"LESSONS LEARNED" DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM IN AFGHANISTAN AND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, AND ONGOING OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND REGION

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JULY 9, 2003

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"LESSONS LEARNED" DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM IN AFGHANISTAN AND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, AND ONGOING OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND REGION

WEDNESDAY, JULY 9, 2003

U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff director; Cindy Pearson, assistant chief clerk and security manager; Kenneth Barbee, security clerk; and Pendred K. Wilson, receptionist.

Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, professional staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Thomas L. McKenzie, professional staff member; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBoses, Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Jeremy L. Hekhuis, professional staff member; and Maren R. Leed, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Andrew W. Florell, Andrew Kent, and Sara R. Mareno.

Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling, assistant to Senator Warner; Dan Twining, assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; James W. Irwin and Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistants to Senator Chambliss; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Sharon L. Waxman, Mieke Y. Eoyang, and Jarret A. Wright, assistants to
Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd; Aaron Scholer, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; William Todd Houchins and Mark Phillip Jones, assistants to Senator Dayton; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman WARNER. The committee meets this morning to receive testimony from the Secretary of Defense and General Tommy Franks, who has just stepped down as the Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). We also step aside from a very sobering and important hearing to congratulate the Secretary on reaching his 71st year. Today is his birthday.

Secretary RUMSFELD. You didn't need to do that.

Chairman WARNER. I know that. You're joined, I understand, by members of your family this morning, which is wonderful. General Franks, we hope the opportunity comes for us to meet your wonderful wife.

General FRANKS. Sir, thank you very much.

Chairman W ARNER. The American public, indeed the world, are awaiting this testimony this morning, and, consequently, I'm going to put my full statement into the record and make brief opening remarks out of deference to my colleagues, who are anxiously awaiting to hear the testimony and participate in the questions and indeed the public that are following the hearing.

First, we open being mindful of the loss of life, loss of limb, and the families who have suffered the consequences as they have throughout the history of this Nation and other nations in times of war. They've paid a great price, and those risks continue, as we well know, each day. They showed courage, the men and women of the coalition forces, they showed commitment. Our delegation of nine Senators witnessed that just days ago when we spent time in Basra, Baghdad, and Kirkuk. We thank you, Mr. Secretary, and your staff, Tommy Korologos, Secretary Cambone, and others who made this trip very successful.

We salute all the men and women of the coalition forces and their families. The leadership that has been shown is remarkable—our President, Secretaries of State and Defense, our military, General Franks, all those in your command. Our hearing this morning covers not only Iraq, but also Afghanistan, and indeed the possible military commitment in Liberia. So I hope each of you, that is you, Mr. Secretary, touch on that issue of Liberia.

Civilian control of the military has been a part of our history, but I look upon the relationship that you, Mr. Secretary, had with General Franks as really one of partnership. I guess that's the way it should be. The buck finally stopped on your desks, but having watched the two of you as partners, conducting the operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan, is truly remarkable.
When Senator Levin and I, on two occasions, visited Afghanistan, and I think to an extent in the Iraqi campaign, we were impressed by the leadership of the noncommissioned officers, and indeed the junior officers, but the noncommissioned officers, how groups of 15, 20, 25, would go in on a mission at night with one officer, and that officer knowing full well that each man or woman, as the case may be, knew exactly what their missions were. A remarkable chapter in history, and also of jointness, joint operations between the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force.

While the major field maneuvers of our troops, divisional level, regimental level, have stopped, nevertheless the fighting continues at the company level. When we visited the 4th ID, the commander went into great detail—three operations, General Franks. I think one is still continuing—taking the battle to the remaining enemy, not waiting for the enemy to come, but taking it to them. To meet that challenge, we would like to have your views this morning on the force levels, the adequacy, the rotation policy, and how other coalition nations are joining. Mr. Secretary, I personally felt that tremendous efforts have been made from Washington and the other capitals of the world to bring in other troops, not only to augment our existing force structure, but hopefully to provide and facilitate for the rotation of our forces and those of Great Britain back home.

Intelligence is a matter of great interest. Your views on the adequacy of that intelligence from a military standpoint—troop commanders told us when we asked the question that they had a high degree of confidence in the intelligence that they received. Nevertheless, Mr. Secretary, the issue of intelligence is of importance, as you well know, and how the intelligence was utilized in the policy-making levels, at your level, and with your subordinates as you address the American public in open forums, and as you address Congress, how you utilize that intelligence in such a manner to—I certainly feel—remain accurate at all times.

The Task Force 20, which is performing, General Franks, the specialized mission of searching out Saddam Hussein, a bounty quite properly now having put on his head, and how they are operating to not only find him and his two sons, but indeed the others that had significant roles in perpetrating the horror throughout Iraq and the threat to the world with their weapons of mass destruction. On weapons of mass destruction, Mr. Secretary, you’ve brought in David Kay, a man with impeccable credentials and a long background and history in this subject, working with General Dayton. You’ve given them a charter to go out and use every asset that they need to uncover the mystery of these weapons of mass destruction.

Lastly, I want to credit Ambassador Bremer. I’ve known him through the years, but I think he’s doing an extraordinary job, and he laid down the three objectives that he has at this time to try and lessen the risk to our troops and at the same time bring about the fulfillment of our mission to provide freedom for the Iraqi people. The first is to take the battle to the enemy, and that’s being done, to root out the last pockets of resistance.

The second is to utilize every effort to find Saddam Hussein and the other principals, and the third is to form an interim government, composed initially of two parts: one, a governing council of
Iraqis who will elect their own chairman of that council to supervise the several ministries, whether it’s the creation of a policy force, whether it’s education, whether it’s the preservation of artifacts, whether it’s sewers, whether it’s electricity; and two, to formulate a group of individuals that will sit down, Iraqis, and write a constitution, because without a constitution, we cannot expect elections to be held nationally. There’s just no infrastructure on which an election can be established until that constitution is put in place and candidates can address their views with respect to the fulfillment of the provisions of that constitution.

Now, while our delegation was there we met in Kirkuk with Iraqis who are assuming local office as mayors, assistant mayors, and so forth—and Bremer is to be congratulated—in pockets here and there where possible putting together groups of Iraqis who sort of elect themselves and take over the responsibilities of community matters. But the national elections have to await the constitution.

On the whole, speaking for myself, I feel very positive on my return from this inspection trip, and I once again salute those in uniform, the coalition forces, who night and day are taking the risks, and their families at home who are sharing in those risks.

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

The committee meets this morning to begin a series of hearings on “lessons learned” during the major combat phases of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as to receive testimony on ongoing military operations in the area of responsibility of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). We welcome Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks, former Commander, U.S. CENTCOM, back before the committee. On Monday, General Franks turned over command of CENTCOM to General John Abizaid. We are thankful for the opportunity to receive testimony from General Franks before he departs for a well-earned retirement and to thank him for an enormously successful command tour in the most volatile region of the world. We in Congress applaud the leadership you have provided, General Franks, in the successful military operations to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. You, together with Secretary Rumsfeld, and President Bush, have rallied an international coalition to fight terrorism, tyranny, and proliferation in that important part of the world. Congratulations on a job, very well done. The world is a safer place as a result of your efforts.

As I said, this hearing is the first in what will be a series of hearings on lessons learned in recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both of these campaigns were decisive military operations and a tribute to the professionalism of the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces and their leaders. Both operations quickly achieved their primary military objectives—removing regimes from power that were a threat to the security of the United States and, indeed, the world community. Both have also required extensive “post-conflict” stability operations that are ongoing and will require significant manpower, resources, time, and commitment in the future to fully secure the peace. We are mindful of the fact that coalition forces continue to be exposed to significant personal risks through this ongoing phase of operations.

Senator Levin and I, along with six other committee colleagues and Senator Rockefeller, Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, have just returned from a most informative trip to the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR)—a trip which included 3 days in Iraq. We received extensive briefings from General John Abizaid, the new CENTCOM Commander; Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the senior U.S. military commander in Iraq; Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority and his staff; David Kay and Major General Keith Dayton of the Iraq Survey Group concerning the WMD search effort; and several other coalition military and civilian leaders. I want to thank Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks for their help in providing our delegation with the access and information we needed. It was a very productive trip that will prove
invaluable to our understanding of the ongoing challenges and opportunities in this very important region.

I want to share a few of my strongest impressions about our visit. First and foremost, as Americans, we can all take pride in our magnificent troops. As we traveled across Iraq, we met soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines doing their job and doing it well in the harshest of conditions—120 degree temperatures, many without minimal shelter or relief from the unrelenting heat, day or night. As we talked with these great Americans, it was very clear that they understood the importance and necessity of performing their duty and the enormity of the task, and they appreciated the support of the American people. Their morale is strong, as to be expected, and they are fully committed to getting the job done.

Were there complaints? Some, but mostly in the nature of constructive ideas. The biggest concern, almost universally, was simply the uncertainty about when they, as individuals, would be returning home. I know you are diligently working that problem, Mr. Secretary, and the Department needs to develop a rotation plan as soon as possible.

Second, I was encouraged by the level of involvement of other nations. Eight countries currently have forces on the ground, and over 30 more are committing to provide forces to the coalition effort in the near future. By the fall, British and Polish Divisions, composed of troops from many nations, will be operating in Iraq. Dutch and Italian forces are scheduled to begin operating in sectors being vacated by U.S. marines this month. Likewise, Ambassador Bremer's efforts are truly international. He has eight nations currently involved, with more expected to contribute. Ambassador Bremer is doing an admirable job, as he and his team attempt to rebuild the economic, social, and political infrastructure of Iraq. His main goal is to put an Iraqi face on this effort and to put Iraqis in charge of the daily lives of the citizens of this nation. I commend his efforts.

Connected to this is the issue of troop levels in Iraq. Military commanders we met with on the ground in Iraq were quite clear in telling our delegation that they have adequate troops to successfully accomplish the mission. That being said, I think Secretary Rumsfeld has taken the proper course by asking General Abizaid to review the situation. It is always prudent to reevaluate during the course of a military operation in light of developments on the ground. We look forward to hearing the results of General Abizaid's assessment.

Third, I was left with the impression that the search for weapons of mass destruction and related programs is making strong progress. Dr. David Kay and General Dayton are leading a careful, deliberate process that I am confident will ultimately yield the evidence that Saddam Hussein had a complex, very capable WMD program that was a threat to the Iraqi people, to Iraq's neighbors, and to the world. Saddam Hussein spent the last decade building a WMD program that was deceptive and well-concealed from the world's eyes—including efforts by U.N. inspection teams. It will take time to uncover these years of successful planning and deception. I am confident we have the right team in place to do the job. The key will be information from Iraqi citizens, from scientists to those who wielded the shovels to build a concealed WMD infrastructure.

Because of questions raised about intelligence related to WMD, I asked our military commanders in Iraq how they felt about the quantity and quality of intelligence and analysis they received on all relevant subjects, including WMD. They all expressed full satisfaction and confidence in the intelligence they received, and all remarked how well the entire intelligence systems worked together, across agency boundaries. Mr. Secretary, I expect you will address the issue of how policy officials in the Department used available intelligence in briefings to Congress and to the American public.

My next impression is related. I did not fully appreciate before visiting Iraq and talking with Iraqi citizens and officials, the absolute fear Saddam Hussein inflicted on this nation. There is a palpable fear that Saddam Hussein may somehow return to power, and anyone who has cooperated with the coalition will be executed. This is impeding the WMD search effort, as knowledgeable Iraqis are still reluctant to cooperate, and encourages those who are perpetrating the violence in central Iraq. It is essential that Saddam Hussein be found—dead or alive, and that the nightmare he still represents for Iraqis be brought to an end.

I was also left with the impression that Americans at home are not getting the full story on what their Armed Forces are accomplishing. Coalition forces are taking the fight to the enemy, aggressively pursuing them and eliminating their funding and safe havens.

Of equal importance, coalition forces are decisively involved in rebuilding Iraq—not from war damage, but from years of neglect under Saddam Hussein. Our forces
are rebuilding hundreds of schools, hospitals, bridges, and other important infra-
structure throughout Iraq, and facilitating the development of local governments.
The American people were understandably proud of our rapid military victory, but
they also need to know that the good work these young people are doing now is
equally, if not more, important. Our troops deserve the full, informed support of the
American people.

One final thought I must share is that the enormity of the task of rebuilding Iraq
after 30 years of neglect and abuse by Saddam Hussein is daunting. But, it is cru-
cial that we succeed. This is clearly a moment of enormous consequence for Iraq,
for the region, and for the world. We must seize the moment, demonstrate our com-
mitment, and bring a sense of optimism and reform to this troubled region.

It is a responsibility of this Congress, as a co-equal branch of government and on
behalf of the American people, to fully review and understand all aspects of the sig-
ificant military operations which this Nation undertakes. This is in keeping with
the precedent of this committee and is a constructive undertaking to evaluate the
performance of our weapons systems, our infrastructure, our organizational struc-
tures, and our people. Only through this process can we make informed decisions
about future investments in defense.

Again, I welcome our witnesses and applaud your successful efforts to date. We
look forward to your assessment of the current situation, the way ahead, and the
things we, in Congress, can do to best support our Armed Forces as they prepare
for current and future threats.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will also shorten my
statement and ask that the entire statement be made part of the
record.

Chairman WARNER. Without objection.

Senator LEVIN. First, General Franks, let me thank you for your
life of commitment to this Nation. In your public service as a sol-
ider, you’ve proven yourself time and time again during a unique
period in our history. Historians will someday judge the military
campaigns that you led in Afghanistan and Iraq that swiftly de-
teated the Taliban and the forces of Saddam Hussein as brilliantly
planned and executed examples of the military art, and as fore-
shadows of future military tactics. While you would be the first to
acknowledge that most of the credit and thanks must go to all who
assisted you in that effort, and especially to the fighting men and
women of the U.S. Armed Forces who executed those campaigns,
your role as their commander was indispensable.

Any inquiry into lessons learned will inevitably tend to empha-
size areas of concern, and will tend to spend less time on the innu-
merable things that were done well. It is essential that that be
done, but it must not detract in any way from our appreciation for
the superb performance of duty by the men and women of our
Armed Forces as they continue to conduct stability operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq and prepare to execute other missions in sup-
port of our national military strategy.

We must succeed in this endeavor, and we need to understand
the strategy for ensuring that success. Part of that strategy hope-
fully will be an attempt to internationalize the security and nation-
building efforts. To achieve that end, I hope that we will seek
NATO and United Nations support and endorsement. That will fa-
cilitate the recruitment of their member nations to our effort in
terms of providing troops, resources, expertise, and international
legitimacy. The whole world has a stake in the stability of Iraq.
It is a mystery to me why apparently we have not reached out to NATO and to the United Nations as institutions. Their support could bring significant additional forces, such as German and French forces through NATO and Indian and Egyptian forces through a U.N. endorsement.

We're going to be in Iraq a long time. A large number of troops are going to be needed, as the President acknowledged last week. There are a number of advantages to having a significant number of additional forces from other countries join us in the stability operations in Iraq. First, some U.S. forces, including Reserves, have seen extended combat and other exhausting duty. With U.S. forces stretched thin around the world, increasing the number of non-U.S. forces who can substitute for us in Iraq would reduce the numbers of, and the burden on, U.S. forces. As of now, the number of troops of other countries present on the ground will increase from the present number of 12,000 to a total of only 20,000 by the end of the summer—an increase of a mere 8,000 troops out of about 165,000. That is difficult to sustain.

Second, I would hope that internationalization would serve to reduce the threat to U.S. forces in more ways than reducing the quantity of our forces on the ground. Up until now, we have been the main target of those Baathists who stand to lose most when democracy is established in Iraq because we were the ones who brought down Saddam's regime, which provided privileged status to the Baathist minority. It would be harder for those Saddam loyalists to sustain attacks on forces wearing NATO or U.N. patches on their shoulders, because it would be dramatized to the people in Iraq that this is not a U.S./British occupation, but is an international effort to bring stability to the nation and to the region.

Just as reaching out to the world is necessary, so is reaching in to the Iraqi people to help this effort succeed. As our chairman has indicated, that means turning over the civilian government as quickly as possible to the people of Iraq so that they understand that they are deciding their own future. It also means making better use of our TV capability in Iraq, so that Iraqis can be interviewed about, and talk to their fellow countrymen about the thousands of projects that we are engaged in to help rebuild their nation. We are rebuilding schools, we are bringing back water, we are fixing up neighborhoods, we are supplying food, we are moving garbage, and doing many other tasks needed to reconstruct Iraq. But we have done an inadequate job of getting that information to Iraqis.

False propaganda that we blew up a mosque must be countered by Iraqis speaking about our rebuilding efforts in their communities, and assuring Iraqis that we are not there for domination, but to help them rebuild. Mr. Secretary, during our trip, we talked to Principal Deputy Under Secretary Cambone about speeding up that television presence and projection to Iraq. I know that he has probably by now already discussed that with you. The chairman and I and all the members of the delegation had some strong feelings about the importance of speeding up that effort.

The United States has taken upon itself the daunting task of nation building in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The administration and Congress must work together to ensure success in those endeavors.
It’s essential in that regard for our Nation to understand the strategy and the milestones for achieving our objectives. Surely, we need to know how we will continue over the foreseeable future to maintain a large American military presence in your former region of command, General. It’s been now, what, 2 days or 1 day?

General FRANKS. Two days.

Senator LEVIN. I know that the relaxation in your face is palpable. Just kidding. You did that with great glory. You handled it absolutely brilliantly, and never even showed the stress. But we have to let the American people know how we’re going to be able to execute other missions of our national military strategy as well as maintaining the large presence in the CENTCOM region.

Mr. Secretary, we very much look forward to your testimony as well as that of General Franks. We thank you for your service, your commitment, and I know you’re grateful for the presence of your family today.

[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

General Franks, I want to add my congratulations and thanks for your life of public service as a soldier, culminating as combatant commander of the U.S. Central Command. You have proven yourself time and again during a unique period in our history. Historians will someday judge the military campaigns you led in Afghanistan and Iraq that swiftly defeated the Taliban and the forces of Saddam Hussein as brilliantly planned and executed examples of the military art and as foreshadows of future military tactics. While you would be the first to acknowledge that most of the credit and thanks must go to all who assisted you in that effort, and especially to the fighting men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces who executed those campaigns, your role as their commander was indispensable.

Today we delve into the lessons learned and still are learning from the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns and the ongoing stability operations. Of course, we can only scratch the surface of those issues here today. Some of the lessons learned will require time to develop, as the records of the wars are examined and input is received from all the levels for all of the Services that participated in those campaigns.

Any inquiry into lessons learned will inevitably tend to emphasize areas of concern and will tend to spend less time on the innumerable things that were done well. It is essential we do this but that must not detract in any way from our appreciation for the superb performance of duty by the men and women of our Armed Forces, as they continue to conduct stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and prepare to execute other missions in support of our national military strategy.

As thoroughly planned and brilliantly executed as the initial military phase of Operation Iraq Freedom appears to have been, the transition to post-conflict stability operations and the conduct of those operations appear to be far less so. We must succeed in this endeavor, and we need to understand the strategy for ensuring that success. Part of that strategy, hopefully, is the attempt to internationalize the security and nation-building efforts. To achieve that end, I believe it is critically important to seek NATO and United Nations support and endorsement. This will facilitate the recruitment of their member nations to our effort—in terms of providing troops, resources, expertise, and international legitimacy.

The whole world has a stake in the stability of Iraq. It is a mystery to me why the administration has not reached out to NATO and to the U.N. Their support could bring significant additional forces, such as German and French forces through NATO, and Indian and Egyptian forces through a U.N. endorsement.

We should end the feud with Germany and France. Those countries are major participants with us in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Kosovo. They should be asked to join with us in Iraq. We are going to be in Iraq a long time and a large number of troops are going to be needed as the President finally acknowledged last week.

There are a number of advantages to having a significant number of additional forces from other countries join in the stability operations in Iraq. First, some U.S. forces, including Reserves, have seen extended combat and other exhausting duty in Iraq and, with U.S. forces stretched thin around the world, increasing the number of non-U.S. forces who can substitute for us, will reduce the numbers of and the
burden on the U.S. forces. As of now, the number of troops of other countries that will be present on the ground will increase from the present number of 12,000 to a total of only 20,000 by the end of the summer—an increase of a mere 8,000 troops out of about 165,000. That is difficult to sustain.

Second, I would hope that internationalization would serve to reduce the threat to U.S. forces in more ways than reducing the quantity of our forces on the ground. Up until now, we have been the main target of those Baathists who stand to lose most when democracy is established in Iraq, because we are the ones who brought down Saddam's regime which provided privileged status to the Baathist minority. It would be harder for those Saddam loyalists to sustain attacks on forces wearing NATO or U.N. patches on their shoulders, because it would be dramatized to the people of Iraq that this is not a U.S. occupation, but an international effort to bring stability to the nation and the region.

Just as reaching out to the world is necessary, so is reaching in to the Iraqi people to help this effort succeed. That means turning over the civilian government as quickly as possible to the people of Iraq, so they understand they are deciding their own future. It also means making better use of our TV capability in Iraq, so Iraqis can be interviewed about and talk to their fellow countrymen about the thousands of projects that we are engaged in to help rebuild their nation. We are rebuilding schools, bringing back water, fixing up neighborhoods, supplying food, removing garbage, and many other tasks needed to reconstruct Iraq. But we have done a poor job of getting that information to Iraqis. False propaganda that we blew up a mosque must be countered by Iraqis speaking about our rebuilding efforts in their communities and assuring Iraqis we are not there for domination but to help them rebuild.

The United States has taken upon itself the daunting task of nation building in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The administration and Congress must work together to ensure success in those endeavors.

It is essential in that regard for our Nation to understand the strategy and milestones for achieving our objectives. Surely we need to know how we will continue over the long-range future to maintain a large American military presence in the CENTCOM region and still be able to execute other missions of the national military strategy.

I look forward to the testimony and discussions to follow.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Levin. I will now submit for the record Senator Allard's statement.

[The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks. I am pleased that you could join us today to share the lessons that we have learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Despite our victory, much is still going on—our forces are still trying to provide security and fend off attacks in Iraq; we are fighting a low-level insurgency in Afghanistan; and we are now considering sending troops to Liberia.

I want to let you know that we appreciate your service and dedication to our country. Your leadership during this difficult time has been outstanding.

I also want to take this moment to say a few words about the men and women in our military. Over the last 6 months, thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardmen have been mobilized and sent overseas to several remote and distant places. Over 5,000 soldiers from Fort Carson, Colorado, have been deployed overseas. These soldiers have embraced their duty and have frequently expressed their determination to serve their country with pride and devotion.

Also, we cannot overlook the service of our reservists and guardsmen. Many have had to leave their careers in order to answer the call of duty. They have responded with enthusiasm and commitment. I am thankful that we live in a nation where our military is widely respected and where so many are willing to step forward in defense of their country.

Again, I thank you for appearing before us. I look forward to working with both of you to confront many of the national security challenges facing our country today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Mr. Secretary.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I would ask that my complete statement be put in the record.

Chairman WARNER. Without objection. The statements of both witnesses will be included in the record.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I’d like to make a brief statement. I’ll begin by saying a few words about the remarkable man seated next to me, General Tom Franks. On Monday, I was in Tampa to attend the change of command ceremony there. It was an occasion to reflect on General Tom Franks and what the CENTCOM leadership that he put together has accomplished during his tenure as combatant commander.

Think back to September 11. It was a dark day for our country, to be sure, but how fortunate our country was to have General Franks and his team in command at CENTCOM. In the period since September 11, consider what has been accomplished. In just weeks, they developed and were executing a war plan for Afghanistan. They had employed a range of capabilities from the most advanced, such as laser-guided weapons, to antique 40-year-old B–52s that had been updated with modern electronics, to rudimentary cavalry charges, driving the Taliban and al Qaeda from power in a matter of months.

The plan they developed for Operation Iraqi Freedom was even more innovative and transformational, employing an unprecedented combination of speed, precision, surprise, and flexibility. One of the most interesting aspects of the campaign was mentioned in the opening statements about the lessons learned process. It began before the war ever began. There were something in excess of 50 to 70 people that General Franks installed as a team from Joint Forces Command in his command from the very start. They did a lot more than take notes to improve our performance for the next war. They actually provided immediate feedback, allowing CENTCOM leadership to apply lessons in real time and improve coalition performance in this war. General Franks has said to me that there wasn’t a day that went by that there wasn’t value added. I’ll leave it to General Franks to describe the lessons he believes are most important. I’ve listed some in my testimony.

We’re still in the early stages of studying these lessons, and the conclusions that are drawn will most certainly affect how the Armed Forces of the United States and the Services organize, train, and equip for many years to come. This will be one of General Franks’ truly enduring legacies. He led the coalition forces that liberated two nations, but how he liberated those two people—the tactics, the strategies that he developed and employed—will contribute to the freedom of our country and our people for years to come.

So while General Franks may be leaving the Army, his service to our country will live on in the impact of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom that it will have on our budgets, our procedures, our training, our doctrine, and our joint warfighting. The people he led, those who served with him in Iraq and Afghanistan, will now take those transformational experiences to their next important commands and teach them to the next gen-
eration of leaders. So General Franks, I salute you and thank you for your truly remarkable service to our country.

Today Iraqis do face the enormous challenge of rebuilding from decades of tyranny. Coalition forces are helping the Iraqi people get on the path to stability and democratic self-government by helping Iraqis reestablish security and commerce, restore power and basic services, reopen schools and hospitals, and establish the rule of law. With each passing week, more services come online. Power and water are restored in more of the country, gas lines disappear, and more Iraqi police are on the streets.

But we must not underestimate how difficult the task is before us. Yet despite the difficulties they face, most Iraqis are far better off today than they were 4 months ago. Let there be no doubt about that. The residents of Baghdad may not have power 24 hours a day, but they no longer wake up each morning in fear wondering whether this will be the day that a death squad would come to cut out their tongues, chop off their ears, or take their children away for “questioning,” never to be seen again.

It’s true there are some Iraqis who are not better off today. For the most part, they comprise a small, elite segment of Iraqi society that benefitted from the Saddam Hussein dictatorship, and they are understandably unhappy now that the regime that favored them, at the expense of the population, has been removed from power. Today some of them are in hiding, others are engaging in acts of sabotage and violence.

Let me say a word about the security situation in Iraq. There seems to be a widely held impression that the regime loyalists are operating freely throughout the country, attacking coalition forces at will. That’s clearly not the case. Large portions of Iraq are stable. If one looks at this map beside me, while there have been isolated incidents in other parts of the country, most of the recent attacks have been concentrated in Baghdad and in the three corridors that reach to the west, the north, and the east out of the Iraqi capital.

[The information referred to follows:]
At this moment, coalition forces are engaged in operations to deal with the threats in these areas. Indeed, a number of recent incidents in those regions are the result of offensive operations by the coalition, cases where the coalition forces have been seeking out and engaging pockets of enemy fighters. Mr. Chairman, the problem is real, but it’s being dealt with in an orderly and forceful fashion by coalition forces.

In Iraq, coalition forces drove the country’s leaders from power, but unlike traditional adversaries in wars passed that sign a surrender document and hand over their weapons, the remnants of the Baath regime, Fedayeen death squads, and the Special Republican forces did not surrender. Some were killed or captured, but many others, particularly in Baghdad and to the north, faded into the population and are now forming pockets of resistance against coalition forces. We’re now dealing with those remnants of the regime just as we are dealing with the remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban that are hiding in the border areas of Afghanistan.

In addition to the remnants of the former regime, coalition forces in Iraq are also dealing with tens of thousands of criminals, some estimate up to 100,000 that were let out of the prisons into the streets prior to the beginning of the war. They’re dealing with foreign terrorists who have crossed into Iraq, in many cases from Syria, looking for an opportunity to harm the coalition and to try to shake our resolve in the war on terror. Well, they’ll not succeed.

So there are a number of sources of instability, but this much is certain: Iraq has been liberated. The Baathist regime has been removed from power and will not be permitted to return. But our war with terrorists, the remnants in Iraq, the remnants in Afghanistan, and terrorist networks across the globe continues. It will take time,
but we will prevail. As President Bush made clear last week, there will be no return to tyranny in Iraq. Those who threaten the order and stability of that country will face ruin just as surely as the regime they once served.

One of the challenges facing the coalition is finding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, as the chairman mentioned. We’re still early in that process, so the task before is sizable and complex. Major combat operations ended less than 10 weeks ago. The Iraqi regime had 12 years to conceal its programs, to move materials, hide documents, disperse equipment, develop mobile production facilities, and sanitize known WMD sites, including 4 years with no U.N. weapons inspectors on the ground. Needless to say, uncovering those programs will take time.

The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass murder. We acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light through the prism of our experience on September 11. On that day, we saw thousands of innocent men, women, and children killed by terrorists, and that experience changed our appreciation of our vulnerability and the risks the U.S. faces from terrorist states and terrorist networks armed with powerful weapons.

The United States did not choose war, Saddam Hussein did. For 12 years, he violated 17 U.N. resolutions without cost or consequence. His regime had an international obligation to destroy its weapons of mass destruction and to prove to the world that they had done so. He refused to do so. If he had, in fact, disarmed, why didn’t he take that final opportunity to prove that his programs were ended and his weapons were destroyed? Why did he continue to give up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue under U.N. sanctions when he could have had those sanctions lifted simply by demonstrating that he had disarmed? Why did he file what all agreed was a fraudulent declaration of his weapons with the United Nations? Why didn’t he cooperate with the international community as Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa did?

Had he done so, war would have been avoided. If he had, in fact, disarmed, he had everything to gain and nothing to lose by cooperating with the United Nations, yet he did not cooperate. He continued to lie and obstruct U.N. inspectors. The logical conclusion is that he did so because he wanted to keep his weapons, and he believed that he could continue to outwit the international community for another 12 years, just as he had for the past 12.

The objective in the global war on terror is to prevent another attack like September 11 or a biological, nuclear, or chemical attack that would be worse before it happens. We can say with confidence that the world is a better place today because the United States led a coalition of forces into action in Iraq and because of General Tom Franks’ skilled execution of the President’s orders.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to meet with the committee. Let me begin by saying a few words about the remarkable man seated next to me—General Tommy Franks.
On Monday, I was in Tampa to attend the change of command ceremony where General Franks handed the reins of U.S. Central Command to his able deputy, General John Abizaid. It was an occasion to reflect on General Franks and what the CENTCOM leadership team has accomplished during his tenure as the combatant commander. It is an extraordinary record of achievement. Think back to September 11—a dark day for our country. But how fortunate our Nation was to have General Franks and his team in command at CENTCOM.

Consider what they have accomplished:

In less than a month, they had developed and were executing a war plan for Afghanistan employing a range of capabilities—from the most advanced (such as laser-guided weapons), to the antique (40-year-old B–52s updated with modern electronics) to the rudimentary (a cavalry charge)—they and our Afghan and coalition allies drove the Taliban and al Qaeda from power in a matter of months.

The plan they developed for Operation Iraqi Freedom was even more innovative and transformational—employing an unprecedented combination of speed, precision, surprise, and flexibility.

The Iraqi regime very likely expected the war to begin, as did the 1991 Gulf War, with a sustained bombing campaign. Instead, General Franks started the ground attack before the air campaign—sending a large force of Special Operators into Western Iraq, followed by thousands of coalition forces streaming across the Kuwaiti border; instead of a long march through the south, with pitch battles for each city along the way, they drove through to reach the gates of Baghdad in a matter of weeks—liberating the Iraqi capital and toppling the regime in less than a month. The plan was adaptable and flexible, allowing General Franks and his team to turn difficulties into opportunities. For example, the inability of coalition forces to enter Iraq from the north was disappointing. But instead of bringing the 4th Infantry Division out of the Mediterranean to the Gulf, General Franks kept them in the Mediterranean—creating the impression in Baghdad that the attack would not start until the coalition could open the northern front. This very likely contributed to the surprise of the Iraqi regime when the war began without those forces in the fight.

One of the most interesting aspects of the campaign was the fact that the “lessons learned” process began before the war began. General Franks installed a “lessons learned” team from Joint Forces Command with his command from the start. They did more than take notes to improve our performance for the next war—they provided immediate feedback, allowing CENTCOM leadership to apply “lessons learned” in real time and improve coalition performance in this war.

I’ll leave it to General Franks to describe in detail the lessons he believes are most important. For my part, I’d say some key lessons so far include:

- The importance of speed, and the ability to get inside the enemy’s decision cycle and strike before he is able to mount a coherent defense;
- The importance of jointness, and the ability of U.S. forces to fight, not as individual de-conflicted Services, but as a truly joint force—maximizing the power and lethality they bring to bear;
- The importance of intelligence—and the ability to act on intelligence rapidly, in minutes, instead of days and even hours; and
- The importance of precision, and the ability to deliver devastating damage to enemy positions, while sparing civilian lives and the civilian infrastructure.

Another lesson is that in the 21st century “overmatching power” is more important than “overwhelming force.” In the past, under the doctrine of overwhelming force, force tended to be measured in terms of mass—the number of troops that were committed to a particular conflict. In the 21st century, mass may no longer be the best measure of power in a conflict. After all, when Baghdad fell, there were just over 100,000 American forces on the ground. General Franks overmatched the enemy not with the typical three to one advantage in mass, but by overmatching the enemy with advanced capabilities, and using those capabilities in innovative and unexpected ways.

There are many more lessons we will learn from the experience in Iraq, and we are still in the early stages of studying them. Admiral Giambastiani and his team at Joint Forces Command are leading this effort, and the conclusions that are drawn will most certainly affect how the U.S. Armed Forces and the Services organize, train and equip for many years to come. This will be one of General Franks’ truly enduring legacies. He led the coalition forces that liberated two nations. But how he liberated those countries—the tactics and strategies he developed and employed—will contribute to the freedom of our country and our people for years to come.
So, while General Franks may be leaving the Service, his service to our country will live on—in the impact Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom will have on budgets and procedures, training and doctrine. The people he led, those who served with him in Iraq and Afghanistan, will now take those transformational experiences to their next important commands, and teach them to the next generation.

So, Tom, we salute you, and we thank you for your remarkable service to our country.

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Mr. Chairman, Operation Iraqi Freedom will go down in history, not just for what was accomplished, but also for what did not happen as a result of the speed and flexibility of the war plan General Franks and his team employed. Consider just some of the things that did not occur:

- Neighboring countries were not hit with Scud missiles.
- The vast majority of Iraq's oil fields were not burned.
- There were no massive civilian casualties, or large masses of refugees fleeing across borders into the neighboring countries.
- There was no large-scale collateral damage. The infrastructure of the country is largely intact.
- Bridges were not blown, and rail lines were protected.
- The dams were not broken, and villages were not flooded.

So for all the difficulties in Iraq today—and there are tough challenges to be sure—it is important to keep in mind all of the problems that Iraqis do not have to overcome because of the way the war was fought. Today, Iraqis do not have to rebuild oil wells, bridges, roads and dams that were not destroyed in the war. They do not have to bury large numbers of innocent civilians, or rebuild residential neighborhoods, because of the compassion and precision with which coalition forces fought.

Iraqis do face the enormous challenge of rebuilding from three decades of tyranny. We must not underestimate how difficult that task will be. But we can take comfort knowing that, as we freed them from tyranny, we did not add to their burden by destroying Iraq’s infrastructure. To the contrary, we saved it.

Today, coalition forces are helping the Iraqi people rebuild and get on the path to stability and democratic self-government. We are making progress in helping Iraqis reestablish security and commerce; restore power and basic services; reopen schools and hospitals; and establish rule of law. With each passing week, more services come online; power and water are restored in more of the country; gas lines disappear; and more Iraqi police are on the streets.

Indeed, civil society is beginning to form. There are now dozens of independent newspapers sprouting up, in Baghdad and throughout the country. Town councils and associations are forming, and people are expressing opinions openly for the first time in decades.

Vendors in Baghdad are selling videotapes detailing the atrocities that took place in Saddam's prisons. As the President put it last week, these are "the true monuments of Saddam Hussein’s rule—the mass graves, the torture chambers, the jail cells for children."

Despite the difficulties they face, most Iraqis are far better off today than they were 4 months ago. The residents of Baghdad may not have power 24 hours a day, but they no longer wake up each morning in fear, wondering whether this will be the day that the death squads come to cut out their tongues, chop off their ears, or take their children away for "questioning"—never to be seen again.

It is true there are some Iraqis who are not better off today—those who comprised the small, elite segment of Iraqi society that benefited from the dictatorship. Such people exist in any dictatorship. They are understandably unhappy now that the regime that favored them has been removed from power. Today some of them are in hiding. Others are engaging in acts of sabotage and violence.

Let me say a word about the security situation in Iraq today. There seems to be a widely held impression that regime loyalists are operating freely throughout the country, attacking coalition forces at will. That is not the case.

Large portions of Iraq are stable. Most of the recent attacks have been concentrated in Baghdad and three corridors reaching west, north, and east out of the Iraqi capital.

At this moment, coalition forces are engaged in operations to deal with the threats in these areas. Indeed, a number of the recent incidents in those regions are the result of offensive operations by the coalition—cases where coalition forces have sought out and engaged enemy fighters.
Mr. Chairman, the problem is real—but it is being dealt with in an orderly and forceful fashion by coalition forces.

Some may ask: Why is the Coalition still engaging hostile forces nearly 10 weeks after major combat operations ended? The answer has to do with the nature of the enemy.

In Iraq, coalition forces drove the country's leaders from power. But unlike traditional adversaries of wars past that sign a surrender document and hand over their weapons, the remnants of the Baath regime and Fedayeen death squads in Iraq did not surrender. Some were killed or captured, but many others faded into the population and are forming pockets of resistance against coalition forces.

We now have to deal with those remnants of the regime—just as we are dealing with the remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban hiding in border areas of Afghanistan. Those battles will likely go on for some time.

In Iraq, we face added challenges. In addition to remnants of the former regime, coalition forces are also dealing with tens of thousands of criminals the regime released into the streets before the war began. They are now at large and are doing what criminals do—looting, robbing, and killing people.

In addition, our forces must also deal with foreign terrorists who crossed into Iraq for an opportunity to harm the coalition and to try to shake our resolve in the war on terror. They will not succeed.

So there are a number of sources of instability. But this much is certain: Iraq has been liberated. The Baathist regime has been removed from power and will not be permitted to return. But our war with terrorists—the remnants in Iraq and Afghanistan and terrorist networks across the globe—continues. It will take time.

Just as we are dealing with terrorist networks in Afghanistan—breaking them up as they attempt to reconstitute—we will deal with them in Iraq. It will take time, but it will prevail.

As President Bush made clear last week:

"There will be no return to tyranny in Iraq. Those who threaten the order and stability of that country will face ruin, just as surely as the regime they once served."

To help ensure long-term security, the coalition is forming a new Iraqi army. Walt Slocombe, the Director of Security Affairs for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, announced last month the start of recruitment for the new army, with an initial goal of having a division of 12,000 men ready within a year, and 40,000 less than 3 years. As with the training of the Afghan National Army, the objective is to create a situation where, over time, Iraqis can take responsibility for their own stability and security and not need to depend on foreign forces.

One of the challenges facing the coalition is finding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. We are still early in the process, and the task before us is sizable and complex. Major combat operations ended less than 10 weeks ago. The Iraqi regime had 12 years to conceal its programs—to move materials, hide documents, disperse equipment, develop mobile production facilities, and sanitize known WMD sites—including 4 years with no U.N. weapons inspectors on the ground. Uncovering those programs will take time.

The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of WMD; we acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light—through the prism of our experience on September 11. On that day, we saw thousands of innocent men, women, and children killed by terrorists. That experience changed our appreciation of our vulnerability—and the risks the U.S. faces from terrorist states and terrorist networks armed with weapons of mass murder.

The United States did not choose war—Saddam Hussein did. For 12 years, he violated 17 United Nations resolutions without cost or consequence. His regime had an international obligation:

- To destroy its weapons of mass destruction; and
- To prove to the world that they had done so.

He refused to do so.

It was the U.N. Security Council which passed the 17th resolution, declaring Saddam Hussein was in "material breach" of his disarmament obligations and giving him one "final opportunity" to disarm. If he had in fact disarmed, why didn't he take that final opportunity to prove that his programs were ended and his weapons destroyed? Why did he continue to give up tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue under U.N. sanctions when he could have had those sanctions lifted simply by demonstrating that he had disarmed? Why did he file what all agreed was a false declaration with the U.N.? Why didn't he cooperate with the international community—such as Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa did?
Had he done so, war could have been avoided. If he had in fact disarmed, he had everything to gain and nothing to lose by cooperating with the U.N. Yet he did not cooperate. He continued to lie and obstruct the U.N. inspectors. The logical conclusion is that he did so because he wanted to keep his weapons—and believed that he could continue to outwit the international community for another 12 years—just as he had for the past 12 years—and survive.

Mr. Chairman, terrorist regimes have been removed in Iraq and Afghanistan—but the global war on terror continues. The President declared last week:

“As long as terrorists and their allies plot to harm America, America is at war. . . . From the beginning, we have known the effort would be long and difficult, and that our resolve would be tested. We know that sacrifice is unavoidable. . . . We did not choose this war. Yet, with the safety of the American people at stake, we will continue to wage this war with all our might.”

The objective in the global war on terror is to prevent another attack like September 11—or a biological, nuclear, or chemical attack that could be far worse—before it happens.

One wonders, looking back on history, what might have happened if the world heeded Winston Churchill’s warnings in the 1930s; if, instead of ignoring the growing evidence, free nations had united, and formed a coalition to intervene and stop Hitler before he completely rearmed—before he invaded Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and set Europe aflame. Consider the lives that would have been saved if the world had faced up to the mounting evidence and the compelling logic of the case Churchill presented, instead of waiting for perfect evidence of his capabilities and intentions in the form of 25 million dead human beings.

The historical record of appeasement is a sorry one. In an age when terrorists and dictators are seeking nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass murder, we need to consider the lessons of history.

We can look to our experience on September 11. We can look to Saddam Hussein’s brutal record of using chemical weapons on foreign forces and on his own people, his history of aggression against his neighbors, his rewards to families of suicide terrorist bombers, and his stated hostility against the United States. We can look to his 12 years of defiance of the international community’s demand that he disarm—and the near unanimous assessment of successive Democratic and Republican administrations, the Intelligence Community (both ours and those of foreign countries), Congress, and the U.N. that he had weapons of mass destruction. We can look at all this and imagine a world in which such a dictator was permitted to develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, while the world’s free nations stood by.

We can say, with confidence, that the world is a better place today because the United States led a coalition of forces into action in Iraq—and because of General Tom Franks’ skilled execution of the President’s orders.

So, yes, we are paying a price in Iraq and elsewhere around the world today—a price in lives and treasure. But it must be compared to the price we paid on September 11 and the price we would have paid for doing nothing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Mr. Secretary, before we hear from the General, I think it’s important that you interpret in some detail this important map. While we hear daily the stories of attacks, my understanding of that map, based also on my trip, is the green indicates those sections of Iraq which are relatively secure. The dark center brown is where the most intense number of attacks are coming, and the lighter shade of green are between the two in terms of level of threat. Is that correct?

Secretary RUMSFELD. That is correct and if you’ll recall, when the U.S. and coalition forces moved up from the south, most of the fighting occurred south of Baghdad and in Baghdad, and, to a considerable extent, the forces in Baghdad and north, in the Saddam Hussein strongholds, in many cases disappeared into the countryside and still are there. So they still need to be dealt with.

Chairman WARNER. Those forces did not witness the maneuver of our heavy forces which at one time were anticipated. Had our
relations with Turkey been such, we could have inserted heavy forces in the north. Is that not correct?

Secretary Rumsfeld. It's true. We did end up, General Franks did, of course, with forces in the north and there was fighting up in that area, but it was not as extensive as it was in the areas to the south.

Chairman Warner. Thank you.

General Franks.

STATEMENT OF GEN. TOMMY R. FRANKS, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

General Franks. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Senator Levin, it's an honor to appear again before the committee. I'd ask that my full statement be entered into the record, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Without objection.

General Franks. Since we last sat in this room, much has taken place in the Central Command area of responsibility. A brutal regime has been removed in Iraq to be sure, and efforts are ongoing to help Iraqis build a new future. Coalition forces have continued to help Afghanistan and those people make strides toward independence and have continued to seek out and destroy terrorists and their networks in that country as well as across the central region as part of the global war on terrorism. I look forward to discussing these important subjects today with the committee.

Let me begin by bringing a message to this committee from some 280,000-plus members of our coalition, those that I have been privileged to command. That message for the committee is very simple. It's thank you. These men and women in uniform very much appreciate the support of this body and the support of this committee and all that you have done on their behalf, Mr. Chairman.

Earlier in this week, General John Abizaid took the reins of Central Command, and, in fact, he is a principled leader, as this committee knows, and a soldier who brings a great deal to United States Central Command. I am proud to relinquish command to him and to consider him a friend.

I'd like to begin today by recognizing coalition nations whose contributions of forces, equipment, and economic support have signaled worldwide commitment to the eradication of terrorism.

Over the past year, the coalition has been steadfast, and today there are 63 nations represented in Tampa at our headquarters, perhaps the largest coalition we have ever seen. A force has been built in the Central Command area of responsibility to continue to move forward to the complete achievement of all of our objectives in Operation Iraqi Freedom as well as in Operation Enduring Freedom, as the Secretary said, to prevent recurrence of the events we saw on September 11, 2001, to deny terrorists opportunities to use weapons of mass destruction on our people, to bring terrorists to justice, and to dismantle their networks.

We've also established a visible and viable presence in the Horn of Africa, Mr. Chairman, since we last met in order to continue that work. Work in the central region is underway, but as I'll discuss in a moment, the environment within Central Command's region remains challenging and volatile, as the Secretary said. Securing U.S. interests in the future and ensuring regional stability will
continue to involve risks in this region and will continue to require the commitment of our resources.

This area encompasses 6.4 million square miles and about a half a billion people, as the committee knows, and it runs from the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula to Pakistan and South Asia up to Central Asia, as far north as Kazakhstan, including the waters of the Red Sea, the northern Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, key maritime chokepoints of Suez, the Bab el-Mandeb and the Straits of Hormuz. This is an area that represents all of the world’s major religions and at least 18 major ethnic groups. National economies in this region produce annual per capita incomes which vary from very little, perhaps a few hundred dollars a year, to tens of thousands of dollars. The area includes dictatorships, absolute monarchies, failed states, democracies, and governments in transition toward democracy.

Humanitarian crises, resource depletion and overuse, religious and ethnic conflicts, demographic challenges, and military power imbalances create social, economic, and military volatility. These factors are particularly significant given the geographical and economic importance of the region where natural resources provide extraordinary opportunities, but they also give rise to a range of socioeconomic problems.

In the past 2 years, Central Command has been at the leading edge of the global war on terrorism, and the context I just provided makes it perhaps understandable why the initial focus on the war on terrorism would be in this region. The command is engaged with U.S. and coalition forces today in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and the commitment, as the Secretary said, remains strong as our leaders and our troopers continue to work to bring security across the region.

On the ground today in Iraq, our troops are conducting ongoing operations. We’re combining civil military work with direct offensive military action which will continue to seek out and bring justice to leaders of the fallen regime and others, as mentioned, Mr. Chairman, by yourself as well as Secretary Rumsfeld.

Priorities will continue to include forming and training police and security forces as well as the creation of a new Iraqi army. We’ll continue to work to improve the infrastructure, working with Iraqis to support the establishment of local governance, providing emergency medical care and other humanitarian assistance. Much dangerous work remains to be done, but millions of Iraqis have freedoms today which 4 months ago were only a dream.

Our troops continue to work closely with Ambassador Jerry Bremer and the entirety of his civilian team to provide the tools he needs to be successful. Progress is being made and our country is justifiably proud of what has been accomplished. I think about lessons learned, as the Secretary mentioned, I’ll talk to just a few. The combat work inside Iraq saw a maturing of joint force operations in a number of ways. Some capabilities we saw reached new levels of performance. From a joint integration perspective, our experience in Operations Southern Watch, Northern Watch, and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan contributed to the jointness and the culture within the headquarters of our area.
These operations helped to improve our interoperability, they also helped to improve our command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence networking. Our forces were able to achieve operational objectives by the integration of maneuver forces, special operations forces, other government agency assets, precision lethal fires, and nonlethal fires. We saw for the first time integration of forces rather than deconfliction of forces. I believe perhaps most transformational is that particular notion, the business of the integration of forces rather than, as we have seen in the past, simple deconfliction of forces.

It seems to me that this integration of the conventional, as you said, Mr. Chairman, air, ground, sea forces to leverage special operations capabilities dealt effectively with asymmetric terrorist-like threats and enabled precision targeting simultaneously in the same battle, in the same battle space. Similarly we have seen in both Afghanistan and Iraq the ability of special operators to use conventional forces in order to set conditions for the success of those forces. Operational fires have been used to spearhead ground maneuver, and our forces have been able to sustain the momentum of the offensive while defeating enemy formations in all kinds of terrain, open desert terrain, complex terrain, and urban terrain.

We saw jointness, precision munitions, command and control, the readiness of our equipment, the state of training of our troops, and coalition support as very clear winners during Operation Enduring Freedom. The Secretary said that I would also mention some of the lessons in my remarks, and I'll do that briefly now. We also identified a number of areas where we believe we require additional work.

Fratricide prevention suffered from a lack of standardized combat identification, so fratricide prevention remains work that we're going to have to focus on in the future. Deployment planning and execution were cumbersome and were much more closely akin to those required during the Cold War than to those required for force projection by our country in the 21st century. Coalition information sharing needs to be improved at all levels. When we operate a coalition, we need the ability to reach back and forth, to and with coalition members. Human intelligence and communications bandwidth also represent areas where we're going to be required, Mr. Chairman, to focus effort in the future.

A few comments on Iraq and where we stand today. As the Secretary says, security continues to improve. Portions of Iraq are now and will remain for some time, however, very dangerous. The term stability operations does not infer that combat operations have ended; indeed, they have not. Our forces are engaged in offensive work as members of this committee saw during a recent trip all over Iraq.

As we move forward, the composition and size of the forces that we have in that country will change to match the conditions, and it will ever change to match the requirements recognizing that the enemy we see there also has a vote. So we will size ourselves, as we have in the past, in order to meet the conditions that we see developed in the future.

Factors that will influence our force mix inside Iraq will have to do, as Senator Levin said, with coalition contributions. They will
have to do with what we see in the way of the enemy threat. They will have to do with what we see in the success of the Iraqi people themselves as they field their security forces, police forces, infrastructure security forces, single site protection capabilities, and as we assist them in fielding a new Iraqi army.

Integration of coalition forces is a major near-term effort. The United Kingdom and Poland are committed at this point to leading divisions in southern Iraq and many partner nations have offered forces to fill those units. Deployment of those forces has already begun, Mr. Chairman. We continue discussions today with India and Pakistan. At this moment, 19 coalition partners are on the ground in support of operations in Iraq with deployment of an additional 19 countries pending. An additional 11 nations are conducting military-to-military discussions with the Secretary’s staff, the Joint Staff, and my staff in Tampa today.

At this point, we see some 35,000 policemen as having been hired, Iraqi policemen. This represents 55, perhaps 60 percent of a total requirement, around 60,000 policemen in that country. Until we see the complete standing up of that number of security forces and policemen, we will continue joint patrolling, we’ll continue to train with and work with these Iraqi forces as we bring them on.

Creation of a new Iraqi army is also moving forward. The plan envisions three divisions located near Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. They will provide for territorial defense and they will conduct stability operations. Over the next year, our goal is to field approximately nine battalions in order to do that work, and initially those forces will focus on performing security at fixed sites, assisting in the movement of convoys, and providing border control. As it develops, this force will work with coalition forces to contribute to stability and security throughout Iraq.

Underlying all security functions is the need to continue humanitarian assistance and the conduct of civil military operations to improve the quality of life for Iraqi people. It is obvious to all that in order to see Iraq move forward into the future, security must in fact come along at a pace that sees the betterment of the conditions of life for the Iraqi people and the establishment of Iraqi governance, the placing of an Iraqi face on the government there. It is in our interest to move these items forward as quickly and thoughtfully as we can, and we’ll continue to do that.

I can’t overstate the value of coalition contribution to success we have seen up to this point. Hospitals, medical supplies, water, food, transportation, expertise in rebuilding is being provided by coalition members. The fact that there has been no humanitarian disaster in Iraq, no widespread outbreak of disease, no hunger, no refugees, or massive problems with displaced persons, or any other predicted consequence of war, is due in large part to the contribution of our allies.

The Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador Jerry Bremer, and our forces will continue to work in concert with international and nongovernmental agencies to reverse the result of more than three decades of a brutal regime.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying the global war on terrorism is ongoing. The precision, determination, and expertise of
our military forces and our coalition partners have brought about the liberation of both Afghanistan and Iraq in lightning speed with minimum bloodshed. However, these two nations have only taken the first steps toward freedom. The United States and our coalition partners must be there to support the whole journey.

While we have accomplished a lot, the potential for terrorist acts and other setbacks remains very real. Afghanistan has a new fragile government, a new army, and with coalition support the nation is making strides toward long-term stability. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s regime was destroyed and regime supporters are being rooted out. Our focus has changed from military destruction of a regime to providing security and humanitarian assistance assisting the Iraqi people to grow a representative form of government.

Decisive combat operations have been completed, but much work remains to be done. I, as every member of this committee, Mr. Chairman, am very proud of each and every one of the men and women who have continued to serve selflessly and tirelessly in the execution of our mission from Egypt to Kazakhstan, from Suez to Pakistan, regardless of the uniform of service they wear or the nation from which they come.

I thank Congress and the American people for the tremendous support you have shown and what you have done for me, Mr. Chairman. I’d be pleased to join the Secretary in answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Franks follows:]
CENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

Our AOR encompasses 6.4 million square miles, from Egypt and Jordan to the HOA, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan in South Asia, and the Central Asian states as far north as Kazakhstan. It includes the waters of the Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the key maritime choke points of the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. The area is home to more than 500 million people, representatives of all the world’s major religions and at least 18 major ethnic groups. National economies produce annual per capita incomes varying from a few hundred dollars to tens of thousands of dollars. CENTCOM’s AOR includes dictatorships, absolute monarchies, failed states, democracies and governments in transition toward democracy. Humanitarian crises, resource depletion and overuse, religious and ethnic conflicts, demographic challenges and military power imbalances that generate social, economic, and military volatility characterize this area. These factors are particularly significant given the geographical and economic importance of the region where natural resources provide extraordinary economic opportunities. However, they also give rise to a range of socioeconomic problems and rivalries. Some states have compensated for their lack of mineral wealth through the industry of their people. However, other nations have not generated the will, resources or organization to move ahead. These factors will not be easily or quickly overcome and signal additional challenges in the future.

In the past 2 years, CENTCOM has been at the leading edge of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). The Command is engaged with U.S. and coalition forces both in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our commitment remains strong as our leaders and troopers work to bring security throughout the region.

On the ground in Iraq today, our troops are conducting ongoing operations, combining Civil Military Operations with direct military action to seek out and bring to justice leaders of the fallen regime. Our priorities include forming and training police, security forces, and the new Iraqi army; improving the infrastructure; supporting the establishment of local government; and providing emergency medical care and other humanitarian assistance. Much dangerous work remains to be done, but millions of Iraqis have freedoms today which 4 months ago were only a dream. Our troops are working closely with Ambassador Jerry Bremer and his civilian team to provide the tools he needs to be successful. Progress is being made, and our country is justifiably proud of all that has been accomplished.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM—LESSONS LEARNED

Decisive combat in Iraq saw a maturing of joint force operations in many ways. Some capabilities reached new performance levels. From a joint integration perspective, our experience in Operations Southern and Northern Watch, and Enduring Freedom helped to develop a joint culture in our headquarters and in our components. These operations helped to improve joint interoperability and improve our joint C4I networks as joint force synergy was taken to new levels of sophistication. Our forces were able to achieve their operational objectives by integrating ground maneuver, special operations, precision lethal fires and nonlethal effects. We saw for the first time integration of forces rather than deconfliction of forces. This integration enabled conventional (air, ground, and sea) forces to leverage SOF capabilities to deal effectively with asymmetric threats and enable precision targeting simultaneously in the same battle space. Likewise, Special Operators were able to use conventional forces to enhance and enable special missions. Operational fires spearheaded our ground maneuver, as our forces sustained the momentum of the offense while defeating enemy formations in open, complex, and urban terrain.

We saw jointness, precision munitions, C2, equipment readiness, state of training of the troops, and coalition support as clear “winners” during OIF. That said, we also identified a number of areas which require additional work. Fratricide prevention suffered from a lack of standardized combat identification. Units in theater arrived with seven different combat ID systems, and our commanders were forced to overcome these shortcomings “on the fly”. Deployment planning and execution were cumbersome and need to be improved to meet the operational demands of the 21st century. Coalition information sharing must be improved at all levels. Finally, human intelligence and communications bandwidth are also areas which will require continuing focus.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM—LESSONS LEARNED

In Afghanistan, coalition forces continue to deny anti-coalition elements sanctuary while disrupting their ability to plan, target, rehearse, and execute operations. This is accomplished through active combat patrolling from secure fire bases and forward
operating bases (FOB) in order to promote stability, enhance the legitimacy of the Interim Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA), and prevent the re-emergence of terrorism.

During OEF, we saw a number of functional areas and capabilities that reached new levels of performance. In some areas, improvements were made prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. For example, the DOD/CIA synergy, which worked well during OEF, was built upon the integration of liaison officers in each of our headquarters which facilitated teamwork and paid great dividends in Iraq.

Also, we continued to leverage coalition strengths as new coalition members were added. “The mission determines the coalition; the coalition does not determine the mission.”

Advanced technologies employed during OEF were also critical. The command and control of air, ground, naval, and SOF from 7,000 miles away was a unique experience in warfare as our forces achieved unprecedented real time situational awareness and C2 connectivity. We learned that precision-guided munitions represent a force multiplier. Low collateral damage during both OEF and OIF was a fundamental factor in achieving our objectives. Early in OEF we saw the need for an unmanned sensor-to-shooter capability to support time-sensitive targeting (TST). The armed Predator demonstrates great potential and will be a high payoff system in the future. Blue Force Tracking and enhanced C4I systems increase lethality and decrease response time, and also represent transformational technologies. We will continue with development of Global Hawk as an unmanned, high-altitude, long loiter time, beyond line-of-sight multi-sensor UAV, and will work to incorporate laser designation and delivery of precision weaponry from that platform.

The integrated common operating picture (COP) was a very powerful tool. Tracking systems were previously Service unique. Workarounds were developed for OIF, but there is a need to develop one integrated, user-friendly, C4I architecture that captures blue and red air, ground and maritime forces.

Strategic lift and tanker aircraft availability were stretched during OEF and OIF. These forces are critical to rapid future force projection, and we must enhance this vital capability in the years ahead.

Combined and joint training of our forces was also a key factor during OEF and was carried over into OIF. Our military forces are the best-prepared forces in the world, and I thank the Members of Congress for providing assets and funding to train these wonderful fighting men and women to give them every possible advantage.

Finally, our ability to take action in OEF was predicated on “Strategic Anchors,” one of which was “Cooperative Security” relationships, which paid high dividends in basing, staging, and over flight rights during recent crisis.

REGIONAL CONCERNS—IRAQ

Although security continues to improve, portions of Iraq are now, and will remain for some time, dangerous. The term “stability operations” does not infer that combat actions have ended. Military forces are still required to set conditions that enable progress. As we move forward, the composition and size of our forces will change to match emerging requirements. Factors that influence our force mix will include coalition force contributions, threat, and success in fielding Iraqi police forces, security, and the new Iraqi army.

Integration of coalition forces is a major near-term effort. The United Kingdom and Poland are committed to leading divisions in Southern Iraq, and many partner nations have offered forces to fill those units. Deployment of those forces has already begun. We continue discussions with India and Pakistan. At this moment, 19 coalition partners are on the ground in support of military operations in Iraq, with deployment pending for 19 additional countries. An additional 11 nations are conducting military to military discussions with respect to possibly deploying forces to Iraq in support of stability and security operations.

At this point some 35,000 police have been hired. This fills about half of the requirement nationwide. Throughout the country, many of these law enforcement officers are conducting joint patrols with U.S. military forces, and we will ultimately transition responsibility for security and stability to the Iraqis. In the near term, we must build upon the momentum we have generated in this area.

Creation of the new Iraqi army is moving forward. The plan envisions three divisions located near Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra to provide territorial defense and conduct stability operations. In the first year, the goal is to field approximately nine battalions. Initially, Iraqi forces will focus on performing security functions at fixed sites, convoy security, and border control. As it develops, this force will work with coalition forces to contribute to stability and security throughout Iraq.
Underlying all security functions is the need to continue humanitarian assistance and the conduct of civil-military operations to improve the quality of life for the Iraqi people. In this regard, our regional allies have been invaluable. Neighboring nations have provided hospitals, medical supplies, water, food, and expertise in beginning the rebuilding process. The fact that there has been no humanitarian disaster in Iraq; no widespread outbreak of disease, hunger, refugees or displaced persons; or any of the other predicted consequences of war is due, in large part, to the generosity of our allies. The CPA and coalition forces will continue to work in concert with international and nongovernmental agencies to reverse the result of years of neglect by a brutal regime.

AFGHANISTAN

Our efforts in Afghanistan have given the Afghan people a chance to break the chain of violence, civil war, and poverty that many have endured their entire lives. Our coalition has made considerable progress over the last 18 months, but much remains to be done. The average Afghan now enjoys basic freedoms, a higher quality of life, and prospects for a better future. A Loya Jirga to ratify a new Constitution will be held this fall and national elections are scheduled for next summer. President Karzai’s transitional government continues to develop as he works to expand its authority beyond Kabul. Security and stability are the keys to President Karzai’s success. Since I May, our primary focus has shifted to stability operations. A stable and secure environment enables reconstruction. U.S. Civil-Military Operations forces have completed more than 150 projects and nearly 300 more are underway. To date, these projects have improved drinking water, medical care, transportation, communications, irrigation, and agriculture throughout the country. To further our reconstruction efforts and to help foster stability, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) are working in Bamian, Kunduz, and Gardez. A fourth U.K.-led team will soon deploy to Mazar-e-Sharif, and other PRTs are being planned for future deployments to additional provinces.

A critical step toward stability in Afghanistan is building the Afghanistan National Army (ANA). The U.S. is leading this effort, supported by five coalition partners. To date, three brigades of professional Afghan soldiers have been fielded; we project ANA strength of approximately 8,500 soldiers by December 2003.

HORN OF AFRICA

Several countries in the HOA responded positively to President Bush’s call for support against worldwide terrorism. However, these states are challenged to conduct successful anti-terrorism campaigns. Over 21 million people remain at risk of starvation in the region. Long-term conflicts have intensified the debilitating effects of natural disasters, especially drought. This forces the dislocation of affected populations seeking food, medical care, and safety. Existing governments find difficulty meeting the needs of their populations, creating an environment hospitable to terrorist cells and transnational threats.

CENTCOM has addressed these issues by standing up a Combined Joint Task Force in Djibouti. This Task Force provides a forward presence; trains counter-terrorism forces; and supervises a number of humanitarian assistance efforts to enhance security, improve public health, and combat famine. These initiatives are key elements of our security cooperation strategy. Close cooperation with interagency and international aid organizations facilitates a regional approach to the humanitarian effort and maximizes the effects of our efforts.

The HOA will require a long-term commitment of resources to achieve stability, thereby setting conditions that will make it less hospitable to terrorists.

IRAN

Iran has long pursued a goal of regional hegemony through modernization of a regionally capable military force, the development of WMD, and the use and promotion of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy.

Tehran perceives itself encircled by the U.S. The enmity and abiding mistrust of the U.S. Government is implacable among Iran’s ruling hard-liners furthering security concerns. Iran’s principal security objectives remain unaltered with the fall of Baghdad, namely the survival of the Islamic state and the preservation of Iranian independence, with the secondary goal of expanding Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and the broader Islamic world. Iran’s national security policies appear focused on maintaining political stability and internal security, expanding diplomatic and economic relations, establishing WMD and long-range missile forces backed up by unconventional warfare capabilities and maintaining a robust terrorism apparatus.
Shifts in regional security relationships are expected as a result of the formation of a stable and productive post-war Iraq. Of course, those realignments and perturbations extend beyond Iraq’s borders and will be of concern to Iran. Following the ouster of the Saddam regime in Iraq, Iran has mounted an increasingly sophisticated and multifaceted influence campaign that will prove persistent in its focus to create an anti-coalition, predominantly anti-U.S., sentiment among Iraqis.

Just as complex is deciphering Iran’s dual-track foreign policy and often contradictory public statements. Iran’s efforts to promote itself as a responsible member nation of the international community are in direct contrast with its long-standing covert and public support to radical resistance groups and terrorists as well as its failure to meet its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obligations.

The Iranian regime’s proclivity for violence through terrorism, in concert with its past support of terrorism and an established pattern of developing nuclear and other WMD and missile programs, will continue to be of concern.

**GULF STATES**

Transnational terrorists remain throughout the Gulf region. Violent, anti-Western ideology appeals to some segments of the populace, due in part to the increasing failure of regional governments to meet the basic needs of the people. As populations increase, regional governments struggle to provide adequate education, housing, infrastructure, and jobs. Closed political systems are only just beginning to reform. Regional politics and long-standing, hard-line stances concerning the Palestinian-Israeli situation exacerbate regional instability.

However, there are also hopeful signs. Many of the Gulf countries are moving toward a more representational government. Bahrain and Qatar have begun municipal elections; Oman continues working toward opening its economy and political system; and Saudi Arabia has begun efforts to change the educational system, privatize state industries, and open a domestic dialogue on other needed social reforms. Substantive improvements will require a long-term, determined effort.

The Gulf States have stepped up their antiterrorism efforts in response to September 11 and the May attacks in Saudi Arabia. Ongoing efforts include increasing law enforcement, stemming the flow of illegal financial support, tracking personnel movements, and monitoring terrorist activities. While their cooperation is extensive, these governments continue to prefer working behind the scenes.

Militarily, the Gulf States continue to perceive a long-term threat from Iran. In a show of support for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Gulf States, for the first time, deployed the Peninsula Shield force in defense of Kuwait. Outstanding OIF basing and access support from the Gulf States demonstrates tangible results of our active security cooperation programs. They understand that our “footprint” in the region is likely to change, and each state continues to advocate security cooperation with the U.S.

While most citizens are relieved that the Iraqi regime has been removed, opinions differ on coalition activities and what type of Iraqi society will eventually emerge. Regional governments are looking to the CPA to ensure Iraq does not become segmented. Gulf leaders look forward to lucrative trade and economic relations with a rebuilt Iraq.

**SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA**

Pakistan’s support has been fundamental to our success in Operation Enduring Freedom. President Musharraf has committed substantial national resources against terrorism to include arresting a number of al Qaeda leaders, freezing the financial accounts of known terrorists, and banning fundraising to support Kashmiri militancy. He has pursued these actions despite ongoing tensions with India and significant domestic pressure, and he continues on a path toward democracy and sustained economic development. The U.S. has expressed gratitude and solidified his political position by lifting sanctions and granting economic assistance. CENTCOM will continue to support our mil-to-mil relationship and build closer security cooperation with Pakistan.

The Central Asian States remain dedicated partners in the global war on terrorism. Each country declared its support for the U.S. immediately after the attacks of September 11. All offered to host U.S. personnel and equipment. Bases established in the Central Asian States have been critical to the success of our operations in Afghanistan. The defeat of the Taliban and the removal of al Qaeda from Afghanistan have enabled the Central Asian States to refocus their attention on internal development. We will continue working with our Central Asian partners to prevent the resurgence of terrorism, and the Department of State and the Bureau of Cus-
toms and Border Protection will continue to improve their capacity to secure their borders against the flow of illegal narcotics.

WMD PROLIFERATION

The proliferation of technologies related to WMD and long-range delivery systems continues to be a significant concern in the Central Region. As some nations and international extremist groups pursue chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities, some regional allies will seek to offset such threats by pursuing strategic weapons of their own, thus perpetuating the proliferation cycle. Security cooperation is our best hedge against this possibility.

Iran continues to pursue WMD. Its nuclear programs are under the continuing scrutiny of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and its chemical weapons stockpile and probable biological weapons program are of concern.

In South Asia, the missile and nuclear race between Pakistan and India is also troubling. Both states continue to develop advanced missiles and the risk of miscalculation leading to escalation remains of concern.

We face a severe threat in the potential for chemical, biological, radiological, or less likely, nuclear attacks by terrorists. Documents found (during the exploitation of suspect WMD sites in Afghanistan) indicated the al Qaeda terrorist network had explored methods for producing toxins and was seeking to establish a biological warfare capability. Terrorists will continue to seek WMD capabilities as their need for more sensational attacks intensifies. The extensive press coverage of the October 2001 anthrax mail attacks highlighted U.S. vulnerabilities and exacerbated an already dangerous situation in the Central Region, where many extremists are based and exploring such capabilities.

TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM

Over the past year, the global war on terrorism has been marked by major achievements. Multiple terrorist operations sponsored by al Qaeda and affiliated extremists have been disrupted; and many terrorists, including high-ranking operational planners, have been captured. Al Qaeda has proven unable to reestablish the extensive training infrastructure it had earlier instituted in Afghanistan. The dispersal of its leaders and cadre from Afghanistan continues to impede al Qaeda’s ability to accomplish timely and secure communications exchanges.

Nevertheless, al Qaeda has responded to our counterterrorism initiatives; in this context, several lesser-known personalities have emerged and this has translated into strikes such as the May 2003 bombings of multiple housing complexes in Riyadh. So far, these attacks have focused on “soft” targets; however, al Qaeda retains an interest in striking larger, more spectacular targets.

Counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda, U.S. victories in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the persistent conflict between Israel and the Palestinians have generated pressure throughout the CENTCOM AOR. Jihadist groups and disgruntled individuals constitute another important source of potential terrorist threats. Given this setting, we are constantly working to identify vulnerabilities and refine our force protection measures.

SECURITY COOPERATION OVERVIEW

Our success in gaining basing, staging, and overflight rights for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and our influence in the region are directly related to an active security cooperation program. CENTCOM’s program builds relationships that promote U.S. interests, build allied and friendly nations’ military capabilities, and provide U.S. forces with access and en route infrastructure. Prosecution of the GWOT requires continued fiscal and political investment in these vital programs. I would like to highlight a few dividends of our approach.

The fiscal year 2003 supplemental appropriation of $398 million in FMF is currently enabling the training of a professional Afghan National Army and allowing Pakistan to restore its military forces. Additionally, long-standing partners such as Jordan are increasing their interoperability through FMF-funded purchases. Continued investment in security assistance allows CENTCOM to improve the capabilities of friendly nations by enabling them to provide for their own security.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) remains a low-cost, high-payoff investment that helps shape the security environment. Courses offered under IMET provide military members of regional states an opportunity to attend courses in U.S. military institutions such as Command and Staff Colleges and Senior Service Schools. IMET participation by students from the Central Region supports congressionally-mandated initiatives: providing exposure to the U.S. concepts of military professionalism, respect for human rights, and subordination to civilian author-
ity. The Counter Terrorism Fellowship, a new DOD appropriation, enables us to provide flexible course offerings to several nations who are key partners in the GWOT.

CONCLUSION

The global war on terrorism is underway. The precision, determination, and expertise of our military forces and our coalition partners brought about the liberation of Afghanistan and Iraq in lightning speed with minimum bloodshed. However, these two nations have only taken the first steps toward freedom, and United States and our coalition partners must be there to support the whole journey.

While we have accomplished much, the potential for terrorist acts and other setbacks remains very real. Afghanistan has a new government, a new army, and with coalition support the nation is making great strides towards long-term stability. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s regime was destroyed and regime supporters are being rooted out. Our focus has changed from military destruction of a regime to providing security and humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, while helping to establish a representative form of government. Decisive combat operations have been completed, but much work remains.

I am very proud of each and every one of the men and women who continue to serve selflessly and tirelessly in the execution of our mission from Egypt to Kazakhstan, from the Suez to Pakistan, regardless of the uniform of service they wear or the nation from which they come. I thank Congress and the American people for the tremendous support you have given them.

I would be pleased to take your questions.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, General. All of us join the Secretary in his commendation of your distinguished career, 36 years I believe, am I not correct, and the contribution of your family.

Those were excellent statements by both witnesses, very balanced, what went right and what we have to learn to do better in the future, and we’ll probe that in these questions. We’ll have a 6-minute round, colleagues. We have almost full attendance of the committee, and I’ll move on quickly.

Mr. Secretary, as I departed the one thing that was foremost in my mind was, how can we proceed and what steps are being taken to reduce the risk to the individual and groups of our soldiers and civilians, coalition civilians who are in support of this in the face of these repeated daily attacks and losses? The most encouraging information that I received was from Ambassador Bremer, that he hopes by this July, within weeks, to have concluded putting in place the initial steps of the interim authority with Iraqis, as I mentioned a council and a constitutional group. Is that on schedule, and do you concur in my view that that’s perhaps the strongest tool that we have to reduce these attacks, put an Iraqi face, a degree of Iraqi responsibility on this situation as we move towards securing their freedom?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, I do. I think it’s a combination of political progress and, as you suggested, Ambassador Bremer is hopeful that sometime next week or the week thereafter there will be the governing council set up with some 25- to 30-plus members. There are a number of city councils that have been stood up in Baghdad and other portions of the country.

I think it is, however, a mixture of the political progress, where Iraqis begin to assume responsibility for some of the ministries and some of their activities; economic progress, as General Franks said, so people see their lives improving; and military security. I don’t think any one can be separated. I think all three are critical, and they all have to move forward.

Chairman WARNER. I agree with that. But as soon as we can begin to hold some Iraqis responsible for these killings and con-
stant attacks, all the better, in my judgment. They can publicly address the need to have them stopped.

Mr. Secretary, with respect to questions of augmenting the coalition forces, and specifically as my colleague, Mr. Levin, said and as I raised with Ambassador Bremer, the inclusion of elements of NATO—can you address that?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I'd be happy to. I keep hearing people say things and people write things to the effect that this is the U.S. and the U.K., and it's not. As General Franks said, we have 19 countries on the ground. We have commitments from another 19 countries. We are in discussions with another 11 countries. That would bring the total up to 49 nations. My understanding is that we currently have on the ground some 19,000 coalition forces with commitments for another 11,000, which would bring the total to 30,000. In addition, the work is going forward to develop an Iraqi army, former Under Secretary of Defense Walt Slocombe is working hard to achieve that goal, and we expect to have thousands of Iraqis back in uniform, functioning in a responsible way as well as the police evolution that you've discussed.

Now, what about the U.N. and NATO? The United Nations passed a resolution. They've assigned an individual, Mr. Sangio de Mello, who works closely with Ambassador Bremer. I believe, Senator Levin, you indicated that it was a mystery why we hadn't reached out to NATO. We have reached out to NATO. NATO is assisting Poland, which has agreed to take a sector in force generation. In addition, there are discussions that have been taking place in NATO about the possibility of taking on an additional role. At the current time, they're planning to take over responsibility in Afghanistan this August.

They have a lot on their platter. But we have reached out to just about everybody I can think of asking for assistance of various types, and it is coming in. Is it as much as we'd like, as fast as we'd like? No, it isn’t. But are we hopeful it will continue to increase? Yes.

Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, all of us are very mindful of the need to maintain a rotation base of our forces back. We recognize that probably the OPTEMPO of our military forces of all branches are at a very high point at this time, and yet our Nation and other nations are faced with a contingency operation in Africa, most notably Liberia. I think the President quite properly is facing this issue, has sent teams out to make an assessment of what needs to be done, will evaluate it, and then make a Presidential decision.

Could you share with us this morning some of the options that are being considered and how those options in terms of our forestructure might impact our troop redeployments out of Iraq or troop redeployments in other areas? In other words, can our military accept in your professional judgment—I know they will, but what are the consequences of—a Presidential decision, should it be made, of a deployment force? We bear in mind that if you deploy, say 1,000 individuals, you have to have 1,000 in transit, 1,000 in training, so it's a multiple of the force that actually goes in the country.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You’re quite right, of course, Mr. Chairman, that when you have 1,000 troops deployed overseas you do need a rotational base, and it ends up like a multiple of 3 rather than just the 1,000. First let me say that it is critically important that the Department manage the forces in a way that we can continue to attract and retain the people we need, that the Reserve who have just done a superb job are not stressed or called up so frequently or kept there so long that it affects their commitment to serve in the Reserves. We need them badly, and we have to be attentive to that, and we intend to be.

The rotation out of Iraq is already starting. I don’t know what the number is, but I think it’s something like 142,000 have already been redeployed. For the most part, there were large numbers of Air Force and Navy. There also have been some Army and Marine Corps.

Chairman Warner. Redeployed back home, put in home?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Redeployed back home, back to their bases, wherever they were, mostly in the U.S. The 3rd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division is now in Kuwait, it’s been taken out of Iraq and it should be back home in July. The plan for the 2nd Brigade is that they would return in August, having been there something like 10 months, and the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division is scheduled to return in September and they’ve been in there since about January, so that would be a total of about 9 months.

The Services and the Joint Staff have been working with Central Command to develop a rotation plan so that we can in fact see that we treat these terrific young men and young women in a way that’s respectful of their lives and their circumstances and the wonderful job they did.

With respect to Liberia, the President is considering the appropriate U.S. role. He has indicated to world leaders that he intends that the United States assist in some way with respect to Liberia. He has asked the Department of Defense to dispatch assessment teams in two locations, one in Liberia and it’s currently there, several dozen people, and in addition he is sending assessment teams to the so-called ECOWAS nations to determine the readiness of the ECOWAS forces and the extent to which they may or may not be ready to deploy and over what period of time, with what type of equipment, having had what type of training.

The United States, Great Britain, and several other countries have been in the process for many months now training ECOWAS forces, and some have been used in Sierra Leone, some are currently committed. So until the assessment teams come back, it seems to me that we will not have a good grip on what we would propose to the President.

Chairman Warner. Thank you. Your staff briefed this committee yesterday and you yourself will be briefing the Senate tomorrow, so I commend you on keeping us informed on it.

General Franks, lastly, in your planning did you anticipate this level of conflict that continues? You’ve been very candid with us this morning. Had you put in place the preparations to deal with it, and have you considered perhaps while we’re standing up an Iraqi army, between now and the stand-up of that army, utilizing some Iraqi soldiers that can be trusted to go along on the patrols
with our own, so that we have not only the coalition helmet, but something that the citizens can clearly perceive as one of their own helmets?

General Franks. Mr. Chairman, the latter point first. Yes, as we begin to work to build the Iraqi army with Walt Slocombe, whom the Secretary mentioned a minute ago, we will, as those forces are brought on, position them, work with them in a very operational way because, as you said, that serves to put an Iraqi face on the security assets that are being used throughout the country. So, yes, sir, that is part of the plan. With respect to the level of violence, Mr. Chairman, I will tell you, I think in a war and in post-conflict, one never knows how to gauge what may be expected in the aftermath of major combat.

Was it anticipated, Mr. Chairman? I would say yes, sir, it was. Perhaps the way I'll justify that statement is to say that the footprint that we see in Iraq today is not the same footprint that was in Iraq on the day the President announced the cessation of major combat operations. In fact, the deployment orders, which had been approved by the Secretary prior to the time—I believe it was the 1st of May when our President said that the major combat operations had ended—the deployment orders which had already been signed, in fact, adjusted the footprint for Iraq in terms of military police, in terms of civil affairs people, in terms of humanitarian assistance type forces, in terms of engineers.

The plan called for the removal of forces that are much more inclined to be used during major combat operations than during stability operations, for example, armor formations. So I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we did anticipate a level of violence, and I can't tell you whether we anticipated that it would be at the level that we see right now. Mr. Chairman, I think that when a war begins one can always hope for a very quick transition to peace, to see a nation begin to rebuild itself without a great deal of friction and without a great deal of messiness. But on the operational side, on the military side we must always be prepared to handle whatever level of violence may come along, and, Mr. Chairman, I believe our forces have been and will continue to be able to handle the levels of violence that we see as this nation tries to bring itself together.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Rumsfeld, going back to the NATO issue just for a minute, on April 13 you were asked about a possible formal role for NATO in the post-war effort in Iraq and this is what you said, “NATO—I’ve suggested to the Secretary General that I thought that would be a good thing. If NATO wanted to do that obviously France would be opposed I’m told. They are opposed to a lot of things so that shouldn’t be a problem, because you can do it at 18 instead of at 19 countries, since they’re not a member of the Defense Planning Committee.”

Now, we have apparently not asked NATO to formally decide to raise a force for deployment in Iraq similar to what they’ve done in Bosnia and in Kosovo. Why have we not made that request of NATO, asked NATO not just to support Poland, for instance, as they’ve done as an individual country, but why have we not asked NATO to formally decide as NATO to raise that force and to give
its endorsement to our action? Is it because we’re afraid France might not go along, or what? We don’t want to ask France?

Secretary Rumsfeld. No, first of all, it’s not clear to me we haven’t. I was told this morning that the discussions taking place in NATO include a discussion about a possible NATO role in Iraq. Now to what extent the Department of State or the United States has or has not issued a formal request, I don’t know, but I know the discussions are going forward and I know that the assistance that NATO is providing, not individual countries in NATO, but NATO as an institution is providing to Poland, is a NATO institutional action. It is something that has been discussed, approved, and under way.

I also know as I said that NATO is preparing to take over responsibilities in Afghanistan so how many things like that they’re going to be able to do at one time remains to be open. But I have no problem, as I indicated then and I indicate now some months later, in having NATO involved. Indeed, I think it would be a good thing.

Senator Levin. NATO involved as NATO, formally being asked and deciding as an organization to raise and to deploy forces in Iraq? You have no problem with that?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I have no problem with that. Indeed, I’m very pleased that NATO has been assisting and is currently discussing assisting in additional ways.

Senator Levin. But if that request to NATO had been made, wouldn’t you know about it?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I don’t know technically what you’re getting at, but whether the Department of State has instructed the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, or Permanent Representative as he’s called, to issue some sort of a formal request, I don’t know. I know NATO has seized the issue, is discussing it. I was told that this morning after General Pace had a phone call with the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, General Jones.

Senator Levin. Would you support asking Germany and France to provide forces in Iraq?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Our goal is to get large numbers of international forces in from lots of countries, including those two, but we have requests out to a large number of countries.

Senator Levin. But you would specifically support requesting Germany and France to provide forces in Iraq?

Secretary Rumsfeld. We have made requests to, I don’t know what it is, something like the Department of State has issued requests to something like 70 or 80, 90 countries.

Senator Levin. Is Germany and France on the list?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I’ll have to ask. I would suspect they are.

[The information referred to follows:]

There have been no formal requests made to, or offers of support from, Germany or France to provide forces in Iraq since the start of the war. As I stated during the hearing we would welcome their support. However, I do note that government officials from both nations have stated publicly that participation requires further endorsement by the U.N.

Senator Levin. But would you support it?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Why certainly.
Senator Levin. Good. The troop level, General Franks, you’ve indicated that that is going to depend upon conditions that exist in the future. General Abizaid, at his confirmation hearing recently, said that he believes that we would have large number of troops in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Do you agree?

General Franks. I do, sir.

Senator Levin. Could you give us just a range of troops? I mean, would it be from 100–150,000 for many years? I’m not asking for any kind of precise figure, but what’s your current best estimate?

General Franks. Senator Levin, that actually is not as hard to answer as it might seem. We have about 145,000 troops in there right now. As I have talked to commanders at every level inside Iraq, one finds that that footprint appears to us on the operational side to be about what that footprint needs to look like. There has been suggestion that perhaps there should be more troops, and, in fact, I can tell you in the presence of this Secretary that if more troops are necessary, this Secretary is going to say yes. We have talked about this on a number of occasions, and when the tactical commanders on the ground determine that they need to raise force levels, then those forces in fact will be provided. The Secretary may want to comment on that.

Senator Levin. That’s reassuring though. In other words, the current footprint is your best estimate. That would be for the foreseeable future?

General Franks. Sir, it is for the foreseeable future.

Senator Levin. Now, on the weapons of mass destruction issue, which is back in many ways in the media this week. Secretary Rumsfeld, earlier this week the White House acknowledged that “the reference to Iraq’s attempt to acquire uranium from Africa should not have been included in the President’s State of the Union speech on January 28.” On the 29th, you said on CNN something very similar to what the President had said the night before when you said that the Iraqi regime “recently was discovered seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”

Now, just a few weeks ago Condi Rice said the following: “that we did not know at the time, no one knew at the time in our circle, maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the agency, but no one in our circles knew that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a forgery.” I’m just curious as to whether or not you’ve determined as a policymaker how the facts, the falsity of that claim of uranium sale to Iraq from Africa, remained in the bowels of the Intelligence Community for 9 months after you made your statement on the 29th.

Did somebody come to you, did the Intelligence Community come to you and say, “My gosh, we have facts that show that that just simply is inaccurate?” Have you determined how those accurate facts, in other words, the knowledge in the bowels of the Intelligence Community that it was wrong that Africa was solicited by Iraq for uranium and that those documents were forged? Have you determined how it happened that that information about the forgery stayed for so long in, to quote Condi Rice, “the bowels of the agency”?

Secretary Rumsfeld. No, I can’t give you a good answer. I can try to get an answer for the record if you’d like. I must say that as someone who reads intelligence every day as you do, I find that
corrections are being made fairly continuously. You review a week’s worth of intel, and 2 months later they come back and say, “Well, we said this on this date, but we have new information that suggests this or that.”

The fact that the facts change from time to time with respect to specifics does not surprise me or shock me at all. It’s to be expected. It’s part of the intelligence world that we live with, this uncertainty and less than perfect knowledge. I must say, however, that as we’ve gone through this period I think the intelligence has been quite good, and I don’t think the fact that there is an instance where something was inaccurate ought to in any way paint a broad brush on the intelligence that we get and suggest that that’s a pattern or something. It’s just not.

Senator Levin. Could you find out for this committee for the record? This is a significant piece of intelligence. It was relied on at the highest level, very publicly, very visibly by the President and by you within 2 days of each, right before the war. It was a very significant statement about seeking uranium in Africa. It was based on intelligence, at the same time the Intelligence Community knew in the depths of their agency that this was not true. It seems to me it is absolutely startling. I think we would all want to know how it could possibly have stayed there in the basement of the agency while policymakers on the upper floors were making these statements.

If you could do that for this committee, I think we’d all appreciate it.

Secretary Rumsfeld. I’ll try to do that.

[The information referred to follows:]

In response to the question on Niger-related intelligence, this question is best answered by the Intelligence Community. I assume this information is being provided to you as a member of the Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence.

Senator Levin. Thank you.

Chairman Warner. Senator Allard.

Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m interested, in light of recent attacks and everything, in your assessment as to what’s happening—are they more organized than say they were 3 or 4 weeks ago, and, if they are becoming more organized, is there any evidence of how central this organization is? Is it regional or is it countrywide? I’d like to hear your assessment on that, General Franks.

General Franks. Senator, because we see more of the activity, I ask myself are we seeing more of this violent activity in the areas that are shaded on the map that the Secretary turned around a minute ago? Are we seeing more of this violent activity because some of these Jihadist extremists, Baathists, Saddam Fedayeen forces are coming together, or are we seeing more violence there because we are more offensive and because we are placing more patrols in there?

So the answer that I give you I will caveat with that because I suspect that we’re seeing increased violence in some of these areas because we are more present. We are out looking for it because that’s our charter, that’s what our force is going to do. Now in terms of networking among these groups or between these groups, Senator, I’m not comfortable right now saying that I believe that
there is operational control between factions operating in Tikrit, Ar Ramadi, Mosul, and Bayji. I'm not sure. I recognize the same thing you recognize which is that we see increased violence, sir, but I'm not ready yet to tell you that I see evidence that these violent acts are being coordinated. I might tell you that next week, Senator, but I do not yet see evidence of it.

Senator ALLARD. Do you see any outside influences coming into the country, for example, Iran? Are there any coalition forces from any of the neighboring countries that you can pick up or any suggestion that there may be?

General FRANKS. Sir, since the war started we have seen infiltration of elements through Syria, and we have encountered those on a number of occasions. I believe that there continue to be efforts by Iran, by Teheran, to influence activities inside Iraq. We see evidence in there of the intelligence services, Iranian intelligence services. We see evidence in there of political forces. So, yes, I do see attempts by nations in the region—I named those two—to influence activities that are going on inside Iraq.

Senator ALLARD. Mr. Secretary, I'm aware that Ambassador Bremer is trying to get some members on their Iraqi Governing Council and get this put together rather quickly, at least in the near future. Do you have any idea what we're thinking about in terms of makeup of the council? Are we going to include Islamic clerics, are we going to have former exiles and Kurdish leaders, and when do you anticipate national elections?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I saw the pool of names, and it's large and diverse, in answer to your question. It includes folks from all across the spectrum, the Iraqis. Elections are something that it seems to me will have to be determined as we go down the road. The goal in life is not to have one election one time as happened when Adolf Hitler was elected, for example. The goal is to have a process and to have true representation and true respect for the various elements, diverse elements in that country.

The steps would be something like this, although I can't even be certain of that: that there will be a governing council, there will be some sort of an interim authority, there will be a constitutional convention to develop a constitution. The constitution and the Iraqis who develop the constitution will make a judgment as to when and at what pace they think their country is ready to have elections in a way that would be reasonable and create a representative system for them.

That's out some way. If you think back to Afghanistan, we still have a provisional government in that country and their elections are expected next year sometime, so it takes some time. It's not an easy transition.

Senator ALLARD. The Kurdish problem in the north, I think, continues to be a problem and the question I have is, from your assessment, Mr. Secretary, do you think the Kurds in the north are more interested in rebuilding Iraq or are they more interested in forming a separate country at this particular point in time?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Oh, I think the former. Everything I've heard is that the individuals from the Kurdish section of Iraq are, in fact, participating in this process, that they've behaved in a reasonably constructive way, that they're relieved that the regime of
Saddam Hussein is gone, and that they intend to play a political role in the evolution of a new Iraq.

Senator ALLARD. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is expired. Thank you.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, could I make a response to Senator Levin on this subject that General Franks answered on footprint? He responded for the foreseeable future about such as it is, as I recall. I would just amend that slightly by saying exactly. We see no reason to think that that footprint isn't the right one for the moment. But the composition of U.S. forces could change and we could end up with different types, as he suggested. Second, the numbers of U.S. forces could change while the footprint stayed the same, in the event that we have greater success in bringing in additional coalition forces, in the event we are able to accelerate the Iraqi army.

The exact number, therefore, of U.S. forces might change as well as the composition even though the footprint, as General Franks said, would be roughly the same until we see evolution in the political and economic spheres. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Two administrative announcements, colleagues. We have two votes coming circa 11:30. It is the intention of the chair to catch the end of the first vote and remain and do the second, and then return and resume the hearing.

Following the open hearing, we will have a closed hearing in the Intelligence Committee next door. Thank you very much.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary, General, we’re all tremendously proud of the troops’ effectiveness in Operation Iraqi Freedom. It’s a great credit to you, Mr. Secretary, and to General Franks. I’m now concerned that we have the world’s best trained soldiers serving as policemen in what seems to be a shooting gallery.

The President declared an end to major combat operation, but the war’s not over for the men and women who are on the ground in Iraq or their families here at home. The lack of a coherent plan is hindering our efforts at internationalization and aggravating the strain on our troops. Our troops are tired and want to return to their families who are at home coping with the absence and the loss of income. They’ve been gone close to a year, and this truly is a hardship. They and the American people want to know what the strategy is to stabilize Iraq, bring the promise of democracy to the Iraqi people, and alleviate the strain on our troops.

Now I’ve heard in response to Senator Levin’s questions about the NATO forces that there are 2 million troops in NATO. Clearly not all of them are qualified to go here, but you have the Italian carabiniere and the French gendarmes and the Spanish guardia civil that are superbly trained troops in riot control and dealing with barriers and fire and explosives. Have we made a specific request to try and get some of the best trained police that exist in the NATO countries to come over and provide some relief to these American troops that are in the process of being attacked almost daily?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, in fact, Italy and Spain have both made commitments.
Senator Kennedy. When will they come, can you tell us what the expectation is and how many are going to be there?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I can't tell you precisely. I've always believed that it's up to those countries to make their own announcements.

Senator Kennedy. I'm asking about what's been requested.

Secretary Rumsfeld. We have requested of them exactly the kinds of forces you've described and they have made commitments to do so. The dates generally for these forces are going to be in the latter portion of this summer and into September and certainly by October. I'm guessing that some will be coming in next month, and then it will be August, September, and October that they will be flowing in, but I don't want to refer specifically to those countries because I'm speaking to the 19 countries that have made commitments.

Senator Kennedy. That's true. But these three certainly, among others, have some of the best trained in terms of the police function.

I was troubled just by your earlier response about the knowledge of the request of troops from NATO. It would seem that you would be the person that would be on the phone to NATO to ask these troops to be available, and we just want to know, are you on the phone talking to NATO, to General Robertson, to request troops? Have you done that? You indicated in an earlier response, we want to reach out to everyone. Is it as much as we would like? No, in terms of response to NATO. It's not clear that we have announced to other countries. I have no problem if they want to provide more help and assistance. I think families want to know what are we doing. If they have 2 million troops over there, what are we doing to bring a major chunk of those troops through NATO into Iraq? Is that part of our plan now in internationalizing the military phase of it?

Secretary Rumsfeld. We have made requests of NATO. I don't know quite what you're asking——

Senator Kennedy. I'm asking when have you talked——

Secretary Rumsfeld. The 2 million troops, Senator——

Senator Kennedy.—have you picked up the phone?

Secretary Rumsfeld. The 2 million troops, I believe, include the United States of America.

[The information referred to follows:] The Europeans, minus France as a non-integrated military member, currently have roughly 2.5 million people in uniform, as you suggested. However, I am advised by our senior military leadership the reality is that only a modest fraction of that number is actually available to deploy to meet the Alliance's challenges. The reasons they are not available are varied. Some NATO nations have legal limitations on the number of troops they can deploy. Others mandate that only volunteer or contract soldiers may deploy. Tens of the current 17 nations, excluding France and the United States for this purpose, have such constraints. As we know, of the fraction of the troops that could be available to deploy, some 70,000, are already deployed by our allies to Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa and elsewhere. The result is that it is estimated that only a very small number of all non-U.S. NATO forces are actually available in the sense of our discussion.

There are, however some optimistic changes occurring in NATO that center around NATO transformation. These include divesting obsolete equipment, and closing unneeded installations. It also includes a new and more modern NATO Response Force. Also we have recently seen NATO demonstrate its will to have a global capability by its decision to deploy, as a NATO command to Afghanistan.
Senator KENNEDY. Then you have, what, 1,700,000 over there, out of the 1,700,000 over there?
Secretary RUMSFELD. I believe, months ago, the United States through the Department of State made a request to something like 70 or 80 countries for assistance. There have been force generation meetings that have been taking place, one that took place very recently, there’s another taking place I believe in New York——
Senator KENNEDY. But your answer, I gather, Mr. Secretary, is you’re doing everything that you possibly can as a Secretary of Defense——
Secretary RUMSFELD. We believe we are.
Senator KENNEDY. —to make every request of NATO for combat troops as well as for the kind of guard functions, and that you’re satisfied you’re doing everything you can within NATO and you have made that request yourself, or you’re conscious of the administration, or if you don’t know that, you’re going to find out whether they have made that request?
Secretary RUMSFELD. We certainly want assistance from NATO and from NATO countries. We have commitments from a good number of NATO countries already, and NATO is already assisting.
Senator KENNEDY. In the other area of the development of Iraq, I understand the U.S. Government has talked about the future of Iraq working groups. But I’m told by the people on the ground that there’s no formal plan for reconstruction. Can you provide us with the operational plans for reconstruction? Who are the people, the level of resources that are committed, how many Iraqis will be involved in the plan to build, police, justice system, the media, the schools, the other institutions? Are there plans on paper, and where are those plans? Or are we shooting from the hip and taking a piecemeal approach when American lives are at stake in terms of the broader security issues?
Secretary RUMSFELD. There certainly are plans for the reconstruction of Iraq. I would, however, say that the plans are not for the United States or the coalition to reconstruct Iraq. Iraq’s circumstance today is the result of 30 years of repression by the Saddam Hussein regime, a Stalinist type economy, and a denial of the people of that country and the infrastructure of that country, the kinds of opportunities and investments that a wealthy country like Iraq is perfectly capable of doing.
Today if one goes from the Gulf States, from Kuwait or Qatar or any of those nations into Iraq, it’s like going in the old days from Romania into West Germany. It’s just stark how damaging that regime has been to that country to say nothing of the mass graves of people that were killed by that regime.
The plans do exist, but it will be the Iraqi people that will have to build back their country and reconstruct their country. A reference was made earlier to nation-building. I suppose it’s mostly semantics, but I think it’s a little heady and arrogant to think that you can build another people’s nation. I think the Iraqi people are going to build their own nation back, and they’re going to build it in a distinctly unique Iraqi way.
Our task is to try to create an environment to get rid of that repressive regime and to try to create an environment within which
the Iraqi people can put themselves on a political and economic path towards a future and not to think that we’re going to go in there and spend the American taxpayers’ dollars, and billions of them, trying to rebuild a country in a way that fits our image because that’s just not going to happen.

Senator KENNEDY. You’re not suggesting we’re not going to be spending billions of dollars of American taxpayers.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Of course we are. Of course we will.

Chairman WARNER. Senator, the light is on. Thank you very much. I didn’t mean to interrupt you, Senator, but we have to move on.

Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Franks, I want to express my congratulations along with the others for your leadership, appreciation for your career, and for the great troops that you led, how they performed under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. They performed so well.

When we think about what has occurred, a lot has occurred. We could have as a Nation stayed right here and tried to build up defenses at home, or we could have gone after the bases of terrorism that were plainly out there in the world. The President made a decision—this Congress supported him overwhelmingly—to eliminate those bases. We saw those in Afghanistan. You’ve liberated that country, and we’ve removed al Qaeda and the Taliban from authority there. We’ve now liberated the people of Iraq, and our prayer is and our hope is that we can help them establish their own nation. It certainly will be, as the Secretary said, ultimately their challenge to do that.

I wanted to ask you a couple of things. One of the concerns I have is how quickly we can bring on the Iraqi indigenous army that will be a servant of the Iraqi army and the Iraqi nation. How difficult is that? Do we need more resources? What can we do to speed along the creation of a healthy, well-trained army that serves the people of Iraq?

General FRANKS. Sir, first thank you for your kind remarks. We do want to bring the Iraqi national army online as quickly as we can. I think the vision is for an order of magnitude of 12,000 or so within the initial 12 months, if my memory serves. We want to have as much Iraqi army as we can, but we want a professional Iraqi army when we build it. What I mean by that is we want the training of the troopers from the bottom up to be done in a very competent way, and we have reinforced for ourselves in Afghanistan that we know how to do that, that we can do it.

But what we also learned in Afghanistan is that we do not want to create an army that has no place to go. We want to be sure that the Iraqis themselves bring along the infrastructure for the positioning of those forces as we bring them online, and at the same time we want to be sure that we work from the top down to create a Ministry of Defense and the operational level for an army that can manage them. I would like, Senator Sessions, to see this thing, the Iraqi army, come along as fast as we can actually control it and put it to work. I am satisfied with the pace that Walt Slocombe intends to work on that project right now, sir.

[Supplemental information follows:]
One of the CPA's major initiatives is to establish a new Iraqi army that will help provide for the military defense of the country and, as units become operational, will assume military security duties now being performed by coalition forces. The old Iraqi military forces disintegrated with the collapse of organized military resistance; virtually all installations and equipment that were not destroyed in the fighting were looted or stolen.

The CPA formally disbanded the former Iraqi military and security services and is currently working on the creation of a new Iraqi army. The current plan is to build a force of about 40,000 members (roughly 3 divisions) over 2 years as the nucleus of the national armed forces of the new Iraq. The first battalion begins training this month. The Vinnell Corporation, a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman, was awarded the contract to conduct the day-to-day training under the supervision of a coalition military assistance training team, which will be commanded by a U.S. major general and will include officers from the United Kingdom, Spain, and other coalition countries. This team is leading the effort, including finalizing recruiting, vetting, and training activities.

It is our intention to build an Iraqi army that has officers who possess true leadership skills, takes on traditional army roles such as border defense, and is truly a national force that represents the demographics of the country. It is our goal to have the first battalion in October, 9 battalions by August 2004 and an additional 27 battalions by mid-2005 for a total force of 40,000 troops.

Senator Sessions. General Franks, if you would just briefly share with us the status of our commitment to containing Saddam Hussein before this war started, those resources that we’ve been committing for over a decade to keeping it in a box, including patrolling the Persian Gulf, air flights, and Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch. We think about the cost of the operation and the effort to help Iraq rebuild, but tell us about the costs we were incurring annually?

General Franks. Sir, if you think about Operation Northern Watch, Operation Southern Watch, and the maritime intercept operations that were ongoing between 1992 and 2002, I can’t give you with precision the math associated with that. The number that I would give you would probably be—Operations Northern Watch, Southern Watch, $1 to $2 billion a year, depending on the year. That does not factor what it costs coalition members like the State of Kuwait, for example, who paid in assistance in-kind perhaps another $200 to $250 million a year during the course of containment.

Sir, I attempt to justify nothing with respect to containment, and I make no comment about whether that was good or bad. From an operational perspective, our job was to control the skies over Iraq and to ensure as best we could in doing that the sanctity, if you will, of 786, 787, and Security Council resolutions, some 17 of them that the Secretary mentioned earlier. That was the policy. That’s what our forces worked to do for that period of time. I will offer the operational fact, sir, that, at this time, those operations are no longer necessary. In fact, there are no longer jets and air defense systems shooting at American men and women and then returning to the sanctity of bases belonging to the regime.

Senator Sessions. I think that’s an important thing for us to consider. I always felt that in fact the Gulf War never ended, that there was an agreed-upon peace that was not holding. To me something had to be done, and I think those actions have been taken.

General Franks. Sir, if I could insert one thing in response to a comment Senator Kennedy made a minute ago about troops having been committed a year and in many cases being very tired. I believe, having been there, sir, that troops are tired at two levels. One is a tactical level where one becomes tired, and the other is
a level where people do not believe in what they're doing. I believe members of this committee who recently visited our troops on the ground in Iraq found none of the latter, and it's my job and our job to be sure that we provide the tactical relief, rest, and quality of life for our troops as best we can. But my comment is that I believe that our young men and women who are deployed in Iraq, working in a very dangerous circumstance, believe in their responsibilities and are doing them remarkably well. I'm sorry, sir, please.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First, General Franks, let me add my commendation for an extraordinary career in the Army and service to the Nation. I think you know that we're all sincerely appreciative, but I think you also know that the appreciation of the soldiers that you've served with, their respect is much more, I think, gratifying to you, and it should be. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Secretary, I had the privilege to go with Chairman Warner and Senator Levin to Iraq, and I had a chance to meet lots of soldiers. I would agree with General Franks. They are proud of what they're doing, they will do it as long as we ask them to do it, but they had one question of me I couldn't answer, particularly the troops in my home State, the 115th Military Police Company, the 119th Military Police Company, the 118th Military Policy Battalion—when are we coming home?

The answer to that question relies upon having troops available to replace these troops because, as you've both indicated, our footprint in Iraq will be significant. This burden falls particularly with impact upon the Army. Today the Army has 370,000 troops in 120 countries. In Iraq, the footprint has the 3rd ID, the 4th ID, the 1st Armored Division, 101st Airborne, 173rd Airborne Brigade, the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd, the 2nd Light Cavalry Squadron, and the 3rd Army Cavalry Squadron, in addition five National Guard enhanced battalions in Iraq and two in Kuwait. That's a significant footprint.

In Afghanistan, shortly we'll have almost two full brigades with the 10th Mountain Division to take the mission. In the Balkans, we have the 34th National Guard Division from Kansas. In Kosovo, we have the 1st Infantry Division, which will be replaced by the 28th National Pennsylvania National Guard Division. We have forces in Korea, the 2nd ID, we have contingency forces in the United States, and there are other areas in the world that are dangerous.

In addition to that, the normal doctrine years ago when I was serving was for every deployed unit you had to have a 3-to-1 ratio. That I think has changed to 5-to-1 now because we also have preparation, exercise phases, training center missions, reintegration, and then the actual mission. We are dangerously stretched thin in the Army and other Services also.

I know the answer to this will be multinational forces will take the place of these troops in Iraq, but so far we've been unsuccessful in arranging those forces. It seems to me that we have to be prepared to increase our Army, number of brigades in our Army, or to activate National Guard Divisions, and we have to make that de-
cision soon because of the training these troops will need before they’re deployed.

Mr. Secretary, are you planning or prepared to increase the size of the Army to meet these commitments?

Secretary Rumsfeld. First, I would say that I talked to General Abizaid this morning, and he is sensitive to the importance of troops knowing what the rotation plan will be so they have some degree of certainty in their lives. He’s sensitive to the importance of the quality of their lives, whether they get mail and those types of things, and is determined to continue the fine work that General Franks has done and, now that we’ve completed major combat operation in Iraq, begin to get greater clarity as to exactly how that rotation will take place.

It would be incorrect to say that we expect that international forces will replace all of U.S. forces. We don’t anticipate that. We’re going to have to replace U.S. forces with U.S. forces in large measure, and we understand that. The Joint Staff and the Services have been asked to make a presentation to me; the request went back many weeks. They have been working in the tank with the Services, and they expect to bring that forward sometime this month, in which case they’ll get clarity as to what people can expect in terms of their circumstances.

Then the question comes, do you need to increase force levels, particularly in the Army or Marine Corps, the ground forces, I would add? The answer to that question is if we believe that’s the case, obviously we would come to Congress and make that request. At the moment we are attempting to bring down our force commitments in a number of countries in the world. We have proposals with respect to what’s taking place in Bosnia and Kosovo, which are through NATO, in together and out together, as you’re familiar. We have been working to try to reduce our force in the Sinai. We have discussions going on with Korea as to how we can have our footprint there arranged. We have discussions taking place in Europe.

We also have, I’m told by Dr. Chu—and I don’t know if we’ve ever gotten the exact list—but something in the neighborhood of 300,000 men and women in uniform doing jobs that aren’t for men and women in uniform. They’re doing civilian functions, and they shouldn’t be doing civilian functions. So we have to continue to try to manage the Department in a way that we make the best use of people who serve in the armed services.

If, at some point, it looks as though what you suggest might be the case turns out to be the case, clearly we will come to Congress and ask for an increase, but at the moment we do not see that that’s the case.

Senator Reed. Let me address the question a different way. Since September 11, 42,000 National Guard troops have been on active duty. That’s before Operation Iraqi Freedom. Doesn’t that suggest to you that there is a need for an increase in Active Forces?

Secretary Rumsfeld. First, I don’t have the number at my fingertips, and I regret that, but there are a very large number of Guard and Reserve that have been on duty that are volunteers. They are individuals who were not called up. They’re not required, but a non-trivial fraction of the total have been individuals who
were asked, “Would you like to come on and serve on an active service for a period?” and they have said, “Yes.”

So it is. You’re right, except that within that mix of numbers of Reserve and Guard, a lot of them are there because they want to be, not because they’re being forced to be.

Senator Reed. You need them, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Rumsfeld. You bet we need them.

Senator Reed. Then the question goes, if you need that many National Guardsman over an extended period of time, stretching back over a year, doesn’t that suggest that the Active Forces have to be increased?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course, we have increased the Active Forces. We have a provision Congress passed and the President has taken advantage of the 2 percent plus, and under an emergency even the 2 percent ceiling is not a requirement for us, and we are in some cases above the 2 percent. The force levels have increased during this period, you’re quite right.

Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, my time has expired, but I think this issue of the size of our forces is rapidly approaching a decision point. From what I’ve seen from the extended deployment of our Army particularly, and I agree the Marine Corps also, and I would suspect the Navy and the Air Force could make similar cases, is that we’re reaching the point where we have to go ahead and bite the bullet and put more forces in our force structure so we can rotate those troops who are doing so well and serving so proudly out of Iraq.

Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Collins.

Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Franks, let me begin my remarks by joining my colleagues in thanking you for a truly outstanding career. Our country owes you an enormous debt of gratitude, and I join my colleagues in saluting you.

Mr. Secretary, I was honored to be part of the Armed Services Committee trip to Iraq recently, and, like my colleagues, I had the opportunity to talk with many of our troops. I want to echo the impressions that Senator Reed received in his conversations. To a person I found that our troops’ morale was very high despite the harsh conditions under which they’re serving and despite the dangers to which they are exposed.

But I also found a weariness among our troops, and over and over I heard, “I’m proud of our mission, I helped free the Iraqi people, but when do I get to go home?” I think it is important that we communicate to the men and women who are serving so that they will have some expectations. One soldier from Maine told me, “I can deal with another 3 months, I can deal with another 6 months, but I just need to know.” I would encourage you—and I know that General Abizaid is working on this—to share that information with our men and women in uniform as quickly as it is available so there can be some certainty.

I would also ask you, Mr. Secretary, to project for us what you see as the percentage mix of American troops versus troops from other countries as part of the coalition forces by the end of the year. Obviously, we can rotate troops home more quickly if we can replace them not just with American troops, but with troops from
other countries. Could you give us some rough estimate of what you see as the percentages of American troops versus troops from other countries as part of the coalition forces by the end of the year?

Secretary Rumsfeld. As General Franks and I have indicated, we now have about 148,000 troops there. We're hoping to have the non-coalition forces up to something like, at the moment we're looking at, 30,000 sometime late summer, early fall. We intend to have the Iraqi army grow as rapidly as we can do so. There's actually a fourth source of forces, and that's contract forces for site protection to the extent that that might make sense. That's roughly what it looks like to me going out toward the end of the year.

Senator Collins. You mentioned, Mr. Secretary, in your statement that Iraqis no longer wake up every morning and fear wondering whether this will be the day that the death squads come. Indeed, all of us feel a great pride in freeing the Iraqi people from the breathtaking brutality of Saddam Hussein and his regime. Nevertheless, what I found during the trip is that there still is very much a climate of fear in Iraq. There's the fear that the Americans and the coalition forces will go home too soon and that Saddam Hussein will return to power.

I was struck by a conversation that we had with an Iraqi who was running an oil refinery in Basra whom, whenever we asked any question that involved Saddam Hussein, would not respond. How important is it that we capture or kill Saddam Hussein, and how high a priority is it for the coalition forces?

Secretary Rumsfeld. The President has said, and we all agree, that the United States and the coalition forces are committed to stay as long as is necessary and not a day longer. So the idea that we would leave too soon and Saddam Hussein would come back is not a realistic concern that anyone ought to have. Saddam Hussein is not coming back.

How important is it that he be caught or killed and that closure come to that? It would be helpful. There's no question that this individual has created such fear on the part of the Iraqi people because of his brutality and the numbers of tens of thousands of people he's killed, and the willingness to use chemical weapons on his own people and on his neighbors, that there is a fear not just in Iraq but in the region that we have to be certain that he is not going to be around.

I think that that will take some time. People don't get over that fear immediately. But he's not coming back. He's through. That regime is over.

Senator Collins. You and I know that. You and I know for certain that Saddam Hussein is not coming back, but I am convinced that the fear that Saddam will come back is impeding our progress in reconstructing Iraq. Prior to this trip, I would have said that as long as he's out of power, that's sufficient. I came back with a very different feeling, a determination that unless we capture or kill Saddam that our progress is going to be far slower.

Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree with that, and I will say, however, that in answer to your question of what's the priority, the priority is very high, as I'm sure you were briefed.

Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to add to the record here my pride of the troops as well as the leadership of General Franks. What you’ve done out there with our troops is extraordinary, and I want to say thank you, and I want to praise you for all of that. I also want to commend Secretary Rumsfeld for all he has done with us as well as with you and the troops during this period.

I want to continue to pursue the question of when are we coming home because, although I didn’t make the trip to Iraq, I’ve heard it at home as well. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned in response to Senator Warner’s questions that CENTCOM is developing a rotational plan for forces in Iraq, and it appears at this point that we don’t have detailed answers about that. My question to you is, when do you expect that plan to be completed and will it include troop rotations in Afghanistan as well? I would appreciate it if you could brief me on that plan when completed as well. As ranking member of the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, I am deeply interested in this issue.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Army will be contacting your office soon to provide that briefing.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, CENTCOM’s responsibility is to communicate the force requirements that they believe they need to do the job that they’ve been asked to do. The Joint Staff and the Services then work with them to determine what kinds of forces and what kinds of rotation schedules make the most sense. That work is currently being done, it’s going to be presented to me this week, and I expect to be able to make some decisions.

The certainty question is clear to the extent we can get that work done, tell them as we’ve now told the 3rd Infantry Division what their certainty is, to the extent we can do that with the other forces there. I should add, however, we have redeployed over 140,000 troops already including some Army, including some Marines, some ground forces, as well as Navy and Air Force.

Senator AKAKA. In regard to this deployment, Mr. Secretary, I recently visited some of our fine marines at Camp Lejeune and our great soldiers at Fort Bragg. Many of them had just returned from deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we spent a lot of time just talking about what they will need to reconstitute their forces after returning home. In past operations it has sometimes taken units up to a year or more to fully regain high levels of readiness. Do you expect these timelines to be about the same after Operation Iraqi Freedom? If not, how do you expect to accelerate them, and how much additional funding will this require?

Secretary RUMSFELD. We’ve asked for some funds already for reconstitution, and I don’t doubt for a minute that we’ll have to ask for additional funds for reconstitution. It’s important that that be done. It varies from unit to unit how much time it takes and how much the cost is, but that work is all being done by the Joint Staff. The other thing that happens, however, is that the combatant commanders around the world look at what took place in CENTCOM, in Afghanistan and Iraq, and they begin to change their judgments
about the numbers of precision weapons they would use, for example, relative to dumb bombs, and how they might conduct their campaigns. As they involve their contingency plans, they then alter their needs, and those kinds of things will be coming in the budget that's being prepared at the present time for presentation next year.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Secretary, I'm quite concerned about the problem, and I'm shifting to dirty bombs. The General Accounting Office recently completed a report for me on the availability worldwide of radioactive material that can be used to construct such a weapon. Because of this, the looting of the Iraqi nuclear sites has been a matter of great concern. I thank you for letting an International Atomic Energy Agency survey team into Iraq. I would appreciate it if you could provide me an update, either now or for the record, as to whether all the missing radioactive sealed sources at the sites have been accounted for.

General FRANKS. Sir, would you repeat the last part of the question, just the last phrase, sir. I missed the last part.

Secretary RUMSFELD. It's the percentage of materials.

Senator AKAKA. I would appreciate it if you could update either now or for the record as to whether or not all the missing radioactive sealed sources at the sites have been accounted for.

General FRANKS. We actually are very pleased with the results of that and having brought the IAEA in to check the work of our troops and some people who had been working that very hard. Senator, I will provide for the record the exact math, but the amount of yellowcake specifically is what we're talking about from two different sites that was unaccounted for at the end of bringing all this together actually is infinitesimal. Virtually all of the drums and the substances, the substance yellowcake, were recovered, and I will give you with precision the math on it.

[The information referred to follows:]

In the International Atomic Energy Agency report summarizing the results of its recent survey inside Iraq, the agency estimates that fewer than 10 kilograms of yellowcake material remains unaccounted for, and believes this small amount is not a proliferation concern.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again let me, General Franks, echo what Senator Akaka and Senator Collins and all the rest of us have said about the great contribution you've made.

In the very beginning of this hearing, Senator Levin mentioned that weapons of mass destruction are now back in the press. I feel compelled to share at least my feelings—and I think of some others up here—that they've never been out of the press. It's so obvious that this whole notion that weapons of mass destruction they claim that are not found, therefore we should not have gone in and done what we have done is nothing but an absurd media-driven diversionary tactic. I've never seen the likes of it before. What these people are saying is that if we didn't find these, therefore we should not have gone in.

First of all, if it hadn't been for the media, I think that would have been put to bed way back in the beginning when they found
11 chemical rockets with the capability—and I'm recalling this from memory now—of 140 liters of some type of chemical. As Richard Butler said, 140 liters of VX could kill a million people. Now to me, we know there are 15,000 more like that out there but we found those. That should have put it to sleep.

General Franks, when you said three decades of bloody regime, that's an understatement, and we all know that, and I know that Secretary Rumsfeld has tried to articulate how bad that really has been. But what you folks have done is end this monstrous bloody regime. When you stop and think and envision if we hadn't gone in, thinking about how in 1 day, 3,000 women and children tortured to death using nerve gas—and I understand that's one of the most painful ways of dying—to envision 317 kids under 12 years old lined up and executed. I recall right after 1991 when the war was supposed to have been over, I think 2 days before that we had the first freedom flight into Kuwait. Alexander Haig was on it. There were about six of us on this flight. I recall going to the headquarters that Saddam Hussein had used and walking through the torture chambers and seeing the body parts and running into a little boy that had his ear cut off because he had a picture of an American flag that was in his pocket.

This fear, and now when I think about how gratifying it must be to the two of you to know, the two of you more than anyone else and the team that you put together, that you have brought this bloodiest regime since Adolf Hitler to a close. It has to be gratifying that people can now have weddings, women can now walk the streets without worrying about being summarily dragged out and raped and tortured to death, parents can send their kids out without fear that they'll have their tongues cut out. So I just would say that, General Franks, as you cap off a career, I don't think you ever in your wildest imagination would have thought that you'd be doing such a liberation the way that you have done.

There are a lot of things that we'd like to talk about and you've covered quite a few, but I would say this. Before I came in 1994, I was on the House Armed Services Committee and all I heard all those years was jointness, jointness, jointness. We're going to have to get to jointness and get rid of this mentality of each one out there doing his own thing. We've come so far. I think that the effort in Iraq and I might also say the effort in Afghanistan is the greatest achievement in jointness. I'd like to have your response, either one of you, to your impression as to where we can go, how much further of this effort of jointness we can go and with the successes that we enjoyed.

Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll start. You're right. The pattern in the past has been for the Services to try to do their own thing and deconflict as best as possible. What took place in Iraq was the most joint warfighting operation I believe in the history of the world. I think the team, Lieutenant General McKiernan, Lieutenant General Moseley, Vice Admiral Keating, Major General Dale Dailey, General Franks and his deputies, Lieutenant General Mike DeLong, and General Abizaid, have set a pattern for the future that will dramatically leverage our capabilities for the future.

General Franks. Sir, the only thing that I would add to that is I think Afghanistan initially and Iraq later gave us some insight
into what joint can be. I think that expansion of that across all our Services, all our combatant commands, is the future. I think that that would fall under probably what the Secretary would call transformation. I actually believe that the notion of this level of jointness is transformational. I think Joint Forces Command, Admiral Ed Giambastiani, my buddy down at Norfolk, will be and has the support of the Secretary to bring this level of jointness all across our uniformed Services in the years ahead.

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that very much. Let me get on record as saying I agree with much of what Senator Reed said concerning a concern on end strength and—you've heard me say this before—it's something that I hope you'll keep your minds open. I know your close communications with the Reserve component will convince you as it's convinced me and many of the members of this panel that there has to be relief. I hope that will continue to stay open.

I had occasion to be in Vicenza the other day and talk to some of those in the 173rd, about half of those who were deployed up to northern Iraq. That was a contingency that we didn't know that would be there. We thought we'd be able to come down through Turkey and it wouldn't be necessary, but they are there. This is one of the minor things that we have learned and this hearing is supposed to be about lessons we have learned. Since my time is expired I'm going to ask you to give this response in the record.

I know that in Vicenza when the 173rd was to deploy they went to Aviano. Fortunately, we had good weather so that the staging area, which is out in the open, could accommodate them, which it would not have if it had been rainy weather. They're now looking at some military construction projects that are going to ensure that. That's just one of many, many lessons I'm sure we've learned. I'd like to get as many of these examples so that we and this committee, as we look at military construction in the future and at our activities in the future, will be able to isolate these and get your impression on all of these things that now we realize maybe should have been done before but we should address as a result of our experiences.

[The information referred to follows:]

Military construction (MILCON) projects support the Commander's strategic vision of how we will operate in our AOR and from our HQ in Tampa. MILCON projects are continuously evaluated and assessed to ensure they continue to meet the requirements and intent of the mission as set by the Commander. Presently, we are reviewing and updating the Commander's strategy and long-term vision for the current AOR. MILCON projects are but one example of the support needed to ensure that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are able to carry out their missions. Currently we have 13 MILCON projects in our AOR: 5 in Bahrain, 2 in Oman, 3 in Qatar, 1 in UAE, and 2 in Uzbekistan for a total dollar figure of $333 million. The following list includes 10 planned/future MILCON projects. Funding targets listed are estimates in some cases, and only reflect MILCON appropriations. In most cases, additional funds from outside MILCON appropriations are required to complete the projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Title/Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Coalition Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF 180) Joint Operations Center (JOC) at Bagram Air Base</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Purpose of the CJTF 180 JOC project at Bagram is to replace the existing JOC facility that is approaching the end of its life cycle due to fair wear and tear and exposure to extreme conditions. The current JOC for CJTF 180, a Corps level command, is comprised of tents of various quality and dimensions. Due to the harsh environmental conditions at Bagram (cold winters with snow, hot summers, intense UV radiation affects due to the altitude, frequent and sustained winds in excess of 40 knots, excessive noise caused by high winds, and excessive dust) the tents need to be replaced.

2. Bahrain    Headquarters Expansion (Operations Center Phase III) at Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain

Purpose of the Headquarters Expansion project at NSA Bahrain is to expand the NSA operations center and incorporate a Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station (NCTS) satellite communications (SATCOM) expansion.

3. Djibouti    Airfield Supplement 2 at Camp LeMonier (Widen Taxiway and Add Ramp Space)

Purpose of the Airfield Supplement 2 project at Camp LeMonier is to allow the Camp LeMonier taxiway to accommodate C-5 and C-17 aircraft and allow ramp space necessary to park aircraft. The current taxiway will not accommodate aircraft larger than a C-130.

4. Jordan    Airlift Apron at “classified Air Base”

Purpose of the Airlift Apron project is to provide aircraft parking apron space for tactical and strategic airlift.

5. Oman    Tanker Truck Offloading Facility at “classified Air Base”

Purpose of the Tanker Truck Offloading Facility project at “classified Air Base” is to provide fuel off-load facilities away from main operations and cantonment areas.

6. Qatar    Construct Contingency Ramp at “classified Air Base”

Purpose of the Construct Contingency Ramp project at “classified Air Base” is to provide additional contingency aircraft parking capability.

7. Qatar    War Readiness Material (WRM) Storage at “classified Air Base”

Purpose of the WRM Storage project at “classified Air Base” is to provide additional storage capability of WRM assets.

8. UAE    Flight Line Facilities at “classified Air Base”

Purpose of the Flight Line Facilities project at “classified Air Base” is to accommodate aircraft operations support.

9. UAE    Refueling Ramp and Hydrant System at “classified Air Base”

Purpose of the Refueling Ramp and Hydrant System project at “classified Air Base” is to support aircraft operations.

10. Tampa, FL    Add to and Upgrade CENTCOM HQ

Purpose is to consolidate CENTCOM staff and coalition personnel into an adequately sized, efficiently configured, modern headquarters facility. Project includes increased space for additional personnel, renovation of the current building, a consolidated coalition facility, and upgraded antiterrorism/force protection systems. Project is spread over 3 fiscal years.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. What is our situation, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the votes on the floor?

Chairman WARNER. Yes, the vote has commenced, and at the conclusion of your questioning, we will adjourn.

Senator BYRD. Would you prefer to go now?

Chairman WARNER. I think we would like to have you complete your questions.
Senator BYRD. All right. Mr. Secretary, what is the current monthly spend rate to support our ongoing military operations in Iraq?

Secretary RUMSFELD. It’s a combination of appropriated funds as you, sir, know better than any plus the expenditures of funds that are taking place from Iraqi frozen assets, from Iraqi seized assets, and from U.N./Iraqi assets under the Oil for Food program. I can certainly have Dr. Zakheim come up and provide a very precise answer as to what’s currently being spent.

[The information referred to follows:]

The projected monthly average obligation rate for the remainder of the fiscal year for military operations in Iraq is about $3.9 billion and about $900 million for the global war on terrorism to include Afghanistan. These costs are financed with DOD appropriated funding.

The following are the type of funds available to finance relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

Resources as of June 30, 2003:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Available</th>
<th>Allocated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Appropriated Funds:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support to the Coalition Provisional Authority (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-DOD Resources (State, USAID, Treasury)</td>
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<td>Other Assets:</td>
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<td>Iraq State Owned—Vested Assets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq State Owned—Seized Assets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development Fund for Iraq (DFI)</td>
<td>1,071.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Data as of June 30, 2003; source is the Section 1506 report submitted to Congress on July 14, 2003.
2 Held by the Office of Management and Budget.
3 Established by the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1483 (2003). Revenue generated from the sale of oil and other Iraqi commodities will be deposited in the DFI along with any frozen Iraqi assets provided by other countries.

Senator BYRD. Do you recall a figure? Can you give us an estimate? I’ve heard a figure of $1.5 billion a month.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I would not want to venture a guess and be wrong, sir.

Senator BYRD. Somebody ought to know.

Secretary RUMSFELD. They do know, and we’d be happy to brief you on it.

Senator BYRD. I’d like to know now. [Laughter.]

Secretary RUMSFELD. We’d have to adjourn, and I’d have to get on the phone with Dov Zakheim.

Senator BYRD. We’ll be back won’t we, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman WARNER. Yes, we will, Senator.

Senator BYRD. Along with that, how much are we spending a month to support U.S. military forces in Iraq?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The expenditures for Iraq are in a variety of categories. You might include the salaries of the people that are serving there. Those salaries would be paid whether they’re serving there or they’re back in Germany or back in the United States. It might include funds as I indicated that are coming from other sources. It might include funds for reconstitution that are currently being spent but for spending on restocks of bombs, for example, and weapons that were used during the conflict.
It is not a question that can be posed and then answered with a single number. I wish I were able to do that, but it falls into a variety of different baskets under our appropriated funds.

Senator Byrd. I understand that, Mr. Chairman, but I've been around here going on 51 years. I'm on the Appropriations Committee and we want to fund our military certainly and meet the needs, but there must be some figure, some amount, that we can cite as an amount that we're spending monthly in Afghanistan and the same with respect to Iraq.

Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm sure there is, and we'll get it for you.

Senator Byrd. That'll be another figure we'll hope to have after when we return, Mr. Chairman, I would hope.

Secretary Rumsfeld. Not likely—that fast?

Senator Byrd. You like to have figures fast when it comes to appropriating money.

Secretary Rumsfeld. That's for sure.

Senator Byrd. I would like to know on behalf of the Appropriations Committee and Congress how much we're spending.

Secretary Rumsfeld. We'll try and get it for you.

Senator Byrd. I hear and I read that it's something like $3 to $3.5 billion a month to support U.S. military forces in Iraq. Now where are these figures coming from that we read about and that we in the Appropriations Committee are told from time to time?

Chairman Warner. Mr. Byrd, the warning for 7 minutes has stopped. We'll recess now and when we come back, you'll be immediately recognized to finish those questions.

Senator Byrd. Very well. Thank you.

Chairman Warner. We're recessed.

[Recess.]

Chairman Warner. We will continue the hearing. Senator Byrd will be recognized following Senator Roberts.

Senator Roberts.

Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Franks, from a Kansas Aggie to an Oklahoma Aggie, you've done pretty darn well.

General Franks. Thank you, sir.

Senator Roberts. We truly appreciate your service and I echo all the comments of my colleagues in that regard.

Mr. Secretary and General Franks, I want to tell you two accounts from the chairman's CODEL over to Iraq of which I was privileged to be a member, and in which I was trying to determine the intelligence capabilities since I am the chairman of the Intelligence Committee.

One is in regards to a massive grave site near Hillah where there is a site about the size of a football field. It's my understanding there are about a hundred of these grave sites around the country and that we have, I think, been involved with this task force justice on the accountability and the forensic job that remains on about 14 and that will go up to about 32, so it's a massive job. It was with anguish and despair that our delegation stood on a mound of sand and overlooked this pit, half of which has been smoothed over, that contained 15,000 Iraqis. They brought them in by truck, three a day, and in this pit would disgorge these people and they would rape them, they would torture them, they would
shoot them. If somebody from the neighboring villages would try to rescue the kids, why they were simply buried alive. Three thousand were excavated when Saddam fell. One thousand were identified, and then finally one of the clerics simply declared the whole ground holy ground.

I stood there, and I wondered about man's inhumanity against man. Saddam Hussein is a Hitler, a Pol Pot, a Stalin, and it gets back to Senator Collins' comment in regards to the palpable fear on the part of Iraqis. I underestimated that. I know that you have made the statement that he is not coming back, we have made the statement he's not coming back, and by damn he's not coming back. But I don't think the Iraqis fully comprehend that or fully grasp it or fully believe it.

That is why I think having been through that and having learned that he basically executed at least 300,000, probably closer to 1,200,000, of his own people and things as graphic as I have described that we must capture or kill him—must capture or kill him. I know Task Force 20, which you can't really talk much about, if at all, has that duty, has that mission. You say it is a priority. I would urge you, sir, to say that it is the highest level priority because I don't think that we're going to get the cooperation that we need and the full partnership and have Iraqis enjoy liberty and democracy until we kill or capture Saddam Hussein and his two sons.

I'm not asking you to comment on that. You've already responded to it, but I feel very strongly about that. The next account that I'd like to bring to your attention is that there is a Colonel A.J. Kessel who is operating out of the Saddam palace or headquarters there. He is working with the Minister of Culture who is an Italian. Colonel Kessel got the bright idea that there might be an opportunity to reconstitute the Iraqi symphony of all things—after 30 years there had been no symphony—and was able to do so by relocating and locating people who played in the symphony and obviously some replacements because it has been 30 years. They were in evening dress that was provided. Some of the members of the symphony found their instruments that had been hidden for 30 years, and those that did not have them were provided, and they had a symphony. It was a packed house. Tom Korologos was at that performance and Tom did a magnificent job over there in Iraq.

The last piece they played, Mr. Secretary, was the Iraqi national anthem, prior to Saddam Hussein. When they did that, the crowd stood, applauded, and cried tears of joy. There is Iraqi nationalism right below the surface that can flourish, and there is hope for Iraq. Now I've not asked you a question. Those are just two observations that I would make: one, anguish and despair on what that man did to brutalize his country and the need to bring him, either killed or captured, and his two sons to justice, so that we can cooperate with Iraqis because they have great fear. You've heard the tapes. You've heard the pamphlets. Anybody that is cooperating lives in fear that he could come back.

Then on the other hand, here we have a symphony of all things that is going to be a regular performance, by the way, from now on. God bless Colonel Kessel, who, by the way, goes by the name of Buttons. So Buttons did his job, and that is one of the projects, over 1,500 projects, that we are conducting in that country that is
the untold story because the media doesn’t cover it. I wish that symphony had been on CNN or, for that matter, any other network. It was very impressive. If you have any comment, I’d be happy to have you comment.

Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Roberts, I agree with you fully on the importance of capturing and bringing to justice Saddam Hussein, his sons, and the senior Iraqi leadership—just as we’ve been working to try to bring the senior al Qaeda and Taliban leadership. We will continue to do it. We recognize the problem it poses. The story you’ve just recounted on the symphony is an important one, and I thank you for doing it.

Senator Roberts. One hour and 28 minutes ago, it was announced over Associated Press we have now captured number 23 on the U.S. most wanted list and number 29. A high-ranking member of the Baath party regional command and the former Interior Minister were taken into custody. The noose draws tighter, and that’s good news.

My time is expired, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Yes, Mr. Secretary, you wish to respond?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, I was asked repeatedly by Senator Levin and others, including members of the press, about whether or not the United States has made an explicit, specific detailed request to NATO for NATO’s participation. I did not know the answer as to what precisely had been done. It turns out that my deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, did travel to Brussels in December 2002, and, at least in that one instance, he made a specific request to the North Atlantic Council to consider contributions that the Alliance could make to post-war stability in Iraq, and that’s the answer to the questions. There may have been other requests, which I suspect there have been through the Department of State.

General Franks. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add a bit to what the Secretary said also. I know the committee is aware and, Mr. Chairman, I know you’re aware certainly that since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan we have had a French delegation with us in our coalition which, as I mentioned earlier, now stands at 63 nations, and that delegation has been with us throughout the entirety of both operations in Afghanistan as well as the operation in Iraq.

Chairman Warner. General, when Senators Levin and I, Rockefeller and Roberts were in-country there, we met with the French officers who were actively participating in the training command there in Afghanistan. As a follow up, Senator Levin, the Secretary addressed your NATO question. I would simply add, Mr. Secretary, that I feel that such additional information—you said, “There could well have been other contacts”—I would hope you’d provide for the record. But, Senator, you might wish to initiate and then we go to Senator Byrd.

Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me just repeat it so that Senator Levin is aware of it. The answer to the question of whether or not we’ve made a specific request to NATO to assist in Iraq is we did. Secretary Wolfowitz was sent over there in December of last year. He did make a specific request. I’m sure there were other specific requests that I’m not aware of either.

Senator Levin. None since the war?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have no idea. I’ll be happy to run around and try to find out the answer to that but I do know there was this one specific one. There may have been some before, there may have been some since.

Senator Levin. If we could get a complete list, if there’s more than one, it would be helpful.

[The information referred to follows:]

On December 4, 2002, in Brussels, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz outlined potential Alliance roles in support of coalition operations in Iraq to the North Atlantic Council. These included:

- Force protection for U.S. forces in light of the increased terrorist threat;
- Backfill for forces deployed in NATO operations;
- Security measures against the increased terrorist threat to shipping in the eastern Mediterranean;
- Support for the defense of Turkey; and
- Support for the post-conflict stabilization, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction.

During a visit to the North Atlantic Council on February 27, 2003, Under Secretary of State Grossman reminded the Members of Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz's presentation, noting that NATO had to decide how it would participate in Iraq. On April 3, 2003, Secretary Powell again reiterated to the Members the U.S. desire for a NATO role in post-conflict stabilization, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction. On at least six occasions between February through May 2003 the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, Ambassador Burns, reminded the North Atlantic Council in permanent session of the U.S. requests for support.

Based on these requests, NATO supported the coalition in the lead-up to and during the Iraq conflict by helping protect U.S. forces on their soil; ensuring the safety of shipping in international waters by carrying out surface, submarine, and maritime air patrols and surveillance activities, including intelligence collection, in the Eastern Mediterranean and escorting civilian ships through the Straits of Gibraltar; and supporting the defense of Turkey through deployment of chemical-biological defense units, AWACs planes, and Patriot batteries.

Following consultations with the U.S., Poland on May 14, 2003, formally requested that the Alliance provide support to the Polish-led multinational division in the stabilization force for Iraq. Ambassador Burns actively supported this request and worked to achieve consensus in the North Atlantic Council for this proposal on May 21, 2003. The agreed support will include:

- Intelligence;
- Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES)
- Topographical and satellite imagery products
- NATO country handbooks and intelligence databases
- Logistics expertise and assistance with logistical planning;
- Movement coordination;
- Communications support;
- CIS Satellite Communications and crypto support (mobile communication module, transportable satellite ground terminal and LAN connectivity equipment)
- BICES equipment (secure phone lines and terminals)
- Force generation.

Chairman Warner. Senator Byrd.

Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now if we may continue with my questions concerning the amounts of spend out monies that we’re expending in Afghanistan and in Iraq monthly, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Byrd, I’ve been given a number by Dov Zakheim that says that in the fiscal year 2003 supplemental there are funds for the United States Government appropriated to spend in connection with Iraq—that between January 2003 and projected through September 2003 will average something in the neighborhood of $3.9 billion spend rate per month.
Senator Byrd. In Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. In Iraq.
Senator Byrd. $3.9 billion.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Right.
Senator Byrd. Okay. Now what has the spend out rate been for Afghanistan?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The estimate that I was given is that it's something in the neighborhood of $700 million per month.
Senator Byrd. $700 million. That doesn't square with the press reports that I read which, as I indicated earlier, amounted to about $1.5 billion.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The 1.5 number that I've seen is a number that people used 4 or 5 months ago as the projected figure for Operation Enduring Freedom, the non-Iraq portion of the global war on terror. I don't know what you saw in the press, but I have seen that same number in that connection.
Senator Byrd. But you say that the amount that you're stating before this committee today is around $700 million?
Secretary Rumsfeld. For Afghanistan.
Senator Byrd. For Afghanistan, per month.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. The numbers that I've been given by Dr. Zakheim of other funds is they anticipate $1.7 billion from frozen assets to be expended by the end of this fiscal year and $800 million in seized assets to be expended by the end of this fiscal year. Then there are some additional contributions from various other countries that are going on and the last time I saw that, it was a number of something like $2.3 billion committed by other nations to assist with the work that's going on in Iraq.

Senator Byrd. Now it would seem then that we're spending about five times as much per month, a little over five times as much per month in Iraq as we're spending in Afghanistan, $700 million as against $3.9 billion, I'd say 5½ times. Yet the numbers there are we have 10,000 men, I believe, in Afghanistan, do we not, and something like 150,000 in Iraq, 15 times as many men in Iraq but we're only spending 5 times as much money.

Anyhow, do you believe that the spending rate for Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to remain at the current rate for the next year?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't know what the administration intends to propose to Congress by way of funding for that, and that's something that is funded out of a whole host of different portions of your Appropriations Committee, AID, Department of State, Department of Defense, and others. What OMB and the President will recommend at some point in the future I just don't know, sir.

Senator Byrd. All right. I see my time is up but let me ask this follow-up question which my line of questions leads me to. When do you expect to see another supplemental submitted to Congress and how large a supplemental should we expect it to be?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am under the impression that the Office of Management and Budget is looking at a supplemental, but I do not know when they would decide to submit it or what the amounts would be either from my department or from other departments because they've not made any recommendations to the President on that to my knowledge.
Senator Byrd. But you have some recommendations to make to OMB?

Secretary Rumsfeld. At some point we will, yes sir.

Senator Byrd. Do you have any idea how much that's going to be?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't. I'm sure that Dr. Zakheim has some preliminary work that he's done with the Services in terms of reconstitution, and we can try to provide some of that to you personally if you wish, but I don't have anything at my fingertips.

Senator Byrd. I'll be pursuing this as a member of the Appropriations Committee, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Byrd.

Senator Dayton.

Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I might say, Mr. Secretary, if you need reinforcements, having been on this trip with the chairman and the ranking member, their ages are classified but they are in extraordinary shape and energy and enthusiasm. It was a privilege to be on the trip with you, both of you.

Chairman Warner. Glad to have you with us, Senator. Thank you.

Senator Dayton. Mr. Secretary, General Franks, I salute both of you for your extraordinary success and military victory in Iraq. Mr. Secretary, you were very complimentary of the General and those who worked with him, but from the published reports I've read you were integrally involved as well, and I think you should share in that. The strategy that you developed and the success—I remember saying beforehand the optimistic but realistic scenario would be to be 3 weeks, but that was very optimistic and I believe it was 3 weeks exactly from the day that you crossed the border to the day that you occupied Baghdad. I think that's an extraordinary success, and I salute both of you for it.

I'm not qualified to draw lessons. I'm not experienced in military affairs, but it would seem to me that at least a similarity in both Afghanistan and Iraq is the dispersal of opposing forces rather than a surrender. I don't believe in either case there was a formal surrender. As General Sanchez told us in our meeting in Iraq, the Iraqi forces dissolved near the end of the advance because of the extraordinary lethality and precision of our firepower and the overwhelming force. This suggests to me that with the follow-through and the continuation of that after, there was a risk of prematurely declaring the victory has been won and the hostilities are over when in fact this continuation of the need to track down people, the principals as well as those who have not really in their own minds surrendered but are just running away to fight another day. That, in fact, leaves our troops even more exposed often than perhaps in the initial stage of combat. That's what seems is occurring now, which is coming as a surprise to the American public who thought that this matter had been declared over and, in fact, was.

That leads me again, Mr. Secretary, to my concern about the follow-through in terms of winning the country after winning the war. As to the progress that you cite, we witnessed some of that with the economic development of the country. The social rehabilitation, which I totally agree with you, sir, is not ultimately the responsibility of the American taxpayer or anyone else in the world but
The Iraqi citizens themselves. At this point in time it seems that there’s a direct correlation between the progress that’s being made in the non-military areas of let’s call it social and economic rehabilitation and the feelings of the populus toward the American forces and even the number of attacks on them.

I guess in my view, and I don’t think this is necessarily the Department of Defense—and we were not briefed and obviously we didn’t see everything—but I’m not aware of the same magnitude of non-military projects and initiatives being undertaken that are going to make any kind of difference in the standard of living in that society. I fear without that kind of parallel effort to the military that our forces are going to be in a holding pattern trying to preserve this military victory but not able to be extricated because this unrest is going to continue.

Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I agree completely that it takes progress on all three fronts: the political, the security, and the economic, and no one is likely to get very far out in front of the other. In the last analysis, either people will be willing to vote with their dollars, and I don’t mean U.S. dollars but dinars or whatever, and invest in that country, and people will come back to that country because they have confidence in it and because it has a well-educated population. It has a population that has energy, it has resources in oil, and it’s not a poor country like Afghanistan. It has wealth, and there isn’t any reason it can’t be as prosperous and as successful as its neighbors in the Gulf States.

I think it’s going to take some time, it’s going to take some effort, and that in the end it will happen, it will improve, and we’ll see progress.

Senator Dayton. I would assert that that question is about when are our troops going to be able to come home, that the speed with which we show some visible signs of improvement across the country, socially and economically, and obviously we’re not going to see those through to completion, those will take decades. To get things started, however, is going to be a major determinant in how quickly our troops are going to be able to come home. I don’t see, and we were not informed, in my recollection, of a magnitude of effort and initiative, which I think is going to have to be U.S.-started anyway, or it’s not going to happen in the near term, to get people to start to have faith in the future and also to look at us more favorably.

I would commend the report in The New York Times this morning which talks about a city, Abu Ghraib, and it talks about the absence of power there. The head of the council there that’s been elected said, “Conditions have never been worse. We’ve never been through such a long bad period.” I’m sure from our experience too there are parts of the country where there is more progress being made, there are parts where progress is not being made, but I would just again say that I don’t see, didn’t see an organized and well-financed non-military initiatives to parallel and build upon the success that was accomplished militarily.

[The information referred to follows:]
On a recent morning, the Abu Ghraib town council was hearing the usual litany of complaints, offering the usual mix of hope and, mostly, impotence in return. Overhead, a fan turned, but the air did not.

The constituents’ woes came down to the essentials. They had no power, and thus no clean water — could they get generators? They had no security — could they get weapons permits?

If anyone could help them, it should have been the man at the center of the scene, Dari Hassan al-Dari. In April, he was selected by the local tribes to lead Iraq’s first freely formed town council after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Since then, he has sat at a desk in a white robe and headdress, in a room lined with men in tribal robes and Western dress all looking to him for answers. He has not had many.

Mr. Dari could do nothing for the man who, lacking electricity, stayed up all night fanning a sick child, nothing for the 5-year-old child who was left helpless by unexploded ordnance that detonated, a sight that caused him to weep. He could do nothing for the multitude complaining of cars, weapons or relatives taken by American forces, other than give their names to the Americans. He could do nothing for those lacking drinking water or waiting for food rations.

“Who do you tell the people — have more patience?” he asked rhetorically. “Tell whom?”

If America had natural allies in Iraq, they are men like Mr. Dari. He attended the American Jesuit school in Baghdad, then university in Frankfurt. He has lived in Europe and speaks excellent English. He maintained his independence throughout Mr. Hussein’s rule, shunning the minimal blandishments with which Mr. Hussein bought the loyalty of many tribal sheiks.

A part-time farmer and businessman, he is a member of the visible Zobaa tribe, which his brother leads. He welcomed the Americans and has worked closely with their military commanders in his area.

So the impatience creeping into his voice and the frustration lining his handsome face made poorly for the fate of the American-led occupation here — even if American officials succeed in drawing Iraqis into a new national leadership. There is no indication that Mr. Dari, who is 54, would turn on the Americans. He is simply losing faith in them.

“Conditions have never been worse,” he said bluntly. “We’ve never been through such a long bad period.”

Abu Ghraib — a largely agricultural area just west of Baghdad that is also home to Iraq’s most notorious prison — has had only one or three hours of power a day in recent weeks. Drinking water cannot be pumped without electricity, so people take water from dirty canals.

The food ration system that functioned smoothly under Saddam Hussein is breaking down, out here at least. Trucks leave Baghdad laden with food, but it mysteriously get off-loaded at markets along the way.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I believe you said that the war was declared over. No one I know in any position of responsibility declared the war over. What the President said was that major combat operations are completed and now we have to go after the remnants of the regime, and that it will take a good deal of time.

Secretary Dayton. I stand corrected. That’s a better description of what was said.

Secretary Rumsfeld. Second, the war started on March 19, major combat was announced as having ended on May 1, and today is July 9. That’s less than 4 months. Think what took place in Germany after World War II in 4 years. Think what took place in Japan in years. I think we have to get some perspective on this and
put this in context and think back in history. This is tough stuff. This is hard work. This takes time. As Senator Roberts said, fear is a powerful thing, and those people were repressed and fearful. Thirty years of a Stalinist type regime suffocating the creativity and energy and brilliance of so many of those Iraqi people has been a devastating thing on that country. We need to have some patience.

Senator DAYTON. All right. I would agree with you. How much patience do the American people whose sons and daughters are over there now need to have? Do they need to realistically expect that those forces are going to need to be there for 2 years, 3 years?

Chairman WARNER. Senator, we have to move on to other Senators. A number are waiting. If you want to make a quick response——

Senator DAYTON. My time is up, could I have an answer to that question?

Chairman WARNER. Yes. I was just about to say if you wish to——

Secretary RUMSFELD. We responded to that question earlier. The answer is that the people who are over there now will be coming home. They will be rotated home. The ones that are there are not going to stay there for 4 or 5 years.

Senator DAYTON. The question, sir, was whether American forces have to be there for 2 years or 3 years.

Secretary RUMSFELD. The answer to that question is we don’t know. Nobody knows the answer to that question, how long it will take. It will take some time, and I think we all believe that it’s important that it be done, that’s it important we get other countries to participate in it. We intend to see it through, and it’s going to take some patience. When it’s done, it’s going to be darn well worth having done.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. General Franks, I want to add my appreciation for your dedicated service and sacrifice for this Nation and your outstanding leadership. I’ll reserve any praise for Secretary Rumsfeld until he retires. [Laughter.]

Please accept the thanks of all America on behalf of your outstanding leadership. Mr. Secretary, here’s what you’re hearing today from the committee. A survey by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press shows that 23 percent of respondents think the U.S. military effort in Iraq is going “very well,” far fewer than the 61 to 66 percent that expressed that view during the conflict. Yet at the same time a large percentage of Americans, in my view very appropriately, think that the decision to go to war was the right thing as you state.

The problem here is that Americans are unsure about the future of our involvement in Iraq. What you need to do, in my view, is give not just this committee but the American people, who hold you in the highest regard and esteem and have the greatest confidence in the President of the United States and his leadership in this conflict, the concrete plan as much as you can. In other words, how
much is it going to cost roughly and how long we expect to be there, even if it's a pessimistic scenario? Also, how many troops are probably going to be required given that there are certain variables? In other words, this whole issue of how long are they going to be there and the uncertainty of seeing the pictures of the wounded or dead American soldiers are leading to this unease, and I emphasize that's the word, "unease," not disaffection, not anger, but unease on the part of the American people.

I am convinced without a doubt that when Americans are told what the plan is for post-war Iraq, then I think you will receive overwhelming support on the part of the American people. I say in all respect and appreciation for your leadership, everywhere I go Americans want to know that. I suggest that you have probably been doing that, but probably not in a fashion that the American people either are hearing or understanding what our future is. But again I want to emphasize an overwhelming majority of American people think we did the right thing. Whether weapons of mass destruction are found or not, the overwhelming majority of Americans support this President and your leadership and that of General Franks.

But they need to be told. That's all they need, and I think by the tenor of the questions that you've gotten today, the other Senators are reflecting what they're hearing from their constituents. I hope you take that as a constructive comment, which it is intended to be.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I do. Thank you.

Senator MCCAIN. Now I'd just like to move quickly to Iran. There's reports today that there's a newly found nuclear site. There's accumulating evidence about Iran. I'd like to know your assessment of the threat, the situation, whether there's any North Korean involvement—I guess I'd like to hear a little more information about how you view this situation in this very bad neighborhood.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, as the President has indicated, the situation in Iran is roughly as follows: the U.S. Intelligence Community has assessed that they do have a nuclear weapon program. The IAEA has had uneven success in dealing with them. The United States, over successive administrations, has had discussions with Russia encouraging them to not participate in a cooperative program with them with respect to anything involving a nuclear power plant. It's estimated that the nuclear facility that they're saying they need for energy would produce less energy than the amount of gas that they burn off on an annual basis.

Senator MCCAIN. Have you seen this report this morning?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I don't know what report you're referring to.

Senator MCCAIN. "Iranian Exiles Describe Newly Found Nuclear Site." It was carried in a number of newspapers.

[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Rumsfeld. I didn’t. I have not seen anything in the press this morning. I apologize.

Senator McCain. Do you see any other North Korean connection?

Secretary Rumsfeld. There has been interaction between North Korea and Iran over a sustained period of time.

I would say one other thing. There are recent reports of Iranians moving some of their border posts along about a 25-kilometer
stretch several kilometers inside of Iraq, obviously not being respectful of Iraq's sovereignty. Certainly that is behavior that is not acceptable, and they should be staying on their own side of the border.

Senator McCaIN. What action do you think we should be taking, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I think that the President and the Department of State have been engaged in a variety of diplomatic efforts to try to persuade countries not to participate with Iran in developing their nuclear capabilities. It takes time to understand the success or lack of success of those efforts.

Senator McCain. It seems to me we may have to contemplate significantly more. I hope not, but it’s certainly disturbing news. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you again, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Bill Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, we’re looking forward to having you as a part of our Tampa civilian community and thank you added to all of the accolades here.

I would like very briefly to report to both of you what I observed since I just returned from Iraq last night. First of all, I think you have a good appointment in General Sanchez and the Secretary’s and your appointment of General Dayton specifically to go after the weapons of mass destruction and trying to find out the fate of Captain Scott Speicher, which was one of the main reasons for my trip there. I am convinced that, in fact, he does have him as a priority along with the WMD.

I went to the Hakmiyah prison. I can only describe it as a hellhole. I wanted to go there because of the cell that has the initials carved into the wall, MSS, which is the same as Michael Scott Speicher. We have no proof that that was the case. I observed the torture chamber and the refrigerated containers outside where they would put the corpses, and it all the more underscored the brutality of this regime.

Happily I noted on the way in this highly protected convoy that went to the prison that economic life was returning on the streets. There were crates of refrigerators and boxes of ovens that you could see along with the fruits and vegetables, the return on the street of economic activity. I was also very heartened to find that new evidence has been produced, which I have just shared at length with Senator Roberts—the two of us have been joined at the hip on this matter of Captain Speicher—that is classified but that gives me reason to be optimistic for the first time in several weeks that I have been pessimistic.

That doesn’t say that he’s alive, but that says that we’re beginning to get evidence that, in fact, we might be able to find out. I wanted to give you that report. At the same time, some of the frustration that you have heard here, I don’t think that there’s any reason for us to shrink from the fact that most of the leadership that briefed me while I was there thinks that we’re going to be there for a long time. Clearly, I hope we’re going to be there for a long time, because we have to be successful. It is very important in this Senator’s opinion that we have economic and political stability, and
I think that’s going to require us being there with a lot of effort for a lot of time.

In addition to Senator Byrd, I had just mentioned to you, maybe we can confirm that in addition to the 150,000 that are there that in the region there are another 80,000 that are basically supporting the 150,000, and I think that we ought to realize that when leadership was telling me that we were likely to be there 5 years, I think it may be longer. Indeed, I can't imagine us being out of Afghanistan just in 5 years, and the experience that we had in Bosnia, now we’re in the 8th year.

I don’t necessarily see that as a negative, but it’s, I think, what we ought to get on the table and understand that over the long haul we’re committed for that being a successful liberation of those people. Now it gets a lot easier if we find Saddam Hussein, dead or alive, because then a lot of this assassination that’s going on right now—and that’s what it is, it’s premeditated, it was probably planned before the war. Unfortunately one of the victims was a member of the Florida National Guard, Sunday night, doing guard duty at the university at which someone slipped up behind him, shot him in the head, and then slipped off into the crowd. That has happened five or six times along with what you see, the tactic finding where our convoys are going, putting a mine, having a remote device, detonating it on a Humvee, and that happened and is chronicled in this morning’s newspaper again.

I think we just have to screw up our courage, our determination. Finally, I might say that, Mr. Secretary, you and I have talked about the question of the morale of the troops, the question of the replacement of the troops. I have specifically raised the issue of the National Guard and the reservists and whether or not a policy change ought to be made upping the active duty roster because indeed most every soldier I talk to, and I talk to a lot of them from Florida, both at the noon hour and then later in the evening, they are pretty well under the impression that they have to stay there for a year. That’s not only the full time Army but that’s also the activated National Guard and the reservists. Of course, that brings enormous disruption in their lives, in their employers’ lives, in their families’ lives that they did not necessarily think of that.

I bring this issue up merely as a policy issue that will have to be considered here as well as by you on the question of, should we be doing this with these wonderfully trained and specially skilled reservists and National Guard men and women, or should we not be doing those kinds of tasks that are going to have to be done for the long haul in Iraq as well as Afghanistan with the active duty roster?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, very briefly, as I indicated earlier, we absolutely have to manage the force in a way that’s respectful of what the obligations are and what the expectations are. One of the things that the Department has been working on since the beginning of this conflict is how we can rebalance what we have in the Reserve and the Guard relative to what we have on active duty. We ought to have on active duty the kinds of people that are going to be needed for longer term chores or tasks which are going
to frequently come up. We can't keep calling the same people up four, five, six times. It's just not right, and the way the force was organized over the past two decades has been the way it is today, and the way it is today is that we don't have the right people in the Active Force, enough of the right people in the Active Force to do those kinds of things.

We will be coming forward with proposals in a relatively short period of time to see if we can't get the people proportion of this right.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Clinton.

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and again, General Franks, not only do I want to congratulate you on your long and distinguished career but I believe that your leadership in both Afghanistan and Iraq will likely be studied by military historians for years to come. I thank you for your service to our Nation.

This is a session on lessons learned, and I have two areas in particular that I am interested in. The first goes back to Senator Levin's early questions, Mr. Secretary, about the intelligence, and he focused in particular on the forged documents out of Niger that served as the unfortunate reference in both comments by you and the President as well as the Prime Minister in England and other officials. Senator Levin's question basically came down to how could it not have been known. In response, and I appreciate your willingness to provide specific details to respond to Senator Levin, you made a statement that the intelligence has been quite good.

I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that, as part of the lessons learned and the after-action review that I'm sure both the civilian and the military leadership are conducting, you will certainly go deeply into the question of intelligence, because it's not just with the incident concerning the alleged efforts by Iraq to obtain enriched uranium from sources in Africa. During his confirmation hearing, General Abizaid said, "[W]e had indications from intelligence that they were getting ready to distribute chemical weapons to forward Republican Guard artillery units. That's what we thought, and so we really targeted those artillery units, in particular, very, very hard."

Then he goes on to say, "So the answer to the question is, I am perplexed as to what happened, and I can't offer a reasonable explanation with regard to what has happened." Now obviously we're all grateful it didn't happen. I know the chairman and I on several occasions shared our concerns about what would happen if they were deployed, but the fact is that in this new threat environment in which we find ourselves, we are increasingly reliant on intelligence. We just heard Senator McCain refer to a report from Iranian exiles concerning some potential new nuclear site in Iran. Therefore, I think that of the lessons to be learned, that I hope we have learned, the thorough scrubbing and very careful analysis of intelligence has to be at the top of the list.

It may very well be that the American people and certainly the majority in this Congress believe we did the right thing given what we found there and given the end of the Saddam Hussein regime. But I don't think that's the answer to the question about the quality, the accuracy, and the use of intelligence. I would join in the
concerns that Senator Levin and others have expressed, not only in closed meetings, but also in public venues insofar as possible, that particularly the Department of Defense but also other agencies within our Government really make it clear what our standards for intelligence are and how we can best understand them because in a democracy that’s critical, this flow of information.

Now turning to another area of lessons, General Franks, in both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom the military we used was fundamentally different than the military that fought and won the first Gulf War. Indeed, we saw the fruits of a decade’s worth of investment in our military. The increased use of special forces, precision-guided munitions, unmanned reconnaissance, and combat air vehicles benefited from the decade’s investment.

As we look ahead to transforming our military, it seems clear that UAVs, special forces, precision-guided munitions that we invested in during the 1990s will continue to play an expanded role; yet, I think it’s also important to look at the legacy systems like the M1 Abrams tank, the A–10 Warthog ground support plane that also played a critical role in this campaign. Now in this committee we’ve debated which weapons systems are necessary in the 21st century. As a man with enormous expertise and experience in this area, what lessons have you drawn from both the Afghanistan and Iraqi campaigns about the role of legacy weapons like the M1 tank, the A–10 Warthog, and others in the transformed military that we are going to be building?

General FRANKS. Yes, ma’am. I think that about any point in the history of our country when we take a look we’re going to find the need for legacy systems. In this case, ma’am, you mentioned two of them, the A–10 Warthog and the M1A2 Abrams tank, and there are a number of others. We will find ourselves being trained and ready at any point in our history to use those legacy systems, and whatever we do tomorrow, we have to be prepared with good legacy systems.

I think the thing that we’re seeing now, the expectation that I have for the next 2 years, the next 4 years, the next 6 years is a tremendous effort in the area of transformation that will seek to maybe skip some steps in there. I think our young people, men and women in uniform, have done, Senator, a remarkable job of using very good systems, and, in Afghanistan and Iraq, we also used some systems that came about, as you said, over the past 10 years, unmanned aerial systems, to be sure, precision munitions—very powerful.

I think the transformation that our armed services are looking at now—this is out of my lane but it’s my view, it’s my opinion—seeks to figure out what we are losing by not putting more money into technologies. What are we losing by perhaps overcapitalizing legacy systems at the expense of what we may want in the future? I think I’m glad that bright people like some subordinates of Secretary Rumsfeld work such things, but I think it’ll be a little bit different in the next 3 to 10 years than it perhaps has been for us in the past 10 years, if that makes sense to you. Thank you, ma’am.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, could I make a brief comment?
Chairman Warner. Yes, of course.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Two things. First I want to give a different number than I gave earlier. I'm told now that the $700 million-a-month burn rate on Afghanistan is low, that it's actually probably $900 to $950. I suppose if we wait another hour we might get a still different number, but that's the trouble with trying to do things in real time.
Senator Clinton, I agree completely on the importance of intelligence. I was asked at my confirmation hearing what was the thing that worried me most, and I said intelligence information. It's such a big complicated world, and there are so many areas that need to be looked at today unlike the Cold War period where you could focus on the Soviet Union and develop a good deal of conviction about it. We're dealing with closed societies. We're dealing with countries that very skillfully used our advanced technologies, where they're trading those technologies. They're indeed trading denial and deception techniques among so-called rogue states.
It is something that we're focused on. We think it is enormously important, and I share your concern about it.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Rumsfeld, I only have 6 minutes here, so I'm going to try to keep my questions very short and I'd appreciate it if you could try to keep your answers fairly concise.
Let me first start with one of Senator Levin's questions earlier in the day where he talked about the breakdown in communications here, maybe between the Intelligence Community and the Oval Office and exactly how President Bush was allowed to talk about the uranium statement in the State of the Union. I'd love to get an answer from you on that, and I hope you will follow up with Senator Levin with the committee. But my question is slightly different from that, and that is, when did you know, Secretary Rumsfeld, that the reports about uranium coming out of Africa were bogus?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Within recent days, since the information started becoming available.
Senator Pryor. In other words, right after the speech you didn't know that or even before the speech, you had no knowledge of that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I've just answered the question.
Senator Pryor. Are you trying to say that in no briefing, in no documents that you had or that you were exposed to, that was never communicated to you in any way?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I didn't say that. I see hundreds and hundreds of pieces of paper a day and is it conceivable that something was in a document? It's conceivable. Do I recall hearing anything or reading anything like that?
[The information referred to follows:]
Shortly after Mr. El Baradei of the IAEA raised questions publicly in a report to the United Nations Security Council on March 7, I asked my CIA briefer what the facts were. After checking, he tells me that I was advised on March 11 that the CIA believed El Baradei could be correct in his suspicions regarding the validity of the
documents in question. A question similar to the one you asked me came up on “Meet the Press” on July 13, and I clarified the situation.

Secretary RUMSFELD. The answer is, as I’ve given it, no.

Senator PRYOR. The next question is on the lessons learned front. We find ourselves in Iraq right now, post-war Iraq, if we can call it that. Based on your experience there and your wide-ranging experience during your career, is there something that we need to do starting now and into the future to provide our troops with more training or different kinds of equipment for circumstances like Iraq, where they come in there and they’re an occupying force, hopefully for not very long, but still at this point an occupying force? Do we need to do things differently? Do we need to do things better?

Secretary RUMSFELD. We think of ourselves as a liberating force, not an occupying force. We think of the role there as not permanent, and, General Franks, maybe you’d be the best one to respond to the question.

General FRANKS. Sir, I think about the national training center at Ft. Irwin, California. I think about Twentynine Palms, the Marine Corps training center. I think about Red Flag and Green Flag Air Force training centers. I think about what has been done during the period of time Senator Clinton mentioned a minute ago, perhaps over the last 10 years, in fact in this case perhaps over the last 15 years, the evolution of things rather than sudden discovery.

Senator, I’ll give you an answer that is precisely to that same point. For the last 10 to 15 years because of our experiences in other places where we were conducting security and stability operations, tremendous energy has gone into the preparation of the United States Marines, the United States Army troopers, airmen and sailors, especially SEALs, for example, to be able to work in an environment of security and stability operations.

But, Senator, the point that I would make is no amount of training and no amount of preparation is going to make it very likely that within a period of 2 months or 4 months or 8 months we’re going to move our troops into a population of 25 million people who have been abused to the extent that the Iraqis have been abused over more than 3 decades and cause there to be no fractious behavior and cause these groups that we’re having all the difficulties with to go away.

So, sir, if I could, I would say again I believe our troops are both trained and ready and very capable and doing, by the way, an excellent job in this very tough environment. Sorry for the long answer.

Senator PRYOR. I don’t disagree with anything you’re saying. In fact, I agree with everything. I just hope that as we look at Iraq and understand it and understand our mission there that we continue to improve down the road and that’s really my main point.

One thing on intelligence, and I don’t want to dwell on weapons of mass destruction, but there was a number, if I recall, of news reports and statements made by the administration and others that Iraq was in possession of several dozen—if I remember the numbers right—Scud missiles before we went into Iraq. The last I’ve heard, and you correct me if I’m wrong, Secretary Rumsfeld, to date there have been zero found.
Secretary RUMSFELD. My recollection that I'm sure is imperfect but I recall hearing that there were 10 or 12 Scud missiles that were unaccounted for, up to two dozen.

Senator Pryor. Two dozen accounted for, and they've not been found yet then, is that what you mean by that?

Secretary RUMSFELD. No, there have been none found.

Senator Pryor. Another thing, Secretary Rumsfeld, if I may, in March on ABC News you indicated that you felt like you knew where Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were and you gave a specific general area, if that's a correct phrase, that they're generally around Tikrit and Baghdad and some to the east, south, west, and north. Knowing what you know now, do you think that was an accurate statement at the time?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Of course it was an accurate statement at the time. It's what I believed.

Senator Pryor. I understand you believed it at the time, but knowing what you know now, do you think your belief was accurate?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I have no reason to believe it's inaccurate. I was asked at a time when our forces were south of Baghdad in the war, in conflict. I was asked why we hadn't found any weapons of mass destruction yet while the war was still going on. I allowed as how that the area from Baghdad to the north and the west——

Senator Pryor. Probably that orange or brown area on that map over there?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Probably. Was an area that probably was more likely to have the locations of these so-called suspect WMD sites. How many hundreds were there?

General Franks. I think just short of 1,000, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUMSFELD. They were all suspect, and there was plenty of time for people to know that they were suspect. As I recall, a large majority of them are in the area that I've just described. Is that right, General?

General Franks. Sir, that's right, and there's one additional piece to it and that is confirming the negative, whether we're talking about up to two dozen Scuds that the Secretary mentioned a minute ago. If we know that coming out of the 1991 Gulf War there are up to two dozen of these systems that have not been found and we know that the United Nations' team has spent 11, 12 years looking for them and have not been able to confirm that the Iraqis don't have them, then we go look for them just as America would expect us to do. We go look for them. Sir, that is the case with these nearly 1,000 sites that the Secretary mentioned. We must believe that the problems are there until we confirm the negative that they're not there, and so that's the process that has been ongoing.

Senator Pryor. I understand the difficulty in that, and I'm out of time, but I would like to ask this one last question. There's been some confusion in the press reports, et cetera, about who actually is in charge of searching for the weapons of mass destruction. Secretary Rumsfeld, I'd like to hear who is in charge of searching for those weapons.

Secretary RUMSFELD. There is no confusion about it that I know of. The facts are these. The capabilities on the ground in Iraq es-
sentially are in the Department of Defense—large numbers, helicopters, the ability to move people around and do things. So the Department of Defense was asked to form the Iraqi Survey Group, which we did. General Dayton is in charge of it.

It was pretty clear to me that the Department of Defense did not have the same level of skill that the Intelligence Community did and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), so I sat down with George Tenet, the Director of CIA, and we discussed the importance, not of running around using helicopters and people on the ground to look for weapons of mass destruction, but the importance of gathering intelligence through interrogations, figuring out who might know what, who could we offer amnesty to, who could we offer a reward to, and go through that process that is quite a different thing than looking under every tree for WMD.

He assigned a man named David Kay to work with General Dayton, and the judgment portion of it is being made by David Kay and his cell back in the United States that is a multi-agency cell. The actual physically doing of things, looking for people, looking for sites is being done under the authority of General Dayton. General Dayton reports to me. George Tenet and I are as close as you can be on this subject. The people on the ground are as close as you can be on this subject, and my impression is that the people that have been put in charge are doing a good job and handling it well.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I'm sure my colleague, Senator Levin, would join me—we met with Dr. Kay. He was part of the team Ambassador Bremer assembled to brief us. Seated right there was General Dayton, and we got clearly the understanding that the chain of command was as you described. Therefore, there is clarity, in my judgment, as to that reporting chain through Bremer and Kay up to you with parallel to the Central Intelligence Agency. Thank you for that.

Senator Ben Nelson.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I know, General, you're never going to get tired of the accolades even though they keep getting heaped on. I want to certainly add mine to those of my colleagues and to extend my appreciation to the Secretary as well for not only taking our questions today but for sticking with this very important task that's before us, and that is, of course, working with the issue about end strength, with rotation, with deployment, and the obvious questions that we’re going to be facing in the future dealing with retention as well as recruitment because that's going to be extremely important to the future of our military.

I think you need to do as you are in the whole area of transformation because obviously the force of tomorrow will only maybe slightly resemble the force of today. This is all before you, and I commend you in advance for your work on this.

Regarding the post-war planning, earlier this year I discussed with former Army Secretary White the concerns that I had regarding the number of military police and the number of reservists who had been called up to active duty as a result. While I recognize that this is a liberating force, there’s no question but for a period of time that we'll be looked at and probably serve as an occupying force until stability is established.
In Iraq I was told by a group of elected officials in Kirkuk, just recently elected group, that they thought that the looting had really undercut the effort toward democracy in certain parts of Iraq and that while folks who had not had any experience with democracy were wondering if this was what democracy was going to be about. They don't have outside experiences, no other experience to call upon and so their first taste of democracy may not have been as sweet as we had hoped, ultimately as sweet as we hope that it will be.

What I'm leading up to is, as we look toward other efforts in the world today that we may be called upon to restore peace, to establish democracy, are we thinking about the force that will obviously involve immediately upon the end of combat operations the installation of peacekeeping that consists of law and order military police far more than our own military forces? Are we thinking about that in terms of transformation because it appears that with the lack of staffing that we may have had in that area that it may have gotten away from us in Iraq, but we may be faced with that in the next effort that may be just down the road? Are we building toward that, and will that be part of transformation?

I guess it's unfair to ask you, General Franks, on the way out, but do you have any thoughts of it, and then, of course, Secretary Rumsfeld, I'd love to have your thoughts too.

General Franks. Sir, your comment about looting, I think, is right. Unfortunately, looting actually was a tool used by the regime before we ever undertook this so some of these criminal elements—and I'm not sure what the number is, I think the Secretary mentioned a number earlier in the testimony.

Senator Ben Nelson. It's 100,000 I've heard.

General Franks. Perhaps 100,000 let out of jail, and so the looting by those people as well as other disgruntled people, for sure affects the taste that the Iraqis have in their mouths.

In terms of expectation, sir, I'm not at all sure that I believe that the planning or execution of the post of the initial 60 days or so—and that's how long we've been looking at this, the initial 60 days or so of post-major combat operations—can be characterized as, "Well, you weren't quite with it." Actually, what we'll do, I suspect, and the Secretary will comment on this, is as the Services think through what the structure needs to be for our Armed Forces over the next 10, 20 years, as part of transformation, I believe that sort of study will be undertaken to decide do we have the balance about right. Are we about right in Active component, Reserve component? Are we about right in the numbers of armor troopers, in the numbers of military policemen?

Sir, that's the best that I can do.

Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.

Secretary Rumsfeld. There's nothing I can add. It clearly is important that as soon as possible at the end of a conflict that you have the ability to assert control over an area. It is also impossible to do. You cannot go from a warfighting circumstance in 1 minute and have a whole lot of forces decide not to fight you, as they did from Baghdad north, and blend into the countryside and think that you have the ability in 1 hour from a powerful warfighting force into a stabilization force capable of guarding every hospital, every
school, every museum, every suspect weapons site in a country the size of California. You can't do it.

Senator Ben Nelson. But is there a period of time that in the planning process you could isolate it down to say that it's something that you should be aiming for within 2 weeks, 7 days, or is there a time frame that you can narrow it down to?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely and they did that.

General Franks. Sir, the comment that I would make is that when you plan a war or an operation with a mission that says remove a regime, you recognize that—and, in fact, the Secretary includes in his statement—some half-dozen or so things that can go wrong. As a planner, what one does is take a look at the things that can go wrong and try to put some scope around how long this operation will take because if we can figure out about how long it's going to take and about what size force in terms of the numbers of tanks and aircraft and so forth we need, then we can figure out how long we have in order to get the sort of force, Senator, that you're mentioning loaded and get it on the ground so that it's Johnny-on-the-spot and ready to do some work.

Senator Ben Nelson. That's exactly why I was asking Secretary White if he thought we had the skill sets—sufficient staffing and support—necessary to be able to move and be able to do that in advance of the occurrence.

General Franks. Sir, actually in this case we couldn't do that. I make no defensive comment about this. We'll let history reflect whatever it chooses to reflect. But I can tell you that there is a direct trade-off between the size force built and the amount of deception and surprise one achieves. One more day, 1 more week, 1 more hour, 1 more month to build additional forces which we would all applaud now would have resulted in a totally different war than the one we saw.

Senator Ben Nelson. The problem with trying to deal with lessons learned is that there's always an element of criticism that's a part of it. When it's not intentional to be critical, if you're not critical, you don't learn the lesson.

General Franks. Sir, I agree with that.

Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Chairman Warner. Senator, I indicated to the General that as this committee continues to complete its reports on the operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and by no means in my judgment are either operation at that point where we do an after-action report because action is taking place, the General has offered to return in his civilian capacity to take further questions.

Yes, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm going to have to excuse myself. This has gone considerably longer than I had expected.

Chairman Warner. I recognize that, and I would like to ask of you if you can provide just a brief few minutes in closed session in SH–219 next door. We want to have one or two questions on the WMD program, and then you'll be free to go. We thank you. This has almost been a 4-hour public open discussion of all issues relating to these important deployments of our troops.

Thank you very much. I'd like to put in today's record a Washington Post article, April 2, 2003, by a former Marine Corps Colo-
nel, Gary Anderson. I was hoping to address it. Time doesn’t permit. We are adjourned.

[The information referred to follows:]
Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LINDSEY O. GRAHAM

UTILIZATION OF GUARD AND RESERVE UNITS

1. Senator Graham, Secretary Rumsfeld, I have received several complaints regarding Guard and Reserve personnel stationed in Iraq lacking missions; being underutilized; and, when used, assigned to duties for which they have not been trained. Some of this has been because of delays in getting their equipment over to them in a timely manner. Can you discuss this in more detail and specifically speak to the 151st Signal Battalion, 122nd Engineer Battalion, and the 3rd Infantry Division?

Secretary Rumsfeld. The general practice for unit deployments is for passengers to arrive by airlift 7 to 10 days prior to unit cargo arrival by sealift. This permits the passengers to arrive, perform necessary inprocessing, acclimatize personnel to the environment, and take necessary logistical actions to receive the cargo at the seaport of debarkation.

In order to move a unit’s equipment by the most efficient and cost effective means—sealift, the movement requirements must be submitted for contract actions well in advance of projected arrival into the area of operations (AOR). Transit times from continental United States to the CENTCOM AOR average about 30 days. These long lead times present unique deployment challenges, especially to Reserve and National Guard Forces, which must undergo mobilization and training activities stateside in preparation for deployment. Synchronizing completion of these activities as far in advance as the sealift requirements’ arrival is not an exact science and occasionally the goal of passenger arrival 7 to 10 days before sealift cargo cannot be achieved. Occasionally, these units will complete mobilization activities earlier than projected. Rather than keep the forces stateside, with no real mission, the operational commander requests the forces to deploy when complete mobilization. This is what happened to the first two units in question (151st Signal Battalion, 122nd Engineer Battalion, and the 3rd Infantry Division).

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While these units may not be capable of performing their assigned tasks immediately without their cargo, they are capable of performing important base support and security missions until their cargo arrives. CENTCOM and the force providers realize this is not the ideal situation and make every attempt to synchronize passengers arriving via airlift with their unit equipment arriving by sealift.

LIVING CONDITIONS FOR TROOPS IN IRAQ

2. Senator Graham, Secretary Rumsfeld, I have also heard from concerned family members regarding the shortage of drinking water and slow mail delivery for our troops in Iraq. Please discuss any problems that have occurred and what has been done or will be done to help in these areas.
Secretary Rumsfeld. With regard to drinking water, theater requirements are four bottles per soldier per day. Water is procured in Kuwait and Turkey and moved by a combination of military and contractor trucks to bases throughout Iraq. Convoy security and force protection requirements can upset or delay deliveries. Dedicated escorts for convoy operations have improved pushes to northern Iraq by 100 percent—only 2 days from Kuwait to 4th ID. Staffs at all levels manage the program. Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) reports on hand balance of theater bottled water in Kuwait as 12 days of supply (at 4 bottles per soldier per day). Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) reports 2 to 5 days of supply at the forward units in Iraq. Units report no shortages and the situation continues to stabilize.

Concerning slow mail delivery, current average transit time for letters and parcels is 12–15 days, down from 13–18 days. Current trend is decreasing as transportation routes are optimized.

GUARD AND RESERVE UNITS ROTATION AND DEPARTURE DATES

3. Senator Graham. Secretary Rumsfeld, in accordance to military guidelines and protocols, please provide me with an update on expected rotation and departure dates for South Carolina Guard and Reserve units.

Secretary Rumsfeld. The policy for Army units currently in-theater is that they will remain there for one year, unless conditions change to allow their earlier release. This policy was established to ensure our ability to successfully prosecute the military mission, while providing our members as much security as possible, which is enhanced by the proficiency and confidence generated through stability and continuity of units. We will continue to promote judicious and prudent use of our National Guard and Reserve Forces. Attached is a roster of South Carolina Guard and Reserve units that are mobilized indicating mobilization date and tentative demobilization date.
### STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA - RESERVE COMPONENTS MOBILIZED/DEMOBILIZED

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TOTAL ARNG MOBILIZED: 2328

### TOTAL ARNG DEMOBILIZED/MOBILIZED

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TOTAL ARNG DEMOBILIZED: 2328

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| ANG | 341 AIR TRAFFIC CTRL SQ | MUSCROSS AIR | SC | 10 | UNAVAILABLE | Mar-02 |
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| ANG | 344 AIR TRAFFIC CTRL SQ | MUSCROSS AIR | SC | 1 | UNAVAILABLE | Jul-02 |
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**STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA - RESERVE COMPONENTS MOBILIZED**

**OPERATION Noble Eagle**

**OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM**

**OPERATION IRAQ FREEDOM**
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**STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA - RESERVE COMPONENTS MOBILIZED/DEPLOYED**

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**OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE ENDURING FREEDOM**
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

FAMILY SUPPORT SERVICES

4. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Rumsfeld, one of the military components I don't want us to forget are our military families. They too are a key to readiness, and I am very encouraged by the reports and briefings I have received about the Marine Corps' OneSource family assistance pilot program. For about the price of a fast food lunch this program delivers an integrated and comprehensive family support program that both maximizes military services and integrates community-based programs to a Marine Corps family for 1 year.

The beneficiary satisfaction is really encouraging, and this program is working especially well for our Marine Corps active duty families as well as Marine Corps reservists who don't necessarily live near bases or other service members for support when deployed. The Marines are rightfully excited about OneSource, and I think once the word gets out on this program, you're going to be getting a lot of calls from
other Members of Congress wanting the Department of Defense to get this program out to everyone.

I want to know if based on the encouraging success of OneSource during one of the most stressful periods for our military families, is the Department considering expanding the pilot program so more of our service members and their families can take advantage of this good news program?

Secretary Rumsfeld. We, too, have been extremely pleased with the success of the OneSource program. This program offers service members and their families, from any location in the world, 24 hours, 7 days a week access to a professional counselor via a toll-free telephone line, the Internet, and e-mail. The program offers the service in more than 130 languages. The Department has already expanded this program to all Special Operations Forces and to several installations in the European Command. The Army implements this program for active duty and Reserve members this summer, and in the fall of this year the program will be expanded further to include all Navy active duty and Reserve members. This program will be a boon for reservists and their families who are often far removed from military installation support services.

5. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, what can we do to help make this program available to more of our military families?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I appreciate your support for the quality of life of our military members and their families. The military family lives with a high level of stress not only because of frequent deployments that place the service member/parent/spouse in harm’s way, but also because of frequent moves, disruptions in the military spouse’s employment, and the challenges created by children changing schools. The OneSource program is a primary means of support to families dealing with these challenges, especially the two-thirds who live off-base and the 60 percent with family responsibilities. Our service members have strong family values and high aspirations and expectations for their quality of life. To that end, the Department, in its new social compact, has entered into a written commitment to improve life in the military, underwrite family support programs, and work in partnership with families to accomplish the military mission. The OneSource program leverages the power of public-private partnerships and technology to deliver services. The Department appreciates your continued support to deliver support services to military members and their families, wherever they are in the world.

AIR WAR

6. Senator Kennedy. General Franks, I was tremendously impressed with the complexity of the air war—1,800 aircraft, over 40,000 sorties, and only 7 aircraft lost due to enemy fire. This kind of success does not come without incredible coordination. What command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) lessons can we take from Operation Iraqi Freedom?

Secretary Rumsfeld. In support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, we planned, deployed, and integrated the most complex theater air control system in history. This complex C4ISR architecture provided our Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) with a redundant and sustainable command and control system and the ability to effectively meet all objectives within a Joint, Combined, and Coalition Force environment. We successfully integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in support of our Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) campaign, streamlined and decentralized the command and control (C2) in support of our Counter-Theater Ballistic Missile campaign, successfully integrated the Special Operations Forces, and were able to provide persistent ISR over the entire battlespace enabling real-time surveillance, targeting, and cross-cueing in support of the Combined Forces Land Component Commander.

The many valuable lessons learned from OIF are being formally documented and coordinated between the components and Services at this time. This in itself is a complex undertaking. However, we are gaining valuable insights into systems interoperability requirements, the balance required between network centric systems, strategic and tactical communications requirements, and those areas requiring improvement in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

We have also seen the value of expanding command and control roles of assets such as the E-3 AWACS into non-standard C2 roles supporting time sensitive targeting (TST) and support to our Special Operations Forces, as well as the value of forward stationing C2 and ISR assets to enhance the support to ground forces in a dynamic battlefield environment. The integration of unmanned aerial vehicles and
their video feeds into our C^4ISR architecture and the use of new C^2 applications in the decisionmaking process were key elements in our ability to prosecute emerging TSTs. Additionally, we are validating the existing requirements for advanced datalink capabilities to connect sensor and shooter platforms and the requirement for the development of courses to better train and integrate the ISR planning through tasking and execution cycle. Our ability to fully integrate our coalition partners including systems, networks, training, and exercises is also being highlighted.

The design and implementation of the complex C^4ISR architecture developed and executed during OIF is best described as an overwhelming success story. While we will certainly identify areas needing improvement, it is believed that these improvements or changes required in systems, doctrine, and TTP are on the margins of our current C^4ISR capabilities and not at the core.

PATRIOT MISSILE EVALUATION

7. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Rumsfeld, I understand that you have conducted an evaluation of the performance of the Patriot missile's performance during Operation Iraqi Freedom. We are very interested in the findings of this evaluation. The Patriot missile system is very important to our military as well as our allies. There is concern over the incident involving the Royal Air Force's Tornado jet and what role the Patriot missile played as opposed to human error in that regrettable accident. Can you share with us the Department's findings on Patriot's performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom?

Secretary RUMSFELD. On 18 June, the Department briefed the Senate Armed Services Committee professional staff members on Patriot tactical ballistic missile performance during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Copies of the briefing were provided to the staffers. Unfortunately, at this time, neither the combatant commander nor the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense has completed their investigations. Anticipate these investigations being completed in the near future.

Any information dealing with fratricide must first be released by the combatant commander involved and briefed to Congress. Until that time, it is premature to release any further information on this issue.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENT

8. Senator BYRD. Secretary Rumsfeld, the mobilization of National Guard and Reserve units has hit the States very hard. When floods hit West Virginia last month, the West Virginia National Guard was unable to send out its engineers to respond to the crisis. Every one of those engineering units has been deployed for Federal duty. If summer rains cause more floods and mudslides, my State will have to wait for engineers from other States to arrive, or rely on expensive contractors to do the work that would have been done by the men and women of units like the 459th Engineer Company, the 219th Engineer Company, and the 1092nd Engineer Battalion. Is anything being done to relieve the strain on the State missions of the National Guard because of these deployments to Iraq and elsewhere?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I signed out a letter July the 9th to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretaries of Defense directing them to rebalance the forces. In that letter I enumerated three principal objectives that I wanted to achieve:

• Structure Active and Reserve Forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve, and structure forces to limit involuntary mobilization to not more than 1 year every 6 years.
• Establish a more rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements; ensuring force structure is appropriately designed.
• Make the mobilization and demobilization process more efficient.

I leved actions that I expect to be completed, and an aggressive set of milestones for the responses. I believe this action will indeed relieve the strain on our National Guard and Reserve units. I assure you that I am as concerned as you are and will strive to ensure the continued judicious and prudent use of our valuable Guard and Reserve Forces.

9. Senator BYRD. Secretary Rumsfeld, will National Guard units under high demand for State duty be deployed back to the United States on a priority basis?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Units that have deployed for operations overseas have initially been mobilized for up to 1 year, contingent upon the needs of the combatant
commander. The policy for Army units currently in-theater is that they will remain there for 1 year, unless conditions change to allow their earlier release. This policy was established to ensure our ability to successfully prosecute the military mission, while providing our members as much security as possible, which is enhanced by the proficiency and confidence generated through stability and continuity of units. We will continue to promote judicious and prudent use of our National Guard and Reserve Forces.

COSTS FOR VARIOUS MILITARY OPERATIONS

10. Senator BYRD. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the total amount of funds spent in fiscal year 2002 for the global war on terrorism, Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom?

Secretary RUMSFELD.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>FY 2002 Total</th>
<th>FY 2003 to Date through May 2003</th>
<th>Estimated FY 2003 Total</th>
<th>January 2003 Monthly Burn Rate</th>
<th>April 2003 Monthly Burn Rate</th>
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<td>(3,189,749)</td>
<td>(64,500,000)</td>
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<td>48,555,202</td>
<td>332,720</td>
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1/ Monthly burn rates were calculated by summing the costs since October 2002 and dividing by the number of months.
2/ The global war on terrorism (GWOT) shows the sum of Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
3/ $17.3 billion was appropriated in FY 2001 in the Defense Emergency Response Fund and has been reissued in the FY 2002 for display purposes.
4/ $10,467,009 less rescission ($234.0 million) and transfer ($392.5 million) Total of $326.3 million

11. Senator BYRD. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the total amount of funds spent to date in fiscal year 2003 for the global war on terrorism, Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom?

Secretary RUMSFELD. See answer to question 10.

12. Senator BYRD. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the estimated total amount of funds that will be spent in fiscal year 2003 for the global war on terrorism, Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom?

Secretary RUMSFELD. See answer to question 10.

13. Senator BYRD. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the monthly spending rate, as of January 2003, for the global war on terrorism, Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom?

Secretary RUMSFELD. See answer to question 10.

14. Senator BYRD. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the monthly spending rate, as of April 2003, for the global war on terrorism, Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom?

Secretary RUMSFELD. See answer to question 10.

15. Senator BYRD. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the monthly spending rate, as of May 2003, for the global war on terrorism, Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom?

Secretary RUMSFELD. See answer to question 10.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN

LIVING CONDITIONS FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE

16. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld, it appears that the U.S. military is now engaged in a classic battle for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi citizenry, and it also appears that we may be losing this battle. Can you tell us what positive steps are being taken to improve the basic living conditions of the majority of the populace?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I do not agree that we are losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi citizenry. Twenty-three million Iraqis have been liberated. Despite the difficulties they face, most Iraqis are far better off today than they were 4 months ago. Iraqis do face the enormous challenge of rebuilding from 3 decades of tyranny. We must not underestimate how difficult that task will be. But we can take comfort knowing that, as we freed them from tyranny, we did not add to their burden by destroying Iraq’s infrastructure. To the contrary, we saved it.

Today, coalition forces are helping the Iraqi people rebuild and get on the path to stability and democratic self-government. We are making progress in helping Iraqis reestablish security and commerce; restore power and basic services; reopen schools and hospitals; and establish rule of law. With each passing week, more services come online; power and water are restored in more of the country; gas lines disappear; and more Iraqi police are on the streets.

Indeed, civil society is beginning to form. There are now dozens of independent newspapers sprouting up, in Baghdad and throughout the country. Town councils and associations are forming, and people are expressing opinions openly for the first time in decades.

Vendors in Baghdad are selling videotapes detailing the atrocities that took place in Saddam’s prisons. As the President put it last week, these are “the true monuments of Saddam Hussein’s rule—the mass graves, the torture chambers, the jail cells for children.”

17. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld, can you provide any kind of estimate as to when the majority of Iraq’s urban populace will enjoy better basic services than they did in prewar Iraq?

Secretary RUMSFELD. In some parts of Iraq, particularly the southern area including Basra, and the north, they are already enjoying better services, especially when you remember that Saddam used basic services as rewards or punishments.

It is true there are some Iraqis who are not better off today—those who comprised the small, elite segment of Iraqi society that benefited from the dictatorship. Such people exist in any dictatorship. They are understandably unhappy now that the regime that favored them has been removed from power.

The Coalition Provisional Authority, led by Ambassador Bremer, and coalition forces are working alongside the Iraqi people to restore basic services to levels that either match or exceed prewar capabilities as rapidly as possible. For all the difficulties in Iraq today—and there are tough challenges to be sure—it is important to keep in mind all of the problems that Iraqis do not have to overcome because of the way the war was fought. Today, Iraqis do not have to rebuild oil wells, bridges, roads, and dams that were not destroyed in the war. They do not have to bury large numbers of innocent civilians, or rebuild residential neighborhoods, because of the compassion and precision with which coalition forces fought.

18. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld, is there an orchestrated plan weaving the restoration of basic services into a larger campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi citizenry?

Secretary RUMSFELD. U.S. policy goals for the recovery of Iraq remain to establish a secure environment for the Iraqi people and the conduct of relief and recovery activities; achieve measurable improvement in the lives of the Iraqi people; maximize contributions from other countries and organizations; and prepare the Iraqis for self-government.

Security continues to be the top coalition priority. Security is the foundation for success of reconstruction efforts in Iraq and a fundamental task in our administration of Iraq. We have made significant progress since the collapse of the Iraqi regime, but substantial challenges remain.

At the same time, the Coalition Provisional Authority is working with Iraqis to get government functions operating. In Iraq, basic services have been provided by the government. The various ministries are already working to develop operating budgets, and to support activities for the remainder of this calendar year and for 2004.
Restoring dependable electrical service throughout Iraq is job number one now because, without it, nothing else works in the country. The good news is that combat damage to Iraq's electrical, water, and other key infrastructure was comparatively light at the conclusion of the war, because coalition military planners made a conscious effort to spare these structures.

19. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, who is the ultimate authority in Iraq in charge of the above?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Ambassador Bremer is the President's special envoy to Iraq and the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority. This authority includes the responsibility to oversee the use of U.S. government appropriations in Iraq, as well as Iraqi state or regime-owned property that is properly under U.S. possession and made available for use in Iraq to assist the Iraqi people and support the recovery of Iraq.

Since the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the Administrator of the CPA has had the primary responsibility for identifying requirements for relief and reconstruction in Iraq, and for overseeing, directing, and coordinating all U.S. Government programs and activities in Iraq, except those under the command of the Commander, U.S. Central Command.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

20. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, who is in charge, in theater, of the search for weapons of mass destruction?

Secretary Rumsfeld. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) is in charge of the search for weapons of mass destruction in theater. Major General Dayton commands this group and reports to the Commander, U.S. Central Command while informing the Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF–7) of ISG activities. The Director of Central Intelligence, through his special advisor to the ISG, Dr. Kay, provides strategic guidance and focus for the ISG and the search for weapons of mass destruction.

SEARCH FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN

21. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, how important is ascertaining the location and/or fate of Saddam Hussein and his sons? Who is in charge of this effort?

Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not believe that killing or capturing Saddam Hussein is necessary to win the war. Either event would certainly dishearten many of the Baathist “bitter-enders” attacking our forces, and would further damage the ability of these insurgents to intimidate the local population. But everyone should be clear that Saddam’s reign of terror is over, and regardless of his personal fate, his regime will never return to power in Iraq.

The center of gravity in this conflict is the trust and confidence of the Iraqi people. As long as we are seen to be working to rehabilitate the dilapidated Iraqi infrastructure, create a free market economy that offers hope to all Iraqis, and help the Iraqis to establish a genuinely representative government, Iraqis will continue to support us in our fight against the Baathists and the foreign jihadists. Eventually, as we realize these goals, the Iraqi people themselves will be able to defeat the insurgents in their midst who seek to return the nation to a brutal dictatorship or turn it into an extreme fundamentalist state.

ATTACKS ON U.S. PERSONNEL IN IRAQ

22. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, as attacks continue against U.S. personnel in Iraq, will forces be drawn off of the reconstruction effort and reassigned to force protection? Won’t this result in precisely what our foes in the region want: namely a failure on our part to provide for the Iraqi citizenry, and an effective recruiting tool for all those who oppose the U.S. presence in that country?

Secretary Rumsfeld. U.S. forces have not been drawn off of the reconstruction effort and reassigned to force protection. The vast majority of U.S. forces are engaged in security tasks, not reconstruction. Most of the reconstruction effort is being handled by the Coalition Provisional Authority and their contractors. While there are some U.S. forces performing reconstruction tasks, notably the civil affairs personnel and engineers, in the aggregate U.S. forces are performing these reconstruction functions while simultaneously conducting operations against former regime loyalists and terrorists. These missions are not mutually exclusive.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld, do you have indications or information that entities may be organizing the opposition to the U.S. and orchestrating recent attacks on U.S. personnel? Would you characterize these as random killings, or is the resistance being directed? By whom? Saddam Hussein? Baath party elements? If these attacks are not centrally orchestrated, are they symptomatic of the beginning of a popular uprising?

Secretary Rumsfeld. The anti-coalition attacks are being carried out by loyalists of the former Iraqi regime who are fighting to regain the status they enjoyed as beneficiaries of Saddam, and to a lesser extent, foreign and indigenous Sunni radical Islamists who naturally resist any form of what they perceive as Western occupation of their lands. Presently, intelligence indicates that anti-coalition attacks neither result from nor are symptomatic of a popular uprising.

The dissolution of the Iraqi regime led to the dispersal of many former regime elites, including government officials, security service members, and military officers. This group of former regime loyalists is predominantly ethnic Sunni, and had long profited, if not subsisted, as a result of its loyalty to Saddam's autocratic regime. We assess former regime elites fund and direct localized political and violent resistance to the coalition. Intelligence community assessments conclude that the opposition has not yet matured into a nationally organized movement.

Intelligence indicates that former regime loyalists and radical Sunni Islamists may have begun to work together. This may indicate coalescence among resistance groups, but does not yet portend their central direction or widespread public support.

COORDINATION OF U.S. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY NEEDS

Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld, how do U.S. civilian and U.S. military authorities in Iraq coordinate their needs, and what steps have been taken to improve that coordination? Are those civilian authorities satisfied with the level of coordination and responsiveness that they receive from the military; are they sufficient to protect them while allowing them to accomplish their task and facilitating their efforts to accomplish that task?

Secretary Rumsfeld. The Coalition Provisional Authority coordinates the efforts of all U.S. and coalition government agencies conducting activities in Iraq. The CPA coordinates regularly with the Coalition Joint Task Force and CENTCOM for security requirements and other military support.

The security situation in Iraq is complex. In some areas, the security environment is generally permissive—there is reasonable freedom of movement, recovery activities proceed without significant hindrance, and coalition forces are engaged in stability operations. In other areas, the environment is less permissive and coalition forces are engaged in combat operations against remnants of the Baathist regime. There will be times when security requirements will be seen as an impediment to other important tasks, but I have every confidence in the skill and abilities of those servicemen and women who are charged with ensuring the safety of the many non-combatants working in Iraq.

U.S. TROOPS AND PEACEKEEPING

Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld, given the doctrine of preemption and regime change adopted by this administration, it would seem to even the casual observer that the indoctrination of our troops with peacekeeping and follow-on stability skills would be extremely important. Do you believe that U.S. troops receive enough training to handle these types of missions?

Secretary Rumsfeld. To date, the performance of U.S. forces during peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations clearly shows that they have had adequate training beforehand to accomplish assigned missions to the high standards expected of them by their Nation. I would even say that mission performance shows that training has been adequate to ensure risk to U.S. forces is acceptable. Considering the complex environment typically presented by such operations, the overall performance of U.S. forces has been remarkable.

In accordance with our joint training doctrine, training of U.S. forces before being assigned a specific operational mission is focused on mission essential tasks required in operational plans or in warfighting doctrine. These tasks are centered on performance in a major theater war. Such performance represents the ‘worst case’—the most difficult-to-master performance required of U.S. forces, and provides a disciplined foundation from which U.S. forces are best postured to execute any mission...
they may be assigned and adequately prepared should an assigned peacekeeping mission escalate.

Once a specific mission assignment is received, unit leaders make maximum use of available training time, both prior to deployment and in the theater of operations, by narrowing their training focus on exact mission requirements. If time allows, mission execution is rehearsed before execution to help ensure success. Units rotating into a theater to replace an already employed unit frequently have adequate time during training to undergo more rigorous mission rehearsal exercises that replicate the operational environment as closely as possible and provide an opportunity for all members of the operational team to practice performance required by the mission. For such training, U.S. forces have benefited immeasurably from Department of Defense ongoing efforts to update training venues to reflect the current operational environment (e.g., to incorporate operations on urban terrain and with civilians on the battlefield).

Finally, training support agencies throughout the Department of Defense assist deployed forces by providing training support packages the ability of in-theater forces to ‘reach back’ into centers of excellence, and helping commanders gather and disseminate operational lessons learned.

As anecdotal evidence of the effectiveness of preparatory training for deploying forces, I offer the following extract from an after action report of the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division, which is being redeployed from Iraq.

Topic A—Training for Combat

The roots of the division’s successful attack to Baghdad are found on the training fields of Fort Stewart, Fort Irwin, and Kuwait. The division crossed the line of departure with a mature and trained group of staff officers, commanders, and soldiers. The ability of the division to stabilize company commanders and field grade officers after conducting multiple CONUS contingency response force (CCRF) and National Training Center (NTC) rotations produced a seasoned fighting force that was trained and ready to fight and win on any battlefield.

A direct correlation can be drawn between the division’s training cycle prior to crossing the line of departure and the division’s successful attack into Iraq. The division conducted multiple integrated live fire maneuver operations on urban terrain and detailed command and control exercises at the task force through the division level to prepare for combat.

All maneuver battalions conducted externally evaluated force-on-force and live fire training events focused on offensive operations at the company team level through the battalion task force level. Every rifle squad conducted combined arms training focused on entering and clearing a complex trench system and a multiple room structure. These training events focused every maneuver unit in the division on the exact missions soldiers would execute weeks later against the Iraqi Regular Army and Fedayeen death squads.

The division artillery conducted live fire training events prior to crossing the line of departure that massed every firing system in the division at a single point and ensured every firing battery was trained and ready to mass fires anywhere on the modern day battlefield.

The 4th Brigade (BDE) trained both close combat attacks in support of the ground maneuver commander and shaping operations under the brigade commander’s control while in Kuwait. This served to not only synchronize the brigade’s internal aviation assets, but to also synchronize the division’s aviation assets with the ground maneuver forces. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) established between 4th BDE and the maneuver brigades facilitated the rapid and safe employment of attack aviation in combat.

The division fought to train under realistic conditions in preparation for combat. The priorities were clear and subordinate leaders executed training that produced a disciplined, lethal, and flexible force capable of accomplishing any tactical task.

The requirement for tough realistic training has not changed in the past 227 years. The division lived under the “train as you fight” motto for the 12 months preceding the war. The training proficiency, lethality, and maturity of the division serve as an example for the Army to follow.

The American people can take pride in the courage and determination of our Nation as evidenced in the 3ID’s conduct during the war. The skill demonstrated by 3ID in combat operations was a product of their training. That same training produced a well-disciplined force capable of rapidly transitioning to peacekeeping and stability operations. Training to the high end of the spectrum of war produced a well-trained, disciplined force capable of executing peacekeeping and stability operations.
27. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld, what kind of specialized civil affairs, peacekeeping, or peace-enforcement training do U.S. forces receive as part of their traditional military education?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Civil affairs, peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement factors are incorporated throughout professional military education curricula. The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School provides specialized civil affairs training for those officers and NCOs assigned to civil affairs billets. Furthermore, instructions are provided in the law of war, law affecting peacemaking and peacekeeping operations and rules of engagement to commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned officers through traditional military education courses such as Officer Advance, Warrant Officer Advanced, Advance Noncommissioned Officer and the Command and General Staff Officers Course. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command is divesting itself of Cold War oriented instruction in professional military education courses. This includes updating doctrine, scenarios, threat, opposing force, and the operational environment. A wide range of opposing forces scenarios integrated with the variables in the operating environment continue to be integrated in the programs of instruction of professional military education courses, as illustrated by the following three examples. First, students must be able to demonstrate a sound knowledge of the complexities and related issues necessary to plan, prepare, execute, and assess missions (offense, defense, stability operations, and support operations) in a full-spectrum operational environment. Second, operational scenarios in courses include joint, multinational, interagency, and intergovernmental operations, and integrated conventional Special Operations Forces operations. Third, courses have also been revised to incorporate the following macrovariables in the operating environment into meaningful elements considered by students as they participate in the various training scenarios.

- Physical environment
- Nature and stability of the state
- Military capabilities
- Technology
- Information
- Economics
- External organizations
- Social demographics
- Regional relationships
- National will
- Time

28. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld, what was the philosophical underpinning of the decision to close the Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), given that this was the only DOD facility that focused on exactly what we’ve engaged in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and that peacekeeping seems to now be a primary mission of the U.S. military?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The decision to close the U.S. Army PKI at the Army War College was based on the recommendations of the recently conducted Realignment Task Force. As a result of subsequent world events, closing the PKI has been put on hold. We are in the process of reviewing the PKI’s mission with a probable outcome that it will be retained at the Army War College, with an updated charter and structure in keeping with our current policies and focus.

29. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld, are the reports that the PKI is being reopened true? Will there be a real plan to provide the PKI with focused resources and dedicated funding?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Based on world events, the U.S. Army has put a hold on closing PKI. We are in the process of reviewing the PKI’s mission with a probable outcome that it will be retained at the Army War College, with an updated charter and structure in keeping with Army and DOD current policies and focus. The PKI’s mission will be similar to the previous PKI mission but will be more focused on the complex stability operations in which the Army is engaged. Its mission will be to study the strategic implications for the Army of stability operations; support senior Army leaders in understanding and dealing with the implications of stability operations on the Army, and the impact of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations on the Army’s conduct of peacekeeping and stability operations; understand current and future allied and other nations’ militaries’ objectives and doctrine on the strategic aspects of stability operations; contribute to evolving stability operations doctrine; and help educate the next generation of Army strategic leaders on stability operations.
PKI’s operating budget request for fiscal year 2004 is $250,000. Costs do not include civilian and military manpower that are currently funded within the respective programs. This funding is included in the Operations and Maintenance, Army request.

30. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld, in his 2000 Presidential campaign, the then-Governor G.W. Bush stated that he opposed U.S. participation in peacemaking operations because it reduced military readiness and morale. Did this position inform the decision to close the PKI? Is this also the view of the Department of Defense today?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The DOD could not find such a reference in President Bush’s campaign speeches.

The commitment of U.S. military forces is a serious issue that the President examines on a case-by-case basis. The U.S. military is capable of performing duties across the spectrum of military activities, from high-end warfighting to peace operations, and has world-wide commitments. As can be seen in numerous places around the world, the U.S. is working with its friends and allies to ensure that peace and stability reign. The conduct of stability operations—including peacemaking and peace enforcement—is an important activity for the U.S. and its allies. At the same time, we are naturally concerned about the stresses that long-term deployments place on military personnel and their families, and we will continue to examine our commitments globally to ensure that we maintain the best fighting force possible.

The Army’s decision to close the Peacekeeping Institute was taken as a result of the recommendations of its Realignment Task Force. Acting Secretary of the Army Brownlee has amended that decision by directing the commandant of the Army War College to reestablish the functions of the Institute as part of the Center for Strategic Leadership.

U.S. MILITARY RECRUITMENT

31. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld, what impact on recruitment for the regular forces has the war on Iraq and its aftermath had?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The decision on whether or not to enlist is highly individual in nature and generally reflects a complex interaction of economic risk/benefit assessments and effective factors. As a result, some individuals are deterred in times when the operational tempo is high while others are attracted. As military activity continues in association with Operation Iraqi Freedom and the global war on terrorism, it is still too early to tell whether these operations will have a measurable long-term impact on recruiting. However, all Services are currently at or above their fiscal year-to-date recruiting goals for the active components. Recruit quality also continues to hold steady above the DOD quality benchmarks of 90 percent high school graduates and 60 percent scoring in the top 50th percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test.

32. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld, what impact on recruitment for the Reserve Forces and National Guard has the war on Iraq and its aftermath had?

Secretary RUMSFELD. As military activity in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the global war on terrorism continues, it is still too early to tell whether these operations will have a measurable long-term impact on Reserve recruiting. Currently, the Reserve components as a whole are achieving 96 percent of their recruiting objectives year-to-date in 2003, and they are exceeding their authorized strength. Recruit quality is very comparable with past years. Individually, all Reserve components except the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve are exceeding recruiting objectives. The Army Reserve has shown significant improvement in recruitment in the second quarter and is currently achieving 98 percent of its objectives. While the Army National Guard is finding it challenging to meet its large recruiting objective, it remains within acceptable limits of its required end strength. We are closely monitoring the recruiting efforts of the Army National Guard and are working with them to overcome the challenges they are currently facing.

TROOP MORALE AND ROTATION

33. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld, some units stationed in Iraq have been in theater for close to a year now and there have been reports that the conditions in which they are operating combined with these extended tours are contributing to low morale. Can you comment on the morale of the deployed troops, and
whether or not some of the most heavily relied upon units can expect to be rotated out of theater shortly?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Troop morale in the entire CENTCOM AOR and specifically in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom is of the utmost concern of the President of the United States, Department of Defense, and the Commander of U.S. Central Command. With some units currently stationed in Iraq that have been in theater for close to a year, their living conditions have improved remarkably over the last several months. Upgrades in their quality of life include: increase in Army Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) operations (exchanges, and food and beverage operations), installation of phone banks and satellite phones for morale calls, increase of additional fitness and recreational kits to the forward areas, and rest and recuperation (R&R) trips to give respite for the troops in the most austere environments. In addition to these improvements, Armed Forces Entertainment (AFE) and USAO are sending entertainment groups into the forward deployed areas on a continuous basis to include Project Salute, the largest AFE/USO show ever seen in CENTCOM’s AOR. Morale among the troops is tremendous considering the energy and effort spent over the last several months ridding Iraq of a terrible regime. Efforts to continually improve quality of life for our troops remain a very high priority. These troops are serving their country well, far from home, and making tremendous strides in making the world a safer and better place for the Iraqi people and the people around the globe.

MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN IRAQ

34. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, some nations have balked at the prospect of placing their troops earmarked for follow-on stabilization operations in Iraq under a unilateral U.S. command. Yet it grows increasingly apparent that we must not, cannot, go it alone in that theater. How will you, or do you even plan to, include other nations in peacekeeping efforts while respecting their desire for multinational leadership of these contributed troops?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Thus far, as of 17 October, 33 nations have contributed troops to the stabilization mission in Iraq, and 57 nations have contributed either aid or humanitarian supplies. Coalition forces in the south sector are under U.K. leadership, and in the center-south sector are under Polish leadership. The deputies and staffs of these command elements include officers from all countries contributing to the stabilization mission in the applicable sector.

In fact, the Turkish and Japanese governments have recently indicated a willingness to send combat troops. The Republic of Korea is sending noncombat troops and is considering a combat contribution after a very positive report from their survey team. Based upon bilateral discussions we have had with other nations, we are optimistic that we will see further troop contributions in Iraq. Thus, the United States is not “going it alone” in Iraq.

Passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 on 16 October also shows international support for our mission.

SEARCH FOR WMD AND LESSONS LEARNED

35. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, as the administration has shifted from nonproliferation measures to counter-proliferation, it will be increasingly important for the U.S. military to find, seize, and assess weapons of mass destruction and associated sites. Yet in Iraq, the effort to do just these things began haphazardly and has not improved to any great degree since. What are the lessons learned that the DOD has “taken away” from the ongoing search for Iraqi WMDs?

Secretary Rumsfeld. U.S. prewar planning focused on finding, seizing, assessing, and dismantling or destroying Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and the programs that developed and maintained them.

During combat operations, the immediate focus was to protect the forces from the effects of the use or discovery of weapons of mass destruction. The unit deployed with V Corps, the 513th Brigade, was manned, trained, and equipped for this purpose. In addition to the force protection task, it also was capable of identifying sites, materials, documents, and individuals who, in the aftermath of the combat operations, were assessed to have been of intelligence value in subsequent exploitation efforts.

Prior to the outbreak of combat operations, plans were developed to deploy the Iraq Survey Group to take on the longer-term mission of exploitation, assessment, dismantlement, and destruction.
In the June time frame, the units associated with the 513th rotated out of Iraq as the ISG deployed, and the ISG is now systematically going about the process of uncovering Iraq's WMD program.

In his February 2003 speech to the United Nations, the Secretary of State outlined the extensive effort by Iraq to hide its WMD program from U.N. inspectors and, by extension, to deny and deceive the United States about its WMD capabilities and intentions.

Our experience thus far underscores the need for a robust human intelligence capability, particularly with respect to entities to which our access is actively denied.

SERVICE TRANSFORMATION VISION

36. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, much of the DOD's transformative vision is characterized by quick deployments, quick victories, and quick disengagement from conflicts. Yet with the administration's declared doctrine of preemption and preventive war, it seems likely that future conflicts will continue a decade-old trend: that of peacekeeping and stability operations. How does the DOD's vision of service transformation take this into account?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Our vision of transformation encompasses developing new concepts for the employment of military force across the spectrum of conflict, from major force-on-force combat to stability operations. These are reinforcing mechanisms in that transformation at one end will have benefits across the spectrum of our core competencies. The Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command, and the military Services are developing future joint concepts that will support our operational goals as laid out in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. The Transformation Planning Guidance includes guidance on developing a joint operating concept in stability operations, with particular emphasis on peace enforcement.

MILITARY STRATEGY

37. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, one of the lessons of the war against Iraq is one of access and its importance to U.S. battle plans. When Saudi Arabia and Turkey refused to allow U.S. forces to stage from their territory, they prevented the northern front against the Hussein regime from being opened, and, in doing so, they prevented the U.S. Army's most digitized division, the 4th ID, from entering the battle. How have these events affected DOD planning for future conflicts? How will the U.S. assure access to future theaters of conflict, and/or how will the U.S. ‘work around’ such denials of access in the future?

Secretary Rumsfeld. Military planners realize that the issues of access, in the form of basing and overflight permission, are politically sensitive issues. For this reason, our planners develop contingencies that account for events like access denial. A good example of this contingency planning was the immediate insertion of the 173d Infantry Brigade in Northern Iraq despite denial of access by Turkey. Branch plans are developed to account for denial of access when it affects the base plan. From this standpoint, there will be no long-term affect on DOD future planning efforts. We are confident that by combining this approach with continued close coordination between DOD and political agencies within the U.S. Government, we can minimize the impact of any such eventualities.

38. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Rumsfeld, most of the U.S. follow-on stabilization plan was highly dependent on an assumption that the Iraqi citizenry would overwhelmingly welcome the U.S. troops as liberators and that they would happily work alongside U.S. during reconstruction efforts. What was this assessment based on?

Secretary Rumsfeld. This assessment was based on the Iraqi peoples’ experiences under 30 years of Saddam Hussein’s tyranny. These experiences include genocide, mass graves, torture chambers, children’s prisons, starvation and deprivation as Saddam, his family, and his cronies acquired more palaces and luxury cars, and a repressive police state unlike any since the darkest days of Stalin’s Soviet Union.

These assessments have been supported by the public opinion polling that has been conducted in Iraq since the end of the war. According to Zogby International, 7 out of 10 Iraqis say they expect their country and their personal lives will be better 5 years from now. The National Democratic Institute Focus Reports find that Iraqis are grateful for the ouster of Saddam, and are excited about their newfound freedoms. According to Gallup International, 71 percent of Baghdad’s residents indicated that they do not want U.S. troops to leave in the next few months.
39. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am troubled that the U.S. has engaged in three wars since 1999 and has failed to embark on an objective, independent assessment of any of them. Indeed, the DOD seems content to allow the individual Services to undertake their own evaluations. Why, in an age of 'jointness,' isn't the DOD aggressively pursuing after-action lessons-learned reports, as opposed to rolling evaluations by individual services?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The Department of Defense understands the importance of capturing lessons learned from military operations. In fact, the Department has been very aggressively pursuing and publishing detailed lessons learned reports for quite some time such as the Department’s “Kosovo After Action Report.” Since then, we have collected joint lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom and are in the process of assessing these lessons at Joint Forces Command and the Joint Staff.

All combatant commanders, to include the United States Joint Forces Command, collect and assess operational joint lessons from actual operations in the form of Joint After Action Reports. Additionally, the Joint Staff captures and assesses joint lessons at the strategic level. In each case the Department of Defense records both the success areas and areas which need improvement. The Joint Forces Command after action report for Operation Iraqi Freedom is due late this year.

BOMBER FORCE

40. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld, the bomber force has performed brilliantly over Iraq, as it did in Afghanistan. Indeed, this force dropped nearly 70 percent of all air-deployed ordnance against Iraq. Yet while the Air Force plans to buy over 2,000 tactical aircraft over the next 20 years, there are no plans for fielding a new bomber until the 2030s. Why?

Secretary RUMSFELD. While all of our bombers and their aircrews performed magnificently during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, our long-term plans call for developing promising technologies in the near term so we can enhance our long-range strike capability beginning in the 2012–2015 time frame. The fiscal year 2002 President’s budget provided $30 million for independent studies and technology development by the Air Force Research Lab and the Institute for Defense Analysis to assess future bomber concepts and technological investments required for pursuing a future long-range strike platform. These studies, along with others, indicate that aggressive modernization of existing platforms is not a substitute for developing and fielding new technologies. In order to capitalize on technological advancements and yield the greatest possible return on investment from constrained S&T resources, we will continue to mature the necessary technologies in order to begin a long-range strike acquisition program in 2012–2015 time frame.

INTELLIGENCE ON ENEMY COMBATANT COMMANDERS

41. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Rumsfeld, according to a recent report, although intelligence on Iraqi forces and capabilities was strong, intelligence on enemy combatant commanders was shaky, at best. What steps is the DOD, along with the Intelligence Community, undertaking to rectify this shortfall?

Secretary RUMSFELD. DOD and the Intelligence Community have already begun adjusting intelligence collection and analysis based on appropriate lessons learned from OIF. We are making significant improvements in both areas. For instance, we are developing and fielding better collection systems and techniques across all intelligence disciplines and providing state-of-the-art analyst support tools. HUMINT reform will soon be initiated, a key element in addressing new world threats, as well as positive actions to improve the analytical skill sets required to increase our knowledge base on future enemy key personalities. We recognize that the enemy combatant commander’s perspective may be a key factor in our own decisionmaking process. To that end, we are taking a multifaceted, multidisciplined approach to focus on those individuals, to include training our analysts to better understand the societies and cultures that produce those commanders. These initiatives will ensure we go into the next conflict with better information on our future adversaries’ commanders.

[Whereupon, at 1:17 p.m., the committee adjourned.]