[Senate Hearing 108-655]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-655
CURRENT ARMY ISSUES
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 19, 2003
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Current Army Issues
november 19, 2003
Page
Brownlee, Hon. Les, Acting Secretary of the Army................. 5
Schoomaker, Gen. Peter J., USA, Chief of Staff, United States
Army........................................................... 8
(iii)
CURRENT ARMY ISSUES
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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:09 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Allard, Sessions, Levin, Kennedy, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E.
Benjamin Nelson, Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; Cindy Pearson, assistant chief clerk and security
manager; and Kenneth Barbee, security clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel;
William C. Greenwalt, professional staff member; Ambrose R.
Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional
staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member;
Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; and Richard F.
Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; and Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Andrew Kent, and
Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Dan Twining,
assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Darren Dick, assistant to Senator Roberts;
Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Meredith Moseley, assistant to Senator
Graham; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell
J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Mieke Y. Eoyang,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; William K.
Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant
to Senator Ben Nelson; Rashid Hallaway, assistant to Senator
Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri
Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. Good morning, everyone. The committee
meets today to receive testimony on current and future Army
issues, particularly with regard to the ongoing operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and in general in the overall global war
on terrorism.
We welcome back before the committee the Honorable Les
Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army, Under Secretary
permanent, and General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the
United States Army. We look forward to your testimony.
I have known both of you for many years and I cannot think
of a better Army team, civilian and military, at any time in
contemporary history than the two of you. Each of you have come
up through the ranks in the United States Army. Each of you has
experienced the rigors of command, the rigors of combat, and
both possess the ability to lead your people and care for their
families. So as a Nation I express our gratitude.
Today's Army has an enormous requirement to provide forces
for ongoing military operations around the world: over 150,000
soldiers in the Persian Gulf region, over 10,000 in
Afghanistan, 5,000 in the Balkans, and the usual number of
around 30,000 in South Korea. This is the greatest army in the
world.
I listened to the President of the United States delivering
a very significant and major address in Great Britain this
morning, in which he expressed the absolute resolve to fulfill
the commitments of this Nation and the other nations that have
joined us, notably Great Britain, in the war on terrorism. It
seems that the bulk of the responsibility, understandably I
think, falls on the United States Army.
So we are here for the purpose this morning of working with
you to see what we can do here in Congress, and to learn from
you how you intend, through your individual and combined
leadership, to provide for these forces now and in the future
to meet adversity wherever it is in the world.
In mid-October of this year, the Stars and Stripes
newspaper ran a series of articles about the morale of soldiers
and living conditions in Iraq. Overall, the poll indicated that
most soldiers surveyed felt unit morale and their own morale
was average or better, and most felt living conditions in Iraq
were average or better. Of note, however, Reserve and National
Guard soldiers rated unit and individual morale somewhat lower
than their active duty brothers. I say brothers and sisters
because it is a total force, and it is a magnificent force in
the fact that they do have the strength of the Guard and
Reserve.
Also, the polling indicated less than full confidence in
the chain of command, and that is somewhat disturbing, and I am
sure you have some responses to that today. The poll drew
attention to the large percentage, 49 percent, of the soldiers
who will likely not reenlist.
Finally, the article raised issues concerning the equitable
availability of services such as mail, PX facilities, email,
and phones, as well as different standards between the Army and
the Air Force. I actually saw that when I was over there with
my distinguished colleague here. I remember at that time
indicating that I felt that corrective measures had to be
taken.
Now, military service is an arduous task. It is not risk-
free and it is very demanding, not only of those in uniform but
their families, and each of you know this very well. Throughout
history, from the time of George Washington's Continental Army
to today, and I will bet you into the future, there is always a
level of griping in the ranks. We have known that. It is part
of military life. There is griping in civilian life. I do not
know how you compare the levels.
But in this instance the level of griping raises some
alarms. We will learn from you today exactly what corrective
measures you have taken and how you have examined the root
causes and hopefully eliminated some of those problems.
These polls are perhaps not scientific. These articles do
raise some questions about the stress on the force, the morale
and retention, and ultimately recruiting, and that of their
families. So we look forward to your assessments.
In October the Army Center for Lessons Learned at Fort
Leavenworth published, to the surprise I think of all of us, an
unusually frank assessment, an unclassified assessment, of
shortfalls in performance of Army units in Iraq and Afghanistan
in the key areas of tactical intelligence, human intelligence,
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations, fire support, and
targeting.
One of the strengths of our Armed Forces is the willingness
to turn a critical eye on yourselves, and we have done that
throughout history, identifying those problems and doing what
we can to fix them. We are very proud of this Army. We are very
proud of your ability and your professional judgment to address
these problems.
Additionally, there have been recent revelations about the
ability of prompt health care and living conditions for those
placed on medical hold, primarily members of the Reserve
component, in preparation for deployment. The issue came to
light in press reports of dissatisfaction and poor living
conditions at Fort Stewart, Georgia. Secretary Brownlee, I
commend you and the Chief and others who went down there very
promptly to examine that situation. So we look forward to
listening to your report today.
Again, the Army has been tasked with the bulk of the
responsibility for stability operations and civil affairs and
peacekeeping operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The scope of
these responsibilities is very large and it is very complex.
The demands on the Army units will continue to be high. We need
only listen to our President's speech this morning.
The rotation plans reflect careful, pragmatic planning, I
hope, to replace these units. Questions remain, however, about
how long such rotation plans can be sustained and what the
long-term impact will be on the Army units, especially in the
Reserve component, the readiness of the Army to respond to
unforeseen contingency and surge requirements.
Finally, questions have been raised about whether the best
equipment is being provided to our deployed forces. Therein,
Congress has a very special role. Both active and Reserve are
forwarding complaints to Congress. For example, do deployed
soldiers have the best possible body armor and adequate body
armor, and is there a need for the so-called up-armored high-
mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) to provide our
soldiers with the best protection possible?
The recent shootdowns of Army helicopters--a tragic loss of
men and women. Secretary Brownlee, you and I have been out
there at Arlington Cemetery. I was out again this week as these
brave soldiers are interred in that magnificent cemetery. What
about the protection on these aircraft? I think we have to go
back and examine the decisionmaking and whether or not we could
have seen this problem before it developed to the magnitude
that we are facing today, certainly in the question of unit
body armor and of course with the helicopters, because that is
not a battle zone that some of us have experienced in years
past, where the rear echelon has a far higher degree of
protection. There is no rear echelon in Iraq or Afghanistan. It
is all a battle front.
The success of the Army in recent military operations is
indisputable. The men and women of the Army and their families
have performed magnificently. Now it is our job to do what we
can to see if we can help them.
This hearing is part of a larger undertaking that this
committee will pursue to fully understand the lessons learned
by all the military Services and the combatant commands during
the conduct of recent military operations. We owe that to our
men and women in uniform and to their families and to the
American people. I am proud that we are undertaking that today
with two of our most distinguished current members of the
military team.
Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
calling this important hearing. I join you in welcoming our two
witnesses, both of whom are very familiar to us.
Last week, I visited five wounded soldiers from Iraq at the
Walter Reed Army Hospital. Two are from my home State of
Michigan, the rest from other States. Two were members of the
active Army, the others from the Army National Guard. Three of
them were amputees. To the person, they were extremely proud of
their service in Iraq and united in their love of our country.
I have not met a finer group of Americans.
One of the wounded soldiers, a staff sergeant who lost a
leg, has already decided that he wants to continue in the Army.
I know that the Army in the past has retained amputees on
active duty. At least two of them have continued on to four-
star rank: General Eric Shinseki, of course, who served as Army
Chief of Staff; and General Fred Franks, who commanded a corps
in Operation Desert Storm. Secretary Brownlee and General
Schoomaker, I ask that you do all that you can to retain such
soldiers, who, though severely wounded, want to continue to
serve in the Army that they love. Who knows; we may have a
future corps commander or Army chief of staff among those
wounded soldiers.
The dedicated, motivated, well-trained, and led soldiers of
the U.S. Army are its prized assets and, much more than its
high technology weapons, are what sets that Army far above
other armies of the world. We have a sacred duty to ensure that
we, the leaders of the Army, the leaders of the Department of
Defense (DOD), and Members of Congress, work together to do all
that we possibly can to provide for their welfare, including
medical care for those who are recovering from injury or
sickness, including our troops being paid on time, including
the best equipment in the world, such as the body armor and the
aircraft protection issues that were raised by our chairman,
and of course the best training, so that they can accomplish
their missions and return home to their families.
As General Schoomaker has testified in the past, we are at
war and the Army is bearing the brunt of it, especially in the
counterinsurgency and stability operations currently being
conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army's planning and
execution of the conventional phase of the war in Iraq was
exceptional. The current phase of the war is far more
problematic, but just as important.
Even those of us who have been critical of the way the
administration took the country to war in Iraq with inadequate
international support and even those of us who are critical of
the administration for a lack of planning for the aftermath, we
believe, along with those who are totally supportive, that the
stakes are much too high for our Nation's security and for
international security to countenance failure. We must succeed
in Iraq.
The Army has been and will continue to play the central
role in dealing with the current chaos and violence and
transitioning to a hopefully swift and greater international
involvement and true transition to Iraqi sovereignty.
We have a host of personnel, equipment, and operational
issues to address in this hearing. The Army, in its own after-
action reviews, tries to compare its performance against the
standard of perfection, as our chairman has said, realizing
that we will never attain that standard, but that in doing so
it will improve performance immeasurably. That is the spirit of
our being here this morning. We need to determine where we are
falling short of that standard and determine what we need to do
to get as close as humanly possible to that standard should the
next conflict come.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Members of the committee, we are going to have at least one
round of questions, 6 minutes each. But the ranking member and
I are very anxious to adjourn and go into room SH-219 for our
classified portion of this hearing. So we will have to evaluate
as time permits whether we can get to a second round. But I
should hope that you can arrange your schedules so as to attend
the classified session.
Secretary Brownlee, we welcome you. For those that may not
know of your background in connection with the Senate, 17 years
of your distinguished career have been devoted to the United
States Senate. You were once staff director of the Armed
Services Committee under the able leadership of Senator Strom
Thurmond and then under myself.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. LES BROWNLEE, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
Secretary Brownlee. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members
of the committee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today to testify on the tremendous accomplishments of our
soldiers and the progress they are making in Iraq. With your
permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit our full joint
statement for the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
Secretary Brownlee. On behalf of our great soldiers who are
serving our country around the world, let me begin by
expressing gratitude for the exceptional support that the
members of this committee have provided to our soldiers and
their families as well. I know that you are deeply interested
in the great work our soldiers are doing, their attitudes, how
they are trained and equipped, and how those with medical
issues are being cared for.
I was in Iraq in June and returned again in late September.
I had the opportunity to speak with commanders and soldiers at
several levels and have regular contact with senior Army
leaders in theater, and am grateful to have the opportunity to
share what I have learned with you.
We appreciate the service and the enormous sacrifice made
by our soldiers and their families as we meet the challenges
and risks of this war on terrorism, with its current higher
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and frequent extended deployments.
As President Bush recently stated: ``Our men and women are
fighting terrorist enemies thousands of miles away in the heart
and center of their power, so that we do not face those enemies
in the heart of America.''
One fact is clear: The Army is at war and is serving a
Nation at war. In this, the dedicated service of the Army's
total force has been invaluable. The steady progress in the war
on terrorism has been possible because both active and Reserve
component forces have fought together, along with our sister
Services, to win decisively on battlefields where terrorists
once flourished. I would like to pay special tribute to members
of our Reserve components and their families and employers as
well for their service and sacrifice.
Now we are engaged in bringing peace to both Afghanistan
and Iraq and creating an environment where democracy can take
root. In Iraq, President Bush has identified three primary
objectives, to which we remain committed: First, we must
improve security by aggressively hunting down the terrorists
who are attempting to undermine progress for the Iraqi people;
second, we must work with the international community and the
Iraqi people to rebuild Iraq, restore basic services, and
revitalize the Iraqi economy; and third, we must support
efforts to accelerate the orderly transfer of sovereignty and
authority to the Iraqi people.
Our soldiers understand this mission and their commitment
to getting the job done is having an extraordinarily positive
effect on the people of Iraq. It is difficult to convey just
how bad things were in Iraq when our forces liberated their
country this past summer. Yet the vast human potential of the
Iraqi people themselves was still there, along with their
country's great natural resources, which will in time help them
recover from the damage Saddam Hussein inflicted on them.
During visits to Iraq, I have witnessed the magnificent
performance of our troops and, as many of you have also
observed, we are making progress.
On behalf of the United States Army, thank you for your
interest and your efforts. We very much appreciate those of you
who have taken the time to visit our soldiers there.
The end of fast-paced mobile operations has given our
supply system time to catch up with our units. Taking care of
our soldiers is of the utmost importance to the Army. In
September soldiers began taking advantage of the Rest and
Recuperation Leave Program.
We are moving to meet the combatant commanders'
requirements for both up-armored HMMWVs and Interceptor Body
Armor. We are boosting current production to the maximum rate
the industrial base is capable of and production is fully
funded at the rate of 25,000 outer tactical vests and small
arms protective inserts per month. At currently planned rates
of production, we will have all our troops in Iraq fitted with
Interceptor Body Armor by the end of December. We owe it to our
soldiers to care for them to the very best of our ability.
Events since the end of major combat operations in Iraq
have differed from our expectations and have combined to cause
problems, including those at some mobilization sites, for some
of our soldiers, problems we have identified and are moving to
fix.
Our soldiers must continue to attack and eliminate
remaining anti-coalition forces in Iraq and establish a secure
environment. The magnitude of the effort is substantial, but
our soldiers are performing as the professionals they are, with
skill, courage, and dedication. It will take time and the Army,
as part of the joint team, will bear the brunt of the fight.
The OPTEMPO is high and so is the pressure. We are in a
dangerous business. Our men and women and their families
recognize the obligations that come with the uniform and they
have not flinched. Like many of you, I have visited with many
of them at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Without exception,
they have impressed me deeply with their spirit, their
dedication to duty and their units, and their abiding faith in
the United States. They understand that freedom is not free,
but is the most precious thing we possess. They are American
soldiers in the finest tradition.
Despite remarkable successes, our fight is far from over.
Our enemies are committed and believe we lack the resolve to
win the peace in Iraq. I can assure you that this is not true.
I have seen it in our soldiers' eyes and heard the
determination in their voices.
In closing, I would like to take this opportunity to thank
this committee for the opportunity to appear before you today
along with our 35th Chief of Staff, a truly great soldier and a
genuine warrior in every sense of the word. It is an honor for
me to work alongside this great American each day on behalf of
our soldiers around the globe. We are truly fortunate that
General Schoomaker answered his Nation's call during this war,
making the difficult decision to leave a comfortable retirement
and far less stressful environment to rejoin our Army.
I might mention that General Schoomaker and I are both
graduates of the University of Wyoming and we are proud of
that.
Mr. Chairman, thank you and the members of this
distinguished committee for your continued support for the men
and women in our Army, an Army that is at war and a full member
of the joint team deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the
world fighting terrorism. I look forward to answering your
questions, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Secretary Brownlee. I had
intended to introduce this distinguished Chief of Staff of the
Army, but I could not do it any better than you. So I will just
say: Thank you for your continued public service and to your
family for joining you. General.
STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES ARMY
General Schoomaker. Thank you, sir. Good morning, Mr.
Chairman and distinguished members of the committee. It is a
pleasure to appear before you today and to tell you about the
tremendous work our soldiers are doing as they accomplish our
Nation's business around the world.
With your permission, I would like to submit, along with
the Honorable Mr. Brownlee, our full statement for the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
General Schoomaker. I would like to begin, as Secretary
Brownlee has, by thanking each of you for your tremendous
support. You have shown our men and women tremendous support
over the recent months during this difficult time for the Army.
I have been impressed by the willingness many of you have shown
to visit our soldiers overseas, to visit our wounded soldiers
at medical centers here in the United States and in Landstuhl,
Germany, and to use these visits to inform legislation and
resourcing levels.
The news reports seem content to highlight the differences
among you, but I am proud of what you have accomplished
together for our soldiers.
From passage of the fiscal year 2004 appropriations bill
and the supplemental, to this committee's ongoing efforts to
complete the conference action on the authorization bill, you
have provided to the world an example of democracy in action,
an example of what we are fighting for. Thank you for your
support.
Today our Nation is at war, and the Army is a critical
member of a joint team serving our Nation at war. Some do not
realize, in my opinion, the gravity of the situation that we
face, and some may have even forgotten the events of September
11. We are not immune from another attack here at home. We are
at war now out of necessity, and I would like to stress, this
is a test of will, a test of will we cannot afford to lose.
We find ourselves in extraordinary times as our Army serves
our Nation at war. As you all know, we have been on an
operational treadmill for quite some time, actually since about
1989. It is hard to recall a time in history, with the
exception of World War II, when we have been busier. But being
busy is different from being at war.
There is no question that the pace of our Nation at war
challenges our Army. We have more than 300,000 soldiers
deployed in about 120 countries, supporting various operations.
We continue to meet these challenges with a seamless commitment
of active, Reserve, and National Guard soldiers and civilians,
who continue to give so selflessly to our great Nation.
Soldiers like Specialist Tillman, who gave up an $11 million
football contract to enlist and now serve in Iraq. Specialist
Tillman gets it. He knows why he is there and exemplifies the
kinds of service all of our soldiers are willing to make for
our Nation.
This is the first time since World War II that we have
deployed soldiers in harm's way directly for the American
people. Previously we deployed our soldiers to help somebody
else during their time of need. Our soldiers understand this.
Since being sworn in as the Army Chief of Staff on the 1st
of August, we have traveled around the world to the Middle
East, Asia, the Pacific Rim, and Alaska to be with our
soldiers. Within the last 30 days, we traveled to Kosovo, where
I met with members of the 28th Infantry--the 28th Division out
of Pennsylvania Army National Guard; and to Bosnia, meeting
with the membership and the leadership of the 34th Division
Army National Guard out of Minnesota; and to Europe, meeting
with General Bell and the soldiers that are preparing to go to
Iraq on this next rotation out of the 1st Infantry Division. I
am proud to report to you that in each of these places skilled,
trained, and ready soldiers are performing magnificently.
I have also had the opportunity to meet with 71 of my Army
chief of staff counterparts from other countries since the 1st
of August, and I have explained to each of them the seriousness
of the war on terror and have enlisted their continued support
in the fight against terror.
Around the world, our soldiers perform with determination,
skill, and courage. As I have stated before, the American
soldier has been and remains indispensable. Our soldiers,
civilians, and their families set the standard every day for
selfless service. Today's soldiers accept their
responsibilities and perform every task and mission asked of
them, just as their parents and grandparents have done before
them.
But while our soldiers are carrying on the legacy of
earlier generations of American soldiers, this is a different
kind of war. This is not easy and we cannot approach it as if
it were business as usual. This state of war requires us to
challenge old paradigms, to be more flexible and adaptable.
Over the course of the last 26 months, our soldiers have proven
that they are up to any task. They are smart, morale is solid,
and, having recently spent time with the 41st Infantry at Fort
Riley, who just returned from duty in Iraq, to a man they are
proud of their service and what they accomplished. They
understand why we are deployed in places that we are. They know
why we are there.
There is an intensity of focus and a dogged determination
to succeed that is absolutely extraordinary. We must never lose
sight of the fact that it is our soldiers that put it all on
the line and we will do everything in our power to prepare for
the challenge that they will face in battle. In return, we owe
them our very best, and I am really proud to serve with them.
I would like to, at this time, read The Soldier's Creed,
because I think it is absolutely imperative that it is right up
front for the American people and for the American soldier.
Inside of this creed is a warrior ethos. It says:
``I am an American soldier. I am a warrior and a
member of a team. I serve the people of the United
States and live the Army values.''
These next four statements are the warrior ethos. This
is what an army is about: ``I will always place the
mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never
quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade. I am
disciplined physically and mentally tough, trained and
proficient in my warrior task and drills. I always
maintain my arms, my equipment, and myself. I am an
expert and I am a professional. I stand ready to
deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United
States in close combat. I am a guardian of freedom and
the American way of life. I am an American soldier.''
I just thought that was appropriate as part of my opening
statement because it is very important that we remember what
the American Army is for and what we are as soldiers.
In closing, I would like to take this opportunity to thank
this committee for the opportunity to appear before you today
and for your continued support for the men and women of our
Army, deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout the world.
Our Nation asks much of our Army and I am confident that we
will deliver. As a soldier, I know we have the will, the
determination, and the drive to master the challenges facing
us. I look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Brownlee and
General Schoomaker follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Les Brownlee and Gen. Peter J.
Schoomaker, USA
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, we
appreciate the opportunity to come before you today and testify on the
tremendous accomplishments of our soldiers and the great progress they
are making in ``winning the peace'' in Iraq. On behalf of the soldiers
who are serving our country around the world, let us begin by
expressing gratitude for the exceptional support that you have provided
to our soldiers and their families.
We have been asked to talk about the great work our soldiers are
doing, their attitudes, their training and equipping, and how those
with medical issues are being taken care of. We have both been in Iraq
in recent months. During those visits, we had the opportunity to speak
face to face with commanders and soldiers at every level. Also,
although our deployed soldiers are under the operational control of the
Combatant Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), senior Army
leaders in the Pentagon communicate routinely with senior Army
commanders in the field. We are grateful to have the opportunity today
to share with you our perceptions of our Army at war.
We appreciate the service and the enormous sacrifice made by our
soldiers and their families as we meet the challenges and risks posed
by the war on terror, with the current higher operational tempo
(OPTEMPO) and frequent, extended deployments. We would also like to
highlight the invaluable contributions of our Reserve components and
their employers.
Against this magnificent performance by our soldiers over the last
26 months, we must express a word of caution. We are an Army at war,
serving the Nation at war, but we are concerned that all too many,
across the Nation as well as within the Army, do not understand the
implications of being at war. Americans have been killed here at home
by terrorists, who will try again; the events of September 11, 2001,
may presage another attack in the future. The resources Congress has
given us, and the work it has done in informing the American people of
what we are doing, and why, are critical to our successes to date.
We must all understand and communicate to our fellow citizens some
key facts about the global war on terror. This war differs in
significant ways from the conventional paradigm that many associate
with World War II, the threat to the survival of our Nation and our way
of life are at least of the same magnitude. In fact, because of the
destructive power that can be unleashed by small numbers of people and
the potentially devastating informational effects of major terrorist
acts, the threat we face today may be even more serious. We cannot let
the fact that the terrorist threat is often difficult to detect and
substantiate lull us into a false sense of security. In fact, the
terrorists we are fighting have been waging war against us for many
years. They are elusive, cunning, and committed to using every means at
their disposal--including our own institutions and processes--to
undermine our society and erode our will to persevere. The war is not
likely to end until we destroy the terrorist networks that are aligned
against us, and convince the populations from which they have arisen
that peaceful development within a framework of representative
government is a better alternative than terror.
The global war on terror will require a sustained effort over a
long period. There will be periods when our military will be in direct
combat during this war, and there are also likely to be periods when
the battles subside. We cannot afford to be lulled into a false sense
of security and we cannot afford to treat our current situation as if
it were ``business as usual.''
War is often ambiguous, and requirements to meet the threat will
continue to change. We must adapt to the changing requirements in order
to succeed. The Members of this Congress have enabled our military to
adapt to the conditions of the battlefield through your action on
recent supplemental spending measures and other defense legislation. On
behalf of our soldiers, we thank you, and ask you to sustain this
critical support. We are committed to working with you in support of
your constitutional responsibilities.
One fact is clear: the dedicated service of the Army's total force
has been invaluable. The steady progress in the war on terror has been
possible because our active, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard
units have fought together, along with our sister services, to win
decisively on battlefields where terrorism once flourished. Now we are
engaged in bringing peace to these regions and creating an environment
where democracy can take root.
As the President said on the same day that he announced the end of
major combat operations, ``We have difficult work to do in Iraq. We're
bringing order to parts of that country that remain dangerous. We're
pursuing and finding leaders of the old regime, who will be held to
account for their crimes.'' He added, ``The transition from
dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every
effort.''
President Bush has identified three primary objectives, to which we
remain committed. First, we must improve security by aggressively
hunting down the terrorists and individuals who are attempting to
undermine progress for the Iraqi people. Second, we must work with the
international community and the Iraqi people to rebuild Iraq and
restore basic services--jumpstart the Iraqi economy. Third, we must
support efforts to accelerate the orderly transfer of sovereignty and
authority to the Iraqi people.
Our soldiers understand this clear mission, and their extraordinary
commitment and dogged determination to getting the job done is having a
positive effect on the people of Iraq. They are working with the Iraqi
people, our coalition partners, and the international community to
achieve a better Iraq for the Iraqi people, the region, and the world.
Our soldiers understand that helping the Iraqis build a free and
democratic society will help make our own country safer, and they
continue to make remarkable progress in that direction every day.
During our visits to Iraq, we have witnessed progress being made.
Living conditions are getting better, and will continue to get better,
both for the people of Iraq and for the men and women serving there.
Several Members of Congress and their staffs who have been to Iraq have
come to the same conclusion. On behalf of the men and women of the
United States Army, thank you for your interest and your efforts.
It is difficult to accurately portray just how bad things were in
Iraq when our forces liberated the country this spring. What we would
consider a normal society did not exist, having been terrorized by
Saddam Hussein's government since 1979. Crippled by decades of neglect,
the country's infrastructure was in shambles and cities were crumbling.
Yet the vast human potential of the proud Iraqi people was still there,
with great natural resources to help rebuild from the damage Hussein
inflicted on them.
Working closely with the people of Iraq, we are making progress
throughout most of the country. Local government councils are taking
increasing responsibility for civic administration and services across
Iraq. Our Army divisions are training Iraqi police, facility protection
forces, and civil defense corps to assume responsibility for local
security and law enforcement; more than 85,000 Iraqis are serving their
countrymen in providing safety from the Baathists who stole it from
them once before. Civil affairs public health teams, working with
governmental and nongovernmental organizations, have facilitated
reopening of all 240 hospitals and 95 percent of Iraq's 1,200-plus
clinics. Since the war, 22 million children and 700,000 women have been
inoculated against diseases.
Our units are helping get Iraqi schools running again. Army Civil
Affairs teams, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) had completed 1,628 school
renovations as of October 14. An additional 1,597 renovations are
ongoing, and 200 more are in the planning stage. In all, 5.1 million
students are enrolled and attending class. These efforts have benefited
from numerous American communities, which have been sending the troops
additional supplies to distribute to Iraqi children. We are continuing
to make things safer for the people of Iraq and our own troops by
removing ammunition caches from around the country, seizing explosives
and weapons from those remnants of the former regime seeking to
terrorize their countrymen. Markets are open, and trade is steadily
coming back to life.
These are but a very few of the thousands of things our Army is
busy doing for the people of Iraq these days. For our troops:
The end of fast-paced mobile operations is providing time for our
supply system time to catch up with the various units. Mail flow has
been improving; food quality is rising with the delivery of more hot
meals plus fresh fruits and vegetables; we are building more dining
facilities, internet cafes, phone banks, and climate-controlled
buildings to give our soldiers better opportunities to relax between
missions.
In September, soldiers began taking advantage of the Rest and
Recuperation (R&R) Leave Program. Under this program, deployed soldiers
may be authorized 15 days of chargeable leave between their third and
eleventh month and a flight, at government expense, to and from
designated airports in either Germany or the United States. We have
recently added Kuwait City as a third departure point, and are steadily
expanding the number of troops participating. When the program started,
we flew the troops into Baltimore-Washington International Airport; on
November 1, we increased the arrival airports to include Atlanta and
Dallas. We feel this program will be a valuable aid in sustaining
deployed forces' morale.
Taking care of our forces is of great importance to the Army. We
are striving to meet the combatant commander's requirements for up-
armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). The
Army's current fiscal year 2004 requirement for up-armored HMMWVs is
3,331, of which 3,142 are for CENTCOM. As the Army recognized this
emerging requirement, we took immediate action to fill a critical need,
including the redistribution of vehicles from across the force (Balkans
and United States). To date, we have redistributed or sent from
production 537 vehicles, bringing the total in CENTCOM's area of
responsibility (AOR) to approximately 1,300. As of last week, another
116 were in transit. The production rates for new vehicles rose to 80
per month at start of fiscal year 2004, and we are seeking to ramp up
production rates to the maximum of 220 per month by May 2004. On
October 17, we began testing kits of bolt-on armor for regular vehicles
to improve their resistance to improvised explosive devices. Testing
continues and an analysis of the results is ongoing. We expect final
definition by the end of this month. For our Strykers, we are fielding
slat armor, with all kits to be in theater before the Stryker vehicles
arrive.
Another example of how we have adapted to battlefield requirements
is Interceptor Body Armor (IBA), comprised of Outer Tactical Vests
(OTVs) and Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI). Last year, commanders
in the field identified a shortage of IBA in theater. The original
requirement for IBA was based on issuing it only to the dismounted
fighting soldier. In June 2003, as the threat to our soldiers changed,
the basis of issue was changed to include every soldier and Department
of Defense (DOD) civilian in-theater. This increased the requirement by
over 80,000. With the support of this Congress, we have stepped up
production to meet this increase. We have boosted current production to
the maximum rate the industrial base is capable of, and production is
fully funded at the rate of 25,000 OTVs and SAPIs per month. As of
November 5, over 116,000 sets of IBA had been fielded. At this pace,
every soldier and Department of the Army civilian in theater will soon
have IBA.
We owe it to our soldiers to care for them to the best of our
ability. Our planning assumptions for our mobilization sites rested
upon the belief that the active duty units at those bases would be
deployed, and that the Reserve component units who mobilized and
demobilized there would do so on largely empty sites. Additionally,
many medical personnel deployed to theater to meet the combatant
commander's requirements. Events since the end of major combat
operations in Iraq have differed from our expectations and have
combined to cause problems for many soldiers--problems we have
identified and are taking corrective actions to fix. For example, on
October 30, we transferred 50 medical hold personnel from crowded
conditions at Fort Stewart to the less-strained facilities at Fort
Gordon. We are taking additional measures to resolve these problems,
such as moving other medical hold personnel into climate-controlled
buildings, seeking local civilian medical appointments, and increasing
medical staff.
Back in Iraq, our soldiers must attack and eliminate remaining
anti-coalition forces and establish a secure environment where the
values of freedom and democracy can take root. An integral part of this
campaign is assisting interim governments to deliver basic services--
security, food, water, power, and education--to their people. Our
soldiers must simultaneously conduct combat operations and provide
humanitarian assistance, often shifting between the two in the course
of a single day.
The magnitude of the effort is staggering. For example, in Iraq,
soldiers are executing around 2,000 missions every day. Each mission is
important, and each one is dangerous. Nonetheless, our soldiers are
performing as professionals--with skill, courage, and dedication. We
all know this will take time, and that for now, the Army, as part of
the joint team, will bear the brunt of the fight.
The OPTEMPO is high and so is the pressure. We are in a dangerous
business. Our men and women and their families recognize the
obligations that come with the uniform, and they have not flinched. We
have visited them at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and at Landstuhl
Regional Medical Center in Germany, as have many of you. Without
exception, they deeply impressed us with their dedication to duty and
their units, their good spirits, and their faith in the United States.
Their families--mothers, fathers, relatives--and friends whom we've met
there and elsewhere are the same. They understand that freedom is not
free, but it is the most precious thing we possess. These soldiers and
hundreds of other service men and women know this and have paid for the
freedom of other Americans they will never meet. They are American
soldiers in the greatest traditions.
It is an All-Volunteer Force doing this tremendous work, and
recruiting and retention are of great interest to the Army's senior
leadership. For the most part, initial indications are encouraging, but
we understand that we must closely monitor this key element of
readiness. The active Army's fiscal year 2003 recruiting objective was
73,800 new recruits. We accessed 74,167, of whom 94.5 percent were high
school graduates. This is the highest percentage since 1992.
Additionally, the percentage of recruits in Category IV was 0.27
percent, the lowest since the All-Volunteer Force began in 1973.
Numbers are comparable in the Reserve components. Charged with
recruiting 26,400 new members, the Army Reserve accessed 27,365, and
the Army National Guard achieved fiscal year 2003 end strength with the
lowest no-show rate ever seen. Further, there were zero no-shows in the
September call-up. We are aware of reports coming out of Iraq that
suggest a morale problem in certain units and are working to address
those issues.
Recent news reports have attempted to highlight impending problems
in retention, but the figures cited in these accounts are not far from
historical averages. For instance, a recent article claimed that 46
percent of soldiers surveyed indicated they would not reenlist. Over
the past 4 years, however, the rate of first term soldiers who did not
reenlist has ranged from 42 percent to 49 percent. The Army achieved
all retention goals during this period. We believe this success can be
directly attributed to the Army's Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB)
program. The Army re-enlisted 54,151 soldiers in fiscal year 2003,
including 15,213 soldiers whose enlistments would have expired before
September 30.
In fiscal year 2004 alone, the Army must retain approximately
58,100 soldiers to maintain desired end strength; this equates to a
retention mission increase of 2,000 soldiers. We will continue to rely
on a robust SRB Program to enable achievement of our retention goals.
Developing ways to retain soldiers directly engaged in the ongoing war
on terror is critical. We implemented a ``targeted'' bonus (TSRB) at
the end of fiscal year 2003 that was quite successful. We expect the
TSRB will greatly enhance our ability to attract and retain soldiers.
Despite remarkable successes, our fight is far from over. Our
enemies are committed and believe we lack the resolve to ``win the
peace'' in Iraq. We can assure you that this is not true: we have seen
it in our soldiers' eyes, and heard their determination in their
voices--here at home and overseas with our deployed forces. The
progress we have made in the past 6 months is a testament to our
force's ability to quickly adapt and respond to the many complex
challenges they face. Our commanders and troops are confident and feel
that we are gaining momentum in the fight, increasingly taking the
fight to the enemy. It is hard, and may take longer than we had
expected or hoped, but our ultimate success in helping the Iraqi people
reclaim their country is assured.
In years to come, when historians write the story of this critical
period, they will note that in Iraq and around the globe, the
unwavering commitment, courage, and compassion of the American soldier
led the way in the fight against terror and lit the lamp of freedom and
democracy for millions who had known only oppression. By carrying the
fight to the enemy, the Army is destroying terrorism today at its core
and spawning grounds, providing the greatest assurance of protection to
the American people, and striking fear in the hearts and minds of our
terrorist enemies.
In closing, we would like to take this opportunity to thank the
committee for the opportunity to appear before you today and for your
continued support for the men and women in our Army--a relevant and
ready Army and a full member of the joint team, deployed in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and throughout the world fighting terrorism. We look
forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
We will now proceed to a round of 6 minutes.
Secretary Brownlee, this question I think falls properly on
you because General Schoomaker has just recently joined the
leadership at the Department of Defense. These reports of a
shortage of body armor, these reports of ill-equipped ground
vehicles and air vehicles in terms of the armor, are just
totally unacceptable. Now, where was the error, and I say it
was an error made in planning, to send those troops to forward
deployed regions--and the conflict in Iraq particularly--
without the adequate numbers of body armor and vehicles?
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, let me just start out by
saying, referring to Senator Levin's statement, we do have a
standard of perfection. We do not always meet it and I regret
every time we do not.
In this particular case, the history of this body armor is
that it was a relatively new piece of equipment when we went
into Afghanistan and later Iraq. Our intention initially was to
ensure that all of our combat troops, those infantry troops
that would be most closely engaged in the fight that we could
anticipate, were the first priority in equipping them with body
armor, and all of these soldiers were equipped.
We simply did not have enough at that time to equip
everyone. We have taken steps to increase the production of
these things. They are dependent on certain substances, some of
which are very limiting in the numbers of these. But we have
increased the number of producers, we have increased the
capacity, and, as I indicate in my statement, at the current
rate of production we should have all the soldiers in Iraq, to
include those in the rear and contractors, equipped with this
kind of body armor by the end of December.
Chairman Warner. Let us use as a baseline the President's
statement that major combat operations are over. You mean in
the forces that were employed from jump-off day through the,
now the term, ``end of major conflict,'' all of those troops
had the equipment?
Secretary Brownlee. The troops that were in the forward
combat elements, the infantry troops, the armored troops, those
that we could anticipate would come in close contact with the
enemy. The rear troops, the logistics forces that we did not
anticipate--since we had to prioritize, we simply did not have
enough to equip everyone. We prioritized and as we move back in
the theater in some cases we had equipped perhaps one per three
soldiers, and the instructions were to put those on the
soldiers that would be going forward. It was a matter of having
more soldiers than we had body armor.
Chairman Warner. So you freely acknowledge we were short in
terms of the inventory?
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Those troops that are most likely to be
confronted with risks, to injury, they had it?
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Now then, you go from that point when the
major conflict is over, and the war went right on. But anyway--
--
Secretary Brownlee. In the conflict that we're in now, as
has been pointed out----
Chairman Warner. There is no rear area.
Secretary Brownlee.--we are not there, that is right. So
everybody is susceptible. So our goal and requirement then
became to equip every soldier with this, and that was a greatly
increased requirement and we've continued to ramp up
production. Now it is up to about 25,000 units per month. At
that rate, we should have every soldier equipped and
contractors equipped by the end of December.
Chairman Warner. Now let us take up the ground vehicles,
the HMMWVs, and then let us transition to the aircraft, the
helicopters.
Secretary Brownlee. The up-armored HMMWV--when the initial
ground battle was ongoing, most of our forward troops were in
either Bradley Fighting Vehicles or tanks. We had, of course,
some ground elements, but they were not up with the 3rd
Infantry Division, which is a heavy division primarily with
tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Most of our troops fought
those battles in that kind of armored protection.
But as the war transitioned from one of that kind of fight
into more of an insurgency, all of the troops are not equipped
with those and in fact the commanders--and these are combatant
commanders' decisions, of course--determined that they would be
better off in lighter vehicles because of the kind of patrols
they were running and the environment they were in.
So our forces there, while they still had tanks and
Bradleys, they began to use lighter vehicles to conduct some of
their operations. It became obvious that, even though it was a
light vehicle, if you could use the up-armored HMMWV, which has
protection against 7.62 bullets and more, that would be an
advantage over just a standard HMMWV.
So we began to first of all redistribute the assets we had
throughout the world and ramp up production there. The
requirements for those vehicles continued to go up and I think
the Chief and I determined it was up to about 3,500 as of this
morning.
Chairman Warner. You indicated December is the date at
which the body armor will meet the standards. Are we able to
have a comparable date for the ground vehicles?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, with the up-armored HMMWV it is
more of a challenge. If we go strictly with that up-armored
HMMWV it could be as late as December--the summer of 2005
before we would have them all. But let me say, we are examining
at this time other alternatives. Some of these alternatives----
Chairman Warner. I do not think we can accept a deadline of
2005.
Secretary Brownlee. Well, what we are doing, sir, because
it is not acceptable to us either, is examining armor that
could be placed on the current family, the current HMMWV. We
have several variations that we have been testing and examining
and we are going to buy probably variations of all of them in
order to get this done as fast as we can.
Chairman Warner. I detect that you are doing the best you
can.
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, we are working this----
Chairman Warner. It is unfortunate that this developed as
it did.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir. The Chief and I put out a
memo jointly that said anything that involves the force
protection of our soldiers has the urgent, most highest
priority, and has a 24-7 requirement.
Chairman Warner. My time is running out. Helicopters remain
the question. I will ask you to put that in the record unless
other members seek that response.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The response to this question is addressed in questions for the
record ``Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)'' #8-16, Senator Levin.
Chairman Warner. General Schoomaker, I question the force
level of the Army, whether we need additional troops in terms
of recruiting and training. You, I think quite understandably,
when asked that question in this series of debates that have
been going on, said: Look, give me time to get a fuller
understanding of this outfit that I am privileged to take over
and then I will be able to provide my opinion.
I would hope by now you have had that time and that you can
give us an opinion about your end strength levels and how you
would recommend to the President and the Secretary of Defense
such adjustments as you deem professionally needed.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir. Thank you very much. I hope
that when we get into closed session we will be able to explore
a little bit further the previous question that you had,
because I think there are things that are appropriate there for
fuller understanding of what that is all about.
On the issue of end strength, I have had the staff working
very hard to take a look at it and do the appropriate studies
here on the end strength issue. We are still in the throes of
that. But I can tell you that I think our understanding of this
is significantly better than it was when I appeared before you
before.
First of all, the United States Army today has about 20,000
more people in it than we are authorized and that is a result
of a stop-loss, stop-move that we have done on the Active
Force. So we are already operating at about a 20,000-soldier--
--
Chairman Warner. That is the regular Army?
General Schoomaker. That is the regular Army.
In recent legislation our end strength was increased by
2,500 people in terms of the authorization. But, as a result of
stop-loss, stop-move right now we are operating with 20,000
more soldiers in the regular Army than we had.
But the greatest move that we can make, and we are in the
throes of making this move right now, is to get the proper
utilization of the soldiers within the Army that we have
authorized and we are paying for right now. This is going to
require significant active-Guard rebalancing and significant
restructuring of policies and, in some cases, probably
legislation that will give us access to more of the force that
we are paying for and have on hand right now.
One of the issues that we have to mine is the non-
deployment rate in our current force. We are studying to see
what that is, but there are all kinds of reasons why there are
people that are nondeployable. We have to look very seriously
at the overstructuring that we have in our force.
Chairman Warner. So you are examining that. Lastly,
acquisition of new soldiers and levels is one thing; retention
of the force, voluntarily retention--now, that is forced
retention, that 20,000.
General Schoomaker. That is correct.
Chairman Warner. So how is that retention and recruiting
holding up?
General Schoomaker. This year we met every goal. In 2003 we
met every goal with the exception of one, and we fell a little
short in the Army Reserve, not the Guard but the Reserve, in
the careerist category.
Chairman Warner. That is retention.
General Schoomaker. That is retention. We exceeded our
accession goals in the active Army, in the Army Guard, and in
the Army Reserve. We exceeded every category of retention in
all components, with the exception of the Army Reserve.
We do not know what the future might hold and we are
running models and we are taking a look from history and
everything else, trying to figure out what this may portend for
the future. I think our experience tells us that the longer we
operate at the tempo we have, the greater the challenge will be
in this. So we are looking at how to incentivize and to target
appropriately.
Chairman Warner. My time has expired, General. Thank you.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. On the aircraft issue, it is a great area of
concern for many of us that we apparently just do not have the
most modern defensive equipment, for instance, on all of the
helicopters. We had the ALE-47s on some of our Chinooks, but
not on other Chinooks. I gather the policy of first to fight
was the policy being applied, whether those helicopters were
active duty or Reserve component helicopters. Is that true,
first of all? Is that the policy that is applied, ``first to
fight,'' regardless of whether it is active duty or Guard?
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Now, there were 62 ALE-47 dispensers
available, and these are dispensers of chaff and flare, and
they had not been installed on helicopters. The question is,
why? Is this a matter of not having adequate funding or not
having adequate people to install the equipment? What was the
problem with that?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, the problem as I understand it was
not funding. The problem is that it takes 3 weeks to rewire a
helicopter to accommodate this new system. So we are proceeding
to do that. We do not want to take all the helicopters down to
do it and we are proceeding to do it with the systems that we
have and we are getting more systems.
So again, it is a matter of applying these systems to the
helicopters, and this particular dispenser is more capable and
also the wiring provides us the capability to go to an even
better system when we get it developed.
Senator Levin. How long will it take for us to get all the
Chinooks, for instance, equipped with the ALE-47s? The Chinook
that was shot down did not have that dispenser on it.
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, could I provide that for the
record? I am not sure exactly when the date is to get all that
done.
[The information referred to follows:]
The response to this question is addressed in questions for the
record ``Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)'' #8-16, Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Will it be this year? Do we know that?
Secretary Brownlee. To get all of them done, I am not sure,
sir. We have a fleet of about 300 or so.
Senator Levin. The ones that are in the field will not all
be equipped this year?
Secretary Brownlee. We are moving now to equip those that
are in the field or that are going to the field.
Senator Levin. Let us know for the record when that will be
accomplished.
Secretary Brownlee. If we could, sir.
Senator Levin. On the morale issue, General Schoomaker, one
of the many issues that families face is uncertainty as to when
our deployed troops are going to be coming home. Is there a
system in place now so that every unit and presumably every
soldier knows when he or she is scheduled to come home?
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir. If you would permit me just
to tag on to clarify your previous question. The ALE-47 is a
system that is an improvement over the system that is on all of
the aircraft. All of the aircraft had survivability equipment
and what we are talking about now is an improvement. This is a
moving train and we will continue to see improvements, and I
think what we should talk about in closed session----
Senator Levin. Even beyond the 47? There will be
improvements even beyond that, we assume?
General Schoomaker. Even beyond the 47, significantly. We
should talk about these things because I think it warrants a
clear understanding of what it is and what the size and scope
of this challenge is.
In regard to expectations, one of the things that I was
confronted with almost immediately is the means in which we
were mobilizing and the means in which we were developing
expectations on the part of the soldiers that were being
mobilized. I think we have a very good handle on that right
now.
We are operating under partial mobilization. The authority
we have under partial mobilization is to mobilize one million
people for 2 years. That is the authority we are operating
under. This is not presidential selective Reserve callup, which
is significantly smaller and it is a significantly shorter
period of time.
Senator Levin. Just in terms of my time, though, is there
now in place that----
General Schoomaker. There is.
Senator Levin. So every soldier now knows when to expect to
be coming home?
General Schoomaker. Every soldier understands that from the
date that soldier is mobilized, not alerted, but mobilized, the
elements that we are mobilizing now, they understand that by
the time 18 months expires they will be demobilized. That
includes their leave. They understand that the moment they set
their boots in the operational area that they will leave within
12 months, and that is the policy that I think is very clearly
understood.
Senator Levin. Thank you, General. There have also been a
number of pay problems, particularly for Army National Guard
personnel. A General Accounting Office (GAO) report came out
recently on that. In a Colorado Special Forces unit, 61 of 62
Army Guardsmen and women experienced pay problems while
deployed. In a Virginia Special Forces unit, 63 of 65 had the
same problems. West Virginia, 84 of 94.
In another case, a soldier submitted documentation on three
separate occasions. He tried to get his housing allowance. Each
time he was told to resubmit his request, because documentation
was lost.
Very quickly, are you familiar with these issues? Are you
on top of these issues? Are you satisfied that these problems
are not going to reoccur?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, I am not satisfied.
Senator Levin. Are you satisfied that these issues are not
going to reoccur?
Secretary Brownlee. No, sir, I am not. This is one of those
problems that every time we think we have it fixed, it pops out
somewhere. I am very upset about some of these that have
happened, because I received assurances in the past that we
have it fixed and suddenly, it is not fixed. So I can only tell
you we are redoubling our efforts. It has a very high priority
within the Army.
We all understand how a soldier feels when his pay is
screwed up and we want it fixed. So I assure you, Senator, we
are moving to fix it.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
The morning paper has an article that says the
administration is going to be proposing a greater United
Nations (U.N.) role in an effort to increase international
support and participation in Iraq. Part of this will be,
hopefully, the attraction of additional troops from other
countries, including Muslim countries, and if that happens it
hopefully will be a quicker not only reduction in the number of
our troops, but less of a visible presence of the number of our
troops and the substitution of troops of other countries.
In the meantime, however, it is our responsibility to the
extent that it is now. We had General Swannack, who is the
commander of the 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq, comment about
some of the tactics which are currently being used. That was in
the paper this morning, too. He talked about using a
``sledgehammer to crush a walnut.''
What he was referring to here was the military tactic in
recent days of employing aircraft dropping 500-pound bombs,
artillery, mortars, and attack helicopters against suspected
insurgents, and recently AC-130 gunships used to attack what
was reported to be an empty warehouse in Baghdad, suspected of
being a planning and staging area for insurgents, and the
destruction of a number of homes of suspected insurgents.
General Schoomaker, I want you to just give us your
comment, given your experience, especially in Special
Operations, as to whether or not you think it is likely that
such a tactic is going to help or hurt a counterinsurgency
effort.
General Schoomaker. First of all, that is quite a bit out
of my lane right now, Senator, as the Chief of Staff of the
Army, and I think that is more appropriately answered by the
operational commander that has it there. But I will tell you
that as a soldier involved in combat it is important that the
enemy understand and feel the weight, the gravity of the
situation per their actions. So I feel very confident that the
application of force over there is being accomplished within
the rules of the law of land warfare. I am very confident that
the tactical commanders, the operational level commanders over
there, understand the situation that they are facing and are
taking these actions because they feel they are appropriate.
But other than that, I would not like to comment any
further.
Senator Levin. I can understand that.
Would you finally, then, talk to General Swannack, the
commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, and report back to us,
if you would, relative to your conversation with him. Obviously
it is a significant comment if the commander out there of that
division is referring to this as a sledgehammer crushing a
walnut, because that could have a counterproductive effect in
terms of the creation or the fueling of a counterinsurgency.
So rather than asking you to comment any further here, and
given the fact that my time is up, unless you want to comment
further, if you just would talk to him and get back to us for
the record about your conversation relative to his comment,
that would be helpful.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I think I will stand on what I
have said, and I will be glad to get into it.
[The information referred to follows:]
The response to this question is addressed in questions for the
record ``Recent Military Actions in Iraq'' #17-20, Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
make my statement a part of the record if you would, please.
Chairman Warner. Without objection. The statements of all
Senators will be admitted in today's record.
[The prepared statements of Senator Allard and Senator
Cornyn follow:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Brownlee, General Schoomaker,
thank you for appearing before us. I understand that both of you are
very busy and I appreciate your willingness to share with us your
impressions of today's Army.
As you noted in your written statement, our Nation is at war, a war
that will not be won with a single battle or even a single campaign. It
will be difficult and it will be arduous. I believe the American people
have come to appreciate that our country will have to make sacrifices
if we are to prevent future terrorist attacks against our country.
I would like to take a moment to honor the recently fallen soldiers
in Iraq and to recognize the mission these men and all of the 10,000
Fort Carson soldiers have been accomplishing since the conflict began.
Last week, the State of Colorado lost four of its courageous Army
warriors when a chinook helicopter assigned to the 12th Aviation
Brigade and attached to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment crash landed
outside of Baghdad. These were brave and loyal soldiers defending the
principles of freedom and liberty and fighting the terrible war against
tyranny and terrorism.
As I learn more of the four men from Fort Carson who lost their
lives my heart swells with pride. I am very proud of the commitment and
sacrifice these soldiers gave to our country and our way of life.
Mr. Chairman, this attack represents another example of the
cowardice and terror tactics employed by Saddam loyalists and the
foreign insurgents intent on our failure to bring peace and freedom to
Iraq and the region.
They will not succeed. Both the American troops and the Iraqi
people are working hard to make the country better.
Mr. Secretary and General Schoomaker, I can tell that even through
last week's disastrous loss, the spirit of Fort Carson stays strong.
The 3rd Armored Calvary's 5,000 soldiers serving in Iraq don't have
time to be horrified or mourn the dead. They have a job to do. They are
committed to their mission.
There has been plenty of discussion lately of America's resolve and
commitment to seeing this through. Let me tell you that the men and
women serving in Iraq are not confused and know how committed this
administration and this country are to ensuring a democracy flourishes
in Iraq.
Surprisingly, though the 3rd Armored Cavalry is still deployed in
Iraq, the unit has not only reached its retention goals, it has greatly
exceeded them. In the last quarter of this past year 294 soldiers re-
enlisted while the objective was 129. This unit is retaining almost
three times it goal for that period and for fiscal year 2003. Over the
year, the regiment had 834 soldiers re-enlist though the goal was 554
reenlistments.
It is clear to me that the soldiers who are laying their lives on
the line; they are committed to this cause; and we need to follow their
lead. This committee, indeed Congress, needs to follow the lead of men
and women from Fort Carson and commit to this cause. We must not waver.
We must stay the course.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
______
Prepared Statement by Senator John Cornyn
Thank you for appearing before the committee, and I would like to
commend Chairman Warner for holding this important hearing. There is no
doubt that our men and women in uniform are doing a tremendous job in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout the world in the global war on
terrorism. It is our duty to ensure that they have the training and
equipment that they need to defend our Nation. Last week, we passed the
Defense Authorization conference report, which contains many important
provisions that will help our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
The bill raises military salaries by an average of almost 4.2 percent
and extends increases in combat and family separation pay.
But we are all concerned when we hear reports that morale among our
troops is low or that our soldiers do not have the proper equipment to
carry out the mission in Iraq or anywhere else in the world. I am
privileged to represent a State that is home to 1 in 10 active duty
military personnel, and I want to ensure they, and all who serve in the
military, have what they need to get the job done. The 4th Infantry
Division from Fort Hood is currently doing a great job in Iraq, and the
1st Cavalry, also from Fort Hood, is preparing to head to Iraq.
It is essential that we understand and address any morale or other
problems as early as possible, not only for the sake of the military
members themselves, but also for the families of those serving our
great Nation. As we all agree, families of our service members are
making great sacrifices as their loved ones head overseas to defend
freedom and liberty.
I would like to join Senators Warner and Inhofe in expressing my
concern about the Lieutenant Colonel West situation. I understand the
military justice process is ongoing, but it is critical that common
sense and a complete understanding of the facts and unique pressures of
command in the current Iraq environment are factored in to any
decisions on this case.
Senator Allard. I want to just make one point here before I
ask my question. The 3rd Armored Cavalry out of Fort Carson in
Colorado has had an enlistment rate that has exceeded their
goals. What that tells me is that the members of that unit
believe in the Army and they believe in their mission in Iraq,
and I just wanted to pass that on to you. I think that is very
significant in our discussion we are having today.
I have a case that has come to the attention of my office
and it has received some national publicity. It is called the
Holcomb case. This was dealing with a Colorado National Guard
medic. Her husband was in the Active Force, she was in the
Reserve or the National Guard, and they had a family plan that
meant that her mother would take care of the seven children in
Colorado. Then the babysitter's husband got cancer, and there
was a court order issued by a judge in Colorado that said you
have to make arrangements to take care of the kids or you are
going to lose two of them because of a previous marriage. There
was a custody issue here.
I viewed that as a hardship case because she had to make a
choice between either serving in the military and getting
absent without leave (AWOL) charges or being there with her
kids and keeping them part of the family. I think that is an
untenable kind of position to put somebody in.
I wondered if you would comment about that case, and I
would hope that you would look at it closely, because there is
another complicating issue here. During her training as a medic
she happened to have punctured herself with a needle and
apparently it was contaminated with hepatitis C. Apparently
that has caused her to have hepatitis C, and so she is
concerned about the possibility of future health problems.
I think the suggested solution was she just be discharged,
but if that happens then she does not get her medical benefits.
So I hope that you take a close look at that and can recognize
that as a hardship case.
I am wondering if you would comment on that, and then also
if you could comment on the Army's policy of deployment of dual
parents and if it is perhaps time to revise that policy or at
least look at it. I do not know whether you, Secretary
Brownlee, or you, General Schoomaker, want to address that
question. Maybe both of you would like to.
Secretary Brownlee. If I could, sir, and then General
Schoomaker can be my guest. Sir, our policy is if there is a
dual family with dependent children then they have to have a
plan in place that indicates how the children will be cared for
if they are both deployed.
Senator Allard. Apparently she had that.
Secretary Brownlee. They did have a plan, sir. Our
understanding is there was a member of the family who was
caring for the children, who became ill or had to go take care
of someone who had become ill. It therefore put their plan in
jeopardy, and then this other case came up where the custody of
the children was in issue.
They both returned to Colorado, I understand, and then her
husband deployed back to the area of operations (AO). Her
status was questionable. It appears that some of the actions
and paperwork were lagging behind what was being reported in
the press. But it is certainly not the Army's intent to punish
anyone for taking care of their children.
But we do insist that soldiers have to be deployable. There
are hardship cases. I think we are understanding of those, and
this one is being handled, as I understand it, appropriately
and compassionately. There is now a medical issue, as you
indicated, and that is being taken into consideration also.
Senator Allard. Thank you for your response.
General.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I think it is a very complicated
issue. I think it goes back to--first of all, I am absolutely
certain that she will be treated fairly within the tools that
are available to the commanders, whether it be the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ) or the administrative tools. When
all this is gone through, I think it will come out in a way
that is appropriate.
But it goes back to the fundamental question that goes all
the way back to what I said in my opening statement: What do we
expect of people when there is an Army at war? The degree to
which we have to have assurances that the soldiers are prepared
to go for extended periods of time is all at the heart of this
matter.
In my view, it is not a question of whether we are going to
have a volunteer force in the future. It is a question of what
kind of volunteer force we are going to have and what the
expectations should be and what we should ask of people in this
volunteer force.
Again, I would like to comment on your previous statement
about the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. When I was in
Afghanistan and I spoke with General Vines over there, who is
commander of the 18th Airborne Corps now, he was commanding the
18th Airborne Corps in Afghanistan with an active unit that had
been gone--this is a ballpark--about 26 of 33 months been
deployed, met their reenlistment goal by 240 percent in
Afghanistan.
Senator Allard. Their action speaks louder than words.
General Schoomaker. Yes. So this whole notion about
morale--I have been in an Army that does not have morale. I was
in the Army in the late 1960s and early 1970s. That was an Army
that did not have morale. This is not an issue of morale. This
Army is committed and what we have to do is commit ourselves
and make sure we are supporting these soldiers. They are
providing extraordinary services to this Nation at an
extraordinary level of excellence, and we owe them everything
we can give them.
So it is a very complex issue that we are talking about
here, and I think part of this is part of the transformation we
have to make, from a Cold War Army to an Army at war.
Senator Allard. I have one more question here. There was a
3-day article in The Denver Post about sexual assault in the
military and the bottom line was that they thought we ought to
look at the UCMJ, because there was much discretion given
between various commanders in applying this and perhaps there
was not consistency.
They said it may have been 50 years since they last looked
at the UCMJ. Do you have a comment in regard to that?
General Schoomaker. Every time the UCMJ is looked at, it is
held up as an extraordinary example of a system, and it has
been looked at many times.
Senator Allard. When is the last time it was reviewed?
General Schoomaker. I will have to get back to you for the
record. It was actually in relatively modern times. The thing
that I would say is that if you look at the civil system you
will find extraordinary latitude on the parts of judges and
juries in the kinds of things that happen. It is very similar
in terms of what you would expect.
We expect every case to be looked at on its merits and for
it to be judged with matters in extenuation and mitigation at
the appropriate phase of the proceedings to be done. We have
great confidence people use their best judgment and that the
element of fairness is involved in it.
[The information referred to follows:]
The UCMJ, which was originally enacted by Congress in 1950, was
most recently revised by the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002, specifically as to the number of members required on
court-martial panels in capital cases. Because the UCMJ is statutory,
only Congress has the authority to amend or otherwise revise it. As
discussed below, however, the UCMJ undergoes an annual review process
and, when appropriate, changes are proposed both to Congress and the
Secretary of Defense.
Article 146, UCMJ, provides for the establishment of a committee
(known as the Code Committee) that meets annually to conduct a
comprehensive review of the UCMJ. Following each review, the Code
Committee must submit a detailed report to the Armed Services
Committees of the Senate and the House, as well as the Secretary of
Defense. This report must include information on pending cases and the
Committee's findings regarding the uniformity of sentencing policy,
recommended amendments to the UCMJ, and other matters as appropriate.
The Code Committee consists of the Judges of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the Service Judge Advocates
General (JAG), and two members of the public who are recognized experts
in criminal law and are appointed by the Secretary of Defense for a
term of 3 years.
As with any statute, changes to the UCMJ may also be proposed by
Members of Congress or the public through the normal legislative
process and outside of the Code Committee process.
The UCMJ is implemented by the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), an
Executive order, which includes Rules for Courts-Martial, Military
Rules of Evidence, and Nonjudicial Punishment Procedures. The President
periodically amends the MCM. The last Executive order amending the MCM
was issued on 11 April 2002. OMB and the White House are currently
processing two proposed Executive orders to amend the MCM. Both have
received public comment and publication in the Federal Register.
A review of the MCM is accomplished by the Joint Services Committee
(JSC). The JSC was established following a 1984 Executive order
directing the Secretary of Defense to have the MCM reviewed annually.
The JSC consists of the Chiefs of the Military Services' Criminal Law
Divisions, including the Coast Guard, and representatives of the DOD
General Counsel, United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces,
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Throughout the year, the
JSC solicits proposed changes to the MCM designed to enhance the
military justice process and provides recommended changes to the MCM
and legislative changes to the UCMJ.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Allard, I thank you for bringing
this matter to our attention. I am going to invite the chairman
and ranking member of the Personnel Subcommittee to look into
this situation. The subject matter of these series of
articles--and I do not know whether you have seen them or not,
Secretary Brownlee.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir, I did see it.
Chairman Warner. They are quite disturbing, and it is
pervasive throughout all branches. So it is just not an Army
problem, and this committee will address that issue.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schoomaker, I understand that there were many
challenges for personnel in Iraq regarding the logistical
process. Poor communications were mentioned, and scarce
transportation assets, poor distribution routes, and the speed
in the initial phase of the operation all contributed to the
shortages of spare parts, ammunition, medical supplies, water,
and other items that hampered our troops' readiness.
For many years the military has employed ``just in time
logistics,'' and this is a good process under peacetime
conditions, as we know, but not under the conditions faced
during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
What steps has the Army taken to better coordinate the
resupply of equipment and the basic necessity quality of life
items for our current troops in Iraq?
General Schoomaker. I think you have pointed out a very
important point. Logistics are everything in terms of what your
capabilities are operationally. I think we ought to get into
the details and specifics, if you want to, when we get in
closed session. But I will tell you in general that what we are
subjects of is extraordinary success. We were the victims of
extraordinary success.
If you take a look at World War II and think about Patton's
race across Europe with the Redball Express, we had to grind
the rest of the Army to a halt to support that. I think you
might remember that the way they stopped Patton was to cut off
his Redball Express there, to slow him down a little bit.
This is a problem that is as old as warfare and it is a
challenge that we have. Some of our peacetime efficiencies that
we have put in place challenge us when we are operating at the
speed and distances that we did in Iraq. A very simple point.
Over time we have reduced the level of what we call the
Prescribed Load List (PLL) for parts at the lower levels in the
units, for efficiency's sake, for dollar savings, and for
management's sake. I think, quite frankly, that, soldiers being
what soldiers are, some of our successes are a result of them
understanding how to creatively circumvent the rules so that
they had the stuff that they needed, thank God. That is the
good part about the American Army; everybody does not listen to
everything in all the rules.
I think you are on a good point. This is something that we
are looking at very strongly and, quite frankly, we are moving
in a direction where we are thinking very much about joint
logistics, where we are taking a look at how we can get more
robustness and more effective logistics by looking at it as a
joint matter.
Senator Akaka. I asked that question because we certainly
want to support you in improving the logistics there.
General Schoomaker. I appreciate it. We are going to need
your support to get after this.
Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, I have been informed
that the contracted logistical support within theater has been
and remains a problem. Claims have been made that soldiers did
not receive support in some areas because contractors refused
to go into dangerous areas. Of course, this is a problem
particularly if the DOD intends, as is reported, to increase
its reliance on non-governmental contractors.
What is the Army doing now to ensure troops are receiving
supplies they need in the time frame that they need them? If
you need to answer it in another meeting, that is fine, too.
General Schoomaker. No, I think it is not that I need to
answer it in another meeting. I am not quite sure I am aware of
your first point on contract logistics. I am sure there is
anecdotal evidence that we have had problems in certain areas.
But I will take that for the record and get the specifics and
be glad to supply it there.
What we are doing in general, as a general statement, is we
are looking at all avenues of approach to provide what we need
to provide to our soldiers that are in Iraq, in Afghanistan,
and everywhere else. But when you take a look at the distances
involved and the security challenges, and all of the things
that are involved in this, I think you will be amazed at how
daunting a challenge this is to reach some of our most distant
elements that are out there.
So I will be glad to get into it and provide you a more
detailed answer for the record. But I will tell you, the gloves
are off and we are doing everything we can to get ahead.
[The information referred to follows:]
Contracted logistics support in Iraq has proven to be excellent
overall, but it's not without it's difficulty. Problems with contracted
support can usually be traced to misunderstandings of the scope of work
or contract requirements, but soldiers have not done without the
essentials. Many commanders are not experienced in managing contractors
and a complete review of Army education programs that include, or
should include, training on contractors accompanying the force (a.k.a.
contractors on the battlefield) is underway. The supported commander is
responsible for providing force protection for the contractors
supporting him.
Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, what has the Army done
to ensure that the problems experienced at Fort Stewart,
Georgia, with soldiers on medical hold status are not repeated
when the second OIF rotation occurs? I think you are well aware
of that. Can you make a comment about that?
General Schoomaker. I can and I think the Secretary may
want to answer this question.
Secretary Brownlee. If I could, sir.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Brownlee. These problems occurred because we have
a different situation than we had when we had a Cold War
mobilization Army. The concept then generally was that the
active component units would move out to go to war, Reserve
component units come in behind them, take over their
facilities; when they got trained up, then they moved out and
other units came in.
We have a situation now where we deploy soldiers and move
other soldiers in behind them, then the other unit returns,
many times at strength above its authorized level. That is what
happened at Fort Stewart and it was happening at other places,
too.
So we set a standard for people with medical issues in that
they have to be in buildings that are clean, in good repair,
have climate control, and have latrines within the same
facility. I have been assured that there is not a soldier on
medical status now that is not in a facility that meets that
standard.
But I have to tell you that in the first 4 months of next
year when we are rotating this force, we will be moving upwards
of 120,000 reservists and elements from 8 of the Army's 10
divisions, which could total 200,000 to 250,000 people on the
move, to go to the AO and to return, both in Iraq and
Afghanistan. So General Schoomaker and I have directed the Army
staff to come up with a plan for this. We are going to have to
plan it very deliberately so that we know every day what the
expected number of troops is at these particular power
projection posts and these mobilization sites that we have
there.
We are looking right now at the possibility, if we have to,
of putting up some prefabricated structures in order to
accommodate the load. But this will challenge the Army. To my
knowledge the Army has never had a rotation like this in the
past. We have always trained people up and shipped them over,
but we have not rotated the units back in this manner. We
usually had an individual replacement system and now we are
rotating units.
So I think the rotation of units is better in many regards,
and the Chief of Staff of the Army can discuss that in some
detail. But we are addressing that, and we are going to take
steps to ensure that, if there are difficulties, they are
minimized, and we are doing that right now through the
planning.
General Schoomaker. If I may add on to the Secretary's
comment, because I think this really is important for a total
understanding. This is not World War II any more. It is not the
Cold War. We are not a mobilizing Army. We are an Army that
goes to war as we are. One of the serious problems we have is
this issue of medical readiness in Reserve components. Under
the current rules they get one physical every 5 years and,
quite frankly, we have real problems in dental readiness.
So when we mobilize soldiers and bring them on out of the
Reserve component, if they are not medically ready we now are
liable and responsible to return them and correct their
problems before they are returned to the system. This is a
result of some of the things from Operation Desert Storm and
all the rest of it.
So we now have mobilization rules that say we will mobilize
soldiers for 25 days and establish their level of readiness
before we mobilize them for the long term, because part of what
we have, if you look at this Fort Stewart example, of all those
600 something soldiers less than 20 were injured as a result of
that deployment. A lot of those soldiers never deployed because
they were determined to be medically unfit, and some of them
were deployed and returned because of their medical fitness.
So this is a huge administrative burden on the
mobilization. One of the issues that we have to look at in a
seamless Army that is going to go to war tomorrow, based upon
the level of investment that we make today and yesterday, is
this issue of what the standard should be and how we are going
to accommodate that, and it is huge. So I just wanted to bring
that out because the overwhelming story here is the level to
which the Guard and Reserve contributed to the success of the
war on terrorism, the overwhelming success of all those great
people that did not fall under the category of these great
soldiers that happened not to be able to be deployed.
I will redouble the statement that the Secretary has made
here: This movement that we are going to do in the early months
of next year is huge. This is going to be huge, and we are
anticipating to be really challenged in this area that you are
talking about right here.
Chairman Warner. Senator Akaka, we thank you for that very
important line of questions and the thorough response. As the
base closure round comes up, you had better look at this issue
where you have to, because of your infrastructure structure,
build tempo. That rings some bells.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. I agree with that, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I appreciate members of this committee on
both sides of the aisle who, in their opening statements and
comments, talked about the troops and their intense loyalty and
commitment to duty. On the trips I have taken over there, the
one thing that has offended our troops more than anything else
is--and they have come up to me and said this. They have said:
Why is the media back there portraying us as something that we
are not?
As you read, the articles and--what was it?
General Schoomaker. The Soldier's Creed.
Senator Inhofe. The Soldier's Creed, and I remember that
when I was a soldier. I had not heard it in a long time. I was
just thinking, they portray everything that you said in that
creed. I just think they are a great bunch over there.
Like many others, last week on Veterans Day I went around
to the hospitals and talked to them. Secretary Brownlee, I
always go to Landstuhl when I am over there to talk to some of
them. You always get this commitment. They want to get well and
want to go back to their units. One of them that I saw last
week, he was Specialist Scott Parks. He is from Lawton,
Oklahoma. I just found out 30 minutes ago--and I could not
believe this because he had pins in every bone in his body as
he was lying there--that he was released to go back to Lawton
on convalescent, and he said: ``Then I want to get back to my
unit.'' So I just think it is so important that we keep saying
that, because some people out there are not hearing it.
In some of the areas of deficiencies, you have covered them
real well, but I think it is important on the body armor just
to repeat it one more time. Do you think by the end of December
you are going to have this corrected? Is that what you said,
Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, if we can maintain the current
level of production we should have everyone equipped by the end
of December.
Senator Inhofe. All right. That is all we could ask for at
this time and I am very glad to hear that report.
Now, for the up-armored HMMWVs, we had in the supplemental
a little over $239 million. That was for the purchase of new
armored HMMWVs. That did not address upgrading the ones we have
right now. Do you have adequate resources to do that right now,
or is that a deficiency that we need to address?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, I am not sure we do, because some
of these things that we have gone out and looked for are new
initiatives, and I will have to get back to you on that. There
are initiatives we have taken, some of them quite surprising to
us that they might be possibilities, and we are in the process
of testing various alternatives. As far as I am concerned, if
they work and we can get them faster, we will buy several
different.
[The information referred to follows:]
The response to this question is addressed in questions for the
record ``Requirements Process'' #7, Senator Levin.
Senator Inhofe. That is something the public is very much
interested in and we are at this table, too.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Another area of deficiency that has not
been mentioned is our deficiency in our artillery capability. I
know you are tired of hearing me talk about that, but here we
are with the Paladin, technology from World War II. Even
members of this committee, when we told them that you had to
stand outside and swab the breach after every shot, did not
believe it until they saw it and they realized it. That is a
huge deficiency.
I think now with the Future Combat System (FCS) coming on
we are talking now about how you fix the problem that is there
today, while looking into the future a little bit. I agree with
what General Shinseki was very adamant about, getting into this
faster FCS, the lead element of that system being a non-line of
sight (NLOS) cannon. I would like to hear just briefly whether
you agree that that should maintain its primary position as the
lead portion of the FCS?
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir, I could address that. It was
our intent to field the FCS in 2008 and the NLOS cannon was to
lead part of that. When we went to the Defense Advisory Board
last summer what happened was, in order to get the seal of
approval from our headquarters, we had to reduce risk in the
program. That caused us to have to go back and identify
additional dollars to put into the program and also extend the
time allowed for development and testing.
That pushed the fielding into fiscal year 2010. Now, you
and I have discussed the part of prototyping and getting some
things out there for testing, and we are certainly going to do
that. I know that there is a law that----
Senator Inhofe. We are running out of time here, but as far
as a preproduction vehicle, though, we can still meet that 2008
deadline. General, do you consider that true?
General Schoomaker. Sir, there is no change from our
previous conversation in terms of manned prototype units.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that. I appreciate that very
much.
Nothing has been said about Lieutenant Colonel Allen West.
I know it is a sensitive subject, but having served in the Army
and served with the court-martial group, I am familiar with
Article 32. A lot of people--and I know that Oklahoma is not
different than many other States and I am sure that each member
up here has heard the same thing--they are concerned about it.
During an interrogation, the interrogation that took place may
have been more forceful than some think it should have been,
but it led to the apprehension of two terrorists and prevented
an attack on soldiers in his command.
I would only say this, and this is not a question. I think
the message--if we were to end up punishing someone for doing
what it took to protect the soldiers entrusted to his command--
it would be the wrong signal. I can only say that if something
does not come up that would totally change my thinking on it in
this Article 32, then I would continue to have the position
that Lieutenant Colonel West should be commended for his
actions in an interrogation that prevented an attack on the
soldiers in his command. That is my feeling and I think others
may share it and may not want to say it.
Lastly, there is a lot of discussion about the security
forces over there. I think all of us would like to see the
security forces going up and our troop deployment going down. I
know that is what you want. But there is some discussion as to
how well-equipped they are. My feeling is if you have some that
are not that well-trained, they can take the positions of
others who would then be released to take more positions that
perhaps they are trained for.
Right now, for the first time I think, last week the
security forces reached 131,000 to our 128,000. It is the first
time that they have outnumbered ours.
Do you have any comments to make about the future of that,
the security forces, and what your goals are in that respect?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, we are very enthusiastic about the
use of the Iraqi forces to pick up some of these security
missions, especially those of guarding static positions and
providing security for facilities and things like that, where
we just do not think it is appropriate to use U.S. forces to do
those kinds of things.
General Schoomaker. Sir, a couple points here. I agree and
the operational commander, General Abizaid, fully supports--
centrally, his whole program over there is to get an Iraqi
face, get Iraqi ownership, and transition to Iraqi sovereignty
as early as possible. The lead elements of that are getting the
security forces in place and reducing the exposure of American
forces.
The other side of that coin is we are challenged in terms
of the equipment for these Iraqi forces and we are under
instructions to actively, very aggressively look for excess
defense articles and other kinds of things to help in the
equipage of these forces over there. So I think it is important
and I think we are at a significant point of transition in this
program.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Inhofe, and thank you
for bringing up the case of Lieutenant Colonel West. Certainly
my office and, I think you are quite correct in your
observation, all congressional offices have a high level of
concern about this case. Now, I know that under the UCMJ, we
should protect everyone's rights. But do not let the lawyers
have exclusive jurisdiction over what I call some sound
judgments that have to be made by thoroughly seasoned combat
soldiers like yourselves.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, gentlemen. I want to go over some of the ground
that has been gone over, but for the obvious reasons. That is,
so many of these young soldiers' lives are at risk traveling in
these light-skinned HMMWVs. Three out of the last four soldiers
from Massachusetts killed were in these light-skinned HMMWVs.
Last week, when I was out at Arlington Cemetery for Private
First Class Hart's burial, the parents said: ``If you can do
anything to make sure that other soldiers who are over there
are not put in the kind of danger that my son was put in, that
would be the best thing that we could ever think of in terms of
our son.''
So it is not very encouraging to hear that ensuring that
the HMMWVs are going to have the kind of armor that is going to
give them the right protection, that we are going to have to
wait until some time in 2005.
This issue was brought up to me with servicemen from
Massachusetts during the summertime and I spoke to General
Abizaid. He said: ``Well, write me.'' I wrote him in September.
He wrote back rather general comments. I appreciated his
willingness to listen and he did listen to what I had to say to
him.
Of course, in his second paragraph he says: ``The Army's
successful rapid fielding initiative was expanded in August
2003 to ensure no soldier will deploy in harm's way without the
proper equipment.'' Well, they are being deployed without the
proper equipment when you send these young soldiers out in
these light-skinned HMMWVs.
It is difficult for me to understand why in these United
States it is going to take us the amount of time that it is
going to take us, until 2005, to get the kind of HMMWV that is
going to have the protection these servicemen need. Now, I
understand that your budget for this year--the maximum HMMWV
capacity, according to the manufacturer, is 2,311. This year,
with the 2003 and 2004 supplemental, you are getting 2,122. So
there are still 189, as I understand the figures that were
provided by both your staffs when they came to brief our
staffs, and also by the committee staff. I do not understand
why we are not getting the full amount to start with. What we
are doing out there in terms of American manufacturing to try
and get this going?
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, if I could. I appreciate the
question, sir, but when I said 2005 I indicated to you that is
what we were told at the time, and we have not accepted that
either, sir. We are moving as fast as we can to get them
quicker.
I did not know there was a discrepancy between what their
capacity was and what we were buying, because I have been
assured we are buying everything they can produce.
Senator Kennedy. Will you check that?
Secretary Brownlee. I will, sir.
Senator Kennedy. It is my understanding it is 118. 2,122 is
the number that are being purchased with the 2003 and the 2004
money. I have the five different bills here--I mean the
different quantities that are bought, and it is the 2,311. Why
can they not--are they running their plant 24 hours a day? What
is the situation?
Secretary Brownlee. Our understanding is, sir, they are
operating at maximum capacity in that plant and we are moving
to equip other lines within that plant.
Senator Kennedy. It is inconceivable that, with our
manufacturing capability, we cannot produce that kind of
vehicle more rapidly and replace it.
Now, I asked--just to mention one other item in terms of
Fort Stewart. I went down and took a trip to Fort Stewart and
had a young serviceman speak to me down there about there being
two medical personnel for 600 soldiers--I guess it is a variety
of different health challenges, some injuries, some non-combat-
related. But there were 600 of them.
When I was there, they said that they were going to have to
wait for an orthopedist. A soldier with a cane said he was
going to wait until after Thanksgiving--I was there probably a
month ago--in order to get an operation. These were a series of
different health challenges, of delays for these servicemen.
They are really unthinkable in terms of today.
How do we know that there are not other Fort Stewarts
around the country? What have you done to make sure? I know you
have visited many of them.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir. As soon as what was happening
at Fort Stewart became apparent, we sent teams out from the
Surgeon General's office and Forces Command to examine all
these other sites, report back, and recommend actions. We have
moved medical assets, we have moved soldiers to where more
medical assets are, and we have leased equipment. Some of the
limiting factors were MRI and so we have taken steps to lease
some of those machines, to reduce these bottlenecks.
You mentioned orthopedics. That was a bottleneck and we
have either redistributed assets or gone on contract and hired
other assets to try to reduce this bottleneck.
Senator Kennedy. Can you give me what the waiting time is
now in terms of these servicemen to get their kinds of
activity? I will send you a note on that if I could, please.
Secretary Brownlee. Okay, sir.
Senator Kennedy. The last item, and my time is just about
up, and I know Senator Clinton is going to get into it, about
closing these schools on these bases for the servicemen. We
find that some of the best education that is taking place for
young people in the country is on these base schools, and there
is increasing anxiety among many of the children because of
their parents being away for a long period of time. That is a
factor and a force now.
With the anticipation that some of these schools may be
closed down, can you give us what the considerations are? What
do you need to keep these schools open? We have difficulty
enough around here trying to fix things that are not working,
but to get things that are working and knowing how important
quality education is for these servicemen and women to know
that they are getting the good education, what can you tell us
about it, the current program as to the anticipated closing of
these schools?
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, it is my understanding that no
decision has been made on these yet, and the Army will make its
case to try to keep these schools open. There may be some
exceptions to that, but we agree with you. At a time our
soldiers are deployed and their families are at these places,
we think we need----
Senator Kennedy. Who makes that decision? How far up? You
will let me know who makes that decision?
Secretary Brownlee. I will, yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Do you know about when it is going to be
made? You will let me know?
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS)
Transfer Study, begun 2 years ago, was structured to begin an analysis
of individual DDESS and to document the benefits and costs of
maintaining them on stateside installations. The design of the study
went even further and projected costs and other impacts related to any
possible future transfer of an individual school to its respective
local education agency (LEA). Specific fiscal and nonfiscal data
provided by each of the respective LEAs has been factored into the
study. Quality of life issues, as well as student achievement data,
have also been noted as a part of the transfer study.
To date, no decision has been made to make any changes to the 58
schools involved in the study. The Deputy Under Secretary for Defense
for Military Community and Family Policy is currently reviewing the
study.
Any decisions regarding the future of the schools will be made on
the basis of the most deliberate, thoughtful consideration of all the
data collected with significant weight given to the testimony of all
interested parties. Decisions will be made on an individual school
basis.
No action will be taken without sufficient notification to a
school, community, or command. Notification of any changes would be
provided at least 1 school year or more before any change(s) become
effective. No specific timetable has been established for reaching the
final decision.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schoomaker, my understanding is after this next
rotation 40 percent of the troops in Iraq will be from the
National Guard or Reserves. Is that true?
General Schoomaker. Sir, that is approximate, but I think
that is about right.
Senator McCain. How much do we need to increase Army end
strength so that we do not have to rely on the Reserve
component for nearly half our troop strength in a combat zone?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I am not sure I understand your
question. How much do we have to increase the troop strength?
Senator McCain. The regular Army, so we do not have to have
nearly half our troop strength be Guard and Reserves.
General Schoomaker. 60 percent of our Army is Reserve
components, 60 percent.
Senator McCain. Who are designed to perform combat roles
for a year at a time.
General Schoomaker. No, sir, they were designed to expand
the Army----
Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, that is not what keeps
Guard and Reserve people in the military, if you keep this kind
of burden on them. You were talking about morale. I agree,
their morale is good, they are ready to fight. They are not
ready to stay in at this kind of deployment schedule. They
might as well be in the regular Army.
You do not even have to reply to that. I know too many
people that do--look, here is the problem. You mentioned that
you were in an Army without morale. One of the reasons why the
Army did not have good morale in the 1960s and the early 1970s
is because the American people did not think they were doing
the job and did not support them.
Here is your problem, General Schoomaker. A, USA Today/CNN-
Gallup Poll asked, ``Question: Do you approve of the way that
the U.S. has handled the situation with Iraq since the major
fighting ended?'' On April 23, 80 percent of the American
people approved, 18 percent disapproved. Today, 42 percent of
the American people approve and 55 percent of the people
disapprove.
That should concern you. That should concern you greatly,
since you made reference to a previous time in the history of
the Army. To me, it is directly related to the number of
casualties that the American people see coming home. Those
casualties are a result of our failure to address the problem
as it existed last August, when I was over there and talked to
so many people who said: ``We need more troops in the Sunni
triangle. We need more troops, and we need to combat that.''
I came back and said we need more troops. No, the
commanders on the ground do not ask for it. What has happened
since August? The numbers of improvised exploding device (IED)
attacks on American troops, wounded American troops, and killed
American troops are all up. There is no objective indicator
that would show that things are improving in Iraq.
Now we have a new bombing campaign, which, according to The
Washington Post, has a surreal quality to it: ``Eager to avoid
civilian casualties, U.S. officials have gone to great lengths
to attack buildings, homes, and warehouses only when they are
certain they are empty. In a few cases, they have even warned
security guards to leave before bombing started. `I worry that
blowing up empty buildings does not demonstrate our resolve or
seriousness to the enemy,' said retired General Richard
Senrich, who plays the enemy in Pentagon war games.''
We need more troops of the right kind there. You and I in
previous conversation agreed that intelligence was a prime
requirement. If the people do not think you are staying,
General, you are not going to get cooperation and good
intelligence. At the time we announced the transfer of power to
Iraqis, which I strongly support as far as the government is
concerned, we announced troop drawdowns. Now, it does not fit.
I am worried as a believer--as one who is deeply concerned,
because we have to win. We cannot afford to lose this conflict.
But this absolute obstinacy to admit--your predecessor
testified before this committee that we ``need several hundred
thousand troops to secure post-war Iraq.'' His words seem to me
more prescient almost every day.
So I would like to hear your rationale for how we are going
to reverse the trends--those are facts, not opinions--the
trends that have continued up as far as American casualties and
the declining American support for what we are doing in Iraq
are concerned.
General Schoomaker. First of all, I share your concern. I
do not think it is my problem; I think it is our problem about
what the American people think about this.
Senator McCain. I do not quite understand that answer, but
go ahead.
General Schoomaker. I think it is the problem of all of us
together to lead and explain and to----
Senator McCain. A lot of us have been trying to do that,
General.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
I would also like to tell you that--as you know, we have
had this conversation--I am not running the war on Iraq. I am
supporting the operational commander over there. We are doing
everything that they ask us to do. I talk every week with the
commanders on the ground over there about what they need and we
are moving it. There has not been one commander that has told
me they want more troops on the ground over there. The whole
point is we are trying to reduce the exposure of our troops and
to transition to an Iraqi face, an Iraqi handling of what is
going on over there.
Now, there is no question that there are parts of Iraq that
we need to surge troops into and there are parts of Iraq that
may not need the number of troops that at earlier times were in
there. That is up to those commanders on the ground and General
Abizaid to figure out.
But the only thing that I can tell you is I share your
concern about the will of the American people, and that is why
I have made some of the statements I have here. This is
important. This is not something that we can quit on. We have
to win and we will. I am concerned that we are providing the
warfighting command over there what they need.
Many of these issues that have been brought up here today
are all the results of previous investment in this force. I
mean, just Senator Kennedy's question on the up-armored HMMWVs;
we have moved all of the up-armored HMMWVs from everywhere else
in the world into this place. It is not just what we are
producing, it is what we are moving from everywhere else. The
same principle applies to the issue that you have.
So in principle I do not disagree with you, but I am
telling you that I cannot in full faith tell you that adding
end strength to the United States Army at this time is the most
important, pressing issue that we have. It is a long-term
solution, it is an expensive solution, and it is not going to
solve what we are doing right now.
Senator McCain. Thank you, General. But I continue to
recommend an increase in marines, Special Forces,
counterinsurgency, counterintelligence, and linguistic
capabilities. I recommended it strongly in August. Things have
deteriorated since by any objective viewpoint. You cannot wait
forever. Otherwise the situation is going to turn very serious.
General Schoomaker. Sir, when we get in closed session
perhaps we can re-address what you just spoke about there and
perhaps you will feel better about some things.
Senator McCain. Unfortunately most Americans are not privy
to those briefings.
Adnan Pachachi, a senior member of Iraq's Governing Council
(IGC), recently had this to say about all the talk coming from
the administration about American troop withdrawals: ``In the
current security crisis, any talk of a withdrawal would swell
the ranks of the insurgents.'' I think we ought to pay
attention to him.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator McCain.
It is fortunate that Senator McCain and others have the
military experience that we can bring to bear on the historic
perception of this conflict.
I fully recognize, General Schoomaker, that by laws of
Congress--as Chief of Staff of the Army--while the American
public thinks you are the number one, as you are in the eyes of
every soldier, but again, with the decentralized command
structure into the combatant commanders, the commander in Iraq,
General Abizaid, who is a very competent soldier, is the one
that has the primary responsibility with regard to the tactics
deployed, together with his deputy, General Sanchez.
I just want to make it clear to those observing here, you
are not ducking it. It is just you are properly putting the
responsibility where it is, although you said clearly you talk
to each of them weekly. I commend you.
Now, Senator Levin would like to have recognition. He made
a comment earlier which he wishes to elaborate.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity.
I asked you a question before, General Schoomaker, about a
comment by General Swannack that the Army was going to, ``use a
sledgehammer to smash a walnut.'' I have reread the entire
article and I think he probably was saying that that was the
right thing to do, he approved that as a policy. I may have
suggested that he had a question about it, whereas I was
raising the question as to whether that is the correct policy
and the correct rhetoric or whether or not that fuels the
insurgency and gives a propaganda handle to those that we are
fighting.
I asked you if you would call him about it and that is
fine. But would you also then call General Abizaid relative to
that approach and that comment.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. I do appreciate the opportunity to clarify
the record, if necessary, but at least the implication that he
was apparently questioning the wisdom of doing that--whereas I
was raising the question about the wisdom of that policy and
that rhetoric in these counterinsurgency circumstances that we
find ourselves.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
For the benefit of the Members, Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld will be before the Senate again in closed session
today and I think that is a very appropriate issue that we
should raise with him, because I think many of us are concerned
about the tactics. Not that we are critics of it, but we would
just like to have a greater explanation as to how these
substantially revised tactics are or are not being successful
and the long-term implication on the ability of the Iraqi
people to come and work more closely with not only our troops
but to form their own government eventually.
Senator Levin. Is this a ``winning hearts and minds''
approach.
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just as a point of reminder, in the Defense Authorization
Bill we included, coming from the Personnel Subcommittee,
language asking the military to develop a policy with husband
and wife deployments. We found there is not really an official
policy and we have asked for one recognizing that under the
current circumstances, with the heavy use of Reserve and Guard
component parts, that would be an important thing to deal with.
So, Senator Allard, it is officially being requested, and
we would plan to follow up on that.
I appreciate the witnesses being here today and being so
candid with respect to a number of very sensitive issues: force
protection in terms of the right equipment, the right armor for
equipment, the right armor for body protection. I received a
call about a week ago from a parent concerned about his son,
who is a scout conducting house to house searches. His concern
about safety was whether or not he was being provided with the
right body protection equipment.
Apparently he is wearing Kevlar and there are some soldiers
that are wearing a composite body armor which provides even
more protection. My response to him will be that by the end of
December we should have that kind of body armor protection.
It would seem to me, though, that if you are going from
house to house, where you face hand-to-hand combat, that
perhaps those soldiers would be in the first priority to have
that kind of composite protection now, not by the end of
December.
Secretary Brownlee?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, I am surprised if he does not have
it. If he is performing the kind of mission you just described,
he should have it and I am surprised that he says he does not,
because we have been assured that those people do. So I will be
happy to check into more detail.
Senator Ben Nelson. Obviously you cannot take care of each
individual case, but each individual case can result in a
casualty, and that is why they are all important. So I would
appreciate your checking that and I will get back to him and
explain to him what the military is doing to provide that kind
of protection.
The issue of morale does come up and has come up. Having
been in Iraq earlier this year, this summer, meeting with
troops, I can say that the morale was high. Their concerns were
also high about deployments, about rotation, about leave. Many
of those issues have been addressed. I know, General
Schoomaker, we talked about it prior to your confirmation. It
appears that you are on the road to finding solutions that will
not only put some sort of terminal point on deployments so that
they can know, but so that they are aware of it as they go in,
because I think that was really running a tremendous risk of
harming troop morale.
But still, multiple deployments, even if you know the point
of termination of that deployment, creates a morale problem
back home for reservists and for Guard families. When the
family is not happy, it is hard for anybody to be happy in the
service of their country because of their obligations that are
continuing.
I hope that this will be a boost towards transformation,
getting the right mix, as you say, of Guard and Reserve
personnel as part of the regular fighting machine, so that we
are not having to rely on those folks who are not signing up to
be part of the Active-Duty Force, but find themselves in some
cases for longer deployments, more multiple deployments, than
the active duty.
If it does not become a major morale problem, as I think it
will, at the very least it becomes a recruitment and retention
problem that will be something we have to deal with. It is
perhaps appropriate that there are bumper stickers going
around--I will clean up the language, but it is a bumper
sticker saying: ``One weekend a month my foot.'' I think we are
all aware that people will assume obligations and they will
fight for their country, but we have an obligation to keep the
responsibilities and the commitments we have made with respect
to reservists and guardsmen that they not become part of the
active duty.
Finally, I might mention something that I have found,
personally. Seven Nebraskans have been casualties in Iraq and
my office was only sent written notification in three of those
cases. In the remaining cases we had to seek out the
information from the Pentagon. In some cases, two to be exact,
we had to contact the base where they had been stationed
directly.
It is awkward to call the families to find out the details.
We would prefer to find it through the ordinary chain of
command and through the Office of Protocol. What we would like,
if it is at all possible, is not only to make sure that that is
happening right for Nebraska, but it is happening right for the
other States, because I am sure my colleagues are all
experiencing some of this themselves.
So thank you for your presence here and I perhaps did more
of the talking than you got an opportunity to respond back. But
if there is anything you would like to say, my time has
expired, but I am sure they would extend the courtesy to get a
response.
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, I would say only that we share
the concerns you described, especially in notification of
families and loved ones. That is very high on our list.
Sometimes the media gets in front of us on this because of the
nature of communications these days. As General Schoomaker and
I can tell you, in the military sometimes--most of the time the
first reports are incomplete or inaccurate. So we try to get
complete and accurate information before we make these very
critical notifications. Sometimes that takes longer than any of
us are comfortable with and sometimes the media does get in
front of us. But we share your concern on that.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir. I would like to just add--and
I support what the Secretary said and we will follow up on
this, the information piece. But you raise a good question and
I think it goes back to something I was trying to allude to
earlier. We have what we have in terms of Active, Guard, and
Reserve Forces. The question is, do we have the relevant force
for what this Nation needs to do?
If we were unconstrained and we were able to use our
imagination, we could probably come up with many alternatives
to the kind of construct that we have right now. But we have
what we have, and this is what we invested in. We have as much
body armor as we have because that is what we invested in. We
have the amount of HMMWVs because that is what we invested in.
We have Reserve and active expectations because that is what we
built.
But the big question is, what is the requirement for this
Nation in the future? If our current construct is inadequate,
then I think we have a shared responsibility to figure out how
we are going to transform and change the expectations and
determine what it is we are going to use the Armed Forces for.
I think it is as simple as that. As simple as it is, it is a
huge issue.
So part of what I face with the Army--and it is a great
Army; it is the greatest Army in the world. But the question
is, is it as great as it needs to be, as it should be, and is
it as relevant to today's operational requirement and
tomorrow's requirement as what it needs to be? That is the
issue that is before us. The kinds of solutions that we could
imagine are huge and expensive, and I think it is an issue that
we have to think about on this.
So I just appreciate the opportunity to respond, because I
think how you think about it depends on where you get on this
train. The purpose of this Army is to meet the needs of the
Nation. If the needs of the Nation change and the means that we
have are insufficient, then we have to take a look at a
different way of meeting the needs, because I do not think we
have the option of ignoring some of the needs of the Nation
just because it is inconvenient for certain people and their
expectations are not being met on things.
So that is why I read this Soldier's Creed. It says the
mission is first.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator, we thank you. That is a very
important line of questioning.
I listened very carefully and I respect your responses. In
today's world of instant warfare, attack from sectors that we
knew not, lack of state sponsors in most instances, we have to
reach onto the shelf and take what is there. So I urge each of
you in your fulfillment of your responsibilities to try and
look into that future and come to Congress and say: ``Look,
this could happen and we want to put some of this new high tech
equipment on the shelf now for our successors to have in
place.''
General Schoomaker. Sir, we all want the same thing.
Chairman Warner. Good.
General Schoomaker. There is no question about it.
Chairman Warner. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have enjoyed
this hearing and I think it has been very informative.
General Schoomaker, I really appreciate your remarks about
the morale of our soldiers. The retention and recruitment is
solid across the board, really above our goals. When I meet
with soldiers I find they are committed. I was with Private
First Class (PFC) Chris Busby from Valley Head. His brother was
with the military police (MP), he is an MP, his daddy was an
MP. He is 20 years old. I said: ``Why did you join?'' He said:
``Well, after September 11 I thought I ought to do something
for my country.'' He took a serious injury in the lower leg.
A friend of mine's son, Sergeant Larry Gill, was injured in
a Beirut bombing as a marine, now in the National Guard 1165th
MP unit out of Fairhope, with another serious leg injury. He
wants to stay in. Both of them want to stay in.
I was with a lieutenant colonel I met at Walter Reed. He
had a serious leg injury. I asked him how his soldiers felt as
they moved about the streets, how concerned were they. I think
he misinterpreted me. He said: ``They are not concerned, sir;
they are warriors. They are prepared to serve their country and
they are not worried about their personal safety.''
All of them made me feel good about it. Also, as a former
Army reservist for 10 years, I would just say these soldiers,
these Guard and Reserves, they deserve our admiration and
thanks. They are heroes. They do not need to be looked at as
victims. Their families all are suffering to some degree, but
they are patriots also and they are serving and they are proud
to serve, and we ought to be proud that 40 percent of the
missions in Iraq are being filled by Guard and Reserve capably.
Everybody I asked over there said there is no problem, no
falloff in capability.
The MP units that were there, almost half of them were
police officers and State troopers back home with many years of
experience in law enforcement. I do not think a young PFC can
be as effective on the streets of Baghdad as a 40-year-old
State trooper can be, whatever their rank. So we are doing a
lot of good things there and I am really, really proud of our
Guard and Reserve.
Alabama has the highest number of Guard people in the
theater, or ordered for deployment, of any State in the Union,
and we are proud of them and their service.
I would just say, General Schoomaker, you commanded the
Delta Force, you have commanded Special Operations Forces. I
guess my question to you, a little bit along with Senator
McCain's comments on intelligence, Special Operations Forces,
and the ability to work with indigenous personnel--do we need
more Special Forces? What plans do you have in the transforming
of our Army to have more people with the kind of capabilities
that would fit in Iraq?
So my first question is: Do the Special Forces capabilities
that our people have, are they the right mix for a situation
like Iraq and do we need more and do you have plans for more?
General Schoomaker. Sir, we are moving and, first of all,
let me say that the Special Forces belong to the commander in
chief of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and I support
him in terms of his structure. As part of our transformation,
we are moving end strength or authorizations into SOCOM for a
variety of things, not only the way we are organized in Special
Forces, but the psychological operations forces, civil affairs
forces, and the other capabilities that he has within that
command.
I think it would probably more appropriately be put to
General Brown down at SOCOM in terms of whether or not he has
enough and what his structure is, because I would be speaking
from a position of 2000 when I retired.
Senator Sessions. In your vision for the transformed
military, it seems to me that we have proven the validity of
the Special Forces in places such as Afghanistan.
General Schoomaker. No question, no question.
Senator Sessions. What a remarkable development that was.
General Schoomaker. I think we have moved, and of course I
go back to the bad old days of the post-Vietnam kind of dip in
our Special Forces. I am extraordinarily proud of where we have
brought not only the Special Forces but the entire Special
Operations capability of this Nation to where we sit today.
Congress, with the Cohen-Nunn amendment, quite frankly, ought
to take a great deal of credit for their foresight in helping
create a unified command to have the kind of force that we have
today, and you ought to be proud of that, because I certainly
am.
But I think one of the things we have seen here in this
last several years is the absolute viability of the construct
of Special Operations Forces in concert with conventional
forces, in concert with our allies and in concert with the
interagency, in terms of what the power of that is. You take a
look at Afghanistan and you think about the degree of success
that relatively few people had, you are talking about captains
and sergeants who won that war. There were not big general
headquarters and all that stuff over there. These are captains
and sergeants operating at the extreme end. Some of those
insertions were 900 miles one way to put those teams in. They
are operating and achieving extraordinary results, the force
multiplier factor working with the Northern Alliance forces and
the other indigenous forces.
So I think it has demonstrated its viability, and the
integration of other joint capabilities into that force. So if
you are asking me do I think that there is a future there, I
think there is a huge future there and I think there is lots
that we will be doing as we transform our force to leverage
that capability, integrate it, and understand how we can work
better with it, and how we can leverage some of those ideas
into the conventional force. That is what we are doing.
Senator Sessions. General, I appreciate your leadership and
I am glad that you understand this as well as or better than
any person who has held your position.
Secretary Brownlee, I did meet with some of the top Guard
and Reserve officers recently. I was pleased to hear that they
had not only had positive support from Secretary Rumsfeld, but
that he was positively insistent that we do a better job of
utilizing our Guard and Reserve, that the mobilization process
be not too prolonged, that demobilization be shortened, that
their concerns be dealt with, that there be the right mix in
the Guard and Reserve.
I suppose that you share those views?
Secretary Brownlee. Oh, yes, sir. We are working on all
that, sir. Again, we would like to achieve a standard of
perfection here. Last year when some of these dips in morale
occurred, it was because we had uncertainty in the length of
the tour. That is one of the reasons we moved to establish a
12-month boots on-the-ground for both active and Reserve
components in accordance with the combatant commanders' desires
and also to ensure that there was predictability for both the
soldiers and their families.
Senator Sessions. Two things I think I heard: They want to
know when they are coming home and what their time limit is,
and you have made progress on that.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Second, when they are deployed they want
to do important work.
Secretary Brownlee. Oh, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. If they feel like the work is not
important--so that is my advice. My time is up.
General Schoomaker. Senator, could I add real quick here?
Senator Sessions. Yes.
General Schoomaker. I think we have a 99-percent solution
to this issue of certainty, but I would be remiss if I did not
just make it known right now that circumstances could change
that would cause us to have to change again. I can envision
circumstances where we would have to tell people that we told
are going to be out there 12 months that they are going to be
there longer. I think that is just reality.
Senator Sessions. I think that is fair enough. We hope that
does not happen.
General Schoomaker. I do, too. But I just do not think that
we ought to cut off the possibility. I think we have a 99-
percent solution. I hope it is a 100-percent solution.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, for bringing up that
point, because this hearing is being broadcast to our troops at
some time in the future and they wish to know that we on this
committee are very conscious about the rotation policy and
their families.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. First, Secretary Brownlee, let me
endorse your response to Senator Kennedy about the value of
military schools on posts. I think these proposals are
generated by people who understand the cost of everything and
the value of nothing. I cannot think of anything that would be
more disruptive to morale and the quality of life than to
return from Iraq or return from Afghanistan and find that the
elementary schools your children are attending have been
closed. So good luck.
General Schoomaker, I would like to return to the issue of
end strength. You quite rightly pointed out to Senator McCain
that you are not responsible for the configuration or the size
of the forces in Iraq, but you are the principal responsible
for the size of the Army. I found it stunning in your response
to Senator Warner that, while the Senate amendment would
increase end strength by 10,000, you indicated you are already
20,000 over authorized end strength. That would barely be
legal. In fact, today I would suspect that--well, let me ask:
Is the end strength of the Army today over the authorized
limits?
General Schoomaker. We have on active duty today, as a
result of our stop-loss, stop-move, about 500,000 soldiers on
active duty.
Senator Reed. As I understand, the new authorization is
496,872, if my math is right. But let us say 496,000. So you
are already over the authorized strength even with the change
in the law recently?
General Schoomaker. Why do you not let me take that for the
record, if you want to get down to the individual numbers. I am
talking in order of magnitude.
[The information referred to follows:]
The projected fiscal year 2004 end strength, based on January 2004
data, is 500,600, which is 18,200 over the National Defense
Authorization Act allowed end strength of 482,400. This includes a
projected stop loss population of 6,600.
Senator Reed. I understand, sir. But I think essentially
that is what I find difficult to understand. This is not a
situation where you are below your authorized end strength and
we want to give you more. You are already over and we just
simply want to make you legal in some respects. Why are we
being opposed?
General Schoomaker. What I was trying to demonstrate is
there is cushion in the system for lots of things, and part of
what we are trying to do is make sure that we are getting all
that we are now paying for out of this force. As we are
exploring this there is ample evidence that there is a huge
piece of this force, a significant piece of this force, that is
unavailable to us and could be made available before we come to
you and ask for the kind of money it takes to sustain.
By the way, if we can make this piece of the force
available to us now, it will help us now. Building end strength
for the future, we may not have the problem we have now in the
future. That is what I am concerned about.
Senator Reed. Well, let me respond. I see your point,
General, but everything I hear, both from General Pace a few
days ago up in Boston at a speech he gave, and everyone around
this table, says we are in for the long term. This is a
generational struggle, and it is not just about Iraq. It could
be other places. So this notion--I think what you are doing is
some ad hoc, short-term adjustments to try to squeeze some more
troops out. As I understand it, there is a 12-percent rate for
trainees, transients, holdees, and students (TTHS), which is
the schooling and training and everything else.
But in the long term, if we are going to stay the course we
are going to need more soldiers, I think. I commend you for
trying to find troops within your current force structure, but
unless our laws are just hortatory you are violating the law
right now, as I read it.
General Schoomaker. I do not think so, but if we are we
will correct ourselves. I think that it depends on when you
measure it, and we will get into the numbers.
But what I am not telling you is that we will never need
more soldiers in the United States Army. What I am telling you
is that what we are doing right now is informing ourselves as
to how much better we can do with what we have, and we ought to
do that first. I could very well be back here next spring and
tell you that we need more end strength because we see a
different picture than we see right now.
Senator Reed. Let me ask in that vein, when do you estimate
that you will be back here to tell us that you have solved what
looks to be a 20,000 personnel problem, or on that magnitude?
When will you be back, General?
General Schoomaker. As I have said, I still think that we
will be back here probably in the spring with posture
statements that will say where we think we are. That could very
well be part of where we think we are. So I think that this
transition we are going to go through this spring between
January and April, let us say, as we have discussed, and what
we will know about where we are going is going to inform us
considerably about what we think we are going to have to have.
It is just not an end strength problem. It is this whole
issue of what is the role of the Guard and Reserve, what is
their availability going to be to us, what should our internal
structure be, and are we really structured to do the kind of
warfare that we need to be conducting in the future.
Senator Reed. In that light, let me ask a question. How far
out are you planning rotations for Iraq? A year out? Two years
out?
General Schoomaker. Inside the Army, we are planning the
rotation for the third rotation, a year out from where we are.
We are looking even deeper in case we have to go to a fourth
rotation.
Senator Reed. In the third or fourth rotation, are you
going to be using National Guard units that have already had
one tour in Iraq?
General Schoomaker. It depends on what the situation is
over there. If it is required, we will be calling them up.
Senator Reed. Again, I think it goes back to one of the
themes that Secretary McCain echoed. That is that we all
recognize--I have two MP companies and they have already had
three killed in action (KIA) and several wounded in action
(WIA), and they are proud and they are doing a great job, but
coming back with the idea they are going in another year or 18
months is not exactly what a Reserve component or National
Guard soldier anticipates.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. My time has expired.
Chairman Warner. Senator, that was a very interesting
exchange. I made a quick check and they are, in a time of war,
able to go 3 percent, and I guess that is 3 percent of the base
force. A quick calculation would say, just as the distinguished
Senator from Rhode Island mentioned, I think you are over the 3
percent. We have instructed our bipartisan staff now to take a
look at this very important question which you raise.
Your statement that you are planning the third and fourth
rotations I do not believe should be interpreted as an omen
that we are going to be there. It is just prudent planning that
you must do.
General Schoomaker. That is correct.
Chairman Warner. We all have high expectations that the
current policies of the President will involve greater and
greater numbers of the Iraqis in all aspects of the turnover of
their nation back to their hands.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing. After the recent reports from Fort
Stewart, as well as reports about body armor and then the
survey that appeared in Stars and Stripes about the condition
of morale, I and others requested that you do this, and I
appreciate very much----
Chairman Warner. Senator, you were among the first that
came to me and suggested that we move swiftly on this.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. I thank you for your participation.
Senator Clinton. I could not agree more with our witnesses,
who have described this as a test of will that we cannot lose.
I also wholly endorse the description of our men and women in
uniform as indispensable and performing selfless service.
I want to focus for a minute on the disconnect that I think
sometimes seems to appear between what I know is our commitment
to our soldiers and some of the statements and proposed
policies that come out of DOD, particularly out of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). This issue about schools is
one that I take very seriously, because we have an All-
Volunteer Force and one that I think deserves all of our
support, and their families are also volunteers and they too
deserve the support of a grateful Nation.
In addition to the threatened school closings, which were
announced out of the blue as a possible action, we recently
heard about some potential commissary closings abroad and at
home. I recently received a copy of a memorandum from General
B.B. Bell, the commanding general of the U.S. Army Europe and
the Seventh Army, raising very strong objections to the
proposed commissary closures in Germany.
In addition to the specifics that he addressed with respect
to transportation difficulties, weather difficulties, and the
like, he said: ``The war is very, very real to our European-
based families. I believe we owe it to our soldiers to provide
compassionate care and service to their families while the
soldiers are deployed in harm's way. Seeking relatively minor
fiscal efficiencies through reduced services and loss of
benefits in this overseas environment during a war erodes the
commitment we have made to the total force.''
I could not endorse that more strongly. I would ask
unanimous consent that this memo from General Bell be included
in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Clinton. In this memo he specifically talks about
Germany, but apparently the proposal goes much further. I know,
for example, in my own State they are talking about closing a
commissary in Scotia, New York, and closing the school at West
Point. For the life of me, I do not understand this, and I do
not believe it is coming from the professional military. I
believe it is coming from the planners and policymakers in the
Department, and particularly again in the OSD.
So I would hope, both Secretary Brownlee and General
Schoomaker, that you would make the strongest possible
objections on behalf of these ill-advised proposals.
I recently paid a call on one of the teachers from the West
Point school and learned that General Lennox, now the
Superintendent, made very clear that this is a recruiting and
retention device for our All-Volunteer Force. So these
potential closings are of concern to me as the Senator from New
York, but also far beyond that, as a member of this committee
looking at how we are going not only to continue the end force
we need, whatever it is decided we need, but also to take care
of the families of those who I think will be rather
continuously deployed around the world in the missions that we
are going to be asking them to do.
So this is a wrong message to send. It is hard to justify
when we just appropriated $87 billion for the reconstruction of
Iraq and the biggest defense appropriations we have ever had in
the history of our country that we would be undermining the
quality of life of our soldiers and their families.
So I have joined with Senators Kennedy, Leahy, and Murray
in writing directly to Secretary Rumsfeld, asking him to desist
from taking any of these actions that would cut essential
military benefits, and I would also ask unanimous consent that
that letter be included in the record as well.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Clinton. I would ask both of you, will you support
these efforts to keep benefits like these available for our
soldiers and their families? Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, we certainly feel the
strongest sense of responsibility toward our families. We have
not yet had a chance to engage on these issues, but I certainly
agree with you on the importance of taking care of families. I
was deployed twice in a combat theater and I can remember
myself and most soldiers saying: ``We will do anything they ask
as long as they take care of our families.''
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General?
General Schoomaker. Senator, I think it is a great point. I
would like to just say again what--I think we had this
conversation in your office. My father was in the Army for 32
years. I grew up in the Army. I am going on my fourth decade in
the Army myself. I have a brother who has been in the Army 25
years, and happens to command a hospital down at Fort Gordon. I
have a daughter that is in her second year right now in Army
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and went through jump
school last August.
So I think of the Army with a big footprint. I mean, this
is not something that is just academic to me. It goes back to
the question that I think I answered earlier: ``What kind of
volunteer Army do we have and what do we have to do to have
it?'' I think that the issues that you are raising here are
central to having the kind of Army that we want to have.
So I will tell you that not only do I support things like
commissaries and medical benefits and all of these, but I
support everything we need to do to incentivize the very top
quality force that we can have. I think it is absolutely
important for this Nation to do that, because we are going to
go to war with what we have the day that the war starts and you
cannot make up for that after we have the emergency.
I am sorry to go a little long in my answer, but this is
more than academic as far as I am concerned.
Senator Clinton. I appreciate that very much, General. That
is very heartening and I know it comes from your heart and that
means a lot.
I would just add, Mr. Chairman, that I think as we move
forward with many of the plans and recommendations that will be
presented to us starting in the spring about further
transformational ideas and the like, that we need to keep the
personnel in the middle of this, that the individual soldier or
the individual family is not some ancillary aspect of this
transformational approach.
I sometimes worry about some of the things that are said
and some of the other moves that, frankly, were made at the
highest levels to hold down growth in pay and benefits, to
stand against efforts to fix the problems with charging wounded
soldiers for their meals, and things that just made no sense in
the great scheme of things fiscally and morally. We keep this
in mind. Your words will certainly be a good beacon to lead us
in that way.
I thank you, General.
Chairman Warner. Senator, the letter that you made
reference to and your important questions this morning
underscore the role of Congress as a coequal branch in working
with the executive branch, which is the DOD. We have our own
views. We draw on our own military experience, as in the case
of Senator McCain. In your case, you are concerned about the
schooling, which is just as important as whether or not, in
many respects, the equipment works.
Now, I would like to take just a minute to ask a question
which I think should be included in your response to the
Senator. Having worked in the Pentagon over 5 years myself in
the Navy secretariat, someone made that decision. Did you just
awaken some day and a memo came across your desk? Was the
Department of the Army consulted? Were you involved in the
decision process by which these reductions in the commissaries
and the schooling were made?
In my day we were very much involved in it. When this
committee eventually gets around to looking at the Goldwater-
Nichols Act and revising it, I think more authority has to be
restored to the secretariats and the chiefs of staff. That is
just a sidebar, a little warning to filter across the horizon,
because I am going to be here a lot longer, thank God, than a
lot of those folks over there. We have to look at this.
Now, in response to the question, how was the decision made
and was the Department of the Army involved?
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, I will check. I do not think a
decision has been made yet. I think there are people who have
gone out and assessed and have made recommendations at some
level, but nobody has told me a decision has been made on this.
Chairman Warner. All right. General, do you have any
further information?
General Schoomaker. I received General Bell's memo 2 days
ago and that is what alerted me to the thing. I agree with the
Secretary. I think that basically what we are in are the throes
of evaluation. I am certainly not involved in it directly.
Chairman Warner. I think that maybe your letter is most
timely, Senator. I know you prepare very carefully for your
questions. Do you have any knowledge that you could share as to
how the decision was made, or is it a final decision?
Senator Clinton. Mr. Chairman, I think that it is one of
those decisions that is floated out there and everybody is
waiting to see whether it stays airborne or falls with a great
thump, and we are hoping it falls with a great thump.
Chairman Warner. You might have punctured it a little bit.
Senator Clinton. I hope so.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much for your oversight
responsibilities being fully fulfilled.
Now, Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, welcome back to the committee, to your home.
Secretary Brownlee. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Schoomaker, it is good to see
you again.
I am going to bring, Mr. Chairman, my experience to the
table here and, having visited----
Chairman Warner. Do not be modest. It is rather extensive.
Senator Bill Nelson. You are very kind, Mr. Chairman. I am
talking about a more recent experience visiting with a number
of the families of the Florida National Guard and talking with
a number of the soldiers. I would be in the middle of a meeting
with the families, and suddenly they would walk up to me with a
cell phone and I am suddenly talking to their loved one from
the field over in Iraq.
Of course, the policy question that I came to the table
with I have already discussed with General Schoomaker, the
Secretary of Defense, and General Abizaid when he was here. He
noted that the 124th is one of the best and that is why they
wanted to keep them. Of course, I was arguing for the first in,
first out policy.
So we have been around and around on all of this, and again
I want to say for these families that they are as proud of
their loved ones and they are as patriotic as anybody. But they
would like to have some certainty, given the constraints of the
needs of the combatant commander.
Now, that is preparatory to what I am about to ask the two
of you. At the end of October, the Florida Adjutant General,
the head of the Florida National Guard, in a press release
based on a conversation that he had with a senior member of the
Army, issued the dates for the departures from Southwest Asia:
the Second Battalion--this is of the 124th--February 10; Third
Battalion, February 20; the First Battalion on March 11.
Of course, I am trying to find out some certainty for these
families. So we called the Army Congressional Liaison Office
and we were told different dates. We were told the Second
Battalion indeed was February 10th, but we were told the Third
Battalion and the First Battalion's departure dates would be
about a month later.
Of course, as you can imagine this is still never-never
land for the families. So what is the theater commander's
decision for the withdrawal of the battalions from the 124th?
That is the question.
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, my understanding is the policy is
not more than 12 months boots-on-the-ground. I do not know the
specific dates for those battalions. I do know of the concern
there. Based primarily on your concern, I made sure that the
last time I was in Iraq, which was the end of September, that I
arranged a meeting with some of the people from the battalion
that was nearest to Baghdad. Unfortunately, they changed my
schedule and it looked like I was not going to get to see them.
When I suddenly realized it, I returned to Baghdad to see them,
and I had a very good meeting with them.
I just have to take the time to say, Senator, I could not
have been more impressed by these soldiers. They clearly have
many reasons why they would want to go home--economic, family,
and other things. But they are a wonderful group of committed
and dedicated people who are doing a great job for their
country. I just have to tell you that I have described these
kinds of people, both active and Reserve, as another great
generation we have here.
But I will just have to get it for the record, Senator. I
promise you we will try to clear up the misunderstanding.
[The information referred to follows:]
An exact redeployment timeline for the units of the 124th Infantry
(Florida Army National Guard) has not yet been established by the
theater commander. Additionally, the enemy situation and transportation
availability may disrupt any schedule once established. However, in
accordance with the current policy of 12 months ``Boots-on-the-
Ground,'' the 1st Battalion will redeploy by March 6, 2004. The 2nd
Battalion will redeploy by February 10, 2004, and the 3rd Battalion
will redeploy by February 18, 2004. The units will redeploy to Fort
Stewart, Georgia.
Senator Bill Nelson. If you will, because there is this
uncertainty out there and, save for the combatant commander
making a change because he needs a change, there is a date. But
we cannot get a date. So can you get us an answer?
Secretary Brownlee. We will, yes, sir. We will get you a
date to the extent we are able to get a date from the combatant
commander. But I can tell you that the policy is that troops
will not serve more than 1 year boots-on-the-ground. The point
was made earlier, we have continually insisted with the
combatant commander that if a unit finishes its mission and is
no longer needed, it may return.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Mr. Secretary, when you get
that date for me, would you also get an idea of when the actual
orders will be cut by the subordinate commanders for them to
plan and begin the handover of their units? Would you also give
me an idea of when those particular units would arrive back in
Fort Stewart?
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir, to the extent I can do that.
I am sure you understand, some of this is dependent on
transportation and other things. But I will get you the best
information I can, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. What I have is a variance of 1 month
on two of the battalions.
General Schoomaker. If I could, we have been over this, you
and I, a bunch. I think, for the broader audience here, what we
need to do is make sure that everybody understands the context
of what we are talking about here. The 53rd Separate Infantry
Brigade, headquartered in Florida, of which the three
battalions of the 124th are part of, were deployed differently
than what almost everybody else was deployed for. They were
mobilized at an early time and had a period before deployment
that in some cases was too long.
They were then deployed, not as the 124th or as the 53rd,
but as companies, to places outside of Iraq to guard things,
like Patriots. They were then at a later date aggregated and
brought into the combat zone. The conversations that we have
had asks the question, when does the time start? The time
started when they were brought into Iraq, not when they were in
Kuwait, not when they were in Tajikistan and all these other
places.
So the 12 months boots-on-the-ground policy began when they
were committed into Iraq. It is unfortunate because, I will
tell you, they are great soldiers and the families are great
families. But they have been through a different experience
than what the main force has been through over there.
I am a little reluctant to tell you, other than 12 months
boots-on-the-ground from when they arrived in country. The
transportation time will be there, and then they are going to
get leave. They are authorized leave for the time they have
been on active duty, and they will continue to remain mobilized
and paid during the time that they are on leave. They then have
demobilization time and then they have to return to their
families.
Anybody that has a medical problem in there will be dealt
with under the same kinds of constructs that we have on the
others. So the precision to which you want this answer, I think
it is unfair for me to tell you that I can give you that much
precision. I can tell you the policy is 12 months boots-on-the-
ground in Iraq and that, unless General Abizaid has a pressing
need to extend them, that our intention is to make sure that
the Florida Guard is right there in the front of our minds to
get them out, because they have been dealt a little tougher row
to hoe as a result of having been involved through that tenuous
time that I described there.
So I am sorry to go a little long, but I think we have to
set the right context here because it is different than it is
for everybody else.
Senator Bill Nelson. Setting the context, you used the word
``unfair.'' It certainly, General, is not unfair if orders have
been cut under an announced policy that a date would be given
so that the families would know when they are to be exiting the
theater. That is not unfair.
General Schoomaker. No, sir, I did not say ``unfair.'' The
point I was trying to make is the way they were introduced in
the theater was fragmented and so to talk about it as a whole
is difficult. What we are trying to do is to give you what you
want----
Senator Bill Nelson. Since they were fragmented, what is
the policy? Will you fragment out certain companies on their
return date? Or do they come back as a whole unit, as a
battalion?
General Schoomaker. Obviously even battalions move in
fragments because that is the way we transport them. Unless
they are on a ship, they generally do not all fit on the same
transportation. What we are looking at right now is the first
unit that went in there from the 124th, because that is the one
we are going to try to move first to get them out of there.
They may very well come out of there a little bit early.
[The information referred to follows:]
An exact redeployment timeline for the units of the 124th Infantry
(Florida Army National Guard) has not yet been established by the
theater commander. Additionally, the enemy situation and transportation
availability may disrupt any schedule once established. However, in
accordance with the current policy of 12 months ``Boots-on-the-
Ground,'' the 1st Battalion will redeploy by March 6, 2004. The 2nd
Battalion will redeploy by February 10, 2004, and the 3rd Battalion
will redeploy by February 18, 2004. The units will redeploy to Fort
Stewart, Georgia.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, that was Charlie Company
of the Second Battalion that went into Iraq before the war
started. They were in western Iraq with the Special Operations
troops doing clandestine things.
General Schoomaker. That I do not know. That is not the
conversation that we had before. That is somebody's allegation.
That is not a fact that I know. We do know that you had a
company that was in Jordan securing a Special Operations
headquarters. But I do not know that anybody was introduced to
Iraq.
I would be glad to deal with this in specifics and we
certainly will get you the answer. If that was the case, then
we will deal with it. But that is not the information that I
have.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is why I bring it up. In fact,
that is a fact. I have talked to some of those soldiers and in
fact they were in Iraq before--the war started, I believe, on
March 19, did it not?
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Senator Bill Nelson. They were actually in Iraq prior to
that.
General Schoomaker. We will take that and get deeper into
it, because that is not the information that I have.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, may I ask another
question?
Chairman Warner. Yes, of course.
Senator Bill Nelson. I am interested in the required
personnel strength and, due to combat and noncombat losses, it
is my understanding those three battalions of the 124th Florida
National Guard are at 64 to 67 percent of their required
personnel strength. As far as I can tell, there is no plan to
replace the troop losses. As Senator Reed said, they have had
some KIA and then they have had a lot more WIA.
But I cannot see a plan to replace those troop losses, and
it looks like that those infantry units are going to be below
strength. The question is, are they at operational risk because
of that? So how do you minimize this risk for the theater
commander if those units are below strength?
General Schoomaker. I am not sure that I understand what
you are saying. If you are talking about units being below
their authorized strength in a battalion, let us say, the
theater commander has the option to consolidate units and apply
them to missions that are commensurate with their capability.
Or he can reduce what he asks those units to do.
Part of your issue here goes back to my earlier statement.
The Reserve components are seriously overstructured. We have
far more structure in the Reserve components than we have
authorized end strength to fill. Therefore, you build in a
level of what you are talking about across the Reserve Force in
the Army. Part of what we are trying to do is to reduce that
overstructure so that we can have better fill of units and
build in a TTHS account, so that we can take non-duty military
occupational specialty (MOS) qualified personnel and get them
to school without putting the unit at risk until they are ready
to go.
In other words, we are trying to take the Reserve component
and mirror the active process, so that we can manage readiness.
This is something that General Blum has taken on and General
Helmsley and General Schultz in the Guard and Reserve. This is
part of this transformation we are talking about to do that.
So I think what you are talking about here is more than
just combat losses, but it also goes to the fact of what they
started with in terms of the structure, and then it talks to
the fact of what was their medical readiness when they were
called to active duty. Did we deploy everybody that was
resident within the structure? Because there is no replacement
for a Reserve soldier. That is the reality of it.
We are going to have to look at whether this is an
appropriate way of doing business in the future if we are going
to go to these come-as-you-are wars. It is not World War II any
more, and we are not going to build up a head of steam and a
mountain of steel and then go to fight. We are going to go with
the way we are right now and we are going to live with what we
have invested. I think that is the strategic question.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you anticipate any reenlistment
problems in the National Guard?
General Schoomaker. We are anticipating that that will be a
challenge. We do not know what the answer to that is. But I
anticipate that we are going to have to incentivize, use
leadership, and address this, because they have been stretched.
By the way, the Guard and Reserve made these reenlistment
rates that we talked about without access to Active Forces that
were getting off active duty, which was traditionally their
primary means of getting their force. So it is pretty
extraordinary that we made these kinds of retention and
enlistment goals, in the Reserve component especially, without
having the benefit of having active soldiers coming out because
we had stop-loss and stop-move on.
So I think it is a challenge we will face. I do not know
what the magnitude of it will be.
Chairman Warner. But the Senator has a very important
question there. In my time at the Pentagon, we tracked every 30
days. Do you not have tracking data as to the retention rates
in the Guard now?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, I am sure we do.
Chairman Warner. What do they reveal?
Secretary Brownlee. I think the question--they reveal right
now, Senator, that we are not having a problem.
Chairman Warner. By that you mean that in adequate numbers
they are remaining in?
Secretary Brownlee. But sir, these things lag several
months.
Chairman Warner. I understand that.
Secretary Brownlee. I believe that we will not be able to
get a good answer to that question until 3 to 6 months after
these units return.
Chairman Warner. That is clear. But I just wanted to
emphasize that the current tracking data--now, mind you, a lot
of these folks, like yours, have been over there for a
considerable period of time. So that tracking data has some
validity.
General Schoomaker. I just brought that up in response to a
previous question. We made more than 100 percent of all
categories.
Chairman Warner. Good. Let us just stress it as we conclude
this hearing.
I would like to go back. General, you were very candid
about one point and that is your concern about the Reserves.
When we use the word ``Reserves'' it includes the Guard.
Secretary Brownlee. It is both.
General Schoomaker. Reserve components.
Chairman Warner. We frankly mentioned both, and I try to
always say ``the Guard and Reserve.''
But the physical condition of a number of them fell below
your current standards, and we accept that information. But it
suddenly triggered in my mind, Secretary Brownlee, that when
you were with me on this side in 1991 during the Gulf operation
there were a significant number of Guard units which, at the
training level, just did not measure up for what could have
been their rapid deployment to the theater of operations and
required extensive training.
Are you able thus far in this operation, which is now
basically a year almost with the buildup and preparation, to
say, do we have a similar problem with Guard and Reserve as we
encountered in 1991?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, depending on the mission that will
be assigned to the unit, their training time may vary. If it is
a logistics unit that performs transportation functions and
most of the people in that unit can do that when they are
mobilized, then they may deploy within a month or so. If it is
a combat unit, like these Florida National Guard units, we call
them up and allow anywhere from 90 to 120 days to be sure they
are properly trained for the task they will be called upon to
execute in the area of operations.
Chairman Warner. The point I was making, though, was that
we had a similar situation that you and I dealt with in 1991,
but 90 or 120 days was not adequate time. Some forecast that we
needed some heavy armored in my recollection, where we had a
particular problem.
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, you might recall that some of
these units were sent out to the National Training Center (NTC)
to train.
Chairman Warner. That is right.
Secretary Brownlee. We went out and visited them. I think
there again the issue was some people thought they should have
been able to deploy immediately and most of the people in the
Army had always insisted they would need some degree of
training. The experience we had out there talking to the
soldiers is they felt that they were benefiting greatly from
the training.
Most of those units did not deploy. In this case we have
already deployed some, which have certainly proven their
mettle, and others will be deployed, and we have started to
mobilize them and give them the training.
Chairman Warner. Could you generally say, from lessons
learned in 1991, that the Guard and Reserve now are better
trained and we learned from those lessons, and as a
consequence, they have been more readily available to integrate
right into the regular Army and pick up in this conflict?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, again it depends on the type of
unit----
Chairman Warner. I clearly understand that.
Secretary Brownlee.--and what we are talking about. But I
would say, in general, that those combat units that will be
called upon, the enhanced separate brigades, they will require
training to get to the level that they should be.
Chairman Warner. I guess we are not in sync. I am just
trying to figure out, did we learn something by 1991 which we
are not seeing a repetition of here?
Secretary Brownlee. Yes.
Chairman Warner. General?
General Schoomaker. The answer is yes, we have learned
since 1991. We are better. But we still have the same
fundamental challenge. If you are talking about, as the
Secretary said, a combined arms unit that is going to operate
at, let us say, a brigade level or as part of a division, that
is a pretty complicated task to be able to do on 39 days a
year.
Chairman Warner. You bet, and I understand and respect
that.
General Schoomaker. But if I could just go one step
further.
Chairman Warner. Yes.
General Schoomaker. We have some huge challenges to get the
right kind of equipment to these Reserve components, both Guard
and Reserve, and we are looking at that. Part of the 30th ESB,
the 39th, and the 81st ESB, the three enhanced National Guard
brigades that we are mobilizing as we speak and are going
through their training right now, they are going to get first
priority on this rapid fielding initiative of equipment. They
are going to get the best equipment that the United States Army
has as they go through that training and go to Iraq with it.
So this is a step in the right direction. This is part of
what we are doing with the support that you have given us, both
through the supplemental and through our normal Total
Obligation Authority, to do the transformation that is
required. But we are still going to have to deal with what
degree of medical readiness, what degree of equipage, what
degree of training we can expect out of a National Guard or
Reserve unit and look at different strategies in terms of how,
if we can come up with a predictable rotational-based Army, to
include the Reserve components, how we can borrow training time
from the future to get them at a higher level of readiness
during the period of time that we want them available for
deployment, and mortgage others on the down side of that.
So we are looking at those kinds of strategies.
Secretary Brownlee. Mr. Chairman, could I just emphasize
one point that General Schoomaker made that I think is really
critically important to the committee? He mentioned an
initiative that we are going to begin soon, and that is, as you
well know, our National Guard and Reserve structure is out of
proportion in accordance with its end strength. In other words,
there is a lot more structure to fill than the end strength
would allow you to fill.
That is why when we call a unit up we have to pull from
other units in order to bring that unit's strength and
equipment up to an appropriate level so that it can then be
trained and deployed. The initiative that we are looking at is
to take this force structure out, not people or spaces, so that
the unit's end strength and force structure are consistent.
We will clearly need the committee's help and support when
we begin that process.
Chairman Warner. The performance of the Guard and Reserve
has been extraordinary. This goes all the way back, Secretary
Brownlee, to when you and I used to go to the Balkans together,
and we flew regularly on aircraft operated by the Air National
Guard. They were going into Sarajevo, where there were some
serious combat conditions.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir. If I could add, the 34th
Infantry Division National Guard is now performing the missions
in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai. They will be replaced this
spring by the 38th Infantry Division National Guard. So they
are performing those missions as we speak.
Chairman Warner. I am proud to say the Virginia National
Guard had that role in the Balkans, too.
I am going to go to one last question. We have had an
excellent hearing. I am going to ask the chiefs of staff to
notify Senators that we are going to take a 10-minute break and
resume at about 12:00 in room SH-219 for the closed session. I
anticipate Senators will want to join us there.
Now, Senator Clinton and a number of Members raised this.
When that Stars and Stripes article came out, it caused a
considerable jolt among the ranks here in Congress. I want to
go back for those who are following this hearing and explain
that Stars and Stripes is a highly regarded media operation,
done by top-notch professionals. It is within the table of
organizations of the DOD. In other words, it is not a private
sector publication; it is operated by the DOD, and the DOD
quite properly gives it the widest measure of latitude, as it
should if it is to become an effective document where the
readers pick it up and say, I want to devote the time to read
this, which they do.
It is a tremendous source of information, not only to the
soldiers on the front lines, because frequently those copies
work their way right up there quickly, but the families.
Now, they came out last month, Stars and Stripes, and
reported a survey of some 2,000 uniformed personnel,
presumably, maybe families too. When asked about their
personnel morale, 34 percent rated it as low or very low. You
know the statistics in that article. While I asked the question
earlier on, as I look back through our record I think it is
important that you submit to the record a point by point
perspective as to their findings and how those findings
coincide or do not coincide with information that you have in
your profession.
I am by no means critical of Stars and Stripes. This survey
simply merits that type of attention. So if you will provide
that for the record.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Stars and Stripes series--``Ground Truth--Conditions, Contrasts
and Morale'' provided detailed information about conditions in Iraq and
the reactions of military personnel stationed there. However, the
results should not be generalized to all military personnel in Iraq
because the sample on which the survey was based was not a
representative sample. The approach used is more likely to produce
findings that are particular to that specific segment of respondents
surveyed, rather than the population of soldiers in Iraq. As Stars and
Stripes acknowledges, ``The results cannot be projected to the entire
military population in Iraq, but the returns were impressive.''
Furthermore, the survey was conducted when the temperature in Iraq
was as high as 125 degrees. In addition, the 3rd Infantry Division
soldiers were told for the second time that they were being extended
and the Reserve component soldiers had just been informed that their
tours were going to be extended for up to a year. It is highly likely
that these issues negatively impacted the comments made by the
respondents.
Stars and Stripes reported that its survey found low morale,
insufficient training, jobs that had little or nothing to do with
training, and lack of a clear definition of mission. Many made it clear
that they did not plan to reenlist when their service was up.
The Army (through its Army Research Institute) will be conducting
surveys and interviews with soldiers to determine career intentions,
factors that impact them, and potential mitigators. Data will be
collected from units deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom. For comparative purposes, a control group of soldiers
who did not deploy will also be surveyed. Findings from this study will
be used to provide indicators of career intentions and determine
potential mitigators.
Chairman Warner. Gentlemen, let me thank you. We have had
an excellent hearing. You have been extremely responsive to
what I regard a very tough and thorough line of questions from
the members of this committee. So this hearing at the moment
will adjourn and resume at 12:00 in room SH-219.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
MOBILIZATION STATIONS
1. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, improvements are
definitely needed at Fort Stewart as they will impact Alabama
reservists when they return from Iraq in February and those being
alerted for Operation Iraqi Freedom. To this end, Senator Bayh and I
wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld suggesting that monies in the supplemental
be released to the Army for military construction upgrades as needed.
What is the Army doing to improve the mobilization process and
resources at Army mobilization stations since your inspection at Fort
Stewart several weeks ago?
Secretary Brownlee. The Army Installations Management Agency (IMA)
is procuring relocatable facilities for Forts Stewart, Bliss, Eustis,
Bragg, Carson, and Hood to provide additional billeting space for the
mobilization/demobilization effort. The cost to repair existing
barracks facilities and short-term leasing of relocatable facilities
will total $52.19 million through the end of fiscal year 2004.
Additionally, a recent change to the mobilization medical hold
policy will allow unit personnel who fail to meet deployment medical
standards to be released from active duty and returned home within 25
days. These personnel are subject to a subsequent order to active duty
upon resolution of the temporary profile or condition.
Currently under review is an initiative to directly deploy select
Army Reserve component (RC) units from their home station without using
a mobilization station. Per the guidance of the Director of the Army
Staff, a working group was established to develop concepts that will
facilitate the direct deployment of Army RC units. Both the Army
National Guard and Army Reserve have identified several units as
candidates to conduct direct deployment under a ``pilot'' project.
United States Forces Command is currently reviewing the list of units.
RAPID FIELDING INITIATIVE
2. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, when you were on the
committee staff in 1990, you had a passion for requesting and fielding
the relatively small things soldiers needed like machine gun mounts and
flashlights, particularly during Operation Desert Storm. Today, I see
the need for more uniform-related body armor, particularly to protect
the arms and legs of our soldiers. Your testimony agrees with my
assessment and I know you are taking action.
Nonetheless, I have seen the need at Walter Reed Hospital during
each of my visits where 100 (see recent November 10 Time article, page
39) soldiers have lost limbs. In some cases, that was preventable if we
can figure a way to use kevlar impregnated material to strengthen the
sleeves and pant legs of our BDUs creating a ballistic exo-skelton.
Clothing technology which gets us closer to this solution is being
worked at the College of Textiles, Auburn University. The technology
exists and there is language in the authorization bill suggesting the
Department of Defense get busy focusing its labs like Natick and other
academic institutions to demonstrate this protective capability sooner,
rather than later. We have come a long way since Somalia, when only
Rangers had the best body armor. Let's not wait, Mr. Secretary, 10
years to field a better uniform. What are the Rapid Fielding Initiative
lessons learned to date?
Secretary Brownlee. The roots of the Rapid Fielding Initiative
(RFI) lie in feedback from soldier experiences in Afghanistan during
late 2002. Reports of equipment issues by deployed soldiers and
commanders supporting Operation Enduring Freedom raised concern among
senior Army leaders. Surveys revealed that the nature of the
battlefield and missions soldiers perform as part of the global war on
terrorism created new requirements for the types and durability of
soldier equipment. To meet these new requirements, soldiers and units
were purchasing equipment with their own funds. To remedy these
shortcomings, the Army leadership directed the rapid fielding of a
number of soldier equipment items, both in theater and to deploying
soldiers. The 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 82nd Airborne
Division was the first to receive new equipment, and the success of
that fielding led to additional directives to equip more forces
deployed and deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom. By the end of fiscal
year 2003, all soldiers of the 82nd Airborne, 101st Air Assault, and
10th Mountain Division BCTs received state-of-the-art RFI equipment; a
total of eight brigades. For fiscal year 2004, we directed that all
deploying active, Guard, and Reserve soldiers receive this equipment. A
minimum of 16 BCTs and some 60,000 support soldiers are scheduled to
receive new equipment as part of the RFI program this year.
DEMINING VEHICLES
3. Senator Sessions. General Schoomaker, can you find out for me
why Peace Enforcement Operation Ground Combat Systems directed the
Unmanned Ground Vehicle/Systems Joint Project Office to purchase anti-
personnel demining vehicles from Croatia for use in Iraq when U.S.
companies have invested in this capability and now find themselves
suffering because of a bureaucratic program decision?
General Schoomaker. The former Unmanned Ground Vehicles/Systems
Joint Project Office (UGV/S JPO), now named the Robotic Systems Joint
Project Office (RS JPO), initiated the Robotic Combat Support System
(RCSS) acquisition program in 2001 to meet an Army requirement to
develop and procure robotic anti-personnel demining vehicles. A limited
number of prototype robotic systems developed in the mid-1990s proved
the utility and producibility of this technology. The program strategy
for RCSS called for a small business set-aside utilizing two competing
contractors to mitigate development risks. As part of the concept
validation program, the contractors' systems were subjected to an
Initial Verification Test (IVT) in 2002 to assess the performance and
maturity of the systems. Both contractors' systems performed so poorly
in the IVT conducted by the Army Test and Evaluation Command that
neither could be supported for entry into the System Development and
Demonstration phase of the acquisition program, thus causing a delay of
several years in fielding this very important capability.
The delay in fielding RCSS left the Army with a gap in anti-
personnel demining capability requiring reassessment of program plans.
To meet the urgent CENTCOM requirement for our operating forces engaged
in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, we embarked
on a new acquisition strategy based upon leveraging existing commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) capability. Accordingly, an evaluation of
available COTS demining equipment currently in production was
conducted, and in late 2003, the RS JPO initiated purchase of a COTS
system built in Croatia that utilizes a Caterpillar engine, Caterpillar
tracks and a Sony control. The decision was not bureaucratic--it was
based upon providing an effective timely solution to an urgent need.
This important capability will begin fielding in just a few months and
is expected to save the lives of service members.
ARMORED VEHICLES
4. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, I received a briefing on
RESET. There is over $170 million in the supplemental for second
destination charges needed to bring equipment back from Kuwait, and
another $122.7 billion for depot RESET activities. To be specific, I am
concerned that the Army staff is about to make a huge mistake in NOT
bringing all our armored vehicles back to the United States for depot
overall and will instead take the cheaper road of only applying 10/20
maintenance standards to a large portion of the fleet leaving the
problem for another day, another commander and another Chief of Staff
to solve, just as happened after Operation Desert Storm.
Mr. Secretary, this is potentially a huge problem set, one which we
will need to discuss in a future Airland Subcommittee hearing. I hope
before then that reason and logic are brought to the problem. In a
recent Defense Science Board study of space acquisition, one of the
findings was the Air Force placed cost concerns over mission. I think
the RESET issue may ultimately be assessed in the same way despite the
emphasis the Chief placed on mission accomplishment in the soldier's
creed he entered into the record. Would you respond to my concerns?
Secretary Brownlee. The initial cost estimate to reconstitute
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
equipment was based on experience from past operations, in-theater
technical inspections, and emerging maintenance data emanating from
current operations. The RESET plan takes into consideration the full
spectrum maintenance operations, from organizational level to depot: 15
percent of the track requirements are projected as depot workload, 83
percent as organizational/direct support/general support/installation
(includes delayed desert damage repairs) and the remaining 2 percent as
non-repairable. Based upon Army projections and operational
requirements, the depots have expanded their capacity to deal with the
larger volume of workload. This plan will result in a reconstituted
force fully capable of responding to all future contingencies with no
degradation to ongoing missions.
COMANCHE
5. Senator Sessions. General Schoomaker, I am concerned about the
rumors being generated that the Comanche program may be a bill payer
for other Army aviation problems. I consider this a key item that must
be discussed in detail before action is taken. Is there a problem with
the Comanche program that you care to discuss today?
General Schoomaker. The RAH-66 Comanche helicopter program is
currently in Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase; the
program is on schedule, within budget, and the program is fully funded.
KOREA
6. Senator Sessions. General Schoomaker, Korea is a hardship area,
and I think our soldiers stationed there need and deserve benefits
comparable to those received by soldiers in Bosnia and Kosovo. What is
your plan for realignment of forces in Korea and what is the Army doing
to help soldiers assigned to Korea with additional benefits like family
separation allowances, and those benefits similar to what soldiers in
Bosnia receive today?
General Schoomaker. With respect to the realignment of forces in
the Republic of Korea (ROK), U.S. forces will be realigned in
accordance with Secretary of Defense guidance and the U.S.-ROK Future
of the Alliance (FOTA) Initiative. Detailed changes to the disposition
of Army forces on the Korean Peninsula are pre-decisional, but will
conform to OSD guidance to combatant commanders on global war on
terrorism and global presence. The Army fully supports those Secretary
of Defense and combatant commander, U.S. Pacific Command and U.S.
Forces Korea initiatives. Korea was a combat zone from 27 June 1950
until 31 January 1955, however, since then soldiers in Korea have not
engaged in combat operations. Hence, we do not believe soldiers serving
in Korea should be entitled to the same entitlements as soldiers
serving in a combat zone. This aside, the Army is aware of the well-
being issues for soldiers who are serving in Korea. This past year all
aspects of service in Korea were reviewed, to include assignment
policy, subsistence, incentives and pays. The Department of Defense
recognized the arduous duty performed by troops in Korea by authorizing
an additional $50-$150 per month in hardship duty pay. Soldiers in
Korea also receive a cost-of-living allowance (average $84/month) and
family separation allowance ($250/month). Additionally, the Army is
drafting a proposal for use of assignment incentive pay to provide
additional money to soldiers that volunteer to serve beyond the normal
Korea tour length. Please be assured that the Army continues to study
ways of improving service in Korea.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
REQUIREMENTS PROCESS
7. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, are you satisfied with the
way the Army establishes and prioritizes requirements? I ask this
question because I see some serious disconnects in that regard.
Examples abound that would indicate a serious problem for instance:
Digitization: The Army has been constructing the tactical internet
since 1997. The original plan was to digitize the entire Army. Then the
Army decided to limit it to the counterattack corps at Fort Hood. Just
before the Iraq war that was seen as a poor decision and there was a
crash program to field Blue Force Tracking to the Third Infantry
Division and other units there so that they would have better
situational awareness.
Interceptor Body Armor: The Army set a requirement of only 40,000
for infantrymen only. Yet for years the Army has been foreseeing a non-
linear battlefield where there are no established front lines, and
consequently all soldiers are at risk. Now we see in Iraq that the
requirement has been (rightfully) changed to equip all soldiers and
Department of Defense civilians in theater. We are now on a crash
program to procure enough to meet that requirement while some soldiers
continue to go unprotected.
Up-armored HMMWVs: A similar problem to the body armor. The
requirement was seriously under-estimated and procurement averaged
about 500 annually, with 250 planned for fiscal year 2004. Now we have
seen the requirement for Iraq increased at least twice, and are working
to ramp-up production while soldiers continue to be killed and wounded
in thin-skinned HMMWVs.
Aircraft Survivability Equipment: The requirement for the improved
chaff and flare dispenser (ALE-47) was originally limited to special
operations aircraft. Just prior to the war, the Chinook product
manager, on his own initiative, began procuring and installing them on
some conventional aircraft in the Active Force. Unfortunately, other
active and Reserve component helicopters in Iraq are not so equipped,
including the Chinook that was recently shot down, killing 16 soldiers
and wounding more.
Battlefield Combat Identification System: The Army began developing
the Battlefield Combat Identification System after Operation Desert
Storm as a result of the high incidence of fratricides. Two years ago
the Army abandoned the program as too expensive, claiming that it would
depend on situational awareness to prevent fratricides. Now, as a
result of the fratricides in this most recent war, Joint Forces
Command, in its lessons-learned report, is again calling for combat
identification systems.
How do you propose to reform the requirements generation and
prioritization process and how do you propose to address the specific
examples I cited?
General Schoomaker. Identifying desired warfighting capabilities
and balancing application of resources between current modernization
and the future force is an incredible challenge. The Army must not make
these decisions in a vacuum; effective support to current and future
combatant commanders requires that these capability and prioritization
decisions be made in a joint context, informed by the Nation's
strategic goals and objectives. The Department of Defense has recently
revised the capability identification (requirements generation) process
to create better linkage to strategy and joint operational concepts.
The Department is also fine-tuning the planning and programming
processes so that prioritization decisions support current and future
operations in this joint context. We must continue to aggressively seek
the best inputs, analysis, and threat assessments available to drive
our decision-making processes.
You must remember that prioritization is a relative process and the
acquisition process was not rapid. Army budgets prior to September 11,
2001, were very small for the number of missions we were conducting. We
cancelled 26 systems to pay for transformational initiatives; even then
we were forced to spread out buys of these initiatives over many years
simply to get some capability out into the force.
Prior to September 11, 2001, the Army perceived that we would not
have to fight an enemy of equal capabilities in the near future. This
assessment supported the decision to shift resources from current force
modernization to future force transformation. As expected, the Army has
reassessed these prioritization decisions to address the near-term
requirements of the global war on terrorism, and specifically our
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In this light, the Army has taken
the following measures to address the examples you've cited:
Digitization: The Army's objective to develop a tactical internet
capability appears to be validated by the Defense Department shift
towards network-centric warfare concepts. We will continue to develop
this capability for the future force. I have challenged the Army to
identify and pursue opportunities to bring future force capabilities to
the current force where logical--I believe that the Blue Force Tracking
effort for Operation Iraqi Freedom is an example of how that can work.
We must ensure that joint interoperability is maximized so that we are
providing coherent, relevant capability to the joint force commander.
Interceptor Body Armor: The Army recognized a requirement for
Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) to replace the Personal Armor System for
Ground Troops (PASGT) Vest for the dismounted combatant. As cited, we
have changed our distribution plans to provide better protection to
soldiers and civilians in non-direct combat situations. The total Army
IBA requirement is now 840,000 sets. At the end of fiscal year 2004 the
Army will have produced and fielded 422,602 sets of IBA, which leaves a
remaining quantity of 417,398 sets to be produced and fielded to
provide the required density.
U-Armored Highly Mobile Multi Wheeled Vehicles (UAH): The original
Army requirement for UAHs was established to equip primarily military
police and light reconnaissance units. This density has served the Army
well in stabilization operations in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The size
of the stabilization force in Iraq has required us to move combat
troops from heavily armored vehicles to wheeled vehicle in order to
operate effectively. The Army and CENTCOM have worked together to
establish a new requirement for 3,615 UAHs to support OIF. The Army
currently has 1,895 UAHs in Iraq, and has increased production to
provide an additional 900 UAHs by June 2004. To ensure that the Army is
identifying the right protection mix for the future tactical wheeled
fleet, this issue is being reviewed as part of our OIF lessons learned
effort.
Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE): The Army is moving
aggressively to determine what technologies are available to defeat the
specific ground-to-air threats presented in Iraq and Afghanistan and
will apply the resources necessary to protect our air fleet. We
recognize that technology alone will not defeat every hostile act. The
Army has established a focused assessment team to gather attack
information; develop tactics, techniques, and procedures to minimize
risks to those attack profiles; and then quickly disseminate that
information to the operational forces.
Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS): The Army continues
to recognize the value of combat identification technology to increase
lethality and reduce fratricide on the battlefield. As stated, the BCIS
program was terminated because the costs to equip the entire force with
that solution were prohibitive. The Army is continuing to explore the
millimeter wave technology with the expectation that this capability
will meet Future Combat System requirements. In the near term, the risk
of fratricide has been reduced through the fielding of improved optics
such as 2nd Generation Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) and digital
situational awareness capability. As recent experience has taught us,
joint interoperability of our fratricide-reduction solutions is
imperative. We are active partners with Joint Forces Command to
determine the right set of capabilities for the joint force.
AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT
8. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, the National Guard Chinook
helicopter that was shot down recently by an Iraqi surface to air
missile was not equipped with the most modern chaff and flare
dispenser, the ALE-47, while the active duty unit to which it was
attached was so equipped. I understand that there are 62 ALE-47
dispensers available, until recently awaiting a decision as to where
they will be installed, along with the funding required to install
them. The Army has applied a ``first to fight'' paradigm to determine
where to field modernized equipment first. Is that paradigm still valid
in this case, and others, where the Army has active duty and Reserve
component units serving side-by-side?
General Schoomaker. The ``first to fight'' paradigm is no longer
valid in this case. Currently, active and Reserve component helicopters
are being upgraded with the ALE-47 dispenser.
9. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, where and when will the
available ALE-47 chaff and flare dispensers be installed?
General Schoomaker. ALE-47 dispensers will be installed on CH-47 a/
c in both the Theater of Operations and in the continental United
States (CONUS) (including Hawaii) commencing in the December 2003
timeframe.
10. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, how many Chinook helicopters
will still be employed in Iraq without the most modern aircraft
survivability equipment?
General Schoomaker. Senator Levin, the answer is none. All of the
Chinook helicopters operating in Iraq will have the most modern
aircraft survivability equipment installed.
11. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what is the plan to
similarly equip those helicopters and how long will it take to do so?
General Schoomaker. Currently, ALE-47 dispenser sets are in theater
and they will be installed, as aircraft are made available to the
installation team. Similarly, ALE-47 dispenser sets are being installed
on aircraft in CONUS (including Hawaii) in preparation for deployment
as follow-on units.
12. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, are there sufficient
quantities of the various types of flares fired by the ALE-47 available
in theater?
General Schoomaker. Standard Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)
on CH-47D aircraft includes the AN/ALQ-156(V)1 Missile Approach
Detector linked to the M-130 Flare Dispenser that uses the M206 flare.
There are sufficient quantities of the M206 flare in theater. The CH-
47F program incorporates the Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure
and Common Missile Warning System (ATIRCM/CMWS) currently in
development and the ALE-47 flare dispenser. In addition to the M206
flare, the ALE-47 dispenser uses the M211 and M212 flares to provide a
better countermeasure than just the M206 alone. The Army G4 arranged a
loan of 2,000 each M211 and M212 flares from the 160th Special
Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) to support all the aircraft
currently in theater with the ALE-47 dispensers. These flares are
currently on hand in theater and being intensively managed. Air Force
has agreed to split equally the M211 production with the Army beginning
mid January 2004. Army and Air Force will equally split delivery of the
M212 starting in March 2004 at the completion of the SOAR deliveries.
The M211 is produced by Alloy Surfaces of Chester Twp, PA. Their
current production capacity is 6,000 per month. The M212 flare is
produced by ATK-Thiokol in Brigham City, UT. Their current production
capacity is 5,400 per month. Additional funding is being provided to
increase production of the M211 from 5,400 per month to 12,000 per
month and the M212 from 6,000 per month to 20,000 per month by August
2004. These production rates will provide sufficient quantities to
satisfy both Army and Air Force requirements.
13. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, members of the unit to which
the downed Chinook was assigned allege that the helicopters in that
unit operated in Iraq for 5 months without even the more basic aircraft
survivability equipment the ALQ-156 threat detector and the M-130 flare
dispenser. Can you confirm or deny this report? If true, why was that
the case?
General Schoomaker. At this point, I can neither confirm nor deny
this report. There is not sufficient ASE equipment to provide a full
compliment to all the Reserve component units. However, when these
units are mobilized the Army cross-levels equipment to ensure they are
capable of operating in the specific threat environment. The unit
received all but six sets of ASE prior to deployment. That includes the
ALQ-156 and the M-130. The remaining ASE was issued in theater, minus
one set for one aircraft. The fact that all but one would be fully
equipped is not alarming because one aircraft is typically in a major
inspection cycle and the ASE is rotated to other aircraft in need.
14. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what is the situation with
the Kiowa, Apache, and Black Hawk helicopters in Iraq?
General Schoomaker. Kiowa, Apache, and Black Hawk helicopters
operating in Iraq all have aircraft survivability equipment installed.
15. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, members of the unit to which
the downed Chinook was assigned also report significant problems with
the reliability of the ALQ-156 Missile Approach Detector that is linked
to the flare dispenser. Consequently, the advantage of an aircraft
having an improved flare dispenser will be degraded by the less
reliable missile detector. What is the extent of the ALQ-156 Missile
Approach Detector's reliability problem and the Army's plan for
correcting it?
General Schoomaker. The Army is taking a number of steps to ensure
that the ALQ-156 remains a reliable and effective missile detector for
our CH-47 Chinook and C-23 Sherpa aircraft. First, we are deploying a
Field Assistance Support Team (FAST) into the Iraqi theater. This team
will assist deployed units in complete end-to-end operational tests of
the infrared aircraft survivability equipment (ASE). The ALQ-156
detector is part of the infrared ASE system. In addition, the Program
Manager Cargo Helicopter has purchased three ALQ-156 test sets to
provide to the Logistics Assistance Representatives (LAR) in theater,
to support end-to-end operational checks of the ASE equipment. Two of
these test sets will be shipped to OIF. The third test set will go to
OEF with a FAST team in February 2004. The FAST will have spare ALQ-156
detectors to maximize operational availability of the systems in
theater.
The Army National Guard (ARNG) has an effort underway to upgrade
the aircraft that have been designated to deploy on the next rotations
into OIF and OEF. The ARNG is procuring 25 ALQ-156A(V)1 systems and two
sets of spares. The ALQ-156A(V)1 system is an improved version of the
ALQ-156, with an increased range and a lower false alarm rate. These
systems will be installed on the Hawaii and Mississippi ARNG aircraft
that have been designated to deploy, in addition to the ALE-47 Improved
Flare Dispenser.
Finally, the Army Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM),
the item manager for the ALQ-156, is intensively managing the system to
ensure that there are sufficient repair parts available for the system.
CECOM also has a contract with BAE, in Nashua, NH (the original
equipment manufacturer), for repair of the ALQ-156 system.
16. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, I understand that the long
term solution is a new suite of aircraft survivability equipment called
the Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures/Common Missile Warning
System (ATRICM/CMWS). The Army cancelled the ATRICM/CMWS in fiscal year
2003 for affordability reasons and then resurrected the program in
fiscal year 2004. Have you been briefed yet on the program, and do you
believe the Army has adequately prioritized the development and
procurement of those systems?
General Schoomaker. Yes, I have been briefed on the Army's ATRICM/
CMWS program and it is one of the highest priority programs in the
Army. The Army has identified options to accelerate the ATRICM/CMWS
program, which includes not only our digitized aircraft but the Army's
entire fleet. In the near future, we will be assessing the best way to
move ahead to accelerate fielding of this critical capability.
RECENT MILITARY ACTION IN IRAQ
17-20. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, Major General Swannack,
commander of the 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq, was quoted in the
press as saying, ``We're going to use a sledgehammer to crush a
walnut.'' He was referring to the military tactic in recent days of
employing aircraft dropping 500 pound bombs, artillery, mortars, and
attack helicopters against suspected insurgents. Recently, AC-130
gunships were used to attack what was reported to be an empty warehouse
in Baghdad suspected of being a planning and staging area for
insurgents. Recent press reports also indicate that the 4th Infantry
Division destroyed a number of homes of suspected insurgents after
evacuating the women and children of the families.
I believe that General Swannack's comments, and the actions to
which he was referring, could be counterproductive. Have you had the
opportunity to discuss this issue with General Swannack and with
General Abizaid?
If yes, what was the gist of those discussions? If no, when do you
expect to have those discussions and get back to me?
Given your experience, especially in special operations, do you
believe that such tactics are likely to help or hurt a counter-
insurgency effort?
Are such tactics consistent with an approach to win the ``hearts
and minds?''
General Schoomaker. I had the opportunity to spend time with MG
Swannack during my recent trip to Iraq. I was most impressed with what
he is doing and the progress he is making in working with the Iraqi
people. He is doing the right things within his sector. Commanders must
make assessments on actions to be taken and the amount of force
necessary to achieve the desired effect on the target. For this reason,
I referred the question to both General Abizaid and MG Swannack for
comment. Both felt that the comment was misconstrued, it was meant to
be descriptive (for an American audience) of the level of force being
employed in Iraq. Not meant to threaten or goad the Iraqi populace.
IRAQ ROTATION PLAN
21. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, in discussing the changes to
the Iraq Rotation Plan and the planned reduction of U.S. forces between
January and April of next year, Secretary Rumsfeld said, ``And I think
it's important to recognize that numbers do not necessarily equate with
capability. We're bringing in forces that are appropriate to deal with
the evolving threats in Iraq today, including more mobile infantry
elements. So while the number of U.S. forces may be level or decline
slightly, this much is certain: the capability of the security forces
in Iraq will increase.''
I note that the Army will be replacing the Fourth Infantry
Division, the Army's most modern, digitized division with its enhanced
situational awareness, and the 101st Air Assault Division, the Army's
most mobile division, with its huge fleet of helicopters that are not
available to other Army divisions. So, I ask if you agree with the
statement that the replacement units will be more appropriate, more
mobile, and of greater capability than those being replaced?
General Schoomaker. The units deploying to Iraq, such as the 1st
Cavalry Division and the 1st Infantry Division, will be trained and
organized for the threat they will face and the lessons we have learned
from our operations thus far. They will bring the correct mix of
aviation, dismounted, and mounted capabilities for the operating
environment. For instance, we have found that heavy tanks and other
tracked vehicles are in some cases too threatening and often lack the
mobility and flexibility for operations such as those that we are
conducting in Iraq. So, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) units will be
using a more appropriate mix of up-armored HMMWVs and armored vehicles
when they deploy. The two divisions, as well as the Stryker Brigade,
will also be task-organized with the correct mix of attack,
reconnaissance, and lift aircraft. This will make them much more
responsive, mobile, and flexible than the forces there today.
As I mentioned, we are also sending the first of our Stryker
Brigades to Iraq. These are infantry-centric formations and benefit
from armored, mobile, wheeled personnel carriers. They also have much
greater situational awareness than traditional forces as a result of
their increased reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
elements and systems.
Many of those same information systems are being fielded to
deploying units. In fact, 1st Cavalry Division, which is a digital
division of the same design as 4th Infantry Division, had most of these
systems already. This will ensure that our forces have better
situational awareness and will allow them to operate more efficiently
in a complex and fluid environment.
22. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, the Army has chosen to do
unit rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as opposed to individual
replacements such as in Vietnam, where units and equipment remained for
years, and individuals rotated on 12 month assignments. While there are
potential benefits to the unit rotation scheme, particularly with
respect to unit cohesion, there are also potential disadvantages:
expertise gained and relationships with Iraqis built over a 12-month
period are severed abruptly and in a major way as whole units rotate,
as opposed to less dramatically as individuals rotate; large equipment
transportation costs are incurred as divisions move from the U.S. to
Iraq and back again; capabilities are lost, such as when the modern,
digitized 4th Infantry Division or the huge helicopter fleet of the
101st Air Assault Division are replaced by less modernized and less
well-equipped divisions; individual soldiers potentially return from
Iraq or Afghanistan, only to be reassigned to a unit that is itself
deploying there shortly. Why do you think the unit rotation plan is
superior to the alternative? How will you address the disadvantages I
have cited?
General Schoomaker. One of the greatest lessons the Army learned
from Vietnam is that a policy of individual replacement into a combat
zone corrodes unit cohesiveness, contributes to reduced soldier morale
and produces significantly less capable fighting formations. An
important step we can take to preserve the great effectiveness of the
units we have in the Army today is to create stability in our
organizations. This includes manning and training our units at their
home stations and deploying them overseas as a ``team of teams'' that
can count on a high degree of personnel stability throughout their
combat tour.
There are some potential drawbacks to this policy, but our pre-
deployment training regimen and the combatant commander's plans for
transitioning units once they are in theater will mitigate the risks.
Units preparing to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan are undergoing
extensive training both at home station and at our Combat Training
Centers. This training is applying the lessons learned from units that
are currently serving in Iraq to create the most realistic pre-
deployment training environment possible. Once the units arrive in
theater they will further undergo an integration process that lasts for
several weeks, including extensive transition time with the units they
are replacing in Iraq or Afghanistan. This will allow the incoming
units to acclimate to the environment, get to know their areas of
operation, and assume critical relationships with the local population
while the units they are replacing is still there to assist. This
method of unit replacement has been validated in recent years with
great success in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.
As you noted, there is a risk of rotating individual soldiers out
of a unit that just completed an overseas tour and into a unit getting
ready to deploy. The Army's Human Resource Command is working to ensure
that the cases of this occurring are kept to an absolute minimum.
To the issue of capabilities and equipment differences between
Operation Iraqi Freedom 1 (OIF 1) and OIF 2 units, United States
Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Army have worked extensively to
ensure the appropriate capabilities are resident in the units deploying
to Iraq for OIF 2. For example, although some of the modernized
equipment and aviation assets of the 4th Infantry and 101st Airborne
Divisions will redeploy to the United States over the next few months,
the Army recently deployed a Stryker Brigade Combat Team to Iraq that
provides an enhanced capability for the combatant commander that he
didn't have for most of OIF 1.
23. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, you have said before that
you intend to convert the Army from an individual replacement system to
a unit manning system. At the same time, you have indicated that at
this time you do not believe that an increase in personnel end strength
is required. However, it is my understanding that a unit manning system
is likely to require more soldiers than an individual replacement
system for a given force structure, because units must be manned above
normally authorized strength to account for the inevitable personnel
losses that will occur over time.
For instance, a recent news report on the experience of A Company,
Second Battalion, Eight Infantry noted that there were 172 troops on
the company roster when it entered Iraq in May. By November the company
had lost nearly one-third of its members to injury, illness, completed
enlistments, and reassignments, dropping to 118, until replacements
pushed the number back up to 129. Assuming that A Company's experience
is typical, and is repeated across the hundreds of company-sized units
in Iraq, the impact on a unit manning system will be enormous. How do
you intend to implement a unit manning system and a unit rotation plan
for Iraq and Afghanistan while keeping Army end strength constant?
General Schoomaker. Force Stabilization (variant of unit manning)
is compatible with maintaining constant Army end strength. It will
allow the Army to best meet its rotation needs by deploying units in
which the soldier and unit operational cycles are synchronized. There
are two major deployment manning issues that Force Stabilization
addresses, combat readiness/soldier non-deployability prior to
deployment, and combat readiness/attrition during deployment. Current
individual replacement system (IRS) manned units are built over time
with staggered soldier arrivals and departures. This results in the
deployment of units with scheduled turnover of at least 33 percent per
year, or last minute shuffling of soldiers including plus ups over
strength authorizations. These required actions are necessitated
because the peace-time IRS manning system is not compatible with war-
time execution--requiring the breakup of combat crews and destruction
of unit cohesion prior to combat. Force stabilization virtually
eliminates these issues by aligning soldier and unit operational cycles
when units are formed, and by implementing a peacetime manning model
that seamlessly transitions to war-time execution. This precludes
shuffling soldiers and breaking up combat crews and teams prior to
deployments.
It allows units to deploy at or near their authorized personnel
strength, minimizing required plus ups and soldier shuffling, resulting
in more stability and predictability for soldiers and families. Force
stabilization has the added benefit that all soldiers go through the
unit training cycle together and therefore are routinely at a higher
level of combat capability than the individual replacement system units
of today. The second issue (depletion of personnel strength in a combat
zone due to injury, illness, completed enlistments, and reassignments)
is exactly what Force Stabilization implementation will help to
minimize. We categorize losses as known or unknown. Unknown losses due
to injury and illness will occur and will require replacements as the
unit strength falls below predetermined minimum levels regardless of
the manning method in use (individual or unit). Package replacements
will continue to be necessary to replace those soldiers suffering
injury, illness, or death. These package replacements will occur
periodically rather than continuously and will be provided to the unit
during unit sustainment periods so new soldiers can be integrated into
the unit prior to performing an operational mission. Force Stabilized
units will not incur many of the known losses, and thus the over
manning you referred to because soldier and unit operational cycles are
aligned prior to deployment. This will virtually eliminate known losses
(attrition) and will significantly reduce the turbulence and loss of
cohesion attributable to conducting major replacement operations in a
war-time theater of operations.
Force Stabilization policies and tenets were developed to directly
address deployment strength and deployment attrition concerns as well
as a peace-time manning system that seamlessly transitioned to a war-
time footing. By implementing Force Stabilization, the Army can more
efficiently man units, train soldiers and teams, and rotate units, all
while staying within current end strength.
NON-LINE-OF-SIGHT CANNON
24. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Congress directed the Army to
field a Future Combat System Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Cannon by 2008.
Congress did so because 2008 was the planned fielding date for the
Crusader artillery system that the Office of the Secretary of Defense
had just cancelled, and because General Shinseki, the former Chief of
Staff, indicated that the Army still had an outstanding requirement for
an artillery system to replace the Paladin. However, General Shinseki
emphasized, and the legislation indicated, that the NLOS Cannon would
be part of the Future Combat Systems a networked system of systems, 18
in total. I, for one, believed that in general it is not good policy
for Congress to legislate a fielding date for a major weapons system.
In fact, it appears now that the Future Combat Systems will not be
ready for a 2008 fielding, and to insist on fielding the NLOS Cannon in
2008 may ultimately result in the NLOS Cannon being fielded outside the
Future Combat System of systems, clearly not what General Shinseki, nor
Congress, intended. In light of Operation Iraqi Freedom lessons
learned, how would you prioritize the requirement to replace the
current Paladin artillery system?
General Schoomaker. With the lessons learned from Operation Iraqi
Freedom it is not a priority at this time to replace the current
Paladin artillery system. With currently funded upgrades, Paladin will
continue to serve the current force for many years. We must however
emphasize the importance of NLOS Cannon as part of an integrated Future
Combat Systems. The NLOS Cannon is an integral part of the system of
systems and as such, synchronization with the overarching FCS program
is imperative for achieving the goals of networked lethality,
survivability, supportability, and affordability.
25. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what is more important: to
have a NLOS Cannon not later than 2008, or to ensure that NLOS Cannon
is part of an integrated Future Combat System of systems?
General Schoomaker. Ensuring that NLOS Cannon is part of an
integrated Future Combat System of systems is more important.
The NLOS Cannon is an integral part of the system of systems and as
such, synchronization with the overarching FCS program is imperative
for achieving the goals of networking lethality, survivability,
supportability, and affordability.
Decoupling NLOS Cannon from FCS development essentially eliminates
any commonality benefits and efficiencies the Army would receive from a
Family of Systems development program. Life cycle costs would increase
because NLOS Cannon would be a unique vehicle. While it is true that
NLOS Cannon if initially developed separately form the FCS system of
systems, might eventually be made common with the rest of FCS, the Army
would have to fund two distinct NLOS Cannon development programs.
Likewise, attempting to force the FCS program to align with an
accelerated NLOS Cannon schedule would cause sub-optimization of the
other systems within FCS. For example, the full design maturity of the
C\4\ISR network would not support an accelerated NLOS Cannon program.
26. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, will you be requesting
relief from the 2008 fielding date for Future Combat System NLOS Cannon
in the fiscal year 2005 budget request?
General Schoomaker. No, we will not seek relief in the 2005 budget
request.
MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS VERSUS SOLDIER SYSTEMS
27. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, given the shortage of
Interceptor Body Armor, up-armored HMMWVs and Aircraft Survivability
Equipment in Iraq, do you believe that the Army has concentrated too
much on the development and procurement of major weapons systems to the
neglect of soldier survivability systems? If so, what will you do to
correct it?
General Schoomaker. With past programs, the Army worked to
establish a balance between maintaining the current force and bridging
to a transformed force. We are constantly reviewing that balance to
ensure we have it correct. Where appropriate, we have and will continue
to make adjustments. Based on requirements identified for ongoing
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army has made program
adjustments to provide immediate fielding of Interceptor Body Armor and
up-armored HMMWVs. We are in the process now of evaluating acceleration
options of improved aircraft survivability equipment to forward-
deployed aircraft. These specific issues are also being assessed as
part of two of 17 key focus areas within the Army (specifically soldier
issues and Army aviation). The Army will continue to seek a balance
between current and future requirements.
PROGRAM UNAFFORDABILITY AND VOLATILITY
28. Senator Levin. Secretary Brownlee and General Schoomaker, each
year it seems that the Army tries to improve itself (currently called
``transformation'') and pursue a number of programs that it cannot
afford. As a result, a number of programs are started but must be
limited to a relatively small portion of the Army, or are stretched out
so far as to be at risk of termination for cost reasons. How would you
each propose to break this cycle of unaffordability and program
volatility? Are you taking any current steps in this direction?
Secretary Brownlee and General Schoomaker. In past programs, the
Army has made some difficult decisions to terminate or restructure some
programs in order to free up resources for other critical priorities.
These decisions were based on a capabilities-based approach. During the
upcoming POM (fiscal years 2006-2011), the Army will incorporate an
enhanced capabilities-based review of the Army's Research, Development,
and Acquisition (RDA) program. This review will team the Army's
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and headquarters, Department of
the Army in order to evaluate the required capabilities for both the
Current and Future Forces within the context of joint capabilities.
This review will identify capabilities gaps and trade space within the
RDA program and will inform program decisions. We will examine
affordability of programs across the Army and stress fielding of
capabilities vice materiel solutions.
TROOP MORALE
29-31. Senator Levin. Secretary Brownlee, a few weeks ago, the
Stars and Stripes newspaper conducted a survey of nearly 2,000 service
members serving throughout Iraq. Stars and Stripes reported that this
survey found low morale, insufficient training, jobs that had little or
nothing to do with training, and lack of a clear definition of mission.
Many made it clear that they do not plan to reenlist when their service
is up.
Dr. David Chu, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, told the House Armed Services Committee on November 5 that
66 percent of the reservists in Iraq said they would reenlist; and ABC
World News Tonight ran a story on Sunday, November 9, stating that
according to a DOD survey, only 54 percent of the reservists and
Guardsmen serving in Iraq would reenlist. Based on the reports that you
receive, how do you characterize the morale of the troops--not of the
leaders--but of the thousands of troops serving in Iraq?
What is your reaction to these survey results?
Is the morale of troops in Afghanistan different than the morale of
troops in Iraq?
Secretary Brownlee. Although the Army has sent individuals and
teams of experts to Iraq and Afghanistan to assess soldier support,
morale, and living conditions, no formal survey had been conducted.
Neither were formal surveys conducted in the war zones during the
Korean Conflict, the Vietnam War, or Operation Desert Storm. Survey
questionnaires can be distracters for soldiers in a war zone and thus
create unnecessary security/safety risks. Furthermore, it is difficult
to obtain scientifically selected samples for surveys in war zones.
The Stars and Stripes survey implies that the Army will face a
serious retention problem in the near future. The success of the Army's
re-enlistment program over the past 5 years indicates that the news is
not nearly as bad as the Stars and Stripes asserts. The Army believes
that so long as funds remain available for the Selective Re-enlistment
Bonus (SRB) program, at the requested levels, it will be able to retain
soldiers with the requisite skills necessary to maintain readiness.
Retention rates are often used as a benchmark to measure the success of
the Army re-enlistment program. Given the historical retention rate for
initial terms soldiers, it is not surprising to note that as many as 49
percent of the soldiers surveyed by Stars and Stripes indicated they
did not plan to re-enlist. The Army staff (G-1) has tasked the Office
of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA) to develop a predictive model
that will allow leadership visibility on future retention problems. The
Well-Being Division of the Headquarters Department of the Army, G-1
compiled a list of human dimension ``indicators'' of stress on the
force, with the top indicators being accessions, retention, and morale.
However, an Operational Stress Framework has been developed that
correlates operations tempo (OPTEMPO) to the indicators of stress and
the United States Military Academy (USMA) OEMA is working on a model
designed to predict stress on the force, given indicator measurements.
The Army (through its Army Research Institute (ARI)) will be
conducting surveys and interviews with soldiers to determine career
intentions, factors that impact them, and potential mitigators. Data
will be collected from units deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom and
Operation Enduring Freedom. For comparative purposes, a control group
of soldiers who did not deploy will also be surveyed. Findings from
this study will be used to provide indicators of career intentions and
determine potential mitigators.
The Army has taken a proactive approach to identifying and
correcting problems for all soldiers and family members involved in OIF
and other contingencies. The Army remains committed to providing the
very best possible programs to the entire Army family during this
stressful and turbulent time in our Nation's history.
MEDICAL CARE AND LIVING CONDITIONS AT FORT STEWART
32. Senator Levin. Secretary Brownlee, we were appalled to learn
that hundreds of sick and wounded soldiers, including many who served
in Operation Iraqi Freedom, were living in substandard conditions and
waiting months for medical care. I know that you have personally
visited Fort Stewart to look into this. What were the conditions for
these sick and wounded soldiers when when you visited Fort Stewart?
Secretary Brownlee. At the end of October 2003 there were
approximately 600 Reserve component (RC) soldiers in medical holdover
(MHO) status at Fort Stewart. Of those present at the time, 406
deployed overseas in support of either OIF or OEF. The remainder were
soldiers who did not deploy overseas. Of those present, 15 had been
WIA. Across the board, their access to medical care was at least as
good as that for active component soldiers, and well within TRICARE
Prime standards. Soldiers in MHO status were waiting for acute
appointments an average of 0.3 days, routine appointments 1.3 days,
specialty appointments 1.45 days, and wellness appointments an average
of 11.6 days. The TRICARE Prime access standards for these types of
appointments are 24 hours, 7 days, 30 days, and 30 days respectively.
During that time, MHO soldiers were being housed in billets
normally provided to all mobilizing soldiers whose mission is to train,
process, and deploy to a theater of operations. Billeting consisted of
open bay barracks with detached gang latrines leased from the Georgia
National Guard. Structures were concrete floored, block construction
with heat. Some buildings were air-conditioned. Barracks were clean and
well maintained. Soldiers ate in contract dining facilities, some in
the mobilization area and others with the 3d ID soldiers. Soldiers with
severe ambulatory conditions or with special environmental
considerations were billeted in an improved climate controlled
facility.
33. Senator Levin. Secretary Brownlee, what changes did you direct
to address this problem at Fort Stewart?
Secretary Brownlee. We recognize the concerns of soldiers in a MHO
status and are addressing these issues. The Army has taken several
actions to provide appropriate medical care and improved living
conditions for all soldiers in a MHO status. In November 2003, the Army
started requiring that all MHO soldiers be housed commensurate to the
same standard of housing provided to AC soldiers on each installation.
Soldiers in a MHO status at all Army installations have now been moved
out of temporary billets into permanent facilities that meet these new
requirements.
Even though the MHO soldiers had access to medical care well within
TRICARE Prime standards, those standards were not sufficient to make
timely dispositions for this particular group. The Army Surgeon
General, therefore, mandated enhanced access standards for MHO
soldiers: any necessary specialty consultations within 72 hours,
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRIs) and other diagnostic studies within 1
week, surgeries within 2 weeks, and medical evaluation boards processed
within 30 days. He further directed that each military treatment
facility would have not less than one nurse case manager for every 50
MHO patients.
34. Senator Levin. Secretary Brownlee, what actions have you taken
to avoid similar problems at other installations treating troops
returning from combat zones?
Secretary Brownlee. The access to care standards listed above apply
to all military treatment facilities caring for MHO soldiers.
Furthermore, our experience with MHO soldiers allows us to predict how
many mobilizing and demobilizing soldiers will enter MHO. Based on
Forces Command troop movement projections, we can forecast how many
soldiers will be in MHO. We can predict these numbers by installation
and by specific dates. This allows us to apply site-specific mitigation
strategies that include use of Navy, Air Force, VA, and civilian
facilities.
One of the mitigation strategies being examined is to provide
health care for many MHO soldiers near their homes through the Army's
community based health care initiative. This plan calls for the
National Guard and Reserve to establish community based health care
organizations (CBHCO) across the Nation that will assume command and
control, and case management of selected MHO soldiers. When medically
appropriate, selected soldiers will receive care at or near their homes
under the auspices of the CBHCOs. This will reduce the requirement for
MHO soldiers to receive care on military installations.
The IMA is procuring relocatable facilities for Forts Stewart,
Bragg, Bliss, Carson, and Hood. IMA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer,
and the Army Contracting Agency are in the process of completing a
Performance Work Statement. IMA is working through the Army Budget
Office to ensure funding for the contract is in place. IMA is also
repairing barracks at Fort Benning, Fort Drum, Camp Atterbury, Fort
Dix, Fort Eustis, and Aberdeen Proving Grounds.
MODERNIZATION AND RECAPITALIZATION STRATEGY
35. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, because of funding
constraints, the Army has followed a strategy that limits modernization
and recapitalization of major weapon and support systems to the two
divisions, and to some extent the cavalry regiment, of the
counterattack corps at Fort Hood. However, in Operation Iraqi Freedom,
none of these more modern units made it to Iraq in time for major
combat operations. Now, in the stability and support phase, units from
throughout the active and Reserve components will be rotating to Iraq
and Afghanistan and engaging in an on-going counter-insurgency
campaign. In light of these circumstances and Operation Iraqi Freedom
lessons learned, do you consider that modernization and
recapitalization strategy to remain valid?
General Schoomaker. The modernization and recapitalization strategy
remains valid. You are correct in noting that the Army has reduced
investments in the current force to more limited modernization and
recapitalization efforts in order to free up resources to support
ongoing and planned transformation programs. Most of the combat forces
assigned to the counterattack corps were not identified by the Central
Command Combatant Commander as essential for the execution of the
Operation Iraqi Freedom campaign plan. However, the 4th Infantry
Division, originally included in the opening phases of the operation,
was delayed until after the completion of initial hostilities due to
political constraints. Lessons learned from Iraq have reinforced the
tenet of balanced modernization as the overall strategy for weighing
current requirements against the need for an even more ready and
relevant force tomorrow. This approach provides an essential means for
implementing the Army's strategic vision of a transformed force for the
future while still preserving sufficient readiness to meet the
challenges associated with the prosecution of the war on terrorism. The
ultimate goal of this strategy is to develop a fully capable force that
will deliver future readiness at every point on the possible range of
military operations. This will ensure that the Army remains fully
capable of performing all missions assigned, while creating the force
for tomorrow that will meet the operational demands that lie ahead.
BRADLEY REACTIVE ARMOR TILES
36. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, the Army established a
requirement for five brigade sets of reactive armor tiles for the
Bradley Fighting Vehicle and, although the funding was never included
in the annual budget request, for the last several years Congress has
appropriated approximately $20 million a year for that purpose. I
understand that a number of sets were shipped to Kuwait prior to the
war, but that commanders there decided not to mount the armor prior to
launching the invasion. It would seem to me that the failure to use the
tiles in such a threat environment puts the overall requirement in
serious question. Do you know why the decision was made not to mount
the reactive armor tiles on the Bradley Fighting Vehicles that attacked
into Iraq?
General Schoomaker. The decision not to mount the reactive armor
tiles on the Bradley Fighting Vehicles was an availability and
operational decision by the commanders on the ground. Only a limited
number of the tiles were arriving in theater as the 3rd Infantry
Division was preparing to attack. Although not privy to the actual
deliberations, the commander would have decided the issue after an
analysis of the mission, enemy, terrain, time, and troops available
(METT-T), which is Army doctrine. Reactive armor tiles are currently in
use in Iraq, no doubt because of the operational commanders' METT-T
assessment of the situation. We are completing the installation of the
initial shipment of 140 sets. On 13 Nov 03, Commander Combined Joint
Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), through the Coalition Forces Land Component
Command (CFLCC), requested an additional 160 sets of Bradley reactive
armor for operations in Iraq. The shipment process for these sets was
initiated on 14 Nov 03. The shipment is scheduled to depart the U.S. on
9 Dec 03 and arrive no later than 10 Jan 04. These dates support the
commander's timeline and both Operation Iraqi Freedom 1 and 2 rotation
requirements.
37. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, do you agree that the
requirement should be re-examined in light of that decision?
General Schoomaker. This capability is required by the force to
counter current and future threats. Reactive armor is designed to
enhance a ground vehicle's survivability at a minimum of weight and
cost and provides the combatant commander the tactically flexible
capability to increase force protection. The modularity and high mass
efficiency of reactive armor has enabled these vehicles to be capable
of effectively defeating shaped-charge warheads and other anti-armor
threats without significant increases in weight and cost. The Army will
review this requirement as part of the OIF lessons learned process.
38. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, do you see a place for
reactive armor, given the danger it presents to our dismounted troops,
in an infantry-centric force such as that to which the U.S. Army is
evolving?
General Schoomaker. Explosive Reactive Armor is the most effective
proven technology to defeat both chemical-energy and kinetic-energy
threats. The reactive armor activates when exposed to a specific heat/
pressure combination does present a ``High Risk'' hazard to unprotected
personnel. However, recent testing has shown that the threat to
civilians and dismounted soldiers is limited to a small area outside
the vehicle.
39. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, do you see a similar
potential problem in relying on active protection systems, which may
also present a danger to dismounted troops, in the infantry-centric
Future Force?
General Schoomaker. Reactive armor is a current requirement for the
Future Combat System. The Army will continue to invest in new armor
designs, featuring more advanced reactive and passive materials and
more effective geometries, that will enable the development of combat
vehicles that can be tailored to meet advanced threats (such as
hypervelocity kinetic-energy penetrators, tandem shaped charge
warheads, and precursors) while being kept at acceptable gross weights.
ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENT ROLES, MISSIONS AND FORCE STRUCTURE
40. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, in light of Iraq and
Afghanistan lessons learned, what changes do you recommend to active
and Reserve component roles, missions, and force structure?
General Schoomaker. Component roles and missions are satisfactory.
However, the structure and function of our Armed Forces will continue
to evolve to better align with our defense strategy. The Army is
undergoing large scale rebalancing actions to increase capabilities for
the early stages of a conflict while providing force structure to
defend the homeland and maintain the force depth needed to support
ongoing rotational requirements. The Army is improving joint and
expeditionary capabilities to enhance strategic responsiveness by
creating modular forces that are more flexible and adaptable to conduct
the full range of missions across the entire spectrum of conflict.
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the need to continue
adjusting the number and type of capabilities in our military. The most
important force structure changes will continue relieving stress on our
high demand units to reduce the frequency and duration of deployments
and spread these burdens more equitably.
IRAQI ``KATUSA'' PROGRAM
41. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, I understand that there is a
program in Korea called the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army
(KATUSA) where individual Republic of Korea soldiers are integrated
into U.S. units in any number of positions that would normally be
filled by a U.S. soldier. This program was begun during the Korean War.
Do you believe that such a program would have merit in Iraq today?
General Schoomaker. The KATUSA program began in July 1950 as a way
to augment understrength U.S. units after the outbreak of war in June
1950. The situation in Iraq is significantly different than the early
months of the Korean War. U.S. units deploying to Iraq are at full
strength and do not need augmentation. Additionally, the KATUSA program
was able to draw upon soldiers in the Republic of Korea Army. If this
program were instituted in Iraq it could undermine current efforts to
rebuild the Iraqi Army by diverting potential Iraqi soldiers to U.S.
units. While there may be some benefit to integrating a small number of
Iraqis into U.S. units to provide language and cultural expertise, this
decision should be made by the combatant commander, General Abizaid,
and the commander in Iraq, Lieutenant General Sanchez.
SPECTRUM INTERFERENCE AND FRATRICIDE
42. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, during the recent war in
Iraq, Patriot anti-missile batteries mistakenly attacked and downed two
coalition aircraft. Although the Army has yet to release its findings
regarding the cause of these incidents, some experts believe that
electromagnetic interference may have caused the Patriots to
malfunction, mistaking the friendly aircraft for incoming missiles.
Unfortunately, electromagnetic interference was also the cause of a
number of Patriot misfires during the first Gulf War in 1991.
Given the increasing dependence on networks, wireless
communications, and the number of military systems that make use of
electromagnetic spectrum, examination of this issue should be a high
priority. For example, a report by the Center for Army Lessons Learned
indicated that ``the Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) system sat
idle in theater for the first 30 days waiting on operational
frequencies.'' To your knowledge, how many other instances of such
electromagnetic interference ``malfunctions'' occurred during the war
in Iraq?
General Schoomaker. To my knowledge, the cause(s) of the incidents
with the Patriot system have not been attributed specifically to
electromagnetic interference (EMI). It may never be known exactly what
role EMI may have played in one of the friendly fire incidents.
However, there were reported incidents of interference during the
deployment and operational phases of OIF that may have been a
contributing factor to the inability to initially operate the Hunter
UAV. As a result of the high density of systems operating in shared
frequency bands located in the confined staging area, an increase in
the amount of interference was observed. To minimize the extent of the
interference, the decision was made to closely schedule when the Hunter
UAV could operate while still in the staging area. It is clear that we
must continue to keep as a high priority our efforts to mitigate the
effects of EMI. We have processes and procedures to do frequency
management. However, the increasing volume of users of the
electromagnetic spectrum necessitates more dynamic and robust testing
as well as better methods of deconfliction across the joint force.
43. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, how will the procedures for
managing the use of spectrum be improved to prevent future incidents
such as occurred with Patriot?
General Schoomaker. As you have stated the use of the
electromagnetic spectrum is becoming more and more prevalent on the
modern battlefield and the tools and techniques we use must be updated
to keep up with the future demand. The use of the electromagnetic
spectrum is shared by all the military services, which is why any
solution must be a joint solution. This is why DISA/Joint Spectrum
Center, (under the direction of the Joint Staff and OASD NII), is
defining the requirements for a system to evolve the management of the
spectrum in Joint as well as coalition military operations. These
requirements will be introduced into the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council process to validate the requirements and assign an acquisition
agent. This system is envisioned to enable the dynamic management of
the electromagnetic battlefield.
44. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what procedures does the
Army have in place to de-conflict spectrum usage by U.S. and coalition
systems on the battlefield?
General Schoomaker. The current procedures to de-conflict coalition
spectrum usage by U.S. and coalition forces on the battlefield resides
at the joint level in a database maintained by the combatant commander
(COCOM) or Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF). This database is made up
of frequency records submitted through the chain of command to a
central repository. Current DOD policy mandates that all systems that
transmit must be registered in this database. The database is accurate
to the point that the user of a piece of equipment submits a request to
operate on specific frequencies. There is currently no system that
prevents a user from transmitting without registering the frequencies
that system transmits on.
LANDMINE ALTERNATIVES
45. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, the Army and DARPA have
invested significant resources in the development of anti-personnel
landmine alternatives, including initiating work on the Intelligent
Munitions System, the next generation landmine component of Future
Combat Systems. In the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Appropriations
Conference Report, the conferees directed that ``. . . the Army clearly
define the requirements for a next generation intelligent minefield and
ensure compliance with the Ottawa Treaty. . .'' What is the status of
the development of these requirements?
General Schoomaker. Senator, we are very early in the development
of the Intelligent Munitions System (IMS), which is a core system of
the Future Combat Systems (FCS) Program. As of April 2003, the
requirements for IMS had been sufficiently developed to include them in
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)-approved FCS
Operational Requirements Document (ORD). According to these documented
and approved requirements, the IMS must provide unmanned ground sensors
linked to lethal/non-lethal scalable effects components via integrated
and robust command and control systems, all of which maybe emplaced by
multiple delivery means. As envisioned, WS will support many functions
and missions including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR), maneuver, and direct and indirect fires throughout the spectrum
of operations. IMS will be an integrated munitions system fully
controllable by our forces.
46. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, will the Intelligent
Munitions System as currently envisioned be compliant with the Ottawa
Treaty?
General Schoomaker. Senator, as you know, the United States is not
a states party to the Ottawa Convention and, therefore, the Ottawa
Convention does not determine our warfighter requirements. All
components of IMS will comply with the Amended Mines Protocol of the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons that the United States has
ratified. The robust command and control system of the IMS will allow
us to employ IMS in a variety of modes, some of which may coincide with
the provisions of the Ottawa Convention.
47. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what lessons learned can be
drawn from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan regarding the need for
antipersonnel and anti-vehicle landmines?
General Schoomaker. Senator, we are still compiling the lessons
learned from Afghanistan and Iraq. Because of the unique character of
these conflicts and the incomplete nature of our lessons learned
efforts, it would be premature at this time to draw definitive
conclusions about the employment of ground-emplaced munitions in OIF
and OEF, or about the military utility of these munitions in future
conflicts. However, I can say that thus far, there is no indication
that ground-emplaced munitions are either obsolete or superfluous.
Although certainly not employed in every combat operation or situation,
ground-emplaced munitions continue to offer unique and desirable
battlefield effects to tactical commanders. Ground-emplaced munitions
enable commanders to shape the battlefield to their advantage by
denying the enemy freedom of maneuver, protecting our forces, enhancing
the effectiveness of other weapon systems, and acting as a ``force
multiplier'' by allowing us to fight with fewer forces. No other weapon
provides the same combination of capabilities, as do ground-emplaced
munitions. During the recent U.S. policy review, the combatant
commanders reaffirmed the continuing need for the capabilities
currently provided by landmines, especially those that incorporate
self-destructing/self-deactivating technologies.
COMMERCIAL SATELLITE USAGE
48. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, during operations in Iraq,
commanders made significant use of leased commercial satellite
capabilities to ensure adequate communications between mobile units,
command posts, and fixed installations in theater. Were there any
indications that communications over commercial satellites were less
reliable or secure than those over military channels? If so, what were
those indications?
General Schoomaker. The U.S. demand for bandwidth during a military
contingency has almost always been underestimated. The Army relies
heavily on commercial satellite capacity today, and will continue to
augment the available military SATCOM capability with commercial assets
in the future. While there were no specific reliability or security
issues associated with Army communications over commercial satellites
in Iraq--dependence creates risk. In the case of commercial
communications capacity, the risk of a denial of service, through
adversary or availability, is among the most important. In addition, in
some cases, the Army shares commercial satellites and/or channels with
our adversaries, which could potentially limit our offensive
opportunities.
49. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, if there were problems, how
do you plan to deal with them? Would that involve shifting reliance
away from commercial satellites?
General Schoomaker. Commercial satellites cannot be relied on
solely to support the Army's Beyond Line-of-Sight (BLOS) requirements
because the commercial satellite market fluctuates and provides no
guarantees of availability. Future military SATCOM system will allow
more of the Army's current requirements to be supported with less
reliance on commercial, and be capable of supporting the Army's
requirements for protected tactical communications and communications
on-the-move (COTM). Focusing on military SATCOM will ensure the Army
obtains the most robust communications; controls the management and
security of the assets; assures inter- and intra-theater connectivity
among troop sites and homestation security; maximizes the use of DOD
investments, while continuing to augment available military SATCOM
capacity with commercial satellites.
ARMY BANDWIDTH REQUIREMENTS
50. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, the Army is developing new
systems that will require the passing of huge quantities of information
including sensor data, imagery from UAVs, and information from the
intelligence community, over battlefield communications networks.
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have confirmed our increasing
reliance on instantaneous communications and data transmission, as well
as its ability to greatly enhance our combat effectiveness.
In recent testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, General
Dennis Moran (Director of Army Information Operations, Networks, and
Space and Central Command (CENTCOM) Command, Control and Communications
Director (J-6)) indicated that ``there simply was not enough bandwidth
at all levels of command to give the warfighters at the . . . brigade
level--the kinds of information they needed to be more effective.''
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently concluded in a study
on Army bandwidth issues that ``. . . at all levels of command within
the Army, the current demand for bandwidth is larger than the supply.''
It goes on to indicate that even after a planned $20 billion investment
in new networks and communications systems, ``. . . the Army will fall
short of its goals at certain command levels by an order of
magnitude.'' Do you agree with the CBO's conclusions that Army
technology investments will still result in a shortfall of needed
bandwidth for communications systems?
General Schoomaker. The Task Force Network recommended development
and fielding of battle command capabilities to leverage and enable
interdependent network centric warfare within joint, interagency, and
multinational full spectrum operations. We need to bring future
capabilities to the force today using COTS as a bridge. In the near
term, the Army will procure more commercial satellite bandwidth while
investing in improved standards and technologies for the mid- to long-
term. Also, the Army will transition to more capable, next-generation
DOD satellites as they are launched and put into operation. The Army's
future tactical information transport systems such as WIN-T, JTRS, and
FCS are being designed to meet the needs of projected bandwidth
requirements. These new systems will start arriving in Army units in
fiscal year 2008.
51. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what technologies are being
developed to address these issues?
General Schoomaker. By applying network operations technologies,
including integrated network management, information assurance and
information dissemination management, internet protocol-based systems,
data compression, and dynamic spectrum management, future force systems
will be able to efficiently plan, configure and control the network. In
addition, software-defined radios, unmanned aerial vehicles with
communications relay payloads, the Wideband Gapfiller Satellite
constellation, Time Division Multiple Access techniques, surrogate
satellites and advanced antenna and amplifier technologies will help
provide future force systems with a multi-tiered, self configuring
network.
52. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what else can be done to
ensure the most efficient use of our available bandwidth and ensure
that our warfighters can make the best use of our advanced networks and
communication systems?
General Schoomaker. The Army will work with DOD in jointly defining
the standards and protocols to guide development of all information
applications and transport systems of our future joint network. The
Army's future applications and transport systems must be fully nested
in joint architectures that are tactically focused. We must also
develop a comprehensive spectrum/frequency management tool to replace
the multiple systems used today with one tool that can efficiently
assign, deconflict and control the limited electromagnetic spectrum
allocated for DOD use.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ISSUES
53. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, how will the lessons learned
in Iraq be transformed into goals and investments in the Army science
and technology program?
General Schoomaker. Lessons learned from all Army operations are
gathered by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), part of the
Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Part of TRADOC's role as
a key participant in the Army's science and technology (S&T) investment
planning process is to ensure lessons learned are addressed in deciding
S&T investment priorities. TRADOC has a process called ``gap analysis''
that examines current and future needs, assesses ongoing S&T from many
sources to determine if relevant efforts are underway, and prioritizes
``gaps'' in S&T that need to be addressed to provide requisite
capabilities.
While retaining a balanced S&T investment strategy, the Army has
focused critical S&T investments on accelerating the transition of
proven technologies to warfighters. Past S&T successes already deployed
to warfighters in Afghanistan and Iraq include: Chitosan bandages to
reduce soldier bleeding; Interceptor Body Armor; Forward Area Language
Convertor (FALCon); and Laser Neutralization System for Unexploded
Ordnance (ZEUS).
The S&T investments in support of current operations include
developing and improving bar armor for high mobility multi-wheeled
vehicles (HMMWVs) to protect crews from rocket propelled grenade (RPG)
attacks as well as small arms fire and electronic warfare (EW)
solutions to prevent the enemy from being able to use improvised
explosive devices (IEDs).
54. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, were there any specific
areas that you believe will require technological innovation to improve
Army capabilities and meet deficiencies experienced during current
operations?
General Schoomaker. There are numerous challenges facing us in the
current war environment that require our current systems to perform
tasks for which they were not originally intended. The good news is
that for the past few years in focusing on and planning for the Future
Combat Systems, we have been maturing and developing a number of
innovative technologies that will improve or significantly enhance the
capabilities of our ground forces. I have asked the Army research and
development (R&D) community to take a hard look at these Future Force
innovative technologies and begin to bring them forward to enhance the
capabilities and meet deficiencies in the current force. Let me give
you two examples.
HMMWVs and other light tactical vehicles have proven very useful in
many roles in the current conflict. However, the majority of the HMMWVs
in the Army's inventory do not provide ballistic or mine blast
protection. These vehicles were not originally intended for use in some
of the roles and missions they currently serve and thus do not have the
protection levels of heavy combat vehicles. We can, and have, armored
some portion of the non up-armored HMMWV fleet. The design of these
light, agile vehicles makes it impossible to use conventional slabs of
steel armor to enhance survivability because the weight burden exceeds
the limits of the drive train and suspension. Therefore an expedient
solution has been developed in which Army scientists and engineers
designed a lightweight add on armor kit to protect crews from small
arms fire. The added on armor solution is being built in our depots and
supplied as fast as we can in kit form to Iraq today. A novel
configuration of slat armor (steel bars) was also developed that can be
added to the doors of the HMMWVs to further increase the crew
survivability from a direct RPG attack on the crew compartment. The
slat armor only protects against RPG threat and not road side
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Several prototype slat armor kits
have been sent to Iraq for evaluation.
Another example is Interceptor Body Armor for individual soldiers.
Interceptor Body Armor is a modular, multi-threat body armor using an
Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) and Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI)
plates. The OTV is made from Kevlar advanced high performance fibers.
The SAPI plate is a lightweight ceramic backed by Spectra composites
and wrapped with a nylon fabric. This system is responsible for saving
the lives of many of our soldiers, both in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Our
researchers are currently exploring newer versions of these materials
that will provide the same protection at a lower weight, reducing the
load on our soldiers.
ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
55. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, I understand the Army is
developing active protection technologies that could provide ground and
air vehicles a measure of defense against extremely close-in attacks,
for example from RPGs. What is the status of the development of these
active protection technologies?
General Schoomaker. Army S&T is working on two Active Protection
System (APS) approaches to address the close-in threats.
(1) The Close-In Active Protection System (CIAPS) uses a
centralized radar to track the incoming rounds and provides 360 degree
azimuth, 50-meter elevation coverage. CIAPS is effective against Anti-
Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and RPGs, intercepting these threats
within several meters of the vehicle on which the system is mounted. A
pre-prototype CIAPS, mounted on a light armored vehicle, is currently
being tested and has successfully intercepted live RPGs in range
testing. The current system was designed for combat vehicles and, at
1,500 pounds, is too heavy for mounting on a HMMWV. A development
effort would be needed to reduce the CIAPS system to less than 840
pounds for incorporation on standard HMMWVs, in conjunction with
lightweight armor or on air vehicles such as helicopters (although
there is no assurance that this technology can be safely employed in
aircraft).
(2) Full Spectrum Close-In Active Protection System (FCLAS) uses an
autonomous radar, digital signal processor, explosives and a
countermeasure integrated in a small, self-contained interceptor round
that may load into either a smoke tube or specially designed tube.
Unlike CIAPS, FCLAS does not rely on a centralized radar system. Each
FCLAS munition conducts surveillance, acquires the target, tracks the
threat, launches, fuses, and detonates the countermeasure to defeat
incoming threats within a few meters of the vehicle on which the system
is mounted. Although a variation of FCLAS for air vehicles has been
considered, there is no assurance that this technology can be safely
employed in that application. At this time, only component level tests
have been completed and the components have not been integrated into
the countermunition.
56. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what is the investment plan
for these systems?
General Schoomaker. These APS programs are still in their infancy
(i.e., emerging technologies versus fieldable systems); therefore our
investments in them are in S&T accounts. In addition to the technical
maturation and engineering required to make APS small, lightweight,
rugged, reliable, and integratable onto existing platforms, there are
operational issues that must be addressed. One major consideration is
the potential for serious damage to personnel and materiel in the
vicinity of the APS intercept of the threat munition. The Army must
carefully weigh the advantages of the protection that these APS
solutions offer for ground vehicles against the consequences of the
residual effects, especially the risks to our dismounted troops and
other vehicles in our formations.
57. Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, what is the strategy and
schedule for testing and deploying these systems?
General Schoomaker. As I have indicated, a lot of work is needed to
spiral back this APS technology into the current force. We are looking
at what could be done to accelerate these efforts, both from a
technical/engineering perspective as well as cost. However, before we
commit to any strategy for developing and deploying APS, we must
develop confidence in the performance and the tactics, techniques, and
procedures to ensure that the risks to personnel and materiel are
manageable. Until these issues are resolved, it is premature to commit
System Development and Demonstration and Procurement funds for either
FCLAS or CIAPS.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee adjourned.]