counsels for these
people who are being accused, and are going to be criminally
prosecuted, will say that these hearings and this discussion
had an influence on the case. We don't want to have that be the
case, and that's why we're being careful in what we say.
The other side of the coin is, we don't want someone's
rights to be infringed upon, someone who is a defendant and may
be innocent. A process could lead to a situation where their
rights would not be fully protected. So we do have to be
careful.
Senator Allard. If there are six courts-martial now, do you
anticipate there will be more courts-martial? Have any of those
in command been indicted?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I checked, and last year we had
something like 18,000 criminal investigations opened, and we
ended up with 3,000 courts-martial. So, at any given time, with
a large organization like the DOD, there is always something
happening.
There is no way in the world I could anticipate. But the
investigations are open, the investigators are determined, and,
to the extent they find information that leads them to believe
that a court-martial is indicated, or non-judicial punishment
of other types, they certainly will do so. They understand the
gravity of this.
Senator Allard. I want to follow up on the ICRC report.
Were they given full access? What main issues did that report
raise?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have the report somewhere here, and
I'd be happy to let you see it. I'm reluctant to start
discussing it, but I can say what I already said, that they
found a number of things that they were concerned about, as
they always do. It's helpful, I must say. The people then began
to read it, agree or disagree, and make the changes. When
General Taguba came in and made his report, he indicated that a
number of the issues that had been raised last year by the ICRC
had, in fact, been corrected by the command structure between
the time that they were observed by the ICRC and the time that
General Taguba's team arrived on the scene.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. I do have
a written statement for the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first join you in welcoming our
witnesses this morning to discuss the troubling issue of prisoner abuse
involving our Armed Forces.
I am deeply saddened and distressed over these allegations. When we
commit our military to fight our country's wars, we fully expect each
and every American soldier to serve as the model soldier-statesman, a
standard bearer for people everywhere. Our American forces are to be
feared for their unmatched effectiveness and valor in combat. More
importantly, they are to be respected and valued for their humanitarian
and compassionate conduct when carrying out their duties.
We are at a delicate phase now, introducing to the Afghanis and
Iraqis the promises of a democracy and the better times ahead. A major
part of our difficulty is the fact that these people simply do not yet
know what democracy holds for them--they have yet to experience the
freedoms and justice that Americans take for granted.
Today, we rely on our Armed Forces to set this stage, to help these
emerging democracies take root. What is so disturbing is that these
allegations erode, to the core, the basic principles of liberty we so
desperately need to instill and uphold across this region.
Based on my preliminary readings, Mr. Chairman, I don't believe we
will uncover systemic problems in our military of wanton disregard for
either the rule of law or general human rights. Rather, I believe the
committee will see, in painful detail, a case study of the
extraordinary damage that can occur when we experience such a
disastrous breakdown in military leadership and discipline. It is of
small consolation that there were many solid, upstanding soldiers in
the middle of this leadership void that maintained their military
bearing, sought command attention for these violations, and carried-on
in accordance with the high professional standards we all expect.
I find it extremely unfortunate that the activities of so few are
now overshadowing the extraordinary accomplishments of so many. I
visited both Afghanistan and Iraq earlier this year, and got to see
firsthand many of our 130,000 uniformed service men and women
undertaking heroic public works projects. General Smith's Central
Command is engaged in building mosques, schools, hospitals, roadways,
water, and sewage facilities, and other critical infrastructure
desperately needed across the region. Now, however, we have a small
minority of apparently misled, misfit commanders and soldiers casting a
negative light over what should be, and what I hope will ultimately be,
a proud accomplishment for our forces.
Mr. Secretary and Chairman Myers, I understand the scope of your
job and responsibilities are enormous. I believe that comprehensive
remedies to this situation need to be among your top priorities. Let's
get out in the open the relevant information and answers we need to
close this issue soonest. Let's get the solutions and preventive
measures identified and in place soonest. Let's get the few soldiers
and commanders--those that let us all down--before the appropriate
judicial process and punish the guilty accordingly.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, the behavior by Americans at the prison in
Iraq is, as we all acknowledge, immoral, intolerable, and un-
American. It deserves the apology that you have given today, as
well as the apologies that have been given by others in high
positions in our Government and our military.
I cannot help but say, however, that those who were
responsible for killing 3,000 Americans on September 11, 2001,
never apologized. Those who have killed hundreds of Americans
in uniform in Iraq, working to liberate Iraq and protect our
security, have never apologized. Those who murdered and burned
and humiliated four Americans in Fallujah a while ago never
gave an apology to anybody. Wrongs occurred here by the people
in those pictures and perhaps by people up the chain of
command.
But Americans are different. That's why we're outraged by
this. That's why the apologies were due. That's why I hope, as
we go about this investigation, we do it in a way that does not
dishonor the hundreds of thousands of Americans in uniform who
are a lot more like Pat Tillman and Americans that are not
known, like Army National Guard Sergeant Felix del Greco, of
Simsbury, Connecticut, who was killed in action a few weeks
ago. We shall not dishonor their service or discredit the cause
that brought us to send them to Iraq, because it remains one
that is just and necessary.
We have to get to the whole truth here, and nothing but the
truth. We can't be defensive. We have to be aggressive about
it. As Senator McCain said, we have to do it quickly so that we
and you and, most of all, our soldiers can get back to fighting
and winning the war on terrorism with determination.
As far as I'm concerned, we do have to know how this
happened, and we have to know it so we can stop it from
happening ever again. You've said that the behavior of those
soldiers was fundamentally un-American. I agree with you. This
goes way back to the first American declaration, the
Declaration of Independence, where we said that every human
being has those rights as an endowment of our Creator. That
even goes to human beings who have been apprehended by our
military, as they have been in Iraq, because they are suspected
of being part of the terrorists, of the jihadists, of the
foreign fighters, of the Saddam loyalists, who are killing
Americans and Iraqis every day.
We know that people are flawed, and that's why we believe
in the rule of law, to try to make us better and punish those
who fall below appropriate humane standards.
In that regard, it seems to me when it comes to the
treatment of prisoners and detainees in conditions of combat,
the Geneva Conventions, adopted by the United States as the law
of the land--and that have been implemented by U.S. Army
Regulation 190-8. You made some controversial statements early
on, after Afghanistan, that said the Geneva Conventions were
``not relevant here,'' that, ``by and large''--and I'm quoting
generally--``American military interrogators or prison guards
would try to carry out the rights of prisoners and detainees
according to the Geneva Conventions.'' But I want to ask you
today, as you look back to that, do you think you were right?
Did anything replace the rules of the Geneva Conventions in
Army Regulation 190-8? If not, why not?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, the President of the United
States made a determination in early 2002 that the Geneva
Conventions' provisions did not apply to our conflict with al
Qaeda, although he concluded that Geneva Conventions did apply
to the conflict with the Taliban. That was a decision by the
President. He determined that Taliban detainees did not qualify
as POWs under the third Geneva Convention criteria for POWs. He
also made clear that it was, and will continue to be, America's
policy to treat detainees humanely and in a manner that was
consistent with the Geneva Conventions. So the people were
treated consistent to the Geneva Conventions, but he made a
distinction with respect to al Qaeda.
Senator Lieberman. Are these detainees, do you assume,
members of al Qaeda? That is, the thousands that have been held
in Iraq? Or are they in another status?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, no, the President announced from
the outset that everyone in Iraq who was a military person and
was detained is a POW, and, therefore, the Geneva Conventions
apply. Second, the decision was made that the civilians or
criminal elements that are detainees are also treated subject
to the Geneva Conventions, although it's a different element of
it. I think it's the fourth instead of the third.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that clarification, because
I was not aware of that. Then you would say that all those held
in prison, including those who were abused here, had the rights
of POWs under the Geneva Conventions.
General Myers. Absolutely.
[Clarifying information from the DOD follows:]
All detainees held in Iraq are protected under the Geneva
Conventions. Enemy POWs are covered under Geneva Convention III.
Civilians are protected under Geneva Convention IV. Those pictured in
the photographs from Abu Ghraib are believed to be civilians.
Senator Lieberman. Therefore, the fault clearly was that
those we've seen, and hopefully not others, were either not
properly trained, properly disciplined, or, in any case, not
observing the law of the United States of America with regard
to the rights of POWs.
General Myers. If I may, I think that's exactly right. It's
aberrant behavior. The Taguba Report, if you recall, looked at
four installations where the 800th MP Brigade had operations.
They found abuse in only one, and that's Abu Ghraib. They found
abuse in one.
Senator Lieberman. My time's up. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
These are, indeed, actions that go against the very core
values of America. I want to say, however, that I believe the
military responded properly immediately. I want to join with
Senator Lieberman's courageous and strong comments about how we
do not need to dishonor the soldiers out there this very day,
at risk of their lives, withholding firing weapons, being in
hostile situations, taking chances with their own lives to
protect the people of Iraq. Yes, this is a serious problem, and
we need to do something about it. Those who dishonored those
soldiers need to be punished. But I feel very strongly that the
military deserves a lot of credit here, and I want to go over
this chart, General Myers, that you have there.
First, I want to say to Secretary Rumsfeld and all of you
there, thank you for your leadership. Yes, you have some
complainers in Congress, but we voted to send our soldiers to
this effort. Nobody else authorized you to go. We voted to
support it. I would also note that the terrorists aren't happy
with you, either. I saw they put a $15 million bounty on your
head, along with General Kimmitt and General Sanchez. I thank
you for that service.
General Myers. Senator Sessions, you want me to go through
the----
Senator Sessions. I would just like to ask you a little bit
about it, because our time is short.
General Myers. Right.
Senator Sessions. As I see it, back in August of last year
you appointed an assessment team. Is that right? Long before
this occurred.
General Myers. Right. As I said in my opening statement, I
think we ought to have a lot of confidence in our military
leadership handling the detention situation in Iraq. It was on
August 11 that General Sanchez was worried about detention and
interrogation operations, and that resulted in General Miller
going over there and submitting a report.
We pushed General Miller on them in August 2003 because he
was so successful in Guantanamo--to look at our detention
operations to make sure that we're doing it right, and also
that it's well connected, that the intelligence is getting to
the analysts and so forth, so we can win this.
Senator Sessions. Now, was this in response to any incident
or was it on your own initiative?
General Myers. That was our own initiative. That was a
discussion between the Secretary and myself and our staffs.
You can see from the chart when the abuse took place. We
were told of the abuse on January 13, 2004. The next day, the
Army police, the CID, went on that particular case. We talked
about the press.
Senator Sessions. No, let's slow down. On January 14, you
started a criminal investigation based on the complaint of one
soldier.
General Myers. They did.
Senator Sessions. On January 16, Major General Kimmitt
briefed the world about the investigation commencing. Is that
correct?
General Myers. Right, and he talked about abuse. As I
remember it, he said there may be pictures involved with this
abuse, as well. Then it was 3 days later where General
Sanchez--based on that criminal investigation he had started--
asked for an investigating officer who turned out to be General
Taguba. The general was asked to look at this MP brigade that
was responsible for detention operations in Abu Ghraib and
those three other locations.
I know we need to do things quickly with full disclosure
and everything. But this 15-6 Report, the Taguba Report, can
result in administrative actions such as relief from command
and other administrative admonishments to military personnel.
So it has to be very thorough. That's why you'll see it was
requested on January 16. It was not approved by General Sanchez
until May 1. As you go through the various chains, the people
that are implicated in wrongdoing have a chance to look at the
report and rebut the report. That's part of this process that I
think we owe it to our troops to uphold.
Senator Sessions. But, General Myers, on January 18,
according to that chart, the 320th MP Battalion had leadership
suspended. Is that correct?
General Myers. That's correct.
Senator Sessions. That's a pretty dramatic action to take,
is it not?
General Myers. It is. But the first look by the Army CID, I
think, gave them indications that things were not right.
Senator Sessions. Now, this wasn't by any pressure from the
media or anyone else; this was the military's own decision that
their high standards had been violated, and that strong actions
should be taken.
General Myers. This was General Abizaid, General Sanchez,
and their folks, absolutely.
Senator Sessions. I know some on this committee have
complained when you took strong action against the brigade
commander publicly, the soldier who fired a weapon as part of
an interrogation effort. He had a fine record. You took strong
action on that case, and some of us in Congress complained you
were too tough.
General Myers. The standards are the standards, Senator.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Sessions. We thank you for your service, all of
you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by stating the obvious. For the next 50 years,
in the Islamic world and many other parts of the world, the
image of the United States will be that of an American dragging
a prostrate, naked Iraqi across the floor on a leash. This is
unfair to the honor and the courage to our soldiers, but,
unfortunately, I think it's become a fact. This is disastrous.
Mr. Secretary, let me follow up on your proposed
commission. As I understand your comments, this commission, or
this group of people, will not have the authority to call
witnesses to obtain material independent of your investigation.
They will simply review what you're doing?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We will be happy to give you a copy of
the draft charge to the individuals. They will have, I can
assure you, the absolute full cooperation of the DOD.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Reed. Will they have the opportunity to call
individuals to testify?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Indeed.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I wouldn't use the word ``testify,''
but certainly they can call individuals.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, the Taguba Report indicated
the principle focus of Major General Miller's team was on the
strategic interrogation of detainees in Iraq. Among its
conclusions in its executive summary was that CJTF-7 did not
have authorities and procedures in place to effect a unified
strategy to detain, interrogate, and report information from
detainees/internees in Iraq. The executive summary also stated
that detention operations must act as an enabler for
interrogation.
Major General Miller was involved with Guantanamo, a DOD
operation in another theater. He was sent to Iraq. I don't
think major generals in the United States Army make up policies
about strategic interrogation of detainees unless they've
coordinated and communicated to the higher headquarters. Did
you ever see, approve, or encourage this policy of enabling for
interrogation? Did Secretary Cambone ever see, approve, or
encourage this policy at either facility?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't recall that a policy came to me
for approval. I think that what we have known since September
11 is that we had three issues with respect to people that were
detained. One issue was to get them off the street so they
can't kill again--more innocent men, women, and children. A
second was the question of criminal prosecution for wrongdoing.
The third was to interrogate and see if additional information
could be found that could prevent future terrorist acts against
our country or our forces or our friends and allies. So all of
those things have been parts of it since the beginning. They're
different functions, as you point out.
Senator Reed. Is that Secretary Cambone's view, too? Did he
either see, approve, or encourage--he's behind you. Can he
respond?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Sure he can respond.
Mr. Cambone. Sir, the original----
Chairman Warner. Would you identify yourself for the
record, please?
Mr. Cambone. Yes, sir. My name is Steve Cambone. I'm the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Senator.
The original effort by Major General Miller was done with
respect to Guantanamo, and had to do with, in fact, whether or
not we had the proper arrangements in the facilities in order
to be able to gain the kind of intelligence we were looking
from those prisoners in Guantanamo. We had then, in Iraq, a
large body of people who had been captured on the battlefield
that we had to gain intelligence from for force-protection
purposes, and he was asked to go over, at my encouragement, to
take a look at the situation as it existed there. He made his
recommendations.
Senator Reed. Were the recommendations made to you, Mr.
Secretary? Did you approve them?
Mr. Cambone. To me directly? No. They were made to the
command.
Senator Reed. But you were aware of the recommendations
about enabling interrogation?
Mr. Cambone. I was aware of those recommendations. I was
aware that he made the recommendation that we get a better
coordination between those who are being held and those who
were being interrogated.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, were you aware that a specific
recommendation was to use MPs to enable an interrogation
process?
Mr. Cambone. In that precise language, no; but I knew that
we were trying to get to the point where we were assuring that
when they were in the general population, those that were under
confinement were not undermining the interrogation process.
Senator Reed. So this was Major General Miller's own
policy?
Mr. Cambone. No, sir, it was not a policy; it was a
recommendation that he made to the command.
Senator Reed. So General Sanchez adopted this policy,
making it a policy of the United States Army and the DOD,
without consultation with you on any specific----
Mr. Cambone. Sir, I don't think that's a proper rendering
of it.
Senator Reed. I don't know what the proper rendering is,
but that seems to be at the core of this issue. Were you
encouraging a policy that had MP officers enabling
interrogations, which created the situation where these----
Mr. Cambone. No, sir.
Secretary Rumsfeld. May I comment? I think it is probably
best put this way. They are different responsibilities,
detaining and interrogating. However, they do need to be looked
at together. They found, in Guantanamo, that how they are
detained, in terms of the rhythm of their lives, can affect the
interrogation process. So the linkage between the two is
desirable if, in fact, you're concerned about finding more
information that can prevent additional terrorist acts or, in
the case of Iraq, the killing of our forces. So it's important
that there be a linkage, a relationship. The way it can be put
is that it has a bad connotation. Goodness knows, that's not
desirable or a policy that General Miller would have
recommended.
On the other hand, it can----
Senator Reed. The policy seems to be to link----
Chairman Warner. Senator, I have to ask if you would
require the witnesses to provide further responses for the
record.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, I will certainly ask for
additional responses.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Mr. Secretary, the vast majority of
American troops performed their duties with compassion,
fairness, and courage. This abuse makes the tasks which they've
been assigned far more difficult and far more dangerous, and
that troubles me greatly. Worst of all, our Nation, a Nation
that, to a degree unprecedented in human history, has
sacrificed its blood and treasure to secure liberty and human
rights around the world, now must try to convince the world
that the horrific images on their TV screens and front pages
are not the real America, that what they see is not who we are.
That is why, Mr. Secretary, I'm so troubled by the
Pentagon's failure to come forward to fully disclose this
appalling abuse, to express outrage and concern, and to outline
swift, tough, corrective actions. I believe that had you done
that, it would have mitigated somewhat how this abuse has been
perceived around the world, particularly in the Muslim
communities. I'm not talking about issuing a press release from
Baghdad. I'm talking about you personally coming forward and
telling the world what you knew about this abuse.
In retrospect, do you believe that you erred in not coming
forward, not just to the President and Congress--you've made
very clear today that you regret not doing that--but to the
world community? Would it have made a difference if it had been
the Pentagon itself that had disclosed the full extent of this
abuse, whatever you knew, and what actions you were going to
take?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think in my statement I responded in
full to your question. I would characterize what was done in
CENTCOM, by way of swift corrective action, as being just
that--swift corrective action.
Second, I don't know quite how to respond to your question.
The DOD announced that abuse was being charged, there were
criminal investigations underway. No one had seen the
photographs. They were part of a criminal investigation, and I
say no one in the Pentagon had seen them. They were part of
that CENTCOM investigative process. It is the photographs that
give one the vivid realization of what actually took place.
Words don't do it. The words that there were abuses, that it
was cruel, that it was inhumane, all of which is true--that it
was blatant--you read that, and it's one thing. You see the
photographs, and you get a sense of it, and you cannot help but
be outraged.
There are, at any given time, in the DOD, these 3,000
courts-martial underway--general courts-martial, some 1,200;
criminal investigations, 18,000 last year. The importance of
protecting the people charged, protecting their rights, and the
importance of seeing that if, in fact, they're guilty, they
don't get off because of command influence--so there's a
pattern of not reaching down into those things, bringing them
up, and looking at all the evidence before it ever arrives. In
this case, it was released to the press.
Now, we announced the problem to the press. We did not
release the Taguba Report to the press. That was done by
someone, to release, against the law, a secret document. That's
how it surprised everyone. It shocked Congress. It shocked me.
It shocked the President. It shocked the country.
But to suggest that they had not taken tough, swift,
corrective actions in CENTCOM, it seems to me is inconsistent
with what took place.
Senator Collins. Mr. Secretary, that's not what I said.
What I said is--and I have no doubt that the military is
committed to swift corrective action--it's the disclosure of
the abuse, and the promise to take those actions. That's where
I feel the Pentagon fell short. I think that rather than
calling CBS and asking for a delay in the airing of the
pictures, it would have been far better if you, Mr. Secretary,
with all respect, had come forward and told the world about
these pictures and of your personal determination--a
determination I know you have--to set matters right and to hold
those responsible accountable.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Collins, I wish I had done
that, as I said in my remarks. We have to find a better way to
do it, but I wish I knew how you reach down into a criminal
investigation when it is not just a criminal investigation, but
it turns out to be something that is radioactive, something
that has strategic impact in the world. We don't have those
procedures. They've never been designed. We're functioning with
peacetime constraints, with legal requirements, in a wartime
situation, in the information age where people are running
around with digital cameras and taking these unbelievable
photographs, and then passing them off, against the law, to the
media, to our surprise, when they had not even arrived in the
Pentagon. There isn't a person at this table, except General
Smith, who had even seen them.
Chairman Warner. You're free to amplify that for the
record, if you wish, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld, according to General Taguba's report,
civilian contractors were found wandering around Abu Ghraib
unsupervised and with free access to the detainee areas. I have
two questions on that. What are the roles of the private
contractors at this and other detention facilities in Iraq and
Afghanistan? Who monitors and supervises these contracted
employees?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The answer is that the civilian
contractors, as I indicated, numbered something like 37 in this
particular facility. They tend to be interrogators and
linguists. They're responsible to MI personnel who hire them
and have the responsibility for supervising them.
Mr. Brownlee. Sir, if I might?
Senator Akaka. Secretary Brownlee.
Mr. Brownlee. In the theater, we have employed civilian
contract interrogators and linguists. CENTCOM has done this.
These people have no supervisory responsibilities at all. They
work under the supervision of officers or noncommissioned
officers (NCOs) in charge of whatever team or unit they are on.
They, most of them, are retired military, and they are usually
of the skill that they retired in, and that's what they're
employed for. They assist in these processes, but they are not
in a supervisory role. In fact, they would be forbidden from
doing that, because it would be inherently governmental.
General Smith. Sir, I might add to that. In this particular
case, there is a ``tiger team'' that interrogates and goes
through that process. One is an interpreter, normally; one is
an analyst; and one is an interrogator. Where we have shortages
in the military of interrogators and translators, we go to
contractors to do that.
I gave the wrong numbers. The number of contractors we have
with CACI for interrogators is 27. Then we have hundreds of
translators that are under contract throughout the country,
under Titan Corporation.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Rumsfeld, the alleged abuse at
this detention facility has been characterized as sadistic,
blatant, wanton, and criminal abuse. So far, we have discussed
allegations against military members. Are there allegations of
abuse against contractors who are working with the military
members? If so, are any of these allegations being
investigated?
Secretary Rumsfeld. My recollection is--and I think it's
okay to say this--that the investigations are ongoing, and that
time will tell.
Go ahead, General.
[Clarifying information from the DOD follows:]
David Passaro, a CIA contractor, was indicted Thursday, June 17,
2004, in connection with the beating death of a prisoner in
Afghanistan. Passaro is the first civilian to face criminal charges
related to U.S. treatment of prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Information on two other CACI contractors (Steve Stepanowicz and
John Israel) has been forwarded to the U.S. Attorney General's Office
by the U.S. Army CID to determine whether evidence supports criminal
charges against these two contractors.
An ongoing investigation is reviewing the MI operations and
includes a review of the actions of civilian contractors involved in
interrogation activities.
General Smith. Yes, sir. There are two contractors that are
being investigated under the investigation for the MI brigade,
and that is from the recommendation of the Taguba Report.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, I want to say that I recently
traveled to Iraq and Afghanistan, and I was so impressed with
the professionalism of the men and women serving in our
military who I had the opportunity to meet. I want to say that
I am really proud of what they are doing there.
General Myers, General Taguba's AR 15-6 Report finds a
general lack of knowledge, implementation, and emphasis of
basic legal, regulatory, doctrinal, and command requirements
within the 800th MP brigade and its subordinate units.
Understanding that there is an issue with authority between the
MP and MI units at Abu Ghraib, how is it that an entire brigade
could be deployed to Iraq and not train for their mission?
Chairman Warner. Senator, I'll have to ask that General
Myers provide his response for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Warner. I thank you for your cooperation.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I have a
written statement that I would like to submit for the record.
Thank you for your responses.
[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to take this opportunity to express
my thoughts regarding the deplorable acts committed by soldiers at the
Abu Ghraib prison. The graphic and disturbing acts that are depicted in
these pictures are inexcusable. These actions have tarnished the heroic
and patriotic acts performed by so many of our military members during
this difficult war.
I recently traveled to Iraq and Afghanistan. I was so impressed
with the professionalism exhibited by the men and women serving in our
military who I had the opportunity to meet. Unfortunately, the rest of
the world and the Nation will not see or hear about these outstanding
individuals. Instead these pictures published on the front pages of
newspapers around the world depict our military members as thugs.
This outcry has been exacerbated by the manner in which this
situation has been handled. Members of Congress, even the President,
according to media reports, learned about this situation from Dan
Rather when ``60 Minutes II'' broadcast this story. I find this cloud
of secrecy that continues to permeate the Department of Defense (DOD)
disturbing and destructive. I find this cavalier attitude towards
accountability and transparency to be a dereliction of duty and an
abrogation of military and civilian control over the ``post-war''
situation.
I find it amazing that Secretary Rumsfeld stated as late as Monday,
May 3, 2004, that he had not yet read the AR 15-6 Report written by
Major General Antonio Taguba which was submitted in March 2004. I find
it unconscionable that soldiers being deployed to a war zone would not
be provided with proper training pertaining to the treatment of
detainees under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the
Geneva Conventions.
I am troubled by the apparent lack of accountability by DOD
leadership. In my opinion, for these soldiers to be so cavalier and
nonchalant as depicted in these photos, which had to have been taken by
other detention facility personnel, tells me that such behavior was
widespread and condoned in this prison.
I remain concerned with the lack of supervision and discipline in
this brigade and even more concerned with the unsupervised and
unlimited access private contractors had inside this facility. I remain
disturbed by the dismissive attitude exhibited by the civilian
leadership in the Pentagon towards this situation which has undermined
our military and damaged our country's reputation.
Chairman Warner. Senator Graham is next.
Senator Graham. Mr. Secretary, have you seen the video?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have not. The disk I saw that had
photos on it did not have the videos on it. I checked with
General Smith, and he indicates he does have a disk with the
videos on it. I don't know if that means there are two disks
with all these photographs, or if the photographs are the same,
and one just doesn't have the video.
Senator Graham. I mention that because I want to prepare
the public. Apparently the worst is yet to come, potentially,
in terms of disturbing events. We don't need to leave here
thinking that we've seen the worst. There's more to come. Is
that correct?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I indicated in my remarks that there
are a lot more pictures and many investigations underway.
Senator Graham. My colleagues, rightly, want it done
quickly, but my concern is to do it right. I don't want to rush
to judgment here and let some people go that deserve to be
prosecuted. I would be very disappointed if the only people
prosecuted are sergeants and privates. That would be very bad,
and sad. So I want it done right, and the sooner, the better.
I'll pick right over sooner.
I'm confused. General Smith, when did you first learn of
these photos and see them yourself?
General Smith. Sir, we knew that there were photos on
January 14, because that's how the investigation started.
Senator Graham. When did you see the photos?
General Smith. CENTCOM headquarters received the photos
towards the end of March. I first viewed the photos on May 6.
Senator Graham. Who did you tell about the photos when you
saw them?
General Smith. Sir, that was part of the investigation, and
that went forward.
Senator Graham. Did it dawn on you that, when you saw these
photos, ``We're in a world of hurt. This is going to look
bad''?
General Smith. Certainly, sir. If those were released, we
certainly----
Senator Graham. General Myers, when you called CBS, had you
seen the photos?
General Myers. No, I hadn't.
Senator Graham. What had you been told about what CBS was
about to air, and by who?
General Myers. They were going to air the photos. We didn't
talk about that with CBS. In our discussions back in January,
when they said there were photos, they described them up
through the chain of command to the Secretary, and I just
happened to be there. It was discussed several times. The
general nature of the photos, about nudity, some mock sexual
acts, and other abuse, was described.
Senator Graham. When you were informed that these photos,
even though you hadn't seen them, were going to come out, who
did you tell about that, and when?
General Myers. There were a lot of people that knew, inside
our building. The people that had been working with the media
knew that there were photos out there, and the media was trying
to get their hands on them from January on. So they had been
working that for 3 months.
Senator Graham. At that time, is it fair to say you knew
there was a story about to come out that was going to create a
real problem for us?
General Myers. At that time, my concern was the impact it
could have on our forces in Iraq. My focus at the time was, if
these photos are revealed right now, given the intensity of
operations, what could be that impact on our troops? My
conclusion was, this would be the worst of all possible times
for these to come forward; realizing that eventually they were
going to come forward.
Senator Graham. Did you feel a need to inform Congress or
the President or the Secretary of Defense about the potential
damage this could do?
General Myers. We had discussed the potential damage back
in January, February, and March. As we marched through those
events on that chart, a lot of those events were based on our
concern with where this might lead.
Senator Graham. Long story short, I do trust the people in
uniform to get it right, and I want to take the time necessary
to make sure the people who are responsible are brought to
justice, and anybody innocently accused has their day in court.
You are right about that, Secretary Rumsfeld.
Here's the problem. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to
figure out the explosive nature of these photos, apart from
court-martial, apart from legal proceedings. Most of us here
found out about it on television. If we knew enough to say,
``Don't air a show that's going to be bad,'' why did we not
call the President and call senior Members of Congress to
prepare us for what we were eventually going to see? That's the
essence of my concern about all this.
General Myers. Senator Graham, in my opinion we could have
done a better job of informing Congress of these pictures and
this situation.
Senator Graham. That is a honest and fair answer.
Secretary Rumsfeld, people are calling for your
resignation. Somebody is drafting an article of impeachment
against you right now. I have my own view about people who want
to call for your resignation before you speak, but I'll leave
that to myself. Do you have the ability, in your opinion, to
come to Capitol Hill and carry the message and carry the water
for the DOD? Do you believe, based on all the things that have
happened and that will happen, that you're able to carry out
your duties in a bipartisan manner? What do you say to those
people who are calling for your resignation?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I's a fair question. Certainly, since
this firestorm has been raging, it's a question that I've given
a lot of thought to. The key question for me is the one you
posed, and that is whether or not I can be effective. We have
tough tasks ahead. The people in the DOD, military and
civilian, are doing enormously important work here, in
countries all over the world. The issue is, can I be effective
in assisting them in their important tasks? Needless to say, if
I felt I could not be effective, I'd resign in a minute. I
would not resign simply because people try to make a political
issue out of it.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, when did you first see the photos?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Last night, at about 7:30. I had seen
the ones in the press, I had seen the ones that are doctored
slightly to suit people's taste. We had been trying to get one
of the disks for days and days and days, and I'm told, by
General Smith, that there were only a couple of these, that
they were in the criminal investigation process. Dick Myers and
I finally saw them last night.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, when did you first find
out about the abuses?
Secretary Rumsfeld. With everybody else, when they were
announced by CENTCOM on January 16. They announced that they
had a series of criminal investigations underway. They told the
world, Congress, me, everyone else, that they were underway.
Then they came back March 20 and said, ``Not only are they
underway, but now we have specific charges.'' Then they
detailed some abuses. You read it, as I said, and it's one
thing; you see these photographs, and it's just unbelievable.
Senator Bill Nelson. When did you first tell the President,
Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't know. Dick Myers and I see the
President every week, and he recalls that sometime after we
were apprised of it through the press, through CENTCOM's
announcement, that it was brought up in one of our meetings. Do
you recall?
General Myers. I don't recall specifically, because I think
the day it was brought up it was General Pete Pace that was
standing in for me. But he remembers roughly when it was,
within a week or so of when he was in that meeting and informed
the President. They talked about it.
Senator Bill Nelson. Was this back in January, Mr.
Secretary?
General Myers. I think General Pace would say early
February. It could have been late January.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I meet with the President once or twice
a week. We cover 8, 10, 15 different points. General Myers or
General Pace are generally there with me. I don't keep notes
about what I do, and I just don't remember when it was.
Senator Bill Nelson. When you all had this discussion with
the President, what did the President say that you should do
about those abuses?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't know that I'm going to get into
private discussions with the President. If I don't remember
when it was, my guess is it was more an information item from
us to him, where we were transmitting and saying, ``Here's the
problem.'' The problem, at that stage, was one-dimensional; it
wasn't three-dimensional, it wasn't video, it wasn't color. It
was quite a different thing.
As I indicated in my remarks, if there's a failure, it is
me. It is my failure for not understanding and knowing that
there were however many there are of these things that could
eventually end up in the public and do the damage they've done.
But I certainly never gave the President a briefing with the
impact that one would have had, had you seen the photographs or
the videos. Let there be no doubt about that. He was just as
blindsided as Congress and me and everyone else.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, what are your
instructions from the President to inform him of matters such
as this?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't know that I'm going to--we have
had so many discussions, and clearly a Secretary of Defense has
the responsibility to try to put himself in the shoes of the
President and say, ``What ought a President know about all the
tens of thousands of things that are happening in the DOD at
any given time?'' We sit down every week, and General Myers and
I go through all the things that we have going on, and we pick
and choose. We say, ``What are the things that are appropriate?
What do we owe him so that he can provide the kind of
leadership that this country deserves? What is it that the
Department's doing now that we can get in his head and apprise
him of so that he knows about that?'' It may be a contingency
plan, it may be a problem of personnel. It just runs the gamut.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I certainly want to echo the sentiments of my colleagues
and the American people by saying that I am extremely
disappointed that any American, and especially one in uniform,
would mistreat or humiliate another human being and commit such
atrocious acts.
The acts depicted in those photographs shown around the
world do not, in any way, represent the values of the United
States of America or our Armed Forces. I know our military men
and women serve their country with great honor.
The abuse of these Iraqi detainees is a serious issue, not
just because it violated human rights; it also tarnished our
Nation's credibility. Furthermore, the inflammatory actions of
a few have provided our enemies with a lucrative venue to
question American values and our true intentions in the war on
terror. Unfortunately, a breakdown of discipline, combined with
a handful of morally deficient individuals, has resulted in
serious implications for our national security and the security
of over 130,000 service members striving to accomplish our
goals in Iraq.
Over the past year, through dedication and sacrifice and, I
must emphasize, strong military leadership, our soldiers have
made incredible breakthroughs. The United States and its allies
have freed 50 million people from oppressive regimes, removed
credible threats to our Nation's security, destroyed burgeoning
terrorist incubators, and set two countries on the path to
democratic and free market reform. In Iraq, 2,600 schools have
been rehabilitated, and now more than 5\1/2\ million children
are enriching their minds, free from the corruption of a
repressive regime and its teachings. Women now have a voice in
their own government. All 240 hospitals in Iraq are open. More
than 1,200 clinics have been established. On the streets and in
the countryside each day, our military medical professionals
offer assistance to the citizens of Iraq, in addition to caring
for their own. After 30 years of being denied the most
fundamental freedoms, today more than 170 independent
newspapers are operating throughout Iraq, providing each member
of that country an opportunity to participate in free and
robust debate, and, yes, the opportunity to view those
horrendous pictures.
Trust among the Iraqi people had slowly been established,
bonds have been made, and, sadly for now, many of those bonds
have been broken. This legislative body is absolutely correct
in focusing on the root causes behind these instances of
prisoner abuse, and doing everything within its power to ensure
that such abuse never happens again. I would expect no less
from the DOD. Transparency is of the utmost importance to our
Nation's credibility and security.
Fundamental to our success in the global war on terror is
winning the hearts and minds of freedom-loving people who are
held captive by a violent few. We are not company to that
violent element, and we denounce anyone who is.
Secretary Rumsfeld, the damage already done cannot be swept
away, but it can be repaired. You touched briefly on your plan
for a way ahead. Could you go into more detail on this plan?
Will it require more or different troops, quicker processing of
detainees, more Iraqi police involvement? You mentioned
reparations. Could you please provide more details?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't think I used the word
``reparations.'' I hope I used the word ``compensation'' for
the detainees who were cruelly treated. I am told that we have
lawyers who have looked into it, and we believe there are
authorities where we can do that. It is my intention to see
that we do it, because it is the right thing to do.
With respect to the processing of detainees, in Iraq a
total of 43,671 were captured. We have released 27,796, and
transferred 4,054. We currently detain something in the
neighborhood of 11,821, which includes 3,842 of the so-called
Majahedim-e Khalq Organization (MEK), who are really not
detainees. They are in a separate status. So it's really closer
to 7,000 or 8,000 that are currently detained.
The key is to process them as rapidly as possible. General
Miller, who was out there and has been addressing all of these
things, also believes a key element is to see that they are
properly identified, and that their families know they're
there, and why they're there, and that it isn't mysterious, and
that we continue to process them. The only people that need to
be retained, obviously, are the ones that are either
criminals--and that's a different category, and a number of
them are--or they are individuals who are terrorists and need
to be kept off the street, or they have intelligence value. The
people have to find out what it is they know so we can track
down the remaining remnants of the Baathist regime and the
Fedayeen Saddam people, and the people that are out killing
Iraqis--not just Americans and coalition people, but are
killing Iraqis every single day in that country.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary and gentlemen, for being here today.
First of all, I appreciate the apologies. Clearly, the
President's apology, I think, is an important step in moving
forward, as are the apologies of all of you today, and, I
think, the apology of the American people, for these
unfortunate incidents.
I agree with my colleague from Connecticut that what this
represents is so unfortunate that it somehow would adversely
impact on the lives and the deaths of those who have served
with such distinction for freedom in Iraq.
Last night, I heard Secretary Armitage say that, ``We're in
a bit of a hole.'' I think those are exact words. When you're
in a hole, the first thing you have to do is stop digging. I
hope that we have now gotten to the point where we've stopped
digging, where we're not making matters worse.
Mr. Secretary, you're right when you say there are times
when words just simply don't do it justice. Pictures, and
perhaps symbols, are more important for expressing or conveying
thoughts or images. In this case, I think tearing down the
statue of Saddam, statues all over Iraq, was a symbolic gesture
to say that there was a new era. I wonder if it wouldn't be
just as important to join together to tear down Abu Ghraib as a
statement that the torture chamber of Saddam that carried forth
past and present is no longer, and create a memorial to freedom
in the future, and the absence of tyranny of any kind.
But what I want to do is, I want to get to a question
dealing with what seems to be an operative word today: ``the
few.'' I think perhaps there are sergeants and privates, as
Senator Graham indicated, who have been involved in this
activity. Obviously, the chain of command would be under
consideration here. Criminal action will be taken. I suspect
responsible action will be taken, in terms of the chain of
command.
Is it the aberrant behavior of a few, or can we expect to
have, out of the investigation, an indication that there was
something more systemic? I know that we have a two-star Reserve
general who has been in some way removed from duty, but isn't
there, to date, some expectation that there was a severing of
the chain of command somewhere along the line, through MI or
other intelligence operations coming in? It's my understanding
that there are reports that General Karpinski was banned from
sections of her own prison system.
I am hopeful that we'll be able to get to the bottom of
that with the reports. In the interim, is there anything that
you might be able to enlighten us with right now?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me answer a couple of pieces, and
let General Smith answer the last piece.
First, you say the first rule if you're in a hole is to
stop digging. I've said today that there are a lot more
photographs and videos that exist.
Senator Ben Nelson. I didn't mean that. Is anything
progressing on today, beyond what we already know or what we're
going to find out from past performance?
Secretary Rumsfeld. If these are released to the public,
obviously it's going to make matters worse. That's just a fact.
I looked at them last night, and they're hard to believe. So,
be on notice. That's just a fact. If they're sent to some news
organization, and taken out of the criminal prosecution
channels that they're in, that's where we'll be, and it's not a
pretty picture.
Second, there are people who were talking about the Abu
Ghraib prison and tearing it down, and certainly that's
something that the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)
and the Iraqi government, the interim government that will take
over by June 30, will be addressing and deciding. Frankly, from
my standpoint, I think it's not a bad idea, but it's really up
to the Iraqis.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary.
Chairman Warner. Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, listening to the questions and the answers
that have been given so far leads me to at least tentatively
conclude that there are two major problems here. One is, first,
the shock to our collective conscience at what we have seen
human beings do to degrade and abuse other human beings.
Second, the shock to our sensibilities as Members of Congress
who have a collective responsibility to the American people, to
see these pictures in the press. I believe that it was General
Myers who talked about what we have seen as being a violation
of American values. I agree with that, but I also want to talk
about other American values. General Myers alluded to this when
he talked about due process, and you mentioned the issue of
command influence.
First, I would like to direct your attention back to the
news release that CENTCOM issued on January 16, 2004,
announcing this investigation. The second and third sentences,
I want to direct your attention to specifically. This news
release says, ``This release of specific information concerning
the incidents could hinder the investigation, which is in its
early stages. The investigation will be conducted in a thorough
and professional manner.''
I think what the American people expect of all of us here
is not only that we have high standards of conduct, which I
know the military subscribes to, but we have the training, the
oversight, the leadership, the accountability, and also the due
process and desire to seek justice when it comes to holding
people accountable for their crimes. I want to tell you that
what you've described here, in terms of this chronology of
investigation, gives me confidence that the DOD has taken this
matter as seriously as it should have. Indeed, as you and
others have said, not all the facts are in yet. But I do see on
this chronology that, indeed, after this investigation, there
have been criminal charges preferred against some who are
guilty of these crimes. I would ask you, please, just to
briefly talk about your obligation, in terms of seeing that the
persons who are accused of these crimes get that due process,
and to make sure that you maintain the integrity of the
investigation by not dripping information out on this incident
in a piecemeal basis over the course of the next few months.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You have your finger on the dilemna, on
the tension that exists between assuring that you protect the
rights of individuals that are in a serious, difficult criminal
prosecution circumstance, and avoiding saying things that
either would infringe on their rights or would enable them to
escape punishment by virtue of being able to successfully
allege that command influence was exercised in a way that
prejudiced the decisions up the chain of command. So we have
that problem. To the extent senior people in the DOD dive down
in and start looking in criminal prosecutions in the early and
mid-stages, the hue and outcry would be horrendous. On the
other hand, if you have a situation where something like this
is buried in there, along with 3,000 other courts-martial, and
buried in there is something of this significance, we have to
find a way to know that. Our country doesn't need those kinds
of shocks, and the troops don't need it.
Chairman Warner. Senator, I have to thank you. We must move
on. The panel leaves here and goes over to the House Armed
Services Committee.
Secretary Rumsfeld. We'll have to leave by about 2:30, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Warner. That is correct. That was made clear, and
I think we will have sufficient time to include our next
Senator, Senator Bayh, followed by Senator Chambliss, Senator
Clinton, Senator Pryor, and Senator Dayton.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and, in addition
to that, for serving our country. These are difficult times,
and your service is not without some personal cost. I am going
to assume some facts up here and then ask what I think may be
two somewhat difficult questions.
I assume that you serve at the pleasure of the President. I
assume that he sets a policy for our national security, in
general, and for Iraq, in particular. I assume that he is
engaged in overseeing the implementation of those policies and,
like you, accepts responsibility for that implementation. This
is a long way of saying, as Senator Byrd mentioned, that in our
system we have a tradition of the buck stopping at 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue. As we're all aware, we're now engaged in a
debate about who the occupant of that residence will be, come
next January.
So in many respects, I view this as a question of
presidential leadership. How does he react? How aggressively?
Does he try and minimize the situation, or does he try and take
dramatic steps to address the magnitude of the problem? As has
been noted, he has apologized for what took place. As all of
you have indicated, particularly you, Mr. Secretary, the
criminal process will move forward. That is a hallmark of our
system of justice.
One of the questions that's overhanging this proceeding
today, and the situation in general, is, is that enough? So the
difficult question I'd like to ask is to follow up on the
question from Senator Graham. Mr. Secretary, I could tell that
you struggled in answering his question, that this is something
that's been on your mind. Your resignation has been called for.
That's a pretty serious thing for any of us. You answered that
if you ever concluded that you could not be effective in
discharging your duties, you would step down, but that you
would not do so as a part of a political ``witch hunt,'' so to
speak.
There's another aspect of this, though, I'd like to ask
your opinion about. I know it's ultimately a decision for the
President to make, but, in your opinion, even though you
weren't personally involved in the underlying acts here, would
it serve to demonstrate how seriously we take this situation,
and, therefore, help to undo some of the damage to our
reputation, if you were to step down?
Secretary Rumsfeld. That's possible.
Senator Bayh. I appreciate your candor.
My second question has to do with some comments that
Senator Lieberman made, and I would like to associate myself
with what I thought were very appropriate and moving comments
by Senator Lieberman. I believe very strongly that our cause--
and these are not words I use frequently--but that our cause is
morally superior to our adversaries', both the terrorists we
fight and those who now seek to undo the future of a free Iraq.
There is growing concern by the supporters of this cause that
this situation we're inquiring into today is part of a broader
problem, that the effort may be bogging down, that we may be
approaching a tipping point, that momentum needs to be regained
if we're going to prevail.
I'd like to just read a couple of sentences from a column
in yesterday's New York Times by Tom Friedman, who supported
this endeavor in Iraq. He says, ``We are in danger of losing
something much more important than just this war in Iraq. We
are in danger of losing America as an instrument of moral
authority and inspiration in the world. This administration
needs to undertake a total overhaul of its Iraq policy;
otherwise, it is courting a total disaster for us all.'' He
goes on to say how he hopes that such an overhaul can be
undertaken, because we need to prevail in Iraq.
So my final question is, Mr. Secretary, do you believe
we're on the right course presently, or is dramatic action
necessary to regain the momentum so that we can ultimately
prevail in what is a very noble and idealistic undertaking?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do believe we're on the right track.
It's a tough road. It's a bumpy road. It's always been bumpy
going from a vicious dictatorship to something approximating a
representative government that's respectful of its different
varied religious and ethnic groups. That's not an easy path.
I am convinced that we are doing exactly what ought to be
done, and that is to pass responsibility for that country to
the Iraqis. I am convinced we're doing exactly what ought to be
done in recognizing that they need to have the ability to
provide for their own security, which is why so much effort's
gone into developing police and civil defense corps and an army
and border patrols and site-protection people.
They do not want Americans or coalition forces in their
country over a prolonged period, and, goodness knows, we don't
want to be there. The only proper way to pass it off is if they
have their own security forces, which is why we're spending the
money and making the effort. It's why General Abizaid and
General Sanchez and General Petraeus now are over there working
that problem. I think that we have a crack at doing it.
[Clarifying information from the DOD follows:]
LTG Petraeus was not in Iraq at the time of this hearing. LTG
Petraeus was in Iraq from March 2003 to March 2004 as commander of the
101st Airborne Division and returned for a second tour in late May 2004
to train Iraqi Civil Defense Corps battalions.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't think it will be smooth. I
think it will be rough. It will be bumpy. But if you don't take
your hand off the bicycle seat, you're not going to be able to
ride the bike, and we have to do that. We're going to do that.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary,
Senator Bayh.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, it's interesting that Senator Roberts and I
had previously been talking about the fact that one thing that
probably should be done is exactly what Senator Ben Nelson just
recommended, and that's tear down that wall--and that wall is
Abu Ghraib prison--to show another sign of the destruction of
Saddam Hussein.
Mr. Secretary, there are different kinds of leaders.
Different leaders even provide different kinds of leadership.
One easy thing for a leader to do is sometimes hide behind the
lower echelon in the chain of command. I just want to say to
you, I've been prepared to be very critical of you if I needed
to be critical today. But by your coming in here and making an
admission, as a strong leader, that a mistake was made and that
you're going to be doing whatever is necessary to correct that
mistake, that shows just what kind of leader you are. Anybody
who questions your effectiveness and your ability to lead the
United States military has had their question answered today.
So, for that, I commend you.
I commend you also for your selection of General Miller.
I've been to Guantanamo twice. I was worried about what might
happen down there with respect to those detainees. I had the
privilege to observe several different interrogations. I think
I was there the day that General Miller first arrived, as a
matter of fact. I observed random interrogations down there.
General Miller did correct a problem that existed. There were
charges of abuse that were much slighter than these charges of
abuse, and General Miller dealt with those swiftly and
directly.
I am concerned, though, about a couple of different things.
First of all, General Ryder did make his report following his
visit to Abu Ghraib from the period of October 13 to November
6. We had a United States Army general doing an investigation
of a prison and the activities that were ongoing in that prison
during a point in time when these alleged atrocities took
place. Now, my understanding from General Ryder is that he was
never told about any of this while he was there. I don't
understand that. I don't understand how the chain of command
could be so faulty within that system to allow that to happen.
The only answer I ever got was that these atrocities
occurred on the night shift. Well, the Army doesn't operate 12
hours a day. We operate 24 hours a day, and there is a failure
in the chain of command that I hope you're in the process of
addressing very directly from that standpoint.
Also, in response to Senator McCain, you made two
comments--first of all, that guards are trained to guard
people, not interrogate; and that guards are trained in the
requirements of the Geneva Conventions. Now, I understand those
are policies of the DOD, as well they should be. But the fact
of the matter is, when you look at page 10 of the Taguba
report, you find out that was not done in this case. These MPs
simply were not trained in what they were supposed to be doing.
So, again, I hope your folks are moving in the direction of
making that correction with respect, particularly, to
reservists that are brought onboard. One obvious judgment is
that the 800th MP Brigade was totally dysfunctional, from
Brigadier General Karpinski on down, with few exceptions. On
the surface, you could portray the 800th MP Brigade as a
Reserve unit with poor leadership and poor training. However,
the abuse of prisoners is not merely a failure of an MP
brigade. It is a failure of the chain of command, Mr.
Secretary.
I want to leave here today knowing and taking comfort in
the fact that, as Senator Graham said, we're not going to just
prosecute somebody with one stripe on their sleeve or four
stripes on their sleeve, but you're going to carry this thing
to whatever extent is necessary to ensure that there's no
``good old boy'' system within the United States Army.
Irrespective of whether they have a stripe on their sleeve or
four stars on their shoulder, we're going to get to the bottom
of this, and we're going to make sure that corrective action is
taken, and, where necessary, criminal action is taken, against
anybody involved in the particular acts or in the shielding of
this and the failure or negligence on their part of keeping
this information from you, in a quick and swift manner.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree with everything you've said,
and there's no question but that the investigations have to go
forward. They have to be respectful of people's rights, but
they have to be handled in a manner that reflects the gravity
of this situation. It does not matter one whit where the
responsibility falls. It falls where it does.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
General Schoomaker. Senator Chambliss, I'd like to----
Chairman Warner. General.
General Schoomaker. Mr. Chairman, Senator Chambliss
characterized our Army in a way that I don't agree with. It
doesn't matter whether a soldier is on active duty, in the
active component, in the Guard, or the Reserve; there's one
standard. We expect that our leadership and our soldiers adhere
to the same standard, and those are Army values, the Soldier's
Creed, and the things that we all believe in. So I disassociate
with your remarks there that, for some reason, because this was
a Reserve unit there isn't a standard that's equal to everybody
else's.
Senator Chambliss. General, my remarks were not directed
towards this unit being a Reserve unit; they just happen to be
a Reserve unit. But the fact of the matter is that the Taguba
Report says that this unit, which is a Reserve unit, did not
receive training during their mobilization, and that was a
fault in the system, and it's a fault because they are a
Reserve unit.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir. We're going to look into
that. We are looking into it, and if that's true, we're going
to correct it.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
General Schoomaker. Nevertheless, they have one standard.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think, Mr. Secretary, that you can discern from the
questions that there are still many issues that we need further
clarification on. I particularly look forward to the answer
that you will provide to Senator Reed's last question,
following up on his line of questioning concerning the enabling
of interrogation by MPs. That is something which, based on Army
regulations, was not to be either done or condoned.
But, Mr. Secretary, in January 2002, when you publicly
declared that hundreds of people detained by U.S. and allied
forces in Afghanistan do not have any rights under the Geneva
Conventions, that was taken as a signal. It is clear, in
looking through the number of investigations that are currently
ongoing, that it wasn't just this particular battalion, but
others that did not receive appropriate training and
information about their responsibilities with respect to
detention or the Geneva Conventions.
The atrocities that have been depicted in photographs were
very graphically described verbally in the Taguba Report. It
doesn't take a lot of imagination to read those descriptions
and have one's stomach just turn, in disgust.
The focus on the pictures being released is, with all due
respect, missing the point. The report was well known, and
apparently discussed on numerous occasions, and obviously the
release of the pictures to the entire world was devastating,
but the underlying conduct and the failure of the command, both
at the site and further up the chain, to act with the
appropriate quick response is really at the heart of what the
most serious problems we face here today are.
The information in the Taguba Report links the atrocities
at Abu Ghraib to Camp Bucca. In fact, some of the same people,
some of the same command, some of the same MPs were apparently
involved. With respect to the recommendations at the end of
General Taguba's report, they call for establishing the
conditions with the resources and personnel required to prevent
future occurrences of detainee abuse.
I would appreciate, since we don't have time in this round
of questioning, to receive, for the committee, a report about
exactly how that is being handled. What changes have been made?
Is the Geneva Conventions training going on now? Are the
appropriate rules being posted, in both English and Arabic?
Certainly we would like an explanation as to the adequacy of
the punishment that was meted out, because, with respect to who
is being punished for what, there is a clear distinction, at
least as reported by General Taguba, between enlisted personnel
and those up the command.
But I'm also concerned by a related matter. Let me just
quickly reference the case of Chaplain Yee, the Muslim Army
chaplain from Guantanamo Bay who was arrested and placed in
solitary confinement. Ultimately, all the charges were dropped,
after his reputation was sullied. It's obvious that the
information about this particular case came from Government
sources. It was pushed out, and it was widely disseminated. So,
Mr. Secretary, how is it that a case with no basis in fact gets
such widespread publicity based on information from Government
sources, while egregious conduct, like that at the Abu Ghraib
prison, is cloaked in a classified report and is only made
available when the investigation is leaked to the press?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, first let me say, with respect
to the question that Senator Reed raised, I can't conceive of
anyone looking at the pictures and suggesting that anyone could
have recommended, condoned, permitted, encouraged--subtly,
directly, in any way--that those things take place.
Second, the decision that was made by the President of the
United States, that you referred to, was announced. In the
announcement, it was said that the al Qaeda in Guantanamo that
were captured around the world, mostly in Afghanistan, would be
treated in a manner consistent with the Geneva Conventions.
That is a fact.
[Clarifying information from the DOD follows:]
The guidelines for handling al Qaeda detainees were in the
President's February 7, 2002, directive, which states (in part): ``As a
matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to
treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent
with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of
Geneva.''
Secretary Rumsfeld. You say the report was ``well known.''
I don't know how you know that. All I know is, when it was made
public, when somebody took a secret document out of
prosecutorial channels and released it to the press, I do not
believe it was yet anywhere in the Pentagon. Certainly I had
not been given it, or seen it.
I quite agree with you. When you read the report, you do
get an impression, as you suggested, that there is something
much worse than what was in the press release, for example, in
January, or the discussion in March by CENTCOM. But that was
not something that had been moved past CENTCOM, to my
knowledge. It may have been somewhere in the DOD, but certainly
I had not received a copy. It was still in those channels.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Pryor.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to have to
remind you that we do have to leave at 2:30. I apologize for
that. Normally I'd stay, but we're due in the House.
Chairman Warner. That is my understanding, and we're within
6 minutes of finishing at the 2:30 deadline.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I'm not sure my microphone's working today, for some
reason, so I'll borrow this one over here.
In Arkansas, Mr. Secretary, we have an expression that
says, ``You cannot unring the bell.'' At this point, we know
where we find ourselves, and that is, these photos--and, as you
indicated, there may be more to come, and even videos--are now
in the public domain. We all know that they will be used to
undermine U.S. credibility for years to come, and that they put
our soldiers at more jeopardy inside Iraq and other places
today than they were just a few days ago.
In fact, this morning, I must tell you, I had trouble
explaining the photographs and what's going on inside that
prison, with my 10-year-old son. They're very hard to explain.
Mr. Secretary, let me say that there has been a pattern
that I have to bring to your attention from our perspective.
First, for months and months, we've asked, ``Do you need more
troops inside Iraq?'' In the last few days, even though you've
assured us many times, and many people at the Pentagon and the
White House have said no, we now have learned that you do need
them.
Second, we've asked, for weeks and weeks and weeks, maybe
months--Senator Byrd could probably tell you more than I could
about that--about whether you'll need a supplemental.
Originally the answer was no, at least until very late in the
year. Now it appears that you do need one.
We've been surprised on those two occasions. Now we're
surprised today. Mr. Secretary, I must tell you that we do not
like these types of surprises here in Congress. I don't want to
sound glib in asking this question, but let me ask it anyway.
We know the photographs are coming out, but do you anticipate
anything else coming out in relation to this story that we need
to know about today?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm certain there will be. You have six
investigations going on. You can be absolutely certain that
these investigations will discover things, as investigations
do, and that they'll elevate other individuals for prosecution
in criminal matters. You can be certain that there's going to
be more coming out.
With respect to your other comments, the commanders on the
ground, from the beginning, asked for and received all the
troops they needed, all the troops they wanted, all the troops
they asked for. They got them. You're right, General Abizaid
called up and said, ``Look, the situation in Iraq is difficult.
I'd like to keep an extra 20,000 during this crossover period,
and go from 115,000 to 135,000.'' We said yes. I went to the
President, and the President said yes. The senior military
advisor, General Myers, said he thought that was correct. You
say you don't like surprises--my Lord, who likes surprises?
Nobody in the world likes surprises. But the world's not
perfect. Facts change on the ground. When facts change on the
ground, commanders tell us. When commanders tell us, they get
the troops they need.
Now, on the budget, you don't like surprises. Well, I don't
either. It happens to be the case that more troops are needed,
and more money is needed. It happens that it's a difficult
thing for the military commanders to cash-flow, taking out of
one account to sustain something that came up that was not
anticipated. So the President said, ``Fine.'' He did not want
to ask for a supplemental. General Myers and I went in to him
and said, ``We think we need one. We think that that's not a
good way to manage the DOD, by jerking money out of one account
and sticking it in another account, trying to get
preprogramming authority by Congress,'' and we said, ``We
believe that it's the appropriate thing to do.'' He didn't want
to do it. He knew what he had said. But he said he'd do it.
Now, that's not a surprise. It's just a fact.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your time.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Dayton. Mr. Secretary, were you aware, or did you
authorize, General Myers to call CBS to suppress their news
report?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't have any idea if he discussed
it with me. I don't think he did.
Senator Dayton. Over the last 2 weeks, calling CBS to
suppress the news report, you don't----
Secretary Rumsfeld. ``Suppress'' is not the right word at
all. It's an inaccurate word, I should say.
Senator Dayton. General Myers, did you discuss it with the
Secretary?
General Myers. This had been worked at lower levels by the
Secretary's staff and my staff for some time, and--
Senator Dayton. That you would call CBS to suppress their
news report.
General Myers. I called CBS to ask them to delay the
pictures showing on the CBS program ``60 Minutes,'' because I
thought it would result in direct harm to our troops.
Senator Dayton. Is that standard procedure for the military
command of this country, to try to suppress a news report at
the highest level?
General Myers. Senator Dayton, this is a serious
allegation.
Senator Dayton. It sure is.
General Myers. It is absolutely--the context of your
question, I believe, is wrong.
Senator Dayton. I understand the context, General. You told
us the context earlier. I have very limited time, sir. I just
want to get----
General Myers. Well, when I----
Senator Dayton. --this is my question.
General Myers. I want to take as much time as we need to
straighten this out. This report was already out there. The
news was out there about the abuse. The thing that I----
Senator Dayton. General, if the news had been out there and
we had all known about it----
General Myers. Right. Let me just----
Senator Dayton. --to extent of this----
General Myers. Senator, please, let me----
Senator Dayton. --we would have----
General Myers. Senator----
Senator Dayton. --had this hearing----
General Myers. Senator, please----
Senator Dayton. --months ago.
General Myers. --let me--let me finish, Senator.
Chairman Warner. Senator, I ask that the witness be allowed
to respond to your question. They're very important questions.
General, would you proceed?
General Myers. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Senator Dayton.
This was not to suppress anything. What I asked CBS to do
was to delay the release of the pictures, given the current
situation in Iraq, which was as bad as it had been since major
combat ended. I thought it would bring direct harm to our
troops, it would kill our troops.
We talked about it, and I said, ``I know this report will
eventually come out, but if you can delay it for some period of
time it would be helpful.''
Senator Dayton. What period of time, sir?
General Myers. I did it based on talking to General
Abizaid, and his worry was like mine, and he convinced me that
this was the right thing to do. This report has been around
since January. What was new were the pictures. I asked for the
pictures to be delayed.
Senator Dayton. Did you discuss calling CBS to ask them to
delay their report with the Secretary of Defense or the Vice
President or the President?
General Myers. Of course not.
Senator Dayton. None of those. All right.
General Myers. Of course not.
Senator Dayton. I would just say, General, that I agree
with your assessment of the consequences of this on our troops.
That is the great tragedy of this. But attempts to suppress
news reports, to withhold the truth from Congress and from the
American people, is antithetical to a democracy.
General Myers. You bet it is, and that's not what we've
been doing.
Senator Dayton. Whatever the intentions may be, sir, the
result is always the same. It is, I think, terribly tragic that
the President, who wants to expand democracy around the world,
by actions of his own administration is undermining that
democracy in the United States. As is always the result when
people try to control information, delay it, manage it, and
suppress it, it has that result. It's antithetical to a
democracy.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, throughout the history of this
country, there have been instances where military situations
have existed that have led governments to talk to members of
the media and make an editorial request of them that they
delay, for some period, disclosing some piece of information.
It is not against our history. It is not against our
principles. It is not suppression of the news. It's a
misunderstanding of the situation to say it is.
Senator Dayton. It is against our principles. It's against
our principles when you come before 40 to 45 Members of the
Senate 3 hours before that news report is going to occur, and
don't mention one word about it, sir. That is antithetical to
democracy and the Constitution, which gives the Senate and the
House coequal responsibility for this country.
I want to just ask about the escalation of American forces,
sir. You're bringing in, in response to all of this--and, yes,
this is also important--this is the future of this Nation and
the people who are over there. You're increasing the number of
forces, the number of tanks over there. How can this do
anything but escalate the level of violence, the opposition of
the Iraqis, and intensify the hatred across the Arab world to
the United States and create more atrocities? How can this have
any result other than to put us deeper into this situation and
make the conditions there worse for our forces and for our
Nation and for the world?
Chairman Warner. Senator, I'm going to ask that the witness
respond to your important question for the record, and I thank
you for your cooperation.
[The information referred to follows:]
In fact, during late April/early May 2004 U.S. troop levels in Iraq
were on their way down. There was a 2 week or so increase in troop
levels during this period due to ``overlap'' as incoming forces replace
troops rotating back to the United States.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary and witnesses, we've had a
very thorough exchange of views. We've had a full and complete
hearing. I wish to commend my colleagues. I wonder if you might
indulge the Majority Leader for 1 minute.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, could the answers for the
record, which the Secretary has promised, be expedited, given
the circumstances? Would that be all right?
Chairman Warner. Yes, absolutely. That will be done.
Senator Frist.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for appearing before the Armed
Services Committee today. It is important for this body, the
United States Senate, to hear from you about the reprehensible
incidents at Abu Ghraib prison. Needless to say, the
individuals that committed these despicable acts must be held
accountable. Justice must and will be served in a swift and
fair and transparent matter.
We are all troubled by the fact that the actions of a few
have tainted the efforts of all Americans who are serving so
nobly abroad.
Mr. Secretary, I commend you for taking responsibility for
what occurred at Abu Ghraib prison. If we're ever going to
repair the damage done to our efforts in Iraq and to the
reputation of the Armed Forces, it's important that we get all
the facts out in a quick and a thorough manner.
The committees of jurisdiction here in the Senate will be
conducting their own inquiries into this matter. We do look
forward to regular updates from you and others on the panel and
the DOD as your investigations proceed, as well as updates on
any other actions you may take to ensure that justice is served
and heinous acts never occur again.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Leader.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. The hearing is concluded.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
red cross recommendations
1. Senator Collins. General Schoomaker, the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) has said that it has had the opportunity to
speak with the detainees about their treatment, and based on these
discussions, it has repeatedly requested that U.S. authorities take
corrective action to correct alleged abuses. The ICRC says that its
recommendations were not taken seriously by the administration. Were
ICRC recommendations taken seriously? If so, then how do you address
these reports that many of the organization's recommendations were
ignored?
General Schoomaker. The ICRC visits to the detention facilities in
Iraq and Afghanistan and reports generated from such visits fall under
the responsibility of the U.S. Army Central Command (CENTCOM);
therefore, I cannot speak to any specific allegations or incidents that
fall within the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). The ICRC provides
their reports only to the chain of command of the detention facility
that they are visiting. It is up to the commander of the detention
facility to reply to the ICRC report and make corrective actions as he
or she see fit; corrective actions will be conducted based on that
commander's assessment of the current military situation, the
availability of support, and other factors.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
the ryder report
2. Senator Levin. General Myers, according to Seymour Hersh's
article in The New Yorker magazine, General Ryder's report of November
5, 2003, on the prison system in Iraq found ``system-wide'' problems
relating to human rights, training, and manpower issues. General Ryder
reportedly recommended that procedures be established to ``define the
role of military police soldiers . . . clearly separating the actions
of the guards from those of the military intelligence personnel.''
General Taguba is reported to find that ``many of the systemic problems
that surfaced during [Ryder's] assessment are the very same issues that
are the subject of this investigation.'' Since the release of General
Ryder's report on November 5, 2003, has the Army implemented General
Ryder's recommendation to establish procedures separating the role of
military police (MPs) from that of military intelligence personnel?
General Myers. Major General Ryder conducted an assessment of
detention and correction operations in Iraq and provided
recommendations to CJTF-7 to improve those operations. The specific
recommendation referred to above was to, ``Determine the scope of
intelligence collection that will occur at Camp Vigilant. Refurbish the
Northeast compound to separate the screening operation from the Iraqi-
run Baghdad Correctional Facility. Establish procedures that define the
role of military police soldiers securing the compound, clearly
separating the actions of the guards from those of the military
intelligence personnel.'' CJTF-7 did take action on this recommendation
concerning force protection responsibilities of military police
soldiers securing the compound.
Further, CJTF-7, under Major General Miller's supervision, has
defined the proper roles for military police and military intelligence
personnel, and has ensured that they understand their respective
responsibilities. The roles of the military police and military
intelligence complement one another. The military police are
responsible for custody and detainee control; the military intelligence
has screening and interrogation responsibilities. Military police can
assist the military intelligence by observing detainees and reporting
on their associations and activities.
CJTF-7 initiated numerous additional improvements to detention
operations based on Major General Ryder's recommendations. These
included strict control of weapons in detention facilities, centralized
planning for interrogation priorities, separation of high value
detainees, augmentation of staffs with subject matter experts,
employment of a detention mobile training team, certification of
personnel on critical detention tasks, and multiple projects to improve
living conditions for detainees and soldiers. Improved medical care,
use of the Biometric Assessment Tool (BAT), and a review of theater
release procedures also resulted from CJTF-7 action on Major General
Ryder's recommendations.
3. Senator Levin. General Myers, will General Miller, who is in
charge of detention operations in Iraq, take steps to ensure that the
role of MP soldiers is defined and clearly separate from the role of
military intelligence personnel at detention facilities?
General Myers. Major General Miller has taken steps to ensure that
both military police and military intelligence personnel understand
their respective roles. Military police can assist military
intelligence personnel by observing detainees and reporting on their
activities and associations. This ``passive'' involvement of the
military police is what MG Miller has advocated.
taguba report recommendations
4. Senator Levin. General Smith, General Taguba's report contained
a number of recommendations resulting from his investigation. To what
extent have the recommendations contained in the Taguba Report been
adopted and implemented? Please address each of the specific
recommendations in the three parts of the report.
General Smith. The attached summary of MNF-I actions taken after
the reports is responsive to this question.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
red cross visits to abu ghraib
5. Senator Levin. General Myers and General Smith, the ICRC report
of February 2004 states that the ICRC was aware of abuses at Abu Ghraib
prison for months prior to the period covered by General Taguba's
investigation and had repeatedly asked U.S. authorities to take
corrective action. What was the extent of the ICRC's access to the
facilities at Abu Ghraib? Did it include the part of the facility where
the abuses depicted in the photos are alleged to have occurred?
General Myers and General Smith. The ICRC Summary Report of
February 2004 refers to an ICRC visit to the Abu Ghraib Correctional
Facility conducted in October 2003, during the same period that many of
the alleged abuses occurred. A written report related to the October
2003 visit was provided to CJTF-7 Staff Judge Advocate's office in
November 2003. Both ICRC reports provide indications of detainee abuse,
however, not to the extent depicted in the photographs. The CJTF-7
Staff Judge Advocate Office circulated the November report among
relevant commands and staffs, proposed a draft response and, following
discussions and meetings with leadership of the military intelligence
and military police units involved, forwarded the draft document to the
800th Military Police BDE. A written response to the ICRC was signed by
the Commander, 800th Military Police Brigade in December 2003 and
delivered to the ICRC. A staff action plan was implemented for the next
ICRC visit to Abu Ghraib in January 2004. During the October visit to
Abu Ghraib and in subsequent visits, ICRC representatives did have
access to the part of the prison where the abuses are alleged to have
occurred.
6. Senator Levin. General Myers and General Smith, what specific
steps were taken to correct the situation at Abu Ghraib in response to
these ICRC requests?
General Myers and General Smith. The longstanding arrangement
between the ICRC and the Department of Defense is that issues are
discussed and resolved at the local level or at the lowest practicable
level of command. At Abu Ghraib, the lowest practicable level of
command would have been the 800 Military Police Brigade and 205
Military Intelligence Brigade, overseen by CJTF-7. Following receipt of
the November ICRC report, a staff action plan was developed.
Improvements in detention conditions were made by the commands
following the October 2003 visit as noted by the ICRC in a subsequent
visit in January 2004. Since January 2004, the Department of Defense
has initiated numerous investigations regarding the treatment of
detainees and instituted changes at every level to ensure improved
conditions of detention facilities and appropriate treatment of
detainees.
Included in these initiatives are significant organizational and
policy changes. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has established
an office, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee
Affairs, which focuses on worldwide detainee operations. The Joint
Staff has also expanded staff organizational responsibilities. As a
result of a policy change, reports from the ICRC are forwarded
expeditiously by commands to the Department of Defense, reviewed by
these staffs and significant issues are brought to the attention of the
leadership.
7. Senator Levin. General Myers and General Smith, there are
reports of ``ghost detainees'' who were moved around within the
facility in order to conceal them from ICRC inspection teams. Have you
investigated these reports, and if so, what were your findings?
General Myers and General Smith. The allegations were investigated
and other investigations are ongoing. Apparently there existed a
practice in the fall of 2003 of allowing Other Government Agencies
(OGA) to drop off detainees for up to a 72-hour hold without being
processed and issued Internee Security Numbers (ISN) in accordance with
Army and CJTF-7 procedures. CJTF-7 learned of this practice in early
January 2004 and stopped it.
In other instances, the OGA detainees were in-processed and
registered with the ICRC. Reports received indicate that ICRC
representatives observed these detainees in cells marked with their
Geneva Conventions status. The ICRC was not allowed to meet with
certain detainees during visits because they were being interrogated.
Under provisions of the Geneva Conventions, detainees may be held for a
reasonable period of time without registering them with the ICRC for
military necessity. This may include the time required to process
detainees from point of capture to a detention facility.
All detainees currently in the custody of the Department of Defense
have been registered with the ICRC.
8. Senator Levin. General Myers and General Smith, the ICRC told
the Department of Defense (DOD) of the alleged abuses at Abu Ghraib
months before a U.S. soldier notified his superiors in January of this
year. What steps were taken to investigate, verify, address, or stop
the abuses detailed by the ICRC?
General Myers and General Smith. An ICRC visit to the Abu Ghraib
Correctional Facility was conducted in October 2003. A written report
related to the October 2003 visit was provided to the CJTF-7 Staff
Judge Advocate's office in November 2003. This ICRC report provided
indications of detainee abuse, however, not to the extent depicted in
the photographs. CJTF-7, the 800th Military Police Brigade and the
205th Military Intelligence Brigade staffed the report locally.
Corrective actions were taken as noted by the ICRC during the January
2004 visit. I am not aware of any other reporting of ICRC findings to
Department of Defense officials. To ensure visibility above the local
level, the Department of Defense has implemented a policy that requires
ICRC reports to be forwarded higher.
9. Senator Levin. General Myers and General Smith, other than
Brigadier General Karpinski, was anyone else within DOD, the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA), or other Federal agencies briefed about
the abuses, detailed by the ICRC, at Abu Ghraib? Who were they and when
were they briefed?
General Myers and General Smith. The November 2003 ICRC report gave
indications of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, but not to the level of
abuse later revealed in the photographs. General Abizaid notified me on
13 January 2003 of the allegations of abuse at Abu Ghraib reported by a
soldier in the 372d Military Police Company. I don't recall an ICRC
report being mentioned during that conversation. I am not aware of
briefings concerning the November ICRC report being conducted within
the Department of Defense or any other Federal agency until after the
investigation into the alleged abuses was opened in January.
10. Senator Levin. General Myers and General Smith, which senior
administration officials have received the reports by the ICRC
detailing abusive behavior at U.S. detention facilities in Iraq? When
did they receive such reports? What actions were taken in response to
such reports?
General Myers and General Smith. I personally was not provided
copies or summaries of any ICRC reports detailing abusive behavior at
U.S. detention facilities in Iraq. The ICRC generally provides working
papers, reports, and observations to the lowest level organization that
the ICRC believes can resolve the issues. In Iraq, the ICRC reports
were provided to the detention facility visited, to the CJTF-7 staff,
or in at least one instance to the CPA. The ICRC does not provide
reports to the Joint Staff. The ICRC may on occasion provide
information to the Department of State or to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD). I am not aware of any senior officials in
OSD, or in any other Federal agency, who may have received ICRC reports
detailing abusive behavior at U.S. detention facilities in Iraq.
information flow
11. Senator Levin. General Myers, USA Today reports that on January
13, 2004, General Abizaid made a phone call to you in which he
``described the allegation of mistreatment'' and told you about the
pictures, saying `here's what basically the pictures might show.' Is
this an accurate accounting of this conversation?
General Myers. Yes, it is accurate. The CENTCOM chain of command
immediately recognized the significance of the allegations of abuse at
Abu Ghraib. Determined to take proper action, a criminal investigation
was immediately initiated and the matter was reported to the chain of
command. General Abizaid contacted me telephonically and informed me
that a soldier had reported the abuse. As I recall, he also informed me
that the soldier provided photos of abusive acts that were significant,
although I do not believe the acts depicted in the photos were
precisely described. General Abizaid further informed me that the
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) was investigating the report and
that LTG Sanchez would direct a separate investigation into the matter.
12. Senator Levin. General Myers, at the hearing you said that you
had meetings starting in January 2004, including with Secretary
Rumsfeld, in which you discussed the detainee abuse situation at Abu
Ghraib, and that you understood at that time the potential damage of
the problem, and of photos you were aware of. Please provide the dates
of the meetings you had at which you discussed this detainee abuse
problem, and whether you discussed the photos and the potential for
this issue to cause damage. When did you plan on informing the relevant
congressional committees about this matter?
General Myers. In January 2004, General Abizaid informed me of the
allegations of abuse and the nature of the photographs. Subsequently,
various meetings were held with the Secretary of Defense in January,
February, and March, and a meeting with the President, Secretary
Rumsfeld, and Vice Chairman Pace was held in mid-April. The abuse issue
was one of many topics mentioned at these meetings. While we were
advised of the allegations, we had not seen the photos. We were aware
that reports of detainee abuse could potentially affect the world's
opinion of the United States and impact our forces in Iraq, especially
at a time when former regime elements had increased the tempo of their
attacks. We were also aware that public discussion of the
investigations into these allegations by senior leaders could be
interpreted as direction or pressure for a certain outcome in these
cases. It was our intent to provide information to the relevant
congressional committees about this matter once the investigations were
complete, the chain of command had the opportunity to make decisions,
and we had sufficient information to release to the committees. This
plan was preempted by unauthorized release of the photographs and Major
General Taguba's report. As I stated in my 7 May testimony, we could
have done a better job of informing Congress of the situation and the
existence of the photographs.
number of investigations
13. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, during the week of May 3,
General Casey, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, said that there were some
35 investigations under way relating to detainee abuses or deaths or
similar allegations. On May 11, General Romig testified that the Army
was tracking some 83 different detainee abuse cases in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As of today, how many cases of abuses have been reported
and how many investigations have been initiated? How many relate to
abuse, and how many relate to deaths?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As of 7 May, a total of 56 cases of abuse had
been reported and were being investigated. Of these 56 cases, 33
involve allegations of abuse and 23 involve deaths. These numbers will
almost certainly change as more information becomes available and we
will continue to brief the committee as additional findings arise.
14. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, how many people are under
investigation in these cases? Is it more than the ones identified in
the Taguba Report?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As of 7 May, a total of 122 people were under
investigation in the 56 detainee abuse and death investigations. It is
believed this number exceeds the number of individuals identified in
the Taguba Report.
15. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, given the apparently large
number of investigations, and based on the Taguba Report, this appears
to be a systemic problem. Do you agree?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department of the Army Inspector General,
after completing his inspection of detainee operations, concluded that
the abuse of detainees does not appear to be a systemic problem. This
conclusion was shared by the Schlesinger Panel, which noted that there
was no ``policy of abuse'' at Abu Ghraib. This conclusion is also
consistent with the findings of the Fay Report. We have other
investigations in progress and will continue to brief the committee on
additional findings.
classification of the taguba report
16. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, the DOD has classified the
Taguba Report. I have concerns about how this process was conducted.
Why is the section detailing abuses classified while the names of the
alleged perpetrators were not?
Secretary Rumsfeld. In preparing his report, I am advised that
General Taguba relied upon material marked classified as sources of
information. Under established classification guidance, General Taguba
was required to carry that classification forward on all statements in
his report that were derived from this source material. Additionally,
his entire report is required to be marked at the highest
classification level of any material in it. Consequently, while most
portions of General Taguba's report were marked unclassified, the
entire report was marked Secret NOFORN. We have, however, released
large portions of that report and the several others that followed.
17. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, Section 1.7 of Executive
Order 12958 states: ``In no case shall information be classified in
order to . . . conceal violations of law [or to] prevent embarrassment
to a person, organization, or agency.'' What was the justification for
classifying some of the report and not the portions naming the alleged
perpetrators? Who was involved in the classification process and how
was their decision reached? Do you believe that it was appropriate
given the nature and content of the report?
Secretary Rumsfeld. See answer above.
reading of the taguba report
18. Senator Levin. General Myers, you testified that you had
discussed the prisoner abuse issue with Secretary Rumsfeld in January.
You called CBS in early April to request that they delay broadcast of
the photos showing the abuse, which they did. Yet a week after CBS had
broadcast the photos, you had still not read the Taguba Report, even
though it had been completed in March. Given that you knew of the abuse
problem in January, and you knew in early April that release of the
photos could cause serious problems, why did you not read the Taguba
Report as soon as it was completed?
General Myers. While Major General Taguba completed his
investigation on 12 March, required chain of command actions were not
complete until the end of April. The appointing authority reviewed
Major General Taguba's findings and recommendations and recommended
appropriate actions on 6 April. In accordance with required procedures,
adverse actions were referred to the individuals involved, providing
them an opportunity to respond. The chain of command took final action
on 30 April. The final report was not received in Washington, DC, until
shortly thereafter, well after my conversation with CBS and after the
unauthorized release of the photographs and Major General Taguba's
report to the media.
19. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, at the hearing General Myers
testified that he had discussed the detainee abuse problem with you in
January, recognizing that it had the potential to cause serious
problems. Yet you had not fully read the Taguba Report a couple days
before the hearing. Given that you were aware of the serious nature of
this abuse problem as early as January, why did you not read the Taguba
Report as soon as it was completed?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Taguba Report was initiated on 31 January
2004. An interim report was completed on 12 March and approved by LTG
McKiernan on 6 April. LTG Sanchez approved the report's recommendations
on 1 May, although the report was publicized by The New Yorker on 30
April. The full Taguba Report numbered in the thousands of pages. I
received a briefing from MG Taguba on 6 May 04.
april 28 senate briefing
20. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, you briefed the Senate on
April 28, 2004 on Iraq in a classified session. This was the same day
that CBS broadcast the photos that General Myers had successfully
requested be delayed. However, you never mentioned the detainee abuse
scandal to the Senators at that briefing, even though you say you were
aware of the seriousness of the issue and of the existence of photos
showing the abuse. Given that you knew well before April 28 about the
abuse scandal, that there were photos of the abuse, and that General
Myers had called CBS in early April to request delay in broadcast of
the photos, why did you not inform the Senate of the detainee abuse
scandal, even as late as the date on which the photos were broadcast?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As I said in my testimony, one cannot truly
appreciate the significance and ramifications of the allegations of
detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib until viewing the photographs. At the time
of the April 28 briefing, I had not seen the photographs. The command
had responded promptly and several criminal investigations were
underway when these allegations came to light in January. Public
announcements were made then, and again when certain individuals were
identified for further investigations in March. Had I seen the
photographs before April 28, they would have been part of my brief.
viewing the photographs
21. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, during the hearing you said
that you did not see the photos of the abuse until after they were
broadcast by CBS, and they appeared in the news media. You also said
that you did not have a chance to personally review the photos until
the night before the hearing, May 6. Given that you knew of the abuse
problem in January and knew of the existence of photos well before they
were broadcast, and given that General Myers asked CBS to delay
broadcast of the photos in early April, did you ever ask to see the
photos before they were broadcast? If not, why not?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As I indicated in my testimony before the
committee, hearing a description of abuse, or hearing someone's
description of a picture of abuse, does not compare to actually seeing
the photographs. It was not until I had seen the photographs that I
appreciated the significance and broad ramifications of the abuse
allegations. The criminal investigations then underway and publicly
announced were appropriate responses to the allegations. The photos
were part of a criminal investigation. It is not established practice
to reach into criminal investigations higher in the chain of command to
review evidence of a possible crime. As I testified, though, in the
digital age, with 24/7 news coverage, we need to develop a process to
elevate such items to senior officials more rapidly than the current
processes allow.
22. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, given that you knew the
nature of the abuse that was under investigation before the photos were
broadcast, and that General Myers called CBS in early April to request
that broadcast of the photos be delayed because they could cause
serious problems, why did you say you did not understand that the
photos of the abuse would be very disturbing until you had actually
seen the photos? Is it not obvious, even without seeing the actual
photos, that a photo of abuse would be very disturbing?
Secretary Rumsfeld. See answer above.
geneva conventions
23. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, during your May 4, 2003,
interview with Matt Lauer, when speaking about Iraq you stated that:
``The decision was made that the Geneva Conventions did not apply
precisely, but that every individual would be treated as though the
Geneva Conventions did apply.'' You went on to state in the interview
that ``the United States Government, the lawyers, made a conscious
decision and announced it to the world and announced it to all the
people engaged in the detention process that these people would, in
fact, be treated as though the Geneva Conventions did apply.''
At the May 7, 2004, hearing before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, you stated that ``the President announced from the outset
that everyone in Iraq who was detained is a prisoner of war (POW) and
therefore the Geneva Conventions apply. Second, the decision was made
that the civilians or criminal elements that are detainees are also
treated subject to the Geneva Conventions, although it's a different
element of it. I think it's the fourth instead of the third.''
Furthermore, you replied ``absolutely'' when asked if ``all those in
prison had the rights of POWs.''
How do you reconcile these statements? Do the Geneva Conventions
apply for all detainees in Iraq or are detainees treated in a manner
``consistent with'' the Conventions?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Geneva Conventions apply during all phases
of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The plans for Operation Iraqi Freedom that
were prepared by Commander, U.S. Central Command, and briefed to the
President and me before outbreak of hostilities included provisions
that clearly stated that enemy prisoners of war, retained persons,
civilian internees will be handled and other detainee ``operations will
be conducted in compliance with the 1949 Geneva Convention and
applicable U.S. military regulations.'' Further, component and
supporting commanders were responsible under the plans for Operation
Iraqi Freedom for ``[e]nsuring treatment of all detained persons is in
accordance with the Conventions and other applicable international
law.'' The President directed these plans to be executed. Detention
operations during all phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom are required to
be conducted in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.
24. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, when did the President
announce that the Geneva Conventions would apply for all detainees in
Iraq? How was this announcement made public? What steps were taken to
inform coalition forces about this decision? When were they made?
Secretary Rumsfeld. On March 24, 2003, shortly after Operation
Iraqi Freedom began, White House spokesman Ari Fleisher, when asked if
the Geneva Conventions applied in Iraq, stated that Iraq was a
traditional conflict, ``[a]nd we have always treated people humanely
consistent with our international agreements. In the case of the fight
in Iraq, there's no question that it's being done in accordance with
the Geneva Conventions.''
Prior to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Commander,
U.S. Central Command, prepared Operational Plan (OPLAN) 1003-V.
Appendix 1 to Annex E of OPLAN 1003-V specifically addressed the
treatment of the operational plan annex on enemy prisoners of war,
retained persons, civilian internees, and other detainees. It outlined
responsibilities, policies, and procedures with respect to the handling
of detainees, and provided specific guidance that the Geneva
Conventions applied to all persons held by U.S. forces. This means of
promulgation is consistent with the usual manner in which commanders
provide guidance to their subordinate commanders. The subordinate
commands would review the OPLAN and draft their own orders. For
instance, the CJSC EXORD itself does not specifically address the
Geneva Conventions; rather, it refers back to OPLAN 1003-V.
In addition to the promulgation of this OPLAN and its annexes,
commanders were responsible for ensuring that detainees were treated in
accordance with the Geneva Conventions and applicable international law
and that measures were implemented to ensure the forces were aware of
and complied with the Law of War.
25. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, do you believe that the
Interrogation Rules of Engagement (ROEs) utilized by the CJTF-7 comply
with the Geneva Conventions? What is your legal basis for this
understanding?
Secretary Rumsfeld. This matter was thoroughly reviewed by the
Kern/Fay investigation. Further, General Sanchez, General Abizaid, and
the CJTF-7 Staff Judge Advocate testified before the committee on the
matter. I have no independent knowledge or assessment.
26. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, did you personally review
these ROEs prior to their being issued? If not, who did and when?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Neither I nor my staff was ever requested to
review the CJTF-7 counter resistance interrogation policy. LTG Sanchez
issued his October 12, 2003, policy guidance after consultation with
U.S. Central Command staff. He has the authority to promulgate such
policies, which were reviewed, as I understand, by the Commander of the
U.S. Central Command.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
presidential notification
27. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, in your testimony you
indicated that General Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, had notified the President about the abuse allegations in late
January or early February. Could you provide the committee the date of
that meeting and any details regarding what the President was told with
respect to this case by General Pace?
Secretary Rumsfeld. During the period of time in question, I met
with the President once, sometimes twice, weekly and either General
Myers or General Pace would accompany me. I cannot recall with clarity
at which particular meeting we notified the President of the abuse
allegations, nor the details of what was conveyed.
april 28 briefing
28. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, when you appeared
before the Senate in a secure setting on April 28, why did you decide
not to brief the Members on the abuse allegations and photographs at
that meeting?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As I said in my testimony, one cannot truly
appreciate the significance and ramifications of the allegations of
detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib until viewing the photographs. At the time
of the April 28 briefing, I had not seen the photographs. The command
had responded promptly and several criminal investigations were
underway when these allegations came to light in January. Public
announcements were made then, and again when certain individuals were
identified for further investigations in March. Had I seen the
photographs before April 28, they would have been part of my brief.
[Whereupon, at 2:36 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
ALLEGATIONS OF MISTREATMENT OF IRAQI PRISONERS
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 11, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss,
Graham, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Lieberman, Reed, Akaka,
Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, and Clinton.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Paula J.
Philbin, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel;
Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F.
Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member;
Jeremy L. Hekhuis, professional staff member; Gerald J.
Leeling, minority counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel;
William G.P. Monahan, minority counsel; and Arun A. Seraphin,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew W.
Florell, and Bridget E. Ward.
Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling,
assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher J. Paul, assistant to
Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
Lance Landry, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Dirk J. Maurer, assistant to
Senator Collins; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign;
Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent; Clyde A. Taylor
IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Meredith Moseley, assistant
to Senator Graham; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator
Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Mieke
Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler,
assistants to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; Rashid Hallaway, assistant to Senator Bayh; and Andrew
Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. The committee meets today for the second
of a series of hearings regarding the mistreatment of Iraqi
prisoners by some elements, and certain personnel, few in
number, I hope, of the Armed Forces, in violation of United
States and international law.
Testifying before us today is Major General Antonio M.
Taguba, U.S. Army, Deputy Commanding General for Support,
Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC).
On January 31, 2004, General Taguba was appointed by
General Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-
7), to conduct a Procedure-15 investigation into allegations of
prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison. General Taguba's
report was received by this committee on Tuesday, May 4, and
its related annexes were received yesterday, May 10. As members
know, they are in the possession of the committee, and members
and staff worked on those reports until very late last night.
Joining General Taguba are Lieutenant General Lance L.
Smith, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Commander of Central Command
(CENTCOM); and Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence (USDI).
We welcome our witnesses. General Taguba, I wish to
personally commend you for your public service.
General Taguba. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Following the testimony of our witnesses,
we'll receive testimony from a second panel of witnesses this
afternoon, commencing at 2:30.
As I stated last week, this mistreatment of prisoners
represents an appalling and totally unacceptable breach of
military regulations and conduct. The damage done to the
reputation and credibility of our Nation and the Armed Forces
has the potential to undermine substantial gains and the
sacrifices by our forces and their families, and those of our
allies fighting with us in the cause of freedom.
This degree of breakdown in military leadership and
discipline represents an extremely rare chapter in the
otherwise proud history of our Armed Forces. It defies common
sense, and contradicts all the values for which America stands.
There must be a full accounting for the cruel and disgraceful
abuse of Iraqi detainees, consistent with our laws and the
protections of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
I'm proud of the manner in which the Armed Forces have
quickly reacted to these allegations, undertaken appropriate
investigation, and begun disciplinary actions. We are a nation
of laws, and we confront abuses of our laws openly and
directly.
We have had an apparent breakdown of discipline and
leadership at this prison, and possibly at other locations. We
think it important to confront these problems swiftly, assuring
that justice is done, and take the corrective actions so that
such abuses never happen again. At the same time, it is
important to remember that our commanders and their troops in
Iraq are confronted with a very difficult, dangerous, complex
military situation. Defeating insurgents and terrorists who
seek to deny freedom and democracy to all Iraqis and who
threaten our troops is the highest priority. Our troops are
working very hard and courageously sacrifice to achieve that
mission. Intelligence obtained in the course of any military
action, obtained in accordance with proper laws and
professional procedures, is an essential element of any
military campaign.
I was heartened by President Bush's words of support for
our men and women of the Armed Forces, as he stated yesterday,
in visiting the Department of Defense (DOD)--and I quote our
President: ``All Americans know the goodness and the character
of the United States Armed Forces. No military in the history
of the world has fought so hard and so often for the freedom of
others. Today, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are
keeping terrorists across the world on the run. They're helping
the people of Afghanistan and Iraq build democratic societies.
They're defending America with unselfish courage. These
achievements have brought pride and credit to this Nation. I
want our men and women in uniform to know that America is proud
of you, and that I'm honored to be your commander in chief.''
Speaking for myself, I feel our President, our Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS),
and the other officers of our military have very correctly and
properly addressed the seriousness of these issues, and I
commend them.
We must not forget our overall purpose in Iraq. Success
there is absolutely essential. Our men and women in uniform
make a remarkable institution in this great America. From time
to time it must heal itself, consistent with law and tradition,
and that is what we're doing in this particular case. We have a
responsibility here in Congress to help them do that, and that
is precisely the purpose of these hearings.
Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today's hearing continues the committee's examination of
the events at Abu Ghraib detention facility and the effort to
learn what led to the abuses of Iraqi prisoners so graphically
depicted in the photographs that have shocked and disgusted the
civilized world; and who may have authorized, encouraged, or
suggested those despicable actions. Getting to the truth of
what happened and who was responsible is important for our
military men and women, for the American people, for the
success of our mission in Iraq, and for a watching world.
General Taguba, while your report paints a disturbing
picture of horrible abuses and leadership failures at Abu
Ghraib, your report reflects an honest and detailed assessment
of the situation there, and includes sensible recommendations
on how to begin fixing those problems. I thank you for your
professionalism in carrying out this service to our Nation.
The hearing we held last week barely scratched the surface
of the issues that this committee must examine. It yielded
little in the form of detailed information as to how these
abuses could possibly have occurred and who was responsible for
them, including those within and without the chain of command
whose policy decisions created an environment in which the
abuses could occur.
The despicable actions described in General Taguba's report
not only reek of abuse, they reek of an organized effort and
methodical preparation for interrogation. The collars used on
prisoners, the dogs, and the cameras did not suddenly appear
out of thin air. These acts of abuse were not the spontaneous
actions of lower-ranking enlisted personnel who lacked the
proper supervision. These attempts to extract information from
prisoners by abusive and degrading methods were clearly planned
and suggested by others.
Today, we begin what must be a determined pursuit of the
answers to the questions:
Who organized the effort?
Who oversaw it?
Under what directives and policies were these actions
implemented?
All of those up and down the chain of command who bear any
responsibility must be held accountable for the brutality and
humiliation they inflicted on the prisoners and for the damage
and dishonor that they brought to our Nation and to the United
States Armed Forces, which is otherwise filled with honorable
men and women acting with courage and professionalism to bring
stability and security and reconstruction to Iraq.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. I'll ask the witnesses to rise. [Witnesses
sworn.]
In accordance with the time-honored traditions of our
country of civilian control over the military, we recognize
Secretary Cambone, who is speaking on behalf of the DOD.
Mr. Secretary?
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE
Secretary Cambone. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Members of the committee, we're here today to continue the
discussion on the terrible activities at Abu Ghraib, begun last
Friday by the SECDEF, the CJCS, and other members of the panel.
Before going further, let me say that we are dismayed by
what took place. The Iraqi detainees are human beings. They
were in U.S. custody. We had an obligation to treat them right.
We didn't do that. That was wrong. I associate myself, without
reservation, to the sentiments expressed by the SECDEF. To
those Iraqis who were mistreated by members of the U.S. Armed
Forces, I offer my deepest apology. It was un-American, and it
was inconsistent with the values of our Nation.
Now, a number of issues arose related to those events
during the hearing last Friday, which, as Senator Levin has
noted, were not fully engaged. I wanted to tick off a short
list that we have been developing since then as a way of
preparation in answer to the questions we know that you have.
But before I go through those, let me say, again, that we
will give you this information today, to the best of our
knowledge. We do not have, yet, all the facts related to this
case. There are at least five other investigations ongoing, and
we will need that information in order to come to a full
understanding.
So, first, with respect to the application of the Geneva
Conventions to detainees in Iraq, from the outset of the war in
Iraq, the United States Government has recognized and made
clear that the Geneva Conventions apply to our activities in
that country. Members of our Armed Forces should have been
aware of that. If they were not--if they were not--Lieutenant
General Sanchez, the CJTF-7 commander, reminded them, on more
than one occasion, that the forces under his command operated
under that obligation.
Nevertheless, there clearly was a breakdown in following
Geneva Conventions procedures at Abu Ghraib, and we are in the
process of investigating why that happened.
As Major General Miller, who is now in charge of detainee
operations in Iraq, remarked on Saturday, ``The procedures
established for interrogations in Iraq were sanctioned under
the Geneva Conventions and authorized in U.S. Army manuals. All
permissible''--permissible--``interrogation activities were
within the requirements and boundaries of applicable provisions
of the Geneva Conventions.'' We are currently investigating why
soldiers--some soldiers--at Abu Ghraib did not abide by those
understood procedures and guidelines.
Early in the war on terrorism, long before the war in Iraq,
the President made a determination that the Geneva Conventions
did not apply to al Qaeda detainees. That decision was made
because the Geneva Conventions govern conflicts between states,
and the al Qaeda is not a state, much less a signatory of the
Geneva Conventions. Moreover, the Geneva Conventions forbid the
targeting of civilians, and require that military forces wear
designated uniforms to distinguish them from noncombatants.
Terrorists don't care about the Geneva Conventions, nor do they
abide by its guidelines. They deliberately target civilians,
for example, and have brutalized and murdered innocent
Americans. To grant terrorists the rights they so cruelly
reject would make a mockery of the Geneva Conventions.
Nevertheless, President Bush did order--did order--that
detainees held at Guantanamo be treated humanely and consistent
with the Geneva Conventions' principles. In fact, those
detainees in the war on terror are being provided with many of
the privileges typically afforded to enemy prisoners of war.
The notion that this decision in some way undermined the
Geneva Conventions or created a poor climate is false. To the
contrary, the administration made this decision with the
objective of assuring that those who would claim protection
under its auspices, and not act in keeping with its intent, did
not abuse the Geneva Conventions. Far from disrespect, the
decision was made out of a notion of respect. The notion of a
departmental belief that the alleged climate created and led to
abuse in Iraq is, therefore, not in keeping with clear and
stated determination to adhere to the Geneva Conventions.
Second, Major General Miller's recommendations. Major
General Miller was sent to Iraq--it was late August 2003--based
on his experience with the flow of information gained by
interrogation at Guantanamo Bay. He was sent under Joint Staff
auspices--and, as I said on Friday before this committee, with
my encouragement--to determine if the flow of information to
CJTF-7 and back to the subordinate commands could be improved.
He laid out an approach to do this in a series of
recommendations to General Sanchez. He had no directive
authority in that visit.
One recommendation on detention operations was to dedicate
and train a detention guard force subordinate to the joint
intelligence commander that would, in the words of General
Taguba's report and others, ``set the conditions for the
successful interrogation and exploitation of internees and
detainees.'' In making this recommendation, Major General
Miller was underscoring the need for military police (MP) and
military intelligence (MI) personnel, both of whom serve
different functions, to act in a fashion such that the one, MP,
did not undermine the efforts of the other, MI, to discover,
during interrogation, the information that was important to
coalition forces and to the lives of Iraqi civilians.
Consequently, he underscored the need for a legal review of his
recommendations by a dedicated command staff judge advocate
(SJA).
With respect to detention operations, Major General Miller
noted that their purpose is to provide a safe, secure, and
humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of
intelligence. In addition, he observed that detention
operations must be structured to ensure the detention
environment focuses the internees' confidence and attention on
their interrogators. He recommended training in building the
teamwork the interrogator and detention staffs needed to
accomplish the objectives.
The order placing the MP at Abu Ghraib under the tactical
control of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade--and here,
for more of the detail, I can defer to General Smith--but on
November 19, 2003, General Sanchez issued an order effectively
placing Abu Ghraib under the tactical control of the 205th
Military Intelligence Brigade. This order was within the
authority of General Sanchez to give. As I say, Lieutenant
General Smith might elaborate on the reasons that the order was
given. But what it did is, it gave a senior officer
responsibility for the facility. For the facility. We needed
someone to take care of such matters as security, force
protection, the internal security, living conditions for the
troops, and other things. It did not give, as far as I
understand it, the MI brigade commander the authority over MP
operations. If I might note, if you look at General Karpinski's
CNN interview last night, she makes comments to that effect.
Let me stress that the promulgation of the order in no way
changed the rules governing the conduct of MP and military
personnel in Iraq with respect to the laws of war, the Geneva
Conventions, CENTCOM directions, or CJTF-7 directions and
instructions.
Third, the role of contractors. Contractors may not perform
interrogations except under the supervision of military
personnel. There may have been circumstances under which this
regulation was not followed. I cannot tell you that it was
followed in all respects. This is a matter that General Fay is
now examining. In addition, contractors may not supervise or
give orders or direction to military personnel. While
contractors are not under military discipline--another issue
raised on Friday--they are subject to suspension from their
contracts by the government for cause. Furthermore, criminal
sanctions for any crimes a contractor may commit may be
available in U.S. Federal Court and may be be referred to U.S.
Federal Court.
Fourth, with respect to the oversight of military
intelligence criminal investigation in the operations of
combatant commanders, I have, on page 8 of the statement that I
prepared for you, listed the roles of the office I presently
hold, that of the joint commands and that of the Services. I
then go on and talk about oversight of criminal investigations
and the role of the DOD Inspector General's (IG) office and the
counterintelligence oversight.
On page 9, I begin the actions underway. The SECDEF
reviewed those with you on Friday, and I will not take your
time here unless the committee wishes to return to them, but to
add one development since we were here last, and that is that
the SECDEF is now preparing a personal message for the men and
women of the Armed Forces, underscoring his dismay over the
events at Abu Ghraib, expressing his confidence in the valor
and professionalism of the men and women, stressing, once
again, that the Geneva Conventions apply to our conflict in
Iraq, and expressing his confidence in the ultimate success of
our mission in Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, this is an occasion to demonstrate to the
world the difference between those who believe in democracy and
those who do not. We value human life. We believe in the right
to individual freedom and the rule of law. For those beliefs,
we send our men and women abroad to protect that right for our
own people and to give millions of others hope for freedom in
the future. Part of that mission is making sure that when
wrongdoing or scandal occurs, it's not covered up, but exposed,
investigated, publicly disclosed, and the guilty brought to
justice.
I believe we can repair the damage done to our credibility
in the region. If we hold true to our principles and continue
to keep our commitments to the people of Iraq and Afghanistan,
eventually the nobility of that mission will touch the hearts
of more people in the Arab world. I am confident of this
because of the outstanding service that has been rendered by
the vast majority of the men and women of the U.S. Armed
Forces.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Cambone follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Stephen A. Cambone
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. We are here today to
continue the discussion on the terrible activities at Abu Ghraib begun
last Friday by the SECDEF, the CJCS, Acting Secretary of the Army, Army
Chief of Staff, and the Deputy Commander, CENTCOM, who is with us
today.
Before going further, let me say that we are dismayed by what took
place. The Iraqi detainees are human beings, they were in U.S. custody,
we had an obligation to treat them right, and we didn't do that. That
was wrong. I associate myself without reservation to the sentiments
expressed by the SECDEF: ``To those Iraqis who were mistreated by
members of U.S. Armed Forces I offer my deepest apology. It was un-
American, and it was inconsistent with the values of our Nation.''
A number of issues related to those events arose during the hearing
last Friday or have been the subject of public commentary before or
since. I'd like to take a moment to address some of them.
First, with respect to the application of the Geneva Conventions to
detainees in Iraq: From the outset of the war in Iraq, the United
States government has recognized and made clear that the Geneva
Conventions applied to our activities in that country. Members of our
Armed Forces should have been aware of that.
If they were not, Lieutenant General Sanchez, CJTF-7 Commander,
reminded the forces under his command of the obligation.
Nevertheless, there clearly was a breakdown in following Geneva
Conventions procedures at Abu Ghraib, and we are in the process of
investigating right now why that happened.
As Major General Miller, who is now in charge of detainee
operations in Iraq, remarked on Saturday, the procedures established
for interrogations in Iraq were sanctioned under the Geneva Conventions
and authorized in U.S. Army manuals. All permissible interrogation
activities were within the requirements and boundaries of applicable
provisions of the Geneva Conventions.
We are currently investigating why some soldiers at Abu Ghraib did
not abide by those understood procedures and guidelines.
Early in the war on terrorism, long before the war in Iraq, the
administration made a determination that the Geneva Conventions did not
apply to al Qaeda detainees.
That decision was made because the Geneva Conventions govern
conflicts between states and the al Qaeda is not a state, much less a
signatory of the convention. Moreover, the conventions forbid the
targeting of civilians and requiring that military forces wear
designated uniforms to distinguish them from noncombatants. Terrorists
don't care about the Geneva Conventions nor do they obey its
guidelines. They deliberately target civilians, for example, and have
brutalized and murdered innocent Americans in their custody.
To grant terrorists the rights they so cruelly reject would make a
mockery of the Geneva Conventions. Nonetheless, President Bush did
order that detainees held at Guantanamo be treated humanely and
consistent with the Geneva Conventions' principles. In fact, those
detainees in the war on terror are being provided with many privileges
typically afforded to enemy prisoners of war (EPW).
The notion that this decision in some way undermined the Geneva
Conventions is false. To the contrary, the administration made this
decision with the objective of assuring that those who would claim
protection under its auspices and not act in keeping with its intent
did not abuse the Geneva Conventions. Far from disrespect, the decision
was made out of respect.
The notion of a departmental belief that the alleged climate
created and led to abuse in Iraq is therefore not in keeping with clear
and stated determination to adhere to the Geneva Conventions.
Second, Major General Miller's recommendations: Major General
Miller was sent to Iraq based on his experience with the flow of
information gained by interrogation at Guantanomo Bay. He was sent
under Joint Staff auspices to determine if the flow of information to
CJTF-7 and back to the subordinate commands could be improved. His
report laid out an approach to do this in a series of recommendations
to General Sanchez.
One recommendation on detention operations was to dedicate and
train a detention guard force subordinate to the Joint Interrogation
and Detention Center (JIDC) commander that ``sets the conditions'' for
the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees/detainees.
In making this recommendation, Major General Miller was underscoring
the need for MP and MI personnel to act in a fashion such that the one
did not undermine the efforts of the other to discover, during
interrogation, information that was important to coalition forces and
the lives of Iraqi civilians. Consequently he underscored the need for
legal review by a dedicated command SJA.
With respect to detention operations, Major General Miller noted
that their purpose is to provide a safe, secure, and humane environment
that supports the expeditious collection of intelligence.
In addition, he observed that detention operations must be
structured to ensure the detention environment focuses the internee's
confidence and attention on their interrogators. He recommended
training in building the teamwork between the interrogator and
detention staffs to accomplish this objective.
Order placing MPs tactical operation (TACON) to MI: On November 19,
2003 General Sanchez issued an order effectively placing Abu Ghraib,
under tactical control of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. This
order was within the authority of General Sanchez to give and
Lieutenant General Smith might elaborate on the reasons this order was
given. It gave a senior officer responsibility for the facility. This
included force protection, internal security, living conditions for the
troops, and so forth. It did not give the MI brigade commander
authority over MP operations. Let me stress that its promulgation in no
way changed the rules governing the conduct of the MP and MI personnel
in Iraq with respect to the laws of war, the Geneva Conventions,
CENTCOM direction or CJTF-7 directions and instructions.
Third, role of contractors: I am informed that contractors may not
perform interrogations except under the supervision of military
personnel. There may have been circumstances under which this
regulation was no, followed. This is a matter that General Fay will
examine. In addition, contractors may not supervise or give orders or
direction to military personnel. While contractors are not under
military discipline, they are subject to suspension from their contract
by the government. Furthermore, criminal sanctions for any crimes a
contractor may commit may be available in U.S. Federal Court.
Fourth, with respect to oversight of MI, criminal investigation,
and the operations of combatant commanders.
Intelligence support--The USDI ensures that
intelligence support across DOD meets warfighters'
requirements. This includes ensuring the alignments of policies
and programs with current operational requirements, oversight
of certain special access programs and development of
intelligence-related strategies and assessments. Joint commands
provide oversight to ``intelligence activities,'' consistent
with their ongoing oversight responsibilities for
``operations.'' Services have responsibility for policy,
training, doctrine, and allocation of forces to joint commands.
Services are also responsible for counterintelligence
investigations and oversight.
Criminal investigations--The DODIG oversees the
military departments' criminal investigative missions. Within
the DODIG's office, the office of Investigative Policy and
Oversight develops and maintains DOD policy addressing
investigative and law enforcement matters in DOD, as well as
corresponding legislative issues. Specifically, the Oversight
Directorate examines investigative and law enforcement
operations and programs to assess effectiveness and efficiency,
compliance with established policy and procedures, and need for
new or revised policy applicable to investigations or law
enforcement.
Actions taken or underway:
A. Lieutenant General Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7, launched a
criminal investigation immediately.
B. He asked Major General Taguba for an administrative review of
procedures at the Abu Ghraib facility. These have resulted already in
criminal or administrative actions against many individuals, including
the relief of the prison chain of command and criminal referrals of
several soldiers directly involved in abuse.
C. The Army has launched an IG Review of detainee operations
throughout Afghanistan and Iraq, which continues.
D. The Army has initiated an investigation of Reserve training with
respect to MI and MP function.
E. Lieutenant General Sanchez asked for an Army Intelligence review
of the circumstances discussed in Major General Taguba's report.
F. The SECDEF has directed the Naval IG to review our operations at
Guantanamo and the Charleston Naval Brig.
G. Several senior former officials, led by former SECDEF James
Schlesinger, have been asked to examine the pace, breadth, and
thoroughness of the existing investigations, and to determine whether
additional investigations need to be initiated. They are being asked to
report their findings within 45 days of taking up their duties, and the
SECDEF will encourage them to meet with you to keep you apprised.
H. The SECDEF is preparing a personal message for the men and women
of the armed forces underscoring his dismay at events at Abu Ghraib,
expressing his confidence in the valor and professionalism, stressing
once again that the Geneva Conventions applies to our conflict in Iraq
and expressing his confidence in the ultimate success of our mission in
Iraq.
This is an occasion to demonstrate to the world the difference
between those who believe in democracy and human rights and those who
believe in rule by the terrorist code. We value human life; we believe
in their right to individual freedom and the rule of law. For those
beliefs, we send our men and women of the Armed Forces abroad--to
protect that right for our own people and to give millions of others
the hope of a future of freedom. Part of that mission is making sure
that when wrongdoing or scandal occurs it is not covered up, but
exposed, investigated, publicly disclosed--and the guilty brought to
justice.
I believe we can repair the damage done to our credibility in the
region. If we hold true to our principles and continue to keep our
commitments to the people of Iraq and Afghanistan, eventually the
nobility of that mission will touch the hearts of more people in the
Arab world. I am confident of this because of the outstanding service
that has been rendered by the vast majority of the men and women of
U.S. Armed Forces.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. My colleagues have some comments to make.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Secretary Cambone.
General Smith, do you have a few opening comments?
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. LANCE L. SMITH, USAF, DEPUTY COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
General Smith. Senator Warner, Senator Levin, members of
the committee, sir, I'll stand by the comments that I made on
Friday, but to add that, once again, on behalf of General
Abizaid and all the men and women of CENTCOM, we regret very
much that these events ever occurred, and apologize to those
who are victims of the abuse.
I would like to assure you that, in every case where the
investigations have had recommendations and findings, that we
have either implemented the recommendations or are in the
process of making the fixes necessary to alleviate the
problems, sir.
That in all cases where we have had recommendations and
findings, they have either been implemented or we are in the
process of implementing fixes to ensure that those gaps that we
had, either in policy, procedures, or leadership, are being
fixed.
We, at the same time, have a number of investigations that
are ongoing that should give us more answers to some of the
questions that we all have about what actually went on in the
Abu Ghraib prison, the most significant of which is the General
Fay investigation over the MI brigade. We will continue to try
and make every effort to ensure that we implement the proper
procedures, policies, and practices to ensure that this never
happens again, sir.
Thank you, Senator Warner.
Chairman Warner. General Taguba, we welcome you.
STATEMENT OF MG ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, USA, DEPUTY COMMANDING
GENERAL FOR SUPPORT, COALITION FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND
General Taguba. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, good
morning, all.
I am Major General Antonio M. Taguba, the Deputy Commanding
General for Support, U.S. Army Central Command and Coalition
Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) that is headquartered in
Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.
Let me continue, sir. On January 24, 2004, I was directed
by Lieutenant General David McKiernan, the Commanding General.
I sent CFLCC to conduct an investigation into the allegations
of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, which is also known as
the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the purpose,
the findings, and the recommendation of that investigation.
The purpose of the investigation, with specific
instructions, were as follows:
First, inquire into all of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the recent allegations of detainee abuse,
specifically allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib
prison.
Second, inquire into detainee escapes and accountability
lapses, as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations
concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib prison.
Third, investigate the training, standards, employment,
command policies, internal procedures, and command climate in
the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate.
Finally, make specific findings of fact concerning all
aspects of this investigation, and make recommendations for
corrective action, as appropriate.
My investigation team consisted of officers and senior
enlisted personnel who are military policemen, experts in
detention and corrections, judge advocates, psychiatrists, and
public affairs officers. At the onset, I did not have MI
officers or experts in military interrogation on my team,
because the scope of my investigation dealt principally with
detention operations and not intelligence-gathering or
interrogations operations.
However, during the course of my team's investigation, we
gathered evidence pertaining to the involvement of several MI
personnel or contractors assigned to the 205th MI Brigade in
the alleged detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib. As stated in the
findings of the investigation, we recommended that a separate
investigation be initiated under the provisions of Procedure
15, Army Regulation 381-10, concerning possible improper
interrogation practices in this case. Again, my task was
limited to the allegations of detainee abuse involving MP
personnel and the policies, procedures, and command climate of
the 800th MP Brigade.
As I assembled the investigation team, my specific
instructions to my teammates were clear: maintain our
objectivity and integrity throughout the course of our mission
in what I considered to be a very grave, highly sensitive, and
serious situation; to be mindful of our personal values and the
moral values of our Nation; to maintain the Army values in all
of our dealings; and to be complete, thorough, and fair in the
course of the investigation. Bottom line, we'll follow our
conscience and do what is morally right.
As agonizing as this investigation was, I commend the
exceptional professionalism of my teammates, their
extraordinary efforts, and the outstanding manner by which they
carried out my instructions. I also commend the courage and
selfless service of those soldiers and sailors who brought
these allegations to light, discovered evidence of abuse, and
turned it over to the military law enforcement authorities. The
criminal acts of a few stand in stark contrast to the high
professionalism, competence, and moral integrity of countless
active, Guard, and Army Reserve soldiers that we encountered in
this investigation.
At the end of the day, a few soldiers and civilians
conspired to abuse and conduct egregious acts of violence
against detainees and other civilians outside the bounds of
international law and the Geneva Conventions. Their
incomprehensible acts, caught in their own personal record of
photographs and video clips, have seriously maligned and
impugned the courageous acts of thousands of U.S. and coalition
forces. It put into question the reputation of our Nation and
the reputation of those who continue to serve in uniform and
who would willingly sacrifice their lives to safeguard our
freedom.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today,
and I look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General. I must say
that I was very heartened by your use of the phrase ``Follow
our conscience. Do what is morally right.''
General Taguba. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. I think you've done that.
Colleagues, we'll have a 6-minute round. We take note that
votes will start at 11:30, but it's the intention of Senator
Levin and myself to continue this hearing on into approximately
the 12:30 to 12:45 time frame, in hopes that further
opportunity can be given to members for question.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, will there be one round?
Chairman Warner. We'll continue until 12:45, and we'll do
our best given the votes. We will try to keep the hearing going
during a portion of the votes. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Secretary Cambone, my understanding is,
and in my briefings with you--and I thank you for discussing
these matters with me over the weekend--that your office has
the overall responsibility for policy concerning the handling
of detainees in the global war on terrorism. Is that correct?
Secretary Cambone. Not precisely, sir. The overall policy
for the handling of detainees rests with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy by directive.
Chairman Warner. Wait a minute. Rests with----
Secretary Cambone. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy by directive. My office became involved in this issue
primarily from the perspective of assuring that there was a
flow of intelligence back to the commands, and done in an
efficient and effective way.
Chairman Warner. Then I would presume that it would be
incumbent upon this committee to get the Under Secretary for
Policy over, and let him provide this committee with such
knowledge that he has.
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir, and that--his
responsibilities--and I have talked with Mr. Feith about this--
he issued any number of statements and directives, to the
effect that detainees in Iraq, civilian or military, were to be
treated under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.
Chairman Warner. Did you work with him in that?
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir, I was aware of that work, and
knowledgeable of it, and endorsed it, of course.
Chairman Warner. I'm trying to ascertain the degree to
which the civilian authority in the DOD, under the SECDEF, be
it yourself----
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner.--or the other under secretary, reviewed
the procedures by which interrogations took place in our places
of incarceration, and, most specifically, by those doing it in
Iraq.
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. You did review the procedures that were
being followed for the interrogation of detainees in Iraq?
Secretary Cambone. We gave direction that the--the DOD gave
direction that the Geneva Conventions were to be followed. The
procedures for interrogation are established via the use of--
and General Taguba and General Smith can clarify--but they are
established on the basis of approved techniques for
interrogation. There is a list of those, and you will find them
in Army doctrine and manuals.
Chairman Warner. Right.
Secretary Cambone. Those are approved for use by the
commanding general. Any exceptions to those activities that he
authorizes, he would then set terms and conditions for
exceptions to his guidance. At the level of those techniques
and so forth, they were signed out at the command level, and
not in the DOD.
Chairman Warner. Now, you've had time to reflect on this.
In simple and plain words, how do you think this happened?
Secretary Cambone. With the caveat, sir, that I don't know
the facts, it's, for me, hard to explain. I have spent a good
deal of time over the last 10 days to 2 weeks looking at the
various elements of this issue, and I think what we did have
here was a problem of leadership with respect to the 372nd
Battalion. That was the MP unit.
Chairman Warner. Failure of leadership starting at what
level?
Secretary Cambone. That is decidedly more difficult to say,
sir. Again, in simple terms, you asked. There was clear
direction moving down the chain from the SECDEF to General
Abizaid to General Sanchez to those people who were in charge
of the MP. That, in this case, is General Karpinski. She had, I
think it's eight battalions----
General Smith. Yes, sir.
Secretary Cambone.--eight battalions under her control,
lodged at a large number of locations. She, as best I
understand it, was not frequently present at Abu Ghraib.
Abu Ghraib, itself--and let's remember the time frame that
we're talking about. We're coming out of the period of active
combat operations. We have a large number of detainees who are
being moved from a facility--
Chairman Warner. I'm going to ask you to be brief, because
I'm holding myself to my time.
Secretary Cambone. I understand, sir--moved them from
temporary facilities into permanent facilities, the places
being mortared and attacked frequently. The local commander was
unable to bring order to that place. For that reason, I would
argue, General Sanchez looked to Colonel Pappas, the head of
the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, and gave him the
responsibility, then, for taking care of Abu Ghraib as an
installation.
Chairman Warner. All right. Now, the reports that were
developed by international organizations--the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and others--in my
understanding, they came to your office for an assessment and a
determination as to what was to be done in response to those
reports.
Secretary Cambone. No, the reports that are at issue here
is--the ICRC, the International Committee of the Red Cross----
Chairman Warner. But you told me, I thought, over the
weekend, that you----
Secretary Cambone. I've seen the report.
Chairman Warner. You've seen them, and----
Secretary Cambone. I have seen it.
Chairman Warner.--you took some steps to implement some of
their recommendations?
Secretary Cambone. Steps were taken to implement their
recommendations. I saw those reports well after they were
issued. The one in question was issued on November 6, 2003. It
was addressed, to my knowledge, to General Karpinski, and she
replied, at her command level, on December 24, 2003, to the
ICRC.
Chairman Warner. Who else in the building had access to
those reports? Did they reach the SECDEF's level?
Secretary Cambone. No, sir, they did not. Those reports,
those working papers--again, as far as I understand it--were
delivered at the command level. The process is designed so that
the ICRC can engage with the local commanders and make those
kinds of improvements that are necessary in a more
collaborative environment than in an adversarial one, and so
they tend to try to work these problems at that level.
There was, sir, just for the record, another paper
developed by the ICRC, which was delivered to the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) in February 2004. That paper is a
historical paper. It is a review of activity from March or so
of 2003 through the end of January.
Chairman Warner. My time is running out. Sorry to cut you
off. We've asked for those reports.
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir. The SECDEF is going to give
them to you, sir.
Chairman Warner. General Taguba, in your orders were there
any restrictions placed upon you by General McKiernan, Generals
Sanchez or Abizaid, in the scope of your inquiry? In other
words, were you given a free hand to do what you felt had to be
done?
General Taguba. Sir, the scope, as I described to you, was
related to the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib. However, because
there were detention operations under the purview of the 800th
MP Brigade, we also looked at the operations at Camp Bucca, the
high-value detention facility at Camp Cropper, and also the
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) facility at Camp Ashraf.
Chairman Warner. I ask the same question to you. In simple,
layman's language, so it can be understood, what do you think
went wrong, in terms of the failure of discipline and the
failure of this interrogation process to be consistent with
known regulations, national and international? Also, to what
extent do you have knowledge of any participation by other than
U.S. military--namely, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and/or
contractors--in the performance of the interrogations?
General Taguba. Sir, as far as your last question--I'll
answer that first--the comments about participation of other
government agencies or contractors were related to us through
interviews that we conducted, it was related to our examination
of written statements and, of course, some other records.
With regards to your first question, sir, there was a
failure of leadership----
Chairman Warner. In other words, in the material that
you've now submitted to the Senate, or the DOD has submitted,
we will find in there all of your knowledge with respect to
participation by other government agencies.
General Taguba. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. It's nine volumes and about 6,000 pages.
We just got it yesterday.
General Taguba. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Can you give us a quick synopsis of
participation by other U.S. Government agencies?
General Taguba. Sir, they refer to other government
agencies as OGAs or MIs. When I asked for clarification, it's
because of the way they wore their uniform. Some of them did
not wear a uniform. So I would ask them to clarify further if
they knew any of these people, and they gave us names as
stipulated on their statements. They also gave us names of
those who are of MI, uniform MI in--personnel in the U.S. Army.
That was substantiated by the comments made to us by other
witnesses as we conducted our interviews.
Chairman Warner. All right. In simple words, your own
soldiers' language, how did this happen?
General Taguba. Failure in leadership, sir, from the
brigade commander on down, lack of discipline, no training
whatsoever, and no supervision. Supervisory omission was
rampant. Those are my comments.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. General Taguba, the ICRC said that the MI
officers at the prison confirmed to them that these activities
were all part of the MI process. Would you agree with the ICRC
that coercive practices, such as holding prisoners naked for
extended periods of time, were used, in their words, ``in a
systematic way'' as part of a MI process at the prison?
General Taguba. Sir, I did not read the ICRC report.
Senator Levin. Would you agree with that conclusion?
General Taguba. Yes, sir, based on the evidence that was
presented to us and what we gathered and what we reviewed. Yes,
sir.
Senator Levin. Now, that's more than a failure of
leadership. That's an active decision on the part of
leadership. It's not just oversight or negligence or neglect or
sloppiness, but purposeful, willful determination to use these
techniques as part of an interrogation process. Would you
include that in your definition of failure of leadership?
General Taguba. Yes, sir, they were.
Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone told us a few minutes ago
that the shift in command at the prison did not mean that the
MI commander had command authority over the MPs. But your
report says the opposite, that the decision to transfer that
command to the MI commander did effectively put that commander
in charge of the MP. Now, do you stick by your statement?
General Taguba. Is that to me, sir?
Senator Levin. Yes.
General Taguba. Sir, I did not question the order that was
given to Colonel Pappas on the fragmentary order (FRAGO) that
he received on November 19, 2003. That was not under my
purview. I did ask him to elaborate on what his
responsibilities were.
Senator Levin. Your report states that that change in
command, ``effectively made an MI officer rather than an MP
officer responsible for the MP units conducting detainee
operations at that facility.'' Is that your conclusion?
General Taguba. Yes, sir, because the order gave him TACON
of all units that were residing at Abu Ghraib.
Senator Levin. All right. Secretary Cambone, do you
disagree with that?
Secretary Cambone. TACON is----
Senator Levin. Do you disagree----
Secretary Cambone.--reflected here.
Senator Levin.--with what the General just said?
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Pardon?
Secretary Cambone. I do. I do not believe that the order
placing Colonel Pappas in charge gave him the authority to
direct the MP's activities in direct operational control
(OPCON) conditions. Is that true, General?
Senator Levin. Thank you. No, it's okay. Let me just keep
going. You'll have just a disagreement over that.
Secretary Cambone, in an article in last Sunday's
Washington Post, in April 2003 the DOD approved about 20
interrogation techniques for use at Guantanamo that permit
reversing normal sleep patterns of detainees and exposing them
to heat/cold sensory assault. The use of these techniques
required the approval of senior Pentagon officials and, in some
cases, of Secretary Rumsfeld, according to that article. These
procedures, according to the Pentagon spokesman, Brian Whitman,
are controlled and approved on a case-by-case basis. Then it
says that the defense and intelligence officials said that
similar guidelines had been approved for use on ``high-value
detainees in Iraq, those suspected of terrorism or of having
knowledge of insurgency operations.'' Is that true? Were those
techniques adopted for Guantanamo? Were they then used or
accepted or adopted for Iraq?
Secretary Cambone. They are command-level guidelines for
the use in interrogation. They are, in some cases, the same;
and, in many cases, not.
Senator Levin. They're not the same in Iraq?
Secretary Cambone. Not the same.
Senator Levin. In Iraq. Can you give us a copy of the
guidelines?
Secretary Cambone. I can do that.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Levin. Both. So there were specific guidelines for
Guantanamo, and they were different from the guidelines for
Iraq.
Secretary Cambone. I believe that they were, and I will
give you the comparisons.
Senator Levin. All right. You'll give those to the
committee, then. Let me go to another issue.
There was an interview in the New York Times last week in
which Major General Miller said that 50 techniques that the
military officially uses in prisoner interrogations--including
hooding, sleep deprivation, and forcing prisoners into stress
positions--have been adopted. Are you familiar with those 50
techniques?
Secretary Cambone. As I said in my opening statement, there
are those techniques in Army doctrine, yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Those are 50 techniques?
Secretary Cambone. I don't know that it's 50, sir. There is
a----
Senator Levin. But it includes stress positions?
Secretary Cambone. I believe they do.
[Subsequently, the witness provided the following
information for the record:] It does not.
Senator Levin. All right, and is that something that you
will also supply to the committee?
Secretary Cambone. We can supply the manual to you, yes,
sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Senator Levin. All right. Now, in an annex in the Taguba
Report it says the following as being a permissible technique
for use in the Iraqi theater: ``The interrogation officer in
charge will submit memoranda for the record requesting harsh
approaches for the commanding general's approval prior to
employment--sleep management, sensory deprivation, isolation
longer than 30 days, and dogs.''
Secretary Cambone, were you personally aware that
permissible interrogation techniques in the Iraqi theater
included sleep management, sensory deprivation, isolation
longer than 30 days, and dogs?
Secretary Cambone. No, sir. That list, both in terms of its
detail and its exceptions, was approved at the command level in
the theater.
Senator Levin. That was a command-level approval?
Secretary Cambone. As far as I understand it, yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Mr. Secretary, you said that you had
decided, right at the beginning, that the Geneva Conventions
would apply to our activities in Iraq.
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Yet Secretary Rumsfeld repeatedly has made a
distinction between whether or not those Geneva Conventions
rules must be applied, whether people--prisoners will be
treated, ``pursuant to those rules'' or ``consistent with those
rules.'' He said--and this is just a few days ago--that the
Geneva Conventions did not apply precisely.
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. You, this morning, said, again, the Geneva
Conventions apply to our activities in Iraq.
Secretary Cambone. In Iraq.
Senator Levin. But not precisely?
Secretary Cambone. No. Sir, I think what--let me tell you
what the facts are. The Geneva Conventions apply in Iraq.
Senator Levin. Precisely?
Secretary Cambone. Precisely.
Senator Levin. Do the----
Secretary Cambone. They do not apply in the precise way
that the Secretary was talking about in Guantanamo and the----
Senator Levin. He was----
Secretary Cambone.--unlawful combatants.
Senator Levin.--talking about Iraq. Let me cut you right
off there. The whole interview here was about Iraq----
Secretary Cambone. And I----
Senator Levin.--and the conditions at that prison. That's
what this whole entire interview was about. It was on NBC. It
was May 5, 2004. It was an interview about Iraq. Guantanamo is
no longer the issue here. The Secretary said something he's
said elsewhere, and I've heard this with my own ears recently.
He said that the Geneva Conventions apply not precisely, that
prisoners are treated ``consistent with, but not pursuant to.''
Now, he did say the other day and this is a quote: ``The
Geneva Conventions did not apply precisely.'' Are you saying
that the SECDEF misspoke on----
Secretary Cambone. I can't speak for the SECDEF. I can only
tell you what my understanding is, Senator----
Senator Levin. You don't know what he meant by that?
Secretary Cambone. I can tell you what I understand, and
that is that----
Senator Levin. No. Do you know what he meant----
Secretary Cambone.--the Geneva Conventions apply.
Senator Levin.--by that?
Secretary Cambone. Sir, I can't speak for the SECDEF on
that issue. I'll----
Senator Levin. You've not talked to----
Secretary Cambone.--take the--I will take the question for
the record, and I will ask him. I can't----
Senator Levin.--the May 5 interview.
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Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.
I think, at this juncture, Secretary Cambone said the
question of the utilization of dogs and other things were at
the command level. Can you speak to that response to that
important question?
General Smith. Sir, I can. The rule on dogs, that I'm aware
of, is that they can patrol in the areas, but they have to be
muzzled at all times.
Chairman Warner. Have you examined the exact language that
your command promulgated down to these prisons?
General Smith. Sir, I have the Army techniques that are
authorized, which is what they live by.
Chairman Warner. All right. We have to clarify this.
Secretary Cambone said it came from your command, so I ask you
to focus on it and provide it for the committee.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Senator McCain?
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Senator McCain. General Taguba, I want to thank you for
your excellent report, and I think it's been very helpful to
this committee, as well as to the American people.
General Miller--first of all, we know that the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay are not subject to the Geneva Conventions
because they're al Qaeda--at least those that are al Qaeda--
and, therefore, being terrorists, they are not subject to the
Geneva Conventions for the treatment of prisoners of war. I
don't disagree with that assessment, and I don't think you do,
either. Do you?
General Taguba. Yes, sir, no.
Senator McCain. Yet General Miller was quoted in your
report, when he arrived in Iraq--I believe Secretary Cambone
was one of those who urged his transfer there--that he wanted
to ``Gitmo-ize'' the treatment of prisoners in--throughout
Iraq, including Abu Ghraib prison. What do you make of that
statement?
General Taguba. Sir, I'd defer that to General Miller, sir.
But, for the record, I've never been to Guantanamo. I'm only
knowledgeable of my experience and my observations at Abu
Ghraib, which is a detention operation, along with the other
detention operations under the command and control of the 800
MP Brigade, as under combat conditions, separate and distinct
of what I consider to be a sterile environment in Cuba.
Senator McCain. But you found, clearly in your report,
violations of the rules for the treatment--Geneva Conventions
for the treatment of prisoners of war, right?
General Taguba. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Including moving prisoners around to avoid
ICRC inspections?
General Taguba. Yes, sir. That was conveyed to us by those
that we interviewed, and comments that we assessed in the
written statements.
Senator McCain. In your report, General Karpinski says that
General Sanchez said that in the case of problems in the
prison--there was uprising and riot and escape--an American, I
believe, was killed--that they should use lethal means
immediately, and not non-lethal means to start with. Isn't that
according to your report?
General Taguba. Yes, sir. They changed their rules of
engagement (ROE), I believe, four times, to use lethal and then
to--non-lethal to lethal force based on the levels of the
events. I believe the last time they changed the ROE, sir, was
in November of last year. That's contained in one of the
annexes that we have.
Senator McCain. In your judgment, were these abuses a
result of an overall military or intelligence policy to
``soften up'' detainees for interrogation?
General Taguba. Sir, we did not gain any evidence where it
was an overall MI policy of the sort. I think it was a matter
of soldiers, with their interaction with MI personnel, who they
perceived or thought to be competent authority that were giving
them--or influencing their actions to set the conditions for
successful interrogations operations.
Senator McCain. According to your report, these abuses were
very widespread, correct?
General Taguba. Sir, the manner by which we conducted our
investigation and collected evidence was that they were between
mid- to late-October, and as late as December, perhaps early
January.
Senator McCain. Mr. Cambone, the media report that
complaints were made by Ambassador Bremer and Secretary Powell
concerning the treatment of prisoners in Iraq, do you know
anything about that?
Secretary Cambone. No, sir, I am not aware of those
complaints.
Senator McCain. In your opinion--well, maybe I'd better ask
General Taguba--how far up the chain of command did awareness
of these ongoing abuses--let me ask this.
When someone says that they're going to ``Gitmo-ize'' a
prison, wouldn't a subordinate think, ``We're going to change
the rules''?
General Taguba. Sir, I'd rather not speculate on that. I
don't exactly know what General Miller meant by ``Gitmo-izing''
Abu Ghraib because it's a different situation there.
Senator McCain. I think it's pretty obvious, but I thank
you for your testimony and your report.
Tell me, again, about your view of General Karpinski's role
in this. She says that she was excluded from certain parts of
the prison and certain areas where some of these abuses took
place. Do you have anything on that?
General Taguba. Sir, I disagree with that.
Senator McCain. You agree or disagree?
General Taguba. I disagree with the fact that she was
excluded from certain areas of the prison. I believe, in my
interview of her, she was still in charge of detention
operations in-theater, and it's hard for me to believe that she
would be excluded from any of those facilities, or even
portions of those facilities.
Senator McCain. What evidence did you find that these
individuals received any training in the Geneva Conventions for
the treatment of prisoners of war?
General Taguba. Sir, the evidence that we gathered were
training records from the training that they received at the
mobilization station and home station, their mission essential-
tasks list that they developed to prepare them for deployment,
that sort of thing. Several of these soldiers intimated to us--
at least conveyed to us--that they were never trained on
internment or resettlement operations. But as far as I was
concerned, sir, they were--their leaders should have, could
have, provided the necessary resources to which they are
expected to do so in training their soldiers.
Senator McCain. But they did not receive it.
General Taguba. No, sir.
Senator McCain. Mr. Cambone states that they did, and the
SECDEF states they did. I thank you, General.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Cambone. Mr. Chairman, could I just be a little
more clear with Senator McCain?
Chairman Warner. Yes, indeed.
Secretary Cambone. You asked if I was aware of concerns
expressed by Ambassador Bremer and the Secretary of State, and
I assumed you meant specifically on these cases.
Senator McCain. No, I----
Secretary Cambone. I mean, that's what I intended to
answer.
Senator McCain.--on the treatment of prisoners of war.
Secretary Cambone. Yes, let me give you a broader answer,
which is----
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Secretary Cambone.--Ambassador Bremer had been concerned
about the number of people who were in custody, and was anxious
to see them move through the system and released as rapidly as
possible, as was Secretary Powell.
Senator McCain. But my question was----
Secretary Cambone.--on the broad question----
Senator McCain.--but my question was--and I'm sorry to
interrupt; my time's expired----
Secretary Cambone. Forgive me.
Senator McCain.--were you aware of the complaints about
treatment of prisoners of war made by Ambassador Bremer?
Secretary Cambone. Per se, in that sense, no. That he was
worried about prisoners of war, that I knew.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Smith. Sir, could I also add that I have all the
standard operating procedures (SOP) here for Gitmo. In every
case, it is very specifically and clearly written that the
humane treatment of prisoners is first and foremost, and
inhumane treatment of detainees is never justified. It is all
in the spirit of the Geneva Conventions.
Senator McCain. I thank you. But clearly there's a
difference between adherence to the Geneva Conventions for
treatment of prisoners of war----
General Smith. Yes, sir, but we were operating under the
Geneva Conventions in Iraq. We clearly understood that.
Senator McCain. I thank you.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. Now, those applied to the prison in Iraq.
General Smith. Sir, when he went over there, and he
talked----
Chairman Warner. When who went?
General Smith. When General Miller went over there, and he
spoke and addressed this with each of the commanders, he gave
them the SOP that they were using at Gitmo to use as an example
on how they should generate their own operating procedures.
Chairman Warner. That included the phraseology to----
General Smith. Exactly, sir. I just read it to you.
Sir, may I also just mention, on your question on
promulgation of policy, the policy regarding dogs was
established and put out by CJTF-7 on October 12, 2003, and it
specifically says that interrogators must ensure the safety of
security internees, and approaches must in no way endanger
them. Interrogators will ensure that security internees are
allowed adequate sleep, that diets--et cetera, et cetera--and
then it says, ``Should military working dogs be present during
interrogations, they will be muzzled and under control of a
handler at all times to ensure safety.''
So General Sanchez, through those things, very specifically
addressed what was allowed in the interrogation room and what
was not allowed and those things that required his approval,
such as segregation from the population in excess of 30 days.
Chairman Warner. Can you throw any light, then, on where
this thing broke down, given that he started in the proper way?
General Smith. Sir, given the guidance that was put out
there, I can't. I have to agree with General Taguba's
assessment of it, in that these rules and regulations were out
there, and, somewhere in the leadership chain execution and
implementation of these policies broke down.
Chairman Warner. Is CENTCOM trying to find out where that
happened?
General Smith. Absolutely, sir.
Chairman Warner. All right. Thank you.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Taguba, I want to join others in commending you and
thank you for the service to this country.
Secretary Cambone, I hope when you have a chance to read
through the 2004 report, which, according to the ICRC, was
given to Paul Bremer, General Sanchez, and the U.S. Permanent
Mission in Geneva, according to Christopher Girard, who's from
the ICRC, it talks about the ICRC collected allegations of ill
treatment following the capture that took place in Baghdad,
Basra, Ramadi, and Tikrit.
General Taguba. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. It isn't only focused on this one prison
camp, but lists the others, as well. I think we have to be
aware of that.
General Taguba. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Now, let me just go quickly to this
report. Newsweek Magazine reports that, since September 11,
Secretary Rumsfeld has insisted on personally signing off on
the harsher methods used to squeeze suspected terrorists held
at U.S. prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He's approved such
tactics as the use of stress positions, stripping of detainees
naked, prolonged sleep deprivation. Have you advised Secretary
Rumsfeld on these issues? What other officials of the DOD have
participated in these decisions?
Secretary Cambone. Sir, I can answer----
Senator Kennedy. Has the General Counsel been involved in--
--
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy.--giving advice?
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. He's been involved?
Secretary Cambone. If I may, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Yes.
Secretary Cambone. With the permission of the chair and
yourself, the SECDEF has a deep regard for the well-being of
those being held in Guantanamo and their well-being and their
care. Therefore, any procedure, which is of the type that
General Smith suggested, which are in the approved rules, but
are harsh, he has withheld to his approval first.
Second, when the issue of how these prisoners, detainees,
in Guantanamo were to be treated--there was convened, under the
GC, the General Counsel of the Department, a working group
whose objective it was to work through all of these issues. So
that matrix that has been reported is the product of that
effort.
Senator Kennedy. All right. Let me--because my time is
short--has the SECDEF--so he has, evidently, approved these
kinds of things.
Secretary Cambone. I don't know in detail, sir, but those
that he--there is a list that he has approved.
Senator Kennedy. He has approved. What about on Iraq? Has
he approved signing off on harsher methods of interrogation in
Iraq?
Secretary Cambone. Again, sir, no. That, as General Smith
said, is CJTF-7 promulgation.
Senator Kennedy. If not, who--has someone had that
authority in Iraq?
Secretary Cambone. If there is anything that exceeds
General Sanchez's direction, he is, as I understand it, to sign
off on that exception.
Senator Kennedy. So he has the authority, General Sanchez.
Do you know whether he's used that or not?
Secretary Cambone. General Smith?
General Smith. Sir, he----
Senator Kennedy. Just quickly.
General Smith. Yes, sir. Just in that policy that I told
you, where separation of greater than 30 days--he would be the
approval authority. To the best of my knowledge, he has not
used anything beyond that.
Senator Kennedy. Let me ask you, Secretary Cambone, about
``rendering.'' There are a number of reports about detainees in
U.S. custody, U.S. intelligence officials being transferred for
interrogations to governments that routinely torture prisoners.
In December 2002, The Washington Post stated, ``Detainees that
refuse to cooperate with Americans have been rendered to
foreign intelligence services''--Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco,
Syria, and other countries. Can you assure the committee that
the administration is fully complying with all of the legal
requirements, and that all reports of U.S. officials engaging
in the practice of rendering are false?
Secretary Cambone. Sir, to the best of my knowledge, that
is a true statement.
Senator Kennedy. We are not--we have not--your statement,
sworn statement, now--to your knowledge, the United States has
not been involved in any rendering, any turning over of any
personnel to any other country.
Secretary Cambone. No. No, you said that they were turned
over for torture and misbehavior--mistreatment. We have
returned, for example, individuals to the United Kingdom. There
may be three or four of them that have been returned from
Gitmo.
Senator Kennedy. Have you turned over, to your knowledge,
any suspects to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, or Syria to
gather information?
Secretary Cambone. From those people in DOD custody, not
that I am aware of, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Well, you would know----
Secretary Cambone. I am not aware of any that have been
transferred for that purpose. If I----
Senator Kennedy. Well, for----
Secretary Cambone.--if there are----
Senator Kennedy.--for any other purpose?
Secretary Cambone. If there are, I will come back to you
and tell you. As best I know, there are not any persons under
our custody that have been transferred.
Senator Kennedy. Do the interrogators for MI, the CIA, and
also the contract intelligence--do they all have identical
rules and regulations, in terms of interrogating the detainees
or prisoners of war or combatants, or is there any distinction
among the three?
Secretary Cambone. Within Iraq, the rules of the Geneva
Conventions apply. So, therefore, the rules----
Senator Kennedy. I was not--that isn't my question. That's
not my question.
Secretary Cambone. Sir----
Senator Kennedy. My question is, do they have different
kinds of rules of questioning? Do each of those services have
rules? If they do have rules, how are they different?
Secretary Cambone. I can speak for the DOD contractor and
military personnel, and those rules are the same. The people we
hire----
Senator Kennedy. Identical.
Secretary Cambone.--the people we hire, in most cases, are
required to have had that training in the military in order to
become interrogators.
Senator Kennedy. They are bound by the same set----
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. So your testimony is, the private
contractors, MI, and the military interrogators all operate at
the same--and the CIA--all operate with the same rules of
interrogation.
Secretary Cambone. I can only speak for the last, the
military, inside of Iraq, sir.
Senator Kennedy. You're going to provide those rules to us?
Secretary Cambone. I can do that.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Kennedy. Let me just ask you, finally, in the
opinion of General Taguba, the setting of conditions for
favorable interrogation is not authorized or consistent with
Army regulations. You seem to reach a different conclusion in
your testimony today.
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Do you agree you and General Taguba differ
on that issue?
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir. We do, and in this sense----
Senator Kennedy. I think it's important that we understand,
when we're talking about the abuses that are taking place with
the MP, and you have two entirely different kinds of viewpoints
on this issue--how in the world are the MP that are supposed to
implement going to be able to get it straight, particularly
when you have General Miller there that is following what you
believe, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. How are we--how do you expect the MPs to
get it straight if we have a difference between the two of you?
Secretary Cambone. Let me try and explain it. As far as I
understand it, there is doctrine relative to the MP which gives
them the responsibility for conveying to the interrogators the
attitudes of those who are going to be interrogated--their
disposition, who they've been talking to, and so forth--and as
the interrogators, in turn, under doctrine, Army doctrine, ask
the MP those kinds of questions. So there is designed in the
system a collaborative approach with respect to gaining that
information.
With respect to the issue of ``Gitmo-izing,'' if I may
return to that, Senator Kennedy, let's go back to the
conditions that were in Abu Ghraib. They were disorderly, as
the General has pointed out. The notion, it seems to me, that
General Miller had was that order needed to be established in
the processes and procedures.
Senator Kennedy. Just to finish, because my time is up--
General Taguba, why do you believe that there should be a
separation between the MP and MI officers?
General Taguba. Sir, there's a baseline that we use as a
reference, which is Army Regulation 190-8, which is a multi-
service regulation, establishing the policy of an executive
agency for detention operations. In there it enumerates, in
paragraph 1-5, the general policy and the treatment of not just
EPWs, but civilian internees, retained personnel, and other
detainees. That's the baseline that we use. We also use the
MP's doctrine on detention operations, which is Field Manual 3-
19.40. We further refer to the interrogations operations
doctrine used by the MI, which is Field Manual 34-52.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I regret I wasn't here on Friday. I was
unable to be here. But maybe it's better that I wasn't, because
as I watch this outrage, this outrage everyone seems to have
about the treatment of these prisoners, I was, I have to say--
and I'm probably not the only one up at this table that is more
outraged by the outrage than we are by the treatment. The idea
that these prisoners--they're not there for traffic violations.
If they're in cell block 1A or 1B, these prisoners, they're
murderers, they're terrorists, they're insurgents. Many of them
probably have American blood on their hands. Here we're so
concerned about the treatment of those individuals.
I hasten to say, yes, there are seven bad guys and gals
that didn't do what they should have done. They were misguided
and, I think, maybe even perverted. The things that they did
have to be punished. They're being punished. They're being
tried right now, and that's all taking place.
But I'm also outraged by the press and the politicians and
the political agendas that are being served by this. I say
``political agendas'' because that's actually what is
happening. I would share with my colleagues a solicitation that
was made. I'm going to read the first two sentences. ``Over the
past week, we've all been shocked by the pictures from Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq, but we have also been appalled at the
slow and inept response by President Bush, which has further
undermined America's credibility.'' It goes on to demand that
George Bush fire Donald Rumsfeld, and then it goes on to a
timeline, a chronology. At the very last--and they say, ``a
solicitation for contributions.'' I don't recall this ever
having happened before in history.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that this
solicitation be made a part of the record at this point.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
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Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I also have to say, when we
talk about the treatment of these prisoners, that I would guess
that these prisoners wake up every morning thanking Allah that
Saddam Hussein is not in charge of these prisons. When he was
in charge, they would take electric drills and drill holes
through hands. They would cut their tongues out. They would cut
their ears off. We've seen accounts of lowering their bodies
into vats of acid. All these things were taking place. This was
the type of treatment that they had.
I would want everyone to get this and read it. This is a
documentary of the Iraqi Special Report. It talks about the
unspeakable acts of mass murder, unspeakable acts of torture,
unspeakable acts of mutilation, the murdering of kids--lining
up 312 little kids, under 12 years old, and executing them--and
then, of course, what they do to Americans, too.
There's one story in here that was in the--I think it was
The New York Times--yes, on June 2. I suggest everyone take
that--get that and read it. It's about one of the prisoners who
did escape as they were marched out there, blindfolded, and put
before mass graves, and they mowed them down, and they buried
them. This man was buried alive, and he clawed his way out and
was able to tell his story.
I ask, Mr. Chairman, at this point in the record, that this
account of the brutality of Saddam Hussein be entered into the
record, made a part of the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection, so ordered.
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Senator Inhofe. I am also outraged that we have so many
humanitarian do-gooders right now crawling all over these
prisons looking for human-rights violations while our troops,
our heroes, are fighting and dying. I just don't think we can
take 7 bad people--there are some 700 guards in Abu Ghraib,
there are some 25 other prisons, about 15,000 guards all
together, and 7 of them did things they shouldn't have done,
and they're being punished for that. But what about some
300,000 troops who have been rotating through all this time,
and they have--all the stories of valor are there.
Now, one comment about Rumsfeld. A lot of them don't like
him. I'm sorry that Senator McCain isn't here, because I just
now said to him, ``Do you remember back 3 years ago when
Secretary Rumsfeld was up for confirmation? I said, `These guys
aren't going to like him, because he doesn't kowtow to them,
he's not easily intimidated.' '' I've never seen Secretary
Rumsfeld intimidated. Quite frankly, I can't think of any
American today as qualified as Donald Rumsfeld is to prosecute
this war.
Now, all the ideas about these pictures. I would suggest to
you any pictures--and I think maybe we should get direction
from this committee, Mr. Chairman, that if pictures are
authorized to be disseminated among the public, that for every
picture of abuse or alleged abuse of prisoners, we have
pictures of mass graves, pictures of children being executed,
pictures of the four Americans in Baghdad that were burned and
their bodies were mutilated and dismembered in public. Let's
get the whole picture.
Now, General Taguba, many, many years ago I was in the
United States Army. My job--I was a court reporter. I know a
little bit about the history. The ``undue command influence''
that is the term that you've heard, and I'd like to make sure
that we get into the record what that is. I'm going from memory
now, but it's my understanding that the commanders up the line
can possibly serve as appellate judges. Consequently,
commanders up the line are not given a lot of the graphic
details, but merely said, as in the case of Rumsfeld, ``Serious
allegations need to be investigated,'' and they started an
investigation. This is back in January. Now, Rumsfeld said, and
I'm quoting him now, ``Anything we say publicly could have the
impact on the legal proceeding against the accused. If my
responses are measured, it is to assure that pending cases are
not jeopardized.'' Do I have an accurate memory as to why they
have this particular ``undue command influence'' provision that
we have been following now for five decades, that I know of?
General Taguba. Sir, I'm not a lawyer, and----
Senator Inhofe. But isn't that the reason you were called
in? I should ask General Smith.
General Smith, isn't that the reason that General Taguba
was brought in, in the first place, to keep this from
happening?
General Smith. Yes, sir, to do the investigation and do the
fact-finding so that the commanders could make informed
decisions on what actions should be taken thereafter. The
difficulty in the command-influence piece is that, should
General Sanchez, or should I or General Abizaid, say something
along the lines that, ``We must take this action against these
individuals,'' then that is command influence and down the line
those that are making judgment on them would be influenced and
biased in their decisions.
Senator Inhofe. That, sir, has not changed over the last 45
years.
General Smith. That has not changed. That has happened, we
have had a number of folks who have had their sentences
impacted by command influence.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, one last question to General
Smith. All kinds of accounts are coming out now and many of
them are fictitious, I would suggest. One was about a guy being
dragged out of a barbershop--this was in The Washington Post
this morning--and blindfolded. They talked about the person
doing this and said he had an AK-47. Are our troops issued AK-
47s?
General Smith. They are not, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
For the benefit of all Members, the subject of the pictures
has been raised, and I'd like to address that. In consultation
with the DOD over the weekend, the DOD indicated its
willingness to cooperate in every way to provide these pictures
to the Senate Armed Services Committee. But it occurred to me,
in my capacity as chairman, that this issue was a Senate
institutional issue--it went beyond this committee--because I
think other Senators should be entitled to receive that
information in the same way as members of this committee.
I, thereby, asked the Senate leadership, majority,
minority, and invited Senator Levin to join me, and we
discussed this issue very carefully yesterday. We are seeking
the advice of Senate counsel and the respective counsel of the
majority/minority leader, and counsel to this committee, and we
will before, hopefully, the end of the day, have adopted a
procedure by which that transmission of further evidence can
come to the whole Senate. We'll focus on how it would be made
available to all Senators, and under what conditions, in
compliance with Senate procedural rules and to protect the
legal interests of all parties involved. Thank you.
Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, General Taguba, for your report
and for your service to your country.
In Friday's hearing before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, General Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff, said of
the prison abuse, ``This is not a training issue, but one of
character and values.'' It's becoming clear to me that this
abuse wasn't just about values; it was about policies and
planning. General Taguba, based on your investigation, who gave
the order to ``soften up'' these prisoners, to give them ``the
treatment''? Was this a policy? Who approved it?
General Taguba. Sir, we did not find any evidence of a
policy or a direct order given to these soldiers to conduct
what they did. I believe that they did it on their own
volition. I believe that we--they collaborated with several MI
interrogators at the lower level, based on their conveyance of
that information through interviews and written statements. We
didn't find any order whatsoever, sir, written or otherwise,
that directed them to do what they did.
Senator Byrd. Doesn't the lack of training of our troops
for prison duty actually demonstrate a monumental failure in
planning for the long-term occupation of Iraq? How else could
the military and civilian leadership of the Pentagon explain
why this training wasn't even offered?
General Taguba. Sir, the training of the Geneva Conventions
is inherent every time we--from as a recruit all the way up to
my rank level. In terms of these MPs, as far as internment and
resettlement, some of them received training at home station
and the Mobility Station, and some did not. That was our
recommendation, that a mobile training team be deployed to
theater to ensure that they are in compliance with training
tasks to do that. There was the capacity to do that during the
conduct of their operation because there were competent
battalion commanders. The battalion commander at Camp Ashraf
was conducting his detention operations to standard. At Camp
Bucca--they did that at Camp Bucca, and also Camp Cropper.
Somehow it did not pan out at Abu Ghraib.
General Smith. Sir, I might also mention that this
organization, the 800th MP, is a specific task-organized
internment and resettlement organization. Their job was this
sort of stuff.
Senator Byrd. So you don't agree that there was a
monumental lack of planning, that there was a monumental
failure of planning for the long-term occupation of Iraq? You
don't agree with that?
General Smith. Sir, I'm--are you talking to me?
Senator Byrd. Yes.
General Smith. I'm just addressing the specific training
issue for the 800th MP that you related to, that this was their
task, to come over and do that. I mean, that's what they did as
an organization. So they were brought over to conduct
internment and resettlement issues.
Secretary Cambone. If I may, Senator Byrd, I don't think
that the difficulties we found at Abu Ghraib indicate that
there was a long-term planning effort. In fact, Major General
Ryder, who also did a report, was there specifically for that
purpose, ``What is the long-term basis for confinement
facilities and training and care and so forth?'' So, no, there
was attention being paid to the longer-term occupation issue.
Senator Byrd. Secretary Cambone, when, if ever, did
Ambassador Bremer first raise any concerns about how the
military was running prisons in Iraq?
Secretary Cambone. Sir, as I said earlier, the broad
question of moving detainees through the prison system was a
concern of Ambassador Bremer early on. With respect to the
specific conditions inside of those facilities, I am not aware
of his having raised them. I don't know when that might have
been. I do know that--I am told that sometime in the February/
March time frame he raised this issue, but I would have to
check records for you, sir.
Senator Byrd. Didn't Ambassador Bremer have overall
responsibility for what was going on in Iraq?
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir. He was the occupying power,
the one in whom that was invested.
Senator Byrd. Shouldn't he have known how Iraqi prisons
were being run? Shouldn't he have sounded the alert if he
thought that the military was doing something wrong?
Secretary Cambone. Again, sir, the working papers that are
issued by the ICRC are done at the level of the command that
they are investigating, and they don't frequently elevate to
that level. They did meet in February 2004, which is the
result--the resulting paper is the one that has been
distributed. At that time, the ICRC presented to Ambassador
Bremer their findings for that previous year. It is my guess it
is that point that the specific issues that you're addressing
may have been raised by Ambassador Bremer.
Senator Byrd. Do you know if Ambassador Bremer made any
recommendations to the DOD?
Secretary Cambone. He was anxious that the DOD find a way
to, as I've said, move the prisoner detainee more rapidly
through the system, provide addresses for the location to the
dependents, and things of that character, that is a general
treatment of the detainees within the system in Iraq.
Senator Byrd. Do you know if he made any recommendations
with reference to policy?
Secretary Cambone. No, sir, not beyond what I've said.
Again, his concern would have been for the broad population and
assuring that we were moving people through that system, doing
what was necessary for interrogations, and releasing those who
had either served their time or had no reason for being in
custody. He was anxious to see those people returned to their
homes and families.
Senator Byrd. My time is up.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Byrd. Thank you very
much.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think my questions are somewhat repetitive. But, at any
rate, General, thank you for the job that you've done. Many are
called, and few are chosen, and you have done an outstanding
job.
In your report, you indicated that the 800th Military
Police Brigade had not been directed to change its policies and
procedures to set conditions for intelligence interrogations,
but you concluded, indeed, such changes had been made at lower
levels. Were these changes made at the battalion or the company
level?
General Taguba. Sir, we didn't find any changes, either at
the company or the battalion, or even at the brigade.
Senator Roberts. I'm going to repeat the question by
Senator Byrd. Did these changes result from orders or direction
from the MI unit at the prison?
General Taguba. Sir, there were interactions between the
guards and the MI at that level.
Senator Roberts. But the changes were not policy.
General Taguba. No, sir.
Senator Roberts. Did you discuss with Major General Miller
his recommendation that the MPs and the MI functions be better
coordinated to determine exactly what he had in mind? As a
follow-up--this is the ``Gitmo-ize'' question--is there some
level of coordination between the MP and the MI units that is
permitted by Army regulations? You cited a whole series of Army
regulations. General Ryder, I believe, states that we should
have a firewall in between the MPs and the military
interrogators. But yet General Miller says from his experience
in regards to Gitmo that that basically, if not impossible, is
actually detrimental, in terms of cooperation; but insists that
if you do have that kind of cooperation, you must have
leadership, you must have discipline, and you must have
training. Were the MI officers at Abu Ghraib familiar with
Major General Miller's recommendations?
General Taguba. Sir, I cannot answer that. I was not there
for the debriefing, nor did I discuss in any detail General
Miller's report.
Senator Roberts. Did the intelligence officers then at the
prison believe that Major General Miller's recommendations had
been accepted and adopted? If so, what was the basis of this
belief?
General Taguba. Sir, I cannot answer that. I was not there,
nor did I question whether the CJTF-7 accepted his
recommendations or not. I just read his report.
Senator Roberts. Okay. General Smith, an order to ``soften
up'' a detainee would not be a lawful order, is that correct?
General Smith. Sir, that's correct.
Senator Roberts. What legal basis then would a soldier have
for following that order?
General Smith. Sir, none. Especially if you're an
organization of that type and have read any of the regulations.
All of them are replete with guidance on humane treatment, as
well as a number of fragmentary orders that were put out
through General Sanchez telling them that they could not do
many of these--or take actions that were inhumane.
Senator Roberts. Secretary Cambone, thank you for your
appearance. We welcome you to the Intelligence Committee
tomorrow.
Some accused of the abuses at the prison claim they were
acting under orders from intelligence officers. Do any of the
DOD regulations or policies encourage, condone, or permit such
acts?
Secretary Cambone. No, sir.
Senator Roberts. In your review of this matter, have you
learned of any local or unit-level policies--I emphasize the
word ``policies''--that encourage or condone or permitted these
abuses?
Secretary Cambone. No, sir.
Senator Roberts. Were you aware of Major General Miller's
recommendations that MPs set the conditions for the
interrogations at the prison? Did you discuss this
recommendation with anybody at the CJTF-7?
Secretary Cambone. I did not discuss them with anybody at
CJTF-7, no, sir.
Senator Roberts. What did you understand this
recommendation to mean?
Secretary Cambone. That there had to be a basis for the
transfer of information from those who had custody, on a daily
basis, of those who were being interrogated--to those who were
being interrogated in order that the interrogators understood
personalities, relationships, in order to be able to gain the
information that they were trying to gain from the----
Senator Roberts. From a pragmatic standpoint, is this a
good thing or a bad thing? Is Ryder right, and Miller wrong?
Miller right and Ryder wrong? Or is this somewhere in between?
Secretary Cambone. While it is written in doctrine, it
seems to me doctrine is meant to be adapted to circumstance,
and that was what the substance of General Miller's
recommendation was.
Senator Roberts. When is the Fay Report going to come out?
Secretary Cambone. It's my understanding--and, General, you
can correct me--that he is completing his work in Iraq over
this week. He has to go to Germany to see people who have since
rotated from Iraq to Germany, and then will come back here to
meet others. So we're looking toward the end of this month and
perhaps the first part of June.
Senator Roberts. Is the policy in regards to the MP and the
MI functions at Gitmo--is this being reviewed for compliance
with Army regulations?
Secretary Cambone. If General Fay didn't realize that was a
subject of his investigation, sir, he is now painfully aware of
it.
Senator Roberts. Was your encouragement to Major General
Miller to inspect the prison in any way prompted or otherwise
linked to concerns about any abuse at the prison?
Secretary Cambone. No, sir. To the contrary, it was the
desire to make certain that we had the proper conditions within
those places in order for the information to be gathered.
Senator Roberts. When you learned of the abuse, and knowing
of the intelligence activities at the prison, did you have any
concern about a possible link to the intelligence unit?
Secretary Cambone. I understood--it was probably in
February--that there were MI personnel who were implicated. I
did not know the nature of that implication, the extent or
scope of the abuse that had taken place. So I didn't make a
connection in the sense that there was a significant issue here
until we moved down the path and realized exactly was taking
place.
Furthermore, I still don't know that there is a significant
issue here.
Senator Roberts. I thank the chairman.
General Smith. Sir, could I clarify on the MP/MI regulation
here? It is not absolutely clear in this regulation that the
MPs and the MI guys should not have some relationship. What is
absolutely clear in the regulation is that the MPs are not
allowed to be in the interrogation process. So do not take it
that there is some Army regulation out there that says, ``This
shall not be.'' I have it right here, and I'll be glad to
provide it for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Roberts. I think that would be helpful. My point
was, I don't think you can set up a firewall between those who
are interrogating and the MPs. I don't even think that would be
desirable. On the other side of the fence, you don't want them
directly involved----
General Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts.--and with the lack of discipline and
leadership and training, to have something like this happen.
General Smith. I agree with you. I believe when you read
the document you will see that that allows that sort of
activity.
Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, it would be helpful if we
had Secretary Cambone's statement. I don't have that. I don't
know if it was made available. He has it now.
Chairman Warner. It was made available just shortly before
the hearing.
Senator Roberts. All right, thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. It's being reproduced now. Thank you.
I acknowledge, as chairman of the Intelligence Committee,
you're conducting a separate inquiry on this matter, but I
think it's important--and I picked up on something Secretary
Cambone said.
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Do you have any knowledge of any CIA
participation in the interrogation process in the cell blocks?
Secretary Cambone. I do know that there were people who
were brought by CIA personnel to that place, to the cell
blocks, and there may be--and, again--there may have been
interrogations conducted by the CIA personnel while they were
there. That's about the extent of my knowledge of specifically
what they were engaged in, in terms of interrogation.
Chairman Warner. General Smith, do you have any additional
knowledge?
General Smith. No, sir, I do not.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Taguba, to the best of your knowledge, when did
this pattern of abuse begin, as we've seen in the pictures?
General Taguba. Sir, to the best of the evidence that we
gathered, it happened sometime after October 15, 2003,
thereabouts----
Senator Reed. 15th of----
General Taguba.--mid- to late-October.
Senator Reed. Right.
General Smith, General Miller came to Iraq in August with
the baseline from Guantanamo, which had a series of coercive
measures, which was being employed in Guantanamo. We all
recognized that area was not subject to the Geneva Conventions.
He briefed, as you indicated in your previous testimony,
individuals at the prison. He also recommended the
establishment of a theater JIDC there. Is that correct?
General Smith. I believe so.
Senator Reed. That's correct.
General Taguba. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. That was August. Then in October, we start
seeing a series of abusive behaviors, which the accused suggest
were a result of encouragement or direction from these
intelligence people in this theater JIDC. General Taguba has
testified that he did not investigate, talk to, or in any way
know anything about what was going on in that JIDC. Is that a
fair chronology?
General Smith. Sir, it's a fair chronology. I would only
say that in speaking with General Miller, he has to be the one
that answers some of this, he spoke directly to the brigade
commanders who were involved here, and he had the special
operating procedures with him, and left those with them.
Senator Reed. General, to your knowledge, General Miller
made it very clear to these brigade commanders that because of
the Geneva Conventions, many of these provisions could not be
applied?
General Smith. Sir, according to General Miller, that was
very clear to the commanders.
Senator Reed. That was very clear. Then why would he bring
those procedures over and brief them?
General Smith. Sir, to the best of my knowledge--and,
again, these are questions you're going to have to ask General
Miller--but, to the best of my knowledge, he did not bring
those coercive procedures over with him.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, you encouraged General Miller to visit.
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Were you in communication, or anyone in your
office in communication, with General Miller during his trip or
after his trip?
Secretary Cambone. He technically went under Joint Staff
auspices, but with my encouragement and that of other senior
members of the DOD, to look at the issues that we've talked
about. Now, on his return, when he completed his report, I
received a briefing on it, and then asked for people to look at
its subsequent progress and what had taken place.
Senator Reed. So you were briefed on his recommendation to
use the guard force actively to condition the----
Secretary Cambone. No, sir. Again, the----
Senator Reed. You weren't briefed on that.
Secretary Cambone. No, no. Excuse me. I want to phrase this
right, and that is, on the issue of making certain that we had
the kind of cooperative relationships, I understood that. I
don't know that I was being told, and I don't know that General
Miller said, that there should be that kind of activity that
you are ascribing to his recommendation.
Senator Reed. General Taguba--excuse me, I'm probably doing
violence to your name; forgive me--was it clear from your
reading of the report that one of the major recommendations was
to use guards to condition these prisoners?
General Taguba. As I read it on the report, yes, sir, that
was recommended on the report.
Senator Reed. But General Miller didn't think it was
important enough to brief you, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Cambone. Sir, I was not briefed by General
Miller.
Senator Reed. Who were you briefed by?
Secretary Cambone. My deputy, General Boykin, briefed me on
the report.
Senator Reed. So General Boykin and General Miller were
collaborating on this exercise?
Secretary Cambone. Oh, not at all. Not at all, sir. Not at
all.
Senator Reed. General Boykin didn't think it was important
enough to brief you on that.
Secretary Cambone. No, sir. Again, your suggestion that the
report on the phrase ``setting the conditions'' is tantamount
to asking the MP to engage in abusive behavior, I believe, is a
misreading of General Miller's intent.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, what I'm suggesting is, anyone
in your position should have asked questions. One,
specifically, would be, what does it mean to ``set the
conditions'' of these troops, under the Geneva Conventions?
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Did you ask that question?
Secretary Cambone. I didn't have to ask that question. Why?
Because we had been through a process in which we understood
what those limits were with respect to Iraq and what those were
with respect to Guantanamo.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, what is the status of the
detainees in that prison under the Geneva Conventions?
Secretary Cambone. I'm sorry, sir, which prison?
Senator Reed. Abu Ghraib.
Secretary Cambone. Abu Ghraib? They are there under either
Article 3 or Article 4 of the Geneva Conventions.
Senator Reed. Let me recite Article 4, ``Persons protected
by the Geneva Conventions are those who, at any given moment
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a
conflict or occupation, in the hands of a party to the conflict
or occupying power of which they are not nationals.'' These are
protected persons.
Let me read Article 31, ``No physical or moral coercion
shall be exercised against protected persons in particular to
obtain any information from them or from third parties.''
Secretary Cambone. Sir, we're in agreement here.
Senator Reed. We're in agreement--I don't think we are, Mr.
Secretary.
Secretary Cambone. We are in agreement on----
Senator Reed. General Miller suggested that guard forces be
used to ``set the conditions.'' Based on the template at
Guantanamo, those methods were coercive. Yet you did not choose
to ask about this. You're completely oblivious.
Secretary Cambone. No, sir. Again, what I said was, we knew
what the circumstances were with respect to Guantanamo. We knew
what the circumstances were with respect to Iraq. We understood
that the Geneva Conventions, and all of its articles, applied
in Iraq. That--again, I come back to what I keep saying here--
the notion was that you had to have a cooperation, a
cooperative attitude, team-building, call it what you will
between the MPs and----
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, please.
Secretary Cambone.--the MIs.
Senator Reed. Please.
Secretary Cambone. Sir----
Senator Reed. This is not a cooperative attitude. This is
not a guard observing the comments of a prisoner.
Secretary Cambone. That is exactly true, sir.
Senator Reed. That is--is that happening in Guantanamo?
Secretary Cambone. No. Sir, what took place----
Senator Reed. Is that what's happening in Guantanamo?
Secretary Cambone.--what took place in the prison, we have
all said, exceeded the regulations, laws, and laws of war,
conventions of the Geneva Conventions, and everything else.
General Taguba has said repeatedly that there was no policy, he
discovered no direction, that these were not directed acts on
the part of those individuals----
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, people failed to ensure, by
asking appropriate questions, that these recommendations were
transmitted down to individual soldiers in a way that they
would understand----
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed.--this is just--is cooperating, not
participating in the ``setting the conditions,'' as was done--
as is done in Guantanamo.
Secretary Cambone. Senator, I agree with you on the
transmission of those directions. As I said to you, and as
General Smith has alluded to, there is a paper from General
Sanchez making precisely those points. Moreover, if you read
General Miller's report, he says, ``Before you do anything with
this, we need a command staff judge advocate to work this
problem and make sure it's done''----
Senator Reed. Did a command SJA issue a legal opinion?
Secretary Cambone. When--again, what I have is his report,
and it says that that was an activity in progress. I have not
heard--what I know is that General Sanchez subsequently----
Senator Reed. General Sanchez ordered this policy without
advice of counsel.
Secretary Cambone. No, sir, he did not. If you read General
Taguba's report, he will tell you that, at the time he was
there, he had not seen any action--it's page 12, I think--to
implement the procedures, specifically and officially, from
General Sanchez down to anyone in the lower ranks of his
command that the activity that was taking place was not
authorized.
General Smith. I would add that there were numerous FRAGOs
out there that direct other than what you are suggesting.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. If there's further
amplification to the Senator's question, please provide it for
the record.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for
moving forward on this investigation quickly here at the
committee level. I think it's something we need to move off our
agenda so that we can begin to concentrate on how many good
things are happening in Iraq, as far as moving them towards a
sovereignty, their own sovereignty. I do have a statement I'd
like to have put in the record and I'd ask unanimous consent,
prior to my questioning.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank our witnesses for
appearing this morning to help us discuss the allegations that have
been raised.
I would like to begin my remarks by reminding us all of the
phenomenal progress we are making in the transformation of the Iraqi
government. Specifically, the Iraqi Governing Council approved the
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), representing the most liberal
basic governance document in the Arab world. As I understand this
historic document, it represents an Iraqi ``bill of rights,'' including
the assurances for all Iraqis of freedom of religion, freedom of
expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly. In addition,
this TAL includes fundamental rights for women.
Our progress in Iraq also includes remarkable public works
accomplishments. Oil production and power generation now surpass pre-
war levels. All 22 universities and 43 technical institutes and
colleges are open. Coalition forces have rehabilitated more than 2,200
schools. All 240 hospitals and more than 1,200 health clinics are open.
Health care spending in Iraq has increased 30 times over pre-war
levels. Additionally, 170 newspapers are being published.
Our military forces are directly responsible for this positive
change, and should be commended. These accomplishments, in my mind, are
what define the valor, commitment, and compassion of our Armed Forces.
It is not the incidents that are the subject of this hearing.
Gentlemen, I know you share my frustration and concern over the
reported incidents of prisoner abuse involving our Armed Forces.
My frustration comes from believing our soldiers know better than
to carryout those activities now splashed all over our public media.
Several of my colleagues and I have been to Iraq and Afghanistan
recently, and we have seen the unmatched skills of our soldiers in
defeating a hostile enemy, as well as rebuilding a public works
infrastructure. Yet, here we are discussing how the misdeeds of a few
can overshadow the accomplishments of so many.
My concern comes from understanding that we need to develop and
employ all prudent measures to ensure our military men and women, as
well as millions of locals, remain safe and secure throughout the
reconstruction of this region. Without a doubt, our forces need
effective detention and interrogation tools for terrorists, insurgents,
and others trying to kill us. Successful exploitation of these enemy
combatants will ultimately deny them the opportunity to plan, prepare,
or execute more killings. Today, we must examine events that got out of
control, and figure out how to realign our people and our practices
toward a humane and legal alternative.
Mr. Chairman, it also appears to me that the military has done a
good job with investigating these allegations and taking appropriate
actions. However, it was disappointing that senior leaders did not
recognize and report the serious consequences that the underlying
allegations entail. I look forward to your continued leadership, as
well as the leadership of SECDEF Rumsfeld, in getting to the bottom of
this matter and getting our focus back on the job well done by our
security and reconstruction forces.
Senator Allard. I'd also share my shock and dismay that
Senator Inhofe mentioned, in the fact that this unfortunate
situation at Abu Ghraib prison is actually being used as a
fundraiser by the Kerry campaign. I just find that appalling.
Now I'd like to move forward and pose a question to you,
General Taguba. In my statement, I find that your reporting
supports that the Army has taken the initiative in following
through appropriately on our own affairs. Just so that I'm
clear in my own understanding, were you directed by any of your
superiors to remove any findings that you felt were credible or
relevant?
General Taguba. Sir, I was not directed by my superiors.
Senator Allard. Were you directed by any of your superiors
to withhold or remove recommendations for any adverse personal
actions regarding subjects of your investigation?
General Taguba. Sir, none whatsoever.
Senator Allard. Just so I'm clear also about the makeup of
the prison population, my understanding, from some of the
testimony that we've received here today, that if somebody is
classified as a terrorist--in other words, they're not
associated with any country, officially--then there's a
difference; they don't fall under the Geneva Conventions'
guidelines. Is that correct?
Secretary Cambone. The President designated the al Qaeda as
being unlawful combatants, sir.
Senator Allard. So just that particular terrorist
organization, or any terrorist organization?
Secretary Cambone. I know for a fact it's al Qaeda, and my
guess is that depending on the circumstances, if we found
ourselves in armed conflict with some other organization, such
as--the President would take that under advisement.
Senator Allard. Okay. Now, did we have terrorists in the
population at this prison?
General Taguba. Sir, none that we were made aware of.
Senator Allard. So as far as we know, these were all
related to those guidelines that generally you were complying
with, as far as the military is concerned, on how you handle
prisoners.
General Taguba. Sir, they were either classified as
security detainees or ``other'' detainees--criminals, things of
that nature.
Senator Allard. But no terrorist classification.
General Taguba. None that we were given, no, sir.
Senator Allard. Okay.
Secretary Cambone or General Smith, in your estimation why
was anyone taking pictures in the security detention facility
at Abu Ghraib? Is there any explanation, from a physical
security or prisoner security or MI perspective?
General Smith. Sir, the photographing of prisoners,
especially with private cameras, is against----
Senator Allard. Private cameras?
General Smith. By private cameras--is against the rules.
Senator Allard. So these were taken by private cameras?
General Smith. Sir, I believe they were taken by digital
cameras that belonged to the individuals, but I don't know
that. Maybe General Taguba does.
Senator Allard. I see.
General Taguba. Sir, they were personal cameras.
Senator Allard. They were personal cameras.
General Smith. This specifically says ``photographing,
filming, and videotaping of individual EPW/civilian internee,
other than internal internment facility administration or
intelligence/counterintelligence purposes, is strictly
prohibited.''
Senator Allard. So this didn't have anything to do with the
way you managed the prisoners or any of their interrogation or
any physical security of the prison. This was taken on by
individuals, unknown to those in command at the time?
General Smith. That is my belief, but I don't know----
General Taguba. Sir, as far as we know, based on the
evidence and the interviews and the statements, they were taken
with personal cameras.
Senator Allard. Individuals taking that on their own,
without any instruction from command.
General Taguba. Yes, sir.
Senator Allard. Okay.
Now, General Smith, in General Taguba's report he
recommended that a mobile training team be assembled and
dispatched to your area of operations to oversee and conduct
comprehensive training in all aspects of detainee and
confinement operations. Were these teams dispatched, as
recommended?
General Smith. Sir, they were dispatched before the report
was actually approved. About 50 percent of the training is
complete, and they will continue and have all of this completed
by the end of June, although everybody who is out there is
getting training weekly, awaiting the mobile training team
specifically getting down there. That will be followed by
sustained required training every week in all of these rules.
Additionally, the Geneva Conventions are required to be briefed
at every change of shift.
Senator Allard. Your point is, is that when you got General
Taguba's report, even before it was finalized you were
beginning to take corrective action, and so action was--you
were responding immediately to concerns about how--what was
being reported in the camp at Abu Ghraib.
General Smith. That's correct, sir.
Senator Allard. Okay.
General Smith, General Taguba--I understand the necessity
and significance of maintaining a strategic interrogation
exploitation process. After all, a primary goal along these
lines is to save the lives of Americans, Iraqis, and other
partners in the region. Can you share with us whether or not
your command is actually developing good intelligence based on
your approved interrogation techniques? In other words, are we
saving lives?
General Smith. Sir, my belief is that we are. We absolutely
have built the networks and what they look like and who the
players are, based on intelligence information from human
intelligence (HUMINT). A portion of that is this kind of
activity. So, sir, I would say, absolutely, that there have
been lives saved because of the people that we have been able
to go out and pick up, because of the HUMINT process.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Taguba, I want to commend you and your team for
submitting a very, what I consider, a candid and thorough
report. Your task was not an easy one. However, your honesty
and your integrity reflect the character we expect from
soldiers in our military.
General Taguba, in your report, you reference the lack of
supervision over U.S. civilian contractor personnel, third-
country nationals, and local contractors within the detention
facility at Abu Ghraib. During your investigation, did you
determine how many civilian contracted personnel were working
there? Who supervised these individuals? Can you describe what
you observed, in terms of type of access these individuals had
to the detainee areas?
General Taguba. Sir, we did not make a determination of how
many civilian contractors were assigned to the 205th MI Brigade
and operating at Abu Ghraib. I personally interviewed a
translator, and I also personally interviewed an interrogator,
both civilians, contractors. There was also a statement--and
substantiated by the witnesses that we interviewed of another
translator--a third-country national, in fact, who was
involved. There was another third-country national who was
acting as a translator for the interrogators, that was involved
in one of the interrogation incidents where dogs were used.
Their supervision, sir, from the best that we could
determine or discern from the information that we gathered,
was, they were under the supervision of the JIDC, who was then
under the supervision of one--a lieutenant colonel, who was
also supervised by the brigade commander, the MI brigade
commander. That was the chain, sir.
Senator Akaka. What access did these individuals have to
the detainee?
General Taguba. Sir, they had an open access to the
detainees.
Senator Akaka. General Taguba, your report finds that two
contractors were either directly or indirectly responsible for
the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Were either of these contractor
personnel supervising soldiers or in a position to direct
soldiers to take specific actions?
General Taguba. Sir, they were not in any way supervising
any soldiers, MP or otherwise. However, the guards, those who
were involved, looked at them as competent authorities as in
the manner by which they described them, as the MI or by name
or by function.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Cambone, what kind of training did
the U.S. civilian contractors have prior to going to Iraq? I've
been informed that the training for interrogators included
training tactics and techniques used by other countries. Did
such training occur? If so, are these tactics and techniques
approved by DOD intelligence officials?
Secretary Cambone. The only tactics and techniques that
would be approved, sir, are those that are approved by the
command for use in that situation. As I said earlier, the
recruitment--and if you look at the advertisements for the
recruitment, they look for people who have had the experience
of being interrogators. I am told that, in fact, some of the
retired personnel and those who have since left the service are
quite capable and are, in terms of the interrogator's art,
better able to conduct those interrogations than the younger
individuals who are new to that activity.
General Smith. Sir, most have gone through the 19\1/2\ week
training at Fort Huachuca, either while they were in the
service or afterwards.
Senator Akaka. General Smith, who is keeping a record of
all the employees that work for all the contracted firms in
Iraq and Afghanistan? Is it the contracted firm or DOD?
General Smith. Sir, you're beyond my knowledge there,
except that the contracting officer who contracts with the
company is responsible for ensuring that they comply with the
contract. By name, I suspect he has who those contractors are.
But I can't tell you that for sure.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responses.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
I first want to, again, state my appreciation for the
superb work of our soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. In many,
many instances, some of which we've seen on television, they
demonstrate restraint day after day. They've maintained their
poise and their professionalism sometimes under very intense
pressure. They've risked their lives, and we've seen a soldier
going to the bridge to save an Iraqi woman under hostile fire.
They have, on their off-hours, built schools and hospitals, and
treated the sick. So this is particularly painful for all of
us, to have this experience.
But I absolutely have visited those soldiers there. They've
told me of things that they've done and the relationships
they've had with Iraqi citizens. I strongly--it's interesting
how many want to volunteer and go back, because they believe in
the work and they want to see this to be a healthy, stable
country. Nothing we say today should denigrate that.
I have been somewhat concerned at the suggestion that there
is a policy of abuse here. General Smith, I think you've read,
clearly, that the explicit statements from every level of
command are in existence that would absolutely prohibit this
kind of behavior, is that not correct?
General Smith. Sir, that's absolutely correct, in many
venues and a number of times where FRAGOs have been republished
for the purpose of doing that. I would like to present those
for the record. I know Senator Reed is very concerned about it,
and I would like to put those in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Sessions. With regard, General Smith, of the Geneva
Conventions, I was in the Army Reserve. I, for a short time,
had a Judge Advocate General (JAG) slot, although I'm not like
Colonel Lindsey Graham over here, who is an actual practicing
JAG officer, but I remember in the transportation unit I had to
train the transportation soldiers, enlisted people in the
Geneva Conventions. Isn't that done throughout the Army?
General Smith. Sir, that is. That continues to be a
requirement.
Senator Sessions. In basic training, every soldier has been
trained in the Geneva Conventions, is that not correct?
General Smith. That's correct, sir.
Senator Sessions. I heard you say that they are briefing
the Geneva Conventions at every shift change now in Abu Ghraib
prison?
General Smith. That's correct, sir.
Senator Sessions. Before that occurred, one of the
criticisms I think General Taguba mentioned was, they were
supposed to be briefing the Geneva Conventions periodically,
but perhaps it was not occurring. Are you familiar with that
part of the report and what the requirement was?
General Smith. I'm familiar with the report.
Senator Sessions. General Taguba, you made some reference
to the fact that there was a procedure established to train
periodically, and it may not have been occurring?
General Taguba. Yes, sir. It's required, under AR-190-8, to
post the Geneva Conventions in the language of the detainee. So
you have many detainees there of different languages. They have
to post that. It's a requirement, especially for those units
that are conducting internment and resettlement mission
requirements. Those guards, in terms of discipline, were
supposed to conduct by their own SOP, guard mounts, where you
have shifts--you're changing shifts, and you have guard mount.
Sir, we found evidence that was not being done. They did kind
of a replacement, so to speak, during their shift time, because
they were not conducting guard mounts by which they were to
reinforce tenets of the Geneva Conventions, or made clear that
the postings of the Geneva Conventions were to be made
available, not only to the detainees in a language from which
they come from, but also where they could see them.
Senator Sessions. That was never challenged or rejected by
General Abizaid, General Sanchez, or anyone else in authority
in Iraq. I mean, those policies were in effect, and amounted to
a violation of the established Army policy when that did not
occur. Is that correct?
General Taguba. Sir, I cannot speak for General Abizaid or
General Sanchez, but that's the responsibility of the battalion
commander and also those personnel who are conducting
internment and resettlement or detention operations. It's
clear, it's in their doctrine, it's in the regulation.
Senator Sessions. Of course, General Smith, MPs have more
of this training than other soldiers, I assume, in how to
handle prisoners.
General Smith. Sir, I can't speak to that, but my
assumption would be that certainly they have more training than
the average soldier would.
Senator Sessions. I thank you for your comments, and would
note that--my time is expiring, but this ``Gitmo-ize'' issue, I
think, really misses the point. Yes, we wanted to use some of
the procedures that were working in Guantanamo, and try to
share that information to get it up to the people in authority
so we could save lives, get it out to the people who could use
it to identify who these attackers and terrorists were, but I
don't think there's any indication that General Miller would in
any way suggest this kind of behavior was legitimate.
General Smith. Sir, you're absolutely right in both counts.
In a counter-insurgency like this, intelligence is critical, in
that if you want to go find the guys that are making the
improvised explosive devices (IED) or the ones who are shooting
down helicopters with surface-to-air missiles like SA-7s, or
folks who are fomenting the insurgency, then you have to use
HUMINT to do that. You can't do that by technical means alone.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
General Smith. So it is a critical piece of the process.
Clearly, time and time again, we are told: humane treatment in
concert with the Geneva Conventions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Warner. That's a very important inquiry and
response, and I appreciate that, General.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't think General Miller is where the problem lies,
Senator Sessions. I think it lies elsewhere.
General Taguba, on page 16 of your report you state, ``I
find that the intentional abuse of detainees by military police
personnel included the following acts.'' You list a whole
number of those acts; among them, videotaping and photographing
naked male and female detainees; forcibly arranging detainees
in various sexually explicit positions for photographing;
forcing groups of male detainees--and I will insert
paraphrasing here--certain sexual acts while being photographed
and videotaped; a male MP guard having sex with a female
detainee; using military dogs, without muzzles, to intimidate
and frighten detainees, and, in one case, biting and severely
injuring a detainee; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical
light and perhaps a broomstick; using military working dogs to
frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and,
in one instance, actually biting the detainee. Is that your
report?
General Taguba. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right.
Mr. Secretary, when did you become aware of the nature of
these prisoner abuses and the existence of the photographic and
video evidence? That's two questions.
Secretary Cambone. The photographic evidence--be clear--
that there were photographs associated with this inquiry, I
knew early, in the change of the year. The nature----
Senator Bill Nelson. I'm sorry, I didn't understand.
Secretary Cambone. I'm sorry. I understood, at the
beginning of this year, that there were photographs associated
with the criminal investigative inquiry.
Senator Bill Nelson. Did you know about these acts?
Secretary Cambone. I did not know about these acts, and
learned of them in specificity when I read the report and when
I was exposed to some of those photographs.
Senator Bill Nelson. You read the report when?
Secretary Cambone. It has to be in the last week, sir. It
was not out of the command until the end of last month.
Senator Bill Nelson. Now, the SECDEF told us last Friday
that he learned about these abuses in the middle of January.
Secretary Cambone. That we had abuses, true. The nature of
them, I was not aware of.
Senator Bill Nelson. Did you know that they were horrific?
Secretary Cambone. No, sir. I received a report that there
was an inquiry underway--a number of--six or seven, by the way,
and this being one of them--in which there were people
implicated in abuses of prisoners in Iraq. The character of it,
the scope, the scale, I was not aware of.
Senator Bill Nelson. Specific to this prison, what was your
role in alerting others that you work for, such as the SECDEF?
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir. Again, as the Secretary
testified, corporately we were aware--and I was one of those
who told him so--that there were investigations underway with
respect to this facility, and ultimately the report that
General Taguba's done, in the February time frame. I mean, and
so it was a report of an investigation about acts of abuse.
Senator Bill Nelson. What was your role in alerting the
SECDEF to the danger posed to our theater strategy and the
general perception around the world?
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir, and let me throw out
gradations here. There are instances of people having been
mistreated in their apprehension, transportation, and
interrogation. That was--a level of poor performance and
behavior on the part of our people was understood, but it was
understood a fairly low level of abuse and incidence--rate of
incidence. The scale of this was unknown to any of us. Had we
known its scale, scope--the earlier we would have known, the
sooner we would have been able to come to you, to the
President, and to others to talk about it.
Senator Bill Nelson. You're saying you didn't know about
that until last week?
Secretary Cambone. Scope, scale--until the pictures began
appearing in the press, sir, I had no sense of that scope and
scale. I knew of the problem, that there was abuse, that there
was a criminal investigation, that there was an investigation
being done by General Taguba, but I had no sense of it, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, given that fact, why was the
SECDEF unprepared when he came before us in the secure room in
the Capitol on April 28, 2004--why was he unprepared to share
the information that he knew of with Members--probably some 35
or 40 Members of the U.S. Senate?
Secretary Cambone. Sir, I don't--I can't answer for the
SECDEF on that question. He was here. He spoke with this
committee and gave his answers, I recall. I can't speak for him
on why he did not raise it that evening. I don't know.
Senator Bill Nelson. You had not discussed that with him?
Secretary Cambone. That day, I had not discussed it with
him, no, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Had you discussed it with him anytime
before, after you learned, in mid-January, about these abuses?
Secretary Cambone. Again, I informed him that there were
investigations underway, of which this is one of six or seven
that I was informed of. I--again, I did not understand the
scope and scale. If I had, I assure you, Senator, I would have
told him.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Talent.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Cambone, very quickly, one of the things that
I've wondered about, when you said you didn't recognize scope
and scale, is it possible that not having seen the pictures,
you didn't recognize what the significance of the pictures
would be, in terms of the impact of this internationally?
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. General Taguba, your report--I think if we
summed it up, we'd say that the unit at the prison was under-
disciplined, under-manned, and poorly led. Is that a fair
summation?
General Taguba. Sir, very fair.
Senator Talent. In the middle of an Army that I think all
of us would agree is very well-disciplined and very well-led.
So the question in my mind--well, how? Why is this particular
unit so below the standards in performance of the rest of the
United States Army? I'm going to make a comment, and you can
comment on it if you want. I was in the other body all
throughout the 1990s, during which time the highest civilian
authorities here and on the other side of Pennsylvania Avenue
were cutting the size of the Army, and, in my judgment, not
funding adequately what--the end strength that we had
remaining. What I saw consistently was the Army, in order to
keep the tip of the spear sharp, if you will, allowing some of
the rest of the spear to go rusty. Sooner or later, those
chickens come home to roost. You have a poor commander, you
don't have enough people, the guys you have are not trained up
adequately because you don't have the money for it, and then
something like this happens. I'll just say, I wish we had had
the interest nationally through the 1990s about funding the
Army adequately, and maybe we wouldn't all be sitting here.
General Smith, let me ask you a question. I had a phone
call, actually, from a constituent who raised an issue that
might help in one aspect of this. As I understand it, one of
the difficulties with getting this up to the various highest
civilian levels is that--the concern about command influence,
because the same people that you'd want to report this through
and to are the people who would be involved in passing on any
court-martials that may emerge from this. I know this is a
problem. My wife used to be in the JAG corps. A constituent let
me know that there is an office in the Air Force, the reporting
office on special-interest cases, which is evidently designed
to deal exactly with this. Are you aware of that office?
General Smith. Sir, I'm not aware of that office, and this
was in basically Army channels.
Senator Talent. Right. What I'm wondering, and maybe to
recommend to the SECDEF, this office exists for--as I am told,
and we're checking this out in my office--in the Air Force to
deal with cases like this. So you can--if you think something's
of special significance, you can get it up to higher authority,
but through a separate, specially-created chain of command so
you don't compromise the command influence, and then you can
get it to somebody who then has the discretion, if they want
to, to go directly to the SECDEF or the Deputy SECDEF. We're
certainly going to be looking--and I'd recommend it to you, if
you're not aware of it, because evidently it functions pretty
well in the Air Force. You're not aware of it, though, as of
now, I take it.
Secretary Cambone. Now that you mention that office, yes, I
recall that there is one, and I can tell you that the SECDEF
has more than that on his list of ideas--or will have more than
that on the list of his ideas.
Senator Talent. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Cambone. You are right. Some way has got to be
found to do this.
Senator Talent. Yes, because we clearly have a defect in
this. Command influence is a problem but I think everybody
involved in this probably wishes they had just said, ``The heck
with command influence, we have to pick up the phone and
call''----
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent.--``and let people know.''
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir. Indeed, at least to the extent
that the sergeant delivered the disk to the criminal
investigative division (CID), he put in train, at least, a
process that has brought all this to light.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Dayton? I'm sorry, we have a different sheet, but I
think Senator Nelson is preceding. All right, thank you very
much.
Senator Ben Nelson. I hate to cheat my colleague from
Minnesota out of his place, but----
Chairman Warner. You've been getting here earlier and
earlier each time. [Laughter.]
Senator Ben Nelson. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses today, as well, for your very strong
statements about your opinions, as well as the nature of the
investigations. I'm going to ignore some of the partisan
sniping that's been going on from the other side today, because
I don't think it's particularly helpful.
Having said that, General Taguba, in your opinion this is
not a top-down problem. I think what you're saying is that this
was something that may have been spontaneous, but an abuse
involving only a handful--last week, the operative word was
``few'' individuals, but I think that right now I think that
perhaps it's a limited number of people. Is that accurate?
General Taguba. Yes, sir. Based on the interviews and the
statements that were given to us by both the detainees, MP
personnel, and those that we examined, there were others, but
we just could not track them down.
Senator Ben Nelson. Who is the highest-ranking officer you
interrogated?
General Taguba. My interviews, sir, Brigadier General
Janice Karpinski.
Senator Ben Nelson. You didn't talk to General Sanchez?
General Taguba. No, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. Did you talk to Colonel Pappas?
General Taguba. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator Ben Nelson. Who's the highest-ranking official--not
officer--you may have talked to?
General Taguba. Sir, none. I stopped at General Karpinski.
Senator Ben Nelson. So what may have happened above General
Karpinski is an open book. In other words, it's not--or it's a
closed book. No one knows what may or may not have occurred
above that level. Is that accurate? Insofar as your
investigation is concerned.
General Taguba. Yes, sir. She did intimate to me other
officials from the CPA that she interacted with, in terms of
the prison system, the Iraqi prison system, but I did not go
after that. I did do a midcourse brief to General Sanchez and
General McKiernan, but only in that we were proceeding on the
timeline without any great delay.
Senator Ben Nelson. But General Karpinski says that her
command was severed by the infusion of MI dealing with certain
detainees. Is that accurate or an approximation of her
statement?
General Taguba. Sir, I don't understand where her command
authority--her command was severed from Abu Ghraib?
Senator Ben Nelson. Because others were put in, and she was
given the instruction--Colonel Pappas appeared on the scene,
and MI not under her command were there, as well. Is that
accurate?
General Taguba. Sir, it's contained in my report that when
I asked her if she had known about FRAGO 1108 dated 19
November, the first time--the only time I interviewed her--she
had no knowledge of that until about 2 days afterwards, of
which I asked her what did she do after that, and then she
wanted clarification from her chain of command, when she was
told that the FRAGO was, indeed, in effect, and that the MI
brigade commander was the commander, the forward-operating base
commander.
Senator Ben Nelson. Under those circumstances, if her
command wasn't severed, was it at least interfered with, in
your judgment?
General Taguba. Sir, truthfully, she challenged that.
Senator Ben Nelson. In what way?
General Taguba. She challenged the authority that was given
to Colonel Pappas.
Senator Ben Nelson. What was the result of the challenge?
General Taguba. Sir, it created confusion and friction
between those two commanders.
Senator Ben Nelson. So what we have now is confusion, a
lack of clarity of command. We have a handful, at least, of
spontaneous abusers, as it relates to detainees. Do we know
whether, in that prison or in other prisons where there were
criminal prisoners, as well, not detainees, whether there was
any abuse that carried over into their lives?
General Taguba. Sir, the FRAGO only affected Abu Ghraib.
Camp Bucca was still under the 800th MP brigade, exclusively.
So was Camp Cropper and Camp Ashraf.
Senator Ben Nelson. Were the abuses there anywhere similar?
Were there photographs there, as in the case of Abu Ghraib?
General Taguba. None that we gathered, in terms of
evidence, no, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. Those other prisons were under her
command. Is that correct?
General Taguba. Yes, sir. There were--you might consider
abuse, but that was in terms of slapping a prisoner, and there
were----
Senator Ben Nelson. Not similar type abuses as we have
here.
General Taguba. Not to the gravity that was exposed, no,
sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. And not photographs.
General Taguba. Not photographs, no, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Chambliss?
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Taguba, it's refreshing to those of us who deal
with the military every day, not only to look at your report,
but to see your frankness here today. I think every military
officer can certainly walk a little taller and a little
straighter because of the work that all of you gentlemen are
doing, but particularly, General, with respect to the way you
have handled yourself and being willing to be critical where
you need to be critical.
Now, General Smith, you made the statement earlier that
this particular unit, the 800th MP brigade, was--they were
trained--their job was this sort of stuff. Now, I'm assuming
you mean from that that their job was to go over there and run
this prison.
General Smith. Sir--and maybe General Taguba can jump in on
this a little bit--but I believe there are only one or two
organizations of its type in the United States Army, and it is
an internment and resettlement brigade.
Senator Chambliss. Okay.
General Smith. Is that correct, General?
General Taguba. That's correct, sir.
Senator Chambliss. General Taguba, while General Schoomaker
took exception to a comment I made the other day relative to
the lack of training of this unit that just happened to be a
Reserve unit, the fact of the matter is, there were a few
dysfunctional individuals within this unit that, according to
your report, was a very poorly trained unit that didn't have
knowledge of what they were supposed to do. In fact, as I read
your statement here, there's a general lack of knowledge,
implementation, and emphasis of basic legal, regulatory,
doctrinal, and command requirements within the 800th MP brigade
and its subordinate units. Do you still stand by that
statement?
General Taguba. Yes, sir, I stand by that statement.
Senator Chambliss. In fact, your report is replete with
comments relative to the lack of training of this particular
unit that was supposed to be highly specialized and trained to
do exactly what they were sent there to do, isn't that correct?
General Taguba. Sir, when I interviewed the company
commander and asked them to outline for me what training he
received at the mobility station, he basically gave me the
typical basic requirements to only marksmanship, things of that
nature. When I asked him, ``Did you get any additional training
prior to your deployment and into deployment with regard to
internment and resettlement or anything that has anything to do
with detention operations,'' he said he did not.
I did not interview the battalion commander, the 320th MP
battalion commander, because he invoked his rights; however,
those that we interviewed within that chain of command also
concluded that.
Senator Chambliss. Okay.
General, there's something that has puzzled me throughout
this process that's evolved over the last--or been made public
over the last 10 days or so. One thing is the fact that Major
General Ryder went in there in October and November 2003 and
did a report. In his report, according to your report, his
objective was to observe detention and prison operations,
identify potential systemic and human rights issues, and
provide near-term, mid-term, and long-term recommendations to
improve operations in the Iraqi prison system. Yet during the
time that he was there, in Abu Ghraib, some of these incidents
were occurring. I think your report confirms that. Certainly
when he testified the other day before the Intelligence
Committee, that was obvious. I have asked the question,
privately and publicly, why didn't somebody come forward and
tell Major General Ryder about this during the time that he was
there when these incidents were going on? Do you have any--can
you shed any light on that particular question?
General Taguba. Sir, I read General Ryder's report. I did
not discuss it with him. I know that within the content of his
report he visited quite a bit of the detention centers, not
just exclusively Abu Ghraib. The results, of course, were his
recommendations, I agreed with, in terms of putting things
under single command and control, things of that nature. I
don't want to speculate about anything with regards to any
knowledge of detainee abuse having not been reported or being
reported up the chain of command. It was apparent in our
investigation that these things were happening, but we were
puzzled also at the fact, sir, that none of this stuff was
going above the battalion commander level. That's what we
concluded, that none of this stuff was going above the
battalion commander level.
Senator Chambliss. Okay, thank you, General.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
The committee will continue right through the first vote,
and if there's a second, likewise, until every Senator has had
their opportunity to ask questions.
Next week we have our bill on the floor, according to the
current schedule, so, in all likelihood, we'll have to suspend
this series of hearings until after the bill has been
considered.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, will we continue with a
second round?
Chairman Warner. No, Senator, because I think we would be
infringing on the policy counsels for both parties.
Thank you very much.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for
holding today's hearings, and for your resolve to face these
atrocities. You're an honorable man, and would that everyone
shared your resolve to find the truth rather than to deny it or
deflect it.
Unfortunately, we in this committee were overshadowed
yesterday by President Bush's words and actions, traveling to
the Pentagon with the Vice President to tell the SECDEF, the
country, and the world, ``You're doing a superb job.'' The
President looked at a dozen more pictures of abuse, and
reportedly shook his head in disgust, but the apologies,
regrets, and mea culpas are now history. It's back to business
as usual.
If anyone missed those subtleties, the Vice President was
even more direct over the weekend when he said, ``People ought
to get off of his case and let him do his job,'' referring to
the SECDEF. In other words, we should stop meddling and
interfering and let them go back to running the war.
This morning illustrates the difficulty in a hearing to get
beyond the words to the realities. General Taguba's report and
directness here today are notable exceptions. But it shows why
the pictures made such a difference. They showed us the truth.
Most of the words today have managed to obscure that truth.
We're told there were papers and procedures, policies and
protocols, there were directives given, conditions set, and
everyone followed the Geneva Conventions, international law,
United States principles, except for a few people, who did very
bad things unbeknownst to anyone else, all of whom were doing
what they were doing to save American lives. So let's dispense
with this and get back to our good intentions, the great
progress going unreported in 95 percent of Iraq, the upcoming
handoff of democracy to whoever the recipients shall be.
That's why those pictures are so disruptive, because they
defy that sanitizing. They can't be obscured by non-
descriptions like, ``the inappropriate behavior of a sexual
nature,'' which were words used to describe the forced
masturbation of one detainee or the rape of another. That's why
Pentagon officials are reportedly preventing the additional
pictures from being publicly released.
The White House communications director said that the
President wants the Pentagon to, ``use its best judgment about
the release of the photos.'' Well, we've seen where that best
judgment has gotten us so far, and I think it's deplorable that
they intend, again, to try to suppress the truth and all the
truth from the American people.
Chairman Warner. Senator, having worked on that question
with the DOD, at this point in time the decision as to public
release is an ongoing review. To the best of my knowledge, as
of late last night, no final decision has been made by the DOD,
the White House, or others.
Senator Dayton. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If you go elsewhere--and thank goodness for a free and
vigilant press, because I don't think we would find most of
this out any other way--but there is an ICRC report which
describes excessive patterns of--patterns of excessive force
used by U.S. soldiers in prisons, and not just the one subject
to this investigation, but throughout the country. The ICRC
wrote that ill treatment during capture was frequent, that it
often included pushing people around, insulting, taking aim
with rifles, punching, kicking, striking, which seem to go
beyond--seem to reflect a usual modus operandi, and appear to
go beyond the reasonable, legitimate, proportional use of force
required to apprehend suspects or restrain persons resisting
arrest or capture.
The published reports say that as many as 43,000 Iraqis
were detained at various times, and that an estimated 90
percent of them were determined to have not had any involvement
in the matters that are under--that were of concern to U.S.
authorities, that only 600 were turned over for prosecution,
that 8,000 remain in detention now for indefinite periods of
time, although I gather that there are now steps being taken to
release all but 2,000 of them.
My time is up, but I'm just going to complete here by just
referring to one individual who said he was taken from a
barbershop where he was getting a shave, and he was beaten with
pipes, starting on his legs and back, and moving to his head.
He was bleeding from his mouth and ears, he fainted. When he
woke up, he was in a dog's cage at a local military base. He
was left naked in the cage for several days, receiving only
scant food and water, until soldiers hung him from a tree by
his cuffed hands, ``They told me they would bring my wife and
hang her next to me.'' I don't take any pleasure in recounting
these incidents, but I take umbrage that there are still those
who want to deny that they occurred to any degree or those that
want to ascribe other motives to those of us who are just
trying to face up to them.
I want the United States to succeed in Iraq. I'm deeply
concerned that what's occurred there is going to cause further
violence that will come down on our troops, that will bear the
brunt of this, and set back our ability to meet our objectives
there. But I don't see how that's going to be served by trying
to obscure or deny what's occurring there or what has occurred
there and make sure--try to make sure it doesn't happen again
there or anywhere else in the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time's expired.
Chairman Warner. I thank you, Senator.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Taguba, Chairman Warner asked, I believe, earlier,
the question, ``What went wrong?'' You answered, there was a
failure of leadership from the brigade level on down--and down.
In your investigation, did you find any evidence--any evidence
whatsoever--that culpability extended beyond the brigade level?
General Taguba. No, sir, we did not. However, we did
recommend, based on some evidence that we gathered of the
complicity of MI interrogators, and we recommended that a
separate investigation be provided under Procedure 15 of 380-
10.
Senator Cornyn. How many individuals do you believe were
involved in this abuse at Abu Ghraib?
General Taguba. Sir, directly, there were those six or
seven, I believe. I know that the ongoing investigation
continues under Article 32. I don't know of any others. In
terms of those soldiers' supervisors and leaders, I enumerated
that on my report. I believe there was a total of 17 there that
I identified.
Senator Cornyn. So there were seven--there was disciplinary
action taken against the seven supervisors, and then there was
the actual criminal charges that have now been brought, I
guess, against another seven, is that correct?
General Taguba. Yes, sir. Those were the criminal
investigations, but I'm not involved in that whole process, but
my investigation was purely administrative, to gather facts and
circumstances that were related to detainee abuse and the other
things that I mentioned to you earlier, principally their
leaders.
Senator Cornyn. I ask those questions because I'm concerned
that there are those who are suggesting that somehow what you
have said was exceptional misconduct on the part of these
guards and their supervising--their superior officers was
somehow the norm. Indeed, there was a question asked earlier,
attempting to suggest that this was the implementation of
policies and procedures that are in existence at Guantanamo
Bay. There was a question asked about whether Guantanamo Bay
was somehow the baseline, and that now that represented the
norm, and this was the logical conclusion of those policies and
procedures at Guantanamo Bay.
I have to tell you that, like other members of the
committee, no doubt, I've traveled to Guantanamo Bay because of
my interest in the detention of the individuals there who--of
course, who plan, finance, and execute terrorist acts against
Americans and other innocent civilians. I had an opportunity to
meet General Geoffrey Miller, who was the commander of the
Joint Task Force at Guantanamo. I was very impressed with the
treatment, with the policies and procedures that allowed the
humane interrogation of detainees there.
Let me just ask you, is there any--whether they're enemy
combatants or unlawful combatants or common criminals, is there
any policy that you're aware of in the United States military
that allows for less than humane treatment of detainees?
General Taguba. No, sir. I did not find that anywhere.
Senator Cornyn. Of course, we are concerned about the
atypical conduct on the part of these individuals who committed
these crimes, and those who failed to see that they got the
supervision and the leadership necessary in order to avoid
these crimes. But I must add my voice to those of others that
say, while we are absolutely committed to getting to the bottom
of this--and your report gets us a long way there--and of
making sure that the guilty are held accountable, we can't
forget the context in which all of this is taking place, and
that is in a larger context of many other military troops
serving honorably in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere, and
the need to get essential information from some of these
detainees that could well protect America from the next 9/11.
So I want to commend you and the others for the wonderful
service that you're performing, and thank you for helping us
get to the bottom of this. I hope that we will ultimately be
successful in doing so, holding those accountable who are
responsible, and then making sure we focus on our greater and
more important job of making sure that America's safe in this
war on terror.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join in thanking you, General Taguba, for your
service and for this report.
I don't think anyone disagrees with the last comment by my
colleague that our objective is to both prosecute this war on
terrorism successfully and also to ensure the safety and
security of our own people from future attacks. The question is
whether behavior and conduct and decisions with respect to the
treatment of these detainees undermine the potential success
that we all agree is essential to our national security.
I am still confused, and my confusion is this. With respect
to the actions that are described in your report, General
Taguba, you also included a number of other problems at other
detention facilities. But is it your best information that no
detention facility that was in any way connected with the 800th
MP brigade had the level of problems that you reported in this
unit at Abu Ghraib?
General Taguba. Yes, ma'am. The scope, again, was within
the context of those facilities that the 800th MP operated.
Senator Clinton. The 800th MP brigade was under the command
of General Karpinski. Is that correct?
General Taguba. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. Now, if the problems were severe and
located principally in this one unit, then I think it is
appropriate to follow the chain of command up to the decision
to send General Miller to that prison, where, as I understand
the testimony thus far, he set up a specific joint
interrogation unit. He did, however one wants to describe it,
either coordinate or direct the MP's involvement in the
conditioning of the detainees. Is that a correct statement,
General?
General Taguba. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. All right. So it seems to me that if,
indeed, General Miller was sent from Guantanamo to Iraq for the
purpose of acquiring more actionable intelligence from
detainees, then it is fair to conclude that the actions that
are at point here in your report are in some way to General
Miller's arrival and his specific orders, however they were
interpreted by those MPs and the MI that were involved.
Therefore, I, for one, don't believe I yet have adequate
information from Mr. Cambone in the DOD as to exactly what
General Miller's orders were, what kind of reports came back up
the chain of command as to how he carried out those orders, and
the connection between his arrival in the fall of 2003 and the
intensity of the abuses that occurred afterwards.
Now, we know that General Karpinski has been rightly
singled out for appropriate concern about her behavior and her
failure of command. But I just want to read to you a comment
she made in an interview, which I find extraordinary. I quote,
``But when I looked at those pictures, and when I continued to
see those pictures, I don't think that there was anything that
was improperly done, because this wasn't something that was a
violation of a procedure. This was something they were
instructed to do as a completely new procedure. I'm not sure
that those MPs had ever been confronted with any instructions
like this before.''
General Taguba, can you explain for us the disparity
between holding this brigade commander completely accountable,
and the comments that I just read to you, in light of the fact
that certainly the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade was
given tactical control over that prison? Can you explain
General Karpinski's comment?
General Taguba. Yes, ma'am. During the course of our
investigation, there was clear evidence, based on my interview
of General Karpinski and Colonel Pappas, that there was
friction between those two commanders in the operation of Abu
Ghraib. The dissension was who was in charge of--when, and at
what time. They could not explain. So that's the context of the
ambiguity of the order that was given to Colonel Pappas. It was
clear that he was directed to be the forward operating base
commander there for security detainees and force protection.
However, General Karpinski challenged that, and she noted that
in her recorded testimony. Point one.
I held her accountable and responsible, not exclusively and
solely for the abuse cases there at Abu Ghraib, but the context
of her leadership, the lack of leadership on her part overall,
in terms of her training, the standards, supervisory omission,
the command climate in her brigade. Those were all, in
totality, why I held her accountable and responsible, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. Just one last follow-up, General. Did
Colonel Pappas report directly to General Miller?
General Taguba. That I did not know because General Miller
was not there. He reported, I believe, to CJTF-7.
Senator Clinton. General Smith, do you know who Colonel
Pappas reported directly to?
General Smith. Yes, ma'am. Through CJTF-7. Ma'am, General
Miller had no command relationship in this at all. He came over
to do an investigation and make some findings and
recommendations on how to improve. Nobody reported to him. He
had no relationship whatsoever, other than to report details.
Senator Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Senator.
I think they've left, but just a few minutes ago there were
some foreign military officers who came to the hearing, and I
would just want to say, for the record, that I'm very proud of
the fact that our military command system, civilian and
military, comes out in the open, is asked hard questions, and
has to appear before the public.
You've documented, General Taguba, some failings. I think
we're failing the country ourselves up here a bit. I think
we're overly politicizing this. This should be what binds us,
not what tears us apart. I think Republicans and Democrats may
have a different view of a lot of things, but it seems to me
that investigating a prison abuse scandal, when you say you're
the good guys, should pull you together, not tear you apart. I
would just hope my colleagues can understand that when you say
you're the good guys, you have to act as the good guys.
So, General Taguba, how long have you been in uniform?
General Taguba. Sir, this is my 32nd year.
Senator Graham. Saddam Hussein is in our control. How would
you feel if we sicced dogs on him tomorrow?
General Taguba. Sir, on Saddam Hussein?
Senator Graham. Yes.
General Taguba. Sir, we still have to follow the tenets of
international law.
Senator Graham. As much as you and I dislike him, as mean a
tyrant as he is, and you know he'd kill us all tomorrow, I am
so proud of you. What are we fighting for, General Taguba, in
Iraq? To be like Saddam Hussein? Is that what we're fighting
for?
General Taguba. No, sir.
Senator Graham. Our standard, General Smith, can never be
to be like Saddam Hussein, can it be, sir?
General Smith. No, sir.
Senator Graham. How long have you been in the service?
General Smith. Thirty-four years.
Senator Graham. Is it okay with you if the ICRC comes and
looks at our prisons?
General Smith. Absolutely, sir, and they should.
Senator Graham. Okay. God bless you both.
General Taguba, it comes down to this for me. You have one
prison that was run differently than other prisons. The photo
we see of the detainee on the stool, wired up, was that just
six or seven people having a good time in a perverted way at
that person's expense, or is there something deeper going on
there, and do you know?
General Taguba. Sir, based on the evidence, it was six or
seven people who created that type of a scenario or situation.
Senator Graham. Okay. To the dog scenario, where you see
the detainee with two dogs, was that a couple of guards with
dogs in a perverted way having a good time, or was there
something else going on?
General Taguba. No, sir. The dogs were invited in there
according to written statements, and collaborated by
interviews, by the two MP guards.
Senator Graham. The way these people were stacked up in
sexual positions and the sexual activity, was that just
individual guards or was that part of something else going on?
General Taguba. Sir, those were individual acts, as based
again on interviews and statements and collaborated by the
detainees' statements.
Senator Graham. Part of the defense that we're going to be
hearing about in these court-martials is that the people that
we're charging are going to say this system that we see
photographic evidence of was at least encouraged, if not
directed, by others. Do you think that's an accurate statement?
General Taguba. Sir, I would say that they were probably
influenced by others----
Senator Graham. Okay.
General Taguba. --but not necessarily directed specifically
by others.
Senator Graham. We're not going to have a seminar in
military law today, but I have a different view of command
influence than some people have suggested, in terms of what we
can disclose and how it would affect court-martials. There is
another level of accountability in the military beyond just
participating in out-of-bounds behavior, Geneva Conventions or
otherwise. Do you agree with me that the UCMJ prevents this
conduct regardless of the Geneva Conventions?
General Taguba. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. So, ladies and gentlemen, what we're here
today is to show the world that our military is governed by the
rule of law, just like all of us. Having been a JAG officer for
over 20 years, a prosecutor, a defense attorney, and now a
Reserve judge, I have great confidence that we will get to the
bottom of this. Do you agree with that, General Smith?
General Smith. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Graham. Now, dereliction of duty is a concept
unique to military law. It probably should apply to us in
politics. A lot of us would be in trouble, probably me
included, if that were the case. But in the military, as a
commander, it can be a criminal offense if you derelict your
duty to maintain good order and discipline in a way that
crosses the line. Is that correct?
General Taguba. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. You interviewed a general officer. In your
report, you indicated that you thought that general officer
misled you about how many times that person had been to the
prison system. Is that correct?
General Taguba. Yes, sir. That was collaborated by her own
aide.
Senator Graham. I would suggest to you, General Taguba,
that out of this investigation, not only should we focus on the
privates and the sergeants and the specialists who did criminal
activity, but we also should have a higher accountability, that
if a general officer misrepresents what they did, in terms of
command and control, that a letter of reprimand may not be the
appropriate sanction. But I will leave that discussion for
others.
Colonel Phillabaum?
General Taguba. Colonel Phillabaum, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Your description of his time there was
classic dereliction of duty. You have recommended a letter of
reprimand for him.
General Taguba. Relief from command, sir, and to be removed
from a promotion list.
Senator Graham. My point is that Secretary Rumsfeld should
not be held accountable for the criminal activity of others. It
would be unfair to any military commander, politician, or
otherwise to have to take a fall when people break the law and
take the law in their own hands. However, those of us in
responsibility do have a burden to bear.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Graham, your time has expired.
Senator Graham. Can I just end with this one thought, Mr.
Chairman?
Senator Inhofe. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Secretary Rumsfeld has to manage the whole
war. I think it would be unfair for him to take a fall if this
is just a limited activity of a few people or of a prison
poorly run. At the end of the day, General Taguba,
responsibility, command and otherwise, is very much part of the
military law and culture, and I appreciate what you've done to
expose the failings.
Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your presence here today.
Two quick questions for you, Mr. Cambone, then one
observation that if any of you want to react to, I would
appreciate it. I apologize for moving expeditiously, but there
is a vote that is about to expire.
Mr. Cambone, I'd like to follow up on the questions of some
others--I think Senator McCain started, and then it was touched
upon a little bit later--with regard to Ambassador Bremer's
warnings.
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Senator Bayh. The published reports indicate that he began
raising these warnings in about August of last year. As I
understand your testimony, these were sort of general in
nature, about the overcrowding and the concern for transiting
people through there and returning them to their civilian
situation when they didn't need to be retained any longer.
The ICRC report came to his attention in February or March,
and you seemed to imply that perhaps his warnings became more
specific with regard to activities in the prison thereafter. Is
that the case?
Secretary Cambone. With respect to the first part of your
question, sir--or your statement--I believe that to be the
case. That is to say, I was not in communications with
Ambassador Bremer, nor know of any statements by him specific
to these abuses.
Senator Bayh. So in these meetings with the SECDEF, you
were never present?
Secretary Cambone. I did not know of those. I did know of
his general concern, as you said, for the prison population.
Senator Bayh. What about following the ICRC report?
Secretary Cambone. With respect to the 2004 report, I can
only tell you, again, what I know, and that is that there was a
meeting in that time frame, of February, at which members of
the--senior members of the CPA staff met with members of the
ICRC, and this report was made available. From that, there were
some communications from CPA to the State Department and
elsewhere with respect to these concerns.
Senator Bayh. About these abuses.
Secretary Cambone. That's what I think I know. Sir, I did
not see the ICRC report until I began working my way into this
problem over the last 2 weeks.
Senator Bayh. My second question involves the dispute
between you and the general about who had tactical control at
the prison. As I understand it, he believes that the MI
individuals did exert practical tactical control, and it's your
opinion that they did not. As I understand your position, the
intelligence authorities were given control over the facility,
but not control over the individuals running the facility. What
exactly does that mean? How do you have control over a
facility, but not the people who are running it? What were they
in charge of, the plumbing or the----
Secretary Cambone. No, sir. In the same way that you have a
building supervisor who doesn't tell the tenants how to do
their business. In other words, you do require someone who is
senior in command to be able to be responsible for the
facility--that is, for its security from outside activity,
internal security, the care and feeding of folks, all of those
administrative and logistics tasks that go with running a large
facility. Then there are, within that facility, a number of
operations and activities that take place, which are under the
command of other individuals, and those individuals are
responsible for the exercise of command over those activities.
Senator Bayh. That's a layman's opinion. General, I'd be
interested in your opinion. It seems to me the attempt here to
draw this line may have contributed to the confusion about who
was in charge, which may have led to some of these troubles.
General, is that a fair comment?
General Taguba. Yes, sir. We followed doctrine in the
context of our investigation as a matter of our baselines. We
used those as references. Doctrinally, TACON, as given to
Colonel Pappas, was that his mission was for security detainees
and force protection. Doctrinally, if you are TACON to him, he
establishes priorities.
Secretary Cambone. That doesn't go, sir, though, to the
heart of his being able to give what would have been--and,
General, correct me--unlawful orders to the commander of that
MP battalion.
General Taguba. Yes, sir.
General Smith. Nor, sir, does it allow him to change their
mission. In other words, they're trained to a specific task.
It's the person with operational control that is allowed to
change how they do business and the like. So as General Taguba
said, he can change the priorities for these folks, but they
still have to operate within the guidelines and the doctrine
that they are trained to. So they are still cops doing cop
business.
Senator Bayh. General?
General Taguba. Sir, there were established standards two,
in fact--that were signed by Lieutenant General Sanchez that
stipulated what you can and cannot do. Those were clear.
However, the failing here was that some leaders just did not
comply with it. They were posted for a purpose, sir, and there
are certain standards that they have to follow.
Senator Bayh. Compounded by a number of other things,
including lack of uniformity in training.
My last comment--and this gets to the dilemma; we face this
repeatedly in the intelligence arena, Mr. Chairman--and that is
the following. Timely and accurate intelligence information is
essential to our protecting our troops, civilians, winning the
war against this insurrection and the larger war against
terrorism. At the same time, preserving our honor and our moral
integrity is also vitally important, in the longer term, to
winning this struggle, because that, at the end of the day, is
what differentiates us from those with whom we fight.
Now, it seems to me there are--you've laid our, all of you,
in your testimony--we begin taking our instruction, but how do
you draw the line? How do you draw the line between vigorous
but acceptable interrogation versus morphing into abuse? We
start with the Geneva Conventions, as general principles. I
think, Mr. Cambone, you then used the term ``approved
interrogation techniques,'' of which there were 20 or 30, so we
try and refine that general guidance into more specific
guidance. Then exceptions are allowed at the behest or the
direction of the commander, who, I assume, in this case, would
have been General Sanchez, is that correct?
General Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Bayh. I assume he didn't authorize any exemptions.
General Smith. No.
Senator Bayh. That's the process that we go through in
trying to determine where the line is, what you can do and what
you can't do.
I'd just like to conclude by saying, I think it is
absolutely critical that we enforce the line as we defined it,
vigorously, hold those who crossed it to account to show that
we don't tolerate this kind of thing. But let's learn the
lessons of the past, as well. We are currently trying to
overcome some past intelligence abuses, 20, 30 years ago, and
our reaction to those abuses that have hamstrung us in the
covert arena, and otherwise. So let's draw the line, bright and
clear. Let's institute training. Let's hold commanders who
don't insist that the line be followed to account, as well as
the foot soldiers. But let's not throw the baby out with the
bath water, because gaining access to appropriate information
is also important as we also preserve our moral integrity and
our honor.
Secretary Cambone. Thank you for that, Senator. If I may
say, in trying to answer the committee's questions today on
these issues, if in any way I suggested that if we find that
there was misconduct or misbehavior or inappropriate behavior
on the part of anyone associated with the MI side of this,
which General Fay is now looking at today, I can assure you and
other members of this committee that we will be back here, and
we will tell you that.
Senator Bayh. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
witnesses.
In absentia, I wanted to thank Chairman Warner and Senator
Levin for the speed and intensity with which they have convened
this series of hearings, and I thank you gentlemen for being
here.
We have a real challenge here, which is to deal with this
inhumane, immoral, unacceptable, un-American behavior that
happened in this prison, and maybe others--I want to ask some
questions about that--and to do it as quickly as we can so that
we can get back to fighting the war on terrorism, and to do it
in so comprehensive and aggressive a way that we do not allow,
or even facilitate unintentionally, the erosion of public
support in this country for the critically important mission
our troops are performing in Iraq and in the broader war
against terrorism. That's why I appreciate these hearings. In
that regard, I think the comprehensiveness of our
investigation--yours, really--is critically important.
General Taguba, I just want to make clear, when you were
asked to investigate, you were asked to investigate conditions
at Abu Ghraib and two of the other most populated prison
facilities in Iraq, is that correct?
General Taguba. Yes, sir. Matters related to training,
standards, internal policies, and the like, yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Are there other prison facilities in
Iraq beyond those three, therefore, that have not been
reviewed, or are they being reviewed now for conduct that we're
concerned about?
General Taguba. Sir, I did not go beyond the four that I
looked at during the course of the investigation, and I believe
a subsequent investigation by the Army IG conducted that
following my investigation. They looked at other facilities,
also.
Senator Lieberman. Is that General Ryder's investigation?
Secretary Cambone. No, sir, there's an independent
investigation put in train by the acting Secretary of the Army
that covers all--as I understand it--not only facilities in
Iraq, but in Afghanistan, as well.
Senator Lieberman. That was my next question. Afghanistan,
as well.
General Smith. That is ongoing, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. That is ongoing?
General Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. In the sense that it predates this
scandal?
General Smith. No, sir. It continues today.
Senator Lieberman. I gotcha. So that--would it be fair for
you to say, through us, to the American people, that we are
essentially looking everywhere throughout the American military
prison system to make sure nothing like what happened at the
Abu Ghraib prison is occurring anywhere else?
General Smith. I would have to look at the specific charge
that the Department of Army IG was given, but I believe that to
be the case, certainly.
Secretary Cambone. With respect to the CENTCOM area of
responsibility (AOR) and the handling of prisoners there, and
terrorists who are in detention, the SECDEF has asked the
Secretary of the Navy to take a look, as well, as Charleston
and in other places where there may be internees.
Senator Lieberman. Okay, that's very important. Let me come
back. Obviously you will continue to report to us on the
conclusions of those investigations.
I had an exchange with Secretary Rumsfeld on Friday that
reverberated in my own mind over the weekend. I think one of
the other Senators may have asked one of you a question about
this. It is about the relevance of the Geneva Conventions to
the prisoners being held in Iraq. I had read various statements
by the SECDEF and others that confused me on this, because I
don't think the Geneva Conventions were being applied precisely
to detainees. In response to--in Iraq--my question on Friday,
Secretary Rumsfeld said the President announced from the outset
that everyone in Iraq who was a military person and was
detained is a prisoner of war; therefore, the Geneva
Conventions apply.
Second, continuing with the Secretary's statement, the
decision was made that civilians or criminal elements that are
detainees are also treated subject to the Geneva Conventions,
although it is a different element of it.
At an earlier point in an interview he did on television,
he--and this is, I think, what was asked--before he said that
they're not entitled to the Geneva Conventions--oh, I'm sorry,
here it is--``The decision was made that the Geneva Conventions
did not precisely apply, but every individual would be treated
as though the Geneva Conventions did apply.'' So, first of all,
my staff can't find the statement that the President made
announcing that policy. Secretary Cambone, I would ask you----
Secretary Cambone. Sir, I'd be happy to get that for you,
and I'm happy to ask the SECDEF this afternoon what, indeed, he
had in mind in that expression. Senator Levin asked that
question earlier, and I will ask him, and I will get you an
answer.
Senator Lieberman. I would appreciate that. As part of
that, I would ask General Taguba or General Smith to respond to
this part of it. How do we--there's a report in one of the
papers today, based on an ICRC Report, that 70 to 90 percent of
the detainees, according to the ICRC, were captured without
solid evidence of their guilt, but--and the numbers are large--
is there a process for determining--considering what Secretary
Rumsfeld said on Friday--who is an EPW, and who is a detainee?
Who's military, and, therefore, treated as a prisoner, or who's
a detainee, and, therefore, who gets the higher level of
rights, legally?
Secretary Cambone. We have at the moment very few, as I
recall, EPWs left in the system. What we have, primarily, are
those who have posed a threat to the security of the coalition
forces, the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi people, or others who
may have committed crimes of one kind or another against Iraqi
citizens. There are some of those latter who are, as I
understand it, in custody and being in the custody of Iraqi
security police and things of that sort, and they are in a
process to be brought forward before an Iraqi judicial process,
which, itself, is slowly and painfully standing up.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. So my final question--and I think
my time is up, maybe I should ask you to bring it back to the
Pentagon and then respond to it if you could--is the status,
which is--because, as I read the Geneva Conventions, I think
that detainees have rights under the convention. They're a lot
lower than the rights of prisoners of war. So I'm confused by
what seems to be the policy that Secretary Rumsfeld articulated
on Friday, that though they're not entitled to the rights of
Geneva Conventions, that we're giving it to them.
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir. I will take one more step on
behalf of my General Counsel, and I will offer you him----
Senator Lieberman. Fine.
Secretary Cambone. --for a period of time, to come by and
brief you and other Senators, as you might wish, Mr. Chairman,
on precisely how this has unfolded, so that there is no
confusion left in the committee or in the American people about
where we stand on the Geneva Conventions.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.
I will be discussing, with the SECDEF and others, the other
witnesses that I think should come before the committee, and I
am considering the General Counsel, given his expertise in this
area. So we'll do that.
Secretary Cambone. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. I wish to thank the SECDEF, through you,
Mr. Secretary, for the cooperation in putting together this
series of hearings that we're holding today.
I would ask now, do you or any other witness have a
response to a question or wish to make any added statement
before we close out this morning's record?
Secretary Cambone. I do. Sir, I ordinarily begin my
presentations here by saying that it's a pleasure. This is not.
It is a duty and a responsibility. We take it seriously.
General Dayton's point, we will get to the bottom of this.
Moreover, I would like to thank you for your courtesies.
They are important to all of us who are grappling with a very
difficult problem. In the end, we will answer this committee's
questions and those of the other committees of Congress to the
best of our knowledge, with as much knowledge as we have at the
time we are asked the question. Sir, therefore, I say to you,
if we read through this record and we find we have made a
mistake, I have misspoken on the Geneva Conventions or I have
told you something about command relationships that is
incorrect, I would beg your indulgence to allow us to correct
that record as quickly and as accurately as we can, and make
any changes known to every member of the committee when we do
so.
Chairman Warner. I thank you for that offer, and it will be
done.
Secretary Cambone. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. This afternoon we'll be having Lieutenant
General Keith B. Alexander--he's the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-
2, United States Army, handling intelligence matters; Major
General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Director for Intelligence, J-2,
The Joint Staff; and Major General Thomas J. Romig, Judge
Advocate General, United States Army.
If there are no other comments, I thank my colleagues for
the sincerity, the tremendous time that each of them is putting
in to prepare for this hearing. I think it has been a very
successful hearing. I thank you, Secretary Cambone, General
Smith, and General Taguba. The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
abu ghraib chain of command
1. Senator McCain. Secretary Cambone and General Smith, I would
like to request a document that will lay out the entire chain of
command, from the guards and interrogators in the prison all the way up
to the SECDEF. I believe we need to see exactly how this chain of
command operated, who it included, and who was ordering the personnel
in Abu Ghraib to act in this way. Under whose authority did the prison
personnel operate and who issued instructions governing prison
operations? Can you provide such a document to this committee?
Secretary Cambone. The military police operated under the command
of the 372nd Military Police Company of the 800th Military Police
Brigade. The interrogators were controlled by the Joint Interrogation
Debriefing Center (JIDC) and the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade.
Tab 1 contains the charts that reflect the chain of command, and has
been previously provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee.
General Smith. The premise of the question implies that abuse was
ordered at some level. This is not established fact and certainly was
not the policy of CJTF-7 or CENTCOM. Specific written policies were in
effect and signed by Lieutenant General Sanchez that emphasized
applicability of the Geneva--Hague Conventions and the importance of
treating all protected persons in a humane manner.
The interrogator chain of command was as follows:
Interrogator--205th MI Bde--CJTF-7--CENTCOM--SECDEF.
The MP chain of command was as follows:
Guard--320th MP Battalion--800th MP Bde--[CJTF-7/CFLCC] \1\--
CENTCOM--SECDEF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ CJTF-7 had TACON of 800th MP Bde, CFLCC had OPCON of 800th MP
Bde.
gitmo-izing abu ghraib
2. Senator McCain. Secretary Cambone, General Smith, and General
Taguba, it has been reported that General Miller wanted to GITMO-ize
the confinement operations at Abu Ghraib prison because of your concern
in that facility that MI was not getting the information from detainees
like he thought they should be. What did he mean by GITMO-izing Abu
Ghraib prison?
Secretary Cambone. I am unaware of any such statement being made by
MG Miller.
General Smith. CENTCOM is not in a position to speculate about what
Major General Miller might have meant by the phrase ``GITMO-ize Abu
Ghraib'' attributed to him in Senator McCain's question. Major General
Miller was not assigned to CENTCOM during the period in which he is
alleged to have made that remark nor was he conducting his review at
CENTCOM's request. Also, his perception of the facility may have
changed since his recent assignment to our AOR. Recommend directing
this question to General Miller who is in a better position to respond
as to his intention.
General Taguba. I have never been to Guantanamo so I would not know
specifically what Major General Miller meant by the term ``GITMO-
izing'' Abu Ghraib Prison. This question should be directed to Major
General Miller.
guantanamo bay
3. Senator McCain. Secretary Cambone and General Smith, are you
comfortable with the open-ended detentions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba?
Secretary Cambone. The United States has no interest in holding
detainees at Guantanamo Bay any longer than is necessary. However,
hostilities in the war on terrorism continue and we do not intend to
take any action that would present an undue risk to our security
interests. Within that framework, the U.S. Government has released and
transferred out of detention at Guantanamo 140 detainees. Additionally,
DOD has instituted an Administrative Review Board and procedures to
determine annually if enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay should be
released, transferred, or continue to be retained. I expect this
comprehensive review process to result in additional detainee transfers
and releases.
General Smith. To the extent these detainees represent a real
threat to safety and security, their continued internment is necessary
and essential for the protection of U.S. forces, our coalition allies,
and the American people.
general officer approval of interrogation tactics
4. Senator McCain. Secretary Cambone, General Smith, and General
Taguba, General Miller announced that certain practices would be
discontinued, including hooding, stress positioning, and sleep
deprivation, but that they would be permitted with approval by a
general officer. Under what authority can a general officer permit
these techniques?
Secretary Cambone. This matter was reviewed extensively in the
Kern/Fay investigation, on which the committee held hearings. Further,
General Sanchez and General Abizaid testified before the committee and
discussed their authorities in detail.
General Smith. Practices not violative of international or national
law or contrary to regulations issued by higher authority may be
approved by a commander pursuant to the exercise of his command
authority.
General Taguba. These practices were outlined in a CJTF-7
memorandum dated 12 October 2003, Subject: Interrogation and Counter
Resistance Policy in which such practices would have to be approved by
the Commander, 205th MI Brigade or by Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, CG
CJTF-7. Commanders may approve practices which do not violate
international or national law or which are not contrary to regulations
issued by a higher authority.
cause of death of former head of iraq's air force
5. Senator McCain. Secretary Cambone, General Smith, and General
Taguba, the Denver Post reports an allegation that the former head of
the Iraqi Air Force died during interrogation when he was rolled up
inside a sleeping bag so only his feet stuck out, and then sat on and
rolled back and forth until he died of suffocation. Apparently the
investigation concluded that this was a death from ``natural causes.''
What can you tell me about this?
Secretary Cambone. The case concerns Major General Mowhosh, the
former Iraqi Air Defense commander. General Mowhosh died on November
26, 2003, at Forward Operating Base Tiger, in western Iraq. The U.S.
Army Criminal Investigation Command was notified of the death and
initiated an investigation that same day. The Office of the Armed
Forces Medical Examiner (OAFME) performed an autopsy on December 2,
2003, with preliminary indications that the manner of death was a
homicide and the cause of death was asphyxia. OAFME issued a death
certificate on May 12, 2004. I am advised that there is a criminal
investigation into this incident.
General Smith. At the 3d Armed Cavalry Regiment detention facility
(FOB Tiger) in Iraq, an Iraqi detainee, Iraqi Army Major General A.
Mowhosh, believed to be former Chief of Army Air Defense, died while in
U.S. custody. On 26 November 2003, the detainee died while undergoing
interrogation by MI soldiers. An autopsy was conducted which disclosed
evidence of blunt force trauma to the body. The preliminary report,
however, lists the cause of death as asphyxia due to smothering and
chest compressions. The manner of death is listed as homicide. A
criminal investigation is still ongoing.
General Taguba. I have no knowledge regarding the cause of death of
this detainee.
evidence of abuse in other u.s.-operated detention sites
6. Senator McCain. Secretary Cambone, General Smith, and General
Taguba, have you seen any evidence of abuses at other detention centers
in Iraq, at Guantanamo, in Afghanistan, or at any other detention
center operated by the U.S. worldwide?
Secretary Cambone. As of late August, of the more than 50,000
individuals apprehended and detained since the beginning of
hostilities, there have been about 300 cases of alleged detainee abuse
across the Joint Operations Areas. 157 individual investigations have
been completed and 66 cases were substantiated so far. Of those 66, 8
occurred in Guantanamo, 3 in Afghanistan, and 55 in Iraq. About one
third of these cases occurred prior to, the detention facilities at the
point of capture or tactical collection point, frequently under trying
circumstances.
There has also been a series of 11 major, comprehensive
investigations conducted prior to and since the situation at Abu Ghraib
became known. Eight of these are complete and have been briefed to
Congress or otherwise released. As the remaining three investigations
develop their conclusions, we will share them with Congress as well.
General Smith. No; I have not personally witnessed any evidence of
abuse at a DOD-operated detention facility.
General Taguba. My investigation team visited only the four
detention sites in Iraq-Abu Ghraib, Camp Cropper, Camp Ashraf, and Camp
Bucca during the period of the 15-6 investigation. Other than Abu
Ghraib, there were two reported detainee abuses cases at Camp Bucca.
The 310th MP Batallion Commander at Camp Bucca took legal action on
those cases.
prison guards
7. Senator McCain. Secretary Cambone, General Smith, and General
Taguba, is it now, or has it been, administration policy that prison
guards should ``facilitate'' detainee interrogations? If so, how were
they instructed to do this?
Secretary Cambone. This matter has been investigated in several of
the reviews the DOD initiated when the abuse allegations came to light.
It is my understanding that the matter was addressed by those
investigations during briefings to SASC members or staff and during
hearings covering those investigations.
General Smith. Prison guards are not to take an active role in
detainee interrogations. A passive role such as observing and reporting
is permissible.
General Taguba. The U.S. Army is the executive agent for EPW and
Detainee Operations in accordance Army Regulation 190-8, and also Army
Field Manual 3-19.40. There are no provisions outlined in these
documents where prison guards should `facilitate' detainee
interrogations, nor do I know of any administration or command policy
that directs it.
permissive climate of prisoner abuse
8. Senator McCain. Secretary Cambone, General Smith, and General
Taguba, in Secretary Rumsfeld's May 7, 2004 testimony, he testified
that the Abu Ghraib prison personnel followed the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions and that the Geneva Conventions were posted for all
prison personnel to see. General Taguba has stated that neither the
camp rules nor the provisions of the Geneva Conventions were posted in
English or in the language of the detainees at any of the detention
facilities in the 800th MP Brigade's area of responsibility. Would this
supervisory error not contribute to a permissive climate of prisoner
abuse?
Secretary Cambone. Posting of camp rules and the applicable Geneva
Conventions is required by the conventions and service regulations.
Detention facilities have posted Geneva Conventions rules both in
English and detainee languages. In addition, I understand that it is
standard operating procedure within MNF-I that the rules regarding both
detention and interrogation, including the principles of the Geneva
Conventions, are routinely briefed at shift changes and guard mounts.
General Smith. If the provisions of the Geneva Conventions were not
posted at 800th MP Brigade Facilities, this would be in error. However,
the failure to post does not excuse individual instances of prisoner
abuse. All MPs should have received training in the Geneva Conventions
and Law of War prior to receipt of their military occupational
specialty designation.
General Taguba. In accordance with Army Regulation 190-8, the
Geneva Conventions are required to be posted in English or in the
language of the detainees and must be available to the detainees.
Guards and interrogators must also have general knowledge regarding the
requirements of the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War and be trained on the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions. It is possible that non-compliance with the requirement to
post the Geneva Conventions and have them available for detainees and
guards could be a contributing factor to a permissive climate of
prisoner abuse.
international committee of the red cross request
9. Senator McCain. Secretary Cambone, General Smith, and General
Taguba, the ICRC has stated that it repeatedly asked U.S. authorities
to take corrective action with respect to the treatment of prisoners in
Iraq. Which U.S. authorities were asked and why did they refuse?
Secretary Cambone. The DOD's internal reviews concluded that we
needed to improve our handling of ICRC reports to ensure that the
concerns raised by the ICRC are reviewed by the proper authorities in
the chain of command. It should be noted that the ICRC did, however,
report their own concerns to responsible commanders at various levels
and how those concerns were addressed is under review in the ongoing
investigations we initiated after those allegations came to light.
General Smith. During the period in question, ICRC reports were
normally handled at the CJTF-7 level. I will defer to those military
officials to provide any relevant details responsive to your questions.
General Taguba. I do not know specifically the U.S. authorities to
whom the ICRC repeatedly requested that corrective actions be taken
with respect to the treatment of prisoners in Iraq.
numbers of detainees
10. Senator McCain. Secretary Cambone, General Smith, and General
Taguba, how many persons do we currently have detained in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere as part of the wars there and the war on
terror?
Secretary Cambone. Although the figures vary daily as persons are
released and others are interned, as of 29 August there were 5,405
persons under the control of MNF-I in Iraq, 476 persons under the
control of CFC-A in Afghanistan, and 586 persons in Guantanamo Bay.
General Smith. Although the figures vary daily as persons are
released and others are interned, as of 6 August 2004, there were 9,416
persons under the control of MNF-I in Iraq and 454 persons under the
control of CFC-A in Afghanistan.
General Taguba. The investigation covered the period of June 2003
to January 2004. Since there were no specific or common detainee
accounting system in theater utilized by the 800th MP Brigade, the
estimates of detainees in U.S. custody were from 11,333 as of June 2003
to 11,699 as of December 2003 in the four detention camps I mentioned
earlier. I do not know the detainee population in Afghanistan or
elsewhere.
prosecution of civilian operators in abu ghraib
11. Senator McCain. Secretary Cambone, General Smith, and General
Taguba, interrogation specialists from private defense contractors were
operating inside Abu Ghraib and may have taken part in these
atrocities. Given the UCMJ has been amended by the Military and
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 1999, do you intend to prosecute
the contractors who allegedly abused prisoners and committed other
atrocities under the UCMJ?
Secretary Cambone. The Department of Defense is taking a wide range
of actions to address the abuses at Abu Ghraib, including criminal
investigative action. Such investigations can result in charges being
brought against military members under the UCMJ, and against DOD
civilian personnel and DOD contractors under the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-778) (MEJA). The
MEJA extended Federal criminal jurisdiction to misconduct committed by
persons employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United
States. This includes civilian employees of both the Department of
Defense and of contractors of the Department of Defense. Of course,
authority to initiate prosecutions rests with the Department of Justice
(DOJ), not the Department of Defense.
Additionally, the Fay investigation's review of the role of
contractors at Abu Ghraib is now complete. The report includes'
recommendations to forward its findings to Army General Counsel and the
DOJ for determination of appropriate action.
General Smith. Culpable persons who abused prisoners will be
referred to the relevant judicial authority system for appropriate
action.
General Taguba. The U.S. Military does not have jurisdiction to
prosecute civilians under the UCMJ except in time of war as officially
declared by Congress. That is not the situation in Iraq. The criminal
prosecution of U.S. civilians could only be effected by the host
country or by the U.S. Department of Justice in coordination with a
U.S. Attorney's office for violation of U.S. laws that have extra-
territorial application.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
gravity of initial abu ghraib prison abuse
12. Senator Collins. General Taguba, did you see any indication
that the initial reports of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison were not taken
seriously by investigators or the DOD chain of command?
General Taguba. I believe the initial reports of detainee abuse
were taken seriously by the CG, CJTF-7 and Commander, CENTCOM. Upon
being made aware of these abuses, Lieutenant General Sanchez almost
immediately requested that the CENTCOM commander appoint a two star
general to investigate reports of detainee abuse and other matters
relating to the 800th MP Brigade. The CENTCOM Commander, through his
Chief of Staff, then directed the CFLCC Commander, Lt. Gen. David
McKiernan to appoint such an investigating officer.
abu ghraib chain of command
13. Senator Collins. General Smith, please describe the chain of
command beginning with the alleged abusers. Who in that chain of
command was aware of the initial reports of abuse of Iraqi prisoners?
General Smith. The initial reports of abuse were reported to CID by
a soldier stationed at Abu Ghraib. CID informed the suspects'
commanding officer who in turn made notification through the
operational chain of command. The Commander of CJTF-7, Lieutenant
General Sanchez, promptly reported the matter to General Abizaid, who
in turn quickly advised Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Myers. Other reporting may have occurred through both Service and CID
channels. Those alleged to have committed the abuse are assigned to the
372nd MP Company, 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade. The brigade
commander was under the tactical control of the Commander, CJTF-7 and
the Operational Control of the Combined Forces Land Component Commander
(CFLCC).
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
miller report
14. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, in early September 2003,
Major General Geoffrey Miller, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo,
led a team to review current ability to rapidly exploit internees in
the Iraqi theater for actionable intelligence. It has been generally
reported that General Miller's team recommended that military police in
Iraq be used to set the conditions for the successful interrogation and
exploitation of internees/detainees . Why was General Miller sent to
Iraq, what were his specific orders, and who recommended that he be
sent and why?
Secretary Cambone. MG Miller was dispatched to Iraq via joint staff
message to advise CENTCOM and the Iraq Survey Group on detainee
operations in Baghdad, including interrogations. Dr. Cambone was
involved only to the extent that he was interested in having MG Miller
help improve the flow of intelligence information to CJTF-7 and back to
the subordinate commands. MG Miller had no directive authority in that
visit. He was in Iraq from August 31 to September 9, 2003.
15. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, who in the Office of the
SECDEF was briefed on General Miller's recommendations and who approved
these recommendations?
Secretary Cambone. The USD(I) was never officially briefed on MG
Miller's report and only received a copy of the report April 2004.
16. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, when and how were General
Miller's recommendations conveyed to commanders at CJTF-7?
Secretary Cambone. Major General Miller conducted briefings to the
staff on 3 and 7 September 2003 during the course of his visit and
concluded with an exit briefing on 9 September 2003.
17. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, does the DOD agree with
General Taguba's conclusion that MP should not be involved with setting
``favorable conditions'' for subsequent interviews?
Secretary Cambone. The Department agrees with the statement General
Sanchez made before the SASC on 19 May: ``MPs were involved in passive
enabling of those operations and had no involvement in the conduct of
interrogations. Those were the orders in the SOPs that remained after
General Miller's visit.''
18. Senator Levin. General Smith, according to the Washington Post,
General Sanchez is reported to have issued a memorandum on October 12,
2003, calling for a ``harmonization'' of military policing and
intelligence work at Abu Ghraib to ``maximize the efficiency of the
interrogation.'' Did General Sanchez issue this memorandum based on the
recommendations of General Miller's report?
General Smith. The 12 October memorandum was the CJTF-7 Command
Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy. To the best of my
knowledge, it was issued, in part, based upon Major General Miller's
recommendations.
end strength and training of the 800th mp company
19. Senator Levin. General Smith, it appears all MP functions at
Abu Ghraib were performed by Reserve MP units, at least during the
period in question. The Taguba Report noted that the units of the 800th
MP Brigade are greatly under strength, as Reserve component units do
not have individual personnel replacement system to mitigate medical
losses or the departure of individual soldiers. Why was an inadequately
staffed, inadequately trained, and unprepared unit sent to handle such
a critical task? Who bears responsibility for this staffing decision?
General Smith. This Reserve Brigade's purpose was to fulfill the
mission for which it was assigned. Brigade leadership was expected to
fulfill its mission by adapting and utilizing soldiers who were
supposed to be trained to accomplish mission requirements. As the
Taguba Report notes, there are only two MP (Internment/Resettlement)
Battalions in the Army, which have corrections training on their
Mission Essential Task List (METL). The Taguba Report also noted that
the Commander of the 800th MP Brigade did a poor job of allocating
resources. The Commander also did not train her soldiers in confinement
operations after it became clear that the mission of her soldiers was
to change after the fall of the former Iraqi regime. Adapting to the
mission is expected of commanders, especially senior commanders. Some
of the ``staffing decisions'' were dictated by the limitations in
specific resources available; a situation which the U.S. Army has
identified and is taking steps to correct.
20. Senator Levin. General Smith, is this a problem faced by Guard
and Reserve units throughout Iraq?
General Smith. Guard and Reserve units deployed throughout Iraq are
expected to be trained and ready to perform their missions. Training
and readiness are responsibilities of the Service components and are
issues currently under review by those components.
21. Senator Levin. General Smith, have there been any changes in
the training of the MP units and personnel since the detainee abuses
were first discovered? If so, what changes have been made to date, and
when were they made?
General Smith. Training and readiness are the responsibilities of
the Service components and I would defer to those officials to report
on changes made.
taguba report recommendations
22. Senator Levin. General Smith, General Taguba's report contained
a number of recommendations with regard to the situation at Abu Ghraib
detention facility. To what extent have the recommendations contained
in the Taguba Report been adopted and implemented? Please address each
of the specific recommendations in the three parts of the report.
General Smith. The attached summary of MNF-I actions is responsive
to this question.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
international committee of the red cross report
23. Senator Levin. General Smith, the February 2004 report of the
ICRC indicates that the abuses revealed in the Taguba Report were
consistent with allegations of abuse collected by the ICRC in the
course of some 29 visits to 14 internment facilities in central and
southern Iraq during the period of March to November 2003. The ICRC
report makes clear that since the beginning of the conflict in Iraq,
the ICRC regularly brought concerns about the ill-treatment of
detainees to the attention of coalition forces. In addition, ICRC
President Jacob Kellenberger has said that he met with senior
administration officials in May 2003 and January 2004 to discuss issues
related to the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, in
Afghanistan, and elsewhere. How many times since the beginning of the
conflict in Iraq were ICRC reports brought to the attention of
coalition forces? Please provide any written reports provided by the
ICRC to coalition forces concerning the treatment of detainees.
General Smith. While ICRC reports are not classified documents,
they must be handled as such. The information contained in these
reports pertains to ongoing military operations and identifies
facilities, practices, personnel, and detainees, including by name.
This information is sensitive and requires protection. Staffers within
DOD have worked closely with staffers of the congressional committees.
The staff and members of the SASC have been briefed on this issue and
DOD has made available all of the relevant ICRC reports to the
committee members.
24. Senator Levin. General Smith, who in CENTCOM was aware of the
ICRC's reports of prisoner abuse throughout 2003? What action was taken
in response to these reports and why wasn't it more successful in
addressing the underlying problems?
General Smith. I was not personally aware of the ICRC reports of
prisoner abuse throughout 2003. Based upon further inquiry, I have
learned that only one ICRC report, dated 12 May 2003, was ever
addressed to this command. This predated my assumption of duties by
approximately 5 months. All other such reports have been addressed to
subordinate organizations or officials at the Pentagon.
Our subordinate commands will hold accountable those who failed in
their duties and they will ensure that the necessary training will be
conducted to curtail future incidents. New leadership at the
confinement facility is clearly aware of the need to heighten their
vigilance to prevent any possible mistreatment of Iraqi detainees.
Additional training on the Geneva Conventions has been conducted for
the new units that are taking over detention operations to ensure the
new soldiers are aware of their duties and responsibilities.
Additionally, the reported allegations prompted Lieutenant General
Sanchez to request the immediate provision of a team to conduct
additional training on confinement operations, with emphasis on
treating detainees with dignity and respect. A single senior officer
with proper authorities and support to oversee all aspects of detainee
operations has been appointed. Maj. Gen. Geoff Miller has been in place
since 15 April 2004 and is properly focused and making a positive
difference.
25. Senator Levin. General Smith, did CENTCOM keep senior
administration officials informed of the ICRC's concerns about the ill-
treatment of Iraqi prisoners? If so, at what level and on what
occasions were they informed?
General Smith. With one exception, ICRC reports and concerns were
handled at the CJTF-7 level. CENTCOM did not receive ICRC reports. Had
I known about the abuses as outlined in the ICRC reports which have now
been furnished to this command, senior administration officials at the
Pentagon would have been promptly informed. In fact, as soon as the
abuses at Abu Ghraib were reported to CENTCOM, that information was
immediately passed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
26. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, on how many occasions did
senior DOD or administration officials meet with representatives of the
ICRC and when did these meetings occur?
Secretary Cambone. There were four such occasions--May 27, June 27,
October 15, and December 19.
27. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, were any investigations,
changes in policy, or other actions initiated as a result of these
meetings?
Secretary Cambone. The Department of Defense has already launched
no less than 12 separate investigations into the ICRC's allegations of
prisoner mistreatment:
a. MG Ryder, the Army Provost Marshall General, launched an
investigation to assess ongoing detention and corrections
operations in Iraq. MG Ryder completed that assessment on
November 6, 2003, and a copy of the Ryder Report has been
provided to Congress.
b. MG Miller, Commander of the Guantanamo facility, launched
an assessment of intelligence and detention operations that was
completed on September 5, 2003. A copy of the Miller Report was
provided to Congress..
c. MG Taguba's administrative investigation of detainee
operations and the 800th MP Brigade was completed May 6, 2004,
and a copy was submitted to Congress.
d. VADM Church completed a review of procedures at Guantanamo
and Charleston on May 11, 2004.
e. LTG Jones and MG Fay are currently reviewing military
intelligence and contractor interrogation procedures of the
205th MI Brigade at Abu Ghraib.
f. LTG Mikolashek, the Army Inspector General, is currently
performing an overall assessment of doctrine and training
related to detention operations.
g. BG Jacoby is currently reviewing detainee operations and
facilities in Afghanistan.
h. Secretary Rumsfeld has ordered an investigation to collect
authorized interrogation practices in the all DOD detention
facilities used for the war on terror and to ensure that all
appropriate policy guidance is being followed.
i. BG Formica is currently performing an administrative
investigation into detainee abuse by CJSOTF-AP.
j. COL Ertman is performing an Army Reserve assessment of
Reserve training with a focus on military intelligence and
military police.
k. Hon. Schlesinger is leading an independent examination of
detainee issues for the Department of Defense.
l. Finally, there are the criminal investigations of detainee
abuse at Abu Ghraib and other detainee deaths while in
Coalition custody.
m. To coordinate these various investigations and ensure a
coherent policy response to their recommendations, the
Department of Defense has created a new position, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs. This
position will allow a single office to ensure compliance with
DOD policy directives and coordinate with the ICRC. As part of
this effort, DOD has taken steps to ensure that all ICRC
reports (which formerly went only to officers in the field) are
submitted directly to the Pentagon. The Departments of the Army
and Navy are currently taking steps to launch criminal
investigations into each instance of abuse alleged by the Red
Cross.
28. Senator Levin. General Smith, the February 2004 ICRC report
indicates that during a mid-October 2003 visit to the Abu Ghraib
Correctional Facility, ICRC delegates witnessed ``the practice of
keeping [detainees] completely naked in totally empty concrete cells
and in total darkness, allegedly for several consecutive days.'' In
response to ICRC inquiries, the report states that ``The military
intelligence officer in charge of the interrogation explained that this
practice was `part of the process' '' for obtaining confessions and
extracting information. In response to the allegations documented by
the ICRC in mid-October 2003, or any other ICRC reports, what specific
steps were taken to correct the situation at Abu Ghraib or any other
detention facilities run by coalition forces and when were they taken?
General Smith. My expanded answer to question 24 responds to this
question.
29. Senator Levin. General Smith, what was the extent of the ICRC's
access to the facilities at Abu Ghraib and did it include the part of
the facility where the abuses depicted in the photos are alleged to
have occurred?
General Smith. During the period in question, ICRC visits were
coordinated by CJTF-7. I will defer to those military officials to
provide any details responsive to your questions.
30. Senator Levin. General Smith, whom did the ICRC brief about
these alleged abuses?
General Smith. The ICRC exercised its prerogative to brief at the
levels they thought were appropriate. The ICRC did not brief anyone in
HQ, CENTCOM, to include me.
interrogation techniques
31. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, in an interview with The New
York Times, Major General Geoffrey D. Miller, the new commander of
American prisons in Iraq, stated that the roughly 50 techniques the
military officially uses in prisoner interrogations include hooding,
sleep deprivation, and forcing prisoners into ``stress positions.'' An
unclassified December 12, 2003, Situation Update to Major General
Miller is included as an annex to the Taguba Report. The document
describes interrogation techniques permissible for use in the Iraqi
theater of operations, and reportedly it includes a process allowing
for the use of sleep management, sensory deprivation, isolation longer
than 30 days, and dogs. Were you personally aware that permissible
interrogation techniques in the Iraqi theater included sleep
management, sensory deprivation, isolation longer than 30 days, and
dogs?
Secretary Cambone. The USD(I) did not know what specific
interrogation techniques were being used in the Iraqi theater. The
techniques used in theater were developed and approved in theater
without any USD(I) involvement.
32. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, who within the Army or DOD
authorized the use of these additional techniques and were they
specifically authorized for use in Abu Ghraib?
Secretary Cambone. Development of interrogation policies consistent
with the standing guidance was within the authority of Combined Joint
Task Force-7 and did not require higher-level approval.
33. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, what steps were taken to
ensure that interrogation techniques complied with the Geneva
Conventions?
Secretary Cambone. Prior to the commencement of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Commander, U.S. Central Command, prepared Operational Plan
(OPLAN) 1003-V. Appendix 1 to Annex E of OPLAN 1003-V specifically
addressed the treatment of the operational plan annex on enemy
prisoners of war, retained persons, civilian internees, and other
detainees. It outlined responsibilities, policies and procedures with
respect to the handling of detainees, and provided specific guidance
that the Geneva Conventions applied to all persons held by U.S. forces.
This means of promulgation is consistent with the usual manner in which
commanders provide guidance to their subordinate commanders. The
subordinate commands would review the OPLAN and draft their own orders.
For instance, the CJSC EXORD itself does not specifically address the
Geneva Conventions; rather, it refers back to OPLAN 1003-V.
In addition to the promulgation of this OPLAN and its Annexes,
commanders were responsible for ensuring that detainees were treated in
accordance with the Geneva Conventions and applicable international law
and that measures were implemented to ensure the forces were aware of
and complied with the Law of War.
34. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, who within DOD made the legal
determination as to whether these interrogation techniques comply with
the Geneva Conventions, including the requirement of Article 31 of the
Geneva Conventions that ``No physical or moral coercion shall be
exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain
information from them or from third parties'' and to whom was that
determination briefed?
Secretary Cambone. I understand that the CJTF-7 policy issued on
October 12, 2003, titled ``Interrogation and Counter Resistance
Policy,'' included interrogation approaches contained in existing
interrogation doctrine (e.g., Army Field Manual 34-52), reflected
longstanding DOD interrogation practice, and was issued after
consultation with the CJTF-7 Staff Judge Advocate and lawyers within
the U.S. Central Command.
35. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, what role did your office
play in developing DOD policy on interrogation in Iraq?
Secretary Cambone. My office did not play any role in developing
DOD policy on interrogation in Iraq.
36. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, did your office provide
direction on interrogation guidelines to either General Abizaid or
General Sanchez? If so, when and to whom?
Secretary Cambone. The USD(I) did not provide direction on
interrogation guidelines to either General Abizaid or General Sanchez.
37. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, did you provide direction on
guidelines to either Secretary Rumsfeld or Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz?
If so, when and to whom?
Secretary Cambone. The USD(I) did not provide direction on
interrogation guidelines to either Secretary Rumsfeld or Deputy
Wolfowitz.
38. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, at a May 14, 2004, DOD press
briefing, senior military officials stated that since last October
General Sanchez had approved 25 requests to hold detainees in isolation
for more than 30 days, but had not approved the use of any other
interrogation technique requiring commanding general approval. General
Sanchez also reportedly announced that he would deny requests to use
other harsh methods that required his explicit approval. How many
requests were made since the issuance of the Interrogation ROE for
permission to use the interrogation techniques requiring General
Sanchez's approval?
Secretary Cambone. The number of requests is unknown. However, the
``Interrogation Rules of Engagement'' were a graphic aid prepared by
the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. This aid is not a policy
document and was not prepared or approved by Combined Joint Task Force-
7. Lieutenant General Sanchez signed an ``Interrogation and Counter-
Resistance Policy'' document on 14 September 2003. Revised policies
were published on 12 October 2003 and 13 May 2004. Some of those
policies required certain specific interrogation techniques to be
approved in advance by Lieutenant General Sanchez on a case-by-case
basis and after a legal review.
39. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, besides the 25 cases
mentioned in the May 14 briefing, are there any other cases in which
the use of these techniques was granted in the Iraqi theater?
Secretary Cambone. The only restricted technique that was approved
for use was segregation in excess of 30 days. The figure ``25''
mentioned in the 14 May briefing was an estimate. Records at
Multinational Force in Iraq Headquarters (successor to Combined Joint
Task Force-7) indicate Lieutenant General Sanchez approved fewer than
20 segregations.
40. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, did General Sanchez suspend
the use of these techniques as a matter of policy, or has a
determination been made that they are not compliant with U.S.
international obligations?
Secretary Cambone. Of the techniques that required his approval,
only segregation in excess of 30 days was ever approved and used.
Whether any of the other techniques could, as a hypothetical matter,
have been approved under any specific set of circumstances is
uncertain. However, both policy and law can be factors in reviewing the
suitability of various interrogation techniques depending on the status
of the detainee and the manner in which the technique might be
employed.
41. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, in your testimony, you
promised to provide a comparison of the command-level guidelines for
the use in interrogation for detainees in Guantanamo and Iraq. Please
provide this comparison.
Secretary Cambone. Attachment prepared by Detainee Task Force on 28
September 2004.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
geneva conventions
42. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, Secretary Rumsfeld testified
on May 7, 2004, that the Geneva Conventions apply to all prisoners of
war, retained personnel, civilian internees, and other detainees in the
custody of U.S. forces in Iraq. General Taguba has stated that the
Geneva Conventions were not posted at Abu Ghraib and military police at
that facility were not trained in the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions. When was the determination made that the Geneva
Conventions did apply to all detainees in Iraq and by whom was it made?
Secretary Cambone. The Geneva Conventions applied during Operation
Iraqi Freedom. The plans for Operation Iraqi Freedom that were prepared
by Commander, U.S. Central Command, and briefed to the President and me
included provisions that clearly stated that enemy prisoners of war,
retained persons, civilian internees, and other detainee ``operations
will be conducted in compliance with the 1949 Geneva Convention and
applicable U.S. military regulations.'' Further, component and
supporting commanders were responsible under the plans for Operation
Iraqi Freedom for ``[e]nsuring that treatment of all detained persons
is in accordance with the Geneva Conventions and other applicable
international law.'' The President directed these plans to be executed.
Detention operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom were always to be
conducted in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.
43. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, how was this decision
disseminated to troops in the field and were specific directives or
guidance sent out, of which the military police at Abu Ghraib should
have been aware?
Secretary Cambone. (from 7 May Levin W, SECDEF, also used for #33):
Prior to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Commander, U.S.
Central Command, prepared Operational Plan (OPLAN) 1003-V. Appendix 1
to Annex E of OPLAN 1003-V specifically addressed the treatment of the
operational plan annex on enemy prisoners of war, retained persons,
civilian internees, and other detainees. It outlined responsibilities,
policies and procedures with respect to the handling of detainees, and
provided specific guidance that the Geneva Conventions applied to all
persons held by U.S. forces. This means of promulgation is consistent
with the usual manner in which commanders provide guidance to their
subordinate commanders. The subordinate commands would review the OPLAN
and draft their own orders. For instance, the CJSC EXORD itself does
not specifically address the Geneva Conventions; rather, it refers back
to OPLAN 1003-V.
In addition to the promulgation of this OPLAN and its Annexes,
commanders were responsible for ensuring that detainees were treated in
accordance with the Geneva Conventions and applicable international law
and that measures were implemented to ensure the forces were aware of
and complied with the Law of War.
44. Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone, will the JAG be conducting
his own review of the interrogation techniques listed in the October 12
Situation Update included in an annex to the Taguba Report to determine
his assessment of their compliance with the Geneva Conventions?
Secretary Cambone. Department-wide, much has been done to improve
detainee operations:
Army:
Established Provost Marshal General in September 2003
as Army executive agent for detainee operations.
Planning for general officer-level Military Police
command in Army future force.
Developed detainee operations integration plan--
prioritized plan addressing policy, doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities.
Synchronized Army with joint policy and doctrine.
Established Detainee Operations Oversight Council.
CENTCOM:
Assigned a general officer to be in charge of all
detention and interrogation operations in Iraq.
Issued standard interrogation policies that emphasize
application of Geneva Conventions and that are fully consistent
with overall DOD policies.
Upgrading detention facilities for soldiers and
detainees.
Joint Staff:
Created Joint Staff Detainee Affairs Division to
address worldwide detainee operations.
Drafted Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
on Detainee Operations by the Air, Land, & Sea Applications
Center.
Expediting publication of Joint Doctrine for Detainee
Operations (Joint Publication 3-63).
Including Joint Interrogation Operations in ``Joint
and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.''
(Joint Publication 2-01)
Added Detainee Operations to ``Joint Training Policy
and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States.''
(Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01C)
OSD:
Established Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA) office.
Established a Joint Detainee Coordination Committee on
Detainee Affairs chaired by DASD-DA.
Issued policy ``Procedures for Investigations into the
Death of Detainees in the Custody of the Armed Forces of the
U.S.''
Issued policy ``Handling of Reports from the
International Committee of the Red Cross.''
Initiated a department wide review of detainee-related
policy directives.
As part of that department wide review of detainee-related policy
directives, the Judge Advocate General will review all policies and
directives in order to ensure their compliance with the Geneva
Conventions.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
CONTINUE TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON ALLEGATIONS OF MISTREATMENT OF IRAQI
PRISONERS
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 11, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Talent, Chambliss, Graham,
Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E.
Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; Elaine
A. McCusker, professional staff member; Paula J. Philbin,
professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Jeremy L. Hekhuis, professional staff member;
Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; and William G.P. Monahan,
minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew W.
Florell, Sara R. Mareno, and Bridget E. Ward.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Darren M. Dick, assistant to Senator Roberts;
Lance Landry, assistant to Senator Allard; Derek J. Maurer,
assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Meredith Moseley, assistant to Senator
Graham; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Erik
Raven, assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator
Akaka; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Andrew
Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze and
Randy Massanelli, assistants to Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. Good afternoon. The Armed Services
Committee reconvenes for a second panel to resume our hearing,
a series of hearings regarding the mistreatment of Iraqi
prisoners by some elements and certain personnel, few in
number, I hope, of our Armed Forces, in violation of the United
States Constitution and laws and international laws.
Testifying before us are Lieutenant General Keith B.
Alexander, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army--
General Alexander is the senior intelligence officer in the
Army; Major General Ronald L. Burgess, Director for
Intelligence, J-2, Joint Staff; and Major General Thomas J.
Romig, Judge Advocate General (JAG) for the United States Army.
We're privileged to have you here. I thank you, Secretary
Rumsfeld, and the Acting Secretary of the Army, Les Brownlee,
for facilitating your presence here today.
Senator Levin, you can make any comments you want.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me add my welcome to our three witnesses this
afternoon. We all appreciate their appearing before us.
This morning, General Taguba agreed with the conclusion of
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), based on
the evidence presented to him, that coercive practices, such as
holding prisoners naked for an extended period of time, were a
systematic part of the intelligence process at Abu Ghraib.
Additionally, we heard from Under Secretary Cambone that
stressful and harsh approaches, including sleep deprivation and
use of dogs, could be approved by the commander. But that
doesn't square with the statements by the witnesses that the
Geneva Conventions provisions and principles were supposed to
be followed, since they don't allow for such practices. For
instance, Article 31 of the fourth Geneva Conventions states
that ``no physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against
protected persons, in particular to obtain information from
them or from third parties.'' I hope that our witnesses this
afternoon will address, in great detail, that issue.
Finally, Mr. Cambone said this morning that one of General
Miller's recommendations for Iraq was to dedicate and train a
detention guard force, subordinate to an intelligence
commander, who would set the conditions for successful
interrogation. But General Taguba told us this morning that
under Army doctrine that should not be the function of a guard
force. So that is also an issue which I hope our witnesses will
address, along with a multitude of other matters which I know
are before this committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Gentlemen, will you kindly stand and raise your right
hands? [Witnesses sworn.]
General Alexander and other witnesses, I presume each of
you has a brief opening statement. Your entire statements will
be admitted to the record.
If you will proceed, General Alexander.
STATEMENT OF LTG KEITH B. ALEXANDER, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF, G-2; ACCOMPANIED BY MG RONALD L. BURGESS, JR., USA,
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, J-2; AND MG THOMAS J. ROMIG, USA, JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL
General Alexander. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, and
members of the committee, on behalf of the men and women of the
United States Army Intelligence, we appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you today. With me today is Major General Ron
Burgess, J-2, Joint Staff, and Major General Tom Romig, the JAG
of the Army. I am making this statement on behalf of the three
of us.
First, let me assure you that we find the alleged abuses of
detainees in Abu Ghraib prison, Iraq, totally reprehensible.
Army Intelligence neither condones, nor tolerates, these
actions. Furthermore, we would like to emphasize that Army
Intelligence soldiers are trained to abide by the highest
standards for the humane treatment of all personnel in the
custody of our soldiers worldwide.
We conduct extensive legal training for all of our Army
Intelligence professionals, especially interrogators, in the
law of war and the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of
1949. Our training manuals specifically prohibit the abuse of
detainees, and we ensure all of our soldiers trained as
interrogators receive this training.
Geneva Conventions protocols are reinforced during each
practical exercise. Sir, there are 12 practical exercises that
the interrogators go through, each of those last 2 hours. An
interrogator will flunk an exercise should he or she
inadvertently violate a Geneva Accord.
The contemptible behavior of a few soldiers does not
represent the professionalism, dedication, and compassion
demonstrated by the majority of soldiers in Iraq. Commanders
and soldiers at every level have the duty to respect and follow
the established international laws of armed conflict, and to
treat everyone, to include those within our military detention
facilities, with dignity and decency in the same ways that we
expect to be treated, as Americans. Those soldiers who
mistreated or humiliated detainees will be brought to justice
swiftly. Again, the Army does not condone or tolerate such
behavior.
The allegations of misconduct at Abu Ghraib have hit at the
very core values of our Nation, the Department of Defense
(DOD), and the Army, causing us grave concern, and prompting a
very focused and thorough review of these incidents. Senior
leaders at all levels take every report seriously, and expect
an extensive investigation of every allegation.
The Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) in Iraq has an
ongoing investigation of allegations that intelligence soldiers
were involved in the abuse of detainees in Abu Ghraib. This
investigation, called a Procedure 15, is currently ongoing and
being conducted by Major General Fay for Lieutenant General
Sanchez, and will identify and report questionable intelligence
activities that may have violated law, executive order, or
presidential directive.
Army Intelligence will not tolerate soldiers who violate
the dignity and rights of others, to include those whom we have
detained. We remain steadfastly committed to dealing
expeditiously with any complaint or allegation of mistreatment,
and to ensuring our commanders take appropriate action.
Sir, I would like to address a few issues that arose during
this morning's testimony.
First, on the interrogation rules of engagement (ROE), we
brought with us the rules of engagement that were in effect at
the CJTF-7 in Iraq prior to October 2003. These rules are in
compliance with the Geneva Conventions, and directly stem from
our interrogation manual, Field Manual (FM) 34-52. These are
the rules that interrogation soldiers are trained on at Fort
Huachuca. In addition, contractors were to read and sign that
they understood these rules.
Second, in the timing of events, the ICRC reports cover
periods from March 2003 through the end of 2003, and perhaps
into 2004. They visited Abu Ghraib, we know for sure, in
October 2003, on the 11th and 12th, and again on the 23rd, and
conducted a series of interviews with detainees. That report,
as Major General Taguba stated, was given to Brigadier General
Karpinski to respond, and she provided her response on the 24th
of December 2003. A formal report was produced in February
2004. Important to note is, many of the problems that were
identified during that time period were prior to the issue of
when the military intelligence (MI) brigade took over, on 19
November 2003.
Chairman Warner. Did you personally get copies of those
reports?
General Alexander. Sir, I got copies of those reports this
week. I did not get those last year. No, I did not.
Sir, reference tactical control (TACON), my understanding,
in discussions with General Sanchez, was that the military
police (MP) would remain in charge of detainee operations, but
he needed Colonel Pappas to take over force protection and the
overall management of the forward operating base (FOB) at Abu
Ghraib and kick off many of the initiatives he wanted
accomplished to upgrade the facility. However, this is a key
issue, and I would recommend that we take this for the record,
from the Joint Staff to Central Command (CENTCOM).
Sir, I would like to briefly go over interrogation
operations, because I think this gets to the key that we see a
split between MI and MPs. I think we need to understand that.
In my discussions with General Ryder, we do not have a split.
There is a door at places, and there is openness at places, and
I'd like to explain that.
First, if you were to look at the general population for
when prisoners of war (POW) come in there, that general
population is seen most clearly by the MPs, and is screened by
MI personnel who talk to the MPs on who are the key folks that
are there. Sir, as you may expect, the MPs understand who are
the ringleaders, who is the person who is in charge, and who
are the key folks that may have intelligence value. It is a
requirement in that phase that the MP and MI work closely
together to develop and understand who are the high-value
detainees.
The second step, isolating and getting those high-value
detainees into the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center
(JIDC), and looking at what goes on with those prisoners. The
people who understand the environment that those prisoners are
in day in and day out, 24 hours a day, are the MPs, and the
best way to understand that interrogation plan and the methods
that the interrogator will use is the MP and the personnel who
are around him, and that is one of the things that we need to
have MP and MI talk about. Is this detainee or prisoner having
a good day or bad? Has he been quiet, or has he been talking?
What is the way to discuss this with him?
There is a gate, and that gates starts at the interrogation
cell itself. That's where the MPs should not be involved, and
that is the door that General Ryder talked about in my
discussions with him. I think we need to be clear on that,
because when we talk about doors we give the inference that we
mean, ``No MPs over here, and no MI over there.''
That is what General Miller found when he went over there.
He found that the MPs and the MI were not talking enough
together, so that we missed key people who ought to have been
interrogated, and that we weren't making the best value of it.
Now, there's another part of this that I need to walk
through, and that is how we develop the interrogation plan.
Because, sir, this is not something that we just say, ``Okay,
bring 'em in. What are we going to do?'' We develop an
interrogation plan. In that plan, we look at the prisoner. What
do we want to get from this prisoner? What are the approaches,
the techniques to be used? Sir, those techniques, again, are in
our FM 34-52, and are in the ROE that I talked about. What are
the questions to be asked? What do we learn?
That interrogation plan is to be approved by the chain of
command. Then, from that, we get an interrogation report that
comes out, the information that was received during that
interrogation. The leaders review and approve both of those
parts of that plan.
All of that stems from the priority intelligence
requirements that the theater, the divisions, and the brigades
have.
Sir, in early August, I went over to Iraq. One of the
things that I found, in talking with the division commanders
and the brigade commanders and CJTF-7, is that the flow of
information that Dr. Cambone talked about, was not getting back
to the units that apprehended these people. There was a
problem. That flow of information--so if they grabbed a
prisoner, the information on what that prisoner had that could
have been useful for that brigade, the interrogation reports,
were not getting there. That's important to saving soldiers'
lives.
That was one of the key things that we were trying to fix.
How do you get, when you consolidate all the prisoners from
Iraq at one facility, information that goes back to 4th
Infantry Division to this brigade to say, ``This is the guy who
fired the improvised explosive device, and he's part of this
network.'' If it does not get there, we are not going to stop
those attacks, and we're going to have soldiers killed. That
was one of the things that we were looking at.
Chairman Warner. Did you visit the prison and look at that?
General Alexander. Sir, at the time I was there--I got
there in early August--Abu Ghraib was not yet stood up. Abu
Ghraib was in the phases of getting the prison stood up. The
engineers were there, so it was not stood up. There were not
prisoners at Abu Ghraib at that time. I have not been back to
Iraq since August, sir.
Sir, once again, thank you for the opportunity to speak
before you today, and we look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Alexander follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Keith B. Alexander, USA
Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, and members of the committee, on
behalf of the men and women of United States Army Intelligence, I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.
First, let me assure you that I find the alleged abuses of
detainees in Abu Ghraib Prison, Iraq, totally reprehensible. Army
Intelligence neither condones nor tolerates these actions. Furthermore,
I would like to emphasize that Army Intelligence Soldiers are trained
to abide by the highest standards for the humane treatment of all
personnel in the custody of our soldiers worldwide.
We conduct extensive legal training for all of our Army
Intelligence professionals, especially interrogators, in the Law of War
and the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Our training
manuals specifically prohibit the abuse of detainees, and we ensure all
of our soldiers trained as interrogators receive this training. Geneva
Conventions protocols are reinforced during each practical exercise. An
interrogator will flunk an exercise should he or she inadvertently
violate a Geneva accord.
The contemptible behavior of a few soldiers does not represent the
professionalism, dedication, and compassion demonstrated by the
majority of soldiers in Iraq. Commanders and soldiers at every level
have the duty to respect and follow the established international laws
of armed conflict and to treat everyone, to include those within our
military detention facilities with dignity and decency in the same ways
that we expect to be treated as Americans. Those soldiers who
mistreated or humiliated detainees will be brought to justice swiftly.
Again, the Army does not condone or tolerate such behavior.
The allegations of misconduct at Abu Ghraib have hit at the very
core values of our Nation, the Department of Defense and the Army
Intelligence Community, causing us grave concern and prompting a very
focused and thorough review of these incidents. Senior Leaders at all
levels take every report seriously and expect an extensive
investigation of every allegation. CJTF-7 has an ongoing investigation
of allegations that Intelligence Soldiers were involved in the abuse of
detainees in Abu Ghraib. This investigation, a ``Procedure 15,''
currently ongoing and being conducted by Major General George Fay, will
identify and report questionable intelligence activities that may have
violated law, Executive Order, or presidential directive.
Army Intelligence will not tolerate soldiers who violate the
dignity and rights of others, to include those we have detained. We
remain steadfastly committed to dealing expeditiously with any
complaint or allegation of mistreatment, and to ensuring our commanders
take appropriate action.
Once again, thank you for this opportunity to speak before you
today. I look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
General Burgess.
General Burgess. Sir, I will stay with the statement as
read by Lieutenant General Alexander, and I look forward to
your questions.
Chairman Warner. Fine.
General Romig.
General Romig. Sir, I have no comments, either. I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Warner. Let us proceed with a 6-minute round, in
hopes that we can get in two rounds this afternoon.
General Alexander, with due respect to you, you laid out
very concisely and professionally, exactly what the manuals
say, what everybody was supposed to do, but it didn't happen,
and this committee--and you pointed out, General Fay is looking
into that--is trying to put together a record for the Senate,
for the American public, that lends some explanation to what
happened.
Now, you're the chief of all Army Intelligence. Number one,
the MI people that did the interrogations participated,
presumably to some degree, with the guards. They were your
people down the chain, correct?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. General Karpinski was in your chain, so to
speak. Is that correct?
General Alexander. She's in the Army, yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. I realize that, but she was working with
your people.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Now, what can you tell the committee, of
your own knowledge, to help us and the American public and,
indeed, much of the public in the world, to understand what
went wrong? We know the wrongs occurred. We've gotten the
initial reports--General Taguba. We, through the press, have
seen pictures. It's a possibility the Senate may see additional
pictures. The Pentagon is very forthcoming in trying to help
this committee and the leadership of the committee and the
leadership of the Senate develop that evidence. What can you
personally tell, as chief, as to what went wrong?
General Alexander. Sir, on the specifics, my assessment, it
was a failure of leadership. What we need to--in terms of the
MP leadership, as General Taguba said--the question, the real
question is, did intelligence personnel tell those individuals
to do that? Were those personnel low-level people who said this
would be a good idea, or was that high-ranking personnel that
said, ``This is the method of operations?'' My understanding
and, to date, my belief, is that this was interaction between
low-level people, who were not in the action of their duties,
who were not doing interrogations at the time, or who made
statements to these folks that, ``Yes, what you're doing''--as
it was in General Taguba's report--``is softening them up.
They're speaking like crazy.''
What General Fay has to find out in his investigation is,
where was there complicity? Who and at what level did that go?
To this point, my belief is that that was informal, and that
these were a group of undisciplined MP soldiers who felt that
they had some, according to their statements, preference from
MI to go and do what they were doing. But we don't have any
facts to an individual that did that, other than a couple of
civilian contractors who were involved.
That's what we're looking for, sir. We will investigate
that to find out exactly who said it and where does it go.
Chairman Warner. So even though you're the chief of Army
Intelligence, even though this series of problems has been
going on since the fall of 2003, you cannot provide the
committee any facts that help us understand exactly what was
done and not done--by all levels, not just low levels--of those
in the Intelligence Command. Is that correct?
General Alexander. No, sir. I----
Chairman Warner. All right.
General Alexander. Let me go up higher. Clearly, at the
higher levels, the rules of----
Chairman Warner. A lot of people are following this. I
think the committee understands ``high'' and ``low.''
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. What's your definition of ``high,'' what's
the definition of ``low''?
General Alexander. Let's start at the brigade level, where
Colonel Pappas was involved. The two incidents that----
Chairman Warner. He was an MI man, is that correct?
General Alexander. He was an MI colonel, subordinate to the
CJTF-7, working for General Sanchez. His responsibilities and
his policies that he put out were--as an example, these
interrogation ROE and the procedures. I know of two incidents--
--
Chairman Warner. You know for a fact he did that?
General Alexander. Yes, sir. We have--in fact, we also have
his rules that he had folks coming in to brief them on. We had
General Sanchez's statements of, ``Here are the interrogator
rules of engagement.'' Both of those are the same, and they
stem from that same manual. In every case, it says, ``Treat
prisoners humanely.''
Also, sir, I think it's important to note that when we talk
about this humane treatment, when Colonel Pappas found a
soldier having a prisoner walk naked, he found out about that
and disciplined that soldier right away. So when actions were
brought----
Chairman Warner. What's the date/time group of that action?
General Alexander. I don't have the date/time group, but
I'll get you that, sir, for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
On 16 November 2003, a military intelligence soldier decided to
strip a detainee in response to what the solder believed was
uncooperative and physically recalcitrant behavior. Later the soldier
walked the semi-naked detainee across the camp. Colonel Pappas left the
issue to Lieutenant Colonel Jordan to handle. Lieutenant Colonel Jordan
temporarily removed the soldier from interrogation duties. The soldier
was counseled by her immediate supervisor but did not received an
Article 15, UCMJ.
General Alexander. But he took action. So my thoughts are,
when he knew something was going on, he took action. There were
other cases of discipline that he took on soldiers who did an
interrogation at the wrong time, and I will get you the exact
date/time group of that, too. It's in General Taguba's report,
but I think we need to get that, and I'll put that for the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
On 7 October 2003, three MI personnel conducted an interrogation
without authorization. The three soldiers each received nonjudicial
punishment, Field Grade Article 15s, from Colonel Pappas for failing to
get authorization to interrogate the detainee. Additionally, Colonel
Pappas removed them from interrogation operations.
General Alexander. So it's clear, from where I sit, that
both Colonel Pappas and the theater knew the ROE.
Chairman Warner. But somehow that information either didn't
flow down the chain or there was absolute total breakdown in
discipline and disregard.
General Alexander. That's what I believe.
Chairman Warner. Go below Pappas. What's the next level?
General Alexander. Sir, the next level was----
Chairman Warner. Battalion commander, isn't it?
General Alexander. There's the battalion commander, and
there is the JIDC.
Chairman Warner. All right. Can you tell us about their
level of responsibility and inquiry into this situation?
General Alexander. Right. Yes, sir. Lieutenant Colonel
Jordan was the officer in charge of the JIDC. He is also
mentioned in the Taguba Report for not doing his job. What we
have to find out is, in executing his, and in executing Colonel
Pappas's, what did they or did they not do. That's one of the
things that General Fay has to find out, and that's part of
that Procedure 15, sir. That's part of an ongoing
investigation.
Chairman Warner. I feel that, as hard as this committee
tries to discharge its oversight, we're at the point where
we're not likely to learn much about what took place and where
that level struck a breakdown of discipline until this Fay
Report is out. Is that your thinking?
General Alexander. Yes sir, to get the accurate answer. I
can give you an assessment, but that assessment will change as
we find these facts out and as General Fay completes his
investigation.
Chairman Warner. Give us your assessment to date.
General Alexander. Sir, my assessment is there was a
complete breakdown in the discipline on the MP side, and there
were some MI soldiers, contractors who may have been involved,
or at least in some of those pictures. The question is, what
did they say to the MPs to get them to do this? To this point,
as General Taguba said, there is nothing that we know that a MI
person told them to do this.
Chairman Warner. All right.
General Alexander. That's what we're trying to find out.
Chairman Warner. Did the MI people hire the contractors?
General Alexander. Sir, the contract actually stems under a
CENTCOM contract, and that CENTCOM contract then went to CJTF-
7. But the MI people there at Abu Ghraib were responsible for
oversight of those contractors. It's important to note that
what Major General Fast required of those contractors--and
she's the C-2 in Iraq, the senior MI person in Iraq----
Chairman Warner. I met her on my visit over there during
the same time frame you were there.
General Alexander. Right. Sir, they were to read and state
they understood the interrogation ROE.
Chairman Warner. Did she check their level of experience
and training?
General Alexander. Sir, that was part of the contract, that
they were supposed to have the 97 Echo, which is our
interrogation military occupational specialty (MOS), or
equivalent, to be hired.
Chairman Warner. All right. Do you have any knowledge of
other government--U.S. Government agencies, Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) or otherwise, Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) or any other group, that were working with your MI
people?
General Alexander. Sir, I know that there were other
government agencies that visited the facility and talked to
prisoners, but I know of no wrongdoing on their behalf.
Chairman Warner. I'm not suggesting that. Who are they?
What are they?
General Alexander. The CIA.
Chairman Warner. CIA.
General Alexander. The CIA also conducted some
interrogations, as I understand it, at that facility.
Chairman Warner. What about DIA?
General Alexander. Sir, I do not know that DIA conducted
that. I would have to check that.
Chairman Warner. All right. My time is expired.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. You say you have no evidence that MI people
were actively involved in and directing, and suggesting that
harsh activities occur?
General Alexander. Sir, we have not found any.
Senator Levin. But----
General Alexander. That's what we're looking for.
Senator Levin.--the Taguba Report itself quotes--for
instance, on page 18, Sergeant Davis, the MP company Sergeant
or Specialist Connell. He said, ``I saw them nude, but MI''--
military intelligence--``would tell us to take away their
mattresses, sheets, and clothes.'' Isn't that evidence that
MI----
General Alexander. Sir, that----
Senator Levin.--told them to take away their clothes? Then
you have Sergeant Davis stating that he heard MI insinuate to
the guards to abuse the inmates. Isn't that evidence? When he
asked what MI said, he stated, ``Loosen this guy up for us.
Make sure he has a bad night. Make sure he gets the
treatment.'' Isn't that evidence that the intelligence folks
were involved in this?
General Alexander. Sir, those are the statements that
spawned the Procedure 15 to look into exactly who said it.
Because the statements, as you read those, it says, ``MI
personnel or people in civilian or people of authority.'' But
when you ask, you get, ``Well, who specifically told you to do
this?'' That's the question that we have to get to.
Senator Levin. But you've----
General Alexander. They can't be----
Senator Levin.--some evidence, at least.
General Alexander. Oh, absolutely. Sir, and that's why the
investigation is going on.
Senator Levin. But I thought a minute ago you said you
haven't seen any evidence that MI was involved.
General Alexander. Sir, we have no proof that a person in
authority told them to do this activity.
Senator Levin. Let's go back to the MI personnel. There is
evidence, I take it, in the Taguba Report that MI personnel
gave suggestions to the MPs that they ``loosen this guy up,''
that they take his clothes away, that they make sure he has a
``bad night,'' and that he gets ``the treatment.'' That is
evidence, isn't it, of MI personnel involvement?
General Alexander. Yes, sir, that's a statement by those
soldiers.
Senator Levin. Right. All I'm saying is, is that evidence?
I'm not saying it's conclusive. I'm not saying anything other
than it is evidence, is it not?
General Alexander. Yes, sir. That's the evidence that led
to the beginning of the Procedure 15.
Senator Levin. All right. So you've seen that evidence.
Now, these interrogation ROE that I think you handed out----
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin.--these are the ones that were adopted by
whom?
General Alexander. Sir, these were the interrogation ROE
that were used by the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade and
their interrogators.
Senator Levin. Who was in charge of that brigade?
General Alexander. Sir, Colonel Pappas.
Senator Levin. Okay. Now, Colonel Pappas adopted these ROE,
which talk about how long you can have sleep management,
sensory deprivation, and stress positions. Are those all
consistent, as far as you are concerned, and do you have a
legal opinion saying those are consistent with the Geneva
Conventions?
General Alexander. Yes, sir. More importantly, because
those are--and as it states in our manual, those are ones that
we have to be very careful that we do not exceed the Geneva
Conventions. It requires the commander's written approval to
implement those.
Senator Levin. All right. You're saying that they are
approved by the Geneva Conventions----
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin.--that they're authorized by the Geneva----
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. But, second, you're saying that only with
commander's approval. Do you have commander's approval for
those activities in that prison?
General Alexander. Sir, I am not aware of any situations
that General Sanchez gave them written approval to do the ones
that are under his part there.
Senator Levin. Do you have any situation where he was asked
for written approval?
General Alexander. No, none, sir.
Senator Levin. So there was no case where he was either
requested, and, therefore, obviously, no case where he would
have granted, written approval, although this specifically says
that these activities require the commander's approval.
General Alexander. That's correct. None that I know of,
sir.
Senator Levin. All right. Thank you. Have you asked General
Sanchez whether or not he had any requests?
General Alexander. Sir, we have asked, and we have gotten--
but I will ask formally, and I will----
Senator Levin. We've gotten----
General Alexander.--I will respond----
Senator Levin.--what?
General Alexander. Gotten the same response that I gave
you----
Senator Levin. All right.
General Alexander.--that none were there. But I will ask
that formally and reply that back for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Lieutenant General Sanchez testified at the Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing, 19 May 2004, with General Abizaid, Major General
Miller, and Colonel Warren on Iraqi prisoner abuse that the only
request he had approved was for continued segregation beyond 30 days.
He testified that he never saw any other method come to his level
requesting approval.
Senator Levin. Okay. Finally, in the annex to the Taguba
Report, the document describes interrogation techniques, again,
which are permissible with certain approvals of commanders. But
then it says the following, ``Interrogation officer in charge
will submit the memorandum for the record requesting harsh
approaches for the commanding general's approval prior to
employment--sleep management, sensory deprivation, isolation
longer than 30 days, dogs.''
Are you familiar with that description that the officer in
charge will submit memoranda to the commanding general (CG)
requesting harsh approaches? Are you familiar with that
language, which was in the annex, but left off this document?
General Alexander. Sir, those are what's under the CG's
approval, part of that document you're holding. If you look in
the right-hand----
Chairman Warner. It says right here, ``requires CG's
approval.''
Senator Levin. No, I'm talking about the harsh-approaches
language.
General Alexander. Yes, and when you read the harsh-
approaches language, sir, read the--if you would read the
language----
Senator Levin. No, I understand that. I'm talking about the
characterization of this list as being harsh approaches. This
is quotes. This comes from the annex in the Taguba Report.
General Alexander. Right.
Senator Levin. It says that in an unclassified December 12
situation update--in that situation update. Have you seen that
situation update?
General Alexander. No, sir, I have not.
Senator Levin. It's that update which is included--to
Miller--included as an annex to the Taguba Report. It says the
document describes these techniques which are permissible, and
that document, which you say you haven't seen, but which is in
the annex, says that a request for harsh approaches. That's
their description. You're saying harsh approaches are approved
by the Geneva Conventions?
General Alexander. Sir, I'm saying that when you read the
interrogation manual, there are--when you look at the ways of
talking to prisoners, it stems--and I have a copy of the manual
that we can leave here, and when you look at it, it talks about
harsh approaches, and it talks about the way that you talk to a
prisoner, it talks about the direct approach. It goes all the
way through all of these. As Dr. Cambone stated this morning,
and others, we have gone to great extent trying to ensure that
everything that we're doing is in compliance with the Geneva
Conventions.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I thank you.
General Alexander and General Burgess and General Romig,
thank you for being here today.
General Alexander, maybe you can't answer this, but we have
a sort of contradiction here. General Taguba, who gave, I
think, an excellent testimony this morning, basically concludes
that these abuses were somewhat confined to a relatively small
area. Is that what you get out of it, General Alexander, as
well?
General Alexander. Sir, the abuses of this nature, yes,
sir, that's correct.
Senator McCain. But yet, on the other hand, we have reports
that Ambassador Bremer complained, that Secretary Powell
complained, at the highest level, that the ICRC issued a long
series--a number of reports concerning prisoner abuses.
Something doesn't connect there. Can you help us out on that?
General Alexander. Sir, I've not seen the reports from
Secretary Powell and from Mr. Bremer.
Senator McCain. How about the ICRC?
General Alexander. I have read the ICRC, and the key ones
that are in the ICRC, when I read that, which was this week,
when I looked at that, and you look at the allegations, and you
look at the pictures, you immediately make the connection that
what the ICRC had and what the pictures said are the event.
Senator McCain. The ICRC alleged, as I understand it, that
these situations were widespread, and not confined to just one
small area.
General Alexander. Yes, sir. But I don't know where the
ICRC went. I do know that in the memo that I saw, it talked
about Abu Ghraib, and it listed those allegations in Abu Ghraib
that were exactly what we saw in those pictures.
Senator McCain. All right. I think we need to pursue that
line, because I--again, as serious as it was for Ambassador
Bremer and Secretary Powell to repeatedly complain about this
situation, I think it leads one to believe that it was
widespread. That may not be the case.
But I want to get into a little philosophical discussion
with you very quickly. Unfortunately, we don't have much time
for all three of you, do you think we should have signed the
Geneva Conventions for the treatment of POWs?
I'll begin with you, General Burgess.
General Burgess. Yes, sir, I do.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
General Romig. Absolutely, sir.
Senator McCain. Why do you think we should? Because this
keeps us from getting information that may save American lives.
This is a restraint by humanitarian do-gooders. Why don't we
just throw them in the trash can and do whatever is necessary?
We certainly have developed sophisticated techniques that we
could just go after these people and get what we need, and save
American lives.
General Burgess.
General Burgess. Sir, two things. One, it applies to us, as
well. Number two, we're a nation of law, sir.
Senator McCain. Good point, General.
General Alexander. I think, sir, one of you mentioned
earlier, either last week or this week, that we hold these
standards, and our military to that standard, to set a symbol
for the rest of the world. Why we're here today and what we're
doing today is explaining the problems that we have openly and
honestly, and trying to fix those problems. We are not perfect.
We make mistakes. When we identify those mistakes, get 'em out.
So when you go back to this, absolutely we should do the--
--
Senator McCain. I'm talking about the----
General Alexander.--the Geneva Conventions.
Senator McCain.--extent and the problem we're facing here.
General Alexander. Yes.
Senator McCain. It seems to me, General, that we
distinguish ourselves from our enemies by our treatment of our
enemies. Would you agree with that?
General Alexander. Absolutely, sir.
Senator McCain. General Romig--I ask you three because
you've served this Nation with distinction, and, obviously,
from looking at you, you've seen incoming fire on occasion--
please go ahead.
General Romig. Yes, sir. I agree with everything that was
said. It impacts on the way our soldiers are treated--our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines--but it's the right
thing to do, too, sir. Those are our values. That's what we
stand for, those sorts of values that we see in the Geneva
Conventions.
Senator McCain. So, General Alexander, are we overreacting
to this situation, in your view? Please be candid, and if you
think we are, please say so.
General Alexander. Sir, at times, sitting here, one might
want to say, yes, we're overreacting. But the reality is, we
are not. I think these were reprehensible acts, and I think we
have to get to the bottom of it. I think if we have a problem,
if it is an intel oversight problem, if it is an MP problem, or
if it's a leadership problem, we have to get to the bottom of
it, we have to do it honestly and objectively, and then we have
to hold those who were responsible accountable. That standard
is so that the rest of the countries of the world know that we
will do that.
Senator McCain. That way we remove the stain on those
million--1.399 million men and women in the military who would
never consider such behavior.
General Alexander. Exactly, sir.
Senator McCain. I thank the chairman. I think it's well to
put this in perspective, particularly in the fact that we are
going to fight other conflicts, I'm very much afraid. I'm very
much afraid Americans may become prisoners. If we somehow
convey the impression that we have to do whatever is necessary
and humanitarian do-gooders have no place in this arena, which
I believe the ICRC has an important role to play, then I think
we're setting ourselves up for some very serious consequences
for American fighting men and women in conflicts in the future.
I see you nodding your head, General Romig. Do you agree
with that?
General Romig. Absolutely, sir.
Senator McCain. General----
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
General Burgess. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. I thank the chairman. I thank the witnesses
for their candor and for their service.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
I want to do a follow-up. You said you saw the material
that was sent by Ambassador Bremer expressing his concern, and
from the Secretary of State, is that correct?
General Alexander. Sir, I said I had not seen that.
Chairman Warner. Oh, you had not seen it.
General Alexander. I have not seen that, no, sir.
Chairman Warner. But you know it existed somewhere.
General Alexander. I heard--yes, sir, in earlier
testimonies, I heard that, watching the testimonies, but I had
not seen the specific documents from either Secretary Powell or
Mr. Bremer. I've not seen those.
Chairman Warner. Were those transmissions in documentary
form, though, to those that received them?
General Alexander. I don't know, sir.
General Burgess. Sir, I do not know.
Chairman Warner. All right, thank you very much, because
the committee is anxious to get a hold of those documents.
Thank you.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much to our panel.
I'd like to address this to General Romig. During the lunch
hour, I read through this United Press International story
about Arnaud de Borchgrave, who's a very experienced writer. He
writes, ``Long before the official reports and journalistic
exposes revealing the horrific abuse of Iraqi prisoners, high-
ranking American officers and the Judge Advocate General (JAG)
expressed their deep concern that the civilian officials at the
Pentagon were undermining the military's detention rules and
regulations and ignoring interrogation procedures, even citing
cases of torture. The Pentagon civilian leadership were
appraised in late spring of 2003, and again in October 2004.
JAG officers are quoted as telling Scott Horton, the chairman
of the Committee on International Law of the Bar Association--
New York Bar Association, that Feith had significantly weakened
the military rules and regulations governing prisoners of war.
JAG informants also blame the DOD's Chief Counsel, William
Haynes, who's been recently appointed by President Bush through
the Federal Appeals Court, along with Feith, for creating an
atmosphere of legal ambiguity that allowed mistreatment of
prisoners. These were eight JAG officers that went and spoke
with Scott Horton. One deputy counsel at the Pentagon, a
staunch Republican, recently resigned, as he explained, not for
attribution, that right-wing ideologues are putting at risk the
reputation of the U.S. military. JAG officers who spoke to
Horton said civilian officials, directed by Feith, removed
safeguards that were designed to prevent the abuses that the
world has now witnessed. At Abu Ghraib, these safeguards should
have included observations of interrogations behind two-way
mirrors by JAG officers--would then be authorized to stop any
misconduct on the spot.''
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Kennedy. Now, do you know anything, General Romig,
about any of your officers in the DOD being concerned about
these issues?
General Romig. Sir, first, I received both of these
articles from one of your staffers immediately----
Senator Kennedy. I wanted you to know it before I asked you
the question.
General Romig. Yes, sir. I appreciate that.
I also contacted my office immediately and said, ``Let's
get to the bottom of this and find out''--for one thing, I
can't tell, really--and I skimmed through the articles--if
these are Army JAGs, Air Force JAGs, Navy JAGs, or Marine JAGs.
It's troubling, regardless of who said it, but we're trying to
get to the bottom of it.
Senator Kennedy. Do you know whether they--any of these
safeguards had been removed with regard to these prisons, such
as the two-way mirror? Have there been changes? Have there been
alternatives for what--a process where JAG had been monitoring,
watching, or observing these kinds of interrogations?
General Romig. Sir, I'm not aware of the use of the two-way
mirror as a regular standard method of monitoring
interrogations. The fact that there are so many interrogations
going on at different locations, we wouldn't have enough JAG
officers to sit through all of these.
Senator Kennedy. Do you know if there's been a change? Here
is--``Mr. Horton and the bar colleagues wrote to Haynes and the
CIA's general counsel in an effort to clarify U.S. policy on
the treatment and interrogation of detainees. `These
inquiries,' he recalls, `were met with a firm brush-off. We
then turned to Senators who have raised the issue previously,
and assisted their staff in pursuing it. These inquiries were
met with a similar brush-off.' ''
What do you know about any of the changes that have taken
place with regards to the JAG position, in terms of observing
the interrogation of detainees, POW, combat----
General Romig. Sir, I'm not aware of any change in that
regard.
Senator Kennedy. That has not been brought at all to your
attention in the----
General Romig. Not the issue of the role of the JAG in
the----
Senator Kennedy. No one in your department has come to you
and expressed any kind of concern that they had heard that
there were these kinds of activities, inappropriate kinds of
activities taking place in any of the prisons? I have to move
along. Either yes or no.
General Romig. Sir, I'm not aware of anybody specifically
talking about any issues in a prison who have looked into
those.
Senator Kennedy. With regard to the contractors, as I
understand, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) doesn't
apply to the contractors, does it?
General Romig. Sir, technically it would in a
congressionally-declared war. Article 2 of the UCMJ----
Senator Kennedy. In the kind of situation we have now, it
does not.
General Romig. It does not, that is correct.
Senator Kennedy. All right. What about the Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA)? I understand we have a SOFA that excludes
prosecution for the military, also civilian personnel.
General Romig. It depends on which SOFA we're talking
about, sir.
Senator Kennedy. I'm talking about those that are
applicable. We're talking about Iraq, and we're talking about
Afghanistan. If there are other places you want to distinguish
you can do that.
General Romig. Yes, sir. Basically, my understanding right
now is that we do not have a SOFA in Iraq because we are in a
mode where we are really operating the sovereignty there. But
once it's turned over, that'll be one of the issues that we
must have, is a SOFA.
Now, there is another piece of legislation that I think
you're aware of----
Senator Kennedy. That's going to happen pretty quickly.
General Romig. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Give me, quickly, the answer in
Afghanistan, so I know that. Can they be prosecuted? Will
civilians be protected under the SOFA?
General Romig. Again, it depends on the kind of offense,
but my understanding is that we would have jurisdiction over
those.
Senator Kennedy. Homicide.
General Romig. Homicide----
Senator Kennedy. There are two individuals----
General Romig.--U.S. on U.S., we'd have jurisdiction.
Senator Kennedy. You'd have jurisdiction.
Let me just, finally, ask General Alexander, what's going
to be the status of these camps on June--at the time of the
transfer of sovereignty? Who's taking them over? Is the United
States still going to be running these camps? Is it going to be
the Iraqis? Tell us what exactly is going to be the status in
these prison camps in Iraq.
General Alexander. Sir, I'm not sure of what the status is
going to be of those camps. I believe that we will still run
some of those camps. I know that when General Ryder went over,
one of his issues was to figure out when the Iraqis would be
capable of running the camps, the prison system, themselves.
I'm not sure what the status is, sir. I'd have to take that for
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
At the time of the transfer of sovereignty, all detainee facilities
will remain under the operational control of U.S. military forces.
Senator Kennedy. My time is up.
Senator Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
Senator Roberts has an Intelligence Committee commitment,
so I'm going to defer to him and then take his turn, without
objection.
Senator Roberts. I thank the Senator, and I will try to be
very brief. I think many of the questions, while important, are
a little repetitive.
This is a question for General Romig. There has been a
great deal of discussion about the fact that the MI brigade at
the prison was given TACON of the MP unit there. Now, given the
fact that the abuse at issue is a violation of the UCMJ, what
impact does the issue of TACON have on the culpability of those
who have committed these acts?
General Romig. Virtually none, sir. If you commit an
offense under the code, regardless of what the chain of command
is, charges can be preferred, and they would go up to the
general court-martial convening authority--or the special
court-martial convening authority, but if it's serious
offenses, it would go up to the general court-martial convening
authority, which would probably be either III Corps or CJTF-7.
Senator Roberts. The same question I asked this morning,
and a related question--an order to ``soften up'' a detainee
would not be a lawful order, is that correct?
General Romig. That's exactly right, sir, depending on how
it was conveyed. But on its face, it does not sound like a
lawful order.
Senator Roberts. So what legal basis, then, would a soldier
have for following that order?
General Romig. Sir, there would be none. Our soldiers are
taught, ``Illegal orders are orders that you first must, or
should, apprise the person giving the order that it's an
illegal order, and, if they don't cease and desist, then you
must disobey.''
Senator Roberts. General Alexander, I know you went over,
in some detail, who had the accountability and the
responsibility on the lack of training and the lack of
leadership and the lack of discipline. Who had the
responsibility to ensure the MPs were properly trained and were
actually fulfilling the unit's mission? Are we talking about
Colonel Pappas or Lieutenant Colonel Jordan or General
Karpinski? Who is it?
General Alexander. General Karpinski and Colonel
Phillabaum, sir.
Senator Roberts. And Colonel Phillabaum.
General Alexander. The battalion commander.
Senator Roberts. Okay. Let me just say that--for the
record, and I hesitate doing this, but I think it's pertinent
to what has been discussed by Senator McCain--there's just been
a video posted on an Islamic militant Web site showing a group
affiliated with al Qaeda that beheaded an American civilian in
Iraq, saying the death was revenge for the abuse of the
prisoners by American soldiers. I will not get into the
individual's name. After reading the statement, the men were
seen pulling the man to his side, and putting a large knife to
his neck, a scream sounded as the men literally cut off his
head, shouting, ``Allah akbar,'' God is great, and then held
the head out before the camera.
It seems to me that this underscores, in part at least, the
tremendous value of interrogation and better intelligence to
prevent atrocities like this. I don't think this was a one-for-
one cause. In other words, I think this happens anyway, under
the circumstances. But there's a different value system going
on here. I know we have to reach--for the very highest levels
of conduct, and I know we will. I know as soon as we get
through with the inquiry--or the investigation, pardon me--the
Fay Report--that you'll report back to the Intelligence
Committee and this committee on what happened.
I mention that only to show that this is a very difficult
situation, and, under the circumstances, I think that the
American public certainly understands that.
I thank the Senator for yielding me the time.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The ICRC has reported that it warned about prison abuses
throughout 2003, but it was only when a young soldier came
forward, on January 13, 2004, that an investigation was
launched. The question must be asked, why did the military only
get serious about this problem when one of its own broke
silence?
General Alexander and General Burgess, you're both senior
military officers with responsibilities for intelligence
collection. The ICRC made a litany of complaints about
interrogations at Iraqi prisons for more than a year. Why
wasn't an investigation launched into those complaints? Why
were our civilian and military leaders sitting on their hands
waiting for a whistleblower to come forward, when ICRC reports
were being stacked from floor to ceiling?
General Alexander. Sir, I'll answer that first. I believe
you're correct, that when that report went forward--and, as I
understand, it went forward to General Karpinski, and she
responded to it. What I would do in that situation is just as
you said, I think an investigation should be done to look into
the incidents that the ICRC had done at that time. I do not
know if General Karpinski did such an investigation. I do not
know the answer to that. But I do agree with you that if those
allegations that were made in there were known to them, they
should have investigated it right then.
General Burgess. Sir, and I would agree with what General
Alexander said. I would also highlight that on the Joint Staff,
as the J-2, I never saw the ICRC report, until here in the last
week.
Senator Byrd. Why were not the ICRC reports taken
seriously? Didn't anyone stop to think that there was a problem
here? Was everyone just passing the buck, right up until the
moment that this young soldier stepped forward? Why did it take
until last week for the ICRC reports to make it to your desk?
Shouldn't you have been seeking out these reports rather than
waiting for them to come to you?
General Alexander?
General Alexander. Sir, that is a great question. As I
understand it, those reports go to the JAG at the CJTF-7 and
were given to the MP brigade commander at the time who was in
charge of the facility to answer. They were not widely
disseminated at that time. Why they were not widely
disseminated, I do not know. Going out and finding them, it's
hard to understand. I would like to do that. I mean, exactly
what you said. Had I known that there was a report out there,
exactly, I would go after it. It's difficult to know to go
after one that you don't know is there, to be honest.
Senator Byrd. General Burgess?
General Burgess. Sir, I understand the system, as he has
laid out, and I would highlight that is also the system that I
am familiar with, based on Guantanamo. When the ICRC does their
looks down there also, they are provided to the commander down
there, which is the situation I'm more familiar with, because I
was involved in that process. So it should have been dealt
with, but that is the process that we currently have in place.
Senator Byrd. The ICRC reports that 70 percent to 90
percent of the Iraqis in detentions were wrongfully arrested.
If the military and the administration seek to win the hearts
and minds of the Iraqi people, it will not be done by rounding
up the usual suspects and throwing them in dysfunctional
prisons for no reason. General Alexander, how can you justify a
wrongful arrest rate of up to 90 percent? Who ordered the
policies that resulted in the arrest of nine innocent Iraqis
for every one criminal or terrorist taken to prison? Has anyone
ordered an end to arbitrary arrest of the Iraqi people, or is
this just another issue that will be subject to another
investigation?
General Alexander. Sir, I don't know how to answer that
question, but let me try this way. As I understand it, no one
is going out and just arresting people. In each case, the
reasons for arrest are based on shootings, an incident, or
intelligence that they have. I saw the report that you saw,
that 70 to 90 percent. I do not know that that's true. I do
know that there are a number of people that have been arrested
that, after further screening, it was determined should not be
arrested, but I don't know the percentage to that, sir.
I do know that the commanders on the ground who are trying
to protect their troops and the Iraqi civilians, when you have
people armed with weapons who are in an area that is shooting
at either our people or the Iraqi people, that's wrong, and
that is one of the reasons that many of these people are
apprehended. How you go about that, that is a very difficult
thing. The essence of your question, though, and how to, as you
put it, win the hearts and minds of the people, is one of the
things that we really have to work at. That is the key to
solving not only that problem, but the rest of the problems in
the Middle East.
Senator Byrd. Has anyone ordered an end to these arbitrary
arrests?
General Alexander. You see, sir, I don't know that anybody
is doing arbitrary arrests, as you say. I don't know that. So,
therefore, I don't know that they've ordered an end to it. I
don't know that they're setting up--as far as I know, they are
not doing that.
General Burgess. I have not seen any indication of
arbitrary arrests, sir. The only thing that I am familiar with,
in terms of--as individuals that have intelligence value are
picked up by the units, whether it be battalion or brigade, the
general standing operating procedure is, the brigade will hold
onto them for up to 14 days and conduct interrogations for
actionable intelligence, and then, following that time frame,
they will be evacuated to Abu Ghraib or to another holding
area.
Senator Byrd. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. I thank the Senator.
In case our panel is wondering, there is a vote taking
place right now, and so I'm going to stay here and keep it open
until someone returns. So I may have 15 or 20 minutes here.
First of all, let me share a thought with you. You
describe, General Alexander, the acts perpetrated by the seven
as being reprehensible, and I certainly agree with you. I have
spent a lot of time looking, since this first became public--
and I think it's gotten way too much publicity, quite frankly,
and I think a lot of it, as I said this morning, is politically
charged. But those reprehensible acts, as near as I can
determine, were confined to about seven people. I understand
those seven people are, right now, being prosecuted within the
system, and that's taking place as we're talking.
Now, first of all, is that your understanding, too?
General Alexander. Yes, sir. I would add that others who
witnessed it, and did not report it, are also responsible, and
those people will be held accountable, too.
Senator Inhofe. Do you know about how many of those there
are?
General Alexander. Right now, I know of two or three more
who will come forward in that category, so that those that you
see in the pictures, that they were in the pictures, even if
they say, ``All I did was see this,'' they should have reported
it, and they were wrong.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. My concern has been what effect this
is having on our ability to get actionable intelligence. This
has been a great concern of mine. First, if this hadn't become
public, if this hadn't come into the public arena as it has, is
it your belief, each one of you, that this would have been
handled internally anyway?
General Alexander. Absolutely, sir.
General Burgess. Yes, sir.
General Romig. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. In fact, wasn't it being handled long
before that happened?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. As I look at the timeline and I see that
starting on January 3, 2004, the different things that
happened, they jumped right in, and I commended them this
morning--General Taguba--the fact that he did that all in just
a little over 1 month, that's beyond the call of duty. So I
would say that, and I think it's important that we tell the
people of America that this would have happened anyway.
I had--45 years ago, I was in the Army, and I was in the
court system. I was a court clerk. I think I saw one general
the entire time I was in the Army. But, nonetheless, I recall
some of the things that were going on at that time, and there
are always court-martial going on. This is not unusual. It's
taking place. They're not highly publicized. It's probably good
that they aren't highly publicized, and sometimes these are
being abused.
Now, would you say that because of this, things are going
on, in terms of securing actionable intelligence as if this
hadn't happened?
General Alexander. Sir, I will tell you that General Miller
is now in charge of Abu Ghraib. He is a great officer. He
understands the process, and he understands the law. He has
gone around and talked to all of the MPs and all the
interrogators and the rest of the support troops there at Abu
Ghraib and the other facilities and told them how important
their work is. Don't let the actions of a few stop the
important work that they're doing, because it is important.
Sir, I think that is exactly right. He is a great leader. He's
not an MP officer, he's not an MI officer. He's a combat leader
who's taken charge of that facility based on experience and
lessons that he learned at Guantanamo.
Senator Inhofe. I was down at Guantanamo, and I saw that,
and I think it's very important for you folks, or us, to keep
reinforcing this, that these are things that are confined to
just a small handful of people. If you had, such as we know
there were, about 700, I understand, guards at just this one
prison, but there's some 25 other prisons, too--that it's
something that we need to keep reminding people.
Chairman Warner [presiding]. You can go vote.
Senator Inhofe. Let me finish when I get back.
Chairman Warner. A vote is on, and we're trying to keep the
hearing going.
Senator Dayton, have you voted?
Senator Dayton. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Fine. Would you like to take your turn
now?
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
General Alexander, if I understand your remarks correctly,
are you asserting that the Taguba Report, the ICRC Report, and
the pictures of the prisoner abuses that we saw last week all
refer to the same limited number of events that were carried
out by a few MPs, with a couple of unidentified low-level MI
officials perhaps interacting with them to lead them to those
actions?
General Alexander. Sir, I'd note that in the ICRC Report it
says that one of the detainees had women's underwear on their
head. I, you, the American public saw that photo on TV. That
led me to make that statement that those same things that they
noted in their report we see in a photograph. So, yes, sir,
that is why I made that. Now, I'm not asserting that it is only
isolated to seven people at one facility, everybody else is
pure. I would not make that statement. I'm saying that the
incidences I looked at, the ICRC allegations, and as I look at
these allegations I see a very close parallel, and that that
committee report was done on two visits in October.
Senator Dayton. I'm sorry, what committee, sir?
General Alexander. The ICRC Report was done based on their
visits in October to Abu Ghraib. That's why I made that
statement, and I believe that is accurate. Now, the ICRC could
say--you see, I don't know who was photographing, and they
didn't know either; they just said it was being photographed,
and they made that statement. Does that make sense?
Senator Dayton. It does make sense. It may well be the same
individuals, although the report, as I read it, refers to other
abuses that occurred in that prison to other prisoners that
didn't fit the descriptions in those pictures. But I guess I
just wanted to clarify, for my own understanding, what you're
implying here, because, as I read the ICRC Report, it refers to
14 other--or a total of 14 detention centers or prisons, and I
don't know how to quantify the extent of the violations that
they are alleging, but it certainly appears to be far broader
and more systemic than one set of incidents photographed at one
prison. Would you concur with that sir, or do you----
General Alexander. Yes, sir, I think--in the ICRC Report,
there was one portion on Abu Ghraib----
Senator Dayton. Right.
General Alexander.--which is what I was referencing.
Senator Dayton. Okay.
General Alexander. There are allegations, and there are
investigations ongoing at other prisons. Anytime someone does
something that violates the law, we ought to ensure that we
begin an investigation. Normally, a criminal investigation, the
Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) does that.
Senator Dayton. The references--and, again, it's hard to
know exactly who--it's impossible to know who they're referring
to, but there are a number of references in the ICRC Report to
MI personnel, and how that they--to characterize these--what
they say are various abuses. Some officers told the ICRC that
the widespread ill-treatment of persons deprived of their
liberty during arrest, initial internment, and tactical
questioning was due to a lack of MPs on the ground to supervise
and control behavior, the lack of experience of intelligence
officers in charge of ``tactical questioning.'' What is
tactical questioning?
General Alexander. Sir, that's at the maneuver-battalion/
maneuver-brigade level. When you first get a prisoner, what are
the questions that you ask him? We actually did send a tactical
questioning training team over to all the divisions to train
them on the standards for that.
Senator Dayton. All right, thank you.
Another part of the report says, ``Several military
intelligence officers confirmed to the International Red Cross
that it was part of the military intelligence process to hold a
person deprived of his liberty naked in a completely dark and
empty cell for a prolonged period, to use inhumane and
degrading treatment, including physical and psychological
coercion against persons deprived of their liberty to secure
their cooperation.'' This is not referring to the Abu Ghraib
facility. I take it that certainly would appear to violate the
edicts that you have described.
General Alexander. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Dayton. It also refers to other MI. Referring to
Abu Ghraib, the MI officer in charge of the interrogation that
they witnessed in early October explained that this practice of
denying them of their--keeping them completely naked in empty
concrete cells, in total darkness, allegedly for several days.
The ICRC investigators interrupted his visit and requested an
explanation from the authorities. The MI officer-in-charge of
the interrogation explained that this practice was ``part of
the process.'' The process appeared to be a give-and-take
policy, whereby persons deprived of their liberty were ``drip-
fed'' with new items--clothing, bedding, hygiene articles--in
exchange for their ``cooperation.'' Again, this would violate
the practices of the----
General Alexander. Absolutely wrong.
Senator Dayton.--instructions?
General Alexander. Absolutely wrong.
Senator Dayton. How, then, were these--if these are MI
officers, how are they getting--how are they deviating, then,
from--and to what extent were they--to what extent were there
MI officers who were deviating from what you said were the
clear instructions they had received?
General Alexander. Right. Sir, here's what we have to
clarify on that point, which we do not know. Who is the person
they referred to as a ``military intelligence officer''? Was it
one of the contractors or was it one of the interrogators? Both
did not wear rank, as is normal practice, because you don't
want an interrogator who is a Spec-4 interrogating a major. In
some cultures, that would never--they would never get anything.
So they go in without rank, and so it may be that an
interrogator, civilian or military, indeed, said that. If that
happened, that is one of the individuals that we need to find
and hold accountable.
Senator Dayton. I'd just--my time is expired, but how are--
what steps have been taken to assure that this is not happening
now, and will not happen in the future there?
General Alexander. Sir, clearly, with General Miller there,
not only do we have the supervision, but he is going back and
ensuring everybody understands those requirements and, I think,
forcing the leadership from both the units to be at the
facility 24 hours a day. That's what needs to happen.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Dayton.
I'm going to ask the indulgence of my colleagues. I just
left the floor, as all of us did, in connection with voting,
and the Senators on the floor are in a virtual state of shock
about this report about this alleged beheading, and it brings
to mind a concern. It's all right in here, very clearly. We're
waiting for the Fay Report. We don't know how long that's going
to be. How many weeks or months might that Fay Report take?
General Alexander. Sir, he's trying to get it done within a
month.
Chairman Warner. Within a month. Then I suppose, it has to
be chopped on by General Abizaid in the chain--in CENTCOM.
Would that be correct? In other words, how soon can--whether
it's Congress or internally within the executive branch,
Department of the Army, DOD--we begin to address where the
problem might lie so that it can't be repeated? Because it is
clear in this report that our service men and women serving in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world are now--could well be
subjected to this type of threat.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. As a matter of fact, the first question I
asked on the last--to the hearing with Secretary Rumsfeld and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was to General Myers. I asked
if these stories are generating a greater risk to your men and
women in uniform worldwide? The answer was yes.
You have to balance the UCMJ, comparing all these reports
with the need to really, and on almost a real-time basis, begin
to deal with this problem so it can't happen again or
proliferate further.
Can you comment on the enhanced risk to our forces in your
intelligence channels? What evaluation have you made?
General Alexander. Sir, first, we are taking actions right
away. We are not waiting on the Fay Report to fix anything.
We're waiting on the Fay Report to find more information on
others who should be held accountable. We are taking actions,
and that's what you're seeing. Those people who we can hold
accountable now, who should be charged, are being charged. As
General Taguba explained, he did not go into the depths on the
MI part of this, and we need to do that and find out, just as
Senator Dayton brought out, if there were MI officers or
personnel involved, and hold them accountable. So we're doing
that in parallel. We're not waiting.
Chairman Warner. All right.
General Alexander. Currently, sir, we're fixing----
Chairman Warner. I don't want to take up too much time.
Did you have any further comments, General Burgess, on this
situation, the enhanced risk to our forces worldwide,
particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan?
General Burgess. Sir, as you highlighted, from what
Chairman Myers and Secretary Rumsfeld said, Chairman Myers has
given me direction to pay attention since this incident, and we
have been following the intelligence. There has been an up-
tick, a little bit----
Chairman Warner. Don't use the word up-tick.
General Burgess. I'm sorry, sir. There has been an
increase, if you will, in some of the threat reportings. We
have followed that. We have also been following the foreign
press as we have followed that. This incident this last weekend
that you're reading about, which occurred on Saturday, is one
that we are taking a look at to see if we can make a direct
correlation to, but at this time have not been able to.
Chairman Warner. The committee would like to have copies.
You have a report that goes out, which is--it's in the open--
about intelligence repercussions. I used it once upon a time.
We'll see that we get it from you.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts brought up the beheading article in his
questions and I just want to compliment you on the great
response that I think you gave. We still need to comply with
the Geneva Conventions and that we still need to welcome
oversight, like from the ICRC, and that you do welcome
oversight, like from the committee. But there is an inherent
risk when we make this public, and I think we all need to
recognize that. But I also think it highlights the difference
between our system and our way of doing things, as opposed to
our opposition so many times, who refuse to comply with that. I
understand the need to do that. Because if we can make these
work, and we get our adversaries to comply with it, it means
our people, our men and women who are serving in the Armed
Forces, if they happen to be prisoners, have a better chance of
survival.
So I compliment you on your foresight. This is unfortunate
that this happened, and it's just--when you make things public
like this, this is what happens. You're going to increase
antagonism on the other side, and we need to think about those
things.
I was struck by the fact that there were people within the
prison, an individual, at least one, who knew the rules well
enough to report an infraction, and knew that he could do that.
In fact, he was encouraged to do that. So the message got down
to some of those people who were working in the prison.
Apparently, it didn't get to some of the others. Can you
explain the discrepancy in why some of them got the message and
some of them didn't? Or is it your view that some of them
decided just to ignore the law?
General Alexander. Sir, I believe that it was a group that
lacked discipline and leadership. I think that--your latter
statement is the more accurate. I think that's really what
happened. I know that, as I stated earlier, cases that were
brought up, people were disciplined, and corrective action
taken. So there were people who knew the rules and brought them
forward consistently. It was not just that one. There were a
couple of instances that I--for the record, those incidences.
But you will see, in those incidents, that, in fact, they
were--when they were brought up, the leadership immediately
took action, brought the JAG in, said, ``Okay, what happened?''
So I think that--I think that needs to come out. Because I
think the perception is that we're not all--but when those
things were going on--I don't know, as I said earlier, what was
done about the ICRC Report, whether an investigation was
started on that.
Senator Allard. My perception is that actually there was a
problem being recognized before this incident actually
happened, in October and December, and there were already----
General Alexander. Right.
Senator Allard.--people beginning to become made aware of
this, and there was beginning to be some review. But,
obviously, you can't jump ahead of the review. You have to
establish the facts before you can take action. Am I correct in
assuming that there already was some review beginning to take
place, before the 1st of October, of the prison system and how
we were handling prisoners?
General Alexander. There clearly are reviews that went on,
in terms of when General Ryder went over to look at the prisons
for General Sanchez.
Senator Allard. That was part of routine review, I guess.
General Alexander. That was part of a routine--yes, sir.
Senator Allard. Okay, very good.
General Alexander. When General Miller went over to look at
how they set up and how they get that--how they set the flow of
information, that also was important.
Senator Allard. General Alexander, at any time after
September 11, 2001, did the Army staff develop or issue to
field commanders a revised doctrine for collecting intelligence
specifically through the strategic exploitation of battlefield
detainees or enemy prisoners of war?
General Alexander. Sir, we didn't put out a revised
doctrine, per se. But I will tell you that we did look at how
we do data-mining, as the Department of the Army and as the
Intelligence Community, and how we used that data-mining to
support analysis. Our intelligence system has an awful lot of
information, and that some of that information may apply to the
guy who is being interrogated. In the past, we were never able
to use that. Some of the tools and things that we do use and
that we have pushed forward, allow us to take advantage of all
parts of our Government for the interrogators, so when they set
that interrogation package up--that's one of the things that is
evolving, and I think it's exceptional.
Senator Allard. General Burgess, did the Joint Staff
develop--same question--or issue to field commanders revised
doctrine for collecting intelligence specifically through the
strategic exploitation of battlefield detainees or enemy
prisoners of war?
General Burgess. Sir, there wasn't any doctrine, if you
will, that was promulgated. But what I will tell you, since you
picked on September 2001, is that as we stood up Guantanamo
Bay, in December 2002, we pulled together across the community,
across the Intelligence Community and the military, those folks
who had some insights into how we would do that. I had to go
back to the Vietnam War and the Korean War to find the last
time we had held detainees and conducted strategic debriefing,
if you will, in the numbers we were talking about, because even
when we conducted Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, in the
early 1990s, we gathered a lot of people, but we didn't do
much, in terms of interrogation, before the war was over and we
released. So we hadn't set up a process. So it was a re-
learning experience in some cases.
Senator Allard. General Romig, would you characterize for
us the number, just a rough estimate, of the UCMJ hearings the
Army conducted during Operations Enduring Freedom or Iraqi
Freedom regarding the mistreatment of enemy prisoners of war or
battlefield detainees or other such prisoners? Then, the final
question, where is the threshold? At what point does this trend
reach such a level that the Chairman or the Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) needs to intervene?
General Romig. Sir, we've been tracking these since
probably end of November, first part of December, all detainee
abuse cases, both in Iraq and Afghanistan. We currently have
about 83 cases. Twenty-two of those cases were cases that were
initiated at the unit level. Somebody came forward and reported
misconduct. A lot of it was low-level misconduct. Often, at the
unit level, it was at roadblocks and things like that, where
somebody mistreated a civilian. But we're tracking all of
those. The units are handling those with a wide variety of
disciplinary actions, from court-martial down through article
15 non-judicial punishment and administrative actions, reliefs,
administrative eliminations from the service, and all those
kinds of things. So 83 is the number we have right now, sir.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I've been thinking--and I gave voice to this the other day
in this hearing--that in our pursuit of justice for those who
have committed what you, General Alexander, quite appropriately
described as reprehensible acts in the prison in Iraq, which
have angered, embarrassed you in the military, we in Congress,
the American people, that there was a danger that people might
misunderstand who has the moral high ground generally, and Iraq
specifically. In my opinion, the zeal with which we pursue this
wrongdoing, punish those responsible, make sure nothing like it
exists anywhere else in our American military prison system,
assures us and the world that we do have the moral high ground.
I've worried, as I've watched the public opinion polls, with
support seeming to drop in the last week for our mission in
Iraq and the focus on these investigations, that there was
beginning to be a blurring of that distinction.
Then we hear this story, which I assume, for the moment, is
true, of al Qaeda beheading an American. There we see what is
exactly the truth. We have the moral high ground in Iraq. Our
enemies are the exact opposite. They are inhumane and immoral.
There's not going to be any investigation by any al Qaeda
legislative body of how that happened. Osama bin Laden and
Zarqawi are not going to apologize to that man's family or to
the American people.
I hope that this awful inhumane act brings us to clarity
that what happened in that prison was wrong, that we will
search it out and eliminate it, and that it does not diminish
the support for our cause in Iraq, which I consider to be not
only moral, but fundamental to the future security of the
American people.
What's going to happen if these people, who beheaded this
man, our enemies who are fighting us, force us to retreat from
Iraq? Think about how they will be emboldened and how our
future and the future of our children will be compromised.
In that regard, I greatly appreciated your answer to
Senator McCain's question about the Geneva Conventions, we
embrace it because it's the law of the land, and we believe in
the rule of law, and we want our prisoners to be treated
humanely.
In that regard, I want to ask you a few questions. I remain
uncertain about the application of the Geneva Conventions to
detainees in the prisons in Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld testified
the other day that he felt they weren't entitled to the rights
under the Geneva Conventions, but they were generally going to
be given them. Maybe General Romig, on behalf of JAG, if you
participate in any meetings and you understand this--we
understand that the people at Abu Ghraib didn't follow the
Geneva Conventions, that's obviously and painfully clear. But
what was the state of the understanding of the rights of those
who were taken as detainees if they were not formally under the
Geneva Conventions? If they were not, why weren't they?
General Romig. Sir, there's really two bases to say that we
apply the Geneva Conventions to these folks. First is, DOD
policy and Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions say, for all
conflicts that we're going to be involved in, we're going to
apply the Geneva Conventions, but, additionally, Geneva
Conventions number four applies to the situation of an
occupation or where we're running the government, and these
individuals--number four is for civilians.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Romig. Number four is the one that we are applying
in Iraq. One of the things that we're doing, and I don't know
if this is the time to do it, but I wanted to dispel the----
Senator Lieberman. Forgive me----
General Romig. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman.--I just wanted to make clear that you
would say that all of these security detainees are entitled to
rights under the Geneva Conventions--not as great as POWs, but
rights, nonetheless.
General Romig. A sliding scale of rights, depending on what
they're being detained for and--but, certainly, yes. What I was
going to illustrate is, we have a procedure for detainees being
brought in, in Abu Ghraib and all of the other detention
facilities, where there is--first off, they have to have an
apprehension form, Coalition Provisional Authority apprehension
form, two sworn statements. They go through a screening
process, and, within 72 hours, our magistrate cell of three to
five JAGs at Abu Ghraib, do a review of the evidence to see if
they're being properly detained, if there's evidence to support
probable cause to believe that they've committed the offense.
On top of that, we also afford them Article 78 of the Geneva
Conventions number four, which requires that you apprise them
of why they're being held, and an opportunity to either appeal
or provide a statement. We do that for every detainee.
Senator Lieberman. As far as you know, that was done, the
detainees who we see humiliated and otherwise abused in those
pictures?
General Romig. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask you another kind of question,
which goes to the credibility of the investigation. I know
there are a lot of investigations going on. General Fay, the
Inspector General, seems to be doing something, and we've asked
questions here at our hearings about up the chain of command.
Is there any group now investigating that question of whether
there was culpability up the chain of command of the behavior
that we have all been so offended by in the Abu Ghraib prison?
General Romig. Sir, there are two ongoing investigations.
General Alexander mentioned the Procedure 15, which is looking
at the MI side, but that's up the MI side of the chain, and
there is an ongoing CID investigation that is looking at taking
all the leads from all the interviews they do and running it
wherever it might go.
Senator Lieberman. Again, none of those is limited to the
people seen in the pictures or in cell block 1A or even at Abu
Ghraib. They're going to go as high as the investigation takes
them.
General Romig. It depends on the evidence they develop,
yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. A final question--I apologize, my time's
up--what about this group Secretary Rumsfeld announced Friday,
which seemed to get lost in all the news about his testimony,
the commission that is headed by Secretary Schlesinger and
Secretary Brown and a couple of others. Do you know what their
authority is here?
General Romig. Sir, I do not know the authority. I've not
seen their charter, but I think it is a good idea.
Senator Lieberman. What do you think they're going to do?
General Romig. Sir, I think they're probably going to make
recommendations on both detention procedures and interrogation
procedures, and look at just an outside look at what we're
doing.
Senator Lieberman. Okay, thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. I thank you, Senator Lieberman, for
bringing out those points.
We're almost in a lock-down for getting information,
subject to the completion of all these investigations, which
are necessary. But I'm just concerned.
Senator Inhofe, you had some time.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, my questions were interrupted by a
vote, so let me just go back and pick up where we left off.
First off, I think we concluded that in the absence of all
the publicity and all of this, that the seven people who are
responsible for the acts we've been talking about would have
been and were being prosecuted anyway to the same degree, and
then also that I believe you said my concerns should not be all
that great, that because of all of this that you are inhibited
in what you're able to do, in terms of your gathering
intelligence information now. In other words, you're still
ongoing in getting this information. Do you all agree to that?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Now, you were here, I think, when
General Taguba was testifying this morning, and I asked him a
series of questions, in terms of did he really feel that the
offenses, that the reprehensible acts, were confined to cell
block 1A and 1B of one prison, and then, in addition to that,
that we don't have any evidence that this is going on at any of
the other 25 prisons. He agreed to that. Do the three of you
agree with that?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. As far as you know.
General Alexander. Of this sort.
General Burgess. As far as I know.
Senator Inhofe. I think that's very important, because
there's an article this morning in the Washington Post that
alleged abuses like those in the prison are widespread, and not
isolated, and I just think it's a bad message to send out since
the message is wrong, and I wanted to hear all of you express
yourselves.
Now, as far as the cell blocks 1A and B are concerned--more
hard-core guys, aren't they?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. I understand that you have three
categories. One was enemy POWs, one was Iraqi crimes against
Iraqis, and one was Iraqi crimes against the coalition. So it
is that last category where the most serious ones are, is that
correct?
General Alexander. Those who have great intel value, yes,
sir.
Senator Inhofe. Intel value, that's good. Now, something
was brought up by Senator Byrd, and he was quoting from this
report, and I want to clarify this, because I think it's very,
very important. In fact, I was criticized. These people didn't
understand what was said in the report that came from the ICRC.
They talked about 70 to 90 percent of the persons were deprived
of their liberty in Iraq and had been arrested by mistake. I
have been told that as you arrest people, and we find out that,
number one, they didn't do anything that was all that bad, and,
number two, they had no value, in terms of intelligence, that
there's a revolving door, they go right back out. I would
suggest that this 70 to 90 percent would include all those
people who were brought in, and then they found out they didn't
have anything of any value to us, in terms of intelligence. Do
you want to comment on that?
General Alexander. Sir, the 70 to 90 percent, I don't know
where we get that number, and I don't know that that is an
accurate number. I do know that, just as you said, when they
find they have a person who was wrongfully arrested, the intent
is to get that person back out as quickly as possible.
Senator Inhofe. I think that's exactly the answer I was
looking for. A lot of people out there are thinking that 90
percent of the people arrested didn't do anything, and that
just flat isn't true.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Alexander, when was General Fay appointed to
conduct his investigation?
General Alexander. Sir, the 7th of April is my
understanding of the date that he was appointed, and I think
that was the day after the 15-6 investigation was signed off.
Senator Reed. Now, General Sanchez received a report from
the ICRC in February, is that correct?
General Alexander. Sir, General Sanchez's headquarters
received it. I don't know when General Sanchez got it.
Senator Reed. But his headquarters received it in February.
Within this report, there are allegations or actually
statements by the inspectors. In particular, they witnessed the
practice of keeping persons deprived of their liberty,
completely naked in totally empty concrete cells, in total
darkness, allegedly for several consecutive days. First, that's
a violation of the commander's guidance.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. That's a violation of the Geneva Conventions.
General Alexander. Exactly, sir.
Senator Reed. So this report is received in February.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. In this particular incident, the explanation
for this behavior was because the MI officer said it was part
of the process.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. From February to April----
General Alexander. No, sir. Let me, if I might----
Senator Reed. Go ahead, General.
General Alexander. We touched on this briefly before. In
the identification of who's a MI officer----
Senator Reed. General, if you'll excuse me, the sequence is
that the report's received by headquarters in February----
General Alexander. That's correct.
Senator Reed.--containing this information, which would
raise, I think, serious concerns about policy, about practice,
about compliance with the Geneva Conventions in the
intelligence operation, regardless of who the individual is. It
takes until April 4 to appoint an investigating officer.
General Alexander. Sir, there's an ongoing investigation at
that time, which is the Taguba investigation on that facility.
Senator Reed. General Taguba testified earlier today
because of his mission he was not required to, nor was he
encouraged to, investigate the MI aspects. Is that correct?
General Alexander. That's correct. When that was brought
out--as soon as that was brought out and made public, to the
best of my knowledge--you see, I did not receive a copy of the
ICRC Report until this week.
Senator Reed. Now, I understand from your testimony that
General Karpinski received a report even before General
Sanchez.
General Alexander. That is correct, sir. My understanding
is, she did an out-brief in November of that report, and she
responded on the 24th of December with actions.
Senator Reed. She did not inform General Sanchez or his
headquarters of these allegations which violated his policy and
which violated the Geneva Conventions?
General Alexander. I do not know who--I understand, but I
do not know who, other than the JAG--is my understanding is the
only person who had information at the CJTF-7. But, sir, I will
have to take that for the record to give you the exact answer.
I do not know.
[The information referred to follows:]
Lieutenant General Sanchez can provide the most authoritative
answer on when he became knowledgeable on the findings of the
International Committee of the Red Cross on Abu Ghraib.
General Alexander. The other part that we answered on that
was, we do not know if General Karpinski started an
investigation based on the incidents that were in those
reports, because, as you point out, they're illegal.
Senator Reed. General Burgess, the JIDC, that's a joint
asset, not an Army asset, is that correct?
General Burgess. Sir, it is joint.
Senator Reed. Colonel Norton is an Army officer, former
JDIC commander, Colonel Steve Norton?
General Burgess. I'm not sure if he is an Army officer or
not.
Senator Reed. Do you know anything about his background,
where he's served before?
General Burgess. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Reed. Were you involved with General Miller's trip,
in terms of being briefed about it or being involved in his
trip in August in which he talked about a different regime, if
you will, in that prison?
General Burgess. Yes, sir, I was.
Senator Reed. Are you aware of the recommendations he made,
including that the MP should be preparing prisoners for
interrogation?
General Burgess. Sir, when he did his report, that was
provided to the theater, and it was not provided to the Joint
Staff; however, I did talk to General Miller, and subsequently
received a copy of that report.
Senator Reed. So you were aware of the fact that he was
recommending something which General Taguba had recognized as
being--at least if carried out, would be violating Army
regulations and maybe even implicated in the Geneva
Conventions?
General Burgess. Sir, I was aware, as I looked at what
General Miller said, and I have read his report, and I have
looked at slides that accompany that. I interpreted what
General Miller had said in a different manner, I think, than
maybe General Taguba may have, and that probably came from my
working with him down at Guantanamo.
Senator Reed. Did Secretary Cambone's office receive the
same briefing, to your knowledge?
General Burgess. Sir, I do not know if Secretary Cambone
received it or not.
Senator Reed. Who else, to your knowledge, received the
briefing from General Miller about his recommendations or saw
the report or slides?
General Burgess. Sir, as far as I know, I can only confirm
that General Miller's report was provided to Lieutenant General
Sanchez. If it was provided higher, I'm not certain. I have
slides that were prepared for the DOD, but I have not been able
to confirm that they were ever presented.
Senator Reed. The ROE that you have handed out, General
Alexander, were they changed in any respect with respect to the
Miller----
General Alexander. No, sir. Those rules, as I stated, stem
from our FM on interrogation operations, and so when you look
at that, that manual was written in 1984, and it's consistent.
So it's one that we have----
Senator Reed. General Miller recommended the establishment
of the theater JIDC in his report. Is that correct?
General Burgess. Yes, sir, he did comment on that.
Senator Reed. General Sanchez approved that?
General Burgess. Sir, I would assume General Sanchez
approved that, because they, in fact, formed a JIDC.
Senator Reed. Can you also assume that General Sanchez
approved his recommendation with respect to using MP to prepare
the prisoners for interrogation?
General Burgess. No, sir, I cannot assume that, because I
have not seen any authorities or promulgation put from General
Sanchez following the release of the Miller Report to him.
General Alexander. Sir, may I comment on that? Because I
think it's taken out of context. I know what it says, but I
honestly believe that that is taken out of context. I have
talked to General Miller on what he meant. I have read our
doctrine from both the MP and the MI side. The part about where
MP and MI have to work together for screening and for
understanding the mindset of the prisoner before he's
interrogated is something that we do have to closely work on,
and it is something that was broken.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, might I ask one follow-up
question?
Chairman Warner. Yes. If I may say, you have a very
important line of questioning, and you may take another minute.
Senator Reed. General Alexander or General Romig, is,
anywhere within the Miller report or the slides, clearly stated
that the situation in Iraq is different than Guantanamo, that
the Geneva Conventions applies in Guantanamo? I ask this
because the interpretation of what is meant by preparing
prisoners in the Guantanamo environment has a much different
legal and practical connotation. In the Iraq environment, it
has a much, much different connotation. It appears that the
Guantanamo connotation found itself in Iraq, as prisoners were
being, in this report, subject to the violations of the
commander's guidance. Also the Geneva Conventions, did you see
anything where it was emphasized the fact that this would be
two separate situations? General Romig, I think you concur with
my analysis.
General Romig. Yes, sir, they are two separate situations,
but I did not see the slides on that, so I don't know.
Senator Reed. General Alexander? General Burgess?
General Alexander. Sir, I've seen the slides, and, again,
I've been to Guantanamo, and I talked to General Miller after
his visit to Iraq. Clearly, before going to Iraq, his concern
was they had enough people. Iraq was getting all the
interrogators. They don't need the help. He went over there,
and he saw some of the conditions in the camp--that was prior
to Abu Ghraib--and he helped fix that. That was the old Camp
Cropper. So one of the things that he did in his time there
was, for General Sanchez, looked at what needed to be fixed in
other camps, the humane treatment, and the facilities that we
have at Guantanamo are an order or magnitude better than the
facilities we have in Iraq. He understood that right away. Sir,
he also understood that the ability to integrate intelligence
into interrogations and what he called the flow of information
that he had at Guantanamo does not exist in Iraq, because the
system was not there to support it. All of those needed to be
fixed, and those were the key things he was talking about.
Nowhere--and he added a line in his report to have the legal
review or recommendations to make sure what we're saying is
correct. But, sir, I believe that what he said was honestly
correct, and I believe that there was no intent to, as it is
taken, to, quote, ``soften up'' prisoners for interrogation. I
know it says it, and people are quoting those, but I've talked
to General Miller, and I will tell you, I honestly believe that
he did not say it in those manners.
Senator Reed. Just a final question.
Chairman Warner. We need to move on, Senator. I thank the
Senator.
General Romig. Sir, if I could, there's one final point, if
I could, on General Miller's--if you read his report, his
primary focus was in three areas--integration, synchronization,
and fusion. That's where his report went and how that comes
together and works. The line on ``softening up,'' as I read the
report, that does not come out, to me, in terms of doing that.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. We will hopefully have General
Miller before the committee at some point.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Alexander and General Burgess, the February 2004
report of the ICRC states that there was a particular category
of prisoners that was particularly at risk for abuse, and I
want to quote to you from the report. It says that ``persons
deprived of their liberty under the supervision of the MI were
at high risk of being subjected to a variety of harsh
treatments, ranging from insults, threats, and humiliations to
both physical and psychological coercion, which, in some cases,
was tantamount to torture, in order to force cooperation.''
That's pretty strong language, talking about prisoners who were
under the control of MI being of particularly high risk.
General Alexander, you've said that this report only came
to your attention, I believe you said, last week, or relatively
recently. General Burgess, when did you learn of the ICRC
Report? I'm talking about the February report?
General Burgess. Yes, ma'am. Just last week.
Senator Collins. Shouldn't this report, with its indictment
of certain MI, have been brought to your attention sooner than
that? Who should have brought this to your attention, General
Alexander?
General Alexander. Ma'am, clearly it should be brought to
the attention of the commander responsible for that theater so
he can take action on it. My understanding is that the initial
report did go to General Karpinski, and that she was asked to
respond to that report, and did so on the 24th of December. I
do not know if she, in fact, started an investigation into
those, because they are serious, and I agree with you that as
soon as we hear about one of those allegations an investigation
should begin right away, and we shouldn't wait for it.
Senator Collins. I want to bring up a second issue and have
all three of you comment. If a small group of guards, on their
own initiative, decided to abuse their prisoners, I am very
skeptical that they would have chosen bizarre sexual
humiliations that were specifically designed to be particularly
offensive to Muslim men. It seems to me that it is far more
likely that a group of out-of-control, undisciplined guards
would beat up prisoners, not strip them naked and put them in a
human pyramid. That really troubles me, because it just
doesn't--it implies too much knowledge of what would be
particularly humiliating to these Muslim prisoners. That is
why, even though I do not yet have the evidence, I cannot help
but suspect that others were involved, that MI were involved,
or people further up the chain of command, in suggesting to
these guards specific types of abuse that were designed to
break these prisoners.
I would like to ask each of you to comment on that,
starting with General Alexander.
General Alexander. Ma'am, your logic is correct. I think
that the difficulty is to find out who told whom what to do. As
you state, the soldiers that are charged are saying that,
``Military intelligence told me to do this.'' Now, the question
is, ``Who?'' A defense can't be, ``I was told to do it by that
group or that group.'' ``Who told you?'' That's really where we
need to get to. Who told them to do this? Who was that
individual? That is the key to all of this.
Now, in the General Taguba Report, there were three
soldiers, not interrogators, who are MI analysts that were
listed, and there were two contractors listed. It appears that
at least one of the contractors did tell some of them some of
this, but it's not clear what they said. What complicates that,
as I understand it, is, some of these soldiers now that are
charged have pleaded the Fifth and are not talking to the
investigators to give out the rest of what they know. So we
want to get exactly the facts that you're stating, because that
is important to us. To fix the system, we have to know who, we
have to know what they did and why they did it, and then we
have to take action, hold them accountable and fix it so that
it doesn't happen again. So I agree with the way that you put
that out.
Senator Collins. General Burgess?
General Burgess. Ma'am, what you've laid out is logical.
What I would say is, I've learned, doing intelligence work,
that you close no doors, you see where the threads, as I call
them, will take you. But the last point I would leave you with,
in my short 30 years in the military, I'm not surprised much
anymore what one person will do to another person. Just dealing
with things that I've had to deal with through my career, just
dealing with the situations that come up. So anything is
possible. I'm not condoning, not saying it's right. It's just
human nature in some cases.
Senator Collins. General?
General Romig. Senator, since we have an ongoing CID
investigation and pending cases, it would be inappropriate for
me to comment.
Senator Collins. I thought you would answer that way.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator, it's an excellent line of
questioning. We keep coming up against the following: ``CENTCOM
knew it, but we didn't know it,'' or, ``investigation is going
to learn the facts.'' We're creeping along here trying to get
at these questions. At the same time, I guess we have to
observe the integrity of these investigations. But I agree with
you, these youngsters didn't understand the nuances of Muslim
culture, who some people say staged those photographs, which I
understand were going to be shown to the prisoners' families,
by way of threat, unless he came forward with some valuable
information. The plot is thickening.
But I'm just curious, General Alexander, you wear three
stars, you're the Chief of Army Intelligence, you train all
your people, you send them to the combatant commanders. It
would seem to me if they are represented to have done wrong--I
don't care whether it's CENTCOM, Southern Command (SOUTHCOM),
European Command (EUCOM)--they should inform you promptly of
what your people are doing wrong. That's my view.
Now, we turn over here to our good friend, Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I've been asking questions about contracted personnel.
General Burgess, how many U.S. contracted personnel do we have
working with our MI units? The big question is, do all of these
individuals have the proper security clearance?
General Burgess. Sir, I would like to take the response to
your question for the record so I can give you an exact
response.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
General Burgess. We've broken the number out in terms of
interrogators, linguists, and others that are providing some
analytical assistance, so it actually breaks out in different
ways and in three different locations. That's not--I'm talking
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo. So to give you a specific
answer, I'd like to provide that to the committee.
Sir, in those cases where security clearance is required,
that is written into the contract, and that is worked. There
are some of the skills that we're talking about, though,
depending on the category of the linguists, where different
security clearances are required or may not be.
Senator Akaka. General Burgess, it is reported that one of
the two civilian contractors named in Major General Taguba's
report did not have a security clearance. What are the rules
regarding security clearances for contracted personnel who will
be interrogating detainees?
General Burgess. Sir, as a general rule--and I highlight
``general rule''--we require at least a collateral clearance,
depending on the access that the individual's going to have.
However, I have asked for the specific statements of work for
those contract, and have not read them yet.
Senator Akaka. I've also read some articles on this, and
would ask the question, whose responsibility is it to ensure
that all of the U.S. contracted personnel have the appropriate
clearances?
General Burgess. Sir, as a general rule, that resides with
the organization that ``lets the contract,'' and you have a
contracting officer who is responsible for seeing that the
contract is executed in accordance with the standards. That is
normally done at the Unified Command and lower, depending upon
where you're executing the contract.
Senator Akaka. I've read some reports where the hired
contractor firms claim that it is not their responsibility to
do any background research or checks or investigations on any
of the people they hire. Do you know that to be true?
General Burgess. Sir, I do not know that to be true.
Senator Akaka. Also, General Taguba's report stated that
contracted personnel from third-world nations were involved in
this. Do you have any comment about that?
General Burgess. Sir, depending on your definition of
third-world country, it is a true statement to say that we use
foreign nationals with security clearances to do interrogations
or translations.
Senator Akaka. Can you name some of the countries that
these foreign nationals are from?
General Burgess. Sir, for example, we are using some Iraqis
to do some linguist work for us, if you will, not only
translation work, but also just providing those skills for the
soldiers on the ground.
Senator Akaka. What kind of training did the U.S. civilian
contractors have prior to going to Iraq? I've been informed
that the training for interrogators included training tactics
and techniques used by other countries. Did such training
occur? If so, are these tactics and techniques approved by DOD
intelligence officials?
General Alexander. Sir, as far as I know, they did not. The
contract that I'm familiar with, the personnel who were brought
on from the CACI contract were former soldiers or former U.S.
who had an interrogation MOS and had been trained on the rules.
Sir, as we stated earlier, they were also supposed to sign and
understand the interrogation ROE.
General Burgess. I would highlight the approaches or the
interrogation techniques would still be those that are laid out
in the Appendix H of the Army FM that we discussed earlier.
Senator Akaka. Another concern I have is about records.
General Burgess, who is responsible for keeping a record of all
of these civilian contractors that the U.S. has in Iraq? Is
this responsibility of the individual contracted firms or the
DOD?
General Burgess. Sir, I do not know the answer to that
question.
Senator Akaka. General Romig, was there any consultation
between commanders--that's commanders from company, battalion,
or brigade--between commanders and the command JAG regarding
the treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib?
General Romig. Sir, we had a JAG officer assigned to the
brigade, the MI brigade. I can't tell you the day-to-day
discussions, but there was a JAG officer assigned to the
brigade. In addition, the MP brigade had a couple of JAG
officers. As I said, there was a magistrate cell in Abu Ghraib
of three to five JAG officers. So there was ample--we believe--
now, having said that, we're taking a look at the resourcing
and the training for our JAG and MI units to make sure we're
doing it right, so we're looking at that also.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responses.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Lindsey Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Hat's off to the panel. You all have done an excellent job
answering a lot of questions. I think the truth is, we won't
know yet. When somebody offers as a defense in a court-martial,
``Someone else made me do it,'' it's going to take awhile to
find out who that someone else is. I share Senator Collins'
concern that this is probably not just six or seven people
having an out-of-bounds perverted experience, it probably goes
deeper. But in terms of what Senator Kennedy was asking,
General Romig--is that right? Am I pronouncing your name right?
General Romig. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. I'm informed the Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act exists that would allow the Department of
Justice to prosecute contractors serving overseas. Are you
familiar with that?
General Romig. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Graham. I would make this invitation to you. Could
you and your JAGs look at that, and maybe get the other JAGs to
look at it and see if we need to improve that? Because I'm not
so sure it gives us all the tools that we need, but I would
appreciate it if you would do that.
General Romig. Yes, sir, we would look at it.
[The information referred to follows:]
Section 3266 of title 18, United States Code, enacted by the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA), directs the
Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State
and Attorney General, to prescribe regulations governing the
apprehension, detention, delivery, and removal of persons under MEJA.
The Department of Defense is currently engaged in that process. The
Department is also reviewing legislation to amend MEJA. H.R. 4390 was
introduced on May 19, 2004, to amend MEJA to apply to employees of
contractors of other Federal agencies when their ``employment relates
to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense.'' Currently
with respect to contractor employees, MEJA applies only to an employee
of a Department of Defense contractor.
General Romig. One additional point about that. There are
implementing instructions that are on the Federal Register
right now that DOD has put out. Prior to that, though, the Air
Force has prosecuted two cases under that act.
Senator Graham. Thank you, and if we need to improve it and
make it tighter, I would appreciate that.
General Alexander, you've been very candid. One of the
things that jumps out at me about this report is that the
prison is being shelled every day, it seems like. These people
are in a war zone, so you could have the best-trained, highly-
motivated people in the world, and this was just a tough job.
But if you have poorly-trained people who were told they were
going to go home, and had that yanked out from under them, and
poor command, it's a cocktail for disaster. Do you agree with
that?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. Part of this hearing--and I
appreciate so much what the Chairman and Senator Levin have
done by having these hearings--is to try to make sure that we
get it right next time. Seven-hundred people guarding 7,000 at
one time is not a good ratio, I don't believe. Do you have the
men and women under your command necessary to, in a valid way,
get MI gathered? Is it your opinion we have enough people in
uniform in the Reserve component to act as MPs to prevent this
problem in the future?
General Alexander. Sir, that's a great question. Army
transformation is at the heart of what you're getting to right
now. I know that the Army leadership has been over here to
brief that, but let me give it to you from my perspective,
because it is important.
Today we have about 240 active duty interrogators. We will
more than triple that under Army transformation and that key
change and some of the other changes we make for our analysis
and other areas to fight this new emerging threat is where our
Army is going under that transformation, and that's very
important to our country in the future.
So I would say that continue please, sir, supporting as you
have that transformation process. It's vital to resolving this
issue and others.
Senator Graham. Chairman Warner asked a very good question
in just simple terms, and give us an educated guess, because I
know you don't know everything, what do you think happened in
that prison between the MI community and the MPs?
General Alexander. Speculation----
Senator Graham. Just your gut feeling as a three-star
general.
General Alexander. I believe you had not only poor
leadership, you had a group that were essentially leadership
and controlled their environment on the midnight shift. Nobody
came to check on them for periods of time and their leaders may
have been absent at those times, and that other people came up
and heard that some of this was going on, and they did things
that were incorrect, reprehensible, and should be punished. If
any leaders participated in that, they should receive the same
punishment, and if anyone told them to do that, in my mind,
they should receive the same punishment.
What we have to do, sir, is find out exactly who told them
and what they did do, and I think that will come out.
Senator Graham. One final thought. I think everyone here,
Republican or Democrat, will make sure you have the resources
necessary to gather intelligence in a lawful way to protect our
troops to do your job, and we will look at retooling the
military. We can learn from this experience.
But I would like to end on this thought. Senator Lieberman
I think spoke to a lot of us here a few minutes ago. The
beheading video is not only shocking, but it should be a wake-
up call as to exactly who we're dealing with here. We're
dealing with an enemy who has absolutely no boundaries, who's
despicable in every way, and really behaves like animals in the
name of God.
Our challenge as a nation, General Alexander, is to keep
the fight going, vanquish this enemy, because losing is
unacceptable to the international community. We learned one
thing if nothing else from Hitler, one more country wasn't
enough. You could never appease him, and we'll never be able to
appease the folks we're fighting today. So for the
international community, it is now time to join this fight. We
have made mistakes, and I'll be the first to admit it, but the
war itself is not a mistake. These people need to be controlled
and vanquished, and in the process we need not become animals
ourselves. That's what this is all about.
Mr. Chairman, I know we can do both of these things. We can
vanquish this enemy and we can do it with honor, because we've
done it before as a nation, just as we defeated Hitler working
together, we can defeat these people. I believe that these
hearings, no matter how bad it makes us look for the moment, is
an opportunity for us to show the world that there is a better
way, and I hope the people of Iraq will be watching and
listening, because they need to have higher expectations about
their future.
I appreciate you all serving our country and we will stay
in touch.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Graham, for
those observations.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We haven't
ceded the moral high ground in this situation, no matter how
bad the abuses are, no matter how many there were. We haven't
ceded the moral high ground, no matter what we find out, as to
who was involved, and as to what level. We will correct it,
we'll prosecute those who have engaged in criminal acts, and we
will hold everyone accountable no matter what their level of
authority.
It will help remove the stain, but in the process of doing
that, it's important that we don't create the opportunity for
scapegoats or duck responsibility as it might be our
responsibility to deal with, simply because it's painful, or it
puts us all in a very difficult situation to deal with it.
So I have to ask this, General Alexander. As you look at
your future investigations and current investigations, would
you expect to find anything that would bear on the court-
martial that are underway or about to get underway? Would there
be any factual evidence that you might determine that would
have any impact on those trials?
General Alexander. Sir, I think the one key thing that will
impact that is if someone in authority told them to do what
they did, that has great impact. It does not condone it, but it
clearly in my opinion is a mitigating factor. We have not found
that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Will you find it, or do you know
whether you'll find it?
General Alexander. Sir, I don't know that it exists.
Senator Ben Nelson. That's what I mean. But if you don't
know whether it exists, you don't know that it doesn't. I guess
I certainly don't want to sweep anything aside, I don't want to
put anything in limbo, but I am concerned that we're moving
forward before all the investigations are complete and no one
would want us to rush to judgment. It would also, I think, be
inappropriate if we look like we're rushing to judgment.
General Alexander. Yes, sir. I think the allegations, and I
think this perhaps may be something that----
Senator Ben Nelson. I think you might want to pass it off
to General Romig.
General Romig. I would say that it looks like that the
cases are being moved very quickly, but you have to realize
that the investigation started in mid-January, and so the chain
of command has had the information as the investigation was
developed.
Senator Ben Nelson. I agree. I shouldn't have used the word
quickly as opposed to prematurely. That's, I think, what my
concern is, and then as it relates to General Karpinski, it's
my understanding that the MI may have taken over November 2003.
Is that after the abuses that are in question here? I guess,
General Alexander, you gave the time frame.
General Alexander. Sir, she was given a report by the ICRC
on November 6.
Senator Ben Nelson. About these particular abuses or the
fact that there were abuses?
General Alexander. About the fact that there were abuses
and some of the abuses listed in there sounded the same as some
of the abuses we're seeing. Now, what we have to do is get the
exact dates of those. I do not have those.
Senator Ben Nelson. Would this have been by the midnight
shift?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. These abuses?
General Alexander. Yes, sir. My understanding, because when
you read in the ICRC, that one statement, you immediately think
of that one picture, at least I do. Now, that report was given
to her on 6 November, and as I said, the Fragmentary Order
(FRAGO) took place on 19 November.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do we have any explanation from General
Sanchez about why he interrupted the command by putting Colonel
Pappas in place to deal with both the intelligence, and force
protection side?
General Alexander. Sir, it was just as you say. That
General Sanchez wanted Colonel Pappas to move his headquarters
to Abu Ghraib and take charge of the force protection. As was
pointed out earlier, they were receiving artillery or mortar
fire. People were getting shot. The facility is not being
policed, and going along with the initiatives as quickly as he
wants to. The MP battalion commander on the ground was not
making that headway. He felt that by putting one of his senior
commanders there, moving Pappas up to do that and putting him
in charge of that, it was the correct thing to do for the
soldiers and the detainees. So that is why I believe he made
that decision.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Burgess, I'm sure you're
familiar with the term, rendering detainees or prisoners in
terms of shifting them off to other locations, other
governments for intelligence-gathering purposes?
General Burgess. Yes, sir, I am aware of the term
rendering.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do you know of any instances where
we've participated in that by sending any detainees or anyone
within our custody to another country for any other purpose or
any purpose?
General Burgess. Sir, I am aware that we have currently
kept individuals under U.S. Government control in terms of
conducting interrogations. I am familiar, but it would not be
appropriate to go into in this session and could discuss with
the leadership another particular case, but it would not be
appropriate here.
Senator Ben Nelson. I wouldn't want you to go into it, but
you are aware it might be something we could take up in a
secure environment?
General Burgess. Yes, sir, but--yes, sir. That's all I'll
say about it here.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Talent.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had one question
for General Romig. Before that, I'll comment on something
Senator Collins said. I understand her saying that it's hard to
believe how these enlisted soldiers would have known that this
was the way to humiliate these particular prisoners. That
actually is less of a question mark in my mind. Anybody who's
worked in the civilian prison system or is relying on anybody
who has, knows something about Islam, that's not uncommon, and
I would think know something about how to humiliate people too,
because unfortunately, that's not uncommon in the civilian
prison system.
What is inexplicable to me, and I'd appreciate your comment
even if you're going over old ground, is where the officers of
this brigade were. If I ask myself what is unusual, truly
incomprehensible about the conduct of these enlisted people is
that they would have done this to this scale and with this
documentation without having asked the officers in their direct
line of command whether they should do it.
Now, maybe you know this and are not commenting on it
because it's part of the cases, I don't know, but that to me is
the true question mark here, because I'm not used to an Army
operation where there seems to be such an abdication of the
first rule of a chain of command, which is to know what is
going on with those immediately beneath you. General, if you
want to comment, go ahead.
General Romig. Senator, as you point out, it would be
inappropriate with an ongoing investigation and criminal cases
moving forward for me to comment on that.
Senator Talent. This is the crux of what, at the
appropriate time, I want to know about this, because I agree
with you, General Burgess, that people can be pretty inventive
even on their own in figuring out ways to do the wrong thing.
But for them to take this on their own responsibility just
seems to me to be extremely unlikely, and the natural place
they would have gone to check this out is their own chain of
command, not somebody in MI.
General Romig, let me ask you a question that I raised with
the panel this morning, and you can just maybe enlighten me
because another side of this is, why, once General Taguba
issued his report, it took so long to work its way up the upper
level of the chain of command, and of course, everybody is
talking about command influence, which I know is an issue. Now,
could we maybe deal with this in the future by having a
separate line apart from the chain of command for the purposes
of court-martial and the UCMJ where you can report a special
interest case? In other words, get it to the top through a
separate line? I'm told the Air Force has this kind of an
office. Are you aware of that? I have an all-green panel here
so maybe you're not, but I mean, are you aware of that? Is this
something the Army could look into?
General Romig. Sir, I'm not sure what you're exactly
referring to.
Senator Talent. It's called the Reporting Office on Special
Interest Cases, and what I'm told is that you can go to this
office if you think the case has some interest beyond the
particular case for the policy of the Air Force, and you don't
have to worry about command influence, because this office is
not in the chain of command for those purposes.
General Romig. There's a difference, I guess, between
reporting, which this was reported up, we knew about it in
January, versus having the entire report up with all, as I've
heard, 6,000 pages if you count the annexes. It's not
necessary, I don't think, to have a full report if you're
apprised of what's in the report, and that occurred much
earlier. But this is something we ought to look at, you're
right.
Senator Talent. Yes, because if the higher level officers
are caught between their responsibilities from a command
influence standpoint and their desire to expedite this up the
chain because of the effect on the mission and the strategy,
then maybe we can do something to free them from that conflict.
General Romig. That's something that should be looked at,
you're right, sir.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. I thank you. We have to look at that. If
you could take that on yourself to look at that situation----
Senator Talent. We're looking at it in my office, Mr.
Chairman. I'll talk to the staff of the committee about it too.
Chairman Warner. When you sit here and say you knew about
it in January, did you blow some whistles and alert people that
we have a problem?
General Romig. Sir, I did not see the videos or the photos,
but I knew of the case and that it was going to be a nasty
case, had meetings with the Vice Chief of Staff and other
leadership in the Army, so we were working the issue. But this
was also----
Chairman Warner. As early as January?
General Romig. Mid- to late-January, yes, sir. This was
also in the context of tracking all the detainee abuses, which
we started well before this.
Senator Talent. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, I asked Secretary
Cambone this morning, and I think that what I can sense that
those at the top level saw this as a UCMJ-type situation and
their command influence protocols cut in in their own minds,
and they said, okay, we have to go by the book on this because
we don't want to prejudice the prosecution, which is
understandable, because you know how that's drilled into them.
So maybe some separate reporting-type situation where we'd have
people who would be more free to really rattle everybody's cage
about it is the way we need to--we will look into it, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Yes, some assessment as to how it affects
American, overall foreign policy, everything. We now have
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Romig, I
want to follow up if I may on Senator Graham's and also Senator
Akaka's questions about contractors, and specifically, just for
clarification, in your view, what rule of law applies to these
civilian contractors?
General Romig. It depends on what they do. If they have
committed an offense that, for example, a homicide or a serious
assault, maiming of somebody, these would be prosecuted under
Federal law, under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act, brought back to the United States and prosecuted in
Federal courts.
Senator Pryor. By the Department of Justice?
General Romig. Yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. Do you happen to know how many contractors
were involved in this prison? Do you know how many----
General Romig. Sir, I have no idea.
Senator Pryor. Do you?
General Alexander. Yes, sir. There were 29 as I understand
it, 8 interrogators, 10 screeners, 9 analysts, and 2 reports
writers, so 29.
Senator Pryor. So 29 civilian contractors?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. Were they all with the same company or is
that different companies?
General Alexander. Sir, they were all with the same
company. Now, those were the interrogators. There was also a
linguist contract under another contractor type.
Senator Pryor. Who had the bigger--the 29, who had that
contract?
General Alexander. That was CACI, sir.
Senator Pryor. Okay. Who was the commanding officer there
at the prison?
General Alexander. Sir, right now today----
Senator Pryor. No, who was it at the time?
General Alexander. Sir, that was the report, so I want to
make sure I answer this exactly correct. After 19 November,
Colonel Pappas was the FOB commander. Prior to that, it was
Lieutenant Colonel Phillabaum, who ran Abu Ghraib for the 800th
MPs, and that was under General Karpinski.
Senator Pryor. Great. General Alexander, you have
mentioned, I think almost all witnesses have mentioned,
discipline and leadership. Is it your conclusion that part of
the problem there with the discipline and the leadership is the
failure to train or is it the failure to screen? Where does
this start to break down?
General Alexander. Sir, I can tell you from my experience
when I was a lieutenant, one of the first things my platoon
sergeants taught me to do was to visit the billets at all times
day and night, so that's one of the first things you learn as a
lieutenant is to go and see what your troops are doing day and
night. We did that in Germany because of drug problems back
then.
I think right there the question is, where was the
leadership on the night shift? When did they come by and visit?
That is, when people refer to a breakdown in the leadership,
that's what forms in my mind.
Senator Pryor. Does that go for training as well?
General Alexander. Absolutely, sir. In training, it is laid
out both in the CJTF orders about make sure your soldiers are
trained on the humane treatment. That's specific in the orders.
Sir, I think it was pointed out earlier that this was an
internment, this is the duty of this unit. This was something
that you are trained to do. That is the first basic thing that
all noncommissioned officers and junior leaders know to do, and
I can't answer why it was not done.
Senator Pryor. Let me ask one last question or one last
line of questions, and that is, understandably, in the last few
days we've been very focused on the conditions in the prison
itself. There have been some question today and previously
about the qualifications for getting yourself into this prison,
and we've talked about that a little bit. There's this ICRC
Report that 70 to 90 percent were wrongly arrested and
detained. We can--we don't know all the background on that, so
I'm not going to ask about that. But my question is, once
they're in the prison, from that point, where do they go? If
you're going to prosecute these people or whatever decision you
make, where do they go from here?
General Alexander. Sir, the facility that is there at Abu
Ghraib--and I'll let General Burgess add in here if I state
anything incorrectly--has three areas, a general detainee
population area, an Iraqi criminal area, and then this JIDC.
The general population is where most everyone is brought in who
is captured by our troops who are doing something against our
soldiers or we believe, or against Iraqi civilians. The
criminals are the ones who are brought in for criminal acts,
and that is now under Iraqi control.
The JIDC is where personnel who are of intelligence value
are placed because they either participated in an act against
our forces or know something that is important for the priority
information requirements that the commanders have.
Senator Pryor. There's a report, and forgive me, but I
can't remember if it's in The Washington Post or exactly where
I saw it, that talks about, it says the Americans have
established a secret court. I was curious about this central
criminal court of Iraq and what exactly is that and how does
that work. I assume some of these prisoners there would be
tried in that court. Could you elaborate on that?
General Alexander. I guess it's a secret court because I'm
not aware of it, sir, I really, truly am not.
General Romig. Sir, that's--I wouldn't really characterize
it as a secret court. It's a court that functions within Iraq
for criminal cases, serious criminal cases. One of the things,
sir, I wanted to point out was that these individuals undergo a
6-month review. If the feeling is we need to continue to detain
them, at the 6-month mark, a review and appeals panel reviews
and makes recommendations for their release if they feel they
should be released. That goes up to Baghdad to an appeals board
that is chaired by some very senior officers.
Senator Pryor. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, that's all I have.
Senator Sessions [presiding]. I'm proud to be a
representative of the people in a country that takes these
things seriously, that believes in truth and facts, honor and
duty, and responsibility, and we're all humans and we
frequently all of us fail. There have been some failures here.
We're going to get to the bottom of it, and I appreciate your
candor, all three of you, as we go forward, and I most of all
appreciate the great service of our soldiers under very
stressful conditions at this very moment, because this Senate
and this Congress voted to send them there by a three-fourths
majority vote. If anybody thought that everything was going to
go smoothly, they're not worthy of the office of United States
Senator, because anybody that knows history knows that there
will be problems.
But we don't believe in them, we believe in eliminating
them, and I'm just proud of the way you've responded to date.
The beheading that we hear about, I pray it's not true. If it
is true, it would not be untypical of what we're seeing in the
enemy that we're facing. They are not going to have their own
internal inquiries and they're not going to condemn these
actions because they justify these actions and they believe in
them.
One of the things I think it's important for us to remember
and I just want to get straight, maybe General Alexander, of
this MP unit, is even last year four members were submitted to
court-martial for abusive procedures, were they not?
General Alexander. Sir, I'm not aware of that.
General Romig. That may be correct, sir. I'd have to double
check.
Senator Sessions. I think it's in the report, referred for
court-martial. I'm not sure how that came out, but they were
disciplined for abusing prisoners last year, which means,
number one, I'm glad somebody in the unit took charge of it,
number two, the military's not tolerating this. I have not
forgotten a very fine brigade commander who, in a combat
situation, lost his discipline and fired a gun by an Iraqi's
head, thinking he had to have information. He was removed from
the service, basically, and a spotless record otherwise,
because the military did not tolerate this kind of activity.
I'm also aware that within 1 day of this specialist, not an
officer, a specialist coming forward, an investigation was
opened under the CID. General Romig, that's what you do to
prosecute people, take them to court-martial and put them in
jail with, is it not?
General Romig. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. So that was commenced the next day. Can
you tell me, any of you, about the suspensions? I know we've
talked about the Brigadier General in charge of the brigade,
but there's been some actions within a few days of this report
to actually remove people from their official position, not
privates, not people out there at the lowest level who were in
the photographs, but officers of substantial rank. What can you
tell me about that, General Romig?
General Romig. Yes, sir. The battalion commander received a
general officer memorandum of reprimand and was relieved for
cause.
Senator Sessions. Within a week perhaps?
General Romig. Sir, I could get the time frame. I just
don't have it in front of me.
Senator Sessions. It was a short period of time, as I
recall.
General Romig. Yes, sir. After a chance for the command to
review the evidence and the facts. There are a number of folks
that they're waiting for their rebuttal on their general
officer memorandum of reprimand. An operations sergeant major
was relieved with a general officer memorandum of reprimand, so
there were a number of actions taken, and all of these are very
significant actions to a person's career obviously.
Senator Sessions. That was long before any news media, any
Congress got involved in this. Sometimes I think this Congress
reminds me, in this instance particularly, of the little dog
that chases an automobile down the road barking and thinks it
ran the automobile off. Like we were demanding you do
something, you've already done it.
Let me ask about this MP situation, General Alexander, and
I think it was somewhat confusing about the chain of command
and the orders. As I understand, Senator Levin indicated there
was some evidence. I think as the good lawyer he is, he was
correct. There was some evidence that perhaps MI personnel had
done wrong. Is it your opinion that there was not persuasive
evidence, and if not, why?
Let me just ask you, are you saying to us that you were not
persuaded by the evidence that you've seen to date that any of
these MI people authorized anything like this?
General Alexander. Sir, that is a good statement and I
appreciate the opportunity to clear it up, because I have not
seen any indications that a person in the intelligence chain of
command told them to take these activities on. There are
numerous statements, as you point out, that allege MI officers,
which could be any of the people there, told them to do this.
We need to find out the specifics and the facts of that,
wherever that may lead this.
Senator Sessions. I agree with that. We need to follow that
up where it leads. I will say, as a person who's been involved
in prosecutions for over 15 years, in fact, they didn't get any
names and specific allegations, and I believe the phrase was
insinuated, that these officers insinuated this or that does
cause me some concern. If somebody had told me to do something
and you were complaining to me about it, I'd say this person
told me to do it and I'd give the name.
But I think we do need to follow that up. I don't believe
that the MI deserves any pass on this in terms of an
investigation, I don't think you do. I do think it's quite
possible that an MP working in that prison, if they had been,
if it had been suggested they do these kind of things, may have
felt they had some authority or ability to do so.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Can you share any more with us on that?
Senator Bill Nelson. Did you know we're in a vote and we
have 3 minutes left?
Senator Sessions. I did not, and my time just ended 1
minute ago.
Senator Bill Nelson. I need to go and vote.
Senator Sessions. I do too.
Senator Bill Nelson. So if you're chairing the meeting,
would you recess it until we can get back?
Senator Sessions. Senator Nelson, that is a brilliant
suggestion.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Sessions. Oh, Senator Levin, you want to chair it
for us?
Senator Levin. There's someone else coming back here as
well, so we'll keep it going if that's all right with you.
Senator Sessions. I would just try to follow up on that. I
think we need to know that. I think we need to know if there
were any suggestions that, going beyond these interrogation
ROE, which I think makes sense, occurred. Also, I'm aware,
General Alexander, that this was a dangerous place to be, and
our soldiers were at great risk, and this Congress, we're on
the top defense officials and military people to get more
intelligence, because we said repeatedly good intelligence
saves lives, and so I know there's a great pressure on.
Are you satisfied now that since January and since these
things have arisen that we've gotten our people back on the
right side of that line if they ever got across of it? Are they
clearly informed now where the line is, what is legitimate for
them to do in interrogation, and are they on the right side of
it?
General Alexander. Yes, sir. I am convinced we have taken
those actions.
Senator Sessions. It seems to me we have at least five
investigations ongoing on policies. Our policies are being
reemphasized and I think we're on the right track, and I
believe that is what a good nation does that has high ideals.
If they mess up, they get themselves straight, but we don't
give up on the mission that we're undertaking, which is noble
and honorable and going to be a great improvement for the lives
of the people of Iraq. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you. I was going to have some
additional questions in the second round.
Senator Sessions. You're available to commence the
questioning if you would like.
Senator Levin. We might as well start a second round before
the first round is over and save some time later on, if that's
all right with you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. I think it makes sense.
Senator Levin. Thank you. First of all, let me ask you,
General Romig, about this interrogation ROE that require the
commanding general's approval. In your opinion, are those
actions and activities, including stress positions, sensory
deprivation, and so forth, consistent--not consistent with--
would the Geneva Conventions say that those are okay?
General Romig. Sir, this is the first that I've seen of
these. They were--the legal review, as I understand, was done
down at CJTF-7, but if I'm not mistaken, these are taken out of
your FM, is that correct?
Senator Levin. Could you tell us which FM that is? We're
having trouble finding that FM. What's the date of it, that
field manual?
General Alexander. Sir, it's FM 34-52.
Senator Levin. What's the date of that?
General Alexander. Sir, it's 1984, I believe. No, 1992, I'm
sorry.
Senator Levin. What page are you on?
General Alexander. Sir, I'm on the date where these are,
they're on 3-16 roughly.
Senator Levin. So those specific items are listed in that
FM?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
General Romig. Sir, the point I was going to make is those
get an exhaustive legal review to ensure that they're
appropriate and consistent with the conventions, international
conventions, the field manuals do.
Senator Levin. That protected persons under the Geneva
Conventions can be subjected to these, is that what you're
saying, General?
General Romig. Again, sir, I have to fall back on the prior
legal review that was much more exhaustive than my taking a
look at right now, and saying that if that's the case, yes, I
would concur with that.
Senator Levin. General Alexander, can you tell us who the
lawyer was who said that these items are consistent for
protected persons, that these are allowed to be applied to
protected persons under the Geneva Conventions?
General Alexander. Sir, I don't know the lawyer's name on
that. I do know that that was done, as General Romig said, at
CJTF-7. It is consistent with our FMs, so I don't know who,
which lawyer at CJTF-7, but we can take that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Interrogation Rules of Engagement Chart was prepared by the
officer-in-charge of interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib prison. It
was intended as a graphic aid to assist interrogators in determining
what interrogation approaches they could or could not use without
higher approval. It was informally review by the 205th Brigade Judge
Advocate and attorneys assigned to the Office of the Staff Judge
Advocate, CJTF-7.
Senator Levin. That would be within the last year or so?
General Alexander. Yes. That part there where these are
laid out are also laid out in the guidance from CTJF-7 on their
interrogation operations.
Senator Levin. So this would be within the last how many
months?
General Alexander. Sir, those came out when the CJTF was
stood up in July, and we have copies of those and their
standing orders that came out.
Senator Levin. Just so I can be real clear again, that FM
specifically lists these items with the same words?
General Alexander. No, sir. In fact, I'll give you the
manual, a copy of the manual to leave here with the committee.
Senator Levin. That would be very helpful, but my question
is, does the FM say specifically that you can apply stress for
up to 45 minutes?
General Alexander. No, sir, it does not say you can apply
stress up to 45 minutes. It says on here, and this is where the
lawyers have to get involved, just as you say, sir, and I
understand you're a lawyer, so I feel I'm on the short end of
the stick.
Senator Levin. No, no, I won't either use that or misuse
that. I'm not sure it's even a plus.
General Alexander. What it says here in the manual is that
you can't use stress positions for a prolonged period of time
is exactly what it says.
Senator Levin. So that's been interpreted by a lawyer to
mean up to 45 minutes?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Unless you get something approved in writing
and then it says sleep management, and what are the words in
the manual, about 72 hours without sleep?
General Alexander. It says abnormal sleep deprivation,
examples of mental torture include abnormal sleep deprivation.
I understand that at the general counsel's, as they convene to
look at what sleep deprivation, and again, that would go on,
but they looked at exactly, okay, so what is sleep deprivation,
is that 16 hours in a day, and so they went through that and
those are the periods, and you can see that because those have
caveats in the FM, those are the ones that General Sanchez
personally had to get involved with.
Senator Levin. No, I understand that, that's if it's more
than 72 hours, but I'm talking about the----
General Alexander. Sir, it says 72 hours----
Senator Levin. You're correct. What are the words in the
manual about sleep management or sleep----
General Alexander. Abnormal sleep deprivation.
Senator Levin. So have you seen the legal opinion that
interprets that to mean you can do sleep management up to 3
days with the commanding general's approval?
General Alexander. No, sir, I have not seen the legal
opinion----
Senator Levin. That supports that.
General Alexander. That supports it exactly like that, but
I do know that both they and a larger one was done for the DOD.
Senator Levin. All right. If you could get that for us, I'd
appreciate it. Have you seen that, General Romig?
General Romig. No, I have not, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
``Sleep deprivation'' is not an approved interrogation technique in
U.S. Army Field Manual 34-52. In January 2003, the Secretary of Defense
directed the DOD General Counsel to establish a working group to review
various interrogation techniques for use in operations at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. The concept of ``sleep deprivation'' as an interrogation
technique was addressed in the Working Group. Their analysis, however,
was limited to possible techniques for use on unlawful combatants in
Guantanamo. It did not address operations in Iraq. After considering
the Working Group Report, the Secretary of Defense approved
interrogation procedures in April 2003 that did not include ``sleep
deprivation.'' As previously noted, the chart prepared at Abu Ghraib
prison was informally reviewed by the 205th Brigade Judge Advocate. I
have been informed that sleep deprivation, or ``sleep management'' as
it is delineated on the chart, was never requested nor approved for use
by the Commanding General, CJTF-7.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Now, on the ROE, this document
here, it's been declassified, in effect, I guess, since the
charts have been used already. Apparently CENTCOM did not
approve the initial draft of these ROE. Do you know anything
about that?
General Alexander. No, sir.
Senator Levin. The ICRC report, page 3.2, called MI
section, and paragraph 27 under that section says the
following, that: ``the ICRC visited people at the Abu Ghraib
correctional facility. They witnessed the practice of keeping
persons deprived of their liberty, completely naked in totally
empty concrete cells and in total darkness allegedly for
several consecutive days. Upon witnessing such cases, the ICRC
interrupted its visits and requested an explanation from the
authorities. The military intelligence officer in charge of the
interrogation explained that this practice was `part of the
process.' ''
Did you see this before I just read it to you?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Does that trouble you?
General Alexander. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Levin. Would that be evidence that the MI officer
in charge of interrogation had something to do with this
process?
General Alexander. Clearly, that's one of the individuals
we would like to know who that was, specifically what is his
name or her name so that we can take action. Sir, you point out
a good question, a good point. As soon as we know that, we
should begin an investigation.
Senator Levin. No, you should begin an investigation to
find that out.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. That's a lot different. You said as soon as
you know that you should begin an investigation. I would hope
you're investigating to find out who these folks are. There's
all kinds of evidence that MI is involved here. We have the
statements in General Taguba's report over and over again
referring to MI people. Sergeant Davis stated he'd heard MI
insinuate to the guards to abuse them. When he said, what did
MI say, he said, loosen this guy up, make sure he had a bad
night. The rest of the wings, according to this witness, are
regular prisoners and 1A, 1B, are MI holds. Was that your
understanding that 1A and 1B are MI holds?
General Alexander. That's my understanding, yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Does anybody here on this panel know what
Secretary Rumsfeld meant when he said the Geneva Conventions
did not apply precisely to Iraq? That's clearly the context
that he was referring to on that date, back on May 5.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Levin. Do any of you know what he meant? General
Romig?
General Romig. No, sir. I did not hear that quote, but I do
not know what he meant either. I do know that I had a
discussion with some folks at DOD a day ago, and their view
was, DOD general counsel, that it did apply.
Senator Levin. But in your judgment, does the Geneva
Conventions apply precisely to Iraq?
General Romig. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. General Alexander, do you know what the
SECDEF possibly is referring to in the month of May of this
year? He says the Geneva Conventions do not apply precisely. Do
you have any idea what he could be referring to?
General Alexander. Sir, I did not hear the context of what
he said, so, sir, I can't comment on that.
Senator Levin. Can I ask one more question?
Chairman Warner [presiding]. Sure.
Senator Levin. I will ask you, General Burgess, do you know
what the SECDEF meant?
General Burgess. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Levin. Secretary Cambone could not tell us either
this morning. He said he would try to find that out, but it's
pretty significant when the SECDEF does not even--or put it
this way, states with great ambiguity and confusion what the
rule of law is relative to the treatment of prisoners in Iraq.
You can understand, it seems to me, how that confusion could
filter down to the lowest levels.
Now, there was on order on November 19, 2003, effective
immediately, commander of the 205th MI brigade assumes
responsibility for the Baghdad confinement facility and is
appointed FOB commander. So the commander on November 19 of
that facility is the commander of the MI brigade. So those MPs
are taking orders, at least on one chain of command, from the
head of the MI brigade. Is that correct?
General Alexander. Yes, sir, for the security, as I
understand it, for the security of the facility and for the
initiatives that General Sanchez had to fix it up.
Senator Levin. But that's their mission, is it not?
General Alexander. But it was not for the detainee
operations. As I understood, that stayed with the MPs, but
that's something that has to be clarified, and we need to get
you that.
Senator Levin. You're saying that the what of the----
General Alexander. The security of the detainees, which is
inherently an MP mission, stayed with the MPs, as I understand
it. There's two parts, sir, if I could just add to this. I
think the timing of the date is also important, and the reason
I bring up the timing is the 19th, the first ICRC report that
went to General Karpinski happened on the 6th, so I believe
that what General Sanchez was doing was to try to fix the force
protection issues at that FOB.
Senator Levin. Let me read you the last line. It says,
``units currently at Abu Ghraib are TACON to the 205th Military
Intelligence Brigade for security of detainees.'' That's what
it says. So they're taking orders, those MPs are taking orders
relative to the security of detainees from the commander of the
205th Military Intelligence Brigade, are they not?
General Alexander. On the 19th----
Senator Levin. And after the 19th.
General Alexander. After November 19, yes, sir.
Senator Levin. So that's who they're getting orders from.
So why is there any doubt in your mind that we ought to go to
the--up that chain of command to find out how it is that these
MPs were performing these actions without the knowledge,
control, of the people in their chain of command, which is the
MI brigade commander. That's the right person to look to, isn't
it?
General Alexander. Yes, sir, if they occurred after the
19th.
Senator Levin. Of course.
General Alexander. If they occurred before, and we have
indications that at least the ICRC report was given to General
Karpinski on the 6th, and those took place in October, so
that's where the difference is.
Senator Levin. After the 19th----
General Alexander. Absolutely.
Senator Levin.--that's where you look.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. To the MI brigade commander before the 19th
otherwise. Got you.
Chairman Warner. You're next, Senator, but let me just
finish up the colloquy that the Senator and I were having here
before you arrived. That FRAGO of the 19th was the subject of a
lot of discussion. It was issued by General Abizaid, is that
correct?
General Alexander. No, General Sanchez.
Chairman Warner. Which he had perfect right to do it. What
concerns me is were you asked to chop on it, because you're
looking at the worldwide picture, you're looking at all of the
combatant commanders. You're looking at SOUTHCOM, which is
running the Guantanamo operation and if this departed from what
you're doing in other commands, it seems to me that's
troublesome.
General Alexander. Sir, it actually was consistent as a
matter of fact with what was done during Panama--or excuse me,
during Haiti.
Chairman Warner. During Haiti?
General Alexander. Yes. In Haiti, the battalion commander
had responsibility over that prison facility and the MPs there.
Now, you asked the question of why did General Sanchez not
chop that through me. But, sir, it would not normally come back
to the Department, because we aren't in that chain per se.
Chairman Warner. I know people are ducking and running from
that chain, but you're the chief of intelligence, you're the
Lieutenant General, you're looking after all your people all
over the world, you train them. It seems to me the combatant
commanders should have an affirmative responsibility to keep
you informed about your sphere of responsibility in the
Department of the Army. The ICRC Report went into details about
allegations of your people performing acts inconsistent with
law and regulation, am I not correct?
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. That should have been brought immediately
to your attention in my judgment, whether it's CENTCOM,
SOUTHCOM, PACOM, or whatever command it is. But it's not the
case, that is not the procedure?
General Alexander. That's correct, sir.
Chairman Warner. Then this committee's going to look into
that, because we cannot have these--I call them symptoms--out
here, which I understand we put them together in Goldwater-
Nickles operating in such a manner that headquarters here in
Washington with individuals of your rank in important positions
having overall examination throughout the whole of the globe
not knowing about it. For example, General Fast. This committee
was asked to expedite her promotion from one star to two stars,
and literally we agreed to have her jump over ahead of others
who were in the normal order of promotion to two stars. I met
her over there on my trip this summer and I was impressed. Now,
she was the J-2 officer for General Abizaid, is that correct?
General Alexander. General Sanchez, sir.
Chairman Warner. I mean General Sanchez, I understand that.
Does she keep you informed as a part of her responsibility of
what's going on in that command?
General Alexander. Sir, clearly we talk a lot, we do.
Chairman Warner. But is there any formality by which she
has an obligation to keep you advised?
General Alexander. No obligation, sir, other than in terms
of resources, outfitting, and training, we clearly have that
responsibility, and for policies where they fall short. So for
fixing the capabilities in Iraq, that is a responsibility that
we have for all our soldiers, and so in that we looked at what
were all the problems, and sir, we came up with 127 different
areas that we needed to fix, some of which fell into that human
intelligence area. That was briefed back by me to both General
Fast and General Sanchez and then that is something that we
here at the headquarters and throughout the Army are working
quickly to fix those, and we fixed about 123 of them.
Chairman Warner. But the training fell down in these
allegations. Your intelligence people were trained according to
your manual presumably, but it collapsed, and it seems to me
that should have been reported back to you ASAP that somehow
all of the indoctrination and training, which presumably these
MI people had, didn't function.
General Alexander. You bring out another good point, sir.
We did the training and doctrine command for the Army, did send
teams over to Iraq on intelligence support to counterterrorism
interrogation training, and that went on from early October
2003 for about a month and a half, along with another set of
courses we talked about earlier called tactical questioning. So
those mobile training teams were both established to go
overseas to hit our divisions and then have hit units here.
Chairman Warner. So you're saying they were training at the
very time that these wrongful acts were taking place?
General Alexander. Throughout Iraq, not necessarily at Abu
Ghraib, but through the units----
Chairman Warner. Throughout Iraq.
General Alexander. Throughout Iraq, yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I want you to recognize
Senator Clinton, because she was before me, but I think you're
on to something. I want to develop it when it comes my turn. I
think Senator Levin is on to something and that needs to be
further developed.
Chairman Warner. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. I thank my friend and colleague. I don't
think that's the right order, but I won't argue about it. Mr.
Chairman, I first want to thank you for your leadership of this
committee. The last 2 days have been extremely challenging, and
in every way you have given tremendous leadership. Of course I
thank our ranking member who's been by your side the whole
time. This is not anything any of us would wish on our Army or
on our Senate or on anyone in any administration, but it comes
to us to try to deal with this and to understand it as best we
can, and I thank each of you for the time you've spent with us
this afternoon.
Chairman Warner. I thank you, Senator. To the extent that
Senator Levin and I have given this particular series of
hearings, leadership has been highly dependent on the total
cooperation of every single member. We've had 100 percent
attendance of our committee for 2 days.
Senator Clinton. Gentlemen, I am still trying to understand
exactly what some of the testimony we've already heard actually
means. When General Sanchez on November 19, 2003, issued what
has been referred to as a FRAGO effectively placing Abu Ghraib
under TACON of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, is that
the only instance in which General Sanchez placed any other
military--any other facility under MI command?
General Alexander. Yes, ma'am, because I think that's the
only place where there is a MI unit of that capability under
him, so that's the only place, there is only one. It is the
205th.
Senator Clinton. So that intel--when you say MI unit,
you're talking about the 205th, right?
General Alexander. MI Brigade, yes, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. MI Brigade. They were solely assigned to
Abu Ghraib?
General Alexander. No, they were not solely assigned. They
were subordinate to General Sanchez as the theater, the core
level brigade that they have for the theater of Iraq. Their
headquarters was about 20 miles south of Abu Ghraib, and he was
the closest senior tactical leader that General Sanchez had to
go in and fix what he saw as severe force protection issues at
Abu Ghraib.
Ma'am, I would have done the same. I think the force
protection issues that he had, the fixing of the facility for
both our soldiers and the detainees were things that he saw
were languishing.
Senator Clinton. General Alexander, may I just clarify that
for my own understanding? When Secretary Cambone testified this
morning, he said that the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade
under Colonel Pappas, as I recall, was given control of the
facility, but not of the MPs. That struck me as a distinction
without any meaning. Was Colonel Pappas put in charge of the
facility under General Sanchez's order?
General Alexander. As I understand it, and this is one that
I said early on we need to take for the record to get General
Sanchez's language on here exact, as I understand it in my
discussions with General Sanchez, is that what Colonel Pappas
was put in charge of was this facility of Abu Ghraib, which had
the prison, it had the living area for the soldiers, it had the
feeding area, it had the perimeter security, it had the MP
detention area, it had an Iraqi criminal area, and it had a
JIDC.
So this whole base, very much like Fort Drum, but smaller,
this base, the garrison commander, and that's the distinguish
that I think Dr. Cambone tried to make, the one responsible for
fixing the garrison of Abu Ghraib was removed from the MP to
the MI battalion commander. I do not believe that it was
General Sanchez's intent to take the security detainee of those
other detainees and say to Colonel Pappas, you also tell the
MPs how to do detainee operations. I believe that was not--and
his comments to me said that, but we need to get his statement
for you on that, because I think he was the commander on the
ground who made that decision.
Senator Clinton. That would be very helpful. Also, as I'm
piecing together the chronology, the order by General Sanchez
apparently flowed from a set of recommendations from General
Miller, is that correct?
General Alexander. No, ma'am, it did not. Although your
chronology is correct in terms of General Miller was there from
August 31 to roughly September 9, there were a series of
incidents of force protection, and I think it's important to
note that Abu Ghraib was totally almost demolished in many
areas before the first of August so that the engineers had to
go in and build it. That part of building it up is some of the
stuff General Miller got to there, the actual compound for
detaining these folks was at what was called Old Camp Cropper,
the Old Camp Cropper area, and then that was moved, those folks
were moved as they opened this up from the mid-August to mid-
September time period up to Abu Ghraib, which became the
theater holding and became the JIDC.
When General Miller went there, the concerns that he had,
as General Burgess has brought out, was intel fusion,
synchronization, the flow of information, and how you work
together as a team to accomplish the mission. Nowhere in my
military experience have I ever seen it where a MI person goes
down and tells an MP that we soften the units up and that's
good behavior. That is totally wrong. We ought to find out if
anyone did say that, hold them accountable.
Now, in October, there was a series of ICRC visits
throughout Iraq and two times they visited Abu Ghraib. It was
those statements that came out in that document that you've
seen that was given to General Karpinski in a draft form for
her to respond on December 24, so that was November 6. So, as
you look at the sequence of events, there was a series of
mortar attacks and persons injured that went on through early
November that I think led General Sanchez to say, I have a
responsibility to protect my forces, you're not moving out fast
enough, Pappas, I want, Colonel Pappas, I want you to move your
unit up there and take charge for that force protection mission
and for getting these initiatives, the quality of living for
those soldiers fixed, and ma'am, you're familiar with that
quality of living because it's the same thing we would say for
our soldiers at Ft. Drum. If we put them in--they didn't have
heat up there--being familiar with in New York State--if you
don't give them heat and they are living in barracks without
heat and the garrison commander went 2 months without having
heat, he'd be out of there and you'd put a new one in charge.
I think that's what General Sanchez did, and I think that
was clearly--I think it is being read into the events that
General Miller said these nefarious things that caused this to
happen. Ma'am, I do not see that, and I do not believe that is
correct.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Clinton, for
those helpful comments. Senator Nelson, you've been patient.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, if I could get Senator
Levin's attention.
Senator Levin. You have it.
Senator Bill Nelson. It seems to me that we have a
revelation here that the two of you as our leaders have
discovered that there was a military intelligence unit after
November 19. When you juxtapose that then upon the testimony
this morning, where there was a difference of opinion between
General Taguba and Secretary Cambone. General Taguba said he
was clearly under the impression that MI had direction over the
MPs there. Secretary Cambone said no, that they didn't.
So with the information that you've gotten here, I think
it's starting to clarify, and the question I would have, and I
wish Secretary Cambone was here, is why does he have a
different impression? Let me ask you this.
Chairman Warner. I think it would be proper if you were to
pose that question to these three witnesses and see what their
views are.
Senator Bill Nelson. Go ahead, gentlemen.
General Alexander?
General Alexander. Sir, I----
Chairman Warner. The MPs, what was their chain of command
up and who had UCMJ authority over them?
Senator Levin. After November 19.
Chairman Warner. After the 19th.
General Alexander. Thank you. I've not studied the FRAGO,
I've not seen it. I know of it, but that would specify in there
who has UCMJ authority.
Chairman Warner. Have we got it here? We're going to send
it right down to you for a good judicial interpretation.
General Alexander. All right, sir.
Senator Levin. You don't have the FRAGO, General?
Senator Bill Nelson. While we're waiting for that, I'll
just ask General Alexander, when did you become aware of the
abuses?
General Alexander. Sir, I heard of the abuses when the
initial reports came out in January that there were abuses
going on. I did not understand at the time that there were MI
personnel in charge because the way it was characterized was of
an MP. So when I look at the abuses, I do not get normally the
abuses of those outside MI.
As soon as we found out that there were MI involved, that's
when they came to us and they said we need somebody, a senior
officer that we could appoint who is senior to these level----
Senator Bill Nelson. When was that?
General Alexander. Sir, that was on November 7 when they
asked me for General Fay.
Senator Bill Nelson. November 7?
General Alexander. No, sir, April 7, I'm sorry, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. April 7.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. When did you see the photographic
evidence?
General Alexander. Sir, on television.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. When did you read the
Taguba report?
General Alexander. Sir, last week.
Senator Bill Nelson. What was the Army's plan for dealing
with the strategic and operational consequences of the release
of this evidence of prisoner abuse?
General Alexander. Sir, I'm not sure I understand your
question.
Senator Bill Nelson. If there was, it has been testified in
front of this committee last Friday by the SECDEF, that he knew
of abuses as far back as the middle of January, we've had other
testimony to that effect. Now, what I want to know is, what was
the Army's plan, knowing of abuses, that--what was your plan
for dealing with the consequences of those abuses?
General Alexander. Sir, there was a series of
investigations, and when those came out, those series of
problems--one of the things that the acting Secretary of the
Army took upon him was, we have to look throughout the Army to
see how our detainees are being operated, and he gave the--and
I'll read you exactly, sir, here--he gave, for starting on
February 11, the Department of the Army Inspector General, the
mission to conduct a functional analysis of the Army's
internment, enemy POW detention, interrogation policies,
practices and procedures based on current DOD and Army policies
and doctrine.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, I don't understand, I don't
understand all that language.
General Alexander. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. The Army had to have a plan once they
found out about abuses that if those abuses became public,
there were going to be consequences in Iraq that were going to
be inimical to our goal in Iraq, which is to stabilize Iraq.
So my question is, what were, are, the Army's plans for
dealing with the consequences of abuses such as this being made
public?
General Alexander. Sir, the Army has not developed a plan
as you say on going against--we are looking at all the things
that we ought to do that as an Army in terms of what measures
can we take with our allies, what are the things that we have
to show as we are here today, what other venues should we do,
what are the actions, is examples that folks like General
Abizaid and others take in the leadership to show the Iraqi
people that we are sorry and that we apologize for these, how
do we police up our own ranks to ensure this will never happen.
All of that are things that the Army leadership and, I
think it's important, the CJTF and the CENTCOM leadership are
concurrently doing, because it's a combined----
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, let me just wrap up here and
then we can go back into this matter that you were talking
about, Mr. Chairman. So you know of no plan, I call it a plan,
but brainstorming session, if for that reason, of first finding
out about these abuses and then saying, what in the world is
this going to do to us out there in the Muslim world,
specifically in Iraq, that is going to hinder the ultimate
objective that we have, which is to stabilize Iraq? You know of
no discussions or plan?
General Alexander. No, absolutely, sir, in terms of
brainstorming. At all levels we are brainstorming, we are
looking at what are the things that we ought to do, what are--
and I've been asked this, sir, last week by--in another
committee, what could Congress do.
Senator Bill Nelson. Did anybody specifically discuss the
kind of physical and torture violence and perhaps even
beheading that would occur as a result of these abuses?
General Alexander. No, sir. Nobody could come out and say,
we think a civilian is going to be beheaded. I think we all are
concerned that these events will increase the number of
incidents, attacks against our soldiers and civilians
throughout the region. We are clearly concerned about that, and
that's one of the things that we as an Army, we as a military,
and we as a Nation need to get out front, because those
terrorist organizations that oppose us are going to use this as
a rallying flag to go against that.
We all understand. We are all working on that, sir. From
both the Joint Staff side, our side, we've had a working group
amongst us with the Joint Staff to talk about, what are the
things that we could or should do. So those are going on, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I would just submit for
our future discussion, and obviously General Alexander is not
responsible here. But the question is that were we prepared
about Muslim sensitivities in trying during an occupation to
prepare that country for something they've never experienced in
recent history called democracy, and so that had we been better
prepared, that we would have immediately jumped on prison
abuses and found out more about what they were.
Why don't you pursue the line on the difference on MI and
MP?
Chairman Warner. Yes, I will do that, but I think this
hearing has really raised a lot of very important questions
which the committee has to work to resolve, and I'm told by my
staff that I may have inadvertently used the word ducking and
bobbing, but that did not refer to this panel before us today,
because I think you have been direct in your responses and
pointed out, it's almost like a bowling alley. Everybody's been
in his lane doing his job but somehow we need more cross action
between these individuals.
So we come back to this order, FRAGO, and we now have the
distinguished JAG interpreting. Judge?
General Romig. Yes, sir. The FRAGO, it would appear that
since they are under TACON of the 205th, I'm talking about the
800th people, the MPs, that they have, the 205th has control
for missions and tasking and things like that, but UCMJ remains
with the 800th MP brigade.
Chairman Warner. Remains with that. But now TACON then did
go to the MI side?
General Romig. It did.
Chairman Warner. It did.
General Romig. That's for control of movements and detailed
direction of the operation of, it appears the facility.
Chairman Warner. Then----
Senator Bill Nelson. Including the interpretation, I mean,
the interrogation, if I might?
Chairman Warner. That's my understanding, and that Taguba
report, he took that position this morning.
General Romig. Sir, absent anything else, that's what it
would appear to be.
Chairman Warner. That's the way it reads to you. General
Alexander, do you want to take a look at it?
General Alexander. No, sir, I've looked at it, and that's
why I said, I know that this is a key issue----
Chairman Warner. But why don't you take a few moments and
look at it?
General Alexander. Sir, I've read it.
Chairman Warner. Oh, you've read it.
General Alexander. I have read it. It's my book that I
passed over to him, and the key issue though is, what did
General Sanchez convey to the two commanders and what did he
expect of them, and my understanding from him is what we need
to clarify to you, and that's one of the things that, as I
started out, I said we'll take that for the record so that we
get it to you exactly correct, go through the Joint Staff to
CENTCOM so that you know that we've done that, because I think
that is one of the key issues of when he said that, who was
expected to have responsibility for the MP part of security
detainee operations?
It was pointed out, I think by General Taguba, if I'm not
mistaken, that in fact General Karpinski thought that she still
had that and it was 2 days after her initial investigation that
she said, well, this order came out. So there is clearly
disagreement, so this is one of the issues that has to be
ironed out, and we owe that back to you accurately from----
Chairman Warner. What does the plain English say?
General Alexander. Just as General Romig read it, sir.
TACON.
Chairman Warner. The plain English language according to
your interpretation is that TACON went from the MP commander to
the MI commander.
General Alexander. Yes, sir. It says under the first
paragraph, effective immediately, the 205th Military
Intelligence brigade commander assumes responsibility for the
Baghdad central confinement facility and is appointed the FOB
commander. Units directly at Abu Ghraib are under the TACON for
security of detainees and FOB protection. Now----
Chairman Warner. Embraced in there is the responsibility
for the interrogation procedures?
General Alexander. I think all of that is what needs to be
laid out by General Sanchez so that we answer it exactly
correct. But as I understand it, the 205th Military
Intelligence Brigade remained responsible for the interrogation
and the overall security of the facility itself, protecting all
the persons there, both the detainees and the soldiers. That's
what I think General Sanchez intended. I know how it reads, and
we have to clarify that point.
Chairman Warner. I come back again. So you feel that you
need to do further research to determine whether or not this
FRAGO in fact reposed in the MI the responsibility for the
conduct of the interrogations?
General Alexander. Sir, they always had----
Chairman Warner. They always had that?
General Alexander. They always had the conduct of the
interrogations. I think the question, the key point, is did the
MI brigade commander tell the MPs out in the general detention
facility how to do their job? That was the key point.
Chairman Warner. Which is a--to use a phrase--a preparatory
step for the MI to come in, so in a sense----
General Alexander. That's correct.
Chairman Warner.--they were telling--I'm not suggesting
what they did because we don't know, we're waiting for the
reports. But someone is likely to have told the MPs, here are
certain steps you can take, and I use the word soften up these
prisoners, so when we come to the cell block, they're mentally
and physically in such a condition that our interrogation can
be more fruitful. Is that about right?
General Alexander. That's how it's reported, sir, but it is
my understanding--and that's why the November 19 and when these
acts took place is such a key time, because if the ICRC report
is correct, as we believe it is, then it took place in October,
or at least some of them.
Chairman Warner. What took place?
General Alexander. Some of these allegations by the ICRC of
detainee abuse took place in October.
Chairman Warner. Correct.
General Alexander. Before the MI brigade was in charge.
Chairman Warner. Correct. But they continued after the
FRAGO is my understanding.
General Alexander. Sir, that's what has to be clarified,
because I don't know that we accurately know when they started,
when they stopped, and what happened. Those dates, I don't have
the dates of all the pictures. But I understand that they were
late October, they were from early October, late October, early
November, but I don't know how far that went on.
Chairman Warner. To the extent that I have any knowledge,
it's because of testimony perhaps the day before yesterday that
this didn't stop until this very courageous enlisted man took
the disk with photos on it and gave it to his superior, and at
that point in time, then everybody turned to and realized we
have a problem and it stopped. Has that scenario been related
to any of you gentlemen?
General Alexander. Not in those words, no, sir.
Chairman Warner. Anything approximating?
General Alexander. As I understand it, that at least we
know it was going on through the October-November time period,
so the detainee abuse cases or events, clearly October,
November, and now the question is when did they stop. I think
the key point of this November 19, so they're going on before
the MI brigade takes command, did they change it and make it
retroactive? No, they couldn't. So that could not have
happened. We all agree on that.
So my concern is that we are trying to say that when we put
the MI brigade commander in charge, what we did was already
make the conditions to soften them up. Sir, look at what was
going on in October and early November. It is clear that they
had already had these infractions, and I don't know how long
that went on. But clearly we have to find that out.
Chairman Warner. I would go back, again we're trying to
surmise in the October time frame, prior to the November 19
FRAGO, these actions of abuse were going on, but they were
going on in the context of interrogations being conducted by MI
people. Am I not correct in that?
General Alexander. Those are the statements, and in each
statement----
Chairman Warner. There were MI people assigned to do those
duties at that prison.
General Alexander. Yes, sir. That's exactly right.
Chairman Warner. Presumably they were trying to elicit
intelligence from the prisoners.
General Alexander. Those are named in General Taguba's
report. There are three soldiers and two contractors named in
his report. But as you state, there are indications that there
are more and there are indications in places that say MI
officers, and so what General Taguba recommended was that a
Procedure 15 look into that because he did not have the
specific data to say it was that person who did it.
What they got was, they told me to do it, and that's where
we really need to make sure we get the facts, wherever they may
lead, sir, and bring them out and hold those who did wrong
accountable.
Chairman Warner. Good. Let me read you from the Taguba
report, it's page 45, that Colonel Thomas Pappas, Commander of
the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade be given a general
officer memorandum of reprimand and investigated UP Procedure
15 AR activities for the following acts, which have been
previously referred to in the aforementioned findings. So he
was punished for the following: failure to ensure that soldiers
under his direct command were properly trained in and followed
the interrogation ROE. So he failed to ascertain that all of
his soldiers had the proper training to adhere to the
interrogation ROE, is that correct?
General Alexander. That's correct, sir.
Chairman Warner. That implies to me that MI people were not
performing their duties, perhaps because they'd never been
trained. Do you infer that from that language?
General Alexander. Well, sir----
Chairman Warner. Or improperly trained.
General Alexander. I think, and as he listed out, and he
lists out the four people, he, Colonel Jordan, and two others,
who acted improperly, and any soldier, it says here, any
soldier who does not report that is not following the
interrogation ROE. We know that there were soldiers who were in
some of those photographs who observed it and didn't report it.
Chairman Warner. But if they--what this says, as I read it,
ensure that soldiers in his command were properly trained, he
didn't ensure that, so that training would have come under your
jurisdiction, wouldn't it, for those soldiers?
General Alexander. Sir, all the training for our soldiers
under the interrogation ROE for the unit there would fall under
the joint command that he's operating under. The doctrinal
training that we have falls under the Army, and that's what we
give them at Fort Huachuca. We also provide a mobile training
team to bring them up.
Chairman Warner. Okay. Much work has to be done, and I
thank you all three of you--I have one or two questions left--
for your cooperation and your direct response today, and I
assure you that I have the highest respect for each of you and
what you've tried to do.
But let me press on into this area. This goes to General
Burgess. According to the CJTF-7 policies on interrogation ROE,
there are certain interrogation techniques whose employment
would require the explicit approval of the commanding general.
The attachment to the Taguba Report included at least one
memorandum requesting such approval from the commanding
general, General Sanchez.
How frequently were requests made for approval to employ
interrogation techniques requiring explicit approval?
General Burgess. Sir, based on the knowledge that I have,
there were no requests to General Sanchez.
Chairman Warner. Therefore, the next question you've
answered, how often were such requests approved by Sanchez?
There were none.
Now, accountability. That's a subject that's very much on
the minds of us here in Congress. I'll ask this to the JAG.
Court-martial action against certain individuals has been,
that's past tense, recommended, but only administrative action
against leaders in the chain of command such as Brigadier
General Karpinski and Colonel Pappas, Lieutenant Colonel
Jordan, Lieutenant Colonel Phillabaum, and others. The apparent
failures of leadership of these individuals as documented in
the Taguba Report could suggest more stringent responses than
``a memorandum of reprimand'' essentially letters of
admonishment.
In your view, are the disciplinary actions recommended for
members of the chain of command appropriate for the offenses in
this situation?
General Romig. Mr. Chairman, first I would point out that
it was the commander on the scene who assessed the evidence
before them in the context of what was going on there and made
those decisions. It's certainly within the realm of the
reasonable and that's why in our system you have the ability of
a commander to choose a couple different options or more.
I would say that some of these, you mentioned Colonel
Pappas, that is still pending the Procedure 15, and there may
be some other things that could come out of this as the cases
move forward and more investigation is done. So I'm not sure
it's over as it stands right now.
Chairman Warner. That's the next question. Do the
administrative and non-judicial actions taken to date preclude
reexamination of any of these cases and potential judicial
action under the UCMJ?
General Romig. No, sir.
Chairman Warner. So that avenue is still open?
General Romig. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Gentlemen, I think we had a marathon,
close to 7 hours of hearing, but we thank you very much first
for your distinguished careers of service, for your continuing
effort to assist the SECDEF and the Acting Secretary of the
Army and all others to get to the bottom of it, including the
United States Senate and the Congress of the United States. So
thank you very much.
I will be in consultation with the ranking member, Mr.
Levin, with regard to future hearings of this committee. It's
apparent to me that we need to do a good deal more work and
there are a lot more witnesses to work with. But we're faced
with the fact that our bill is on the floor beginning Monday,
and it's at the moment not clear to me that we can next week
continue with a hearing in view of the heavy commitment of all
members of this committee to floor action. Then following
that's a recess period, so we could be 2 weeks away, although
I'll examine Thursday of this week with the staff and Senator
Levin and see whether or not the availability of some of the
witnesses we have in mind can be arranged for that hearing.
So for the moment, subject to further announcement, we'll
let you know of our schedule. But thank you again for today.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
gitmo-izing abu ghraib
1. Senator McCain. General Alexander, General Burgess, and General
Romig, it has been reported that General Miller wanted to GITMO-ize the
confinement operations at Abu Ghraib prison because of your concern in
that facility that military intelligence was not getting the
information from detainees like he thought they should be. What did he
mean by GITMO-izing Abu Ghraib prison?
General Alexander. I am unaware of any such statement being made by
Major General Miller.
General Burgess. I am unaware of any such statement being made by
Major General Miller. During General Miller's testimony in the Senate
hearing on Iraq prison abuse on 19 May 2004, Senator Daniel Akaka (D)
Hawaii asked him: ``Did you tell General Karpinski that you were going
to GITMO-ize Abu Ghraib? My question is, what did you mean by this
statement?
General Miller responded: ``Senator, I did not tell General
Karpinski I would GITMO-ize Abu Ghraib. I don't believe I've ever used
that term. Ever.''
General Romig. I am unaware of any such statement being made by
Major General Miller.
general officer approval of interrogation tactics
2. Senator McCain. General Alexander, General Burgess, and General
Romig, General Miller announced that certain practices would be
discontinued, including hooding, stress positioning, and sleep
deprivation, but that they would be permitted with approval by a
general officer. Under what authority can a general officer permit
these techniques?
General Alexander. Concur with Major General Romig and Major
General Burgess.
General Burgess. A general officer can only approve techniques that
are approved by doctrine and in accordance with applicable
international law. In addition, the Secretary of Defense may further
limit authority by requiring that he receive specific notification and/
or provide approval of certain lawful techniques.
General Romig. If a practice or technique is lawful, a commander
may restrict the use of that practice or technique in many ways,
including that a general officer approve its use. To the extent that
any practice involving detainees violates U.S. or international law, no
general officer would have authority to permit the practice or
technique.
cause of death of former head of iraq's air force
3. Senator McCain. General Alexander, General Burgess, and General
Romig, the Denver Post reports an allegation that the former head of
the Iraqi Air Force died during interrogation when he was rolled up
inside a sleeping bag so only his feet stuck out, and then sat on and
rolled back and forth until he died of suffocation. Apparently the
investigation concluded that this was a death from ``natural causes.''
What can you tell me about this?
General Alexander. I have been informed that the case is presently
being investigated by the Army's Criminal Investigation Command as a
suspected homicide.
General Burgess. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID)
initiated an investigation immediately after the death of Major General
Mowhosh, the former Iraqi Air Defense Minister, on November 26, 2003. A
preliminary investigation determined that General Mowhosh died during
interrogation by two U.S. Army interrogators. The CID investigation is
ongoing and being treated as a suspected homicide.
General Romig. I have been informed that the case is presently
being investigated by the Army's CID as a suspected homicide.
prison guards
4. Senator McCain. General Alexander, General Burgess, and General
Romig, is it now, or has it been, administration policy that prison
guards should ``facilitate'' detainee interrogations? If so, how were
they instructed to do this?
General Alexander. I don't know of any administration policy that
prison guards should facilitate detainee interrogations. However, it is
clear that in screening prisoners and understanding the state-of-mind
of detainees to be interrogated, MI and MP should work together.
Specifically, FM 34-52 says on page 3-9, ``Interrogators should
question guards about the sources, time permitting, as part of
preparation. Since the guards are in constant contact with the sources,
they may be able to provide information on:
Their physical condition.
Demonstrated attitude and behavior.
Contact made with other guards or sources.
How the source has been handled since capture.
Hearsay (H/S) information from others who have handled
the source.
Confirmation of capture data, especially the
circumstances under which the sources was captured.''
General Burgess. I am not aware of any policy that prison guards
should facilitate detainee interrogations.
General Romig. I don't know of any administration policy that
prison guards should facilitate detainee interrogations. I am aware
that this issue was reviewed by both Major General Miller, Commander of
JTF-GITMO, and Major General Ryder, Army Provost Marshal General, last
fall, and more recently by Major General Taguba, CFLCC Deputy
Commanding General, in his investigation of the 800th Military Police
Brigade. Neither Army doctrine on detention operations (Army Regulation
190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees
and Other Detainees) nor the Army's Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence
Interrogation, addresses the issue other than to specifically prohibit
physical or moral coercion and inhumane treatment to compel
information. In my opinion, we need to revise our doctrine to better
define the relationship between interrogators and those responsible for
operating detention facilities.
permissive climate of prisoner abuse
5. Senator McCain. General Alexander, General Burgess, and General
Romig, in Secretary Rumsfeld's May 7, 2004 testimony, he testified that
the Abu Ghraib prison personnel followed the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions and that the Geneva Conventions were posted for all prison
personnel to see. General Taguba has stated that neither the camp rules
nor the provisions of the Geneva Conventions were posted in English or
in the language of the detainees at any of the detention facilities in
the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade's area of responsibility. Would
this supervisory error not contribute to a permissive climate of
prisoner abuse?
General Alexander. Posting of camp rules and the applicable Geneva
Conventions is required by the conventions and service regulations.
However, the absence of these postings cannot be directly related to a
permissive climate of prisoner abuse.
General Burgess. At this time ongoing investigations will determine
where and how the camp rules and Geneva Conventions provisions were
posted in the 800th MP Brigade's area during the time the alleged
offenses took place.
General Romig. Posting of camp rules and the applicable Geneva
Conventions is required by the conventions and service regulations.
Failure to adhere to this requirement could be one of a number of
indicators that regulations were not strictly followed. Without more
facts, however, I cannot conclude that a failure to post the documents
would necessarily contribute to a permissive climate of prisoner abuse.
prosecution of civilian operators in abu ghraib
6. Senator McCain. General Alexander, General Burgess, and General
Romig, interrogation specialists from private defense contractors were
operating inside Abu Ghraib and may have taken part in these
atrocities. Given the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) has been
amended by the Military and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 1999,
do you intend to prosecute the contractors who allegedly abused
prisoners and committed other atrocities under the UCMJ?
General Alexander. Concur with Major General Romig.
General Burgess. As standard practice, military commanders order
investigations when personnel under their command are suspected of
committing UCMJ offenses, including atrocities of this nature. The
Department of Justice has the authority to prosecute contractor
employees of the Department of Defense under the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). Contractors are only subject
to the UCMJ during a declared state of war. I would respectfully defer
all legal opinions to General Romig.
General Romig. The MEJA of 2000 is a separate and distinct Federal
criminal statute. It does not amend the UCMJ, nor does it enforce the
punitive articles of the UCMJ. Under MEJA, the decision to prosecute is
made by the Department of Justice (DOJ). It is my understanding that
DOJ is currently reviewing the conduct of certain private defense
contractors in Iraq.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
chain of command at abu ghraib
7. Senator Levin. General Alexander, we have heard that Abu Ghraib
Prison was placed under the command of the 205th Military Intelligence
Brigade commander on November 19, 2003. According to General Taguba,
this effectively made an MI Officer, rather than a Military Police (MP)
Officer, responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at
that facility, which is not doctrinally sound due to the different
missions and agendas assigned to each of these respective specialties.
Who made the decision to put the MI commander in charge of the Abu
Ghraib facility and why?
General Alexander. According to Lieutenant General Sanchez's
testimony before Congress, he put the 205th as TACON authority on
November 19 to enhance the force protection posture of Abu Ghraib,
i.e., to act as the garrison commander of FOB Abu Ghraib, not to assume
the responsibilities for detention operations
8. Senator Levin. General Alexander, does the Department agree with
General Taguba's conclusion that this decision was ``not doctrinally
sound''?
General Alexander. It normally would not be ``doctrinally sound''
to place a Military Intelligence (MI) commander in charge of the
Military Police in order to run a prison as MI personnel are not
trained in the running of a prison; however, as stated before,
Lieutenant General Sanchez testified it was never his intent for MI to
run the prison, but to assume responsibility for the force protection
of the base.
9. Senator Levin. General Alexander, General Taguba specifically
recommended that General Karpinski, brigade commander, be relieved from
command and issued a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand. General
Karpinski was issued a General Officer Memorandum of Admonishment on
January 17, 2003 but as of early March was still in command of the
800th Military Police Brigade. On what basis was General Karpinski
issued a General Officer Memorandum of Admonishment on January 17?
General Alexander. General Karpinksi was issued a General Officer
Memorandum of Admonishment on January 17 by Lieutenant General Sanchez
because incidents that had occurred ``reflect a lack of clear
standards, proficiency and leadership within the brigade.''
10. Senator Levin. General Alexander, why was General Karpinski not
relieved of command at that time?
General Alexander. As this is a command decision, refer to CJTF-7,
Lieutenant General Sanchez.
11. Senator Levin. General Alexander, it has been reported that
General Miller's review team recommended that military police set the
conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of
internees/detainees and that the guard force be actively engaged in
setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees.
General Taguba has stated that these recommendations would appear to be
in conflict with the recommendations of General Ryder's Team and AR
190-8 that military police do not participate in military intelligence
supervised interrogation sessions. Do you agree with General Taguba's
conclusion that military police should not be asked to ``set the
conditions'' for interrogations?
General Alexander. Military Police are part of the interrogation
mission. Their role is not only to secure the detainees as well as
escort them to and from interrogation booths but also to provide
passive intelligence to interrogators. Per Field Manual 34-52,
``interrogators should question guards about the sources, time
permitting, as part of preparation. Since the guards are in constant
contact with the sources, they may be able to provide information on:
their physical condition; demonstrated attitude and behavior; contact
made with other guards or sources. . .'' MPs are in a unique position
to provide information on detainees because of their daily interaction
with them. Army G2 believes Military Police should not play an active
role during actual interrogations, meaning except for security
presence, they should not interact with detainees during interrogations
nor conduct their own ``interrogations'' of detainees. Military
doctrine and policy has to be updated to reflect the roles and
responsibilities of both MPs and MI for future detention operations.
12. Senator Levin. General Alexander, doesn't the subsequent
decision to appoint General Miller to take over Abu Ghraib prison
appear to ratify his recommendation for using military police to
support interrogations? Doesn't this send the wrong message after the
abuses at Abu Ghraib?
General Alexander. See answer to question #11.
13. Senator Levin. General Alexander, who made the decision to
appoint General Miller?
General Alexander. Refer to CJTF-7, Lieutenant General Sanchez, for
answer.
role of the judge advocate generals
14. Senator Levin. General Romig, the Army Judge Advocate General
(JAG) Corps has consistently served as one of our strongest lines of
defense against unlawful or indefensible conduct by members of the
military. That line of defense appears to have broken down at Abu
Ghraib prison. To your knowledge, was there a JAG assigned to Abu
Ghraib prison--with either the military police battalion or the
military intelligence brigade responsible for the prison? If so, was
the JAG consulted on the detention and interrogation techniques used by
military police and military intelligence at the prison?
General Romig. The 800th Military Police Brigade had a Lieutenant
Colonel Staff Judge Advocate with an organic legal element that
provided area coverage to the Abu Ghraib detention facility. The 205th
Military Intelligence Brigade had two Brigade Judge Advocates, one of
whom was assigned to the Abu Ghraib detention facility with his brigade
in late November. A magistrate's cell, typically consisting of three
Judge Advocates, was placed at Abu Ghraib in late September 2003 in
order to conduct legal reviews of detention. The 205th Military
Intelligence Brigade Judge Advocate was consulted on interrogation
approaches as necessary. Additional legal support was provided by the
CJTF-7 SJA section.
15. Senator Levin. General Romig, did the JAG review interrogation
plans on a case-by-case basis to ensure their compliance with Army
regulations and the Geneva Conventions?
General Romig. The Brigade Judge Advocate would review
interrogation plans and observe interrogations on a periodic basis. He
did not review all plans or attend all interrogations. The Judge
Advocate reviewed all requests for exception to CJTF-7s 12 October 2003
Interrogation Policy. The CJTF-7 Staff Judge Advocate reviewed requests
for exception that were submitted to the CJTF-7 Commander.
16. Senator Levin. General Romig, who has responsibility for
ensuring that the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) in Iraq,
provided to this committee at today's hearing, are properly applied and
adhere to the Geneva Accords?
General Romig. This is a command responsibility. Under Army
doctrine as reflected in FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, the
command's J2, G2, or S2 has primary staff responsibility to ensure
interrogation activities are performed in accordance with the Geneva
Conventions and U.S. policies. The manual further states that if there
is any doubt as to the legality of a proposed form of interrogation,
the advice of the Command Judge Advocate should be sought before using
the method in question. The IROE document provided to the committee was
locally-produced by the officer in charge of interrogations at the Abu
Ghraib Prison and informally reviewed by the 205th Military
Intelligence Brigade Judge Advocate along with members of the Office of
the Staff Judge Advocate, CJTF-7. [I would also like to point out that
the term ``IROE'' is an improper use of the concept of ROE. In military
operations, the term ``rules of engagement (ROE)'' refers to
limitations on the use of force.]
17. Senator Levin. General Romig, what role does your office play
in vetting and approving rules for the conduct of interrogations?
General Romig. We provide legal advice to the Army Chief of Staff
and the Army Staff on a wide range of matters, including the DOD Law of
War Program and the DOD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War and Other
Detainees. This includes reviewing Army interrogation doctrine for
legal sufficiency. In the case of interrogations at Guantanamo, we
participated in a review of interrogation procedures as part of a DOD
Working Group (please see my answer to question 28). In Iraq, my office
does not have a direct role in vetting and approving rules for the
conduct of interrogations. The collection of intelligence is tasked to
components assigned to the Subordinate Joint Force Command (CJTF-7) in
accordance with collection plans prepared by the Command's J2. The
chain of command runs from CJTF-7 through the Combatant Command
(USCENTCOM) to the Joint Staff. Legal officers are assigned to each of
these headquarters. Although my office is not technically in the chain
of command, we are a ``reach-back'' source from which judge advocates
in the field can request advice or opinions regarding any legal issue
affecting current operations. I am not aware of this happening for this
particular issue.
18. Senator Levin. General Romig, did your office review these
IROEs?
General Romig. No.
accountability of civilian contractors
19. Senator Levin. General Romig, there is evidence that civilian
contractors may have been involved in some of the potentially criminal
actions documented in the Taguba Report. It has been reported that a
contractor serving as an interrogator at Abu Ghraib allowed and/or
instructed MPs, who were not trained in interrogation techniques, to
facilitate interrogations by ``setting conditions'' which were neither
authorized and in accordance with applicable regulations/policy and he
clearly knew his instructions equated to physical abuse. If you
conclude that civilian contractors overseas have committed criminal
acts, what systems are in place to hold them accountable and is there a
court with jurisdiction to try them for criminal conduct?
General Romig. U.S. contractors accompanying a force are not
subject to the UCMJ except in time of a congressionally declared war.
However, they are still subject to U.S. Federal jurisdiction under the
War Crimes Act (which provides for jurisdiction over any U.S. national
who commits a ``war crime''), 18 USC Sec. Sec. 2340-2340A (implementing
the Torture Convention), and potentially to the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act.
20. Senator Levin. General Romig, has anybody in the Department
reviewed the use of civilian contractors as interrogators to determine
whether this is an appropriate use of contractors or is an inherently
governmental function?
General Romig. I believe the Army is reviewing the issue.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
process in formulation of detention and interrogation rules of
engagement
21. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, I provided you with two media
reports (the UPI article by Arnaud de Borchgrave and the Salon.com
article by Joe Conason, both dated May 11, 2004). Were you previously
aware that senior Judge Advocate General (JAG) officers went outside
the Department to the New York City Bar Association to raise their
concerns on the formulation of military interrogation and detention
rules?
General Romig. No.
22. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, the JAG officers reportedly
said that civilian appointees, and particularly Mr. Feith and Mr.
Haynes, have ignored or bypassed the military lawyers with respect to
the formulation, drafting, vetting, and implementation of interrogation
rules of engagement and other legal issues related to the subjects of
our hearings. Please describe the process for establishing policies on
interrogation rules of engagement and detention and the role of JAG
officers in the process.
General Romig. Army doctrine and policies for intelligence
interrogation are contained in Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence
Interrogation. The most current version is dated 28 September 1992. The
FM implements general principles contained in Field Manual 34-1,
Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, and several
standardization agreements (STANAGs) that the U.S. has entered into
with our NATO allies (i.e., STANAG 2033, Interrogation of Prisoners of
War; STANAG 2044, Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War; and
STANAG 2084, Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and
Documents). The principles and techniques of interrogation set out in
the FM specifically incorporate the constraints established by the UCMJ
and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The FM recognizes that intelligence
interrogation execution will vary depending on unit mission, task
organization, and collection priorities. The current manual was
reviewed for legal sufficiency and comment by Judge Advocates assigned
to U.S. Army Intelligence Center (the agency proponent) and in the
Office of The Judge Advocate General (OTJAG). All changes recommended
by OTJAG were incorporated in the final FM. Regarding the role of Judge
Advocates assigned to commands in the field, please see my answer to
questions 16 and 17.
23. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, have the processes changed
since September 11, 2001? If so, please describe the previous process,
highlighting the differences between then and now.
General Romig. Please see my answer to question 28.
24. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, since the assumption by Mr.
Feith and Mr. Haynes of their current positions, what has been their
role in the matters and processes described in the previous question?
General Romig. Aside from the formulation of a working group noted
in question 28, I am not aware of any role Mr. Haynes may have played
in the processes described in the previous question. With regard to Mr.
Feith, on January 17, 2002, he issued a memorandum, subject:
Responsibility for detainees in association with the global war on
terrorism, in which he advised that the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict) would assume
responsibility for ``overall development, coordination, approval, and
promulgation of major DOD policies and plans related to persons
detainees in association with the global war on terrorism. This
include[d] development, coordination, approval, and promulgation of
major DOD policies, and new courses of action with DOD components and
other Federal agencies as necessary.'' This memorandum also advised
that DOD Directive 2310.1 would be adjusted to reflect this decision. I
have no knowledge of what other role, if any, Mr. Feith has had in
these matters.
25. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, after assuming their positions,
did either Mr. Feith or Mr. Haynes alter the role of civilian
appointees in the process? If so, was this done by formal order, by
oral directions, or some other means? Please provide any documentation
that would indicate when this change was made and the substance of
those changes.
General Romig. Please see my answer to question 24.
26. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, if the decisions on IROE and
other legal issues were not made and implemented through the regular
pre-existing assignments, channels, and command chain, including JAG,
how were they made and communicated to the action commands and
officers? Please provide details on the rules and other orders most
relevant to these hearings and list the others affected.
General Romig. Please see my answer to question 16. I am not aware
of any other decisions involving legal matters that were made outside
regular pre-existing assignments, channels, and command chain.
27. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, if such decisions were
communicated by Mr. Feith and/or Mr. Haynes horizontally or upwards to
other civilian officials, and then downward to military officials,
please describe those channels in as much detail as you can, providing
documentation where available.
General Romig. I have no personal information on how Mr. Feith or
Mr. Haynes communicates decisions aside from established channels and
modes, such as information papers, directives, instructions, and policy
guidance.
mr. haynes' ``working group''
28. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, are you familiar with the
``working group'' under the direction or other leadership of Mr.
Haynes, described to us by another witness, in connection with the
matters under review by the committee? Please describe the membership
and functions of that working group. If you or any member of your
office were a member, please provide all documentation with respect to
that group. If no one in your office was a member, please explain why,
when, and how that occurred.
General Romig. In early January 2003, a working group of various
attorneys and operators was formed within the Department of Defense
regarding detainee interrogation. The group was generally directed to
review interrogation procedures at Guantanamo, and make recommendations
regarding appropriate techniques and approaches. The specific function,
membership, reports, and comments of the working group are contained in
classified documents maintained by the Department of Defense. The group
was headed up by Mary Walker, Air Force General Counsel, who reported
the findings of the group to Mr. Haynes. Members of my staff served on
the working group. In March, I submitted a memorandum to Ms. Walker
expressing a number of reservations and concerns with the final draft
of the working group report. In addition, we briefed the Army Chief of
Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, of our concerns in preparation
for Joint Staff meetings on this issue.
news articles and the taguba report
29. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, do you believe that the
concerns reportedly raised by JAG officers in the above mentioned
articles may have been a contributing cause of any of the gaps, faults,
and misbehavior described in the Taguba Report? Please explain in
detail.
General Romig. Please see my answer to question 30.
interrogation safeguards and jag's involvement
30. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, the civilian officials
reportedly removed safeguards designed to prevent the abuse of
prisoners. One of those safeguards was the routine observation from
behind a two-way mirror by a JAG officer who was empowered to stop any
misconduct. The instructions originated by these officials also
reportedly granted private contractors unprecedented participation in
the interrogation process--precisely because such civilian contractors
are not covered by the UCMJ and therefore are ``free to do whatever
they want to do.'' An April 26, 2002, report in the Wall Street Journal
stated that the JAG Corps ``keeps a lawyer on hand during
interrogations, for quick decisions on the degree of physical or mental
pressure allowed.'' Was this military policy? If so, under what
circumstances? Is this no longer policy? If so, when was this change in
policy made, who made it, how was it transmitted to the field, and did
the JAG Corps have any role in making this policy change?
General Romig. I believe the individuals who reported that
officials removed safeguards designed to prevent abuse of prisoners,
specifically that these officials prevented judge advocates from being
present during all interrogations, are incorrect in their understanding
of the facts. To the best of my knowledge, judge advocates have never
routinely observed all intelligence interrogations. During Operations
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, judge advocates at the division, corps, and
theater level were available to advise commanders on a wide-range of
operational law issues, including the application of the law of war and
the UCMJ as to interrogations and treatment of detainees. Judge
advocates were neither required to nor precluded from observing
interrogations. As a practical matter, it would have been physically
impossible for judge advocates to routinely observe all of the large
number of interrogations that occurred during those operations. After
discussing the issue with command legal advisors, it is my
understanding that the current practices at Guantanamo and in Iraq are
the same: judge advocates are neither required to nor precluded from
observing interrogations.
31. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, have JAG lawyers been present
during all interrogations conducted by military or intelligence
personnel in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay? If not, do you
believe that the absence of JAG lawyers may have contributed to any of
the reported abuses in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay?
General Romig. Please see my answer to question 30.
32. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, according to the Taguba Report,
a new policy authorizing the use of ``stress and duress'' practices was
initiated by the Pentagon in late 2002 or early 2003. Are you aware of
this change in policy? Who made it and when, how was it transmitted to
the field, and did the JAG Corps have a role in making this policy
change?
General Romig. I am not aware of any change of policy other than
noted in my answer to question 28.
33. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, do you believe that this change
in policy contributed to any of the reported abuses in Iraq or
Afghanistan?
General Romig. Please see my answer to question 32.
34. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, was the JAG Corps involved in
the decision to give private contractors much broader authority to
interrogate military detainees?
General Romig. My office was not involved in the decision to employ
private contractor interrogators or how much authority private
contractors should have when interrogating military detainees.
35. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, who made this decision and when
and how was it transmitted to the field?
General Romig. I don't know.
36. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, in making this policy change,
did policymakers discuss the lack of accountability under the UCMJ for
civilian contractors?
General Romig. I don't know.
37. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, was there any discussion of the
limits of jurisdiction for prosecuting military contractors?
General Romig. There has been considerable discussion within all
the Services regarding the increasing reliance of contractors on the
battlefield, the lack of UCMJ jurisdiction except during periods of a
congressionally declared war, and the other possible forums for
exercising criminal jurisdiction (the War Crimes Act, 18 USC
Sec. Sec. 2340-2340A, and potentially the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act). However, I am not aware of discussions focused on
contractors hired to perform interrogations.
38. Senator Kennedy. General Romig, do you share the concerns
reportedly expressed by the JAG articles as summarized in the three
articles I have referenced?
General Romig. As set out in my answer to question 30, I believe
the concerns reportedly raised by Judge Advocates in the articles were
based upon an incorrect understanding of JAG roles in observing
interrogations, both during Operation Desert Storm and in our present
conflicts. To that extent, I do not share their concerns. As to any
concerns I may have had regarding the formulation of interrogation
policies at Guantanamo, please see my answer to question 28.
[Whereupon, at 5:57 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
ALLEGATIONS OF MISTREATMENT OF IRAQI PRISONERS
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 19, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:35 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss,
Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, Clinton,
and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional
staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member;
Elaine A. McCusker, professional staff member; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Paula J. Philbin,
professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; Diana G. Tabler,
professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Jeremy L. Hekhuis, professional staff member; and
William G.P. Monahan, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew W.
Florell, and Bridget E. Ward.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Darren M. Dick, assistant to Senator Roberts;
Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Derek J.
Maurer, assistant to Senator Collins; D'Arcy Grisler, assistant
to Senator Ensign; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Aleix Jarvis and Meredith Moseley, assistants to
Senator Graham; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator Dole;
Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Sharon L.
Waxman and Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistants to Senator Kennedy;
Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth
King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and
Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to
Senator Ben Nelson; Rashid Hallaway, assistant to Senator Bayh;
Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze,
assistant to Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. Good morning, everyone. The committee
meets today for the third in a series of hearings regarding the
mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners by a small--hopefully, a very
small--number of personnel of the Armed Forces of the United
States, in violation of U.S. and international laws.
Testifying before us today are General John P. Abizaid,
Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); Lieutenant General
Ricardo Sanchez, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq; Major
General Geoffrey Miller, Deputy Commander for Detainee
Operations, Multi-National Force; and they are joined this
morning by their Judge Advocate General (JAG), which I think is
a very wise decision.
We welcome our witnesses and thank them again for their
service. Many times members of this committee and other Members
of Congress have gone abroad and visited each of you in
CENTCOM, and, most particularly, in Afghanistan and Iraq. We
must all be mindful of the role of our witnesses in the
operational chain of command and of their related
responsibilities in the administration of military justice.
Each witness this morning will use caution with regard to their
comments, such as not to inadvertently influence, in any way,
the ongoing criminal or administrative proceedings and the
investigations. Many investigations instituted by the
Department of Defense (DOD) are now ongoing. Indeed, this
morning we see the opening of the first trials, an opening in a
manner in which the entire world can see democracy in action.
As I have previously stated, this mistreatment of prisoners
represents an appalling and totally unacceptable breach of
military regulations and conduct. Our committee, a part of the
United States Congress, a coequal branch of government, has a
solemn responsibility to determine, as best we can, how this
breakdown in military leadership and discipline occurred, and,
most importantly, what steps are being taken, by the civilians
in control and, indeed, those in the uniform, to see that it
never, ever happens gain.
I firmly believe this prisoner mistreatment represents an
extremely rare chapter in the otherwise proud, magnificent
history of the United States military. It is counter to every
human value that we, as Americans, have learned beginning in
our earliest stage with our families, our schools, and our
churches. It is counter to what this Nation stands for, and it
is counter to the principles that the men and women of the
Armed Forces, today and in years past, have fought to protect
wherever they are in the world. It is counter to the cause of
freedom.
There must be a full accountability for the abuse of Iraqi
detainees, and important questions must be asked of the chain
of command to understand what happened, how it happened, when
it happened, and how those in positions of responsibility
either ordered, encouraged, authorized, or maybe looked the
other way at such conduct.
Our witnesses today are uniquely qualified to answer many
of these important questions, including:
What policies and procedures were established for the
treatment of prisoners and detainee interrogations?
What was the chain of command at the prison?
Were military police (MPs) or military intelligence (MI)
personnel in charge, and at what times?
When did you--I say that collectively and individually--
realize the magnitude, seriousness, and uniqueness of these
allegations?
What measures did you take to inform the civilian
structure, from the President to the DOD, Department of State,
and others, that civilian structure that has the ultimate
responsibility for the control of the United States military,
which goes back to the very origins of this country?
What steps were taken to respond to earlier reports of
mistreatment of prisoners received from the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and possibly other sources?
Finally, how did the conduct of interrogations and detainee
operations evolve from May 2003 until January 2004?
I am confident that you will, to the best of your ability,
be responsive to these and other questions.
I am proud of the manner in which the Armed Forces of the
United States, represented by these extraordinarily
accomplished officers before us, have promptly reacted to the
allegations, undertaken the appropriate investigation, and
begun disciplinary actions under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ). The trials, in some instances, begin today.
We are a nation of laws. We confront breaches of our laws
openly and directly, and we must find the evidence to hold
those who break the law accountable. We must not forget our
overall purpose in Iraq and, indeed, in Afghanistan. Success in
both areas is essential not only to our Nation and the people
of Iraq, but to the entire world as we fight global terrorism.
We all have an important stake in learning the truth. We
must not allow these acts of a few to tarnish the honor of the
many dedicated men and women in uniform, 99.99 percent of whom
are valiantly upholding the values they were taught in the
cause of freedom, and doing so at great personal risk and with
great sacrifice.
Lastly, how this hearing originated is spelled out in a
letter that I wrote to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) last
week on May 13, in which I thanked him for his participation
and assistance in facilitating the hearings that we had had. I
indicated that our committee would pursue further hearings and
involve a list of witnesses, and I named them all, you three
among them.
Then I will recite this paragraph: ``To date, in
scheduling, the committee has tried to meet your requirements,
and we hope to continue such cooperation in arranging the
earliest possible date for appearances of these witnesses.
Given that some witnesses may need to remain in Iraq for
operational reasons, we are open to exploring the option of
video teleconferences for some hearings.''
In the course of the last few days, in working with the
Department on having, I thought, several civilians come up
today, somewhat unexpectedly my distinguished colleague,
Senator Levin, and I were informed that you were in town,
General Abizaid, and had been for several days, and that the
other witnesses were coming for consultation to the DOD.
Therefore, the Secretary made you available here this morning.
That is, plain and simple, how it happened.
As to the conduct of this hearing, the buck stops right
here on this desk, and I am the chairman, and I consult with my
members, as my distinguished ranking member consults with his,
and I am very proud in the manner in which this committee has
pursued its responsibilities under the Constitution. We are
trying to search for the facts and put together a record so
that we here in Congress, and, indeed, the American public can
better understand these problems.
This story has been unfolding in many ways. First, a very
brave enlisted man sought to bring to the attention of his
superiors a problem which, frankly, in his gut he knew was
wrong. He is to be commended for that. Thereafter, the military
very quickly took action, and the rest is history. The press
has been diligent. The victims have actually gone on to tell
their story. The lawyers are trying to interpret it. Really,
the distressing thing is watching the families of the soldiers
who are under the UCMJ now being examined, as well as the
families of other soldiers. I felt it was imperative that, at
some point in time--and the Pentagon basically selected when
that time would be: this morning--you would face the American
public and then face the world and give your own personal
accounts of how this situation happened and, most importantly,
what we are going to do to see that it never happens again.
That is the executive and legislative branches working
together.
We are proud of the democracy here in America. It is an
open process, and we are going to show the world how we fairly,
firmly, and calmly deal with this situation.
Thank you.
Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First I want to join you in welcoming our witnesses this
morning. I want to join you in thanking each one of them for
their service to our Nation. Most importantly of all, I join
you, Mr. Chairman, in asking our witnesses to pass along to the
troops under their command the gratitude of every member of
this committee and of our Nation for their service.
The allegations of abuses of Iraqi detainees have shocked
our country and shocked our justifiably proud Armed Forces and
their families. The committee's hearing this morning is part of
our continuing effort to investigate and find out the full
extent of these abuses and how they could have happened.
Insisting on accountability will help prevent future abuses,
and hopefully help restore the credibility of our Nation within
Iraq, the region, and throughout the world.
The inquiry is not just about the behavior of a few
soldiers at a detention facility. We, of course, must do
whatever we can to ensure that the perpetrators of the abuses
are held accountable. But those who were responsible for
encouraging, condoning, or tolerating such behavior, or who
established or created an atmosphere or climate for such
abusive behavior, must also be held accountable.
The February 2004 report of the ICRC presents an overview
of documented abuses that extend beyond the conduct of
interrogations at one cell block in one detention facility. The
report sets forth an extensive list of methods of ill treatment
used ``in a systematic way'' by MI at Abu Ghraib and a number
of other facilities. The abuses that are alleged apparently are
not limited to detention facilities. Many of the alleged
violations are reported to have occurred at the time of arrest.
This is particularly disturbing, given the statement in the
ICRC report that ``certain military intelligence officers''
told the ICRC that, in their estimate, between 70 and 90
percent of the persons deprived of their liberty in Iraq had
been arrested by mistake.
In addition, according to their report, the ICRC, in May
2003, handed over to CENTCOM, in Doha, a memorandum based on
``over 200 allegations of ill treatment of prisoners of war
during capture and interrogation.'' I know that General Abizaid
and General Sanchez will inform us today about when the ICRC
report and other reports of abuse were brought to their
attention and what actions were ordered to address those
concerns.
In addition to reports that were made in the field, ICRC
President Kellenberger stated that he briefed administration
officials, including Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
Administrator Paul Bremer, Secretary Powell, National Security
Advisor Rice, and Pentagon officials, concerning allegations of
abuse on a number of occasions, including in early- and mid-
2003 and January 2004. We would be interested in hearing from
our witnesses about what word, if any, was received from
Washington or Ambassador Bremer as a result of those
allegations of abuse being brought to the attention of
administration officials.
Finally, I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for your
determination to carry out the oversight responsibility of this
committee. Committees of jurisdiction have an obligation to
understand these events, to deter future abuses, and to help
assure proper accountability. Mr. Chairman, you are leading
this committee in a responsible way to do just that, and the
Nation is in your debt for carrying out your duty as you see
it.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin, the committee is acting as
a whole. All members, and most especially yourself, have been
responsible for conducting ourselves, I think, in strict
accordance with the institution of the Senate and in the best
interest of the Constitution.
Gentlemen, I ask you to rise. [Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Warner. General Abizaid.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN P. ABIZAID, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
CENTRAL COMMAND
General Abizaid. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Warner, Senator Levin, and members of the
committee:
A few days ago I had the honor to talk to the class of 2004
at West Point, a group of young men and women who have
dedicated themselves to service to the Nation, and who clearly
understand that within the first year of their duties they will
likely find themselves in combat, probably in the CENTCOM
theater of operations. I could have just as easily been talking
to young cadets at the Air Force or Naval Academies, or at
countless other colleges or places where our young people are
about to be commissioned as officers in our Armed Forces. One
of the most important messages I had for them is my deep belief
in the principle that officers of the United States military
are responsible; that, when in charge, we must be in charge.
This is as true for the lowest second lieutenant in the chain
of command as it is for me. Every officer is responsible for
what his or her unit does or fails to do. I accept that
responsibility for CENTCOM.
I come before you as a senior regional commander to address
the Abu Ghraib prison case, and, at the same time, I hope you
will allow me to discuss the conduct of the war, not only in
Iraq, but throughout the region.
As all of you understand, both General Sanchez and I, as
members of the chain of command, have yet to examine all the
facts about the incidents at Abu Ghraib and have made no
judgement as to the guilt or innocence of any person associated
with events there, nor have we precluded further action against
others that additional testimony or evidence may indicate acted
inappropriately or failed in their duties.
From evidence already gathered, we believe that systemic
problems existed at the prison that may have contributed to
events there. Other investigations are currently underway, and
we will consider their findings carefully once they become
available. We will follow the trail of evidence wherever it
leads. We will continue to correct systemic problems. We will
hold people accountable. In accordance with the UCMJ, we will
take appropriate action.
On my way back to the States, I stopped and talked to many
of the region's top military and political leaders to discuss
Abu Ghraib and the situation in Iraq to assess the damage that
this incident has done to our reputation. They, like us, and
like the many Iraqis who talked to me before I last left Iraq,
were shocked, disgusted, and disappointed at the images of
abuse. Yet all of them expressed confidence that our system
could and would produce answers and hold people accountable.
If we endanger our ability to see that justice is served,
through failure to thoroughly investigate allegations, by
inadvertently exerting inappropriate command influence, or
through the inappropriate handling of evidence, we will do
ourselves, the region, and Iraqis, in particular, a great
disservice.
As concerned as the good people of the region are about
what happened at Abu Ghraib, they are more concerned about our
willingness to stay the course in Iraq and Afghanistan. They
are more worried that we will lose our patience with the
difficult task of stabilizing those places, and we will walk
away, come home, and bring up the drawbridges and defend
``Fortress America.'' For some of the nations in the region,
our departure could be fatal. I reassured our friends that we
are tough, that we cannot be defeated militarily, and that we
will stay the course.
We know that we must move quickly from occupation to
partnership in Iraq. We know that we must help the Afghan
Government of President Karzai extend its influence throughout
its own land. We must find and destroy al Qaeda and its
ideological partners wherever we find them, and we must help
the nations of the Middle East help themselves in fighting this
desperate war against terror and extremism. We have given much
blood and treasure since September 11, and we will give more.
Allowing moderation to succeed in a region where talented
people seek prosperity and hope for their children is as an
important victory as were our struggles against totalitarian
regimes in World War II. Our enemies are in a unique position,
and they are a unique brand of ideological extremists, whose
vision of the world is best summed up by how the Taliban ran
Afghanistan. If they can outlast us in Afghanistan and
undermine the legitimate government there, they will once again
fill up the seats at the soccer stadiums and force people to
watch executions. If, in Iraq, the culture of intimidation
practiced by our enemies is allowed to win, the mass graves
will fill again.
Our enemies kill without remorse, they challenge our will
through the careful manipulation of propaganda and information,
and they seek safe havens in order to develop weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) that they will use against us when they are
ready. Their targets are not Kabul and Baghdad, but places like
Madrid and London and New York. They are a patient and
despicable enemy who seek to break our will, to terrorize us in
such a manner as to cause us to leave the fight, to isolate us
from our allies, to destroy those who seek a better future, and
to wreck the patient work required to build reliable
infrastructure and sophisticated economic structures. Unlike
us, they will not hold themselves accountable for their
outrages.
Our enemies believe they have scored a great victory in
Madrid. They believe they changed a government and forced a
valued ally off the battlefield. They see before them elections
in Iraq, elections in Afghanistan, and, indeed, elections here
at home and elsewhere. They see us mired in scandal and
preoccupied with failure.
We should not kid ourselves about the violent times ahead.
Yet we should also understand that despite the images of Abu
Ghraib and burning High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
that constantly play on our media screens, we are winning the
battle against extremism. Our troops are confident. They win
tactical battle after tactical battle. They work with Iraqis
and Afghanis to build viable security forces. One day these
viable security forces will allow us to come home. They know
that the enemy is elusive and dangerous, and they know that
they need to fight this war with balanced ferocity and
compassion.
As we fight this most unconventional war of this new
century, we must be patient and courageous. It will require a
great amount of intelligence work. We must focus all of our
national power, and recognize that this war requires as much
political, economic, diplomatic, and national willpower to win
as it does the courage to fight and to sacrifice with our young
people in harm's way.
There are more people in the region who value peace over
terrorism, who know that moderation brings prosperity and hope
for their children. They also know that if they cannot stand
alone, they certainly cannot expect that the United States of
America will walk away from them.
Our gift to them has to be to give them a chance to win.
Our great gift to ourselves will be to show a great and open
demonstration that the rule of law applies in time of war, that
despite the great demands of the day-to-day battles, we will
fix what is broken, and we will let justice be served.
No doubt, we have made mistakes in Abu Ghraib. We have
suffered a setback. I accept responsibility for that setback.
But the failures of a few will not keep the many courageous
young men and women of ours from accomplishing their dangerous
and important work to defend the Nation abroad.
I thank the committee.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General, for a very good
statement.
General Sanchez.
STATEMENT OF LTG RICARDO S. SANCHEZ, USA, COMMANDER, MULTI-
NATIONAL FORCE--IRAQ
General Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee
and talk to you about events in Iraq, and specifically the
events at Abu Ghraib.
Before I talk about these events, I am proud to report that
over 150,000 coalition military personnel are doing great work
in Iraq under very difficult circumstances. They are fighting
an insurgency, rebuilding and protecting infrastructure, and
setting the conditions for the inevitable turnover to an
interim government on the June 30. Those soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines of America, and the people who support
them, are stunned, disappointed, and embarrassed by the events
that transpired at Abu Ghraib prison. However, like me, these
great service members also understand that we must continue
with our mission.
Regarding the events at Abu Ghraib, we must fully
investigate and fix responsibility as well as accountability. I
am fully committed to thorough and impartial investigations
that examine the role, commissions, and omissions of the entire
chain of command, and that includes me. As a senior commander
in Iraq, I accept responsibility for what happened at Abu
Ghraib, and I accept, as a solemn obligation, the
responsibility to ensure that it does not happen again.
We have already initiated courts-martial in seven cases,
and there may very well be more prosecutions. The Army Criminal
Investigative Division's (CID) investigation is not final, and
the investigation of MI procedures by Major General Fay is also
ongoing. We may find that the evidence produced in these
investigations not only leads to more courts-martials, but
cause us to revisit actions previously taken to determine
whether to initiate judicial or non-judicial action in cases
which may have been handled to date by adverse administrative
action.
In this regard, I must be very circumspect in what I say.
We must let our military justice process work. It is a process
in which the American people can and should have confidence,
and one in which I take great pride.
I cannot say anything that might compromise the fairness or
integrity of the process, or in any way suggest the result in a
particular case. I have taken an oath to support and defend the
Constitution of the United States, and that includes ensuring
that all persons receive a fair trial and, if found guilty,
appropriate punishment.
This respect for the rule of law has been a guiding
principle for my command. There is no doubt that the laws of
war, including the Geneva Conventions, apply to our operations
in Iraq. This includes interrogations. I have reinforced this
point by way of orders and command policies. In September and
October 2003, and in May 2004, I issued interrogation policies
that reiterated the application of the Geneva Conventions and
required that all interrogations be conducted in a lawful and
humane manner with command oversight.
In October 2003, I issued a memorandum for all coalition
forces personnel that was titled ``Proper Treatment of Iraqi
People During Combat Operations.'' I reissued this memorandum
on January 16 after learning about the events that had taken
place at Abu Ghraib.
On March 4, 2004, I issued my Policy Memorandum Number 18,
titled ``Proper Conduct During Combat Operations.'' This
document, which I also reissued in April, emphasized the need
to treat all Iraqis with dignity and respect. This policy
memorandum also contained a summary for distribution, down to
the individual soldier level, that provided clear guidance and
mandated training on the following points: Follow the law of
war and the rules of engagement (ROE); treat all persons with
humanity, dignity, and respect; use judgement and discretion in
detaining civilians; respect private property; and treat
journalists with dignity and respect.
With regards to Abu Ghraib, as soon as I learned of the
reported abuses, I ensured that a criminal investigation had
been initiated, and requested my superior appoint an
investigating officer to conduct a separate administrative
investigation under Army Regulation 15-6 into this matter.
Within days of receiving the initial report, I directed
suspension of key members of the chain of command of the unit
responsible for detainee security at Abu Ghraib.
The criminal investigation, while still underway, resulted,
thus far, in the decision to initiate court-martial proceedings
against seven individuals. The administrative investigation
that was conducted by Major General Taguba has caused me to
change the way we conduct detention, internment, and
interrogation operations.
One significant change has been the addition to my staff of
a general officer with responsibility for detention operations.
Major General Geoffrey Miller was assigned this task, and has
taken numerous positive steps to eliminate the possibility that
such abuse could occur in the future.
Well before I received the January 14 report and viewed the
shocking photographs later on, I had directed steps be taken to
improve the overall condition of detainees at Abu Ghraib. Back
in August 2003, I requested that subject-matter experts conduct
a comprehensive assessment of all detention operations in Iraq.
This was the genesis for the report completed by Major General
Ryder, the Provost Marshal General of the Army.
In September, a team headed by General Miller assessed our
intelligence interrogation activities and humane detention
operations. We reviewed the recommendations with the express
understanding, reinforced in conversations between General
Miller and me, that they might have to be modified for use in
Iraq, where the Geneva Conventions were fully applicable.
Plans for the new detainee camp at Abu Ghraib, which will
now be called Camp Redemption, were begun in November of 2003
in order to relieve overcrowding at the facility. After a
series of mortar attacks against the facility in September
which killed and injured both Iraqi detainees and U.S.
soldiers, I directed increased force-protection measures be
taken in order to protect coalition forces and detainees. Plans
to upgrade the facilities for soldiers and detainees were also
implemented.
Finally, the rate at which detainee case files were
reviewed and recommended for release or continued internment
was increased, both in November 2003 and again in February
2004, in order to ensure that only those detainees who posed a
threat to security were detained. Indeed, our February 2004
changes resulted in the review of over 100 cases per day. The
terrible events that occurred in the fall of 2003 have
obviously highlighted additional problems that we have moved
quickly to address.
While horrified at the abusive behavior that took place at
Abu Ghraib, I believe that I have taken the proper steps to
ensure that such behavior is not repeated. I further believe
that my actions have sent the correct message that such
behavior is inconsistent with our values, our standards, and
our training. I have faith in our military justice system to
resolve the cases brought before it.
I would like to read the concluding paragraph from my
memorandum to the command on proper conduct during combat
operations. I believe it is an accurate summary of my standards
and expectations. ``Respect for others, humane treatment of all
persons, and adherence to the law of war and rules of
engagement is a matter of discipline and values. It is what
separates us from our enemies. I expect all leaders to
reinforce this message.''
In closing, the war in Iraq continues against a relentless
enemy that is focused on preventing the Iraqi people from
achieving their dream of freedom, prosperity, and security.
This awful episode at Abu Ghraib must not allow us to get
distracted. America's Armed Forces are performing
magnificently, sacrificing every single day to defeat an enemy
that is ruthless and elusive in its quest to terrorize Iraq and
the world. The honor and value systems of our Armed Forces are
solid and the bedrock of what makes us the best in the world.
There has been no catastrophic failure, and America's Armed
Forces will never compromise their honor. America must not
falter in this endeavor to defeat those who seek to destroy our
democratic value systems. In Iraq, the coalition military,
including our 130,000 Americans, remain focused, and I
guarantee you they will not fail.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General. That is a very
comprehensive statement, and I would ask, on behalf of the
committee, that the documents that you referred to in your
testimony--could copies be provided to the committee?
General Sanchez. We will comply, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
General Miller.
STATEMENT OF MG GEOFFREY D. MILLER, USA, DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR
DETAINEE OPERATIONS, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE--IRAQ
General Miller. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,
thank you for affording me this opportunity to appear this
morning. While I have no opening statement, I do stand with the
statements of General Abizaid and General Sanchez.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Colonel Warren, do you wish to add anything?
STATEMENT OF COL MARC L. WARREN, STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, CJTF-7
Colonel Warren. Mr. Chairman, I have no opening statement,
but I would be happy to respond to any questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
We will have a 6-minute round and I advise the committee
that, in consultation with General Abizaid and the ranking
member, there will be a brief closed session following the open
session, such that we can receive some classified material.
General Abizaid, what policies has CENTCOM established for
the conduct of interrogations in detainee operations? When were
these policies established? What allegations of abuse are you
aware of that could have also occurred in Afghanistan? Are the
policies being uniformly applied and enforced throughout your
area of responsibility (AOR)?
General Abizaid. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I believe the Army has come over and discussed with the
committee, the total number of detainee abuse cases that have
been investigated since, I believe, the beginning of the
conflict in Afghanistan is around 75. Of course, there are some
death investigations, as well. We have homicide investigations
that go back as far as December 2002 in Afghanistan that we
absolutely have to move on and understand what happened there.
We are working with the Army CID to understand that. But I
believe the committee has the statistics on abuse.
Abuse has happened. Abuse has happened in Afghanistan, it
has happened in Iraq, it has happened at various places. The
question is, is there a systemic abuse problem with regard to
interrogation that exists in the CENTCOM AOR?
Yesterday--and I know the committee has not had a chance to
review it yet--I did see the preliminary findings of a
Department of the Army Inspector General (IG) investigation
that talked about problems in training, problems in
organization, very specific changes that will need to be made
in doctrine, et cetera. I specifically asked the IG of the Army
if he believed that there was a pattern of abuse of prisoners
in the CENTCOM AOR. He looked at both Afghanistan and Iraq, and
he said no. I sent my IG out in August of last year, asking him
the same question, Are we treating people with dignity and
respect?
Chairman Warner. What findings did he report back when you
sent him out in August?
General Abizaid. He came back and said that we were
struggling with the number of prisoners, we were struggling
with the facilities, and we were struggling to, in particular,
deal with criminal detainees that needed to go into an Iraqi
criminal detention system that still did not exist.
Chairman Warner. But he did not discover any of the
evidence that is now being revealed about these abuses?
General Abizaid. No, sir, he did not.
Chairman Warner. All right. That is a direct answer.
Can you provide the committee, without violating UCMJ
procedures, your own personal observations as to what you
believe happened from the breakdown of the orders to General
Sanchez, as clearly documented here this morning, and where it
happened?
General Abizaid. Sir, I think you know that Major General
Fay is still conducting----
Chairman Warner. Yes.
General Abizaid.--an investigation, and so I am not quite
ready to say where I think all the breakdowns were. But it is
clear that there were some breakdowns in procedures, in access,
in standards of interrogation, in confusion between the roles
of what the MI people were doing, versus the MPs. There was
also, clearly, criminal misconduct that took place.
Chairman Warner. All right.
General Abizaid. The criminal misconduct is not the subject
of any order or policy that I believe exists anywhere.
Chairman Warner. There has been, of course, concern that
the initial steps by the chain of command were directed at a
group of enlisted people who are now subject to various forms
of UCMJ accountability. Can you assure this committee that you
will diligently pursue all evidence and--no matter how high up
the chain, or sideways or down the chain--all persons will be
brought forward, subject to the UCMJ?
General Abizaid. Sir, I assure the committee that we will
do that.
Chairman Warner. Fine.
General Abizaid. I can also assure the committee that I
have been in this business a long time, and when General
Sanchez called me up and told me, I think, probably within 24
hours of the evidence being handed to his CID people in
Baghdad, he followed it up very shortly with a decision to
suspend the entire chain of command, which is a pretty strong
action that does not just focus at a low level. He initiated
investigations and he moved ahead in a way that I thought was
commendable.
Chairman Warner. Do you feel that the UCMJ procedures and
other regulations impeded, in any way, your responsibility to
keep the civilian control structure back in Washington advised?
General Abizaid. No, sir, it did not impede us. As always,
we believe that we have to do everything possible to protect
the evidence that is available to keep the investigatory
information within investigatory channels, and that is what we
tried to do.
Chairman Warner. You tried to do that in a timely fashion.
General Abizaid. That is what we tried to do, yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. General Sanchez, on November 19 you
directed that the commander of the 205th MI Brigade assume
command of all units and operations in the Abu Ghraib prison.
Why did you put MI in charge of the prison? In your view, did
this new command arrangement improve intelligence and detainee
operations? What objections did General Karpinski, commander,
have concerning the change in command responsibilities?
General Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, on November 19, I issued a
Fragmentary Order that placed all elements at Abu Ghraib under
the tactical control of Colonel Pappas, the 205th MI commander.
The specific order stated that this was for forward-operating
base (FOB) protection and for security of detainees. The
context of the order was that we had been receiving significant
amounts of direct and indirect fire, and, during the conduct of
one my visits, I had found that force protection and the
defensive planning of that FOB was seriously lacking, and I
needed to get a senior commander in charge of the defense of
that FOB, and that was the purpose of the order.
The order did not intend to eliminate any of the
responsibilities of the 800th MP Commander, and that was a
specific purpose for the tactical control (TACON). TACON placed
the 320th under the 205th MI Brigade Commander, and what that
does--specifically, it gives the MI brigade commander authority
to conduct local direction and control of movements or
maneuvers to accomplish the mission at hand. All of the other
responsibilities for continuing to run the prison, for
logistics, training, discipline, and the conduct of police--or,
correction--of prison operations remained with the 800th MP
Brigade Commander. There was never a time where General
Karpinski surfaced to me any objections to that TACON order.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
General Abizaid, you have, quite properly, advised this
committee this morning that you are fighting a war. This
responsibility, occasioned by these abuses, has taken a measure
of your time, but you have continued, and your troops have
performed bravely.
Here is the question I put to you, eliciting your
professional and personal view: Is the scheduled change of
limited sovereignty on July 1 consistent and achievable, in
your judgement, given the security situation?
General Abizaid. Mr. Chairman, it is achievable, but it
needs to emerge soon as to who is going to be in charge, what
their names are, where they are going to be, and what they are
going to do.
Chairman Warner. That is on the Iraqi side.
General Abizaid. That is correct.
Chairman Warner. It is clear on our side that we have a
United States Ambassador in place to provide the security?
General Abizaid. Sir, we are going to be there, no matter
what.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
General Sanchez, your answer to Senator Warner about who
was responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations
at that facility leaves me uncertain now, because General
Taguba says that your order of November 19 effectively made the
MI officer, rather than the MP officer, responsible for the MP
units conducting detainee operations. That is a quote. Do you
disagree with General Taguba, then, on that point?
General Sanchez. Senator, the purpose of the order was as
described. It was to ensure that I had synchronized FOB
defenses, and that was the purpose for the TACON order that was
issued to the MP unit at that installation.
Senator Levin. In addition to its purpose, though, General
Taguba said that the MI officer then became responsible for the
MP units conducting the operations. Do you differ with that?
General Sanchez. They were responsive to the MI officer for
the specific purpose of defending the FOB, Senator.
Senator Levin. That did not, then, include conducting
detainee interrogations.
General Sanchez. That is exactly right, sir. It did not
include that.
Senator Levin. There is a difference there between you and
General Taguba.
General Sanchez. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. General Abizaid, in May 2003, the ICRC sent
to the coalition forces a memorandum based on over 200
allegations of ill treatment of prisoners during capture and
interrogation at collecting points, battle-group stations, and
temporary holding areas, according to the ICRC report, which I
am now reading. It said here that CENTCOM in Doha received this
memorandum. I am wondering if, in fact, you remember receiving
that memorandum and what action you took on it.
General Abizaid. There are some ICRC reports, Senator, that
we received. Which one are you talking about?
Senator Levin. May 2003.
General Abizaid. I know that the May 2003 report was
received at our headquarters, that is correct.
Senator Levin. What action do you remember taking?
General Abizaid. I was the deputy commander at the time. I
know that we discussed the report, we sent it forward to the
Coalition Forces Land Component Commander, General McKiernan,
and we asked for his take on it.
Senator Levin. Did you receive a report from him, do you
remember?
General Abizaid. I do not believe we received a report in
writing. I do not recall having a lot to do with this
particular report, or paying much attention to it.
Senator Levin. Perhaps you could check your records and
supply to the committee any documents relative to that.
General Abizaid. I will, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
CENTCOM was unable to locate the requested document. A memo is
attached explaining.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Levin. In early July, according to the ICRC, they
sent to the coalition forces a working paper detailing
approximately 50 allegations of ill treatment in the MI section
of Camp Cropper. This, according to their report, set forth
requiring or using stress positions for 3 or 4 hours, physical
hits, prolonged exposure to sun, and a number of other
allegations. Can you tell us whether the early July ICRC report
was received at headquarters?
General Abizaid. No, and we have a real problem with ICRC
reports and the way that they are handled and the way that they
move up and down the chain of command. For example, the
February report of 2004, I first read in May.
Senator Levin. But relative to the early July report----
General Abizaid. I will not make any excuses for it,
Senator. I will just say that we do not all see them. Sometimes
it works at a lower level. Sometimes commanders at the lowest
level get the report, and they work on it confidentially. I
think what we have to do is have a system, when there is
something that comes to the attention at any level of command,
that is not being worked through at the lower level, but that
it surface all the way up through the chain of command. So we
have a problem there that has to be fixed.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
General Sanchez, is there a record of the ICRC working
paper being received by you or at your level?
General Sanchez. Is this the July paper?
Senator Levin. The July working paper detailing 50
allegations of ill treatment.
General Sanchez. Not that I am aware of, Senator.
Senator Levin. So there is no indication at your level, at
your headquarters, that that document was ever received?
General Sanchez. No, Senator. The working paper that I am
aware of that made it to my headquarters was the November
paper.
Senator Levin. The Interrogation Rules of Engagement is a
document which was presented to this committee by General
Alexander, saying that the ROE that were in effect at the
Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CTJF-7) in Iraq prior to 2003 are
set forth on a piece of paper, which--are you familiar with
it?--called ``Interrogation Rules of Engagement''?
General Sanchez. Yes, sir, I have seen that.
Senator Levin. Did you approve this? Did you have legal
advice? What is this document that General Alexander told us
were the ROE that were in effect at the CJTF?
General Sanchez. Sir, the first time I saw that paper was
when it was shown in one of the prior hearings in this same
forum.
Senator Levin. So that he would----
General Sanchez. I had no role in preparing it or approving
it.
Senator Levin. All right. So he was in error, then,
relative to that? General Alexander, then, would have been in
error if he said this was the document----
General Sanchez. Right, sir. I have never seen that, I had
never approved it, and I had no part in putting that together,
sir.
Senator Levin. I do not believe this committee has your
October 12 policy statement. If I am wrong, then fine. But
would you provide that October 12 statement to the committee?
General Sanchez. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The requested document was provided to the committee as an
attachment to the question for the record (QFR) 76 for Lieutenant
General Sanchez.
Senator Levin. Finally, the newspaper reported that a
hundred or so high-value detainees do not fall under your
command, General Sanchez, but are the responsibility of General
Dayton, who is commander of the Iraq Survey Group and reports
directly to General Abizaid. Is that accurate, as far as you
know?
General Sanchez. Yes, sir, that is accurate.
Senator Levin. Do you know why?
General Sanchez. My MPs provide security at that----
Senator Levin. Can you just tell us, then, why that was
done that way, General Abizaid?
General Abizaid. Sir, that was done that way because the
people at Camp Cropper happened to be those people who had
theoretical information concerning WMD information, and also
were the high-value detainees who we hope someday to turn over
to a legitimate Iraqi government for trial.
Senator Levin. But why should they be treated differently
from other detainees, separated out that way?
General Abizaid. They were separated out that way to ensure
that we understood, I guess I would call it, the strategic
environment, as opposed to the tactical environment, where we
would get information from lower-level detainees. It was
established that way as a result of discussions that had taken
place here in Washington regarding having a better and more
efficient way to really understand what was going on with
regard to WMD.
Senator Levin. That was all, then, WMD-information related,
basically?
General Abizaid. It was, sir, but it was also dealing with
very senior levels of the former Iraqi Government.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
I have just been told that the DOD has informed the
committee that another disk of pictures has been located, and I
will soon advise the committee on the conditions under which
that can be viewed.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses, particularly Generals
Miller, Abizaid, and Sanchez, for their outstanding service to
our Nation under the most difficult circumstances. I was
pleased to hear that you were here on other business and did
not have to be called back from the theater of operations. I
thank you for all the time and effort you have devoted to
trying to resolve this terrible issue. We are very grateful for
that and for your appearance here today.
General Sanchez, according to a November 19, 2003, message,
as you responded to questions from Senator Warner and Senator
Levin, you transferred full responsibility to Colonel Pappas to
assume full responsibility for Abu Ghraib and appointed the
National Guard units to be under the tactical control of 205th
MI Brigade Commander for security of detainees and FOB
protection. I quote from your message. I think that is
accurate.
In his statement to General Taguba, Colonel Pappas said,
``Policies and procedures established by the joint detention
and detention center at Abu Ghraib relative to detainee
operations were enacted as a specific result of a visit by
Major General Geoffrey Miller, Commander Joint Task Force
Gitmo.'' He went on to say, ``The key findings of his visit
were that the interrogators and analysts developed a set of
rules and limitations to guide interrogation and provide
dedicated MPs to support interrogation operations.'' I repeat,
``and provide dedicated MPs to support interrogation
operations.''
Now, General Sanchez, General Miller's report, as I
understand it, had observations and recommendations. One of
those recommendations was, ``It is essential that the guard
force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for
successful exploitation of the internees.''
Am I accurate so far, General Sanchez?
General Sanchez. Yes, Senator.
Senator McCain. General Miller.
General Miller. Yes, sir, you are.
Senator McCain. Well, General Miller, do you believe that
your instructions may have been misinterpreted?
General Miller. Senator, I do not. On our visit to the JTF
to be able to give an assessment of the intelligence function--
it is three major areas: intelligence fusion, the interrogation
process, and humane detention--the team of 19 experts laid out
those standards that would allow for humane detention,
interrogation in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, and
then recommended procedures by which intelligence could be
fused more rapidly to provide actionable intelligence for units
and for the JTF itself.
Senator McCain. Well, thank you. But it seems to me that
this order that I just quoted turned over certain MP duties to
the control of Colonel Pappas and then certain things happened.
According to General Taguba's report, soldiers were questioned
who were involved in this.
Soldier number one, question: ``Have you ever been directed
by the MI, military intelligence, personnel or any government
agency to soften up a prisoner prior to interrogation?''
Answer: ``Yes. Sometimes they would ask me to show a
prisoner, `special attention.' ''
Soldier number two: ``Have you ever been told by MI
personnel to work over a prisoner?''
``Yes. MI told us to rough them up to get answers from the
prisoners.''
``Why didn't you report the abuse?''
``Because I assumed that if we were doing anything wrong or
out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would
have said something. Also, the wing belonged to military
intelligence, and it appeared military intelligence personnel
approved of the abuse.''
Soldier number three, question: ``What can you tell us
about the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib?''
``Yeah, the MI staffs, to my understanding, have given
compliments to us on the way we were handling the MI holds.
Example being statements like: `Good job. They're breaking down
real fast;' '' `` `They answer every question now. Keep it up;'
'' and `` `They're giving out good information.' ''
Soldier number four: ``Have you heard MI insinuate the
guards to abuse inmates of any type of manner?''
``Yes.''
``What was said?''
Answer: ``They said, `Loosen this guy up for us. Make sure
he has a bad night. Make sure he gets the treatment.' ''
Do you see my point, Major General Miller? According to
General Taguba's report, there were at least a number of
guards, MPs, who were under the impression, or stated that they
were under the impression, that they were under specific
directions of MI personnel to, ``rough up, soften up, given `em
a bad night,'' et cetera. How do we respond to that, General
Miller?
General Miller. Senator, in the recommendations that we
made----
Senator McCain. This goes back to my first question. Does
this lead you to believe that your orders were misinterpreted?
General Miller. No, sir. The leadership that received the
recommendations throughout the JTF had a clear understanding of
the recommendations that we made in those three areas of
intelligence fusion, interrogation, and humane detention that
laid out those requirements, that laid the base that they must
be in concert with the Geneva Conventions, and gave
recommendations from our experience about how those three
functions could be done successfully.
Senator McCain. There must have been a breakdown somewhere.
General Miller. Sir, in my estimation, it was a breakdown
in leadership on how follow-on actions may have occurred, but I
was not present at that time, so it would be difficult for me
to give a----
Senator McCain. General Sanchez, my time is expired.
Chairman Warner. Yes, go ahead.
Senator McCain. General Sanchez, please?
General Sanchez. Senator, I wanted to make one
clarification, that General Miller did not issue any orders,
and he has not issued any orders, until he arrived as the
deputy commanding general for detainee operations. Those orders
were my orders, sir.
Senator McCain. I guess my question was better directed to
you. Were those orders misinterpreted?
General Sanchez. Sir, I do not believe those orders were
misinterpreted. The procedures that General Miller and I had
discussed, that he recommended, were very detailed, and it very
clearly stated that MPs were involved in passive enabling of
those operations and had no involvement in the conduct of
interrogations. Those were the orders in the standard operating
procedures (SOPs) that remained after General Miller's visit.
Senator McCain. I thank the witnesses. My time has expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much. General, I echo the
sense that all of us greatly respect you and the troops who you
are commanding. We have lost 23 very brave soldiers from my
State of Massachusetts and we are all very mindful of the
complexities and the difficulties that the uniformed service
personnel are facing over there. So we thank you so much for
your leadership and your careers of public service in serving
our country.
General Sanchez, as an old MP myself, I am surprised that
you think the MI are better at protecting the forces than the
MPs, but we will leave that for another time.
When we had the SECDEF here, General Abizaid, last week, he
denied that there was any failure to take any of these reports
seriously. The military, not the media, discovered these
abuses, he said. Specialist Joseph Darby reported the acts of
abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in mid-January. According to
Secretary Rumsfeld, by the next day, investigations were
authorized.
Yet now we learn, both from the front page of The New York
Times and the front page of The Wall Street Journal today, that
the ICRC observed abuses in the prison during the two
unannounced inspections in October 2003 and it complained in a
strongly-worded written report on November 6. This report was
reviewed by senior military officials in Iraq, including two
advisors to General Sanchez, according to this report.
So it appears that the military's first reaction was to
restrict future ICRC visits to Abu Ghraib. That is the story in
here. After the ICRC had provided two critical reports, the
reaction of the military personnel who were dealing with the
prison then was to restrict access. They said, ``You have to
give us notice.'' All of us understand what that means. If you
are going to give notice prior to the inspections, it obviously
compromises the inspections.
So according to those news reports, nothing was done in the
prison for 2 months. The military previously acknowledged that
the worst abuses continued into December 2003.
So we have the SECDEF saying one thing, and we are
learning, from two newspapers, another story. That is why I
think we were trying to find out exactly who was in charge and
who bears the responsibility. These are completely conflicting
stories that have come out within a period of just a few weeks
here before this committee. I do not know whether you have any
reaction to those stories, whether you had a chance to see
those this morning.
I want to move on quickly. I suppose it is fair to ask, who
in Iraq or in CENTCOM is responsible for receiving and
responding to the reports of violations of international law or
conventions by U.S. military personnel?
General Abizaid. I am responsible. If someone brings it to
my attention, I am responsible, and I will not turn my back on
any report that I receive.
Senator Kennedy. Well, you obviously did not get these
reports.
General Abizaid. No, I did not, but----
Senator Kennedy. Well, I am asking who would have gotten
these reports. Who would have received this report in the chain
of command? General?
General Sanchez. Senator, the November report was received
by the brigade commander. Then, as I find out now, the CJTF-7
staff assisted her in responding to that report.
Senator Kennedy. Did that brigade commander receive all of
the reports, or just who, institutionally----
General Sanchez. No, sir. What----
Senator Kennedy.--receives, within your organization, any
of the--like for the ICRC violations that come on in. Who is in
charge on that? Who receives it?
General Sanchez. When the February 2004 report came in,
that is when I found out that the November working papers had
been issued to the brigade commander. At that point, I
immediately changed the procedure and required that those
reports come to me as the senior commander in the country. That
is the procedure now.
Senator Kennedy. There was no central receiving officer in
charge prior to what you have just established? Is that right?
General Sanchez. Sir, prior to that, those all would come
to the Staff JAG's Office. That was the repository, and he was
the point of contact, in terms of commander--it was coming at
the lowest level.
Senator Kennedy. At the staff JAG officer----
General Sanchez. Yes, sir, that is correct.
General Abizaid. If I may, sir, this system is broken.
Senator Kennedy. Okay. All right.
General Abizaid. We have to fix it.
Senator Kennedy. Let me move on to General Miller. After
your assessment of the detention interrogation in Iraq, you
stated that it was essential that the guard force be actively
engaged in setting the conditions for the successful
exploitation of the internees. General Taguba strongly
disapproved of the recommendation, and he has stated that
setting of the conditions for the detainees' successful
exploitation through interrogation is fundamentally
inconsistent with Army regulations and undermines the goals of
running a safe and secure detention facility. That is what he
testified to here, before this committee.
The New York Times reported yesterday that Colonel Thomas
Pappas, who is the MI Brigade Commander at Abu Ghraib, told
General Taguba that there were no safeguards to ensure the MPs
at Abu Ghraib behaved properly in setting conditions for the
detainees. ``There would be no way for us to actually monitor
whether that happened,'' Colonel Pappas said. ``We have no
formal system in place to do that.'' General Taguba also found
the MPs had not been trained on the Geneva Conventions.
Was this not a catastrophic failure of leadership? How
would you expect an average soldier in the Army to understand
the term ``successful exploitation'' is not simply an euphemism
for ``anything goes''? Do you take responsibility for that
failure?
General Miller. Thank you, Senator.
The Taguba Report was very thorough, but I would like to
clarify on this one point. The recommendation that my team made
in the September time frame was that the MPs help set the
conditions for successful interrogation as we had learned of
their success in Guantanamo. The recommendation was that they
conduct passive intelligence-gathering during this process.
That meant to observe the detainees, to see how their behavior
was, to see who they would speak with, and then to report that
to the interrogators so the interrogators could better
understand the human dynamic of the detainee as he would come
into the interrogation booth.
We also recommended that the MPs, for security reasons,
would accompany the detainee from the cell block, or the area
where they were held, up to the interrogation booth, because
they are security risks. Then the MP would wait somewhere else,
and then accompany the detainee back. Our recommendation was
that the MPs did not actively participate in any form of the
interrogation itself. That was explained, in detail, to the
chain of command. The SOP that laid that out was provided to
them. It is about 200 pages long, and it goes into great detail
about how this system works, because it says, in the SOP, that
the MPs are not trained intelligence officers and should not
initiate questioning or anything like that; they were just to
be observers of that process. So that was the active support
for the interrogation process that was recommended.
So, Senator, I will tell you, I believe that the
recommendations we made, had they been implemented, would have
not only increased the intelligence value of what was being
done, but helped ensure that humane detention was accomplished
throughout every facility.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Before responding, General Sanchez, you made full reference
to the brigade commander. Now, that would be General Karpinski?
General Sanchez. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Chairman Warner. All right. I want the record to reflect
that.
General Abizaid. Mr. Chairman, just for the record, I would
like to caution the committee. We still do not know what we do
not know.
Chairman Warner. That is very clear, and we recognize that.
It has been a struggle to get a full understanding throughout
this whole thing and that is why we have to entrust credibility
to what the DOD, and the Army particularly, are doing now with
a series of investigations. We fully appreciate that.
General Abizaid. I think that Major General Fay's report
will go a long way to make us understand this dynamic between
MPs and MI, in particular, relative to Senator McCain's
questions.
Chairman Warner. I share that. Thank you, General.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. General Abizaid, you realize that your
statement is contrary to the United States Senate, where we
always know what we do not know. [Laughter.]
Let me say that I want to thank Senator McCain for his
comments, because I think he spoke for the whole committee in
reference to the contribution that you are making to our
country and your service to our country, and I would like to
associate myself with his remarks.
I am going to try to get my fast questions in to General
Miller and basically--well, first let me ask of General
Sanchez, no soldier would be justified in interpreting an order
in such a way as to violate the UCMJ, is that correct?
General Sanchez. Sir, I would agree with that, absolutely.
Senator Roberts. So even if a soldier did misinterpret
General Miller's recommendation, even though I doubt if they
had it, to carry out these acts, it would not be an excuse,
would it?
General Sanchez. Sir, that is correct. That is a basic
instinct we have built into the soldier.
Senator Roberts. General Miller, would the abuse evidenced
by the photos be permitted or condoned under any practices or
policies that were recommended in your report?
General Miller. Senator, they absolutely would not be.
Senator Roberts. Would the abuse evidenced in the photos be
permitted or condoned at any of the practices or policies at
Guantanamo Bay?
General Miller. Senator, they would not.
Senator Roberts. Do you have any problem with General
Ryder, who allegedly said there should be a firewall between
the MPs and MI, given your rationale as to why they should work
together, if we have the leadership and the training and the
discipline that you have indicated that we now have?
General Miller. Sir, our doctrinal publication said that
there should be cooperation between the MPs and the
intelligence function in a detention facility, but it does say
there should not be any active participation by the MP force in
any interrogations.
Senator Roberts. I have a staffer who works on the
Intelligence Committee for me. I have the privilege of being
chairman. He has been down at Guantanamo, in a Reserve
capacity. He indicates that you made a remarkable turnaround
down there. Many Senators have gone down. It only takes a day.
I encourage every Senator here to do that. I credit you for
improving a very difficult kind of situation.
In Iraq, it is my understanding that there are three
prisons, five battalions. Four of the five are Reserves. Is
that correct?
General Miller. Senator, in the organization that I now
lead, as the Deputy Commanding General for Detainee Operations,
that is a correct statement.
Senator Roberts. After the incident at Abu Ghraib, how
would you determine the leadership today in regards to
discipline, training, and leadership of those personnel who you
command as of right now?
General Miller. Sir, in the first 30 days of my opportunity
to work in this capacity, I was able to visit every facility
and talk to virtually every leader and soldier who is involved
in this. I will tell you that there is strong, positive,
dynamic leadership throughout this chain of command.
Senator Roberts. So we have seen a hell of a change.
General Miller. Sir, we have seen soldiers and leaders who
know what standards are and execute them 7 days a week, 24
hours a day.
Senator Roberts. At Guantanamo Bay, you had one MP per two
prisoners. In Iraq, you have one MP per eight and a half
prisoners. Is that correct?
General Miller. Sir, those are approximately the correct
numbers.
Senator Roberts. Okay. But you have indicated that 50
percent of the prisoners in Abu Ghraib will be released. You
have 3,800 prisoners now; that will bring it down to 1,500.
What is happening to the 1,500? I understand there are 74 being
tried by the Central Court of Iraq. Will all 1,500 be tried?
General Miller. Sir, those approximately 1,500 security
internees have been interned. That means that we have strong
evidence that they have committed attacks on the coalition, and
they will most likely be referred to the Central Criminal Court
of Iraq for trial by the Iraqi system for those. There are a
number of those, approximately 600 to 700, who are so dangerous
that, should they be released back into Iraqi society, they
would put that society at risk of a high probability of attack
on their fellow citizens.
Senator Roberts. So they are the worst of the worst.
General Miller. Sir, those are the worst of the worst.
Senator Roberts. If the ICRC investigated today, what would
they find?
General Miller. Sir, the ICRC is, as a matter of fact,
investigating today. They are at Camp Bucca, which is one of
our theater facilities down by Umm Qasr, on the southern
border. They have found that we are making an enormous effort
to improve conditions every day, that we take their findings
seriously, and that we have addressed them. General Sanchez
made a change when I arrived in the theater and put the ICRC
responsibility directly on me. So all reports come to me, and I
move them to General Sanchez and the command leadership as
rapidly as possible.
Senator Roberts. So until we get the report by General Fay
to assess responsibility and accountability, you think there
has been a big change in regards to leadership, training, and
discipline, which are all directed at interrogation, to provide
better intelligence to save Iraqi lives and American lives, is
that correct?
General Miller. Yes, sir, that is absolutely correct.
Senator Roberts. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Abizaid and General Sanchez, this travesty of
justice occurred on your watch. The Iraqi prisoner abuse
scandal has dealt a body blow to the heroic efforts of scores
of American military troops and civilian workers in Iraq to win
the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. I do not know if that
damage can ever be fully repaired. Certainly, a lot depends on
what else might emerge about this scandal and on what you and
the civilian leadership at the Pentagon do to set things right.
General Sanchez, you told Senator Levin that you never saw
the ROE presented to this committee last week. If you did not
see or set the so-called ROE for the interrogation of prisoners
in Iraq, who does? Who does set them?
General Sanchez. Senator, what I stated was that I had not
seen the specific slide that was referred to. I was the one who
approved the interrogation ROE on September 12 and again in the
October time frame, sir.
Senator Byrd. Does anyone in the civilian leadership of the
Pentagon need to approve the rules of interrogation operations?
General Sanchez. Senator, those rules were forwarded to
CENTCOM in the September time frame, and, based on the inputs
from CENTCOM, resulted in the October memorandum.
Senator Byrd. I will ask the question again. Does anyone in
the civilian leadership of the Pentagon need to approve the
rules of interrogation operations?
General Sanchez. Sir, I do not know. As far as I know,
there is no requirement for the civilian leadership to approve
those rules of engagement.
General Abizaid. Senator, I would say we are all
responsible for making sure what happens in our organizations
happens right. Things do not have to go all the way to the top
to be approved. We know what is right and we know what is
wrong.
Senator Byrd. The committee needs to know if you can answer
this question. Does anyone in the civilian leadership of the
Pentagon need to approve the rules of interrogation operations?
If so, who?
General Abizaid. My answer is no. It is our responsibility.
Senator Byrd. Then you are saying that nobody in the
Pentagon approves these rules.
General Abizaid. No, I am not saying that, sir.
Senator Byrd. Then what are you saying?
General Abizaid. I am saying that the ROE for interrogators
are a product of Army doctrine, of Army training, of practices
in the field, and of commanders doing their job out there.
Senator Byrd. General Abizaid, if someone at the Pentagon
is required to approve these ROE, surely you know.
General Abizaid. If I knew, Senator, I would tell you. I
would not forward any ROE to anybody. Nobody has asked me for
any, and I would not have forwarded it to them.
Senator Byrd. So you are, indeed, saying that nobody in the
Pentagon approved these rules.
General Abizaid. I do not know that I am saying whether
they reviewed them or not. I am saying that I have not
personally forwarded anything to the Pentagon for their
approval.
Senator Byrd. Did the SECDEF have to approve these rules to
your knowledge?
General Abizaid. Sir, I am just telling you what I said. In
CENTCOM, I have not forwarded anything to the Pentagon for
approval with regard to ROE.
Senator Byrd. I am not asking you what you forwarded to the
Pentagon. To your knowledge, did the SECDEF have to approve
these, or did he approve these ROE, to your knowledge?
Colonel Warren. Senator, if I might, I was the legal
advisor for the command and participated in the drafting of the
counter-resistance and interrogation policy. There is no
requirement that the DOD review or approve the methods that we
used. As Generals Abizaid and Sanchez have said, they were
operating in a combat environment. The commanders have the
authority to approve those policies.
Senator Byrd. All right, if there is no requirement, to
your knowledge, did the SECDEF approve these ROE?
Colonel Warren. Sir, to my knowledge, no.
Senator Byrd. General Sanchez, as Senator Kennedy stated,
The New York Times reported this morning--and here it is, right
here--the headline says, ``Officer Says Army Tried to Curb ICRC
Visits to Prison in Iraq.'' Is that allegation accurate?
General Sanchez. Sir, I never approved any policy or
procedure or requirement to do that.
Senator Byrd. Let us see what this says. ``Two announced
inspections in Iraq,'' and, ``The ICRC observed abuses in one
cell block on two unannounced inspections in October, and
complained in writing on November 6. The military responded
that inspectors should make appointments before visiting the
cell block.'' Well, we know what that means.
General Abizaid, the ICRC has alleged a pattern of abuse at
detention centers in Iraq. With all due respect, how can you
explain the culture of abuse that was allowed to develop in a
prison system under your ultimate command?
General Abizaid. I do not believe that a culture of abuse
existed in my command. I do not believe that based on what my
IG told me and what the Department of the Army IG told me. I
believe that we have isolated incidents that have taken place.
I am aware that the ICRC has its view on things. A lot of its
view is based upon what happens at the point of detention where
soldiers fighting for their lives detain people, which is a
very brutal and bloody event.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my time is up.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
Senator Allard.
General Abizaid. Mr. Chairman, if I may?
Chairman Warner. Feel free, General, when you wish to add
some information.
General Abizaid. Policies do flow from the top of the DOD
and I do not want to give any impression that they do not.
Chairman Warner. We recognize the tradition of civilian
leadership.
General Abizaid. But SOPs are our business and we work
them.
Senator Byrd. These are not SOPs we are talking about, I
hope.
Chairman Warner. Fine.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I just want to point out that
I think the real travesty of justice is on the other side,
where we see women and children used as shields, where we see a
fight being carried on in mosques and other religious
structures by our adversaries, where I see that conflict being
carried in schools, and where our adversaries do not care about
innocent lives. They will cheat and lie and do anything. I
think that we have to understand the challenges that our men
and women are facing in Iraq, and I think that it is a very
difficult situation.
Now, that does not justify, I think, what we have seen by a
few individuals here in this prison, and I want to fully
understand how it is that that kind of incident would happen in
the prison. I think we all have to understand it. I think,
General Abizaid, that you have recognized that there is a
problem and that we are in the process of correcting that
problem.
Major General Miller, of the list of reports that came out,
yours was the first report. You looked at Guantanamo and then
you went on ahead and briefed, I think, the command in Iraq as
to what you learned in Guantanamo, is that correct?
General Miller. Senator, when I briefed the command of
CJTF-7, it was on the findings and recommendations that the
team I brought found of our assessment of the operations within
CJTF-7 in Iraq.
Senator Allard. Did you share with them some of the lessons
learned and what not in Guantanamo, and explain to them what to
watch out for?
General Miller. Yes, sir. We used our SOPs that we had
developed for humane detention, interrogation, and intelligence
fusion, to be able to use that as a starting point where they
could go about improving their capability.
Senator Allard. So when you did your briefing, how far down
did that information go? Did it go to those interrogators or
were you relying on individuals further down in the command to
pass on your words?
General Miller. Sir, the recommendations that I made from
the assessments were given to the senior leadership of the JTF
for them to make decisions, upon their applicability, and then
to, if they chose, make additional modifications to their
procedures to go about doing that. In no case did the team have
the opportunity to or ask to brief down at the lowest level. It
was at the senior leadership level, at the commander and the
senior staff-officer level.
Senator Allard. Now, with those lessons learned, can
anybody on this panel explain to me what happened to the
information that was shared by Major General Miller to the
higher command? How was that passed down?
General Sanchez. Yes, Senator. After I received the
recommendations of General Miller, I then forwarded those to my
staff and the commander of the detention center for
modification, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, since
we knew that there was a difference in climates between the two
different operations.
Senator Allard. By that difference in climate, you are
saying that, in Guantanamo, it was not as pertinent to actually
what was happening in the field of battle, but what was
happening in Iraq was very pertinent to what was happening on a
day-to-day basis in the field of battle, and that information
was crucial to the survival of Americans. Is that correct?
General Sanchez. Yes, sir, that is exactly right. We were,
at that point in time, working very hard to get intelligence
fusion at a higher level that could allow us to target,
precisely, the enemy forces. We had to very rapidly take those
recommendations and modify them to the theater, modify them to
ensure that they were in accordance with the Geneva
Conventions, get the lessons that had been learned before in
interrogation and detention operations, and be able to adjust
our own procedures and fix the procedures that we had in
country.
Senator Allard. Now, General Abizaid and General Sanchez, I
would like for you to describe the checks and balances, or the
command-wide reporting and supervision, that was in place
during 2003, when the subject prisoner abuses occurred. General
Taguba's report clearly shows abuses reported as early as May
2003 in Iraq, as well as major accountability and leadership
and basic discipline breakdowns through the 800th MP Brigade. I
guess the bottom line is, did Brigadier General Karpinski, the
800th MP Brigade Commander, keep you informed as to the
deteriorating conditions in her command?
General Abizaid. I did not talk to the 800th MP Brigade
Commander.
Senator Allard. General Sanchez.
General Sanchez. Sir, as far as the deteriorating
conditions of her command, part of our basic understanding in
the July/August time frame was that we had a detainee situation
that had not been faced by our Army in over 50 years. That was
the reason why I had requested the Ryder team to come in to
assist us in establishing those operations so that they would
be efficient, effective, and treating people with dignity and
respect. That is why I supported the Miller team coming into
the country. We were providing the resources that were
necessary in order for us to stand up the capabilities of the
800th to be able to function effectively.
Senator Allard. So the Ryder Report, that was a first
report in trying to deal with any hint of impropriety that was
happening at the prison, is that correct?
General Sanchez. Senator, there were investigations that
had been conducted as a result of allegations of abuse that
were out in the command, not at the detention centers, at that
point. As we have stated before, there were allegations at the
point of contact, where the soldiers are fighting every single
day, from the ICRC, that prisoners were being treated roughly.
Those were the allegations that were being investigated at that
point in time. As far as detention center abuses at that point,
I did not have knowledge of that.
General Abizaid. But I would like to make sure that the
committee understands we did have detention center problems.
They were overcrowded, we didn't have the MPs in the right
place, we were moving into facilities that had been destroyed
or damaged by the war, and we had an intelligence problem, in
that the tactical units were not getting feedback from the
detainees who moved into the detention centers. From Ambassador
Bremer's point of view, he had a problem, in that we were not
releasing detainees back into the population quickly enough,
and he wanted us to come up with a system that would make that
more efficient.
So let us be clear that we understood there were problems
in the detainee system, linked to the intelligence system,
linked to the political system, that had to be addressed and we
were working on them. But I would also like to remind you that
these images are not the kind of thing that we thought was
happening out there, that anyone in the chain of command would
have condoned or allowed to be practiced.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired.
General Miller. Sir, if I may just add one clarifying
point, because I think it is important. During the assistance
visit that my team made in the August/September time frame, we
were also charged with the responsibility of looking for humane
detention at the CJTF-7 level detention facilities. In doing
that assessment in one of the facilities, the team found that
it was being operated in an unsatisfactory manner. I stopped
the assessment, went to General Sanchez and made this report.
He directed that there be corrective action made within 48
hours in this facility. That action was immediately started and
was continuing on as the assessment team that I led departed
theater. So there were reports. I will tell you there was very
aggressive action taken by the chain of command to go about
correcting those shortfalls.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Allard. My time is expired.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Colonel Warren, is it accurate to say that all the
prisoners at Abu Ghraib were entitled to the protections of the
Geneva Conventions, that they were either enemy prisoners of
war (POWs) or protected persons? Is that correct?
Colonel Warren. Sir, that is right. They were protected
persons, either under the Third or Fourth Geneva Conventions.
Senator Reed. Under the Geneva Convention Article 31, no
physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against any
protected persons, in particular to obtain information about
them or from third parties. Is that correct?
Colonel Warren. Sir, you are quoting from Article 31 of the
Fourth Convention. That is an accurate recitation of what the
Article says. I would cite for you Pictet's Commentary on the
Article for elaboration that coercion should not be taken out
of context.
Senator Reed. Colonel, thank you. But that is the operative
rule.
Colonel Warren. That is the literal rule.
Senator Reed. Let us go back to the ROE here. Sleep
management, 72 hours, sensory deprivation, 72 hours. Would you
consider that to be physical or moral coercion?
Colonel Warren. Sir, not prohibited coercion, under Article
31, for security internees and unlawful combatants.
Senator Reed. I am talking about ``in particular to obtain
information about them or from third parties.''
Colonel Warren. No, sir, I would not.
Senator Reed. So these are not methods to use for
interrogation.
Colonel Warren. Sir, the list on the right-hand side of
the----
Senator Reed. Can you answer the question, Colonel?
Colonel Warren. Sir, that does not require a yes or no
answer. I have to elaborate upon it.
Senator Reed. Well, Colonel, my time is 6 minutes, so let
me just move on.
Colonel Warren. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. You have just said that these are coercive
means.
Colonel Warren. No, sir, I did not. What I said is----
Senator Reed. For a protected person to obtain information.
Colonel Warren. No, sir. What I said was those that are on
the right are a list on a slide, which was produced at a low
level, which was not representative of our counter-resistance
and interrogation policy.
Senator Reed. Excuse me, Colonel. I am not asking how it
was evolved, but if 72 hours with a bag over your head is
contrary to Article 31 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Colonel Warren. That would be. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Sanchez, in today's USA Today, it has been reported
that you ordered or approved the use of sleep deprivation,
intimidation by guard dogs, excessive noise, and inducing fear
as an interrogation method for a prisoner in Abu Ghraib prison.
Is that correct?
General Sanchez. Sir, that may be correct that it is in a
news article, but I never approved any of those measures to be
used within the CJTF-7 at any time in the last year.
Senator Reed. Excuse me. Now I want to get back to this. It
may be correct that you ordered those methods used against a
prisoner, is that your answer?
General Sanchez. No, sir, that is not what I said. I said
it may be correct that it is printed in an article, but I have
never approved the use of any of those methods within CJTF-7 in
the 12\1/2\ months that I have been in Iraq.
Senator Reed. What level of command produced this slide?
General Sanchez. Sir, my understanding is that that was
produced at the company commander level.
[The information referred to follows:]
In response to questions by Senator Reed concerning whether I had
ordered or approved specific interrogation approaches, I stated, ``I
have never approved the use of any of those methods within CJTF-7 in
the 12.5 months that I've been in Iraq.'' I provided a similar response
to follow-up questions by Senators Collins and Dayton.
In the context of Senator Reed's questions, ``those methods''
referred to a list of interrogation approaches on the right column of a
chart entitled, ``Interrogation Rules of Engagement'' (IROE), which
would require a written exception to policy for use, and to ``Sleep
Deprivation, Intimidation by Guard Dogs, Excessive Noise and Inducing
Fear,'' which were reported in a USA Today article as having been
approved by me for a specific prisoner at Abu Ghraib prison.
CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy in the fall of
2003 was stated in two memoranda, the first dated September 14, 2003,
and the second dated October 12, 2003. Both CJTF-7 Interrogation and
Counter-Resistance Policy memoranda were furnished to the committee on
May 19. The September 14 Policy authorized the methods listed in the
right column of the IROE chart, except for ``sensory deprivation'' and
``sleep deprivation.'' Use of the authorized methods was subject to the
general and specific safeguards listed in Enclosure 2 of the Policy, as
well as the implementation guidance of the commander, 205th MI Brigade.
The September Policy remained in effect for less than 1 month, until
superceded by the October 12 Policy.
The October 12 Policy, which remained in effect for 7 months,
authorizes the methods listed at its Enclosure 1. These methods do not
include sleep deprivation, presence of military working dogs, or
excessive noise. Use of any methods not listed at Enclosure 1 of the
October 12 memorandum would require an exception to policy granted by
me, as well as legal review and review by the command's senior
intelligence officer. The methods listed in the right column of the
IROE chart are similarly not authorized under the October 12 Policy
without an exception to policy granted by me.
Except for segregation in excess of 30 days, I have neither
received nor approved any requests for the use of any methods requiring
an exception to policy. Except for segregation in excess of 30 days, I
have not approved the use of any of those methods for a particular
prisoner.
Senator Reed. How could the company commander evolve such a
specific list? How could the company commander then turn around
and say some of these things would require your permission,
without any interaction between your commands? It seems to me
just difficult to understand.
General Sanchez. Sir, it is difficult for me to understand.
You would have to ask the commander.
Senator Reed. This is the company commander that you
relieved and gave a letter of admonition?
General Sanchez. No, sir.
Senator Reed. No? Okay.
General Miller, at Guantanamo it has been reported that you
developed a 72-point matrix for stress and duress that lays out
types of coercion and escalating levels. They include harsh
heat or cold, withholding food, hooding for days at a time, and
naked isolation in cold, dark cells. Is that correct?
General Miller. Sir, that is categorically incorrect.
Senator Reed. That never happened.
General Miller. Sir, that is categorically incorrect.
Senator Reed. All right. When you were dispatched by
Secretary Cambone and General Boykin to go to Iraq, did they
give you any specific instructions about increasing the
aggressiveness of interrogations?
General Miller. Sir, I was tasked to conduct an assistance
visit by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They tasked U.S. Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM), who then tasked CJTF-Guantanamo to put the
team together.
Senator Reed. Did you have conversations with General
Boykin and Secretary Cambone, prior to your departure, about
your trip?
General Miller. Sir, I did not.
Senator Reed. You did not. Did you have any discussions
after your visit, after you returned?
General Miller. Sir, I submitted the report up to SOUTHCOM.
I had no direct discussions with Secretary Cambone or General
Boykin.
Senator Reed. Well, Secretary Cambone testified that
General Boykin briefed him on your discussions, and he led to
the implication that you and General Boykin had--have you
spoken to General Boykin about any of these issues?
General Miller. No, sir. The report was provided up, and
this is my speculation, because I do not know--it may have gone
to General Boykin, but he and I have not had personal
conversations about this inspection visit.
Senator Reed. Your team, when they went down and briefed at
the--how low a level did you brief and talk to the people in
that prison?
General Miller. Yes, sir. Sir, that team went at several
different levels. They started at the CJTF level.
Senator Reed. How far did they go in the prison?
General Miller. Then went down to the battalion commander
level at the MP function, and to the company commander level at
the MI function.
Senator Reed. That might be the level where this document
was developed?
General Miller. Sir, I do not know what level that document
was developed at.
Senator Reed. Did your team specifically brief that these
techniques, which you deny being in place in Guantanamo, could
not be used? Did they in any way suggest that methods could be
used in that prison that are contrary to the Geneva
Conventions?
General Miller. Sir, no methods contrary to the Geneva
Conventions were presented at any time by the assistance team
that I took to CJTF-7. There is no--because you brought it up
again, sir--there is no status, or there is no program at JTF-
Guantanamo that has any of those techniques that are that are
prohibited by the Geneva Conventions.
Senator Reed. One of the problems we have, General, is that
we have not yet, after repeated requests, received that
documentation about the interrogation techniques at Guantanamo,
which is another lack of cooperation in this investigation.
My time has expired. Will we have a second round, Mr.
Chairman?
Chairman Warner. It is important that we conclude today's
round with a closed session, and Senators will be given an
opportunity to ask questions.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of
you for your service in a difficult and dangerous area of the
world. You are serving your country with distinction.
General Abizaid, I appreciate your leadership and your
comments earlier today. We have made progress in Afghanistan
and Iraq. We have had al Qaeda on the run and we have avoided
another attack on this country, for which we can be grateful. I
think you are correct to suggest that sometimes in this city,
people get preoccupied with failure and error, rather than
seeing the progress that has occurred.
I am troubled by this suggestion that the interrogation
rules are some sort of a smoking gun of illegality and
impropriety. You have been asked about sleep adjustment, or
sleep management, for 72 hours. Those, as I read this
document--this is a restrictive document that says such an
action must have the direct approval of the commanding general.
Is that the way you understand it, General Sanchez?
General Sanchez. Sir, that is the way I read that document
also.
Senator Sessions. Are you the commanding general, or who
was the commanding general referred to?
General Sanchez. That referred to the commanding general of
CJTF-7. That is me, sir.
Senator Sessions. So the system was set up to restrict
these kind of activities. They could never be done, even
though, as Colonel Warren, the JAG officer, said, they could be
acceptable under--some of them, at least--the Geneva
Conventions, but they had to make a written report and request
to you before any of those could be used.
General Sanchez. That is exactly right, sir.
Senator Sessions. Were any of these ever approved by you?
General Sanchez. Sir, the only approvals that I ever had at
my desk were for continued segregation beyond 30 days, and
there were 25 of those that were approved. I never saw any
other method come to my level requesting approval.
Senator Sessions. So the only requests under this category
of what some referred to as ``harsher treatment'' were the
isolation requests, which is done in American prisons every
day. These isolations requests were, in fact, submitted to you
in writing. Did you or your staff make an evaluation before you
approved them?
General Sanchez. Yes, sir. Those came forward. My staff,
both the intelligence officer and my staff judge advocate,
evaluated those, and then my staff judge advocate brought them
in to me, and I personally approved them.
Senator Sessions. I would like to note that, in big print
here, it says, ``Safeguards. Approaches must always be humane
and lawful. Detainees will NEVER''--in capital letters--``be
touched in a malicious or unwanted manner.'' Were the actions
in this prison in violation of that directive? The allegations
and the pictures we have seen, those would be in violation of
that directive, would they not?
General Sanchez. Sir, if those allegations are proved in
the investigative process to be true, those would be
violations.
Senator Sessions. It says, ``Geneva Conventions must be
complied with.''
General Sanchez. Absolutely, sir. That was always the
standard.
Senator Sessions. Now, General Abizaid or General Sanchez,
General Ryder was a provost marshal. That is the person in
charge of the military prison system, is that not correct?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Sessions. He is the Army's top expert on how to
house prisoners. It is not easy in the United States, I am
telling you. Senator Kennedy and I sponsored a bill recently to
crack down on sexual abuse in prisons, the prison rape bill,
because it happens in American prisons, we have abuses. But it
is difficult in a theater of combat operations. You brought him
over to help you bring order to this situation in the post-
hostility conflict, is that what you did?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir. We have asked for a lot of help,
because we needed a lot of help in this theater on a lot of
different things. But what is the most helpful is where
commanders travel and look and see with their own eyes what is
going on and how it is going on. General Sanchez and I and
others have been all around the theater, have talked to
interrogators, we have looked to make sure what was happening
was right, and we emphasized to them, all the time, that they
need to treat people right.
Senator Sessions. Well, things go awry. There is just no
doubt about it. It is more difficult in a combat environment.
General Miller, you had a reputation for being able to
manage a prison and to obtain information from detainees in a
way that was closely inspected and observed by the ICRC and
other people on a continuing basis. We had soldiers at risk in
Iraq. We have civilian leadership of the new Iraqi Government
at risk of their very lives, as we saw one just killed
recently. It certainly would have been wonderful if we had
obtained intelligence so we could have interdicted the latest
murder of the head of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC).
General Abizaid, you said you want to get information to
the tactical commanders. For the American people who may not
understand this language, part of the problem was, as I
understood it, you were obtaining information, but were not
getting it out to the people who could benefit from having it,
is that fair to say?
General Abizaid. Well, Senator, as I traveled around--and I
spend most of my time when I go around going to tactical
units--I was extremely impressed by the amount of information
that they had about local conditions. I would always ask them
whether, once the detainees were evacuated into the prison
system, they receive follow-up information that would help them
in their difficult job of breaking down the cellular structures
that the enemy uses against us. At the same time, General
Sanchez and I, probably very early on in General Sanchez's
arriving in the theater, were concerned that we were not
getting a good view of what was happening at the leadership
level. So we knew that there had to be a connection between
what the tactical units knew and what the leadership knew if we
were ever to get at the insurgency-based problems that we were
seeing out there. So we were dealing with a systemic problem,
and we still do not have as good a view as we would like to
have about the nature of the insurgency, and who is in charge,
and where the cells move, and how they operate, et cetera. It
is an intelligence-intensive task.
Senator Sessions. General Miller, one of your
responsibilities was trying to make sure that the evidence that
had been gathered was promptly disseminated. Is that one of
your responsibilities?
General Miller. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Sessions. I think my time has expired, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
all for being here this morning.
General Abizaid, I want to commend you, particularly for
your candor. This city, and this group, from time to time, is
used to what I have termed ``progressive candor.'' We learn a
little bit at a time, and ultimately somebody has to take
responsibility. I appreciate very much your willingness to take
the responsibility.
General Miller, there are photos showing MI, MPs, and
private contractors in the vicinity of prisoner abuse. We are
being told that it was a handful, or a few--the operative word
of the day--bad apples engaging in activities that were
abusive, not consistent with either Geneva Conventions rules or
with the expectations of the command above them. So can you
tell me who were the participants, who were the abusers in this
situation? I am not aware of anyone outside of a handful of
privates, sergeants, et cetera, being charged with anything.
What about the private contractors? Are the MI people, apart
from MPs, being charged, or do you know?
General Miller. Senator, those events are a part of the
investigations being done, also being done now by General Fay,
involving the intelligence elements, both the military and any
of the contractors who would be involved in the intelligence
function.
Senator Ben Nelson. Will we expect something within a
timely manner on those investigations?
General Miller. Sir, it is my understanding that General
Fay's report is nearing a close and that those reports will be
given to the chain of command very quickly.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Miller, what instructions or
orders were you given before you arrived on your way to
Guantanamo?
General Miller. Sir, on my assumption as the commander of
JTF-Guantanamo, I went to the headquarters, SOUTHCOM, and
General Hill laid out his responsibilities for me and gave me
the orders. We had an opportunity to fuse two JTFs together
that were not working as successfully. That was the priority
mission, to be able to integrate both a detention and
intelligence function to produce actionable intelligence for
the Nation--in this case, operational and strategic
intelligence to help us win the global war on terror.
Senator Ben Nelson. Did you talk to any of the civilians
within the DOD?
General Miller. Sir, initially I did not. Once I made my
assessment at JTF-Guantanamo, then I went to Washington, DC,
and talked to both the Intelligence Community and others who
are a part of the functionalities that we had at Guantanamo
about detention, interrogation, and an intelligence fusion.
Senator Ben Nelson. Anyone at the level of Under Secretary
or Assistant Secretary of Defense?
General Miller. Sir, I did not initially talk to them. But
later on--as you remember, I was there for 17 months--I talked
all the way up to the SECDEF level, briefing them on the
operations that we had and the intelligence that we gathered
and then the integration of those operations throughout
Guantanamo.
Senator Ben Nelson. Were any of those discussions directed
at what you might do in the future if you were assigned to Abu
Ghraib, or to Iraq in general?
General Miller. No, sir, they were not.
Senator Ben Nelson. Were there any differences between the
two assignments?
General Miller. Senator, there were substantial
differences. JTF-Guantanamo has the responsibility to detain
enemy combatants not covered by the Geneva Conventions, and so
there were specific authorizations and limits that went
directly into Guantanamo. So I became very knowledgeable of
those. I read the Geneva Conventions, to be frank with you, in
great depth. My lawyer probably spent 1 to 2 hours a day with
me as I learned every day how to be more effective in doing
this job and also doing it to the standards of America, using
humane detention and interrogation that reflected America's
values.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
General Sanchez, you suspended the entire chain of command
that was under the command of General Karpinski, including
General Karpinski herself. She says she objected to the
interference with her command, which was represented by Colonel
Pappas, in bringing intelligence operations and TACON over the
prison. But you disagree that she objected.
General Sanchez. Senator, General Karpinski never talked to
me about any interference.
Senator Ben Nelson. Did she send you a written
communication?
General Sanchez. Sir, she received the same order that
assigned responsibility for FOB protection and security of
detainees as the other commanders in the task force.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is it usual that an MI officer would
take over the tactical command for force protection?
General Sanchez. Sir, it is dependent upon the senior
commander in that FOB who has responsibility to defend his
soldiers.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do you know of any other instances?
General Sanchez. A brigade commander, yes, sir. The MI
brigade commander, no, sir. He was a senior man who was
permanently on that FOB, and he had responsibilities for
protecting his soldiers, and that was my intent.
Senator Ben Nelson. Merging interrogation and force
protection together?
General Sanchez. Sir, a commander has integral
responsibility, independent of his mission, to protect his
soldiers, and that was what I was trying to institutionalize.
Senator Ben Nelson. My time has expired. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me begin by thanking all of you for your
extraordinary service. One of the tragedies of this abuse
scandal is that it not only obscures the fine work that you are
doing, but it also overwhelms the thousands of acts of
kindness, courage, and compassion by our troops every day in
Iraq, and that is why this abuse scandal is particularly
upsetting. I feel it sets back and undermines the good work of
the vast majority of our troops.
I have to say that after reading the Taguba Report,
reviewing the various interviews, and participating in these
hearings, I remain unclear about the answers to some very basic
and critical questions, questions such as, who really was in
charge of the prison, and what was allowed in the treatment of
the prisoners?
General Sanchez, at the committee's hearing last week,
General Alexander referred to these guidelines, the
interrogation ROE, as yours. Numerous press reports have
referred to these rules as ``the Sanchez guidelines.'' But is
it your testimony this morning that these guidelines were not
issued by your office and that, in fact, you only saw them last
week at our hearings?
General Sanchez. Ma'am, absolutely not. The first time I
saw the slide that was specifically shown to me by one of the
Senators, that is what I was referring to. I personally issued
the memorandums, and I have both memorandums sitting here that
I will provide to the committee.
[The information referred to follows:]
The requested documents were provided to the committee at the
conclusion of the hearing on May 19, 2004, and as part of QFR number 76
for Lieutenant General Sanchez.
General Sanchez. Those ROEs were my ROEs, and I personally
approved those after I consulted with my higher headquarters
and my staff judge advocate.
Senator Collins. In response to a question from Senator
Reed, you said, however, that you had never approved the
presence of dogs, sleep deprivation, or stress positions that
are listed on these guidelines. Is that correct?
General Sanchez. Ma'am, that is exactly right.
Senator Collins. General Sanchez, I also want to follow up
on your November order putting MI in charge of some aspects of
the prison. I also want to explore with you the role of MI, in
general.
In the Taguba Report, the General says that the
recommendation of General Miller's team, that the guard force
be actively engaged in setting the conditions for the
successful exploitation of the detainees, would appear to be in
conflict with the recommendations of General Ryder's team and
AR 190-8, that MPs do not participate in MI-supervised
interrogation sessions. He also says that having MPs actively
set the favorable conditions for interviews runs counter to the
smooth operation of a detention facility. Didn't your order,
where you involved the MPs in some aspects of the supervision
of the prison, run counter to the regulation cited by General
Taguba?
General Abizaid. Senator Collins, may I address this?
Senator Collins. Yes, General.
General Abizaid. First of all, we do not have all the
facts. I think it is important for the committee to understand
that. We need to see what we are going to hear from the 205th
MI Brigade. What was in the mind of that commander? What did he
think?
So if we can set that aside, let me share with you one of
the findings that came out of the Department of the Army IG
investigations but are preliminary. They are not approved. I am
sure they will be shared with this committee. Our doctrine is
not right. It is just not right. There are so many things that
are out there that are not right in the way that we operate for
this war. This is a doctrinal problem of understanding where
you bring--what do the MPs do? What do the MI guys do? How do
they come together in the right way? This doctrinal issue has
to be fixed if we are ever going to get our intelligence right
to fight this war and beat this enemy. So we have problems that
have to be looked at from top to bottom in order to ensure that
there is no confusion. Because, you see, the Ryder Report says
one thing, the Taguba Report will say one thing.
Senator Collins. Exactly my point.
General Abizaid. You are going to see that the Fay Report
says something else. It is not because anybody is lying to
anybody; it is because the system is not right. There are a lot
of systems that are wrong out there that we had better fix if
we are going to beat this enemy.
Senator Collins. But, General, I guess what concerns me is,
when you have all these contradictory doctrines or all these
contradictory findings, it suggests to me that there was great
confusion at the prison, and that confusion can set the stage
for the kinds of unacceptable abuses that occurred. That is my
concern.
General Abizaid. It is a concern that I share, Senator, and
we will find out the facts. But I would like to ensure that you
understand that there is great confusion in a combat zone all
the time--almost as much as there is here in Washington, but
not quite.
Senator Collins. Thank you, General.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
That confusion in the combat zone goes way back in history.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to join
with others in thanking you for convening this hearing and
doing your utmost to get to the bottom of these matters.
But I really question our ability to get down to the truth
of what has occurred at 6 minutes apiece. We now have heard
from 15 of the highest-level officials involved in this entire
operation, from the SECDEF to the generals in command, and
nobody knew that anything was amiss, no one approved anything
amiss, no one did anything amiss. We have a general acceptance
of responsibility, but there is no one to blame, except for the
people down at the very bottom of one prison. The focus has
been on that, although the ICRC report says that there were
abuses at 14 different prisons under U.S. control.
According to The New York Times today, the ICRC complained
in writing on November 6 about some of the abuses that they had
witnessed, which paralleled the practices that were shown in
the pictures, of holding Iraqi prisoners naked in dark concrete
cells for several days at a time, forcing them to wear women's
underwear on their heads while being paraded and photographed,
and it characterizes the response of the Army to that complaint
as barring unannounced visits by the ICRC at the prisons. It
cited a particular letter dated December 24 that the Army had
described as evidence of the military promptly addressing the
ICRC concerns, but the action that was taken, the barring of
unannounced visits, brings into question what the content of
that letter actually was.
The Army has refused to release that letter, citing ``a
tradition of confidentiality in dealing with the international
agency.'' An Army spokesman declined on Tuesday to characterize
the letter or to discuss what it said about the ICRC's access
to the cell block.
General Sanchez, is that evidence of the transparency of
this Army's handling of these matters? How are we going to find
anything out if no one will tell us anything or even provide
the information that is necessary to evaluate these matters?
General Sanchez. Senator, I swore to tell you the truth,
and everything that I have told you in here is the truth.
Senator Dayton. What is in the December 24 letter to the
ICRC?
General Sanchez. Sir, I do not recall exactly what the--we
have the letter, obviously, and I would have to leave it to the
Department to provide that letter to you, sir. Sir, as far as I
am concerned, we are transparent within CJTF-7.
Senator Dayton. All right, I will accept that, then. So you
will provide a copy of that letter, and we can assess what the
response was?
General Sanchez. Sir, as long as that is within the
approval of the higher headquarters and the DOD, yes, sir, we
will provide that.
[The information referred to follows:]
The requested document was provided as an attachment to the
Lieutenant General Sanchez QFR number 35.
Senator Dayton. All right. That is a big caveat, but we
will see what comes forward.
General Sanchez. Sir, I have no problems with providing you
that letter; however, there are higher-headquarters directives.
Senator Dayton. Fair enough.
Sir, on November 19, you--again, according to another
newspaper report; sometimes I think our responsibilities in
this body are relegated to reading the newspapers and watching
the other news reports to find out these things that we are not
getting any information about--but there is reportedly a memo
from your office, General Sanchez, on November 19, that placed
the two key Abu Ghraib cell blocks, where the abuses occurred,
under the control of Colonel Pappas. Then there is also
reference made to a request he reportedly made to you 11 days
later about a interrogation plan for a particular prisoner that
involved--first, the interrogators were to throw chairs and
tables in the man's presence at the prison and ``invade his
personal space.'' This is a request from Colonel Pappas, the
man to whom you turned over that authority over those two
cells. Then the police were to put a hood on his head and take
him to an isolated cell through a gauntlet of barking dogs.
There, the police were to strip-search him and interrupt his
sleep for 3 days, with interrogations, barking, and loud music,
according to Army documents, the plan that was sent to you. Is
that one of the 25 requests for additional interrogation
techniques that you approved?
General Sanchez. Sir, first of all, you stated that I
issued an order that I specifically put key cell blocks under
Colonel Pappas. I never issued such an order. Second----
Senator Dayton. Okay. So the article is incorrect?
General Sanchez. Sir, I never issued such an order.
Second, that request never made it to my headquarters--or
to me, personally, rather.
Senator Dayton. So there was not any memo on November 19
from your office to place these cell blocks under Colonel
Pappas?
General Sanchez. No, sir. I never issued such an order.
Senator Dayton. All right.
General Sanchez. That specific request for interrogation
methods, that never got the CJTF-7 commanding general's level,
and I never approved any interrogation methods other than
continued segregation.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
General Abizaid, you commented on the need to stay the
course. Speaking for myself--I will not presume to speak for my
colleagues--the Senate has been bipartisanly resolute behind
every request the President has made for funding and support.
It has been virtually unanimous. It has been across the board--
the supplemental appropriations, the authorizations we are
taking up now, the 2005 authorization. We are adding, at the
request of the President, an additional $25 billion for
purposes that have not even been defined. But I think it is
something I wanted to try to get an answer on from various
authorities. What is that course? What is the direction that we
are on? I would just note in response particularly to some
comments that were made about how well things are going, I do
not know how to sort this out. I want us to succeed there. I
just want to be told the truth about whether we are doing well
or not, so we can assess whether the Minnesotans and other
Americans who are serving over there are going to be there for
months or years, and what their likelihood is of returning
safely and alive.
But I refer here to a Washington Post comment made by a
Kurdish member of the IGC, that if something is not done about
the security situation, there will be no transfer of power.
``Uthman''--his name--``who is generally pro-American,
described the assassination as only the most extreme example of
the lawlessness that has grown in the year since President
Saddam Hussein was driven from power. `Never in Iraq has it
been like this. Never. Even under Saddam,' he said. `People are
killed, kidnapped, and assaulted, children are taken away,
women are raped, no one is afraid of any punishment.' '' Is
that an accurate description of 1 percent of the country, 5
percent, more than that? What is the security situation there,
sir?
General Abizaid. Yes, sir. I appreciate the question. First
of all, not only were people carried away in the middle of the
night and raped and tortured and killed under Saddam, but it
happened at a huge scale, at an institutional scale unequaled
in any recent memory, perhaps only rivaled by what the Nazis
did. So, are things better just by the mere fact that that
regime of torture and intimidation is gone? Yes, that is a good
thing.
On the other hand, I will not be Pollyannaish about where
we are, Senator. This is a hard thing, and it is going to take
a long time, and it is going to take a lot of courage and a lot
of perseverance and, unfortunately, more blood, and it is going
to take more treasure. But there are more people in Iraq that
are working with us to try to make their country a better place
than are trying to tear it apart. The people that are trying to
tear it apart are ruthless. They are doing it precisely now for
the reasons that--I think I have been about as honest as I
could be with this committee in the past--because this is the
vulnerable time. They must make it fail now. They are pulling
out everything that they can to make it fail. It is hard. That
is why we kept extra forces there. It is hard, and it is tough,
and it is difficult. But we will prevail. I am telling you,
there are things that are bad about Iraq, and we are
responsible for security, and it is not like walking in
downtown Washington, DC. It is a dangerous place. But I can
tell you, people have a right to express their opinion. There
is political activity, there is freedom of the press, there are
things that are happening in Iraq that do not happen anywhere
else in the Middle East, and we ought to be damn proud about
it.
Senator Dayton. May I just conclude? My time is up. How
soon do you expect that the 200 or 4,000 or whatever Iraqi
police and militia will be in a position to enforce their own
law and order on their city streets?
General Abizaid. Well, Senator, I would have said, before
the recent events, that somewhere between September and
December they would be ready, but we had a setback. We know we
had a setback, and we are putting one of our best officers in
the United States military on the job. If the creek does not
rise, somewhere between January and April they will be ready.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, let me echo the sentiments of all of our
colleagues up here relative to the leadership you are providing
and the great job that all the men and women underneath you are
doing. While we have seen this story on the front pages of the
paper for the last 3 weeks, those of us who have followed the
details of the battles that your men and women are waging every
day know and understand that you have scored major victory
after major victory in the last 3 weeks, and we commend you for
the great job your folks are doing.
Colonel Warren, would you tell me what the jurisdiction is
between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Army
relative to the arresting, securing, transporting, and
interrogation of these detainees in Iraq?
Colonel Warren. Sir, I do not know that it is a matter,
necessarily, of jurisdiction. We do know that other agencies do
detain individuals in Iraq. They use the same legal standard
under the Fourth Geneva Convention, which is that they are
imperative threats to security. Once they are brought into a
coalition force's detention facility, they are subject to our
rules and regulations.
Senator Chambliss. Well, is there any integration or
cooperation between the CIA and the Army relative to the
securing of prisoners and bringing them to places like Abu
Ghraib?
Colonel Warren. Sir, your question is outside the scope of
my knowledge. I can speak to the rules that apply once they are
inducted; the arrangements relative to operations, I am unable
to speak to those.
Senator Chambliss. General Abizaid, can you answer that
question?
General Abizaid. Sir, I would like to answer the question
in closed session.
Senator Chambliss. Okay.
General Abizaid and General Sanchez, I have asked this
question twice before, and I still have not gotten a
satisfactory answer. General Ryder was sent to this prison. He
was there in late October, early November 2003. During the very
time he was there, these particular incidences that are
alleged, the alleged abuses that we are talking about now, were
ongoing. Yet even though he was asking questions of the
conditions of the prison and the condition of the prisoners,
nobody told him, apparently, one word about these incidences
happening. Can either of you give me any explanation of why
that would have happened when a general of his stature was
there?
General Abizaid. Well, I can tell you that as I travel
around, I do not always get the whole truth and nothing but the
truth. I get a lot of, ``Everything is okay, everything is
fine, do not worry about it.'' That is one of the problems that
we have in the Armed Forces, that we have to look beyond our
rank and think about what would our son be doing in that
particular position in that particular unit, and is he or your
daughter doing the right thing or not. So just because General
Ryder was there, because General Sanchez was there, because
half a dozen other important people that went there to visit it
did not see it does not mean it was not happening. We have a
lot to understand about what went on in that organization, and
why and who was responsible.
Senator Chambliss. Well, I accept your answer. I think it
is a repeat of the statement you made earlier that there are
some things in this system that are broken, and you are now
working to fix them. That is what leadership is all about; when
you recognize a problem, you take after it, and you fix it. I
commend you for doing that.
General Miller, the situation at Guantanamo has been
alluded to by a number of folks during this process. I have
been down there a couple of times. I had the opportunity to
visit the prison, both before the new camp was built as well as
afterwards, and I saw the interrogation of prisoners down
there. From what I saw, and from what I have heard, there has
been no systemic prisoner abuse that was ongoing at any point
in time at Guantanamo, and I just wish you would address that
very quickly, if you will, please.
General Miller. Thank you, Senator. Sir, there was no
systemic abuse of prisoners at Guantanamo at any time. I
believe that there were three or four events--I will have to
correct that for the record as we go back and look--of
instances of minor abuse.
[The information referred to follows:]
There were a total of eight instances of minor abuse requiring
administrative action. Those infractions resulted in one reassignment,
one counseling, three reprimands, two Article 15s, and one Special
Court Martial acquittal.
Two or three of those were corrected by administrative
action, an Article 15, and one went to court-martial about an
abuse of one of the enemy combatants down there. It was the
effect of strong, dynamic leadership by the chain of command 24
hours a day, 7 days a week, that did not allow the abuse to
happen. We walked the cell blocks and the interrogation booths
of Guantanamo around the clock--not because we did not trust
our people, but this is a very difficult mission, and it takes
active engagement by leadership to ensure that it is done
correctly. That is why, in Guantanamo, because of the
enormously talented people who were there--75 percent, as most
of you know, were Reserve component leaders--we were
successful.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
Colonel Warren, there is an article in The Wall Street
Journal today, which says, ``A senior legal advisor to
Lieutenant General Sanchez helped draft a formal response to
the Red Cross's November report, according to one senior Army
official.'' Is that you they are referring to?
Colonel Warren. Sir, that may be me to whom they are
referring. In fact, I did not draft that particular response. I
believe, however, that my office did. As General Sanchez
alluded to earlier, before January the intake of working
papers--the camp visit reports from the ICRC--were handled in a
haphazard manner. Some of them were given to the camp
commander, some were given to the MP brigade, some went to my
office. In the particular case that is at issue, the October
visit, it took a period of time--and I do not know how long,
but I believe several weeks--for the working papers to reach
the level of my office. My office participated in the drafting
of a response for Brigadier General Karpinski's signature. That
response was dated December 24, and would have been delivered
to the ICRC.
When we discovered this haphazard process--and, frankly,
were concerned in the December time frame, when I first became
aware of the content of the report and its genesis--I talked to
General Sanchez. This would have been in early January. General
Sanchez then mandated that, from that point forward, all ICRC
reports and working papers would be addressed to him, and that
the single entry point for those to the command would be me.
That way we could maintain positive accountability of those
reports, as well as take remediative action and track the
corrections that were done by the subordinate commands.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank our witnesses for their service and for their
appearance today. I know it is not an easy assignment to be
here, given, especially, all your other responsibilities. But
it is in line with this committee's constitutional and
institutional responsibilities, and I believe all of us are
trying to discharge them to the best of our ability.
General Miller, I would like to return for a moment to this
Interrogation ROE document that has been much discussed.
General Sanchez characterized this document as having been
developed at a relatively low level, at the company level, and
indicated that he had not seen it before it became public at
our hearings. But in an annex to the Taguba Report, it was
revealed that this document was briefed to you as part of a
situation report when you visited Iraq in August 2003. What was
your reaction to that document at that time? Did you have any
concern that the techniques described would violate the Geneva
Conventions?
General Miller. Senator, that report is incorrect. At no
time was that document briefed to me during my visit in the
August/September time frame.
Senator Clinton. Was it briefed to you at any time prior to
that or following that period?
General Miller. Senator, that document was never briefed to
me at any time.
Senator Clinton. Were the contents of the document briefed
to you, General?
General Miller. The contents of that document were not
briefed to me.
Senator Clinton. So it is not only that you never saw the
document, the slide; you were never briefed, orally or in
writing, about the contents of that document. Is that correct?
General Miller. Senator, that is absolutely correct.
Senator Clinton. General Sanchez, at a hearing last week,
General Alexander, the head of Army MI, distributed that slide
to the committee. He stated, at that time, that the slide was
prepared by CJTF staff, your staff. Do you know where General
Alexander obtained the slide or why he believed that this came
from your staff?
General Sanchez. No, ma'am, I do not.
Senator Clinton. Colonel Warren, do you have any
information that would lend us some additional enlightenment
about why General Alexander told us, in sworn testimony, that
this slide came from General Sanchez' staff?
Colonel Warren. I absolutely do, ma'am. The reason that the
General made the statement that he did is because the slide, as
we now know, contained a CJTF-7 logo and was posted on the wall
of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center at Abu Ghraib.
It was titled ``The Interrogation Rules of Engagement,'' an
unfortunate use of the term ``ROE. What it should have said is,
``Interrogation Policy Extract.'' That is the context that is
so vital for you to understand, ma'am. When that slide was
created--and I talked to the person who created it; it was the
commander of Alpha Company 519th MI Battalion----
Senator Clinton. What was that person's name, Colonel?
Colonel Warren. Captain Woods, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Colonel Warren. It was intended to be a prophylaxis. There
is really nothing insidious about that particular slide. In
fact, if you will go back, ma'am, to the Counter-Resistance and
Interrogation Policies, which General Sanchez has said we will
make available to the committee, you will see that they lay out
specific measures that are approved.
The October 12 memorandum, in fact, approves only those
measures which are contained within the Army Field Manual on
interrogations that applies to POWs and segregation in excess
of 30 days. The intent of the slide, however, was to ensure
that interrogators understood that those measures on the left-
hand column--the ones that were approved, the ones I
mentioned--were authorized, but that any other measures were
not, without commanding-general approval.
Now, why is it that some of those, again, that seem to be
the so-called ``harsh methods'' appear on the right, ones such
as sensory deprivation that were never in any authorized
policy? The reason is that within the drafts that we prepared
in the headquarters in the September and October time frame,
we, collectively--the legal community and the MI community--
took every doctrinal approach that was authorized, we took
every approach that had been used by interrogators in other
places, we took every approach that was contained in any
document that we could find, and we put that in a policy so as
to regulate it to ensure that it complied with the Geneva
Conventions, that there was command oversight, there was a
specific safeguards document that was published that referenced
the Conventions, and required that at no time could any
interrogator in any approach violate the floor of the Geneva
Conventions--that is, the basic requirements to food, shelter,
water, medical care, clothing, and protection. It required an
interrogation plan. It required that any exception to policy go
through the senior intelligence officer and the staff judge
advocate, me, before going to the commanding general.
So the intent of that slide was to remind interrogators
that anything that was not authorized had to go to the
commanding general. By the way, that list was prepared by a
captain with all good intentions, but it had items on it that
could never be approved, and frankly, could never reasonably be
requested.
But note, ma'am, what is on the bottom. That is something
that often is overlooked, because that captain did not do a bad
job. That captain paraphrased the safeguards that are in
enclosure two of our Counter-Resistance and Interrogation
Policy. You will note that they talk about the requirement to
treat everyone with humanity, to follow the Geneva Conventions,
and to never unlawfully touch a person who is under
interrogation.
Senator Clinton. Colonel, may I just quickly follow up in
one question. Are you aware of any requests for approval
submitted in writing for any exceptions to the list on the
right-hand side?
Colonel Warren. Yes, ma'am. I am aware of approximately 25
requests for segregation in excess of 30 days, which went
through the process of approval that I described. I am also
aware that there were three requests for stress positions which
were submitted and were denied at the brigade commander level,
so they never would have arisen to the CJTF-7 level for review
or approval.
Senator Clinton. Is it also your understanding that non-
military agents of our government and private contractors were
similarly bound by the rules that you have just described?
Colonel Warren. Ma'am, I can not speak definitively to the
former. However, I can speak definitively to the latter, and
any contractors who were working within our facility under
contract to the DOD were certainly and clearly bound by our
rules and policies.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Abizaid, is it fair to say that people in the
region, the Arab world, are watching these hearings, and have
been?
General Abizaid. It is fair to say that, Senator, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. In your professional opinion--I know we are
sort of beating on ourselves here a bit--does this help or hurt
our cause?
General Abizaid. It helps our cause.
Senator Graham. I could not agree with you more.
General Abizaid. It helps our cause, because they have to
know that people will be held accountable who are in positions
of responsibility.
Senator Graham. Does anybody at this panel feel like a
burden has been placed upon you to come here and have to talk
about what happened?
General Abizaid. No, sir. We feel it is our responsibility.
Senator Graham. Colonel Warren, you are a very good JAG
officer and a very good officer, and I know you are in a tough
spot. But if you had talked about that slide an hour ago, that
would have really helped. So just pipe up. [Laughter.]
Don't be bashful.
Now, I disagree with you a bit, General Abizaid, about a
doctrine problem. I do not think we have a doctrine problem. I
like our doctrine. Our doctrine, when it comes to trying to
gather intelligence, is that anybody in Iraq is covered by the
Geneva Conventions, and that we are going to follow the law
because that is who we are as a nation. The idea that MPs--
General Miller, I am talking to you now--can help the
interrogators know what is going on in the cell block is a good
doctrine, is it not?
General Miller. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Graham. It is stupid to not be able to talk to the
people who are running the jail about how the prisoner is doing
that day before you interrogate him, right?
General Miller. Yes, sir, that is exactly right.
Senator Graham. Okay. For those who are watching, in the
Arab world or anywhere else, can you get good intelligence and
still be humane and decent?
General Abizaid. Yes, you can, sir.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, General Miller?
General Miller. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Graham. That is our doctrine.
Our problem is that these well-thought-out policies and
procedures, when it came to practice, failed miserably, and
that is why we are here, is that not true?
Now, let us talk about how that failure may have occurred.
Colonel Warren, I need you to help me here.
Colonel Warren. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Pappas comes in November, is that correct,
General Sanchez?
General Sanchez. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Graham. But we know that in October abuse is
already taking place before he gets there, is that correct?
General Sanchez. Yes, sir, now we know that.
Senator Graham. Okay. So there was a culture in that jail
that was abusive before November. My question is, do we know if
it changed after November in its tone or its application? Do we
know the answer to that yet?
Colonel Warren. Sir, I do not think we know. I think, as we
have said, that the Fay Report may provide some insight, and
also the CID report conducted by the Army is not yet final.
Senator Graham. Is it true, or not, that some of the people
in these abuse photos are common criminals?
Colonel Warren. Sir, that is absolutely correct. We know,
from the list of victims, that that is true.
Senator Graham. So now we know that the abuse was not just
directed at the high-value targets, but there was abuse going
on, just in general.
Colonel Warren. Absolutely correct, sir, and they should
not have been in that cell block. That violated our orders and
our policies.
Senator Graham. So one thing we can find out pretty quickly
is, in October, it is done to people who are not high-value
targets. That jail was just sort of screwed up.
Colonel Warren. Certainly, it would suggest, by the
investigations and the evidence we have, that that statement is
accurate. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. General Sanchez, I have never been in
combat, but I do have some knowledge of the military. I have
never seen a more dysfunctional command relationship, in the
history of me looking at the military, like that jail. Do you
agree with that?
General Sanchez. Sir, it was dysfunctional before November
19.
Senator Graham. Right.
General Miller, the reason you were called over is to make
sure that we not only did this legally, but to ensure we that
got the necessary intelligence to win this war, is that
correct?
General Miller. Sir, I was requested to come over to give
an assessment and then to be able to----
Senator Graham. Is that why you brought him over, General
Sanchez?
General Sanchez. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. I think you have done a great job at
Guantanamo Bay. I am glad you brought him over.
People did not misunderstand what you said. They just
totally ignored it. That is why we are here, is it not?
General Miller. Sir, in my opinion, that is exactly
correct.
Senator Graham. Now, here is my problem. When it comes time
to assess who ignored it, I am just not convinced that it is
six or seven MPs doing this by themselves, because we know, in
the photos, Colonel Warren, that there are people who are not
MPs. We know that MI analysts and maybe interrogators are
present at abuse situations.
Colonel Warren. That is correct, sir.
Senator Graham. Do I have your promise and pledge, all of
you, that you are going to make sure that whatever information
we get out of these court-martials will answer that question?
General Abizaid. You do, sir, absolutely.
General Sanchez. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Graham. I will give everybody an A-plus past
January. I thank General Sanchez. You reported this
appropriately to General Myers. Did you call him on January 14?
General Sanchez. Sir, I called General Abizaid.
Senator Graham. Okay. Who called General Myers?
General Abizaid. I did, sir.
Senator Graham. You told him this was a big deal.
General Abizaid. I did, sir.
Senator Graham. He had every assurance that you were
investigating it. So from General Myers' point of view--he is
running this war--it is fair to say that, in January, he
thought you were on top of it and you were investigating the
matter, is that correct?
General Abizaid. That is correct, sir.
Senator Graham. So when we look at responsibility up the
chain, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was informed that it
was being investigated in early January.
General Abizaid. I would say immediately, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Please, if you can, explain how the abuse
could have happened at this level, for this long, with this
much devastation to our country, and no one knew about it
before January in the photos given over by the specialist?
General Abizaid. Explain how the abuse was taking place
between October and November with us not knowing about it?
Senator Graham. How did it happen so long and so deep
without us knowing?
General Abizaid. Well, I think there are failures in people
doing their duty, and there are failures in systems. We should
have known, and we should have uncovered it and taken action
before it got to the point that it got to. I think there is no
doubt about that. I have asked myself the question, as I am
sure everybody else in the chain of command has, what could and
should we have done differently? I can think of some things
that we have to do. We have to ensure that we have transparency
with the ICRC, for example. We have to ensure that there are
other methods--just like when we had this problem that we
looked at during the movement phase of the war, where there
were a lot rapes and sexual assaults going on that were
unreported. When we looked at our systems, what we have at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, does not get replicated on the
battlefield.
So, Senator, there is a lot of work we have to do, and we
have to fix this one so it doesn't happen again.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
witnesses.
Obviously, I express not only my gratitude for your
service, but my support for the mission we have sent you to
Iraq to carry out. I think it is the test of a generation, and
I appreciate your confidence as you go forward, because it is
going to have a lot to do with our future security. It makes
why we are here all the more heartbreaking and infuriating,
because it distracts us from that mission. But I absolutely
agree with you, we have to go at this. Casualties occur in a
war. The tragedy here is that this prison abuse scandal is a
self-inflicted wound. But, like any wound, we have to clean it
up, fix it up, and then try our best to make sure it does not
happen again.
I want to express, first, my concern that, on more than one
occasion, at least two of you today--and you are honorable
people, obviously, under oath--have taken specific objection to
parts of General Taguba's report. That report has received a
lot of credibility and I believe it was a report, General
Sanchez, to you. Should we think less of it because of the
objections raised today? General Miller's response to a
question Senator Clinton asked said that something that he was
reported to have done or seen just did not happen. You have
separated yourself from conclusions in the report on a few
occasions. Does it lead you to doubt the thoroughness of the
report, or lead you to feel, as the commander, that you ought
to send somebody else out there?
General Sanchez. No, sir, it does not. As we have stated
here, there are some differences, there are some concerns with
our doctrinal foundations and the conduct of MP and MI
operations, and I think that is what is reflected there. We
have to fix those over time.
Senator Lieberman. So the areas in which you disagree--and
you have heard that General Miller has disagreed with General
Taguba's report--you are pursuing in different ways, then.
General Sanchez. Sir, where I disagreed with the report was
in my placing the 205th MI commander in charge of force
protection and security of detainees.
I believe that was exactly the right decision to make,
given the circumstances, the tactical circumstances, and the
warfighting conditions that existed----
Senator Lieberman. So, in that case, your disagreement is
on a matter of judgment, really, not fact.
General Sanchez. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Lieberman. General Miller, yours is a matter of
fact.
General Miller. Yes, sir, mine is a matter of fact. The
incident that Senator Clinton brought forward----
Senator Lieberman. In your testimony, you said it did not
happen.
General Miller. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Lieberman. Let me go on to another concern of mine
that follows up on Senator Graham's questions. Let me preface
this by saying, in taking some notes myself, General Abizaid,
you said two things here today that I want to come back to. One
is that, to the best of your knowledge, there was no pattern of
prisoner abuse in your command. Second, you expressed a belief
that there were systemic problems that existed at Abu Ghraib
that may have contributed to events there. Obviously we are all
interested in trying to figure out when a reasonable person in
a position of responsibility would have found that out.
The decision by the Pentagon to send General Miller to
Iraq, and then your decision, General Sanchez, to get Colonel
Pappas involved--am I correct, General Sanchez, that you are
saying that that decision was made because of your concern that
conditions at Abu Ghraib were as--I think someone used the
word; maybe you did, yourself--dysfunctional? Is that correct?
General Sanchez. Sir, that is exactly right. It was
dysfunctional in terms of the ability to defend the FOB. That
was the judgment that I expressed in the issuance of that
Fragmentary Order.
Senator Lieberman. Got it. Well, that is what I wanted to
clarify. But, at that time, the dysfunction that you saw in Abu
Ghraib did not include your knowledge of prisoner abuse. Is
that right?
General Sanchez. Sir, that is exactly right.
Senator Lieberman. General Miller, your understanding of
the reasons why you were dispatched to Iraq last fall did not
include--or did they?--a concern about prisoner abuse.
General Miller. Sir, they were not focused on the concern
about prisoner abuse. They were about the overall capability of
CJTF-7 to develop actionable intelligence, to do intelligence
fusion, to see how interrogations were conducted.
Senator Lieberman. Your stress on humane treatment, on the
Geneva Conventions, was of your own initiative, not because
anyone, as they dispatched you to Iraq, had said, ``We think we
have a problem of prisoner abuse.''
General Miller. Sir, that is absolutely correct.
Senator Lieberman. Let me now go to this chart that has
received so much attention. I have to say, again here, this was
put before us by General Alexander, the general in the Army who
is in charge of intelligence, so the fact that it comes from a
lower-ranking--well, a company commander, Captain Woods, is
surprising. Now, maybe it was given to us in the context of
this investigation because it is not all bad news for the Army.
It does have a series of approved approaches for all detainees
on the left here, which certainly, to me, seems reasonable. At
the bottom, it lists safeguards, including ``approaches must
always be humane and lawful, Geneva Conventions apply.''
The problem is this section here on the right, and Captain
Woods told anyone who saw this chart that it required General
Sanchez's approval. Some of these seem reasonable, some of them
literally seem in violation of the Geneva Conventions.
I wanted to ask you, Colonel Warren, two questions. First,
how could Captain Woods have come up with these sections that
she said required the commanding general's approval if the
commanding general had not approved this chart? Second, do you
agree that the procedures listed on the right side, including
environmental manipulation, sleep adjustments, and sensory
deprivation, are, in fact, violations of the Geneva Conventions
under all circumstances? Because I thought in your answer to
Senator Reed earlier, you opened a door in which you were
suggesting they might not be. If so, I think it is very
important for the committee to hear that.
Colonel Warren. My answer is that they are not.
Senator Lieberman. That these are not violations of the
Geneva Conventions?
Colonel Warren. These are not, in and of themselves, in
isolation, violations of the Geneva Conventions. Specifically,
the Fourth Convention, when applied to security internees--in
this case, who were unlawful combatants.
Senator Lieberman. Which covers a number of the people at
Abu Ghraib, is that right?
Colonel Warren. It does. It should cover those who, in this
circumstance, would have been permissibly under active
interrogation. As was pointed out by Senator Graham, some of
the people depicted in these photographs should not have been
under interrogation at all; they were of no interest. They were
actually criminal detainees who should not have been in that
cell block in the first place.
But that as an aside, sir, this is more complicated than a
yes or no answer. Those things that were on the right that were
placed there by Captain Woods, as I said earlier, sir, were
placed there in order to show the range of the universe, if you
will, of things that were not authorized. They were
representative.
Senator Lieberman. Where did she get the authority to not
only put them down on paper, but to say that they required the
approval of General Sanchez? She is a captain.
Colonel Warren. I think I can explain that, sir, because,
again, I was present throughout as this policy developed.
Senator Lieberman. Please, with the chairman's consent, if
you would just take a moment to go over this.
Colonel Warren. If I might.
Chairman Warner. The witness will have adequate time to
respond.
Colonel Warren. Thank you, sir. This goes back to General
Miller's team's visit, where they looked at a broad range of
interrogation and intelligence analytical operations. Their
recommendation was that we should have an interrogation policy.
We, as a task force, did not have one. We were focused on the
tactical level of interrogations. We were following
predominantly Army Field Manual approaches. In addition, we had
other units, such as Alpha Company 519th MI Battalion, which
had served in Afghanistan, bring in their own policies that
have been used in other theaters.
Additionally, we had what we called the Common Law of
Interrogation Approaches, and that consists of approaches which
were variations on the authorized approaches contained within
the Army Field Manual by way of implementation. So the point
that was made, to have a policy, I believe, was a reasoned and
correct recommendation, and I was present at meetings in
which----
Senator Lieberman. Reasoned and correct.
Colonel Warren. Reasoned and correct, absolutely, sir. I
believed we needed to have one as we moved our focus to the
operational level, as we became more sophisticated, and,
frankly, if we wanted to stem the growth of this Common Law of
Interrogations so that we could regularize it, so that we could
regulate it, and so that we should be able to provide proper
oversight.
So we took a number of these SOPs and policies. Among them
were those in use in Guantanamo Bay. Others were, as I
mentioned, those that were imported into theater. We put
together a team of folks who were MI and legal officers. We
looked at those policies, we reviewed them against the
requirements that we believe were imposed by the Fourth Geneva
Convention. We discarded some of those procedures. An example
is sensory deprivation. We floated these through the command in
a series of drafts.
To be sure, in some of these drafts--specifically one dated
September 10--you may very well find all of those on the right-
hand side, including sensory deprivation. But during the course
of the staffing and the deliberative process and the review--
and, sir, by no means is there a book that you can look up that
runs through interrogation approaches and methods and has a
check and a block that they comply or do not comply with the
Geneva Conventions--this is a matter of judgment, a matter of
rigor, and a matter of oversight and interpretation. We came up
with the interrogation policy first dated September 14. We then
sent that to CENTCOM, as General Sanchez described.
During the course of the next 28 days, this deliberative
and consultative process continued within the legal and the MI
community. It resulted, ultimately, in the October 12 policy.
The October 12 policy, as I described, requires compliance with
the Geneva Conventions. It draws a legal contrast between POWs
and between security internees interned for suspicion of
hostile activity to the security of the state, and it requires
the safeguards and oversight mechanisms I described. That
policy contains only the field manual approaches, which applied
to enemy POWs who enjoyed the highest, most preferred status on
the battlefield plus segregation in excess of 30 days. When
Captain Wood at some point, we believe in October, prepared
that slide, what I believe that she did was to take all of the
approaches that were floating around the command, if you will,
in various drafts, and within the policies listed them to
ensure that interrogators understood that only those things on
the left were authorized without permission.
Senator Lieberman. But again, you would say that of the
group on the right, which has attracted the attention of the
committee, the media, and the public, none of these are
inherently or automatically in violation of the Geneva
Conventions?
Colonel Warren. In my opinion they are not, sir, and this
is why one has to read not just Article 31 of the Fourth
Convention but also Pictet's commentary and various legal
treatises and interpretations of coercion as applied to
security internees.
I will make another point, sir, with regard to the
environment in which we found ourselves. Remember that there
were three Geneva Conventions, initially. In the 1929
iteration, after World War II, the Fourth Convention, the
Civilian's or Occupation Convention, was added. The body of
case law, if you will, concerning interpretation of specific
articles within the Fourth Geneva Convention is not very great
at all. In fact, as we worked through this we did the best we
could do under the exigencies of the circumstances and I am
frankly very comfortable, sir, with that October 12 policy that
remained our policy for a period of 8 months.
If I might add one other thing, sir. It is very important--
and this is a problem with a chart like this--it is very
important that you understand the definitions which are
contained, for example, in the field manual and the policy of
some of those measures. To use a term I have learned in the
past week in Washington, the optics are bad on that chart. But
if you read the actual definitions you will find, for example,
with regard to environmental manipulation, it sounds horrible.
But the fact is that environmental manipulation can be as
simple as, while at all times maintaining the minimum
requirements of the Geneva Conventions, that a person who
cooperates in interrogations would get an air conditioned room.
A person who is not cooperating gets the minimum, non-air
conditioned room. Each of those approaches has to be laid out,
in writing, in an interrogation plan. Each of those
interrogation plans is reviewed at the brigade level. For an
exception to policy it comes up for legal and senior
intelligence review before going to the commanding general. So
the intent of the chart, frankly, was to regulate, not to
impose unlawful measures.
Senator Lieberman. So though General Sanchez did not see
the chart before last week when General Alexander put it before
us, it accurately reflects what you think is the appropriate
policy for interrogation?
Colonel Warren. Those on the left and the safeguards,
absolutely. Those on the right, again, are the range of things
that may very well in implementation not be authorized. In
particular, given the intensity, the magnitude, the duration,
and the combination of measures, they may very well, as Senator
Reed suggested, violate the Geneva Conventions. You have to
look at it on a case-by-case basis.
Senator Lieberman. But obviously you would agree that a lot
of what we have seen in pictures that occurred in a particular
cellblock in Abu Ghraib violated the Geneva Conventions?
Colonel Warren. No question about it, sir. They also
violated U.S. law and that is why we are seeing court martials.
Senator Lieberman. This chart?
Colonel Warren. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess we can
conclude that not even the combatant commanders can go very far
without their lawyers, correct, General Abizaid?
General Abizaid. I am going to hire Colonel Warren.
Senator Cornyn. I do not think any of us should be
surprised that at least six separate investigations occurring
in a war zone might occasionally come up, at least in a
preliminary fashion, with some conflicts or gaps in the
investigation. But I want to make sure that we understand, at a
baseline, where we are.
General Abizaid, is it not true that in basic training our
soldiers receive training on the Geneva Conventions?
General Abizaid. Yes sir, that is true.
Senator Cornyn. Also, prior to their deployment to the
theater of operations they receive retraining on the terms of
the Geneva Conventions?
General Abizaid. They are supposed to, yes sir.
Senator Cornyn. I believe that you have made very clear
that under no circumstances, no matter what the category of
detainee may be, that at a basic minimum everyone in the
custody of the United States Military is entitled to be treated
humanely. Is that correct, sir?
General Abizaid. That is correct, sir.
Senator Cornyn. I believe very strongly that in addition to
the hearings that we have had here, which hopefully will, after
they conclude, allow our military to get back and do what we
have asked you to do in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that is
defeat the enemy. That we have to let our military justice
process work.
But General Sanchez, you suspended the entire chain of
command, not just privates and corporals, on January 17 or
thereabouts. Is that correct?
General Sanchez. Yes sir, that is correct.
Senator Cornyn. So just to be clear, no one is pointing the
finger at the lowest level of our military food chain and
saying, ``You are at fault and the commanding officers are
being protected.'' Is that right?
General Sanchez. Sir, that is correct.
Senator Cornyn. General Miller, I had the pleasure of
traveling to Guantanamo Bay, like a number of committee members
have, and meeting you there. I was enormously impressed with
that operation. There have been some who, during the course of
these hearings, have suggested that perhaps because of the
various categories of detainees we have in different locations,
whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Guantanamo Bay, there is some
variation in terms of the acceptability of humane treatment.
But would you also confirm for us that at a minimum everyone,
regardless of their status at Guantanamo Bay or anywhere else,
to your knowledge, is entitled to be treated humanely?
General Miller. Yes, Senator. Every combatant who is at
Guantanamo is detained in a humane manner.
Senator Cornyn. In your opinion, General Miller, has the
intelligence that you have been able to gain from those who
have recruited, financed, and carried out terrorist activities
against the United States or our military saved American lives?
General Miller. Senator, absolutely.
Senator Cornyn. Would you confirm for us, General Abizaid,
that that is also true within CENTCOM?
General Abizaid. Senator, I agree that it is true. I would
also like to add that some of these people who we are dealing
with are some of the most despicable characters you could ever
imagine. They spend every waking moment trying to figure out
how to deliver a WMD into the middle of our country. We should
not kid ourselves about what they are capable of doing to us,
and we have to deal with them.
Senator Cornyn. If we needed any other reminder of that,
the death of Nicholas Berg, I believe, reminded us, again, in a
graphic fashion. But I, for one, am not troubled by the fact
that some person who is trying to kill Americans is deprived of
a good night's sleep in order to elicit information, consistent
with the Geneva Conventions and our laws and humanity that
might save American lives. I consider you all American heroes
and congratulate you for the job that you are doing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Abizaid,
according to The Washington Post on May 8, 2004, starting in
August 2003, Ambassador Bremer had concerns about the treatment
of detainees and pressed the military to, ``improve conditions,
and later made the issue of regular talking points and
discussions with Secretary Rumsfeld, Vice President Cheney, and
National Security Advisor Rice.'' The same Washington Post
article notes that in August 2003, Ambassador Bremer, ``After
interceding in one detainee's case, urged the U.S. Military in
Iraq and top Bush administration officials to improve
conditions and avoid potential fallout.'' General Abizaid, is
that statement I just read essentially true?
General Abizaid. Ambassador Bremer brought up to me on one
of my many trips to Iraq, on more than one occasion, his
concern about detainees.
Senator Pryor. Okay, so you were aware that Ambassador
Bremer had concerns about the treatment of detainees. Were you
also aware that he raised this matter with a wide array of
senior administration officials?
General Abizaid. I am not aware of that, Senator, but as I
understand the context of Ambassador Bremer's and my
discussions, and also the context of discussions that I had
with many Iraqis who were talking to me about the detainee
issue, it had to do with moving into the prison system, being
lost sight of because we did not have a good tracking system,
not being able to get information to families in a timely
manner. These were things that we were all concerned about.
General Sanchez and I talked about them, and we certainly knew
that the detainee system had to be such that we could identify
people, track people through the system, and then release
people in a timely fashion back to their families once we had
determined that they served no intelligence purpose to us.
Until General Miller got there--well, I should not say that. We
were struggling with this very early on and I will not make any
excuses for it other than to say, when you take a country in
the shape that we took it, everything was broken and we were
starting from zero.
Senator Pryor. But are you saying that Ambassador Bremer
did not have concerns about human rights violations? It was
more a clerical concern?
General Abizaid. To me the issue was how you want to
describe human rights violations, as far as the Arabs were
concerned and then Ambassador Bremer was concerned. ``My
husband disappeared into your prison system and now you guys
cannot find him.'' That is a human rights problem. I agreed
with him and Rick agreed with him and we moved to fix it.
Senator Pryor. Okay. General Sanchez, were you aware that
Ambassador Bremer had concerns about the prison system?
General Sanchez. Sir, on many occasions since the time I
became the commanding general of CJTF-7, Ambassador Bremer and
I had discussions about detainee operations. We talked, as
General Abizaid stated, about the identification, the in-
processing, and the release procedures.
Senator Pryor. What about the treatment of the prisoners
and detainees?
General Sanchez. We also talked at some points about the
quality of life of prisoners and the conditions that existed,
especially during the summer and into the early fall.
Senator Pryor. Do you recall when he first brought those to
your attention?
General Sanchez. Sir, it was not a matter of him bringing
it to my attention; it was a part of general discussions that
we were having.
Senator Pryor. Do you remember when those general
discussions started?
General Sanchez. Sir, we started having those in the mid-
summer time frame.
General Abizaid. Senator, if I could just add, there is
another issue here which I want to make clear to the committee.
It has to do with what goes on at the point of capture. This is
not police work that we are dealing with, it is not a standard
arrest, it is combat, and there were an awful lot of people in
Iraq at the IGC level that thought our troops were being too
harsh in the way that they took people into custody. In my
mind, having seen it personally on the battlefield, I thought,
and I still think, it was some of the most professional work I
have seen young troopers do anywhere. So, we did have a
different point of view in that regard.
Senator Pryor. General Sanchez, let me follow up with you,
if I may. You mentioned you were having these general
discussions about conditions and a variety of issues relating
to the detainees. When did you first start to report that up
the chain of command, and who did you report that to?
General Sanchez. Sir, there were multiple occasions when
General Abizaid and I had discussions, especially as they
related to actions at the point of attack.
Senator Pryor. Here again, do you remember when that
started?
General Sanchez. Sir, as I stated, immediately.
Senator Pryor. As soon as you were aware of it.
General Abizaid. Senator, let there be no doubt. We knew
there were problems in the detainee system. We did not think
that there was a set of conditions existing out there such as
we have seen in the photographs. But we knew that there were
problems and we moved to get them under control as quickly as
we could. When I say immediately, I took command in July and I
would imagine that, besides talking about operational matters,
one of the first things that the two of us talked about was how
we had to get this under control.
Senator Pryor. General Abizaid, when you talked to your
superiors, who did you talk to?
General Abizaid. Sir, I cannot recall specifically
mentioning the problem to the SECDEF or to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, but on one of their visits and during
one of our phone calls--we talk all the time, and there is a
free exchange of information--they would have known. I do not
think that Don Ryder coming over to look at the system was
indicative of us trying to sweep the problem under the table;
it was indicative of us trying to fix the problem.
Senator Pryor. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One advantage of
going close to last is that you can cross things off your list.
I have done a lot of crossing off. Let me just share a concern.
During the last 3 hours there have been eight references to
different newspaper accounts, some of them with the same
newspaper several times. Of the articles that were written,
there are four of them that have been categorically denied by
you, General Abizaid, or by General Sanchez, and I believe you
in that. It leads me to believe this is so press-driven that it
is just out of control. But when you get your briefings every
morning, I know you read the different articles in the paper
that affect you. Is that not correct?
General Abizaid. Yes sir.
Senator Inhofe. There are many times that you have found
that they are in error, and I am sure you have either directly
or indirectly called that to the attention of the newspaper or
the publication that gave these in these articles. Is that
correct? You have done it right here in this setting.
General Abizaid. Well sir, there are a lot of things that
are incorrect. I do not spend much time correcting them.
Senator Inhofe. Well, I would hope you did not but I guess
I would ask this: have you ever seen a retraction by any of
these newspapers when something is proven to be wrong?
General Abizaid. No sir.
Senator Inhofe. All right. I have not either. I think
Senator Collins was right when she talked about all the good
things that are happening that you just do not see in the
media. Not just the humanitarian things that we see when we go
over to Iraq and go to Afghanistan and see what these great
guys and gals are doing and how much they are loved by the
people over there. In the case of Afghanistan, General Abizaid,
the Oklahoma 45th, they have taken on the responsibility of
training the Afghan National Army to train themselves, and they
are doing a great job. When I was over there I watched the
expressions on the faces of the new Afghan commanders, teaching
and training their troops. This is something that would be
worthy, certainly, of publication. I dare say very few people,
not half of 1 percent of the people in America, know all these
good things that are going on. Quite frankly it just breaks my
heart to see you guys over here. I agree with what Senator
Graham said, that we have to air this out and get it out in the
public but we have already had the SECDEF, the Under Secretary
of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and quite frankly,
I am sorry that you guys are here. I would rather be handling
this in some way where we can get your statement, get it in the
record and have that done with. Because you have an awesome
responsibility. General Sanchez, as commander of CJTF-7--that
is all the Army, all the Navy, all the Air Force, all the
Marines, all the coalition forces, all the allies--that is your
responsibility in Iraq. General Abizaid, you have that
responsibility plus what is going on in Afghanistan. By the
way, I think that the Afghanistan success story should serve
and will serve as a model for what we are trying to get done in
Iraq.
So, that is just one opinion. I know that you are anxious
to get back to the battlefield and that is where your mind is
today and that is where your heart is. I did talk to Senator
Warner when I found you were going to be here and he assured us
that you had other reasons to be here. So, perhaps that takes
care of that.
I think some things are worth repeating. I think that until
we see the Fay Report, until we get the results of the
investigations, the results of the courts martial, we are not
going to have the answers. This concept of undue command
influence puts you in a very awkward position to say things,
and I hope in your own minds you have not said anything
publicly that is going to interfere with the prosecutions that
are going on. Do you feel pretty comfortable that you have been
able to do that?
General Abizaid. Yes sir, I do.
Senator Inhofe. I look at what happened when things were
discovered and I was amazed with how quickly things were done,
how quickly you took care of the problems that were there. The
guards were removed, the commanders were relieved, criminal
investigations started immediately. That was long before the
public even knew what was going on, long before the pictures
came out. Maybe the system is broken but it is not broken to
the extent that you did not perform immediately when you found
out what was going on.
I want to say one thing, and this is just an opinion. There
are a lot of people who have been critical that some of the
guards, the seven guards that have been referred to many times,
are taking the heat for all of this. I do not think there is an
American out there, once they see the videos and the pictures
that we at this table have seen of the behavioral pattern of
these guards, who would be at all critical of any kind of
punishment that they would be subjected to. Now, I am not
saying anything that has not already been in the paper. I was
very careful, after I saw those, not to say anything. But
others did, and they talked about the fact that this was like
they were staging a porn film. Well, this is something that no
one would condone. You folks would not; no one else would. So I
just think that we need to talk about the good things that have
been happening and get you back in the battle where you belong.
Before I run out of time, General Sanchez, there have been
several things that you have taken away in terms of
interrogation techniques. Do you think that has harmed your
ability to get the information that you need to have?
General Sanchez. No sir, it has not.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Colonel Warren, I believe it was you
who said that, yes, in cellblock 1-A and 1-B those are the
tough guys, those are the terrorists. But occasionally one gets
in there who is not. I would suggest that probably the profile
of that individual got them there and when you realized that
they did not belong there you took them out. General Miller, is
that what you think might have happened?
General Miller. Sir, I was not there when they were using
cellblock 1-A and 1-B, but in discussions that was the intent
early on in September.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Well, I knew that you were not there
at the time. In fact, I was down at Guantanamo Bay when you
were there and you just did great work down there. My time has
expired, but I am glad that Senator Cornyn brought up something
most significant, and that was, did any of the information that
you have been able to get from these detainees prevent
something bad from happening or save American lives or save
coalition lives and, if so, are there any specific examples
that you would like to share with us? In other words, you were
successfully interrogating some of these people in that
particular section. Was some of the information that you got
helpful in saving American lives or saving troops?
General Abizaid. Senator, I do not know the answer to that.
I certainly do know that in many cases good interrogation
techniques used by very smart people have saved the lives of an
awful lot of Americans and Iraqis.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
General Miller. If I could just add to that. General
Sanchez, as one of my new jobs as the Deputy Commander for
Detainee Operations, asked me to look at the intelligence
function. I tell you that half the effort of CJTF-7, now Multi-
National Force Iraq, is going down to develop actionable
intelligence at the unit level. That saves soldiers' lives
every day. The other 30 percent goes toward theater-level
things that come down from the commanders' decision or in
taskings from other organizations. The other 20 percent we just
keep as a standby that is used every day because of high
profile. So that system, that organization works every day and
every night to try to be able to provide actionable
intelligence.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Miller, and I hope that
the media is paying attention today after you gave--I know my
time is up, but Colonel Warren wanted to say something about
Article 32 early on.
Chairman Warner. Please, Colonel Warren.
Senator Inhofe. Is there anything you would like to say
about Article 32?
Colonel Warren. Well sir, Article 32 of the Fourth
Convention is the one that prohibits torture and the conduct of
medical experimentation and so forth. Those are grave breaches
under the law of war. Of course, obviously prohibited under our
policies, under our values, our standards, our training, and
our interrogation policy.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
General Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, may I add something?
Chairman Warner. Yes, General Sanchez.
General Sanchez. As a result of the two visits from General
Miller and then from General Ryder, the system that we put into
place for intelligence fusion within CJTF-7 matured
significantly because of the experience and the lessons and the
integration of those lessons into the command under General
Fast. There is absolutely no question in my mind that because
of those two efforts, significant amounts of Americans' lives
have been saved because of the turn in terms of from the time
we find the information, develop the intelligence and get it to
the tactical level for action, it is absolutely the right thing
for us to have done and I would do it again.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you for that answer.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. General Sanchez, in my most
recent visit I met with General Fast. Would you kindly explain
the position that she occupies?
General Sanchez. Yes sir. Brigadier General Fast has been
my Director for Intelligence of the CJTF-7.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our
country under most difficult circumstances. I can only hope
that your treatment at our hands today has been humane. I
sometimes feel empathy for those who are on the receiving end
of these hearings.
General Abizaid, who was responsible for the staffing
levels at the prison, for the number of MPs and prison guards?
General Abizaid. I would say the responsibility for a unit
coming with the right number of people belongs to the United
States Army. The responsibility if we have shortages then
devolves upon CJTF-7 to tell me so I can tell the Army to fix
it.
Senator Bayh. The reason I ask is I understand Army
doctrine calls for one MP brigade per about 4,000 prisoners,
and here we had one battalion for what ultimately reached about
7,000 or slightly more prisoners, or about five times the
number of detainees per guard or MP that the Army doctrine
would call for. I would like your opinion--and there have been
some reports to this effect--this substantial overcrowding did
not excuse the behavior, of course, but did it contribute to an
atmosphere which might have given rise, at least in part, to
this aberrant behavior?
General Abizaid. Well, it contributed to systemic failures
at the prison. I think that is clear.
Senator Bayh. It gets to my second and somewhat broader
concern, now that I have had a chance to reflect upon this
whole set of circumstances. I would like your opinion, both
with the benefit of hindsight and going forward, on whether we
have adequate troop strength in Iraq to accomplish our mission.
I have been concerned from day one, and I know Senator McCain
and some others have had this concern, that we did not have
adequate strength at the beginning to prevent some of this
rampant looting that took place; that we did not have adequate
troop strength to prevent some of the sabotage of vital
infrastructure that took place; that we did not have adequate
troop strength to immediately clamp down on the insurrection
which has now gathered a momentum all on its own. I wonder if,
just in a microcosm, this is another manifestation of our
continual underestimation of the task that we have taken on
here. In a situation like this where we are deposing a regime,
we are trying to reconstitute a country with no history of
democracy, it seems to me we should err on the side of having
more strength than necessary rather than too little.
Both looking back and looking forward, have we had adequate
troop strength and do we have adequate troop strength to
accomplish our mission with this critical June 30 handover fast
approaching?
General Abizaid. Have we had adequate troop strength?
Certainly in February I would have told you absolutely. Things
were where we thought they would be. Did we anticipate that
there would be additional violence as we moved towards a
political process? We did, and that is the reason I asked for
the troops from the First Armored Division and the Second
Armored Cavalry Regiment to remain there, although we did not
specify them particularly. I would like to point out that one
piece of hugely good news that has been lost in this period of
the Abu Ghraib scandal is the incredible work and bravery and
selflessness and military capability of those two units, as
well as have the Marines in moving from positions in contact in
Baghdad down into the south and fighting a very tough fight.
But to answer your question directly--and forgive me for
diverting--Senator McCain and I have had the opportunity many
times to discuss it and I appreciate his opinion. There are
certain types of troops that we do not have enough of and we
still do not have enough of them, and we have to figure out how
to get them. They are MPs and they are MI guys and they are
human intelligence guys and they are civil affairs people. We
must build a force structure that allows us to be able to fight
a war like this in the 21st century and they are not in the
force structure. We have MPs on the scene that the Army has
done a very good job in training that do not happen to be MPs.
We have Air Force truck units. We are doing things with our
force structure that, in my view, we need to sit back from a
service provider point of view and say, ``Okay, what do we
really need?''
Now, in terms of asking are there enough tanks, are there
enough Bradleys, are there enough combat troops, marines,
etcetera, I am pretty comfortable with that. It is the enablers
I am not comfortable with. I will end it up by saying I am also
not comfortable that there are enough international troops on
the battlefield because the effort needs to be not just
American, but it needs to be international. These are things
that I have said, I believe, to the committee on numerous
occasions.
Senator Bayh. It is not new thinking.
General Abizaid. Did I miscalculate the number of troops?
Maybe. Maybe I miscalculated, but I think we have adjusted and
will continue to adjust based on what the enemy does, because
the enemy has a vote.
Senator Bayh. The civilian leadership always places this at
your doorstep, saying that they are endeavoring to get you
everything you need and I certainly appreciate that. But Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz began to touch on this, I think, yesterday
in some of his testimony up here in a different capacity, when
he said this is not only a military undertaking, this is a
political undertaking. I am just wondering if those who felt
that we were going to be greeted as liberating heroes, so to
speak, perhaps did not underestimate the magnitude of the
societal transformation we have taken on. This goes way beyond
the military purview, and I am just wondering if, given the
magnitude of that task, we have been understaffed and this is
just another manifestation of that.
General Abizaid. Well Senator, I cannot comment for the
political side of the house, but I can comment in saying that
while we cannot be defeated militarily we are not going to win
this thing militarily alone. We have to get everything
together--economics, politics, intelligence, information, you
name it--it all has to come together in a synchronized fashion
that allows us to do this very important task. It is really one
of the hardest things that this Nation has ever undertaken in
this part of the world or anywhere else.
Senator Bayh. Gentlemen, several of you have indicated in
response to recent questioning that lives have been saved,
attacks have been prevented with access to timely and accurate
intelligence. I think, General Miller, you have indicated that
approximately 600 of these detainees are some of the worst of
the worst and that if released upon Iraqi society they would
not only imperil our forces, but also innocent Iraqis. Colonel
Warren, I think you indicated that the Geneva Conventions would
allow somewhat more vigorous interrogations of some of those
kind of folks, but with the exception of a few requests for
solitary confinement we have not gone there. Is that all
correct? Stress positions were requested but were not
permitted.
Where I am going with all this is that it is so important
that we strike the right balance here. On the one hand, timely
intelligence saves innocent Iraqi lives and the lives of our
troops. On the other hand, there is a dividing line beyond
which our moral integrity, our honor is vitally important if we
are going to win this war against terrorism because we do stand
for something better. So what has been brought before this
committee with these pictures, which obviously go to the latter
issue of who we are and what we stand for, let us not lose
sight of the former, either.
The pictures that stick in my mind also, Mr. Chairman, are
the pictures of the young men out there at Walter Reed, some of
them missing arms, some of them missing legs, fractured lives
in the full flower of their youth. The pictures that came out
of those flag-draped caskets. Those pictures are important,
too. So, there is no excuse for the behavior that gave rise to
the pictures of this abuse at this prison. We have to root it
out and some of these individuals are on trial. But at the same
time, let us not repeat some of the mistakes that we have made
in the area of covert intelligence where the Director of the
CIA now tells us it is going to take 5 years to reconstitute
our covert capabilities and adequately protect this country. A
balance is in order here and I just hope that we are empowering
you to strike that balance in ways that protect our brave men
and women on the one hand and preserve our honor on the other.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator. Is there a
desire for any witness to speak? If not, Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I
certainly want to join my colleagues in thanking you for your
tremendous leadership and your outstanding service to your
country. Like Senator Cornyn, I regard you as heroes sitting in
front of us today, and I thank you for your time with us. Since
all of you have been very forthcoming in the last 3 hours of
questions, I would like to take this opportunity to ask some
questions with regard to your overall Iraqi operations.
First of all though, General Miller, let me ask you, would
you clarify who will be in charge of running the Iraqi prison
system after June 30?
General Miller. Senator, that is still in dialogue and
discussion between the CPA, the IGC, and now the soon-to-be
Interim Iraqi Government. Those transitions are working. I will
tell you that as far as Multi-National Forces Iraq, our plan is
to continue to run our theater-level, our Multi-National Forces
Iraq three detention facilities and other detention facilities
that allow us to ensure we can implement a safe and secure
environment. But as we work towards transition, every day I
meet with my Iraqi counterparts to see how we can more
successfully move to integrate this operation.
Senator Dole. Thank you. Now, in an intercepted letter
written by al Qaeda operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, we were
given insight to a terrorist message that was very significant
and compelling. In noting concern that he may lose a foothold
in Iraq he wrote, ``With the spread of the army and the police,
our future is becoming frightening.'' He went on to detail the
very environment of chaos his network requires to succeed--
attacks on Iraqi security forces, the targeting of Kurds, the
Shi'ite populations, and the killing of Americans--the very
environment evolving in Iraq that he feared the coalition
forces would suffocate.
General Abizaid, several reports have claimed that Zarqawi
is in Baghdad. If he actually got into Baghdad past coalition
forces, can we assume that he has the mobility to move to other
regions in Iraq?
General Abizaid. Senator Dole, I would assume that Zarqawi
has the ability to move around the Nation, unfortunately. The
nature of the insurgency is one that you cannot stop one person
from moving where you would not like them to move, even as
visible as they may be. He can move around, he can strike at
will, and we have reason to believe that he was in Jordan
recently and had his hands in the plot that would have killed
thousands and thousands of Jordanians that was foiled by the
king's special forces and intelligence forces. So there is a
great battle going on in the region. It not only extends to
Iraq, but it is in Saudi Arabia. It should come as no surprise
to the committee that these people are also attacking
foreigners in places like Saudi Arabia. There is a strategy at
work here that we should not lose sight of, and it is happening
in Afghanistan and it is happening in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, and elsewhere in the region, and it is also happening
in places like Madrid.
Senator Dole. Can you confirm that Zarqawi beheaded
Nicholas Berg?
General Abizaid. I do not know that I can confirm that it
was him. I know that there are various reports of people saying
it is his voice on the tape. I know he has claimed it, and it
certainly would not be past him.
Senator Dole. General Kimmitt said that the killing of
Salim had the classic hallmarks of Zarqawi. Do you have any
further information to share with us on that?
General Abizaid. No Senator. I would not want to give
Zarqawi any stature he does not deserve. He is a murderer, he
is a torturer, and that is the status he deserves.
Senator Dole. Do you have any indication that al Qaeda is
coordinating with al-Sadr's resistance?
General Abizaid. That is a very good question, but I think
the answer is no. But in that part of the world you never know.
Senator Dole. Saddam Hussein's government was believed to
have produced several hundred tons of sarin as well as
stockpiles of mustard gas. Now, the presence of both sarin and
mustard gas has been reported in Baghdad. Do our men and women
in theater have the equipment, the devices that they need in
order to protect themselves from the exposure to such agents as
these? General Sanchez?
General Sanchez. Yes ma'am. The answer is yes, we do. We
deploy with all of our chemical, nuclear, biological
capabilities and those are present.
Senator Dole. General Abizaid, defense contractors and
private business representatives, of course, are critical to
reconstruction efforts and rebuilding in Iraq. Terrorists seem
to have shifted their focus; they are targeting these unarmed
civilians. A corporation from my home State of North Carolina,
Blackwater, of course, with four contractors who were shot,
burned, and hung from a bridge; Nick Berg's murder--what are
you doing to provide increased security for these unarmed
civilians?
General Abizaid. I think it is best left for General
Sanchez to talk about the details, but it is clear that the
enemy has discovered a vulnerability in the contracting system.
It is also clear that we have to work with the contractors to
protect them, not only in coordinating with Iraqi security
services but with our own. For example, we should not have
convoys moving around areas that we know to be very violent
without some sort of coordination with the military, and that
has happened before and that has gotten people into trouble
before.
Senator Dole. General Sanchez, do you want to answer that
as well?
General Sanchez. Yes ma'am. We are working with the CPA
reconstruction effort. We work with all the contractors in the
country. We have the mechanisms to provide escort for convoys
as they move across the country, and there have been instances
where contractors have moved without coordination with the
local commanders and without escort and they have gotten
themselves in trouble. But we do have the mechanisms and we are
continuing to work that with them.
General Abizaid. By the way, Senator Dole, if I may, I
would just like to add by saying, we sometimes forget that a
lot of these contractors who are out there are heroes too.
Senator Dole. Yes.
General Abizaid. They are out there in a very dangerous
area. A lot of them--I would say the vast majority of them--are
doing it because they love their country. We should not fail to
praise them. There are times when we are not happy with the way
contracts work, et cetera, but these young Americans and older
Americans who are out there doing this are by and large great
people who love the country and doing God's work.
Senator Dole. Thank you for adding that statement. I could
not agree with you more. My time has expired.
Chairman Warner. I would like to also say I thank you very
much for the recognition. It is well-deserved by that
infrastructure that supports our forces.
We have two remaining Senators, then the committee will
stand in recess for just a few minutes and we will resume in
room 219, which is in this building.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Miller, I think you cleaned up
the situation at Guantanamo. I think you did a good job. Of
course, we are trying to sort out other things but I just want
that in the record, from my observations, having been there
twice.
General Abizaid, yesterday we had Lieutenant General Sharp
in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He offered
a little bit of clarity, and perhaps you can help clarify
things here for us. Earlier in your testimony you stated that
what we are facing, ``It's a hard thing, it will take a long
time.'' One of the responsibilities that we have is looking at
a force structure. We keep getting different statements that
are interpreted different ways. So one of the things that I
would like to ask you is, do you consider it part of the
mission in Iraq to disarm the militias, such as the Mehdi army
of al-Sadr?
General Abizaid. I regard al-Sadr's militia right now as
being a hostile force and it is our mission to disarm them or
destroy them in battle.
Senator Bill Nelson. I would think that would be the common
sense thing; if I were the commander that would be part of my
mission.
General Abizaid. But Senator, if I might add, it is also
clear that as we move towards a period of partnership in Iraq,
which is so essential for us to move to, that those militia
forces or armed groups that may belong to people loyal to the
new Iraq, that are willing to move forward in a manner of
reconciliation and work towards a better future, we need to
work with them to integrate them into the system. So it is not
that we will go out and destroy all militias, certainly not. It
is that we will fight those who are working against us and will
work to help integrate those that have worked with us, such as
we find in the Kurdish areas and to a certain extent in some of
the Shi'ite areas with the Badr Corps.
Senator Bill Nelson. It would be nice if we had an Iraqi
army that was ready to do a lot of that. It would be nice if we
had a police force that would be able to help us. But at the
moment we do not. So I am asking you about your mission now.
Does your mission in Iraq include providing security on the
streets against crime, functions normally performed by a police
force?
General Abizaid. Our mission in some areas, where the
police force is not working, unfortunately causes us to have to
do police work. That is correct. It is also correct to say,
Senator, that we probably have overstated how bad things are
with the Iraqi security forces, that the Iraqi security forces
in certain areas of the country are exceptional and they are
doing very well. In the north we see it and in some places in
the south. There are many police forces that are doing well by
Iraqi standards and will continue to do well. We had a failure
during the April time frame, as you are well aware, of some
units of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, of some units of the
Army and of some units of the police. But on the other hand,
Senator, I believe this has more to do with our willingness to
give them authority than it has to do with their willingness to
fight for their country. They want to fight for their country
but they want to fight for Iraqis. So as we move towards this
period of sovereignty and Iraqi chains of command are
established that are reliable, I believe that the quality of
Iraqi forces will move in a direction that will surprise a lot
of people. I have faith in them.
Senator Bill Nelson. I certainly hope so. I visited one of
those police academies in Jordan where you are training them,
but it is a long time and there are only X thousand that you
can prepare. We will find out how many in the future. Since we
are having to disarm militias and also having to provide some
protection against street crime right now, the question is, is
the 105,000 level, augmented by keeping the additional 20,000
so that you are somewhere in the range of 125,000, 130,000
troops, is that sufficient for you to carry out your mission
over the course, not only before June 30 but over the rest of
the year after June 30?
General Abizaid. Again, I do not like to waffle in my
answers, and this will sound like a waffle to you, but it
depends on a couple of different things. It depends upon the
enemy, although I would predict, and I think Rick will agree
with me, that the situation will become more violent, even
after sovereignty, because it will remain unclear what is going
to happen between the interim government and elections. So
moving through the election period will be violent, and it
could very well be more violent than we are seeing today. So it
is possible that we might need more forces. But I would again
say that perhaps with a resolution in the United Nations could
say that instead of international forces withdrawing from Iraq
they should come to Iraq, because other nations need to
understand how important Iraq's stability is for their future
as well as the entire region's future. Getting more
international forces and getting a higher quality of Iraqi
forces will help us figure out where we stand. But I think the
numbers about where we are now for the foreseeable future
unless something changes, either international force-wise or in
the quality of Iraqi troops, and is what we can expect through
the elections.
Senator Bill Nelson. What did you mean by a long time?
General Abizaid. Well, we know the elections will take
place in December or January. So, I am saying that the First
Armored--please do not get me in any more trouble with the
First Armored Division and the Second Armored Cavalry. We will
rotate them out of there but the force levels will stay about
what they are, I think, until after the elections. Or until we
come to a point where we see that we are going to have a soft
landing.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
add my gratitude to you and praise and commendation for your
leadership as well as to our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. I
too have visited Iraq and Afghanistan, and the kind of message
I got while I was there was good. Our troops seemed to have
been working well at that time.
I have been very concerned about one part of the personnel
that is there. We have talked about international and coalition
forces, we have talked about the MPs, the MIs. One group is the
contractors--this has been mentioned here--and I get the sense,
and I would like to get an answer from you on this, that the
contractors seem to be outside of the line of command. That is
my feeling. As a result some things they do are not known by
us.
General Abizaid, it is my understanding that the civilian
contractors who are interrogators--there are many different
kinds--work directly with MI personnel. My question is, who
supervises the civilian interrogators and do they report to any
agencies other than the DOD? Another question is, is anyone in
the DOD accountable for the behavior the civilian contractors?
General Miller. Sir, if I could I would like to take this.
Senator Akaka. General Miller. Thank you.
General Miller. The civilian contractors who work in our
intelligence organizations are accountable to the chain of
command of the intelligence organization. So if you are an
interrogator you are accountable to the chain of command of the
interrogation company or the battalion or the brigade that goes
in there. So there are also people who do screening. By
screening I mean when you are captured, they do the initial
debriefing to be able to develop intelligence. So we have a
small number who are in our Intelligence Fusion Centers. They
all work for the military through here. In our organization
currently no civilian contractor is at a supervisory position.
It is the military who sets the priorities and ensures that we
meet our standards.
Senator Akaka. What other types of personnel do you have
there as contractors besides interrogators?
General Miller. Sir, in the intelligence area there are the
screeners, those who get initial information from those under
interrogation, and those who are involved in intelligence
fusion, developing intelligence from processed intelligence,
from raw intelligence and feeding our computer systems. Those
are the contractors that we have in the intelligence system.
General Abizaid. You will also find interpreters, Senator.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. My question on that is, are there
any contractors who are from Third World nations?
General Abizaid. I am sure there are. Yes, I have talked to
some.
General Miller. Our translators, some of them are from
Third World nations. They do an excellent job for us.
Senator Akaka. Okay. Can you name some of the nations?
General Miller. Sir, I am sorry, I cannot.
Senator Akaka. My concern has been--and thank you for
answering it--that they are within the line and chain of
command so that we know what they are doing and they are
answerable to someone in DOD.
General Miller. Sir, we will, for the record, get the
Nations that those interpreters are from.
[The information referred to follows:]
This is in response to your request about the countries whose
citizens are working for us as interpreters/translators through the
Army's linguist contract. As regards JTF-GTMO, all the linguists there
now are U.S. citizens with security clearances, although previously
there were some linguists there who did not require a security
clearance. At that point we did have non-U.S. citizens there, most
notably a Chinese citizen who spoke Uighur; he has since become a U.S.
citizen and remains on the island. Due to the high level of proficiency
required to support Army missions, many of the linguists working as
U.S. citizens in positions that require security clearances are
naturalized citizens. Their countries of origin have no specifically
been tracked--some of these individuals became U.S. citizens more than
20 years ago while others, such as the Uighur linguist at JTF-GTMO, are
very new citizens.
As to the foreign nationals working under the Army linguist
contract, the majority of the requirements for linguists who do not
require access to classified information are hired locally. We have
such linguists hired in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain.
OSD funded an effort for linguists without security clearances to be
hired from the U.S. and other allied nations with the intent of
providing the forces in Iraq with linguists who are not only fluent in
the Iraqi dialect of Arabic and knowledgeable of Iraqi customs, but
also are familiar with U.S./Western culture. While the majority of the
linguists hired through this program are Iraqi citizens who are
permanent resident aliens of the U.S., there are also some Canadians of
Iraqi descent working for us as linguists. Additionally, there are one
or two linguists from Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Italy, all of whom
have sufficient proficiency in the Iraqi dialect and English to allow
them to support Army missions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. General Miller, you
have had quite a bit of publicity and so let me ask you this
out of my curiosity. Did you tell General Karpinski that you
were going to ``Gitmoize'' Abu Ghraib? What did you mean by
this statement?
General Miller. Senator, I did not tell General Karpinski I
was going to ``Gitmoize'' Abu Ghraib. I do not believe I have
ever used that term. When Janis Karpinski and I were having our
dialogues, they were about humane detention, how the detention
centers would be run, the requirements for the MPs and the
leadership to be present and ensure that humane detention is
done. As we have talked about before, it is an enormously high
leader impact, high leader-type requirement.
Senator Akaka. Do you think it is possible that any of your
recommendations could have been misconstrued by the civilian
contractors?
General Miller. Senator, I do not believe that any of those
recommendations were misconstrued. At that time there were no
civilian contractors employed in the organization. But once
again, that would be speculation on my part because I was not
there during the hiring to see how the civilian contractors
came in.
Senator Akaka. General Abizaid, you discussed the need to
modify Army doctrine about Abu Ghraib, and you cited instances
of abuse in Afghanistan and Iraq. Is the problem of detainee
abuse systemic within CENTCOM?
General Abizaid. No sir, I do not believe it is systemic.
There have been instances of abuse in Afghanistan and other
prisons, and in Iraq as well. I believe my comments concerning
doctrine have to do more with how we fuse intelligence, how we
distribute intelligence, how we work in a synchronized manner
to achieve results that will help our young soldiers and
marines on the battlefield.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your response.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.
We have had an excellent hearing, a very thorough exchange
of views and responses. We thank you.
Senator Talent.
Senator Talent. I appreciate the opportunity and if we are
going to go in a closed I will withhold my questions. I do have
a very brief statement, though. I do want to associate myself
with some of the concerns that Senator Inhofe raised. There is
so much that you do do not know whether you know it or not, and
one of the worst things that could happen out of this is if we
ended up in a situation where some of these people got off
because of something that was said at one of these hearings. In
addition, I think there is something to be said for waiting
until you all can present the comprehensive results of your
investigations. I do want to, just for the record, Mr.
Chairman, respectfully suggest to you and the ranking member
that we consider whether it would be good to have the Fay
Report in hand before we do the next hearing. I know you are
talking constantly with the ranking member about timing and
what we ought to do, and I think these hearings have been very
good. But it almost comports with the Senate schedule anyway,
given that a recess is coming up.
Chairman Warner. Senator, in my discussions with the DOD,
which I might say has been very cooperative, they have
indicated that this committee will be the first to receive the
Fay Report when it is available.
Senator Talent. If it looks like they are stonewalling on
it I think it is a different thing.
Chairman Warner. No.
Senator Talent. But you think in a couple of weeks that the
report will be available.
Chairman Warner. The DOD will determine the timing of the
release of that report.
Senator Talent. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Again, I thank you very much. We will now
go to Hart 219 for a closed session. I thank the committee. I
take note that we have had 100 percent attendance here today. I
think that speaks to the seriousness and the solemnity with
which this committee regards this very serious issue.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank our witnesses
for joining us but also indicate that I have some additional
questions that are unclassified that we do not have time to
ask.
Chairman Warner. Right.
Senator Levin. I will be submitting those to our witnesses.
I think if the chairman would set a deadline for those so our
witnesses will not have to be troubled by questions coming in
for a long period of time; for instance, questions within the
next 24 hours or 48 hours would be very helpful.
Chairman Warner. Absolutely. Thank you.
Senator Levin. Would that be all right?
Chairman Warner. That would be fine.
Senator Levin. Forty-eight hours then?
Chairman Warner. Let us just establish midday Friday.
Senator Levin. That would be fine. Noon Friday?
Chairman Warner. Noon Friday. Thank you very much.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
general taguba's report
1. Senator Collins. General Miller, General Taguba's report stated
that the 320th Military Police (MP) Battalion (BN) and the 372nd MP
received no training in detention or internee operations prior to
deployment to Iraq. I would like your assessment of the training of the
MPs at Abu Ghraib prison. Prior to their deployment to Iraq, what was
their experience at civilian or military prisons, and once they were
mobilized, what training were they provided?
General Miller. The United States Army Reserve Command could better
comment on the exact make up from civilian life of the 320th MP BN. The
soldiers and leaders of the 320th MP BN were trained in accordance with
the current Department of the Army mobilization requirements. The
Department of the Army would better be able to comment on pre-
deployment training conducted.
lack of training
2. Senator Collins.General Miller, do you believe that a lack of
training played a part in the alleged abuse at Abu Ghraib?
General Miller. I believe it was a breakdown in the fundamentals of
leadership within the unit that led to the alleged abuse going
unreported. Leaders set the tone by which a unit runs; they imbued the
morals and standards of the unit on each individual soldier and junior
leader. In this case the leadership failed to do their primary job: to
lead.
other u.s.-run prison facilities
3. Senator Collins. General Abizaid, can you give me your
assessment on whether abuse similar to that alleged at Abu Ghraib has
occurred at other U.S.-run prison facilities in Iraq or Afghanistan?
General Abizaid. The type of abuse seen in many of the photographs
taken at Abu Ghraib appears at this time to be confined to that
location and to have occurred during the timeframe of October-November
2003. At other detention facilities there have been isolated incidents
of alleged abuse, normally involving the use of excessive and
unauthorized physical force. Each of these incidents is currently the
subject of review and investigations are ongoing.
international committee of the red cross report
4. Senator Collins. Colonel Warren, with respect to the working
paper that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
submitted to the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) officials on November
6, 2003 to complain about abuses observed at Abu Ghraib in October, you
testified that your ``office participated in the drafting of a response
for Brigadier General (BG) Karpinski's signature. That response was
dated December 24 and would have been delivered to the International
Committee of the Red Cross.'' According to The Wall Street Journal,
General Karpinski stated that the first time she learned of the ICRC
report was in late November when she was summoned to a meeting with you
and General Walter Wojdakowski, where she was told by you ``not to
worry about the response because his officers were working on the
response for my review.'' When did you first become aware of the
November 6 ICRC report, to whom was it addressed, did you read the
report, and were you aware of its content?
Colonel Warner. I first became aware of the report in early
December 2003 when I returned to Iraq from leave. I was on leave in
Germany from 12-30 November 2003. The report was transmitted by the
ICRC cover letter, dated November 12, 2003, addressed to ``BG Janice
Karpinsky (sic), 800th MP Brigade.'' General Karpinski's December 24,
2003, response is enclosed.
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5. Senator Collins. Colonel Warren, did you personally approve your
office's response to the ICRC report? What actions did your office take
to inquire into the validity of these ICRC alleged abuses?
Colonel Warren. I approved the proposed response provided to the
205th MP Brigade (BDE). In my absence in late November, my section
conducted an analysis of the report, which it provided to the
Commander, 800th MP BDE and CJTF-7 C-2 by transmittal memorandum, dated
November 27, 2003.
Judge Advocates from my section met with officers from the 205th
Military Intelligence (MI) BDE and the 800th MP BDE in order to inquire
into the validity of the reported abuses. Through this process, Judge
Advocates were continually assured that the accusations were baseless.
Judge Advocate General Corps (JAGC) officers responsible for ICRC
liaison attended a meeting with the ICRC on November 16, 2003, at which
the report was discussed and a meeting at Abu Ghraib with the MPs and
MI personnel on December 4, 2003, called for the purpose of discussing
the report. I personally discussed the allegations of the report with
MI and MP personnel present at a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
Prison Meeting in December. I also personally discussed the allegations
with the Judge Advocate of the 205th MI BDE, who was present at Abu
Ghraib. The unanimous reaction of all military personnel with whom I
talked was that the allegations were implausible and not credible or
exaggerated.
6. Senator Collins. Colonel Warren, what was BG Karpinski's role in
the drafting and approval of the response? Did she sign the response to
the ICRC? At that time, was it normal procedure for your office to
draft responses to ICRC reports?
Colonel Warren. BG Karpinski signed the response, dated December
24, 2003. Notice of the report was provided to her command in late
November, while I was on leave. A draft response was formulated in
concert with her command and the 205th MI BDE and was provided to her
office in mid-December. I understand that changes were made to the
draft by the BDE during the coordination process before it was prepared
in final for her signature. To the best of my knowledge, this was the
first time that my office drafted a response to an ICRC report.
There was no normalized procedure for handling ICRC reports and
responses. Until January 2004, there was no clear delineation of
responsibility for receipt of, and response to, ICRC reports in Iraq.
This is because the 800th MP BDE, a Coalition Forces Land Component
Command (CFLCC) unit, had operated the Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW)
facility at Camp Bucca since the beginning of the war and had an
established and continuing relationship with the ICRC.
My section became involved in the ICRC visits to detention
facilities in late May 2003. This involvement consisted of attendance
at some portion of the inspection visits, typically the in and out-
briefs, and reviewing copies of the reports. Meetings at the ICRC
Baghdad headquarters were attended by officers from the 800th MP BDE
and CJTF-7 Judge Advocates. At these meetings, my officers or I would
receive copies of ICRC reports and I was added as a courtesy copy
addressee on most correspondence. Until January 2004, when the process
was changed at the direction of Lieutenant General Sanchez, I believe
that all original reports were addressed to the 800th MP BDE (either to
BG Karpinski or to the camp [battalion] commander). The process, as
explained to me by an ICRC delegate, was such that these reports
(termed ``Working Papers'') were to be handled at the lowest level
possible, typically one level up from the camp commander, and a written
response was neither required nor expected by the ICRC. Rather, the
ICRC would use the report content as a basis to assess corrective
action in subsequent visits to the camp at issue.
7. Senator Collins. Colonel Warren, what other responses to the
ICRC did your office participate in drafting or reviewing prior to that
time?
Colonel Warren. To the best of my knowledge, the December 24, 2003,
response was the first written response to a camp visit drafted by my
section. Previously, my section drafted and reviewed correspondence to
and from Lieutenant General Sanchez. A summary of correspondence with
the ICRC is enclosed. While I believe this summary to be complete, it
is possible that documents have been lost in the past 16 months of
combat operations.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
8. Senator Collins. Colonel Warren, who in your chain of command
did you inform of the substance of the report? Did you inform General
Sanchez, and if so, when?
Colonel Warren. I do not recall personally informing any superior
officers in my chain of command of the report transmitted by letter of
November 12, 2003, until January 2003. When I returned from leave, I
learned that the report was being staffed within the command for a
response. I do not recall discussing the detailed substance of the
report with Lieutenant General Sanchez until February 2004.
9. Senator Collins. Colonel Warren, when you learned of the report,
what actions, if any, did you personally take to inquire into the
validity of the ICRC alleged abuses?
Colonel Warren. Please see my response to question number 5.
10. Senator Collins. Colonel Warren, what corrective actions, if
any, were taken in response to the report? Please provide the CJTF-7
response to the ICRC report.
Colonel Warren. For specific corrective actions on conditions of
detention, I must refer you to the 800th MP BDE. For general conditions
of the Abu Ghraib base camp after November 19, 2003, and for all
matters pertaining to interrogation operations, I must refer you to the
205th MI BDE. As to corrective actions on ICRC access beginning in
January 2004, officers from the CJTF-7 headquarters coordinated and
attended future visits. This approach was implemented for the next ICRC
visit to Abu Ghraib, which occurred during the period of January 4-8,
2004, and was the subject of positive comment by ICRC delegates. In its
report on the January 4-8, 2004, visit, the ICRC commented on
improvements at Abu Ghraib made since their October visit. Also in
January 2004, the ICRC was informed that reports should be addressed to
the commander, CJTF-7 and provided to me or one of my officers.
There was no CJTF-7 response to the October 2003 report. The
response provided to the ICRC was from the Commander, 800th MP BDE.
cjtf interrogation policy
11. Senator Collins. Colonel Warren, could you confirm that: CJTF
had not issued official interrogation policy guidance prior to
September 14, 2003; the September 14, 2003 interrogation policy was
subsequently determined to be noncompliant with the Geneva Conventions;
and this determination led to the issuance of new guidance on October
12, 2003?
Colonel Warren. It is correct that CJTF-7 had not issued official
interrogation policy guidance prior to September 14, 2003. It is not
correct that the September 14, 2003, interrogation policy was
subsequently deemed to be noncompliant with the Geneva Conventions.
However, it is accurate that legal analysis conducted within CJTF-7 and
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) contributed to the decision to issue the
more conservative October 12, 2003, policy.
12. Senator Collins. Colonel Warren, did any of the alleged
detainee abuses that have come to light occur during the period prior
to September 14, 2003? If so, please describe the nature of these
alleged abuses.
Colonel Warren. To the best of my knowledge, none of the detainee
abuses that came to light in the U.S. Criminal Investigation Division
Command (USACIDC) Investigation or the Army Regulation 15-6
Investigation conducted by Major General (MG) Taguba concerning Abu
Ghraib occurred prior to September 14, 2003. It is possible, however,
that cases of abuse that occurred prior to that date will come to light
in the course of MG Fay's investigation. I believe that the chronology
of any cases of abuse will be part of the report of investigation by MG
Fay.
13. Senator Collins. Colonel Warren, did any of the alleged
detainee abuses that have come to light occur during the period between
September 14 and October 12, 2003? If so, please describe the nature of
these alleged abuses.
Colonel Warren. To the best of my knowledge, two incidents of
detainee abuse occurred at Abu Ghraib between September 14 and October
12, 2003. I believe that the first was an allegation of rough treatment
of an Iraqi male suspected of mortar attacks. The second was an
incident in which three MI soldiers were punished under Article 15,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), for improper association with
a female detainee (violation of policy). It is possible, however that
additional cases of abuse that fall within that time period will come
to light in the course of MG Fay's investigation.
14. Senator Collins. Colonel Warren, what categories of persons
(e.g., prisoners of war (POWs), detainees, etc.) were covered by the
September 14, 2003 interrogation policy and the October 12, 2003
interrogation policy?
Colonel Warren. The September 14, 2003, policy covered both
categories and distinguished the two. The October 12, 2003, policy
applies by its terms only to civilian security internees.
military intelligence
15. Senator Collins. Colonel Warren, is it true that MI operations
at Abu Ghraib detention facility and other detention facilities in Iraq
were conducted by MI units that had prior experience in Afghanistan,
where the administration determined the Geneva Conventions did not
apply?
Colonel Warren. I understand that at least one MI unit (A Company,
519th MI BN) and selected soldiers from other units had prior
experience in Afghanistan. My understanding of the U.S. Government's
position on the application of the Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan is
that they did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda. Regardless, as a
matter of policy, the U.S. forces treat all detainees humanely and, to
the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a
manner consistent with the principles of Geneva Conventions.
16. Senator Collins. Colonel Warren, in the absence of any
interrogation policy guidance from CJTF-7 prior to mid-September 2003,
are you concerned that those units might have utilized the
interrogation rules that had been in effect in Afghanistan?
Colonel Warren. Yes. This is one reason why CJTF-7 issued the
policy that culminated in the October 12, 2003, memorandum.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
high value detainees
17. Senator Levin. General Abizaid, you have confirmed that the
high value detainees at Camp Cropper fall under the responsibility of
General Dayton, commander of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), who reports
directly to you. You also confirmed that the high value detainees were
put under General Dayton as a result of a decision in Washington to
have a better and more efficient way to understand what was going on
with respect to weapons of mass destruction. General Sanchez testified
that his MPs have responsibility for providing security. Who in
Washington was involved in this decision?
General Abizaid. The decision to establish the ISG involved
appropriate members of the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). The ISG is a unique organization designed to
explore the linkage between weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the
former regime leadership. Its establishment required close coordination
and careful consideration.
18. Senator Levin. General Abizaid, is there a division in the
chain of command for the high value detainees at Camp Cropper, with the
detention and interrogation of the high value detainees under one chain
of command and the protection and security of those detainees under
another chain of command?
General Abizaid. During the period in question, there was a
division between responsibility for the detention facility and its
security and responsibility for the interrogation of high value
detainees (HVDs) at Camp Cropper. As the CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez
was responsible for the Camp Cropper detention facility: its security;
operations and maintenance; and disposition/protection of all resident
HVDs. The Director, ISG, in compliance with modification 3 to the ISG
execute order (EXORD), dated October 17, 2003, conducted interrogations
and debriefings of HVDs resident at Camp Cropper in order to acquire
information in direct support of ISG's unique mission: organize, direct
and apply capabilities and expertise in Iraq to discover, take custody
of, and exploit information and material of intelligence value on
individuals and methods within the following three areas: weapons of
mass destruction, counterterrorism, and the fate of Captain Michael
Scott Speicher.
19. Senator Levin. General Abizaid, who were the sources of the
decision that there be dual chains of command and for what reason?
General Abizaid. The original EXORD, dated May 31, 2003, directed
Commander, CENTCOM, to coordinate with the Director, DIA, to stand up
the ISG in order to accomplish national objectives in Iraq. This EXORD
clearly stated that the ISG would generate its own taskings and that
its priorities would be highly responsive to national requirements. The
command relationships reflected in the original EXORD had the ISG
operational control to the CJTF-7. In modification number one to that
EXORD, dated June 20, 2003, the Secretary of Defense directed a change
to the command relationships making ISG operational control to CENTCOM.
The ISG is a unique organization, reporting to both Commander,
CENTCOM and the DIA with strategic direction from the CIA. The
specialized mission and requirements of the ISG demanded unique
management, to include a direct link to the Department of Defense (DOD)
for time sensitive permissions and authorities, as well as consistent
alignment with national objectives. I believe this change in command
relationships was designed to reflect the relative independence and
unique mission of the ISG.
20. Senator Levin. General Abizaid, in your personal view, is it
wise to focus so much on WMD when the HVDs might have information that
could be valuable in the day-to-day effort to protect U.S. and
coalition forces?
General Abizaid. At the time of the establishment of the ISG, the
need to immediately locate and disable any possible Iraqi WMD was one
of the highest national priorities. While ISG interrogations were
focused on WMD, counterterrorism, and the fate of Captain Speicher,
these were not the only topics addressed. Standing operating procedure
(SOP) in the ISG required that all captured persons were immediately
interrogated or debriefed for all actionable intelligence, to include
force protection information.
The mission of the ISG is currently under re-evaluation. I agree
that intelligence assets, already in short supply throughout the
theater, need proper focus and constant re-tasking to meet changing
requirements. Currently, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
requirements are theater-wide priorities.
21. Senator Levin. General Abizaid, what benefit do you see in the
command relationship that seems to violate the tenet of unity of
command?
General Abizaid. The ISG, because of its unique mission,
organizational structure and technical areas of expertise, had a dual
reporting chain to CENTCOM and the DIA. Unity of command was not
affected by this reporting relationship. Command and control remained
under CENTCOM operational control, with close coordination with CJTF-7.
This reporting relationship, which affected collection and exploitation
priorities, merely allowed more rapid access to strategic information
of value to national level policymakers.
22. Senator Levin. General Abizaid, do the CJTF-7 October 12, 2003
interrogation policy guidelines apply to those HVDs? If not, why not?
What interrogation policy applies? Please provide a copy of the
interrogation policy for these HVDs.
General Abizaid. The ISG promulgated its own interrogation SOP on
October 3, 2003. ISG had no command and control relationship to CJTF-7
and its SOP pre-dated the CJTF-7 October 12, 2003, policy guidelines.
Consequently, the original ISG SOP did not follow the October 12, 2003,
interrogation policy guidelines of CJTF-7. The ISG interrogations SOP
was updated in May 2004 and now includes by reference the October 12,
2003, CJTF-7 interrogations policy memo. Both the October 3, 2003, and
current ISG interrogations SOPs are classified at the SECRET level.
meetings with icrc officials
23. Senator Levin. General Abizaid and General Sanchez, the
February 2004 ICRC report makes clear that since the beginning of the
conflict in Iraq, the ICRC regularly brought concerns about the ill-
treatment of detainees to the attention of coalition forces.
Additionally, Secretary Powell has stated that he met with ICRC
President Jacob Kellenberger three times since the beginning of 2003
and they discussed the treatment of detainees, including in Iraq.
Secretary Powell advised that Mr. Kellenberger raised this matter in
meetings with the Pentagon and with National Security Advisor
Condoleeza Rice over the same time period. Did any senior
administration officials contact you with concerns about the treatment
of detainees in Iraq following their meetings with Mr. Kellenberger or
any other ICRC official?
General Abizaid. I do not recall being contacted by any senior
administration officials following their meetings with Mr. Kellenberger
or any other ICRC representatives.
General Sanchez. No.
24. Senator Levin. General Abizaid and General Sanchez, which
officials contacted you, when did they do so, and what was the nature
of their concerns?
General Abizaid. I do not recall being contacted by any senior
administration officials following their meetings with Mr. Kellenberger
or any other ICRC representatives.
General Sanchez. No officials contacted me.
25. Senator Levin. General Abizaid and General Sanchez, were any
investigations, changes in policy, or other actions undertaken
following the ICRC's meetings with administration officials?
General Abizaid. I do not recall being contacted by any senior
administration officials following their meetings with Mr. Kellenberger
or any other ICRC representatives and am unaware of any investigations,
changes in policy or other actions that may have resulted from those
meetings.
General Sanchez. I am not aware of any ICRC meetings with
administration officials. If those meetings took place, I am not aware
of any investigations, changes in policy or other actions being
initiated as a result of those meetings.
26. Senator Levin. General Abizaid and General Sanchez, did either
of you keep senior administration officials informed of the ICRC's
concerns about the ill-treatment of prisoners? If so, at what level and
on what occasions were they informed?
General Abizaid. I do not recall contacting any senior
administration officials concerning ICRC concerns during the period in
question. The ICRC provided its reports on a confidential basis which
were designed for issue resolution at the lowest possible level. As I
testified during the hearing, at the time in question, ICRC reports
were not ordinarily surfaced all the way up through the chain of
command.
General Sanchez. I had no communication with senior administration
officials concerning the ICRC.
The ICRC provided confidential reports which were designed for
issue resolution at the lowest level possible. The ICRC Working Papers
regarding the ICRC October were enclosed in a November 12, 2003, letter
from the ICRC to BG Karpinski, commander of the 800th MP BDE. Those
concerns were examined by the 800th MP BDE in concert with CJTF-7 Judge
Advocate, C2 (Intelligence), and Provost Marshal's Office. Brigadier
General Karpinski provided a December 24, 2003, response.
As soon as information about the detainee abuse reached my level in
January 2004, a criminal investigation was initiated. A command-
directed investigation (the Major General Taguba investigation) quickly
followed. This information about the abuse was provided to higher
levels in the military chain of command immediately.
Starting in March 2004, my command prepared a periodic, typically a
weekly, report of ``detainee abuse'' cases that was provided to the
Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army.
27. Senator Levin. General Abizaid and General Sanchez, were any
investigations, changes in policy, or other actions undertaken as a
result of your meetings with the ICRC or receipt of ICRC reports?
General Abizaid. ICRC reports and concerns were normally handled at
the CJTF-7 level and generally resulted in locally improved conditions.
I will defer to LTG Sanchez to provide more details on any actions
taken.
General Sanchez. Yes. The improvement in conditions at detention
facilities was a mutual goal of the ICRC and the command. Although not
taken solely as a result of ICRC meetings and reports, many
improvements did address observations of the ICRC. Particularly during
the period April through fall 2003, improvements in shelter, food,
clothing, showers, medical care, sanitation facilities, segregation of
categories of prisoners, hygiene items, and overall quality of life
were made in all detention facilities, most noticeably Camp Cropper
and, later, Abu Ghraib. ICRC complaints about overcrowding were
addressed by closing Camp Cropper as a Corps Holding Area.
ICRC observations about family notification led directly to the
decision to produce Arabic language prisoner lists in the fall of 2003
and distribution of the lists to Civil-Military Operations Centers and,
through the CPA, to Iraqi authorities. ICRC observations also led to
the posting of names of detainees on the CPA Web site. ICRC
observations about family access contributed to the decision to open a
visitor's center at Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca with detainees allowed
two visits per month. Additionally, in the absence of a reliable mail
system, CJTF-7 continued to personally deliver ``Capture Cards'' to the
ICRC.
ICRC complaints about access difficulties during the October visit
to Abu Ghraib led to the decision of CJTF-7 to provide dedicated
officers to future ICRC visits to ensure that the ICRC delegates were
properly accommodated. This was implemented in the January 2004 visit
to Abu Ghraib and was the subject of positive comments by the ICRC.
Specific complaints about ICRC access to HVDs were resolved when access
was allowed starting in May 2003. Specific complaints about access to
eight internees at Abu Ghraib, to whom private visitation had been
temporarily denied during the January 2004 visit, were resolved when
the ICRC was allowed private interviews with seven of the internees in
March and the eighth internee in April. (In January, the ICRC was
denied private interviews of eight individuals undergoing active
interrogation, but allowed to see the internees, observe the conditions
of detention, and obtain the individuals' names and internee serial
numbers).
ICRC complaints about rough treatment of persons at the point of
capture or in detention were addressed by the publication of command
policy memoranda and orders. These include:
Issuance of interrogation policies in September and
October 2003, and May 2004 reiterating the application of the
Geneva Conventions and requiring that all interrogations be
conducted in a lawful and humane manner, with command
oversight.
Issuance of a memorandum in October 2003 titled
``Proper Treatment of Iraqi People During Combat Operations,''
and reissued on January 16, 2004, after learning about the
events that had taken place at Abu Ghraib.
Issuance of the ``Rules for Proper Conduct in Combat''
memorandum, partly in response to the ICRC's February report. A
draft of the rules was provided to the ICRC for review and
comment prior to publication.
ICRC complaints about legal process were addressed through
implementation in the summer of 2003 of a requirement that a Magistrate
review detentions within 72 hours of induction in a detention facility,
service of internment orders and notice of opportunities to appeal, and
initiation of both Criminal Detainee Release and Security Internee
Review and Appeal Boards in August 2003. Complaints about legal status
determination of HVDs were addressed by holding tribunals convened
under Article 5, Third Geneva Convention, in the summer of 2003.
ICRC complaints about availability of medical treatment were
addressed through increased availability of both dental care and
elective surgery and continuing planning for a hospital dedicated to
the care of detainees, with provision for intensive care needs and
surgery requirements. Services will include emergency physicians, an
optometrist, and preventive medicine. Capabilities will include a
primary care clinic, pharmacy, laboratory, x-ray capability,
rehabilitation capability with an occupational therapist and physical
therapist, a prosthetics unit, medical record keeping unit, and
respiratory care unit.
The command has centralized the command and control of detainee
operations under a Deputy Commanding General, Detainee Operations. One
of the goals of this reorganization is to improve the conditions and
processes of detention, a mutual goal of the command and the ICRC.
Detention Operations is:
Reviewing the entire process of notifications of
detainee deaths and family retrieval of remains with a view
towards consistency, efficiency, and responsiveness.
Reforming the processing of detainee medical records
to consolidate record keeping.
Providing guidance to units to further preventative
medicine efforts and arrange for relocation of detainees from
the vicinity of areas with standing water.
Promulgating special training to medical staff for
screening of detainee abuse, to include informing detainees
that there would be no retaliation for reporting abuse.
Monitoring food service upgrades to ensure improved
conditions for detainees with diabetes. Further nutritional
care is to be made available through the detainee hospital.
Reviewing issues associated with the rapid turnover of
medical personnel to ensure proper medical treatment.
Ensuring emplacement of sandbags around detainees'
tents, as well as concrete bunkers for protection against
mortars.
Detention Operations has taken steps to relieve over-crowding and
ensure cleanliness of camps. Current planning includes climate
controlled living facilities. All detainees are issued cots,
mattresses, and pillows. Food quality has been improved. Ice is now
available on a daily basis. Detainee holding areas now have ``pea
gravel'' in place to hold dust down. A mail system is now in place for
detainees. Detainee compound leaders now meet weekly with battalion
commanders to discuss detention issues. There is improved
accountability and security of detainees' personal property.
abu ghraib visits by icrc
28. Senator Levin. General Sanchez, the February 2004 report of the
ICRC describes a mid-October 2003 ICRC visit to Unit 1A of the Abu
Ghraib correctional facility. It states that in the course of that
visit, ICRC delegates witnessed, among various methods used to secure
the cooperation of detainees, the practice of ``keeping [detainees]
completely naked in totally empty concrete cells and in total darkness,
allegedly for several consecutive days.'' Upon demanding an explanation
from authorities at the facility, the ICRC delegates were told by the
MI officer in charge of the interrogation that ``this practice was
`part of the process'.'' [Emphasis added.] The ICRC expressed their
concerns about the Abu Ghraib correction facility in a November 6,
2003, working paper submitted to CJTF-7 officials. Who received the
November 6, 2003, ICRC working paper?
General Sanchez. The November 6, 2003, ICRC working paper was
transmitted by ICRC letter dated November 12, 2003, and delivered by
the ICRC to an officer of the CJTF-7 Staff Judge Advocate's office on
November 16, 2003. It was addressed to the Commander, 800th MP BDE.
29. Senator Levin. General Sanchez, was there a ``process'' in
effect at Abu Ghraib facility in October 2003 by which detainees would
be segregated and deprived of light and clothing for days at a time, in
order to secure their cooperation in interrogations?
General Sanchez. Not to my knowledge. Such a ``process'' would have
violated the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Polices, as
well as command policies that mandate the treatment of all Iraqis,
including prisoners and detainees, with dignity, respect, and humanity.
(See, for example, the October 5, 2003, policy memorandum, Subject:
Proper Treatment of the Iraqi People During Combat Operations, which is
enclosed.)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
30. Senator Levin. General Sanchez, did you approve the use of
these practices at Abu Ghraib or other detention facilities in Iraq?
General Sanchez. I never approved these practices at Abu Ghraib or
any other detention facility within my command. Over a 7-month period,
I approved approximately 25 requests for segregation in excess of 30
days. Subject to safeguards, segregation from the general detainee
population was authorized for up to 30 days for the purpose of security
and to prevent collusion of persons believed to possess significant
intelligence information. Requests for segregation in excess of 30 days
had to be approved by me on an exceptional basis. I did not approve the
deprivation of light and clothing. This is not authorized under the
CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy.
31. Senator Levin. General Sanchez, would such a ``process'' be
consistent with the interrogation guidelines issued by CJTF-7, either
on September 14 or October 12, 2003?
General Sanchez. Absolutely not.
32. Senator Levin. General Sanchez, when were the ICRC working
paper and concerns about this ``process'' or these practices brought to
your attention?
General Sanchez. The existence of the ICRC working paper was
brought to my attention in mid-January 2004 during the same timeframe
that the CID investigation and the Army Regulation 15-6 investigation
were initiated. I learned of the specific contents of the ICRC Working
Papers for visits in October 2003 in February 2004 during an update on
the status of the ongoing Abu Ghraib investigations.
33. Senator Levin. General Sanchez, was the November 6, 2003,
working paper provided to General Karpinski?
General Sanchez. Yes.
34. Senator Levin. General Sanchez, did CJTF-7 ever recommend the
establishment of a ``give-and-take policy'' at Abu Ghraib facility in
order to improve the effectiveness of interrogation operations? If so,
was such a policy established based on the recommendations of the
Miller report?
General Sanchez. I have no knowledge of a ``give-and-take policy.''
35. Senator Levin. General Sanchez, at the May 19 hearing, there
was discussion of a December 24, 2003 letter, which members of your
staff helped to prepare, in response to the ICRC November report.
Please provide the committee a copy of that December 24 letter.
General Sanchez. A copy of the letter is enclosed.
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36. Senator Levin. General Abizaid, when were the ICRC working
paper and concerns about the practices described above brought to your
attention?
General Abizaid. I did not become aware of the contents of the
November 6, 2003, working papers until shortly before I prepared for my
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
37. Senator Levin. General Abizaid, did General Sanchez, or anyone
else, alert you to ICRC concerns about the treatment of detainees at
the Abu Ghraib prior to January 2004?
General Abizaid. I did not become aware of the contents of reports
authored by the ICRC until shortly before I prepared for my testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Historically, the ICRC
determines at what level they would like to air their concerns and
views their communications as confidential. The ICRC exercises their
prerogative to address officials at the level they deem appropriate. It
has been our practice in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) to
address the ICRC's concern at the level of command to which they were
raised. I have since changed that practice and directed that copies of
ICRC reports be forwarded through the chain of command to me.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
icrc visits and reports
38. Senator Kennedy. General Abizaid, General Sanchez, and General
Miller, it would be helpful for the committee if you would clarify and
complete the various pieces of testimony on the ICRC visits and reports
by having the witnesses answer the following questions. For each answer
indicate the witness or witnesses who are the source of the
information, whether the information is from personal knowledge or from
inquiries or review of records, and that each witness has reviewed the
answer and does or does not have additional or conflicting information.
What were the dates and locations of the visits the ICRC made
during the period from September 11, 2001, to the present to detention
or interrogation facilities or other holding facilities of any kind in
Afghanistan, Guantanamo, or Iraq operated, controlled, or directed in
whole or in part by the United States Government, the CPA, or any
related entity?
General Abizaid. Historically, the ICRC determined at what level
they would like to air their concerns and viewed these communications
as confidential. The ICRC exercised its prerogative to address
officials at the level they deemed appropriate which was generally the
lowest level possible. It has been our practice in the CENTCOM AOR to
address the ICRC's concern at the level of command to which they were
raised, and, as I testified at the hearing, with one exception, ICRC
reports were not normally surfaced all the way up through the chain of
command. That exception is a report, dated May 12, 2003, concerning
facilities in Iraq that was provided directly to the CENTCOM Director
of Policy and Plans (J-5).
General Sanchez. Dates and locations of ICRC visits to facilities
in Iraq are listed on the enclosed summary. A succession of commands
has been engaged in continuous combat operations in Iraq since March
2003. CJTF-7 records reasonably available are provided from the date of
CJTF-7's inception on June 14, 2003, to the present. CJTF-7 does not
have records that may have been kept by other commands, such as CFLCC
or the 800th MP BDE.
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General Miller. I defer to U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to
respond on any ICRC visits to Guantanamo.
39. Senator Kennedy. General Abizaid, General Sanchez, and General
Miller, who at any level of the CPA was aware of the visit before or at
the time it took place? Who was informed of the visit after it
occurred?
General Abizaid. I am not aware of whom, if anyone, in CPA was
involved with ICRC visits.
General Sanchez. I do not know who within CPA was aware of the
October 2003 ICRC visit to Abu Ghraib before or after it took place. In
early February 2003, I attended one meeting with Ambassador Bremer and
representatives of the ICRC which included discussion of the working
papers pertaining to the ICRC's visits in October. As a matter of
practice, I understand that the CPA Office of General Counsel
frequently had representatives at meetings with the ICRC at which
visits were discussed and reports were provided. Meetings between CPA
and ICRC representatives at which CJTF-7 personnel were not present
occurred periodically throughout the period of occupation.
General Miller. I was assigned to CJTF-7/Multi-National Force-I on
April 12, 2004, and am unaware of events which occurred during the
October and November time frame in regards to CPA and ICRC visits.
40. Senator Kennedy. General Abizaid, General Sanchez, and General
Miller, in what form, on what date, and, if oral, to whom was each ICRC
report made? To whom was each written report delivered?
General Abizaid. Please see my response to question #38.
General Sanchez. Detailed information on ICRC reports in Iraq is
provided in the enclosed summary. Prior to January 2004, ICRC reports
were addressed to the Commander, 800th MP BDE or one of its subordinate
organizations, with a copy furnished to the CJTF-7 Staff Judge
Advocate. Reports were actually delivered to a CJTF-7 Judge Advocate or
to a representative of the CPA Office of General Counsel. From January
until April 2004, ICRC reports were addressed to the Commander, CJTF-7
and delivered to a Judge Advocate from CJTF-7. Starting in April 2004,
ICRC reports were addressed to the Deputy Commanding General, Detention
Operations, and delivered to a Judge Advocate from CJTF-7. The
procedure for the ICRC is to provide an oral out-brief to the camp
commander at the end of each visit. The out-brief observations form the
basis of the subsequent ICRC written report.
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General Miller. Prior to April 12, 2004, I do not know who received
reports from the ICRC. Since April 12, 2004, I have served as the
single point of contact for all matters related to the ICRC and
detainee operations.
41. Senator Kennedy. General Abizaid, General Sanchez, and General
Miller, to whom was each report disseminated by the person who first
received it and by each successive recipient and when? If the witnesses
do not know and cannot determine all the recipients, explain why.
General Abizaid. The May 12, 2003, ICRC report delivered to the
CENTCOM J-5 was provided by him to the CENTCOM Chief of Staff. It was
not brought to my attention and I do not know if it was disseminated
further.
General Sanchez. Information on ICRC reports in Iraq is provided in
the previously enclosed summary. Originals of reports were provided to
the addressee. Copies of reports or extracts of the reports were
typically disseminated within the command to C-2 (Intelligence), C-3
(Operations), Provost Marshal, Engineer, Surgeon, and Staff Judge
Advocate. All of the recipients of each report cannot be determined
with specificity. The command was conducting continuous combat
operations during this period.
General Miller. Prior to April 12, 2004, I do not know who received
reports from the ICRC. Since April 12, 2004, I have served as the
single point of contact for all matters related to the ICRC and
detainee operations.
42. Senator Kennedy. General Abizaid, General Sanchez, and General
Miller, who wrote or otherwise gave any summaries, memoranda, reports,
or other descriptions of each report, when and to whom were they
disseminated and re-disseminated?
General Abizaid. In Afghanistan, the CJTF Staff Judge Advocates
have, in the past, designated a point of contact (POC) who routinely
met with the ICRC and received reports together with other
representatives from the detention center and the command. In Iraq, MG
Miller has instituted detailed procedures for handling ICRC
correspondence. MG Miller met with the ICRC and established himself as
the single POC for all ICRC matters to include documents, working
papers, visit coordination, and any other ICRC-related issues which may
arise.
General Sanchez. Information on summaries, memoranda, and reports
is provided in the enclosed summary. All of the recipients of each
report cannot be determined with specificity. The command was
conducting continuous combat operations during this period.
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General Miller. Prior to April 12, 2004, I do not know who received
reports from the ICRC. Since April 12, 2004, I have served as the
single point of contact for all matters related to the ICRC and
detainee operations.
43. Senator Kennedy. General Abizaid, General Sanchez, and General
Miller, please provide copies of each report or document describing the
report not already provided and identify any report which has already
been provided to the committee. Please provide all summaries,
memoranda, reports, or other descriptions of each report.
General Abizaid. It is my understanding that copies of all
documents responsive to your request have or will be provided by the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs.
General Sanchez. All known and available reports have been
provided.
General Miller. All known and available reports have been provided.
44. Senator Kennedy. General Abizaid, General Sanchez, and General
Miller, were there outstanding orders, Field Manual provisions, or
other SOPs at any level anywhere for the handling of requests for
visits and visits from the ICRC? If so, what were they? Please provide
copies of all versions since September 11, 2001, including any written,
oral communications, orders, or other statements altering or providing
exceptions to the stated procedures.
General Abizaid. Appendix 1 to Annex E to the CENTCOM Operational
Plan 1003V, EPW, Retained Persons, Civilian Internees, and other
Detainees, dated September 25, 2002, paragraph 5(f), briefly addresses
ICRC visits. In addition, an internal memo outlining procedures for
ICRC visits was developed by CJTF-7 in February 2004. The following
official documents may be consulted generally on the subject of ICRC
visitations: DODD 2310.1; Joint Publication 1-0, Appendix T; and Army
Regulation 190-8.
General Sanchez. An internal memo outlining procedures for ICRC
visits was developed by Judge Advocates within the command. This memo,
dated February 7, 2004, is enclosed. In addition, our Judge Advocates
rely upon guidance contained in the Operational Law Handbook, which
discusses visits by the ICRC and, in particular, the role Judge
Advocates play in the process. I am enclosing the appropriate section
from the handbook, as well as a portion of a cited field manual (FM 71-
100-2) dealing with the same topic.
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General Miller. Prior to April 12, 2004, I do not know who issued
specific guidelines, field manuals or SOPs for dealing with the ICRC.
Since April 12, 2004, I have served as the single point of contact for
all matters related to the ICRC and detainee operations and as such I
receive all reports from the ICRC directly.
45. Senator Kennedy. General Abizaid, General Sanchez, and General
Miller, were there outstanding orders, field manual provisions, or
other SOPs at any level anywhere for the dissemination and handling of,
or responses to, such oral or written reports? If so, what were they?
Please provide copies of all versions since September 11, 2001,
including any written, oral communications, orders, or other statements
altering or providing exceptions to the stated procedures.
General Abizaid. The tri-service regulation on EPWs and civilian
internees, Army Regulation 190-8, paragraph 3-16, briefly addresses
handling of ICRC reports and requires that they be forwarded by the
relevant camp commander through Army channels to Headquarters,
Department of the Army. As I stated in my testimony, I believe the
reporting process for ICRC reports was broken and subsequent to that
hearing I directed my staff to conduct a review of these procedures.
Consequently, CENTCOM has recently implemented a new policy which
requires subordinate units to provide copies of all ICRC correspondence
within 48 hours of receipt to the Office of The Staff Judge Advocate,
CENTCOM. Additionally, subordinate units are to immediately provide
CENTCOM with responses to all ICRC concerns. ICRC correspondence is
immediately analyzed in light of the unit responses, and submitted to
my Chief of Staff (through the Joint Security Director) for review and
any necessary action by me.
General Sanchez. I am not aware of any outstanding orders, field
manual provisions, or other SOPs that prescribe how to handle ICRC
reports. In January 2004, I orally directed that ICRC reports would be
addressed to me and provided to my Staff Judge Advocate section. In
April 2004, I directed that ICRC reports would be received by the
Deputy Commanding General, Detention Operations.
General Miller. Prior to April 12, 2004, I do not know who issued
specific guidelines, field manuals or SOPs for dealing with the ICRC.
Since April 12, 2004, I have served as the single point of contact for
all matters related to the ICRC and detainee operations and as such I
receive all reports from the ICRC directly.
dod inquiry of abu ghraib
46. Senator Kennedy. General Abizaid, General Sanchez, and General
Miller, have you been the subject of, participated in, or become aware
of any internal DOD inquiry into or investigation of the matters raised
by these questions or the issues raised at the May 19 hearing? If so,
please provide the name of the person and office conducting that
inquiry or investigation, the date it began, and copies of any
materials or information you provided for that purpose. If you were
interviewed, please provide the date of the interview, the name of the
interviewer, and a copy of any notes, summary, transcript, or other
record of the interview. If there has been a report, summary, or other
document or oral presentation arising out of such inquiry or
investigation, please provide a copy or if oral your knowledge of the
contents of the oral presentation.
General Abizaid. I am aware of the following investigations/
inquiries:
a. Schlesinger Panel.
b. Interrogations Special Focus Team (Admiral Church)
c. Sec Navy Detainee Review
d. Jacoby Assessment (CFC-A)
e. Taguba AR 15-6
f. MG Fay Procedure 15
g. Miller Report
h. Ryder Report
i. Formica AR 15-6
j. Army Inspector General (IG) Report
k. Army Reserve Review of Training
To the best of my knowledge, the Taguba, Miller, and Ryder reports
are complete and available. In addition, I have provided an interview
for the Schlesinger Panel and the Interrogation Special Focus Team
(Admiral Church).
General Sanchez. I am aware of the investigation initiated on
January 19, 2004, at my request by MG Antonio Taguba and conducted
under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6. This investigation is
complete and I understand that a copy of the report of investigation
has been provided to Congress.
I am also aware of the ongoing investigation initially appointed by
me under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6 in which MG George Fay
is the investigating officer. At my request, a superior appointing
authority was named by the acting Secretary of the Army. I have not
been interviewed by MG Fay.
I am also aware of the appointment of a DOD Independent Commission
on Detention Practices, appointed by the Secretary of Defense in May
2004. I was interviewed by this body on June 24, 2004. Because its
report has not yet been completed, I refer you to the Commission for
any records of my interview.
I am aware of the investigation being conducted by Vice Admiral
Church, also at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. I have not
been interviewed by Vice Admiral Church.
Additionally I am aware of an ongoing USACIDC investigation. I have
not been interviewed in this investigation.
General Miller. Yes. I have been interviewed by the OSD Schlezinger
Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention Operations and MG Fay's
investigation. As all investigations/panels remain ongoing, I cannot
comment on them at this time.
non-disclosure agreements
47. Senator Kennedy. General Abizaid, General Sanchez, and General
Miller, there are reports that persons with information potentially
relevant to our inquiry have been asked to sign non-disclosure or other
agreements precluding their disclosing what they know and that others
may have been threatened with courts martial or other reprisals if they
disclose what they know. Please tell us everything you know about these
allegations.
General Abizaid. I am not aware of persons being asked to sign
nondisclosure statements or threatened with courts-martial or reprisals
for providing information to investigators.
General Sanchez. I am not aware of any such agreement within my
command, nor do I know anything about the allegations.
General Miller. I have no knowledge of any actions of this nature.
judge advocate general officers
48. Senator Kennedy. General Abizaid, General Sanchez, and General
Miller, there have been published allegations that JAG officers have
been excluded from the legal decisionmaking and implementation of
policies in the field of interrogation and detention practices, and
have been displaced by civilian attorneys and officials at DOD. Please
tell us everything you know about the substance of these allegations.
General Abizaid. I am not aware of JAG officers being excluded from
the legal decisionmaking and implementation of policies in the field of
interrogation and detention practices at CENTCOM. I actively seek and
routinely rely on the advice and counsel of my Staff Judge Advocate on
all such matters.
General Sanchez. This is not the case at the task force level.
Judge Advocates are integral members of my command, full participants
in operations, and relied upon to provide legal advice and support in
the field of interrogation and detention practices in the field. I have
no knowledge of the role of JAG officers at higher levels.
General Miller. I have no knowledge of any actions of this nature.
icrc reports
49. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, apparently you received one or
more ICRC reports yourself (as will be indicated in full in the answers
to the previous questions). Who determined, and on what basis, that you
should receive those reports?
Colonel Warren. CJTF-7 Judge Advocates typically received copies of
the reports from the ICRC at our periodic meetings. If a representative
of the 800th MP BDE was not present at the meeting, we would also
receive the original report and provide it to the Brigade or the CJTF-7
Provost Marshal's office. This protocol was self-imposed and was not
determined by superior authority. In January 2004, we informed the ICRC
to address reports to LTG Sanchez and provide the original reports to
me or to a CJTF-7 Judge Advocate. Previously, CJTF-7 was given copies
of reports (often with my name on the ``copy furnished'' line) that
were addressed to commanders within the 800th MP Brigade. It is
certainly possible that one or more reports would have been given to me
at a meeting, either as copies or sealed originals for another
addressee. However, I recall receiving only other correspondence that
was addressed by name to LTG Sanchez. After the bombing of the ICRC
headquarters in the fall of 2003, most meetings with the ICRC were held
at the CPA. There, ICRC meetings were also attended by one or more
attorneys from the CPA Office of General Counsel, as well as MP
officers (and MI officers as available as well). If a CJTF-7 Staff
Judge Advocate officer was not present at a meeting, a CPA General
Counsel attorney would receive the report.
50. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, what did you think your
responsibilities and obligations required you to do with those reports?
Which of the following did you think you were receiving them on behalf
of: the facility Commander, JTF-7, CENTCOM, JAG, MI, DOD, or OSD? Which
of those, and who else, did you disseminate the reports or descriptions
of the reports to? Who told you whom to disseminate them to? Why did
you not disseminate them to each of those people or entities?
Colonel Warren. The reports were directed to the addressees.
Starting in January 2004, I began accepting original reports on behalf
of CJTF-7. For this reason, I had my officers ensure that the reports
had been or were provided to activities that had responsibilities for
the facilities: C-2, C-3 (PMO), 800th MP BDE, 205th MI BDE, and the
camp commander. As a result of the October 2003 ICRC visit to Abu
Ghraib and the delay in responding to the November 2003 ICRC report, I
recommended to the Commander, CJTF-7 that, as a matter of procedure,
all future ICRC reports be addressed to the Commander, CJTF-7 and given
to a CJTF-7 Judge Advocate. Starting with the January 2004 ICRC visit
to Abu Ghraib, this was the practice followed until changed by the
Deputy Commanding General, Detention Operations in April 2004.
51. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, what was your personal
reaction when you saw or heard those reports?
Colonel Warren. For purposes of questions 51 through 55, I assume
you are referring to the reports pertaining to the October 2003 ICRC
visit. My reaction was one of surprise and disbelief. The report seemed
so implausible as to be unbelievable.
52. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, did you think the activities
described were consistent with applicable policy?
Colonel Warren. Not if the report was accurate.
53. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, did you think the activities
described were consistent with the Geneva Conventions?
Colonel Warren. Not if the report was accurate.
54. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, did any of the activities
described surprise or outrage you?
Colonel Warren. Yes. Please see my response to question 51.
55. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, did you think that the reports
required remedial action?
Colonel Warren. Yes. Remedial action was taken as described in my
responses to questions 5 and 10.
56. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, did you express your opinions
on the preceding four questions, or on any other questions raised by
the reports to anyone in any form? To whom and in what form? Please
provide copies of any materials in any form containing or reflecting
those opinions.
Colonel Warren. I do not specifically recall to whom I stated my
opinion at the time, although I am sure that I commented on the report
to officers in my section, and to MP and MI officers. The only
documents that I am aware of that could be considered as reflecting an
opinion are those referred to in my response to question 5.
authority to take action
57. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, did you think it was your
responsibility as a legal advisor to take remedial action yourself?
Colonel Warren. Yes. In addition to my responsibility as a legal
advisor, I believe it is my duty as a member of the U.S. military to
ensure that captured persons are protected and treated humanely. I
regret that I did not recommend a more formal inquiry into the
allegations of the report. While this would not have prevented the
abuse documented in the USACIDC report, which occurred in November, a
more formal inquiry might have resulted in an earlier initiation of the
CID investigation.
58. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, did you have authority to take
that action? If so, what did you do? Please provide any documentation.
If not, whose responsibility did you think it was or to assure that
remedial action was taken? Did you inform that person promptly and
fully? Please provide documentation.
Colonel Warren. The primary authority and responsibility to take
remedial action rested with the MP commanders of the camps and the
facilities, and with their chain of command. Having said that, early on
in the war and throughout the fall, in an effort to assist those
efforts, I was personally involved, along with my officers, in
arranging for and obtaining food, water, shelter (including tents),
showers, and other supplies for prisoners, as well as obtaining
detention facilities.
prisoner categories at abu ghraib
59. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, we have heard that the
prisoners at Abu Ghraib fall into three categories: common criminals,
EPWs, and security internees. Could you explain the difference between
an EPW and a security internee?
Colonel Warren. An EPW is a person who meets the criteria of a
lawful combatant in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention (Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Enemy Prisoners of War, August
12, 1949). In Iraq, a security internee is a person who is a civilian
(not meeting prisoner of war criteria) who is interned as an imperative
threat to security in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention
(Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, August 12, 1949). Both EPWs and security internees are
``protected persons'' under the Geneva Conventions.
60. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, could you elaborate on what
circumstances of capture would lead to a determination that someone is
a security internee? Is that decision reviewed, and if so, when?
Colonel Warren. Authority to capture or detain is stated in the
ROE. Upon capture, a person is to be treated humanely and with dignity
and respect. Their status is irrelevant. Within 72 hours (until the
summer of 2003, 21 days) after induction at a detention facility, a
Magistrate reviews the circumstances of capture to determine whether a
reasonable basis exists to conclude that the detainee is an imperative
threat to security. This review exceeds the legal requirement of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, which mandates a review within 6 months of
detention. Whether detention should continue is reviewed by the Review
and Appeal Board, which also considers appeals from orders of
internment.
61. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, is a security internee an
unlawful combatant? If a security internee is an unlawful combatant,
does that mean the Geneva Conventions do not apply to them?
Colonel Warren. Not all security internees are unlawful combatants.
An unlawful combatant is a person who engages in hostilities against a
lawful combatant without legal privilege. Simply put, legal privilege
attaches when a person meets the criteria of Article 4 of the Third
Geneva Convention. The significance of this legal privilege is that it
means that the person cannot be prosecuted for lawful ``warlike acts.''
While an unlawful combatant can be prosecuted for warlike acts, the
Geneva Conventions still apply to them. If captured, they, like
security internees who are not unlawful combatants, are protected
persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention.
62. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, does some lesser standard of
Geneva Conventions apply to the security internees?
Colonel Warren. The four Geneva Conventions afford different
protections to different categories of individuals. At one end of the
spectrum are the protections afforded by the Third Geneva Convention to
EPWs during international armed conflict. This includes immunity from
all lawful pre-capture acts, and is the highest protection afforded by
the Geneva Conventions. The Fourth Geneva Convention applies to
civilians, who are afforded many, but not all, of the protections and
privileges afforded POWs. Security Internees (persons who present an
imperative threat to security) are a category of civilian internees who
are afforded fewer protections than civilian internees not suspected of
being a security threat. The latter point proceeds from a plain reading
of the Fourth Geneva Convention and in Pictet's Commentary to the
Geneva Conventions. See, for example, Pictet's comments on ``coercion''
under Article 31 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
63. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, why would the Geneva
Conventions apply to unlawful combatants in Iraq, but not in
Afghanistan?
Colonel Warren. The Geneva Conventions apply in Iraq because there
was a state of international armed conflict, then occupation,
triggering the application of the Conventions by their terms. I refer
you to the DOD for an analysis of the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions in Afghanistan.
criteria for determining the status of persons captured by the united
states
64. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, did the United States military
change their criteria for determining the status of persons captured by
United States military personnel after May 1?
Colonel Warren. No. The criteria are not set by the military, but
by international law. Specifically, in situations such as Iraq where it
is applicable, Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention would require a
presumption of POW protection in cases ``where status is in doubt.'' In
these cases, POW protections could only be denied based up action by
competent tribunal convened under Article 5.
CJTF-7 conducted such tribunals through the summer of 2003 where
status of captured personnel was in doubt. POW protections were
accorded to Saddam Hussein, captured in December 2003, without action
of an Article 5 tribunal because CJTF-7 concluded that his status as a
POW was not in doubt.
However, for the majority of persons captured after May 1, the date
of the announced end of major combat operations, no doubt existed as to
their status as POWs. By May 1, 2003, the Iraqi military had
disintegrated and had been abolished by CPA order. U.S. and U.K.
military forces were under effective control of Iraqi territory and
Iraq was occupied territory. Virtually all persons detained after May 1
simply did not meet the criteria of the Third Geneva Convention as
members of the Armed Forces, or of a militia, volunteer corps or levee
en masse, in order to be accorded POW status.
65. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, what was the number of EPWs
captured after May 1? How many security detainees have been captured
after May 1? If there was a change in criteria after May 1 , why does
this date have legal significance?
Colonel Warren. Those numbers are not available to me, but I
believe they can be obtained from the National Detainee Reporting
System database. The criteria by which we discerned the status of POWs
has never changed throughout the conduct of the war and is governed by
the Third Geneva Convention. The significance of May 1 is discussed in
the response to question 64.
66. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, were the implications of the
change discussed with Pentagon leadership, Pentagon legal counsel,
State Department leadership, State Department legal counsel, the White
House, or White House legal counsel?
Colonel Warren. The distinction between international armed
conflict and occupation was and is a widely known fact, consistent with
applicable international law, specifically the law of war and the law
of occupation. The distinction explains the difference between the
Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. It was a matter of continuous
discussion and implementation. One example of its implementation is the
establishment and operation of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq
(CCCI), which has had a number of prosecutions and convictions of
unlawful combatants for attacks on coalition forces. Their very status
as unlawful combatants makes defendants susceptible to prosecution.
Were they POWs, they would be afforded legal privilege (immunity) for
their acts. I discussed this matter with the DOD General Counsel and
the JAG of the Army, and their staff.
scope of geneva convention
67. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, could you please provide a
list of all legal and military treatises, texts, authorities,
regulations, journals, and manuals that you relied upon as
authoritative or informative for defining the scope of the Geneva
Conventions relative to limits on interrogation and detention?
Colonel Warren. To the best of my recollection:
a. Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Enemy
Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949.
b. Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949.
c. The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary. Jean S.
Pictet, 1958.
d. FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, July 18, 1956.
e. FM 34-52, Interrogation Intelligence, September 28, 1992.
f. DA Pam 27-1 Treaties Governing Land Warfare, December 7, 1956.
g. CENTCOM Reg 27-13, Captured Persons, February 7, 1995.
h. CFLCC Operations Orders.
i. CENTCOM Operations Orders.
j. DOD Directive 2310.1, DOD Enemy POW Detainee Program, August 18,
1994.
k. SECDEF Memorandum, Subject: Interrogation Techniques in the War
on Terrorism (S), April 16, 2003.
l. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian
Internees and other Detainees, October 1, 1997.
m. AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law
Enforcement and Securities Duties, March 12, 1993.
n. AR 190-40, Serious Incident Report, November 30, 1993.
o. AR 381-10, U.S. Army Intelligence Activities, July 1, 1984.
p. Israeli Supreme Court decision on ``Torture'' (Judgment
Concerning the Legality of the General Security Service's Interrogation
Methods).
q. U.S. Code, Anti-Torture Statues, 18 USC 2340A/B.
time line of cjtf-7 interrogation policy
68. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, could you provide a time line
describing the development of the CJTF-7 interrogation and counter
resistance policy signed by you on October 12, 2003?
Colonel Warren. I did not sign the policy, which is a CJTF-7
command policy memorandum.
The following timeline describes the development of the policy:
September 10, 2003: Draft Interrogation and Counter-
Resistance Policy memorandum circulated for comment.
September 14, 2003: Policy memorandum issued, provided to
CENTCOM for review.
September 14-October 12, 2003: Review of the policy within
CJTF-7 and between CJTF-7 and CENTCOM.
September 28, 2003: Second draft circulated for comment.
October 4/5, 2003: Third draft circulated for comment.
October 12, 2003: Final policy memorandum issued.
69. Senator Kennedy. Colonel Warren, could you provide a time line
describing the evolution of the chart provided to the committee by MG
Alexander and described as the CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement
that appear several times in the Taguba report annexes?
Colonel Warren. I cannot from personal experience. However, I
understand that the chart was prepared at Abu Ghraib in late September
or October 2003. It was not a CJTF-7 command product.
detainees at abu ghraib
70. Senator Kennedy. General Sanchez, were you aware of the number
of detainees who were there on average at Abu Ghraib in the fall and
winter of 2003? How many?
General Sanchez. Yes. A report is forwarded daily to the National
Detainee Reporting System database, which is maintained by
Headquarters, Department of the Army. During the fall and winter of
2003, the detainee population varied between 5,000 and 6,700.
71. Senator Kennedy. General Sanchez, were you aware of the number
of detainees who were processed in and released on a daily basis? How
many?
General Sanchez. I was not aware of the number of in-processed and
released detainees on a daily basis as the Commanding General, CJTF-7.
Periodically I reviewed snapshots of detainee numbers in order to
maintain situational awareness of ongoing developments in the detainee
population. Examinations of the databases for Abu Ghraib indicate the
following numbers in-processed during the months from October 2003 to
March 2004:
October - 2,429
November - 1,980
December - 2,105
January - 1,922
February - 1,143
March - 961
The daily report of releases may be obtained from the National
Detainee Reporting System database, maintained at Headquarters,
Department of the Army.
prisoner tracking system
72. Senator Kennedy. General Sanchez, were you aware of the
prisoner tracking system at Abu Ghraib?
General Sanchez. Yes. At first, a manual tracking system was used,
but this was replaced by the Biometric Automated Track Toolset (BATS)
system in the latter part of 2003. This system has vastly improved our
ability to account for those in the custody of coalition forces.
73. Senator Kennedy. General Sanchez, were you aware of the
problems the military had with keeping track of who was at the prison?
General Sanchez. Yes. That is why we transitioned to more
technologically advanced systems such as BATS. For several months, we
had enormous problems with the identification of detainees. This was
caused by difficulties in entering and maintaining the correct data in
non-standard databases developed by the 800th MP BDE. Problems ranged
from transliteration and disarrangement of detainees' multiple names
through misunderstanding of the Arabic language to false names provided
by some detainees. Early in the war, some prisoners had no capture tags
or documentation. These problems were exacerbated by the use of at
least two numbering systems for detainees and maintenance of at least
three populations: EPWs, criminal detainees, and security internees.
military police at abu ghraib
74. Senator Kennedy. General Sanchez, did you have sufficient MPs
at Abu Ghraib to maintain security and aid in detention operations?
General Sanchez. Yes.
interrogation rules of engagement
75. Senator Kennedy. General Sanchez, do you believe that it was
appropriate to use the tactics listed on the right hand side of the
slide titled ``Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE)'' provided to
the Committee by MG Alexander on the prisoners at Abu Ghraib when you
didn't even know who was there and if they deserved such treatment?
General Sanchez. The IROE slide was not approved or produced by
CJTF-7. The slide was prepared by a subordinate command in order to
summarize the interrogation and counter-resistance policy. The CJTF-7
interrogation and counter-resistance policy was stated in two
memoranda, the first dated September 14, 2003 and the second dated
October 12, 2003. Both memoranda were furnished to the committee on May
19, 2004.
The September 14, 2003 policy authorized the methods listed in the
right column of the IROE chart, except for ``sensory deprivation'' and
``sleep deprivation.'' Use of the authorized methods was subject to the
general and specific safeguards listed in Enclosure 2 of the Policy, as
well as the implementation guidance of the commander, 205th MI BDE. The
September policy remained in effect for less than 1 month, until
superceded by the October 12, 2003, policy.
The October 12, 2003, policy which remained in effect for 7 months,
authorizes the methods listed at its enclosure 1, subject to the
safeguards listed at its enclosure 2. These methods do not include
sleep deprivation, presence of military working dogs, or excessive
noise. Use of any methods not listed at enclosure 1 of the October 12
policy is not authorized without a written exception to policy granted
by me, as well as legal review and review by the command's senior
intelligence officer. The methods listed in the right column of the
IROE chart are similarly not authorized under the October 12 policy.
Except for segregation in excess of 30 days, I have neither
received nor approved any requests for the use of any methods requiring
an exception to policy. Except for segregation in excess of 30 days, I
have not approved the use of any of those methods for a particular
prisoner.
Safeguards for all interrogation methods included: limited use of
the techniques only by trained personnel; medical evaluations of all
candidates prior to employment of interrogation approaches and their
combinations; interrogation plans with specific attention to proposed
limits on duration, intervals between applications of interrogation
approaches, termination criteria, and the presence of qualified medical
personnel; appropriate supervision; provision for adequate sleep, food
and water; monitoring for adverse medical or psychological effects
during segregation; adequate supervision of the use of interrogation
approaches.
By its terms, the October 12, 2003, policy enunciates the purpose
of interviews and interrogations to obtain the ``most information from
a security internee with the least intrusive method, applied in a
humane and lawful manner with sufficient oversight by trained
investigators or interrogators. Further, ``Interrogators must ensure
the safety of security internees, and approaches must in no way
endanger them.''
Additionally, interrogations were subject to a October 5, 2003,
command policy memorandum entitled ``Proper Treatment of Iraqi People
During Combat Operations'' which emphasized treatment of all persons
under coalition forces' control, including prisoners and detainees,
with dignity, respect, and humanity. This memorandum was reissued by
order in January 2004. Similar memoranda and orders were issued in
April and March 2004.
Finally, the slide itself reiterates adherence to these standards
outlined above: ``[a]pproaches must always be humane and lawful,
[d]etainees will NEVER be touched in a malicious or unwanted manner--
[t]he Geneva Conventions apply within CJTF-7. . . . VIOLATIONS MUST BE
REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO THE OIC.'' The slide concludes with the
reiteration that the use of all the techniques are subject to general
safeguards as well as guidance from the 205th MI BDE Commander, CJTF-7
Commander and FM 34-52, Interrogation Intelligence.
76. Senator Kennedy. General Sanchez, could you describe your
rationale for the development of the October 12 guidance for IROE and
the October 5 memorandum on the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter
Resistance Policy? Are these documents different? If so, how? Please
provide copies of both and any earlier drafts of both documents.
General Sanchez. The October 12 memorandum was the ``Interrogation
and Counter-Resistance Policy.'' There was no CJTF-7 document termed
IROE. There was an October 5, 2003, memorandum entitled, ``Proper
Treatment of the Iraqi People During Combat Operations.''
The October 12, 2003, memorandum was developed to state the
command's policy on Interrogation and Counter-Resistance. It was
preceded by the September 14, 2003, policy on the same subject, and a
series of drafts, all of which are enclosed in classified form
(enclosures retained in committee files). The October 5, 2003,
memorandum on Interrogation and Counter-Resistance was a draft that
reflects the process leading to the October 12, 2003, policy.
The October 12 document is very different from the October 5
memorandum. The October 5, 2003, memorandum applies to Interrogation
and Counter-Resistance only generally in that it requires the treatment
of all persons, including detainees, with dignity, respect, and
humanity. There were no prior drafts of this memorandum. The rationale
behind the October 12 policy was to ensure that the command had a
single interrogation policy that comported with the Geneva Conventions.
The rationale behind the October 5 memorandum was to reemphasize to
soldiers that they had an obligation to follow the law of war and treat
all persons, including detainees, with dignity, respect, and humanity.
77. Senator Kennedy. General Sanchez, did you adopt General
Miller's recommendations from his September report in your October 5
memorandum? To what extent did you accept General Miller's
recommendations? If you rejected any of his recommendations, could you
explain why?
General Sanchez. The October 5 memorandum was developed to
reinforce the obligation of coalition forces to treat the Iraqi people
with dignity, respect and humanity. This obligation specifically
extended to detainees. MG Miller's recommendations had no connection to
the drafting or issuance of the October 5 memorandum. A copy of the
memorandum is enclosed.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
There was an October 5, 2003, unsigned draft of the CJTF-7
Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy. The draft led to the final
policy, issued on October 12, 2003. The promulgation of a command
Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy was based on the
recommendations of MG Miller's assessment. With regard to the
observation that CJTF-7 should have a specific interrogation policy, no
aspect of MG Miller's recommendation was rejected.
78. Senator Kennedy. General Sanchez, did you coordinate
recommendation of MG Miller with anyone in the Pentagon? Was this
policy coordinated with interrogation policies in any other theaters or
with any other agencies? Who approved this policy?
General Sanchez. I did not coordinate MG Miller's recommendations
with anyone in the Pentagon and I am not aware of any such coordination
by my staff. I understand that the September 14 Interrogation and
Counter-Resistance Policy was modeled on the policy from Guantanamo
Bay, modified for use in a theater of war in which the Geneva
Conventions were applicable. I understand that other policies were
consulted in the development of the CJTF-7 policy, but I am unaware of
any coordination with other agencies.
copper green
79. Senator Kennedy. General Sanchez, I would like to ask you a
question that may require a classified response. If such a response is
necessary, I would appreciate it if you would provide unclassified and
classified answers for the record. Are you aware of the existence of a
program that was called ``Copper Green''?
General Sanchez. No.
special access program
80. Senator Kennedy. General Sanchez, are you aware of any Special
Access Program to gather intelligence from detainees at Abu Ghraib?
General Sanchez. No.
assessment of detainee operations
81. Senator Kennedy. General Miller, after you completed your
assessment of detainee operations on September 9, did you provide
recommendations to LTG Sanchez? Did you provide those recommendations
to Colonel Pappas?
General Miller. I gave an outbrief to LTG Sanchez and MG Fast
covering those topics covered in the Assessment of DOD Counterterrorism
Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq (MG Miller Assistance
Visit Report). This included recommendations in detention, information
management and fusion, and interrogation operations. Colonel Pappas,
though present during visits to Abu Ghraib and consulted at Camp
Victory, was not provided with a copy of the final report by the
assessment team.
[Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m. the committee adjourned.]
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON DETENTION
OPERATION DOCTRINE AND TRAINING
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 22, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain,
Sessions, Talent, Levin, Kennedy, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E.
Benjamin Nelson, Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff
member; Paula J. Philbin, professional staff member; Lynn F.
Rusten, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general
counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; and William
G.P. Monahan, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Alison E. Brill, Andrew W.
Florell, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator
Collins; Clyde E. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Meredith Moseley, assistant to Senator Graham; Christine O.
Hill, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson,
assistant to Senator Cornyn; Mieke Y. Eoyang and Jarret A.
Wright, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Erik Raven, assistant to
Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to
Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Andrew
Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze,
assistant to Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. The committee meets today to continue its
series of hearings relating to allegations on prisoner abuse
and otherwise the manner in which the Department of Defense
(DOD), particularly the Department of Army, maintains and
conducts its detention and interrogation of the prisoners. This
is a very important segment of the U.S. commitment in the
ongoing war on global terrorism.
Today's hearing will focus on the Department of Army
Inspector General's Detainee Operations Inspection Report that
focuses on detention operations, doctrine, and training. I
welcome our witnesses this morning: the Honorable Les Brownlee,
Acting Secretary of the Army; General Peter J. Schoomaker,
Chief of Staff of the United States Army; and Lieutenant
General Paul Mikolashek, Inspector General (IG) of the Army.
Good morning, gentlemen, and thank you for coming.
General Mikolashek. Good morning, sir.
Chairman Warner. On February 10, 2004, the Secretary of the
Army as executive agent for the Department of Defense, Enemy
and Prisoner of War Detention Program, issued a directive for
the Army IG to establish an assessment team to complete a
functional analysis of the Department's internment, enemy-
prisoner of war, and detention policies, practices, and
procedures.
Secretary Brownlee took this action after allegations of
detainee abuse and inadequate training for soldiers involved in
the detention of prisoners came to the Secretary's attention.
I have the full text of that directive here, and I ask that
it be placed following my opening statement in the record. It
is here for anybody to inspect.
I apologize to my colleague for the short notice about this
hearing, but Senator Levin and I feel as these matters become
available we should bring them to the attention of our
colleagues promptly with a hearing, and we have done so this
morning.
I want to thank the Department of Defense and the
Department of the Army for making this information available to
the committee in a timely and a forthright manner. I have been
in consultation with the Secretary for a week or 10 days about
the timing, and he assured me that it would be forthcoming as
soon as it has been completed, and that has been done. So I
thank you, Mr. Secretary.
At a time when the Army is decisively engaged around the
world, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is also
committed to rigorously and thoroughly reviewing its practices
and procedures and making constructive adjustment and changes
along the way. I commend you, Mr. Secretary, the Chief, and
others for that course of action.
As a result of allegations of abuse of prisoners and the
related scrutiny of interrogation policy and procedures, the
Department has directed 11 senior-level reviews--that is the
Department of Defense--in addition to many unit-level reviews
and criminal investigations. That list of reviews was provided
to the committee at the last hearing, but basically five of
these reviews are now complete and have been provided to the
committee in their entire text. Five of the remaining six
senior-level reviews are estimated to be completed over the
course of the next several months, including the Fay report on
interrogation procedures at the Abu Ghraib prison and Dr.
Schlesinger's independent review together with Secretary Harold
Brown of the DOD detention operation. That review was directed
specifically by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).
I wish to remind members of the committee that the report
that will be presented this morning is not, and I repeat, is
not, an investigation of specific allegations of abuse. Rather,
it is an IG inspection, which is focused on the adequacy of
current Army training and doctrine to prepare soldiers to
properly and safely capture, care for, control, and interrogate
prisoners in a combat theater of operations.
It is intended to examine the presence or absence of
systemic issues, not just individual cases. It must be viewed
in that context. It is but one piece of a larger picture, but
in my view a very important piece, and it is a timely public
disclosure of that piece.
As the committee has conducted its oversight
responsibilities, we have learned that detention operations are
complex and are not limited to the operation of just prisons.
Detention operations start at the moment of capture, often in
the heat of battle and the ensuing confusion, and continue
through the screening, transportation, interrogation, and in
some cases the long-term internment.
Prior to September 11, few people in our military had
experience in the detention of prisoners. It was a skill not
often practiced. That has changed since operations began in
Afghanistan and now continuing through Iraq.
In the case of the Abu Ghraib prison, we have experienced
an unacceptable breakdown in military discipline. This
represents an extremely rare chapter in the otherwise
extraordinary proud history of our Armed Forces. It defies
common sense and contradicts all the values that Americans
stand for and that our military defends. Once again, I commend
the Department of Defense and specifically the Department of
the Army for the manner in which it is proceeding under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to hold those
accountable where they have been determined to have broken the
Military Code and the Geneva Conventions.
Of our uniformed personnel, 99.9 percent are performing
difficult tasks humanely and honorably and in some cases making
the ultimate sacrifice of life and limb to win the war on
terror. Each of us on the committee has nothing but the
strongest support for our brave men and women in uniform and
their families.
Congress has the responsibility to get at the facts, to
make sure that the conditions that have allowed this misconduct
to occur have been identified and corrected, and to ensure that
systems are in place so that the misconduct of this type never
happens again. But as we conduct our necessary oversight, it is
just as important to ensure that the Armed Forces have the
ability to vigorously conduct the missions required to defend
our Nation and to win the global war on terrorism.
Intelligence-gathering is at the very heart of that.
I thank our witnesses for their service and their
dedication to do the right thing for the Army and our Nation.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join you in
welcoming our witnesses and thanking them on behalf of the
entire committee for their service to the people of the United
States and what we represent.
Today we receive testimony on the Army Inspector General's
analysis of the Army's prisoner detention operations doctrine
and training.
General Mikolashek, your report examines whether there were
systemic problems with detention operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan that may have contributed to abuse of detainees in
U.S. custody, including the abuses, which were so graphically
depicted in photos from Abu Ghraib.
When General Abizaid appeared before this committee in mid-
May, he testified that one of the preliminary findings of the
Army IG's investigation was that, ``Our doctrine is not
right.'' Based on a very quick perusal of the final report,
which we just received, it claims that the incidents of abuse
in Iraq and Afghanistan were not the result of systematic
problems. Nonetheless, the report finds that Army doctrine
needs to be adapted to the environment in which our soldiers
are working to provide security, and in this regard the report
makes over 50 recommendations for improving Army detention
operations.
The findings and recommendations of this report will need
to be closely examined in light of the additional allegations
of abuse and legal and policy memoranda that have emerged in
the last few months. This additional information includes the
February 2004 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
report, which documents a wide variety of ``methods of ill
treatment'' in the detention and interrogation of detainees in
Iraq. It reports that these methods were used ``in a systematic
way,'' and, quoting again from the ICRC February 2004 report,
``appeared to be part of the standard operating procedures by
military intelligence personnel to obtain confessions and
extract information.''
Interrogation techniques witnessed by the ICRC during their
visits to Abu Ghraib appear consistent with techniques that we
now know were approved and later rescinded by high-level
Defense Department officials or by in-theater commanders in
Iraq. In light of the frequently changing ``rules of
engagement,'' as they were called, for interrogations in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere, it is difficult to believe that
there were not systemic problems with our detention and
interrogation operations.
The report that we receive today is the first of a half
dozen reports that we expect to receive over the next several
weeks, including a report from Generals Fay and Jones on the
role of military intelligence personnel at Abu Ghraib. Each of
these reports will be helpful to us and the Nation in
understanding what really happened with the detainees in Iraq.
I look forward to your testimony. I also want to thank our
chairman because he continues to pursue the reports and to
schedule hearings, when appropriate, when these reports are
received. Very strong oversight by this committee is surely
appropriate under the circumstances we face.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin. Again, in
consultation with you we have arranged today in S-407 of the
Capitol to have additional matters relating to the ICRC
available for inspection by members and such other material as
has been made available by the Department relative to the
overall question of the prisoners throughout the world.
Secretary Brownlee, we welcome you before our committee,
that you remember with, I hope, great fondness. You were our
Chief of Staff under a series of chairmen. We just admire so
much your work in the Department of Defense, your love for the
United States Army, the men and women in uniform and their
families, and the around-the-clock care that you try to provide
for your family in the Army. Thank you, sir, for your service.
STATEMENT OF HON. LES BROWNLEE, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY;
ACCOMPANIED BY GEN PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMY; AND LTG PAUL T. MIKOLASHEK, USA, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF
THE ARMY
Mr. Brownlee. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner; Senator Levin;
and distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to be here today along with our Chief of Staff of
the Army, General Schoomaker, and our Inspector General,
General Paul Mikolashek. I might add, sir, that the lavish
praise that you just heaped on me should be spread among all
these people in uniform and those serving around the world,
because it is their service and sacrifice that really counts.
Chairman Warner. You have followed that same message ever
since you were a platoon leader.
Mr. Brownlee. Which I might still should be doing, sir.
But we are here this morning, sir, to offer testimony on
the Department of Army Inspector General's report on the
detention operations. When I last appeared before you on 7 May
to testify about detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib, the Inspector
General's inspection was ongoing. It is now complete.
Let me begin by emphasizing again that this is a report of
an assessment of detention operations across the Central
Command area of operations. It is not the result of an
investigation of a single incident.
In mid-January 2004, credible reports led senior commanders
in the Central Command area of responsibility to begin
investigations into allegations of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib
Prison. Concerned that there might be systemic problems in the
planning, doctrine, or training of how the Army was conducting
detention operations in Central Command, on 10 February I
directed the Inspector General of the Army, Lieutenant General
Paul Mikolashek, to conduct a functional analysis of the
Department's internment, enemy prisoner of war, and detention
policies, practices, and procedures.
General Mikolashek conducted a thorough and balanced
inspection in the following 5 months. He and his team looked at
ongoing detention operations in Central Command with assessment
visits to 16 detention facilities in that theater. During the
course of their inspection, they interviewed some 650 soldiers,
noncommissioned officers, and officers.
Three key findings emerged based on this inspection: First,
all the leaders and soldiers interviewed by General Mikolashek
and his team understand the requirement and obligation to treat
all detainees humanely, and they are doing so.
Second, while the inspection revealed some deficiencies,
shortfalls, and required adjustments, we were unable to
identify system-wide failures that resulted in incidents of
abuse. This inspection indicates that these incidents of abuse
resulted from the failure of individuals to follow known
standards of discipline and Army values and in some cases the
failure of a few leaders to enforce these standards of
discipline.
Third, just as the current operational environment demands
that we adapt, so too we must adapt our organization, doctrine,
and training. We are making these adjustments.
General Mikolashek's team concentrated on two key
components of detention operations: the capture, security, and
humane treatment of the detainees; and the conduct of
interrogation operations in order to gain useful intelligence.
While he did not find any systemic failures that led directly
to the abusive situations we reviewed, his report makes
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of detention
operations. We are reviewing those recommendations. We are
implementing them as quickly as possible.
It is worth noting that our soldiers are conducting
operations under demanding, stressful, and dangerous conditions
against enemies who do not follow the Geneva Conventions, who
take hostages and ruthlessly execute them, who maim and kill
noncombatants indiscriminately and without remorse, who fight
from inside mosques and other protected sites.
Our soldiers are in an environment that demands significant
volumes of human intelligence, particularly at the tactical
level, where the need for this actionable intelligence is most
critical to protect our forces and the intelligence itself is
most perishable.
They understand their duty to treat detainees humanely and
in accordance with the laws of land warfare and report
incidents of abuse when they occur. I am proud of our soldiers,
as I know all of you are. They are indeed doing their duty
every day under harsh, difficult, dangerous conditions, and the
allegations and reports of abuse have in many cases come from
the soldiers themselves, who saw something wrong and informed
their chain of command.
We have developed, trained, and educated our leaders to
adapt to the environments in which they find themselves. They
understand their tasks, conditions, and standards and to the
best of their abilities and capabilities have adapted their
tactics, techniques, and procedures to accommodate this
operational environment.
Institutionally, we are expanding our doctrine on detainees
to provide our commanders greater flexibility and adaptability
within well-defined principles. Our training and education at
the individual, unit, installation level, and institutional
levels must continue to be thorough and reflect the intensity
of the environment in which we now operate.
During the course of his inspection, General Mikolashek's
team noted that since October 2001 U.S. forces have detained
some 50,000 individuals in Afghanistan and Iraq. As of June 9,
2004, which was the cutoff date for General Mikolashek's
report, there were 94 cases of confirmed or possible abuse of
any type, which include theft, physical assault, sexual
assault, and death. The Army has initiated criminal
investigations into these allegations and, where appropriate,
legal action has been and will be taken.
The Inspector General's review of all reported cases of
abuse determined that these incidents resulted from the failure
of individuals to follow known standards of discipline and Army
values and, in some cases, the failure of a few leaders to
enforce those standards of discipline. These incidents are not
representative of Army policy, doctrine, or soldier training.
These actions, while regrettable, are aberrations when compared
to the actions of the hundreds of thousands of our soldiers who
have served and continue to serve around the world with
distinction and honor.
Mr. Chairman, all of you are aware that these incidents of
detainee abuse have occurred. Army soldiers and leaders were
involved in these incidents, and the Army is responsible for
their actions. As the senior civilian official in the Army, I
accept this responsibility.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear
before this distinguished committee today. I thank you and the
members of the committee for your continuing support of our men
and women in the Army, and we look forward to answering your
questions.
Let me just say as I yield to my friend here what a great
pleasure it is to serve every day with General Pete Schoomaker.
He brings such great leadership to the Army and our soldiers,
and I am so proud just having the honor on a daily basis to
work with a soldier like this.
Chairman Warner. I share those views.
Mr. Secretary--General, if you will just wait a minute--you
and I met earlier this morning on a subject, which is not
directly before the committee today, and that is the reported
problems with the Army budget. I wonder if you would just
provide the committee with a brief synopsis of what we
discussed because one or more members may wish, given the
opportunity here to have you this morning, to probe into this
budget matter. I think you can bring some clarity to it.
Mr. Brownlee. Yes, sir. The article certainly reflects that
there are continuing demands for resources through our efforts
in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department has met with us and the
other Secretaries, Chiefs, and the staff of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) has worked closely with us. A plan
was in place and we have all taken actions to defer some things
into the next fiscal year where possible.
But also, we want to be sure and express our sincere
appreciation to the members of this committee and the entire
Congress because the appropriations bill, the defense
appropriations bill that is now before the Senate and we hope
will pass today. This bill has within it a $25 billion bridge
supplemental, which includes a provision that will make that
$25 billion accessible to the Department upon enactment of the
bill, which is a little unusual. Normally it would be available
at the first of the fiscal year.
But Congress, recognizing the demand for resources, the
situation we were in, and some of the deferrals we were making,
recognized this and took steps. Sir, we are greatly
appreciative.
Chairman Warner. I hope you can assure us that this
shortfall has not in any way affected the combat operations or
deprived any soldier, sailor, or airman working with the Army
of the means by which to carry out their missions?
Mr. Brownlee. Sir, to my knowledge there is no shortfall
anywhere as a result of these kinds of issues. We would ensure
that that did not happen.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
General Schoomaker.
General Schoomaker. Sir, thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. You also joined in the discussion with the
Secretary this morning, and I presume you can give us the same
assurances?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I can, and I would just amplify
the Secretary's comments there, that the Department of Defense
helped us with the corporate decision of a little more than $4
billion to fulfill----
Chairman Warner. Added it to your cash?
General Schoomaker. Added it to us, to ensure the
continuity of operations and that we did not have to do things
that were not in our best interests. So we appreciate their
support as well.
Sir, thank you very much for your kind statements. Chairman
Warner, Secretary Levin, distinguished members of the
committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today
with Secretary Brownlee and with General P.T. Mikolashek.
We currently have more than one million soldiers in the
Army and more than 300,000 of them are deployed around the
globe in over 120 countries. The vast majority of our soldiers
are performing their duties with honor, dignity, courage, and
respect.
We are, have been, and will remain a value-based
institution. When I was sworn in as Chief of Staff in August of
last year, I said our values will not change. That was true in
August, and it is true today. Our values will not change, and
they are nonnegotiable. Our soldiers are warriors of character.
They exemplify our values every day and are the epitome of the
American spirit. They are the heart of our Army.
As the Chief of Staff of the Army, as the senior uniformed
officer in the Army, I am responsible to train and equip
soldiers and grow leaders. I am also responsible to provide
ready and relevant land power to the combat commanders and the
joint team. Although I am not in the operational chain of
command, I am responsible for our soldiers' readiness, and it
has been made very clear over the last couple of months that we
could have prepared our soldiers better, and I feel a great
deal of responsibility for the actions of our soldiers, both
good and bad.
Having said that, I believe the inexcusable behavior of a
few is not representative of the courageous and compassionate
performance of the majority of our soldiers. The IG report
confirms that belief. As the Secretary has already stated, the
report focuses on the training, material, leadership,
personnel, facilities, standards, force structure, and policy.
It identifies what went right as well as where we could do
better as related to the internment of enemy prisoners of war
and other detention operations and intelligences procedures. It
also recommends actions to begin addressing the identified
shortfalls right away.
Commanders and leaders at every level have a duty to
respect the established international laws of armed conflict,
to treat those within our military detention facilities with
dignity and decency in the same ways that we expect to be
treated as Americans. This inspection shows that our commanders
and leaders in nearly every case know this and did this.
Abuses that did occur by a few have hit at the very core of
the values of our institutions, caused us grave concern, and
prompted us to take a very focused and thorough review of this
matter. I am pleased that the Inspector General has completed
this very important review.
In our Army we expect all soldiers to demonstrate the basic
core values of dignity and respect for others, to include those
we have detained. We remain steadfastly committed to dealing
expeditiously with any complaint or allegation of mistreatment,
and I am confident that our commanders have been taking
appropriate action.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
General Mikolashek.
General Mikolashek. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, I
appreciate the opportunity to speak to you and the members of
this committee on this important subject. As has already been
mentioned, the Secretary did direct us on February 10 to
conduct this functional analysis of how the Army conducted
detention operations in the context of our doctrine,
organization, current and future organizations, training
material, leadership, and soldiers, and recommend changes to
those as we saw fit.
While this inspection began with this directive on 10
February, the Army had already begun to assess detention
operations internally. An assessment of interrogation
operations as well as an assessment by the Provost Marshal
General regarding corrections operations in theater had been
completed. Further, commanders of forward-deployed units were
using their own inspectors general to conduct assessments of
detention operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. While a
catalyst for this specific inspection was the initial report of
the crime at Abu Ghraib, we had been looking at these processes
for some time.
This inspection represents one of several ongoing
inspections and investigations. It is not a criminal
investigation. The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) will
continue to conduct investigations into the specific crimes
involving detainee abuse. This inspection does not seek to find
culpability or fix responsibility regarding questionable
activity by military intelligence personnel, as the Procedure
15 report seeks to accomplish that task.
This inspection, as previously stated, was not an
investigation of a particular incident or a unit or solely
focused on abuse, but a comprehensive, broad examination of all
our systems that influence the conduct of these operations in
both Iraq and Afghanistan and how the Army prepares and
supports its soldiers in the execution of these tasks.
We approached this mission with an eye toward the future by
offering recommendations as to how the Army can adjust its
doctrine, organizational structures, training, and other key
systems. To some degree, it does represent a snapshot in time.
Even during the conduct of our visits, we noticed continual
adjustments and improvements by the commanders and soldiers in
the field. Many of the recommendations contained in this report
are already being acted upon.
We conducted this inspection, as the Secretary mentioned,
through the use of interviews, sensing sessions, surveys of
over 650 soldiers from private to major general. We visited
sites from the point of capture to the internment and
resettlement facilities in both Afghanistan and Iraq. We
visited our combat training centers at Fort Polk and Fort
Irwin, as well as the Army's Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and
Escape Training Center. We visited units and soldiers who had
redeployed to the continental United States (CONUS) and Reserve
component soldiers who were demobilizing who had been
conducting detention operations in theater. We visited the
Military Intelligence School, the Military Police School, as
well as reviewed all known previously conducted reports and
investigations regarding detention operations.
We also analyzed 125 case summaries of alleged abuse in an
effort to establish a pattern, a trend, or a root cause. We did
conduct a thorough review of the systems affecting detention
operations through the eyes of the soldiers and the leaders who
are tasked with executing those operations. We looked for
systemic issues and problems, and we defined a systemic problem
as one that is widespread or presents a pattern. We attempted
to determine what problems exist within these systems and to
determine if any directly related to abuse.
This report must also be taken in context of the world in
which our soldiers are operating. We see that this is a tough,
demanding, dangerous, and different environment that is in a
constant state of flux. The enemy we face is ruthless and
determined, who seeks to accomplish their objectives through
terror, murder and intimidation. They seek to hide among the
people and gain support from the populace as well as from
external sources. They adapt as we adapt.
This environment puts a tremendous burden on our soldiers
who confront this enemy and their supporters eyeball-to-eyeball
every day. You will see our soldiers have responded to this
challenge very well.
This kind of battlefield puts a premium on knowing the
enemy in detail on virtually a personal basis, and thus a
premium on human intelligence, particularly at the tactical
level.
In order to examine these operations, we determined that
there are fundamentally two components of detention operations:
first, the capture, care, and control of detainees; and second,
the interrogation process itself. These components enable the
goals of detention operations: first, to keep the enemy off the
battlefield in a humane and secure manner; and then to gain
intelligence from those who would do us harm.
In summary, during our inspection we found that, as the
Secretary mentioned, our soldiers and leaders do understand the
requirement to treat people humanely. They are doing so. They
also understand their duty obligation to report incidents of
abuse and they do so. They also have done a remarkable job of
adjusting their procedures to the environment that I described.
While we did find shortcomings and flaws in each of the
systems we looked at, we also found that in our analysis of
those abusive situations that did occur they were not the
result of any widespread systemic failure. In those cases that
we reviewed, the result was of an individual's failure to
adhere to known standards of discipline, training, or Army
values, or in some cases an individual failure that was
accompanied by the failure of a leader to enforce discipline,
provide supervision and oversight.
We found that the current operational environment puts
demands on our soldiers and leaders to adapt rapidly, and they
are doing so. We saw that our soldiers and leaders, when
confronted with the difficult and unexpected, responded exactly
the way they should have: creatively, rapidly, and
aggressively. Our leader development doctrine and process
produced these leaders who are unafraid to take risks and,
despite a wide range of adversities and uncertainty, adapted
and are getting the job done.
Our training doctrine teaches that we train to a task,
condition, and a standard. But when the conditions become so
different new tasks are created, our soldiers and leaders must
respond and react, and they are doing so today.
However, as I mentioned, not all of these systems function
perfectly and, just as our soldiers and leaders in the field
are adapting, our doctrinal, organization, and training systems
must also continue to adapt to support these soldiers in these
kinds of operations.
Throughout the report we identify 8 significant findings,
15 other observations, and suggest 52 recommendations that,
when implemented, will assist our soldiers and commanders in
accomplishing their mission. I will discuss the major findings
in the context of the two key components of detention
operations.
Regarding the capture, care, and control of detainees, as I
previously mentioned, we find that commanders, soldiers, and
leaders at all levels throughout the process do treat them
properly and emphasize the importance of doing so. We found
that leaders are visible during the conduct of detention
operations from the point of capture up through the internment
and resettlement operations. We found that soldiers are aware
of that responsibility to report infractions and they do report
them. In fact, during the course of our inspection five
soldiers came forward and reported to my inspectors incidents
of abuse.
We examined all known cases of abuse that had been reported
in Army channels as of June 9, 2004. As of that time, there
were 125 reports of abuse cases. We recognize that since that
time other reports of alleged abuse have come forward and you
have probably seen a different set of numbers, and those
differences can be accounted for by the time gap since our data
cutoff and what has gone on since then. Our information only
includes Afghanistan and Iraq, not Guantanamo. Our reports are
based on those made to the Army CID or to Army units as of that
cutoff date of June 9.
Having said that, for the purpose of our analysis the use
of the all known reports at that time, the study of those 125
cases does provide us a solid basis for analysis in an effort
to determine if there was a pattern, a root cause, or perhaps a
systemic failure.
As mentioned before, we found that the abuse that did
occur, based on a review of those incidents, it was the result
of an individual failure of discipline or compounded by the
actions or failure of actions of a leader at the tactical level
to enforce those standards of discipline, provide the right
kind of oversight and supervision.
We defined ``abuse'' as wrongful death, assault, sexual
assault, or theft. As of June 9, we had reviewed 103 summaries
of completed and ongoing CID investigations and 22 unit
investigations conducted by the chain of command, hence the 125
total.
Not all of the investigations are closed, but nevertheless
we attempted, based on the information we had, to categorize
each of them in order to identify a pattern. We separated the
125 cases into two categories where it was determined through
the course of the investigation that no abuse had occurred.
There were 31 of those cases, leaving 94 that abuse was
confirmed, that was possible, or that was in an unknown or
undetermined category.
As the Secretary mentioned, this number must be taken in
the context of the estimated 50,000 detainees that had been
under U.S. control for some period of time, not to mention the
volume and number of contacts with Iraqi people through
checkpoints, patrols, and other operations. We view the 50,000
as a conservative estimate.
We then associated each case with a location on the
battlefield. We determined that nearly half the cases, 45 out
of the 94, took place at the point of capture. Of note, 20 of
those 45 cases were theft and 25 had some element of physical
abuse associated with them. The point of capture is the place
on the battlefield that is the most uncertain, dangerous, and
violent.
Most of the allegations of abuse that occurred at the point
of capture were the result of actions by a soldier or soldiers
who failed to maintain their self-discipline or follow
procedures when dealing with recently captured detainees. Some
were a reflex or impulse action on the part of the detainee or
the part of the soldier. There are a few incidents that clearly
show criminal activity.
Twenty-one of the cases took place at internment and
resettlement facilities, including the highly publicized case
at Abu Ghraib. There were 19 incidents that occurred at
division and brigade level collection points throughout the
battlefield. Our review of those cases also establishes that
abuse was caused by an individual or individuals acting
criminally or failing to follow the known standards, or the
failure of a leader to be involved and intercede to stop
potentially abusive situations from occurring.
There are nine other cases for which the location precision
of what happened is unknown or undetermined, and that accounts
for the 125.
Our report also identified several other findings regarding
security, administration, medical support, organization,
training, regarding the capture, care, and control of
detainees.
We also examined and inspected all the four internment and
resettlement facilities and found among all of them only Abu
Ghraib was in an undesirable location based on its proximity to
hostile fire and the location near an urban area.
Regarding interrogation operations, we looked at the
process and the necessity to gain valuable information from
those we detain. We recognize that this environment has placed
a premium on human intelligence, particularly at the tactical
level. We found that our commanders recognized this quickly and
adapted their procedures in an effort to meet this demand. They
realized the necessity to hold detainees long enough at the
tactical level to take advantage of the knowledge that both the
command has of the environment and the possible information
that the detainee may have.
The commanders then must provide, however, for their
security, medical care, accountability of the detainees and
then be able to conduct more extensive questioning
interrogation at that tactical level.
We found that our doctrine must be expanded to further
define the relationship between military police (MP) and
military intelligence (MI). Both must understand not only their
roles, but also the roles and limitations of the other.
We also must provide our commanders more precise guidance
on how to establish and operate joint-interrogation facilities.
We found that our commanders need more interrogators and
interpreters, particularly at the tactical level, and that
contract interrogators, while providing considerable value,
must be trained on military interrogation techniques,
procedures, and policy.
We found that our tactical intelligence officers have the
need to conduct complex human intelligence missions and must be
able to manage the full spectrum of human intelligence (HUMINT)
assets that are being used now in this current environment. Our
training of these officers must be expanded to include these
types of operations.
We reviewed the existing command policies developed for the
conduct of interrogations to determine their compliance with
law and policy. We found that the approved command policies
regarding interrogation approach techniques developed for
Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF),
along with the published safeguards, were generally consistent
with law and policy. We also found, however, that training and
oversight of these policies was inconsistent, but could also
find no confirmed instance involving the application of an
approved approach technique that led to abuse.
We also identified another series of observations. We
provide recommendations that will clarify our policy, expand
our doctrine, verify our ongoing organizational efforts,
improve the living conditions for our soldiers and detainees,
and refine our training to support these operations and better
enable our commanders to accomplish the mission in its current
environment and into the foreseeable future.
Our recommendations have been reviewed and an action plan
has been developed that tasks the Army staff and the
subordinate commands for further review and implementation.
I appreciate the opportunity to provide this summary of our
report and look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The Department of the Army Inspector General's Detainee
Operations Inspection follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. I am impressed by
your report, General. It seems to me to track very carefully
within the prescribed guidelines issued by the Secretary.
If I might inform our witnesses and all others present,
there will be three votes stacked at 11 o'clock. Furthermore,
my distinguished colleague the ranking member has to be on the
floor at 10:30 to address the issues in one or more of those
votes. So it is the intention, I will announce it now, of the
chairman to continue this hearing to approximately 11:15 and
then, if Senators are unable to come, I will entertain with the
ranking member the option of keeping this hearing open. We will
almost take an hour hiatus. So I am certain those who are
monitoring the hearing will let us know in that event.
Now I will yield to the distinguished ranking member and
then follow him, and then we will have a first round of
questions with those members who are here.
I also advise the witnesses that unexpectedly the
leadership announced this morning that all Senators were
invited to a briefing on the 9-11 report. Consequently, there
are a number of conflicts that made it unable for Senators to
attend this morning.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, thank you for yielding to me.
I appreciate that very much.
General Mikolashek, you have testified that your inspection
did not find systemic problems in doctrine and training. But
General Abizaid told us on May 19 that he had reviewed the
preliminary findings of the IG's inspection, and at that time
he told us that, ``Our doctrine is not right. It is just not
right. There are so many things out there that are not right in
the way that we operate for this war. This is a doctrinal
problem of understanding what do the MPs do, what do the
military intelligence guys do, and how do they come together in
the right way. This doctrinal issue has to be fixed if we are
ever going to get our intelligence right to fight this war and
beat this enemy.'' \1\
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\1\ Senate Armed Services Committee, ``Hearing to Continue to
Receive Testimony on Allegations of Mistreatment of Iraqi Prisoners.''
Wednesday, May 19, 2004, 8:30 a.m.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am just wondering how that statement of his squares with
your testimony here.
General Mikolashek. Sir, it squares perfectly. Let me just
emphasize that what we found was that none of those--well, we
did find doctrinal problems, and they are laid out in the
report. But as we went back, we looked at each of those cases
of abuse, what caused them: was it a doctrinal problem, was it
a problem with our training, our organization, and when the
leadership failed was it a result of a large-scale widespread
leadership failure in each of those specific cases? In that
kind of autopsy, we found that, while there were problems and
there are problems in our doctrine, our organization, how we
train and prepare soldiers for this kind of operation, we found
no direct linkage to each of those cases of abuse that we
reviewed.
We do make a considerable number of recommendations
regarding our doctrine that specifically addresses the points
that you addressed regarding the MI and MP relationship, the
doctrinal and organizational structures for our interrogation
facilities, and how those interview approach techniques should
be applied and safeguards applied to make sure they are done in
a safe manner.
We also again addressed the training issues.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
The February 2004 ICRC report that has been published--it
is on the Internet--says that several military intelligence
officers confirmed to the ICRC that it was part of the military
intelligence process to hold a person deprived of his liberty
naked and in a completely dark and empty cell for a prolonged
period, to use inhumane and degrading treatment, including
physical and psychological coercion. Then they went into
details of some ill-treatment and abuses.
Then they said: ``These methods of physical and
psychological coercion were used by the military intelligence
in a systematic way to gain confessions and extract information
or other forms of cooperation from persons who had been
arrested in connection with suspected security offenses or
deemed to have an intelligence value.''
Did you read that report?
General Mikolashek. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Do you disagree with those conclusions?
General Mikolashek. Sir, if those occurred as they
described--and of course those matters are under investigation
by the Procedure 15 report that will determine those kinds of
activities and determine the outcome of those. But if you
assume for a minute that they did occur, that still they were
not the result of an approved technique, based on our
investigation. They still would have been an individual
breakdown in following orders, following the procedures that
had been published, and a failure of the leaders who should
have known that those kinds of incidents are wrong and should
have been stopped.
Senator Levin. That makes it much more systematic.
General Mikolashek. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. You make a distinction between systematic
and systemic.
General Mikolashek. Yes, sir, we do make a difference
between systematic and systemic.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Did you review who received the November ICRC report?
General Mikolashek. Sir, we did not, and I know there are
other people looking at the audit trail on how that report was
provided to the command and others.
Senator Levin. Now, you made some findings relative to the
subordination of MP custody and control mission to the need for
intelligence and indicated that this need for intelligence can
create settings in which unsanctioned behavior, including
detainee abuse, could occur and that failure of the MP and the
MI, the intelligence personnel, to understand each others'
specific missions and duties could undermine the effectiveness
of safeguards associated with interrogation techniques and
procedures.
General Taguba raised in his report concerns about the
recommendation of General Miller that an MP force be
subordinate to the commander at the Joint Interrogation Center.
General Taguba recommended that the military police should not
be involved with setting ``favorable conditions'' for
subsequent interviews.
I am wondering, General, whether you agree with General
Taguba's recommendation regarding subordinating MPs to the
intelligence command and whether or not the policy of
subordinating MPs, military police, to the military
intelligence's need for intelligence contributed at least
indirectly the prisoner abuse by creating a setting in which
unsanctioned behavior, including detainee abuse, could occur.
General Mikolashek. Sir, that strikes at the heart of one
of our recommendations regarding the MI-MP relationship. To
answer perhaps your last question first, our effort to look at
that particular process was an effort to ensure that we put our
doctrine in place, that we provide our commanders how to
organize these facilities, that we provide the right kind of
direction, guidance, and training to both our MPs and our MIs,
MI personnel, to prevent the kind of situation that may occur.
While we did find no direct relationship to any of those to
an abuse situation, because the cases we looked at, the most
notable ones in Abu Ghraib, were outside the confines of
interrogations. I would rather defer to the other
investigations that will look at the environment, because we
were not able to interview the people directly involved in that
or we decided not to interview them because of the ongoing
criminal proceedings.
Senator Levin. Could there have been at least an indirect
connection?
General Mikolashek. But our----
Senator Levin. Could there be an indirect contribution of
the failure of the Army doctrine to clearly address the role of
military police in the interrogation process? That absence of
doctrine, could that have indirectly contributed to the
problem?
General Mikolashek. In that case I do not think so, sir,
because again what I know and what we looked at from Abu
Ghraib, it was outside the bounds of interrogation. But it does
demand that we look at how the MPs are trained and prepared and
how the MI personnel are trained and prepared. They need to
acknowledge and be aware of other people's roles and
responsibilities. We need to provide the guidance as to how
they organize these facilities to prevent those things in the
future or, if that were the case, that environment did ensue,
that we would find a way to help prevent that.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
I will save the balance of my questions
Mr. Brownlee. Could I add one thing to that, sir, just
about doctrine in general? We do have doctrine, and we go to
war with that doctrine. These are guiding principles. But as
you well know, war is a fluid, dynamic situation. Things
change; the environment changes. We went from a rather linear
kind of battlefield to an urban insurgency. As the environment
changed, the nature of the detainees changed. We did not have
large bodies of compliant soldiers who were coming in with
their hands up. We were detaining individuals who were
suspected of perhaps acting against the coalition. We in some
cases had hardened criminals in these groups.
It was a different environment, and in different
environments we educate our soldiers, leaders, and commanders
to adapt to these environments. The doctrine will catch up with
this, and it is already doing that. But the same is true of our
organization and our training. Much of this stems from these
changing environments. But that is the reason we train our
leaders and soldiers to be adaptable and not to follow in a
rote sense a plan or even a doctrine.
Chairman Warner. Chief, you wish to reply. Go right ahead.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I would just like to add
something, and I would ask General Mikolashek to confirm this.
But it is in the report if you read it, there is a difference
in the MP doctrine that articulates what the MP's role is in
this process. If you go to the military intelligence doctrine
published, the manual, you will find a nuance in there that
indicates that the MPs are part of the process. This is one of
his findings and one of the corrections that we need to make,
and that is the reconciliation of this Joint Intelligence
Center operation so that we remove the confusion that may have
existed in this.
I would just ask, is that accurate?
General Mikolashek. Sir, that is exactly right.
Senator Levin. That is doctrinal.
General Schoomaker. Exactly.
Mr. Brownlee. But even with that, sir, it is important to
add, even if there was a nuance between the two field manuals
in the doctrines, that would not have given anyone the notion
that they had approval to engage in some of these abusive acts.
General Schoomaker. I did not mean to indicate it was an
excuse for anything. Still the bottom line is the actions that
we are most concerned about are breakdowns in discipline and
people doing things that fundamentally they knew to be wrong.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Again, Secretary Brownlee, you touched on the fact that our
forces in the rapid advancement up through and into Baghdad
were encountering a lot of unanticipated factors, among them it
is my recollection Saddam Hussein opened the doors of all the
prisons.
Mr. Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. At least some, I have heard, 60,000----
Mr. Brownlee. Yes, sir. I have heard up to 70,000, sir.
Chairman Warner. 70,000 individuals----
Mr. Brownlee. Criminals.
Chairman Warner.--just out into the nation, across the
nation again. Those are individuals that through some means or
for some reason had been incarcerated for actions contrary to
whatever the law was in Iraq. That was an enormously
complicating factor for our forces moving in.
Mr. Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. And dangerous to them.
Mr. Brownlee. Probably led to a great deal of the looting
that occurred.
Chairman Warner. I share that view.
Mr. Secretary, the United States quite justifiably has
refused to enter into international treaties that would subject
U.S. military personnel to an international court of criminal
justice. However, it is imperative that the U.S. demonstrate to
the world a firm resolve to vigorously investigate potential
criminal actions by members of the Armed Forces and that
appropriate actions are taken under the United States Uniform
Code of Military Justice.
Are you satisfied the Army is thoroughly investigating all
allegations of potential criminal activity?
Mr. Brownlee. Yes, sir. In fact, I have a periodic update
on that. I need to be careful here that I do not indicate in
any way to influence it or cause command influence. But I am
convinced that the allegations and incidents of abuse that we
know about are being thoroughly investigated and will be
pursued where appropriate with legal action under the UCMJ.
By the way, sir, we brief your staff on that periodically
also.
Chairman Warner. That is correct.
General Schoomaker, we have heard the Inspector General
discuss what he observed and his recommendations for what he
needs to be fixed. Please summarize for the committee what the
Army has already done to better prepare the units, especially
tactical units, for the environment they will face in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the detention operations and tactical human
intelligence they will have to conduct to be successful?
General Schoomaker. Sir, we have a continual process of
rolling the things that we are learning back into the training
and mobilization process of our units. We have affected all the
way from the point of how we are alerting units, how we are
preparing them for deployment, what their post-mobilization
training is, the reinforcement of the individual annual
recurring training on the Geneva Conventions and the law of
land warfare, reinforcing with the leadership the challenges
that they will face in this highly violent environment that
requires a great deal of adaptation and judgment.
We have rolled it into our combat training center so that
we offer specific replication of actual incidents that have
been experienced in theater. We have brought soldiers from
theater or that have recently served in theater into these
training centers to address their specific experiences and
setting the specific scenarios that we train on.
Of course, we are doing a comprehensive review of our
doctrine, and as we speak there is a detailed action plan that
the Department of the Army has put together. Many of these
actions are already being implemented. But we have a matrixed
action plan that we will follow up through and do a very
comprehensive--it is going to take us months to do.
Having said all of that, as we get ourselves set we are
going to continue to roll lessons learned in, to monitor the
adaptations and the nuances of the environments that we find
ourselves in, and this is going to be a continuing, evolving
process.
But again, I would like to reemphasize: the principles, the
values, the standards do not change. Having an Army of
character, with soldiers of character that understand the
values of the American people, that understand the values of
our government, that understand the values of our institutions,
are fundamental. Those do not change. We have to continue to
reinforce them. We have to continue to reinforce the leadership
aspects of what we have.
So this is something that as we go into the 21st century is
going to continue to be a challenge for us to deal with.
I would just wrap up one thing. As you heard, the majority
of the incidents of abuse occurred at the point of capture. You
have to remember that at the point of capture you are
transitioning from a very high level of violence, where the
very same people you have captured have been trying to kill you
just seconds before, where it is in the middle of a rumble that
this is occurring. It is understandable that there can be
misjudgments, and that is why we have to train our leadership
and remind our leadership that it is at this point that they
have to be very well-prepared to control the aggression and the
instincts of people that are in this situation.
You can remember having your adrenalin up before and how
sometimes what you think might be a minor shove turns out to be
something else.
Chairman Warner. I am glad you brought that point up,
because you can speak, as can Secretary Brownlee and indeed
General Mikolashek, from personal experience under those
circumstances in your earlier years of military service.
Mr. Brownlee. I might say, sir, that not only might these
people have been the ones who were trying to kill you, but they
may also have just killed some of your squad members.
Chairman Warner. That is a very important point.
My last part of that question, I want to go back to it, and
that is as a consequence of all of this recognition now that we
have a problem, whether it is at the point of initial contact
of the detainee following a firefight or other combat
activities all the way through the prison system, I hope the
pendulum has not swung so far that we are not fully exercising
our obligation to those combat forces to, within the framework
of the several treaties, Geneva treaties, and Army doctrine, to
continue to get the intelligence that is essential for that
battlefield soldier.
If you could just touch on that and then perhaps amplify it
for the record, I would be appreciative.
General Mikolashek. I can promise you that is of the
highest concern to me. We must be very careful that we must not
mistake the fact that this is a very dangerous environment and
one which is going to continue our leadership and our soldiers,
and one in which we must be very careful that we do not
overreact and fail to or put in place such things that they
make fatal mistakes, fatal hesitation, or we fail to do what we
are allowed to do and what is proper to do and what we must do
to ensure the safety and the success of our operation.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Commander of U.S. Central Command can provide the most
authoritative assessment as to the effects of the investigations,
inspections, and assessments of Abu Ghraib, as well as detention and
interrogation operations, on intelligence production.
Chairman Warner. Secretary Brownlee, do you have anything
to add to that?
Mr. Brownlee. Sir, I share the concern. We all worry about
it. I have talked in some detail with our G-2, General
Alexander, that you know well. We have all discussed that some
of these abuses that occurred, many of them, most of those that
occurred at Abu Ghraib, did not occur with detainees who were
even being interrogated, were not even the subjects of
interrogation. But unfortunately, some of the measures that may
have been effective are no longer used.
But sir, we would never want our sol