[Senate Hearing 108-658]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-658
NUCLEAR POWER
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
TO
RECEIVE TESTIMONY REGARDING THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN NATIONAL
ENERGY POLICY
__________
JULY 13, 2004
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
______
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico, Chairman
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BOB GRAHAM, Florida
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee RON WYDEN, Oregon
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
CONRAD BURNS, Montana EVAN BAYH, Indiana
GORDON SMITH, Oregon DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JIM BUNNING, Kentucky CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
JON KYL, Arizona MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
Alex Flint, Staff Director
Judith K. Pensabene, Chief Counsel
Robert M. Simon, Democratic Staff Director
Sam E. Fowler, Democratic Chief Counsel
Pete Lyons, Professional Staff Member
Jonathan Epstein, Legislative Fellow
C O N T E N T S
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STATEMENTS
Page
Alexander, Hon. Lamar, U.S. Senator from Tennessee............... 14
Bayh, Hon. Evan, U.S. Senator from Indiana....................... 15
Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from New Mexico................ 2
Bunning, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from Kentucky.................... 15
Craig, Hon. Larry E., U.S. Senator from Idaho.................... 3
Domenici, Hon. Pete V., U.S. Senator from New Mexico............. 1
McSlarrow, Kyle E., Deputy Secretary, Department of Energy....... 5
APPENDIX
Responses to additional questions................................ 35
NUCLEAR POWER
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TUESDAY, JULY 13, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in
room SD-366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Pete V.
Domenici, chairman, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF PETE V. DOMENICI,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
The Chairman. This hearing of the Energy and Natural
Resources Committee on the role of nuclear power in our
national energy policy is now in session. The purpose of the
hearing is to evaluate the progress of various nuclear energy
programs at the Department of Energy, to better understand the
administration's commitment to nuclear energy. Today I want to
discuss all of the Department's nuclear energy programs in the
context of what I hope is an integrated administration strategy
for a renaissance of nuclear energy.
With Friday's court decision on Yucca Mountain, the
Department's preliminary views on that decision will be of
great interest to the committee. Currently 103 nuclear power
plants are operating in the United States. These reactors
provide 20 percent of the electric power needed for our Nation,
thereby injecting important diversity into our energy supplies.
Nuclear plants provide the Nation's lowest cost electricity
other than hydropower, emit no atmospheric pollutants, excel at
providing steady baseload power essential for anchoring grid
stability, have demonstrated outstanding reliability, and have
a superb safety record.
However, the last completed nuclear plant in the United
States was ordered in 1973. Combinations of issues, including
high up-front capital costs back in those years, unproven
regulatory framework for new plants, progress on spent fuel
management, and a deregulated and highly competitive electric
market, all have contributed to perceived financial risks that
to date have precluded new orders.
In contrast, nuclear plants with characteristics well
advanced over any in the United States are operating today in
Japan, are being built around the world. Four of these plants
are under construction in Japan, two in Taiwan, two in Korea,
one in Romania, and one in Finland.
In 1997 I said we needed a renaissance of nuclear power in
America and today we are on the verge of it, except we do not
know what the circuit court opinion does to that. More voices
have joined us in calling for expansion of nuclear energy. Alan
Greenspan has testified on the importance of new nuclear
plants, and just recently I was presented with a preeminent
international spokesman for environmental causes, Gene
Lovelock, stated: ``We have no time to experiment with
visionary energy sources. Civilization is in imminent danger
and has to use nuclear power, the one safe, available energy
resource, now or suffer the pain to be inflicted on our
outraged planet.'' He is a very out-front environmentalist who
has made this statement. ``Opposition to nuclear energy,'' he
said, ``is based on irrational fear fed by Hollywood-style
fiction and green lobbyists and the media. These fears are
unjustified and nuclear energy has proved to be the safest of
all nuclear powers,'' he concluded in his statement. That is
Gene Lovelock.
I was enthusiastic earlier this year when I learned that
three consortia had submitted proposals to begin the process to
build the first new power plants in our country in a very long
time. This opens the door for a new plan of construction that
is critical for our country. It is a process that we will all
watch with strong interest.
This has been a roller-coaster year for Yucca Mountain
program. The proposal of OMB to move the nuclear wastes off
budget, while a good goal, is not well thought out. As noble as
this goal was, their execution was lacking. In a year of belt-
tightening, they have almost forced Congress to fund the
project at a lower than necessary level.
As one possibility, I propose to make up the funding
shortfall with a one-time transition cost increase on nuclear
utilities. Of course, the whole program is now assessing last
Friday's court decision about the 10,000-year radiation
standard for the repository. I will continue to work with
others--the Department, the administration, and industry--to
solve these challenges.
Testifying today, Senators, is Deputy Secretary of Energy
Kyle McSlarrow. Kyle, we always appreciate your views and you
will testify shortly.
Senator Bingaman.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN, U.S. SENATOR
FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Bingaman. Thank you very much for having the
hearing, Mr. Chairman. Obviously it is very timely. The future
of nuclear power in this country is a very important issue and
one that I know has been a major focus of your efforts in
particular. I have certainly tried to be supportive as well, as
most members of this committee have.
I do think the two key issues that obviously I would be
anxious to learn more about today relate to Yucca Mountain.
One, as you referred to it, is the administration's request to
take Yucca Mountain project funding off budget and the almost
inevitable reduction in funding for Yucca Mountain that seems
to be resulting from that.
Second, this decision last Friday by the court of appeals
to vacate the EPA and the NRC rules that use the 10,000-year
period, vacate them as being inconsistent with congressional
intent that they follow the recommendations of the National
Academy of Sciences. Obviously, the National Academy determined
that the peak risk was considerably farther out in geologic
time and that 10,000 years was not appropriate. I would be
anxious to find out what course the administration sees to keep
the Yucca Mountain project on track and to move ahead with it
in light of all these developments.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Bingaman. I also want to
acknowledge the authenticity of your statement, that you have
been very helpful. You have also been very helpful in terms of
your insight in terms of how we get things done. That is really
the issue. We all can keep talking about how good it is, but if
we cannot get things done it is like whistling in the dark.
I did not say in my statement, but I think I ought to and
then yield to Larry, I think everybody knows that the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Energy
was finding it difficult to model 10,000 years out in the
future. That is almost as far out in the future as civilization
in terms of its existence. There may have been a few little
villages that sprung up 12 and 13,000 years ago, but
essentially there was nothing in the world 10,000 years ago
that had to do with mankind.
Yet this report says that the National Academy of Science,
which they were supposed to look to, has found that the highest
peak of radiation is 300,000 years from now, the implication
being if you want to use existing standards and existing
statutes your new model is going to have to be 300,000 years.
We can call any scientists or engineers in the world and
all of them, nobody will tell you that you can do that. It is
impossible. So we have to set out trying to see where we are
going.
Let me acknowledge Senator Craig's enthusiastic support,
not only for nuclear, but his genuine help in trying to get
things done. Thank you, Senator.
STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY E. CRAIG, U.S. SENATOR
FROM IDAHO
Senator Craig. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let
me thank you for the continued leadership you have demonstrated
on the issue of nuclear energy and a path forward for it.
I guess my reaction is, whoever said it would be easy? What
we are trying to do here is break out of a mind set that this
country has been locked into for 2 decades. The good news is
that those who helped establish the mind set are now beginning
to see the error of their ways as it relates to abundant clean
sources of energy that this country so desperately needs if it
wants to retain its position as a world economic leader, and
those 103 reactors that are now relicensed and functioning are
setting tremendous records as it relates to productivity at low
costs, and that is fundamentally important. And by the way, we
dare not fail to say they are producing extremely clean sources
of energy.
The only problem, and we do face the problem, is that those
reactors function substantially based on a path forward as it
relates to the management of waste, and that is what we have
got to be about.
What we have also got to be about and what I want to
recognize Kyle McSlarrow for this morning is the kind of
leadership that he and the Secretary have demonstrated in
looking out into the future, along with Bill Magwood and others
who are here this morning, to see where we can get and where we
must get as it relates to Gen IV and new reactors and new
reactor designs. While the court decision of last Friday is
going to cause us to be focused for a moment, I hope it is not
but a moment, and I hope that you and I and the other Senator
from New Mexico, Senator Bingaman, can show the kind of
leadership with the Senate and the Congress to recognize that,
while the EPA and others looking at the 300,000 years did not
think they could get there and it was not necessary to get
there and 10,000 years was more realistic, but if you carry it
a step further it was also that the peak dosage was 300,000
years and you ought to really look out a million years.
There are many of us who would like to think we are
visionary as it relates to the shaping of public policy. But
the best of our scientists and the best of the engineers the
world over are not there, cannot get there, and will not get
there. And maybe we have to rethink our policy a little bit,
that we were designing a policy in an era of nuclear
schizophrenia and that is changing today and there is a much
more realistic attitude growing across America.
That attitude is already in France and in Europe, where
they were facing energy crises long before our abundance denied
us and now we face crisis.
So I hope we can get there. I think we can get there and we
should get there. While we are getting there, I think it is
important that we look at the 20 percent nuclear base we
currently have, wishing it were 30 or 40 as it relates to clean
energy, and that we have a plan to do so, certainly in working
with the Department and with our national laboratory in Idaho
to develop a premier nuclear laboratory and the kind of new
design and development that we hope can get there.
My questions this morning are going to be directed at that
and the future, not a bump in the road that I would hope and
that I would wish that the Congress would view the circuit
court decision, will change the language so the judges can look
at it a bit differently. They too I think need to be realistic,
and certainly our country is headed in that direction.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Secretary, before you testify, I just want to put on
the record: Senator Craig said that all of the nuclear reactors
have been relicensed. But that is not so. I did not want to
stop him.
Senator Craig. No, not all 103, that is correct.
The Chairman. In fact I was going to ask you, how many?
Twenty or thirty or something like that out of the 103
operating?
Mr. McSlarrow. Twenty-six to date, although we do expect
that all of them ultimately will be relicensed.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF KYLE E. McSLARROW, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
Mr. McSlarrow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
first, obviously I will summarize this testimony and submit it
for the record.
I would like to thank you and Senator Craig and Senator
Bingaman for your leadership. You have been working on these
issues a long time, as you noted, often during a period when
some analysts were predicting the end of nuclear energy in the
United States. It is important to recall that during the last
decade things looked very bleak for nuclear power in the United
States. The door seemed to close on the future of nuclear power
early in the decade as the Shoreham nuclear power plant on Long
Island was finally closed in 1992. That event showed that even
a completed plant in which $5.5 billion had been invested,
which had been licensed to operate by the NRC, which had a
virtual twin that had been operating in Connecticut for 2
decades, even this plant could fail to reach commercial
operation.
The following year saw the termination of nearly all of the
Department of Energy's nuclear energy research and development
activities. The bottom came in fiscal year 1998. In that year
the Department's civilian nuclear energy research funding fell
to zero. At the time I am sure that many saw this as an
embarrassing collapse in what had once been a world-leading
research program. But many members of this committee and you,
Mr. Chairman, have provided support to get us back on our feet
again.
At the same time, during that decade what might not have
been obvious was many positive trends. The industry was making
tremendous progress in operating U.S. nuclear power plants more
efficiently. After trailing behind nuclear programs in other
countries, U.S. operators responded vigorously to the challenge
of deregulation with better management and a new focus on the
efficient and reliable operation of U.S. plants.
The key event in the revival came when the President
unveiled the National Energy Policy, in which we issued a clear
policy statement of encouraging the expansion of nuclear power.
With the recommendations of the NEP guiding our program and
policy decisions, we were able to focus the Department's
nuclear energy program and enhance its core mission of nuclear
energy research.
I would like to briefly summarize these programs. First, we
believe that state-of-the-art nuclear power plants developed by
U.S. and overseas suppliers can and should play an important
role in meeting U.S. energy requirements in the next decade.
Under the auspices of the Nuclear Power 2010 program, we are
working with industry to pave the way for an order to be placed
for a new U.S. nuclear power plant in the next few years.
We have seen important successes in this program already,
with three U.S. utilities partnering with the Department to
test the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's early site permitting
process.
Last November, the Department challenged the utility
industry to organize itself to evolve from the study and
evaluate stage to consider specific projects that could result
in the construction of new nuclear power plants. We asked those
utilities to form teams that could create solid plans to
demonstrate the major components of the NRC's licensing regime
that remains untested, the one-step licensing process, which is
formally known as the combined construction-operating license
process. We have received three proposals from industry thus
far.
I should note, Mr. Chairman, that I realize we are going to
get into Yucca Mountain today. Our view is that continued
progress toward establishing a high-level waste repository at
the Yucca Mountain site is absolutely essential. We are still
on track toward submitting a license application in December
and opening a repository and beginning waste acceptance in
2010, and it is extremely important to put in place a long-term
funding solution if 2010 is to be a reality. We look forward to
working with you and the other members on this.
Mr. Chairman, we also have to plan for the longer term, as
Senator Craig pointed out. We have two complementary programs
designed to achieve this. First is the Advanced Fuel Cycle
Initiative, which is designed to develop a better, more
efficient, and more proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycle
that can support an expanding role for nuclear power in the
United States.
The second technology program is Generation IV. Technology
needs to provide a nuclear plant of the future that is a
superior business choice, essentially to natural gas or other
options in direct head-on competition, with the kinds of
attributes that I just described as part of the AFCI program.
That is exactly the thinking that led to the formation of the
Generation IV International Forum, or GIF. That forum is
looking at six technology concepts. We have selected one of
those concepts that I know we will be discussing, the NGNP,
which will be able to make both electricity and hydrogen at
very high levels of efficiency.
The Department of Energy is obviously well equipped to
pursue this kind of research, development, and demonstration of
complex and advanced systems. Most of the labs have excellent
capabilities and expertise in various aspects of nuclear
technology. We have established a program management structure
that brings all of that talent together in an integrated
fashion. In managing the Generation IV, AFCI, and nuclear-
hydrogen activities, we have developed an integrated structure
that designates key laboratory personnel at different labs as
national technical directors. Obviously, the Idaho National
Laboratory is intended to play a central role.
I know we are going to discuss the RFP's here in a moment,
so I will not go into detail right now. But the basic thrust
is, as Secretary Abraham has said, to establish a command
center of a revived nuclear technology, education, and research
enterprise in this country.
Mr. Chairman, we are at a critical moment in deciding our
energy future. As Secretary Abraham and you have said, we need
to get our energy house in order. We believe that task requires
a strong contribution by nuclear energy well into this century.
Ensuring this occurs is a formidable challenge, but we need to
start now.
The past 3 years has seen a dramatic change in terms of
actions taken, increased industry interest, and a broader
recognition of the benefits of nuclear energy. We look forward
to working with you and this committee in resolving those
challenges and meeting these goals.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McSlarrow follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kyle E. McSlarrow, Deputy Secretary,
Department of Energy
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. It is a
pleasure to be here today to discuss the progress we are making toward
restoring nuclear power as a vibrant and realistic option to meet this
Nation's future energy needs. Building on industry's success with the
efficient and safe operation of current nuclear power plants, the Bush
Administration is looking to both pave the way for deployment of new
plants in the next few years and point the way toward a new generation
of nuclear energy for the future.
First, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for this Committee's
leadership. Even before President Bush took office in 2001, you,
Senator Craig, Senator Bingaman and others were working on the issues
facing nuclear energy in this country--often during a period when some
analysts were predicting the end of nuclear energy in the United
States. This committee's efforts provided a solid programmatic and
policy foundation that has made the progress we are seeing today
possible. While, as we all know, there is still much to be done, I
believe that it is important to recognize the success that we have seen
in the nuclear field over the last few years.
It is important to recall that during the last decade, things
looked very bleak for nuclear power in the United States. The door
seemed to close on the future of nuclear power early in the decade as
the Shoreham nuclear power plant on Long Island, New York was finally
closed in February 1992 after a long, contentious fight. That event
showed that even a completed plant in which $5.5 billion had been
invested, which had been licensed to operate by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, which had a virtual twin that had been operating in
Connecticut for two decades--even this plant could fail to reach
commercial operation.
The closure of Shoreham seemed to herald a stream of bad news for
nuclear power. The following year saw the termination of nearly all the
Department of Energy's nuclear energy research and development
activities. Work on programs such as the Integral Fast Reactor, the
Gas-Turbine Modular Helium Reactor, and the SP-100 space reactor were
all brought to a rapid end. The number of students taking up nuclear
engineering in the United States was in free-fall--dropping from about
1,500 before Shoreham to less than a third that level by 1997.
Deregulation of the electric utility industry and the advent of the
competitive electricity market led many analysts--and more than a few
members of Congress--to predict that nuclear power plants would become
``stranded costs'' that would force their owners to close them
prematurely and replace them with smaller plants fueled by demonstrably
cheap and apparently infinite supplies of natural gas.
The Yucca Mountain project was stuck in neutral. While taking in
hundreds of millions of dollars of ratepayer money each year, the
program, delayed by litigation and funding shortfalls, was making
little progress towards its goal of accepting commercial and defense
high-level nuclear waste by 2010.
In this environment, the nadir came in fiscal year 1998. In that
year, the Department's civilian nuclear energy research funding fell to
zero.
At the time, I'm sure that many saw this as an embarrassing and
harmful collapse in what had once been a world-leading research
program. But many of the members of this Committee provided support and
encouragement that made it possible to begin the long process of
rebuilding the Federal nuclear energy program.
At the same time, industry made tremendous progress in operating
U.S. nuclear power plants more efficiently. After trailing behind
nuclear programs in other countries for many years in terms of
efficient operation, U.S. operators responded vigorously to the
challenge of deregulation with better management and a new focus on the
efficient and reliable operation of U.S. plants. U.S. capacity factors
were less than 70% when the 1990s began and topped 90% only ten years
later, leading the world in the safe and efficient operation of nuclear
power plants. Moreover, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has acted
quickly and effectively to enable utilities to ``uprate'' their plants
and extend operating licenses for an additional 20 years. One result--
which is very different from the picture that some analysts painted
only a few years ago--is that essentially all nuclear power plants in
the country are expected to apply for license renewals.
The key event in the revival came when the President unveiled the
National Energy Policy (NEP). For the first time since the Department
of Energy was formed in 1977, the Government issued a clear policy
statement encouraging the expansion of nuclear power to meet our future
energy needs. With the recommendations of the NEP guiding our program
and policy decisions, we were able to focus the Department's nuclear
energy program and enhance its core mission of nuclear energy research.
We started important new initiatives and Secretary Abraham authorized
the formal creation of the Generation IV International Forum, the model
for many of the international efforts the Department is pursuing today.
Most recently, we set off to establish a premier laboratory for nuclear
energy research and development, the Idaho National Laboratory.
In parallel with this progress, Secretary Abraham, citing the sound
scientific work conducted by the program since its inception,
recommended and the President accepted the Yucca Mountain site as the
best place to build the Nation's high-level waste repository. This step
cleared a major roadblock in enabling a vibrant U.S. nuclear power
program to move forward. With Congress's strong votes in support of the
site selection; and the Department's demonstrated progress toward
meeting our goal to establish a geologic repository by 2010, industry
saw clearly that the nuclear power option was truly back on the table.
This brings us to today. We have much work ahead of us and I would
like to discuss with you today the programs, strategies, and policies
that are advancing our goal to assure a strong, long-term role for
nuclear energy in helping this country to meet its energy and
environmental goals.
ENCOURAGING GENERATION III+
We believe that state-of-the art nuclear power plants developed by
U.S. and overseas suppliers can and should play an important role in
meeting U.S. energy requirements in the next decade. It is clear that
U.S. demand for electricity will continue to increase. Despite the fact
that the U.S. economy has become increasingly efficient in its use of
energy, growth in energy use and growth in economic activity remain
linked. The Energy Information Administration projects that assuming
modest economic growth of three percent annually through 2025, U.S.
energy use will grow by about 1.5 percent each year. While this does
not sound like a big number, this means the U.S. will need to build
over 335,000 megawatts of new capacity during that period to meet the
demand and this does not include the plants we will need to build to
replace older, retiring plants.
Industry has generally anticipated that most of these new plants
would be efficient gas-fired units similar to those that comprise the
vast majority of the power plants built over the last decade. Use of
natural gas for electric power generation increased by 85% from 1990 to
2002. It is projected to nearly double by 2025--from 685 BkWh today to
1,300 BkWh. This dependency on a single fuel type for new generation
represents a potential vulnerability in our energy security.
Nuclear power should be a key part of the U.S. electric generating
portfolio. Advanced, Generation III+ light water reactor-based plants
are on the market today and more will be available from U.S. and
foreign suppliers in the coming years. Advanced Boiling Water Reactors
(ABWRs) based on U.S. technology are being built and operated today in
Japan and other countries with impressive results. Finland will build a
large French-supplied European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) plant to meet
the needs of its growing industries. China is planning to build 30 new
plants by 2020 to meet its rapidly growing energy requirements.
Under the auspices of the Department's Nuclear Power 2010 program,
we are working with industry to pave the way for an order to be placed
for a new U.S. nuclear power plant in the next few years. The Nuclear
Power 2010 program is designed to work with industry to identify sites
for new nuclear power plants, develop and bring to market advanced
nuclear plant technologies, evaluate the business case for building new
nuclear power plants, and demonstrate untested regulatory processes.
We have seen important success in this program already, with three
U.S. utilities partnering with the Department to test the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's Early Site Permit process. Under this process,
utilities can work with the NRC to evaluate potential sites for new
plants and, if the sites pass regulatory scrutiny, the utilities can
obtain permits from the Commission that would ease the licensing of a
plant at an approved site in the future.
Clearly, there is great value to such a process. However, like many
of the advanced NRC licensing activities that came into force after the
Energy Policy Act of 1992, this procedure has never been tested. Under
our Nuclear Power 2010, the Department is working with three of the
Nation's major utilities--Dominion Resources, Entergy, and Exelon--to
evaluate sites in Virginia, Mississippi, and Illinois. This effort has
already resulted in applications by these utilities to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. We anticipate that the first Early Site Permits
ever issued will emerge from this work in 2006.
The Department has also funded several important studies under the
Nuclear Power 2010 program. For example, we have launched a cost-shared
study with the petrochemical industry to explore the benefits to
industrial users of natural gas of building a new nuclear power plant
in the Southwest. Most important, in 2002 we completed an independent
business case analysis that was based on comprehensive interviews and
workshops with industry leaders and Wall Street experts. The resulting
report, Business Case for New Nuclear Power Plants in the United
States, provided an authoritative account of the business and financial
issues facing utilities that are considering the construction of new
plants.
The Business Case study found that there are two primary obstacles
to building new plants in the United States:
1. The difficulty in obtaining up-front financing for a large
project that requires five or more years to complete; and
2. The uncertainty in the untested licensing process.
The first issue reflects the changes in the market since the last
plants were built. In the 1970s, a utility deciding to build a nuclear
plant simply placed the order and paid for all the necessary design and
engineering work required for the project. Costs were generally passed
on to ratepayers as part of the cost needed to assure a long-term
electricity supply. Today, the situation is very different. Because
utilities are unable simply to pass costs to ratepayers in the
competitive markets in which many now operate, they are unwilling to
absorb the very expensive up-front design and engineering work required
for new plant technologies to be brought to market. Further, because of
the scrutiny utilities face from investors and credit rating
organizations, they are very reluctant to make large capital
investments of any kind--especially if these investments have a multi-
year long impact on earnings.
The second issue reflects the negative experiences utilities had in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Few utilities are interested in making
investments in billions of dollars in a new power plant if they can't
be certain that they can operate the plant on a predictable schedule--
or, in a worst case, if there is a prospect that they won't be able to
operate at all. The legacy of Shoreham looms large in this thinking.
It is in this context that we designed the next step in the Nuclear
Power 2010 program. On November 20, 2003, the Department challenged the
utility industry to organize itself to evolve from the ``study and
evaluate'' stage to consider specific projects that could result in the
construction of new nuclear power plants. We asked the electric
utilities to form teams that could create solid plans to demonstrate
the major component of NRC's licensing regime that remains untested:
the ``one-step'' licensing process, which is formally known as the
combined construction/operating license (COL) process.
By receiving the authorization to construct and the authorization
to operate at essentially the same time, a utility could build a new
plant with a very high degree of confidence that a well-executed
project will allow a new plant to go on-line on schedule.
We have received three proposals from industry thus far. We have
awarded costshared funding to one consortium led by the Tennessee
Valley Authority to verify vendors' cost and schedule estimates to
build an ABWR at the utility's Bellefonte site near Hollywood, Alabama.
The results of this work will be available in April 2005 and will be
used to allow the TVA Board to make an informed decision about the
future of this concept.
Two other consortia have also made proposals. One, led by Dominion
Resources, would demonstrate the COL process using technology from
Atomic Energy of Canada, Limited (AECL); the other is led by a large
consortium of 9 utilities that plans to consider two technologies--the
Westinghouse AP-1000 and the General Electric Enhanced Simplified
Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR). Since this procurement action is still
open, I am not at liberty to discuss the details of the industry
proposals.
YUCCA MOUNTAIN: CONTINUING THE PROGRESS
If we are to see our Nuclear Power 2010 efforts develop into actual
nuclear power plant projects, continued progress toward establishing
the Nation's high-level waste repository at the Yucca Mountain, Nevada
site is absolutely essential.
This Administration has made a strong commitment to resolving the
nuclear waste challenge and making the construction of a repository
achievable. We have followed through on that twenty-year commitment
with important actions, such as the 2002 recommendation of the Yucca
Mountain site and support for the enactment of the Congressional joint
resolution that enabled the Department to move toward licensing the
repository. This decision allows the Nuclear Regulatory Commission--an
independent regulatory body implementing an extensive set of
regulations--to review the science during a rigorous three-to-four-year
licensing process, which will involve many other parties and will be
open to public scrutiny.
We are moving ahead with developing a high-quality license
application for submittal to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at the
end of this year. The application is built on over 20 years of sound
science, making Yucca Mountain the most exhaustively studied project of
its kind in the world. Since the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 was
enacted, five Presidents have overseen work on a geologic repository
for spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. This Administration's
policy has been to complete the science, to fulfill all the technical
and institutional requirements laid out in the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act, and begin construction if authorized by the NRC.
At the end of June, the Department fulfilled a prerequisite for
submittal of the license application, certifying the availability of
approximately 1.2 million documents, totaling some 5.6 million pages,
submitted by the Department for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
Licensing Support Network. The Licensing Support Network is an
electronic, Internet-based discovery system that will allow the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, the public, and parties to the licensing
proceeding electronic access to the results of scientific studies and
other information used to develop the license application.
This system is the first of its kind, and its development is
providing lessons learned for many of the parties involved. We are
working out technical issues and ensuring that we do not disclose
individuals' privacy information. It is important to note that the
Licensing Support Network is not the License Application--the document
collection supports the License Application, which will provide context
and present the substantive conclusions drawn from these documents.
We are still on track toward submitting a license application in
December of this year, and opening a repository and beginning waste
acceptance in 2010. The President's Fiscal Year 2005 budget reflected
the funding needed to maintain these longstanding goals, and, in
parallel; the Department offered a legislative proposal to resolve a
funding problem that has burdened the Program for many years. It is
extremely important to put in place a long-term funding solution if
2010 is to be a reality, and we look forward to working with the
Congress further to achieve this objective.
TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS FOR THE LONG-TERM FUEL CYCLE
Our Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) is designed to develop a
better, more efficient, and more proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel
cycle that could support an expanding role for nuclear power in the
United States. AFCI technologies could provide important benefits such
as enhancing national security by lowering proliferation risk through
the reduction of inventories of commercially-generated plutonium
contained in spent fuel. AFCI will also enhance national energy
security by recovering the significant energy value contained in spent
nuclear fuel--the 44,000 metric tones of spent nuclear fuel currently
stored at nuclear power plant sites across the country that contain the
energy equivalent of over 6 billion barrels of oil, or about two full
years of U.S. oil imports.
One possible key to realizing these benefits is the development of
advanced separation technologies. These are technologies that can
remove the useful components of spent nuclear fuel from the materials
that must be disposed as waste. This is not a new field of study. The
United States developed PUREX technology during the Manhattan Project
to provide plutonium for use in atomic weapons. PUREX technology is
used today in Europe to reprocess spent fuel.
However, while commercial reprocessors have done much to improve
existing separation technology, it remains too expensive, generates too
much high-level waste, and separates plutonium that presents a long-
term proliferation risk. We believe it is the wrong technology for the
future and the National Energy Policy reflects this. We have, instead,
focused on two technologies that show great promise.
Through the AFCI program; our scientists have invented a technology
known as Uranium Extraction Plus (UREX+), an advanced aqueous process
that can be used to remove the uranium and a combination of plutonium
and selected minor actinides from spent nuclear fuel. It is our hope
that this technology will prove proliferation-resistant enough to
provide the benefits of recycling spent fuel without increasing
proliferation risks.
Another technology, pyroprocessing, was investigated during the
Integral Fast Reactor program of the 1980s. In its current form, it is
proving to be a highly efficient, proliferation-resistant, non-aqueous
approach to separate the actinides in spent fuel from fission products.
The AFCI pyroprocessing activities support the ultimate reduction of
the radiotoxicity of nuclear waste through the transmutation of minor
actinides in future Generation IV fast spectrum reactors or in
dedicated transmuter devices. In addition, these activities provide the
means for closure of the fuel cycle for Generation IV fast reactors.
The AFCI program is preparing for its next steps--larger-scale
demonstration of key technologies and development and testing of
advanced transmutation fuels. If successful, this research will reduce
the toxicity of nuclear waste to the point that it will decay to the
same toxicity as natural uranium ore in less than 1,000 years--instead
of the 300,000 years required without AFCI technology.
MOVING FORWARD WITH GENERATION IV: NGNP
Current, state-of-the-art Generation III+ technologies such as
AECL's ACR-700, the Westinghouse AP-1000, and the GE ESBWR could serve
the future market for nuclear energy well. Our Nuclear Power 2010
program is designed to help utilities decide among these technologies
and to place new plant orders. While utilities are positively engaged
in this effort, we cannot ignore the fact that ordering a new nuclear
plant remains a tough decision for any utility operating in a
competitive market. As we look to the longer-term future, it is clear
that nuclear power must find a way to deal with the structural issues
that potentially limit its expansion.
Again, we believe advances in technology can provide a path-
forward. To allow nuclear to compete more effectively with other energy
options, it will be necessary for the utility decision to build a
nuclear unit to be a matter of fuel mix rather than an issue of cost
and risk. In other words, technology needs to provide a nuclear plant
that is a superior business choice to natural gas units or other
options in a direct, head-on competition. Such a plant must be capable
of coming on-line in a time frame similar to a gas plant, with no more
financial risk. Such a plant must be licensed and regulated under a
regime that recognizes its safety advantages. Such a plant must be
highly flexible and able to serve the needs of the market as they
evolve.
This is exactly the thinking that led to the formation of the
Generation IV International Forum, or GIF. That group, in coordination
with the Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee (NERAC), led the
evaluation of over 100 different nuclear energy concepts by over 100
expert scientists and engineers from over a dozen countries. After a
complex, carefully managed two year process, the GIF concluded that six
technology concepts held the most promise for the future and the GIF
member countries agreed to establish an international framework to
allow all countries to work on the technologies of greatest interest to
them in direct partnership with other member countries.
Today, GIF is comprised of ten countries and EURATOM, working
together to advance next-generation nuclear energy technologies.
Working with brilliant engineers and scientists from all over the
world, the GIF has selected six advanced nuclear energy technologies
that it will pursue for the future use by nations all over the world.
Under U.S. chairmanship, the GIF is at this time completing a
multilateral agreement that will allow all GIF nations to share in this
important work.
For our part, as we indicated in our report to Congress last year
on the U.S. Generation IV program, the Department of Energy has
selected one of the six technologies as its lead technology. This
technology is now known as the Next Generation Nuclear Plant, or NGNP.
The NGNP would be able to make both electricity and hydrogen at very
high levels of efficiency; would be deployable in modules that will
better fit the highly competitive, deregulated market environment in
the United States; and would be extraordinarily safe, proliferation-
resistant, and waste-minimizing.
The base concept of the NGNP is that of a very-high temperature
gas-cooled reactor system. coupled with an advanced, high-efficiency
turbine generator and an even more advanced thermochemical hydrogen
production system. We have very high expectations for this technology.
As we indicated in our recent request for Expressions of Interest
(EOI), we are interested in the eventual deployment of commercial
plants that can generate electric power at a cost of less than 1.5
cents/kilowatt hour; produce hydrogen at a cost of less than $1.50/
gallon-gasoline equivalent; and cost less than $1,000/kilowatt to
construct with a goal of $500/kilowatt.
These characteristics are obviously challenging. But, because of
the work we have completed thus far in our work on Generation IV
nuclear power systems, we believe these characteristics are achievable.
It is very possible that this type of nuclear plant could be brought to
market by the 2020s and serve the world's long-term needs for many
decades thereafter.
The Department is working with its international partners to define
the research and development activities necessary to advance this
concept. We have received comments from the U.S. private sector on our
NGNP strategy and have also received indications from several companies
regarding their interest in serving as the Project Integrator. To be
successful, such a technology must be flexible, safe, reliable, and
consistent with the economic realities of the market.
Our EOI also noted that a management and funding option the
Department is considering is to implement a cooperative agreement with
a Project Integrator to pursue this technology. This entity would
create the mechanisms needed to assure strong private sector and
international participation in the project and also assure a solid
private sector management approach to the selection of technologies and
the construction project. This entity, with its eventual consortium
partners, will be able to apply this technology to commercial projects
in the U.S. and abroad. We also expect the Project Integrator to build
any fuel fabrication or other facilities that will be needed to support
commercial use of NGNP technology (though we may, as some potential
applicants have already inquired, certain proposals to build such
facilities at the Idaho National Laboratory). The Consortium will also
be responsible for obtaining an NRC license for the NGNP.
We believe that a strong role for the private sector in this
program is essential to its success. Without private sector leadership,
the NGNP will lack credibility with industry and it will be very
difficult to bring this technology to commercial deployment. We have
considerable confidence in the U.S. private sector to assemble the
right technologies, the right players, and the right strategy to make
NGNP technology a reality.
If we are successful in creating such a technology, we will
transform the energy and environment future of the United States. We
will not only assure a vibrant, long-term future for nuclear energy
that will allow the Nation to benefit from nuclear energy's enviable
environmental qualities, but we will expand its advantages from
electricity production to fueling the Nation's vast transportation
system. In doing so, we will enable the President's vision, as
articulated in the National Hydrogen Fuel Initiative, to be realized
far earlier than many thought possible.
MANAGING DOE'S NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENDA
The Department of Energy is well-equipped to pursue the research,
development and demonstration of complex, advanced systems such as the
NGNP because it has access to some of the best scientific and
engineering talent in the world--at the DOE laboratories. Because of
its roots in the Atomic Energy Commission, most of the Department's
labs have excellent capabilities and expertise in various aspects of
nuclear technology. The Department has established a program management
structure that brings the best technical talent to bear on DOE's
nuclear energy R&D programs, no matter where that talent may reside. In
managing the Generation IV, AFCI, and Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative
activities, for example, DOE has developed an integrated structure that
designates key Laboratory personnel as ``National Technical Directors''
of specific technology areas. These individuals have the responsibility
to coordinate work at the national labs with universities, industry,
and the international community in areas that they have particular
expertise.
We believe that there is a role for many of the labs in advancing
our nuclear energy program objectives. I have met personally with the
``Seven Lab'' group to discuss their ideas on promoting a broad-based
nuclear energy research program. And, as I told the senior lab staff at
this morning's ``Decision-Marker's Forum.'' We expect to rely on
Argonne National Laboratory (with its unique expertise in reactor
analysis, reactor safety, physics and computer codes); Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (which has great expertise in materials and
chemical processes); Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (with its
international nuclear safety expertise); Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (which leads in the consideration of the national security
considerations of nuclear technology); Los Alamos National Laboratory
(which has some the Department's finest advanced nuclear fuel
technology capabilities); and Sandia National Laboratories (which has
outstanding energy conversion, systems engineering, and
nonproliferation expertise).
Obviously, however, the Idaho National Laboratory will play a
central role. As you know, we have issued a request for proposals which
will establish a new Management and Operations Contractor at the lab
who will have the task of merging the lab operations of Argonne
National Laboratory-West and Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory to create a new, multi-program national
laboratory. The new lab will serve as what Secretary Abraham called the
``command center'' of a revived nuclear technology, education, and
research enterprise in this country. We expect that the INL will form
close and productive relationships with other national laboratories--
particularly those where important, irreplaceable expertise and
capabilities exist today.
The development of this new laboratory is a key objective of our
Next Generation Nuclear Plant program. It is fair to note that the
Department has two coequal purposes in pursuing the NGNP; one is to
work with industry to develop and deploy a technology that would help
us meet the Nation's long-term energy and environmental goals. The
other is to initiate the ten-year effort to build the Idaho National
Laboratory into the world's premier nuclear energy research laboratory.
Pursuant to the latter objective, the Department has developed a
strategy that assures both a strong management role for the private
sector and a major, well-defined role for the INL. In particular, we
envision that the INL would have the following key responsibilities in
the NGNP project:
The INL would serve as the Department's lead laboratory and
technology agent for the entire project. All of DOE's funding
for the considerable research required for the NGNP project
will go to the INL. I would expect that INL would coordinate
tasks utilizing some of our other outstanding labs which play a
significant role in nuclear research and development today.
DOE's current approach is to maintain the National Hydrogen
Fuel Initiative as a distinct program. The INL will conduct the
hydrogen technology program and coordinate with the Integrator
to eventually marry the NGNP with the hydrogen plant.
The INL will provide the Integrator and the Consortium with
technology support required for the project.
The Department expects that the INL will also play a major
role in the construction of the NGNP; it is our experience that
first-of-a-kind components are fabricated at national
laboratories.
The INL will coordinate all educational activities connected
with the project, most likely through the proposed Center for
Advanced Energy Studies to be collocated with the INL.
INL will serve as the primary point-of-contact on the
relevant Generation IV International Forum ``system steering
committee'' related to NGNP technology and coordinate any
international government-to-government research and development
work.
Beyond nuclear energy research, we envision the INL continuing to
serve as a multi-program laboratory, with a broad and varied portfolio
of work. We believe that a diverse scope of work activities would
provide a sound intellectual basis for the lab and help attract the
wide range of expert researchers and technologists from many
disciplines that will be needed to allow us to reach our ambitious
nuclear energy goals. In addition to its nuclear energy role, the
request for proposals indicates that the new INL M&O contractor will:
Consolidate at the INL the ability to fabricate, test and
assemble plutonium-238 power systems needed for both national
security and space exploration;
Establish a world-class Center for Advanced Energy Studies
in Idaho Falls, Idaho, in which the INL, Idaho universities and
other regional and national universities cooperate to conduct
on-site research, classroom instruction, technical conferences
and other events;
Be a lead science and technology provider in nuclear
nonproliferation and counter proliferation activities, and play
an increased role in developing science-based, technical
solutions for protecting the country's critical infrastructure;
and
Research, develop, demonstrate and deploy technologies that
improve the efficiency, cost effectiveness and environmental
impacts of systems that generate, transmit, distribute and
store electricity and fuels.
For the nuclear energy and other missions, we have asked the
Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee to evaluate the assets in
Idaho and to recommend to us improvements it believes we should make
not just in facilities and equipment, but also in less tangible areas,
such as personnel development and incentives and laboratory culture. We
look forward to receiving their recommendations later this year.
ENHANCING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I think it is important that I highlight the
progress we have made in reversing the decline in nuclear engineering
in the United States. With significant support and encouragement from
this body and your colleagues in the House of Representatives, we are
now reversing the decline in undergraduate enrollments in this area of
study that began in 1993 and continued through 1998. In 1998, the U.S.
saw only around 500 students enrolled as nuclear engineers--down from
almost 1,500 in 1992. After several years of focused effort, the United
States now has over 1,300 students studying nuclear engineering. That
number is set to increase further, as strong programs--such as at
Purdue and Texas A&M, not to mention Idaho State University and the
University of New Mexico--continue to grow and we see new programs
start at schools such as South Carolina State University, the
University of South Carolina, and the University of Nevada-Las Vegas.
The growth of nuclear energy in the United States is dependent on
the preservation of the education and training infrastructure at
universities. The research conducted using these reactors is critical
to many national priorities. Currently, there are 27 operating
university research reactors at 26 campuses in 20 states. These
reactors are providing support for research in such diverse areas as
medical isotopes, human health, life sciences, environmental
protection, advanced materials, lasers, energy conversion and food
irradiation.
The most exciting development in University Reactor Infrastructure
and Education Assistance is the Innovations in Nuclear Infrastructure
and Education (INIE) Program established in FY 2002. In FY 2003, two
additional university consortia were awarded, bringing the total to six
INIE grants, providing support to 24 universities in 19 states across
the Nation. These consortia have demonstrated remarkable collaborative
efforts and strong formation of strategic partnerships between
universities, national laboratories, and industry. These partnerships
have resulted in increased use of the university nuclear reactor
research and training facilities, upgrading of facilities, increased
support for students, and additional research opportunities for
students, faculty and other interested researchers.
We plan to do even more to support nuclear technology education in
the future. With the advent of the Idaho National Laboratory's proposed
Center for Advanced Energy Studies, we expect that the lab will become
a center point for strengthening nuclear education nationwide. We look
forward to the opportunities this new Center will create for our
efforts to maintain and enhance the Nation's nuclear education
infrastructure.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, we are at a critical moment in deciding our energy
future. As Secretary Abraham and you have said, ``we need to get our
energy house in order.'' We believe that task requires a strong
contribution by nuclear energy well into this century. Ensuring this
occurs is a formidable challenge. But we need to start now; the past
three years has seen a dramatic change in terms of actions taken,
increased industry interest, and a broader recognition of the benefits
of nuclear energy. We look forward to working with you and this
committee in resolving outstanding challenges and meeting these goals.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
I want to ask Senators that came late if they would like to
make a brief opening remark. Senator Alexander and Senator
Bayh, and then we will ask Senator Bunning. Would you like to
make a remark?
STATEMENT OF HON. LAMAR ALEXANDER, U.S. SENATOR
FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Alexander. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and I will make it
brief. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for----
The Chairman. It does not have to be brief; whatever you
would like.
Senator Alexander. Thank you.
These are the points that I would like to make. I very much
support nuclear energy as an option for us in the United
States. It ought to be a major component of our National Energy
Policy. I am from a part of the country, Tennessee, which has a
big clean air problem and one of the surest ways to clean our
air is to produce more of our electricity from nuclear power.
We get 20 percent of that from TVA right now and I support
TVA's effort to continue to expand nuclear power in the area.
So I support the administration on that.
I am concerned about a couple of things. One is I want to
make sure that we have sufficient resources in the budget, Mr.
McSlarrow, to reach the 2010 goal. We have consortia, as you
have mentioned, who have stepped up and said that they want to
work through this very expensive process of making sure that
the regulations permit licensing. I look forward in the
question and answer period to talking more about whether we
have enough money there to send a clear signal to the industry
that this is a real prospect, the opening of new plants.
The second area I would like to ask you about and I hope
you will comment when the time comes has to do with the Idaho
National Laboratory. I am all for its being the lead lab for
nuclear research, but I wonder whether it is wise to take the
plutonium 238 processing capabilities which we now have at Oak
Ridge and the plutonium 238 encapsulating capacity which we now
have at Los Alamos and move it to Idaho. I do not think that
would be necessary in order for Idaho to fulfill its mission
and I would be interested in the cost of that. It would seem to
me that if it is likely to cost hundreds of millions of dollars
to take that established capacity which is at Oak Ridge and Los
Alamos and move it to Idaho, I would rather spend the money in
Idaho to try to get a new, lower cost nuclear power plant going
than to take existing capabilities that have existed over the
last 30 years and replicate them there.
So those are the areas I would like to hear more about. I
thank you for coming.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Bayh.
STATEMENT OF HON. EVAN BAYH, U.S. SENATOR
FROM INDIANA
Senator Bayh. Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman. I thank you
for holding this hearing.
I arrived at this subject as something of an agnostic, but
am interested in the role that nuclear power can play in
addressing two of the big issues of our time. The first is
increased energy independence for our country. This is a
significant national security issue, the significance of which
we are reminded of every day with most of the world's energy
supplies residing in fairly unstable places.
The second is the issue of global warming and the possible
contribution that an appropriate use of nuclear power as a part
of our Nation's energy mix can make in contributing toward
that.
The final factor would be affordability. With natural gas
and other energy sources increasing in cost, I am interested in
the role that nuclear power can play in perhaps lending some
stability to affordable energy sources for our country.
So I am here to listen and learn, not to speak, but I thank
you for affording us all this opportunity.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Bunning.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM BUNNING, U.S. SENATOR
FROM KENTUCKY
Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased that
we are having this hearing today on the role of nuclear power
in our National Energy Policy. It is important that we remain
focused on the need to increase our domestic energy production
and lessen our dependency on foreign national, such as the
Middle East, foreign nations.
The need to increase our own production of energy has never
been more important than now. This hearing is especially
important because of the high price of oil and natural gas that
we are experiencing. This Nation needs to diversify its energy
resources, including using energy from coal, oil, gas, and
nuclear energy.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
the use of nuclear power and a means to diversify and increase
our domestic energy sources. I thank the witnesses for
appearing and I will question our No. 1 witness, a little later
on, on why it has been since 1973 that we have not had a new
nuclear power plant started.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
We are going to now proceed to some questions and I am very
hopeful everybody will have some. I do think it is very
important for our committee that we get an opinion as soon as
we can, as valid as we can make it, as to what the impact of
the circuit court decision is on nuclear power. I am not sure
everybody knows that last week there was a very, very
significant ruling by the circuit court up here regarding how
many years out in the future we must provide this facility at
Yucca Mountain, how many years out in the future do we have to
provide for safety.
We were doing 10,000 years because that is about all we
could model. They leave the impression that it might have to be
300,000 years, which seems impossible.
But let me ask a couple of questions so we get the record
straight. What percentage of the electric power does France get
from nuclear power generation?
Mr. McSlarrow. It is about 75 percent.
The Chairman. 75 percent of France's power comes from that.
They have interim storage of their nuclear waste, is that
correct?
Mr. McSlarrow. Correct.
The Chairman. Have you ever seen that?
Mr. McSlarrow. I have not personally seen it, no.
The Chairman. I would like to just say on the record that I
have seen it, and you would not know that you were there. You
get into a building that looks much like a junior high school
in America, a big one, a big junior high, and you walk in and
the floor is kind of glassy. And you ask, where is the waste,
and they say: Look down. And you look down and you are standing
on it.
It is encapsulated in glass tubes and then glass-filled,
and then glass on the top, and you can walk all over it. There
is no radiation emitted. And that will last 75 years and they
figure they will be looking for other ways, and they proceeded
to have 75 percent, while we here in America decided that our
way to store it was to put it in the ground permanently and
that is the law, that we are going to get there some day.
Rather difficult so far. That opinion is going to require
that Congress act in certain ways, I am sure.
Senator Bayh raised the issue of is there enough money in
the budget to keep this going, or who asked that? Senator
Alexander. So let me ask you right now, Mr. Secretary. In spite
of the decision, it is your opinion, is it not, that if we fund
this the funding can be used and the project can continue in
spite of this decision; is that correct?
Mr. McSlarrow. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. That is because you are proceeding to develop
it, but you are not yet licensing it; is that correct?
Mr. McSlarrow. We are at the stage right now where we are
preparing a license application by the end of the year, and we
will meet that deadline. There is a lot of useful work to be
done and that is what the funding requirements in the next
couple of years would be devoted to.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Secretary, I am in the enviable or
unenviable position, whichever it may be, of chairing this
committee, which has some authorizing power with reference to
paying for Yucca, which I was not aware of, but it is there and
I will discuss that in a paper with all of you as to what that
is.
But second, I chair the subcommittee that pays for this,
the Energy and Water. So I want to ask you, based on all of the
problems we have shared with you, is there sufficient money in
the budget to pay for the next stage of the evolution of this
project?
Mr. McSlarrow. There is, if the President's request is met.
If it is below that, I cannot say. It is a year for year slip,
but it will obviously have some impacts. The request of $880
million, that is the $131 million from the defense account plus
the $749 million included in the administration's
reclassification proposal, keeps us on track to take waste
beginning in 2010.
The Chairman. I want to make it clear, and then I will
yield to Senator Bingaman. I have some additional questions,
but I may just submit them to you. I want to make it clear that
I blame no one, but the way the budget was prepared took $500
million off budget to pay for Yucca. Our budget process do not
permit us to do that, does not permit us to do that. So what we
have to do is take the regular budget for Energy and Water and
take that money out of it to pay for a huge portion of Yucca.
That is almost impossible from the adding up of the numbers
as to how it can be done. So we are looking everywhere we can
to find some way to do that.
But his answer begs the question. The budget has the money
in, but does it have it in there in a way that we can spend it?
The answer is probably no.
Senator Bingaman.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, as I understand what the court of appeals
ruled this last Friday, they basically said that under the law
EPA is required to establish a standard that is, quote, ``based
upon and consistent with the National Academy report.'' The EPA
had established what they thought was a standard that was based
upon and consistent with the report, and the court said, no, it
is not, because the academy report does not permit you to
establish a standard that contemplates 10,000 years.
Is it your view that it is possible for EPA now to go back
and develop a workable standard that is consistent with that
National Academy report?
Mr. McSlarrow. First let me say, we are obviously
evaluating a lot of options. That would be one of them. We have
had essentially 1 full business day to review this opinion, but
let me just give you sort of the initial cut at this. I told
Senator Domenici yesterday, I am a congenital optimist about
Yucca Mountain and I guess I have to be in this job. But
everybody said we could not get to the point we are at right
now in terms of the Congress having approved the siting
solution.
This court case--and it is often lost sight, and I realize
opponents are going to try to make hay of what they got. This
court case was an enormous victory. Everything regarding site
selection and everything regarding the standards that the EPA
and the NRC did was upheld, except for one thing. And other
than that one thing, the 10,000-year period that you have
identified, it is clear to me that the 10,000-year period with
the 15 millirem standard, which is what the EPA and the NRC
established, has been upheld. So all the work that is devoted
to that in the license application is still very useful and we
will proceed, as I said before, to file a license application.
What you do after the 10,000-year period is the question
mark that is presented by the court case. Just to give you an
example of what we are dealing with, in the final environmental
impact statement produced on the Yucca Mountain project by the
Department, we estimated a mean peak dose just to show
magnitude, occurring in 480,000 years, of 150 millirem. Just to
put that in context, 150 millirem is roughly half of the
average background radiation in the United States.
So based on what I know right now, I see no technical
reason why EPA or anybody else cannot do something that allows
us to proceed and deals with the post-10,000 year period. But
obviously those are decisions that will be the product of
consultation among our agencies and with the Congress.
Senator Bingaman. So you are saying that it may be possible
for EPA to revise its standard to comply with whatever the
court has said and there will be no need to change the law?
Mr. McSlarrow. That is possible. I do not know that. I know
that is certainly a possibility.
Senator Bingaman. And your intent is to go ahead and
develop your application for a license on the assumption that
if a new standard comes forth from EPA you would then change
the application to reflect that, even if that occurred once the
initial application had been filed?
Mr. McSlarrow. Right. I think it is unlikely, not
impossible perhaps, but unlikely that anything that might occur
on a post-10,000 year standard would cause us to revisit the
first 10,000 years. So I would view it as possible that even as
we work through an application and a license we might have to
supplement it with new performance data according to whatever
new standards might be brought to bear.
Senator Bingaman. You referred in your testimony to the
Nuclear Power 2010 program and the value of that. As I read the
fiscal year 2005 budget request, it proposes cuts to that
program by almost 50 percent and states on page 398 of the
budget volume, quote: ``The Department has requested only
minimal funding for fiscal year 2005 to enable the continuation
of ongoing licensing demonstration and related analysis
projects.''
Could you explain why, if this Nuclear Power 2010 program
is a priority, you are proposing to cut that program by 50
percent?
Mr. McSlarrow. Sure. Of course, I remember that asterisk
very well. It is a fair point, and I think what in
bureaucratese was being said there is this. We started the
NP2010 program because we thought it was vital that we move to
new starts. We had to test the early site permitting process.
We want to test the combined construction and operating
license. We want to do the predesign certification.
All of these are the product of the new NRC rules, Part 52.
We are well into the early site permitting process. It was not
until last November that we issued a solicitation inviting the
industry to come forward and tell us what they would be
interested in doing in terms of testing out new designs and
most importantly perhaps, testing the combined operating,
construction and operating license.
So at the time we produced the budget we did not know what
the answer was. Now we have some sense of the answer. We have
three consortia that have come in the door. One of them we have
actually agreed to fund. It was a much smaller amount. It was
TVA, looking at a study of the ABWR down at Bellefonte. The
other two are very substantial. I cannot go into details
because of the procurement sensitivity, but these are real
serious proposals. We are in the midst of evaluating them right
now.
I would expect that now we have, all of us, new data and
the industry has stepped forward to say what it is they are
interested in doing, that this will have an effect certainly on
next year's budget. But at the time we did not have that data.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Bingaman, I might say, although it is
preliminary, we do intend to address the issue that you raised
in the appropriation bill. So whether they put it in or not, we
are looking at it as a must.
Before I yield to Senator Craig, I have one follow-up
question to something you have been saying. Can you tell us how
the research that you are doing on the Advanced Fuel Cycle
Program is progressing and how it could address issues
associated with licensing of a high-level waste repository?
Mr. McSlarrow. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am not a nuclear
engineer, although I have stayed at a Holiday Inn Express. I
will give it my best shot.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. McSlarrow. As I understand it, when you are dealing
with disposal long-term of waste in a repository you really
have three issues: the issue of volume, the issue of heat, and
the issue of radiotoxicity. These are all the challenges that
the Yucca Mountain project is currently grappling with. The
Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative has in terms of the research
that we are doing an ability to address all three of those.
You can pursue a UREX, uranium extraction, process to pull
useful uranium out of spent fuel--a lot of people do not
realize that in a spent fuel rod about 96 percent is uranium--
and either re-use it or dispose of it as class C waste. You can
use other technologies to separate out the plutonium or the
long-term actinides, which are one of the causes of the heat
and certainly one of the drivers for the radiotoxicity. And you
can burn it as fuel in a light water reactor or, more
importantly, if you use a fast spectrum reactor, you can
actually burn it and transmute it, so that you take what is
essentially, we have used the term, a 300,000-year problem
today, take what is a 300,000-year problem and turn it into
something that is only several thousand years, which is a much
more manageable deal from an engineering point of view.
We feel very positive about AFCI and what we have already
learned to date. For example, we have already proved on the
laboratory scale--we have not scaled up yet, but in the
laboratory--that we can extract the uranium in a way that is
proliferation-resistant. This is the opposite of what we did
for the weapons program. So we are very excited about the
opportunities.
The Chairman. This is called transmutation, right?
Mr. McSlarrow. Part of it, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Part of it is.
Did he explain it right, Dr. Chu? You are the expert. You
are the engineer. Please assist him. Was it pretty good?
Dr. Chu. Yes.
The Chairman. You taught him well?
Dr. Chu. Yes.
The Chairman. Senator Craig.
Mr. McSlarrow. You will get that raise I promised you
earlier, Margaret.
[Laughter.]
Senator Craig. Then apparently between the checking in and
the checking out of the Express Holiday Inn you did learn a
bit. Obviously by that last answer you did.
Kyle, how will DOE both rebuild the Idaho lab
infrastructure to meet the goals as you now plan it and perform
actual nuclear research with what we call a flat budget through
2009? How do you get there? You began some of that explanation
with Senator Bingaman. Expand on that if you would.
Mr. McSlarrow. I think one of the things about Idaho is we
are trying to do many things at once. Obviously we are trying
to--we are trying to separate out the mission so that the
cleanup program, which is the RFE that we are currently
developing right now, is focused just on cleanup. One of the
reasons we transferred this to nuclear energy as the program
office was we wanted the site to know what its mission was, not
that the cleanup is not important. So that is the first step.
The second step was to do, as we proposed in the RFP, to
combine INL, currently INEEL and Argonne West, and from the
efficiencies of the combination, not just infrastructure and
logistical efficiencies but efficiencies we believe that are
intellectual, to build a powerhouse capability in terms of that
kind of work. Then you have got programs, Generation IV, the
nuclear-hydrogen program, the NGNP, which has been the subject
of the expressions of interest that we just sent out, that are
not going to be exclusively funded at Idaho, because obviously
we are going to call on the other labs who have expertise to be
participants in this, but there is going to be a funding stream
that relates to that.
I think the biggest problem we have had in 2005--this is
reflected in the budget--was to ensure that we dealt with the
transition costs and we dealt with some of the early
infrastructure costs--because they have not, frankly, been
attended to in the past--in the 2005 budget, which kept the
nuclear R&D side from being as high probably as we want it to
be. But we felt it was important to make sure that we lay the
foundation for the future of this lab there.
I think with the nature of Generation IV, the hydrogen
program, and most particularly the NGNP, there is a lot of
uncertainty there. I mean, we have flat budgets for just about
everything in the Federal budget documents. It does not
actually reflect what happens the following year.
Part of this too is going to be informed by what we
discover this year. Obviously, you are going to have an
important role in terms of what money is actually appropriated.
But I believe that we have laid the foundation and are in the
middle of establishing something that will ensure not just a
thriving, but an exciting, future for the Idaho National
Laboratory.
Senator Craig. Beyond the restructuring and the RFP's, one
of the things that is essential in developing the NGNP, as you
have just mentioned, is material development. The Idaho
Advanced Test Reactor has been in operation since 1968 and most
believe it will be essential to material development in the
NGNP. Yet the fuel for the ATR is in danger of no longer being
manufactured.
The question is is DOE budgeting for fuel purchases and
major system maintenance that will be needed to sustain the
test reactor toward this new materials development that will be
necessary?
Mr. McSlarrow. Well, Dr. Magwood just whispered in my ear
that that is something we are conscious of, that we are looking
at in terms of the 2006 budget.
Senator Craig. It will be essential.
According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
regulations, for any reactor design that differs significantly
from current light water reactors the NRC will require testing
of an appropriately sited full-sized prototype for the design
over a significant range of normal operating conditions,
transient conditions, and specific accident sequences. Now I am
going to test how much you learned between the checking in and
the checking out.
In order to ever deploy advanced reactors in this country,
we would really have to undertake a project like, I think, the
Idaho Advanced Reactor Demonstration would be. Or would we not?
That is the question.
Mr. McSlarrow. I think we do. But over and above what the
NRC regulations are, I think we do simply as a practical
matter. The rest of the designs that we have been talking about
that we would be testing against the design certification are
so-called Generation III Plus. Now we are talking about
something that is Generation IV. It is really new. And the
NGNP, which is a very high temperature reactor, is sort of the
one we have selected to really pursue.
Our goal, at least in terms of the Department, what we have
recommended to Congress, has been to produce a prototype, a
demonstration plant, that can be commercialized. Obviously it
will have important benefits in terms of the research that is
done there and certainly all the research on technology that
leads up to it. But ultimately it is to actually produce
something that can receive a license, that can demonstrate the
qualities that we want it to have and be commercialized so we
move to the next generation.
I mean, that is why we call it the Next Generation Nuclear
Plant. So I think as a practical matter it would be very odd, I
think, if we ended up with a design certification of a
Generation IV design and then we just expected the industry to
step forward and start building them without one having been
built. And I think that of necessity it requires government and
industry partnering.
Senator Craig. And also to have it licensed by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
Mr. McSlarrow. Correct.
Senator Craig. Because I think we are also concerned about,
you mentioned in your opening statement, uniformity of
licensing and licensing process. And based on current licensing
procedure, ultimately there has to be that model in place
functioning.
Mr. McSlarrow. Correct.
Senator Craig. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Alexander.
Senator Alexander. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
First I wanted to say this committee also has a lot to do
with the Forest Service and the National Park Service, and on
this past weekend I took a 13-mile bicycle ride between Idaho
and Montana on a trail that Senator Craig helped to create. And
I just want to congratulate him for that. It is a rails-to-
trails.
Senator Craig. Well, Lamar, that is a beautiful example of
an old rail right-of-way that the Forest Service wanted to
condemn and walk away from. It has how many tunnels that you
trafficked through?
Senator Alexander. We went through about seven tunnels and
over some of the most fantastic trestles in the country. It is
where the old Sky-Top used to go from Chicago to Tacoma and I
am glad you saved it.
Senator Craig. And we saved it and it has now become one of
the premier mountain biking paths in the western world. That is
my commercial for the day.
Senator Alexander. I am grateful for it.
Senator Craig. Thank you very much, Lamar.
Senator Alexander. Now I want to talk about Idaho some more
in just a minute, on the lab. But first I want to reemphasize
what I said earlier. I do not see any alternative to, in the
next 10 to 15 years especially, to nuclear power if we want to
be energy independent and if we want clean air and we want
reasonable cost.
I very much hope that we can find a way to sequester carbon
from burning coal and have coal gasification. I hope that
happens, and I applaud your efforts to push us in that
direction. I would like to find some new natural gas sources on
non-protected Federal lands. But 20 percent of our energy today
comes from nuclear power. As Senator Domenici said, France is
taking our technology, Japan is taking our technology, and they
are using it and they are cleaning their air and they are
producing power, and we should do the same.
I am glad you have your 2010 project. I am glad you have
already funded the TVA consortium. I hope that we have enough
money to push that ahead. I appreciate Senator Bingaman's
questions on that.
Let me go to one set of questions I have to try to
understand what the Department's proposals are for the
plutonium 238. I do not want to be misunderstood. We have the
Idaho laboratory and its mission as I understand it is to help
us find a way to create new commercial nuclear power plants so
we can duplicate them and replicate them in a McDonald's
fashion. It will be cheaper and easier to do that. And we need
to focus that somewhere and Idaho is our place to do that. That
is where we want to do it, and we need to put as much money
into that and the 2010 project, is to help us get through the
regulatory part of the process so people can actually get a
license to build such plants.
Now comes the proposal to consolidate the plutonium 238
program at Oak Ridge and at Los Alamos, where they have got a
long history of processing plutonium 238 from irradiated
targets at Oak Ridge and then shipping it to Los Alamos, where
they then encapsulate it. Why does that need to be moved to
Idaho? Will not that cost several hundred millions of dollars?
And if so, would it not be better to spend that several hundred
millions of dollars to help push ahead with the Idaho mission
of creating this new commercial nuclear power plant?
Mr. McSlarrow. The quick answer--and we will get you
something more specific--is I think it will cost a couple
hundred million dollars total life cycle to stand up the
complete ability to produce the Pu-238.
This is not a search for a mission for Idaho National Lab.
I just want to be clear about that up front. It made sense to
us for the following reasons. First, we actually do not have
the capability of producing plutonium 238 today. We are just
drawing on inventory as it stands right now. We have not yet
done the production facility at Oak Ridge. That is the plan
currently that we propose to change.
At Los Alamos, as you mentioned, you have got the
processing, and then the last part is assembling the elements
of this into useful national security or space systems. That
has already been moved to Idaho.
So those are the three functions. But when you produce
plutonium 238 what we had in mind was essentially bouncing back
and forth with irradiated targets from Oak Ridge to Idaho
anyway. When you look at all of the shipments suddenly we were
talking about, which of course have to be secure transport, at
a certain point we realized, given that we have already moved
the assembly operations to Idaho, given that we would like to
free up space at TA-55 in Los Alamos, and given the constraints
that we need the transportation units to do a variety of
different things, not just this program, it made sense to us to
consolidate it in one place.
So it is partly driven by the transportation costs, it is
partly driven by security concerns. It is partly driven by what
we believe ultimately would be efficiencies in that operation.
Senator Alexander. I appreciate that and would like to
learn more about that. It is not necessary--I am trying not
just to be parochial about this. In the Oak Ridge case, for
example, with the designation of Oak Ridge as the lead agency
in helping to recapture high-speed computing, it was not
necessary to move all of the computing operations there.
Argonne and other laboratories will be in partnership. Many
universities will be in partnership with that effort.
So I guess my caution would be that just because an
operation is relevant to the mission of the Idaho laboratory
does not mean it all needs to be moved there if it is not cost
efficient to do that. I would just like to wave a yellow flag
and ask for more information on that process. And if it is true
that it does not have to be there and we could take the same
amount of money and accelerate the mission in Idaho, then I
think that ought to be considered. That is my point.
Mr. McSlarrow. We will be happy to provide that for you.
[The information follows:]
The Department has the responsibility to maintain the
infrastructure required to provide plutonium-238-fueled radioisotope
power systems to various Federal government agencies in support of
important national science and security missions. Unfortunately, our
infrastructure to produce this material was dismantled in the 1980s
after the reactors at the Savannah River Site were shut down over
safety concerns. Since that time, we have relied on a dwindling
inventory of this material to support important national security
missions.
To address the need to produce new Pu-238 for this inventory, we
established a plan to put in place a new capability at Oak Ridge
National Laboratory to fabricate and process reactor targets needed to
make this material. We also planned to conduct irradiation of these
targets in the Advanced Test Reactor in Idaho; continue the existing
program of encapsulating Pu-238 into pellets at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory; and conduct final testing and assembly of the power systems
at the Mound Plant in Ohio.
After the events of September 11, 2001, two changes occurred that
altered the status of our Pu-238 activities. First, the demand for our
power systems by national security elements of the United States
government increased significantly. As a result, our inventory will be
depleted by the end of the decade. Second, the effort to assure the
security of this material has become more intensive. The safety of the
public and, therefore, the security of the material, is the highest
priority of the Department's Pu-238 activities. Pursuant to this, the
Department relocated the power system testing and assembly effort from
the Mound Plant to a more secure location in Idaho.
Similarly, our original plan to move target material to the Oak
Ridge campus has had to change. We are now proposing to relocate the
material to a secure site in Idaho, where it can be more effectively
protected. We must also revisit the location of the Pu-238 processing
effort.
The consolidation of plutonium-238 operations would significantly
increase security of the material and would enhance program
flexibility, while reducing future secure transportation requirements
and risks associated with regularly transporting this nuclear material
across the United States. Relocating the processing and encapsulation
function currently performed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory
would also free up facility space for future national security missions
by the National Nuclear Security Administration. Including the
production function as part of a consolidation effort at Idaho would
also not impact current employment at Oak Ridge since the capability
does not currently exist at that site and would have to be put in
place.
Nevertheless, we intend to conduct an open, public process in
deciding where the processing mission will be located. We will
determine whether it should be consolidated with other Pu-238 missions
in Idaho or remain in Oak Ridge. Our preliminary assessment of the
costs, reliability, and security issues points to consolidation in
Idaho, but we intend to conduct a complete National Environmental
Policy Act review before making a final decision.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Bunning.
Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to get back to the administration's fiscal year 2005
budget. In your budget for nuclear energy research and
development there is $96 million, $96 million.
Mr. McSlarrow. Correct.
Senator Bunning. That is $34 million less than provided in
fiscal year allotment last year.
Mr. McSlarrow. Right.
Senator Bunning. Why did the Department of Energy decide to
cut nuclear energy research and development?
Mr. McSlarrow. The answer is much the same as my first
budget hearing that we had here in February, which was this was
a tight budget across the board. I think you all have heard
this a million times by now, but the President recommended a
budget to you that focused increases on defense and homeland
security. Everything else was tight. It is not just nuclear
energy. Everything at the Department was very tight.
The budget actually for the Office of Nuclear Energy went
up, slightly, but it went up. There were other programs that
went down. It did go down because it was a tight budget year.
There is no question about it. It is not centered on nuclear
energy per se. It is not sending a message about that, because,
as I say, we have had these conversations about science and
fossil and everything else.
What is important I think in terms of the commitment that
we and this committee and members of this committee have shown
is--I mentioned in my testimony that in fiscal year 1998 the
budget for nuclear energy, the research and development portion
was zero. If you average out all of the budgets requested by
the previous administration prior to this President's National
Energy Policy, it is a little below $40 million. If you average
our budgets that we submitted after the President's energy
plan, it is slightly below $100 million. It has more than
doubled. So it is very robust. And like everything else, we
might want more money, but we have the budget realities that we
are dealing with.
But again, it is not centered on nuclear energy per se.
Senator Bunning. Mr. Secretary, that is very well-meaning
and nice-sounding and everything, but it does not get to the
problem. If we do not expend more dollars in research and
development of nuclear power, we are never, never going to open
another nuclear power plant, because, as you know and I talked
about it before, the last completed nuclear power plant in the
United States of America was in 1973. That is longer than I
care to remember and it should be longer than the Department of
Energy ever cares to remember.
If we are going to get a new nuclear power plant built, the
Federal Government is going to have to subsidize that nuclear
power plant. We had it in our energy bill. Unfortunately, it
was filibustered and it did not go forward. We never got
cloture.
But I am telling you, and you know it, if we do not
subsidize the development of nuclear power and a fourth
generation--I have a son who works in a nuclear power plant in
Clinton, Illinois, and they are constantly upgrading that plant
so that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not come in and
shut them down, and it lasts about 2 years.
So I am begging you as part of the Department of Energy to
do something about that. The only way we can do something about
that is to put more dollars into research and development to
make sure that investors, investor-owned utilities, private
enterprise, and the Federal Government partner in the
development of stage four or whatever we want to call it, phase
four, nuclear energy production.
And please, do not tell me about how many dollars we have
got going in. It is not enough.
Mr. McSlarrow. OK.
The Chairman. Senator, I might tell you I do not know where
we will go this year with appropriations, but the Subcommittee
on Energy and Water has taken your point and we do fund what
you ask for, even though it is not in the President's budget.
Senator Bunning. That is very good, Senator, chairman, and
I hope to gosh that the Senate has the wisdom to pass that when
it comes to the floor.
The Chairman. I want to also say for the record, the
Senator talks about subsidy. I want to explain what the energy
bill had in it. The energy bill followed the recommendations of
the best experts around, and what we put in was production tax
credits, production tax credits. They are the same
proportionately as we gave to wind energy, as we gave to solar
energy, as we gave to geothermal energy. So they all fit in
with the same production tax credits that would have been part
of the bill.
I am not critical of anyone. Most everybody would have been
for those, even though the bill got caught up in an MTBE issue.
So I just wanted to make sure that you knew that.
Senator Craig, do you have anything further?
Senator Craig. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Kyle, last year DOE tasked an independent technology review
group to evaluate design features and technology risks for the
NGNP. This was followed on--this was follow-on work to the
development of functional requirements for the NGNP. All of
this work was part of the evolution of DOE's Generation IV
program, as you have already explained.
This review group was made up of an international cross-
section of major industry and utility executives. Their task
was to identify an appropriate level of technology risk for the
project.
The question is, does DOE think the independent review,
technology review group report, could be used as technical
guidance for the development of a new reactor and what is the
status of that report?
Mr. McSlarrow. There is no question that it would be
available for use and I think our expectation is that we would
certainly make it available as guidance to the project
integrator, which is the subject of the EOI that went out
recently. The status is it is still in draft and it is
completed soon, in weeks, is the status.
Senator Craig. How long is ``soon''?
Mr. McSlarrow. Weeks. Does next month work any better?
Senator Craig. I do not know. We will not be here next
month, so you will probably have until September 1.
Mr. McSlarrow. September you will have it.
Senator Craig. All right. But that report will be valuable,
I think, for overall understanding.
Some of the industry comments on the expressions of
interest have been shared with me for information. One company
that has an extremely long history with nuclear power in this
country commented as follows: ``DOE's conceptual strategy,
which relies heavily on a single project integrator, will
result in higher than necessary costs, a longer than necessary
schedule, and is unlikely to lead to a plant being built.''
The reason I selected that quote, because I thought it was
very blunt and direct, but more importantly it came from an
industry source that has phenomenal credibility in the
construction of nuclear plants.
The question is, how did DOE justify the use of a project
integrator? What has this approach been used--where has this
approach been used in DOE in similar projects in the past?
Mr. McSlarrow. As an aside--I do not think we need to get
into this because I will take it on its own merits. But I have
obviously heard comments that are diametrically the opposite.
The important thing about the expression of interest, where
we lay out essentially the idea that a project integrator, a
private company, would essentially form a consortium that would
go from the early stages through obtaining a license and
construction of an NGNP, is a product of several things. First,
you and Senator Domenici wrote the Department a letter in
November of last year where you said: We do not view the entity
responsible for the NGNP as something that should come within
the work scope of Idaho National Laboratory, No. 1. No. 2, we
do not think it should be sole sourced. No. 3, we believe that
when you get into the technology you should ensure that there
is competition between at least two technologies and then a
down-select to an ultimate one.
Obviously, we attach great weight to what you have to say.
As we thought our way through that, we tried to design
something that would, even if it is housed and obviously lashed
up extremely tightly with the M&O contractor at Idaho National
Lab, that would allow us to think through before we leap into
the process of how the private sector, if we are going to
commercialize a plant like this, how the private sector viewed
this from the very get-go.
You asked a question about if we have done this in the
past. My guess is no. In my role as Deputy Secretary and the
acquisition executive for the Department, I sort of deal with
legacy issues when it comes to contracts all the time, and they
are not pretty. My sense of it is that we very often cannot
distinguish between when we are doing acquisition and when we
are partnering with industry, when industry should take the
lead.
So the idea of the project integrator was to have somebody
in industry who has got those kinds of capabilities who could
put it all together. Now, they do not have free rein.
Obviously, what we have described is something where every step
of the way they have to work with the Department. And there are
going to be offramps.
But that is the concept. Now, that said, we have not locked
this in by any means. There is no pride of authorship here at
all. This is a concept we have thrown out for comment. We are
getting comments, obviously blunt ones like that, but we are
getting lots of comments. I expect that, based on what I
already know about what people are saying, we are going to end
up tailoring this somewhat.
It was not--again, I wanted to be as careful as possible to
think through this. I want to get this right. So we welcome
that kind of input.
Senator Craig. Could I do a follow-on to that question?
The Chairman. Please.
Senator Craig. While, because Idaho is tied to this, the
questions may sound parochial, they are not. I think all of us
on this committee want to make sure that we do it right in our
relationship with industry. This is something that is
developing a great deal of attention, not only nationally but
internationally.
The capabilities of the project integrator are listed in
the EOI as management, integrate research, manage projects
within the cost and schedule, evaluate competing technologies,
organize an international team. My question would be, will not
the new management and operating contractor that the DOE is
hiring to run the Idaho National Lab have these capabilities?
Should they not have these capabilities, no matter where this
facility might be constructed?
I say that because I do not have the letter in front of me,
but your comments in last November when talking about the INL
lab contractor should not build in GMP, but that their role is
in no way slighted. In other words, they had to have these
capabilities and talents. So when I am sitting here looking at
this, I look at this as almost a duplication of bureaucracy or
management bureaucracy, management team. Maybe ``bureaucracy''
is too negative to use. And where do we get by doing this kind
of double layering, if you will, when we ought to be hiring
somebody with these kinds of talents from the beginning through
the end?
Mr. McSlarrow. Well, I will go back and look at the letter,
too. I mean, my recollection is that what you all had said was
separate it from the Idaho contract so that you would
essentially have two things, but maybe we misunderstood.
But there is some duplication. I do not think we thought
that was a bad idea in this instance because the M&O contractor
is going to have a lot on its plate. It is going to be
responsible for leading and integrating with all the other labs
and the important work that they are doing to support all of
these programs.
Obviously, we have not said this today, but there are lots
of things outside of nuclear energy that are happening at Idaho
on the national security and homeland security front too that
the M&O has to focus on. The nuclear-hydrogen program is going
to be a big part and a big program at the Idaho National Lab.
On the NGNP, obviously we are at the very beginning stages.
No one, including Congress, has made a decision we are actually
going to construct it, but we are going to start driving in
that direction. But the NGNP potentially is so huge that I
think, just my own opinion is, I do think it merits a separate
program structure with direct supervision right out of Bill
Magwood's office. I think it is that important.
It is what we are doing with Future Gen on the coal side.
it is a big deal. It is a Presidential initiative, and so it is
being managed--obviously, in the case of Future Gen, it is
lashed up very closely with NETL--in Idaho's case, because you
are actually potentially talking about siting the facility
there and all the research is there.
I think to the outside observer it is possible that you
would not even know the difference between INL, NGNP. It would
all seem like the same. But I think in terms of building,
producing and managing a project, I think that has got to be
seamless. I do not think anybody should be confused about what
the mission is on that. I think the visibility suggests,
although I am open to other arguments, suggests that that ought
to be managed right out of the headquarters department.
Senator Craig. Further questions? I have got some more, but
go ahead.
The Chairman. Thank you. Let me say, Senator Bingaman
wanted to ask some and then I have a couple. Senator Bingaman.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you very much.
Let me ask about two issues. One is this Nuclear Energy
Research Initiative. That has generally been a successful
program to permit far-ranging R&D in the nuclear science. The
proposal in the fiscal year 2005 budget, is to zero that out,
subsume it under the advanced fuel cycle initiative, whose
purpose is to reprocess and recycle fuel at the national
laboratories. Can you just explain briefly what steps are being
taken to ensure that universities can continue to play an
important role in nuclear energy research in light of this
proposal?
Mr. McSlarrow. Sure. First, there is good news here. The
amount of money that is going to go to universities is under
our budget substantially going to increase. It is true that the
NERI line was zero funded. But we are proposing--and I have
talked to Dr. Magwood and his folks and I know they have the
plans. We are proposing as part of those plans that we are
going to spend $7 million in 2005 going directly to
universities.
What we did was take it out of the NERI line item, and we
have now--we want these activities at the universities to
support our work, whether it is Gen IV or the nuclear-hydrogen
program or AFCI. The big R&D program lines are what we want to
support. So we wanted to wrap it in. And it in no way
diminishes the importance of universities. As I said, it
enhances it.
In addition, of course, you have got the universities
research and assistance line item that will continue, both the
assistance for research reactors and the grants and the
fellowships that have been the case in the past, at basically
the same funding we got in 2004.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you.
One other issue, which I know you would be disappointed if
I did not ask about. Both Senator Domenici and I think some
others have asked you nearly a year ago, in September of last
year, about the plans with regard to polygraph exams in the
Department. You stated there--this is in response to a written
question. You said: ``Before I leave the mandatory screening
program, let me mention that if a revised rule is proposed and
promulgated I believe it is important we proceed with full
implementation of that rule expeditiously so that the Secretary
is in a position to make the certification required in the
fiscal year 2002 defense authorization bill regarding the
implementation of the new program.''
Could you tell us the status of the polygraph rule and the
revisions that you proposed to the committee?
Mr. McSlarrow. Yes. This is one reason why, after 3\1/2\
years, I really hate government. I testified before you and I
told you what the plan was going to be, and then when I
testified here in February you asked me where it was. I said we
were just about to get it to OMB for inter-agency clearance.
Inter-agency clearance has just completed. It is now back with
us.
I expect very soon, now that it is back within my control
that we will get it out. And I am as frustrated by the length
of time as you are on this.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Bingaman.
Senator Craig, I am going to get to you and let you ask as
many questions as you would like, if you do not mind my leaving
while you do that. I have to be in another place.
Let me just close by saying we sit here today with all
these accolades aimed at the need for and the propriety of
nuclear energy in our future. We know what others have done and
we know what we have done. We know what we ought to be doing
and we know what we were doing. But as we sit here today a
little statute that was inserted in the Energy Policy Act--
Senator Bennett Johnston was presiding then--and it said that
in doing this work the Environmental Protection Agency should
be guided by the National Academy of Science.
Now, the National Academy of Science talked about when the
maximum exposure would occur, and nobody but nobody expected
that to--270,000 years is one interpretation. Even a million
years is another interpretation. Nobody thought that anybody in
the world would have to meet that kind of standard up front in
starting the repository process.
The court has nonetheless said that the EPA failed to
consider the National Academy's report. I want to suggest that
this is an ominous situation. It is terrifically important that
we in some way find a solution to this. The entire nuclear
energy production in the United States could stand or fall on
this interpretation, because if we cannot proceed with Yucca,
soon across this land the States will find that there is no way
to take care of the wastes that are in every State in America
and that they are going to have to keep them. And nobody wants
to do that, and there might be some statute compliance required
that says they cannot continue to produce nuclear power until
they have solved this.
So I want to make sure that as we leave this meeting today,
we could have an array of people telling us the consequences
and we could have a few people saying rah, rah, rah, it means
the end of nuclear power. But I believe concertedly, working
with everyone, we have to find a way to be more realistic.
For those who do not want it, this is not a way to have a
victory. They think so, but this is not a victory; this is the
destruction of an industry and a source of energy that is now
20 percent of America's needs. We even have, and I read into
the record, one of the most significant environmentalists based
upon global warming saying it is imperative that we move to
nuclear energy quickly and many, many nuclear power plants,
because the time is too short, says he, to use the other energy
sources we have all been talking about. They cannot get the job
done.
Now, that is probably right whether you are worried about
global warming or whether you are worried about diversification
of energy for the United States, less reliance upon foreigners.
And here we sit.
So I want the Department to know that this chairman is
interested in trying to find a solution, and I think we have a
compelling number of Senators on this committee who would like
to find a solution. I am not sure we can because we may not
have the authority. But we have not looked at all the authority
we have on this committee either. We will be doing that.
So Mr. Secretary, I thank you. I did want to say, with
reference to the laboratory in Idaho, that I do not believe
2020 is right. I think it is too far in the future. We have to
expedite that. We have to get that done quicker. I am not
saying that because Larry Craig is here. It is just too long
for what we are trying to do and how important it is in terms
of where we are going.
So I want to leave you and your people with my firm belief
that we have got to find different ways to get there faster. I
am sure that is good news to Larry Craig, but I did not say it
for Idaho. I said it because I really believe doing that
reactor is terribly, terribly important.
I also want to say another thing that I forgot to say.
There are so many people saying we ought to have new cars, cars
that run on hydrogen. And there is this great big hoopla that
that might be really good. Well, I want to tell you, most
experts say you cannot produce enough of that to run the cars
in America without a nuclear power plant or more to generate
the hydrogen that you need.
Now, if you want to keep saying we are going to have
hydrogen cars and have a little experimental hydrogen around,
that is fine. You might produce 10,000 or so and show them off.
But you do not have a permanent supply without a nuclear power
plant.
So everywhere you look it is imperative. I hate to make it
so ominous, but I think it is. I really am worried that
something very wrong has been done here and we must fix it.
Senator Craig.
Senator Craig. Mr. Chairman, before you leave, I appreciate
your drawing attention to the importance of proceeding with
Yucca Mountain as it relates to the industry and clean
electricity. I have been a fairly regular attendee at climate
change conferences around the world, and at the last one that
we attended in Milan, Italy, last spring I found something most
significant. Two of the countries I visited with that have
already adopted the Kyoto Protocol and were supposedly driving
their economies toward compliance by the reduction of the
emission of greenhouse gases had to openly admit that they were
not going to meet those standards and probably could not ever
meet those standards.
Japan was within, I believe, 7 percent of meeting those
standards. Now their economy is coming back on line and they
bumped themselves another 3 to 5 percent ahead of where they
wanted to be. Italy is the same way.
Clearly, there is no question that providing abundance of
energy is directly tied to the economy of countries and the
ability of those countries to grow. And those two countries had
to admit in conversation with me that as their economies came
back on line their margin of getting to compliance had rapidly
grown again and that they just did not know how they were going
to get there, in all fairness, based on current technology,
current energy production technology.
That is why future technologies and clean technologies are
so critically important in those general concepts of climate
change.
The Chairman. Also, Senator, that is why France can say to
America, why do you not sign the treaty----
Senator Craig. Sure.
The Chairman [continued]. Because they can comply easily
when 75 percent of their electricity comes from nuclear. They
start off with none of the pollution or a very insignificant
portion coming from the electric power generation, which is a
pretty easy start. What if we did not have any. We would move
in the direction of the numbers set by Kyoto, and we would say
to other countries, why do you not join us. But we do not have
it like France.
Senator Craig [presiding]. Mr. Chairman, I do have a couple
of more questions. I will be short. Kyle, we appreciate your
time here. I have others that I will ask that you respond to
the record with.
In relation to Yucca Mountain--and you have talked about
continuing to move there--I know that DOE must give advanced
notice to potential layoffs and faces a deadline of later this
month in relation to budget and all of that. Does DOE plan to
request administrative flexibility from OMB regarding this
layoff notice while Congress continues to work on finding a
solution?
Mr. McSlarrow. I do not think that is a bridge we have to
cross yet. The Secretary identified this as a potential
challenge I think a month or so ago in a letter to the Hill.
Senator Craig. It is not at the end of the fiscal year?
Mr. McSlarrow. Well, it has changed since then because of
the--as you point out, July 31 would be the 60 days that you
would be required under the Warren Act.
Senator Craig. That is true.
Mr. McSlarrow. What has changed since we notified people
about this concern is I think we are much more comfortable,
based on discussions with you and the leadership on the Senate
side as well as on the House side, that we are going to get
this resolved, even though if you look at the committee marks
it may not reflect this. I think we are much more comfortable
that ultimately we will have the kind of funding that takes us
way beyond any need to think about RIF's.
So right now, for the time being we are just going to work
with Congress. We are not going to have to go through that
process. We are just going to work with Congress to ensure that
we get the funding stream that we have asked for.
Senator Craig. Well, that is our hope, too.
In the expression of interests list, some in my view--I
should put it this way. In the expression of interest there are
some very ambitious cost projections for the Advanced Reactor
Demonstration. Were these cost goals based on comparable
cutting edge energy research as they--well, first of all, what
were they based on? I guess that is the first question I would
want to ask.
Mr. McSlarrow. There are several different ones.
Senator Craig. Let me put it this way. Are they based on a
first of a kind research project? Can we do that in relation to
what we are talking about is really the first of a kind,
because we are out on the edge of technology again to some
degree?
Mr. McSlarrow. Yes and no. Yes in the sense, if you just
take one of the goals it is to actually construct for $1,000 a
kilowatt, with a goal to get down to $500 a kilowatt. So it is
yes in the sense of $1,000 is completely doable for a first of
a kind. It is a stretch goal. That is what we want to do, is
challenge them, but ultimately to make it commercialized and
successful there the $500 per kilowatt would be the stretch
goal in terms of commercialization.
The other goals are essentially the production of hydrogen
at a gasoline-equivalent cost of $1.50 a gallon, I think, and
then the production of electricity, which is the other part
obviously of the plant, at 1.5 cents a kilowatt-hour. Those are
all aggressive. But in order for this to succeed in the
commercial sector we think those are the goals that anybody who
is doing this project has to at least achieve.
Senator Craig. Well, Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for
being here this morning. I think for the value of our record it
was extremely important that you be here, and we appreciate
your testimony, and the full committee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
Responses to Additional Questions
----------
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Office of Congressional Affairs,
Washington, DC, September 14, 2004.
Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am responding to questions regarding changes
in force-on-force exercises at power reactor facilities licensed by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Given the nature of these
questions, they were referred to the NRC from a list of questions
submitted for the record to the Department of Energy's Deputy
Secretary, Kyle McSlarrow, following his appearance before the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on July 13, 2004.
The NRC's responses to the four post-hearing questions from Senator
Byron Dorgan are enclosed. If additional information is needed, please
do not hesitate to let me know.
Sincerely,
Dennis K. Rathburn,
Director.
[Enclosure.]
Questions From Senator Dorgan
Question 1. I understand that the NRC is now refocusing its efforts
on force-on-force security exercises at nuclear power facilities. Under
this program, the NRC is now allowing third party security forces to
perform these training exercises. What are the reasons for this change
in practice?
Answer. Since the inception of the force-on-force (FOF) security
exercise program in the early 1980's, there has been essentially no
change in the practice of using security officers from the facility
being evaluated, other nuclear power facilities, or local law
enforcement officers to serve as mock attackers during FOF exercises.
During pilot program FOF exercises aimed at strengthening the program
in 2003, the NRC identified a need to improve the offensive abilities,
consistency, and effectiveness of the exercise adversary force. The
Commission addressed this need by directing the staff to develop a
training standard for a Composite Adversary Force (CAF) which will
travel from site to site to serve as the mock adversary. The CAF for a
given NRC-evaluated FOF exercise will include security officers from
various nuclear power facilities (excluding the licensee being
evaluated) and will have been trained in offensive, rather than
defensive, skills to perform the adversary function. We believe this
will lead to a more effective exercise.
Question 2. Do you agree that by allowing third party contractors
to essentially evaluate their own readiness, there may be a perception
that these evaluations pose a conflict of interest?
Answer. CAF members do not perform an evaluative function. The NRC
and its subject matter expert (SME) contractors evaluate the
performance of each licensee during FOF exercises, and the NRC will
continue to evaluate the abilities, consistency, and effectiveness of
the exercise adversary force.
The industry has selected Wackenhut to manage the CAF. Wackenhut
also provides protective services to a substantial number of operating
power reactors. The NRC recognizes that some may perceive a conflict of
interest with respect to the same contractor providing both the
protective services to some individual sites and staffing some members
of the adversary force used for exercises. The Commission has directed
the staff to ensure that there is a clear separation of functions,
including appropriate management and administrative controls, in place
within the Wackenhut organization to provide adequate independence
between the Composite Adversary Force and the nuclear reactor guard
force. In addition, the NRC will continue to assess the performance of
the adversary force and require improvements if appropriate, including
developing an NRC-contracted adversary force. One of the benefits of an
industry adversary force is the feedback of a mock adversary's
perspective into enhancement of site protective strategies and security
officer training at his or her normally assigned facility, as well as
improving the quality of FOF exercises conducted by the licensees
annually for training.
Question 3. I do not feel security forces, especially in the area
of nuclear security, should be allowed to evaluate themselves. If this
is happening, what procedures have the NRC put in place to ensure that
members of the same company evaluating their own security teams will be
isolated from each other?
Answer. The evaluation is done by the NRC. The NRC independently
evaluates licensee performance in FOF exercises at each site on at
least a triennial basis, using the CAF to provide a consistent,
capable, and effective adversary. The CAF will not perform an
evaluative role in the exercises. CAF members will arrive on site at
about the same time that the NRC evaluation team arrives and will be
coordinating closely with the NRC evaluation team and the NBC's SME
contractors before and during the exercises.
In addition, each facility licensee will conduct its own FOF
training exercises each year during the remaining 2 years of the
triennial evaluation cycle. The industry has included provisions for
conducting FOF training exercises in the training and qualification
section of each site's unique security plan. The NRC is currently
reviewing and approving these security plans. The NRC includes
verification of the proper conduct of industry-conducted FOF exercises
in its procedures for periodic inspections of the licensee's security
training programs. The NRC will also maintain its capabilities to
conduct independent verification of licensee performance, on a for-
cause basis, as needed.
Question 4. It would seem that the best way to avoid a potential
conflict of interest would be to have the government conduct these
exercises like they did before 2001. What level of funding or other
tools are needed for the NRC to be able to conduct force-on-force
exercises like they did before September 11, 2001?
Answer. Prior to September 11, 2001, the exercise adversary force
was also provided by the licensee being evaluated, usually from another
site's security force. Then, as now, the NRC was the sole evaluator of
licensees' performance during the exercises. The NRC expects the CAF to
be a significant improvement in ability, consistency, and effectiveness
over the status quo before September 11, 2001.
Since September 11, 2001, the NRC has made additional enhancements
to the FOF exercise program, including an increase in the frequency of
NRC-evaluated FOF exercises from once every 8 years to once every 3
years, the use of the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System
(MILES) equipment for effective and objective evaluations, and a
significant reduction in the licensee's notification time associated
with exercise logistics and the use of Trusted Agent Agreements to
minimize opportunities for compromising exercise integrity. The NRC
believes that these changes, taken together in an integrated program,
have substantially improved the effectiveness and quality of the FOF
program.
The NRC routinely reassesses the effectiveness and efficiency of
its FOF evaluation program and has mechanisms in place to revise or
improve its FOF processes and procedures as needed. Should industry be
unable to maintain an adequate and objective CAF that meets the
standards mandated by the NRC, the NRC has a contingency plan that
would expand its support agreement with DOE/NNSA to fulfill the CAF
function. The cost of this contingency is estimated at $4.3 million
annually.
______
Department of Energy,
Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs,
Washington, DC, September 29, 2004.
Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On July 13, 2004, Kyle E. McSlarrow, Deputy
Secretary, testified regarding the role of nuclear power in national
energy policy.
Enclosed are the answers to 20 questions that were submitted by
Senators Craig, Alexander, Landrieu, and you for the hearing record.
The four remaining answers are being prepared and will be forwarded to
you as soon as possible.
If we can be of further assistance, please have your staff contact
our Congressional Hearing Coordinator, Lillian Owen, at (202) 586-2031.
Sincerely,
Rick A. Dearborn,
Assistant Secretary.
[Enclosures.]
Questions From Senator Domenici
Question 1. Earlier this year three consortia responded to a
solicitation from DOE asking energy companies for proposals to test the
NRC's new licensing process. That's an absolutely critical step toward
new plant construction and one that we should strongly encourage. But
to date, the Administration has only provided nominal financial support
to one consortium. What's the status of support for the other two
consortia?
Answer. The Department has completed the technical merit and
programmatic review of the New Nuclear Plant Licensing Demonstration
Project proposals from teams led by NuStart Energy, LLC and Dominion
Resources. Several important issues were identified during these
reviews and, during the week of July 26, 2004, the Department met with
representatives of both teams to obtain clarifications. One team,
NuStart Energy, also provided a revised proposal. The Department is
evaluating the new information obtained from each team.
Question 2. How soon will the Administration provide significant
encouragement to these other consortia to get them moving too?
Answer. The Department is evaluating new information provided by
the NuStart LLC and Dominion Energy, Inc. teams. As soon as this
process is complete, we will be in a position to make a final decision.
Question 3. In developing the comprehensive energy bill, I believed
that the first priority for nuclear power was to see a few new plants
built in this country. That required extension of Price Anderson and
some government assistance to reduce the financial risks of new plant
construction. Any construction in the near future would involve
advanced models of our current reactors.
Just below those top priorities, I supported construction of a
Generation IV reactor, study of advanced fuel cycles, and improved
university programs. But no Gen IV reactor is going to be ready for
commercial use for a long time, at least 20 years. We can't wait that
long to start our nuclear renaissance.
Yet some argue that we should just push immediately for the
advanced reactors and forget about building the advanced models of
current reactors.
What's your view on this key issue? Do you think it is realistic
build Generation IV reactors and use advanced fuel cycles without new
starts of advanced plants of our current generation?
Answer. The Department believes that for nuclear energy to make a
real contribution in the near and the long term, both new orders for
advanced light water reactors, and Generation IV systems are needed.
Without new orders for current-technology advanced light water
reactors, the country will lose vital intellectual, technical, and
industrial infrastructure that will be extremely difficult and
expensive to reestablish. On the other hand, without advanced
Generation IV reactors and fuel cycles, nuclear energy will not become
truly sustainable in the long term. In the even longer time-frame,
Generation IV fast reactors will manage the burden of ever-increasing
quantities of spent nuclear fuel and, eventually, provide the needed
fuel when uranium becomes scarce.
Question 4. What plans does DOE have to work with the industry to
develop and commission a Generation IV reactor in a manner that will
effect an easy transition to a commercial Generation IV design? How
would such a project be financed, if the industry is committed in the
near term to Generation III licensing and construction?
Answer. The Department has not made a decision on whether to
proceed with Generation IV reactor; however, on May 26, 2004, the
Department published a Request for Information and Expressions of
Interest in its conceptual strategy for developing and demonstrating a
Generation IV reactor capable of both hydrogen production and
electricity generation. In our conceptual strategy, the Department
proposes to partner with private industry in the form of a ``Project
Integrator'' to lead the development of the NGNP. The Project
Integrator would hold a design competition to select the most
commercially promising NGNP technology capable of meeting the
Department's goals and then would organize an international consortium
that would on a cost shared basis with the Department, design, develop,
construct and operate the NGNP.
The Department would anticipate a 50-50 cost share over the life of
the project. We believe that this cost share expectation is realistic
given the huge market potential of a successful NGNP. We expect
electric utilities will continue to focus on near-term, Generation III+
technology for the foreseeable future. However, we anticipate
considerable interest in the NGNP effort from both domestic and
international vendors.
Question 5. For over half a century the U.S. has provided
responsible technical nuclear leadership in commercial nuclear
technology. Foreign nations have taken U.S. technology and developed
their own programs for the benefit of their own countries.
How does DOE intend to regain U.S. technical leadership in
commercial nuclear technology other than participation in both the
Generation IV International Forum and the Paris-based OECD Steering
Committee on Nuclear Energy? Do you agree such leadership is important?
Answer. U.S. leadership in commercial nuclear technology is very
important and the fact that the U.S. chairs both the Generation IV
International Forum and the OECD Steering Committee on Nuclear Energy
clearly represents that revived leadership. Such leadership enables the
United States to influence international nonproliferation institutions,
and monitoring and inspection arrangements, as well as the deployment
of nuclear energy around the world. United States leadership will be
enhanced by deploying new nuclear energy capacity and commissioning a
geologic repository. Additionally, this will strengthen our position in
the international market and in the development of Generation IV
nuclear systems in cooperation with other countries.
Question 6. The DOE estimates that by 2020, 15% of our natural gas
will have to be imported from non-North American sources, even with
completion of the Alaskan pipeline.
Each new large nuclear plant will displace about 112 billion cubic
feet of natural gas per year. Ten large new nuclear plants could
substitute for 5 percent of the nation's total natural gas needs--that
would be an immense cut in our need for LNG imports. And with gas at $5
per thousand cubic feet, just that 5 percent translates to about $6
billion that we wouldn't be sending overseas to pay for imports.
With gas prices where they are now and are likely to be, isn't it
sound national economic policy to increase our use of nuclear power?
Answer. As reflected in the National Energy Policy, we believe that
increased use of nuclear energy should be a major component of our
national energy policy. This is supported by the economic advantages
that accrue as the price of alternate fuels increases, the excellent
safety record, the security of energy supply, the small footprint and
light environmental burden of nuclear systems, the absence of
greenhouse gas emissions, and the positive influence on the U.S. trade
balance.
Question 7. Over the next 20 years, what role do you see for
nuclear power in reducing our dependency on foreign energy suppliers?
Answer. I see increased deployment of new nuclear power plants to
reduce U.S. dependency on foreign energy suppliers. New advanced light
water reactors, currently being developed in cooperation with industry,
will, when deployed, reduce the importation of natural and liquefied
gas for electrical generation. Further, in the longer term, the
development of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant, coupled to advanced
electricity and hydrogen generation capabilities, and its commercial
follow-on plants will not only offset gas imports, but produce hydrogen
for our transportation infrastructure that will offset the use and
therefore the importation of oil from foreign sources.
Question 8. I am a strong supporter of the new reactor at Idaho. I
worked to insert $15 million into the budget for this year to start the
competition for that new reactor. I was pleased that the Secretary
assured Senator Craig and me in January that competition for the new
reactor would begin this fiscal year.
I'm pretty disappointed that it took 8 months of the fiscal year to
even issue a 4 page Expression of Interest for the new reactor. Several
areas in those four pages are of concern to me, including the
suggestion that an operational 2020 date is acceptable. That's just far
too long. Furthermore, it's hard to see how any effective design
competition is going to start this year after so much delay.
Does the Administration support construction of the new Idaho
Reactor?
Answer. We are very excited by the possibilities presented by the
NGNP. Because the INL is our preferred location for such a project, it
was essential that we complete our Request for Proposals for the
management and operating contract for that lab before issuing our
Expression of Interest (EOI) document. While only a few pages long, the
EOI lays out a new and exciting approach to the NGNP that has generated
great interest. We have held detailed discussions with 12 large U.S.
companies that are interested in serving as the project integrator for
the NGNP. The input we have received and the interest we have seen in
this initiative will be weighed as we make a final decision regarding
this project.
Question 9. Do you concur that it is critical to get this reactor
operating quickly enough to help the nation's nuclear program recover
some of its design leadership? And do you believe that a 2020 reactor
start-up date accomplishes that goal?
Answer. The Department believes that the Next Generation Nuclear
Plant is a critical component of our overall strategy to reinvigorate
the domestic nuclear industry and ensure a domestic energy supply free
from dependence on foreign energy providers. We feel that the NGNP
works in concert with the NP 2010 program to strengthen our national
nuclear infrastructure and enhance U.S. leadership in the international
nuclear arena.
A specific timetable for development of the NGNP depends upon a
number of factors and remains to be determined. We believe, however,
our strategy of involving the private sector could result in a plan
that meets our technology goals at an earlier date.
Questions From Senator Craig
NEXT GENERATION NUCLEAR PLANT
Question 1. DOE specifies that the project integrator must be a
``U.S. owned'' organization. This will narrow the field of nuclear
experienced competitors considerably.
Energy in general, and nuclear specifically, is an increasingly
global business. Countries like France and Japan have been investing in
nuclear energy research during all the years that we were not. They
have built reactors--recently. We will need other countries in order to
make this demonstration a success.
DOE wants to build the NGNP as part of an international
consortium--and DOE is also requiring these other countries to cost
share in the reactor--probably substantially. In addition, these
international participants will be exposing their intellectual property
to the larger consortium.
Why did DOE require a ``U.S. owned'' entity, instead of a ``company
incorporated in the U.S.''?
Answer. The request for expressions of interest puts forth a
proposal and does not reflect a final decision on this issue; however,
the Department believes that with the large amount of government
funding expected for this project, paid for by the U.S. taxpayer, it is
appropriate to consider requiring that a U.S. owned company serve as
the integrator for the development of the Next Generation Nuclear
Plant. This would not ``narrow the field'' of nuclear-experienced
companies that can contribute to the project. Our strategy, in fact,
relies significantly on the participation of international
organizations on the NGNP consortium that would ultimately develop,
design, and build a pilot facility.
Question 2. Why should international participants be willing to put
their intellectual property into this project--when the ``U.S. owned''
integrator will, at the end of the demonstration, ``lead the commercial
deployment of the design''?
Answer. The primary role of the integrator is to identify a
private-sector-led consortium to carry forward this technology. It will
be the consortium that will ``lead the commercial deployment of the
design,'' not the integrator. The technology rights of each member of
the consortium would be negotiated on an open, commercial basis.
Question 3. DOE has specified an outlet temperature of 1000 degrees
C for its ``base concept'' for NGNP. Some believe this will not be
possible with currently used and qualified materials.
Do you agree that although the NGNP must stretch the envelope in
technology development, this goal must be tempered with the need to
develop the foundation for deploying a reactor that is economically
competitive and that harbors a minimum of inherent economic risks, if
any?
Answer. Yes, the Department agrees that the overriding concern in
the development of the NGNP is that it be commercially attractive. To
that end, as reflected in the EOI, the Department is not imposing
design specifications for outlet temperature of the NGNP. Rather, the
Department intends to specify economic performance goals that will
ensure that the NGNP will generate electricity and hydrogen
economically and therefore will find receptive customers and contribute
in a meaningful way to our national energy economy.
Question 4. DOE will pursue NRC licensing for the NGNP--which I
believe is absolutely critical to the success of the project.
Since the project will be externally regulated by NRC, is DOE
limiting the redundant involvement of DOE's own safety and health
office and of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board? If not, will
DOE have achieved a demonstration whose results can be translated to
the commercial sector?
Answer. The Department believes that redundant or overlapping
oversight leads to confusion and conflict, and must be avoided. In the
case of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) oversight is a key element to make the selected
technology commercially deployable. While no final decision regarding
the licensing and safety oversight of the NGNP has been made, it is our
view that this project should be overseen by the NRC as would any other
commercial nuclear power project. That said, with the demonstration of
this technology at the preferred site of the Idaho National Laboratory,
an interface between NRC and the Department's oversight organizations
would be required, but must be clear and constructive to maintain
safety and protect the environment while achieving our objectives.
Because the NGNP is a civilian technology at a non-defense site, we do
not envision a role for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
Question 5. How is DOE providing resources to the NRC to be
involved with the demonstration at its earliest stages?
Answer. Over the past year, the Department and NRC senior
management have met several times to discuss various strategies for
licensing the NGNP. The Department continues to work with the NRC on
various technology components that may be incorporated into the NGNP.
Some examples include the Advanced Gas Reactor fuel development program
that has been coordinated with the NRC to ensure that NRC gets the data
it needs to make its own evaluation as to the behavior of this fuel
under accident conditions. The Department is also preparing to jointly
fund, with the NRC, low-flux vessel-steel irradiation studies so that
both development and regulatory data needs are met. Further, we are
funding studies at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory that will assist the NRC in developing a risk-informed,
technology-neutral licensing framework for advanced reactors and in
evaluating the license-by-test concept.
PRICE ANDERSON REAUTHORIZATION
Question 6. The provisions of the Price-Anderson Act that provide
insurance for commercial nuclear power plants licensed by NRC expired
last year. While existing NRC licensed facilities are grandfathered,
any new nuclear reactors would not have Price-Anderson coverage until
the law is reauthorized. I understand from utility executives that no
one is prepared to invest in new commercial nuclear power until they
are assured that Price-Anderson insurance will be available to protect
the public.
Does the Administration still support the expeditious
reauthorization of the expired portions of Price-Anderson dealing with
commercial reactors so that there can be new nuclear development in
this country?
Answer. The Administration strongly supports the expeditious
reauthorization of the Price-Anderson Act (the Act). Although all
current reactors would continue to receive coverage without
reauthorization of the Act, industry would not be in a position to
consider the construction of new nuclear power plants.
The indemnification provisions under the Act provide both the
economic protections needed to allow for the construction of new
nuclear plants in the United States and protects the interests of
property owners in the improbable event of a nuclear power plant
accident. The Act establishes the ideal design for an insurance program
where the probability for occurrence of an event is extremely remote,
but the potential damages could be very high. The retrospective premium
aspects under the Act minimize the cost of this indemnification to
electric ratepayers, but still provide over $10 billion in coverage.
Further, claimants benefit from the fact that industry would assume
full responsibility for a nuclear accident rather than engaging in
lengthy legal processes.
Questions From Senator Alexander
Question 1a. In January 2001, Secretary Richardson issued a record
of decision regarding the production and processing of Plutonium-238.
In this decision, the Department acknowledged that the Radiological
Engineering Development Center (REDC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory
was the preferred facility for processing irradiated targets. The REDO
facility has over 30 years of target fabrication and processing
experience. However, despite this proven record and the Department's
recent decision, the Department has proposed consolidating the
plutonium-238 program at the Idaho National Laboratory.
Why would the Department reverse this decision through a contract
proposal for the operation of Idaho National Laboratory?
Answer. The Department is revisiting its decision on where the
production of plutonium-238 should be reestablished since the original
decision was made prior to the events of September 11, 2001. Because
plutonium-238 requires significant precautions to protect this
material, there are significant security benefits that could be
achieved by consolidating all plutonium-238 operations at a single,
well-protected site that is remote from the public. The Department is,
therefore, exploring this option. Reestablishing the production of
plutonium-238 operations that would be included in consolidation of
these operations. As a result, the Department asked that bidders
interested in operating the new Idaho National Laboratory address, as
part of their proposals, the potential consolidation of all plutonium-
238 operations at this laboratory. Such consolidation would include the
plutonium-238 processing and encapsulation efforts currently being done
at Los Alamos National Laboratory as well as the plutonium-238
production efforts previously proposed to be established at Oak Ridge
National Laboratory but not yet established. Consolidation would
eliminate the need to ship irradiated targets and plutonium-238 between
the various sites, thereby enhancing overall security, and would
increase program efficiency and flexibility by doing all of the
operations at a single site. With the required target irradiation
planned to occur primarily at the Advanced Test Reactor in Idaho and
with the assembly and testing of heat sources and generators already
being moved to Idaho from the Mound Site in Ohio, the logical site for
potential consolidation is the Idaho National Laboratory. It is in this
context that the Request for Proposals included the potential
consolidation of all plutonium-238 operations as an option to be
considered in the contractor proposals. Since the previous decision on
the facilities to be used for reestablishing plutonium-238 production
was issued in the January 2001 Record of Decision, any change in this
decision would be only be made after completing an appropriate
environmental review and decision process.
Question 1b. Is the Department going to conduct a full National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review of the proposed operations at
the Idaho National Laboratory for processing and--encapsulating
plutonium-238? If so, when will this review be conducted and when will
public comment be accepted on the proposed plutonium-238 activities?
Answer. Yes, the Department will conduct a full National
Environmental Policy Act review for the proposed Plutonium-238
Consolidation Project before a final decision is made to pursue the
project. The review, in the form of an environmental impact statement,
will be initiated in the near future and is expected to last between 12
and 18 months. There will be several opportunities for the public to
comment on the proposed action during the preparation of the
environmental impact statement. The specific dates for the public
comment period have not yet been established, but will be made public
as soon as possible.
Question 1c. Does the Idaho National Laboratory have sufficient
expertise and facilities to process irradiated targets in the most
timely and economical manner?
Answer. The irradiation and processing of irradiated targets has
been accomplished at the Idaho National Laboratory site for many years.
Key programs involved in this effort include the past operation of the
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, one of DOE's three former large-scale
reprocessing facilities; the ongoing operation of the Fuel Conditioning
Facility and other experimental work in support of the Advanced Fuel
Cycle Initiative; isotope production and separation at the Test Reactor
Area; and numerous experiments at several analytical laboratories
across the site. Therefore, adequate technical expertise exists at the
site. Equipment and facilities needed to process the irradiated targets
would have to be procured and constructed, but this type of activity
would be required to place this mission. at any potential site,
including the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. In addition, consolidation
of all plutonium-238 activities at Idaho National Laboratory would
significantly increase programmatic reliability and reduce operational
costs--in part by eliminating the need to transport radioactive
materials across the country.
Question 1d. How many staff currently work at the Idaho National
Laboratory that have expertise in processing irradiated materials?
Answer. There are several hundred staff members at the Idaho site
that have relevant experience with the irradiation and processing of
irradiated target materials. This experience has been gained through
programs such as the past operation of the Idaho Chemical Processing
Plant, the ongoing operation of the Fuel Conditioning Facility and the
production and separation of isotopes for the isotope production
program.
Question 1e. Has the Department done a detailed analysis of the
cost of consolidating this program at Idaho including construction of
new facilities and additional security requirements for such
facilities? If so, what are the detailed costs including the cost of
constructing a new category I nuclear facility for processing the
plutonium-238 oxide and the cost of constructing the hot cells for
processing the irradiated targets?
Answer. The Department has completed a preliminary cost estimate
for the proposed plutonium-238 Consolidation Project. This project
would be conducted in an already secure area and, therefore, should not
involve any significant increase in security costs. The cost estimate
for the proposed Plutonium-238 Consolidation Project includes the
construction of a hazard category 2 nuclear facility. This facility
would support both the production of new plutonium-238 and the
processing and encapsulation of the plutonium-238 that is currently
accomplished at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The cost estimate for
the facility to include both of these functions is $205 million to $230
million over five years. The cost estimate for installing the target
processing mission at INL is about the same as the cost for installing
the mission at ORNL, but operating costs are projected to be lower if
the consolidation of plutonium-238 activities in Idaho is completed.
Question 1f. Does the Department have a detailed plan for
consolidating this program at Idaho National Laboratory that include
facility designs and project milestones? If so, please elaborate upon
these plans.
Answer. No, the Department does not have a detailed plan for the
potential consolidation of the plutonium-238 operations at the Idaho
National Laboratory. The project is not yet approved by the Department
and project specific funding is not included in the fiscal year 2005
budget request before Congress. The Department has developed
preliminary high-level milestones and plans for the project. However,
the Department plans to complete a National Environmental Policy Act
review and initiating conceptual facility designs over the next 12-18
months. Final facility designs and firm project level milestones would
be established after the National Environmental Policy Act review is
completed and a Record of Decision issued.
Question 1g. Does the Department have a cost estimate for shutting
down these operations at Oak Ridge National Laboratory?
Answer. The capability to produce plutonium-238 does not currently
exist and, therefore, there would be no cost associated with shutting
down these operations. A small amount of funding, on the order of $1
million per year, has been directed towards the planning for plutonium-
238 production and no major investments have been made in facilities or
hardware. If the Department should decide to pursue the Plutonium-238
Consolidation Project, it would not affect other ongoing operations at
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Therefore, the impact on the Oak
Ridge National Laboratory is expected to be negligible.
Question 1h. Has the Department performed an environmental impact
analysis of consolidating this program at Idaho?
Answer. No, the Department has not yet performed an environmental
impact analysis for consolidating the plutonium-238 operations in
Idaho. However, in support of the Plutonium-238 Consolidation Project,
the Department plans to initiate a National Environmental Policy Act
review during FY 2005.
Question 2. Is the budget for the Office of Nuclear Energy,
Science, and Technology sufficient to research, design, develop, and
deploy a next generation nuclear reactor? Please elaborate upon your
response.
Answer. The budget requests for the NGNP to date have been
submitted as part of the overall Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems
Initiative. Thus far, these budget requests have been consistent with
the early planning stages for the NGNP program. The Department places a
very high priority on the Next Generation Nuclear Plant program. If a
decision is made to proceed with development of the NGNP, as the
program moves forward into design and build phases, the Department
would reflect the need for additional funding in its future budget
requests.
Question 3. What cost arrangements does the Department foresee with
its industrial partners in the design, construction, and deployment of
the next generation nuclear plant?
Answer. The Department anticipates a 50-50 cost share arrangement
over the life of the NGNP program, with the Department assuming more of
the burden, in the first few years to establish the baseline technology
and supporting research and development and our partners in the program
doing so in the later stages of the program.
Question 4. Is the Department's budget sufficient to support the
activities of the three consortia that have responded to the
Department's solicitation for participation in the Nuclear Power 2010
program?
Answer. The Department's FY 2005 request was formulated before we
received proposals from the three consortia. As a result, we did not
have the information required to estimate the cost of these projects.
Further, it was unclear, until we received these proposals in the
spring of this year, that industry was interested in proceeding with
projects to demonstrate the licensing process for new nuclear power
plants. The information we have now received will be taken into account
as we develop our funding requirements for FY 2006 and beyond.
Questions from Senator Landrieu
Question 3. Given the importance of the Nuclear Power 2010 program
in terms of testing the combined construction and operation process is
DOE going to increase its funding level from $10 million back to
recommended level of $20 million?
Answer. The Department's FY 2005 request was formulated before we
received proposals from the three consortia. As a result, we did not
have the information required to estimate the cost of these projects.
Further, it was unclear, until we received these proposals in the
spring of this year, that industry was interested in proceeding with
projects to demonstrate the licensing process for new nuclear power
plants. The information we have now received will be taken into account
as we develop our funding requirements for FY 2006 and beyond.
______
Department of Energy,
Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs,
Washington, DC, October 4, 2004.
Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On July 13, 2004, Kyle E. McSlarrow, Deputy
Secretary, testified regarding the role of nuclear power in national
energy policy. On September 29, 2004, we sent you the answers to 20
questions for this hearing.
Enclosed are answers to the four remaining questions that were
submitted by Senators Landrieu and Feinstein to complete the hearing
record.
If we can be of further assistance, please have your staff contact
our Congressional Hearing Coordinator, Lillian Owen, at (202) 586-2031.
Sincerely,
Rick A. Dearborn,
Assistant Secretary.
[Enclosures.]
Questions From Senator Landrieu
FUNDING
Question 1. Has the Department begun to re-prioritize its internal
programmatic funding to account for the $749 million shortfall for
Yucca Mountain in Fiscal-Year 2005?
Answer. The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management is
currently reviewing its budget request for FY 05 in light of the amount
that would be appropriated in the House passed Energy and Water
Development Appropriations bill. That said, it is vital that the
program receive its budget request, and that the Congress enact the
legislation to reclassify fees paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund as
offsetting collections.
CONTINGENCY PLANS
Question 2. DOE must have been aware from the direction of the oral
arguments made in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia that the current EPA standard for 10,000 years could be
thrown out--What contingency plans has DOE made in terms of moving
forward with Yucca Mountain?
Answer. I do not believe that the 10,000 year standard was thrown
out. As I stated at the hearing, I believe the issue is what you do
after the 10,000 year period. We still intend to submit an appropriate
license application with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in light of
the court decision. If the safety standard is revised at some point, we
will address this issue.
Questions From Senator Feinstein
FUNDING CONTINUATION
Question 1. On Friday, a federal appeals court ruled that that the
EPA must take into account findings by the National Academy of
Sciences, which called for a storage system that would protect against
radiation releases beyond the next 10,000 years.
A former DOE official, Lake H. Barrett, wrote in 1999 that devising
a radiation standard beyond the next 10,000 years ``would be
unprecedented, unworkable, and probably unimplementable.''
Should we continue to spend billions of dollars to develop the
single repository when we could harden the existing storage sites?
Answer. The national policy since 1982 has been to pursue geologic
disposal. This policy, which was made law in the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act, was recommended by the National.Academy of Sciences, has been
consistently endorsed over the years by four presidents and the
Congress, and is overwhelmingly the choice of the international
community.
BUDGET SHORTFALL
Question 2. The President's Budget included $880 million for the
DOE civilian nuclear waste disposal program, a 50% boost over FY2004.
The Administration also is proposing that $749 million of the FY2005
request be offset by the existing nuclear waste fee, so that the net
appropriation would be $131 million. The House Appropriations
Committee, noting that Congress has not enacted the Administration's
waste-fee offset proposal, voted to provide only the $131 million net
appropriation request.
Without at least $600 million (according to lobbyists for the
nuclear power industry), Yucca cannot continue-the House Energy and
Water Appropriations Committee report noted DOE'S prediction that the
funding reduction could force layoffs of 70% of the program's work
force, place submittal of the repository license application ``at
risk,'' and cause ``an indefinite delay in opening the repository.''
How is the Administration going to try to make up the budgetary
shortfall?
Answer. We are currently working with the leadership in the Senate
and the House, as well as the Office of Management and Budget, to
secure adequate funding for the program.