[Senate Hearing 108-645]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-645
IRAQ'S TRANSITION--THE WAY AHEAD
[PART I]
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 18, 2004
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Armitage, Hon. Richard L., Deputy Secretary of State, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 11
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Lugar...................................................... 80
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Biden...................................................... 92
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Feingold................................................... 104
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 30
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared
statement...................................................... 20
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S.
Department of Defense; accompanied by: Lt. Gen. Walter L.
Sharp, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, U.S. Department of Defense, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 4
Prepared statement of Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz............. 5
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Lugar...................................................... 86
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Biden...................................................... 96
(iii)
IRAQ'S TRANSITION--THE WAY AHEAD
[PART I]
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 18, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Brownback,
Voinovich, Alexander, Coleman, Sununu, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd,
Feingold, Boxer, Bill Nelson, and Corzine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR, CHAIRMAN
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. Today, the Committee on Foreign
Relations meets to continue our ongoing oversight of American
policy toward Iraq. The Coalition intends to hand over
sovereignty to an Iraqi government 6 weeks from tomorrow.
We're pleased to welcome Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary
of State; Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and
Lieutenant General Walter Sharp, Director of Strategic Plans
and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We look forward to a
wide-ranging discussion that further clarifies United States
plans for the Iraqi transition.
This is the nineteenth hearing on Iraq the Foreign
Relations Committee has held since January 2003, and the fifth
in this past month. Tomorrow we will hold another hearing on
Iraq that will feature several expert witnesses from outside
our government. Within the substantial bounds of Congress's
oversight capacity, we are attempting to illuminate United
States plans, actions, and options with regard to Iraq, both
for the benefit of the American people and to inform our own
policymaking role.
I am convinced that the confidence and commitment
demonstrated by the pronouncement of a flexible but detailed
plan for Iraq is necessary for our success. With lives being
lost and billions of dollars being spent in Iraq, the American
people must be confident that we have carefully thought through
an Iraq policy that will optimize our prospects for success.
Moreover, a detailed plan is necessary to prove to our allies
and to Iraqis that we have a strategy and that we are committed
to making it work. If we cannot provide this clarity, we will
risk the loss of support of the American people, the loss of
potential contributions from our allies, and the
disillusionment of Iraqis.
As the June 30 transfer of sovereignty draws closer,
violent attacks on Coalition forces have increased, and power
struggles between Iraqi factions have intensified. The lack of
security has hampered political and economic development in key
parts of Iraq. Many non-governmental aid organizations have
pulled out of Iraq. Adding to the difficulties, the appalling
revelations of our prisoner abuse in Iraq have repulsed
Americans and hurt our reputation in the international
community. In dealing with this scandal, we need to establish
absolute accountability and stay true to our values without
reducing our efforts to overcome terrorism.
At this critical junction, the committee and the American
people need to hear directly from the administration. Are U.S.
plans for building Iraq shifting to address the new realities
on the ground? And have sufficient resources been identified to
carry through with our plans?
The Senate confirmed Ambassador John Negroponte, to be
Ambassador to Iraq, on an expedited basis to ensure that he and
his team would be in place quickly. We are interested in
knowing how the State Department plans to staff, house, and
secure what will be one of the largest embassies in the world.
Under Secretary Marc Grossman has testified that the embassy
could cost more than a billion dollars, but these funds were
not included in fiscal year 2005 budget request. The
administration recently requested an additional $25 billion in
contingency funds for Iraq and Afghanistan, but this amount
does not apparently include any funding for the new embassy.
Our diplomatic forces, as well as our military forces, must
have what they need to succeed.
I am especially interested in details surrounding the use
of the $18.4 billion provided for Iraq by the emergency
supplemental signed last November 6, 2003. In this bill,
Congress gave broad authority to the President to control these
funds through the Office of Management and Budget. The OMB
report submitted last month showed that only $2.3 billion of
the $18.4 billion has been obligated by March 24, 2004. Given
the urgency of reconstruction efforts in Iraq and the role that
they play in a successful outcome for the United States, it is
perplexing that only about 12 percent of the money has been
obligated. Committee inquiries indicate that reconstruction
projects have been slowed by a long bureaucratic contracting
process overseen by the OMB and the Department of Defense. In
addition, the OMB report lacks specificity. In many cases, the
report fails to identify the agency responsible for carrying
out reconstruction projects. Our committee needs to be
reassured that Congress's intent is being fulfilled and that
there is no unnecessary delay in reconstruction efforts.
In Iraq, we are perceived more as an occupation force by
some than as a friend helping to nurture a new nation. Delays
in reconstruction undercut United States credibility and
increase suspicions among Iraqis who are impatient for
improvements. Without tangible progress in reconstruction,
Iraqis will perceive little benefit in the U.S. military
presence. Achieving a transfer of sovereignty on June 30, 2004,
was always going to stretch our capabilities. But since we are
firmly committed to that date, we should be attempting to
accelerate stabilization and reconstruction in every possible
way.
We are hopeful that Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi will be
successful in his work to construct an Interim Iraqi
Government. The Iraqis themselves must reach internal political
consensus and balance among competing Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish
factions and their thoughts. Once the new government is named,
the transition to sovereignty should begin immediately. If
possible, in my judgment, we should establish the United States
Embassy before the June 30 transfer, and bring Ambassador
Negroponte in early. Ambassador Bremer has provided
extraordinary service, but, at this stage, he will begin to
take on lame-duck status.
Under Secretary Grossman testified, on April 22, about the
importance of engaging an Interim Iraqi Government as soon as
it is selected. We cannot simply turn on the lights in the
embassy on June 30 and expect everything to go well. We must be
rehearsing, with Iraqi authorities and our Coalition partners,
how decisionmaking and administrative power will be distributed
and exercised. It is critical, therefore, that Ambassador
Negroponte and his team be put in place at the earliest
possible moment. We also should be accelerating negotiations to
complete a United Nations Security Council resolution to give
international legitimacy to the new Iraqi government and to
define new security arrangements. In addition, the United
Nations and the new interim government should consider
accelerating the elections scheduled for January 2005 and
December 2005 for the Transitional and Permanent Iraqi
governments.
We are especially appreciative to have our witnesses with
us today. Now, let me just say, as a point of personal
privilege and, likewise, history, that about 19 years ago, in
1985, when I was a newly anointed Chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, on the first occasion, Paul Wolfowitz and
Rich Armitage came before the committee on that occasion to
talk about the Philippines. Their testimony was farsighted and
courageous. In a chapter in a book that I wrote about the
situation, I stated my admiration for their testimony, for
whatever it's worth, because it was remarkably prescient with
regard to events that occurred throughout 1985 and the
elections in February 1986 and subsequently. My admiration for
these two gentlemen has remained unabated ever since. I
appreciate especially your coming today at this important time
for our committee, and for our colleagues, and for the American
people who will witness this hearing.
Senator Biden has been delayed by train difficulties, pure
and simple. He will be here, and when he arrives, I will call
upon him, of course, for his opening statement and comment.
And, at some stage, we will have, the committee knows, a
rollcall vote at approximately 11:15. We will try to continue
the hearing throughout that time. I will slip over to the floor
and vote as rapidly as possible, and call upon one of my
colleagues to chair the meeting so we may continue with our
deliberations.
We thank the witnesses for coming. We look forward to
hearing from them, first of all, in the order in which they are
listed in our agenda, which would be Secretary Wolfowitz, then
Secretary Armitage.
Secretary Wolfowitz, we're delighted that you are here and
we would be pleased to hear your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY: LT. GEN. WALTER L.
SHARP, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE PENTAGON
Mr. Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, I'm delighted to have the
opportunity to come here to talk about the very important
questions that you've outlined in your opening statement. I
want to thank you for the kind words that you just spoke about
the role that Rich Armitage and I played some 20 years ago, not
quite 20 years ago, but you were unduly modest, because you
yourself played a more important role and with considerable
courage, both in taking on an assignment that nobody else
wanted to do, and then carrying it forward in the face of a
great deal of pressure. And I think our country and the
Philippine people have a lot to thank you for that great
leadership.
Mr. Chairman, I have a somewhat long statement, which you
can read and I would like to put in the record. I would just
like to put it aside and make a few brief comments about the
overall situation in Iraq.
The Chairman. Your statement will appear in the record in
full, and, likewise, that of Secretary Armitage.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the
great men and women who wear the uniform of the United States
have already accomplished amazing things in Iraq. They have
removed a regime that was a threat to the United States and to
the entire Middle East, a regime that sponsored terrorism and
then developed and used weapons of mass destruction. In the
process, they have also liberated a nation of 25 million
talented people, most of them Muslims, from the grip of one of
the most cruel and sadistic tyrants in modern history. But
their work is not done. The enemy that was defeated in major
combat a year ago continues to sow death and destruction in the
effort to prevent the emergence of a new Iraq. They and their
terrorist allies from inside and outside Iraq understand that
real defeat for them will come when Iraqis achieve the ability
to govern themselves in freedom and to provide for the security
of their own country. That is why the enemy realizes that the
next year or year and a half will be so critical, because that
is the time it will take to stand up Iraqi security forces that
are fully trained, equipped, and organized, and to elect a
representative Iraqi government after 40 years of tyranny and
abuse.
Already more than 775 American military have died in this
noble cause, and many more have suffered grievous wounds. Brave
civilians have been killed, as well. More than a hundred of our
Coalition partners have given their lives for this cause. And
by our own count, which is probably far from complete, 350
Iraqi policemen, civil defense fighters, and other security
forces have given their lives for the cause of a new Iraq in
the last year, and that doesn't count the thousands of Iraqis
who have died fighting that evil regime for the last several
decades, nor does it count the many brave Iraqi civilians who
have stepped up to lead Iraq into the future and who were
gunned down and murdered for that reason alone. Just this week,
a second members of the Iraqi Governing Council, Izzedine
Salim, was brutally assassinated, the second member of the
Iraqi Governing Council, along with that brave woman, Akila al-
Hashimi, to give their lives for the cause of Iraqi freedom. We
owe it to these noble Americans, to the Iraqi and Coalition
partners, and, indeed, to ourselves and to the world, to finish
the work that they have so nobly advanced.
Today's hearing, like many other hearings in this
distinguished body, will be listened to by the entire world. In
recent weeks, we have been sending many messages to the world
about our shock and horror at the abuse of Iraqi prisoners,
messages of regret and remorse, messages of outrage and horror,
messages of American commitment to correct our mistakes, to
find the truth, and to punish the guilty. It is entirely proper
that we should do so. Most of all, we are sending the message
that in democracies abuses are not tolerated or covered up, but
revealed and punished. That is a very important message for the
Iraqi people and a lesson, as well, as they seek to build a
government that would be the first of this kind in the Arab
world.
But it is even more important that the Iraqi people hear an
additional message from this great body and from the American
people, the message that we will win in Iraq, and that we are
determined to win, and that we understand that winning means
giving their country back to them, but also sticking with them
until they have a reasonable chance to establish a government
that represents them and creates security forces that can
protect them.
Mr. Chairman, the enemies of a free Iraq are tough and
determined killers and terrorists, but they have nothing
positive to offer the Iraqi people--only fear and death and
destruction. Our weapon is not fear, but hope. But it is a hope
that is shared by millions of Iraqis. In the coming months,
they and we will be the targets of the killers who hope to
block the progress to Iraqi self-government and Iraqi self-
defense. They need to know that we will stand with them as they
stand up for a free Iraq.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfowitz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Paul Wolfowitz
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I thank you for the opportunity to come and brief you today on the
Defense Department's role in the upcoming transition to Iraqi
sovereignty. I am heartened by the numerous statements from members of
this Committee recognizing the importance of Operation Iraqi Freedom
and the ongoing reconstruction mission in Iraq to our nation's
security. Such statements send a strong message of America's resolve to
those who oppose our efforts to help the Iraqi people rehabilitate
their nation after 35 years of unimaginable tyranny under Saddam
Hussein.
I would also like to thank the members of this Committee for their
continued support to the men and women of our Armed Forces. Our prayers
are with all our people currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Whether members of Active Duty, Reserve, or National Guard units, these
heroes embody the best ideals of our nation--serving so that others may
be free--and we thank them all for the sacrifices they make.
I would also like to pay tribute to the hard work and sacrifices of
all the civilians and Foreign Service officers in the Coalition
Provisional Authority and various NGOs. Their tireless efforts and
heroism have been vital to our mission in Iraq, and they have been as
fine a group of ambassadors for this nation as we have ever sent
abroad.
Finally, we also owe a sincere debt of gratitude as well to the
roughly 25,000 men and women from our Coalition partners, who are
serving the cause of freedom in Iraq. This coalition is neither
``illegitimate'' nor ``window dressing.'' Thirty-four of our closest
friends have troops that are bravely fighting alongside us in Iraq,
spearheaded by the two multinational divisions led by the British and
the Poles. British, Italians, Bulgarians, Thais, Poles, Danes,
Estonians, Ukrainians, and Spanish have been killed while trying to
advance freedom and democracy in Iraq. Just recently, one of our
smallest allies, El Salvador, has been singled out for the valor of its
troops in countering the recent violence in Iraq. Most significantly,
the largest partner of this Coalition is the Iraqis themselves, tens of
thousands of whom are already fighting for a new Iraq. The number of
Iraqi Security Forces may exaggerate their capability at this time, but
not their determination to rebuild their country, as more than 300
Iraqi Security Forces have been killed in action, and close to 700
wounded.
The horrible abuses at Abu Ghraib prison have been, as Secretary
Rumsfeld characterized it, a body blow for all of us. These actions are
a betrayal of what thousands of Americans have risked their lives to
achieve in Iraq. But these actions do not represent America, nor do
they represent American values. We will uncover the truth. We will
punish the guilty. And we will act to prevent such abuses from
recurring in the future. The Iraqi people will see that a free
democratic system functions and operates transparently. Americans are
human and we make mistakes, but when we do, we work to correct them.
And it was not a mistake to free the Iraqi people and the world from
one of the most abusive dictators in history.
the coalition's strategy to achieve victory in iraq: capacity building
We need to continue to move forward on all fronts implementing the
coalition's strategy to set conditions that will ensure a free Iraq
that is stable and at peace with its neighbors. Our strategy involves
three interdependent lines of operations to build indigenous Iraqi
capacity and transition responsibilities from the Coalition to Iraq
rapidly, but not hastily. While the lessons to be learned from the
violent events of the past few weeks affect the way we pursue these
three lines of operation, these are still the three key elements that
will bring success in Iraq.
The first element involves building capable Iraqi security forces
to achieve stability. Accordingly, we have redoubled our efforts to
recruit, train, equip and, most importantly, mentor Iraqi security
forces--Police, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, Army, Border Police, and the
Facilities Protection Service. Over the next few months our aim is to
be able to certify the ability of these forces, as they become ready to
assume greater responsibilities from coalition forces. Also, through
technical assistance and mentoring by U.S. prosecutors, we are helping
to build the capacity of the Iraqi criminal justice sector.
The second element involves nurturing Iraq's capacity for
representative self-government, with the aim of creating a government
that can assume sovereignty on behalf of the Iraqi people. June 30 is
not a magical date on which the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
will suddenly transition all of its responsibilities to a new Iraq
government. It is actually just one step, albeit a very important one,
in a process. Free Iraqis have been gradually assuming responsibility
for governmental functions for quite some time. Eleven Iraqi ministries
already report to the Governing Council rather than the CPA. Iraq now
has a functioning judiciary to provide equal justice for all. At the
local and provincial levels, elected assemblies are up and running.
When the Interim Government assumes sovereign authority on June 30, its
most important task will be to prepare the way for elections to
establish the Transitional Government in January of 2005. That
government in turn facilitate the drafting of a permanent Iraqi
Constitution which will pave the way for the election of a fully
constitutional government at the end of 2005.
The third element of the strategy involves the reconstruction of
Iraq's infrastructure and the restoration of essential services that
are providing better lives for Iraqis and putting people back to work.
Iraq has tremendous potential. Iraq has well-educated and industrious
people. It has fertile land and water resources and it has abundant
natural resources. Our strategy aims to put Iraq on course to realizing
that potential and to setting conditions for Iraqis to prosper in the
future.
IRAQ'S PROGRESS SINCE LIBERATION
The recent violence in Iraq is aimed at obstructing the progress
that is being made toward building a new Iraq and to create chaos that
will permit the return of the old tyranny or the imposition of a new
one. Despite this assault, after 35 years of living through the
nightmare of Saddam's cruelty and misrule, Iraq is slowly beginning to
realize its long-suppressed potential. Given its talented people,
fertile land, and natural resources, Iraq should have been a wealthy
nation. Yet Iraq's economy was moribund due to state control, rampant
corruption, and Saddam's misallocation of resources. Money earmarked
for life-saving medicines was used to buy means to end life. Money
available to maintain Iraq's infrastructure instead maintained Saddam's
palaces. Schools that should have been centers of learning became
command centers and ammunition bunkers.
Today, the Iraqi economy is on the path to recovery and prosperity.
Unemployment has fallen by nearly one-half over the past year.
Inflation is a quarter of what it was before the war. Iraqi
marketplaces are filled with consumer goods for the first time in
decades. All of this is occurring despite ongoing security concerns,
and before the full effect of the $18.4 billion in reconstruction
grants and more than $15 billion in international aid is felt.
Iraqi essential services have also seen significant improvement in
the past year. Electricity generation has surpassed prewar levels and
is more evenly distributed. Iraqi schools are no longer propaganda
factories for Saddam's cult of personality and Ba'ath party fascism.
Health care spending in Iraq is 30 times greater than its pre-war
levels.
Iraqis are also experiencing unprecedented political freedoms as
well. The Transitional Administrative Law, the document that will
govern Iraq's transition period beginning June 30 and which was signed
by all members of the Iraqi Governing Council, is the most liberal
basic governance document in the Arab world, with assurances that
include:
Freedom of Religion;
Freedom of Expression;
Freedom of the Press; and
Freedom of Assembly.
The TAL calls for equal rights for all citizens of Iraq regardless
of ethnicity, denomination, or sex. Over ninety percent of Iraqi towns
and provinces have local councils. More than half of the Iraqi
population is active in community affairs, and one in five belongs to a
non-governmental organization.
SECURITY IN IRAQ
Although these achievements are far from trivial, they take place
against the background of continuing violence. The past month has been
as costly to us as any since the liberation of Iraq a year ago. We are
facing a pivotal moment in the battle for Iraq's future, making sober
reflection on where we stand and where we are heading in Iraq critical.
This reflection begins with recognizing who the enemy is in Iraq.
Among the groups in Fallujah the U.S. Marines have been fighting are
the murderers and torturers of the Fedayeen Saddam and Mukhabarat who
melted away without engaging our forces a year ago. Reports indicate
that Iraqi officers of the so-called ``Special Operations and
Antiterrorism Branch,''--a truly Orwellian designation--also known as
M-14, are responsible for planning roadway improvised explosive devices
and some of the larger car bombs that have killed Iraqis, Americans,
and other foreigners. Their campaign of terror and intimidation springs
not from frustration with the Coalition's occupation of Iraq, but from
their desire to dominate and brutalize their fellow Iraqis. Captured
documents reveal that these members of Saddam's secret service were
making plans for urban guerrilla warfare even before the fall of
Baghdad, and took steps such as preparing explosives-laden vests for
suicide attacks before the war. In order to destroy the last vestiges
of Saddam's tyranny, it was always necessary that we defeat these
forces. They are joined by domestic and foreign terrorists, including
the notorious Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who moved to Iraq after the fall of
Afghanistan and who claims credit for personally beheading Nicholas
Berg and is responsible for conducting many of the worst terrorist
bombings in Iraq, and he is connected to a number of plots in Europe
and possibly elsewhere.
In the Shi'a community, Muqtada al Sadr's power grab has not
succeeded. A February poll by Oxford Research International showed that
only one percent of Iraqis name al Sadr as the national leader they
trust most. This number seems to be declining as the Shi'a clerical
establishment influences their community against him. U.S. and Iraqi
forces have launched numerous attacks against Sadr's gang of thugs in
the past week, further limiting his efforts to intimidate his way into
power.
LESSONS LEARNED AND CHALLENGES AHEAD
It is well known that no pre-war prediction will unfold perfectly,
and that there will be setbacks that require adjustments in both
objectives and courses of action. In war, plans are at best the basis
for future changes. This Coalition has repeatedly demonstrated that it
can be flexible when necessary. Examples of this flexibility include:
Creating a new type of indigenous force (the Iraqi Civil
Defense Corps) to fill the gap left by the Iraqi police
service, many of whose members turned out not to be as well
trained as we had supposed.
Requesting a large amount of supplemental funds when the
requirements for Iraqi reconstruction became clear.
Responding to Iraqi demands for an earlier resumption of
sovereignty by developing the idea of a transitional government
that could take power before a permanent constitution is
ratified.
Dropping the ``caucus plan'' for selecting the transitional
government, when it turned out to be unpopular with Iraqis, and
substituting a two-step process involving an interim government
that can take power before legislative elections.
Revising the mechanisms for implementing the de-
Ba'athification policy to address complaints that the appeals
process was not working as intended, and to respond to the
Sunni minority's fears of marginalization.
Similarly, events of the past month have taught us several lessons
that have influenced our policy decisions. We are focusing intently on
the Iraqi Security Forces, whose performance during the recent spike in
combat activity has been mixed. Approximately half of the security
forces stood their ground, and in Fallujah some ICDC units fought
bravely and well. Iraqi commandos from the Iraqi Counter Terrorist
Force were instrumental in expelling Sadr's militia from the Mukhaiyam
Mosque in Karbala. However, other units, however, did not face the
enemy or avoided contact altogether, and a small proportion cooperated
with the enemy.
Our disappointment with the security forces has to be tempered with
realism. Overall, they were not capable by themselves of deterring or
withstanding the recent attacks, and that fact should not surprise us.
We have been fielding Iraqi security forces as fast as we could, but we
never expected Iraqi security forces to take over responsibility for
Iraq's security on June 30th, much less April 5th. Our plan was--and
is--for Iraqi forces to develop strength, capability, and experience
under the security umbrella of the Coalition, while the Coalition
retained overall security responsibilities. Recent events provide
lessons we can apply to increase the impact of what we are doing.
The first lesson is the need for stronger leaders in the security
forces. We will build on the leaders whose units fought and we will
replace those whose units did not. We will integrate Iraqi officers
with Coalition forces and we will embed Coalition officers with the
Iraqi security forces. This arrangement provides liaison, which
produces mutual confidence, and it also helps us develop Iraqi
leadership. Similarly, we need police liaisons and specialized trainers
to get down to police stations around the country to provide confidence
and set the example.
Second, the Iraqi security forces need more and better equipment.
We had not planned for them to be fully equipped at this point, but
some police and ICDC units were outgunned in recent action, so we are
reexamining the equipment requirements. We have also incurred some
delays in equipping the Iraqi security forces. Part of the delay has
been caused by challenges in the contracting process, and we hope those
problems have been fixed. We need to make up for lost time, but any
delay is unacceptable.
Third, it is clear that the members of the security forces, most of
whom are Iraqi patriots, need an Iraqi rallying point. They need to
understand they operate under an Iraqi chain of command, and that at
the top of that chain of command is a lawfully constituted Iraqi
government. The chain of command is being put in place now. A defense
minister has been named, along with a commander in chief of the armed
forces and a chief of staff. A new interior minister has also taken
office. We need to fill in the rest of the chain, but Iraqis in the
security forces can see today that there are Iraqis at the top.
The greatest factor in the mixed performance of the security forces
was an intangible: fear. The enemies of a democratic future for Iraq
have so terrorized the cities of central Iraq that many members of the
security forces doubt that they or their families can be protected from
the retribution that may follow their participation in operations
alongside the Coalition. Until Iraqis are convinced that Saddam's
regime has been permanently and irreversibly removed, and until a long
and ghastly part of their history is put to rest and overcome, that
fear will remain. Convincing them of this truth--that Saddam and the
Saddamists are finished--will continue to require investments of our
time and our resources and our precious men and women in uniform, to
continue to build trust among the Iraqi people. That is why it is so
important in this time of stress to show that our commitment to their
freedom is rock-solid.
POLITICAL PROGRESS AND THE WAY AHEAD
The timing of the current violence was not entirely unexpected.
President Bush warned that we could expect increased violence in the
months leading up to the transition to Iraqi sovereignty. We knew that
the enemies of democracy in Iraq would do everything they could to
disrupt the transition to sovereignty. This expectation was confirmed
when we intercepted a letter from Abu Musab Zarqawi to his Al Qaeda
colleagues in Afghanistan. In this letter, Zarqawi recognized that the
fast-approaching turnover of sovereignty would further weaken his
cause, saying:
With the spread of the [Iraqi] army and the police, our
future is becoming frightening. The problem is you end up
having an army and police connected by lineage, blood and
appearance to the people of the region. How can we kill their
cousins and sons and under what pretext, after the Americans
start withdrawing? This is the democracy . . . we will have no
pretext.
Zarqawi's letter strongly suggests that we are seeing an upsurge in
violence precisely because the terrorists and extremists in Iraq
believe we are winning and that their time to derail democracy in Iraq
is running out. The same political situation that is driving such
attacks also is a source of optimism for the Iraqi people and their
Coalition partners.
The reason the enemy believes its time is running out is because
Iraqis, as reflected in the Transitional Administrative Law, have
established a clear way forward for drafting and ratifying a permanent
constitution for Iraq and the election of a government in accordance
with its terms. This political transition is scheduled to evolve over
three phases:
Phase I (June 30, 2004)--Iraqi Interim Government
Phase II (January 2005)--Iraqi Transitional Government
Phase III (January 2006)--Iraqi Government under Permanent
Constitution
According to the timeline laid out in the TAL, the Iraqi Interim
Government will take power on June 30. This Interim Government is being
selected based on intensive consultations among Iraqis, led by
Ambassador Brahimi, the UN Secretary General's Special Advisor on Iraq.
Under this plan, the UN will appoint an Iraqi executive consisting of:
A President;
Two Deputy Presidents;
A Prime Minister; and
A Ministerial Cabinet.
In accordance with the TAL, the interim Government will assume full
sovereignty on June 30th, And in July a national conference will be
convened to select a ``consultative'' council. Ambassador Brahimi
currently is in Iraq where he is consulting closely with Iraqis and
U.S. officials to produce a list of names by the end of May.
We believe the ideas put forth by Mr. Brahimi are promising and we
look forward to more details from the UN. U.S. officials remain in
close contact with Mr. Brahimi, members of the Iraqi Governing Council
and other Iraqis as these procedures are finalized.
This Administration has made a major effort from the start to
involve the United Nations in the reconstruction of Iraq. The
Coalition's ongoing efforts in Iraq have been endorsed by three
Security Council Resolutions: UN Security Council Resolution 1483--
passed May 22, 2003--supports the formation of the CPA and an Iraqi
Interim Administration. UNSCR 1500--passed August 14, 2003--welcomed
the establishment of the Governing Council. UNSCR 1511--passed October
16, 2003--authorizes a multinational force under U.S. command. All
three of these resolutions were unanimously endorsed by the UN Security
Council.
The Administration has worked closely with the United Nations
Secretary General throughout the past year. Before his tragic murder by
terrorists, UN envoy Sergio Viera de Mello was instrumental in
establishing the Iraqi Governing Council. Since the tragic bombing of
the UN Headquarters in Baghdad last August--which Zarqawi boasts was
his doing and which was clearly aimed at driving out the UN--security
for the UN has been a major challenge. However, the UN representative
for Security Coordination's Office has been in Baghdad since mid-
January. A UN Election Assistance Team headed by Carina Perelli
continues to work with the Iraqi people to help them create the legal
and institutional structures for direct national elections by the end
of January 2005. And as noted, we have welcomed the proposals of the
new UN envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, regarding the creation of the Iraqi
Interim Government.
The Interim Government will serve until the Transitional National
Assembly, or TNA, is elected in either December 2004 or January 2005.
The TNA will then elect a three-person Presidency Council consisting of
a President and two Deputies, who will appoint by unanimous vote the
Prime Minister and, on the Prime Minister's recommendation, a Council
of Ministers. The Prime Minister and Council of Ministers must obtain a
vote of confidence from the TNA before taking office. Together, the
TNA, the Presidency Council and the Council of Ministers will comprise
the Iraqi Transitional Government.
In addition to being the legislature, the TNA will also draft a
permanent constitution for Iraq, which will be submitted for popular
ratification by October 15, 2005. Elections under this new constitution
are to be held by December 15, 2005, and the newly elected government,
operating under the permanent constitution, will take office by
December 31, 2005.
Now, I cannot sit here today and predict the exact form of the
permanent government. Iraqis will decide the exact provisions of their
permanent Iraqi constitution, and who will emerge as the leaders of the
new Iraq. After 35 years of totalitarian dictatorship, it is a
complicated task to build new political institutions and it cannot
happen overnight.
Since the liberation of Iraq a year ago, Iraqis have conducted
themselves extraordinarily well for a nation so long exposed to Saddam
Hussein's unique level of sadism. In a remarkably short period of time,
Iraqi leaders have overcome many differences to demonstrate the arts of
political compromise and their commitment to the goal of a new Iraq.
Americans of all people should understand that democracy does not
guarantee specific outcomes, it opens ideas up for debate. One need
only look back at our own Constitutional Convention to be reminded that
with any attempt to establish rule for the people by the people, there
is always a great deal of uncertainty and controversy, even after the
ink has dried. We should not expect Iraqis to achieve immediately what
we and the British, for example, have labored to accomplish over the
course of centuries. But even an imperfect Iraqi democracy will be an
enormous improvement for a country that has suffered so much over the
past 35 years.
An early end to the occupation is essential to our political
strategy to defeat the terrorists. A sovereign Iraqi government will be
better able to marginalize its extremist opponents politically while
Coalition forces defeat them militarily. As the letter from Zarqawi
demonstrates, such a transformation is the worst possible scenario for
those who oppose the emergence of democracy in Iraq. They fear it, and
that's why they are trying so hard to derail it.
Moving ahead is important to inspire Iraqi confidence that the
transition is moving forward and that their country will not be
occupied indefinitely. The transfer of sovereignty will also help to
create the national rallying point for the Iraqi Security Forces I
alluded to earlier. But it is important also to make clear that we
believe that there will continue to be an urgent need for coalition
forces to remain in Iraq after June 30, as there will still be serious
threats to security in Iraq. But, on July 1, Iraq will be governed by
an Iraqi government. This is in accordance with the expressed wishes of
the Iraqi people.
We will have a legal basis for continued MNF operations in Iraq.
The TAL provisions relevant to security arrangements provide the
appropriate framework for implementing our security strategy in Iraq
after this transition. Article 59(B) of the TAL states that Iraqi armed
forces will be ``a principal partner in the multinational force
operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to'' UNSCR 1511.
Article 59(C) states that the elected Iraqi Transitional Government
``shall have the authority to conclude binding international agreements
regarding the activities of the multinational force,'' and that
``nothing in this Law shall affect rights and obligations . . . under
UNSCR 1511 . . . which will govern the multinational force's activities
pending entry into force of those agreements.'' And perhaps most
importantly, Article 26(C) ensures that CPA orders and regulations
``shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly
enacted and having the force of law.''
While it is important not to view the accomplishments in Iraq
through rose-colored glasses, it is also harmful to give way to
excessive pessimism. The American people need to know what their forces
are accomplishing in Iraq, how the efforts of our servicemen and women
are transforming the lives of 25 million Iraqis for the better, and
transforming a region that has for too long accommodated despotism to
the detriment of its freedom starved populations. And both our friends
and our enemies in Iraq need to know that we have the will and resolve
to accomplish our objectives.
They also need to know that the Defense and State Departments share
the same objectives in Iraq. Today as we face the challenge of
executing the transition from the Coalition Provisional Authority to a
sovereign Iraqi government 45 days from now, we must also plan for U.S.
representation in Iraq to be conducted by a U.S. Embassy. Fortunately,
planning for this transition has been well underway within the Defense
and State Departments for some time. LTG (USA, Ret.) Mick Kicklighter
and Ambassador Frank Ricciardone lead Transition Teams for the two
Departments, and they have worked hand in glove with the CPA and
Defense and Army staffs since early January to make the transition a
success. They have formed an Interagency Transition Planning Team
(ITPT) and provide the State and Defense leadership for drafting an
Operations Plan for the transition. Experts from 16 subject matter
sectors (such as Security, Human Resources and Personnel, Facilities,
Finance, Medical and Health Services, etc.) from State and Defense
coordinate closely to draft the highly detailed, time-phased plan. The
ITPT as a whole meets almost daily, with sector leads meeting with
their teams more often as required. General Kicklighter and Ambassador
Ricciardone meet several times each week to ensure that planning and
implementation of the plan are on track.
CONCLUSION
When the President declared the end of major combat operations last
year, he noted that ``We have difficult work to do in Iraq. . . . The
transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time.'' This
prediction has turned out to be correct, although the specific nature
of some of the challenges we have encountered could not have been
foreseen a year ago. But it is important to remember how large the
stakes are and that fortitude and steadfastness are essential for
success.
Iraqis seem to understand this and are less prone to pessimism in
the face of setbacks than we are half a world away. Despite all the
violence and uncertainty caused by the enemies of a free Iraq, Iraqis
sense dramatic improvement in their everyday lives and anticipate much
more.
Iraqis recognize the challenges they face and embrace them as a
revolutionary opportunity to build a free nation and to better their
lives. Recently, Nesreen Berwari, the woman serving as the Iraqi
Minister of Municipalities and Public Works said: ``On April 9, 2003,
Iraqis were offered the opportunity to begin to dream their future.
Before April 9, 2003, we were not allowed to dream. We could not
imagine life with the kinds of positive challenges we face today.''
Minister Berwari's optimism persists even though she recently survived
a second assassination attempt on her life which killed her bodyguard.
There is an old Chinese saying, ``May you live in interesting
times.'' This saying is intended as a curse not a blessing. There are
some days when it is tempting to view events in Iraq this way.
But overall, I think we are in fact blessed with the opportunity
and the capability to help the Iraqi people to realize their goal of a
stable and representative government. And with this Committee's help,
we will begin to make this a reality with the transition to Iraqi
sovereignty next month. Recently in Houston, seven Iraqi businessmen
were fitted for artificial hands. Saddam had ordered their hands
amputated, to make them scapegoats for Iraq's economic failure. As one
of those businessmen said, ``The age of tyrants is over, the age of
good remains. God willing. Good is coming in Iraq.''
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Secretary
Wolfowitz.
Secretary Armitage.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members. I'll try
to respond, rather than going through my opening statement,
which you've kindly submitted for the record, to the individual
items you brought up, Mr. Chairman, and I'll do it very
briefly.
I want to echo Paul's comments about your kind comments
regarding us. It's been a pleasure to serve with you and in
front of you many times, through the Philippines and other
different foreign policy activities. And we're proud again to
be here today.
You mentioned that you want to see things move to autonomy
as rapidly as possible. Eleven of the Iraqi ministries right
now are autonomous, and two more this week will become
autonomous. And that means their ministers make all the
decisions, prepare the budgets, are responsible for all of the
programs, et cetera. And the CPA folks who have been in those
ministries revert to the position of senior advisor, and we
will attrit these away when the ministers themselves tell us
that they feel that they no longer need senior advisors. That's
a story, I think, that has been untold--13 of the 25 ministries
this week are autonomous.
You talked about John Negroponte. Thank you very much, and
your other Senate colleagues, for being so rapid in conducting
a hearing, and confirming the nomination.
Now, I understand the desire to have John out in Iraq as
soon as possible, but let me explain our reason. We want to
make sure that there's a clean break between Ambassador Bremer
and Ambassador Negroponte. Ambassador Negroponte is not Mr.
Bremer's successor. He is the first U.S. Ambassador to a
sovereign Iraq, and we're trying to make that point
dramatically. We also want John's expertise as we move forward
to another U.N. Security Council Resolution, which I will get
to. But we've tried to meet you halfway, sir. We chose, as the
DCM, our ambassador to Albania, who is a decorated Vietnam
combat officer. We chose him for that reason, as well as his
overall leadership skills, because we wanted to send him out
early. And he's there now. He's arranging the embassies. He's
putting together the different political shops, governance
shops, et cetera, right now. We thought it was very helpful to
have someone who, frankly, spoke the same language as our
military colleagues and one who has walked the walk, as well as
talking the talk. Jim Jeffrey is there now. He is getting the
job done for us.
You mentioned funding. We're going to need about $483
million for the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, and that is
from July until September. Right now, I can lay my hands on
$477 million. The $6 million that I don't quite have, I plan to
get by charging other agencies for their billeting, et cetera,
with the State Department. We have these cross-servicing
agreements, so that's not a particular problem. We do estimate,
as Marc Grossman told you, that it will be a little over a
billion dollars to run an embassy for fiscal year 2005, and
this money, I'm pleased to say, will be coming forward,
requesting, at the beginning of the year in a supplemental, an
administration-wide supplemental, a State and foreign
operations supplemental.
I do want to be clear, however, the President has very
kindly requested, and DOD has acceded, to continue to supply to
the U.S. Embassy what we call the LOGCAP, the Logistics
Civilian Augmentation Program, and security. And this, over a
year, amounts to about $800 million. So when I finally come
forward to you with a supplemental, then it will be, I think,
somewhat less than a billion dollars to operate the embassy.
We've got three properties that are in the process of
renovation. They will be completed by the 15th of June. One is
a residence, which will serve as a chancery. It's inside the
Green Zone. The palace, which Ambassador Bremer is in now, will
be an annex. And Ambassador Negroponte will move into the
residence which Ambassador Bremer now occupies.
A little bit about the UNSC. We desire to move ahead as
rapidly as possible, and we've had informal consultations in
New York and, most recently, with the G-8 foreign ministers
here in Washington on Friday. There's not a piece of paper that
we have put forward. We have gleaned and garnered all the ideas
of those who are most interested. We do want to await the
outcome of the Brahimi consultations. Then we would have an
actual government which we would want to support in that
resolution.
But we want to accomplish several other things, as well. We
want to make it very clear that occupation is over. Sovereignty
is Iraqis'. The assets gained from the sale of oil belong to
Iraqis now. Those type things.
We also want to talk about the security arrangements moving
forward. We do feel, under Security Council Resolution 1511 and
other associated memoranda, we have sufficient basis to
continue to operate in Iraq. However, we would want, and many
of our partners are desirous of having, a further U.N. Security
Council Resolution which makes this fact well known.
So I've tried to respond to several of your items. One, if
I may, about funding. I said, I've got about $477 million; $196
million of that will come from the OMB fourth-quarter
apportionment, $97 million of it comes from 2003 and 2004
moneys which have already been appropriated, and the $184
million remaining would be out of the so-called ``one-percent
funds,'' which, following the law, the Iraq reconstruction and
redevelopment fund, up to 1 percent of the money was allowed to
be used for administrative costs. So I think we've got a pretty
good handle on that, and I hope you will agree with me by the
end of the hearing.
So I'll stop there, sir, and look forward to questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Armitage follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard L. Armitage
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, Members of the Committee, it is always
an honor to engage with you in a dialogue about the foreign policy
challenges and opportunities facing our nation. The transition to
sovereignty and democracy in Iraq is the pivotal opportunity and
challenge for our nation at the moment, so I especially appreciate the
chance to discuss this subject with you today.
In 44 days, the Department of State takes the lead in managing and
representing U.S. interests to a sovereign Iraqi government. At this
point, you have confirmed Ambassador Negroponte, who is well prepared
for this work. We have selected a very capable Deputy Chief of Mission
in Jim Jeffrey, our current Ambassador to Albania, who already has
moved to Baghdad to smooth the transition. Nearly all of the 140 State
Department staff positions have been filled, and a number of Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) staff will stay on for a period to ensure
continuity of operations. We already have a number of the 155 Locally
Employed Staff the State Department will hire here in Washington for
training. Combined with personnel from other U.S. Government agencies,
the U.S. Mission will total up to 1,000 permanent American staff, as
well as a total of approximately 500 Locally Employed Staff. Our
temporary chancery will be ready by July 1st, and we have chosen a site
for a permanent embassy.
Of course, the Department of Defense (DOD) will also continue to
support a sizeable force in Iraq after June 30th. An Interagency
Transition Planning Team, headed by Ambassador Frank Ricciardone and
General Mick Kicklighter, is working out how our two agencies will work
together, including how our roles, missions, resources,
responsibilities, and authorities will complement and support each
other. With the ongoing primacy of security concerns, this will
obviously continue to be an important issue, and a top priority for
Ambassador Negroponte and Lieutenant General Sanchez. Indeed, the
security of our mission itself is a top priority in our transition
planning; we already have 32 Diplomatic Security staff in Iraq defining
and implementing measures to protect our staff. A total of 48
Diplomatic Security agents will serve in the mission as of July 1st.
As for funding the U.S. Mission, we are working with CPA and DOD to
project start-up and fourth quarter operating costs, as well as to
develop FY 2005 requirements. For FY 2004, the costs to stand up and
operate the U.S. mission are around $480 million. We believe these
costs are covered by the funding available from CPA's fourth quarter
operating budget, the one percent transfer of Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Funds (IRRF) available under the law, and the funding
directly appropriated to the Department of State from FY 2003 and FY
2004 supplemental appropriations. Our rough estimate of FY 2005
operating costs for the new mission amount to approximately $1 billion,
exclusive of capital facility costs for a new embassy compound. Of this
total, State Department costs for personnel and administrative support,
IT, provincial teams, and to maintain a strategic communications
capability total about $112 million. The largest cost components are
logistics and security contracts that are being managed by DOD. It is
our expectation that DOD will continue to cover logistics and security
costs until Ambassador Negroponte and his team have time to assess the
actual needs and provide an estimate we can include in a 2005
supplemental request. We plan to meet the remaining FY 2005
requirements through funds requested by the Department in the FY 2005
budget, as well as potential cost allocations to other agencies,
potential carryover from FY 2004, and the IRRF for any appropriate
reconstruction expenses.
Overall, this transition presents both opportunities and
challenges, as I noted. We have the opportunity to help secure our
long-term interests in seeing a stable, peaceful, and economically
vital region. At the same time, we have the challenge of helping a
country emerge from decades of tyranny, divide and rule tactics,
propaganda, and opprobrium. Of course, the revelations about the
terrible treatment of detainees in Iraq have complicated our challenges
and our opportunities.
The diplomats of the Department of State are accustomed to telling
the world about the strengths of our country, and that is usually an
easy task--our strengths are manifestly obvious. It is in times of
trouble, however, that the world sees the strength of our system
actually tested. With all eyes transfixed on the images of American
soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, it is one of those
times.
Americans are human beings; we are not above injustice and sin. But
because we are American, we can also say that we are not above the
law--no one is above the law. We will hold every person who bears
responsibility for the human rights violations in Iraq accountable. As
President Bush has said, we will compensate those who suffered. In his
meetings with Iraqis, Ambassador Bremer has expressed deep remorse and
the resolve to address these violations. And while accountability for
individual soldiers is necessary, that alone is insufficient. As
General Abizaid has noted, we are also correcting the system that
accommodated such abuses in the first place.
The Department of State is also taking measures to deal with the
damage these violations have brought to our country, particularly to
our efforts in Iraq. We are engaging in an open dialogue with other
nations and with the news media, with a focus on the Islamic world. I
want to underscore, however, that our outreach goes beyond a frank
discussion of Abu Ghraib. There are hundreds of thousands of Americans
around the world who are engaged every day in positive and productive
actions to strengthen human rights, democracy, and open economies, to
give aid to people in need of help, as well as to protect the security
of this country.
I believe we all have a responsibility, as official representatives
of this government, to provide a balanced picture. Personally, in the
course of the past week alone, I have tried to do so in interviews with
a roundtable of Arabic print media, Al-Ikhbariya TV, and Lebanon's an-
Nahar newspaper. In the past few days, Secretary Powell has talked to
al-Arabiya and the World Economic Forum in Jordan. As for gaining the
good opinion of Iraqis and the international community about our
efforts in Iraq, Ambassador Bremer and his team, along with Ambassador
Blackwill, are meeting with government officials, civil leaders,
clerics, tribal leaders and many others from across Iraqi society to
talk about American policy and intentions and to seek input.
Ultimately, however, our overall strategy for success in Iraq will
be the most persuasive proof of our good intentions. That strategy is
entirely sound, even in light of shifting events on the ground: we must
succeed in helping Iraq to become a stable and successful independent
state with a democratic, representative government and the seeds of a
strong economy. That will require progress on the political, economic,
and security fronts, so allow me to turn now to the ``way ahead.''
The United States and coalition countries have spent the last year
preparing Iraq to assume sovereignty by building up the political
system, from the ground up and the top down. First, we have provided
the training, advice, equipment, and facilities to help construct
local, regional, and national governing structures. Indeed, as of our
last count, there are 18 governorate councils, 90 district councils,
194 city councils, and 445 neighborhood councils. At the national
level, there are 11 Ministries already under direct Iraqi control; and
more will be transferred in the coming weeks leading up to June 30. We
will, however, continue to provide some 155 liaison officers to these
Ministries after the transition. We also supported Iraqis as they
drafted and adopted clearly defined principles and targets for the
national government in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which
will be in effect as of July 1st and will stay in effect until a
constitutionally-based, elected government takes office.
The Interim Iraqi Government is taking shape. At the invitation of
the Iraqi Governing Council and with full U.S. support, the United
Nations has played a leading role in advising and assisting Iraqis in
forming this interim government and preparing for elections. Ambassador
Lakhdar Brahimi, who successfully helped steer the Bonn process and
political transition in Afghanistan, is continuing his broad
consultations with Iraqi leaders across the country. We welcome his
proposal to establish by early June an interim government led by a
Prime Minister, along with a President, and two Deputy Presidents. A
Council of Ministers would report to the Prime Minister. An Advisory
Body, selected in July by a National Conference, would serve alongside
the Executive, but with no legislative authority. We have full
confidence in Ambassador Brahimi, and not just because of his
demonstrated competency in this area. We also have confidence because
we are working in cooperation for the same ends.
The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) will have full sovereignty, but
as spelled out in the TAL, it will serve for a limited term. The main
focus of this interim government will be to take the country to an
elected government in early 2005. The IIG will also take charge of the
daily administration of the country, including the security and safety
of the Iraqi people and continued progress in the economic recovery.
As for the economy, the Coalition Provisional Authority reports
important progress. Electric power production has exceeded pre-war
levels, and more to the point, is now being distributed more widely and
equitably across the country. Under the previous regime, much of the
distribution had been concentrated on the Baghdad and Tikrit areas.
Less than half of the population had access to potable water before the
war; now two-thirds has access. Wheat production in the fertile
Central-South region is up by 60 percent. Oil production has surpassed
prewar levels. More than 5 million children are back in school, many of
them vaccinated for the first time. The port and airport are fully
functional for the first time in years and the Central Bank is fully
operational. Of particular significance in a country where unemployment
and underemployment together may be as high as 50 percent, the CPA has
helped create nearly half a million jobs. The foundation for a healthy
economy is in place and our efforts will continue. The Secretary of
State, through the Chief of Mission, will assume ultimate authority for
all of the projects and contracts as of 1 July.
As we saw yesterday with the assassination of Iraqi Governing
Council President Izzedin Saleem, security will continue to be the
seminal challenge for a sovereign Iraqi government. For that reason,
the TAL spells out an Iraqi desire to keep the Multi-National Force
(MNF) in place, with an Iraqi security force at its core. Both the TAL
and UN Security Council Resolution 1511 provide the legal framework for
that ongoing presence. In addition, the TAL gives the elected
transitional government the authority to conclude additional, binding
international agreements relevant to the MNF. We have already begun
consultations on a new UN Security Council resolution, as well, but
want to be careful not to get ahead of the political process within
Iraq.
We will continue to recruit and train Iraqi forces to eventually
take responsibility for security, and all security assistance will
continue to be under DOD authority after June 30th with the policy
guidance of the Chief of Mission. I would like to express our high
level of confidence in Major General David Petraeus, who will be
leading the effort to train and equip the Iraqi military. He has
already demonstrated, in his command of the 101st Airborne, a high
degree of success and skill in this environment, and we look forward to
working with him.
In addition, Ambassador Bremer, Ambassador Blackwill and their
colleagues, as well as Mr. Brahimi, are also consulting widely with
Iraqis on security issues, a pattern that Ambassador Negroponte and the
coalition military commanders in theater will strengthen and deepen.
Indeed, dialogue and cooperation with Iraqi leaders about the
situations in Fallujah and Najaf has been essential in moving toward
resolution in both places. In both situations, a sovereign Iraqi
government would stand to inherit the same security challenges with
which we are now confronted. Antipathy to the occupation may have
generated some popular sympathy, but I believe most Iraqi citizens
recognize that these lawless, violent groups do not represent their
interests.
The antipathy is understandable. Iraqis are a proud people who have
endured a great deal of hardship. They have wanted their freedom for
many years, and now they want their sovereignty. The sacrifice of brave
Iraqis, such as Izzedin Saleem, is testament to the will of so many
Iraqis to secure a better future. So while I recognize that there are
still details to be worked out over the course of six short weeks, I
believe our ability to see progress in our overall strategy for Iraq
hinges on sovereignty.
I am confident that on July 1st Ambassador Negroponte will take the
reins of a large Embassy, with a highly experienced Deputy Chief of
Mission and an eager country team. There will be more than 100,000 U.S.
forces in the country, working alongside the forces of at least 32
other nations, including Iraq. When the Ambassador calls on the Iraqi
leadership, he will meet with the Prime Minister and President of a
sovereign nation.
There will be much to accomplish, of course. The country will still
be immersed in all the confusion of a dramatic transition: elections
will need to be held; a constitution will need to be drafted; and
economic reconstruction will need to continue. The U.S. commitment to a
strategy of success also will continue unabated, and we will continue
to define success as a democratic and prosperous Iraq, at peace within
itself and with its neighbors. I appreciate the support this Committee
already has given the Department of State in reaching for that success,
and I look forward to discussing our strategy with you today.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Armitage.
We'll try to have a 10-minute question round at this point.
We have good attendance. I will proceed with questions.
I appreciate your response to some of the questions that I
had raised in the opening statement. I'm going to ask that you
respond, both of you, to questions that will be submitted for
the record. We have gotten into a detailed list of questions
regarding the $18.4 billion. These are too voluminous for a 10-
minute question-and-answer period, but it is important that you
have an opportunity to detail what is being done with the $18.4
billion, or what will be done, and what problems have occurred
in terms of our bidding, contracting, and so forth.
Ambassador Brahimi will soon name Iraqi leaders. What is
our plan, or what should be our plan, for Mr. Jeffrey if he is
onboard in Baghdad, or for General Abizaid, General Sanchez, to
visit with these people? My thought, as I've expressed in other
hearings, is that it would be very helpful to have some
rehearsal offstage before the curtain opens on the 1st of July,
specifically about these issues of putting an Iraqi face on
both governance and security, and what that means. What I
suspect it may mean, in terms of many Iraqis, is that they will
want to take more responsibility, and we may wish that that was
the case. Clearly, in Fallujah, we have had a step forward that
was very substantial in terms of both the vetting of the
general and the troops. Mr. Bremer has pointed out that this
should not serve as a model of how things may go elsewhere, but
it certainly is interesting as an instructive, pragmatic
example currently in the security area. As for governance, it's
never been quite clear what sovereignty meant. And, really, as
you pointed out, Secretary Armitage, 11 of the 25 ministries,
as I understand it, are presently passed over and are moving,
but, Mr. Bremer points out, we probably won't get to the end of
the 25 list before June 30. Can either of you describe, in the
security area or in the governance area, how these new leaders
are coming together, so that there is at least, if not a smooth
transition, some modus vivendi for people to talk, as opposed
to a public row as to who does what and push-back by the
Iraqis? Would you have a go at this to begin with?
Mr. Armitage. I'd be glad to, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
what Ambassador Brahimi is doing is finally coming up with a
list that will be winnowed down to 30 names, and his suggestion
is for a President, two Vice Presidents, Prime Minister, and 26
Ministries, because it will include the Ministry of Defense, as
well. He is also going around the country--he was in Irbil 2
days ago, with the late Izzedine Salim, as a matter of fact--
talking with Iraqis about various lists of names, and winnowing
them down. We've seen some of them. We haven't seen them all. I
don't think it does any good to talk about them publicly,
because what matters is not so much what I think or Paul
thinks; it's what Iraqis think about those names.
Once they are named, and we hope to have that done by the
end of the month of May, perhaps the first week of June--and
then the TAL annex, which we have spoken about in the past, the
pen is held by Mr. Pachachi, and he and his colleagues will
write the TAL annex, which will document the responsibilities
of the Iraqi Interim Government.
I don't expect that document to be extraordinarily
voluminous, because this is not an elected government. Mr.
Brahimi and Ayatollah al-Sistani and others have spoken about
the need to run the day-to-day business of government, and not
to be involved in long-term negotiations between the long-term
agreements internationally, et cetera. So I would say that we
have a month or so, roughly, to work with the Iraqi Interim
Government, to make it very clear what sovereignty means. And
it's not limited. They are sovereign. This will be encompassed
or spoken to in the U.N. Security Council resolution.
The Chairman. Secretary Wolfowitz.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I don't have a lot to add to that. I agree
with all of it. We view moving forward in security areas
definitely as something that's going to be a partnership. So as
soon as we know who our counterparts are, I think the kind of
dialog that you describe is something that should take place,
and hopefully before the actual date that the government takes
over.
You correctly said Iraqis look forward to taking more
responsibility. I think you suggested that we look forward to
them taking more responsibility. That's part of this whole
process.
One of the limitations, of course, is that this will not be
an elected government. There will be an elected government at
the end of this year, and I think Iraqis probably want this
government to take more responsibility, but not too much.
To be helpful, Mr. Chairman, we have an easel chart that
lists some of the specific powers and responsibilities that
would flow to this interim government, according, at least, to
the Transition Administrative Law, and I think it bears out
what Rich Armitage said, they are very extensive administrative
responsibilities. But the most important task they have is to
help organize and run elections for an elected Transitional
Government at the end of this year.
[The chart referred to follows:]
The Chairman. On the point of elections, there would be
some virtue, I would think, in having elections for somebody
even prior to December. By that, I mean, a constitutional
assembly. It might be persons with some regional powers. But it
appears to me, at this point, that the legitimizing of Iraqi
leadership through people voting for it--we have some votes on
the board here--may be very important, despite the formality
that we've been talking about, in December and January and then
the following December and what have you, so that, in fact,
there is a sense of sharing. If there are insurgents, if there
are terrorists who don't like this situation, they're going to
be shooting at Iraqis as well as Americans. There are going to
be some Iraqi people up front with the supporting cast of
Americans and the security and the governance situations, as
opposed to the other way around. And it seems to me, without
knowing precisely who the new leaders are going to be, what
kind of responsibilities they have contemplated, how we could
use the U.N. food rolls that the press may be more rough and
ready than the fastidious work that we would like to see later
on. Have either of you thought about that? And what comment do
you have?
Mr. Armitage. Mr. Chairman, the U.N. Representative for
Electoral Processes, Carina Perelli, has been in Iraq since
April, and she has been trying to set the atmosphere for these
elections. The first task that she has undertaken is, again,
garnering nominations from Iraqis themselves for the post of
what we call Federal Election Commissioner, they would call
Iraqi Election Commissioners, seven of them. And there will
eventually be seven. She's winnowing down those names. They
will be chosen by an international group of experts in
electoral law. There will also be three Directors General, for
a total of ten people. This is the first step in getting to
where you want to be and where we all want to be in late
December, early January 2004/2005.
She has noted, as you have noted, that there's something
contradictory about the ballot and the bullet, but she's also
noted that in the spirit that she sees among the Iraqi people,
that when they see that they actually are going to have a buy-
in and--that means a vote, a say--that their desire for this
becomes much greater than the ability of enemies to defeat
them. And she has noted past U.N. experiences in Timor and
other places where elections took place in an atmosphere of
some violence.
There are many municipal elections and neighborhood council
elections which are being held with stunning regularity, and
I've got the number in this book, and I can't memorize the
whole book--I think it's about 60,000 Iraqis hold some sort of
elected position, some sort of position or another, not just in
the Kurdish area, where you'd expect it, but throughout Iraq.
And it's not a position that comes without some danger, because
some of them have been assassinated, because they look like
they might be leaders who could stand on a larger stage. So
some of what you suggest is ongoing.
The Chairman. Let me intrude before my time is up. To what
extent will the Transitional Administrative Law that has been
promulgated by the Governing Council now--that suggests 25
percent participation by Iraqi women, as a minimum, the
freedom-of-speech and the freedom-of-religion clauses, as well
as other things that are very important, we hope, to Iraqis,
and very important to us--what's going to happen to that? Is
this the law as we proceed?
Mr. Armitage. The so-called TAL, the Transitional
Administrative Law, will be the law of the land, and it
embodies a stunning array of rights never before held by the
Iraqis, and it will last and cannot be amended except by a
Transitional Government, which would be in place with the
election of a 275-person National Assembly in January. They
have the ability to amend laws. Now, I'm not going to say that
it's perfect and I can guarantee you that women's rights and
religious rights will be respected as we'd want them. But we've
faced this in Afghanistan, we've faced it earlier this year,
and we prevailed. And I believe we prevailed not because of the
wisdom and the strength of our arguments, but because Iraqis
hold their religion very dear, but they also hold the idea of
secular government to be something very worthy. So I have some
optimism we'll prevail.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, if I might emphasize a point
you made at the end of your question, that this is a key part
of winning the military battle, as well. And, in fact, page 7
of my statement, I got this quote from that notorious letter
from that notorious terrorist, Mr. Zarqawi, where he says,
``The problem is, you end up having an army and police
connected to the people. How can we kill their cousins and sons
after the Americans start withdrawing? This is the democracy.
We will have no pretext.'' And then elsewhere he refers to that
as ``suffocation.'' It's winning for us, it's losing for them.
And, if I might add, too, the point Secretary Armitage made
about elections, it was a very interesting report recently in
the Guardian of London, that in some, I believe it was, 15
local elections in southern Iraq, in most of those the
Islamists lost the election, and I think that tells you
something, also, about what Rich said, that these are very
religious people, but that doesn't mean they want a religious
tyranny imposed on them.
The Chairman. Good point.
Senator Feingold.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold
First I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member for
holding this important hearing, and to thank our witnesses for being
here today.
It is vitally important that this committee seek out and insist on
answers from the administration about just where the path of current
U.S. policy is leading us in Iraq, about what additional commitments of
American resources will be made to this endeavor, and about whether we
have a viable political strategy in Iraq and a plan for increasing
burden-sharing. I want to hear about all of these issues today. I want
to hear about the implications of the sarin-filled artillery shell
found over the weekend, and the murder of the President of the Iraqi
Governing Council yesterday. I want to hear about where we stand in
getting a transitional government in place in time for next month's
transition. Most importantly, I want to hear about how U.S. policy in
Iraq is affecting our capacity to protect our national security and
pursue our national interests overall. So in many senses I eagerly
await the testimony of our witnesses.
But there are a few things I don't want to hear today. I don't want
to hear that attacks on our troops and terrible instability in Iraq are
actually somehow positive indicators that we are on the right track.
And I don't want to hear that reasonable estimates of the scope and
scale of the U.S. commitment in terms of troops, timelines, and
taxpayer dollars are utterly unknowable. We have heard all of that
before, and the American people--especially the brave men and women in
uniform who are making great sacrifices on the ground--deserve so much
better than obfuscation or misguided, wishful thinking. The stakes are
terribly high, the current indicators are deeply troubling. Getting our
policy right must start with honesty about what is wrong. We cannot
afford to wait another day.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first thank all of you, and especially Secretary
Armitage and Secretary Wolfowitz, for being before us today. It
has always been important for you to appear before this
committee as often as possible, but let me suggest that I hope
this is the beginning of a pattern. The American people, as you
know, are extremely irate and concerned about what is happening
in Iraq, and I think I can honestly say it goes all the way
across the political spectrum. There has never been a time when
we need your answers and your guidance more, and I am hoping
this is the beginning of a very regular opportunity to have
contact with you and ask these kinds of questions.
Secretary Wolfowitz, I want to ask you again how long we
can reasonably anticipate needing a substantial U.S. troop
presence in Iraq. I know that you can't give me an exact
timeframe. We've been through this before. But since our forces
are on the ground training Iraqi security forces and,
therefore, we are in an excellent position to judge their
capacities and to estimate how long it will be before they can
provide for their own security, I would think you would be able
to give me at least a reasonable estimate. We've seen that
slap-dash efforts to train and deploy Iraqi security forces can
lead to dangerous failures and instability. So I guess what I
want to know is, how long will it take to properly train Iraqis
such that they'll be able to provide for their own country's
security? And for how long will security be primarily the
responsibility of U.S. forces?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, you know, because you've said it in
your question, the course of war is simply not something one
can determine. We can say, I think, with reasonable confidence,
that we have a plan underway to train and equip and organize
very substantial Iraqi security forces by the end of this year.
We finally have the various obstacles to funding, I think,
unblocked. I hope that's true. There have been some critical
delays that have done harm. We have unity of command for doing
this, all the five Iraqi security forces will be--training and
equipping and organizing of them--will be the responsibility of
a single lieutenant general, who happens to be the general who
commanded for a year up in Mosul in Northern Iraq, with Iraqi
security forces. In fact, it performed impressively in the
fighting in the last month. So I think we're on a course to
substantial Iraqi security forces by the end of this year. But
I can't tell you how strong the enemy will be. I can't tell
you--predict exactly how things will go. But our goal is to put
responsibility in their hands as quickly as we can, and not too
rapidly to create problems.
Senator Feingold. So if I were to look at a memo where
you're planning your goals, and the goal was stated that by the
end of this year the United States will no longer be primarily
responsible for the security, is that a realistic goal?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, that's more than what I just said.
What I said is, there will be substantial capable Iraqi
security forces by the end of this year, we believe. That's our
plan. How much they will still need help from the United
States, I can't predict. We want it to be as little as
possible. And I'll give you, sort of, real examples. In some of
the fighting in recent weeks, Iraqi security forces have
performed well, have been able to do things like going into
mosques to seize weapons supplies. That's something that we
would always prefer be done by Iraqis and not by Americans. In
the fighting I referred to up in Mosul, where the enemy
attacked the government house, the Governor, who, by the way,
is a Sunni Arab, stayed there through the night, through the
fighting. The police initially left, because they were
outgunned. The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps stayed and fought,
fought off the enemy. The police came back. Through all of it,
they were in touch with General Ham, who commanded the American
forces there. And I'm quite sure that the knowledge that
General Ham was there to back them up if needed probably
emboldened them and gave them courage. And that's the kind of
arrangement we need to have.
We're in this to win, as I think you agree, and winning
means having the Iraqis take as much responsibility as they
possibly can, but also not putting them too far, so far out in
front that they fail.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Let me ask a question about the transition. Let me start
with Secretary Armitage. When the CPA ceases to exist, what
authority will take over the implementation of the $20 billion
reconstruction program that has been financed by the U.S.
taxpayer? Who's going to be in charge of that? And I'd like to
also hear Secretary Wolfowitz's feelings on it.
Mr. Armitage. All appropriated U.S. moneys, sir, the Chief
of Mission, John Negroponte, will have the responsibility for
it. For Iraqi money, which will be theirs, and they'll have
responsibility, and they can contract with whomever they like.
Senator Feingold. So the Ambassador will be in charge of
the entire $20 billion?
Mr. Armitage. Correct.
Senator Feingold. Secretary Wolfowitz, do you concur with
that?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I do. I'd point out that Iraqi funds are
very substantial.
Senator Feingold. So the State Department will now have
authority over the reconstruction funds. That's correct, isn't
it?
Mr. Armitage. That's correct.
Senator Feingold. Secretary Armitage, when do we expect to
see a new Security Council Resolution on Iraq, and what will
be, in your view, the substance of the resolution?
Mr. Armitage. We and our friends on the Security Council
are desirous of moving forward shortly after we find the shape
and the names of a new Iraqi government. We think it would be
very important to have as one of the elements of the U.N.
Security Council Resolution support for that Iraqi Interim
Government [IIG]. Other elements which may very well find
themselves in this will be end of occupation, make a
declaration of sovereignty for Iraq, make it clear that Iraqi
assets, particularly oil assets, belong to Iraqis and would be
managed by them, discuss security, though we don't feel we need
more, if you'll allow me to use the term, ``international
cover,'' and we think it's a very good thing and it'll be very
helpful for many of the other Security Council Members to have
a specific reference to security arrangements in Iraq during
the time of the Interim Iraqi Government. Those are some of the
things. There might be other elements. Everyone's got different
ideas. But I'm pleased to say in the consultations informally
in New York, and more recently that Secretary Powell had with
the G-8, there was a pretty good comity of views. So I find
everybody's within a certain box, and I think we'll be able to
do this pretty well.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Followup to Secretary Wolfowitz, there are reports that
Iraq, our troop strength in Iraq, will remain at about 135,000
troops until the end of 2005. Is that report inaccurate?
Mr. Wolfowitz. We don't know what it'll be. We've had
changes, as you know, month by month, we have several different
plans to be able to deal with the different levels that might
be required. Our current level is higher than we had planned
for at this time this year. I have no idea what it'll----
Senator Feingold. So it could well be accurate, then.
Mr. Wolfowitz. It could be. It could be more, it could be
less, Senator.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Secretary Armitage, I've served, as you know, on this
committee and on the Subcommittee on African Affairs for almost
12 years. One name that keeps coming up and is very familiar is
the name of Victor Bout, because he appears at the center of
illicit arms trafficking that has fueled devastating conflicts
in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and elsewhere. Is Victor
Bout, or any firm associate with Victor Bout, providing air
freight services for Coalition forces in Iraq, as the Financial
Times alleged in an article published yesterday? Has the United
States opposed, including Bout on an asset freeze list being
compiled by the United Nations, which targets individual who
were involved with the criminal regime of former Liberian
President Charles Taylor? And if so, why?
Mr. Armitage. As you, I have seen the name Victor Bout. I
believe he's a Ukrainian arms merchant, merchant of death. I
certainly hope what you suggest is not true. And as far as I'm
concerned, he ought to be on any asset freeze list and anything
else you can do to him.
Senator Feingold. So would you followup with me on any
awareness of that, that might be available from the State
Department?
Mr. Armitage. Of course.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Secretary Wolfowitz, do you know
anything about the question I just asked with regard to Mr.
Bout? Has he been involved with providing air freight services
for Coalition forces in Iraq?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I don't know more than what you and
Secretary Armitage know, but I share your concern about it, and
I will work with Secretary Armitage to look into it and try to
fix the problem if there is one.
[The following information was subsequently provided:]
United States Department of State,
Washington, DC 20520, June 2, 2004.
The Honorable Russ Feingold,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.
Dear Senator Feingold:
Deputy Secretary Armitage has asked that I respond to your question
of May 18 regarding the U.S. position on including Victor Bout on a UN
asset freeze. We support the designation of Bout for the asset freeze
in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1532, as well as his
designation under any other applicable sanctions measures.
Resolution 1532 was adopted unanimously on March 12 to prevent
former Liberian President Charles Taylor, his immediate family members,
senior officials of the former Taylor regime and Taylor's close allies
or associates from using misappropriated funds and property to
interfere in the restoration of peace and stability of Liberia. Bout
was a major supplier of arms to former Liberian President Taylor and,
as noted by a recent UN experts' report, it would be possible to
reactivate quickly the former weapon supply networks, a step which
would have ``grave implications for peace in Liberia.'' We believe that
designating Bout as subject to the assets freeze will impair Taylor's
potential access to arms, and assist in the restoration of peace in
Liberia.
With regard to your question on whether Viktor Bout or any
enterprise associated with Viktor Bout is providing air freight
services for coalition forces in Iraq, we are researching Department of
State procurement records to look at any air freight services we have
contracted in this regard. Preliminary results of this research into
Iraq freight contracts are negative, but we have not yet completed this
effort and are sending a cable to overseas posts to be certain we have
complete information. We will update you when we have completed our
investigation of State records. We cannot speak for DOD/CPA, which
handle the larger portion of contracting for Iraq.
In connection with our data search, however, we would like to
inform you that we did identify two cases in which a freight forwarder
under contract to the Department subcontracted without our prior
knowledge, for freight service to destinations outside of and
unconnected to Iraq, with air charter services believed to be connected
with Viktor Bout. In view of this, we will send instructions to posts
and Despatch Agencies overseas to ensure that contracts with freight
forwarders preclude any use of entities connected to Bout. Should you
require further information, we would be happy to arrange for a
classified briefing.
I hope this information is helpful to you.
Sincerely,
Paul V. Kelly,
Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Mr. Wolfowitz, in the lead-up to the war in Iraq, I
repeatedly raised questions which I felt were never
satisfactorily answered about what exactly the plan was for
dealing with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. And given the
number of troops we had on the ground when Baghdad fell, and
the wide-scale looting that ensued, I have remained uncertain
that a viable plan for securing this material ever existed.
Lately, concerns about WMD in Iraq have fallen out of favor in
the administration's remarks about Iraq, because, at least as
far as we could tell, we've not found what was advertised. But
yesterday, as you know, we learned that an artillery round
containing sarin gas was employed as an IED near Baghdad
International Airport. I'm wondering what this means to you, in
terms of what we did and what plans we had for securing any
weapons of mass destruction as we entered Iraq and entered
Baghdad.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Well, in fact, as I think--I know we've
briefed the Armed Services Committee in detail, and we had very
extensive plans that transformed into what was called the Iraq
Survey Group to find the weapons of mass destruction, to locate
them, to make sure, to the best of our ability, they didn't
leak out elsewhere. And when David Kay stepped down, one of the
reasons why we felt it was very important to continue the work
of the Iraq Survey Group is not only to find out what may have
happened to those things, but also to secure them if they're
around. And I would note, also, according to Stuart Cohen, at
least, who was the national intelligence officer who prepared
the NIE, that some 2,000 Iraqi officers were deliberately
looting files and hard drives and so forth during the fall of
Baghdad. So there was some pretty active work on their side,
apparently, at trying to destroy at least records. I don't know
any more than what you've read in the newspapers about this
device that has been discovered. It is obviously something that
we're very concerned about, and we're going to try to find out
about it as much as we can.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Chairman, I'm sure my time's up. Let
me just conclude by saying a number of us started, in late July
and early August of 2002, to raise these very questions, to ask
what was the plan with regard to a possible negative reaction
from the Iraqi people, and also, specifically, what was the
plan with regard to securing any weapons of mass destruction.
I, frankly, feel we were never given real answers to that, and
I have a feeling it's because there wasn't a serious plan. And
I think, at this point, we're paying a serious price for it.
But I do thank the witnesses for their answers. And,
Secretary if you'd like to respond----
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, there was a serious plan I'd be
happy to give you for the record, the full table of
organization and the number of people that were planned to do
it. A lot of thought went into it. It may not have been
perfect, but there was a lot of work done on it.
Senator Feingold. Well, I wish that we had been told about
these plans, because whenever we made an effort to ask about
it, we were just told to trust you, and we didn't get the
assurance that we needed. But I would like to receive those
materials.
[The following information was subsequently provided:]
The material provided was classified. [Deleted]
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Gentlemen, welcome.
Secretary Armitage, going back to the question Senator
Feingold asked regarding a new U.N. resolution, how necessary
is a new U.N. resolution as we move toward June 30?
Mr. Armitage. It's very desirable. It's not exactly
necessary, except in political terms. I think politically this
will find great favor with our major Security Council partners,
both the P5 and the elected ten, and I think it makes a rather
dramatic point to the Iraqi people, sir.
Senator Hagel. Well, politically speaking, as we all know,
that's the essence of the effort here. If we lose the Iraqi
people, we've lost.
Mr. Armitage. Exactly.
Senator Hagel. So I would hope that there is serious work
being done now on working with our allies on getting a new U.N.
resolution. You can assure this committee that's being done.
Mr. Armitage. I'll assure the committee, I'll assure you
personally it is being done, and it's being done almost on a
daily basis.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
What additional resources could we expect from our
partners, those not now participating in the effort in Iraq,
if, in fact, we were able to get a new U.N. resolution?
Resources, meaning troops, meaning money, meaning training. Are
we anticipating that?
Mr. Armitage. Let me parse it, if I may, Senator. We would
be desirous of getting greater NATO involvement, although 17 of
the 26 NATO countries are on the ground with us in Iraq. There
aren't large numbers of ground forces in NATO. Only the French
have large ground forces. I think it's very unlikely that they
may be involved.
One possible involvement for them on the ground might be if
the U.N. Security Council resolution there's a call to provide
forces to protect the U.N. as they go about their business of
elections, et cetera, and that might be something that might
find some favor.
We would be desirous of engaging NATO in greater talks,
particularly about providing headquarters, perhaps where the
Polish division has been, something of that nature. But I
think, in candor, it's a little premature.
A new U.N. Security Council resolution could possibly
encourage some of the South Asian nations to step up a little
more, and that would certainly be a target of opportunity.
Senator Hagel. What about Middle Eastern countries?
Mr. Armitage. I think it's unlikely. We've had discussions
recently with King Abdullah, and I went around to the gulf, who
didn't specifically ask for forces, but there's a lot of
neuralgia that exists in Iraq evolving around the neighbors,
and I think it might be a little premature.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, I might add that we've been asking
NATO for help, actually going back to December 2002--I did when
I was in Brussels--and specifically said even those countries
that may not support the war could contribute afterwards to
reconstruction. But as Secretary Armitage said, their capacity
has, unfortunately, declined substantially over the last 10
years, and even in Afghanistan, where NATO has an important
role and has made a lot of commitments, they're having some
trouble meeting some of their commitments, even in Afghanistan.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Let me take that point, Mr.
Secretary, and ask about the reports, which I understand are
accurate, that we will be moving 3,600 American troops from
Korea into a brigade, the second division, into Iraq. Was that
planned?
Mr. Wolfowitz. It was--let me put it this way, we have been
discussing for some time with our Asian colleagues, with the
Congress, the whole restructuring of the U.S. global footprint.
We have already made some adjustments to our posture in Korea,
in both directions. We've moved troops off of the DMZ, where,
frankly, they were performing nothing except a kind of useless
and, indeed, I would say, counterproductive trip-wire function.
We are investing a great deal in increasing our capability to
reinforce Korea, to the tune of, I believe the number is--well,
it's over $10 billion of various force improvements. But it was
concluded, over a year ago, that it was long overdue to reduce
the strain on our Army that comes from having these continuous
1-year unaccompanied tours in Korea. So we had planned on some
reductions. We need a brigade, an extra brigade, in Iraq, and,
in fact, the brigade in Korea is ideally suited for that.
Senator Hagel. My understanding is that this will mean
that, for this brigade moving to Iraq from Korea, it's an
additional 12-month commitment in addition to the unaccompanied
12-month commitment they have just finished. Is that right?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Do you know, General Sharp?
General Sharp. It will be a 12-month commitment, sir. As
you know, we rotate troops into Korea on a continuous basis, so
about half of them will have been in Korea already 6 months. So
some of the tours will be very short, they will be 12 months;
others will go up to a maximum of 23 months.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
So this was discussed with the Congress, the possibility of
moving a combat brigade from Korea into Iraq. Is that what you
just said, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Wolfowitz. With the leadership of the committees, yes.
Senator Hagel. So Senator Warner and Senator Levin were
consulted on this, and they knew about it.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Either they or their staffs were, yes.
Senator Hagel. They or their staffs knew about it?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I have been told that, yes, sir. And I
consulted with several Senators.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Wolfowitz, how will prisoners, detainees, be handled
after the transition of government in Iraq?
Mr. Armitage. May I, Senator?
Senator Hagel. Secretary Armitage.
Mr. Armitage. Right now, two classes. There are prisoners
of war, and there are criminals. Criminals are handled right
now by Iraqis. The management of the military prisons is that
the U.S. military is working with the Ministry of Justice and,
after the turnover, it is my understanding that we want, as
rapidly as possible, to put those into the hands of Iraqis.
Senator Hagel. As rapidly as possible. Do we have any idea
what that means?
Mr. Armitage. I don't have that, sir.
Senator Hagel. Does anybody?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I don't.
Senator Hagel. It's a fairly significant issue, as we all
know. There's been a little attention brought to this issue the
last few weeks, and I would have thought that this government
would put some time into this, especially what we've just been
through the last 2 weeks. Can someone get back to the committee
with some plan?
Mr. Wolfowitz. We absolutely will. We agree with you on the
importance of it, Senator.
[The following information was subsequently provided:]
United States Department of State,
Washington, DC 20520, June 18, 2004.
The Honorable Chuck Hagel,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.
Dear Senator Hagel:
I would like to follow up on an exchange between you and Deputy
Secretary Armitage at the May 18 SFRC hearing on Iraq. You asked for
more information on how detainees will be handled after the June 30
transition.
There are several categories of detainees currently under Coalition
control, the most important of which are High-Value Detainees (HVD's)
and security internees. HVD's number less than 100 and are comprised
primarily of former regime officials, including Saddam Hussein. A small
number of foreign fighters have also been captured. Security internees
are individuals detained by coalition forces in the course of counter-
insurgency operations. There are currently several thousand security
internees; they comprise the majority of detainees in Iraq.
The Multinational Force (MNF-I) will have sufficient legal
authority under international law to detain suspected insurgents after
the June 30 transition. However, we believe that, as a matter of
principle, the incarceration of Iraqis on Iraqi soil is a matter for
which Iraqi government authorities should assume responsibility.
Therefore, as Mr. Armitage told you in the hearing, we are working to
develop a process for the orderly transfer of authority over detainees
to the Iraqi government.
Both the CPA and Major General Miller are working hard in Iraq to
build Iraq's capability to manage detainees, including training guard
forces and putting in place judicial mechanisms to ensure internees are
subject to due process. For Saddam and other senior Iraqi implicated in
atrocities against the Iraqi people, we are working with the JIG to
identify a suitable holding facility or, if necessary, construct one.
Our approach to working through these complexities is based on
three principles. First, we need to respect Iraq's sovereignty and the
inherent responsibility for its citizens. Second, those who have
committed crimes against the Iraqi people or the Coalition should face
justice in an Iraqi-led process. Third, the continuing safety and
security of the Iraqi people and the MNF forces is paramount.
We are engaging PM Allawi and his government to develop a
coordination mechanism between the MNF and the Iraqi government
officials on transferring detainee operations to Iraq based on the
three principles listed above.
I hope you find this information useful. More details will take
shape as we discuss transitional arrangements in the coming weeks with
the newly appointed government. We will gladly keep you and your staff
apprised.
Sincerely,
Paul V. Kelly,
Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Secretary Wolfowitz, Secretary Armitage, you know, about
the latest Washington Post stories regarding polls. Now, I
don't subscribe completely to polls, but just for everyone's
quick review here, last week the Washington Post reported, on a
recent poll conducted by the CPA, 80 percent of Iraqis lack
confidence in the CPA, 82 percent disapprove of the United
States and allied militaries in Iraq; furthermore, 45 percent
of those polled in Baghdad, 67 percent polled in Basra, said
they backed Muqtada al-Sadr. This was before the prison abuse
issue. Then there was a subsequent poll taken, as well. How
concerned are you with these numbers? Do you believe these
numbers?
Secretary Wolfowitz.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think we are concerned about them. And, in
fact, the reason why we have wanted to move toward Iraqi self-
government is so that the Iraqis feel that its their people who
are running their country, it's their security forces that are
dealing with their country. As you say, it's hard to know the
reliability of polling data, and especially in a country where
people are, to put it mildly, not used to telling the truth to
anyone, although it is striking how some of these polls do seem
to show important things. One of them is a poll that I've seen
that shows very rapidly declining approval of our forces, but
pretty steady confidence in Iraqi security forces. I think it
says that we're on the right track in moving as rapidly as we
can to Iraqi self-government and Iraqi self-defense. We don't
have an infinite amount of time, though.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Secretary Armitage.
Mr. Armitage. As with Paul, I'm very concerned about it. I
would note, though, usually if you look at the question a
little more closely, it's, ``We'd like you out of here, but not
now.'' Our forces, who are operating around Najaf anaconda-
like, closed in a bit on Muqtada al-Sadr, have found the people
coming out thanking them for these activities. So we're very
concerned, but I think it's a more complicated picture than
that poll would represent.
Senator Hagel. Let me ask you both this. Do you believe a
rising sense of nationalism in Iraq, if that's happening, is a
result mainly of a target of the United States or an anti-
American sense as much as anything else that may be occurring?
Mr. Armitage. My understanding of Iraq historically is
they've always had a good sense of themselves and their place
in the region, in the world, and at one time as the center for
science and alphabets and things of that nature. So I don't
think it's a direct result of this.
Senator Hagel. Just the anti-Americanism.
Mr. Armitage. The reputation of the Arab----
Senator Hagel. You don't think is an anti-Americanism.
Mr. Armitage. No, I don't. I think it's the reputation in
the Arab world has historically been a very scrappy, tough
people.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Secretary Wolfowitz.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I would agree with that. And I think
overwhelming numbers of them are nonetheless, whatever their
feelings about our staying in Iraq, grateful that we helped
them to remove a terrible dictator.
Senator Hagel. Let me ask a question about sovereignty
which you have both noted. A couple of pieces. One, what will
be the role of the Department of Defense, come July 1? And the
second part of that is, what, in fact--and I see your charts
here--but what, in fact, is the power of this new government
yet to be determined, undefined--we don't know who they are--as
to security? I see, in the Washington Post this morning, a good
friend of the Defense Department, Ahmed Chalabi, who is an
Iraqi Governing Council member, says the Iraqi government must
have exclusive and complete control over the army and all
security services of Iraq, come July 1. So if you would both
handle each of those parts.
Secretary Armitage.
Mr. Armitage. Yes, Senator, thank you.
Iraqi forces will work for an Iraqi general, who will work
for the Ministry of Defense. They will work in partnership with
Coalition forces, under the unity-of-command theory, for a U.S.
general. The real question that you're asking is: Can they opt
out of an operation if they don't want to, or something of that
nature? And the answer has to be yes.
But, if I may, this is not very unusual to us. If you can
think back to a fellow you all know, by the name of Wes Clark,
who in Kosovo, when told the Russians were heading for the
Kosovo Airport, told his British counterpart who worked for him
to go stop them. The British said, ``No, I think I'll check
with headquarters for guidance on that issue,'' and he didn't
do it. So there will be a lot of management, sort of, alliance/
coalition/partnership management as we go forward, but they are
sovereign, and they'll be in charge of their forces.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Secretary Wolfowitz.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I agree exactly with what Rich just said.
Senator Hagel. OK, well, that makes it easy, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
We welcome now the distinguished ranking member of the
committee, and we're grateful he has surmounted the obstacles
presented to him this morning.
Senator Biden. This is a hearing on funding for Amtrak,
isn't it?
All the trains out of New York, Mr. Chairman, today, were
exceedingly late, and I do apologize, because it is a very
important hearing, and I appreciate you calling it and our
witnesses being here.
May I have permission to make my opening statement and then
to save my questions until the next round so I do not use my
time for a statement at this point?
The Chairman. Please proceed.
Senator Biden. And I apologize, gentlemen, for not hearing
your statements. You, as well, general.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
RANKING MEMBER
Senator Biden. From my point of view, notwithstanding the
meeting last week with the President, which I truly
appreciated, I don't think things are going all that well in
Iraq, notwithstanding that our people have performed miracles
opening schools and hospitals and restoring some oil production
and setting up local councils. But these successes, I think,
have been dwarfed by two towering deficits that the
administration created--a security deficit and a legitimacy
deficit. And the result, I think we're losing support, as
Senator Hagel suggested, although I'm not associating him with
my remarks--I don't want to get him in trouble. But we're
losing the support of the Iraqi people.
When I get a round of questioning, have an opportunity, I'd
like to know what our strategy is to erase those deficits, the
deficits in security and legitimacy, because I think both are
needed to be erased in order to build a successful plan.
Success, in my judgment, and this is what I told the
President, would be a stable Iraq--secure within its borders,
with a representative government that doesn't threaten its
neighbors or threaten us. I'm convinced that we can defeat the
insurgent forces. But while military superiority is essential,
I don't think, quite frankly--and I don't think you all do
either--it's enough. We also need an effective political
strategy. And based on a very brief briefing I got from my
staff on your opening statements, although I'm sure they were
necessarily truncated, my chief concern is, first, whether we
have one, and my second concern is, we appear to have lost the
Iraqi people.
As Senator Hagel said, 82 percent of the Iraqi people
oppose our presence, although some pockets may very much want
us to stay. They're in a conundrum, as the President said in a
different context. He can understand why they'd chafe at
occupation. They know they have to have these forces in order
to prevent a civil war from occurring, but they don't like the
forces being there. And only 23 percent support the Iraqi
Governing Council. At the same time, as Senator Hagel pointed
out, al-Sadr gets alarmingly high marks at least in two major
cities. And I would suggest these numbers would be worse if
this poll had been taken after the debacle at the prison.
So my question is, how do we reverse this downward dynamic?
I think we have to go back to first principles. The first is,
and I'm sure we agree, we can't want freedom for the Iraqi
people more than the Iraqi people want it, and that's what the
silent majority in Iraq seeks, I believe--freedom. I believe
the polls all show, as well, that they neither want an Iranian-
style theocracy, nor do they want another strongman. But after
being brutalized for three decades, they've learned to keep
their heads down, that middle, that 65 to 80 percent of the
people, if it's that high. It seems to me we have to create the
conditions that encourage them to raise their heads. The Iraqi
people must have more security in their daily lives, and they
must believe that there is a legitimate plan to return
sovereignty to them, and that it makes sense.
Second, it seems to me we have to square the circle between
the need for significant international support for years to
come, both political, economic, and security, and their growing
frustration with U.S. occupation, or any occupation, for that
matter. And I think that requires investing our European and
Arab allies more heavily in Iraq today and working with them to
prepare Iraqis to take back their country tomorrow. As it
stands, the Iraqis are going to wake up on July 1, after the
so-called transfer--and I'm not belittling that--of some form
of some sovereignty to a group of people whom they don't know.
There's going to be no single national figure. There's going to
be no George Washington, there's no Madison, there's no
Benjamin Franklin as part of this. And so they're going to wake
up, and the bulk of the Iraqi people are not going to know the
bulk of the people in this new government, although I believe
it will be viewed regionally as more legitimate. They're going
to see 140,000 troops, Americans, with American patches on
their shoulders still patrolling the streets, and a new super-
Ambassador, who they're going to suspect, I think, is going to
be the one pulling the strings in a cast, as I said, of
unelected and relatively unknown political figures. That's not
in any way to denigrate the capacity or the integrity of those
who will be chosen.
And it seems to me we have to change that dynamic. And in
order to do that, the President has to articulate a single
overarching goal that everybody can understand. And I think
this presents a significant opportunity for the President to
state a goal that everyone can rally around, and a rationale.
And the goal should be that our job, and the international
community's job, is to hold successful elections in November of
2005. We want a civil election and not a civil war in December
2005. And I believe these elections should be the rallying
point within Iraq--and, quite frankly, outside of Iraq--to
build security and legitimacy. I think it's a rationale for
European leaders who know they have a great stake in success or
failure in Iraq to be able to justify to their people why
they're there, with an implied end date to it. Not a literal
end date, an implied end date. I believe it provides a
rationale as well for Arab leaders to join in the effort. I
also believe that it provides a rationale for the Interim Iraqi
Government to be able to speak to interlocutors to actually
cooperate with this new military force, this old military force
hopefully with a new face.
Because I asked the President in our meeting, I said, Mr.
President, we're all just plain old politicians. Imagine if
you're about to be appointed to an interim government, and you
want to be a permanent, or at least an elected, official
running that country 13 months from now, or 16 months now, and
82 percent of the people say, I hate the outfit that you're
dealing with. What are you going to do? I'm just a plain old
politician, Mr. Secretary. You ain't gonna talk to 'em. You're
not going to be seen as cooperating with them. It will
guarantee your defeat.
Now, this is the only thing I probably do know more than
all you guys, just plain old politics. And so we've got to
provide them a rationale. Why are they going to be cooperating
with, no matter what the face is, a U.S.-led and dominant U.S.
presence. And I think this election process as a rationale for
our staying cannot be repeated enough, in my view.
I also think it would be a strategy that the American
people could understand, and could understand that there's an
end date. Not a definite date, not a date to say, we're out of
here by such and such, but there is a strategy that is able to
be articulated that the American people are smart--and they can
understand. We had a hearing here last summer after the report
done by John Hamre, the former controller of the Defense
Department, on the closing window of opportunity in Iraq,
meaning the Iraqi people. The three of us said basically, ``The
window of opportunity in America is closing.'' In America, it's
closing.
And, fellows, we're all about the same generation. Once the
folks decide this ain't gonna work, I don't care how brilliant
any of us are, I don't care how wonderful any plan we have is,
it ain't gonna work without the informed consent of the
American people.
So I think the President has an opportunity, and only the
President can lead in this regard. And I would respectfully
suggest the first order of business should be to form a contact
group who would give those whose help we're seeking a seat at
the table on the political decision. And this includes the
major powers in Europe, it includes the Security Council--not
as a security council--and it includes our Arab allies, who
have a great deal to lose, and the incoming Iraqi government.
And I respectfully suggest that the President publicly call a
summit of those folks. Get on the plane, go to Europe, pick a
venue, meet--he could meet with the G-8 a little bit--meet,
meet, find out what the deal is, how we get them involved.
Second, the enormous logistical security requirements for
elections are going to require a surge of security forces. It
required that in Bosnia, it required that in Kosovo, it even,
in a sense, requires that in Afghanistan. And we're not quite
doing it the same way, but it required it. And the President
should seek, I believe, agreement for NATO to take over
multinational security forces under U.S. command. I know,
fellows. You know. We go back a long way, Mr. Secretary, about
30 years--you a staffer, and me essentially a staffer, a 29-
year-old United States Senator is equivalent to being a
staffer, only staffers knew more in those days. And notice I
said ``those days.''
But the point is, we know there's never been a single
serious plan NATO has initiated that we haven't carried over to
Brussels. Never. Never. So as that old song goes, ``What's the
plan, Stan?'' We ought to show up.
Now, I have met with a lot of your former colleagues. I've
met with a total now of seven four-stars, and I meet with them
regularly in conferences. Every single one of them, reflecting
various points of view in the military, believe if the
President says, ``This is the deal I want,'' sits down, hammers
it out at the NAC--authorizes you to hammer it out at the NAC--
we can get a NATO-led mission. It's only going to be 3,000 to
7,000 forces over the next several months, but a NATO-led
mission. That's an important, symbolic, and substantive change,
in my view.
So I believe that the President should ensure this new U.N.
resolution you all talked about authorizes a NATO-led security
force, supports the Brahimi plan for a caretaker government and
elections, endorses a senior rep to be Iraq's primary
international referee in what are going to be serious disputes
between July 1 and the end of January 2005, when these
elections are supposed to be held. Were this to occur, I
believe we might find participation with countries such as
Pakistan, Morocco, India--maybe even India, although I don't
know now, in light of recent election results.
And, once named, the incoming government should be invited
to participate in drafting this resolution, in my humble
opinion. Iraqis should see its members, not new ambassadors.
And I have great respect--don't anybody in the press translate
this as a knock on Ambassador Negroponte; it's not--but I don't
want to see Negroponte's face, I don't want to see General
Kimmitt, who's a great American--I don't want to see their
faces ever again on Iraqi television. Let's see Iraqis' faces
speaking the language without an accent on television. And I
think we have to spare no effort to help the Iraqis field an
effective security force.
I notice you said, Mr. Secretary Wolfowitz, that the Iraqi
forces are gaining some confidence. Even though it's water
under the bridge, I don't know why we don't have a massive
effort to train Iraqis using the officers that were originally
made by the French and the Germans and others. We're already
doing it in Jordan--American-trained Arab forces training the
Iraqis, because I think you're right, this is an essential,
overwhelming need. And I think we have to spare, as I said, no
effort to help the Iraqis field this force. And we should be
inviting European and American-trained Arab officers to
participate in that training, beyond what we've done.
And the last thing, Mr. Chairman, and I will end, the
President, I think, also has to make a gesture as dramatic and
consequential as the symbolic damage done when, in fact, the
prison scandal broke. Mr. Chairman, I know you've heard me say
this before but I believe the President should go to both these
Secretaries and say, find me the remaining 100 or 200 most
qualified men and women we have in the government that have any
background in quasi-military-police work. Go vet every one of
the 8,000 prisoners, release every damn one that's not a
security risk, if there's a doubt. Be seen to be releasing
them. Sit down with the interim government, ask them what
plan--for permission, because we want to ask their permission,
to bulldoze down that damn prison, bulldoze it to the ground.
That will cause us big problems, finding room for 2,000 people
somewhere. And ask them what they want to do with this symbol
of tyranny. Do they want a new institution of their choice on
that spot? The biggest school? A university? A hospital? What
do they want? I think our gestures have to be as grand as the
damage done. And I think we should state clearly that we're
willing to bring American forces home once Iraqis--and you
have--can handle their own security and there's a legitimate
government.
So, folks, despite the fact I am very, very concerned about
the state of affairs, I still think, quote, ``this is
winnable.'' But I do think it is not ``staying the course.'' It
is ``changing the course'' in order to be able to stay to be
successful.
I apologize to my colleagues for not being here in time to
make that at the beginning, and I'll hold my questions until
the end.
I thank you, appreciate you listening.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
gentlemen.
Despite some of the progress we are making there and some
of the positive signs, some of the generals on the ground have
expressed great concern. And, in particular, an Army general
who was posted in western Iraq, when asked whether he believes
the United States is losing there, he said, ``I think
strategically we are.''
And an Army colonel who was based in Baghdad, said,
``Unless we ensure that we have coherency in our policy, we
will lose strategically.'' And he went on to say, ``We don't
understand the war we're in.''
And then a senior general went on to say, ``I do not
believe we had a clearly defined war strategy, end state, and
exit strategy before we commenced our invasion,'' and that, he
said, ``It is doubtful we can go on much longer like this. The
American people may not stand for it, and they should not.''
So maybe somewhere in between what you're portraying and
what they're portraying is the truth, but, nonetheless, there's
cause for alarm, which I certainly hear from my constituents
back in Rhode Island.
But what I'd like to ask is that--just yesterday, King
Abdullah of Jordan was asked the question, ``Do you see a link
between the war in Iraq and the Palestinian/Israeli peace
process?'' And he answered, ``They sort of feed off each
other.'' The core issue in the hearts of everybody in the
Middle East is the Israeli/Palestinian one. The core issue.
They feed off one anther. They are related.
And what I'd like to go back to is what the President said
on February 28, 2003 in a speech before the American Enterprise
Institute, where he said, ``Success in Iraq could also begin a
new stage for Middle Eastern peace and set in motion progress
toward a truly democratic Palestinian state.'' And he went on
to say, ``America will seize every opportunity in pursuit of
peace, and the end of the present regime in Iraq would create
such an opportunity.'' He said it: the end of the present
regime in Iraq would create this opportunity.
And then, Secretary Wolfowitz, I'll also say, I gave you a
shot in May 2003, right after the end of the war, when things
were going very, very well, and I asked at a hearing, from the
transcript, ``It seems to me that we have thrown a rock into
the pool that is the Middle East. And, just for the sake of my
question, if all goes well in restoring order in Iraq, what is
our strategic vision of the ripples now going out from that
rock we have thrown into the pool? What is the strategic vision
in the Middle East now?'' And you answered, ``A clean piece of
canvas.'' You said, ``I would say several things. I think some
of them hopefully will happen even perhaps before some of the
other results are achieved inside Iraq. I think one of the
ripples is a positive impact on the Arab/Israeli peace process,
and clearly we need it. We need to move that process forward. I
think we have credibility, enormous credibility, not that we
did not have it before. We have it more than we did before.''
Those are you words from May 2003, when things were going well.
So my question is, why the paralysis--if this is so
important, by your own words--why the paralysis on this
important issue? As King Abdullah said, ``the core issue.''
Mr. Wolfowitz. Let me ask Rich----
Senator Chafee. I'll ask Secretary Wolfowitz, since I
quoted him, if I could.
Mr. Wolfowitz. OK, but I'm going to turn to my colleague in
the State Department on this issue of what you call paralysis.
But I would say this. I think that, in fact, part of our
problem, as we said, as those quotes make clear, I think
success in Iraq will have these effects. We are not--we're not
at success, to put it mildly, and we need to get there. I agree
very strongly with what both the chairman and Senator Biden
said on that point.
I think, if you go back to last year, when there was a bit
of euphoria, I believe, in the sense that we really were
getting success, I know I heard from Arab democrats that there
was some sense of exhilaration in the Arab world about the
prospects of change. And I don't claim to be expert enough to
say it's cause and effect, but I think we--in the meeting in
Sharm el Sheikh, we saw some signs of Egyptians and the Saudis
stepping up to responsibilities to support the peace process.
And, again, I can't say it's cause and effect, but I don't
think it's helped the peace process that the enemy in Iraq has
proved as resilient as it has.
And, let's be clear, that enemy includes Saddam Hussein,
who was out there funding attacks on Coalition forces right up
until he was captured in December. It includes No. 6 on the
black list, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, who is still at large and
still funding attacks on American and Coalition forces with
money that he's salted in banks in neighboring countries. It
includes the former killers, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, from the so-called--the M-14 branch of the Iraqi
intelligence, the so-called anti-terrorism branch. George
Orwell would have used that phrase. Anti-terrorism meant that
they specialized in killings, hijackings, assassinations, and
bombings. Those people are still out there, they're still
killing people, killing Iraqis, killing Americans. Their goal
is to prevent exactly that process that, I agree with Senator
Biden, we need to move forward.
If I could just----
Senator Chafee. If you could, I'm talking about the
paralysis. And there have been so many opportunities. After
Akaba, in June, there was the long 7-week cease-fire. Abu Mazen
came here to the Foreign Relations Committee and begged--and he
met with the President--begged us to help him on the
settlements, the wall, the prisoners held without charges,
``Please empower me with my people.'' He went back empty-
handed. These are the missed opportunities. When the Geneva
Accords came, in October of last year, there was a cold
shoulder given to those. I believe this is what's hurting us in
Iraq, not taking the opportunities--even as the President said,
taking the opportunities that are presented to us, and
energizing our adversaries in Iraq.
Mr. Armitage. Senator, may I? There are others who would
say that what happened to Abu Mazen was that we held him too
close, and that's burned him. And he became----
Senator Chafee. He wouldn't say that. He wouldn't say that.
Mr. Armitage. Several of those who served with him when he
was Prime Minister would say that, and gave us advice to be
somewhat cautious. You're right, we have a 7-week window with
the cease-fire. The difficulty with the cease-fire is the
Palestinian Authority can have a cease-fire, but if they won't
control Hamas, then it's for naught. And they're not
controlling Hamas. They're not even trying to.
We thought we were on the verge of something, and it's very
frustrating, almost ``Perils of Pauline,'' the Middle East saga
of a search for peace with the Sharon plan for disengagement
from Gaza, where 80 percent of the people of Israel, by opinion
polls, appear to be for it. But Likkud was not for it, and,
hence, he was unsuccessful. We thought it was rather noteworthy
for the first time since 1967 to have 21 Gaza settlements and
four West Bank settlements turned over to the Palestinians. We
weren't quite bullish on this, and now we're disappointed. But
Mr. Sharon is making the refinements and modifications to his
plan. He will eventually show them to us. We have not seen it,
to my knowledge yet. Secretary Powell met at the Dead Sea with
Abu Allah and Dr. Rice met with Abu Allah in Berlin. So
there's--it's kind of like a duck on the water; it doesn't
appear to be moving very much, but underneath there's a lot of
churning going on. And we're doing a lot of it, some of the
Palestinians are doing it, and certainly our Israeli allies are
doing it.
Senator Chafee. I'd just like to go further and say there's
a lot of churning going on, but, in the meantime, the days are
slipping by, the months are slipping by, the tide is turning.
If you believe what King Abdullah says, he's geographically
located, as he said, ``in between Iraq and a hard place,'' and
he says this is ``the core issue.'' And I think my constituents
just see paralysis on this issue. And maybe if you can level
with us, is it an election issue that, a certain base that
you've got to be careful of? What's the truth?
Mr. Armitage. Well, the affection of the President for
Israel and for that democracy has nothing to do with elections.
It has to do with his view that Israel as one of the great
democracies in the world, perhaps the most pure democracy.
However, it was our President who was the only one who spoke up
about a vision of two states living side by side. He's held
that vision for 2 years now, he's not shying away from it, and,
hence, he has encouraged Secretary Powell to meet with Abu
Allah, and Dr. Rice to meet with him, as well.
It's frustrating for us, as well as for you and your
constituents, but it's most frustrating for the Palestinians
who are having their houses bulldozed and for those 11 or 12
IDF soldiers who were killed last week.
Senator Chafee. Well, I'll conclude just by saying every
visitor that I get said only the Americans can push this
forward. I hear it every time. Only the Americans. And sadly,
we're not exercising that power.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I know how hard you are working, and I know that
the burdens that you bear are very heavy, but I have to say I
was very disappointed in your opening statements, to be honest
with you. Listening to you, one would never know what is
happening in America, how people are so distraught over this.
And I think if you looked at the faces of my colleagues, I've
never seen us quite look this way. It's not partisanship. And I
didn't get, as Senator Biden pointed out, where are you
changing course? I don't hear it. And if there's one thing I
want to say, it is to agree with my ranking member here, that
this is the moment to do it, if ever there was a moment.
Now, the essence of our country has taken an enormous hit
in the world, to the point where American business people, Mr.
Secretaries, are telling me and telling us that they've never
seen such a negative view of America in many, many, many years.
As they put it, one put it, one very successful businessman,
the American brand is being pummeled. Now, some of it, I
believe, is due to a go-it-alone policy that's been perceived
as arrogant, and I won't go through it all, but we've seen it
over and over. And then there's the prison scandal, which has
really seared the soul of America.
Now, some of the things that we saw, we have seen even
worse by the terrorists, but our strength is that we're not
like them, and they repel us because they have no respect for
human rights. But all of us who have seen the original photos
and then moving pictures, frankly, of torture--I need to ask
you, Secretary Wolfowitz, in Newsday yesterday, Pentagon
officials adamantly deny charges. In a New Yorker magazine
article, the Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and other key officials
had approved a plan to expand from Afghanistan to Iraq, a
secret interrogation program that included rough treatment and
sexual humiliation. Do you stand by that? Do you deny?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator Boxer, we're trying to find out
what, if any, possible truth led to that story. I'm aware of
nothing that would substantiate that.
Senator Boxer. So you don't deny it. You're saying you're
still looking into it?
Mr. Wolfowitz. No, we stand by our denials. When something
comes out like that, and people claim that they have sources
inside that reveal something, you have to try to find out.
Senator Boxer. OK. Do you agree with Pentagon officials who
basically said that those charges are wrong, that there was
never a plan that was approved to expand from Afghanistan to
Iraq a secret interrogation program that included rough
treatment and sexual humiliation?
Mr. Wolfowitz. To the best of our knowledge, yes, Senator.
Senator Boxer. OK.
Mr. Wolfowitz, you spoke eloquently about your desire to
help the good people of Iraq. We were all stunned by those
pictures of Abu Ghraib. And one of those pictures--I'll never
forget any of them, but one of them that is haunting me is that
of a beautiful Iraqi woman who is staring into the camera with
dead eyes, and then, in the next shot, she is lifting her
blouse, and she is exposing her nudity to the camera with the
same dead eyes. Have you seen this photo, Mr. Wolfowitz?
Mr. Wolfowitz. No, I haven't, Senator. I've seen some of
the photos. Let me explain. Secretary Rumsfeld, when this thing
began, put together a considerable task force to dig into the
facts to find out what had happened to make sure that we get to
the bottom of this. And I would underscore that the Army had
already--the reason----
Senator Boxer. Sir, if I might, I don't have time.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Can I just----
Senator Boxer. I only have 5 minutes left, and I would--I
understand that you're looking into it, but I want to find out
what you personally know. So if I might just continue to----
Mr. Wolfowitz. I know enough----
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Wolfowitz [continuing]. To be horrified at what has
happened. I have not spent the 2-hours that Secretary Rumsfeld
did looking at all the photos. I will look at the one you
mentioned.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. Given the Islamic rules for
modest dress, even the removal of a head scarf is a major
violation of faith for many Iraqi women. So the abuse that was
inflicted upon these female Iraqi prisoners is not only
physical abuse, but it is mental abuse.
According to a recent article written by Tracy Wilkinson, a
Polk Award-winning journalist for the Los Angeles Times, quote,
``One woman told her attorney she was forced to disrobe in
front of male prison guards. After much coaxing, another woman
described how she was raped by U.S. soldiers. Then she
fainted,'' unquote.
Secretary Wolfowitz, have you looked into this particular
claim that Iraqi women were actually raped by our soldiers?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator Boxer, we're looking into all of
this. And the behavior you've described is absolutely
appalling, to treat any woman that way, Muslim or otherwise,
and I share your horror at it. I very strongly do. It's
absolutely contrary to everything we're trying to accomplish in
Iraq.
Senator Boxer. Well, I know you don't have the answers, but
I would appreciate, in writing, if you could let us know how
many Iraqi women have been raped in U.S. prisons.
[The following information was subsequently provided:]
Senator, we can not confirm that any women in Iraq that have been
raped while in DOD custody. There have been multiple visits with the
women in DOD custody by the Iraqi Governing Council and the ICRC and no
allegations of rape have surfaced. There is, however, a finding in the
Taguba investigation indicating that a male MP guard had sex with a
female detainee. That finding was based upon a statement of a witness
who did not see the actual event and did not know the identity of the
woman. However, if the event is proven, given the position of authority
of a guard over a detainee, a charge of rape could be sustained. The
guard is currently facing court-martial on a variety of charges.
Additionally, the Taguba report states there was also a single
photograph uncovered by CID where a female detainee is shown exposing
her breast. The facts and circumstances surrounding that event are not
known at this time.
Finally, we are aware of one incident in which a female detainee
was assaulted (kissed) by male interrogator, working in concert with
two other male interrogators. The detainee reported the incident to a
female guard and an investigation ensued. The military personnel
involved were disciplined.
Senator Boxer. And we know that many of them are disowned,
then, by their families. And Secretary Rumsfeld is on the
record saying restitution would be provided for the victims.
And could you tell us how far along we're getting in this plan
and if we're looking particularly at these women, who, as I
say, are, many of them, disowned by their families?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I know that we are looking into how to do
restitution the best possible way. There are legal issues
involved, too, with respect to whether or not it might affect
the trials of people that these people may have to testify
against. I consider it very important to make restitution and
do it as quickly as we possibly can and as generously as we
possibly can.
Senator Boxer. Secretary Wolfowitz, because I'm the only
woman on this committee, sometimes I will put forth a lot of
these issues. And it has come to my attention, and the
attention of the women Senators, that there have been reports
of 129 credible cases of sexual assault against our women
military by our military in Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and
Bahrain. And the rules today say that a woman who is a victim
of rape in our military, she's allowed to use the military
hospital, but she has to pay for an abortion if she chooses to
end this pregnancy of violence. And I am asking you if you
would consider supporting Senator Snowe and my bill that would
say if a woman in our military is sacrificing her life and she
is raped, that she can--she is not forced to pay for this
abortion, that the military will, in fact, pay for it.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I would certainly consider that, Senator.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Secretary Wolfowitz, in March 2003, you said the oil
revenues of Iraq could bring between $50 and $100 billion over
the course of the next couple of years, and you went on to say,
``We're dealing with a country that can really finance its own
reconstruction, and relatively soon.'' Do you still feel that
way?
Mr. Wolfowitz. If I might say, first, Senator, that was in
the context of a hearing on the House side that--some days
after the war had already begun, and I introduced those
comments by emphasizing no one can predict what the cost of the
reconstruction in Iraq will be. At that moment, we fully
anticipated--anticipated is too strong a word--we were very
fearful that, among other things, the oil fields of Iraq might
be completely destroyed, so the bill could have been much, much
greater even than it's turned out to be, and that caveat is
frequently omitted.
Let me note that, in the last year alone, Iraq has
contributed some $21 billion in Iraqi assets to the running of
the country and to the reconstruction of the country. Oil
revenues are currently above target, partly because production
has come back faster, also because of higher oil prices. I will
get you the exact numbers for the record but I don't think, in
the end, those numbers will turn out to be too far off the
mark.
[The following information was subsequently provided:]
From its inception in May 2003 to 28 June 2004, the total cash
inflow for the Development Fund for Iraq was $20.7 billion. The largest
portion of this fund, $11.3 billion, has been drawn from Iraq's oil
exports. The remaining $9.4 billion comes from repatriated Iraqi
assets, Oil for Food money, and other Iraqi sources.
$14.1 billion of this has already been spent by Iraqis towards the
reconstruction of their country.
Senator Boxer. So you don't think we need to put any more
American dollars into Iraqi reconstruction.
Mr. Wolfowitz. No, in fact, I think when we came up with
the request for the supplemental, and I'm working from memory
here, and I hope this doesn't--if my memory is wrong, we don't
go back again and say I got it wrong--but it was--the estimate
of Iraqi needs for reconstruction was something like $75
billion, based on the World Bank needs assessment and other
requirements that the World Bank didn't take account of, and
that we said in testimony that we considered that an American
contribution would on the order of the $20 billion that we
requested and that it would apply initially----
Senator Boxer. So just yes or no, will we have to put more
American dollars into reconstruction in Iraq, in your opinion?
Mr. Wolfowitz. We don't think that there will be any need
for a supplemental of the enormous kind that we had last year.
I would assume that there will probably be some kind of an
American economic assistance program in the future, but Iraqi
revenues are running----
Senator Boxer. So you're asking us for $25 billion for the
military, for the troops, nothing for reconstruction, and that
will be it until--we won't need any more. Is that correct?
Mr. Wolfowitz. First of all----
Senator Boxer. You won't have to come back----
Mr. Wolfowitz [continuing]. The $25 billion for the troops
is--it's more complicated than--that's not the amount for this
year. It's the amount to get us into early next year, when
we'll be able to request a supplemental. We have, thanks to the
approval of Congress, some $18.6 billion, as you know, in
appropriated funds available for Iraqi reconstruction. In
addition, as I had just mentioned, there's $20 billion just in
the last 12 months in Iraqi funds--some of it for operating the
government, some of it for reconstruction. There is some $15
billion or so from international sources that Secretary Powell
raised at the Madrid Conference. And we anticipate, I think--
I'm going to be careful with my numbers--very substantial Iraqi
contributions----
Senator Boxer. OK.
Mr. Wolfowitz [continuing]. In coming years for their
reconstruction.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, maybe you followed all this. I
don't know exactly what they're going to ask us for. Thanks.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Senator Brownback.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, glad
to have you here.
Secretary Wolfowitz or Armitage, just in following that
line, is there a chance we're going to get some money back from
the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program? There's been a huge controversy
about the number of dollars, and we were tracking that, the
subcommittee I was on during the time period that that was
operating for those years, the billions of dollars of oil
revenues that were flowing out of Iraq then that were supposed
to go into food that appears as if now there were billions that
were skimmed off of that, either by Saddam or people on the
other end of this. Do we know where that is in its
investigation? I mean, is there a chance there's going to be
some substantial resources that should come back to Iraq for
its reconstruction from that program?
Mr. Armitage. Mr. Volcker, of course, is running the
investigation for the U.N. Just as a sidebar, we have provided
to the members of the committee, in an appropriate fashion,
those documents which we had that might in any way refer to
this.
I think there will be, at the end of the day--my view is,
you will find wrongdoing, and you will find moneys. And I hope
the people who were involved, as I said in the House side the
other day, are hung.
But, having said that, I don't think the moneys will be
substantial, in terms of billions and billions of dollars. I
don't think it runs that high. But, you know, follow the trail
and follow the money.
Senator Brownback. Let me ask you, on this sarin gas and
mustard gas issue that's come up--and I'm looking off of two
news stories that I just want to quote to you of some
individuals. This is the Reuters story yesterday, where David
Kay is asked about this sarin-gas weapon. He says it appears to
be--this is just his direct quote, `` `It was probably just
scavenged from one of the 125-plus ammunition storage points
that still remain,' Kay said.'' And then the article goes on to
say, ``more forensic testing should determine with some
confidence when it was produced.'' Now, he speculated that it
was probably left over from the 1980's, produced either during
the Iraq/Iran war or before the 1991 Gulf War. Now, that's
David Kay's comments on this sarin gas that they found.
Then this is General Mark Kimmitt. This is in a FOX News
story on Monday. ``The Iraq Survey Group confirmed today that a
155 millimeter artillery round,'' which, as I understand, is a
pretty good-size shell, ``containing sarin nerve agent had been
found.'' This is another quote from him, ``The round had been
rigged as an IED, which was discovered by a U.S. Force convoy.
The round detonated before it could be rendered inoperable,
which caused a very small dispersal of the agent.''
Then in this same story, they're citing a senior Bush
administration official, which they do not give the name of,
said, ``Two weeks ago, U.S. military units discovered mustard
gas that was used as part of an IED. Tests conducted by the
Iraq Survey Group, U.S. organizations searching for weapons of
mass destruction, and others concluded the mustard gas was,
`stored improperly,' which made the gas, `ineffective.' ''
Now, we know that Iraq used sarin gas during the Iraq/Iran
War. However, now Kimmitt--I'm going back to him--said ``the
shell belonged to a class of ordnance that Saddam's government
said was destroyed before the 1991 Gulf War. Experts believe
both the sarin and mustard-gas weapons date back to that
time.''
Here's, again, Kimmitt, ``It was a weapon that we believe
was stocked from the ex-regime time and thought to have been an
ordinary artillery shell set up to explode like an ordinary
IED, and basically from the detonation of that when it
exploded, it indicated that it actually had some sarin in it.
It was a binary type of shell in which two chemicals held in
separate sections are mixed, after firing, to produce sarin
gas.'' And then they, quote, ``Later, a former Iraqi nuclear
scientist, Gazi George, is saying that Saddam stored these
around the country.'
Can you react? You had this question a little bit earlier,
but it appears as if there are people that are commenting on
this to some extent, and I would appreciate it if you could
comment on either the sarin gas or the mustard gas, to what we
know has actually taken place or what's happened with those to
date.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator Brownback, with your permission, I'd
really like to reply for the record. It's just very important
that we be precise about what we know and what we don't know,
and there are some things we are still trying to find out about
exactly the origin of those shells, whether it was a failure of
the Iraqis to account for them or whether they were simply
stray shells, and so forth. They're very key issues here, which
I think would be important to give you a careful answer on.
Senator Brownback. Can you answer whether or not we know if
sarin gas or mustard gas has been used in the Iraqi theater
within the last 2 weeks?
General Sharp. Sir, the tests that came back were field
tests done by two different independent type of tests in the
field. They have a good degree of reliability, but not near 100
percent. So right now, the shells and the substance are being
sent back to the United States for conclusive tests back here.
Senator Brownback. OK, and what did the field tests reveal?
General Sharp. That they were sarin, sir. But, again,
that's not 100 percent guaranteed.
Senator Brownback. And then apparently in this one article,
the two soldiers are showing signs of a reaction to a chemical
weapon, that they're showing symptoms similar to a mild
chemical-weapons exposure. Is that correct, as well?
General Sharp. Yes, sir, that was correct. While they were
transporting it back, they showed nausea and had some
orientation problems. But they are well now, they have been
treated, and they're back to duty.
Senator Brownback. OK. Now, what about this mustard gas 2
weeks ago reported by the Iraqi Survey Group?
General Sharp. Sir, the information I have is as you have
laid out, that they found it and that it's also being tested. I
don't have any further information on that round.
Senator Brownback. OK. Was there a field test as to whether
this was mustard gas?
General Sharp. I do not know, sir.
Senator Brownback. OK, now that's by the Iraqi Survey Group
that was reporting that. All right, but you don't know anything
further about the mustard-gas one?
General Sharp. No, sir, not the earlier one.
Senator Brownback. OK. Do we--and, Secretary Wolfowitz, I'm
presuming you're going to say the same answer, but I do want to
ask this--do we know any of the sources of these shells? Not
necessarily the gas, but the sources of these shells. Do we
know anything about that yet?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Not that I'm aware of, and that's one of the
important questions to be answered.
Senator Brownback. OK. There's a speculation in this
article, from the Iraqi nuclear scientist, Gazi George was
saying that lots of them have gone west to Syria and have been
brought back with the insurgencies. And he was speculating this
was a stepping up of the insurgency against the United States
and against the Coalition forces. Do you have any reaction to
that thought, or any that you can put forward?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I'd say, at the moment, that's a
speculation. It's another--it's a hypothesis that certainly is
something we're looking at very hard, because it would be a--if
it's a systematic pattern, then it's something that would cause
us very great concern, obviously.
Senator Brownback. And when you have a chance, I'm sure you
will be issuing statements publicly about the full nature of
whether this is sarin gas or mustard gas in this last instance.
[The following information was subsequently provided:]
The sarin nerve agent was found on 15 May in a 155 millimeter
artillery round which had no particular markings. The round had been
rigged as an improvised explosive device (IED) along a roadside, when
it was discovered prior to detonation by a U.S. military convoy. The
round detonated before it was rendered inoperable, which caused a small
dispersal of the agent. The other shell, found on 2 May in Baghdad, was
also a 155 millimeter round configured as an IED, and it tested
positive for a sulphur mustard agent. Both shells are being returned to
the United States for more extensive analysis and testing. Currently,
there is no evidence linking the sarin IED with the mustard IED. These
projectiles could be from a proving ground or a disposal site. The
projectiles may have been deliberately not declared, or misplaced among
conventional projectiles that were later looted. There is no indication
that the anti-Coalition forces knew these rounds were chemical
projectiles or understood their proper functioning. In the 1990s, Iraq
had declared sarin-filled artillery shells, but said all were destroyed
before the 1991 Gulf War. Some mustard shells were also declared, but
UNSCOM was unable to locate or account for 550 of those projectiles.
Senator Brownback. If I could ask Secretary Armitage, when
do you anticipate that Saddam Hussein will be going on trial?
Mr. Armitage. I saw speculation in the press from the
Iraqis that it would happen before turnover. I think that's
very unlikely. This is an Iraqi determination. They are having
a small debate among themselves as to whether they ought to try
Saddam Hussein first, or whether they should try him in some
lesser lights first. We are in--the U.S. Government, the
Department of Justice--in an advisory role to them to help them
get their house in order so this will stand up to international
scrutiny. Beyond that, there is no time set.
Senator Brownback. This year?
Mr. Armitage. There is no time set.
Senator Brownback. We just don't know that.
Secretary Armitage, if I could, you mentioned that you've
made the trip in the region recently, and I know Secretary
Powell has been over at the World Economic Forum, and I applaud
all of those connections and move into the region. I've made
that trip before, as well. I'm wondering how much OPEC is
putting pressure back on us through gas prices because we're
pushing democracy and open societies in the region. These are
generally monarchies and dictatorships that are in the region.
We are clearly standing for democracy and open societies.
There's clearly a rub in the region of what's taking place. Are
they pushing pressure back on us through oil production?
Mr. Armitage. First of all, on OPEC, sir, it's a mixed bag.
The Kuwaitis, for instance, did not go along with the idea of
cutting back on production. As far as I know, the Saudis, a
month and a half or so ago, said they were going to cut back,
and then didn't. Now they are now saying that they may
increase--they've got excess capacity, they may increase it. I
think--this is a personal opinion--I defer to those on the
Energy Committee, but this is as much psychological as anything
else, the spike in prices to $41-plus a barrel. I think there's
some argument to be made for the need for more refining
capacity here in the United States. But, beyond that, I'm out
of my league.
The question of democracy and openness in the region is one
that's moving every country in the region at varying speeds and
in varying ways. Paul mentioned that even the Saudis and the
Egyptians have had some rather far-reaching statements, and
it's true. Other states have gone a lot farther, with women's
rights, transparency, et cetera. This is why the upcoming G-8
summit at Sea Island and its promise of some discussion of
greater Middle East initiative and putting some wind in the
sails of those reformers of the various countries is so
important.
Senator Brownback. I think it's one of the most dramatic
moves toward democracy I've seen in that region at any time,
and I certainly applaud that.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Brownback.
Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, first of all I want to commend you and
Senator Biden for these series of hearings you've been holding
with respect to Iraq. I think they have really focused on
important, substantive questions, and I think that's obviously
a very important responsibility of this committee, and I just
want to underscore my appreciation to you and the ranking
member, Senator Biden, for undertaking that responsibility.
Secretary Wolfowitz--then I'm going to direct this, as
well, to the other members of the panel, but let me start with
you--as we look ahead and make our calculations about the path
that lies ahead, it seems to me we have to have some sense of
what the miscalculations were that have resulted in us
confronting the situation we now have in Iraq. So the question
I want to put to you--and then I'll do it to the others, as
well--is, because you've been a central player in all of this,
what were the miscalculations?
Mr. Wolfowitz. You know, Senator, when people start listing
the miscalculations, they rarely bother listing all the things
that we calculated on that didn't happen, and I think, in part,
didn't happen because of the way in which the military campaign
was conducted, which is to say with enormous speed, faster than
I believe Saddam or his people believed we could advance. I
think that may be a reason why we didn't face the enormous
destruction of Iraqi oil fields, for example. It may be a
reason that we didn't face extensive urban fighting, as we had
anticipated. Indeed, in anticipation of it, we decided on a
plan that would emphasize speed over mass.
One can go back and look at many things that maybe we
needed to do differently, and we are doing that. And I agree
with the spirit of your question, that if we want to set the
course, going forward, then it's important to figure out if we
made some misjudgments in the past. And I would say one that we
believe was done a bit too severely was the policy of de-
Ba'athification. And that's, in fact, why Ambassador Bremer
announced, just a couple of weeks ago, that we were going to
look at modifying it.
I must say that as soon as we talked about modifying it, we
heard very, very strong expressions, particularly from the
Kurds and the Shia, that we might be abandoning them and that
we might be opening the door to bringing the Ba'athists back to
power. So there's always a balance to be struck.
I would say, of all the things that were underestimated,
the one that almost no one that I know of predicted, with the
exception of a retired Marine colonel named Gary Anderson, who
wrote this in an op-ed in the Post, I believe it was April 2 of
last year, was to properly estimate the resilience of the
regime that had abused this country for 35 years, to properly
estimate that Saddam Hussein would still be out there funding
attacks on Americans until he was captured, that one of his
principal deputies, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, would still be out
there funding operations against us, that they would have
hundreds of millions of dollars in bank accounts in neighboring
countries to support those operations, that the old Iraqi
intelligence service which had so much blood on its hands,
which I believe is not reconcilable--we're not talking about an
ordinary person who joined the Ba'ath Party in order to get a
promotion as a teacher--those are the people we're trying to
bring back in--but the real killers, who number in the
thousands--were much tougher people, I think, than anyone
imagined. And they are out there killing, and they are working
with Mr. Zarqawi, who seems to have been associated with them
from before the war. They're bringing in foreign fighters, as
they did in the early stages of the war. And they may not be
good in large-scale, open battle, but they seem to have a
dangerous capability for urban guerrilla tactics, and that's
what we're up against.
I think the great strength we have against them remains the
fact that the Iraqi people don't want these people back, and if
they have confidence that they can stand up against those
people, they do so. In fact, they do so even when they know
they may be murdered for it, as the member of the Governing
Council was, just yesterday, and as police chiefs are and as
security officers are. The number of Iraqis that actually will
stand up and fight for their country is considerable, and I
think that is where success is going to lie for us, is
empowering those people more rapidly. If anything, I would say
we were slow in doing it maybe in part because we thought we'd
have something like peacekeeping operations instead of a
continuing war.
Senator Sarbanes. Secretary Armitage.
Mr. Armitage. No, I look at this question--or, to answer
it, Senator Sarbanes, by saying, ``What would I do
differently?'' And the single thing I would have done
differently after the splendid military victory was to more
rapidly have brought in the sheikhs, tribal sheikhs. I think
that--I'll speak for myself--I've felt that, with the Shia and
Sunni and Kurds and Turkmen and a couple of others, and we
could deal with them in that way. It was wrong, I think. I
think they're a tribal society in a way that I didn't fully
appreciate, and I wish that I had been involved much more in
bringing the tribal sheikhs into things earlier on. I think
we'd be a lot farther down the pike now.
Senator Sarbanes. General.
General Sharp. Sir, as you know, as the military looks at
the situation on the ground we continuously assess as to what
changes need to be made based upon the circumstances that we're
under. As you know, we're working very hard now to train the
Iraqi security forces as a result of their performance in
recent days. We're looking at leadership training and
specialized training in order to be able to get the leaders and
the people in the security forces to be able to stand up.
On the military side, we continue to assess the
capabilities of both the Iraqi security forces and our
Coalition partners and us, and to determine how to best defeat
the threat that's out there. So you see us adjusting
boundaries, you see us integrating some of the Iraqi security
forces and military into our military forces, and vice versa.
We're standing up a new headquarters in order to be able to
best work in the new environment with a strategic situation
with Ambassador Negroponte going in. So we're standing up a
headquarters there, with General Sanchez to work on the
military and political level, and then General Metz working on
the tactical and operational level. And we're sending, for
example, General Petraeus back to, again, take all of the Iraqi
security forces and make sure that we are focusing the efforts
on those to get the Iraqis enabled to be able to take over
responsibility for their own security.
Senator Sarbanes. The difficulty I'm having here is,
obviously, I would assume, none of you at the table calculated
that we would be confronting the situation we are confronting
there now. So the question becomes, what miscalculations? Let
me ask a couple of specifics.
Secretary Wolfowitz, you said that they were drawing money
from the surrounding countries, that they had deposits in the
surrounding countries and were now calling on those resources
to carry out this insurgency that's taking place, if I
understood you correctly. Is that right?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I'm saying that Saddam and his gang have
access to enormous resources, and they are using those
resources to pay for hired killings.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, those are coming from the
surrounding countries----
Mr. Wolfowitz. I'm not sure where they're coming from,
Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, what cooperation are we getting
from the surrounding countries?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think that----
Senator Sarbanes. I see the King of Jordan said, just
yesterday, that he thought Iraq needed a ``strongman,'' as I
understand it, and that that was what is now needed in the
current situation, which, of course, is very much at odds, as I
understand it, with what you're projecting to do.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Well, I would say we're getting very
excellent cooperation from Jordan. We may have--I mean, it's
the kind of ally which whom you can have differences of view
that lead you to better policies. I think we need a lot more
cooperation from Syria.
Mr. Armitage. The question of Iran is a more interesting
one, in a way, because, during the time of the Arbayeen, where
Zarqawi was threatening to bring about civil war--publicly he
threatened it--the Iranians were actually quite helpful,
because they kept many of their pilgrims home, and they made
fewer targets and a much more manageable situation.
At the same time, however, we find them, in the south
particularly, trying to buy clerics with their money. So it's a
mixed view. Kuwait has been extraordinarily helpful, as well.
Senator Sarbanes. What is the legal status of the U.S.
contractors operating in Iraq, the non-military people that are
in there, some of them apparently doing military-type
activities?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I'm not aware that it's different from their
status as contractors for us in Kosovo or Bosnia. We make
extensive use of contractors everywhere, and we are doing so in
Iraq, and they operate under--if they're working for the U.S.
military, they operate according to U.S. military regulations.
And, of course, the status of everything in Iraq is under the
overall authority of the CPA.
Senator Sarbanes. So the U.S. military, in effect, has the
responsibility for the conduct of the private contractors, is
that correct?
Mr. Wolfowitz. No, those contractors that are working for
us, I would--but there are many contractors that are working
for CPA, or are working on their own, or working for the Iraqi
Governing Council. There are contractors all over the country.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, is it your view that you don't need
another Status of Forces Agreement after June 30, when you
transfer sovereignty, in order to ensure the legal status of
American forces?
Mr. Armitage. Senator Sarbanes, as a legal matter, that
would be the case. As a political matter, it might be something
else again. The Security Council Resolution 1511, combined with
CPA Order 17 gives us the sufficient legal cover, if you will,
for Status of Forces Agreements. However, it clearly--if we do
move forward, as we're planning to, with a new U.N. Security
Council resolution, we'd also want to put this in that
resolution, as well, as an extra bit of protection.
Our view of SCR 1511 is not universally shared by our
allies, sir.
Senator Sarbanes. What will be the status of the private
contractors after June 30, when sovereignty is transferred?
Mr. Armitage. I've got to take it for the record, Senator
Sarbanes. I don't know.
[The following information was subsequently provided:]
United States Department of State,
Washington, DC 20520, June 17, 2004.
The Honorable Paul Sarbanes,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.
Dear Senator Sarbanes,
Deputy Secretary Armitage has asked that I respond to your question
of May 18, 2004 regarding the status of private [military] contractors
after June 30th, when sovereignty will be transferred to the Iraqi
Interim Government. First, I would like to assure you that the State
Department is well aware of the concerns that contractors have for
their security operations after June 30th.
At present, Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17 (attached)
regulates the status of contractors. This Order is currently being
reviewed to determine how it should be revised to reflect the June 30
transfer of authority. The issue regarding the status of Americans who
are working in Iraq, including contractors, is currently being
discussed with Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi and the Iraqi Interim
Government. In all of our discussions, we are examining how best to
ensure the safety and security of Americans in Iraq now, and after June
30.
When a decision has been made revising Order 17, I will be happy to
convey it to you.
Sincerely,
Paul V. Kelly,
Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs.
Enclosure: As stated.
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 17
Status of the Coalition, Foreign Liaison Missions, Their Personnel and
Contractors
Pursuant to my authority as head of the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA), and under the laws and usages of war, and consistent
with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution
1483 (2003),
Recalling that under international law occupying powers, including
their forces, personnel, property and equipment, funds and assets, are
not subject to the laws or jurisdiction of the occupied territory,
Conscious that states are contributing personnel, equipment and
other resources to the Coalition in order to contribute to the security
and stability that will enable the relief, recovery and development of
Iraq,
Noting that states are sending Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel to
Iraq,
Conscious of the need to establish and confirm the status of such
Coalition and Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel in respect of the CPA
and the local courts,
I hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION 1--DEFINITIONS
1) ``Coalition Personnel'' means all non-Iraqi military and
civilian personnel assigned to or under the command of the Commander,
Coalition Forces, or all forces employed by a Coalition State including
attached civilians, as well as all non-Iraqi military and civilian
personnel assigned to, or under the direction or control of the
Administrator of the CPA.
2) ``Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel'' means those individuals
who have been issued Foreign Liaison Mission personnel identification
cards by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the supervision of
the CPA.
3) ``Legal Process'' means any arrest, detention or legal
proceedings in the Iraqi courts or other Iraqi bodies, whether
criminal, civil, administrative or other in nature.
4) ``Parent State'' means the state providing Coalition Personnel
as part of the Coalition in Iraq or the state providing Foreign Liaison
Mission Personnel.
5) ``Coalition contractors'' means non-Iraqi business entities or
individuals not normally resident in Iraq supplying goods and/or
services to or on behalf of the Coalition Forces or the CPA under
contractual arrangements.
6) ``Coalition sub-contractors'' means non-Iraqi business entities
or individuals not normally resident in Iraq supplying goods and/or
services to or on behalf of Coalition contractors and in respect of
Coalition or CPA activities under contractual arrangements.
SECTION 2--COALITION AND FOREIGN LIAISON MISSION PERSONNEL
1) CPA, Coalition Forces and Foreign Liaison Mission, their
property, funds and assets of shall be immune from Iraqi Legal Process.
2) All Coalition personnel and Foreign Liaison Mission personnel
shall respect the ``Iraqi'' laws applicable to those Coalition
personnel and Foreign Liaison Mission personnel in the territory of
Iraq and the Regulations, Orders, Memoranda and Public Notices issued
by the Administrator of the CPA.
3) Foreign Liaison Mission personnel shall be immune from Legal
Process.
4) All Coalition personnel shall be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of their Parent States and, they shall be immune from
local criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction and from any
form of arrest or detention other than by persons acting on behalf of
their Parent States, except that nothing in this provision shall
prevent Coalition Forces personnel from preventing acts of serious
misconduct by Coalition personnel, or otherwise temporarily detaining
Coalition personnel who pose a risk of injury to themselves or others,
pending expeditious turnover to the appropriate authorities of the
Parent State. In all such circumstances the national contingent
commander of the detained person shall be notified immediately.
5) In respect of those Coalition personnel who commit an act or
acts in Iraq for which there are no criminal sanctions in the Parent
State, the CPA may request from the Parent State waiver of jurisdiction
to try such act or acts under Iraqi law. In such cases, no Legal
Process shall be commenced without the written permission of the
Administrator of the CPA.
SECTION 3--CONTRACTORS
1) Coalition contractors and their sub-contractors as well as their
employees not normally resident in Iraq, shall not be subject to Iraqi
laws or regulations in matters relating to the terms and conditions of
their contracts in relation to the Coalition Forces or the CPA.
Coalition contractors and sub-contractors other than contractors and
sub-contractors normally resident in Iraq shall not be subject to Iraqi
laws or regulations with respect to licensing and registration of
employees, businesses and corporations in relation to such contracts.
2) Coalition contractors and their sub-contractors as well as their
employees not normally resident in Iraq, shall be immune from Iraqi
Legal Process with respect to acts performed by them within their
official activities pursuant to the terms and conditions of a contract
between a contractor and Coalition Forces or the CPA and any sub-
contract thereto.
3) In respect of acts or omissions of Coalition contractors and
sub-contractors as well as their employees not normally resident in
Iraq, which are not performed by them in the course of their official
activities pursuant to the terms and conditions of a contract between
them and the Coalition or the CPA, no Iraqi or CPA Legal Process shall
be commenced without the written permission of the Administrator of the
CPA.
SECTION 4--DURATION OF IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS
The immunity from Legal Process provided by the present Order to
Coalition personnel and Foreign Liaison Mission personnel as well as
Coalition contractors, sub-contractors and their employees not normally
resident in Iraq operates only in respect to acts or omissions by them
during the period of authority of the CPA.
SECTION 5--WAIVER OF LEGAL IMMUNITY AND JURISDICTION
1) The immunity from Legal Process of Coalition personnel, Foreign
Liaison Mission personnel, Coalition contractors and their sub-
contractors as well as their employees not normally resident in Iraq is
not for the benefit of the individuals concerned and may be waived by
the Parent State.
2) Requests to waive jurisdiction over Coalition personnel or
Foreign Liaison Mission personnel shall be referred to the respective
Parent State.
3) Requests to waive the immunities with respect to Coalition
contractors and subcontractors and their employees not normally
resident in Iraq as set forth in Section 3 of this Order shall be
referred to the respective Parent State with which the contractor has
contracted.
SECTION 6--CLAIMS
1) Third party claims including those for property loss or damage
and for personal injury, illness or death or in respect of any other
matter arising from or attributed to Coalition personnel or any persons
employed by them, whether normally resident in Iraq or not and that do
not arise in connection with military combat operations, shall be
submitted and dealt with by the Parent State whose Coalition personnel,
property, activities or other assets are alleged to have caused the
claimed damage, in a manner consistent with the national laws of the
Parent State.
2) Third party claims for property loss or damage and for personal
injury, illness or death or in respect of any other matter arising from
or attributed to Foreign Liaison Mission personnel shall be submitted
and dealt with by the Parent State whose Foreign Liaison Mission
personnel, property, activities or other assets are alleged to have
caused the claimed damage, in a manner consistent with the national
laws of the Parent State.
section 7--entry into force
This Order shall enter into force on the date of signature.
L. Paul Bremer, Administrator,
Coalition Provisional Authority.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, that would be quite a problem,
could it not? Would they still be under the rules of the U.S.
military?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I repeat, they were under the rules of the
Coalition Provisional Authority. And since that authority will
transfer to the interim government, I assume they'll be under
the authority of the interim government. And if there are
issues about how they conduct themselves--for example, I think,
obviously, one of your concerns is, what are they allowed to
carry in the way of weapons? I think those will be laws and
regulations written by the interim government. I think,
Senator, that the policies and regulations of the Coalition
Provisional Authority, which governs them now----
Senator Sarbanes. One final question. Are these issues
going to be worked out before the transition date? I mean, are
these people just going to be left--I don't want to use the
expression ``high and dry''--but left with a potential serious
problem on their hands? I mean, what's going to happen?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, I believe that the laws and
regulations of the CPA will remain the laws and regulations of
the interim government unless further amended. And in the case
of contractors, there may be some need for changes, which might
be taken while the CPA is still in authority, or might be taken
by the interim government.
General Sharp. And, sir, if I may----
Mr. Wolfowitz. It's not going to be a vacuum of law,
though.
General Sharp. CPA 17, which, according to the Transitional
Administrative Law, will continue after 1 July, includes the
rights and the authorities and the obligations of contractors,
not just military SOFA-type of requirements. So those
authorities are in CPA 17 authority also, so that would
continue on.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, my concern has not been alleviated
here, and I think it's a matter that needs to be looked into
very carefully; otherwise, you're going to have things
occurring, and everyone's going to say, well, we never
calculated for that to happen. That wasn't part of our
calculation. We have to do some tough-minded calculations here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Sarbanes.
Just to summarize, for the record, would you research--the
witnesses research the answer to Senator Sarbanes question? I
think you've given an answer, but it could well be that you
might want to make additional comments.
Mr. Armitage. Absolutely.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Absolutely. No, you deserve and answer, and
we'll get you one, Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
thank you for convening this meeting.
We've been doing this now for over a year, and, at the time
we started, we wanted to know, do we have a plan? Do we know
what we're doing? And the American people wanted to know that
we're not like a leaf meandering down a stream. And I am
comforted by the testimony that we have had this morning. But
my concern is that, are we really leveling with the American
people? For example, we know--we were talking about troops
commitments, and if we look at what we've done in Bosnia, if we
look at what we've done in Kosovo, we've been there for quite
some time. It seems to me that we ought to talk about what's
the future going to be, and have a rough estimate about the
commitment that we're going to be making, in terms of troops
and the cost of it.
I was somewhat comforted by the fact that you indicate that
we might not be asking for more money for reconstruction. But
my constituents are interested, Are we going to put more money
into reconstruction in Iraq?
The other issue that I am very concerned about is the issue
of the involvement of religious leaders in Iraq, including
Ayatollah al-Sistani, in terms of developing a transition plan.
I think one of the things that we may have miscalculated--
you're talking about errors that you made--I think that one of
the errors we made is, the militancy of Muslim fundamentalism.
Several people said that--I think it was Senator Biden said 82
percent of the Iraq people would like to see us out of there.
It's like that was a change. Do we really know how many of them
wanted us in there? I mean, they wanted to get rid of Saddam
Hussein, there's no question about that, but did they like us
any more than--you know, do they want a secular Western
democracy in that country? And what about Muqtada al-Sadr, 31
years old, and seems to have a great deal of support from some
people--where is he getting his support? Is this an effort on
his part to work with--I don't know, is he working with people
up in Iran to have a Muslim type of regime where they control
things? It just seems to me that there's a lot more going on
over there than what we anticipated. The American people
thought, and we were led to believe, we will be looked upon as
liberators and that they'll be glad to have us there. But it
appears to me that the sooner we get out, the happier they're
going to be. And I'm just real concerned that--you know, people
ask me what's going to happen come July 1, and I just tell them
it's going to be a jump-ball. We're not really sure what's
going to happen. We hope there are some things that are going
to happen, and I just wonder if we're not being as candid as we
should be with the American people about what we're into over
there. And I think they would probably feel more comforted if
maybe we leveled with them a little more than maybe what we're
doing right now. And I would like you to react to that.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, I think we are being candid. We try
to be candid, and things change. We had a plan that
anticipated, I think, that we could proceed with an occupation
regime for much longer than it turned out the Iraqis would have
patience for. We had a plan that assumed we would have
basically more stable security conditions than we've
encountered. In response to both of those changes, we have
considerably speeded up the transition to sovereignty. And I
share Senator Biden's comments that I think we should put a lot
of focus on successful elections. I think that's going to be
one of the keys to changing the way Iraqis view us.
With respect to the security problem, we have enormously
speeded up both the speed and the level of effort in equipping
Iraqi security forces. I think it's--I don't remember the exact
numbers, I could get them for you, some of those early polls
were very striking, because they had overwhelming percentages
of the Iraqis polled--I think in the neighborhood of 70-plus-
percent--saying they wanted the Americans to leave, and equally
large numbers wanted us to stay for at least 2 years. That's
not a contradiction; it's people who genuinely welcomed us as
liberators but did not want us owning their country or
occupying their country. I think this label of occupying power
is a very unfortunate one. It will be good, July 1, to be rid
of it.
Senator Voinovich. Actually, some people have exploited
that, and that is why this transition to turn it over to them
is very, very important. Do you believe that, because we're
doing that, that that's going to lessen some of the ability of
people like al-Sadr to ignite folks to be against us?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, you're absolutely right, although
it is not going to be transformational on July 1. That is why
Senator Biden is so correct when he says the key thing I think
is going to be not when they have a sovereign appointed
government, but when they have a sovereign elected government.
The issue of Mr. al-Sadr, I think, is--everything that I see
suggests this is a man who is very young, exploited, a very
distinguished family name. Both his father and, I think, his
great uncle were distinguished religious clerics and martyrs,
but he's basically intimated a large part of the country by
putting together gangs of young people with heavy weapons and
an ability to intimidate people. And as our operation has begun
to shut down those operations, what we're also seeing is a lot
of Iraqis in the south, who I think were intimidated by him
previously, coming out and saying, we've had enough of this
lawlessness. And I'm told that AP has reported that Ayatollah
al-Sistani has actually now come out publicly and said al-
Sadr's forces should get out of Najaf and Karbala. That's an
early report. I would be careful with it. But certainly we're
hearing many reports that as Iraqis see law and order being
restored, they're coming out much more openly against al-Sadr.
So I think, in that case, we're dealing with a fairly thuggish
individual, who, with the power of the gun, was intimidating
people. I think it is, by no means, as serious a problem as the
much more ruthless former elements of the old regime and
terrorists that we're dealing with up north.
Senator Voinovich. Is he getting any encouragement from
Muslims in Iran?
Mr. Wolfowitz. My impression is that the Iranians are
finding him an embarrassment. I don't know, Rich, if you would
want to comment.
Mr. Armitage. If I may, you used a sports analogy about a
jump-ball, and I know this is not a game, it is very serious
business, but if you will allow me, we've got a game plan, but
we are going to have to audible from time to time. Muqtada al-
Sadr is a case of an audible. This is a thug, just as Paul
described. He has been unable to garner popular support, Shia
support, in the south. They are turning on him. And as I said
earlier, Senator Voinovich, when our forces come in with wisdom
and determination carefully there, they've been welcomed by
people. The situation is very complex. It is not good, but
there are some signs that we ought to look at, and that is one
of them.
The Iranians actually came to Baghdad, and they met with
the British and they met with us to talk about Muqtada al-Sadr,
because, as Paul suggests, they find him an embarrassment, and
he is getting in their way.
Senator Voinovich. Well, has any thought been given to some
type of effort to--instead of having a kind of a democracy that
we're hoping for, that we'll end up with something like we have
in Iran?
Mr. Armitage. We've been very leery of it, very watchful of
it. And we're, thus far, quite satisfied that the most
important cleric, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, has stated that
he does not want a theocracy. If there's another surprise in
this area, it was the more secular nature of Iraqi society than
I had initially understood, though that is in no way a
suggestion they're not faithful to their beliefs.
Mr. Wolfowitz. In fact, Senator, I think, before you came
in, I mentioned that there was a report recently of some 17
local elections in southern Iraq where the Islamists were
defeated in most of those elections.
Senator Voinovich. I heard that, and I was, quite frankly,
surprised at that. So that you believe that there is enough
support for some type of secular Western type of democracy
there?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think, Senator, most Iraqis don't want to
go back to a tyranny, even the ones who are deeply religious.
And if there's a fair degree of local autonomy, it wouldn't
surprise me that in some parts of Iraq you find very
conservative governments with respect to issues like what kinds
of images you can show on television, for example. But I don't
think most Iraqis would--if they're free to vote their
conscience, would want to see a government that imposes a kind
of tyranny they see in Iran. They've been through 35 years of a
different sort of tyranny.
Senator Voinovich. Well, certainly what has happened in
that prison has really been ammunition for those who talk about
us defiling their country.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Terrible ammunition. But I hope that the way
in which we deal with it will be an example, that this is a
country that doesn't tolerate abuse and that punishes abuse,
and that hopefully Iraq will be the first Arab country that has
the same approach to those things.
Senator Voinovich. I would just like to also say--you say
you need this resolution from the United Nations, but you're
not certain you're going to get it, and it just seems to me
that one of the things--when we supported the $87 billion for
Iraq, one of the conditions was that we would get support from
other countries in terms of reconstruction, and we would get
support from other countries in terms of reducing their debt to
the country. Are we getting any--we've got some help, but it
seems to me that it is not very enthusiastic.
Mr. Armitage. Perhaps I misspoke. We're going to get a U.N.
Security Council resolution. And the good news, from my point
of view, is the consultations--the informal consultations, both
in New York and, more recently, Secretary Powell's
consultations with the G-8, indicate that all of our thinking
is within certain acceptable bounds. So it's a matter of
working out and accommodating everyone's views. So I'm
absolutely positive we're going to get a U.N. Security Council
resolution, without question.
Senator Voinovich. Again, can you repeat how much
reconstruction money have we got from other countries, and how
many countries have reduced their debts or eliminated them
since we've made the $87 billion commitment?
Mr. Armitage. The international donors, I believe came up
with $13.8 billion dollars, of which about a billion has been
disbursed. We are into it for $20 billion, as you've indicated,
sir. All the major debtors, except for Russia, I believe, have
indicated a willingness to engage in substantial debt
reduction. It hasn't happened yet, but that's the status, as I
know it.
Senator Voinovich. The question I have is that when we
passed that--authorized the $87 billion, there was a
requirement in there for a report. Have we ever received a
report back from you yet on where we stand, in terms of that
request? The report?
Mr. Armitage. I don't know, and I'll find out.
Senator Voinovich. Well, I would like to see it, because
I've asked this question several times, and I would like to see
exactly how much money are we getting from our allies and how
much are they cooperating with us. Because, again, you get back
to the streets of Ohio, and people are saying, we are Uncle
Sugar. We're over there and we're taking care of everything,
and where are the rest of the people that should be interested
in what happens in Iraq as we are interested in it? Where are
they?''
Mr. Armitage. That's the neighbors, you bet. I'll find out
where it is, Senator.
[The following information was subsequently provided:]
United States Department of State,
Washington, DC 20520, March 11, 2004.
The Honorable George Voinovich
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.
Dear Senator Voinovich:
Pursuant to Section 2215(3)(b) of the FY 2004 Emergency
Supplemental for Iraq and Afghanistan (P.L. 108-106), please find
enclosed a report on Iraq and Afghanistan.
We hope you find this information useful. Please do not hesitate to
contact us if we may be of assistance on this or any other issue.
Sincerely,
Paul V. Kelly,
Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs.
Enclosures: As stated.
Report to Congress on Iraq and Afghanistan
This report is submitted pursuant to Section 2215(3)(b) of the FY
2004 Emergency Supplemental for Iraq and Afghanistan (P.L. 108-106)
(``the Act''). It details:
1. ``The amount of debt incurred by the Government of Saddam
Hussein in Iraq, the impact forgiveness of such debt would have
on reconstruction and long-term prosperity in Iraq, and the
estimated amount that Iraq will pay, or that will be paid on
behalf of Iraq, to a foreign country to service such debt
during fiscal year 2004.''
2. ``The efforts of the Government of the United States to
increase resources contributed by foreign countries and
international organizations, including the United Nations, to
the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq and to increase
international participation in peacekeeping and security
efforts in Iraq.''
3. ``The manner in which the needs of people with
disabilities are being addressed in the development and
implementation of programs, projects and activities funded by
the United States Government in Iraq and Afghanistan.''
4. ``The progress being made toward indicting and trying
leaders of the former Iraqi regime for war crimes, genocide,
and crimes against humanity.''
5. ``The efforts of relevant Iraqi officials and legal
advisors to ensure that a new Iraqi constitution preserves
religious freedom and tolerance of all faiths.''
Report
I. IRAQ'S DEBT
Although efforts to reconcile data numbers are ongoing, we estimate
Iraq's external official debt to be approximately $120 billion,
virtually all of which was incurred during the period of Saddam
Hussein's regime. The IMF's Macroeconomic Assessment, done in October
2003 for the Madrid Donor's conference, noted that Iraq is one of the
most heavily externally indebted countries in the world. The
Macroeconomic Assessment added that Iraq's fiscal situation would
remain under strain for years even assuming increased oil production
and domestic tax revenues and that Iraq would need ``generous
restructuring'' of its external debt to achieve sustainability. The IMF
is in the process of completing its Debt Sustainability Analysis for
Iraq.
The United States has been working to encourage the international
community to forgive or at least substantially reduce the large amount
of debt that Iraq accumulated under Saddam Hussein. On December 5, the
President named former Secretary James A. Baker III as his Special
Presidential Envoy to work with the world's governments at the highest
levels in seeking to restructure Iraq's official debt. In December and
January, Baker traveled to Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and
the UK), Asia (Japan and China), and the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
the UAE and Qatar), and successfully secured commitments from the
leaders of these nations to provide at least substantial debt reduction
for Iraq in 2004. The United States will continue to work toward the
goal of debt reduction for Iraq in 2004. The exact percentage of
reduction is subject to further agreement among parties.
II. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND PARTICIPATION IN
PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY
A. International Support for Reconstruction
The United States has been successful in raising support from the
international community for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of
Iraq. The U.S. played a major role in organizing the highly successful
Madrid Donors' Conference in October. Representatives of 73 countries
and 20 international organizations attended the meeting as well as
members of the Iraqi Governing Council. The official tally of the
Conference's results showed final pledges of at least $32 billion,
including our own pledge of $18.4 billion in grants from the FY 04
supplemental; the highest ever obtained at an international pledging
Conference.
Non-U.S. pledges, around $13 billion, will be a mixture of grants
and loans to be disbursed during 2004-2007. Not included in the pledge
numbers for other donors are offers of trade credits, in-kind
assistance, and technical assistance (including training).
The World Bank and the United Nations Development Program have just
established trust funds within an International Reconstruction Fund
Facility for Iraq (IRFFI). Senior Iraqi officials, along with a U.S.
Government team, will meet with other major donors in Abu Dhabi at the
end of February to discuss the functioning of the trust funds and other
aid coordination issues.
B. International Participation in Peacekeeping and Security
The United States has broadened international military
participation in Iraq. There are now 34 countries contributing
approximately 24,000 troops to the stabilization of Iraq, including two
multinational divisions led by the United Kingdom and Poland. In
addition, the Iraqis themselves now contribute to their own
stabilization. There are over 200,000 Iraqi police, military, and civil
defense forces on duty. In total, 65% of security forces in Iraq are
non-U.S.
We continue to seek additional international participation in the
security and stabilization of Iraq. We anticipate new contributions,
including pledges by the Korean and Japanese governments to increase
their current contingents that will add a total of 4,000 troops.
Armenia, Tonga, and Bosnia-Herzegovina have also recently made formal
offers of forces, and we are continuing discussions with seven other
nations on their informal contribution offers.
Iraq
III. ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
Department officials met with organizations representing the rights
of the disabled during the summer of 2003. Discussions addressed the
opportunity presented by reconstruction to ensure that the needs of the
disabled are met in the new Iraq, both legally and in terms of
infrastructure and services. These organizations reported that they had
approached the Polish government with a proposal to conduct a
conference in Warsaw in late 2003 that would result in a set of
recommendations for the CPA. The Department forwarded this information
to CPA representatives in Baghdad.
The Ministry of Human Rights in Iraq, established pursuant to CPA
order and opened on February 14, 2004, is mandated to protect and
promote human rights. Concerns regarding the rights of the disabled and
steps necessary to safeguard them have been brought to the Minister's
attention. The USAID/Mission in Iraq has adopted a formal, written
policy on the rights of the disabled and has begun to implement that
policy. USAID is refurbishing the Kirkuk Rehabilitation Center, which
principally serves Iraqi veterans and others who have lost limbs, and
has worked to accommodate disabled travelers at the Baghdad and Basrah
airports.
Afghanistan
Through the Leahy War Victims Fund (LWVF), the United States
supports the United Nations Development Programme's Comprehensive
Disabled Afghan's Program (CDAP). The program is constructing five
community rehabilitation centers using ADA accessibility guidelines
that will serve 1,000-1,500 persons. It also provides technical
assistance to the Government of Afghanistan to meet the needs of people
with disabilities. The LWVF also supports international NGOs, such as
Handicap International, which provides wheelchairs and wheelchair
training to disabled persons in Kandahar. USAID is completing 92
handicap-accessible schools and 220 handicap-accessible clinics,
expected to be operational by June 2004.
IV. WAR CRIMES
Our policy is to see Saddam Hussein and others who committed war
crimes and crimes against humanity prosecuted by Iraqis. We are working
closely with the Iraqis to help them create a fair, transparent and
effective process, which will stand up to international scrutiny and
conform to international standards of human rights and humanitarian
law. The new Iraqi Government will decide how former regime officials
currently in detention under USG or Coalition control will be tried,
and how proceedings will be conducted.
Mass grave sites have been discovered all over the country; to
date, approximately 263 sites have been identified, of which
approximately 40 have been confirmed. Hundreds of thousands of people
are missing--current estimates are that between 300,000 and one million
people remain unaccounted for from the period of Saddam's regime.
The Iraqi Governing Council, with input from CPA and others,
drafted the Statute creating an Iraqi Special Tribunal. Ambassador
Bremer delegated to them the authority to promulgate the Statute; it
was issued on December 10, 2003. We believe the Statute provides enough
flexibility to achieve a fair process. Highlights of the Statute
include:
Jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and specified violations of Iraqi law,
committed between July 17, 1968 and May 1, 2003.
Judges, prosecutors, investigative judges, and the
Administrative Director shall be Iraqi nationals; however, the
Iraqi Governing Council can appoint non-Iraqi judges.
Non-Iraqis must be appointed to serve as observers/advisors
to each of the Chambers.
Penalties that may be imposed by the Tribunal shall be those
prescribed by Iraqi law.
Rights of the accused include a presumption of innocence,
entitlement to a public hearing, representation of counsel,
confrontation of accusers, right against self-incrimination and
right to remain silent.
V. PRESERVING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
President Bush recently reiterated our commitment to religious
freedom in Iraq, calling in a nationally televised interview for an
Iraqi constitution that ``recognizes minority rights and freedom of
religion.'' Promoting an atmosphere of religious tolerance and insuring
the individual right of thought, conscience, and religion in Iraq, are
important elements in creating a stable environment in which democracy
can flourish.
It is essential that the documents that will form the foundation of
the new Iraqi government enshrine the principle of religious freedom.
The November 15 agreement between the Iraqi Governing Council and the
Coalition Provisional Authority established, in accordance with UNSC
Resolution 1511, a timeline and program for the restoration of Iraq's
governmental authority and the drafting of a permanent constitution.
The agreement calls for a fundamental law (currently referred to as the
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)), which will govern Iraq until it
has ratified a permanent constitution, to include a provision
guaranteeing religious freedom. CPA officials have repeatedly conveyed
to Iraqis involved with the TAL drafting process our expectation that
the final document will contain guarantees of religious freedom in
accordance with international standards and Iraq's international treaty
obligations.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I would say there's $12 billion of Iraqi
funds that have been applied to running the government and
doing the reconstruction, and another $8 billion committed for
the rest of this year.
Senator Hagel [presiding]. Let me announce, for the benefit
of the members here, there's a vote on. Chairman Lugar has gone
to vote. He will be back, and he will continue this hearing.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And maybe if someone
would call over and see if they would hold it up a couple of
minutes so we can get a line of questioning in here.
Senator Biden. They've already said they would hold it a
few more minutes. There's 6 minutes left.
Senator Dodd. Well, thanks. And thanks to our witnesses for
being here. And let me echo the comments, by the way, of
Senator Sarbanes, about you, Senator Biden and Senator Lugar.
These have been tremendously helpful, these hearings, and it's
exactly what the Congress should be doing. In the absence of
legislating, holding oversight hearings on critical issues,
both domestic and foreign, are absolutely essential, and these
have been worthwhile hearings. And I want the chairman and the
ranking member to know how much all of us appreciate it very,
very much.
Let me begin by just expressing to you what I think is
obvious, but probably needs to be stated again, and that is,
anybody who ever thought this was going to be easy was deluding
themselves. This is a difficult task. And so you all know that
as we raise questions about these matters here, at least I
think for all of us on this side of the dais, there is an
appreciation of how complicated and difficult this mission is.
Second, I think, without exception, all of us want you to
succeed, want the administration to succeed, want this policy
to succeed, that it's critically important that the present
situation we find ourselves in--and the exact description, I
think, that Senator Voinovich gave is one that is not narrowly
held; there are a lot of people across this country who are
very, very worried about how this is progressing, what the end
game is, whether or not we're going to achieve even a part of
our goals here, and the growing fear that we may even be, in
some ways, in a worse situation if we're not careful at the end
of all of this. So I raise that point with you.
And to express what Senator Voinovich said, and it's my
view, as well, one of the concerns I have is the lack of candor
and transparency about what is going on. And let me, if I can,
jump to this issue of the prison abuses, if I may for a minute.
I'm very interested in knowing whether or not the State
Department was aware of the situation at the prison. We know
now that General Myers had asked CBS to delay using those
photographs for several weeks. Was the State Department aware
of this, Mr. Armitage?
Mr. Armitage. If I may, we were aware that there were some
alleged abuses, back in the January/February timetable, and
Secretary Powell, as he said publicly, made this a subject of
discussions with his colleagues, the principals, as well as the
President.
Senator Dodd. Were you briefed on it, though? Were you
actually briefed on the Taguba Report?
Mr. Armitage. No, we were not briefed on it, to my
knowledge; we heard from the press that there were photos,
about a week or so before they appeared.
Senator Dodd. So were you aware that a request had been
made to a major network to delay the release of those
photographs?
Mr. Armitage. I was aware, because the press person who
told me worked for that network.
Senator Dodd. The reason I raise it, we had Mr. Negroponte
here, and all of us supported his nomination, and he appeared
here on the 27th of April. The reports came out the following
day. And I'm just curious as to why, in the interest of candor
and transparency, that either in direct testimony or a response
to questions, the designee to be the Ambassador to Iraq
wouldn't have laid out to this committee a critical issue that
was about to explode onto the public scene within 24 hours.
Mr. Armitage. I don't think he knew anything about it. I
don't think any of us in the Department of State had any idea
what were on the pictures. I've told you the sum of our
knowledge of this, that there were some photographs.
Senator Dodd. But, beyond that----
Mr. Armitage. I don't think he had any inkling.
Senator Dodd. Because Senator Feingold asked John
Negroponte very specific question about the human rights
issues, and it would have been a perfect opportunity, if not in
direct testimony, to say, by the way, we've got a problem here
that you ought to be aware of, whether or not he could give you
the details, but certainly to lay it out to the committee would
have been helpful at that point.
Mr. Armitage. I say, again, I don't think he knew anything
about pictures, Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. But he knew about the prison abuse.
Mr. Armitage. I'll have to find out. We, in the Department
of State, knew about, and I don't know how much he was read
into it as he went through his confirmation preparations.
Senator Dodd. Well, wouldn't he have been briefed?
Mr. Armitage. He wouldn't have been briefed in New York,
sir. I don't know if he was briefed down here on it.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, I think the whole world knew that
there was prison abuse. Central Command announced the
investigation, I think, January 16, and, I believe, in March--I
don't know the exact date--they announced that criminal
proceedings were being brought against some U.S. military
personnel. The shocking part of it is when you see the pictures
and you understand what is being talked about.
Senator Dodd. I understand that, Mr. Secretary. I'm not
trying to get down to the details. I'm just--about the candor
and transparency. Now, I know when particularly a sensitive
issue, like the Ambassadorship to Iraq is coming up, there's a
Q&A period, and you go back and forth, and it goes to the point
that Senator Voinovich is raising. This is where we begin to
get ourselves in trouble. Sometimes it's not the act, it's the
perjury that occurs. I'm not suggesting perjury was the case
here, but it's usually being candid about what is going on, and
how all matters are revealed, how they become--the public
becomes aware of things. So what I'm trying to get at is
whether or not John Negroponte was aware of the abuses, whether
or not he had seen the photographs or not, whether or not,
during the question-and-answer period of training and
preparation for him to come up here, these issues were raised
in any way.
Mr. Armitage. I'll ask him.
Senator Dodd. But you're not aware of it.
Mr. Armitage. No, I'm not, sir.
Senator Dodd. Let me, if I can, pick up very quickly on a
question that Senator Sarbanes raised and the chairman wisely
asked you to possibly amend answers, particularly with regard
to contractors dealing with detainees or prisoners. How would
you feel about just a direct prohibition of having contract
employees involved in the interrogation of detainees and
prisoners in Iraq? One of the problems, it seems to me here, is
the lack of authority and direct control of some of these
people. I guess there are 20,000 of them in the country. Do you
have a quick response as to how you would feel about such a
prohibition against contractors being directly involved in the
interrogation of detainees?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator Dodd, there are so many people
trying to look into this and fix the problem, I wouldn't want
to speculate. I do think it is absolutely essential--a lesson
from this is not to have people involved in interrogation who
aren't thoroughly trained and disciplined and know the rules
and follow the rules. And if you could have a contractor that
meets those qualifications, it might be better than having a
less-well-trained uniformed person. But I think it absolutely
brings home the importance of having disciplined, trained
people doing the work.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Armitage.
Mr. Armitage. I don't know what the military manpower
situation is, but to have this done without training and
without oversight and supervision is not acceptable.
Senator Dodd. Let me ask you about--there was apparently,
in January of 2002, a memo from the legal counsel at the White
House--Mr. Alberto Gonzalez, wrote a memo to the Department of
State--wrote to the President and the Department of State, I
guess--in which he says, ``In my judgment, this new paradigm of
terrorism renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitation on
questioning of enemy prisoners, and renders quaint some of its
provisions of the Geneva Accords.'' Were you aware of that
memo?
Mr. Armitage. Yes, I was aware of it as I came here today,
because I saw our General Counsel look at it. I don't remember
seeing it at the time, and I've heard, and I will have to
check, and I think you will want to check, that that quote was
disavowed, that it was in an earlier draft of a memo that was
being prepared and was not in the final draft, particularly the
comment about ``obsolete.'' But you've now, or I've, adjusted
my knowledge of this.
Senator Dodd. Do you want to comment on what's your own
reaction? I gather that the Secretary, the quote was, ``hit the
roof'' on all of this. Now, this goes back to January 2002,
more than 2 years ago. But it raises concerns on the part of
many of us here that, in fact, prior to, actually, the
commencement of hostilities in Iraq, that there was this
preparation, a notion that we were going to sort of walk away
from the rule of law. And I wonder if you might take an
opportunity here, both of you, to comment on your general
observations as to whether or not--whether he used the word
``obsolete'' or ``quaint'' here, and I'm not going to--if they
say that's an early draft--what is your view regarding the
Geneva Convention, Geneva Accords, and whether or not the
United States ought to be adhering to its principles and its
letter?
Mr. Armitage. Whether you're talking Geneva 2 or Geneva 3,
it seems to me that what separates us and allows us to listen
to a higher standard is, where principle is involved, or we're
deaf to expediency. And so my view is, we ought to always do
the principled thing, and we ought to embrace these. They are
protections for us, as well as for others.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I agree with that, Senator. In fact, I think
the U.S. military would view us as having a greater practical
interest in the Geneva Convention than any other country
because we count on them to try to protect our prisoners when
they're detained. I would emphasize that if we're talking about
January 2002, we're in the context of post-September 11, and
the issue of how you try to obtain information that could
prevent a repetition of the September 11 attacks on the United
States was not at all in anticipation of a war in Iraq.
Senator Dodd. I appreciate that. But you can certainly
appreciate the fact that this is unsettling. This wasn't a memo
from some freshman law student who may have an ideological
point of view; this is the counsel to the President of the
United States in the White House. Were you aware of this memo?
Mr. Wolfowitz. No, I wasn't.
Senator Dodd. Did the Department of Defense receive a
similar memo?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I can't tell you. I can find out.
Senator Dodd. I would appreciate it if you would.
[At the time of publication no response had been received.]
Senator Dodd. General, do you have any quick comments on
this?
General Sharp. Sir, we are 100 percent behind the Geneva
Convention and the importance of it.
Senator Dodd. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator
Dodd.
On this issue, as well as in the earlier one, if you would
clarify for the record any further research you have on the
counsel's memo, it is an important point, and we would
appreciate your underlining that.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And,
gentlemen, thank you for being with us today.
These are challenging times, and we appreciate your
efforts. There has been a lot of discussion about the course
we're on, changing courses. General Sharp, I think you
described the approach that I would like to see. It's not about
changing course; we need to stay on course with the transition
on June 30, we need to stay on course with elections at the end
of the year and the start of the next year. But we have to
continue--I think these are your words--continually reassess,
based on the circumstances on the ground.
Let me first just raise the issue of security. Obviously,
the tragic killing of President Salim yesterday, can you talk
to me a little bit about security, then, for folks on the
Governing Council, American officials? Does that incident cause
us to reassess circumstances on the ground and to change our
course of conduct?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, Iraq is a dangerous place. I mean,
I visited in late October, and was staying in the Al Rashid
Hotel, and we were rocketed. One American was killed, and four
Americans and one Brit were seriously wounded. It's going to
keep happening. I think this enemy we're up against believes
that if Iraq gets its own government, its own security forces,
they're finished, and so they're going to be doing everything
they can in the coming months--not just until July 1, but at
least up until elections--to try to destabilize the country
sufficiently to prevent that progress from happening.
There's enormous heroism on the Iraqi side. These Governing
Council members knew that they were targeted. One of their
number, Akila al-Hashimi, was brutally murdered last fall, or
late last summer, so they're real heroes. And, as I mentioned
in my statement, some 350, by our count Iraqi security forces,
police, civil defense corps have been killed fighting for a new
Iraq, and my guess is the numbers are actually a lot higher. We
keep very careful count, obviously, of our own numbers. I don't
think we have the ability to do the same on the Iraqi side.
Senator Coleman. One of the----
Mr. Armitage. If I may, there's--something new will be
introduced on 1 July, and that is that these Iraqi forces, who
have fought, in many cases, valiantly, will no longer be
fighting for the occupiers, they're going to be fighting for
Iraq. And I think many who are expert in the Middle East, and
in Iraq particularly, have noted that this is a new situation,
and it's not as if the Iraqis don't know how to fight, but they
will have a little something different to fight for.
Second, on security, this is not generally what a State
Department official would be talking about, but as we prepare
for 140 State officers out there, we've got about 130 armored
vehicles either there or on the way, we've got body armor
ordered that will be there before 1 July, not normally things
that State officers are having to do. But because the security
situation is as it is, we have to take these precautions.
Senator Coleman. One of the enemies obviously still active
is al-Zarqawi. Help me understand. Do we know where his dollars
are coming from? Do we know where his support is coming from?
Do we--kind of a multiple question here--have a sense of how he
is perceived by Iraqis?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think all we can say is there's money
available both inside Iraq and some coming from outside. It
goes to al-Zarqawi, among others. It comes from some of the
same sources that fund al-Qaeda. Al-Zarqawi himself is called,
I think, an al-Qaeda affiliate. I'm really not quite sure why
we make these distinctions. He ran a terrorist training camp in
Afghanistan, under bin Laden's direction, and then after the
Operation Enduring Freedom, he fled Afghanistan, went to Iraq,
has a number of ties to Iraqi intelligence, which seem to have
grown thicker, although I emphasize--I should emphasize we know
a lot less about these people than we would like to. They
operate in great secrecy. It was a huge breakthrough when we
captured Mr. Hassan Ghul, who was one of al-Zarqawi's senior
lieutenants who was carrying a message from al-Zarqawi to one
of his associates in Afghanistan. That's this remarkable letter
that I think you've heard about and that I quoted in my
testimony. We're pretty certain that al-Zarqawi has been
working with former Iraqi intelligence officers and others in
this fight in Fallujah, that he was probably there at least
some of the time.
And, unfortunately, the fact is that it doesn't take large
numbers of people, especially if some of them are willing to
commit suicide, to do enormous damage.
Senator Coleman. Yes, about a month ago, we read the papers
that Iraq was in the middle of an uprising, a civil uprising,
al-Sadr on one side, Sunnis on the other. I don't see much of
that. I mean, my sense is that we're killing al-Sadr's folks,
and he is not replenishing. Give me a sense of the situation in
Iraq, vis-a-vis, civil uprisings. Give me a sense of that.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Let me make three points. No. 1, in al-
Zarqawi's infamous letter, where he expresses a sense of
desperation that if they can't destabilize the country before
it gets its own government, they will suffer what he calls
``suffocation,'' he identifies his principal target as being
attacks on the Shia in an effort to create a Shia/Sunni civil
war. And that would explain a number of the attacks we've seen,
including the horrendous bombings in southern Iraq on the
Ashura holiday, and they've been totally unsuccessful in
creating a Sunni/Shia civil war.
No. 2, with respect to al-Sadr, we think it's a very
different situation, that, in fact, as the Shia majority have
come to understand, that there will be resolute action taken
against him and his forces. Not only are we reducing his forces
in number, but, equally importantly, we're getting more and
more of the population coming out and speaking against him.
On the worrisome side, I guess I would have to put on the
table that up north, particularly in Kirkuk, which is a mixed
Kurdish Arab city, we have had remarkable good luck over the
last year in preventing what we've always feared could be a
source of real ethnic violence. It's a little troubled right
now, and it's one of the situations we're looking at closely.
You know, we always get--we come up here, we try to emphasize
some of the positive things that are happening. We're not
trying to suggest, by any means, that this is a rosy scenario,
but we do think that Iraq is moving forward toward self-
government and self-defense, and that's the key to winning.
Senator Coleman. Do I have time for one more question, Mr.
Chairman?
The Chairman. Yes, you do.
Senator Coleman. There was a statement by Ayatollah al-
Sistani recently saying it would be permissible--and this is
his the statement--``permissible to demand the withdrawal of
all military vestiges from the two cities and allow the tribal
forces to perform their role in preserving security and
order.'' What do you make of that statement?
Mr. Armitage. We see a lot of statements attributed to
Ayatollah al-Sistani, and if he made that one, I'm not sure--
but we've looked at it as a not-very-veiled reference that
Muqtada al-Sadr ought to get out of Najaf and Karbala, himself,
and particularly stop using holy places to store weapons and to
foment violence.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. The reason he's going
to me, I didn't ask any questions yet. I apologize.
General, let me ask you, if I may, to begin with, and this
is a serious question, and I'll put it in context, because if I
just ask it, it will sound strange. I remember when General
Joulwan, in the Clinton administration, was put in charge of
our effort in the Balkans. And I remember being in a meeting
and he was asked, and I'm paraphrasing, do you have enough
troops? And his response was, ``That depends on my mission, Mr.
President. So what is my mission?'' President Clinton said, in
effect, what do you think the mission should be? The general
said, well, the mission is obviously force protection, No. 1.
We have a mission to protect our own forces there. And, No. 2,
do you want me, Mr. President, to go and capture the war
criminals who have been indicted? Do you want me to guarantee
the security of several-hundred-thousand people who have come
down from the hills? Do you want me to disarm the populace? Do
you want me to--and he went down the list. And he said, for all
of those, I'll need x. And the President says, no, not all of
those. So it's x-minus.
So what is the mission? Is the mission of our force in
Iraq, does it include civilian policing of Iraqi neighborhoods?
Does it include fighting street crime, preventing kidnaping,
catching thieves, as well as fighting insurgents? I mean, what
is our mission? What's the mission statement you all have?
General Sharp. Sir, the mission is to provide a secure and
stable environment for Iraq. That encompasses several things
right now. Clearly, killing terrorists and capturing
terrorists. Second is working with Iraqi security forces to
provide a safe environment for the people of Iraq in and among
the cities. So, as you know, right now we patrol with Iraqi
security forces, we train Iraqi security forces, and we are
moving, in some cities, to be able to hand off a lot of that to
the Iraqi security forces. So if you have to define----
Senator Biden. Do you have enough forces for the mission?
General Sharp. General Abizaid, General Sanchez, all the
commanders on the ground--and I was there as recently as 3
weeks ago--General Myers asked this very question to all the
division commanders there, and their consistent answer was,
across the board, ``yes,'' they have enough forces in order to
be able to accomplish that mission, and are working hard to be
able to get the security responsibilities handed off to the
Iraqi security forces, and that's why you see----
Senator Biden. Well, who are you going to hand them off--
excuse me for interrupting you--who are you going to hand them
over to, general? There's no seriously trained Iraqi force now.
I mean, this malarkey you guys came up with, that you've got
200,000 trained Iraqis, I mean, every single solitary expert,
including your guys that we met with in Iraq, said, it's going
to take 3 years to train 40,000 Iraqi military, 3 to 5 years to
get up to the 79,000 Iraqi police needed. And you point out
you're doing a good job now, you're going out and trying to
identify leaders to lead. You know, you haven't had those
folks. So you really don't have except in some places--it's
spotty--some places, you have folks whom you can rely on. And
that's why, it's been pointed out to me by our military, the
insurgents are smart enough to go blow up the police stations
and blow up the policemen and blow up people who are in line
signing up to become police officers and/or join the military.
I mean, you know, these guys aren't stupid. That's their
target. And I'm not suggesting there are not plenty of Iraqis
who want to do this. But, right now, the military I speak
with--you know that old thing, I know I'm going to be asked
names, and, off the record, I'm happy to give you the names.
There's a number of Iraqi Americans with families in Iraq who
keep in touch with us. You know, I mean, all you've got to do
is go to Detroit. And they say you still don't let your
daughter out of the house, you're still not able to send her
down to the corner store to get milk. You know, there is
rampant crime. And all the evidence is, none of the Iraqis
think that they have security. And it's not just insurgents. I
mean, they're--everybody, like in Israel, is worried a bus is
going to blow up.
So I want to know for example, is disarming the militias
part of the mission?
General Sharp. Sir, let me----
Senator Biden. All militias?
General Sharp [continuing]. Talk to a couple of things.
First off, to be clear, we are not going to hand off security
on 1 July, writ large, across the country to the Iraqi security
forces. As you point out, those security forces will not be
nearly trained by 1 July. In fact, by 1 July, we'll have
approximately 10 percent of the total required Iraqi police
academy-trained, and another 20 percent trained by the shorter
3-week program that our military does throughout the country.
We will continue the--and are continuing to accelerate the
training both in Jordan and in Baghdad and in Irbil and than at
the different academies across the country. There's been a
recent change where we have really started focusing on training
mid-level leadership, specialized training, so that Iraqis who
want to take security responsibilities have the capability to
be able to do that.
There is a CPA regulation out that says that you are not
allowed to carry weapons without a card--you know, a weapons
card. That has to be issued by the CPA or the correct
authority. And as soldiers come and see people doing it, they
are being arrested at doing it.
Senator Biden. I believe you. If I could interrupt, in the
interest of time, general. And by the way, I think you know,
you're on the right track. I'm not being critical of what
you're trying to do. What I'm trying to get at is, seeing
someone with a weapon, and arresting them, is very different
than aggressively----
General Sharp. Yes, sir.
Senator Biden [continuing]. Going and disarming the
population. What about the militias? I don't mean just al-
Sadr's militia. What about the other militias that exist within
the country? Is it part of the mission--I'm not saying it
should or shouldn't; I want to know, though, is it part of the
mission? Does a commander in the various regions in Iraq have,
as a mission, to disarm the militias? Is that part of it?
General Sharp. Sir, the militias, if they are active--let
me start with--we actively go out to try to find weapons
caches, and work on every tip that we get from the Iraqis to be
able to get at--not just if we see weapons on the street, but
the number of cordons and searches, the number of raids that we
do, consistently brings in a lot of different weapons across
the board. We are actively trying to get at all of those
different weapons out there.
Senator Biden. Do you have enough forces for that, general?
I mean, we had 850,000 tons of open ammunition dumps that we
didn't have enough soldiers to guard. So we obviously didn't
have enough for the mission. I think that's right, 850,000
tons, it may have been 900,000. We had helicopters, guys with
night-vision goggles watching people go in and out, but we
didn't have enough forces. Do we have enough forces now to be
certain that--if there's any ammunition dumps that are still
there, that we can either control them or destroy them?
General Sharp. Sir, every time we find an ammunition dump
out there, we assess, No. 1, how quickly can somebody take
things out of that ammunition dump? If it looks like it's the
type of ammunition and weapons that could go against Coalition
forces, we immediately secure them. Is that to say that they
are all completely secured across the country? No, there are
some that have been covered up so that they could not be
stolen. But we find ammunition caches every day, and they're
using our forces to be able to try to destroy those and guard
those.
Senator Biden. Well, there are at least five major
militias--the Da'wa Party, the Badr Brigade, the two Kurdish
parties' militias al-Sadr's so-called army. Is it our policy,
I'm not saying that we should or shouldn't, and part of the
mission of Abizaid in Iraq to disarm the militias? That's my
specific question for anyone to answer, including you, general.
Is that part of the mission statement?
General Sharp. Sir, the mission is to not allow any of the
militia forces to be able to go against the rule of law in
Iraq.
Senator Biden. With all due respect, general, that's not an
answer. The question is, do we specifically include in the
mission statement the disarmament of the Da'wa Party's militia,
roughly about 10,000 people, the Badr Brigade, roughly 10,000
militia--by your numbers; is that part of the mission? I'm not
suggesting it has to be. Is that a mission? Is that part of the
mission?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, I think the correct interpretation
of the mission statement that General Sharp just gave you is,
that is not part of the mission unless it is necessary to bring
them under control. And in the case of al-Sadr, it's proving to
be necessary. In the case of the Kurdish militias, for example,
it would give us--frankly, it would be a source of instability
if we were to try to go out and forcibly disarm them. And, in
fact, they have been a source of stability in many parts of the
country--not one you want to rely on long-term, but the
approach to those militias is to try, over time, to integrate
them into new Iraqi security forces. And the real answer to
disarming militias is to create an alternative security
institution, and then the militias can go away.
Senator Biden. Just a real quick adjunct to that. Are we
using the Badr Brigade or the Da'wa militia, allowing them to
independently engage al-Sadr in Najaf? Now, it's one thing to
integrate the militias into a U.S. command structure so that
there is some cooperation. And it's another thing--and I'm not
saying one's right or wrong; it's just a different thing--to
essentially give a green light to one of the militias to take
on another militia in Iraq. With regard to Najaf and al-Sadr,
are any existing Iraqi militia engaged, given the green light,
to take on al-Sadr?
Mr. Wolfowitz. You say engaged or given a green light.
Engaged, they may do on their own. Green light means, I think,
under our direction, our command, and----
Senator Biden. No, not command. Just say, go to it, guys,
any way you want. Not our command.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, that is precisely what we're trying
to avoid, is----
Senator Biden. That's why I'm asking the question.
Mr. Wolfowitz [continuing]. We are trying to avoid it. I
can't say that some--I mean, we're making a lot of--as
Secretary Armitage has called them, audibles, and tactical
commanders have to decide what is the best way to bring law and
order, and I wouldn't want to rule out if, at some point, in
order to deal with what you understand is one of our
fundamental dilemmas in Najaf, which is----
Senator Biden. I'm truly agnostic in this. I'm just trying
to get at----
Mr. Wolfowitz. I understand.
Senator Biden [continuing]. What the deal is.
Mr. Wolfowitz. And I'm trying to say, we're agnostic. The
principle is to establish law and order in a disciplined way,
and to do it without putting Coalition forces into the areas of
the holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala. And that's why we're
proceeding very carefully. We want Iraqis to do it as much as
possible. We want regular Iraqi security forces to do it as
much as possible. If some commander came and said, there's a
militia force here that I would like to use, I'm sure it would
be scrutinized pretty carefully, but I wouldn't rule it out as
a possibility.
Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, you look like you've got your
uniform back on.
Mr. Armitage. No, I don't dare, but just--there have been
some reports of the Badr Corps, as far as I know, independently
have conducted some, what I'd call, low-level operations
against the Medhi army.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Senator Biden, I'm not nearly as agnostic.
I think we're going to have to have more troops.
Senator Biden. Well, I'm not talking about the troops. I
meant on the issue of whether or not we are engaging, using,
and/or dealing with the militias of consequence in Iraq. That's
what I meant. I wasn't making a statement. For purposes of the
question, I'm agnostic on that issue. I'm not agnostic on the
fact--as you may recall, I am literally the very first person
here to call for significant increase in the number of American
troops a year and 2 months ago.
Senator Nelson. Well, as you have been a mentor to so many
of us, I agree with you on that issue. And that is a predicate
to ask this question. Given the fact that we have seen, for
example, when were ready to take on Fallujah, parts of the Iraq
Civil Defense force melted away--I know we are going through
the training; I've been to one of the training camps for the
police in Jordan--but when it came time for the ICDC to
perform, they suddenly vanished. That's one of the reasons that
I think we're going to have to have more troops, not less
troops. And I was somewhat concerned when I saw, in the London
Times of yesterday, that the shift of focus seems to be from
talking about forces staying in Iraq as long as it takes to now
that there's much of a focus on our forces leaving. And,
specifically, the London Times is talking about that Blair and
Bush are drawing up plans to speed the pullout.
Mr. Secretary Wolfowitz, do you want to comment about that?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I wouldn't believe everything I read in the
London Times, or certainly not that one. We are looking at
sustaining pretty high levels of U.S. forces, and certainly
higher than we anticipated earlier, for some time. And I would
add, we knew there were problems with the ICDC in Fallujah, the
locally recruited one. The 36th Battalion of the ICDC, by the
way, which was not a local battalion, did come to Fallujah, did
do some pretty serious fighting. If you go up to Mosul, where
General Petraeus' 101st Airborne Division trained ICDC, I
think, more effectively than anywhere else in the country, they
stood their ground and fought successfully and defended the
government house in Mosul. So it's a mixed picture. What we
believe is very important is that we think we know how to
improve the picture in places like Mosul, from good to
excellent, and in places like Fallujah, from terrible to,
hopefully, at least moderate.
Senator Nelson. How did they perform in Ramadi?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Probably not very well.
Senator Nelson. They melted away.
Mr. Wolfowitz. And, in some cases, they helped the enemy.
That's one of our problems.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary Armitage, you know my----
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator Nelson, if I might say, I mean, so
everyone understands, Fallujah and Ramadi have been, since the
beginning, the most difficult parts of the country with the
most seriously embedded elements of the old regime there
fighting us.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, you know my personal
affection and respect for you. I want to pick up on a question
that Senator Dodd was asking, and follow that. The media has
reported that Secretary Powell expressed concern about the
prison abuses to Secretary Rumsfeld. Would you pick up on that
and tell us what you know?
Mr. Armitage. I don't think my job is to exactly say what
Secretary Powell said to any of his Cabinet colleagues.
However, since he himself has said that when he was informed of
these by Mr. Kellenberger, of the ICRC, and laterally he
actually received a report through CPA in February, he raised
these with all the principals, not just Secretary Rumsfeld, as
well as with the President.
Senator Nelson. And that was when?
Mr. Armitage. February.
Senator Nelson. Let me ask you, regarding Iran, Iran has
been making some noise regarding the U.S. presence specifically
fighting the Shi'ites. What have we communicated to and with
Iran on this subject?
Mr. Armitage. I think yesterday or the day before, they
made some very strong noises about this, opposed to any
violence to any Shia. This was the loudest noise that they've
made recently. We have communicated to them, in no uncertain
terms, that the solution to the question of Muqtada al-Sadr is
one that doesn't need their active involvement in any way.
We've also said that we are watching their activities in the
south, particularly provision of money to certain clerics who
try to win favor, and we view it with disfavor, and they would
be judged by their actions in the south.
Senator Nelson. Would you feel comfortable, in this setting
or closed setting, of sharing with us some of the specific
communications and how it's been received by Iran?
Mr. Armitage. We normally, except for the time--the recent
event where the Iranians came to Baghdad and had a very
businesslike discussion with the British and our representative
about the question of Muqtada al-Sadr. We normally communicate
through the Swiss, and I'd be glad to come up and show you the
tone and tenor.
Senator Nelson. And would you also, at that time--and I
would welcome that--also talk to us about to what degree are we
getting through to Iran that they should be stopping their
nuclear program?
Mr. Armitage. I'll be glad to discuss that now. We, along
with our European friends, have--we have been skeptical from
the beginning about their willingness to stop the nuclear
program. Our European friends have been somewhat less
skeptical. But, in recent months, given the difficulty that the
IAEA has had in getting Iran to do what they said they'd do,
ratify the additional protocol and throw open to inspection
those things which need to be thrown open for inspection, and
say there's a gathering feeling in Europe, that they're hiding,
and they're holding something out.
Senator Nelson. You are going to be getting a letter that
Senator Ensign and I are now circulating for signatures on this
subject. It's addressed to the President, but I'm sure that you
all will weigh in on it. And this is something that I would
like to followup in detail, perhaps in a closed session. The
concern of the interests of the United States being threatened
by a nuclear Iran, of course, is enormous.
Could you tell us something about, Mr. Secretary, the
corruption in the ministries in Iraq?
Mr. Armitage. There is a lot of speculation in the very
free Iraqi press about this. Anyone who's seen participating in
the Governing Council is, at one time or another, as far as I
can see, accused of these matters. There are some
investigations which are ongoing, which I would prefer not to
mention here and would refer you to IGs and others. But I think
there's a lot of speculation that makes it seem that it's a lot
higher than it is. Having said that, there's no question, some
people have used their positions to enrich themselves or people
around them have used their position to enrich themselves
without, necessarily, reference to the principal.
Senator Nelson. Either you or Secretary Wolfowitz, would
you care to comment about the cutting off of the payments to
Mr. Chalabi?
Mr. Wolfowitz. That was a decision that was made in light
of the process of transferring sovereignty to the Iraqi people.
We felt it was no longer appropriate for us to continue funding
in that fashion. There has been some very valuable intelligence
that's been gathered through that process that's been very
important for our forces, but we will seek to obtain that in
the future through normal intelligence channels.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Corzine.
Senator Corzine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
hearings you're having. I think the topics on the table are
absolutely essential for us to explore.
I have to say, I'm a little out of sync with some of my
colleagues. I think there is a basic question that I think
needs answering, and it is, are we ready for anything that
looks like a credible transfer of sovereignty on June 30? I
just don't understand how we can be so bent on it, when we
don't know--we're told that sovereignty would include the
ability of the Iraqis to formulate foreign policy and
diplomatic relationships, and then I wonder how they're going
to deal with the Iranians post-June 30. I don't understand what
it means to transfer sovereignty when the command and control
of prisons is not yet identified, if I heard a response to
Senator Hagel's questions earlier-on and questions about
contracting and projects, which, at least under Secretary
Armitage's comments, said would be under the control of Chief
of Mission that would assume the ultimate authority for all the
projects and contracts as of July 1.
Mr. Armitage. For U.S.-appropriated money, sir.
Senator Corzine. Right. Well, are the Iraqis going to be
able to make that distinction and understanding with regard to
how that operates, either with regard to contractors or major
projects that are going on? I think a failed transfer runs
grave risks for the long-run potential of success of providing
a stable and democratic Iraq over a period of time. And it may
be good politics to make sure that we no longer have occupying
power after our name, but if it is a puppet regime or if it is
ineffectual, it may end up setting a framework for failure in
the long term. So I'm really troubled by it, and I make that
more of as a statement than--I do have serious questions about
how they formulate foreign policy and diplomatic representation
in conjunction with how you're going to deal with the Iranians
if they get in.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, Senator Corzine. I followed very
closely your very excellent questions to my colleague, Marc
Grossman, and these are clearly a follow-on to that, so you've
had these concerns for some time.
You're dead right, as far as I can see, an ineffectual or
faulty transition would be a disaster for us. A puppet would
even be worse. The TAL annex, which is to be written bu Iraqis,
is going to contain the duties and the responsibilities of this
caretaker government until January 2005. It is not an elected
government, which has been remarked upon by all concerned,
including Ayatollah al-Sistani. And as it's not a truly
representative government, it has to be somewhat careful and
circumspect in what it actually does.
Ambassador Brahimi envisions that this government will run
the operations day to day. What does this mean in foreign
policy? They'll send out diplomatic communications. They could,
in theory, establish relations with Iran over time. I'm sure
they will. All the other neighbors have relationships with
Iran. They make their own autonomous judgments, they run their
budgets, they take their money from the oil, and they
distribute it to meet their budget needs. So in everything, I
think, except the ability to make long-range, lasting
agreements, which tie the hands of a legally elected or a
democratically elected government, they will have full
sovereignty.
Now, that's not Rich Armitage's view. This is Secretary
Brahimi's view. This, I believe, is the view of the leading
Iraqis who want to be sovereign, but don't want to have binding
agreements in the long-run signed by somebody who's going to be
there for 7 months.
Senator Corzine. Well, it may not be treaties and long-run
policies, but it is the opening for dialog that might be
contradictory to establishing security and stability on the
ground in southern Iraq, as we were just commenting on in
another dialog. I just think my point really gets at that this
transfer of sovereignty doesn't feel, to this Senator, as
fleshed out in detail in a way that the American people, or at
least I could convey to the people that I represent, that it
has been challenged. And I don't know whether there are any
contingency plans if it doesn't work. You know, is there
serious thinking about what happens if a lot of these
questions, which are reasonable for indefinite answers at this
point, although we are only 44 days from this so-called
transfer. Are we dealing with contingencies if this comes
unwound?
Mr. Armitage. I would--at the risk of being seen in your
eyes as a wise guy, I'd say I prefer to look at this somewhat
like people look at the music of Wagner; it's better than it
sounds. It may be better than it sounds, particularly if the
people of Iraq buy it. That's what's important, by the way.
Senator Corzine. I couldn't agree more.
Mr. Armitage. And if the leading lights in Iraq, and
intellectuals and the academics, if they see it as a way
forward, which dramatically makes the points that we're not
occupiers, we're liberators, and as soon as they stand on their
feet, we'll remove ourselves as soon as they can provide for
their own security.
Regarding plan B, I guess is what we often hear, there have
been a lot of speculations about what a team B might be, an
expanded Iraqi Governing Council, the existing members can
bring in some more to be a caretaker government. Each of these,
in the words of our former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Hugh Shelton, ``have a lot of hair on 'em.'' This has
got the least hair on 'em. And I think we really need to try to
see this thing through, particularly as we've got such a
distinguished and able diplomat as Lakhdar Brahimi, backed up
by the United Nations.
Senator Corzine. May I switch gears? I think I have time
for another question.
Yesterday, there was an article in the L.A. Times about a
remarkable deal in Fallujah. A Fallujah Brigade now controls
the city. I had a comment that, you know, I'd love to hear
whether you all agree with, or don't. I know you can't believe
everything in the papers. But Fallujah is, for all intents and
purposes, a rebel town, complete with banners, proclaiming a
great victory, and insurgents integrated into the new Fallujah
Brigade. And, as we know, we haven't accomplished bringing to
justice those responsible for the killing of the contractors.
Is this a model? As I read in the testimony, ``Indeed, dialog
in cooperation with Iraqi leaders about situations in Fallujah
and Najaf, it's been essential in moving toward resolution in
both places.'' Is this a model that we think is working? Is
this something that we can look forward to, to be implemented
in how we integrate militia into future security arrangements
in the Iraqi forces?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator Corzine, I think it's too soon to
tell, and the marines on the ground would tell you it's too
soon to tell. And one hears reports like the one you described,
and one hears some more positive reports--for example, what
General Latif was doing just in the last 2 days. It will not be
acceptable for Fallujah to become, again, a sanctuary for enemy
fighters, and there are a number of red lines that the marines
have laid down, and we'll have to see how that brigade
performs.
If I could go back to the question you asked Secretary
Armitage, I think it would help the American people a lot if
you explain that July 1 is just the first step in a process,
and one of the most important steps is the one Senator Biden
correctly identified, which is elections. That's going to be
one of the keys. I think it also helps if you think of it--at
the risk of maybe--I don't mean this at all condescending--but
when you're teaching a youngster to ride a bicycle, you don't
keep your hand on the seat the whole time. At some point, you
have to take it off. In fact, the Iraqis have been assuming a
great deal of responsibility already. I think 11 ministries are
under Iraqi direction. There are very talented Iraqis. Their
Foreign Minister is a very impressive man--the current Foreign
Minister. I don't know if he will continue in that job.
At some point, and sooner rather than later, it's important
for them to make their decisions, it's important for them to
feel it's their country. I agree with what I think was the
thrust of Senator Biden's comments, that that will make the
situation safer for our forces while they're there, and make it
possible for us to leave sooner rather than later.
I think it might also help the American people to realize
that we've been in a similarly uncertain process in Afghanistan
since December 2001, when a virtually unknown man named Hamid
Karzai was selected by the same Ambassador, Lakhdar Brahimi, to
lead the Afghan transitional administration, and it's been
successful--I think, remarkably successful, because that wasn't
the end of the process; it was the start of a process, and that
process has led to a successful constitution for Afghanistan, a
process that will lead to elections in Afghanistan.
But let's be clear, I mean, democracy doesn't mean----
Senator Corzine. It's also been very flexible with respect
to a time table, too. There have been slides and slippages and
movements and changes.
Mr. Wolfowitz. And we need to be prepared to call audibles,
as Secretary Armitage said. But we also--the purpose of all of
this is not to meet any timetable of ours; it's to develop
confidence on the part of the Iraqis that we're not there to
take over their country, we're not there to seize their oil; we
will stay while they need us, but they need to step up and take
responsibility. And when they do so, they will make some
decisions that we don't like. You know, we have a terrific ally
in South Korea, a democratic ally, that has its own views about
security on the peninsula, its own views about how to deal with
North Korea. We're much better off for having a democratic ally
than having some American puppet that does exactly what we say.
Senator Corzine. I would concur with the analysis with
regard to Korea. I think it took, what, 50 years, 30 years? It
took----
Mr. Wolfowitz. It's still in--very much in the----
Senator Corzine [continuing]. A very long time.
Mr. Wolfowitz [continuing]. Walking stage, but you've got
to walk at some point.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Corzine.
Senator Biden and I have just a couple of questions each,
and then we will conclude the hearing.
Let me ask this basic question. Many scholars who have
appeared before our committee have talked about the whole
proposition of whether Iraqis feel like they want to be Iraqis,
as opposed to Kurds or Sunnis or Shi'ites or members of Arab
tribes. And this becomes a crucial question at the point that
sovereignty passes on to the Iraqi people. As we turn over more
authority, as we will be doing, to Iraq, what is your own basic
assumption about the nationhood status, as opposed to the
worst-case scenario? In this worse-case scenario the Kurds or
the Sunnis or others do not find the arrangements satisfactory,
either in the interim period or in the constitutional
formulation, and, as a result, want a carve-out, or want
separatism, or want their own situation, and are prepared to
fight about it and create if not a civil war, at least elements
of instability purely by their desire to not be coopted?
Mr. Armitage. This possibility certainly exists, and we're
very alert to it. And during the whole discussion of
federalism, we were alert to it--and federalism, which devolves
power to more local communities, but one that's based not on
ethnicity, but on location, is where we went. I think we're
somewhat heartened that, thus far, even in the face of someone
whose avowed intention was to bring about civil war--al-
Zarqawi--that we haven't had it. And even in very troubled
places where the Sunnis had displaced the Kurds in various
cities and taken their lands under Saddam Hussein's rule, the
violence that one would expect to occur after that has been
somewhat lessened, partially because IOM and others have been
in there working hard, but partially, I think, because most
Iraqis are willing to give it a ride and see where it goes.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator Lugar, I had a--actually, it was the
same day that we were in the Al Rashid Hotel when it was
attacked. That evening, we had dinner with Abdel Aziz al-Hakim,
the head of the SCIRI organization, the younger brother of
Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, who was brutally assassinated in Najaf
last August. This was late October. And I said to him that I
thought there was a lot that Iraqis might profitably learn from
our Constitution about the rule of law, separation of powers,
and so forth; that I thought that they had two problems that
are uniquely Iraqi that we probably couldn't help them much
on--one was the issue that you're alluding to, of regional
separation, and the other, I said, is the role of religion. And
I was, frankly, surprised when he showed enormous knowledge of
our Constitution. He said, ``No, I think your Constitution has
the answer to one and a half of our two problems,'' and he
proceeded to explain that the answer, in his view, to
maintaining the unity of Iraq is what they call ``regional
federalism,'' federalism that's based not on a Kurdish bloc and
a Sunni bloc and a Shia bloc, but, rather much more local
autonomy. And I do think a key part of holding that country
together is to convince Iraqis that it's not going to be held
together in the old-fashioned way, it's not going to be held
together by a brutal central rule from Baghdad, that people
will have a great deal of local autonomy. And I think the
second part is to convince them that, nonetheless, there are
real benefits to being Iraqis, that there are real benefits
that flow from that relationship. And a Kurdish friend of mine,
who is a prominent leader in the PUK, said, some time ago,
``There's no reason why I, as an Iraqi Kurd, shouldn't be able
to be a leader of this country.'' I think the challenge is
going to be to make sure that those sort of possibilities are
open, and that it doesn't become a monopoly of a single group,
whether it's the 65 percent Shia majority or the old Sunni
Ba'athist minority or any other single group.
The Chairman. It's a very important conclusion. And I think
all of our hopes are that the Iraqis will continue to counsel
with us, despite the polls that have been given that they don't
really care for us, and that they want us out of there. I hope,
at least in this respect, that there will be some consultation,
for our benefit. We want a stable, whole Iraq, and we think
that they will, too. But ultimately, as we've suggested, the
Iraqis are going to have to decide what they want for
themselves. There's a lot of debate still to go on within the
country.
Now, let's take the other side of this, that we don't have
civil war, but, in fact, there is a sense of being Iraqi. The
compromises are made and a degree of federalism is achieved.
For some time to come, as the army is vetted and trained, as
arms and equipment come to them from whatever source, there
will be external dangers to this country. One of the reasons
for Coalition security forces has been to make sure that no one
else intruded. Well, we've tried to do this--whether it be
preventing terrorists from Syria or Iran from joining the
insurgency. But we also must contemplate--leaving aside
terrorists--that other countries, surrounding countries,
because they don't like the way things worked out in Iraq,
decide to intrude, either formally or informally, covertly or
overtly in the affairs of Iraq. At some point, the security
situation takes on, then, a very different view. It's not
simply the taking down of insurgents of unstable people in
cities in Iraq, but it then becomes a question of Iraq as an
area that becomes an incubator for terrorism, or a no-man's
land or a nation that cannot become truly sovereign or self-
determined. What sort of thought have you given to this? In
other words, pinning down the worst scenario case, how does
Iraq remain Iraq, at least as far as we're concerned, as
opposed to someone else's playground or a target of invasion or
incorporation by others? We've been through this many times,
discussing the Kurds, but they're not the only group that has
thought of a greater expansion that doesn't know the
boundaries, or doesn't respect them in the same way that we do.
What kind of planning effort or thoughts on the security side
come to this issue?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think--with respect to the danger of
external invasion, I think this new Iraq can count on
international guarantees of a kind that might not have been
available in the past, and that certainly need a 400,000-man
army--I shouldn't say it doesn't--hopefully, there can be
arrangements that avoid having to have a 400,000-man army to
protect it from its neighbors.
With respect to what you, I think, talked about as, sort
of, covert influences from outside, which is one of the
problems we're dealing with today, most of those ultimately
have to take the shape of an internal security threat of some
kind. And I think what we're counting on is that, as Iraqis
develop the capacity to provide for their own internal
security, very few of them, I think, want to see Syria
influencing things, or Turkey influencing things, or Iran
influencing things, and certainly not doing it at the point of
a gun.
The Chairman. But we trust they will have the ability to
repel that, I suspect. That's axiomatic, to make sure it
doesn't happen.
In the U.N. resolution that we're attempting to work with,
should there perhaps be a clause that indicates that the
international community would come to the rescue of Iraq in the
event that there was an external effort to terminate this
country or to invade it? In other words, you've mentioned that
the international community would not look kindly on this.
Well, that's quite true. But isn't this the time, really, to
formalize what the international community is prepared to do
about that? And by that, I mean the whole community, not just
the United States.
Mr. Armitage. I think my initial impression of that idea,
Mr. Chairman, is that somewhere in the hortatory language of
the--or the preparatory paragraphs, if you will, of the U.N.
Security Council resolution, you could express views about
territorial integrity and all of that, and the need to respect
it, and how we'd view with disfavor anything against that. But
in the operative paragraphs, I think you'd find it very
difficult to keep the Security Council onboard with some sort
of ironclad, ``We will do x if y happens.'' I think that would
actually complicate matters if we put that in one of the
operative paragraphs.
The Chairman. Well, I agree it would. I'm just concerned
about the fact that we have already had great difficulty with
the Security Council, in terms of responsibility. And clearly
if we are to attempt to move on to Iraqi sovereignty and a
lesser United States role, and others have not stepped forward,
despite all the invitations, it would be well to discuss this
in advance.
Mr. Armitage. Oh, indeed, it will be. I have no doubts that
your comments will be viewed with great interest. I would note,
Mr. Chairman, that, on Iraq particularly, we've had three 15-0
votes in the Security Council since our one failure prior to
the war. So there's a great deal of comity of views out there
on the need to get it right.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, it strikes me that what you're
suggesting certainly should be the goal, going forward. I'm not
saying tactically. I can't judge whether this next resolution
will bear that load or not. But it seems to me putting that
idea forward and moving toward it over time is certainly
something that we ought to be trying to accomplish.
The Chairman. Perhaps Ambassador Negroponte, in both of his
hats, as it turns out, might offer this counsel during the
course of his work at the United Nations, prior to his going to
Baghdad.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I might add, we're very lucky to have him.
The Chairman. I agree.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I've been impressed with this hearing, more than
any other that we've had, or other committees have had, at the
more willingness to acknowledge things that we miscalculated.
And I think that gives the American people some confidence,
because obviously everybody knows things aren't going as
initially planned. And that's an oversimplification, because,
up to now, there has been, steady as we go, we're doing great,
things are OK. It's like I said to the Secretary, I think it's
like that Calypso song that was popular years ago, ``Don't
worry, be happy.'' You know, I mean, everything's fine. And you
guys, today, more than any time that I recall here in the last
several months, have said, well, you know, we need some
changes, we miscalculated. For example, you said, Secretary
Wolfowitz, you certainly are there--``We're going to be there
longer, and with more forces than we thought initially,'' and
so on.
I say that as a compliment. That's not a backhanded
criticism. I want to emphasize, but I think it leads people to
say, OK, you know, these guys get it. They acknowledge there's
got to be some changes.
But what I don't get a sense of, because we didn't get to
specifics, and maybe it exists, is, for lack of a better
phrase, there seems to be a little bit of a lack of imagination
right now about doing what I hope we all agree needs to be
done. We've got to change the mindset here of the American
people about the possibilities of success; the Iraqi people,
about the genuineness of us wanting to hand it over to them in
an orderly way so they can succeed; about the region, looking
at our motives; about the Europeans and Asians, how they think
of us. And I understand we can make a legal case that existing
U.N. resolutions give us essentially a Status of Forces
Agreement already, authorize us to do a number of things. But
what I'd like to plumb for just a few minutes here is the use
of the resolution, the purpose of the resolution, not only
substantively, but diplomatically in a much larger sense. What
do we want to communicate--not just factually accomplish, but
strategically, in the diplomatic sense, accomplish? And it
seems to me that one of the things that would be very important
is to get a new U.N. resolution that specifically authorized a
multinational force and, if possible, assuming we could do the
preparatory work, under a command that was not specifically
U.S. command, but, in fact, U.S. command. I can only think of
one outfit: NATO.
It would seem to me it would be useful if we were able to,
in that U.N. resolution, be able to get named, essentially, a
referee, so the only major figure with whom there was any
discussion was not the Iraqi acting government and Mr.
Negroponte, so there's somebody else in there--I mean, and not
just generically, but somebody. It would seem to me to
communicate this notion, Secretary Wolfowitz, that the
elections are the grail we're holding out to be accomplished,
that the more detail we can put into the resolution, the longer
its political legs, the better our chances of success. In raw
street terms, its going to be hard for these guys to be seen to
cooperate with us in order to get it right, because of the
nature of--a thousand reasons--culturally, all the way from
there to the specific incidents at Abu Ghraib prison, and
everything in between.
And so in order to get those bigger pieces done in a
resolution, it seems to me there is a practical need at various
levels to give up some of the total control of the political
situation and the political future of Iraq. That's why I've
been toying with this thing. I've been banging it around. I
know State is banging around other concepts. I suspect Defense
is, as well, whether you call it an international support
group, a board of directors, a contact group. But in order to
do any of that, when I speak to these leaders, whether or not
they're foreign ministers of our European friends and friends
in the region, or the heads of state that I've had the
opportunity to speak to, they all basically come back with one
thing, ``Well, we want a piece of the action,'' meaning the
political decisions. They want to actually sit down general,
and you actually work out a document that specifies what role
they would play in Iraq. I mean, it's not generic. It's very
specific. I mean, you know, you don't fly spec everything, but
it's very specific. That same kind of interchange, with
whomever I speak with, whether it's the Brits, the Germans, the
Belgians, the French, the Italians, the Jordanians, the
Egyptians. They all are looking for a chance to sit at that
table and actually bang out with us, OK, here's the deal. This
is the political game plan. These are the steps, these are the
objectives. As opposed to being asked to sign on to a well-
thought-out--arguably--plan that we've come up with that sets
election dates, transition dates, you know, and so on.
And so, for example , I was told, before I came in, one of
the Secretaries indicated that we've already turned over de
facto sovereignty to 17, 10, 12 Iraqi ministers.
Mr. Armitage. Eleven.
Senator Biden. Eleven. And so, for the voters, our citizens
who are listening to this, by that it's kind of like turning
over the Commerce Department to, you know, control of the
Iraqis, turning over the HHS to whatever. I mean, we've done
that in 11 of the 25 or so ministries, correct?
Mr. Armitage. Yes, sir.
Senator Biden. I think it would have been a pretty good
idea if we had sat down with some of these other folks and
said, how do we want to do this?--this, sort of, international
board of directors. I'm not trying to make this rocket science
here, but somehow we've got to get other folks in to get our
face off of it. And so on July 1, or shortly thereafter, I
don't want it to be an American-led occupation force. I want it
to be something else other than American-led occupation force.
It will be de facto American. We're going to be the only ones
that have the troops there. Even if NATO comes on, we're
talking a handful, in relative terms--three, four, five, six,
seven-thousand folks over several months. And I don't trust
``blue helmets'' going in there. I don't want to go through
another Bosnia at the front end again.
So I can't come up with anything other than NATO. But I'm
convinced, if we don't come up with that, it ain't gonna work
if it's just us. So that's why I think we need some specific
mention of some entity where there's some political power, if
you will, shared in the military occupation force. Am I making
any sense? Not do you agree, but do you understand what I'm
trying to get at?
Mr. Armitage. Yes.
Senator Biden. What are you thinking about along those
lines?
Mr. Armitage. Well, I'm listening to you very carefully,
and some of the things you mention we've discussed and others
have discussed, such as a P5 plus the neighbors as a contact
group, for openers. One of the difficulties we've had is,
Lakhdar Brahimi is working night and day to fashion this
interim government, and he's not able to turn his attention to
that. We've had discussions with him. Iraqis have had
discussions with him. This is even more important. Or maybe you
want it P5, plus neighbors, plus EU.
Senator Biden. Yes.
Mr. Armitage. We've recently had discussions with the EU on
this. So I'm not sure that any of us are off the page. We're
all on the same page. Whether we're going fast enough and are
imaginative enough, I don't know. We've had discussions with de
Hoop Scheffer, in NATO, about this. And I would characterize
him as very interested--the Secretary General--in this matter.
Not ready to take it on, doesn't think the body's ready yet.
Senator Biden. But here's where I am.
Mr. Armitage. But we don't let him walk away from it.
Senator Biden. Well, look, and this is--I apologize, I'll
finish this in a second, Mr. Chairman. A high-ranking and by
definition, the Foreign Minister is high-ranking--a Foreign
Minister of one of our major NATO allies was here in recent
weeks. We had a private meeting with him, and I raised NATO----
Mr. Armitage. I'll do the investigative work and figure out
who this was.
Senator Biden. You know, I mean, it's pretty obvious, but I
don't want to--well, he told me, ``No, no, NATO, we can't do
that, we can't do that.'' And I said, by the way, the President
of the United States gets on a plane and went to your capital
and said, Mr. Leader of this country, I want this. Could he say
no? And he said, ``Don't do that.''
The truth is, the only person that can do this now is the
President. Every single solitary person, from four-stars to
Under Secretaries to Secretaries, can't do it. They're going to
get----
Mr. Wolfowitz. Not even Deputy Secretaries.
Senator Biden. Deputy Secretaries can't even do it.
And you are an incredibly competent person. You can't do
it, because they don't want to do this, they don't want to wear
the jacket, they don't want to get into the deal, but they know
they're going to have to get into the deal. And so does the
Defense Department support the notion of literally creating a
contact group that actually oversaw the political transition?
Would you support that at Defense? Or have you talked about it?
Mr. Wolfowitz. It's a general--let me put it this way. I
certainly agree with the spirit of what you're suggesting, and
we have been eager to get a larger NATO role. We'd love to see
a larger NATO role. I appreciate what you said earlier on, that
it may only generate three or four-thousand additional troops,
but that it's symbolically important. I think it is important,
by the way, on that point, for people to be realistic. I don't
think anybody's going to want to put a lot of troops into Iraq
and----
Senator Biden. Absolutely not.
Mr. Wolfowitz [continuing]. Until the killing stops.
Senator Biden. Absolutely.
Mr. Wolfowitz. We and the Iraqis are stuck. But I think the
symbolism is important. I think, especially at this stage, we
ought to be careful about deciding, ourselves, who's an
appropriate contact group. The Iraqis have a lot to say about
it, and----
Senator Biden. Well, no--by the way, you know, in the
beginning I said I would include the Iraqis in determining who
that should be. I don't want to----
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think the spirit of it, we agree. And one
of the reasons--we agreed very strongly that anything that puts
U.S. troops in the background instead of the foreground, that
reduces the appearance that we're there as an occupying power,
that reduces the appearance that we're there unilaterally, I
think, improves our chances for success.
Senator Biden. OK, well, I'll conclude Mr. Chairman,
because--and I'll followup----
Mr. Wolfowitz. Let me just say, you know I--I mean, more
than 30 countries are there with us, and----
Senator Biden. No, I know.
Mr. Wolfowitz [continuing]. Those are the countries that
really, I think, need to get pride of place in anything we do.
Senator Biden. Look, I don't give a damn about anybody
else's pride or place anymore. The only pride I'm worried about
right now is the Iraqi pride, because unless we figure out how
to satisfy the Iraqi pride, we're all in deep, deep, deep,
deep, deep, deep, deep trouble. And so what I mean by Iraqi
pride--which is a way for me to conclude, Mr. Chairman--is
that, guys, the new President, the new Prime Minister, the new
Vice President, they ain't gonna want to hang out with you.
They're not going to want to hang out with you. You need to
give them an excuse. You need to give them a strawman. You need
to give them something for them to say, something's changed
here. You're still going to have the same 140,000 American
troops there. They're still going to be your guys, general, and
it's still going to be their job. But you've got to have an
excuse. You've got to have an excuse. Take it from a plain old
politician, who got elected to this place when I was 29. I may
not know much, but I know politics. You gotta give 'em an
excuse. No kidding. I'm not joking about this.
And so what happens here is, I think we think too much, to
use a trite phrase these days, inside the box here. For
example, if I could wave a wand, I'd find a NATO general who's
not an American, who headed up the force in Iraq. He still has
Jonesey looking over him. Jones still runs the show. He's still
the Supreme Allied Commander. I'd want to see somebody in a
bright, different-color uniform standing there. I don't care
what country he's from. Because you've got to give these guys
an excuse, fellows. If you don't--if you don't--I respectfully
suggest this is not going to work. It's a little bit like when,
God forbid, a woman feels a lump in her breast, she knows, God,
the best thing to do is immediately go to the doctor,
immediately get it checked out. Or a guy's having trouble, and
they think it may be prostate cancer, he knows he should
immediately get it checked out. But what do we do? Human beings
go, aw, aw, it's OK. It's all right. Because if you go, you're
afraid of the answer you might get. That's human nature.
Well, you know, that's where most of our friends are, our
European powers; they know they've got to get in the game, but
they're going to do everything to not go to the doctor, and the
doc has to show up at the house and say, you need the exam. The
doc, his name is Bush. He's the doc. He's going to show up on
the doorstep. He's going to say, look, we need this. You need
this. I'm willing to deal. Not on the essentials. I'm willing
to lay out and be part of a negotiation of how we move from
here. But this is a deal.
Because, for example, a question--when we talk about Iraqi
forces, can Iraqi forces opt out of an operation? I don't worry
about that, because I have no faith in their forces anyway. I
worry when they can opt us out. Can a new Iraqi government say,
whoa, boys. No, no, no, no, no. No Fallujah, no this, no that.
That's a different question. I won't get into that now.
But the point I'm making is, the President has to be the
doctor here, fellows. Because each of these countries know they
can't afford us to lose. And I strongly recommend, for what
it's worth, that you'd better figure out--I don't mean you,
particularly--the administration better get together in a game
plan specifically--not generically--how we're going to get
other people in. And I know--I have great respect for the
troops that are there, Paul, from the 29 or 30 other countries,
I really do. But come home with me. Nobody knows they're there.
Come with me out to Missouri, where I was last week. Nobody
knows they're there. When they leave, they don't even know they
left. And so we've got to get some of the big dogs in the pit,
even if they just hang out. Don't do anything, just hang out.
Because you've got to change the face of this.
Anyway, I appreciate your time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, with your permission, gentlemen, I may just drop you--not
even for the record, but I'd like to importune you on the
telephone about some specifics that we haven't had a chance to
get to here.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.
I agree with your earlier comment about the participation
of the committee members today, the interesting questions that
were asked, and the important responses that we received, which
have furthered our understanding. We appreciate your time and
your patience. I think this was a good example of congressional
oversight, and it will continue tomorrow. We look forward to
another hearing on Iraq with people outside of our government
who may offer us some constructive advice.
We thank you, and the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Wednesday, May 19, 2004.]
----------
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Responses of Hon. Richard L. Armitage to Additional Questions for the
Record Submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question 1. When the Senate calls up the State Department
Authorization Bill, we hope to consider amendments that would target
funds for Iraq. Until then, the Administration has indicated there are
unfunded requirements to run the new U.S. Embassy in Iraq.
Specifically, Secretary Grossman testified he would need between $1.1
to $1.4 billion to operate the new mission.
(a) Is this estimate correct?
(b) Have you made a request for this funding to OMB?
(c) Why has OMB not included this request for the U.S.
Embassy operations in the President's request to Congress for
additional funds?
(d) I understand there are no reconstruction funds for
agriculture costs and several other areas are short funds. Will
any of the $25 billion contingency fund be available for such
unfunded reconstruction costs?
(e) I note that a recent NSPD signed by the President
directed the Director of OMB to make requests for necessary
funding and authorities for Iraq. Have such requests been made?
(f) How is State determining the allocations to be charged to
other agencies for operations in Baghdad, and how will that
affect the expenditures by the U.S. Embassy Baghdad?
Answer. (a) Yes, the current estimated requirements for U.S.
Mission Baghdad in FY 2005 are in that range. However, cost estimates
remain subject to change due to the uncertainty of conditions in Iraq.
(b) The full estimated requirements were not included in the
regular FY 2005 budget request that was submitted through OMB last
February.
(c) The Administration will pursue a full FY 2005 supplemental
request after Ambassador Negroponte and his team have had time to
assess the actual needs and provide more precise cost estimates.
(d) The President has requested the $25 billion contingency fund to
meet DOD's requirements to continue operations in Iraq. None of the
funding has been requested to provide further foreign assistance to
Iraq.
(e) No requests have been made by OMB for U.S. Mission funding and
authorities in FY 2005 under the recent NSPD.
(f) The Administration is not considering cost sharing at this
time. It is believed that cost sharing should wait until all agencies
have had an opportunity to budget for these costs. In the interim, the
State Department will study how best to assign separate costs while
paying for U.S. Mission activities and support.
Question 2. Will Iraq continue to be a combat zone following the
transition? If so, what will be our military objectives? How will this
affect the role of the Ambassador and of the multinational force?
Answer. Unfortunately, we expect that Iraq will continue to face
serious security problems after the June 30, 2004 transition, and the
Iraqis have said publicly that their security services are not
adequately prepared to maintain security in Iraq. It is likely, if
unfortunate, that violence will escalate in the short-term as
transition nears as terrorists seek to derail the transfer of power and
undermine the efforts of the Iraqi Government. The U.S. is committed to
continuing our assistance, both military and otherwise, to support the
Iraqi people as they work for an independent, united, democratic,
prosperous and peaceful country.
My colleagues at the Department of Defense would be better able to
answer any questions regarding military objectives.
The Ambassador (Chief of Mission) and the Commander of
Multinational Force Iraq will work closely together, and with the
Iraqis, on political-military issues. Joint State-DOD planning is
underway which recognizes that the roles, missions, resources,
responsibilities and authorities of our agencies are complementary, and
must work jointly toward the goal of a stable and democratic Iraq.
The security situation makes the closest partnership between the
MNF-I and the Embassy all the more critical to our success. State and
Defense personnel have formal joint teams in some 15 management
sectors, including security, to establish the foundations of
interagency teamwork at an operational level of detail. The Chief of
Mission and the MNF-I commander will ensure the closest cooperation and
mutual support in all their activities, in accordance with standing
instructions from the President.
On July 1, the Chief of Mission will assume full responsibility for
the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG Executive
Branch employees and programs in Iraq, except for those under the
command of the U.S. area military commander, and those seconded to an
International Organization.
The Secretary of State will be responsible for the continuous
supervision and general direction of all assistance for Iraq. The Chief
of Mission will provide policy direction for reconstruction projects
funded by the Iraq Reconstruction and Relief Fund (IRRF). CENTCOM will
take the lead on security assistance with the policy guidance of the
Chief of Mission.
Question 3. Have you appointed someone to look over prisoner issues
following the transition from CPA? What will be the scope of his or her
authorities?
Answer. CPA, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) and the Iraqi
Interim Government (IIG) have been working together to decide the way
forward for prisoner issues following the transition. Our goal is to
transfer all detainees to Iraqi authority as soon as possible, given
Iraqi capacity constraints. CPA and MNF-I have been working to
integrate Iraqi officials into detainee operations at all levels in the
short-term, and are developing plans to build Iraqi capacity to take
physical custody of the detainees in the longer term.
Within the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense will remain
the lead agency for detention operations and Major General Geoffrey
Miller, Deputy Commanding General for detention operations, will
continue to oversee detainee issues for MNF-I.
Question 4. Would you provide a briefmg to the committee on your
plans regarding this at the soonest opportunity?
Answer. As previously stated in our response to question #3, the
Department of Defense will continue to be responsible for detention
operations following the June 30 transition. Thus, we would refer you
to our colleagues in DOD to provide a briefing on plans for detainees.
Question 5. A National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD),
signed last week by President Bush, defined the roles of the State and
Defense Departments in Iraq in more detail. It institutionalized some
of the organizational mechanisms the Committee had been briefed
previously. It institutes an Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
(IRMO), whose director will be appointed by the Secretary of State . .
. and a Program Management Office to provide acquisition and project
management support.
(a) Has Secretary Powell or Ambassador Negroponte made these
appointments yet?
(b) What more can you tell us about this organization and the
people who will populate the jobs?
Answer. We are in the process of selecting a Director for IRMO. In
the interim, David Nash, the current head of CPA's Program Management
Office, will serve as Director of IRMO.
Under the supervision of the Secretary of State, IRMO will
coordinate U.S. assistance activities in Iraq with a core staff of
approximately 37. IRMO will principally develop and coordinate a
strategic plan for U.S. assistance to Iraq, ensuring it remains
consistent with overall U.S. policy goals. It will also coordinate
implementation of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and prepare
reports (e.g. 2207) for the Department, OMB, Congress, and others as
appropriate.
The Project and Contracting Office (PCO), a temporary organization
created under the Department of Defense, will operate in Baghdad under
Chief of Mission authority. PCO will implement the on-going IRRF
projects for which the Program Management Office (PMO) has been
responsible, and undertake such other reconstruction-related activities
as the Chief of Mission, IRMO, or other agencies may request. IRMO and
PCO will be staffed with individuals hired in accordance with Title 5,
U.S. Code, section 3161 as well as agency detailees; many of them
worked in similar jobs for CPA.
Questions 6 a. and b. A key sentence in the NSPD states: ``The
Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision
and general direction for all assistance for Iraq.''
a. However, in a recent hearing before the Armed Services
Committee, Army contracting officials stated that once the
Embassy is opened, the Chief of Mission will set priorities for
contracts and requirements but the Department of Army will
handle program management and contracting. This sounds
confusing. Do you foresee any difficulties in this arrangement?
b. Will the State Department handle contracting hereafter for
reconstruction aid in Iraq?
Answer. The Chief of Mission, through the Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office, will set priorities and requirements for all USG
assistance programs in Iraq. Agencies implementing projects may let
their own contracts or use the services of the Project and Contracting
Office to carry out the assistance goals set by the Chief of Mission.
Similarly, the Project and Contracting Office will implement the
ongoing IRRF projects for which the Program Management Office (PMO)
have been responsible, and undertake such other reconstruction-related
activities as the Chief of Mission, IRMO, or other agencies may
request.
Question 6c. What will happen to contracts that have been let by
CPA using other than U.S. appropriated funds, such as the DFI?
Answer. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 (8 June 2004) states
that DFI funds shall be utilized to satisfy outstanding obligations of
the DFI after the transition.
From early July 2003 to May 2004, the CPA allocated approximately
$4.8 billion from the DFI for contracts relating to relief and
reconstruction services. The resulting contracts will remain in full
force and effect after the transition.
Question 6d. Can you comment on the continuity and transparency of
the oversight mission--Inspector General functions, etc.? Who will have
primary responsibility for Inspector General Oversight, how does the
CPA-IG factor into the process?
Answer. The State Department Office of Inspector General, along
with the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense, U.S. Agency
for International Development and the Coalition Provisional Authority
have been working with each other on an administration position to
ensure effective continued oversight of Iraq-related activities. The
State Department OIG, consistent with legislation, is responsible for
oversight of all State Department Iraq-related activities and is
actively engaged in initiating a number of Iraq-related projects. The
CPA IG, consistent with legislation, will remain in place for six
months post-June 30. The State Department OIG, as well as the other
agency Inspectors General, will coordinate with CPA IG and with each
other in order to ensure vigorous oversight over all Iraq-related
activities of their respective agencies.
Question 6e. A key sentence in the NSPD states: ``The Secretary of
State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general
direction of all assistance on Iraq.''
What approach will the State Department take to reviewing
current reconstruction priorities and revising them as needed?
How will they make decisions regarding updated priorities? Is
there any truth to a rumor that State is holding up all new
programming until it takes the reigns?
Answer. The State Department will undertake a thorough review of
all reconstruction programs and priorities and will revise them as
needed in consultation with Congress. The review will involve
consultations with the Iraqis and the international donor community.
The new Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), one of the
successors to the current Program Management Office, will play a key
role in this review and will make recommendations to the Ambassador for
revision of the, assistance program. The State Department is not
holding up new programming. Programming has been following the spending
plan revised and submitted to Congress on a quarterly basis.
Question 6f. How is the Department of State determining the
allocations to be charged to other agencies for operations in Baghdad,
and how will that affect the expenditures by the U.S. Embassy Baghdad?
Answer. The Administration is not considering cost sharing at this
time. It is believed that cost sharing should wait until all agencies
have had an opportunity to budget for these costs. In the interim, the
State Department will study how best to assign separate costs while
paying for U.S. Mission activities and support.
Question 7. What setbacks have there been in planning for the
transition? What do you attribute them to? What did you think went
better than expected? What has surprised you in developments in Iraq?
Answer. The security situation has affected our transition
planning. It has raised the costs associated with many of our
activities in Iraq, such as insurance, the airlift of goods and
supplies due to road insecurity, and extra security measures for
facilities and personnel.
The interagency coordination, especially with DOD, has gone well.
We are also pleased with the number of Foreign Service officers who
heeded the call to service in Iraq.
Question 8. How will differences of opinion between the new U.S.
Embassy and the caretaker government be resolved?
Answer. After June 30, the United States will interact with the
Government of Iraq in the same way that we would with any sovereign
government around the world. Ambassador Negroponte and his team at the
U.S. Embassy in Baghdad will work closely with the Iraqi Government to
pursue our shared goal of a stable, unified, and democratic Iraq. Given
the circumstances, it is clear that our engagement will need to be
broad-based and robust. It is in that spirit of partnership that
differences of opinion, should they arise, will be discussed.
Question 9. How confident are you that free and fair elections can
be held for the 250 seat National Assembly by the end of January 2005,
as planned?
Answer. We expect that the elections timetable laid out in the
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) will be followed. Iraqis, working
with the United Nations, have made good progress towards setting up an
electoral, commission that will oversee preparations for the January
2005 elections. Of course, the security situation will present
challenges. But MNF-I and Iraqi security forces are taking into account
the requirement for election security so that Iraq can hold free and
fair elections by January 2005.
Question 10. Are Iraqi political moderate voices emerging to lead
political groups?
Answer. Iraqis of all political stripes are forming groups to
advance their views. More than 200 political parties have been
identified to the National Democratic Institute, the International
Republican Institute, and the U.S. Government. Many of these parties
have a secular, moderate outlook. There are also parties which espouse
extreme views, some of which are well organized, but polling in Iraq
suggests that most Iraqis do not support these groups.
Question 11. A poll conducted last week for the CPA indicates that
respondents in Hillah have vastly different views from the rest of the
country with respect to democracy, the TAL, how are we working with
those groups to ensure they are being heard?
Answer. While we follow Iraqi public opinion polls closely, we are
aware that the results of individual polls in Iraq can vary
considerably. Comparisons of different polls, and comparisons of polls
over time, give more confidence in our understanding of Iraqi public
opinion. CPA officials, several of whom are seconded State officers,
have been actively engaged with the range of political groups in Hillah
to ensure that the TAL is understood and that they understand the path
it lays out to representative government. We believe the people of
Hiliah are committed to democracy.
Following the transfer of authority by June 30 to an Iraqi Interim
Government, we expect to maintain a State Department diplomatic
presence in a number of Iraq's regional centers, including Hillah, to
support the new government's efforts to build democracy, establish the
rule of law, and conduct elections as called for in the TAL.
Question 12. The same poll indicated that 80% of the people wanted
more information about the TAL. What are we doing to address that? Are
we paying attention to these polls?
Answer. We pay close attention to Iraqi public opinion polls. With
respect to the TAL, since it is an Iraqi document, we believe Iraqis
should take the lead in discussing its contents. We have been
encouraging them to do so, and believe they are making good progress in
a dialogue about their national governance.
The National Conference of Iraqi leaders and other notables, which
is set to meet in July 2004 to chose the members of an Interim National
Council to advise the Interim Iraqi Government, will also represent a
forum in which Iraqis will discuss the TAL.
Question 13. The President two weeks ago enacted stricter sanctions
toward Syria. Will that help or hurt our Mission in Iraq?
Answer. Syria has a mixed record in supporting stability and
security in Iraq. While we appreciate Syrian efforts to improve border
security, we believe the Syrian Government could do more. We remain
deeply concerned about terrorists and other fighters entering Iraq from
Syria. To date, Syria has not taken any measures in response to the
sanctions.
We have a very direct dialogue with the Syrian Government regarding
our concerns with their behavior. We believe that implementation of the
Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003
has further demonstrated the depth of our concern to the Syrian
Government. We believe that Syria can contribute to international
efforts in Iraq and continue to urge the Syrian government to cooperate
to tighten border controls and to comply with its obligations under UN
Security Council resolutions 1483 (2003) and 1546 (2004) with regard to
the return of frozen Iraqi assets to the Development Fund for Iraq for
the benefit of the Iraqi people.
Question 14. There have been alarming reports of Syrian and Iranian
cross-border influence in Iraq. Are these foreigners welcomed by
Iraqis? Are they operating on their own or are they joining forces with
other Iraqi elements? What plan do the Iraqis have to address this
issue following sovereign transfer?
Answer. While some Iraqis may have welcomed foreign fighters to
Iraq, their presence is not welcomed by the vast majority of Iraqis. We
are in contact with all of Iraq's neighbors to emphasize the need for
stricter border controls to prevent the inflow of foreign fighters,
terrorists and weapons and to combat smuggling. This is an important
priority for the Iraqis, CPA, and Coalition forces.
We have long been concerned about the activities of some Iranian
officials in Iraq. Although we have seen reports, we have little
credible evidence to date of direct Iranian support to insurgent or
terrorist groups attacking Coalition forces.
We have repeatedly warned the Iranian government, publicly and
privately, against activities in Iraq that might be destabilizing. We
will continue to ensure that the Iranian government is aware of our
views and encourage it to support the establishment of a stable, free,
democratic Iraq.
We have also communicated our concerns about the inflow of fighters
through Syria. We are working with the Syrians to increase the density
of forces along and surveillance over that border. The Syrian
government understands the importance we attach to this issue, and has
taken steps to improve security along its border with Iraq. By its own
admission, however, Syria acknowledges that measures to date have not
been completely effective.
We will continue to use Coalition military assets as appropriate to
enforce border controls, while supporting the establishment of
professional Iraqi security and border forces. Improving border
controls is a focus of our overall effort to train and equip Iraqi
security forces.
Question 15. What are we hearing through diplomatic channels from
Iran and Syria with respect to their intentions as neighbors of Iraq?
Answer. We would be happy to brief you or your staff in closed
session on the substance of our contacts with Iran and Syria regarding
Iraq.
Some of Iran's public statements with respect to Iraq have been
positive, but we remain concerned that the activities of some Iranian
officials in Iraq are not consistent with statements from Tehran. We
have repeatedly warned the Iranian government, publicly and privately,
against activities in Iraq that might be destabilizing.
Iraqi officials, including several members of the Iraqi Governing
Council, have visited Syria and have had useful meetings with President
Asad and other senior officials. Syria, like Iran, maintains a
diplomatic mission in Baghdad. We have encouraged Syria to take a more
constructive tone in its public statements about Iraq and have noted
the unhelpful language on Iraq employed by the state-run media. We
maintain an ongoing dialogue with Syria on a range of Iraq issues--from
the return of frozen Iraqi assets to securing Syria's long and porous
border with Iraq.
We will continue to ensure that the Iranian and Syrian governments
are aware of our views, understand the negative consequences of
activities supporting the destabilization of Iraq, and encourage them
to support the establishment of a stable, free, democratic Iraq.
Question 16. Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia and others have
language skills and resources which they have offered and which could
be helpful to reconstruction in Iraq. Have we accepted such offers by
neighbors to assist in Iraq?
Answer. Regional governments and firms have not only language
skills and resources, they also have lower overhead, lower potential
security costs, and more invaluable in-country experience than most
European and American counterparts. In addition, they have cultural
familiarity and local know-how. Kuwait has provided $200 million in in-
kind humanitarian assistance to Iraq, such as a water pipeline that the
Kuwaitis built to Basra. Kuwaiti firms are directly involved in
reconstruction, including local provision of services to contractors
and others. They have also provided at least $2 billion in direct
support for the U.S. military, other coalition forces, and key regional
allies in Operation Iraqi Freedom, such as oil for Jordan. They are
paying for 88% of the U.S. military's operational fuel needs, and have
shown appreciation for the idea that reconstruction depends on
security. They pledged $500 million for Iraqi reconstruction, and have
deposited $10 million divided equally between the UN and World Bank
trust funds.
Saudi Arabia has also helped with oil for Jordan to replace Iraqi
oil. For Iraq, they have provided refined petroleum products for
humanitarian use. They constructed and staffed a field hospital in
Baghdad. They pledged $500 million at the Madrid Donors' Conference for
Iraqi reconstruction and have offered substantial debt reduction to
Iraq.
Egypt has provided diplomatic training to Iraqis and made a major
investment in telecom infrastructure. In addition, they have made
offers of training for Iraqi doctors, nurses, and other Iraqi civil
servants, and are also exploring ways to train Iraqi police.
Other regional countries have been actively engaged in
reconstruction, including Jordan (police training), UAE ($215 million
pledge), Qatar ($100 million), Turkey ($50 million), Oman ($3 million),
and even Iran ($5 million). Iran has also pledged an economic package,
which includes credit facilities, restoration of religious sites,
tourism and pilgrimage, technical and advisory services, trade,
investment, market transition from the current Cost Plus Award Fee
(CPAF) contract to a Firm, Fixed Price (FFP) structure. The U.S.
Mission Task Order will incorporate the ability to sever portions for
local competitive award for construction, commodities, and other
opportunities that will directly enable commerce with the people of
Iraq.
Question 17. As you know Kellogg, Brown, and Root is providing
logistics support in Iraq to the Coalition Provisional Authority and to
U.S. Forces via the LOGCAP III contract. The committee has been told
you plan to also use KBR to support the logistical needs of the U.S.
Mission in Iraq. How do you plan to control the costs?
Answer. The CPA and Department of State have taken significant
action to reduce cost under the existing Task Order as well as the
proposed U.S. Mission Task Order. The Department of State assigned a
senior Program Manager to Baghdad responsible to work in real time with
executive and management levels of the U.S. Mission to Iraq, Department
of State contracting authority, and LOGCAP to ensure that only
requirements of the Embassy become the responsibility of the U.S.
Mission Task Order;
The Department of Defense dedicated a full-time Defense
Contract Management Agency (DCMA) office consisting of a senior
military commander, senior civilian manager, an Administrative
Contracting Officer (ACO), Property Manager, and Planner who
are solely responsible to administer the current and follow-on
Task Order;
The Department of Defense dedicated several full-time staff
members from the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to
provide oversight;
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) developed and
issued a vehicle identification card that has stopped
unauthorized users from obtaining fuel;
Oversight has reduced unauthorized users of the Dining
facilities (DFAC);
The Department of Defense and the Department of State are
cooperating in a proven logistics system consisting of a
Requirements Review Board (RRB), Area Support Group (ASG), and
Award Fee Board (AFB) that augment CONUS-based Department of
State, DCMA and DCAA to continually monitor KBR performance,
cost, and asset management.
As the Department of State management and administrative team
assume their assignments they will undertake additional oversight
measures. Once stability increases in the area, the U.S. Mission Task
Order can access, and humanitarian assistance. Overall, the U.S.
government has encouraged offers of help from regional countries, and
is actively soliciting further regional support in a variety of areas.
______
Responses of Hon. Paul Wolfowitz to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Updated as of June 3, 2004
Question 1a. On November 19, 2003, Admiral Nash of the CPA Program
Management Office announced at a contractors convention in Crystal
City, that RFPs would be issued on January 1, bids would be received on
February 1 and awards be made on March 1. He stated that contractors
would be expected to mobilize in a short period of time following the
award of the contracts. However, reports by USAID and CPA officials in
Washington and Baghdad last week indicate that the only construction
work that has been done through these PMO-managed contracts were for
bases to support the U.S. military. And further, that NO work has been
done in the seven major reconstruction sectors through these PMO
contracts.
Why was Congress led to believe that funds we appropriated
on an urgent and emergency basis last Fall would have an impact
this quickly?
Answer. Reports regarding construction work being done only in
bases to support the U.S. military are untrue. To date, under the major
design/build contracts, we have 104 project sites where construction is
occurring in the Public Works, Oil, Transportation, Electricity,
Security, and Buildings Sectors. The RFPs were issued on January 6, the
bids closed on February 5, and contracts were awarded in mid-March.
These contracts were solicited and awarded in a remarkably short time.
The design/build contractors are already mobilized and operating in
Iraq. More than 7,000 Iraqis are employed daily in work related to the
104 project sites.
Initially, we had to work to overcome early planning obstacles in
developing the detail requirements for contracts, identifying
eligibility requirements for prime and subcontractors, and maintaining
the integrity of full and open competition for all contracts as
required by Congress. As of May 26, we have obligated $3.7 billion in
contracts for the reconstruction program. This puts us on schedule with
the program goals at this time.
Question 1b. Were PMO cost estimates made by USAID development
experts or by contractors used to working in a benign environment?
Answer. Estimates for PMO's list of 2,311 construction projects,
which are funded by Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) FY 04,
were made by a team of 15 engineers who worked in the PMO in Baghdad.
The estimates were made based upon data and information provided to
this team by Iraqi Ministries and their CPA senior advisors. Where
possible, the team experts visited officials and military units around
the country to corroborate data. Due to conditions in country at the
time, estimates were ``burdened;'' that is, they included project
security, overhead, contingencies, and other costs.
Question 1c. To what extent has the slow-moving assistance affected
Iraqi capabilities, particularly the security forces?
Answer. Equipment shortages--especially of body armor, Kevlar
helmets, and communications equipment--contributed to the poor
performance of police and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps during fighting in
April, particularly in areas west and south of Baghdad and in Sadr
City. Other factors, such as inadequate training and poor leadership,
also affected their performance. There were some exceptions, however,
and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) is now reconstituting. It
should be noted that when police stations were attacked by dozens of
insurgents with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and crew-served
weapons, the police had little capability to fight back, nor should
they be expected to, when facing a military-style assault. Even if they
had been fully equipped, they are not military forces and were thus
ill-suited to the situations they faced.
Question 1d. Has the lack of delivery of concrete assistance
increased Iraqi disillusionment and anti-American sentiments?
Answer. No. There has, in fact, been concrete assistance: $5
billion in contracts have been awarded in an open competitive process.
Our prime contractors have been mobilized and are operating in Iraq. To
date, under the major design/build contracts, we have 104 project sites
where construction is occurring in Public Works, Oil, Transportation,
Electricity, Security, and Buildings Sectors. We are currently
employing more than 7,000 Iraqis daily in work related to these
construction contracts.
Question 2a. (Regarding use of Iraqi Funds): The April 5 Section of
the 2207 Report received by Congress indicated that only $2.3 billion
of the $18.4 billion we appropriated last November has been obligated.
I understand that last Saturday, the Program Review Board at CPA
recommended a $2 billion transfer from the Development Fund for Iraq
(DFI) for a myriad of purposes, including:
$500 m to the Joint Task Force--CJTF-7
$125 m to a ``revenue stabilization fund''
$180 m for real property compensation claims
$200 m for food basket/public food distribution
$315 m for electricity sector
$460 m for oil infrastructure rebuilding
$65 m for agriculture infrastructure
How will CPA program this $2 billion in DFI money by the end
of June if it has taken five months to move $2.3 billion in
appropriated funds?
Answer. This allocation builds on the Iraqi budget initiatives
described in the DFI appendix of the Section 2207 Report, dated April
5, 2004. There is no requirement to expend this $2 billion by June 30.
While the execution of each of the approved program items will vary,
most expenditures will occur post June 30.
Question 2b. Is it official U.S. policy and strategy approved by
OMB to use the DFI before U.S. appropriations?
Answer. No. The people of Iraq face a vast array of pressing needs
for infrastructure and social development projects. In sectors such as
oil, electricity, and agriculture, the nation's needs clearly exceed
the sector allocations of the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund
(IRRF). The recent PRB allocation funded additional projects for the
relief and reconstruction of Iraq and did not affect the status of
individual projects funded by the IRRF.
Question 2c. Is this an effort by CPA to avert normal developmental
programming process and congressional notifications?
Answer. No. The recent PRB allocation did not affect IRRF-funded
projects. If it had, the Congress would have been notified, if
required.
Question 2d. What will CJTF-7 be using the $500 million for? CERP?
Answer. CJTF-7 is still reviewing how this allocation will be used.
Question 2e. How are these funds being accounted for and reported
on? Could you please provide for the committee a full accounting of all
the DFI expenses to date?
Answer. These allocations are accounted for and reported on in the
same manner as all other DFI funds. Both the PRB decisions and DFI
expenditure information are available on CPA's Web site.
Question 3. Regarding oversight of the $87 billion of appropriated
funds support for Iraq, what are your views on the effectiveness of
Department of Defense criminal investigative support of the
expenditures of U.S. appropriated funds in Iraq? Will the Defense
Criminal Investigative Service maintain a presence in Iraq? If not, why
not? If so, how large will the office be?
Answer. The criminal investigative support provided by the
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (OIG) has been
significant since the CPA was established. A rotating team of three
Special Agents from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS),
the criminal investigative arm of the OIG, is stationed in Baghdad
coordinating investigative matters relating to allegations of bribery,
contract irregularities, counterfeiting, embezzlement, and the sale and
smuggling of illegal weapons and explosive devices. This past year,
DCIS agents, working with Military Police, Iraqi police, and the CPA
Ministry of Finance, broke up an Iraqi dinar counterfeiting operation
and seized counterfeit currency worth more than 100 billion dinars ($50
million).
The OIG plans to maintain a presence in this area. Its current
plan, contingent upon the availability of funding, is to establish a
Resident Agency in Qatar or Bahrain comprised of 10 investigative and
support personnel.
Question 4. What are the plans to turnover former Iraq regime non-
cash assets; e.g., automobiles, boats, etc, to the Iraqi people? How
and when will the Iraqi real estate that the Coalition Provisional
Authority and U.S. forces have occupied be returned to the Iraqi
people?
Answer. The return of non-cash assets from the previous regime has
been handled thus far by the Department of the Treasury, which leads an
interagency working group on this issue. After the transition to Iraqi
sovereignty, the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) will be responsible for
arranging the return or sale of these assets in accordance with UN
Security Council Resolution 1483. Once the IIG takes office, the United
States will begin to negotiate the modalities of turning over property
occupied by the CPA or Coalition forces to the Iraqi people.
Question 5. Were you aware that on March 26 this committee asked
for a briefing on detainee treatment issues? Do you know why the
Foreign Relations Committee was told repeatedly through the month of
April that this issue could not yet be briefed?
(a) Will MNF-I continue to hold Iraqi prisoners after we turn
over sovereignty? Under what authorities?
(b) Official reports from CPA indicate that 500 courts are
operating in Iraq. Presumably if you have courts, you have
jails in which to put the guilty parties. Are jails being run
by Iraqis? Are we supervising or advising in any capacity? If
so, is this a CPA or a military function, or a contractor?
Answers. (a) MNF-I will continue to hold Iraqi security detainees
following turnover of sovereignty under the authority of UNSCR 1511,
which is not affected by the transfer of sovereignty. These detainees
have committed offenses against or pose imminent threats to Coalition
forces.
(b) The Iraqi penal system is being run by Iraqis with Coalition
assistance, and is separate from the MNF detention facilities. CPA
personnel, both civilian and military, are advising Iraqi judicial and
penal authorities. After 30 June, these advisors will become liaison
officers and work for the U.S. Ambassador. They are not contractors.
Question 6. What is the administration doing to ensure that the
Ba'ath Party is not organizing clandestinely to seize power again, as
it did in the 1960s? Is there a focal point of the opposition? Are
Iraqis, other than exile officials, engaged on this?
Answer. It is highly unlikely that the Ba'ath Party will be able to
organize clandestinely and regain power in Iraq as it did in the 1960s
for at least three reasons. First, de-Ba'athification only applies to
one percent of the former Ba'athists. All others will have an
opportunity to participate in a more prosperous and freer Iraq than
that which existed under Saddam Hussein's tyranny.
Second, of the remaining one percent of Ba'athists, we have
captured or killed a majority of those who were complicit in the crimes
of the previous regime. Those who have been captured will eventually be
tried by Iraqi judges for their crimes against the Iraqi people.
Without this leadership, it is improbable that the Ba'athists would be
able to regain power.
Finally, and most importantly, the Iraqi people have made clear
that they do not want to return to the era of hopelessness and fear
that the Ba'ath Party represents. This is true across denominational
and ethnic lines. Even in the Sunni Triangle, Coalition forces continue
to receive useful intelligence from Iraqis that has enabled successful
operations against the members of Saddam's intelligence and ``Special
Services'' apparatus that continues its efforts to terrorize the Iraqi
people and impose their tyranny upon them.
Question 7. What setbacks have there been in planning for the
transition? To what do you attribute them? What did you think went
better than expected? What has surprised you in developments in Iraq?
Answer. The security situation has hampered our ability to conduct
site surveys for the proposed regional teams and impedes the facility
with which we can visit the various Iraqi ministries outside the Green
Zone. Ultimately, it hinders our understanding of future requirements
both at the regional team locations and within the various Iraqi
ministries themselves, but we are confident we will overcome the
challenges.
The level of interagency support and involvement has been
exceptionally positive.
In order to hammer out the details of the OPLAN, we have
held a number of conferences and workshops in which DOD, DOS,
Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), other U.S. departments
or agencies and troop-contributing nations have all
participated.
Differences in institutional philosophy and vocabulary alone
could have caused this effort to fail, not to mention the
competing stakeholder equities involved, but the OPLAN and the
Memoranda of Agreement and Understanding reflect the
willingness of all the parties to roll up their sleeves, set
aside parochial differences, and make sure no detail is
overlooked in standing down the CPA and standing up the U.S.
Mission.
DOD and DOS have set up transition planning teams, and
particularly at the forward element in Iraq, team members are
working seven days a week to make this transition as seamless
as possible.
The loss of contracts for equipment for the Iraqi Security
Force cost us some time. This is now getting back on track.
There have not been that many surprises with regard to
planning for the transition, just a lot of hard, demanding
work. The Iraq Transition Planning Team is working diligently
to ensure that the June 30 transition from CPA to U.S. Mission
will involve as few moving parts as possible, that the U.S.
Mission will have the best possible personnel, logistics,
contracts, etc, in place when Iraq's sovereignty is restored on
30 June.
Question 8. How confident are you that free and fair elections can
be held for the 250 seat National Assembly by the end of January 2005,
as planned?
Answer. We are confident that the Iraqi Interim Government will be
able to hold free and fair elections as planned by the end of January
2005. Iraq's leaders have thus far been able to meet the deadlines to
establishing a representative Iraqi government since the November 15
Agreement last fall, including the signing of the Transitional
Administrative Law in March and the establishment of the IIG by June.
Question 9. Are Iraqi political moderate voices emerging to lead
political groups?
Answer. Iraqi political moderates are emerging in leadership
positions. Recently 17 local elections were held in the heavily Shi'a
Dhi Qar province. In almost every case, secular parties or independents
outpolled Islamist parties. Combined with recurring poil results, this
strongly suggests that Iraqis want democratic moderates rather than
extremists as leaders.
Question 10. A poll conducted last week for the CPA indicates that
the respondents at Hillah have vastly different views from the rest of
the country with respect to democracy, the TAL, how are we working with
those groups to ensure they are being heard?
Answer. The results of the poll need to be treated with some
caution given the small numbers sampled and the conditions under which
the poll was conducted. The total number of respondents to this poll
was 1,111 across Iraq. The number of people surveyed in Hillah was only
114. The reliability of the Hillah results is in doubt, however,
particularly regarding questions about the Transitional Administrative
Law (TAL). Nevertheless, the comprehensive range of democratic
initiatives, including the women's center based in Hillah and USAID's
Democracy Dialogue Activities (DDA), provide not only a flexible means
to respond to such issues but also a forum for the Iraqi people to
voice their concerns.
While the TAL is very important as underpinning the path to
democracy for Iraq, it will expire once a new government is elected. As
a result, it is likely that the Iraqi public will increasingly focus on
tangible outcomes at the end of the transition process, including a
permanent constitution and a democratically elected government.
Question 11. The same poll indicated that 80% of the people wanted
more information about the TAL. What are we doing to address that? Are
we paying attention to these polls?
Answer. We are undertaking a very intensive program to inform the
Iraqi public about the TAL. This program uses a wide range of methods
and approaches, including television, newspapers, distribution of
booklets and leaflets, focus groups, seminars, public forums, and town
hail meetings across Iraq. One example is the USAID's Democracy
Dialogue Activities (DDA) program, which serves to encourage civic
participation and increase Iraqis' understanding of the TAL. Over 7,000
DDA program sessions, led by more than 500 Iraqi facilitators, have
already been conducted in Iraq.
Given the political environment and fear in which Iraqis lived
under the previous regime, the level of civic literacy is not high in
Iraq. The Iraqi people are learning about, and discussing, political
concepts that many Iraqis have not experienced in their lifetime. The
comprehensive program being undertaken was developed with these
challenges in mind.
Questions 12 and 13. The attacks on U.S. and Coalition forces have
continued for months. Will Iraq continue to be a combat zone following
the transition? If so, what will be our military objectives? How will
this affect the role of the Ambassador and of the multi-national force?
Answer. Iraq will continue to be a hostile fire zone following the
transition. Our military objectives will remain the establishment and
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, which will remain the
mission of MNF-I, as described in UNSCR 1511. The security environment
will not directly affect the role of the Ambassador, but it will
clearly affect the Ambassador's ability to further U.S. national goals
and objectives.
Question 14. The committee was briefed on a poll last week that
suggested most Iraqis feel safe in their own neighborhoods, and that to
them security did not mean attacks on Coalition forces, but rather
crime--muggings, theft, lawlessness, etc.--and that they felt that the
best way to bring that about was not more troops, but more police. Are
we training enough police? Do we have the right assistance authorities?
Answer. Training the Iraqi police to allow them to assume full
responsibility for maintaining security in Iraq is the Coalition's
highest priority. Currently, there are more than 90,000 Iraqi police
either on duty or in training, 29% of which has either completed
training or is in training. We anticipate having the entire Iraqi
police force retrained by June 2005 at the latest.
Question 15. What is your assessment of the progress of U.S. forces
and political authorities in Iraq in calming the Moqtada Sadr uprising?
Is [sic] To what extent is he likely to challenge the sovereign Iraqi
government after June 30, 2004.
Answer. Moqtada Al-Sadr and his supporters have advocated violence
against Coalition Forces and moderate Iraqis since the liberation of
Iraq. But Mr. Al-Sadr has never had more than a couple thousand armed
followers, and his actions in and around Najaf cannot be considered an
uprising. Over the weeks that he has operated in the area, the local
population has repudiated his positions and demanded his departure.
There has been no Shi'a revolt in answer to his call. Moreover, many of
his urban followers from Baghdad have returned home, thereby leaving
him with a destructive but limited band of armed fighters. His utter
lack of political and military success should be predictive of his
ability to challenge the Interim Iraqi Government when it takes office
this July. We do not expect him to be a political factor after
Transition.
Question 16. No security arrangement or SOFA has been signed. What
rights and protections will U.S. military and civilian personnel in
Iraq have with respect to Iraqi laws?
Answer. In fact, the security arrangement for Coalition forces
operating in Iraq has already been instituted. Article 59 (C) of the
Transitional Administrative Law states that the elected Iraqi
Transitional Government ``shall have the authority to conclude binding
international agreements regarding the activities of the multinational
force,'' and that ``nothing in this Law shall affect rights and
obligations . . . under UNSCR 1511 . . . which will govern the
multinational force's activities pending entry into force of those
agreements.'' Article 26 (C) ensures that CPA orders and regulations
``shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly
enacted and having the force of law.'' This includes CPA Order #17,
which provides SOFA-like protections for Coalition Forces, and will
stay in effect until an international agreement is negotiated with the
sovereign Iraqi government.
If a civilian contractor is accused of criminal conduct in Iraq,
such accusations would be handled through a complaint made to the local
Iraqi Police. If the contractor was acting within the scope of his/her
official employment under the terms and conditions of a contract with
the Coalition forces or CCPA, then he/she would be immune from the
Iraqi legal process under the terms of CPA Order #17, which remains in
effect after June 30th. The parent country of the contractor maintains
the right to waive this immunity, however, and if the civilian
contractor outside the scope of his or her official employment, the
individual would be subject to Iraqi law.
Question 17. There have been alarming reports of Syrian and Iranian
cross-border influence in Iraq. Are these foreigners welcomed by
Iraqis? Are they operating on their own or are they joining forces with
other Iraqi elements? What plan do the Iraqis have to address this
issue following sovereign transfer?
Answer. There is evidence to suggest that some of these foreign
fighters have linked up with former regime elements to conduct
terrorist attacks against Coalition forces and the Iraqi people.
However, these foreigners are generally not welcomed by the Iraqi
populace, and Coalition forces continue to receive useful intelligence
regarding the activities of these foreign terrorists. Although the
Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) is too new to have developed a detailed
plan addressing this issue, the incoming Prime Minister of the IIG,
Ayad Allawi, has indicated that he will make combating these forces a
priority after the transfer to sovereignty.
Question 18. Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and others have language
skills and resources which they have offered and which could be helpful
to reconstruction in Iraq. Have we accepted such offers by Arab
neighbors to assist in Iraq?
Answer. We have accepted several offers of assistance from Iraq's
neighbors. Jordan has been training Iraqi police for several months,
and we have accepted a similar offer from Egypt. The Germans have been
conducting forensic training for Iraqi police in the United Arab
Emirates, and Turkey has been helping to train border police.
Additionally, employees of the Central Bank of Iraq have been taking
classes on modern banking in Kuwait.
Question 19. [Deleted.]
Question 20. This committee remains greatly concerned regarding the
corruption surrounding the implementation of the United Nation's Oil
for Food Program. In our efforts to empower Iraq ministries and turn
sovereignty over to the people of Iraq, why has the CPA refused to
release funds to the Iraqi Governing Council so that they may employ
the U.S.-based accounting firm KPMG to conduct a local investigation?
In its stead, the committee has learned that the CPA has used Iraqi
funds to hire another accounting firm (Ernst & Young) to do an
investigation. Why?
Answer. In furtherance of its stewardship responsibilities on
behalf of the Iraqi people under international law and United Nations
Security Council Resolutions, the CPA is obligated to ensure that an
Iraqi entity carries out a full and independent investigation of
allegations of misconduct associated with the OFF Program. As the
highest public audit organization in Iraq, the Iraqi Board of Supreme
Audit (BSA) is uniquely placed to provide impartial oversight of such
an investigation. It is the only body under Iraqi law authorized to
conduct audits of government-wide financial practice and in any event
would have been obliged under its charter to investigate these matters.
Under international good governance practice, such investigations of
misconduct should be conducted by an independent body. In addition, the
BSA is a permanent institution staffed with qualified public servants
who can provide continuity of oversight. The IGC is a political, not an
investigative body. Moreover, the IGC will cease to exist after June 30
and therefore is not in a position to continue to oversee the
investigation.
With regard to the selection of Ernst & Young, the BSA conducted a
full and open competition to select the firm. The BSA is serving as the
Contracting Officer's Representative for this contract and will issue
tasks to the contractor and monitor progress to ensure compliance with
the terms of the contract.
______
Responses of Hon. Richard L. Armitage to Additional Questions for the
Record Submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question 1. Can you elaborate on what limitations in authority the
interim government will have? What powers will the interim government
exercise? What powers will it NOT hold? Who will hold them?
Answer. The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) will be the fully
sovereign government of Iraq no later than June 30. Iraqis are
discussing now, in the context of the Brahimi-led process, what the
particular powers of the interim government will be. We expect that the
Iraqi Interim Government's primary tasks will be to administer the
country's day-to-day affairs, and prepare for and hold elections no
later than January 31, 2005, as prescribed in the Transitional
Administrative Law, for, the Transitional National Assembly. It is
anticipated that the IIG will have the authority to conduct foreign
relations, including establishing diplomatic relations. Indeed, the
U.S. intends to re-establish diplomatic relations with Iraq soon after
the transition.
Some Iraqis have said that decisions that have long-term
implications should be reserved for an elected Iraqi government. Such
limitations are for Iraqis to decide in the context of the ongoing
consultations being led by Ambassador Brahimi. That said, we believe it
is critical that economic reconstruction efforts continue and it will
likely be important for the Iraqi Interim Government to have the
ability to enter into at least some international agreements, including
with respect to diplomatic relations, Iraq's sovereign debt, engagement
with the International Financial Institutions, and international
assistance. Iraq's independent central bank will manage monetary
policy.
Question 2. How important is the issue of sovereignty to other
members of the UN Security Council as it relates to deliberation on a
new UN resolution? What specific agreements and disagreements do we
have with other members on the Council on the question of sovereignty?
Answer. The issue of sovereignty was a common theme among all
Security Council members ``wish lists'' for a new resolution, as is
clearly reflected in the unanimously adopted Resolution 1546.
``Sovereignty'' (i.e., the new government's full governing authority
and responsibility for Iraq) is one of the themes of this resolution
and is reflected throughout, including in addressing the Multinational
Force (MNF). As stated in the resolution, the MNF's presence in Iraq is
at the request of the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG). The resolution
also states that the MNF's mandate will terminate prior to the
completion of the political process if requested by the Government of
Iraq.
Resolution 1546 reflects consultation and cooperation with Security
Council members, the Iraqis--both in Baghdad and New York--as well as
with Coalition members and countries in the region.
Question 3. How likely do you think it is that Coalition forces
will be asked to leave after June 30th? How certain are you of this?
Answer. We are confident that the Iraqis will not request the
Multinational Force (MNF) to leave after June 30. Iraqis remain
committed to holding elections by no later than January 31, 2005, and
international security-related assistance will be important in making
this goal achievable. They also realize, and have said so publicly,
that their security services are not adequately prepared to maintain
security in Iraq.
Security is critical to the success of Iraq's political transition
process. UNSCR 1546 both reaffirms the authorization for the MNF under
unified command to, among other things, enable the Iraqi people to
implement freely and without intimidation the timetable and program for
the political process, and notes that the presence of the MNF in Iraq
is at the request of the incoming Iraqi Interim Government (IIG).
Annexed to the resolution is a June 5 letter from Iraqi Prime Minister
Ayad Allawi requesting a new UNSCR on the MNF mandate to contribute to
maintaining security in Iraq.
Both Allawi and Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari have publicly
stated the need for the MNF remain in Iraq. In his June 3 address to
the UN Security Council, Zebari said: ``Since April] last year, we have
been working very hard to re-establish Iraq's security, military, and
police forces. However, we have yet to reach the stage of being able to
maintain our own security and therefore the people of Iraq need and
request the assistance of multinational forces to work closely with
Iraqi forces to stabilize the situation. I stress that any premature
departure of international troops would lead to chaos and the real
possibility of a civil war in Iraq. This would cause a humanitarian
crisis and provide a foothold for terrorists to launch their evil
campaign in our country and beyond our borders. The continued presence
of the multinational force will help preserve Iraq's unity, prevent
regional intervention in our affairs and protect our borders at this
critical stage of our reconstruction.''
In addition Allawi, as recently as June 20, said: ``Until our
forces restore their full capability, we will remain in need of the
support and backing of the friendly multinational forces and also Arab
and Islamic countries.''
In light of statements from Iraq's new leadership, and the
continuing and increasing Iraqi-MNF security partnership, we do not
foresee the Iraqis requesting the MNF to leave.
Question 4. What is the CPA's current assessment of the Iraq
ministries' capacity to assume political and economic responsibilities
for governing Iraq by July 1, 2004? How is the CPA helping build Iraq's
national ministries in such areas as ensuring accountability,
transparency, and due process?
Answer. The U.S. is confident in Iraq's ability to transition to a
sovereign nation by June 30, 2004. Our advisors are working diligently
with all Iraqi ministers and their staff in preparation for transition
to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG).
Our programs include building financial market structures,
developing transparent budgeting and accounting arrangements, and
increasing the capacity of the Ministries of Finance and Planning to
manage public resources. The U.S. assists the IGC and appointed
ministries and plans to offer continuous support if desired by the IIG,
both political and economic, after the June 30th transition.
Questions 5 and 6. Senate Foreign Relations staff has been told
that there are plans to keep roughly 200 American and coalition partner
advisors in the various Iraqi ministries.
Please describe these plans in detail. What ministries are
involved? How many per ministry? What will their roles be in
each ministry? Will they have oversight? Will they answer to
Iraqi or American officials?
Will the presence of these individuals diminish the sense of
Iraqi sovereignty? Will this be seen as just one more example
of any meaningful change on June 30th by ordinary Iraqis?
Answer. Virtually all of Iraq's ministries have indicated to CPA
that they will continue to require the specific subject area expertise
offered to them by some 200 of the foreign ``advisors'' now in Iraq.
The role of these ministry liaisons will be to offer a wide-range of
technical assistance to Iraq's ministries. The U.S. currently intends
to offer 146 American experts to Iraq's ministries. It is our hope that
other governments and international organizations will plan to offer
technical experts as well. The Iraqi Government alone will decide
whether to avail itself of such international offers of development
assistance.
The ministry liaison officers will answer to Iraqi officials, who
will choose to accept or reject the assistance offered. Sovereign
governments throughout the world welcome our offers of technical
assistance. We expect Ministers of the Interim Iraqi Government to make
clear to the Iraqi people that they will be running the affairs of
their individual ministries. The substantial reduction in the number of
advisors and the assumption of governing authority by the Iraqi Interim
Government will signal a clear change to the Iraqi people on June 30.
Question 7. Senate Foreign Relations staff has been told that there
are plans to keep roughly 200 American and coalition partner advisors
in the various Iraqi ministries. How will these advisors be able to
help in areas such as ensuring accountability, transparency, and due
process? What oversight authority will these folks have, particularly
with respect to American reconstruction funds?
Answer. The State Department currently plans to provide
approximately 200 advisors (from the U.S. Government and Coalition
partners) to Iraqi ministries, at their request, to provide counsel and
assistance during this interim period of government. Each advisor will
bring relevant experience to his or her assignment, and will work with
their Iraqi counterparts to promote accountability, transparency, and
due process, while helping the ministry identify and address critical
priorities. The U.S. Government also provides support and advisory
assistance to the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity.
Regarding oversight over the spending of U.S. Reconstruction funds,
implementing agencies will have this responsibility, not, the advisors.
Advisors will, however, be consulted to ensure the appropriate
prioritization of spending of U.S. reconstruction funds.
Question 8. What is the CPA's current assessment of the Iraq
ministries' capacity to assume political and economic responsibilities
for governing Iraq by July 1, 2004?
Answer. The U.S. is confident in Iraq's ability to transition to a
sovereign nation by June 30, 2004. Our advisors are working diligently
with all Iraqi ministers and their staff in preparation for transition
to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG).
Our programs include building financial market structures,
developing transparent budgeting and accounting arrangements, and
increasing the capacity of the Ministries of Finance and Planning to
manage public resources. The U.S. assists the IGC and appointed
ministries and plans to offer continuous support if desired by the IIG,
both political and economic, after the June 30th transition.
Question 9. What are we doing to prepare for the January elections?
On what basis will voter rolls be drawn--food ration cards [which were
only given to male heads of households], a census, some other
mechanism?
Answer. Preparations for the January election will be carried out
by an independent Iraqi electoral commission, which the United Nations
is working to set up. We are working to ensure the commissions will
have sufficient financial resources and will provide security
assistance to that commission to help it carry out its work.
The Iraqi electoral commission will have to decide the exact
methods by which it will conduct the January 2005 elections after
consultations with the Interim Iraqi Government and the United Nations.
Although we are aware of various proposals to draw up voter rolls, we
do not expect a census to be taken by January 2005.
Question 10. Do you agree with Ms. Perelli's assessment that we are
in danger of falling off track for elections in January 2005?
Answer. As Ms. Perelli, the leader of the United Nations' electoral
assistance mission to Iraq, has stressed, security will be necessary to
ensure the credibility of the election process, beginning with the
establishment and staffing of election administration and continuing
through polling day. In particular, security will be necessary to
ensure that political parties and candidates can campaign effectively,
and that election officials and voters are able to safely journey to
polling places and to ensure that once votes are cast they are securely
transported and reported.
Ms. Perelli is currently working with Iraqi officials to help set
up an Iraqi electoral commission that will prepare for the January 2005
elections. We believe that this commission will adhere to the timetable
for elections laid out in the TAL. We are working to ensure the
commission will have sufficient financial resources and will provide
security assistance to ensure that the commission can carry out its
mandate.
Question 11. How do the continuing security problems impact on
elections preparation? How much improvement do we need in the security
situation to permit elections? How do you plan to achieve it?
Answer. As Ms. Carina Perelli, the leader of the United Nations'
electoral assistance mission to Iarq, has stressed, security will be
necessary to ensure the validity of the election process, beginning
with the establishment and staffing of election administration and
continuing through polling day. In particular, security will be
necessary to ensure that political parties and candidates can campaign
effectively, and that election officials and voters are able to safely
journey to polling places and to ensure that once votes are cast they
are securely transported and reported.
Security is a major issue for the UN as it plans for resuming
operations in Iraq. We are working with the Iraqis, the MNF, potential
contributors, and the UN to develop appropriate protection capacity and
procedures for UN staff. Together with the UN, the U.S. continues to
solicit troop contributions for this dedicated force within the MNF.
The UN is working with us to encourage contributions.
MNF-I and Iraqi planning also are taking into account the
requirement for election security. I am also hopeful that the general
security situation will improve before the elections as the Iraqi
security forces mature. Greater security will likely mean larger
numbers of voters will participate and give the election greater
credibility amongst Iraqis.
Question 12. What role do you see the United Nations playing after
June 30th? Specifically, what should be its responsibilities?
Answer. The President has clearly stated his commitment to support
the UN's role in Iraq. UNSCR 1546 states that the UN shall play a
leading role in the political process and carry out various
humanitarian, legal and economic reconstruction activities ``as
circumstances permit.'' UNSCRS 1483, 1511, and 1546 clearly identify
all of the activities the UN has been charged to pursue in Iraq.
The UN has made a significant contribution to the political process
through the work of its Special Advisor Lakhdar Brahimi and the
electoral assistance mission led by Carla Perelli, and of course
through the work of the Secretary-General's late Special Representative
(SRSG) Sergio de Mello before them.
Carina Perelli and the Electoral Assistance Mission of the UN are
working with the Iraqi Independent Electoral Commission on elections
preparations, including staff recruiting, political party formation,
voter registration activities, budgeting and planning, and elections
security. Together with the UN, we are committed to providing all
available assistance to support the preparations for and the holding of
elections scheduled to be held by no later than January 31, 2005.
With regard to the UN's other activities, it has continued to carry
out limited humanitarian and reconstruction programming from outside
Iraq, via national staff who are in country, since the August 19, 2003
attack on UN headquarters in Baghdad. We appreciate the efforts of the
acting SRSG, Ross Mountain, and the UN Assistance Mission to Iraq
(UNAMI). The UN has an important role to play in reconstruction and
development in Iraq, through the UN Development Group's Trust Fund (the
Fund). The United States is among the countries contributing to the
Fund.
The UN has stated its intent to reestablish its international
presence in Iraq. In order that it may do so, we are working with the
Iraqis, the Multinational Force (MNF), potential contributors, and the
UN to develop appropriate protection capacity and procedures for UN
staff. Consistent with UNSCR 1546, the U.S. continues to solicit troop
contributions for a dedicated unit within the MNF charged with
providing security for the UN in Iraq. The UN is working with us to
encourage contributions, although no specific contributions have yet
been identified. I would be happy to provide details of this diplomatic
outreach in a closed session.
The Secretary General has recently stated that he intends to name a
new SRSG to Iraq in the near future. We welcome this and hope to see a
new SRSG named as soon as possible. It is important for the UN's
leading role in Iraq.
Question 13. What will we have to give to the United Nations and
other major powers in order to receive their assistance?
Answer. The President has clearly stated his commitment to support
the UN's role in Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority and the
Multinational Force (MNF) provided security and other support for the
important work of UN Special Adviser Lakhdar Brahimi and continues to
provide similar support for the electoral assistance missions led by
Carina Perelli. We are committed to support the UN as it reestablishes
an international presence in Iraq to, among other things, assist the
Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) in holding direct democratic elections
by no later than January 31, 2005. As part of this assistance, the
United States has approached several countries to contribute troops to
the MNF for the specific mission of protecting the UN in Iraq. We are
prepared, as appropriate, to provide these countries with the same type
of support that we have provided to other members of the MNF.
More broadly, several countries, including those currently in the
MNF have expressed the need for an invitation from the IIG and the UN
Security Council in order to contribute troops and other security-
related assistance. Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and Foreign
Minister Hoyashr Zebari have since offered such an invitation publicly,
including most recently on June 20. Furthermore, the UN Security
Council voted unanimously in favor of UNSCR 1546, which among other
things, calls on the international community to provide security-
related assistance to the MNF and to Iraqi security services.
In addition to security-related assistance, UNSCRS 1483, 1511 and
1546 call for a central role for the United Nations, including in the
political process, and for the international community to provide
humanitarian and economic reconstruction assistance to Iraq.
Question 14. Do you support the naming of an international figure,
reporting either to the Contact Group or to the U.N. Security Council
to be Iraq's primary international partner, to help referee political
disputes, and to be the international point person on elections? If
not, why not?
Answer. UNSCR 1483 requests the Secretary General to appoint a
Special Representative (SRSG) for Iraq whose independent
responsibilities shall involve reporting regularly to the Security
Council on his activities, coordinating activities of the United
Nations in Iraq, coordinating among UN and international agencies
engaged in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities in
Iraq, and assisting the people of Iraq through humanitarian, political,
legal and economic reconstruction.
Since UNSCR 1483, we have sponsored two additional UNSCRs--1511 and
1546--which further structure the UN's role in Iraq, particularly in
the political process (e.g. elections). In addition, we have joined the
international community in continuing to urge the Secretary General to
name a new SRSG.
We appreciate the UN's significant contribution to the political
process, despite the security situation, through the work of its
Special Advisor Lakhdar Brahimi and the electoral assistance mission
led by Carla Perelli, and of course through the work of the late SRSG
Sergio de Mello before them.
In addition, we appreciate the efforts of the acting SRSG, Ross
Mountain, and the UN Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI), who,
subsequent to the August 19, 2003 bombing, have had the difficult task
of carrying out limited humanitarian and reconstruction programming
from outside Iraq, via national staff who are in country.
We welcome the Secretary General's recently stated intent to name a
new SRSG to Iraq in the near future. We hope to see a new SRSG named as
soon as possible, preferably before June 30, as it is important for the
UN's leading role in Iraq--both substantively and symbolically. The UN
has a central role to play and we look forward to continuing to work
with them to this end.
______
Responses of Hon. Paul Wolfowitz to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
iraqi security forces
Question 1. On March 21st, Jerry Bremer signed CPA Order 67 which
created a new Iraqi Ministry of Defense. The order contained the
following paragraph:
``In light of the current emergency situation within Iraq, and
consistent with Iraq's stated desire to join other nations in helping
to maintain peace and security and fight terrorism during the
transitional period pursuant to the provision of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1511, all trained elements of the Iraqi
Armed Forces . . . shall at all times be under the operational control
of the Commander of Coalition Forces for the purpose of conducting
combined operations and providing other support in accordance with CPA
Orders 22 and 28, respectively, and any future relevant CPA Orders. The
interim Minister shall exercise administrative control over elements of
the Iraqi Armed Forces that are under the operational control of the
Commander of Coalition Forces.''
1a. Order 67 includes no explanation on when the ``current
emergency'' situation will end. After Iraqi sovereignty is
restored on June 30 will the Commander of Coalition Forces
continue to have operational control in Iraq? If not, who will
control Iraqi security forces? When will a security agreement
be worked out with the Iraqis? What do you imagine such an
agreement will look like?
1b. How will disagreements between the Iraqi political or
security leadership and American military leadership be
brokered? For example, what happens in the event of future
Fallujas should U.S. commanders order our forces to intervene
but the Iraqi caretaker government objects?
Answer. After the transfer of governance authority to the Iraqi
Interim Authority, the Commander of Multinational Forces Iraq (MNF-I)
will have operational control of all forces under his command, as he
does now. The difference is that the Iraqis will become full partners
in the MNF-I. The partnership between MNF-I and the Iraqi Ministries of
Defense and Interior will be facilitated by the Ministerial Committee
on National Security and includes direct coordination between the MNF-I
and Iraqi ministers and commanders. Iraqi military personnel will be
integrated at all levels of the MNF-I and subordinate organizations.
Tactical methods will evolve to place more and more responsibility on
Iraqi forces and gradually transition to Iraqi responsibility for local
and then regional control. Iraqi security forces under the Iraqi
Ministry of the Interior (police, Department of Border Enforcement and
Facilities Protective Service) will be under the control of the Iraqi
Minister in concert with local MNF-I commanders. The Secretary of
Defense has said we look forward to negotiating a security agreement
with the Iraqis as soon as a duly-elected Iraqi Transitional Government
is in place, which is foreseen for early next year. (The anticipated
Iraqi Interim Government, to take authority not later than 30 June,
will not have a legislature to ratify international agreements.) The
agreement will likely resemble the many other security agreements we
have with other countries around the world.
Question 2. Last month Secretary Wolfowitz told the House Armed
Services Committee that one of the fundamental elements for stabilizing
Iraq is ``building capable Iraqi security forces.'' You continued,
``The picture there is mixed. We have lessons learned--important
lessons learned from the last few weeks.''
What are the ``lessons learned'' that you referred to? How
are these ``lessons learned'' being implemented?
Answer. Recent performance by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) was
mixed; some performed well and some did not. Common denominators among
forces that did not perform well were:
Lack of proper equipment
Lack of an Iraqi leadership figure
Having to chose between tribal loyalty and loyalty to the
immature Iraqi government and security forces.
Incomplete training
Insufficient Coalition mentors
Factors that successful Iraqi forces had in common were:
Completion of training programs
Equipped with appropriate vehicles, radios, weapons and
individual gear
Close integration with Coalition forces
Effective chains of command and leadership
Unit cohesion developed from having worked together for some
time.
Since the dramatic increase in insurgent activity in early April,
many of the security forces have begun to stabilize, and numbers are on
the rise once again. In general ISF units, like any other security
forces, need time to work together and develop confidence in their
capabilities. Many ISF units have bad limited opportunity to do so.
We have developed a series of actions designed to get the security
forces on track as quickly as possible. Within the police (Iraqi Police
Service (IPS)) and the border police (Department of Border Enforcement
(DBE)) services we are re-training and replacing police that failed to
perform and increasing the number of trained police by increasing
training throughput of current training programs and opening additional
academies. Initiatives within the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC)
include creating a strike platoon within each battalion, mentoring ICDC
battalions through Coalition augmentation and integrating ICDC more
fully into Coalition operations. With respect to the Iraqi Armed Forces
(IAF), we are completing training and deployment of the initial IAP
battalions and the construction of their new garrison facilities. We
are employing former Iraqi officers as liaison officers to the
Coalition to build a cadre of good Iraqi leadership and heavily
embedding Coalition trainers as mentors. Our newest initiative is the
fielding of a brigade-sized Iraqi National Task Force (INTF) in 30
days, expanding to division sized within 90 days.
Initiatives across all of the security services include providing
DFI funds to get ISF on line and reconstituted, increasing hazardous
duty pay and other incentive pays for security sector and increasing
emergency CERP funding. Overall training and equipping priority is to
the INTF, IPS, ICDC and DBE in order.
Question 3. Senators Lugar, Hagel and myself were told almost a
year ago in Baghdad that it would take 5 years to train an Iraqi police
force of 75,000, and 3 years to train an Iraqi army of 40,000.
a. Specifically, what is the plan to recruit and train 75,000
police and 40,000 soldiers? Who will do the training? Where?
How long are the training sessions and for how many trainees at
a time? How long will it take to field fully trained police and
military forces? How many international police trainers are now
working with the Iraqi security forces? Who is providing them?
Answer. The endstate goal for police is 89,000, and for the Iraqi
Armed Forces (IAP) it is 35,000. With respect to the IAF, there is no
recruiting problem. Potential soldiers are recruited country-wide with
the intent of gaining an ethnicity mix that approximates that of the
four main constituencies (Shia, Sunni, Kurd, Turkoman). The first four
battalions were trained at Kirkush Military Training Base and have been
deployed to their garrison locations in Iraq. Training was conducted by
Vinnell Corporation. Vinnell has completed training of NCO cadre, and
the Jordanian Army has completed training of officer cadre; these cadre
will then train the rest of the IAP under the guidance of the Office of
Security Transition. The fifth battalion entered recruit training last
week. These formally trained officers and NCOs then form the cadre for
their new battalion and conduct basic training for new recruits at
Kirkush. USCENTCOM will also employ 500 former Iraqi officers as
liaisons to the Coalition to help build a cadre of good Iraqi
leadership. We plan to field a total of 9 brigades (3 divisions) by
early October 2004. Throughout the process, Coalition trainers will be
embedded into IAF units and serve as mentors. Units are typically
employed at the platoon and company level and are OPCON to the
Coalition divisions in their region. Ten of these 27 battalions will
become part of the Iraq National Task Force (INTF) and can be used for
counter insurgency tasks, but focus is on external security. There is a
possibility, with the recent emphasis on accelerating training for the
10 battalions of the INTF, that the entire IAP may not be fully
operational until on or about 1 December.
With respect to the 89,000 member police force, the primary issue
is not meeting this numerical goal, since there are currently 83,000
police on the rolls. Our challenge is to fill the force with properly
vetted and reliable police forces. We are currently reviewing the
police force. The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior has adopted policies
and procedures to dismiss Iraqi Police Service (IPS) personnel with
unacceptable performance records and to identify and reward those who
have performed well. There is a three-tier training program consisting
of a 3-week transition integration program (TIP), an 8-week formal
academy training and leadership training. TIP training is taught by the
local Major Subordinate Command in the region. There are currently 15
locations where the training is conducted. TIP training throughput has
been increased to 2825 every 3 weeks, and we are transitioning
responsibility for the conduct of much of this training to local
Iraqis. Our goal is to train 43,000 by the end of December 2004.
Academy training is currently conducted in Ahman, Jordan and in
Baghdad. At the Jordan Academy training throughput is being increased
from 1000 to 1500 per month (starts August). In Baghdad training
throughput will increase from 500 to 1000 per month (starts June). We
plan to have trained 36,000 trained by June 2005. Approximately 280
international police trainers from various countries are providing
instruction at the Jordan Academy, and the Baghdad Public Safety
Academy has about 160 U.S. military and three civilian and two UK
civilian instructors.
A reconstitution plan is currently underway at Irbil Academy, where
basic leadership is being taught to mid-level supervisors who will then
conduct train-the-trainer classes for the remainder of police stations
requiring reconstitution (Najaf, Kut, Falluja, Karbala). The first 171
leaders graduated from a 1-week course last week. (10 each will return
to each police station in Karbala and Najaf). Two additional courses
are scheduled. Following completion of this training, graduates will be
required to sign a code of conduct. 10,000 junior, mid level and senior
level police officers will be trained by December 2004 at a variety of
locations based upon Irbil model.
In addition, selected IPS will participate in a $200M specialized
training program. Program consists of:
Basic Criminal Investigations--1200 IPS
Internal Controls--200 IPS
Intelligence--100 IPS
Counterterrorism (CT) Emergency Response Unit and National
CT--250 IPS
CT Investigations--150 IPS
Post Blast Investigation--144 IPS
Drug Enforcement--200 IPS
Police Recruitment--20 IPS
Courses are scheduled to begin at the Adnan Facility in Baghdad in
mid-June. The IPS will also receive riot control training and the
associated equipment for three 400-man riot control battalions.
The International Police Advisor program will provide a critical
mentorship and advisory function. We have deployed 276 of a planned 500
IPAs, to Iraq but, because of the non-permissive security environment,
most of them are unable to deploy outside Baghdad to actually work in
police stations.
Recruitment/Logistics/Transportation--27
CPA Ministry of Interior--IPS--36
IPA Operations Staff & Admin--28
Region I (Basra)-8*
Region II (Tikrit)--41
Region III (Mosul)--11
Region IV (Ramadi)--13
Region V (Babylon)--11
Region VI (Baghdad)--95
TDY Other Unit Cs)--4
* Approximately 90 additional IPAs are scheduled to arrive in Iraq
in mid-May.
b. Given that the Iraqi police will not be capable of
providing general law and order on the ground for at least a
couple of years, what do we do in the meantime to provide
security?
Answer. As the date approaches for the transition of authority in
Iraq, efforts to build up Iraqi capacity to assume security
responsibilities must continue and be further intensified to provide a
foundation for Iraq's political transition. Priority of resources
(including funds, trainers and equipment) has been shifted to the Iraqi
Police Service (IPS) and Iraq Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) to ensure that
both are fully funded, well trained and well equipped, as they will
share the task of Iraq internal security.
There is currently a requirement for 89,000 Iraqi Police, based
upon a 1:300 ratio of police to population. The current goal is to have
the required amount of IPS personnel trained by June of 2005.
Following the 30 June transition, the IPS will report to the
Ministry of the Interior (MOI), and Commander, Multi-National Forces-
Iraq (CDRMNF-I), will exercise tactical control only for specific
operations and will closely coordinate with the MOI for operations
outside of this purview. The ICDC will provide support to the police
and defend against threats to Iraq's internal security. The Iraqi Armed
Forces (IAP) will provide support for internal security tasks beyond
the capacity of the internal security forces and assist in performing
security and stability operations at least, while Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) are under the direction of CDRNNF-I.
The current training regimen for IPS personnel is an 8-week Police
Training Academy, 3-week Transition Integration Program, and 10-month
field training program. The principles taught at the various training
programs will continue to be assessed and reinforced by the embed
advisor/mentorship program. International police advisors will
continued to be crucial to the success of the continued development of
the IPS.
Currently, IPS is conducting joint patrols with Coalition/U.S.
forces in select areas with some success. As the rapport matures
between Major Subordinate Commands and IPS leadership, we can
reasonably expect this to become more effective in the near future. As
IPS becomes more effective in assigned security roles and gain the
confidence of the local populace; the primary role for civil security
operations will transition in phases. As respective conditions are met
the transition of security operations will encompass security
responsibility transfer to local control, regional control and
strategic overwatch by multinational forces, respectively.
Way Ahead: Continue combined operations with a phased transition to
the area/regional support role for military quick reaction forces, IAF
and ICDC support, and Coalition liaison or embedded advisor presence.
Commander, USCENTCOM, will continue to certify the readiness of ISF,
upon completion of training and maturation milestones, to conduct
effective operations with minimal support from other multinational
forces. In addition, mutual support across the security spectrum will
remain key to the strategic vision of a secure and stable Iraq in which
ISP ultimately assumes the lead role.
c. What role should the Iraqi security forces play in dealing
with insurgents? Is it realistic to expect them to fight Iraqi
insurgents in most cases?
[There was no response to this question at time of publication.]
d. What about the idea of engaging our allies in the Arab
world to build on the police training model in Jordan to open
up several regional training centers staffed by Americans,
Europeans, and Arab-trained officers who would train Iraqi
security forces on an urgent basis? What, if anything, is the
administration doing to make this happen?
[There was no response to this question at time of publication.]
militias
Question 4. Last month, when a decision was made to go after
Muqtada Al-Sadr, Coalition spokesman Dan Senor cited al-Sadr's militia,
the Mahdi Army, as one of the primary reasons. And yet the Coalition
has not decided to go after other militias.
Does the CPA have a consistent policy on militias? If so,
what is this policy?
What role are these groups playing in providing security? Do
we welcome their role in some instances?
Do you have a plan to bring them under a new minister of
defense and interior, or disarm and disband them? Where are you
on implementing the plan?
[There was no response to this question at time of publication.]
coalition force levels
Question 5. Military experts have been arguing for more troops for
months of course, many since before the war even started. Force
protection should always be the number one priority, but I am concerned
that we're not putting enough emphasis on--or do not have enough troops
on the ground to provide--security for the Iraqi people. If our mission
is the stabilization of Iraq, then I can draw no other conclusion than
that we do not have enough troops as evidenced by--
1. The reluctance of Iraqis to join the political process.
2. The proliferation of militias.
3. The growing number of private military contractors and the
rising costs of security in reconstruction spending.
4. A surge in violence in April.
5. The inability of the Iraqi security forces to provide law
and order.
a. What is the specific mission statement of our armed forces
in Iraq? Does it include civilian policing--fighting crime,
preventing kidnappings, catching thieves?
Answer. The Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) conducts offensive
operations to defeat remaining non-compliant forces and neutralize
destabilizing influences in Iraq in order to create a secure
environment In direct support of the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA). MNF-I organizes, trains, equips, mentors and certifies credible
and capable Iraqi security forces in order to transition responsibility
for security from Coalition forces to Iraqi forces. Concurrently,
conducts stability operations to support the establishment of
government, the restoration of essential services and economic
development in order to set the conditions for a transfer of
sovereignty and operations to designated follow-on authorities.
Although this mission statement does not specifically include
kidnappings, preventing crimes and catching thieves, the enforcement of
the law as written by the CPA and enforced by MNF-I makes these implied
tasks to subordinate units under MNF-I and espouse into subordinate
unit missions and commanders' intent at all levels.
b. Do our commanders in the field have the forces needed to
successfully carry out the civilian policing mission? Have they
told you what they need to do that? Have you asked them?
Answer. Coalition forces are in a training and advisory capacity
with the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), and we perform local joint patrols
with them. However, the goal is not for Coalition forces to perform the
police mission, but for IPS to perform that mission with our support
and training. The limitations on training and equipping IPS are not
related to either the number of IPS personnel or the number of
trainers. We have set up training programs that put IPS personnel
through a variety of general and specialized training, and have
maximized the available facilities to do so. In the days of Saddam
Hussein, the Iraqi police did not have the training we normally assume
of police forces--they had little to no training in the gathering of
evidence or other skills associated with civilian policing in the
Western world. Because of that, the training requirements for IPS are
extensive and we are maximizing the throughput with the available
resources. Previous testimony has indicated the limited availability of
military police resources, and we are maximizing the availability of
what we have to perform military police missions; this does not include
day-to-day civilian policing.
c. Can you provide detailed information on how many foreign
troops are there in Iraq and when their deployments are
scheduled to end? What commitments do we have for the future?
Answer. The Coalition currently has 24,273 soldiers from 34 nations
contributing forces to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Unfortunately, Spain,
Honduras and the Dominican Republic have elected to withdraw their
forces. Once their redeployment is complete the force will drop to
about 22,900.
Most nations have limited their formal commitments to 6-month
intervals. Under this 6-month framework, the majority of the formal
commitments will expire between December 2004 and February 2005. Two
notable exceptions are the United Kingdom and Poland, who have agreed
to stay as long as required.
While we have few formal commitments for the period beyond February
2005, many countries have made public and private statements that lead
us to believe they will remain for the foreseeable future. However,
there are two or three countries we believe may withdraw their forces
if they were to have either a change in government or a terrorist
attack on home territory.
The Republic of Korea has agreed to provide about 3,000 soldiers.
Preparations for their deployment are ongoing. We are also examining
offers for smaller sized units from Azerbaijan, Tonga and Georgia, but
these have not yet resulted in formal commitments of forces.
reconstruction and contracting
Question 6. Recently, Stuart Bowen, the Coalition Provisional
Authority's Inspector General, told Reuters that in the wake of the
spate of violence directed at contractors, the security and insurance
costs might be in the range of 25 percent of costs. To make matter
worse, there was a disturbing recent report on the National Public
Radio's ``Marketplace'' that indicated that up to 20 percent of our
reconstruction dollars could be lost to corruption. With contractors
being kidnapped and murdered, most NGOs and many contractors are either
hunkering down or pulling out and reconstruction efforts are being
hampered.
a. What is your best estimate for the amount of
reconstruction funds that are being spent on security and lost
to corruption? Are Mr. Bowen's estimates credible? What is your
response to the ``Marketplace'' allegations?
Answer. The level of security required in Iraq is a unique aspect
of moving and building there. Based on proposals submitted by
contractors, security costs are estimated at 10 to 15% of construction
costs. Contractors are currently in the early stages of submitting
vouchers for security so the actual costs are not available at this
point.
This estimating and stating of security costs is an inexact science
at best until the construction is complete and the costs are paid. We
are working hard to control all costs but the environment is in charge
of how much it costs for security. It will change over time and the
costs (percentages) could go up, stay the same or go down. Predicting
security costs even based on past data from other sources may be very
misleading. This information is not ``knowable'' in advance like the
cost of cement or pipe.
Security remains a top concern. But despite the challenges, it is
important to move forward with efforts to help bring essential services
to the people in Iraq. We firmly believe that the construction efforts
and the jobs created through the contracting process will help
stabilize the country and contribute to security. Security will impact
the pace and the cost of construction but it will not stop
construction. Despite the security concerns, all of our contractors
have personnel on the ground and are executing plans for deployment of
resources to meet their obligations. With the beginning of our major
construction, we have an overall PMO security contractor who will
assist the Coalition in defining the security requirements for our
construction contractors.
In addition, we will establish security operations centers in
various locations throughout Iraq. These centers will be information
nodes receiving reports and sharing security information. Our security
contractor will be integrated closely with the construction
contractors' security, coalition military, and Iraqi security
authorities.
b. What is your response to the ``Marketplace'' allegations?
Answer. As for the construction funds ``being lost to corruption,''
we are participating fully with all oversight agencies to prevent this
from happening. We have auditors from the General Accounting Office,
the Army Audit Agency, the Defense Contracting Audit Agency, the U.S.
Department of Defense Inspector General, and the Coalition Provisional
Authority Inspector General, among others, overseeing and reviewing the
entire contracting award process to ensure that our actions remain
open, competitive, and transparent.
c. Who will be in charge of contracting after June 30? What
role does State have now? What role will it have? What will
DOD's role be in contracting post June 30?
Answer. When CPA dissolves, the United States will be represented
by the Chief of Mission who will be responsible for direction,
coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Government, employees,
policies, and activities in country, except those under the command of
an area military commander or employees of an International
Organization. The Department of the Army will continue to serve as the
Executing Agent, providing contracting and program management support.
A temporary organization called Army Project and Contracting Office
(APCO--formerly Program Management Office) within the Department of the
Army has been established to provide acquisition and contract
management support.
d. How much of the $18.4 billion in reconstruction funds has
actually been spent in Iraq as opposed to obligated? How long
will it take to spend the entire $18.4 billion? Why is it
taking so long to spend this money? If any part of the problem
lies with Congress, have you requested a fix?
Answer. While there were some initial delays in contracting for the
various reconstruction projects, the Coalition Provisional Authority is
executing these funds now.
As of May 26, 2004, $7.6 billion (41 percent) of the $18.4
billion was committed, and $3.7 billion (20 percent) was
obligated.
Since DOD has awarded the, PMO construction contracts in
March, execution has been accelerating.
Expenditures will lag obligations. Expenditures are recorded
as work is completed.
Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) funds are
available through FY 2006, and some major projects may take
that long to complete.
Initial delays were caused by:
The requirement to submit the financial plan required by
section 2207 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act for the
Reconstruction of Iraq,
The Supplemental Appropriations Act requirement that IRRF-
funded contracts be awarded through full and open competition,
and
The need to definitize requirements to a level so that the
contract/task order could be awarded.
We are using our normal acquisition process to ensure fair and open
competition.
This is a deliberative process so that we can preclude protests
that would result in further delays in execution (e.g., NOUR USA LTD
protest that has affected equipping the New Iraqi Army and the Iraqi
Civil Defense Corps).
For those projects for which the Department of Defense is
responsible for executing.
DOD awarded 10 construction contracts to support the
security, electrical, water, transportation, communications,
and public buildings. These contracts were executed under an
accelerated and fully open competition.
Proposals for these solicitations were due on February 5,
2004, and all contract awards were made by March 26, 2004.
These contracts are cost plus award fee, indefinite delivery,
indefinite quantity (IDIQ) with a 2-year base period with three
1-year options.
Projects will be executed via task order as specific
requirements are prioritized. These contracts combined with the
current construction contracts underway will serve as the
majority of the capacity to accomplish the construction work
identified in the section 2207 report.
For the non-construction contracts,
DOD is defming the contract requirements as quickly as
possible and is issuing those contracts on a case-by-case basis
based on when the items are required.
DOD sent a special contracting team led by Brigadier General
Steve Seay to Baghdad to assist in the definitization of
requirements--especially those for Iraqi security forces; the
ministries know what they want, but they need assistance in
translating these needs into requirements for contracting
purposes.
corruption
Question 7. In February, Ambassador Bremer signed CPA Order number
57 which created Inspectors General in each Iraqi ministry, which
``report to the relevant ministers and shall respond to requests or
inquiries submitted by the Coalition Provisional Authority. In cases
involving allegations of misconduct by the relevant minister, and
Inspector General shall report to'' Jerry Bremer.
a. Which requests or inquiries has the CPA made of the
various IGs? Has Ambassador Bremer made any requests to
investigate Iraqi ministers?
Answer. The CPA has initiated no requests to the Ministry IGs to
investigate Ministers.
b. Have the IGs been tasked to look into the specific
allegations contained in the Marketplace series of similar
allegations?
Answer. No.
c. Can you relay to us the reporting, if any, that these
Inspectors General have conveyed to the CPA?
Answer. None.
Question 8. Could you provide the committee with a detailed summary
of the activities thus far of the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity?
Have the Annual Iraqi Financial Statements yet been made public?
Answer. Activities relating to the Iraqi Commission on Public
Integrity can be classified into several categories:
Selection of Commissioner and Iraqi Staff.--A Commissioner has been
appointed. Approximately 100 Iraqis have applied for positions in the
Commission, and they are currently undergoing background
investigations.
Code of Conduct and Financial Disclosure Programs.--A Code of
Conduct and financial disclosure regulations have been drafted. These
drafts have been briefed to the Commissioner and await his input and
approval. The signing of the Code of Conduct is a condition of
employment for all governmental employees. The actual Code of Conduct
was developed with Iraqi involvement. The training, distribution, and
tracking aspects of the Code of Conduct Program is under development in
union with the Inspectors General of each ministry. The program has
been set back, however, by the recent loss of the coalition program
coordinator. The Financial Disclosure Project was briefed to the
Commissioner. Modifications will be made to secure certain financial
information so that it can not be used by criminal elements to target
the governmental worker or set kidnapping ransoms and to ensure
confidentiality of certain information while balancing the need for
transparency. The information that will be required has been made
public, but the actual rules and regulations have not been released.
Training.--Coalition subject matter experts have been building
courses of action in numerous areas. An investigative training plan has
been developed, and upon the transfer of funds to the International
Criminal Investigation and Training Program (ICITAP), trainers will
deploy to conduct high intensity training in undercover activity,
including the use of electronic surveillance equipment, to detect,
identify, infiltrate, and prosecute all levels of public corruption.
Educational programs are being developed to train Iraqis in basic and
advanced accounting and auditing techniques to enhance detection and
investigation. Additional educational initiatives are directed at grade
school civics education curricula. A public relations campaign is under
development to encourage local citizen cooperation in the fight against
corruption and to promote a sense of pride in government work by
drawing upon the region's rich cultural, religious, and historical
history for integrity and honesty. Training on the nature and scope of
the Commission has been provided to all prosecutors, investigative and
trial judges.
Investigations.--A hotline for the anonymous reporting of corrupt
activity should be rolled out in 30 to 45 days. Because no Iraqi staff
is in place, no investigations have begun.
Funding.--A total of $15 million in supplemental and $20 million in
DFI money has been secured to stand up, equip, train, and maintain the
Commission. An Anti-Corruption Working Group has been established to
maximize coordination, cooperation, and training and to reduce
duplication of efforts among the three pillars of the anti-corruption
initiatives (i.e., the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, the Board
of Supreme Audit, and the Inspectors General in each of the
ministries). Efforts are underway to develop alternative funding
sources for FY 2006 and beyond.
Security.--A safe and secure building from which to operate the
Commission on Public Integrity has been located and rebuilt. Final
interior refurbishing is expected to be complete in 10 days. A rapid
deployment training program to investigate and prosecute criminals who
threaten employees, witnesses, and judges involved in uncovering
corruption will be developed by June 15th. A witness/employee
protection location has been identified and will be refurbished. This
location will also be an emergency secondary base of operation in case
of a destructive attack on the main site. Long term witness protection
has been coordinated with the U.S. Marshals. We are attempting to
purchase armored cars from neighboring countries to reduce the six-
month minimum lag time between order and delivery.
Regarding whether or not Annual Iraqi Financial Statements have yet
been made public: they have not been made public because they have not
been prepared.
Question 9. In September 2003, Ambassador Bremer signed CPA Order
number 30, which reformed employment conditions for state employees.
According to the order, ``Public Service Employees who fail to report
to work for five consecutive days or ten days in a month, except as
authorized by their senior supervisor or as a result of verifiable
medical incapacitation, may be dismissed from their employment.''
a. How many employees have been dismissed for reason of
failure to report to work since the order was signed?
Answer. To our knowledge, no employees were fired as a result of
CPA Order #30.
b. A May 13, 2004 Economist article entitled, ``Without
peace, reconstruction stalls'' says that ``the foreign ministry
will not re-open until the autumn. Its 1,400 officials work for
only two days a week, due to shortage of space.'' How is CPA
order 30 reconciled with the foreign ministry's apparent two
day work week?
Answer. The Economist article is wrong. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs works six days a week and is fully engaged in the hard work of
reopening and restaffing Iraq's embassies abroad and formulating and
articulating a new foreign policy for a new, democratic Iraq. Foreign
Minister Hoshyar Zebari has endorsed a new Corporate Management Plan
jointly developed by CPA and the Ministry's senior staff that
establishes sound, modern management principles for the Ministry. It is
true that there are space problems at the Ministry due to the looting
of the main Ministry building following the liberation of Baghdad, but
the renovated main headquarters building will open in a few months.
Some of the more junior staff do only work part-time while the
renovation is underway, but the Ministry is very actively engaged in
its important tasks.
______
Responses of Hon. Richard L. Armitage to Additional Questions for the
Record Submitted by Senator Russell D. Feinglod
Question 1. At the same time that Congress passed an $87 billion
supplemental spending bill requested by the administration, primarily
for Iraq, last year, Congress also created an Inspector General for the
Coalition Provisional Authority to ensure that massive sums of U.S.
taxpayer dollars were not lost to waste, fraud, and abuse. But only a
fraction of the billions appropriated for reconstruction programs in
Iraq has been obligated thus far. When Congress created the IG for the
CPA, we did so because we recognized that the amount of money involved
in reconstruction was so great that we needed an IG on the ground in
Baghdad, not an office in Washington that viewed Iraq as one operation
among hundreds that needs oversight. What will become of the CPA IG
given the fact that the funds he was suppose to oversee have barely
begun to be obligated? The law says that the IG's office will terminate
six months after the authorities and duties of the Coalition
Provisional Authority cease to exist. It seems to me that the
authorities and duties, in terms of the reconstruction effort, do not
cease to exist on June [30, 2004.] Will the CPA IG be subsumed into the
State Department's IG office or is some other arrangement under
consideration? I asked this question of Secretary Grossman last month,
but I still do not have an answer, so I am trying again.
Answer. We expect the Coalition Provisional Authority's Inspector
General (CPA/IG) to remain in place for six-months following June 30,
2004, and to sunset on December 31, 2004, in accordance with 3001(o) of
Public Law 108-106. The State Department's Inspector General (DOS/IG)
has detailed six people to the CPA/IG, both in Iraq and Washington, and
is in the process of developing plans for work to be initiated after
June 30, 2004, which is commensurate with expanded Iraq-related duties
to be assumed by the Department.
As to the oversight responsibility for Iraq reconstruction funds,
it is our understanding that each Inspector General (for the Department
of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of
Defense and others) will acquire oversight responsibility as each
parent agency acquires responsibility for programs previously under the
purview of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The Secretary of State
will, however, assume responsibility for the continuous supervision and
general direction of assistance for Iraq.
Question 2. As I understand it, the International Committee of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent alerted senior officials at both the
Department of Defense and the Department of State about alarming abuses
of Iraqi prisoners directly in mid-January. Press reports indicate that
the ICRC communicated concern directly to both Secretary Powell and
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. So regardless of whether other reports made
it onto the desks of the right people, the message was delivered at
very high levels at that time. I would like to ask both Secretary
Armitage and Secretary Wolfowitz, what action did your respective
Departments take after the ICRC delivered that very troubling message?
Answer. ICRC President Kellenberger visited Washington in January
and discussed detention issues with Secretary Powell, Deputy Secretary
of Defense Wolfowitz and National Security Advisor Rice. Senior
administration officials meet with Kellenberger every time he visits
Washington, a reflection of our high regard for the International
Committee of the Red Cross. In response to a question from the
Secretary on detainees in Iraq, Kellenberger told the Secretary that
the ICRC had concerns about the treatment of detainees in Guantanamo,
Afghanistan and Iraq and mentioned that a report was being prepared on
Iraq. He did not mention specifics or ask for any specific action. The
ICRC provided its confidential report to CPA and U.S. military
authorities in Baghdad in February 2004, covering the organization's
visits to prisons in Iraq from March to November of 2003. The U.S.
Mission in Geneva obtained a copy of the report and transmitted it to
the Department on March 5, 2004. Secretary Powell received an internal
memorandum describing the allegations of the report on March 11, 2004.
He was also informed that serious investigations were taking place. The
system appeared to be working and we understood that issues were being
dealt with at the local level. Our colleagues in the ICRC also appeared
to share the view in late March and April, both in Washington and
Geneva, that the February Report was being taken seriously at the local
level and that steps were being taken locally to address the concerns
raised.
The Department of Defense and the Department of Justice are
conducting various investigations arising from the allegations of abuse
at Abu Ghraib prison and elsewhere. The Department of State has
maintained a regular dialogue with the ICRC and other international
organizations and NGOs at the working level regarding these issues;
Secretary Powell and others ensure that the concerns the ICRC raises
are carefully considered in interagency discussions.