CURRENT ARMY ISSUES

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UNITED STATES SENATE
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FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 19, 2003

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CURRENT ARMY ISSUES

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:09 a.m. in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff director; Cindy Pearson, assistant chief clerk and security manager; and Kenneth Barbee, security clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, professional staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; William C. Greenwalt, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; and Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Andrew Kent, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members’ assistants present: Dan Twining, assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Darren Dick, assistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Meredith Moseley, assistant to Senator Graham; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Rashid Hallaway, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER,
CHAIRMAN

Chairman WARNER. Good morning, everyone. The committee meets today to receive testimony on current and future Army
issues, particularly with regard to the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in general in the overall global war on terrorism.

We welcome back before the committee the Honorable Les Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army, Under Secretary permanent, and General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the United States Army. We look forward to your testimony.

I have known both of you for many years and I cannot think of a better Army team, civilian and military, at any time in contemporary history than the two of you. Each of you have come up through the ranks in the United States Army. Each of you has experienced the rigors of command, the rigors of combat, and both possess the ability to lead your people and care for their families. So as a Nation I express our gratitude.

Today’s Army has an enormous requirement to provide forces for ongoing military operations around the world: over 150,000 soldiers in the Persian Gulf region, over 10,000 in Afghanistan, 5,000 in the Balkans, and the usual number of around 30,000 in South Korea. This is the greatest army in the world.

I listened to the President of the United States delivering a very significant and major address in Great Britain this morning, in which he expressed the absolute resolve to fulfill the commitments of this Nation and the other nations that have joined us, notably Great Britain, in the war on terrorism. It seems that the bulk of the responsibility, understandably I think, falls on the United States Army.

So we are here for the purpose this morning of working with you to see what we can do here in Congress, and to learn from you how you intend, through your individual and combined leadership, to provide for these forces now and in the future to meet adversity wherever it is in the world.

In mid-October of this year, the Stars and Stripes newspaper ran a series of articles about the morale of soldiers and living conditions in Iraq. Overall, the poll indicated that most soldiers surveyed felt unit morale and their own morale was average or better, and most felt living conditions in Iraq were average or better. Of note, however, Reserve and National Guard soldiers rated unit and individual morale somewhat lower than their active duty brothers. I say brothers and sisters because it is a total force, and it is a magnificent force in the fact that they do have the strength of the Guard and Reserve.

Also, the polling indicated less than full confidence in the chain of command, and that is somewhat disturbing, and I am sure you have some responses to that today. The poll drew attention to the large percentage, 49 percent, of the soldiers who will likely not re-enlist.

Finally, the article raised issues concerning the equitable availability of services such as mail, PX facilities, email, and phones, as well as different standards between the Army and the Air Force. I actually saw that when I was over there with my distinguished colleague here. I remember at that time indicating that I felt that corrective measures had to be taken.

Now, military service is an arduous task. It is not risk-free and it is very demanding; not only of those in uniform but their fami-
lies, and each of you know this very well. Throughout history, from the time of George Washington’s Continental Army to today, and I will bet you into the future, there is always a level of griping in the ranks. We have known that. It is part of military life. There is griping in civilian life. I do not know how you compare the levels.

But in this instance the level of griping raises some alarms. We will learn from you today exactly what corrective measures you have taken and how you have examined the root causes and hopefully eliminated some of those problems.

These polls are perhaps not scientific. These articles do raise some questions about the stress on the force, the morale and retention, and ultimately recruiting, and that of their families. So we look forward to your assessments.

In October the Army Center for Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth published, to the surprise I think of all of us, an unusually frank assessment, an unclassified assessment, of shortfalls in performance of Army units in Iraq and Afghanistan in the key areas of tactical intelligence, human intelligence, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations, fire support, and targeting.

One of the strengths of our Armed Forces is the willingness to turn a critical eye on yourselves, and we have done that throughout history, identifying those problems and doing what we can to fix them. We are very proud of this Army. We are very proud of your ability and your professional judgment to address these problems.

Additionally, there have been recent revelations about the ability of prompt health care and living conditions for those placed on medical hold, primarily members of the Reserve component, in preparation for deployment. The issue came to light in press reports of dissatisfaction and poor living conditions at Fort Stewart, Georgia. Secretary Brownlee, I commend you and the Chief and others who went down there very promptly to examine that situation. So we look forward to listening to your report today.

Again, the Army has been tasked with the bulk of the responsibility for stability operations and civil affairs and peacekeeping operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The scope of these responsibilities is very large and it is very complex. The demands on the Army units will continue to be high. We need only listen to our President’s speech this morning.

The rotation plans reflect careful, pragmatic planning, I hope, to replace these units. Questions remain, however, about how long such rotation plans can be sustained and what the long-term impact will be on the Army units, especially in the Reserve component, the readiness of the Army to respond to unforeseen contingency and surge requirements.

Finally, questions have been raised about whether the best equipment is being provided to our deployed forces. Therein, Congress has a very special role. Both active and Reserve are forwarding complaints to Congress. For example, do deployed soldiers have the best possible body armor and adequate body armor, and is there a need for the so-called up- armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) to provide our soldiers with the best protection possible?
The recent shootdowns of Army helicopters—a tragic loss of men and women. Secretary Brownlee, you and I have been out there at Arlington Cemetery. I was out again this week as these brave soldiers are interred in that magnificent cemetery. What about the protection on these aircraft? I think we have to go back and examine the decisionmaking and whether or not we could have seen this problem before it developed to the magnitude that we are facing today, certainly in the question of unit body armor and of course with the helicopters, because that is not a battle zone that some of us have experienced in years past, where the rear echelon has a far higher degree of protection. There is no rear echelon in Iraq or Afghanistan. It is all a battle front.

The success of the Army in recent military operations is indisputable. The men and women of the Army and their families have performed magnificently. Now it is our job to do what we can to see if we can help them.

This hearing is part of a larger undertaking that this committee will pursue to fully understand the lessons learned by all the military Services and the combatant commands during the conduct of recent military operations. We owe that to our men and women in uniform and to their families and to the American people. I am proud that we are undertaking that today with two of our most distinguished current members of the military team.

Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling this important hearing. I join you in welcoming our two witnesses, both of whom are very familiar to us.

Last week, I visited five wounded soldiers from Iraq at the Walter Reed Army Hospital. Two are from my home State of Michigan, the rest from other States. Two were members of the active Army, the others from the Army National Guard. Three of them were amputees. To the person, they were extremely proud of their service in Iraq and united in their love of our country. I have not met a finer group of Americans.

One of the wounded soldiers, a staff sergeant who lost a leg, has already decided that he wants to continue in the Army. I know that the Army in the past has retained amputees on active duty. At least two of them have continued on to four-star rank: General E. R. Shinseki, of course, who served as Army Chief of Staff; and General Fred Franks, who commanded a corps in Operation Desert Storm. Secretary Brownlee and General Schoomaker, I ask that you do all that you can to retain such soldiers, who, though severely wounded, want to continue to serve in the Army that they love. Who knows; we may have a future corps commander or Army chief of staff among those wounded soldiers.

The dedicated, motivated, well-trained, and led soldiers of the U.S. Army are its prized assets and, much more than its high technology weapons, are what sets that Army far above other armies of the world. We have a sacred duty to ensure that we, the leaders of the Army, the leaders of the Department of Defense (DOD), and Members of Congress, work together to do all that we possibly can to provide for their welfare, including medical care for those who
are recovering from injury or sickness, including our troops being paid on time, including the best equipment in the world, such as the body armor and the aircraft protection issues that were raised by our chairman, and of course the best training, so that they can accomplish their missions and return home to their families.

As General Schoomaker has testified in the past, we are at war and the Army is bearing the brunt of it, especially in the counterinsurgency and stability operations currently being conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army’s planning and execution of the conventional phase of the war in Iraq was exceptional. The current phase of the war is far more problematic, but just as important.

Even those of us who have been critical of the way the administration took the country to war in Iraq with inadequate international support and even those of us who are critical of the administration for a lack of planning for the aftermath, we believe, along with those who are totally supportive, that the stakes are much too high for our Nation’s security and for international security to countenance failure. We must succeed in Iraq.

The Army has been and will continue to play the central role in dealing with the current chaos and violence and transitioning to a hopefully swift and greater international involvement and true transition to Iraqi sovereignty.

We have a host of personnel, equipment, and operational issues to address in this hearing. The Army, in its own after-action reviews, tries to compare its performance against the standard of perfection, as our chairman has said, realizing that we will never attain that standard, but that in doing so it will improve performance immeasurably. That is the spirit of our being here this morning. We need to determine where we are falling short of that standard and determine what we need to do to get as close as humanly possible to that standard should the next conflict come.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Levin.

Members of the committee, we are going to have at least one round of questions, 6 minutes each. But the ranking member and I are very anxious to adjourn and go into room SH–219 for our classified portion of this hearing. So we will have to evaluate as time permits whether we can get to a second round. But I should hope that you can arrange your schedules so as to attend the classified session.

Secretary Brownlee, we welcome you. For those that may not know of your background in connection with the Senate, 17 years of your distinguished career have been devoted to the United States Senate. You were once staff director of the Armed Services Committee under the able leadership of Senator Strom Thurmond and then under myself.

Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. LES BROWNLEE, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Secretary Brownlee. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to testify on the tremendous accomplishments of our soldiers
and the progress they are making in Iraq. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit our full joint statement for the record.

Chairman WARNER. Without objection.

Secretary BROWNLEE. On behalf of our great soldiers who are serving our country around the world, let me begin by expressing gratitude for the exceptional support that the members of this committee have provided to our soldiers and their families as well. I know that you are deeply interested in the great work our soldiers are doing, their attitudes, how they are trained and equipped, and how those with medical issues are being cared for.

I was in Iraq in June and returned again in late September. I had the opportunity to speak with commanders and soldiers at several levels and have regular contact with senior Army leaders in theater, and am grateful to have the opportunity to share what I have learned with you.

We appreciate the service and the enormous sacrifice made by our soldiers and their families as we meet the challenges and risks of this war on terrorism, with its current higher operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and frequent extended deployments. As President Bush recently stated: “Our men and women are fighting terrorist enemies thousands of miles away in the heart and center of their power, so that we do not face those enemies in the heart of America.”

One fact is clear: The Army is at war and is serving a Nation at war. In this, the dedicated service of the Army’s total force has been invaluable. The steady progress in the war on terrorism has been possible because both active and Reserve component forces have fought together, along with our sister Services, to win decisively on battlefields where terrorists once flourished. I would like to pay special tribute to members of our Reserve components and their families and employers as well for their service and sacrifice.

Now we are engaged in bringing peace to both Afghanistan and Iraq and creating an environment where democracy can take root. In Iraq, President Bush has identified three primary objectives, to which we remain committed: First, we must improve security by aggressively hunting down the terrorists who are attempting to undermine progress for the Iraqi people; second, we must work with the international community and the Iraqi people to rebuild Iraq, restore basic services, and revitalize the Iraqi economy; and third, we must support efforts to accelerate the orderly transfer of sovereignty and authority to the Iraqi people.

Our soldiers understand this mission and their commitment to getting the job done is having an extraordinarily positive effect on the people of Iraq. It is difficult to convey just how bad things were in Iraq when our forces liberated their country this past summer. Yet the vast human potential of the Iraqi people themselves was still there, along with their country’s great natural resources, which will in time help them recover from the damage Saddam Hussein inflicted on them.

During visits to Iraq, I have witnessed the magnificent performance of our troops and, as many of you have also observed, we are making progress.
On behalf of the United States Army, thank you for your interest and your efforts. We very much appreciate those of you who have taken the time to visit our soldiers there.

The end of fast-paced mobile operations has given our supply system time to catch up with our units. Taking care of our soldiers is of the utmost importance to the Army. In September soldiers began taking advantage of the Rest and Recuperation Leave Program.

We are moving to meet the combatant commanders' requirements for both up- armored HMMWVs and Interceptor Body Armor. We are boosting current production to the maximum rate the industrial base is capable of and production is fully funded at the rate of 25,000 outer tactical vests and small arms protective inserts per month. At currently planned rates of production, we will have all our troops in Iraq fitted with Interceptor Body Armor by the end of December. We owe it to our soldiers to care for them to the very best of our ability.

Events since the end of major combat operations in Iraq have differed from our expectations and have combined to cause problems, including those at some mobilization sites, for some of our soldiers, problems we have identified and are moving to fix.

Our soldiers must continue to attack and eliminate remaining anti-coalition forces in Iraq and establish a secure environment. The magnitude of the effort is substantial, but our soldiers are performing as the professionals they are, with skill, courage, and dedication. It will take time and the Army, as part of the joint team, will bear the brunt of the fight.

The OPTEMPO is high and so is the pressure. We are in a dangerous business. Our men and women and their families recognize the obligations that come with the uniform and they have not flinched. Like many of you, I have visited with many of them at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Without exception, they have impressed me deeply with their spirit, their dedication to duty and their units, and their abiding faith in the United States. They understand that freedom is not free, but is the most precious thing we possess. They are American soldiers in the finest tradition.

Despite remarkable successes, our fight is far from over. Our enemies are committed and believe we lack the resolve to win the peace in Iraq. I can assure you that this is not true. I have seen it in our soldiers’ eyes and heard the determination in their voices.

In closing, I would like to take this opportunity to thank this committee for the opportunity to appear before you today along with our 35th Chief of Staff, a truly great soldier and a genuine warrior in every sense of the word. It is an honor for me to work alongside this great American each day on behalf of our soldiers around the globe. We are truly fortunate that General Schoomaker answered his Nation’s call during this war, making the difficult decision to leave a comfortable retirement and far less stressful environment to rejoin our Army.

I might mention that General Schoomaker and I are both graduates of the University of Wyoming and we are proud of that.

Mr. Chairman, thank you and the members of this distinguished committee for your continued support for the men and women in our Army, an Army that is at war and a full member of the joint
team deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world fighting terrorism. I look forward to answering your questions, sir.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Secretary Brownlee. I had intended to introduce this distinguished Chief of Staff of the Army, but I could not do it any better than you. So I will just say: Thank you for your continued public service and to your family for joining you. General.

STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

General SCHOOMAKER. Thank you, sir. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today and to tell you about the tremendous work our soldiers are doing as they accomplish our Nation’s business around the world.

With your permission, I would like to submit, along with the Honorable Mr. Brownlee, our full statement for the record.

Chairman WARNER. Without objection.

General SCHOOMAKER. I would like to begin, as Secretary Brownlee has, by thanking each of you for your tremendous support. You have shown our men and women tremendous support over the recent months during this difficult time for the Army. I have been impressed by the willingness many of you have shown to visit our soldiers overseas, to visit our wounded soldiers at medical centers here in the United States and in Landstuhl, Germany, and to use these visits to inform legislation and resourcing levels.

The news reports seem content to highlight the differences among you, but I am proud of what you have accomplished together for our soldiers.

From passage of the fiscal year 2004 appropriations bill and the supplemental, to this committee’s ongoing efforts to complete the conference action on the authorization bill, you have provided to the world an example of democracy in action, an example of what we are fighting for. Thank you for your support.

Today our Nation is at war, and the Army is a critical member of a joint team serving our Nation at war. Some do not realize, in my opinion, the gravity of the situation that we face, and some may have even forgotten the events of September 11. We are not immune from another attack here at home. We are at war now out of necessity, and I would like to stress, this is a test of will, a test of will we cannot afford to lose.

We find ourselves in extraordinary times as our Army serves our Nation at war. As you all know, we have been on an operational treadmill for quite some time, actually since about 1989. It is hard to recall a time in history, with the exception of World War II, when we have been busier. But being busy is different from being at war.

There is no question that the pace of our Nation at war challenges our Army. We have more than 300,000 soldiers deployed in about 120 countries, supporting various operations. We continue to meet these challenges with a seamless commitment of active, Reserve, and National Guard soldiers and civilians, who continue to give so selflessly to our great Nation. Soldiers like Specialist Tillman, who gave up an $11 million football contract to enlist and
now serve in Iraq. Specialist Tillman gets it. He knows why he is there and exemplifies the kinds of service all of our soldiers are willing to make for our Nation.

This is the first time since World War II that we have deployed soldiers in harm’s way directly for the American people. Previously we deployed our soldiers to help somebody else during their time of need. Our soldiers understand this.

Since being sworn in as the Army Chief of Staff on the 1st of August, we have traveled around the world to the Middle East, Asia, the Pacific Rim, and Alaska to be with our soldiers. Within the last 30 days, we traveled to Kosovo, where I met with members of the 28th Infantry—the 28th Division out of Pennsylvania Army National Guard; and to Bosnia, meeting with the membership and the leadership of the 34th Division Army National Guard out of Minnesota; and to Europe, meeting with General Bell and the soldiers that are preparing to go to Iraq on this next rotation out of the 1st Infantry Division. I am proud to report to you that in each of these places skilled, trained, and ready soldiers are performing magnificently.

I have also had the opportunity to meet with 71 of my Army chief of staff counterparts from other countries since the 1st of August, and I have explained to each of them the seriousness of the war on terror and have enlisted their continued support in the fight against terror.

Around the world, our soldiers perform with determination, skill, and courage. As I have stated before, the American soldier has been and remains indispensable. Our soldiers, civilians, and their families set the standard every day for selfless service. Today’s soldiers accept their responsibilities and perform every task and mission asked of them, just as their parents and grandparents have done before them.

But while our soldiers are carrying on the legacy of earlier generations of American soldiers, this is a different kind of war. This is not easy and we cannot approach it as if it were business as usual. This state of war requires us to challenge old paradigms, to be more flexible and adaptable. Over the course of the last 26 months, our soldiers have proven that they are up to any task. They are smart, morale is solid, and, having recently spent time with the 41st Infantry at Fort Riley, who just returned from duty in Iraq, to a man they are proud of their service and what they accomplished. They understand why we are deployed in places that we are. They know why we are there.

There is an intensity of focus and a dogged determination to succeed that is absolutely extraordinary. We must never lose sight of the fact that it is our soldiers that put it all on the line and we will do everything in our power to prepare for the challenge that they will face in battle. In return, we owe them our very best, and I am really proud to serve with them.

I would like to, at this time, read The Soldier’s Creed, because I think it is absolutely imperative that it is right up front for the American people and for the American soldier. Inside of this creed is a warrior ethos. It says:
"I am an American soldier. I am a warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States and live the Army values."

These next four statements are the warrior ethos. This is what an army is about: "I will always place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade. I am disciplined physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior task and drills. I always maintain my arms, my equipment, and myself. I am an expert and I am a professional. I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States in close combat. I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life. I am an American soldier."

I just thought that was appropriate as part of my opening statement because it is very important that we remember what the American Army is for and what we are as soldiers.

In closing, I would like to take this opportunity to thank this committee for the opportunity to appear before you today and for your continued support for the men and women of our Army, deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout the world. Our Nation asks much of our Army and I am confident that we will deliver. As a soldier, I know we have the will, the determination, and the drive to master the challenges facing us. I look forward to answering your questions.

Thank you.

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Brownlee and General Schoomaker follows:]

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. LES BROWNLEE AND GEN. PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, USA

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, we appreciate the opportunity to come before you today and testify on the tremendous accomplishments of our soldiers and the great progress they are making in "winning the peace" in Iraq. On behalf of the soldiers who are serving our country around the world, let us begin by expressing gratitude for the exceptional support that you have provided to our soldiers and their families.

We have been asked to talk about the great work our soldiers are doing, their attitudes, their training and equipping, and how those with medical issues are being taken care of. We have both been in Iraq in recent months. During those visits, we had the opportunity to speak face to face with commanders and soldiers at every level. Also, although our deployed soldiers are under the operational control of the Combatant Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), senior Army leaders in the Pentagon communicate routinely with senior Army commanders in the field.

We are grateful to have the opportunity today to share with you our perceptions of our Army at war.

We appreciate the service and the enormous sacrifice made by our soldiers and their families as we meet the challenges and risks posed by the war on terror, with the current higher operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and frequent, extended deployments. We would also like to highlight the invaluable contributions of our Reserve components and their employers.

Against this magnificent performance by our soldiers over the last 26 months, we must express a word of caution. We are an Army at war, serving the Nation at war, but we are concerned that all too many, across the Nation as well as within the Army, do not understand the implications of being at war. Americans have been killed here at home by terrorists, who will try again; the events of September 11, 2001, may presage another attack in the future. The resources Congress has given us, and the work it has done in informing the American people of what we are doing, and why, are critical to our successes to date.
We must all understand and communicate to our fellow citizens some key facts about the global war on terror. This war differs in significant ways from the conventional paradigm that many associate with World War II, the threat to the survival of our Nation and our way of life are at least of the same magnitude. In fact, because of the destructive power that can be unleashed by small numbers of people and the potentially devastating informational effects of major terrorist acts, the threat we face today may be even more serious. We cannot let the fact that the terrorist threat is often difficult to detect and substantiate lull us into a false sense of security. In fact, the terrorists we are fighting have been waging war against us for many years. They are elusive, cunning, and committed to using every means at their disposal—including our own institutions and processes—to undermine our society and erode our will to persevere. The war is not likely to end until we destroy the terrorist networks that are aligned against us, and convince the populations from which they have arisen that peaceful development within a framework of representative government is a better alternative than terror.

The global war on terror will require a sustained effort over a long period. There will be periods when our military will be in direct combat during this war, and there are also likely to be periods when the battles subside. We cannot afford to be lulled into a false sense of security and we cannot afford to treat our current situation as if it were "business as usual".

War is often ambiguous, and requirements to meet the threat will continue to change. We must adapt to the changing requirements in order to succeed. The Members of this Congress have enabled our military to adapt to the conditions of the battlefield through your action on recent supplemental spending measures and other defense legislation. On behalf of our soldiers, we thank you, and ask you to sustain this critical support. We are committed to working with you in support of your constitutional responsibilities.

One fact is clear: the dedicated service of the Army's total force has been invaluable. The steady progress in the war on terror has been possible because our active, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard units have fought together, along with our sister services, to win decisively on battlefields where terrorism once flourished. Now we are engaged in bringing peace to these regions and creating an environment where democracy can take root.

As the President said on the same day that he announced the end of major combat operations, "We have difficult work to do in Iraq. We're bringing order to parts of that country that remain dangerous. We're pursuing and finding leaders of the old regime, who will be held to account for their crimes." He added, "The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort."

President Bush has identified three primary objectives, to which we remain committed. First, we must improve security by aggressively hunting down the terrorists and individuals who are attempting to undermine progress for the Iraqi people. Second, we must work with the international community and the Iraqi people to rebuild Iraq and restore basic services—jumpstart the Iraqi economy. Third, we must support efforts to accelerate the orderly transfer of sovereignty and authority to the Iraqi people.

Our soldiers understand this clear mission, and their extraordinary commitment and dogged determination to getting the job done is having a positive effect on the people of Iraq. They are working with the Iraqi people, our coalition partners, and the international community to achieve a better Iraq for the Iraqi people, the region, and the world. Our soldiers understand that helping the Iraqis build a free and democratic society will help make our own country safer, and they continue to make remarkable progress in that direction every day.

During our visits to Iraq, we have witnessed progress being made. Living conditions are getting better, and will continue to get better, both for the people of Iraq and for the men and women serving there. Several Members of Congress and their staffs who have been to Iraq have come to the same conclusion. On behalf of the men and women of the United States Army, thank you for your interest and your efforts.

It is difficult to accurately portray just how bad things were in Iraq when our forces liberated the country this spring. What we would consider a normal society did not exist, having been terrorized by Saddam Hussein's government since 1979. Crippled by decades of neglect, the country's infrastructure was in shambles and cities were crumbling. Yet the vast human potential of the proud Iraqi people was still there, with great natural resources to help rebuild from the damage Hussein inflicted on them.

Working closely with the people of Iraq, we are making progress throughout most of the country. Local government councils are taking increasing responsibility for civic administration and services across Iraq. Our Army divisions are training Iraqi
Many medical personnel deployed to theater to meet the combatant commander’s requirements for mobility and demobilization. Additionally, units at those bases would be deployed, and the Reserve component units who assumed for our mobilization sites rested upon the belief that the active duty forces would keep this pace, every soldier and Department of the Army civilian in theater will soon receive SAPIs per month. As of November 5, over 116,000 sets of SAPIs had been fielded. At our current rate of 25,000 OTVs and SAPIs per month, production is fully funded at the rate of 25,000 OTVs and SAPIs per month. With the support of this Congress, we have stepped up production to meet this increased requirement by over 80,000. As of last week, another 116 were in transit. The production rates for new vehicles rose to 80 per month at start of fiscal year 2004, and we are seeking to ramp up production rates to the maximum of 250 per month by May 2004. On October 17, we began testing kits of bolt-on armor for regular vehicles to improve their resistance to improvised explosive devices. Testing continues and an analysis of the results is ongoing. We expect final definition by the end of this month. For our Stryker vehicles, we are fielding slat armor, with all kits to be in theater before the Stryker vehicles arrive.

Another example of how we have adapted to battlefield requirements is Interceptor Body Armor (IBA), comprised of Outer Tactical Vests (OTVs) and Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPIs). Last year, commanders in the field identified a shortage of IBA in theater. The original requirement for IBA was based on issuing it only to the dismounted fighting soldier. In June 2003, as the threat to our soldiers changed, the basis of issue was changed to include every soldier and Department of Defense (DOD) civilian in theater. This increased the requirement by over 80,000. With the support of this Congress, we have stepped up production to meet this increase. We have boosted current production to the maximum rate the industrial base is capable of, and production is fully funded at the rate of 25,000 OTVs and SAPIs per month. As of November 5, over 116,000 sets of IBA had been fielded. At this pace, every soldier and Department of the Army civilian in theater will soon have IBA.

We owe it to our soldiers to care for them to the best of our ability. Our planning assumptions for our mobilization sites rested upon the belief that the active duty units at those bases would be deployed, and that the Reserve component units who mobilized and demobilized there would do so on largely empty sites. Additionally, many medical personnel deployed to theater to meet the combatant commander’s re-
Despite remarkable successes, our fight is far from over. Our enemies are committed and believe we lack the resolve to “win the peace” in Iraq. We can assure you that this is not true: we have seen it in our soldiers’ eyes, and heard their dedication in their voices—here at home and overseas with our deployed forces. Our commanders and troops are confident and feel that we are gaining momentum in the fight, increasingly taking the fight to the enemy. It is hard, and may take longer to quickly adapt and respond to the many complex challenges they face. Our commanders and troops are confident and feel that we are gaining momentum in their voices—here at home and overseas with our deployed forces. The magnitude of the effort is staggering. For example, in Iraq, soldiers are executing around 2,000 missions every day. Each mission is important, and each one is dangerous. Nevertheless, our soldiers are performing as professionals—with skill, courage, and dedication. We all know this will take time, and that for now, the Army, as part of the joint team, will bear the brunt of the fight.

The OPTEMPO is high and so is the pressure. We are in a dangerous business. Our men and women and their families recognize the obligations that come with the uniform, and they have not flinched. We have visited them at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany, as have many of you. Without exception, they deeply impressed us with their dedication to duty and their units, their good spirits, and their faith in the United States. Their families—mothers, fathers, relatives—and friends whom we’ve met there and elsewhere are the same. They understand that freedom is not free, but it is the most precious thing we possess. These soldiers and hundreds of other service men and women know this and have paid for the freedom of other Americans they will never meet. They are American soldiers in the greatest traditions.

It is an All-Volunteer Force doing this tremendous work, and recruiting and retention are of great interest to the Army’s senior leadership. For the most part, initial indications are encouraging, but we understand that we must closely monitor this key element of readiness. The active Army’s fiscal year 2003 recruiting objective was 73,800 new recruits. We accessed 74,167, of whom 94.5 percent were high school graduates. This is the highest percentage since 1992. Additionally, the percentage of recruits in Category IV was 0.27 percent, the lowest since the All-Volunteer Force began in 1973. Numbers are comparable in the Reserve components. Charged with recruiting 26,400 new members, the Army Reserve accessed 27,365, and the Army National Guard achieved fiscal year 2003 end strength with the lowest no-show rate ever seen. Further, there were zero no-shows in the September call-up. We are aware of reports coming out of Iraq that suggest a morale problem in certain units and are working to address those issues.

Recent news reports have attempted to highlight impending problems in retention, but the figures cited in these accounts are not far from historical averages. For instance, a recent article claimed that 46 percent of soldiers surveyed indicated they would not reenlist. Over the past 4 years, however, the rate of first term soldiers who did not reenlist has ranged from 42 percent to 49 percent. The Army achieved all retention goals during this period. We believe this success can be directly attributed to the Army’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program. The Army re-enlisted 54,151 soldiers in fiscal year 2003, including 15,213 soldiers whose enlistments would have expired before September 30.

In fiscal year 2004 alone, the Army must retain approximately 58,100 soldiers to maintain desired end strength; this equates to a retention mission increase of 2,000 soldiers. We will continue to rely on a robust SRB Program to enable achievement of our retention goals. Developing ways to retain soldiers directly engaged in the ongoing war on terror is critical. We implemented a “targeted” bonus (TSRB) at the end of fiscal year 2003 that was quite successful. We expect the TSRB will greatly enhance our ability to attract and retain soldiers.

Despite remarkable successes, our fight is far from over. Our enemies are committed and believe we lack the resolve to “win the peace” in Iraq. We can assure you that this is not true; we have seen it in our soldiers’ eyes, and heard their determination in their voices—here at home and overseas with our deployed forces. The progress we have made in the past 6 months is a testament to our force’s ability to quickly adapt and respond to the many complex challenges they face. Our commanders and troops are confident and feel that we are gaining momentum in the fight, increasingly taking the fight to the enemy. It is hard, and may take longer

Requirements. Events since the end of major combat operations in Iraq have differed from our expectations and have combined to cause problems for many soldiers—problems we have identified and are taking corrective actions to fix. For example, on October 30, we transferred 50 medical hold personnel from crowded conditions at Fort Stewart to the less-strained facilities at Fort Gordon. We are taking additional measures to resolve these problems, such as moving other medical hold personnel into climate-controlled buildings, seeking local civilian medical appointments, and increasing medical staff.

Back in Iraq, our soldiers must attack and eliminate remaining anti-coalition forces and establish a secure environment where the values of freedom and democracy can take root. An integral part of this campaign is assisting interim governments to deliver basic services—security, food, water, power, and education—to their people. Our soldiers must simultaneously conduct combat operations and provide humanitarian assistance, often shifting between the two in the course of a single day.

The magnitude of the effort is staggering. For example, in Iraq, soldiers are executing around 2,000 missions every day. Each mission is important, and each one is dangerous. Nevertheless, our soldiers are performing as professionals—with skill, courage, and dedication. We all know this will take time, and that for now, the Army, as part of the joint team, will bear the brunt of the fight.

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than we had expected or hoped, but our ultimate success in helping the Iraqi people reclaim their country is assured.

In years to come, when historians write the story of this critical period, they will note that in Iraq and around the globe, the unwavering commitment, courage, and compassion of the American soldier led the way in the fight against terror and lit the lamp of freedom and democracy for millions who had known only oppression. By carrying the fight to the enemy, the Army is destroying terrorism today at its core and spawning grounds, providing the greatest assurance of protection to the American people, and striking fear in the hearts and minds of our terrorist enemies.

In closing, we would like to take this opportunity to thank the committee for the opportunity to appear before you today and for your continued support for the men and women in our Army—a relevant and ready Army and a full member of the joint team, deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout the world fighting terrorism. We look forward to answering your questions.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, General.

We will now proceed to a round of 6 minutes.

Secretary Brownlee, this question I think falls properly on you because General Schoomaker has just recently joined the leadership at the Department of Defense. These reports of a shortage of body armor, these reports of ill-equipped ground vehicles and air vehicles in terms of the armor, are just totally unacceptable. Now, where was the error, and I say it was an error made in planning, to send those troops to forward deployed regions—and the conflict in Iraq particularly—without the adequate numbers of body armor and vehicles?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Senator, let me just start out by saying, referring to Senator Levin’s statement, we do have a standard of perfection. We do not always meet it and I regret every time we do not.

In this particular case, the history of this body armor is that it was a relatively new piece of equipment when we went into Afghanistan and later Iraq. Our intention initially was to ensure that all of our combat troops, those infantry troops that would be most closely engaged in the fight that we could anticipate, were the first priority in equipping them with body armor, and all of these soldiers were equipped.

We simply did not have enough at that time to equip everyone. We have taken steps to increase the production of these things. They are dependent on certain substances, some of which are very limiting in the numbers of these. But we have increased the number of producers, we have increased the capacity, and, as I indicate in my statement, at the current rate of production we should have all the soldiers in Iraq, to include those in the rear and contractors, equipped with this kind of body armor by the end of December.

Chairman WARNER. Let us use as a baseline the President’s statement that major combat operations are over. You mean in the forces that were employed from jump-off day through the, now the term, “end of major conflict,” all of those troops had the equipment?

Secretary BROWNLEE. The troops that were in the forward combat elements, the infantry troops, the armored troops, those that we could anticipate would come in close contact with the enemy. The rear troops, the logistics forces that we did not anticipate—since we had to prioritize, we simply did not have enough to equip everyone. We prioritized and as we move back in the theater in some cases we had equipped perhaps one per three soldiers, and the instructions were to put those on the soldiers that would be
going forward. It was a matter of having more soldiers than we had body armor.

Chairman WARNER. So you freely acknowledge we were short in terms of the inventory?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes, sir.

Chairman WARNER. Those troops that are most likely to be confronted with risks, to injury, they had it?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes, sir.

Chairman WARNER. Now then, you go from that point when the major conflict is over, and the war went right on. But anyway——

Secretary BROWNLEE. In the conflict that we're in now, as has been pointed out——

Chairman WARNER. There is no rear area.

Secretary BROWNLEE.—we are not there, that is right. So everybody is susceptible. So our goal and requirement then became to equip every soldier with this, and that was a greatly increased requirement and we've continued to ramp up production. Now it is up to about 25,000 units per month. At that rate, we should have every soldier equipped and contractors equipped by the end of December.

Chairman WARNER. Now let us take up the ground vehicles, the HMMWVs, and then let us transition to the aircraft, the helicopters.

Secretary BROWNLEE. The up-armored HMMWV—when the initial ground battle was ongoing, most of our forward troops were in either Bradley Fighting Vehicles or tanks. We had, of course, some ground elements, but they were not up with the 3rd Infantry Division, which is a heavy division primarily with tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Most of our troops fought those battles in that kind of armored protection.

But as the war transitioned from one of that kind of fight into more of an insurgency, all of the troops are not equipped with those and in fact the commanders—and these are combatant commanders' decisions, of course—determined that they would be better off in lighter vehicles because of the kind of patrols they were running and the environment they were in.

So our forces there, while they still had tanks and Bradleys, they began to use lighter vehicles to conduct some of their operations. It became obvious that, even though it was a light vehicle, if you could use the up-armored HMMWV, which has protection against 7.62 bullets and more, that would be an advantage over just a standard HMMWV.

So we began to first of all redistribute the assets we had throughout the world and ramp up production there. The requirements for those vehicles continued to go up and I think the Chief and I determined it was up to about 3,500 as of this morning.

Chairman WARNER. You indicated December is the date at which the body armor will meet the standards. Are we able to have a comparable date for the ground vehicles?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Sir, with the up-armored HMMWV it is more of a challenge. If we go strictly with that up-armored HMMWV it could be as late as December—the summer of 2005 before we would have them all. But let me say, we are examining at this time other alternatives. Some of these alternatives——
Chairman WARNER. I do not think we can accept a deadline of 2005.

Secretary BROWNLEE. Well, what we are doing, sir, because it is not acceptable to us either, is examining armor that could be placed on the current family, the current HMMWV. We have several variations that we have been testing and examining and we are going to buy probably variations of all of them in order to get this done as fast as we can.

Chairman WARNER. I detect that you are doing the best you can.

Secretary BROWNLEE. Sir, we are working this——

Chairman WARNER. It is unfortunate that this developed as it did.

Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes, sir. The Chief and I put out a memo jointly that said anything that involves the force protection of our soldiers has the urgent, most highest priority, and has a 24–7 requirement.

Chairman WARNER. My time is running out. Helicopters remain the question. I will ask you to put that in the record unless other members seek that response.

Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:] The response to this question is addressed in questions for the record “Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)” #8–16, Senator Levin.

Chairman WARNER. General Schoomaker, I question the force level of the Army, whether we need additional troops in terms of recruiting and training. You, I think quite understandably, when asked that question in this series of debates that have been going on, said: Look, give me time to get a fuller understanding of this outfit that I am privileged to take over and then I will be able to provide my opinion.

I would hope by now you have had that time and that you can give us an opinion about your end strength levels and how you would recommend to the President and the Secretary of Defense such adjustments as you deem professionally needed.

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir. Thank you very much. I hope that when we get into closed session we will be able to explore a little bit further the previous question that you had, because I think there are things that are appropriate there for fuller understanding of what that is all about.

On the issue of end strength, I have had the staff working very hard to take a look at it and do the appropriate studies here on the end strength issue. We are still in the throes of that. But I can tell you that I think our understanding of this is significantly better than it was when I appeared before you before.

First of all, the United States Army today has about 20,000 more people in it than we are authorized and that is a result of a stop-loss, stop-move that we have done on the Active Force. So we are already operating at about a 20,000-soldier——

Chairman WARNER. That is the regular Army?

General SCHOOMAKER. That is the regular Army.

In recent legislation our end strength was increased by 2,500 people in terms of the authorization. But, as a result of stop-loss, stop-move right now we are operating with 20,000 more soldiers in the regular Army than we had.
But the greatest move that we can make, and we are in the throes of making this move right now, is to get the proper utilization of the soldiers within the Army that we have authorized and we are paying for right now. This is going to require significant active-Guard rebalancing and significant restructuring of policies and, in some cases, probably legislation that will give us access to more of the force that we are paying for and have on hand right now.

One of the issues that we have to mine is the non-deployment rate in our current force. We are studying to see what that is, but there are all kinds of reasons why there are people that are nondeployable. We have to look very seriously at the overstructuring that we have in our force.

Chairman WARNER. So you are examining that. Lastly, acquisition of new soldiers and levels is one thing; retention of the force, voluntarily retention—now, that is forced retention, that 20,000.

General SCHOOMAKER. That is correct.

Chairman WARNER. So how is that retention and recruiting holding up?

General SCHOOMAKER. This year we met every goal. In 2003 we met every goal with the exception of one, and we fell a little short in the Army Reserve, not the Guard but the Reserve, in the careerist category.

Chairman WARNER. That is retention.

General SCHOOMAKER. That is retention. We exceeded our accession goals in the active Army, in the Army Guard, and in the Army Reserve. We exceeded every category of retention in all components, with the exception of the Army Reserve. We do not know what the future might hold and we are running models and we are taking a look from history and everything else, trying to figure out what this may portend for the future. I think our experience tells us that the longer we operate at the tempo we have, the greater the challenge will be in this. So we are looking at how to incentivize and to target appropriately.

Chairman WARNER. My time has expired, General. Thank you.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. On the aircraft issue, it is a great area of concern for many of us that we apparently just do not have the most modern defensive equipment, for instance, on all of the helicopters. We had the ALE–47s on some of our Chinooks, but not on other Chinooks. I gather the policy of first to fight was the policy being applied, whether those helicopters were active duty or Reserve component helicopters. Is that true, first of all? Is that the policy that is applied, “first to fight,” regardless of whether it is active duty or Guard?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Now, there were 62 ALE–47 dispensers available, and these are dispensers of chaff and flare, and they had not been installed on helicopters. The question is, why? Is this a matter of not having adequate funding or not having adequate people to install the equipment? What was the problem with that?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Sir, the problem as I understand it was not funding. The problem is that it takes 3 weeks to rewire a helicopter to accommodate this new system. So we are proceeding to do that.
We do not want to take all the helicopters down to do it and we are proceeding to do it with the systems that we have and we are getting more systems.

So again, it is a matter of applying these systems to the helicopters, and this particular dispenser is more capable and also the wiring provides us the capability to go to an even better system when we get it developed.

Senator Levin. How long will it take for us to get all the Chinooks, for instance, equipped with the ALE–47s? The Chinook that was shot down did not have that dispenser on it.

Secretary Brownlee. Sir, could I provide that for the record? I am not sure exactly when the date is to get all that done.

[The information referred to follows:]

The response to this question is addressed in questions for the record “Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)” #8–16, Senator Levin.

Senator Levin. Will it be this year? Do we know that?

Secretary Brownlee. To get all of them done, I am not sure, sir. We have a fleet of about 300 or so.

Senator Levin. The ones that are in the field will not all be equipped this year?

Secretary Brownlee. We are moving now to equip those that are in the field or that are going to the field.

Senator Levin. Let us know for the record when that will be accomplished.

Secretary Brownlee. If we could, sir.

Senator Levin. On the morale issue, General Schoomaker, one of the many issues that families face is uncertainty as to when our deployed troops are going to be coming home. Is there a system in place now so that every unit and presumably every soldier knows when he or she is scheduled to come home?

General Schoomaker. Yes, sir. If you would permit me just to tag on to clarify your previous question. The ALE–47 is a system that is an improvement over the system that is on all of the aircraft. All of the aircraft had survivability equipment and what we are talking about now is an improvement. This is a moving train and we will continue to see improvements, and I think what we should talk about in closed session——

Senator Levin. Even beyond the 47? There will be improvements even beyond that, we assume?

General Schoomaker. Even beyond the 47, significantly. We should talk about these things because I think it warrants a clear understanding of what it is and what the size and scope of this challenge is.

In regard to expectations, one of the things that I was confronted with almost immediately is the means in which we were mobilizing and the means in which we were developing expectations on the part of the soldiers that were being mobilized. I think we have a very good handle on that right now.

We are operating under partial mobilization. The authority we have under partial mobilization is to mobilize one million people for 2 years. That is the authority we are operating under. This is not presidential selective Reserve callup, which is significantly smaller and it is a significantly shorter period of time.
Senator Levin. Just in terms of my time, though, is there now in place that—
General Schoomaker. There is.
Senator Levin. So every soldier now knows when to expect to be coming home?
General Schoomaker. Every soldier understands that from the date that soldier is mobilized, not alerted, but mobilized, the elements that we are mobilizing now, they understand that by the time 18 months expires they will be demobilized. That includes their leave. They understand that the moment they set their boots in the operational area that they will leave within 12 months, and that is the policy that I think is very clearly understood.

Senator Levin. Thank you, General. There have also been a number of pay problems, particularly for Army National Guard personnel. A General Accounting Office (GAO) report came out recently on that. In a Colorado Special Forces unit, 61 of 62 Army Guardsmen and women experienced pay problems while deployed. In a Virginia Special Forces unit, 63 of 65 had the same problems. West Virginia, 84 of 94.

In another case, a soldier submitted documentation on three separate occasions. He tried to get his housing allowance. Each time he was told to resubmit his request, because documentation was lost.

Very quickly, are you familiar with these issues? Are you on top of these issues? Are you satisfied that these problems are not going to reoccur?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, I am not satisfied.
Senator Levin. Are you satisfied that these problems are not going to reoccur?
Secretary Brownlee. No, sir, I am not. This is one of those problems that every time we think we have it fixed, it pops out somewhere. I am very upset about some of these that have happened, because I received assurances in the past that we have it fixed and suddenly, it is not fixed. So I can only tell you we are redoubling our efforts. It has a very high priority within the Army.

We all understand how a soldier feels when his pay is screwed up and we want it fixed. So I assure you, Senator, we are moving to fix it.

Senator Levin. Thank you.

The morning paper has an article that says the administration is going to be proposing a greater United Nations (U.N.) role in an effort to increase international support and participation in Iraq. Part of this will be, hopefully, the attraction of additional troops from other countries, including Muslim countries, and if that happens it hopefully will be a quicker not only reduction in the number of our troops, but less of a visible presence of the number of our troops and the substitution of troops of other countries.

In the meantime, however, it is our responsibility to the extent that it is now. We had General Swannack, who is the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq, comment about some of the tactics which are currently being used. That was in the paper this morning, too. He talked about using a “sledgehammer to crush a walnut.”
What he was referring to here was the military tactic in recent days of employing aircraft dropping 500-pound bombs, artillery, mortars, and attack helicopters against suspected insurgents, and recently AC-130 gunships used to attack what was reported to be an empty warehouse in Baghdad, suspected of being a planning and staging area for insurgents, and the destruction of a number of homes of suspected insurgents.

General Schoomaker, I want you to just give us your comment, given your experience, especially in Special Operations, as to whether or not you think it is likely that such a tactic is going to help or hurt a counterinsurgency effort.

General SCHOOMAKER. First of all, that is quite a bit out of my lane right now, Senator, as the Chief of Staff of the Army, and I think that is more appropriately answered by the operational commander that has it there. But I will tell you that as a soldier involved in combat it is important that the enemy understand and feel the weight, the gravity of the situation per their actions. So I feel very confident that the application of force over there is being accomplished within the rules of the law of land warfare. I am very confident that the tactical commanders, the operational level commanders over there, understand the situation that they are facing and are taking these actions because they feel they are appropriate.

But other than that, I would not like to comment any further.

Senator LEVIN. I can understand that.

Would you finally, then, talk to General Swannack, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, and report back to us, if you would, relative to your conversation with him. Obviously it is a significant comment if the commander out there of that division is referring to this as a sledgehammer crushing a walnut, because that could have a counterproductive effect in terms of the creation or the fueling of a counterinsurgency.

So rather than asking you to comment any further here, and given the fact that my time is up, unless you want to comment further, if you just would talk to him and get back to us for the record about your conversation relative to his comment, that would be helpful.

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I think I will stand on what I have said, and I will be glad to get into it.

[The information referred to follows:]

The response to this question is addressed in questions for the record “Recent Military Actions in Iraq” #17–20, Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Allard.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to make my statement a part of the record if you would, please.

Chairman WARNER. Without objection. The statements of all Senators will be admitted in today’s record.

[The prepared statements of Senator Allard and Senator Cornyn follow:]
PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Brownlee, General Schoomaker, thank you for appearing before us. I understand that both of you are very busy and I appreciate your willingness to share with us your impressions of today's Army.

As you noted in your written statement, our Nation is at war, a war that will not be won with a single battle or even a single campaign. It will be difficult and it will be arduous. I believe the American people have come to appreciate that our country will have to make sacrifices if we are to prevent future terrorist attacks against our country.

I would like to take a moment to honor the recently fallen soldiers in Iraq and to recognize the mission these men and all of the 10,000 Fort Carson soldiers have been accomplishing since the conflict began.

Last week, the State of Colorado lost four of its courageous Army warriors when a chinook helicopter assigned to the 12th Aviation Brigade and attached to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment crash landed outside of Baghdad. These were brave and loyal soldiers defending the principles of freedom and liberty and fighting the terrible war against tyranny and terrorism.

As I learn more of the four men from Fort Carson who lost their lives my heart swells with pride. I am very proud of the commitment and sacrifice these soldiers gave to our country and our way of life.

Mr. Chairman, this attack represents another example of the cowardice and terror tactics employed by Saddam loyalists and the foreign insurgents intent on our failure to bring peace and freedom to Iraq and the region. They will not succeed. Both the American troops and the Iraqi people are working hard to make the country better.

Mr. Secretary and General Schoomaker, I can tell that even through last week’s disastrous loss, the spirit of Fort Carson stays strong. The 3rd Armored Cavalry’s 5,000 soldiers serving in Iraq don’t have time to be horrified or mourn the dead. They have a job to do. They are committed to their mission.

There has been plenty of discussion lately of America’s resolve and commitment to seeing this through. Let me tell you that the men and women serving in Iraq are not confused and know how committed this administration and this country are to ensuring a democracy flourishes in Iraq.

Surprisingly, though the 3rd Armored Cavalry is still deployed in Iraq, the unit has not only reached its retention goals, it has greatly exceeded them. In the last quarter of this past year 294 soldiers re-enlisted while the objective was 129. This unit is retaining almost three times its goal for that period and for fiscal year 2003. Over the year, the regiment had 834 soldiers re-enlist even though the goal was 554 re-enlistments.

It is clear to me that the soldiers who are laying their lives on the line; they are committed to this cause; and we need to follow their lead. This committee, indeed Congress, needs to follow the lead of men and women from Fort Carson and commit to this cause. We must not waver. We must stay the course.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN CORNYN

Thank you for appearing before the committee, and I would like to commend Chairman Warner for holding this important hearing. There is no doubt that our men and women in uniform are doing a tremendous job in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout the world in the global war on terrorism. It is our duty to ensure that they have the training and equipment that they need to defend our Nation. Last week, we passed the Defense Authorization conference report, which contains many important provisions that will help our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. The bill raises military salaries by an average of almost 4.2 percent and extends increases in combat and family separation pay.

But we are all concerned when we hear reports that morale among our troops is low or that our soldiers do not have the proper equipment to carry out the mission in Iraq or anywhere else in the world. I am privileged to represent a State that is home to 1 in 10 active duty military personnel, and I want to ensure they, and all who serve in the military, have what they need to get the job done. The 4th Infantry Division from Fort Hood is currently doing a great job in Iraq, and the 1st Cavalry, also from Fort Hood, is preparing to head to Iraq.

It is essential that we understand and address any morale or other problems as early as possible, not only for the sake of the military members themselves, but also for the families of those serving our great Nation. As we all agree, families of our
service members are making great sacrifices as their loved ones head overseas to defend freedom and liberty.
I would like to join Senators Warner and Inhofe in expressing my concern about the Lieutenant Colonel West situation. I understand the military justice process is ongoing, but it is critical that common sense and a complete understanding of the facts and unique pressures of command in the current Iraq environment are factored in to any decisions on this case.

Senator ALLARD. I want to just make one point here before I ask my question. The 3rd Armored Cavalry out of Fort Carson in Colorado has had an enlistment rate that has exceeded their goals. What that tells me is that the members of that unit believe in the Army and they believe in their mission in Iraq, and I just wanted to pass that on to you. I think that is very significant in our discussion we are having today.

I have a case that has come to the attention of my office and it has received some national publicity. It is called the Holcomb case. This was dealing with a Colorado National Guard medic. Her husband was in the Active Force, she was in the Reserve or the National Guard, and they had a family plan that meant that her mother would take care of the seven children in Colorado. Then the babysitter's husband got cancer, and there was a court order issued by a judge in Colorado that said you have to make arrangements to take care of the kids or you are going to lose two of them because of a previous marriage. There was a custody issue here.

I viewed that as a hardship case because she had to make a choice between either serving in the military and getting absent without leave (AWOL) charges or being there with her kids and keeping them part of the family. I think that is an untenable kind of position to put somebody in.

I wondered if you would comment about that case, and I would hope that you would look at it closely, because there is another complicating issue here. During her training as a medic she happened to have punctured herself with a needle and apparently it was contaminated with hepatitis C. Apparently that has caused her to have hepatitis C, and so she is concerned about the possibility of future health problems.

I think the suggested solution was she just be discharged, but if that happens then she does not get her medical benefits. So I hope that you take a close look at that and can recognize that as a hardship case.

I am wondering if you would comment on that, and then also if you could comment on the Army's policy of deployment of dual parents and if it is perhaps time to revise that policy or at least look at it. I do not know whether you, Secretary Brownlee, or you, General Schoomaker, want to address that question. Maybe both of you would like to.

Secretary BROWNLEE. If I could, sir, and then General Schoomaker can be my guest. Sir, our policy is if there is a dual family with dependent children then they have to have a plan in place that indicates how the children will be cared for if they are both deployed.

Senator ALLARD. Apparently she had that.

Secretary BROWNLEE. They did have a plan, sir. Our understanding is there was a member of the family who was caring for the children, who became ill or had to go take care of someone who had
become ill. It therefore put their plan in jeopardy, and then this other case came up where the custody of the children was in issue.

They both returned to Colorado, I understand, and then her husband deployed back to the area of operations (AO). Her status was questionable. It appears that some of the actions and paperwork were lagging behind what was being reported in the press. But it is certainly not the Army’s intent to punish anyone for taking care of their children.

But we do insist that soldiers have to be deployable. There are hardship cases. I think we are understanding of those, and this one is being handled, as I understand it, appropriately and compassionately. There is now a medical issue, as you indicated, and that is being taken into consideration also.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you for your response.

General.

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I think it is a very complicated issue. I think it goes back to—first of all, I am absolutely certain that she will be treated fairly within the tools that are available to the commanders, whether it be the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or the administrative tools. When all this is gone through, I think it will come out in a way that is appropriate.

But it goes back to the fundamental question that goes all the way back to what I said in my opening statement: What do we expect of people when there is an Army at war? The degree to which we have to have assurances that the soldiers are prepared to go for extended periods of time is all at the heart of this matter.

In my view, it is not a question of whether we are going to have a volunteer force in the future. It is a question of what kind of volunteer force we are going to have and what the expectations should be and what we should ask of people in this volunteer force.

Again, I would like to comment on your previous statement about the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. When I was in Afghanistan and I spoke with General Vines over there, who is commander of the 18th Airborne Corps now, he was commanding the 18th Airborne Corps in Afghanistan with an active unit that had been gone—this is a ballpark—about 26 of 33 months been deployed, met their reenlistment goal by 240 percent in Afghanistan.

Senator ALLARD. Their action speaks louder than words.

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes. So this whole notion about morale—I have been in an Army that does not have morale. I was in the Army in the late 1960s and early 1970s. That was an Army that did not have morale. This is not an issue of morale. This Army is committed and what we have to do is commit ourselves and make sure we are supporting these soldiers. They are providing extraordinary services to this Nation at an extraordinary level of excellence, and we owe them everything we can give them.

So it is a very complex issue that we are talking about here, and I think part of this is part of the transformation we have to make, from a Cold War Army to an Army at war.

Senator ALLARD. I have one more question here. There was a 3-day article in The Denver Post about sexual assault in the military and the bottom line was that they thought we ought to look at the UCMJ, because there was much discretion given between various
commanders in applying this and perhaps there was not consistency.

They said it may have been 50 years since they last looked at the UCMJ. Do you have a comment in regard to that?

General Schoomaker. Every time the UCMJ is looked at, it is held up as an extraordinary example of a system, and it has been looked at many times.

Senator Allard. When is the last time it was reviewed?

General Schoomaker. I will have to get back to you for the record. It was actually in relatively modern times. The thing that I would say is that if you look at the civil system you will find extraordinary latitude on the parts of judges and juries in the kinds of things that happen. It is very similar in terms of what you would expect.

We expect every case to be looked at on its merits and for it to be judged with matters in extenuation and mitigation at the appropriate phase of the proceedings to be done. We have great confidence people use their best judgment and that the element of fairness is involved in it.

[The information referred to follows:]

The UCMJ, which was originally enacted by Congress in 1950, was most recently revised by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, specifically as to the number of members required on court-martial panels in capital cases. Because the UCMJ is statutory, only Congress has the authority to amend or otherwise revise it. As discussed below, however, the UCMJ undergoes an annual review process and, when appropriate, changes are proposed both to Congress and the Secretary of Defense.

Article 146, UCMJ, provides for the establishment of a committee (known as the Code Committee) that meets annually to conduct a comprehensive review of the UCMJ. Following each review, the Code Committee must submit a detailed report to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House, as well as the Secretary of Defense. This report must include information on pending cases and the Committee’s findings regarding the uniformity of sentencing policy, recommended amendments to the UCMJ, and other matters as appropriate.

The Code Committee consists of the Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the Service Judge Advocates General (JAG), and two members of the public who are recognized experts in criminal law and are appointed by the Secretary of Defense for a term of 3 years.

As with any statute, changes to the UCMJ may also be proposed by Members of Congress or the public through the normal legislative process and outside of the Code Committee process.

The UCMJ is implemented by the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), an Executive order, which includes Rules for Courts-Martial, Military Rules of Evidence, and Nonjudicial Punishment Procedures. The President periodically amends the MCM. The last Executive order amending the MCM was issued on 11 April 2002. OMB and the White House are currently processing two proposed Executive orders to amend the MCM. Both have received public comment and publication in the Federal Register.

A review of the MCM is accomplished by the Joint Services Committee (JSC). The JSC was established following a 1984 Executive order directing the Secretary of Defense to have the MCM reviewed annually. The JSC consists of the Chiefs of the Military Services’ Criminal Law Divisions, including the Coast Guard, and representatives of the DOD General Counsel, United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Throughout the year, the JSC solicits proposed changes to the MCM designed to enhance the military justice process and provides recommended changes to the MCM and legislative changes to the UCMJ.

Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Senator Allard, I thank you for bringing this matter to our attention. I am going to invite the chairman and ranking member of the Personnel Subcommittee to look into this
situation. The subject matter of these series of articles—and I do not know whether you have seen them or not, Secretary Brownlee.

Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes, sir, I did see it.

Chairman WARNER. They are quite disturbing, and it is pervasive throughout all branches. So it is just not an Army problem, and this committee will address that issue.

Senator Akaka.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Schoomaker, I understand that there were many challenges for personnel in Iraq regarding the logistical process. Poor communications were mentioned, and scarce transportation assets, poor distribution routes, and the speed in the initial phase of the operation all contributed to the shortages of spare parts, ammunition, medical supplies, water, and other items that hampered our troops' readiness.

For many years the military has employed "just in time logistics," and this is a good process under peacetime conditions, as we know, but not under the conditions faced during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

What steps has the Army taken to better coordinate the resupply of equipment and the basic necessity quality of life items for our current troops in Iraq?

General SCHOOMAKER. I think you have pointed out a very important point. Logistics are everything in terms of what your capabilities are operationally. I think we ought to get into the details and specifics, if you want to, when we get in closed session. But I will tell you in general that what we are subjects of is extraordinary success. We were the victims of extraordinary success.

If you take a look at World War II and think about Patton's race across Europe with the Redball Express, we had to grind the rest of the Army to a halt to support that. I think you might remember that the way they stopped Patton was to cut off his Redball Express there, to slow him down a little bit.

This is a problem that is as old as warfare and it is a challenge that we have. Some of our peacetime efficiencies that we have put in place challenge us when we are operating at the speed and distances that we did in Iraq. A very simple point. Over time we have reduced the level of what we call the Prescribed Load List (PLL) for parts at the lower levels in the units, for efficiency's sake, for dollar savings, and for management's sake. I think, quite frankly, that, soldiers being what soldiers are, some of our successes are a result of them understanding how to creatively circumvent the rules so that they had the stuff that they needed, thank God. That is the good part about the American Army; everybody does not listen to everything in all the rules.

I think you are on a good point. This is something that we are looking at very strongly and, quite frankly, we are moving in a direction where we are thinking very much about joint logistics, where we are taking a look at how we can get more robustness and more effective logistics by looking at it as a joint matter.

Senator AKAKA. I asked that question because we certainly want to support you in improving the logistics there.

General SCHOOMAKER. I appreciate it. We are going to need your support to get after this.
Senator AKAKA. General Schoomaker, I have been informed that the contracted logistical support within theater has been and remains a problem. Claims have been made that soldiers did not receive support in some areas because contractors refused to go into dangerous areas. Of course, this is a problem particularly if the DOD intends, as is reported, to increase its reliance on non-governmental contractors.

What is the Army doing now to ensure troops are receiving supplies they need in the time frame that they need them? If you need to answer it in another meeting, that is fine, too.

General SCHOOMAKER. No, I think it is not that I need to answer it in another meeting. I am not quite sure I am aware of your first point on contract logistics. I am sure there is anecdotal evidence that we have had problems in certain areas. But I will take that for the record and get the specifics and be glad to supply it there.

What we are doing in general, as a general statement, is we are looking at all avenues of approach to provide what we need to provide to our soldiers that are in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and everywhere else. But when you take a look at the distances involved and the security challenges, and all of the things that are involved in this, I think you will be amazed at how daunting a challenge this is to reach some of our most distant elements that are out there.

So I will be glad to get into it and provide you a more detailed answer for the record. But I will tell you, the gloves are off and we are doing everything we can to get ahead.

[The information referred to follows:]

Contracted logistics support in Iraq has proven to be excellent overall, but it's not without it's difficulty. Problems with contracted support can usually be traced to misunderstandings of the scope of work or contract requirements, but soldiers have not done without the essentials. Many commanders are not experienced in managing contractors and a complete review of Army education programs that include, or should include, training on contractors accompanying the force (a.k.a. contractors on the battlefield) is underway. The supported commander is responsible for providing force protection for the contractors supporting him.

Senator AKAKA. General Schoomaker, what has the Army done to ensure that the problems experienced at Fort Stewart, Georgia, with soldiers on medical hold status are not repeated when the second OIF rotation occurs? I think you are well aware of that. Can you make a comment about that?

General SCHOOMAKER. I can and I think the Secretary may want to answer this question.

Secretary BROWNLEE. If I could, sir.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Secretary.

Secretary BROWNLEE. These problems occurred because we have a different situation than we had when we had a Cold War mobilization Army. The concept then generally was that the active component units would move out to go to war, Reserve component units come in behind them, take over their facilities; when they got trained up, then they moved out and other units came in.

We have a situation now where we deploy soldiers and move other soldiers in behind them, then the other unit returns, many times at strength above its authorized level. That is what happened at Fort Stewart and it was happening at other places, too.

So we set a standard for people with medical issues in that they have to be in buildings that are clean, in good repair, have climate
control, and have latrines within the same facility. I have been assured that there is not a soldier on medical status now that is not in a facility that meets that standard.

But I have to tell you that in the first 4 months of next year when we are rotating this force, we will be moving upwards of 120,000 reservists and elements from 8 of the Army’s 10 divisions, which could total 200,000 to 250,000 people on the move, to go to the AO and to return, both in Iraq and Afghanistan. So General Schoomaker and I have directed the Army staff to come up with a plan for this. We are going to have to plan it very deliberately so that we know every day what the expected number of troops is at these particular power projection posts and these mobilization sites that we have there.

We are looking right now at the possibility, if we have to, of putting up some prefabricated structures in order to accommodate the load. But this will challenge the Army. To my knowledge the Army has never had a rotation like this in the past. We have always trained people up and shipped them over, but we have not rotated the units back in this manner. We usually had an individual replacement system and now we are rotating units.

So I think the rotation of units is better in many regards, and the Chief of Staff of the Army can discuss that in some detail. But we are addressing that, and we are going to take steps to ensure that, if there are difficulties, they are minimized, and we are doing that right now through the planning.

General Schoomaker. If I may add on to the Secretary’s comment, because I think this really is important for a total understanding. This is not World War II any more. It is not the Cold War. We are not a mobilizing Army. We are an Army that goes to war as we are. One of the serious problems we have is this issue of medical readiness in Reserve components. Under the current rules they get one physical every 5 years and, quite frankly, we have real problems in dental readiness.

So when we mobilize soldiers and bring them on out of the Reserve component, if they are not medically ready we now are liable and responsible to return them and correct their problems before they are returned to the system. This is a result of some of the things from Operation Desert Storm and all the rest of it.

So we now have mobilization rules that say we will mobilize soldiers for 25 days and establish their level of readiness before we mobilize them for the long term, because part of what we have, if you look at this Fort Stewart example, of all those 600 something soldiers less than 20 were injured as a result of that deployment. A lot of those soldiers never deployed because they were determined to be medically unfit, and some of them were deployed and returned because of their medical fitness.

So this is a huge administrative burden on the mobilization. One of the issues that we have to look at in a seamless Army that is going to go to war tomorrow, based upon the level of investment that we make today and yesterday, is this issue of what the standard should be and how we are going to accommodate that, and it is huge. So I just wanted to bring that out because the overwhelming story here is the level to which the Guard and Reserve contributed to the success of the war on terrorism, the overwhelming suc-
cess of all those great people that did not fall under the category of these great soldiers that happened not to be able to be deployed.

I will redouble the statement that the Secretary has made here: This movement that we are going to do in the early months of next year is huge. This is going to be huge, and we are anticipating to be really challenged in this area that you are talking about right here.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Akaka, we thank you for that very important line of questions and the thorough response. As the base closure round comes up, you had better look at this issue where you have to, because of your infrastructure structure, build tempo. That rings some bells.

Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes, sir.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. I agree with that, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I appreciate members of this committee on both sides of the aisle who, in their opening statements and comments, talked about the troops and their intense loyalty and commitment to duty. On the trips I have taken over there, the one thing that has offended our troops more than anything else is—and they have come up to me and said this. They have said: Why is the media back there portraying us as something that we are not?

As you read, the articles and—what was it?

General SCHOOMAKER. The Soldier’s Creed.

Senator INHOFE. The Soldier’s Creed, and I remember that when I was a soldier. I had not heard it in a long time. I was just thinking, they portray everything that you said in that creed. I just think they are a great bunch over there.

Like many others, last week on Veterans Day I went around to the hospitals and talked to them. Secretary Brownlee, I always go to Landstuhl when I am over there to talk to some of them. You always get this commitment. They want to get well and want to go back to their units. One of them that I saw last week, he was Specialist Scott Parks. He is from Lawton, Oklahoma. I just found out 30 minutes ago—and I could not believe this because he had pins in every bone in his body as he was lying there—that he was released to go back to Lawton on convalescent, and he said: “Then I want to get back to my unit.” So I just think it is so important that we keep saying that, because some people out there are not hearing it.

In some of the areas of deficiencies, you have covered them real well, but I think it is important on the body armor just to repeat it one more time. Do you think by the end of December you are going to have this corrected? Is that what you said, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Senator, if we can maintain the current level of production we should have everyone equipped by the end of December.

Senator INHOFE. All right. That is all we could ask for at this time and I am very glad to hear that report.

Now, for the up-armored HMMWVs, we had in the supplemental a little over $239 million. That was for the purchase of new armored HMMWVs. That did not address upgrading the ones we have right now. Do you have adequate resources to do that right now, or is that a deficiency that we need to address?
Secretary BROWNLEE. Sir, I am not sure we do, because some of these things that we have gone out and looked for are new initiatives, and I will have to get back to you on that. There are initiatives we have taken, some of them quite surprising to us that they might be possibilities, and we are in the process of testing various alternatives. As far as I am concerned, if they work and we can get them faster, we will buy several different.

[The information referred to follows:]

The response to this question is addressed in questions for the record “Requirements Process” #7, Senator Levin.

Senator INHOFE. That is something the public is very much interested in and we are at this table, too.

Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes, sir.

Senator INHOFE. Another area of deficiency that has not been mentioned is our deficiency in our artillery capability. I know you are tired of hearing me talk about that, but here we are with the Paladin, technology from World War II. Even members of this committee, when we told them that you had to stand outside and swab the breach after every shot, did not believe it until they saw it and they realized it. That is a huge deficiency.

I think now with the Future Combat System (FCS) coming on we are talking now about how you fix the problem that is there today, while looking into the future a little bit. I agree with what General Shinseki was very adamant about, getting into this faster FCS, the lead element of that system being a non-line of sight (NLOS) cannon. I would like to hear just briefly whether you agree that that should maintain its primary position as the lead portion of the FCS?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes, sir, I could address that. It was our intent to field the FCS in 2008 and the NLOS cannon was to lead part of that. When we went to the Defense Advisory Board last summer what happened was, in order to get the seal of approval from our headquarters, we had to reduce risk in the program. That caused us to have to go back and identify additional dollars to put into the program and also extend the time allowed for development and testing.

That pushed the fielding into fiscal year 2010. Now, you and I have discussed the part of prototyping and getting some things out there for testing, and we are certainly going to do that. I know that there is a law that—

Senator INHOFE. We are running out of time here, but as far as a preproduction vehicle, though, we can still meet that 2008 deadline. General, do you consider that true?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, there is no change from our previous conversation in terms of manned prototype units.

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that. I appreciate that very much. Nothing has been said about Lieutenant Colonel Allen West. I know it is a sensitive subject, but having served in the Army and served with the court-martial group, I am familiar with Article 32. A lot of people—and I know that Oklahoma is not different than many other States and I am sure that each member up here has heard the same thing—they are concerned about it. During an interrogation, the interrogation that took place may have been more forceful than some think it should have been, but it led to the ap-
prehension of two terrorists and prevented an attack on soldiers in his command.

I would only say this, and this is not a question. I think the message—if we were to end up punishing someone for doing what it took to protect the soldiers entrusted to his command—it would be the wrong signal. I can only say that if something does not come up that would totally change my thinking on it in this Article 32, then I would continue to have the position that Lieutenant Colonel West should be commended for his actions in an interrogation that prevented an attack on the soldiers in his command. That is my feeling and I think others may share it and may not want to say it.

Lastly, there is a lot of discussion about the security forces over there. I think all of us would like to see the security forces going up and our troop deployment going down. I know that is what you want. But there is some discussion as to how well-equipped they are. My feeling is if you have some that are not that well-trained, they can take the positions of others who would then be released to take more positions that perhaps they are trained for.

Right now, for the first time I think, last week the security forces reached 131,000 to our 128,000. It is the first time that they have outnumbered ours.

Do you have any comments to make about the future of that, the security forces, and what your goals are in that respect?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Sir, we are very enthusiastic about the use of the Iraqi forces to pick up some of these security missions, especially those of guarding static positions and providing security for facilities and things like that, where we just do not think it is appropriate to use U.S. forces to do those kinds of things.

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, a couple points here. I agree and the operational commander, General Abizaid, fully supports—centrally, his whole program over there is to get an Iraqi face, get Iraqi ownership, and transition to Iraqi sovereignty as early as possible. The lead elements of that are getting the security forces in place and reducing the exposure of American forces.

The other side of that coin is we are challenged in terms of the equipment for these Iraqi forces and we are under instructions to actively, very aggressively look for excess defense articles and other kinds of things to help in the equipage of these forces over there. So I think it is important and I think we are at a significant point of transition in this program.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Inhofe, and thank you for bringing up the case of Lieutenant Colonel West. Certainly my office and, I think you are quite correct in your observation, all congressional offices have a high level of concern about this case. Now, I know that under the UCMJ, we should protect everyone’s rights. But do not let the lawyers have exclusive jurisdiction over what I call some sound judgments that have to be made by thoroughly seasoned combat soldiers like yourselves.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, gentlemen. I want to go over some of the ground that has been gone over, but for the obvious reasons. That is, so many of these young soldiers’ lives are at risk traveling in these light-
skinned HMMWVs. Three out of the last four soldiers from Massachusetts killed were in these light-skinned HMMWVs.

Last week, when I was out at Arlington Cemetery for Private First Class Hart's burial, the parents said: "If you can do anything to make sure that other soldiers who are over there are not put in the kind of danger that my son was put in, that would be the best thing that we could ever think of in terms of our son."

So it is not very encouraging to hear that ensuring that the HMMWVs are going to have the kind of armor that is going to give them the right protection, that we are going to have to wait until some time in 2005.

This issue was brought up to me with servicemen from Massachusetts during the summertime and I spoke to General Abizaid. He said: "Well, write me." I wrote him in September. He wrote back rather general comments. I appreciated his willingness to listen and he did listen to what I had to say to him.

Of course, in his second paragraph he says: "The Army's successful rapid fielding initiative was expanded in August 2003 to ensure no soldier will deploy in harm's way without the proper equipment." Well, they are being deployed without the proper equipment when you send these young soldiers out in these light-skinned HMMWVs.

It is difficult for me to understand why in these United States it is going to take us the amount of time that it is going to take us, until 2005, to get the kind of HMMWV that is going to have the protection these servicemen need. Now, I understand that your budget for this year—the maximum HMMWV capacity, according to the manufacturer, is 2,311. This year, with the 2003 and 2004 supplemental, you are getting 2,122. So there are still 189, as I understand the figures that were provided by both your staffs when they came to brief our staffs, and also by the committee staff. I do not understand why we are not getting the full amount to start with. What are we doing out there in terms of American manufacturing to try and get this going?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Senator, if I could. I appreciate the question, sir, but when I said 2005 I indicated to you that is what we were told at the time, and we have not accepted that either, sir. We are moving as fast as we can to get them quicker.

I did not know there was a discrepancy between what their capacity was and what we were buying, because I have been assured we are buying everything they can produce.

Senator KENNEDY. Will you check that?

Secretary BROWNLEE. I will, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. It is my understanding it is 118. 2,122 is the number that are being purchased with the 2003 and the 2004 money. I have the five different bills here—I mean the different quantities that are bought, and it is the 2,311. Why can they not—are they running their plant 24 hours a day? What is the situation?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Our understanding is, sir, they are operating at maximum capacity in that plant and we are moving to equip other lines within that plant.

Senator KENNEDY. It is inconceivable that, with our manufacturing capability, we cannot produce that kind of vehicle more rapidly and replace it.
Now, I asked—just to mention one other item in terms of Fort Stewart. I went down and took a trip to Fort Stewart and had a young serviceman speak to me down there about there being two medical personnel for 600 soldiers—I guess it is a variety of different health challenges, some injuries, some non-combat-related. But there were 600 of them.

When I was there, they said that they were going to have to wait for an orthopedist. A soldier with a cane said he was going to wait until after Thanksgiving—I was there probably a month ago—in order to get an operation. These were a series of different health challenges, of delays for these servicemen. They are really unthinkable in terms of today.

How do we know that there are not other Fort Stewarts around the country? What have you done to make sure? I know you have visited many of them.

Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes, sir. As soon as what was happening at Fort Stewart became apparent, we sent teams out from the Surgeon General’s office and Forces Command to examine all these other sites, report back, and recommend actions. We have moved medical assets, we have moved soldiers to where more medical assets are, and we have leased equipment. Some of the limiting factors were MRI and so we have taken steps to lease some of those machines, to reduce these bottlenecks.

You mentioned orthopedics. That was a bottleneck and we have either redistributed assets or gone on contract and hired other assets to try to reduce this bottleneck.

Senator KENNEDY. Can you give me what the waiting time is now in terms of these servicemen to get their kinds of activity? I will send you a note on that if I could, please.

Secretary BROWNLEE. Okay, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. The last item, and my time is just about up, and I know Senator Clinton is going to get into it, about closing these schools on these bases for the servicemen. We find that some of the best education that is taking place for young people in the country is on these base schools, and there is increasing anxiety among many of the children because of their parents being away for a long period of time. That is a factor and a force now.

With the anticipation that some of these schools may be closed down, can you give us what the considerations are? What do you need to keep these schools open? We have difficulty enough around here trying to fix things that are not working, but to get things that are working and knowing how important quality education is for these servicemen and women to know that they are getting the good education, what can you tell us about it, the current program as to the anticipated closing of these schools?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Senator, it is my understanding that no decision has been made on these yet, and the Army will make its case to try to keep these schools open. There may be some exceptions to that, but we agree with you. At a time our soldiers are deployed and their families are at these places, we think we need——

Senator KENNEDY. Who makes that decision? How far up? You will let me know who makes that decision?

Secretary BROWNLEE. I will, yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Do you know about when it is going to be made? You will let me know?
Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS) Transfer Study, begun 2 years ago, was structured to begin an analysis of individual DDESS and to document the benefits and costs of maintaining them on stateside installations. The design of the study went even further and projected costs and other impacts related to any possible future transfer of an individual school to its respective local education agency (LEA). Specific fiscal and nonfiscal data provided by each of the respective LEAs has been factored into the study. Quality of life issues, as well as student achievement data, have also been noted as a part of the transfer study.
To date, no decision has been made to make any changes to the 58 schools involved in the study. The Deputy Under Secretary for Defense for Military Community and Family Policy is currently reviewing the study.
Any decisions regarding the future of the schools will be made on the basis of the most deliberate, thoughtful consideration of all the data collected with significant weight given to the testimony of all interested parties. Decisions will be made on an individual school basis.
No action will be taken without sufficient notification to a school, community, or command. Notification of any changes would be provided at least 1 school year or more before any change(s) become effective. No specific timetable has been established for reaching the final decision.
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator.
Senator McCain.
Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schoomaker, my understanding is after this next rotation 40 percent of the troops in Iraq will be from the National Guard or Reserves. Is that true?
General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, that is approximate, but I think that is about right.
Senator McCaIN. How much do we need to increase Army end strength so that we do not have to rely on the Reserve component for nearly half our troop strength in a combat zone?
General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I am not sure I understand your question. How much do we have to increase the troop strength?
Senator Mccain. The regular Army, so we do not have to have nearly half our troop strength be Guard and Reserves.
General Schoomaker. 60 percent of our Army is Reserve components, 60 percent.
Senator McCAIN. Who are designed to perform combat roles for a year at a time.
General SCHOOMAKER. No, sir, they were designed to expand the Army——
Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, that is not what keeps Guard and Reserve people in the military, if you keep this kind of burden on them. You were talking about morale. I agree, their morale is good, they are ready to fight. They are not ready to stay in at this kind of deployment schedule. They might as well be in the regular Army.
You do not even have to reply to that. I know too many people that do—look, here is the problem. You mentioned that you were in an Army without morale. One of the reasons why the Army did not have good morale in the 1960s and the early 1970s is because the American people did not think they were doing the job and did not support them.
Here is your problem, General Schoomaker. A USA Today/CNN-Gallup poll asked, “Question: Do you approve of the way that the U.S. has handled the situation with Iraq since the major fighting ended?” On April 23, 80 percent of the American people approved, 18 percent disapproved. Today, 42 percent of the American people approve and 55 percent of the people disapprove.

That should concern you. That should concern you greatly, since you made reference to a previous time in the history of the Army. To me, it is directly related to the number of casualties that the American people see coming home. Those casualties are a result of our failure to address the problem as it existed last August, when I was over there and talked to so many people who said: “We need more troops in the Sunni triangle. We need more troops, and we need to combat that.”

I came back and said we need more troops. No, the commanders on the ground do not ask for it. What has happened since August? The numbers of improvised exploding device (IED) attacks on American troops, wounded American troops, and killed American troops are all up. There is no objective indicator that would show that things are improving in Iraq.

Now we have a new bombing campaign, which, according to The Washington Post, has a surreal quality to it: “Eager to avoid civilian casualties, U.S. officials have gone to great lengths to attack buildings, homes, and warehouses only when they are certain they are empty. In a few cases, they have even warned security guards to leave before bombing started. ‘I worry that blowing up empty buildings does not demonstrate our resolve or seriousness to the enemy,’ said retired General Richard Senrich, who plays the enemy in Pentagon war games.”

We need more troops of the right kind there. You and I in previous conversation agreed that intelligence was a prime requirement. If the people do not think you are staying, General, you are not going to get cooperation and good intelligence. At the time we announced the transfer of power to Iraqis, which I strongly support as far as the government is concerned, we announced troop drawdowns. Now, it does not fit.

I am worried as a believer—as one who is deeply concerned, because we have to win. We cannot afford to lose this conflict. But this absolute obstinacy to admit—your predecessor testified before this committee that we “need several hundred thousand troops to secure post-war Iraq.” His words seem to me more prescient almost every day.

So I would like to hear your rationale for how we are going to reverse the trends—those are facts, not opinions—the trends that have continued up as far as American casualties and the declining American support for what we are doing in Iraq are concerned.

General Schoomaker. First of all, I share your concern. I do not think it is my problem; I think it is our problem about what the American people think about this.

Senator McCain. I do not quite understand that answer, but go ahead.

General Schoomaker. I think it is the problem of all of us together to lead and explain and to——
Senator M. McCain. A lot of us have been trying to do that, General.

General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.

I would also like to tell you that—as you know, we have had this conversation—I am not running the war on Iraq. I am supporting the operational commander over there. We are doing everything that they ask us to do. I talk every week with the commanders on the ground over there about what they need and we are moving it. There has not been one commander that has told me they want more troops on the ground over there. The whole point is we are trying to reduce the exposure of our troops and to transition to an Iraqi face, an Iraqi handling of what is going on over there.

Now, there is no question that there are parts of Iraq that we need to surge troops into and there are parts of Iraq that may not need the number of troops that at earlier times were in there. That is up to those commanders on the ground and General Abizaid to figure out.

But the only thing that I can tell you is I share your concern about the will of the American people, and that is why I have made some of the statements I have here. This is important. This is not something that we can quit on. We have to win and we will. I am concerned that we are providing the warfighting command over there what they need.

Many of these issues that have been brought up here today are all the results of previous investment in this force. I mean, just Senator Kennedy’s question on the up-armored HMMWVs; we have moved all of the up-armored HMMWVs from everywhere else in the world into this place. It is not just what we are producing, it is what we are moving from everywhere else. The same principle applies to the issue that you have.

So in principle I do not disagree with you, but I am telling you that I cannot in full faith tell you that adding end strength to the United States Army at this time is the most important, pressing issue that we have. It is a long-term solution, it is an expensive solution, and it is not going to solve what we are doing right now.

Senator McCain. Thank you, General. But I continue to recommend an increase in marines, Special Forces, counterinsurgency, counterintelligence, and linguistic capabilities. I recommended it strongly in August. Things have deteriorated since by any objective viewpoint. You cannot wait forever. Otherwise the situation is going to turn very serious.

General Schoomaker. Sir, when we get in closed session perhaps we can re-address what you just spoke about there and perhaps you will feel better about some things.

Senator McCain. Unfortunately most Americans are not privy to those briefings.

Adnan Pachachi, a senior member of Iraq’s Governing Council (IGC), recently had this to say about all the talk coming from the administration about American troop withdrawals: “In the current security crisis, any talk of a withdrawal would swell the ranks of the insurgents.” I think we ought to pay attention to him.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator McCain.
It is fortunate that Senator McCain and others have the military experience that we can bring to bear on the historic perception of this conflict.

I fully recognize, General Schoomaker, that by laws of Congress—as Chief of Staff of the Army—while the American public thinks you are the number one, as you are in the eyes of every soldier, but again, with the decentralized command structure into the combatant commanders, the commander in Iraq, General Abizaid, who is a very competent soldier, is the one that has the primary responsibility with regard to the tactics deployed, together with his deputy, General Sanchez.

I just want to make it clear to those observing here, you are not ducking it. It is just you are properly putting the responsibility where it is, although you said clearly you talk to each of them weekly. I commend you.

Now, Senator Levin would like to have recognition. He made a comment earlier which he wishes to elaborate.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity.

I asked you a question before, General Schoomaker, about a comment by General Swannack that the Army was going to, “use a sledgehammer to smash a walnut.” I have reread the entire article and I think he probably was saying that that was the right thing to do, he approved that as a policy. I may have suggested that he had a question about it, whereas I was raising the question as to whether that is the correct policy and the correct rhetoric or whether or not that fuels the insurgency and gives a propaganda handle to those that we are fighting.

I asked you if you would call him about it and that is fine. But would you also then call General Abizaid relative to that approach and that comment.

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. I do appreciate the opportunity to clarify the record, if necessary, but at least the implication that he was apparently questioning the wisdom of doing that—whereas I was raising the question about the wisdom of that policy and that rhetoric in these counterinsurgency circumstances that we find ourselves.

Thank you very much.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Levin.

For the benefit of the Members, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld will be before the Senate again in closed session today and I think that is a very appropriate issue that we should raise with him, because I think many of us are concerned about the tactics. Not that we are critics of it, but we would just like to have a greater explanation as to how these substantially revised tactics are or are not being successful and the long-term implication on the ability of the Iraqi people to come and work more closely with not only our troops but to form their own government eventually.

Senator LEVIN. Is this a “winning hearts and minds” approach.

Chairman WARNER. Yes.

Senator Ben Nelson.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just as a point of reminder, in the Defense Authorization Bill we included, coming from the Personnel Subcommittee, language ask-
ing the military to develop a policy with husband and wife deployments. We found there is not really an official policy and we have asked for one recognizing that under the current circumstances, with the heavy use of Reserve and Guard component parts, that would be an important thing to deal with.

So, Senator Allard, it is officially being requested, and we would plan to follow up on that.

I appreciate the witnesses being here today and being so candid with respect to a number of very sensitive issues: force protection in terms of the right equipment, the right armor for equipment, the right armor for body protection. I received a call about a week ago from a parent concerned about his son, who is a scout conducting house to house searches. His concern about safety was whether or not he was being provided with the right body protection equipment.

Apparently he is wearing Kevlar and there are some soldiers that are wearing a composite body armor which provides even more protection. My response to him will be that by the end of December we should have that kind of body armor protection.

It would seem to me, though, that if you are going from house to house, where you face hand-to-hand combat, that perhaps those soldiers would be in the first priority to have that kind of composite protection now, not by the end of December.

Secretary Brownlee?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Sir, I am surprised if he does not have it. If he is performing the kind of mission you just described, he should have it and I am surprised that he says he does not, because we have been assured that those people do. So I will be happy to check into more detail.

Senator BEN NELSON. Obviously you cannot take care of each individual case, but each individual case can result in a casualty, and that is why they are all important. So I would appreciate your checking that and I will get back to him and explain to him what the military is doing to provide that kind of protection.

The issue of morale does come up and has come up. Having been in Iraq earlier this year, this summer, meeting with troops, I can say that the morale was high. Their concerns were also high about deployments, about rotation, about leave. Many of those issues have been addressed. I know, General Schoomaker, we talked about it prior to your confirmation. It appears that you are on the road to finding solutions that will not only put some sort of termin- nal point on deployments so that they can know, but so that they are aware of it as they go in, because I think that was really running a tremendous risk of harming troop morale.

But still, multiple deployments, even if you know the point of ter- mination of that deployment, creates a morale problem back home for reservists and for Guard families. When the family is not happy, it is hard for anybody to be happy in the service of their country because of their obligations that are continuing.

I hope that this will be a boost towards transformation, getting the right mix, as you say, of Guard and Reserve personnel as part of the regular fighting machine, so that we are not having to rely on those folks who are not signing up to be part of the Active-Duty
Force, but find themselves in some cases for longer deployments, more multiple deployments, than the active duty.

If it does not become a major morale problem, as I think it will, at the very least it becomes a recruitment and retention problem that will be something we have to deal with. It is perhaps appropriate that there are bumper stickers going around—I will clean up the language, but it is a bumper sticker saying: “One weekend a month my foot.” I think we are all aware that people will assume obligations and they will fight for their country, but we have an obligation to keep the responsibilities and the commitments we have made with respect to reservists and guardsmen that they not become part of the active duty.

Finally, I might mention something that I have found, personally. Seven Nebraskans have been casualties in Iraq and my office was only sent written notification in three of those cases. In the remaining cases we had to seek out the information from the Pentagon. In some cases, two to be exact, we had to contact the base where they had been stationed directly.

It is awkward to call the families to find out the details. We would prefer to find it through the ordinary chain of command and through the Office of Protocol. What we would like, if it is at all possible, is not only to make sure that that is happening right for Nebraska, but it is happening right for the other States, because I am sure my colleagues are all experiencing some of this themselves.

So thank you for your presence here and I perhaps did more of the talking than you got an opportunity to respond back. But if there is anything you would like to say, my time has expired, but I am sure they would extend the courtesy to get a response.

Secretary Brownlee. Senator, I would say only that we share the concerns you described, especially in notification of families and loved ones. That is very high on our list. Sometimes the media gets in front of us on this because of the nature of communications these days. As General Schoomaker and I can tell you, in the military sometimes—most of the time the first reports are incomplete or inaccurate. So we try to get complete and accurate information before we make these very critical notifications. Sometimes that takes longer than any of us are comfortable with and sometimes the media does get in front of us. But we share your concern on that.

General Schoomaker. Yes, sir. I would like to just add—and I support what the Secretary said and we will follow up on this, the information piece. But you raise a good question and I think it goes back to something I was trying to allude to earlier. We have what we have in terms of Active, Guard, and Reserve Forces. The question is, do we have the relevant force for what this Nation needs to do?

If we were unconstrained and we were able to use our imagination, we could probably come up with many alternatives to the kind of construct that we have right now. But we have what we have, and this is what we invested in. We have as much body armor as we have because that is what we invested in. We have the amount of HMMWVs because that is what we invested in. We have Reserve and active expectations because that is what we built.
But the big question is, what is the requirement for this Nation in the future? If our current construct is inadequate, then I think we have a shared responsibility to figure out how we are going to transform and change the expectations and determine what it is we are going to use the Armed Forces for. I think it is as simple as that. As simple as it is, it is a huge issue.

So part of what I face with the Army—and it is a great Army; it is the greatest Army in the world. But the question is, is it as great as it needs to be, as it should be, and is it as relevant to today's operational requirement and tomorrow's requirement as what it needs to be? That is the issue that is before us. The kinds of solutions that we could imagine are huge and expensive, and I think it is an issue that we have to think about on this.

So I just appreciate the opportunity to respond, because I think how you think about it depends on where you get on this train. The purpose of this Army is to meet the needs of the Nation. If the needs of the Nation change and the means that we have are insufficient, then we have to take a look at a different way of meeting the needs, because I do not think we have the option of ignoring some of the needs of the Nation just because it is inconvenient for certain people and their expectations are not being met on things.

So that is why I read this Soldier's Creed. It says the mission is first.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Senator, we thank you. That is a very important line of questioning.

I listened very carefully and I respect your responses. In today's world of instant warfare, attack from sectors that we knew not, lack of state sponsors in most instances, we have to reach onto the shelf and take what is there. So I urge each of you in your fulfillment of your responsibilities to try and look into that future and come to Congress and say: "Look, this could happen and we want to put some of this new high tech equipment on the shelf now for our successors to have in place."

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, we all want the same thing.

Chairman WARNER. Good.

General SCHOOMAKER. There is no question about it.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have enjoyed this hearing and I think it has been very informative.

General Schoomaker, I really appreciate your remarks about the morale of our soldiers. The retention and recruitment is solid across the board, really above our goals. When I meet with soldiers I find they are committed. I was with Private First Class (PFC) Chris Busby from Valley Head. His brother was with the military police (MP), he is an MP, his daddy was an MP. He is 20 years old. I said: "Why did you join?" He said: "Well, after September 11 I thought I ought to do something for my country." He took a serious injury in the lower leg.

A friend of mine's son, Sergeant Larry Gill, was injured in a Beirut bombing as a marine, now in the National Guard 1165th MP unit out of Fairhope, with another serious leg injury. He wants to stay in. Both of them want to stay in.
I was with a lieutenant colonel I met at Walter Reed. He had a serious leg injury. I asked him how his soldiers felt as they moved about the streets, how concerned were they. I think he misinterpreted me. He said: “They are not concerned, sir; they are warriors. They are prepared to serve their country and they are not worried about their personal safety.”

All of them made me feel good about it. Also, as a former Army reservist for 10 years, I would just say these soldiers, these Guard and Reserves, they deserve our admiration and thanks. They are heroes. They do not need to be looked at as victims. Their families all are suffering to some degree, but they are patriots also and they are serving and they are proud to serve, and we ought to be proud that 40 percent of the missions in Iraq are being filled by Guard and Reserve capably. Everybody I asked over there said there is no problem, no falloff in capability.

The MP units that were there, almost half of them were police officers and State troopers back home with many years of experience in law enforcement. I do not think a young PFC can be as effective on the streets of Baghdad as a 40-year-old State trooper can be, whatever their rank. So we are doing a lot of good things there and I am really, really proud of our Guard and Reserve.

Alabama has the highest number of Guard people in the theater, or ordered for deployment, of any State in the Union, and we are proud of them and their service.

I would just say, General Schoomaker, you commanded the Delta Force, you have commanded Special Operations Forces. I guess my question to you, a little bit along with Senator McCain’s comments on intelligence, Special Operations Forces, and the ability to work with indigenous personnel—do we need more Special Forces? What plans do you have in the transforming of our Army to have more people with the kind of capabilities that would fit in Iraq?

So my first question is: Do the Special Forces capabilities that our people have, are they the right mix for a situation like Iraq and do we need more and do you have plans for more?

General Schoomaker. Sir, we are moving and, first of all, let me say that the Special Forces belong to the commander in chief of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and I support him in terms of his structure. As part of our transformation, we are moving end strength or authorizations into SOCOM for a variety of things, not only the way we are organized in Special Forces, but the psychological operations forces, civil affairs forces, and the other capabilities that he has within that command.

I think it would probably more appropriately be put to General Brown down at SOCOM in terms of whether or not he has enough and what his structure is, because I would be speaking from a position of 2000 when I retired.

Senator Sessions. In your vision for the transformed military, it seems to me that we have proven the validity of the Special Forces in places such as Afghanistan.

General Schoomaker. No question, no question.

Senator Sessions. What a remarkable development that was.

General Schoomaker. I think we have moved, and of course I go back to the bad old days of the post-Vietnam kind of dip in our Special Forces. I am extraordinarily proud of where we have
brought not only the Special Forces but the entire Special Operations capability of this Nation to where we sit today. Congress, with the Cohen-Nunn amendment, quite frankly, ought to take a great deal of credit for their foresight in helping create a unified command to have the kind of force that we have today, and you ought to be proud of that, because I certainly am.

But I think one of the things we have seen here in this last several years is the absolute viability of the construct of Special Operations Forces in concert with conventional forces, in concert with our allies and in concert with the interagency, in terms of what the power of that is. You take a look at Afghanistan and you think about the degree of success that relatively few people had, you are talking about captains and sergeants who won that war. There were not big general headquarters and all that stuff over there. These are captains and sergeants operating at the extreme end. Some of those insertions were 900 miles one way to put those teams in. They are operating and achieving extraordinary results, the force multiplier factor working with the Northern Alliance forces and the other indigenous forces.

So I think it has demonstrated its viability, and the integration of other joint capabilities into that force. So if you are asking me do I think that there is a future there, I think there is a huge future there and I think there is lots that we will be doing as we transform our force to leverage that capability, integrate it, and understand how we can work better with it, and how we can leverage some of those ideas into the conventional force. That is what we are doing.

Senator Sessions. General, I appreciate your leadership and I am glad that you understand this as well as or better than any person who has held your position.

Secretary Brownlee, I did meet with some of the top Guard and Reserve officers recently. I was pleased to hear that they had not only had positive support from Secretary Rumsfeld, but that he was positively insistent that we do a better job of utilizing our Guard and Reserve, that the mobilization process be not too prolonged, that demobilization be shortened, that their concerns be dealt with, that there be the right mix in the Guard and Reserve.

I suppose that you share those views?

Secretary Brownlee. Oh, yes, sir. We are working on all that, sir. Again, we would like to achieve a standard of perfection here. Last year when some of these dips in morale occurred, it was because we had uncertainty in the length of the tour. That is one of the reasons we moved to establish a 12-month boots-on-the-ground for both active and Reserve components in accordance with the combatant commanders’ desires and also to ensure that there was predictability for both the soldiers and their families.

Senator Sessions. Two things I think I heard: They want to know when they are coming home and what their time limit is, and you have made progress on that.

Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.

Senator Sessions. Second, when they are deployed they want to do important work.

Secretary Brownlee. Oh, yes, sir.
Senator SESSIONS. If they feel like the work is not important—so that is my advice. My time is up.

General SCHOOMAKER. Senator, could I add real quick here?

Senator SESSIONS. Yes.

General SCHOOMAKER. I think we have a 99-percent solution to this issue of certainty, but I would be remiss if I did not just make it known right now that circumstances could change that would cause us to have to change again. I can envision circumstances where we would have to tell people that we told are going to be out there 12 months that they are going to be there longer. I think that is just reality.

Senator SESSIONS. I think that is fair enough. We hope that does not happen.

General SCHOOMAKER. I do, too. But I just do not think that we ought to cut off the possibility. I think we have a 99-percent solution. I hope it is a 100-percent solution.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator, for bringing up that point, because this hearing is being broadcast to our troops at some time in the future and they wish to know that we on this committee are very conscious about the rotation policy and their families.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen. First, Secretary Brownlee, let me endorse your response to Senator Kennedy about the value of military schools on posts. I think these proposals are generated by people who understand the cost of everything and the value of nothing. I cannot think of anything that would be more disruptive to morale and the quality of life than to return from Iraq or return from Afghanistan and find that the elementary schools your children are attending have been closed. So good luck.

General Schoomaker, I would like to return to the issue of end strength. You quite rightly pointed out to Senator McCain that you are not responsible for the configuration or the size of the forces in Iraq, but you are the principal responsible for the size of the Army. I found it stunning in your response to Senator Warner that, while the Senate amendment would increase end strength by 10,000, you indicated you are already 20,000 over authorized end strength. That would barely be legal. In fact, today I would suspect that—well, let me ask: Is the end strength of the Army today over the authorized limits?

General SCHOOMAKER. We have on active duty today, as a result of our stop-loss, stop-move, about 500,000 soldiers on active duty.

Senator REED. As I understand, the new authorization is 496,872, if my math is right. But let us say 496,000. So you are already over the authorized strength even with the change in the law recently?

General SCHOOMAKER. Why do you not let me take that for the record, if you want to get down to the individual numbers. I am talking in order of magnitude.

[The information referred to follows:]

The projected fiscal year 2004 end strength, based on January 2004 data, is 500,600, which is 18,200 over the National Defense Authorization Act allowed end strength of 482,400. This includes a projected stop loss population of 6,600.
Senator Reed. I understand, sir. But I think essentially that is what I find difficult to understand. This is not a situation where you are below your authorized end strength and we want to give you more. You are already over and we just simply want to make you legal in some respects. Why are we being opposed?

General Schoomaker. What I was trying to demonstrate is there is cushion in the system for lots of things, and part of what we are trying to do is make sure that we are getting all that we are now paying for out of this force. As we are exploring this there is ample evidence that there is a huge piece of this force, a significant piece of this force, that is unavailable to us and could be made available before we come to you and ask for the kind of money it takes to sustain.

By the way, if we can make this piece of the force available to us now, it will help us now. Building end strength for the future, we may not have the problem we have now in the future. That is what I am concerned about.

Senator Reed. Well, let me respond. I see your point, General, but everything I hear, both from General Pace a few days ago up in Boston at a speech he gave, and everyone around this table, says we are in for the long term. This is a generational struggle, and it is not just about Iraq. It could be other places. So this notion—I think what you are doing is some ad hoc, short-term adjustments to try to squeeze some more troops out. As I understand it, there is a 12-percent rate for trainees, transients, holdees, and students (TTHS), which is the schooling and training and everything else.

But in the long term, if we are going to stay the course we are going to need more soldiers, I think. I commend you for trying to find troops within your current force structure, but unless our laws are just hortatory you are violating the law right now, as I read it.

General Schoomaker. I do not think so, but if we are we will correct ourselves. I think that it depends on when you measure it, and we will get into the numbers.

But what I am not telling you is that we will never need more soldiers in the United States Army. What I am telling you is that what we are doing right now is informing ourselves as to how much better we can do with what we have, and we ought to do that first. I could very well be back here next spring and tell you that we need more end strength because we see a different picture than we see right now.

Senator Reed. Let me ask in that vein, when do you estimate that you will be back here to tell us that you have solved what looks to be a 20,000 personnel problem, or on that magnitude? When will you be back, General?

General Schoomaker. As I have said, I still think that we will be back here probably in the spring with posture statements that will say where we think we are. That could very well be part of where we think we are. So I think that this transition we are going to go through this spring between January and April, let us say, as we have discussed, and what we will know about where we are going is going to inform us considerably about what we think we are going to have to have.
It is just not an end strength problem. It is this whole issue of what is the role of the Guard and Reserve, what is their availability going to be to us, what should our internal structure be, and are we really structured to do the kind of warfare that we need to be conducting in the future.

Senator REED. In that light, let me ask a question. How far out are you planning rotations for Iraq? A year out? Two years out?

General SCHOOMAKER. Inside the Army, we are planning the rotation for the third rotation, a year out from where we are. We are looking even deeper in case we have to go to a fourth rotation.

Senator REED. In the third or fourth rotation, are you going to be using National Guard units that have already had one tour in Iraq?

General SCHOOMAKER. It depends on what the situation is over there. If it is required, we will be calling them up.

Senator REED. Again, I think it goes back to one of the themes that Secretary McCain echoed. That is that we all recognize—I have two MP companies and they have already had three killed in action (KIA) and several wounded in action (WIA), and they are proud and they are doing a great job, but coming back with the idea they are going in another year or 18 months is not exactly what a Reserve component or National Guard soldier anticipates.

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir.

Senator REED. My time has expired.

Chairman WARNER. Senator, that was a very interesting exchange. I made a quick check and they are, in a time of war, able to go 3 percent, and I guess that is 3 percent of the base force. A quick calculation would say, just as the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island mentioned, I think you are over the 3 percent. We have instructed our bipartisan staff now to take a look at this very important question which you raise.

Your statement that you are planning the third and fourth rotations I do not believe should be interpreted as an omen that we are going to be there. It is just prudent planning that you must do.

General SCHOOMAKER. That is correct.

Chairman WARNER. We all have high expectations that the current policies of the President will involve greater and greater numbers of the Iraqis in all aspects of the turnover of their nation back to their hands.

Senator Clinton.

Senator CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing. After the recent reports from Fort Stewart, as well as reports about body armor and then the survey that appeared in Stars and Stripes about the condition of morale, I and others requested that you do this, and I appreciate very much—

Chairman WARNER. Senator, you were among the first that came to me and suggested that we move swiftly on this.

Senator CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. I thank you for your participation.

Senator CLINTON. I could not agree more with our witnesses, who have described this as a test of will that we cannot lose. I also wholly endorse the description of our men and women in uniform as indispensable and performing selfless service.
I want to focus for a minute on the disconnect that I think sometimes seems to appear between what I know is our commitment to our soldiers and some of the statements and proposed policies that come out of DOD, particularly out of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). This issue about schools is one that I take very seriously, because we have an All-Volunteer Force and one that I think deserves all of our support, and their families are also volunteers and they too deserve the support of a grateful Nation.

In addition to the threatened school closings, which were announced out of the blue as a possible action, we recently heard about some potential commissary closings abroad and at home. I recently received a copy of a memorandum from General B.B. Bell, the commanding general of the U.S. Army Europe and the Seventh Army, raising very strong objections to the proposed commissary closures in Germany.

In addition to the specifics that he addressed with respect to transportation difficulties, weather difficulties, and the like, he said: “The war is very, very real to our European-based families. I believe we owe it to our soldiers to provide compassionate care and service to their families while the soldiers are deployed in harm’s way. Seeking relatively minor fiscal efficiencies through reduced services and loss of benefits in this overseas environment during a war erodes the commitment we have made to the total force.”

I could not endorse that more strongly. I would ask unanimous consent that this memo from General Bell be included in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Commissary Closures in Germany

1. I have reviewed the proposed four Germany commissary closures (Idar-Oberstein, Neubrücke, Panzer Kaserne, and Kelly Barracks) and in the strongest terms submit my heartfelt objection to each. To close these facilities which are operated for local military families, at a time when military sponsors are deployed to hostile fire environments, in my view approaches the unbelievable. To date 38 USAREUR soldiers have made the ultimate sacrifice serving in Iraq while nearly 500 Purple Hearts have been awarded to USAREUR soldiers for wounds received in action. This war is very, very real to our European-based families. I believe we owe it to our soldiers to provide compassionate care and service to their families while the soldiers are deployed in harm’s way. Seeking relatively minor fiscal efficiencies through reduced services and loss of benefits in this overseas environment during a war erodes the commitment we have made to the total force.

2. Commissaries are particularly important overseas. Local exchange rates, foreign languages, unfamiliar food products, and dangerous roads all contribute to limiting the number of acceptable, alternative locations to shop for groceries. Sales at the four commissaries identified for closure have held steady over the past 2 years, despite numerous and repeated deployments by local military units. Overall, costs in relation to sales have also been lowered over the past 2 years, with the total number of employees at each commissary ranging from only three to five people. These are small operations, but are immensely important to those who shop there.

3. The Idar-Oberstein and Neubrücke commissaries are located at remote housing areas and are 20 minutes away from the nearest larger commissary in Baumholder. The roads to Baumholder are narrow, full of curves, and subject to harsh winter conditions. Public transportation, both Army and host-nation, is either limited or nonexistent. Many families have one or no car available and would have to struggle to get to and from the Baumholder commissary. Furthermore, the local commissaries overseas become gathering places for neighbors to meet and support one another by exchanging war-related information and concerns, thereby providing a place for them to reassure one another during this time of uncertainty and fear for the safety of their loved ones.

4. Panzer Kaserne and Kelly Barracks have small commissaries employing only five workers each, and are located 20 to 30 minutes away from the nearest large commissary at Patch Barracks. The Patch Barracks commissary is already hampered by a severe lack of parking and could not reasonably be expected to absorb the additional shoppers from Panzer and Kelly. The parking problem has become so bad that the Commandant, USEUCOM, has initiated plans to move the PX and commissary from Patch Barracks to Panzer Kaserne. It therefore makes no sense to close any of the commissaries in the Stuttgart community until the plans for these moves have been finalized and executed.

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ABACG
SUBJECT: Commissary Closures in Germany

5. Again, I am asking the decision-makers not to close these four commissaries in Germany. Please take whatever measures are necessary and feasible to postpone what would only be viewed as an erosion of the commitment of our nation to embrace military families who are making personal sacrifices and demonstrating extraordinary commitment during this time of war.

B. B. BELL
General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
Charles S. Abell, Principal Deputy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of the Army (M&RA)
Chief of Staff of the Army
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Director, Defense Commissary Agency, Europe
Director, Installation Management Agency, Europe
Deputy Commander, United States European Command

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Senator CLINTON. In this memo he specifically talks about Germany, but apparently the proposal goes much further. I know, for example, in my own State they are talking about closing a commissary in Scotia, New York, and closing the school at West Point. For the life of me, I do not understand this, and I do not believe it is coming from the professional military. I believe it is coming
from the planners and policymakers in the Department, and particularly again in the OSD.

So I would hope, both Secretary Brownlee and General Schoomaker, that you would make the strongest possible objections on behalf of these ill-advised proposals.

I recently paid a call on one of the teachers from the West Point school and learned that General Lennox, now the Superintendent, made very clear that this is a recruiting and retention device for our All-Volunteer Force. So these potential closings are of concern to me as the Senator from New York, but also far beyond that, as a member of this committee looking at how we are going not only to continue the end force we need, whatever it is decided we need, but also to take care of the families of those who I think will be rather continuously deployed around the world in the missions that we are going to be asking them to do.

So this is a wrong message to send. It is hard to justify when we just appropriated $87 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq and the biggest defense appropriations we have ever had in the history of our country that we would be undermining the quality of life of our soldiers and their families.

So I have joined with Senators Kennedy, Leahy, and Murray in writing directly to Secretary Rumsfeld, asking him to desist from taking any of these actions that would cut essential military benefits, and I would also ask unanimous consent that that letter be included in the record as well.

Chairman WARNER. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]
United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

November 6, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon, Room 3E880
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

We were taken aback by a recent news report in The Army Times which cites plans by the Department of Defense to close military base commissaries and schools. Congress has indicated its interest in providing for our men and women in uniform by providing health insurance access for all members of the Guard and Reserve. A decision to scale back schools and commissaries would be an incredible blow to military families and retirees who spent their careers serving our nation. We hope you will reconsider this policy.

Under the plans that were promulgated from your office, the military services have been ordered to close 19 commissaries across the country. The August 29 memorandum from The Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness indicated that another 19 could be closed in the coming year. We also understand that the Department is considering closing more than 50 schools in bases across the nation.

Closing commissaries would considerably undermine the morale and welfare of these troops and their families. These facilities allow service members access to essential goods and service, often at bases in locations that are remote and far from other stores. We are concerned that the Department did not follow its own criteria in reviewing the efficiency of these facilities.

Department of Defense domestic elementary and secondary schools provide high quality education. Closing these schools would force the sons and daughters of our military personnel to commute long distances to attend schools that may not have the capacity to absorb the DOD student population. Our men and women in uniform have enough to worry about in Iraq, without throwing their children’s education into chaos.
Senator CLINTON. I would ask both of you, will you support these efforts to keep benefits like these available for our soldiers and their families? Mr. Secretary?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Senator, we certainly feel the strongest sense of responsibility toward our families. We have not yet had a chance to engage on these issues, but I certainly agree with you on the importance of taking care of families. I was deployed twice in a combat theater and I can remember myself and most soldiers saying: “We will do anything they ask as long as they take care of our families.”

Senator CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

General?

General SCHOOMAKER. Senator, I think it is a great point. I would like to just say again what—I think we had this conversation in your office. My father was in the Army for 32 years. I grew up in the Army. I am going on my fourth decade in the Army myself. I have a brother who has been in the Army 25 years, and happens to command a hospital down at Fort Gordon. I have a daughter that is in her second year right now in Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and went through jump school last August.

So I think of the Army with a big footprint. I mean, this is not something that is just academic to me. It goes back to the question that I think I answered earlier: “What kind of volunteer Army do we have and what do we have to do to have it?” I think that the issues that you are raising here are central to having the kind of Army that we want to have.

So I will tell you that not only do I support things like commissaries and medical benefits and all of these, but I support everything we need to do to incentivize the very top quality force that we can have. I think it is absolutely important for this Nation to do that, because we are going to go to war with what we have the day that the war starts and you cannot make up for that after we have the emergency.

I am sorry to go a little long in my answer, but this is more than academic as far as I am concerned.
Senator CLINTON. I appreciate that very much, General. That is very heartening and I know it comes from your heart and that means a lot.

I would just add, Mr. Chairman, that I think as we move forward with many of the plans and recommendations that will be presented to us starting in the spring about further transformational ideas and the like, that we need to keep the personnel in the middle of this, that the individual soldier or the individual family is not some ancillary aspect of this transformational approach.

I sometimes worry about some of the things that are said and some of the other moves that, frankly, were made at the highest levels to hold down growth in pay and benefits, to stand against efforts to fix the problems with charging wounded soldiers for their meals, and things that just made no sense in the great scheme of things fiscally and morally. We keep this in mind. Your words will certainly be a good beacon to lead us in that way.

I thank you, General.

Chairman WARNER. Senator, the letter that you made reference to and your important questions this morning underscore the role of Congress as a coequal branch in working with the executive branch, which is the DOD. We have our own views. We draw on our own military experience, as in the case of Senator McCain. In your case, you are concerned about the schooling, which is just as important as whether or not, in many respects, the equipment works.

Now, I would like to take just a minute to ask a question which I think should be included in your response to the Senator. Having worked in the Pentagon over 5 years myself in the Navy secretariat, someone made that decision. Did you just awaken some day and a memo came across your desk? Was the Department of the Army consulted? Were you involved in the decision process by which these reductions in the commissaries and the schooling were made?

In my day we were very much involved in it. When this committee eventually gets around to looking at the Goldwater-Nichols Act and revising it, I think more authority has to be restored to the secretariats and the chiefs of staff. That is just a sidebar, a little warning to filter across the horizon, because I am going to be here a lot longer, thank God, than a lot of those folks over there. We have to look at this.

Now, in response to the question, how was the decision made and was the Department of the Army involved?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Senator, I will check. I do not think a decision has been made yet. I think there are people who have gone out and assessed and have made recommendations at some level, but nobody has told me a decision has been made on this.

Chairman WARNER. All right. General, do you have any further information?

General SCHOOMAKER. I received General Bell's memo 2 days ago and that is what alerted me to the thing. I agree with the Secretary. I think that basically what we are in are the throes of evaluation. I am certainly not involved in it directly.

Chairman WARNER. I think that maybe your letter is most timely, Senator. I know you prepare very carefully for your questions.
Do you have any knowledge that you could share as to how the decision was made, or is it a final decision?

Senator CLINTON. Mr. Chairman, I think that it is one of those decisions that is floated out there and everybody is waiting to see whether it stays airborne or falls with a great thump, and we are hoping it falls with a great thump.

Chairman WARNER. You might have punctured it a little bit.

Senator CLINTON. I hope so.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much for your oversight responsibilities being fully fulfilled.

Now, Senator Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, welcome back to the committee, to your home.

Secretary BROWNLEE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator BILL NELSON. General Schoomaker, it is good to see you again.

I am going to bring, Mr. Chairman, my experience to the table here and, having visited——

Chairman WARNER. Do not be modest. It is rather extensive.

Senator BILL NELSON. You are very kind, Mr. Chairman. I am talking about a more recent experience visiting with a number of the families of the Florida National Guard and talking with a number of the soldiers. I would be in the middle of a meeting with the families, and suddenly they would walk up to me with a cell phone and I am suddenly talking to their loved one from the field over in Iraq.

Of course, the policy question that I came to the table with I have already discussed with General Schoomaker, the Secretary of Defense, and General Abizaid when he was here. He noted that the 124th is one of the best and that is why they wanted to keep them.

Of course, I was arguing for the first in, first out policy.

So we have been around and around on all of this, and again I want to say for these families that they are as proud of their loved ones and they are as patriotic as anybody. But they would like to have some certainty, given the constraints of the needs of the combatant commander.

Now, that is preparatory to what I am about to ask the two of you. At the end of October, the Florida Adjutant General, the head of the Florida National Guard, in a press release based on a conversation that he had with a senior member of the Army, issued the dates for the departures from Southwest Asia: the Second Battalion—this is of the 124th—February 10; Third Battalion, February 20; the First Battalion on March 11.

Of course, I am trying to find out some certainty for these families. So we called the Army Congressional Liaison Office and we were told different dates. We were told the Second Battalion indeed was February 10th, but we were told the Third Battalion and the First Battalion's departure dates would be about a month later.

Of course, as you can imagine this is still never-never land for the families. So what is the theater commander's decision for the withdrawal of the battalions from the 124th? That is the question.

Secretary BROWNLEE. Sir, my understanding is the policy is not more than 12 months boots-on-the-ground. I do not know the specific dates for those battalions. I do know of the concern there.
Based primarily on your concern, I made sure that the last time I was in Iraq, which was the end of September, that I arranged a meeting with some of the people from the battalion that was nearest to Baghdad. Unfortunately, they changed my schedule and it looked like I was not going to get to see them. When I suddenly realized it, I returned to Baghdad to see them, and I had a very good meeting with them.

I just have to take the time to say, Senator, I could not have been more impressed by these soldiers. They clearly have many reasons why they would want to go home—economic, family, and other things. But they are a wonderful group of committed and dedicated people who are doing a great job for their country. I just have to tell you that I have described these kinds of people, both active and Reserve, as another great generation we have here.

But I will just have to get it for the record, Senator. I promise you we will try to clear up the misunderstanding.

[The information referred to follows:]

An exact redeployment timeline for the units of the 124th Infantry (Florida Army National Guard) has not yet been established by the theater commander. Additionally, the enemy situation and transportation availability may disrupt any schedule once established. However, in accordance with the current policy of 12 months “Boots-on-the-Ground,” the 1st Battalion will redeploy by March 6, 2004. The 2nd Battalion will redeploy by February 10, 2004, and the 3rd Battalion will redeploy by February 18, 2004. The units will redeploy to Fort Stewart, Georgia.

Senator Bill Nelson. If you will, because there is this uncertainty out there and, save for the combatant commander making a change because he needs a change, there is a date. But we cannot get a date. So can you get us an answer?

Secretary Brownlee. We will, yes, sir. We will get you a date to the extent we are able to get a date from the combatant commander. But I can tell you that the policy is that troops will not serve more than 1 year boots-on-the-ground. The point was made earlier, we have continually insisted with the combatant commander that if a unit finishes its mission and is no longer needed, it may return.

Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Mr. Secretary, when you get that date for me, would you also get an idea of when the actual orders will be cut by the subordinate commanders for them to plan and begin the handover of their units? Would you also give me an idea of when those particular units would arrive back in Fort Stewart?

Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir, to the extent I can do that. I am sure you understand, some of this is dependent on transportation and other things. But I will get you the best information I can, Senator.

Senator Bill Nelson. What I have is a variance of 1 month on two of the battalions.

General Schoomaker. If I could, we have been over this, you and I, a bunch. I think, for the broader audience here, what we need to do is make sure that everybody understands the context of what we are talking about here. The 53rd Separate Infantry Brigade, headquartered in Florida, of which the three battalions of the 124th are part of, were deployed differently than what almost everybody else was deployed for. They were mobilized at an early
time and had a period before deployment that in some cases was too long.

They were then deployed, not as the 124th or as the 53rd, but as companies, to places outside of Iraq to guard things, like Patriots. They were then at a later date aggregated and brought into the combat zone. The conversations that we have had asks the question, when does the time start? The time started when they were brought into Iraq, not when they were in Kuwait, not when they were in Tajikistan and all these other places.

So the 12 months boots-on-the-ground policy began when they were committed into Iraq. It is unfortunate because, I will tell you, they are great soldiers and the families are great families. But they have been through a different experience than what the main force has been through over there.

I am a little reluctant to tell you, other than 12 months boots-on-the-ground from when they arrived in country. The transportation time will be there, and then they are going to get leave. They are authorized leave for the time they have been on active duty, and they will continue to remain mobilized and paid during the time that they are on leave. They then have demobilization time and then they have to return to their families.

Anybody that has a medical problem in there will be dealt with under the same kinds of constructs that we have on the others. So the precision to which you want this answer, I think it is unfair for me to tell you that I can give you that much precision. I can tell you the policy is 12 months boots-on-the-ground in Iraq and that, unless General Abizaid has a pressing need to extend them, that our intention is to make sure that the Florida Guard is right there in the front of our minds to get them out, because they have been dealt a little tougher row to hoe as a result of having been involved through that tenuous time that I described there.

So I am sorry to go a little long, but I think we have to set the right context here because it is different than it is for everybody else.

Senator Bill Nelson. Setting the context, you used the word “unfair.” It certainly, General, is not unfair if orders have been cut under an announced policy that a date would be given so that the families would know when they are to be exiting the theater. That is not unfair.

General Schoomaker. No, sir, I did not say “unfair.” The point I was trying to make is the way they were introduced in the theater was fragmented and so to talk about it as a whole is difficult. What we are trying to do is to give you what you want——

Senator Bill Nelson. Since they were fragmented, what is the policy? Will you fragment out certain companies on their return date? Or do they come back as a whole unit, as a battalion?

General Schoomaker. Obviously even battalions move in fragments because that is the way we transport them. Unless they are on a ship, they generally do not all fit on the same transportation. What we are looking at right now is the first unit that went in there from the 124th, because that is the one we are going to try to move first to get them out of there. They may very well come out of there a little bit early.

[The information referred to follows:]
An exact redeployment timeline for the units of the 124th Infantry (Florida Army National Guard) has not yet been established by the theater commander. Additionally, the enemy situation and transportation availability may disrupt any schedule once established. However, in accordance with the current policy of 12 months “Boots-on-the-Ground,” the 1st Battalion will redeploy by March 6, 2004. The 2nd Battalion will redeploy by February 10, 2004, and the 3rd Battalion will redeploy by February 18, 2004. The units will redeploy to Fort Stewart, Georgia.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, that was Charlie Company of the Second Battalion that went into Iraq before the war started. They were in western Iraq with the Special Operations troops doing clandestine things.

General SCHOOMAKER. That I do not know. That is not the conversation that we had before. That is somebody’s allegation. That is not a fact that I know. We do know that you had a company that was in Jordan securing a Special Operations headquarters. But I do not know that anybody was introduced to Iraq.

I would be glad to deal with this in specifics and we certainly will get you the answer. If that was the case, then we will deal with it. But that is not the information that I have.

Senator BILL NELSON. That is why I bring it up. In fact, that is a fact. I have talked to some of those soldiers and in fact they were in Iraq before—the war started, I believe, on March 19, did it not?

Chairman WARNER. Yes.

Senator BILL NELSON. They were actually in Iraq prior to that.

General SCHOOMAKER. We will take that and get deeper into it, because that is not the information that I have.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask another question?

Chairman WARNER. Yes, of course.

Senator BILL NELSON. I am interested in the required personnel strength and, due to combat and noncombat losses, it is my understanding those three battalions of the 124th Florida National Guard are at 64 to 67 percent of their required personnel strength. As far as I can tell, there is no plan to replace the troop losses. As Senator Reed said, they have had some KIA and then they have had a lot more WIA.

But I cannot see a plan to replace those troop losses, and it looks like that those infantry units are going to be below strength. The question is, are they at operational risk because of that? How do you minimize this risk for the theater commander if those units are below strength?

General SCHOOMAKER. I am not sure that I understand what you are saying. If you are talking about units being below their authorized strength in a battalion, let us say, the theater commander has the option to consolidate units and apply them to missions that are commensurate with their capability. Or he can reduce what he asks those units to do.

Part of your issue here goes back to my earlier statement. The Reserve components are seriously overstructured. We have far more structure in the Reserve components than we have authorized end strength to fill. Therefore, you build in a level of what you are talking about across the Reserve Force in the Army. Part of what we are trying to do is to reduce that overstructure so that we can have better fill of units and build in a TTHS account, so that we can take non-duty military occupational specialty (MOS) qualified
personnel and get them to school without putting the unit at risk until they are ready to go.

In other words, we are trying to take the Reserve component and mirror the active process, so that we can manage readiness. This is something that General Blum has taken on and General Helmsley and General Schultz in the Guard and Reserve. This is part of this transformation we are talking about to do that.

So I think what you are talking about here is more than just combat losses, but it also goes to the fact of what they started with in terms of the structure, and then it talks to the fact of what was their medical readiness when they were called to active duty. Did we deploy everybody that was resident within the structure? Because there is no replacement for a Reserve soldier. That is the reality of it.

We are going to have to look at whether this is an appropriate way of doing business in the future if we are going to go to these come-as-you-are wars. It is not World War II any more, and we are not going to build up a head of steam and a mountain of steel and then go to fight. We are going to go with the way we are right now and we are going to live with what we have invested. I think that is the strategic question.

Senator BILL NELSON. Do you anticipate any reenlistment problems in the National Guard?

General SCHOOMAKER. We are anticipating that that will be a challenge. We do not know what the answer to that is. But I anticipate that we are going to have to incentivize, use leadership, and address this, because they have been stretched.

By the way, the Guard and Reserve made these reenlistment rates that we talked about without access to Active Forces that were getting off active duty, which was traditionally their primary means of getting their force. So it is pretty extraordinary that we made these kinds of retention and enlistment goals, in the Reserve component especially, without having the benefit of having active soldiers coming out because we had stop-loss and stop-move on.

So I think it is a challenge we will face. I do not know what the magnitude of it will be.

Chairman WARNER. But the Senator has a very important question there. In my time at the Pentagon, we tracked every 30 days. Do you not have tracking data as to the retention rates in the Guard now?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Sir, I am sure we do.

Chairman WARNER. What do they reveal?

Secretary BROWNLEE. I think the question—they reveal right now, Senator, that we are not having a problem.

Chairman WARNER. By that you mean that in adequate numbers they are remaining in?

Secretary BROWNLEE. But sir, these things lag several months.

Chairman WARNER. I understand that.

Secretary BROWNLEE. I believe that we will not be able to get a good answer to that question until 3 to 6 months after these units return.

Chairman WARNER. That is clear. But I just wanted to emphasize that the current tracking data—now, mind you, a lot of these
folks, like yours, have been over there for a considerable period of time. So that tracking data has some validity.

General SCHOOMAKER. I just brought that up in response to a previous question. We made more than 100 percent of all categories.

Chairman WARNER. Good. Let us just stress it as we conclude this hearing.

I would like to go back. General, you were very candid about one point and that is your concern about the Reserves. When we use the word “Reserves” it includes the Guard.

Secretary BROWNLEE. It is both.

General SCHOOMAKER. Reserve components.

Chairman WARNER. We frankly mentioned both, and I try to always say “the Guard and Reserve.”

But the physical condition of a number of them fell below your current standards, and we accept that information. But it suddenly triggered in my mind, Secretary Brownlee, that when you were with me on this side in 1991 during the Gulf operation there were a significant number of Guard units which, at the training level, just did not measure up for what could have been their rapid deployment to the theater of operations and required extensive training.

Are you able thus far in this operation, which is now basically a year almost with the buildup and preparation, to say, do we have a similar problem with Guard and Reserve as we encountered in 1991?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Sir, depending on the mission that will be assigned to the unit, their training time may vary. If it is a logistics unit that performs transportation functions and most of the people in that unit can do that when they are mobilized, then they may deploy within a month or so. If it is a combat unit, like these Florida National Guard units, we call them up and allow anywhere from 90 to 120 days to be sure they are properly trained for the task they will be called upon to execute in the area of operations.

Chairman WARNER. The point I was making, though, was that we had a similar situation that you and I dealt with in 1991, but 90 or 120 days was not adequate time. Some forecast that we needed some heavy armored in my recollection, where we had a particular problem.

Secretary BROWNLEE. Sir, you might recall that some of these units were sent out to the National Training Center (NTC) to train.

Chairman WARNER. That is right.

Secretary BROWNLEE. We went out and visited them. I think there again the issue was some people thought they should have been able to deploy immediately and most of the people in the Army had always insisted they would need some degree of training. The experience we had out there talking to the soldiers is they felt that they were benefitting greatly from the training.

Most of those units did not deploy. In this case we have already deployed some, which have certainly proven their mettle, and others will be deployed, and we have started to mobilize them and give them the training.

Chairman WARNER. Could you generally say, from lessons learned in 1991, that the Guard and Reserve now are better
trained and we learned from those lessons, and as a consequence, they have been more readily available to integrate right into the regular Army and pick up in this conflict?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Sir, again it depends on the type of unit——

Chairman WARNER. I clearly understand that.

Secretary BROWNLEE.—and what we are talking about. But I would say, in general, that those combat units that will be called upon, the enhanced separate brigades, they will require training to get to the level that they should be.

Chairman WARNER. I guess we are not in sync. I am just trying to figure out, did we learn something by 1991 which we are not seeing a repetition of here?

Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes.

Chairman WARNER. General?

General SCHOOMAKER. The answer is yes, we have learned since 1991. We are better. But we still have the same fundamental challenge. If you are talking about, as the Secretary said, a combined arms unit that is going to operate at, let us say, a brigade level or as part of a division, that is a pretty complicated task to be able to do on 39 days a year.

Chairman WARNER. You bet, and I understand and respect that.

General SCHOOMAKER. But if I could just go one step further.

Chairman WARNER. Yes.

General SCHOOMAKER. We have some huge challenges to get the right kind of equipment to these Reserve components, both Guard and Reserve, and we are looking at that. Part of the 30th ESB, the 39th, and the 81st ESB, the three enhanced National Guard brigades that we are mobilizing as we speak and are going through their training right now, they are going to get first priority on this rapid fielding initiative of equipment. They are going to get the best equipment that the United States Army has as they go through that training and go to Iraq with it.

So this is a step in the right direction. This is part of what we are doing with the support that you have given us, both through the supplemental and through our normal Total Obligation Authority, to do the transformation that is required. But we are still going to have to deal with what degree of medical readiness, what degree of equipage, what degree of training we can expect out of a National Guard or Reserve unit and look at different strategies in terms of how, if we can come up with a predictable rotational-based Army, to include the Reserve components, how we can borrow training time from the future to get them at a higher level of readiness during the period of time that we want them available for deployment, and mortgage others on the down side of that.

So we are looking at those kinds of strategies.

Secretary BROWNLEE. Mr. Chairman, could I just emphasize one point that General Schoomaker made that I think is really critically important to the committee? He mentioned an initiative that we are going to begin soon, and that is, as you well know, our National Guard and Reserve structure is out of proportion in accordance with its end strength. In other words, there is a lot more structure to fill than the end strength would allow you to fill.
That is why when we call a unit up we have to pull from other units in order to bring that unit’s strength and equipment up to an appropriate level so that it can then be trained and deployed. The initiative that we are looking at is to take this force structure out, not people or spaces, so that the unit’s end strength and force structure are consistent.

We will clearly need the committee’s help and support when we begin that process.

Chairman WARNER. The performance of the Guard and Reserve has been extraordinary. This goes all the way back, Secretary Brownlee, to when you and I used to go to the Balkans together, and we flew regularly on aircraft operated by the Air National Guard. They were going into Sarajevo, where there were some serious combat conditions.

Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes, sir. If I could add, the 34th Infantry Division National Guard is now performing the missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai. They will be replaced this spring by the 38th Infantry Division National Guard. So they are performing those missions as we speak.

Chairman WARNER. I am proud to say the Virginia National Guard had that role in the Balkans, too.

I am going to go to one last question. We have had an excellent hearing. I am going to ask the chiefs of staff to notify Senators that we are going to take a 10-minute break and resume at about 12:00 in room SH–219 for the closed session. I anticipate Senators will want to join us there.

Now, Senator Clinton and a number of Members raised this. When that Stars and Stripes article came out, it caused a considerable jolt among the ranks here in Congress. I want to go back for those who are following this hearing and explain that Stars and Stripes is a highly regarded media operation, done by top-notch professionals. It is within the table of organizations of the DOD. In other words, it is not a private sector publication; it is operated by the DOD, and the DOD quite properly gives it the widest measure of latitude, as it should if it is to become an effective document where the readers pick it up and say, I want to devote the time to read this, which they do.

It is a tremendous source of information, not only to the soldiers on the front lines, because frequently those copies work their way right up there quickly, but the families.

Now, they came out last month, Stars and Stripes, and reported a survey of some 2,000 uniformed personnel, presumably, maybe families too. When asked about their personnel morale, 34 percent rated it as low or very low. You know the statistics in that article. While I asked the question earlier on, as I look back through our record I think it is important that you submit to the record a point by point perspective as to their findings and how those findings coincide or do not coincide with information that you have in your profession.

I am by no means critical of Stars and Stripes. This survey simply merits that type of attention. So if you will provide that for the record.

Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]
The Stars and Stripes series—"Ground Truth—Conditions, Contrasts and Morale" provided detailed information about conditions in Iraq and the reactions of military personnel stationed there. However, the results should not be generalized to all military personnel in Iraq because the sample on which the survey was based was not a representative sample. The approach used is more likely to produce findings that are particular to that specific segment of respondents surveyed, rather than the population of soldiers in Iraq. As Stars and Stripes acknowledges, "The results cannot be projected to the entire military population in Iraq, but the returns were impressive."

Furthermore, the survey was conducted when the temperature in Iraq was as high as 125 degrees. In addition, the 3rd Infantry Division soldiers were told for the second time that they were being extended and the Reserve component soldiers had just been informed that their tours were going to be extended for up to a year. It is highly likely that these issues negatively impacted the comments made by the respondents.

Stars and Stripes reported that its survey found low morale, insufficient training, jobs that had little or nothing to do with training, and lack of a clear definition of mission. Many made it clear that they did not plan to reenlist when their service was up.

The Army (through its Army Research Institute) will be conducting surveys and interviews with soldiers to determine career intentions, factors that impact them, and potential mitigators. Data will be collected from units deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. For comparative purposes, a control group of soldiers who did not deploy will also be surveyed. Findings from this study will be used to provide indicators of career intentions and determine potential mitigators.

Chairman WARNER. Gentlemen, let me thank you. We have had an excellent hearing. You have been extremely responsive to what I regard a very tough and thorough line of questions from the members of this committee. So this hearing at the moment will adjourn and resume at 12:00 in room SH–219.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

MOBILIZATION STATIONS

1. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee, improvements are definitely needed at Fort Stewart as they will impact Alabama reservists when they return from Iraq in February and those being alerted for Operation Iraqi Freedom. To this end, Senator Bayh and I wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld suggesting that monies in the supplemental be released to the Army for military construction upgrades as needed. What is the Army doing to improve the mobilization process and resources at Army mobilization stations since your inspection at Fort Stewart several weeks ago?

Secretary BROWNLEE. The Army Installations Management Agency (IMA) is procuring relocatable facilities for Forts Stewart, Bliss, Eustis, Bragg, Carson, and Hood to provide additional billeting space for the mobilization/demobilization effort. The cost to repair existing barracks facilities and short-term leasing of relocatable facilities will total $52.19 million through the end of fiscal year 2004.

Additionally, a recent change to the mobilization medical hold policy will allow unit personnel who fail to meet deployment medical standards to be released from active duty and returned home within 25 days. These personnel are subject to a subsequent order to active duty upon resolution of the temporary profile or condition.

Currently under review is an initiative to directly deploy select Army Reserve component (RC) units from their home station without using a mobilization station. Per the guidance of the Director of the Army Staff, a working group was established to develop concepts that will facilitate the direct deployment of Army RC units. Both the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have identified several units as candidates to conduct direct deployment under a "pilot" project. United States Forces Command is currently reviewing the list of units.

RAPID FIELDING INITIATIVE

2. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee, when you were on the committee staff in 1990, you had a passion for requesting and fielding the relatively small things soldiers needed like machine gun mounts and flashlights, particularly during Oper-
ation Desert Storm. Today, I see the need for more uniform-related body armor, particularly to protect the arms and legs of our soldiers. Your testimony agrees with my assessment and I know you are taking action.

Nonetheless, I have seen the need at Walter Reed Hospital during each of my visits where 100 (see recent November 10 Time article, page 39) soldiers have lost limbs. In some cases, that was preventable if we can figure a way to use kevlar impregnated material to strengthen the sleeves and pant legs of our BDU’s creating a ballistic exo-skelton. Clothing technology which gets us closer to this solution is being worked at the College of Textiles, Auburn University. The technology exists and there is language in the authorization bill suggesting the Department of Defense get busy focusing its labs like Natick and other academic institutions to demonstrate this protective capability sooner, rather than later. We have come a long way since Somalia, when only Rangers had the best body armor. Let’s not wait, Mr. Secretary, 10 years to field a better uniform. What are the Rapid Fielding Initiative lessons learned to date?

Secretary BROWNLEE. The roots of the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) lie in feedback from soldier experiences in Afghanistan during late 2002. Reports of equipment issues by deployed soldiers and commanders supporting Operation Enduring Freedom raised concern among senior Army leaders. Surveys revealed that the nature of the battlefield and missions soldiers perform as part of the global war on terrorism created new requirements for the types and durability of soldier equipment. To meet these new requirements, soldiers and units were purchasing equipment with their own funds. To remedy these shortcomings, the Army leadership directed the rapid fielding of a number of soldier equipment items, both in theater and to deploying soldiers. The 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 82nd Airborne Division was the first to receive new equipment, and the success of that fielding led to additional directives to equip more forces deployed and deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom. By the end of fiscal year 2003, all soldiers of the 82nd Airborne, 101st Air Assault, and 10th Mountain Division BCTs received state-of-the-art RFI equipment; a total of eight brigades. For fiscal year 2004, we directed that all deploying active, Guard, and Reserve soldiers receive this equipment. A minimum of 16 BCTs and some 60,000 support soldiers are scheduled to receive new equipment as part of the RFI program this year.

DEMINING VEHICLES

3. Senator SESSIONS. General Schoomaker, can you find out for me why Peace Enforcement Operation Ground Combat Systems directed the Unmanned Ground Vehicle/Systems Joint Project Office to purchase anti-personnel demining vehicles from Croatia for use in Iraq when U.S. companies have invested in this capability and now find themselves suffering because of a bureaucratic program decision?

General SCHOOMAKER. The former Unmanned Ground Vehicles/Systems Joint Project Office (UGV/S JPO), now named the Robotic Systems Joint Project Office (RS JPO), initiated the Robotic Combat Support System (RCSS) acquisition program in 2001 to meet an Army requirement to develop and procure robotic anti-personnel demining vehicles. A limited number of prototype robotic systems developed in the mid-1990s proved the utility and producibility of this technology. The program strategy for RCSS called for a small business set-aside utilizing two competing contractors to mitigate development risks. As part of the concept validation program, the contractors’ systems were subjected to an Initial Verification Test (IVT) in 2002 to assess the performance and maturity of the systems. Both contractors’ systems performed so poorly in the IVT conducted by the Army Test and Evaluation Command that neither could be supported for entry into the System Development and Demonstration phase of the acquisition program, thus causing a delay of several years in fielding this very important capability.

The delay in fielding RCSS left the Army with a gap in anti-personnel demining capability requiring reassessment of program plans. To meet the urgent CENTCOM requirement for our operating forces engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, we embarked on a new acquisition strategy based upon leveraging existing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) capability. Accordingly, an evaluation of available COTS demining equipment currently in production was conducted, and in late 2003, the RS JPO initiated purchase of a COTS system built in Croatia that utilizes a Caterpillar engine, Caterpillar tracks and a Sony control. The decision was not bureaucratic—it was based upon providing an effective timely solution to an urgent need. This important capability will begin fielding in just a few months and is expected to save the lives of service members.
ARMORED VEHICLES

4. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, I received a briefing on RESET. There is over $170 million in the supplemental for second destination charges needed to bring equipment back from Kuwait, and another $122.7 billion for depot RESET activities. To be specific, I am concerned that the Army staff is about to make a huge mistake in NOT bringing all our armored vehicles back to the United States for depot overall and will instead take the cheaper road of only applying 10/20 maintenance standards to a large portion of the fleet leaving the problem for another day, another commander and another Chief of Staff to solve, just as happened after Operation Desert Storm.

Mr. Secretary, this is potentially a huge problem set, one which we will need to discuss in a future Airland Subcommittee hearing. I hope before then that reason and logic are brought to the problem. In a recent Defense Science Board study of space acquisition, one of the findings was the Air Force placed cost concerns over mission. I think the RESET issue may ultimately be assessed in the same way despite the emphasis the Chief placed on mission accomplishment in the soldier's creed entered into the record. Would you respond to my concerns?

Secretary Brownlee. The initial cost estimate to reconstitute Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) equipment was based on experience from past operations, in-theater technical inspections, and emerging maintenance data emanating from current operations. The RESET plan takes into consideration the full spectrum maintenance operations, from organizational level to depot: 15 percent of the track requirements are projected as depot workload, 83 percent as organizational/direct support/general support/installation (includes delayed desert damage repairs) and the remaining 2 percent as non-repairable. Based upon Army projections and operational requirements, the depots have expanded their capacity to deal with the larger volume of workload. This plan will result in a reconstituted force fully capable of responding to all future contingencies with no degradation to ongoing missions.

COMANCHE

5. Senator Sessions. General Schoomaker, I am concerned about the rumors being generated that the Comanche program may be a bill payer for other Army aviation problems. I consider this a key item that must be discussed in detail before action is taken. Is there a problem with the Comanche program that you care to discuss today?

General Schoomaker. The RAH–66 Comanche helicopter program is currently in Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase; the program is on schedule, within budget, and the program is fully funded.

KOREA

6. Senator Sessions. General Schoomaker, Korea is a hardship area, and I think our soldiers stationed there need and deserve benefits comparable to those received by soldiers in Bosnia and Kosovo. What is your plan for realignment of forces in Korea and what is the Army doing to help soldiers assigned to Korea with additional benefits like family separation allowances, and those benefits similar to what soldiers in Bosnia receive today?

General Schoomaker. With respect to the realignment of forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK), U.S. forces will be realigned in accordance with Secretary of Defense guidance and the U.S.-ROK Future of the Alliance (FOTA) Initiative. Detailed changes to the disposition of Army forces on the Korean Peninsula are pre-decisional, but will conform to OSD guidance to combatant commanders on global war on terrorism and global presence. The Army fully supports those Secretary of Defense and combatant commander, U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea initiatives. Korea was a combat zone from 27 June 1950 until 31 January 1955, however, since then soldiers in Korea have not engaged in combat operations. Hence, we do not believe soldiers serving in Korea should be entitled to the same entitlements as soldiers serving in a combat zone. This aside, the Army is aware of the well-being issues for soldiers who are serving in Korea. This past year all aspects of service in Korea were reviewed, to include assignment policy, subsistence, incentives and pays. The Department of Defense recognized the arduous duty performed by troops in Korea by authorizing an additional $50–$150 per month in hardship duty pay. Soldiers in Korea also receive a cost-of-living allowance (average $84/month) and family separation allowance ($250/month). Additionally, the Army
General Schoomaker, are you satisfied with the way the Army establishes and prioritizes requirements? I ask this question because I see some serious disconnects in that regard. Examples abound that would indicate a serious problem for instance:

- Digitization: The Army has been constructing the tactical internet since 1997. The original plan was to digitize the entire Army. Then the Army decided to limit it to the counterattack corps at Fort Hood. Just before the Iraq war that was seen as a poor decision and there was a crash program to field Blue Force Tracking to the Third Infantry Division and other units there so that they would have better situational awareness.

- Interceptor Body Armor: The Army set a requirement of only 40,000 for infantrymen only. Yet for years the Army has been foreseeing a non-linear battlefield where there are no established front lines, and consequently all soldiers are at risk. Now we see in Iraq that the requirement has been (rightfully) changed to equip all soldiers and Department of Defense civilians in theater. We are now on a crash program to procure enough to meet that requirement while some soldiers continue to go unprotected.

- Up-armored HMMWVs: A similar problem to the body armor. The requirement was seriously under-estimated and procurement averaged about 500 annually, with 250 planned for fiscal year 2004. Now we have seen the requirement for Iraq increased at least twice, and are working to ramp-up production while soldiers continue to be killed and wounded in thin-skinned HMMWVs.

- Aircraft Survivability Equipment: The requirement for the improved chaff and flare dispenser (ALE–47) was originally limited to special operations aircraft. Just prior to the war, the Chinook product manager, on his own initiative, began procuring and installing them on some conventional aircraft in the Active Force. Unfortunately, other active and Reserve component helicopters in Iraq are not so equipped, including the Chinook that was recently shot down, killing 16 soldiers and wounding more.

- Battlefield Combat Identification System: The Army began developing the Battlefield Combat Identification System after Operation Desert Storm as a result of the high incidence of fratricides. Two years ago the Army abandoned the program as too expensive, claiming that it would depend on situational awareness to prevent fratricides. Now, as a result of the fratricides in this most recent war, Joint Forces Command, in its lessons-learned report, is again calling for combat identification systems.

How do you propose to reform the requirements generation and prioritization process and how do you propose to address the specific examples I cited?

General Schoomaker: Identifying desired warfighting capabilities and balancing application of resources between current modernization and the future force is an incredible challenge. The Army must not make these decisions in a vacuum; effective support to current and future combatant commanders requires that these capability and prioritization decisions be made in a joint context, informed by the Nation’s strategic goals and objectives. The Department of Defense has recently revised the capability identification (requirements generation) process to create better linkage to strategy and joint operational concepts. The Department is also fine-tuning the planning and programming processes so that prioritization decisions support current and future operations in this joint context. We must continue to aggressively seek the best inputs, analysis, and threat assessments available to drive our decision-making processes.

You must remember that prioritization is a relative process and the acquisition process was not rapid. Army budgets prior to September 11, 2001, were very small for the number of missions we were conducting. We cancelled 26 systems to pay for transformational initiatives; even then we were forced to spread out buys of these initiatives over many years simply to get some capability out into the force.

Prior to September 11, 2001, the Army perceived that we would not have to fight an enemy of equal capabilities in the near future. This assessment supported the decision to shift resources from current force modernization to future force trans-
formation. As expected, the Army has reassessed these prioritization decisions to address the near-term requirements of the global war on terrorism, and specifically our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In this light, the Army has taken the following measures to address the examples you’ve cited:

Digitization: The Army’s objective to develop a tactical internet capability appears to be validated by the Defense Department shift towards network-centric warfare concepts. We will continue to develop this capability for the future force. I have challenged the Army to identify and pursue opportunities to bring future force capabilities to the current force where logical—I believe that the Blue Force Tracking effort for Operation Iraqi Freedom is an example of how that can work. We must ensure that joint interoperability is maximized so that we are providing coherent, relevant capability to the joint force commander.

Interceptor Body Armor: The Army recognized a requirement for Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) to replace the Personal Armor System for Ground Troops (PASGT) Vest for the dismounted combatant. As cited, we have changed our distribution plans to provide better protection to soldiers and civilians in non-direct combat situations. The total Army IBA requirement is now 840,000 sets. At the end of fiscal year 2004 the Army will have produced and fielded 422,602 sets of IBA, which leaves a remaining quantity of 417,398 sets to be produced and fielded to provide the required density.

U-Armored Highly Mobile Multi Wheeled Vehicles (UAH): The original Army requirement for UAHs was established to equip primarily military police and light reconnaissance units. This density has served the Army well in stabilization operations in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The size of the stabilization force in Iraq has required us to move combat troops from heavily armored vehicles to wheeled vehicle in order to operate effectively. The Army and CENTCOM have worked together to establish a new requirement for 3,615 UAHs to support OIF. The Army currently has 1,895 UAHs in Iraq, and has increased production to provide an additional 900 UAHs by June 2004. To ensure that the Army is identifying the right protection mix for the future tactical wheeled fleet, this issue is being reviewed as part of our OIF lessons learned effort.

Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE): The Army is moving aggressively to determine what technologies are available to defeat the specific ground-to-air threats presented in Iraq and Afghanistan and will apply the resources necessary to protect our air fleet. We recognize that technology alone will not defeat every hostile act. The Army has established a focused assessment team to gather attack information; develop tactics, techniques, and procedures to minimize risks to those attack profiles; and then quickly disseminate that information to the operational forces.

Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS): The Army continues to recognize the value of combat identification technology to increase lethality and reduce fratricide on the battlefield. As stated, the BCIS program was terminated because the costs to equip the entire force with that solution were prohibitive. The Army is continuing to explore the millimeter wave technology with the expectation that this capability will meet Future Combat System requirements. In the near term, the risk of fratricide has been reduced through the fielding of improved optics such as 2nd Generation Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) and digital situational awareness capability. As recent experience has taught us, joint interoperability of our fratricide-reduction solutions is imperative. We are active partners with Joint Forces Command to determine the right set of capabilities for the joint force.

AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT

8. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, the National Guard Chinook helicopter that was shot down recently by an Iraqi surface to air missile was not equipped with the most modern chaff and flare dispenser, the ALE–47, while the active duty unit to which it was attached was so equipped. I understand that there are 62 ALE–47 dispensers available, until recently awaiting a decision as to where they will be installed, along with the funding required to install them. The Army has applied a “first to fight” paradigm to determine where to field modernized equipment first. Is that paradigm still valid in this case, and others, where the Army has active duty and Reserve component units serving side-by-side?

General Schoomaker. The “first to fight” paradigm is no longer valid in this case. Currently, active and Reserve component helicopters are being upgraded with the ALE–47 dispenser.

9. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, where and when will the available ALE–47 chaff and flare dispensers be installed?
General SCHOOMAKER. ALE–47 dispensers will be installed on CH–47 a/c in both the Theater of Operations and in the continental United States (CONUS) (including Hawaii) commencing in the December 2003 timeframe.

10. Senator LEVIN. General Schoomaker, how many Chinook helicopters will still be employed in Iraq without the most modern aircraft survivability equipment?

General SCHOOMAKER. Senator Levin, the answer is none. All of the Chinook helicopters operating in Iraq will have the most modern aircraft survivability equipment installed.

11. Senator LEVIN. General Schoomaker, what is the plan to similarly equip those helicopters and how long will it take to do so?

General SCHOOMAKER. Currently, ALE–47 dispenser sets are in theater and they will be installed, as aircraft are made available to the installation team. Similarly, ALE–47 dispenser sets are being installed on aircraft in CONUS (including Hawaii) in preparation for deployment as follow-on units.

12. Senator LEVIN. General Schoomaker, are there sufficient quantities of the various types of flares fired by the ALE–47 available in theater?

General SCHOOMAKER. Standard Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) on CH–47D aircraft includes the AN/ALQ–156(V)1 Missile Approach Detector linked to the M–130 Flare dispenser that uses the M206 flare. There are sufficient quantities of the M206 flare in theater. The CH–47F program incorporates the Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure and Common Missile Warning System (ATIRCM/CMWS) currently in development and the ALE–47 flare dispenser. In addition to the M206 flare, the ALE–47 dispenser uses the M211 and M212 flares to provide a better countermeasure than just the M206 alone. The Army G4 arranged a loan of 2,000 each M211 and M212 flares from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) to support all the aircraft currently in theater with the ALE–47 dispensers. These flares are currently on hand in theater and being intensively managed. Air Force has agreed to split equally the M211 production with the Army beginning mid January 2004. Army and Air Force will equally split delivery of the M212 starting in March 2004 at the completion of the SOAR deliveries.

The M211 is produced by Alloy Surfaces of Chester Twp, PA. Their current production capacity is 6,000 per month. The M212 flare is produced by ATK-Thiokol in Brigham City, UT. Their current production capacity is 5,400 per month. Additional funding is being provided to increase production of the M211 from 5,400 per month to 12,000 per month and the M212 from 6,000 per month to 20,000 per month by August 2004. These production rates will provide sufficient quantities to satisfy both Army and Air Force requirements.

13. Senator LEVIN. General Schoomaker, members of the unit to which the downed Chinook was assigned allege that the helicopters in that unit operated in Iraq for 5 months without even the more basic aircraft survivability equipment the ALQ–156 threat detector and the M–130 flare dispenser. Can you confirm or deny this report? If true, why was that the case?

General SCHOOMAKER. At this point, I can neither confirm nor deny this report. There is not sufficient ASE equipment to provide a full compliment to all the Reserve component units. However, when these units are mobilized the Army cross-levels equipment to ensure they are capable of operating in the specific threat environment. The unit received all but six sets of ASE prior to deployment. That includes the ALQ–156 and the M–130. The remaining ASE was issued in theater, minus one set for one aircraft. The fact that all but one would be fully equipped is not alarming because one aircraft is typically in a major inspection cycle and the ASE is rotated to other aircraft in need.

14. Senator LEVIN. General Schoomaker, what is the situation with the Kiowa, Apache, and Black Hawk helicopters in Iraq?

General SCHOOMAKER. Kiowa, Apache, and Black Hawk helicopters operating in Iraq all have aircraft survivability equipment installed.

15. Senator LEVIN. General Schoomaker, members of the unit to which the downed Chinook was assigned also report significant problems with the reliability of the ALQ–156 Missile Approach Detector that is linked to the flare dispenser. Consequently, the advantage of an aircraft having an improved flare dispenser will be degraded by the less reliable missile detector. What is the extent of the ALQ–156 Missile Approach Detector’s reliability problem and the Army’s plan for correcting it?
General Schoomaker. The Army is taking a number of steps to ensure that the ALQ–156 remains a reliable and effective missile detector for our CH–47 Chinook and C–23 Sherpa aircraft. First, we are deploying a Field Assistance Support Team (FAST) into the Iraqi theater. This team will assist deployed units in complete end-to-end operational tests of the infrared aircraft survivability equipment (ASE). The ALQ–156 detector is part of the infrared ASE system. In addition, the Program Manager Cargo Helicopter has purchased three ALQ–156 test sets to provide to the Logistics Assistance Representatives (LAR) in theater, to support end-to-end operational checks of the ASE equipment. Two of these test sets will be shipped to OIF. The third test set will go to OEF with a FAST team in February 2004. The FAST will have spare ALQ–156 detectors to maximize operational availability of the systems in theater.

The Army National Guard (ARNG) has an effort underway to upgrade the aircraft that have been designated to deploy on the next rotations into OIF and OEF. The ARNG is procuring 25 ALQ–156A(V)1 systems and two sets of spares. The ALQ–156A(V)1 system is an improved version of the ALQ–156, with an increased range and a lower false alarm rate. These systems will be installed on the Hawaii and Mississippi ARNG aircraft that have been designated to deploy, in addition to the ALE–47 Improved Flare Dispenser.

Finally, the Army Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM), the item manager for the ALQ–156, is intensively managing the system to ensure that there are sufficient repair parts available for the system. CECOM also has a contract with BAE, in Nashua, NH (the original equipment manufacturer), for repair of the ALQ–156 system.

16. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, I understand that the long term solution is a new suite of aircraft survivability equipment called the Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures/Common Missile Warning System (ATRICM/CMWS). The Army cancelled the ATRICM/CMWS in fiscal year 2003 for affordability reasons and then resurrected the program in fiscal year 2004. Have you been briefed yet on the program, and do you believe the Army has adequately prioritized the development and procurement of those systems?

General Schoomaker. Yes, I have been briefed on the Army’s ATRICM/CMWS program and it is one of the highest priority programs in the Army. The Army has identified options to accelerate the ATRICM/CMWS program, which includes not only our digitized aircraft but the Army’s entire fleet. In the near future, we will be assessing the best way to move ahead to accelerate fielding of this critical capability.

RECENT MILITARY ACTION IN IRAQ

17–20. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, Major General Swannack, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq, was quoted in the press as saying, “We’re going to use a sledgehammer to crush a walnut.” He was referring to the military tactic in recent days of employing aircraft dropping 500 pound bombs, artillery, mortars, and attack helicopters against suspected insurgents. Recently, AC–130 gunships were used to attack what was reported to be an empty warehouse in Baghdad suspected of being a planning and staging area for insurgents. Recent press reports also indicate that the 4th Infantry Division destroyed a number of homes of suspected insurgents after evacuating the women and children of the families.

I believe that General Swannack’s comments, and the actions to which he was referring, could be counterproductive. Have you had the opportunity to discuss this issue with General Swannack and with General Abizaid?

If yes, what was the gist of those discussions? If no, when do you expect to have those discussions and get back to me?

Given your experience, especially in special operations, do you believe that such tactics are likely to help or hurt a counter-insurgency effort?

Are such tactics consistent with an approach to win the “hearts and minds”?

General Schoomaker. I had the opportunity to spend time with MG Swannack during my recent trip to Iraq. I was most impressed with what he is doing and the progress he is making in working with the Iraqi people. He is doing the right things within his sector. Commanders must make assessments on actions to be taken and the amount of force necessary to achieve the desired effect on the target. For this reason, I referred the question to both General Abizaid and MG Swannack for comment. Both felt that the comment was misconstrued, it was meant to be descriptive
for an American audience) of the level of force being employed in Iraq. Not meant to threaten or goad the Iraqi populace.

IRAQ ROTATION PLAN

21. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, in discussing the changes to the Iraq Rotation Plan and the planned reduction of U.S. forces between January and April of next year, Secretary Rumsfeld said, “And I think it’s important to recognize that numbers do not necessarily equate with capability. We’re bringing in forces that are appropriate to deal with the evolving threats in Iraq today, including more mobile infantry elements. So while the number of U.S. forces may be level or decline slightly, this much is certain: the capability of the security forces in Iraq will increase.”

I note that the Army will be replacing the Fourth Infantry Division, the Army’s most modern, digitized division with its enhanced situational awareness, and the 101st Air Assault Division, the Army’s most mobile division, with its huge fleet of helicopters that are not available to other Army divisions. So, I ask if you agree with the statement that the replacement units will be more appropriate, more mobile, and of greater capability than those being replaced?

General Schoomaker. The units deploying to Iraq, such as the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st Infantry Division, will be trained and organized for the threat they will face and the lessons we have learned from our operations thus far. They will bring the correct mix of aviation, dismounted, and mounted capabilities for the operating environment. For instance, we have found that heavy tanks and other tracked vehicles are in some cases too threatening and often lack the mobility and flexibility for operations such as those that we are conducting in Iraq. So, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) units will be using a more appropriate mix of up-armored HMMWVs and armored vehicles when they deploy. The two divisions, as well as the Stryker Brigade, will also be task-organized with the correct mix of attack, reconnaissance, and lift aircraft. This will make them much more responsive, mobile, and flexible than the forces there today.

As I mentioned, we are also sending the first of our Stryker Brigades to Iraq. These infantry-centric formations and benefit from armored, mobile, wheeled personnel carriers. They also have much greater situational awareness than traditional forces as a result of their increased reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition elements and systems.

Many of those same information systems are being fielded to deploying units. In fact, 1st Cavalry Division, which is a digital division of the same design as 4th Infantry Division, had most of these systems already. This will ensure that our forces have better situational awareness and will allow them to operate more efficiently in a complex and fluid environment.

22. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, the Army has chosen to do unit rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as opposed to individual replacements such as in Vietnam, where units and equipment remained for years, and individuals rotated on 12 month assignments. While there are potential benefits to the unit rotation scheme, particularly with respect to unit cohesion, there are also potential disadvantages: expertise gained and relationships with Iraqis built over a 12-month period are severed abruptly and in a major way as whole units rotate, as opposed to less dramatically as individuals rotate; large equipment transportation costs are incurred as divisions move from the U.S. to Iraq and back again; capabilities are lost, such as when the modern, digitized 4th Infantry Division or the huge helicopter fleet of the 101st Air Assault Division are replaced by less modernized and less well-equipped divisions; individual soldiers potentially return from Iraq or Afghanistan, only to be reassigned to a unit that is itself deploying there shortly. Why do you think the unit rotation plan is superior to the alternative? How will you address the disadvantages I have cited?

General Schoomaker. One of the greatest lessons the Army learned from Vietnam is that a policy of individual replacement into a combat zone corrodes unit cohesion, contributes to reduced soldier morale and produces significantly less capable fighting formations. An important step we can take to preserve the great effectiveness of the units we have in the Army today is to create stability in our organizations. This includes manning and training our units at their home stations and deploying them overseas as a “team of teams” that can count on a high degree of personnel stability throughout their combat tour.

There are some potential drawbacks to this policy, but our pre-deployment training regimen and the combatant commander’s plans for transitioning units once they are in theater will mitigate the risks. Units preparing to deploy to Iraq and Afghani-
stan are undergoing extensive training both at home station and at our Combat Training Centers. This training is applying the lessons learned from units that are currently serving in Iraq to create the most realistic pre-deployment training environment possible. Once the units arrive in theater they will further undergo an integration process that lasts for several weeks, including extensive transition time with the units they are replacing in Iraq or Afghanistan. This will allow the incoming units to acclimate to the environment, get to know their areas of operation, and assume critical relationships with the local population while the units they are replacing is still there to assist. This method of unit replacement has been validated in recent years with great success in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

As you noted, there is a risk of rotating individual soldiers out of a unit that just completed an overseas tour and into a unit getting ready to deploy. The Army’s Human Resource Command is working to ensure that the cases of this occurring are kept to an absolute minimum.

To the issue of capabilities and equipment differences between Operation Iraqi Freedom 1 (OIF 1) and OIF 2 units, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Army have worked extensively to ensure the appropriate capabilities are required for Iraq for OIF 2. For example, all units deployed to Iraq for OIF 2 will have access to the modernized equipment and aviation assets of the 4th Infantry and 101st Airborne Divisions will redeploy to the United States over the next few months, the Army recently deployed a Stryker Brigade Combat Team to Iraq that provides an enhanced capability for the combatant commander that he didn’t have for most of OIF 1.

23. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, you have said before that you intend to convert the Army from an individual replacement system to a unit manning system. At the same time, you have indicated that at this time you do not believe that an increase in personnel end strength is required. However, it is my understanding that a unit manning system is likely to require more soldiers than an individual replacement system for a given force structure, because units must be manned above normally authorized strength to account for the inevitable personnel losses that will occur over time.

For instance, a recent news report on the experience of A Company, Second Battalion, Eight Infantry noted that there were 172 troops on the company roster when it entered Iraq in May. By November the company had lost nearly one-third of its members to injury, illness, completed enlistments, and reassignments, dropping to 118, until replacements pushed the number back up to 129. Assuming that A Company’s experience is typical, and is repeated across the hundreds of company-sized units in Iraq, the impact on a unit manning system will be enormous. How do you intend to implement a unit manning system and a unit rotation plan for Iraq and Afghanistan while keeping Army end strength constant? General Schoomaker. Force Stabilization (variant of unit manning) is compatible with maintaining constant Army end strength. It will allow the Army to best meet its rotation objectives by deploying units in which the soldier and unit operational cycles are synchronized. There are two major deployment manning issues that Force Stabilization addresses, combat readiness/soldier non-deployability prior to deployment, and combat readiness/attrition during deployment. Current individual replacement system (IRS) manned units are built over time with staggered soldier arrivals and departures. This results in the deployment of units with scheduled turnover of at least 33 percent per year, or last minute shuffling of soldiers including plus ups over strength authorizations. These required actions are necessitated because the peacetime IRS manning system is not compatible with war-time execution—requiring the breakup of combat crews and destruction of unit cohesion prior to combat. Force stabilization virtually eliminates these issues by aligning soldier and unit operational cycles when units are formed, and by implementing a peacetime manning model that seamlessly transitions to war-time execution. This precludes shuffling soldiers and breaking up combat crews and teams prior to deployments.

It allows units to deploy at or near their authorized personnel strength, minimizing required plus ups and soldier shuffling, resulting in more stability and predictability for soldiers and families. Force stabilization has the added benefit that all soldiers go through the unit training cycle together and therefore are routinely at a higher level of combat capability than the individual replacement system units of today. The second issue (depletion of personnel strength in a combat zone due to injury, illness, completed enlistments, and reassignments) is exactly what Force Stabilization implementation will help to minimize. We categorize losses as known or unknown. Unknown losses due to injury and illness will occur and will require replacements as the unit strength falls below predetermined minimum levels regardless of the manning method in use (individual or unit). Package replacements will
continue to be necessary to replace those soldiers suffering injury, illness, or death. These package replacements will occur periodically rather than continuously and will be provided to the unit during unit sustainment periods so new soldiers can be integrated into the unit prior to performing an operational mission. Force Stabilized units will not incur many of the known losses, and thus the over manning you referred to because soldier and unit operational cycles are aligned prior to deployment. This will virtually eliminate known losses (attrition) and will significantly reduce the turbulence and loss of cohesion attributable to conducting major replacement operations in a war-time theater of operations.

Force Stabilization policies and tenets were developed to directly address deployment strength and deployment attrition concerns as well as a peace-time manning system that seamlessly transitioned to a war-time footing. By implementing Force Stabilization, the Army can more efficiently man units, train soldiers and teams, and rotate units, all while staying within current end strength.

NON-LINE-OF-SIGHT CANNON

24. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Congress directed the Army to field a Future Combat System Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Cannon by 2008. Congress did so because 2008 was the planned fielding date for the Crusader artillery system that the Office of the Secretary of Defense had just cancelled, and because General Shinseki, the former Chief of Staff, indicated that the Army still had an outstanding requirement for an artillery system to replace the Paladin. However, General Shinseki emphasized, and the legislation indicated, that the NLOS Cannon would be part of the Future Combat System of systems, 18 in total. I, for one, believed that in general it is not good policy for Congress to legislate a fielding date for a major weapons system. In fact, it appears now that the Future Combat Systems will not be ready for a 2008 fielding, and to insist on fielding the NLOS Cannon in 2008 may ultimately result in the NLOS Cannon being fielded outside the Future Combat System of systems, clearly not what General Shinseki, nor Congress, intended. In light of Operation Iraqi Freedom lessons learned, how would you prioritize the requirement to replace the current Paladin artillery system?

General Schoomaker. With the lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom it is not a priority at this time to replace the current Paladin artillery system. With currently funded upgrades, Paladin will continue to serve the current force for many years. We must however emphasize the importance of NLOS Cannon as part of an integrated Future Combat Systems. The NLOS Cannon is an integral part of the system of systems and as such, synchronization with the overarching FCS program is imperative for achieving the goals of networking lethality, survivability, supportability, and affordability.

25. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what is more important: to have a NLOS Cannon not later than 2008, or to ensure that NLOS Cannon is part of an integrated Future Combat System of systems?

General Schoomaker. Ensuring that NLOS Cannon is part of an integrated Future Combat System of systems is more important.

The NLOS Cannon is an integral part of the system of systems and as such, synchronization with the overarching FCS program is imperative for achieving the goals of networking lethality, survivability, supportability, and affordability.

Decoupling NLOS Cannon from FCS development essentially eliminates any commonality benefits and efficiencies the Army would receive from a Family of Systems development program. Life cycle costs would increase because NLOS Cannon would be a unique vehicle. While it is true that NLOS Cannon if initially developed separately form the FCS system of systems, might eventually be made common with the rest of FCS, the Army would have to fund two distinct NLOS Cannon development programs. Likewise, attempting to force the FCS program to align with an accelerated NLOS Cannon schedule would cause sub-optimization of the other systems within FCS. For example, the full design maturity of the C4ISR network would not support an accelerated NLOS Cannon program.

26. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, will you be requesting relief from the 2008 fielding date for Future Combat System NLOS Cannon in the fiscal year 2005 budget request?

General Schoomaker. No, we will not seek relief in the 2005 budget request.
27. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, given the shortage of Interceptor Body Armor, up-armored HMMWVs and Aircraft Survivability Equipment in Iraq, do you believe that the Army has concentrated too much on the development and procurement of major weapons systems to the neglect of soldier survivability systems? If so, what will you do to correct it?

General Schoomaker. With past programs, the Army worked to establish a balance between maintaining the current force and bridging to a transformed force. We are constantly reviewing that balance to ensure we have it correct. Where appropriate, we have and will continue to make adjustments. Based on requirements identified for ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army has made program adjustments to provide immediate fielding of Interceptor Body Armor and up-armored HMMWVs. We are in the process now of evaluating acceleration options of improved aircraft survivability equipment to forward-deployed aircraft. These specific issues are also being assessed as part of two of 17 key focus areas within the Army (specifically soldier issues and Army aviation). The Army will continue to seek a balance between current and future requirements.

28. Senator Levin. Secretary Brownlee and General Schoomaker, each year it seems that the Army tries to improve itself (currently called “transformation”) and pursue a number of programs that it cannot afford. As a result, a number of programs are started but must be limited to a relatively small portion of the Army, or are stretched out so far as to be at risk of termination for cost reasons. How would you each propose to break this cycle of unaffordability and program volatility? Are you taking any current steps in this direction?

Secretary Brownlee and General Schoomaker. In past programs, the Army has made some difficult decisions to terminate or restructure some programs in order to free up resources for other critical priorities. These decisions were based on a capabilities-based approach. During the upcoming POM (fiscal years 2006–2011), the Army will incorporate an enhanced capabilities-based review of the Army’s Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) program. This review will team the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and headquarters, Department of the Army in order to evaluate the required capabilities for both the Current and Future Forces within the context of joint capabilities. This review will identify capabilities gaps and trade space within the RDA program and will inform program decisions. We will examine affordability of programs across the Army and stress fielding of capabilities vice materiel solutions.

29–31. Senator Levin. Secretary Brownlee, a few weeks ago, the Stars and Stripes newspaper conducted a survey of nearly 2,000 service members serving throughout Iraq. Stars and Stripes reported that this survey found low morale, insufficient training, jobs that had little or nothing to do with training, and lack of a clear definition of mission. Many made it clear that they do not plan to reenlist when their service is up.

Dr. David Chu, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, told the House Armed Services Committee on November 5 that 66 percent of the reservists in Iraq said they would reenlist; and ABC World News Tonight ran a story on Sunday, November 9, stating that according to a DOD survey, only 54 percent of the reservists and Guardsmen serving in Iraq would reenlist. Based on the reports that you receive, how do you characterize the morale of the troops—not of the leaders—but of the thousands of troops serving in Iraq?

Secretary Brownlee. Although the Army has sent individuals and teams of experts to Iraq and Afghanistan to assess soldier support, morale, and living conditions, no formal survey had been conducted. Neither were formal surveys conducted in the war zones during the Korean Conflict, the Vietnam War, or Operation Desert Storm. Survey questionnaires can be distracters for soldiers in a war zone and thus create unnecessary security/safety risks. Furthermore, it is difficult to obtain scientifically selected samples for surveys in war zones.

The Stars and Stripes survey implies that the Army will face a serious retention problem in the near future. The success of the Army’s re-enlistment program over
the past 5 years indicates that the news is not nearly as bad as the Stars and Stripes asserts. The Army believes that so long as funds remain available for the Selective Re-enlistment Bonus (SRB) program, at the requested levels, it will be able to retain soldiers with the requisite skills necessary to maintain readiness. Retention rates are often used as a benchmark to measure the success of the Army re-enlistment program. Given the historical retention rate for initial terms soldiers, it is not surprising to note that as many as 49 percent of the soldiers surveyed by Stars and Stripes indicated they did not plan to re-enlist. The Army staff (G–1) has tasked the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA) to develop a predictive model that will allow leadership visibility on future retention problems. The Well-Being Division of the Headquarters Department of the Army, G–1 compiled a list of human dimension “indicators” of stress on the force, with the top indicators being accessions, retention, and morale. However, an Operational Stress Framework has been developed that correlates operations tempo (OPTEMPO) to the indicators of stress and the United States Military Academy (USMA) OEMA is working on a model designed to predict stress on the force, given indicator measurements.

The Army (through its Army Research Institute (ARI)) will be conducting surveys and interviews with soldiers to determine career intentions, factors that impact them, and potential mitigators. Data will be collected from units deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. For comparative purposes, a control group of soldiers who did not deploy will also be surveyed. Findings from this study will be used to provide indicators of career intentions and determine potential mitigators.

The Army has taken a proactive approach to identifying and correcting problems for all soldiers and family members involved in OIF and other contingencies. The Army remains committed to providing the very best possible programs to the entire Army family during this stressful and turbulent time in our Nation’s history.

MEDICAL CARE AND LIVING CONDITIONS AT FORT STEWART

32. Senator Levin. Secretary Brownlee, we were appalled to learn that hundreds of sick and wounded soldiers, including many who served in Operation Iraqi Freedom, were living in substandard conditions and waiting months for medical care. I know that you have personally visited Fort Stewart to look into this. What were the conditions for these sick and wounded soldiers when you visited Fort Stewart?

Secretary Brownlee. At the end of October 2003 there were approximately 600 Reserve component (RC) soldiers in medical holdover (MHO) status at Fort Stewart. Of those present at the time, 406 deployed overseas in support of either OIF or OEF. The remainder were soldiers who did not deploy overseas. Of those present, 15 had been WIA. Across the board, their access to medical care was at least as good as that for active component soldiers, and well within TRICARE Prime standards. Soldiers in MHO status were waiting for acute appointments an average of 0.3 days, routine appointments 1.3 days, specialty appointments 1.45 days, and wellness appointments an average of 11.6 days. The TRICARE Prime access standards for these types of appointments are 24 hours, 7 days, 30 days, and 30 days respectively.

During that time, MHO soldiers were being housed in billets normally provided to all mobilizing soldiers whose mission is to train, process, and deploy to a theater of operations. Billeting consisted of open bay barracks with detached gang latrines leased from the Georgia National Guard. Structures were concrete floored, block construction with heat. Some buildings were air-conditioned. Barracks were clean and well maintained. Soldiers ate in contract dining facilities, some in the mobilization area and others with the 3d ID soldiers. Soldiers with severe ambulatory conditions or with special environmental considerations were billeted in an improved climate controlled facility.

33. Senator Levin. Secretary Brownlee, what changes did you direct to address this problem at Fort Stewart?

Secretary Brownlee. We recognize the concerns of soldiers in a MHO status and are addressing these issues. The Army has taken several actions to provide appropriate medical care and improved living conditions for all soldiers in a MHO status. In November 2003, the Army started requiring that all MHO soldiers be housed commensurate to the same standard of housing provided to AC soldiers on each installation. Soldiers in a MHO status at all Army installations have now been moved out of temporary billets into permanent facilities that meet these new requirements.
Even though the MHO soldiers had access to medical care well within TRICARE Prime standards, those standards were not sufficient to make timely dispositions for this particular group. The Army Surgeon General, therefore, mandated enhanced access standards for MHO soldiers: any necessary specialty consultations within 72 hours, Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRIs) and other diagnostic studies within 1 week, surgeries within 2 weeks, and medical evaluation boards processed within 30 days. He further directed that each military treatment facility would have not less than one nurse case manager for every 50 MHO patients.

34. Senator Levin. Secretary Brownlee, what actions have you taken to avoid similar problems at other installations treating troops returning from combat zones?

Secretary Brownlee. The access to care standards listed above apply to all military treatment facilities caring for MHO soldiers. Furthermore, our experience with MHO soldiers allows us to predict how many mobilizing and demobilizing soldiers will enter MHO. Based on Forces Command troop movement projections, we can forecast how many soldiers will be in MHO. We can predict these numbers by installation and by specific dates. This allows us to apply site-specific mitigation strategies that include use of Navy, Air Force, VA, and civilian facilities.

One of the mitigation strategies being examined is to provide health care for many MHO soldiers near their homes through the Army’s community based health care initiative. This plan calls for the National Guard and Reserve to establish community based health care organizations (CBHCO) across the Nation that will assume command and control, and case management of selected MHO soldiers. When medically appropriate, selected soldiers will receive care at or near their homes under the auspices of the CBHCOs. This will reduce the requirement for MHO soldiers to receive care on military installations.

The IMA is procuring relocatable facilities for Forts Stewart, Bragg, Bliss, Carson, and Hood. IMA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer, and the Army Contracting Agency are in the process of completing a Performance Work Statement. IMA is working through the Army Budget Office to ensure funding for the contract is in place. IMA is also repairing barracks at Fort Benning, Fort Drum, Camp Atterbury, Fort Dix, Fort Eustis, and Aberdeen Proving Grounds.

MODERNIZATION AND RECAPITALIZATION STRATEGY

35. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, because of funding constraints, the Army has followed a strategy that limits modernization and recapitalization of major weapon and support systems to the two divisions, and to some extent the cavalry regiment, of the counterattack corps at Fort Hood. However, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, none of these more modern units made it to Iraq in time for major combat operations. Now, in the stability and support phase, units from throughout the active and Reserve components will be rotating to Iraq and Afghanistan and engaging in an on-going counter-insurgency campaign. In light of these circumstances and Operation Iraqi Freedom lessons learned, do you consider that modernization and recapitalization strategy to remain valid?

General Schoomaker. The modernization and recapitalization strategy remains valid. You are correct in noting that the Army has reduced investments in the current force to more limited modernization and recapitalization efforts in order to free up resources to support ongoing and planned transformation programs. Most of the combat forces assigned to the counterattack corps were not identified by the Central Command Combatant Commander as essential for the execution of the Operation Iraqi Freedom campaign plan. However, the 4th Infantry Division, originally included in the opening phases of the operation, was delayed until after the completion of initial hostilities due to political constraints. Lessons learned from Iraq have reinforced the tenet of balanced modernization as the overall strategy for weighing current requirements against the need for an even more ready and relevant force for tomorrow. This approach provides an essential means for implementing the Army’s strategic vision of a transformed force for the future while still preserving sufficient readiness to meet the challenges associated with the prosecution of the war on terrorism. The ultimate goal of this strategy is to develop a fully capable force that will deliver future readiness at every point on the possible range of military operations. This will ensure that the Army remains fully capable of performing all missions assigned, while creating the force for tomorrow that will meet the operational demands that lie ahead.
Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, the Army established a requirement for five brigade sets of reactive armor tiles for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and, although the funding was never included in the annual budget request, for the last several years Congress has appropriated approximately $20 million a year for that purpose. I understand that a number of sets were shipped to Kuwait prior to the war, but that commanders there decided not to mount the armor prior to launching the invasion. It would seem to me that the failure to use the tiles in such a threat environment puts the overall requirement in serious question. Do you know why the decision was made not to mount the reactive armor tiles on the Bradley Fighting Vehicles that attacked into Iraq?

General Schoomaker. The decision not to mount the reactive armor tiles on the Bradley Fighting Vehicles was an availability and operational decision by the commanders on the ground. Only a limited number of the tiles were arriving in theater as the 3rd Infantry Division was preparing to attack. Although not privy to the actual deliberations, the commander would have decided the issue after an analysis of the mission, enemy, terrain, time, and troops available (METT–T), which is Army doctrine. Reactive armor tiles are currently in use in Iraq, no doubt because of the operational commanders' METT–T assessment of the situation. We are completing the installation of the initial shipment of 140 sets. On 13 Nov 03, Commander Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF–7), through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), requested an additional 160 sets of Bradley reactive armor for operations in Iraq. The shipment process for these sets was initiated on 14 Nov 03. The shipment is scheduled to depart the U.S. on 9 Dec 03 and arrive no later than 10 Jan 04. These dates support the commander's timeline and both Operation Iraqi Freedom 1 and 2 rotation requirements.

Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, do you agree that the requirement should be re-examined in light of that decision?

General Schoomaker. This capability is required by the force to counter current and future threats. Reactive armor is designed to enhance a ground vehicle's survivability at a minimum of weight and cost and provides the combatant commander the tactically flexible capability to increase force protection. The modularity and high mass efficiency of reactive armor has enabled these vehicles to be capable of effectively defeating shaped-charge warheads and other anti-armor threats without significant increases in weight and cost. The Army will review this requirement as part of the OIF lessons learned process.

Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, do you see a place for reactive armor, given the danger it presents to our dismounted troops, in an infantry-centric force such as that to which the U.S. Army is evolving?

General Schoomaker. Explosive Reactive Armor is the most effective proven technology to defeat both chemical-energy and kinetic-energy threats. The reactive armor activates when exposed to a specific heat/pressure combination does present a “High Risk” hazard to unprotected personnel. However, recent testing has shown that the threat to civilians and dismounted soldiers is limited to a small area outside the vehicle.

Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, do you see a similar potential problem in relying on active protection systems, which may also present a danger to dismounted troops, in the infantry-centric Future Force?

General Schoomaker. Reactive armor is a current requirement for the Future Combat System. The Army will continue to invest in new armor designs, featuring more advanced reactive and passive materials and more effective geometries, that will enable the development of combat vehicles that can be tailored to meet advanced threats (such as hypervelocity kinetic-energy penetrators, tandem shaped charge warheads, and precursors) while being kept at acceptable gross weights.

ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENT ROLES, MISSIONS AND FORCE STRUCTURE

Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, in light of Iraq and Afghanistan lessons learned, what changes do you recommend to active and Reserve component roles, missions, and force structure?

General Schoomaker. Component roles and missions are satisfactory. However, the structure and function of our Armed Forces will continue to evolve to better align with our defense strategy. The Army is undergoing large scale rebalancing actions to increase capabilities for the early stages of a conflict while providing force
structure to defend the homeland and maintain the force depth needed to support ongoing rotational requirements. The Army is improving joint and expeditionary capabilities to enhance strategic responsiveness by creating modular forces that are more flexible and adaptable to conduct the full range of missions across the entire spectrum of conflict. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the need to continue adjusting the number and type of capabilities in our military. The most important force structure changes will continue relieving stress on our high demand units to reduce the frequency and duration of deployments and spread these burdens more equitably.

IRAQI "KATUSA" PROGRAM

41. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, I understand that there is a program in Korea called the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) where individual Republic of Korea soldiers are integrated into U.S. units in any number of positions that would normally be filled by a U.S. soldier. This program was begun during the Korean War. Do you believe that such a program would have merit in Iraq today?

General Schoomaker. The KATUSA program began in July 1950 as a way to augment understrength U.S. units after the outbreak of war in June 1950. The situation in Iraq is significantly different than the early months of the Korean War. U.S. units deploying to Iraq are at full strength and do not need augmentation. Additionally, the KATUSA program was able to draw upon soldiers in the Republic of Korea Army. If this program were instituted in Iraq it could undermine current efforts to rebuild the Iraqi Army by diverting potential Iraqi soldiers to U.S. units. While there may be some benefit to integrating a small number of Iraqis into U.S. units to provide language and cultural expertise, this decision should be made by the combatant commander, General Abizaid, and the commander in Iraq, Lieutenant General Sanchez.

SPECTRUM INTERFERENCE AND FRATRICIDE

42. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, during the recent war in Iraq, Patriot anti-missile batteries mistakenly attacked and downed two coalition aircraft. Although the Army has yet to release its findings regarding the cause of these incidents, some experts believe that electromagnetic interference may have caused the Patriots to malfunction, mistaking the friendly aircraft for incoming missiles. Unfortunately, electromagnetic interference was also the cause of a number of Patriot misfires during the first Gulf War in 1991.

Given the increasing dependence on networks, wireless communications, and the number of military systems that make use of electromagnetic spectrum, examination of this issue should be a high priority. For example, a report by the Center for Army Lessons Learned indicated that "the Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) system sat idle in theater for the first 30 days waiting on operational frequencies." To your knowledge, how many other instances of such electromagnetic interference "malfunctions" occurred during the war in Iraq?

General Schoomaker. To my knowledge, the cause(s) of the incidents with the Patriot system have not been attributed specifically to electromagnetic interference (EMI). It may never be known exactly what role EMI may have played in one of the friendly fire incidents. However, there were reported incidents of interference during the deployment and operational phases of OIF that may have been a contributing factor to the inability to initially operate the Hunter UAV. As a result of the high density of systems operating in shared frequency bands located in the confined staging area, an increase in the amount of interference was observed. To minimize the extent of the interference, the decision was made to closely schedule when the Hunter UAV could operate while still in the staging area. It is clear that we must continue to keep as a high priority our efforts to mitigate the effects of EMI. We have processes and procedures to do frequency management. However, the increasing volume of users of the electromagnetic spectrum necessitates more dynamic and robust testing as well as better methods of deconfliction across the joint force.

43. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, how will the procedures for managing the use of spectrum be improved to prevent future incidents such as occurred with Patriot?

General Schoomaker. As you have stated the use of the electromagnetic spectrum is becoming more and more prevalent on the modern battlefield and the tools and techniques we use must be updated to keep up with the future demand. The
The use of the electromagnetic spectrum is shared by all the military services, which is why any solution must be a joint solution. This is why DISA Joint Spectrum Center, (under the direction of the Joint Staff and OASD NII), is defining the requirements for a system to evolve the management of the spectrum in Joint as well as coalition military operations. These requirements will be introduced into the Joint Requirements Oversight Council process to validate the requirements and assign an acquisition agent. This system is envisioned to enable the dynamic management of the electromagnetic battlefield.

44. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what procedures does the Army have in place to de-conflict spectrum usage by U.S. and coalition systems on the battlefield?

General Schoomaker. The current procedures to de-conflict coalition spectrum usage by U.S. and coalition forces on the battlefield resides at the joint level in a database maintained by the combatant commander (COCOM) or Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF). This database is made up of frequency records submitted through the chain of command to a central repository. Current DOD policy mandates that all systems that transmit must be registered in this database. The database is accurate to the point that the user of a piece of equipment submits a request to operate on specific frequencies. There is currently no system that prevents a user from transmitting without registering the frequencies that system transmits on.

LANDMINE ALTERNATIVES

45. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, the Army and DARPA have invested significant resources in the development of anti-personnel landmine alternatives, including initiating work on the Intelligent Munitions System, the next generation landmine component of Future Combat Systems. In the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Appropriations Conference Report, the conferees directed that „...the Army clearly define the requirements for a next generation intelligent minefield and ensure compliance with the Ottawa Treaty...” What is the status of the development of these requirements?

General Schoomaker. Senator, we are very early in the development of the Intelligent Munitions System (IMS), which is a core system of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) Program. As of April 2003, the requirements for IMS had been sufficiently developed to include them in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)-approved FCS Operational Requirements Document (ORD). According to these documented and approved requirements, the IMS must provide unmanned ground sensors linked to lethal/non-lethal scalable effects components via integrated and robust command and control systems, all of which maybe emplaced by multiple delivery means. As envisioned, WS will support many functions and missions including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), maneuver, and direct and indirect fires throughout the spectrum of operations. IMS will be an integrated munitions system fully controllable by our forces.

46. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, will the Intelligent Munitions System as currently envisioned be compliant with the Ottawa Treaty?

General Schoomaker. Senator, as you know, the United States is not a states party to the Ottawa Convention and, therefore, the Ottawa Convention does not determine our warfighter requirements. All components of IMS will comply with the Amended Mines Protocol of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons that the United States has ratified. The robust command and control system of the IMS will allow us to employ IMS in a variety of modes, some of which may coincide with the provisions of the Ottawa Convention.

47. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what lessons learned can be drawn from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan regarding the need for antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines?

General Schoomaker. Senator, we are still compiling the lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq. Because of the unique character of these conflicts and the incomplete nature of our lessons learned efforts, it would be premature at this time to draw definitive conclusions about the employment of ground-emplaced munitions in OIF and OEF, or about the military utility of these munitions in future conflicts. However, I can say that thus far, there is no indication that ground-emplaced munitions are either obsolete or superfluous. Although certainly not employed in every combat operation or situation, ground-emplaced munitions continue to offer unique and desirable battlefield effects to tactical commanders. Ground-emplaced munitions enable commanders to shape the battlefield to their advantage by denying the
enemy freedom of maneuver, protecting our forces, enhancing the effectiveness of other weapon systems, and acting as a "force multiplier" by allowing us to fight with fewer forces. No other weapon provides the same combination of capabilities, as do ground-emplaced munitions. During the recent U.S. policy review, the combatant commanders reaffirmed the continuing need for the capabilities currently provided by landmines, especially those that incorporate self-destructing/self-deactivating technologies.

COMMERCIAL SATELLITE USAGE

48. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, during operations in Iraq, commanders made significant use of leased commercial satellite capabilities to ensure adequate communications between mobile units, command posts, and fixed installations in theater. Were there any indications that communications over commercial satellites were less reliable or secure than those over military channels? If so, what were those indications?

General Schoomaker. The U.S. demand for bandwidth during a military contingency has almost always been underestimated. The Army relies heavily on commercial satellite capacity today, and will continue to augment the available military SATCOM capability with commercial assets in the future. While there were no specific reliability or security issues associated with Army communications over commercial satellites in Iraq—dependence creates risk. In the case of commercial communications capacity, the risk of a denial of service, through adversary or availability, is among the most important. In addition, in some cases, the Army shares commercial satellites and/or channels with our adversaries, which could potentially limit our offensive opportunities.

49. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, if there were problems, how do you plan to deal with them? Would that involve shifting reliance away from commercial satellites?

General Schoomaker. Commercial satellites cannot be relied on solely to support the Army's Beyond Line-of-Sight (BLOS) requirements because the commercial satellite market fluctuates and provides no guarantees of availability. Future military SATCOM system will allow more of the Army's current requirements to be supported with less reliance on commercial, and be capable of supporting the Army's requirements for protected tactical communications and communications on-the-move (COTM). Focusing on military SATCOM will ensure the Army obtains the most robust communications; controls the management and security of the assets; assures inter- and intra-theater connectivity among troop sites and homestation security; maximizes the use of DOD investments, while continuing to augment available military SATCOM capacity with commercial satellites.

ARMY BANDWIDTH REQUIREMENTS

50. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, the Army is developing new systems that will require the passing of huge quantities of information including sensor data, imagery from UAVs, and information from the intelligence community, over battlefield communications networks. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have confirmed our increasing reliance on instantaneous communications and data transmission, as well as its ability to greatly enhance our combat effectiveness.

In recent testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, General Dennis Moran (Director of Army Information Operations, Networks, and Space and Central Command (CENTCOM) Command, Control and Communications Director (J–6)) indicated that "there simply was not enough bandwidth at all levels of command to give the warfighters at the . . . brigade level—the kinds of information they needed to be more effective."

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently concluded in a study on Army bandwidth issues that "... at all levels of command within the Army, the current demand for bandwidth is larger than the supply." It goes on to indicate that even after a planned $20 billion investment in new networks and communications systems,"... the Army will fall short of its goals at certain command levels by an order of magnitude." Do you agree with the CBO's conclusions that Army technology investments will still result in a shortfall of needed bandwidth for communications systems?

General Schoomaker. The Task Force Network recommended development and fielding of battle command capabilities to leverage and enable interdependent network centric warfare within joint, interagency, and multinational full spectrum op-
erations. We need to bring future capabilities to the force today using COTS as a bridge. In the near term, the Army will procure more commercial satellite bandwidth while investing in improved standards and technologies for the mid- to long-term. Also, the Army will transition to more capable, next-generation DOD satellites as they are launched and put into operation. The Army’s future tactical information transport systems such as WIN–T, JTRS, and FCS are being designed to meet the needs of projected bandwidth requirements. These new systems will start arriving in Army units in fiscal year 2008.

51. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what technologies are being developed to address these issues?

General Schoomaker. By applying network operations technologies, including integrated network management, information assurance and information dissemination management, internet protocol-based systems, data compression, and dynamic spectrum management, future force systems will be able to efficiently plan, configure and control the network. In addition, software-defined radios, unmanned aerial vehicles with communications relay payloads, the Wideband Gapfiller Satellite constellation, Time Division Multiple Access techniques, surrogate satellites and advanced antenna and amplifier technologies will help provide future force systems with a multi-tiered, self-configuring network.

52. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what else can be done to ensure the most efficient use of our available bandwidth and ensure that our warfighters can make the best use of our advanced networks and communication systems?

General Schoomaker. The Army will work with DOD in jointly defining the standards and protocols to guide development of all information applications and transport systems of our future joint network. The Army’s future applications and transport systems must be fully nested in joint architectures that are tactically focused. We must also develop a comprehensive spectrum/frequency management tool to replace the multiple systems used today with one tool that can efficiently assign, deconflict and control the limited electromagnetic spectrum allocated for DOD use.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ISSUES

53. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, how will the lessons learned in Iraq be transformed into goals and investments in the Army science and technology program?

General Schoomaker. Lessons learned from all Army operations are gathered by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), part of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Part of TRADOC’s role as a key participant in the Army’s science and technology (S&T) investment planning process is to ensure lessons learned are addressed in deciding S&T investment priorities. TRADOC has a process called “gap analysis” that examines current and future needs, assesses ongoing S&T from many sources to determine if relevant efforts are underway, and prioritizes “gaps” in S&T that need to be addressed to provide requisite capabilities.

While retaining a balanced S&T investment strategy, the Army has focused critical S&T investments on accelerating the transition of proven technologies to warfighters. Past S&T successes already deployed to warfighters in Afghanistan and Iraq include: Chitosan bandages to reduce soldier bleeding; Interceptor Body Armor; Forward Area Language Convertor (FALCon); and Laser Neutralization System for Unexploded Ordnance (ZEUS).

The S&T investments in support of current operations include developing and improving bar armor for high mobility multi-wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) to protect crews from rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attacks as well as small arms fire and electronic warfare (EW) solutions to prevent the enemy from being able to use improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

54. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, were there any specific areas that you believe will require technological innovation to improve Army capabilities and meet deficiencies experienced during current operations?

General Schoomaker. There are numerous challenges facing us in the current war environment that require our current systems to perform tasks for which they were not originally intended. The good news is that for the past few years in focusing on and planning for the Future Combat Systems, we have been maturing and developing a number of innovative technologies that will improve or significantly enhance the capabilities of our ground forces. I have asked the Army research and development (R&D) community to take a hard look at these Future Force innovative
technologies and begin to bring them forward to enhance the capabilities and meet deficiencies in the current force. Let me give you two examples.

HMMWVs and other light tactical vehicles have proven very useful in many roles in the current conflict. However, the majority of the HMMWVs in the Army's inventory do not provide ballistic or mine blast protection. These vehicles were not originally intended for use in some of the roles and missions they currently serve and thus do not have the protection levels of heavy combat vehicles. We can, and have, armored some portion of the non up-armored HMMWV fleet. The design of these light, agile vehicles makes it impossible to use conventional slabs of steel armor to enhance survivability because the weight burden exceeds the limits of the drive train and suspension. Therefore an expedient solution has been developed in which Army scientists and engineers designed a lightweight add on armor kit to protect crews from small arms fire. The added on armor solution is being built in our depots and supplied as fast as we can in kit form to Iraq today. A novel configuration of slat armor (steel bars) was also developed that can be added to the doors of the HMMWVs to further increase the crew survivability from a direct RPG attack on the crew compartment. The slat armor only protects against RPG threat and not road side Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Several prototype slat armor kits have been sent to Iraq for evaluation.

Another example is Interceptor Body Armor for individual soldiers. Interceptor Body Armor is a modular, multi-threat body armor using an Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) and Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plates. The OTV is made from Kevlar advanced high performance fibers. The SAPI plate is a lightweight ceramic backed by Spectra composites and wrapped with a nylon fabric. This system is responsible for saving the lives of many of our soldiers, both in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Our researchers are currently exploring newer versions of these materials that will provide the same protection at a lower weight, reducing the load on our soldiers.

ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

55. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, I understand the Army is developing active protection technologies that could provide ground and air vehicles a measure of defense against extremely close-in attacks, for example from RPGs. What is the status of the development of these active protection technologies?

General Schoomaker. Army S&T is working on two Active Protection System (APS) approaches to address the close-in threats.

(1) The Close-In Active Protection System (CIAPS) uses a centralized radar to track the incoming rounds and provides 360 degree azimuth, 50-meter elevation coverage. CIAPS is effective against Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and RPGs, intercepting these threats within several meters of the vehicle on which the system is mounted. A pre-prototype CIAPS, mounted on a light armored vehicle, is currently being tested and has successfully intercepted live RPGs in range testing. The current system was designed for combat vehicles and, at 1,500 pounds, is too heavy for mounting on a HMMWV. A development effort would be needed to reduce the CIAPS system to less than 840 pounds for incorporation on standard HMMWVs, in conjunction with lightweight armor or on air vehicles such as helicopters (although there is no assurance that this technology can be safely employed in aircraft).

(2) Full Spectrum Close-In Active Protection System (FCLAS) uses an autonomous radar, digital signal processor, explosives and a countermeasure integrated in a small, self-contained interceptor round that may load into either a smoke tube or specially designed tube. Unlike CIAPS, FCLAS does not rely on a centralized radar system. Each FCLAS munition conducts surveillance, acquires the target, tracks the threat, launches, fuses, and detonates the countermeasure to defeat incoming threats within a few meters of the vehicle on which the system is mounted. Although a variation of FCLAS for air vehicles has been considered, there is no assurance that this technology can be safely employed in that application. At this time, only component level tests have been completed and the components have not been integrated into the countermuniition.

56. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what is the investment plan for these systems?

General Schoomaker. These APS programs are still in their infancy (i.e., emerging technologies versus fieldable systems); therefore our investments in them are in S&T accounts. In addition to the technical maturation and engineering required to make APS small, lightweight, rugged, reliable, and integratable onto existing platforms, there are operational issues that must be addressed. One major consideration
is the potential for serious damage to personnel and materiel in the vicinity of the APS intercept of the threat munition. The Army must carefully weigh the advantages of the protection that these APS solutions offer for ground vehicles against the consequences of the residual effects, especially the risks to our dismounted troops and other vehicles in our formations.

57. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what is the strategy and schedule for testing and deploying these systems?
   General Schoomaker. As I have indicated, a lot of work is needed to spiral back this APS technology into the current force. We are looking at what could be done to accelerate these efforts, both from a technical/engineering perspective as well as cost. However, before we commit to any strategy for developing and deploying APS, we must develop confidence in the performance and the tactics, techniques, and procedures to ensure that the risks to personnel and materiel are manageable. Until these issues are resolved, it is premature to commit System Development and Demonstration and Procurement funds for either FCLAS or CIAPS.

   [Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee adjourned.]