[Senate Hearing 108-643]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-643
AFGHANISTAN: CONTINUING CHALLENGES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 12, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Witnesses
Gouttierre, Dr. Thomas, dean of international studies and
programs and director of The Center for Afghanistan Studies,
University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, Nebraska............... 3
Isby, David, foreign and defense policy analyst, Washington, D.C. 23
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Perito, Robert, senior fellow and special advisor, Rule of Law
Program, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C..... 19
Schneider, Mark, senior vice president, International Crisis
Group, Washington, D.C......................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Map of Afghanistan............................................... 48
Appendix
Additional Material Submitted by the International Crisis Group
Elections and Security in Afghanistan........................ 49
Additional Material Submitted by the United States Institute of
Peace
Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan.................. 58
(iii)
AFGHANISTAN: CONTINUING CHALLENGES
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Wednesday, May 12, 2004
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met at 9:35 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar, chairman of the
committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Biden, and Feingold.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
Today the committee again meets to examine the challenges
in Afghanistan. Despite many successes on the ground, the
prospect that we could fail in Afghanistan is still very real.
Congress and the administration must soberly assess the state
of political and economic reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan
and devise adjustments to the current plan where necessary.
The same sources of conflict and instability that allowed
the Taliban to seize power and fueled the growth of Al Qaeda's
terrorist network continue to threaten the future of
Afghanistan. Conflicts among heavily-armed militias controlled
by warlords, pervasive poverty, systemic corruption, and an
increasingly entrenched narco-economy threaten to undermine
reconstruction activities. Despite coalition efforts to
establish security, disarm the warlords and strengthen the
central government of President Karzai, the situation sometimes
appears to be getting worse, not better.
Too little assistance to Afghanistan has been provided, and
often it has come too late to address the daunting needs of
that country. The lack of security and continuing attacks on
aid workers, particularly in southern Afghanistan, have delayed
or prevented aid deliveries. In 2003, Congress appropriated
funding to speed up the training of Afghan security forces,
including the Afghan National Army, police, and border guards.
The security force has increased to about 20,000 Afghanis, but
this is a fraction of what is needed across the country.
Many of the same warlords who helped the coalition oust the
Taliban are fighting each other, instilling fear in the
population, and frustrating rebuilding efforts. These warlords
control vast regions of Afghanistan. Reports by the UN Special
Representative for Afghanistan, Jean Arnault, indicate that
efforts to disarm the clashing Afghan militia factions have
barely begun.
NATO decided last December to expand the International
Security Assistance Force, ISAF, outside of Kabul, but the
number of NATO forces has increased only from about 5,000 to
6,500. NATO allies promised to provide increased equipment and
personnel support, but thus far the NATO effort has been
tentative and incremental. Given the extreme challenges in
Afghanistan, NATO must step forward with a much bolder
commitment.
The Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the PRTs, units that
concentrate military and civilian capabilities in critical
locations, have been successful in establishing islands of
security. The intended purpose of the 13 PRTs is to jump-start
reconstruction outside Kabul. But this relative success has
been hampered by a lack of resources, equipment, common
doctrine, coordination, and training. Without a substantial
expansion of resources and commitment, the PRTs will not
succeed as a platform for reconstruction.
The failure of efforts to stem poppy production and provide
alternative sources of income undermines every aspect of
reconstruction in Afghanistan. The warlords are financing
themselves through the illegal opium trade, valued at close to
$2.3 billion last year. If this estimate is accurate, it would
account for more than 50 percent of Afghanistan's gross
domestic product. This drug trade also is funding resurgent
Taliban units, Al Qaeda, and other criminal and terrorist
elements.
As we tackle these security problems, the administration
and the Congress must ensure that prisoners of war in
Afghanistan are not being abused and that vigorous
investigations occur into any wrongdoing. The revelations about
prisoner abuse in Iraq have repulsed Americans and hurt our
reputation in the international community. We need to establish
absolute accountability and stay true to our principles and
values without reducing our efforts to overcome terrorism.
The President and Congress have made clear our long-term
commitment to a free and stable Afghanistan. Last fall,
Congress strongly supported more resources in the Emergency
Supplemental, bringing U.S. aid to Afghanistan to $3.7 billion
since 2001. Our hope was that security enhancements and other
improvements would lead to successful elections, now scheduled
for next September. The UN has reported that nearly 2 million
of the 10 million eligible Afghanis have been registered to
vote thus far. Of those already registered, an estimated 29
percent are women. As September approaches, we must either
register voters far more efficiently or develop alternatives to
traditional registration that will allow elections to proceed.
This year's budget request includes $1.2 billion for
Afghanistan. The administration recently announced it will seek
an additional $25 billion contingency fund for Iraq and
Afghanistan. Congress must carefully review these requests,
assess how these funds are to be used, and ensure that they are
managed properly.
We have asked a distinguished panel of experts to testify
today about the priorities and the prospects for redevelopment
in Afghanistan. Which elements of the reconstruction effort are
succeeding and which are failing? What adjustments can be made
now to improve the prospects for long-term success?
We are pleased to welcome Dr. Thomas Gouttierre, Mr. Mark
Schneider, Mr. Robert Perito, and Mr. David Isby. I would point
out that Dr. Gouttierre is Dean of International Studies and
Director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies at the
University of Nebraska, Omaha. Mr. Schneider is Senior Vice
President of the International Crisis Group. Mr. Perito is
Senior Fellow and Special Advisor for the Rule of Law Program
at the United States Institute of Peace, and Mr. David Isby is
author of several books on Afghanistan and a foreign aid and
defense policy analyst.
We look forward to your insights, and we look forward to
the opportunity to question you. We thank you for coming to the
hearing this morning. I would like for you to testify in the
order that I mentioned. That would be Dr. Gouttierre to begin
with.
Let me indicate that all of your prepared statements will
be made a part of the record in full. We would ask, just for
the sake of moving on in the hearing, that you either give your
statement or summarize in about 10 minutes or so. In the event
that it moves it beyond that, the chair will be liberal,
because the purpose is to hear you today, and to make certain
that we encompass the ideas that you bring to us. Thank you for
coming and would you please proceed, Doctor.
STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS GOUTTIERRE, DEAN OF INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES AND PROGRAMS AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR AFGHANISTAN
STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT OMAHA, OMAHA, NEBRASKA
Dr. Gouttierre. Thank you, Senator Lugar. I am pleased to
mention that I'm an IU graduate, and I remember seeing you on
campus when you were mayor of Indianapolis. So that puts both
of us back quite a number of years, as you well know.
The Chairman. An excellent qualification for testifying
today.
Dr. Gouttierre. Well, I think it is as well.
I am pleased to be able to come here, and I know the other
panelists are as well because the issue of Afghanistan is still
a very important one. I think in many ways, though it is often
obfuscated by the news that we see daily coming from Iraq, it
offers to the United States a greater opportunity for success
and a greater opportunity for us to take the type of advantage
we have been seeking in the Middle East with fewer challenges
if we do it correctly. So thank you and the committee for
having this hearing. I appreciate the fact that it is being
done. It is good for U.S. interests. It is very important for
Afghanistan.
In the nearly 30 years of war and instability which
preceded the swearing-in of the Karzai government, nearly every
element of Afghanistan's infrastructure, human and material,
was significantly destroyed or displaced. Most of those
services and resources upon which Afghans had come to rely in
the years leading up to that tragic period are still not
available to Afghans.
And yet, there can be no denying that many positive
developments, some of which I observed in my most recent trip
to Afghanistan a month ago, are also occurring. There are also
many challenges, and I will try to address the primary ones of
both the positive developments and the challenges.
The thing that stood out most to me was the fact that the
population and commercial centers of Afghanistan are truly
being resuscitated. The bazaars of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and
Mazar-i-Sharif are well stocked with food, essential goods, and
an amazing array of commodities. The people are in the streets
in colorful clothing like they were in years past. They bargain
for their purchases, shouting above the cacophony and gridlock
created by the four-wheel vehicles of donor nations and
organizations, the other means of transport drawn by humans and
animals, and the ubiquitous music blaring from loudspeakers in
the bazaars.
Most noticeable is the look of hope and anticipation in the
eyes of a nation where none existed 3 years ago. There is a
building and rebuilding boom in these centers, a demonstration
of confidence that perhaps the long national nightmare of
Afghanistan is coming to an end.
This expression of confidence is further fueled by a number
of other demonstrable developments in several key sectors of
Afghan society. I'm just going to mention these briefly.
Education is one with which our Center for Afghanistan
Studies is intimately involved, and we've been pleased to be
involved with USAID and the Bureau of Education and Cultural
Affairs and the Afghan Ministry in a number of programs over
the last couple of years. Right now, education is being pursued
by Afghans with a vengeance. This follows, of course, nearly 30
years of little or no access. More Afghan school children
today, over 4 million, are in school than at any other time in
Afghan history. Education is the only national effort currently
reaching into all the provinces and districts of Afghanistan.
I first went to Afghanistan 40 years ago as a Peace Corps
volunteer. I lived there for 10 years, and I have been working
since then at the Center for Afghanistan Studies, so I'm able
to offer a perspective on education. I've never seen an
interest in education in Afghanistan at the level that there is
today.
The reconstruction of Afghanistan's ground transport
infrastructure is improving access of Afghans to their
government and regional commercial centers. Afghanistan's so-
called ``Ring Road'' is being rebuilt. The Kabul-Kandahar
corridor is reopened, reducing travel time from nearly 2 days
to 5 hours. The Salang Tunnel through the Hindu Kush mountains
is repaired and reopened, again reducing travel time from Kabul
to the north from several days to 5 or 6 hours. Donors have
been identified for each of the remaining sectors of this
``Ring Road.''
This road reconstruction also plays an important role in
the improvement of Afghanistan's economy and its ability to
play an integral role in the trade between South and Central
Asian nations. When asked why Afghanistan is important to
regional and U.S. interests, I always like to answer what real
estate agents always recite in their mantra: ``location,
location, location!''
Astride the arteries of the Silk and Spice roads,
Afghanistan is already profiting as a transit sector for
commercial traffic between its neighbors in South and Central
Asia and from Iran to South Asia as well. Should a natural gas
pipeline be built from Turkmenistan to Pakistan, it will likely
travel a route above the Herat-Kandahar sector of the ``Ring
Road.'' In essence, Afghanistan has begun the process of
rejoining the world economy.
The economy of Afghanistan, according to a recent statement
by U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, grew by 29 percent in
2003. The traditional exports of Afghanistan, fruits, nuts,
textiles and carpets, jewelry and precious stones, are once
again being shipped abroad. In 2003, America bought over 14,000
square meters of handwoven carpets, 13 tons of dried and fresh
fruit, and almost 600 tons of licorice root, an amazing kind of
ad there.
Unlike Iraqis and many others in the Muslim world, Afghans
have previous history with constitutional democratic process.
During the decade under the Constitution of 1964, Afghans
elected national officials and governments and turned them out
with votes of no confidence. Afghans retain this democratic
experiment, as it is often called, in their collective memory.
Many believe that a democratic process is their legacy and
their right.
After years of being a stateless nation, a system of
governance is being rebuilt. In a series of efforts, beginning
with the Bonn process in December 2001, Afghans have taken
several steps towards reconstituting a national government. The
constitution approved in January of this year is regarded by
many observers as among the most progressive and enlightened in
the Muslim world. It mandates a strong central government and
presidency, with a two-house national assembly and independent
judiciary. National presidential and parliamentary elections
are scheduled for this September.
These positive developments have been obtained despite what
most analysts characterized as a slow, distracted, and
sometimes inept start on the part of U.S. and Coalition forces.
The donor conference approach has proven to be disjointed,
inconsistent, and largely unmanageable. Pledges are late in
coming; some do not come at all. U.S. leadership in the process
has often been solicitous rather than forthright. In the face
of U.S. involvement in Iraq, Afghans have questioned whether
the U.S. is committed, over the long haul, to reconstruction of
their country.
A number of recent developments, however, have helped to
assuage these concerns of Afghans. The first is the arrival of
Zalmay Khalilzad as U.S. Ambassador. In my opinion, he is the
best person for this job at this critical juncture. He knows
most of the Afghans in national and regional leadership roles.
He is considered credible and tough by those who share U.S. and
Afghan aspirations for a stable Afghanistan. Needless to say,
these favorable opinions are not shared by terrorists,
warlords, and drug lords.
Khalilzad can speak to leaders and common citizens
effectively. He is fluent in Dari and Pashto. He has good
connections to the White House and with Congress. His relations
with Hamid Karzai and other key Afghan leaders are
constructive.
Another positive development centers around the growing
number and effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) as you indicated earlier. Lieutenant General David
Barno's vision for the PRT process is solid, anchored in
community-based reconstruction. Members of the Center for
Afghanistan Studies have observed particularly successful PRT
efforts led by New Zealand forces in Bamiyan and British forces
in Mazar-i-Sharif.
The new, imposing American embassy and adjoining
residential and office buildings are nearing completion. They
have gone up in a remarkably short time. Afghans note that the
investment required to construct these buildings suggest the
Americans are, indeed, in it for the long haul. This builds
confidence.
The continuing security, political, and economic challenges
to the reconstruction of Afghanistan remain formidable. The
most critical is security. It negatively affects all other
factors. The lack of security is perhaps the only factor that
might ensure a return of a stateless society to Afghanistan.
The three primary security threats are terrorists, drug
lords, and warlords. These are holdovers, sometimes
protagonists, other times allies, from the period of protracted
civil war in Afghanistan. Though routed out of their
strongholds and camps after 9/11, replenished and reorganized
elements of Al Qaeda and the Taliban remain at large and
constitute a threat, both real and symbolic, to the overall
reconstruction effort. They gain financial support from drug
interests.
These elements threaten Afghan teachers, students, election
workers, and other government workers, even shop owners and
farmers. They threaten them with death or other bodily harm if
they teach, go to school, register to vote or assist in the
election process, or appear to side with the government.
International assistance workers and military forces are also
threatened; some have been killed. The continuing capacity of
these terrorists to intimidate slows and even terminates
certain reconstruction efforts.
I have some recommendations on how these might be
addressed.
First, increase the military capacity to provide security
in the rural areas of Afghanistan through expanding the PRT
program.
Second, go after Osama bin Laden, Aiman Zawahiri, Mullah
Muhammad Umar, and Gulbudeen Hikmatyar with a ``deck-of-cards''
intensity. They remain the real and symbolic leaders of the
terrorist networks and organizations whose activities are the
cause of the periodic alerts in the U.S. and around the world,
not those adversaries in Iraq. The fact that they remain at
large undermines the confidence in U.S. policy among Afghans,
reduces the credibility of the Afghan government and
international reconstruction efforts, and sends the wrong
message to Afghan and Pakistani tribes in their respective
border areas.
Third, the pace and financial support for the creation of
adequate Afghan security forces should be increased.
The U.S. Government should intensify pressure on
Afghanistan's neighbors and Persian Gulf nations not to aid and
support forces connected to the security threats to
Afghanistan.
Afghan Vice President Hidayatullah Aminarsalah has
suggested that instead of going after terrorists, warlords, and
drug lords in sequential fashion, a concerted effort be made.
His argument is that a sequential approach permits those
sectors not targeted to aid those that are. His idea of
following a more concerted approach against these threats I
believe has merit.
Relating to education and the challenges there, although
there is an unprecedented number of Afghan school children in
school, there still are many, many challenges.
More teachers are needed. This should be a priority of the
Afghan government and donors.
More in-service teacher training is necessary to bring some
standard to education throughout the country. Many current
teachers do not possess any manner of formal training.
The delivery of textbooks and teachers' kits is still
flawed. Though millions of textbooks have been produced, many
classrooms remain without books.
Vocational education is essential for the unemployed and
the under-employed. The Afghan government has set a target to
demilitarize 60,000 Afghan men from militia forces in the near
term. What will they do for employment? They are not likely to
go back to primary school, if they ever were in school, or to
secondary schools. Many of them are illiterate. Vocational
education in the basic construction and office management
skills would attract large numbers. This need is severe.
Currently, there are thousands of foreign workers in
Afghanistan, primarily in Kabul and Kandahar, due to the lack
of trained Afghans, taking places that many Afghans might
occupy were they trained. For many, vocational literacy will
also be essential.
The pace of the physical reconstruction of schools has also
been slow. Many schools are still without water and sanitation.
Security threats continue to impede the attendance of girls
in schools and intimidate female teachers.
Finally in this area, higher education, an area in which
the U.S. was the leading donor prior to the Soviet invasion,
remains neglected. Few laboratory resources remain at Kabul
University. This sector within education is kind of a stepchild
without the priority accorded the primary and secondary
education sectors by the Afghan government and donor nations.
Health care is in even a worse state. Most Afghans do not
have access to reliable health care. This is particularly
critical for mothers and children. Afghan infant and maternal
mortality rates are the highest and second highest in the
world, respectively. There is no plan for comprehensive
training of Afghans to take over their own medical health needs
currently on the boards, primarily because Afghanistan's
colleges of medicine, which were located at Kabul University
and Nangrahar University, have not yet been reconstructed. The
only type of education going on there is through lecture. There
is no laboratory, no practical clinical experience. Most of
Afghanistan's trained medical personnel left during the war
years. So the situation in the medical profession and the
medical treatment in Afghanistan still remains very woeful.
Most of all of the medical attention that any Afghans get is
delivered by international support and organizations.
Rural reconstruction lags far behind that of the
reconstruction moving forward in the population centers, which
I mentioned briefly earlier. This greatly enhances the power of
warlords and handicaps the reach and influence of the central
government. The crowding of Afghans into population centers,
coupled with the inflationary presence of international
organizations, leaves many Afghans without any real option.
They cannot stay in the neglected rural areas and cannot afford
to relocate in the centers where services are available. The
men, in particular, are vulnerable to those who would employ
them away from the process of reconstruction into the militias
of warlords and the cultivation of poppies. Until the central
government is able to provide the carrots and sticks that
outnumber those of the warlords, the warlords are going to
continue to be able to hold sway in their regions.
I would like to conclude with just a few comments about
what I feel still remain the windows of opportunity for the
United States to help the Afghans, and some of the assets that
we have. I am certain the other members of the panel will focus
on these particular comments that I have made in greater
detail.
On balance, in spite of a slow and inconsistent start, the
window of opportunity for all involved in the reconstruction of
Afghanistan remains open. There are many factors which
constitute significant assets in this.
One, a credible political process has been launched without
the uncertainties that plague Iraq. The Afghan government is
gaining capacity. It is true that its reach is often limited to
Kabul and, tenuously, to other population centers. At the same
time, it must be noted that almost all members of the
government had little or no experience in the governance
process before their current assignments. They literally had to
learn on the job. There are legitimate complaints stimulated by
evidence and rumors of corruption and incompetence. Yet, some
in this new cadre of Afghan civil servants are learning well
and have helped to restore a measure of credibility in the
restoration of Afghan state.
The leadership of this government has been identified and
confirmed by a national assembly. President Hamid Karzai,
though not without detractors, and even implacable enemies
among Afghans, is largely well-known and well-regarded and is
popular. He understands and is a believer in human rights. He
pursues consensus, perhaps to a fault. He learned this skill
from his late father, a highly regarded tribal khan. His likely
reelection in September should enhance stability and provide
continuity to a delicate process.
Afghans are very clear about the way they feel about
Americans. They want them in Afghanistan. They want American
leadership and assistance in the reconstruction process. There
are no armed insurrections in the towns and villages, no
demonstrations. Afghans have never regarded Americans as their
enemies. To the contrary, they appreciated our development
assistance in the 50s, 60s, and 70s. They appreciated American
support in their war against the Soviet Union and in the war,
though belated, against terrorists. They now see us as their
primary allies in the reconstruction of their country.
I have attached to my statement a copy of my favorite Dari
poem, ``Rose and Clay,'' which Afghans often use in describing
to me how they feel about Americans. I am going to subject you
to a reading of that because I always believe it is important
to point out the cultural aspects of Afghan society, something
that gets left behind when we talk about these issues and
urgencies and emergencies in the country.
One day at bath a piece of perfumed clay was passed to
me
from the hand of a friend.
I asked the clay, are you musk or ambergris?
because your delightful scent intoxicates me.
It answered--I am but a worthless piece of clay that
has
sat for a period with a rose.
The perfection of that companion left its traces on me
who remains that same piece of earth that I
was.
The whole world, especially the Muslim world, is watching
what is going on in Afghanistan today. If we do not try to do
Afghanistan on the cheap and in piecemeal fashion, we can work
with the Afghans in this cooperative venture. We will acquit
ourselves admirably in our own eyes, in the eyes of Afghans,
and in the eyes of others around the world.
If we muddle through, we will probably still prevent
Afghanistan from returning to its status as a haven for
terrorist camps. It will cost us more, take a longer period,
and not really gain the credit we would deserve by doing it
right. We might also lose an already unstable Pakistan in the
process.
Much effort has been expended. We have learned much in the
process. Assets are available. The Afghans are allies. They are
in place. We can do this right. The window is open. I think the
choice is ours. I think we are on the right track. I hope we
really go at this with all the resources that we are able to
bring to bear in this effort.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Doctor, for a
very, very compelling piece of testimony. We appreciate your
coming and all that you have brought to the hearing.
I would now like to recognize the distinguished ranking
member of the committee, Senator Biden, for his opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
am anxious to hear the witnesses. I will forgo my opening
statement.
Just by way of explanation, I have been very involved as
the author of the Violence Against Women Act years ago. There
is a conference that was taking place downtown this morning
that I had to--not had to--I was invited to attend, and it ran
a little bit longer, and I apologize for my tardiness. But I am
anxious to hear the rest of you.
I ask unanimous consent that my statement be placed in the
record.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record and published
in full.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you for calling this hearing. Although our
attention is focused on Iraq these days, we must never let ourselves be
distracted from the urgent challenges in Afghanistan.
For the past two years, many of us on this Committee have been
making the same basic points about Afghanistan:
First, the reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan is a
vital national security imperative of the United States. We cannot
permit this country to again become a haven for terrorists.
Second, the reconstruction of Afghanistan will require a very
significant investment of American capital, both financial and
diplomatic. We can't do this on the cheap.
Third, without bringing security to Afghanistan, nothing else is
possible. Unless we are able establish stability and basic order
throughout the country, any reconstruction will be built on a
foundation of sand.
Three simple points. And it would be tough to dispute any of them.
But, looking at the administration's performance since the fall of the
Taliban, one has to wonder whether the White House has received the
message.
On the issue of security, vast areas of Afghanistan are still
disputed territory, with the resurgent Taliban launching attacks
throughout the south and southeast. The movement is stronger now than
it was two years ago.
Most of the rest of Afghanistan is only nominally under the control
of the central government. Instead, it is brutal warlords who wield
real power.
The Afghan Ministry of Defense has promised to disarm 40,000 of the
nation?s 100,000 warlord militiamen by June 30. According to the UN, as
of last week, the number who had been disarmed was exactly zero. [AP
report, May 6]
The administration has put forward the idea of training the Afghan
National Army to combat the warlord militias--and someday this force
will indeed be able to shoulder the burden. But today the ANA has an
operational strength of just over 8,000--and few of these troops, if
any, have the training or experience necessary for serious combat.
The warlord armies support themselves through the illicit profits
of the drug trade. As several of our witnesses will describe in greater
detail, this trade risks turning Afghanistan into a full-blown narco-
state.
Under the administration's watch, Afghanistan has firmly entrenched
itself as the world's number-one supplier of opium and heroin. The
opium crop of 2003 was up 7 percent from the previous year, to a near-
record 3600 tons. The crop for this year is expected to increase
another six percent. The drug profits amount to $2.3 billion annually--
five times the entire budget of the Afghan government.
On the issue of reconstruction, the administration has failed to
make good on the President's pledge of a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan.
According to the assessment of the World Bank and other
authorities, Afghan reconstruction will require at least $28 billion
over the next 7 years. How do the commitments thus far add up?
To date, the world community has disbursed only $3.7 billion in
nonmilitary aid, with $1.4 billion of this sum coming from the United
States.
What's more, the vast majority of this aid has gone for
humanitarian relief, not for long-term reconstruction. Relief aid is
necessary to stave off immediate disaster, but it is not the basis on
which to build a stable nation.
Looking to the future, there seems to be little encouragement in
sight. Total pledges from all sources, ever since 2001, add up to less
than $10 billion, of which about one-third are American. And here the
administration's lack of long-term vision is apparent.
In the current fiscal year, the administration proposes a marked
increase in reconstruction funding--to $2.2 billion, compared with a
mere $900 million for the past two years combined. This would be
encouraging if it were the beginning of a program--but it seems,
instead, to represent the end of the administration's stepped-up
commitment.
The administration's request for fiscal year 2005 is barely half
the rate for this year. [$1.2 billion, 54% of FY 04]. That is not the
kind of sustained commitment that Afghanistan needs.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to asking questions about Afghan
policy to witnesses from the administration. I am concerned, too, that
the prisoner abuse scandal we've been contending with in Iraq could
also touch Afghanistan--I very much hope the Administration will get
all the facts out as quickly as possible and make clear what steps have
been taken to prevent this from happening again. Mr. Chairman, I
understand that you are planning to schedule a hearing, before the
summer recess, at which we will be able to get answers on Afghanistan
policy from top-ranking administration officials. I look forward to
that hearing, because this issue is too important to be put off any
longer.
Today's hearing, however, will be informative and valuable. Our
privatewitnesses bring a varied range of experiences and perspective to
the discussion, from security to narcotics to nation-building. Let me
also welcome the first Afghan graduates from a journalist-training
program established by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty at my urging,
with the strong support of Congress. Your work will be vital to
building a free and open society in Afghanistan.
I welcome all of our witnesses.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the Senator.
Mr. Schneider.
STATEMENT OF MARK SCHNEIDER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Biden. Let me thank the committee, the Chairman and the
leadership for holding this hearing on the continuing
challenges facing the Afghan people, the United States, and the
international community.
The International Crisis Group is deeply concerned that the
effort to assist Afghanistan in building democracy and
rebuilding its shattered economy may fail. As you said in your
opening statement, Mr. Chairman, it may fail because there has
been a failure to recognize the magnitude of the threats that
face Afghanistan, and we believe as well to direct sufficient
political, military, and financial resources to overcome those
threats. We also believe there have been several policy
mistakes, a few of which have yet to be corrected.
This does not mean that we do not recognize positive
progress that has been made from the Kandahar Road, to the
constitution, to immunizing children, and to ridding the
country of the Taliban repression.
However, after more than nearly 2 and a half decades of
war, Afghanistan is second to last in the indicators of human
development of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
There are still 2 million refugees in Pakistan and Iran,
300,000 displaced persons inside Afghanistan.
The country's first and, therefore, most important
transition election has yet to be held. The date already has
been postponed from June to September. We believe that those
elections must be fair, free, credible, and legitimate. Yet,
registration is barely at 20 percent of eligible voters. The
electoral law has not yet been decreed. A smattering of
political parties has been registered. No one yet knows where
the voting sites will be or who will protect them, and the
decision of how the votes will be counted is still to be
determined.
Opium, as you've noted, has been allowed to expand now to
28 of 34 provinces. Its cultivation, transformation into
heroin, and trafficking across borders now accounts for $2.3
billion of a $4.5 billion to $5 billion economy. Afghanistan is
in clear and present danger of descending from a narco-economy
into a narco-state.
My colleague noted that Afghanistan has begun to reenter
the world economy. With respect to drugs, it has reentered,
fully. Warlords siphon off customs revenues that the central
government needs badly to address its needs. They also
increasingly use their drug-financed militias to intimidate and
to challenge President Hamid Karzai.
As you noted, the central government barely has some 8,000
newly minted ANA soldiers who show up for roll call, barely
another 10,000 new police, and it faces several times that
number, solely in terms of the militia forces, that are
responding to regional and local commanders. And the Taliban
and Al Qaeda continue to pose a significant military threat to
security, and it is very important, a significant political
threat to the transition itself. Their attacks on the United
Nations NGOs and Afghan government officials have nearly
doubled over the past 4 months compared to last year. More NGO
staff were killed in these first 4 months of the year than all
of 2003.
When I stayed overnight in Gardez in November behind the
barbed wire encampment of the UN, I was really stunned at the
level of security that was viewed as necessary. It hit me a few
days later as to why when a young UNHCR field worker was
murdered in Ghazni.
Closing the security gap--and I think you will hear that
from all of us--is absolutely crucial to the success of the
transition in Afghanistan. In many ways, we believe that the
extension and expansion of NATO/ISAF beyond Kabul is the
linchpin to greater progress on many of these issues, with
respect to peace, political transformation, relief, and
reconstruction. ICG has been working in Afghanistan now since
2001, just prior to the Bonn conference. We have offices in
Kabul and Islamabad, and our field-based people really allow us
to try and understand the real-time dynamics of what is
occurring.
Let me just mention, as you did at the outset, that we also
are concerned about the issue of human rights and the issue
about how prisoners are being dealt within the prisons; there
is a New York Times story today. A month ago, though, Human
Rights Watch put out a report that contained information
detailing mistreatment of detainees. They raised questions
about the different areas in the country, where prisoners are
being held and who controlled them. Some of the same issues
about control, the lack of the application of the Geneva
Convention were raised in that report. I think it is an issue
of concern because, obviously, it can undermine our role, our
presence, and the values that we all believe are important to
convey.
With respect to Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the recent
Pakistani offensive, together with the U.S., in south
Waziristan should not have been something so new. It should
have been going on from the start. Taliban political leaders
still appear to move with relative ease in many of the
Pakistani cities. Pakistan has just announced an amnesty
proposal for foreign fighters in that region, and that proposal
also needs to be scrutinized very closely. With respect to Al
Qaeda, it should be cut off and terminated.
The Taliban and other Islamic extremists are still
recruiting in Pakistan's madrasas, and they are seeking through
intimidation and violence to rebuild their power base in
Afghanistan. So in terms of policy, there needs to be greater
pressure on Pakistan to go after both Taliban political and
military leadership on a continuing and unyielding basis, not
just going after Al Qaeda.
Second--and here I would agree with my colleague, Dr.
Goutierre--there has been a recent increase of U.S. forces as
part of the coalition to some 15,500. That should not be
reversed. If anything, it should be increased. Really, no
significant reduction should be considered until the full task
of security has been taken over by the new indigenous Afghan
forces when they are prepared.
A year ago, Secretary Rumsfeld spoke of having U.S. troops
leaving Afghanistan by June of this year. That was simply not
realistic, and it sent the wrong signals. Achieving real
security on the ground is the only way to pave the way for a
successful exit strategy.
With respect to disarmament and demobilization, President
Karzai emphasized at the time of the Berlin conference some 6
weeks ago, that the DDR program, which began last November,
would produce a 40 percent reduction in militias and cantonment
of 100 percent of their heavy weapons by the end of June. We
are not even close to meeting that goal. As you heard--you
mentioned yourself--the UN raised that issue last week and is
very concerned.
The key policy change needed for the demobilization program
to be effective is a shift in focus from disarming and
demobilizing individual soldiers to the complete removal of
militia units, including those still under the control of the
minister of defense. Until that happens, the credibility of the
entire program is in question.
There is something else that I would call to the
committee's attention, which is the worrisome proposal to
create a new paramilitary force called the Afghan Guard Force.
They would operate in combat alongside U.S. Special Forces
units. Partisan and poorly trained, coming from the militias--
to have the U.S. identified with those paramilitary forces is
really a bad idea. They say it is a stopgap until ANA troops
are produced in greater numbers. The answer is to increase the
pay, increase the incentive structure, offer long-term career
guarantees, and put more resources into developing trained
Afghan National Army to do the job.
Another part of the answer is to rapidly obtain a major
expansion of NATO/ISAF. I know that this committee has
supported that, and I know that you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator
Biden have spoken out for it. Unfortunately, even after the
agreement by NATO last October to expand those forces, as you
said, barely 1,500 additional troops have been added, nothing
like the three battalions that have been requested to be
deployed across northern Afghanistan. NATO/ISAF has chapter VII
authority and could provide the mailed fist behind the
demobilization program, help prevent local conflicts, and
ensure greater confidence in the election process. We need to
double or triple the size of NATO/ISAF.
Just a few weeks ago, the Deputy Commander of the Canadian
Army who used to be the Deputy Commander of NATO/ISAF spoke
specifically to that. They need at least to double, another
5,000 and probably an additional 10,000, and spread around the
country, including the PRT in every province, but the
additional forces should focus on security. We would urge you
to urge your North Atlantic Assembly colleagues at the North
Atlantic Assembly at the end of this month to pressure their
governments to make commitments at the Istanbul Summit that
would permit this to take place in time to have the ability to
put a security mantel out there for the elections.
Let me talk briefly about drugs. Last year 1.7 million
people, about 260,000 farm families, were engaged in producing
3,600 metric tons of opium, three-quarters of the world's
illicit production. There was a recent survey of farmers'
intentions and there's an expectation now, as a result of that
survey, that the farmers are going to increase their production
of opium this year. We are now in the beginning of the harvest.
It is likely that we are going to find that it is going to go
well over the 4,000 mark in terms of tons produced, and it
probably will reach the largest ever amount of hectares under
cultivation. In 1999, 91,000 hectares were under cultivation;
it will probably go well over 100,000 this year.
It is important to understand that this is directly linked
to the warlords. The local commanders are among the ones, as in
Colombia, in terms of illegally armed groups--they provide
protection for the drug traffickers. They tax their produce.
Sometimes they help with transportation, and if Colombia is any
example, in a very short time, they will begin acquiring the
land, forcing farmers off the land. They will combat each other
for the routes, and they will become the drug traffickers.
The response we all know has to be law enforcement,
alternative development, and political leadership. Within the
enforcement category, there is an argument now about
eradication between the British and the United States. I can go
into that later, but essentially right now we think the focus
on law enforcement has to be interdiction on the roads and on
the border and the destruction of laboratories and warehouses
to go after not the small farmer but the traffickers and the
warlords who are running the trade. We happen to be in the best
position because we have more international forces in
Afghanistan that anyone could ever imagine in a similar
situation.
But three policy decisions are crucial.
First, the rules of engagement and mission of the expanded
NATO/ISAF have to clearly state that one of their missions is
counter-narcotics and helping the Afghan government destroy
that network.
The second is that the United States, DOD, and our other
coalition forces also have to amend their rules of engagement
to include counter-narcotics within their mandate. They have
shifted now from a ``don't look/don't tell'' stance with
respect to drugs that they find, to one where, if they run
across them, they will destroy them when they find them. But
that is really not good enough. Actively disrupting and
destroying the opium network should be within their mandate.
Finally, of course, expanded resources in training police
and building a justice system are crucial.
With respect to elections that are upcoming--supposedly in
September--I know the bells, and so I will close quickly by
just simply saying that with respect to elections, there are
many things that need to be done. It is not clear it is going
to happen. They need to be credible first rather than held
without the level of security and the level of participation
that are needed. There are things that can be done we believe.
Finally, with respect to reconstruction, I will simply say
that we have not put sufficient resources into Afghanistan. The
international community now is putting about one-fourth the
level per capita that it did in Bosnia and East Timor and El
Salvador. We need to do better. And I would urge the committee
in that regard to authorize a full 7-year commitment that
matches the needs assessment defined in the recent Berlin
conference in terms of external support from the United States
that would provide somewhere between 25 and 40 percent of the
external aid required, which would replicate, generally, what
we have done in other situations. I would urge the committee to
consider doing that. It would be the best way to attract others
as well to make the same kind of commitment.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I will simply say that making that
kind of commitment and helping Afghanistan complete its
transition is the most cost effective way of avoiding a
recurrence of the conflicts that have virtually destroyed the
country and whose consequences have reached out to cause
enormous suffering in our own country and elsewhere.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark L. Schneider, Sr.
I want to thank Chairman Lugar and the ranking member, Senator
Biden, for holding this hearing on the continuing challenges facing the
Afghan people, the United States and the international community in
Afghanistan. The Taliban regime was repressive and a willing ally of
al-Qaeda in its terrorist endeavors. The allied effort to removing the
Taliban reflected an international consensus, backed by UN
authorization, to defeat and destroy al-Qaeda and to assist Afghanistan
in building democracy and rebuilding its shattered economy.
This effort may fail. It will not fail because of a lack of desire,
a lack of commitment by millions of Afghans, or a lack of bravery and
determination among U.S., British and other coalition soldiers,
diplomats, development professionals and relief workers. Instead, it
may fail because the administration has been unwilling to recognize the
magnitude of the threats which we face and to direct sufficient
political, military and financial resources to overcome them. In Kabul,
Kandahar and Gardez, bombs and mines have not disappeared, and killings
take place on a regular basis. Afghanistan remains second to last in
the world in the human development rankings of UNDP. Warlords continue
to siphon off customs revenues that should go to the national
government, and nearly half of Afghanistan's $4.5 billion economy comes
from drug trafficking. There still are more than 2 million Afghan
refugees in neighboring countries and some 300,000 internally displaced
persons within Afghanistan.
The International Crisis Group has been working in Afghanistan
since 2001, just prior to the Bonn Conference. Our offices in Kabul and
Islamabad allow us to conduct intensive field research in developing
our analysis and recommendations. When I drove with our team from Kabul
to Gardez last November and visited local Afghan offices, the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and a U.S. Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT), I saw the sacrifice and courage that they
all were making. It was even more poignantly conveyed to me again a few
days later when a young French field officer for UNHCR in Ghazni was
killed. While I will touch on the major issues of security, elections,
drugs and economic reconstruction, I want to be clear that expanding
NATO/ISAF remains the lynchpin to greater progress on peace, political
transformation, relief and reconstruction.
Security
Security affects everything from elections to reconstruction, and
it is vital to understand that this is not a post conflict situation--
an unrelenting battle continues in Afghanistan. The Taliban government
and al-Qaeda bases were quickly dispatched by coalition forces barely
two months after 9/11. That is the good news because it opened the
window for fundamental change. But many of the Taliban and al-Qaeda
simply took refuge across the border in Pakistan, and for many, many
months, little pressure was placed on Pakistan to deny them sanctuary.
Taliban political and military leadership moved with relative ease. The
just announced Pakistani proposal to provide amnesty to foreign forces
in South Waziristan, bordering on Afghanistan, presumably including al-
Qaeda, in return for pledges of ``good behavior,'' is particularly
disturbing. The Taliban and other Islamic extremists are still
recruiting and have built up their strength. If anything, the capacity
of Taliban and al-Qaeda today to maintain a deadly insurgency across
the south and southwest of the country appears to be increasing. Within
Afghanistan, there has also been an unwillingness to take on the hard
work of disarming and demobilizing regional warlords and militias,
despite its crucial linkage to political stability and to controlling
the drug trade.
Al-Qaeda and Taliban attacks on UN, NGOs and Afghan government
officials have nearly doubled over the past four months compared to
last year. More NGO staff were killed in these first four months than
all of 2003. Two schools recently rebuilt with international aid were
burned down in a village south of Kandahar and a senior Muslim cleric
critical of the Taliban was assassinated in Kandahar city. And it is
not limited to the south and southeast. Only last week, two British
private security contractors and an Afghan elections worker were killed
in the north eastern province of Nuristan.
A year ago, Secretary Rumsfeld spoke of having U.S. troops leaving
Afghanistan by June of this year. There needs to be a clearer
understanding that achieving real security on the ground is the only
way to pave the way for a successful exit strategy. We were pleased to
note that last month there was an increase of some 2,000 U.S. Marines,
bringing U.S. forces up to 15,500. These troops need to be there--and
maybe even more troops need to be there until Afghan security forces
are capable of defending the country against whatever remains of an
armed al-Qaeda and Taliban military forces.
Getting the security services up and running has moved in fits and
starts. The U.S. has bolstered the German-led coordinated training of
Afghanistan police, with some 20,000 police slated to be trained,
equipped and on the ground by the end of June, in time for the coming
elections. UNAMA has estimated that between 29,000 to 38,000 police
will be required for polling places. But the pressures to get more
people through the training pipeline have resulted in shorter and
shorter training sessions and more questions about vetting. More than
one quarter of the 10,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) troops trained
have disappeared, presumably deciding that either the risks or the
money did not match the competing offers. There needs to be a re-
thinking of strategy to ensure that this kind of attrition does not
continue.
Disarmament and demobilization: The failure to disarm and
demobilize individual warlords and factional militias has sharply
undercut progress on a number of fronts. UN Special Representative
Lakhtar Brahimi and his successor, Jean Arnault, have criticized
sharply the weakness of the demobilization program. While some militias
appear willing to identify their futures with a new national Afghan
government; most have simply claimed land, resources and power and used
their armed militias to maintain those claims. The militias continue to
engage in bitter factional infighting, retain ties to organized crime
and drug trafficking and have not been particularly helpful in
combating terrorism.
President Karzai emphasized at the time of the Berlin conference
six weeks ago that the demobilization program, which began last
November with three pilot efforts, would produce a 40% reduction in the
militias and cantonment of 100 per cent of their heavy weapons by the
end of June. Not only has this effort not produced any results, since
Berlin this accelerated phase of the Afghan New Beginning Programme has
not even begun. The initial weapons turned in included a collector's
treasure of 19th century Lee Enfield rifles and World War I artillery.
The demobilization program will not be effective until it shifts
from a focus on disarming and demobilizing individual soldiers to the
complete removal of militia units. Some 6,225 militia members have been
demobilized thus far nationwide. The militia universe initially was
claimed to be 100,000, but it is probably even lower than the 45,000 to
60,000 that international observers cite. The units that are presently
based in Kabul, including at least three that are directly accountable
to the Minister of Defense remain in place two and a half years after
the Bonn Agreement called for their withdrawal. Unless they are
decommissioned, the credibility of the demobilization process itself
will be undermined. Worse, until the bulk of the militias are
decommissioned, there is a grave risk that the coming elections will be
determined by those who control the guns.
The Afghan Defense Ministry also recently adopted a Coalition plan
to fold 2,000 members of existing militias into a new Afghan Guard
Force (AGF). Without real training, but under Special Forces
supervision, they would be operating in combat alongside U.S. Special
Forces units in the east and southeast. This would essentially be a
national paramilitary force, with enormously dangerous political
implications. Its formation serves as a disincentive to the national
disarmament and demobilization effort. The potential, as we have seen
in country after country, of such a partisan and poorly trained force,
for abuse of civilians, is enormous. To identify the U.S. with such
forces seems particularly unwise.
NATO/ISAF One of the most effective forces in providing security in
Kabul and in Konduz has been NATO/ISAF. Fortunately, the U.S.
government removed its objection to the expansion of NATO/ISAF outside
Kabul last August, a step widely called for. In October 2003, NATO and
then the Security Council authorized that expansion, but to date,
barely a few hundred more troops beyond the 5,000 previously authorized
for Kabul are in place, far fewer than the three battalions requested
to be deployed across northern Afghanistan. Nor has there been a great
deal of movement toward the concept of a PRT in every province. At this
point there are 13 on the ground, with only two operating under NATO
authorship--Konduz and Faizabad. The window is closing on the
opportunity to create the security environment needed for elections and
reconstruction. NATO/ISAF has chapter VII authority and could provide
the potential mailed fist behind the demobilization program, help
prevent local conflicts and back up legitimate local and national
government decisions. It also could ensure greater confidence in the
election process by deploying rapid reaction forces from forward bases.
NATO member countries have not responded adequately to the call.
ICG has joined with other organizations including IRC, CARE and Mercy
Corps, in appearing before the North Atlantic Council in an unusual
effort to emphasize the strong link between NATO expansion and the
entire reconstruction effort. Time is running out in Afghanistan. The
frustration is building. A robust NATO/ISAF expansion beyond Kabul
should take place immediately. The deputy commander of the Canadian
Army and the former deputy ISAF commander, Gen. Andrew Leslie, said
doubling NATO/ISAF forces nationwide to 10,000 or more is essential.
The Istanbul NATO Summit really is the final opportunity for pledges to
meet NATO/ISAF needs before for expansion before the proposed elections
and then there has to be the earliest possible deployment. ICG also
would hope that NATO parliamentary members of the North Atlantic
Assembly would press their governments toward objective.
The new Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has said,
``We cannot afford to fail . . . if we do not meet our commitments to
the people of that country to help them build a better future--then who
will have confidence in us again?''
Drugs
Last year in Afghanistan, according to the UN Office of Drugs and
Crime, (UNODC), 1.7 million people were directly engaged in producing
more than 3,600 metric tons of opium three quarters of the world's
illicit opium production. In a UNODC survey, 69% of last year's poppy
farmers stated that they intend to increase their production, and 43%
of those who have not been growing will start cultivating in 2004.
Afghanistan is in clear and present danger of descending from a narco-
economy into a narco-state.
Local commanders, many in the areas controlled by President
Karzai's allies, others by political opponents, are providing
protection for the drug traffickers, taxing their produce, and
sometimes helping with transportation. Opium poppy cultivation has
expanded to 28 of the country's 32 provinces from a handful, and the
illegal armed groups are financing themselves and seeking to use the
political process to insure they keep those streams of financing
flowing. If Colombia is any example, it will not be long before local
commanders begin to acquire the land; combat each other for the routes
and become the drug traffickers themselves. The good news is that
President Karzai has been ahead of the curve in terms of knowing that
his international colleagues were letting the drug market get out of
hand.
While everyone now asserts that they recognize the seriousness of
the drug trafficking threat to political stability, more needs to be
done. The common elements of the international approach appear to be:
Eradication, Law Enforcement--including interdiction and destruction of
laboratories, Alternative Development and political leadership.
However, the UK and the U.S. disagree on eradication. The British,
particularly in the prelude to elections, argue against forced
eradication of a small impoverished farmer's crop when there is nothing
to offer in return. Not surprisingly, they believe it will antagonize
those farmers and make them far more likely to sympathize with
opposition forces. The U.S. position is to move forward on eradication
under any circumstances--whether there is replacement income or not.
The compromise reached at a recent conference papers over the
differences but does not resolve them. The British moving in Phase I,
will fund governors who pay the ANA to go out and eradicate in Helmand,
Kandahar and Nangarhar provinces where there are DFID and other
externally financed alternative development projects. The U.S. has a
centrally directed $40 million Phase II program in which a U.S.
contractor finances an Afghan eradication force comprised of
individuals chosen by the Ministry of Interior to actually pull out the
poppy plants. It started Monday, according to the State Department, in
one province. That eradication force will be protected by a U.S.
contractor-financed private foreign security force. This again raises
additional questions about who is responsible for security in
Afghanistan and the standards which apply to a U.S. financed private
military force.
The primary focus should be on a broad rural development strategy
that provides rural credit to small farmers, alternative crops and
alternative income generating opportunities, and investment in a
community's schools, clinics and infrastructure. In addition, community
elders and figures of authority, and after the September polls, elected
representatives, should be enlisted to argue against planting opium
poppies. At the same time, interdiction, by both Afghan and
international security forces, on the roads and at the border is
essential.
Three policy decisions are crucial to taking advantage of the
unique presence of international troops:
The rules of engagement and mission of NATO/ISAF need to
state clearly that one of its missions is counternarcotics and
helping Afghan government agencies to destroy the Afghan drug
trafficking network.
Coalition forces also must amend their rules of engagement
to incorporate an offensive command to go after drug
traffickers. While they have shifted from don't look, don't
tell when encountering drug traffickers to being able to
destroy what they find when pursing other objectives, it is not
good enough. Actively disrupting and destroying the opium
network should be within their mandate.
Building an effective police and judicial system also has to
be part of the counterdrug efforts as well. While the British
are training an Afghan interdiction force, right now it will
only be 200 strong. It needs to be expanded. Similarly the U.S.
is working on producing more police fast and INL has $160
million to help train and equip those police over time. The
judicial side of the house is moving even more slowly.
Elections
The forthcoming presidential and parliamentary elections are vital.
Originally scheduled for June, they were postponed until September by
President Karzai, and with good reason. Security conditions have
impeded the registration process, and would not permit open campaigning
by candidates. And there is a question whether citizens would be able
to vote in confidence and safety. The fundamental question now is
whether adequate conditions will exist to permit both elections to be
held in September--and it is ICG's view that every effort should be
made to hold those elections together--and not merely because of the
cost savings involved. Having the assembly in session will permit the
critical institutions of government to be in place. Without a
legislative body, Afghanistan would begin its democratic life with a
serious lack of accountability and challenges to the central
government's legitimacy.
But even more questionable is the level of registration. Barely 20
percent of Afghan voters have been registered, 2,033,568, 30% of them
women, out of an estimated 10.5 million Afghans eligible to vote. There
are some 275 registration sites and plans to increase those to a number
equal to the 2,600 sites where ultimately voting would take place. At
this point, results of the registration drive are tilted toward the
center of the country because it has been too dangerous to reach
potential voters in the south and southeast. However, all of this
should have taken place weeks ago. The delay will make it increasingly
difficult for the 70% registration figure to be reached that was among
the benchmarks cited as essential in holding a credible election.
Finally, the contours of the electoral law are still in question, and
there are serious concerns about the absence of a centrality for
political parties in the law. The electoral law supposedly to be
promulgated before the Berlin conference was still in debate this
Monday within the Karzai cabinet. Political party registration, despite
USAID and NDI efforts, has been slow. To date only five parties have
been registered. There have been threats directed at the Justice
Minister by some parties anxious to by-pass serious inquiry into
whether they have armed forces. The process for nominating candidates
has not yet defined nor the forms prepared, nor has agreement been
reached on what procedures will be followed for counting the ballots,
nor have security arrangements been finalized.
New provinces also seem to be springing up as negotiations over
electoral constituencies remains unresolved. Two new provinces, Dai
Kundi in the central highlands and Panjshir in the northeast, have been
announced.
It is difficult to see how the September date can be met for the
combination of presidential and parliamentary elections since the
electoral law has not even been approved and some significant issues
remain to be resolved. However, if elections are to be postponed, the
reasons for yet another delay in transferring power to a truly
representative government should be conveyed; a definite date announced
for presidential and parliamentary polls; and all possible steps taken
to ensure that there is no need for yet another postponement.
Reconstruction
Afghanistan's reconstruction is a case of starting from zero. Few
other countries are trying to build roads, schools, agriculture, and
public infrastructure nearly from scratch after 23 years of war, a four
year drought and a continuing insurgency. There has been a reasonable
level of planning for the mid and long-term rather than the short-term
alone. The World Bank, ADB, UNDP and others have engaged the government
in a coherent strategy for development that has an initial, post
humanitarian relief phase of seven years. During that period there is a
$27.5 billion shortfall in financing. The international community took
the first step toward meeting that request with commitments of some
$7.2 billion at the Berlin conference. While most were not for the full
seven years, there were a good number, including the U.S. that at least
set out a multi-year pledge.
There are some significant steps to show progress already, from the
first stage of the Kandahar-Kabul road being completed, to a nationwide
polio immunization campaign, to irrigation projects. However these
actions pale alongside the need and the willingness of the U.S., as
well as other donors, to meet that need. Security also impedes the
recovery process in a host of ways, most clearly by restricting access.
A USAID official lamented the inability to visit the NGOs the U.S. is
funding. To drive outside the city there would be a need for two extra
escort teams ``of protective shooters in the front and the same in the
rear.''
There also is a particular need for the focus to be on rural
poverty and rapid evidence of the impact of those programs. For
Afghanistan to succeed in reaching even the minimum levels of
development that President Karzai has described--achieving $500 per
capital annual income in 10 years, the legitimate economy must grow at
an annual rate of 9 percent. Alongside the growth of the private Afghan
economy there will need to be a state whose institutions can alleviate
the social deficit facing some four million vulnerable members of
Afghan society, and provide an opportunity for broad active
participation in national life by all of its diverse ethnic groups and
by women.
For the international community, there must be at least a 10 year
commitment at an even higher level of support than currently is the
case. One of the strongest arguments for doing so is that it is the
most cost effective way of avoiding a recurrence of the conflicts that
have virtually destroyed the country and whose consequences reached out
to cause enormous suffering in our own country and elsewhere.
[A report by the International Crisis Group, ``Elections and
Security in Afghanistan,'' appears in the appendix to this hearing.]
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Schneider, for
that very helpful and comprehensive statement. We will look
forward to asking questions of you and the other witnesses.
Mr. Perito.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT PERITO, SENIOR FELLOW AND SPECIAL ADVISOR,
RULE OF LAW PROGRAM, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Perito. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
the opportunity to appear here this morning. I would like to
thank you and Senator Biden for your interest in this very
important topic.
Mr. Chairman, my oral statement this morning is a summary
of a report entitled ``Establishing the Rule of Law in
Afghanistan,'' which I co-authored; I ask your permission to
have the report entered in the record.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record.
Mr. Perito. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, two-and-a-half years after the defeat of the
Taliban, security remains the primary concern in Afghanistan.
During 24 years of war, the rule of the gun long ago replaced
the rule of law. Today Afghanistan faces a combined threat of
resurgent terrorism, fractional conflict and dependence on
narcotics.
In the south, U.S.-led coalition forces are engaged in a
running fight with resurgent Taliban and Al Qaeda. In the
north, warlords and militia commanders maintain private armies
and engage in armed clashes over territory, border crossings,
and transportation routes. They use intimidation and violence
to control the local population, and they rely on narcotics
trafficking and extortion to finance their operations.
The U.S. provided money to the northern warlords in 2001
and continues to work with them in the fight against Al Qaeda
and the Taliban. Some of the most powerful warlords hold
positions as provincial governors but ignore the central
government and refuse to turn over tax revenue. Other warlords
hold key positions in the central government. Mohammed Fahim,
an ethnic Tajik leader with a strong northern power base,
serves as the Vice President and the Defense Minister.
More than terrorists and warlords, however, the growing
dependence on narcotics poses the greatest threat to
Afghanistan's future. Since the fall of the Taliban, there has
been an explosion in poppy cultivation, opium production, and
narcotics trafficking. According to the annual report of the
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, opium production has
spread from the traditional growing areas in the south of the
country to 28 of the country's 32 provinces. Today Afghanistan
is the world's largest producer of opium.
In 2003, Afghans earned $2.3 billion from opium production.
This amount was equal to half the country's legitimate gross
domestic product and five times the government's annual budget.
According to the UN, the international trade in Afghan opiates
generates a worldwide turnover of some $30 billion.
In Afghanistan, the narcotics problem is exacerbated by the
fact that growers, brokers, and traffickers enjoy the
protection of police chiefs, militia commanders, provincial
governors, and even cabinet ministers. These officials use the
proceeds from drugs to fund personal armies and to maintain
their independence from the central government. Profits from
narcotics trafficking also find their way through supporters to
the Taliban and Al Qaeda that are used to finance local and
international terrorism.
In a situation where there are few disincentives and no
equally lucrative alternatives, the country's rural population
has turned to opium production. Afghanistan's renowned orchards
and vineyards were sown with land mines and withered during the
conflict. In contrast, opium grows very well in barren and arid
terrain.
Opium brokers and traffickers provide a kind of highly
organized agricultural extension service. Farmers are provided
with seed, fertilizer, advance payments, technical training,
and an assured market for their product. Opium is easy to
package, store, and transport, and it does not spoil. Growing
poppies enables farmers to earn 10 times the amount that they
would earn from other crops, and opium production is
particularly attractive to returning refugees who find ready
work and good pay helping farmers grow poppies.
With the assistance of the UN and Britain, the Afghan
government has put in place the institutional framework to
begin a counter-narcotics program. Afghanistan now has a
Counter-Narcotics Directorate, a national drug control
strategy, and a modern narcotics control law. The Karzai
government, however, is incapable of implementing its own
counter-narcotics program. Afghanistan does not have a national
police force. There are some 50,000 men in Afghanistan who work
as police, but they are generally untrained, ill-equipped,
poorly paid, if paid, and loyal to warlords or local
commanders.
International efforts to create a national police force,
including the drug enforcement capacity, are just beginning.
The U.S. is spending $110 million to provide training to 50,000
currently serving police. This training is taking place in
Kabul and at seven regional training centers co-located with
provincial reconstruction teams. The initial training is
focused on basic skills and election security, however. It will
take time before a newly trained police force can be counted on
for effective law enforcement.
Germany, which is the lead donor nation for police
training, has spent some $70 million on new equipment and
rebuilt the police academy in Kabul. But under the German
program, 1,500 new police officers and 1,000 non-commissioned
officers are enrolled in a 5-year work/study program. The
Germans are also working to create a 12,000-member border guard
force. This effort is well intentioned, but the benefits are
years in the future.
The UK, which is the lead donor nation for counter-
narcotics programs, will spend $12 million over the next 3
years to create an anti-narcotics task force to conduct
eradication. The UK has also promoted crop substitution and
alternative livelihood programs for Afghan farmers, but again,
the benefits are not going to be felt for some time.
Once trained, Afghan police will be ineffective, however,
if there is no functioning criminal justice system to support
them. Unfortunately, little has been done to aid courts and
prisons. There is no master strategy or even consensus on
priorities for judicial reform. Italy, the lead donor nation,
has failed to promote cooperation among the relevant Afghan
institutions. There is a critical shortage of trained
personnel, buildings, equipment, and financial resources.
International funding for judicial projects has been very
limited.
There is also an ongoing debate within the country about
which law to enforce and about what the role of religion should
be in the legal process. The new constitution concentrates the
power to appoint judges in the hands of the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, but the current Chief Justice, a
conservative cleric, has packed the court system with mullahs
with no legal education.
In the critical area of corrections, jails and prisons,
there has been almost no effort made. Prison conditions in
Afghanistan are routinely described as inhumane, lacking
adequate food, sanitation, trained personnel, and space.
Outside of Kabul, warlords control detention facilities and
conditions are even more deplorable.
International assistance for corrections has been severely
limited. Other than a few NGO projects, the UN is working alone
on jail and prison improvement. Currently the UN is spending
only $2 million over 2 years on very basic renovation of a
detention center in Kabul and three cellblocks of the infamous
Pul-e-Charki prison. The UN is also providing some limited
training to administrative staff.
The interrelated problems of terrorism, warlords, and
narcotics are extremely serious, but many Afghans, particularly
Afghans that we spoke with when we visited there, think the
situation may still be reversible. Afghan farmers are reluctant
to engage in illegal activities, especially those that are
viewed as immoral by Islam. Any hopeful scenario, however,
involves a race against time. The UN has warned that
Afghanistan is in critical danger of becoming a narco-state and
a haven for narco-terrorists.
To prevent this from happening, the United States should
make counter-narcotics its top priority. Curtailing the
narcotics trade will deny terrorists and warlords the funds
they use to recruit followers and conduct operations. The U.S.
is currently training four teams of Afghan police in crop
eradication, but this and other law enforcement programs must
be coupled with effective projects for creating alternative
livelihoods and imaginative programs for crop substitution.
Thanks to your leadership, Mr. Chairman, the United States now
has the financial resources it needs. The emphasis must now be
placed on vigorous implementation.
The U.S.-led coalition and the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) must now join in the fight against
narcotics. Military forces must begin to proactively perform at
least a limited number of counter-narcotics mission. These
would include intelligence sharing, destruction of drug
warehouses and heroin laboratories, and drug seizures. At
present U.S. military forces only seize drugs if they encounter
them in the course of their routine operations.
The U.S. must make good on Secretary Powell's recent
statement that warlords have no place in Afghanistan and
private armies must be disbanded. Warlords and militia
commanders are a source of insecurity and a threat to the
central government. U.S. military payments to what are called
regional influentials conflict with our overall policy of
promoting national unity. Stopping payments would correct the
impression that many Afghans have, that the U.S. military
condones the warlords' participation in the drug trade.
There must also be a vigorous effort to curtail corruption.
We should assist the Afghan government to pay adequate salaries
to police, judges, and prison personnel. It is impossible to
have judicial reform when judges earn only $36 a month and
policemen earn only $15 a month and then are not paid.
The U.S. should ensure that equal attention and resources
are paid to police, the judicial system, and prisons. Emphasis
on police training at the expense of the other parts of the
justice triad will produce the kind of results that we saw in
Haiti and in Iraq. Without effective courts and humane prisons,
there can be no rule of law. As events in Iraq demonstrate, we
cannot allow ourselves to ignore conditions and practices in
Afghan detention facilities.
At this point, the U.S. should not be constrained by the
lead donor nation approach and should do what is needed to
provide training and technical assistance. The effort to
promote burden sharing has not worked well and the U.S. can no
longer wait for other donors to take effective action. The
United States has both the most experience and the most at
stake.
The missing ingredient in international assistance to
Afghanistan has been leadership. The so-called ``light
footprint'' approach has left the Afghans adrift. Afghans
realize they need help. Afghans look to Americans for guidance.
We need to move quickly, however, Mr. Chairman, before it is
too late.
Thank you.
[The report to which Mr. Perito referred, ``Establishing
the Rule of Law in Afghanistan,'' appears in the appendix to
this hearing.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Perito.
Mr. Isby.
STATEMENT OF DAVID ISBY, FOREIGN AND DEFENSE
POLICY ANALYST, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Isby. I would like to thank the chair and the
distinguished members of this panel for the opportunity to talk
here about Afghanistan.
There have been a number of successes affecting Afghanistan
in recent months, including the donor conference in Berlin. But
new challenges to Afghanistan's security are emerging. These
include the effects of the elections called for under the new
constitution. The revival of often divisive politics inside
Afghanistan has led to largely cross-border violence aimed at
preventing electoral participation. Reconstruction has been
limited in the south and east by the same violence. Narcotics
cultivation and trafficking have been revived. Disarmament has
stalled. The Afghan security situation is more difficult and
complex than it was a few months ago.
To prevent a challenging situation becoming a deteriorating
one, the United States and its international partners must
shift their Afghanistan priorities. Long-term security
commitments should match the aid commitments made at Berlin.
These should include a sustained, enhanced U.S. presence,
ideally matching ISAF expansion. But regardless of NATO
actions, there is no substitute for the perceptions of
commitment to both security and reconstruction created by
deployed U.S. forces, especially in areas where the UN and NGOs
have been deterred from operating.
An enhanced U.S. security commitment to south and east
Afghanistan could take the form of a near-term surge deployment
to secure the elections, attack Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants,
build intelligence networks, and revive reconstruction.
Military units committed to reconstruction can provide their
own security while training Afghans to take over their tasks. A
longer-term U.S. security commitment can take the form of
expanding the successful provincial reconstruction teams.
Such an enhanced commitment needs to be reconciled with
admittedly over-stretched U.S. capabilities in force structure
and integrated with those forces already operating in
Afghanistan. The commitment needs to be implemented in a way
that at the grassroots level will enhance security rather than
focus Afghan resentment.
The most important U.S. contribution to security in
Afghanistan, however, is through engaging with regional
countries. One of the functions of a long-term U.S. security
commitment to Afghanistan is to show these countries that they
are more likely to realize their own security goals by
cooperating with the international community and Kabul. Since
2001, Pakistan has cooperated in anti-Taliban activities and
anti-terrorist activities. Yet, the Taliban culture that exists
in Pakistan provides support for terror and violence inside
Afghanistan. U.S. engagement with Pakistan needs to encourage
them both to crack down on the roots of violence in the Taliban
culture and to improve their cooperation with Kabul.
Outside funding and support coming into Afghanistan, often
through religious channels, is another security challenge. This
can affect the upcoming elections, especially those for
parliament. However, effective reconstruction must include an
Islamic dimension amongst its objectives.
Assessing U.S. policy success in Afghanistan is more
complex than simply counting troops deployed or dollars spent.
We need to avoid the entanglement of Afghan politics. We must
not treat the Afghan government as just another faction, but we
must also avoid an embrace of them that will make them appear
as a United States creation. We must not act as Kabul's
enforcer, carrying out politically costly tasks.
Today our most important security contribution to
Afghanistan is to prevent outside spoilers. We need more U.S.
boots on the ground in the near term because of the election.
We need to jump start reconstruction in the south and east and
we need to address disarmament and narcotics issues. Together,
these actions will demonstrate U.S. commitment to Afghans and
regional countries alike.
The best hope for Afghanistan is the Afghans. If the United
States and the international community can enable them to
decide their own future and prevent outside spoilers, there is
cause for guarded optimism about the future of Afghanistan.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Isby follows:]
Prepared Statement of David C. Isby
I would like to thank the Chair and the distinguished members of
this panel for the opportunity to talk here about Afghanistan.
There have been a number of successes in Afghanistan recent months.
The new constitution has been generally accepted. Increased United
States government efforts have resulted in $1.2 million Emergency
Supplemental assistance programs under the ``Accelerating Success in
Afghanistan'' strategy. The initial stages of the Kabul-Kandahar
highway reconstruction have been completed. A new ``South and Southeast
Strategy'' has provided resources to combat hostile activities and
enhance lagging reconstruction. At the recent donor's conference in
Berlin, the Afghan government presented a request for aid commitments
based on what it had determined would be required to re-create a
functioning national economy and saw those commitments, reflecting the
priorities of Kabul rather than the donors, largely met.
The war against Taliban and Al Qaida needs to continue. The
national security of the United States is served by defeating these
forces in detail. Key leadership figures remain to be captured. While
they present only a limited military challenge, their campaign of
violence and terror is preventing reconstruction and political
participation in areas in the south and east.
The national security of the United States is also served by
effectively implementing our commitment to assist in the international
community's efforts to rebuild Afghanistan, to prevent it ever again
being a base of terrorism and extremism that threatens other countries.
Afghanistan still has a need for humanitarian assistance and,
increasingly, reconstruction throughout all the country. Such
activities also contribute to security. They demonstrate to the Afghan
grass roots that their lives are being made better. Functioning
government outside Kabul and a viable national economy are both
evolving slowly despite many setbacks.
Through its continuing commitment to Afghanistan, the United States
can demonstrate that they can help a people that suffered from Taliban
and Al Qaida oppression, terrorism, and warfare. In Afghanistan in
2001, the U.S. demonstrated the power of even a relative small part of
its armed forces in helping their Afghan allies militarily defeat the
Taliban and Al Qaida on the battlefield. In 2001, the world saw the
jubilation of Afghans as the Taliban and Al Qaida were driven from
Kabul, including the joyful re-openings of the long-shuttered movie
theaters. Now the U.S. is faced with the opportunity to help bring
about a third success, making possible the rebuilding of Afghanistan. I
believe that the United States needs to do more to meet emerging
challenges to this last--and most critical--of our national security
goals in Afghanistan.
Conflict in Afghanistan tends to be about legitimacy. To win the
current conflict, the government in Kabul needs to continue to increase
its legitimacy, building on continued commitment to the Bonn process
and the desire for peace of the vast majority of the Afghan people. I
believe that the U.S. and the world community need to do more. Success
in Afghanistan requires effective diplomatic activity to prevent
outside forces from acting as spoilers, both a near-term surge and a
long-term security commitment of troops on the ground, and more
resources available for addressing emerging new challenges.
The military elements of U.S. policy in Afghanistan since 2001 have
been, in many ways, the most successful. Yet the U.S. must use military
force with care, avoid the pitfalls of resurgent Afghan politics and
avoid involvement in implementing policies of the Kabul government that
would make it appear an outside creation. In some cases, international
security cooperation cannot serve as a substitute for U.S. action.
Perception of a long-term U.S. security commitment is crucial.
Afghanistan's new challenges come from diverse sources. The
requirement, under the new constitution, for presidential and
parliamentary (both houses) elections has led to critical security
concerns. It has presented a target for the forces that are using
terror and violence against the Kabul government and its international
supporters and so must be considered the most significant security
threat in Afghanistan. The Taliban and Al Qaida are making a strong
attempt to limit voter registration in a number of areas in the south
and east of Afghanistan.
The upcoming presidential election itself marks the formal return
of Afghan politics. The wars of 1978-2001 polarized Afghans, not only
along the ethno-linguistic divisions but also those of economic
interest, religious practice and philosophy, class and locality, and
other complex factors. Recently, these tensions have undercut ambitious
internationally-supported programs aimed at disarmament. A revival in
narcotics cultivation and traffic presents an international threat and
provide a source of funding for those opposed to the Kabul government.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to identify many
missed opportunities in Afghanistan since 2001. The prompt and skillful
military action that enabled and empowered our Afghan allies to
liberate their own country from the Taliban and Al Qaida was not
matched by comparable decisive action, unity of command, and
application of resources in other areas. Too often, opportunities to
build on momentum were not taken. The U.S. now has enough experience
and knowledge to learn from mistakes.
Yet I believe the bottom line is guardedly optimistic. Afghanistan
is neither the former Yugoslavia nor Iraq. The Afghan people, resilient
though destitute and war-weary, have demonstrated they are willing and
able to deal with the deep and fundamental issues that divide them. The
U.S. needs to give them the tools to make this possible and help stop
those that aim, for their own ends, to blight Afghan hopes.
What Should We Be Doing?
The current U.S. commitment to security, reconstruction and
developmental aid to Afghan government is vital. The Afghan government
has had an increasing role in decisions to allocate this aid,
demonstrating competence and legitimacy both internationally--as seen
at the Berlin conference--and domestically, where it allows the
government to find sources of revenue outside of aid, build patronage
and demonstrate its relevance.
The U.S. needs to support implementation in Afghanistan that will
avoid what Ambassador Peter Thomsen has termed ``the briar patch of
Afghan politics.'' The United States must not treat the Afghan
government as just another faction. Yet it must also avoid too close an
embrace that will make that government appear as a creation of the U.S.
Nor must the U.S. act as the Afghan government's ``enforcer,''
implementing policies that Kabul lacks the political or military
strength to carry out. The elections, the conflict with the Taliban and
Al Qaida, disarmament, corruption, narcotics, human rights abuses, the
lack of economic development and many other critical problems can block
progress. These issues are now firmly enmeshed in Afghan politics.
Afghans are increasingly accusing their political opponents of these
(and other) problems and insisting that justice requires that foreign
influence (or force) be used to put them (and their friends) into
power.
What the U.S. should aim for as a priority of a strengthened
commitment to Afghanistan is not implementing specific solutions
devised by the Kabul government of the U.N., but rather to continue to
enable and empower Afghans to work together, to build confidence is
each other, and to identify steps that will lead to an emergence of a
more mature political culture in a society that has been mobilized by
war throughout the 1978-2001 period by using every possible claim and
rationale to get Afghans to fight others, usually other Afghans.
It is vital that the U.S. not be seen as being politically
manipulated in policy implementation in Afghanistan, especially with
the elections likely to hold center stage for the immediate future.
While the U.S. is rightly engaged primarily with the Kabul government,
it also needs to engage with regional leaders (including some of those
lumped together pejoratively as ``warlords'' by their political
opponents) and, through mechanisms such as the PRTs and cooperation
with NGOs, the grass roots.
The Afghan government will have in effect, to repeat the state-
building process that took place in the generation before 1978 while
avoiding the mistakes in that process that led directly to the tragic
events that followed. It is a difficult task. There are many places in
Afghanistan where nothing good came from Kabul in 1978-2001. Legitimacy
and a presumption of competence and even-handedness must be rebuilt
from less than zero in 2001.
Indeed, there are still many Afghans--in and out of government and
of many different political alignments--that, like the post-
revolutionary Bourbons, appear to have both learned nothing and
forgotten nothing. Urban Kabulis with Pushtun roots want Dari-speaking
rural Panjsheris disarmed and out of their city. Those that
collaborated with the Soviets during the occupation or are returning
from exile demand criminalization of the ``jihadis'' that fought the
Soviet invaders and took part in the civil wars of 1992-2001; they, in
turn, disparage the ``washers of dogs and cats'' returning from exile
that, without their record of being able to get things done on the
ground (made possible by their appropriation of income, patronage
networks and their Kalashnikovs), have to rely on foreign support. All
will try their best to secure U.S. support in the emerging world of
Afghan politics.
Regional Security Issues
The most important U.S. contribution to Afghanistan's security is
through interaction with the regional actors. In 1992-2001, it was the
willingness of those actors--especially but not exclusively neighbors--
to back opposing sides in Afghanistan's civil wars that kept the
conflicts going.
If the neighbors believe the U.S. security commitment to
Afghanistan be a long-lasting one, they will be more likely to
permanently turn away from their 1990s policies and seek to accommodate
their security interests through cooperation with the internationally-
recognized government in Kabul and not by backing Afghan regional
military commanders to oppose it. If the neighbors believe the U.S.
presence and interest in Afghanistan are transitory and that the U.S.
is, despite its rhetoric, looking for an exit strategy, then they will
hedge their bets in their relations with Afghanistan. U.S. long-term
security commitments are going to be stronger than any coming from
elsewhere in the international community, including NATO.
Effective U.S. interaction with Pakistan is most important thing we
do for security in Afghanistan. Pakistan's involvement with Afghanistan
has been, in recent decades, an order or magnitude greater than any
other neighbor. The conflict currently going on in Afghanistan by
Taliban and Al Qaida is a cross-border insurgency mounted from
Pakistan. It is not a grass-roots insurgency by Afghans aggrieved at
the slow rate of reconstruction or that members of other ethnic groups
hold ministerial positions in Kabul. Even though the Taliban may have
sympathy in some areas in Afghanistan on ethno-linguistic, local, or
religious grounds, it they are no longer a viable political movement
inside Afghanistan. However, in Pakistan, the ``Taliban culture''
remains, including a network of internationally linked fundamentalist
groups, madrassas and Pakistani religious parties that support the
conflict in Afghanistan.
Challenging this culture is politically costly for any Pakistani
government. In the longer term, however, it is likely to prove critical
not only for Afghanistan but for the future nature of state and civil
society in Pakistan. Yet as long as the Taliban culture remains strong
across the Durand line, achieving peace in Afghanistan will be
problematic, regardless of how many resources are committed by the
international community, including the U.S., to Afghanistan.
The current U.S. engagement has been met with increased Pakistani
willingness to address the threat to achieving peace and security in
Afghanistan that is coming from Pakistan. This was demonstrated in
recent Pakistani military operations in South Waziristan. It has also
been seen in President Musharref's address to parliament earlier this
year and in a range of other actions dating back to his 14 January 2002
speech and before. Pakistani cooperation in arresting foreign
terrorists has included a number of significant successes. These
actions have been recognized by the recent U.S. designation of Pakistan
as a major non-NATO ally.
Yet problems remain. Taliban leaders--not limited to
``moderates''--live openly in Quetta. The Pakistani intelligence
services and elements of the military have not turned away from the
policies that brought Afghanistan to the disastrous situation of 2001.
In recent weeks, statements of concern about Pakistani policies from
U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad and the commander
of Combined Forces Command, U.S. Lieutenant General David Barno, have
been matched by statements from the Afghan government.
The upcoming Afghan election is vulnerable to a broad range of
action by its opponents. While the Taliban and Al Qaida must be
considered the most important threat, they are not the only one.
Throughout Afghanistan, regional and local leaders--who tend to
perceive no viable alternative to themselves--are likely to use all the
power at their disposal, from the use of patronage to armed
intimidation, to see that the elections do not overturn their power.
However, in these cases, U.S. and international community interaction
with these leaders are important to try and minimize their effect. The
security situation is most important in those areas in the south and
east where the threats to the election include terrorist violence. Nor
is reducing participation to reduce legitimacy the only threat goal.
Reports at the time of loya jirga delegate selection from the south
have told of convoys of ``voters'' being trucked from Pakistan.
Regional Security is Linked to Reconstruction
The importance of reconstruction aid is that it allows the U.S. to
have an impact that will increase stability while not becoming hostage
to Afghan politics. For example, gender issues are likely to remain
politically polarizing for the immediate future. They may be used as a
shorthand to rally opposition to the current government on a range of
issues. Yet by backing programs that make Afghans lives better at the
grass roots by rebuilding schools or microcredit schemes that put
sewing machines in villages, the U.S. can hope to avoid its policies
being perceived as contributing to the continued divisions and
polarization that marks Afghan politics.
No one is likely to be against schools and sewing machines. If the
Taliban and Al Qaida come with guns to burn them, they need to be
detected and defeated. If mullahs--supported with rupees from
Pakistan's ``Taliban culture'' or from foreign radical Islam--preach
against them and demand the schools and sewing machines be burned, then
there needs to be a countervailing support for traditional Afghan
Islam, which has long demonstrated that piety can lead to resistance to
fundamentalism and oppression.
It has been a long time since anyone has funded traditional Afghan
religious practices and leaders, while those attacking them have
enjoyed extensive foreign support. While this may be an uncomfortable
issue for the U.S., it remains that a purely secular conception of
reconstruction will be inadequate to deal with Afghanistan and the role
of Islam in its politics and life. Reconstruction has to include not
only government, infrastructure and economy, but Afghan Islam as well.
If this is not an area where the U.S. is competent or comfortable in
acting, then by all means let us engage with international partners to
deal with this issue, as so long as they do not have their own agendas.
If there is a vacuum in funding and support here, it will be filled by
men from outside Afghanistan with evil ideas and suitcases full of
dollars.
This is a necessary part of security making possible
reconstruction--blocking the outside spoilers. The religious element is
more difficult than interacting with the regional players, for most of
the action here involves sub-national actors and many of these have
committed Afghan political allies. Addressing this problem in a way
that will not be perceived as an attempt to criminalize opposition
politics by the Kabul government is a challenge.
Security Forces in Afghanistan
The national security interests of the United States in making
Afghanistan secure are likely to mandate the presence of military
forces there for at least the next five to ten years. Currently, there
are three distinct foreign security forces in Afghanistan. In Kabul is
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), currently under
NATO. There are the coalition forces taking part in the war on terror,
often with the support of aircraft and assets based outside
Afghanistan. U.S. and coalition provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs)
(plus an ISAF German effort in Konduz) carry out high-value relief
programs while being able to provide for their own security. They bring
an outside presence and token of commitment to grass-roots Afghanistan.
ISAF expansion remains problematic despite the 2003 commitment to
its expansion. While there are places in the north and west where such
forces could be useful--Herat, Konduz, areas of tension in the
northwest--they would best be employed in the south and east, to
counter Taliban and Al Qaida terror and help make possible humanitarian
aid and reconstruction. While NATO is making good current commitments
and has offered to deploy an additional five PRTs in north Afghanistan
(where there is largely not a security threat) lack of long-term
security commitments to match the aid commitments made at Berlin
earlier this year is disconcerting.
In reality, it has been difficult to sustain the force at its
current level. While expansion of ISAF would be a good thing, it is
hard to see how it could be carried out on a sustainable basis. NATO
countries are finding that the Afghanistan commitment stretches their
forces and funding even at current levels. They have cut back force
structures and have other commitments. While expanding ISAF may be
possible, before implementing it is necessary to recall that poorly
trained, ill-equipped or ineffective troops are worse than no troops.
One must be hesitant about any expansion that would bring in untrained
or inexperienced units--in terms of the current situation rather than
conventional operations--into Afghanistan.
Deployment of additional U.S. forces to southern and eastern
Afghanistan could provide security, assist with reconstruction, and
help the campaign against Taliban and Al Qaida. There is a need a
short-term this-year surge deployment to deal with emerging problems
such as making possible election security, the completion of high-value
infrastructure reconstruction, narcotics eradication, and disarmament.
Even if the troops do not carry out these missions themselves, their
presence and military action against the threat will help make it
possible for Afghans to carry out these actions.
The current force structure and resources overstretch by the U.S.
(and any participating NATO or coalition members) means that deployment
of such forces needs to be targeted to help provide security especially
in areas where reconstruction efforts by the UN and NGOs being deterred
by terrorism or, as in case of UN with election registration, have
turned the program over to Afghans. In these areas, the U.S. and
coalition presence is currently limited to those forces waging military
operations against the Al Qaida and Taliban remnants and the PRTs.
While the PRTs have done good work (despite the hostility of some
NGOs and skepticism of some of the local population), their actions
have not been sufficient for average Afghans in this area to see how
their life is better. The deployment of additional PRTs should be made
alongside the surge deployment. The PRTs can remain as a part of a
long-term commitment to Afghan security.
While ISAF expansion into areas in the south and east would be a
good and important advance, NATO troops are not a substitute for U.S.
troops in those areas of Afghanistan. Only U.S. troops are the ``boots
on the ground'' that indicate superpower commitment and an effective
willingness to support Afghanistan and the Kabul government against
both Taliban and Al Qaida and the policies of regional players.
Deployments will also have to be done to skillfully minimize
friction (and friendly fire incidents). More garrisons in the south and
east--unless integrated into an effective operational concept--may only
provide targets for Taliban and Al Qaida mortars and rockets. Many
Afghans are anxious for an outside presence to assure security, but it
needs to be implemented to avoid the streak of xenophobia that runs
alongside the hospitality of Afghanistan.
An expanded U.S. security commitment should not be judged by troop
end-strength but rather by effectiveness. It should include increased
intelligence assets and be able to work with both grass roots Afghans
and Kabul government forces to develop intelligence. It could include
expanded PRTs; or units such as engineer battalions that could both
initiate reconstruction programs and train Afghans--ideally demobilized
fighting men paid by aid money--to take over their jobs.
While the U.S. military should look to make clear its security
commitment to Afghanistan is a long-term one, in carrying out
reconstruction tasks the goal should be to train and turn over the
tasks to Afghans as soon as possible. Infrastructure building and
provision of security are two exceptions but those digging wells and
carrying out other needed tasks should be Afghans.
To meet regional goals and make Afghanistan a place that will not
be a haven for terrorism and extremism, I believe that U.S. forces,
concentrating on security, will need to remain in place for foreseeable
future, five to ten years. I believe that a similar commitment of ISAF
forces will be required if it is to remain viable. I believe that a
near-term surge commitment of U.S. and ISAF forces to the south and
east is required to help provide security, defeat terrorist forces, and
help jump-start reconstruction.
DDR--Example of an Emerging Challenge
There is no disagreement that the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration) process is vital to the future of Afghanistan. and
that, at some point in the future, there will be a single national army
and police force in Afghanistan. It has also been determined by the
Bonn process and the Afghan constitution that the armed forces that
liberated Afghanistan in 2001 are not to enjoy the central place in
national life that has been the case in many developing countries, most
notably that of Pakistan. It has also been determined that the emerging
national army and police forces are to reflect the entire country's
ethno-linguistic makeup (especially in their commanders), which is
frequently not the case in many developing countries, most notably
region that of Pakistan.
Demobilization of fighting men outside the Kabul government's army
and police forces without jobs creates only bandits and narcotics
cultivators. Demobilization has to be a primary aim of reconstruction
aid. In long term, rebirth of a national economy is the only answer.
But in the short term, the U.S. may have to look to these forces to
assist with security.
However, in the short term, the DDR process has led to a stand-off
between U.N. authorities trying to implement it and defense minister
Marshal Fahim. In the longer term, effective DDR is going to be the
consequence of the successful assumption of legitimate and competent
national power by the government in Kabul rather than the cause.
Since 1978, armed power wielded by Kabul has been discredited, and
it will require years of increasing legitimacy and competency to
restore it. The Hazaras and the Bamiyan shura are going to have a
different view of the DDR process than that held in Kabul by our
friends in the government. They are going to want re-assurance that the
emerging national army and police force and not going to be used as the
``big stick'' of a repressive center-periphery relationship. The same
considerations also apply to other armed forces in Afghanistan, which
need to have their security situation considered on a case-by-case
basis.
The U.S. can contribute to an effective DDR process. The most
important elements are already being carried out--the creation of a
national army and reconstruction that can both employ and train former
fighting men. An important challenge will be to extend the benefits of
DDR not only to the regional commanders--they already have jobs with
the government--but to their senior and mid-level commanders. If they
end up as bandit chiefs or narcotics growers, then the effectiveness of
the entire process will be undercut.
Hindering the implementation of DDR is a widespread belief by the
Afghans affected by it in political bias by both UN and the Kabul
government. If the U.S. retains the confidence of the regional
commanders, it can act as a trusted interlocutor, looking for ways to
implement DDR. This is likely to be more effective than having U.S.
combat units physically disarming Afghans. Effective actions in support
of DDR can include the continued provision of U.S. Special Forces teams
with Afghan forces. On multiple occasions, these have ``deconflicted''
potential problems and demonstrated earnest that the regional
commanders should continue to support Kabul, the constitution, and the
Bonn process rather than call up their foreign supporters and look for
funding to start implementing their own agenda.
The U.S. needs to work with these commanders and forces where
appropriate. While they are ``yesterday's men'' and they know it, their
residual power--in the terms of patronage networks and armed men--is
significant. Demanding that they be swept away as an a priori condition
for the elections while the central government's institutions that
would replace them--and the legitimacy for their non-repressive use--
are both still weak is unachievable and will undercut the potential for
limited--but still real--gains.
Conclusion
These are just a few elements of a vast interconnected problem.
While judging the U.S. effort by money spent or number of troops in-
country rather than their effect is dangerous, more U.S. resources
would be good. There is a continued need for reconstruction funds.
Money can smooth over many of the center-periphery political problems.
There would be many fewer Afghans carrying Kalashnikovs for regional
commanders or maintaining poppy fields if there were programs where,
funded by aid money, they could work on rebuilding in the morning and
be taught to read in the afternoons. When such programs have been
offered, there have been literally hundreds of applicants for each
place.
But until that time, even with more U.S. troops on the ground and
more U.S. aid over what is currently available, we will have to
prioritize. I believe that the elections make regional security the
highest priority. But additional resources would make it possible for
the U.S. to have more policy options in dealing with worsening problems
such as disarmament and narcotics. Dealing with both while avoiding
becoming a participant in Afghan politics or making the Afghan
government appear to be a U.S. creation will be difficult, but this
cannot be an excuse for inaction.
A goal of all U.S. and international action--diplomatic, security,
reconstruction--is to ensure an Afghan government is able to make
meeting the needs of its citizens a priority. This was not a priority
in 1978-2001. The government needs, within the context of the
constitution and the Bonn process, to grow revenues and patronage
networks that can help stabilize Afghanistan. But do not expect--or try
and fund--short-term success. While supporting the government in Kabul,
we must help ensure tomorrow's Afghans do right what the former King
and his governments--flush with superpower aid at the height of the
Cold War--did terribly wrong in the decades before 1978.
There is a desperate need for training Afghans in many fields,
especially civil administration. The concept of effective, accountable,
impartial administration was put aside in 1978-2001 when power and its
possession were often the sole concerns. Between the pre-1978 heritage
and the skills of individual Afghans, there is hope for improvement,
but this is an area where the aid is needed.
U.S./NATO troops are needed to make reconstruction possible in the
south and east. But keep in mind that goal should be the minimal level
of troop commitment consistent with effectiveness. While U.S. troops
are a unique and important symbol of commitment, good foreign troops
are needed to share the burden and demonstrate international security
commitments. The wrong foreign troops need to stay home.
The most important reconstruction aid--that only the U.S. can
provide --is preventing regional players acting as spoilers in
Afghanistan. This means, in the near term, undercutting support for the
cross-border actions by the Taliban and Al Qaida. In the longer term,
it means support for efforts that will undercut the ``Taliban culture''
on Pakistan's side of the Durand Line and encourage the growth of civil
society and effective governance. Religious funding originating in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region will be critical if it is
used in the election process.
In the final analysis, Afghans are likely to work things better out
themselves. We need to build back their infrastructure, act as
interlocutors and mediators, prevent outsiders from acting as spoilers,
and be guided by a goal of not doing for the Afghans what they can do
for themselves. The U.S. and the international community--by making
long term security commitments to match the aid commitments given
recently at Berlin--can help the Afghans work things out themselves. If
the U.S. and the international community can enable and empower them to
decide their own future and can prevent outside spoilers from doing
damage, then there is cause for guarded optimism about the future of
Afghanistan. But as new challenges have emerged in Afghanistan--the
need to conduct elections, the need for disarmament and narcotics
eradication, the creation of a national economy--they require new
responses and commitment of resources from the United States.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Isby.
Let me say that we will try to have 10 minutes of
questioning by each Senator and then maybe another round. Let
me recognize for a moment Senator Biden. You have to leave.
Senator Biden. Yes. I am supposed to address a national
police organization, but this is, quite frankly, much more
important. I wonder if you would indulge me to ask one
question.
The Chairman. Please.
Senator Biden. I know it is not appropriate. The Chairman
speaks first.
Gentlemen, some of us on this committee have had a running
and legitimate debate with people inside and outside the
administration, from the moment the Taliban collapsed, as to
how we should proceed. I want to make it clear that I think
when we are talking about Afghanistan or Iraq and how we should
have proceeded, a strong dose of humility is in order for
anyone who has a recommendation, particularly speaking for
myself. I am not suggesting by the question I am about to ask
that had the prescriptions offered by the majority of this
committee been followed, that things would be materially
different. I think they would, but I do not know. This is not
one of these ``we told them so and here we are and what do we
do.''
I want to get to the heart of what I see as a difference in
policy prescriptions here without speaking about the details,
the tactics, whether we are speaking about education and
whether or not--when I was in Afghanistan, meeting with a man
who had been in Italy for the last 24 years and came back to
become the head of the Department of Education, in effect, he
talked about opening up the university. I went in to see him
and I said, basically what do you need? I thought he was going
to tell me he needed supplies, laboratories, books, et cetera.
He said, I need one thing. I need security on the roads. No
student is going to show up without security on the roads. I
said, what do you mean? He said, literally on the roads. I have
got to be able to have a student who lives in Kandahar or lives
in Herat or lives in Bagram to be able to think they can travel
the road to get to the university.
When I visited the first schools that were open, the grade
schools, it was impressive the determination of the young girls
in particular who had been out of school for 5 years, some of
them 14, 15 years old going back to primary school and their
determination to learn to read. One young woman, as I said I
was leaving, stood up with those magnificent hazel eyes so many
of them have and with fire in them, looked at me and said,
``You cannot go.'' I thought she meant I could not leave the
classroom. She said, ``America cannot go. I will never learn to
read. I want to be a doctor like my mother.'' This was through
a translator. Her determination was incredible.
But again, security. Even immediately after the Taliban was
on the run, I met with two women ministers and sublevel women
in the government who told me that, as they took the bus to
work, they wore their burka. They told me of examples where
cars would drive up with four men and the men would jump out,
throw the women against the wall, threaten them, tell them if
they are not covered next time, they will be punished.
So, when we tried to expand the security force--and
Secretary Powell weighed in on this force as well--there was a
reluctance, a judgment made at the highest levels in our
government that that was not the way to go.
Then in what were at the time weekly meetings with Dr.
Rice--and I think she expresses a legitimate view, but a
different view--I remember one day saying to her, Condy, the
warlords are gaining power not reducing power. For a brief,
shining moment there, they were all sort of cowed and they all
were worried about whether benefactors would continue to
support them, whether it be any one of the five surrounding
countries. There was a moment there where they were ready to
let international security forces in sort of as apartheid cops.
They kind of viewed it as if the international security force
was there, at least their territory would not be encroached
upon by a competing faction.
And Dr. Rice looked at me and she said this--I am not
telling tales out of school--she said, ``What do you mean? What
is the problem?'' I said well, Ismail Khan in Iraq. She said,
``What is the problem? The Taliban is not there. Al Qaeda is
not there. It has always been this way.''
So I think we should level with one another here about what
is the base, fundamental difference in approach and what we
have to deal with here. There has been a judgment made, if not
by direction, by indirection in a sense, that the way to
maintain stability in Afghanistan was to try to do whatever is
necessary within our power and divert our attention to deal
with Al Qaeda and deal with the Taliban. Part of that seems to
have been that the warlords are an element in that. If you have
Khan in charge, you do not have the Taliban in charge.
And also, this debate, Mark, about the British view and the
American view on dealing with poppy. We met with some high
ranking German officials who said this is not the time to crack
down on the poppy trade because you will just cause more
unemployment and you will have another problem. Now, maybe I
have spent too much of my life, 23 years of the 32 I have been
here, being chairman or ranking member of the subcommittee on
drugs of the Judiciary Committee. This seems to me a
prescription for disaster.
It is a long prelude to a short question. I am not looking
for what you think should be our policy. I want you to respond
to what you think our policy is. Does the support or the
failure to attempt to crack down--and we have limited capacity
right now--on warlords have, for all the bad aspects of it, the
positive impact at least of, other than in the south,
curtailing the activity, growth, and influence of the Taliban
and Al Qaeda? That is my first question. Can you just give me a
yes or no, since we only have 10 minutes here? Does it have
that effect? Not all the bad effects that flow from it. Does it
have that effect of dampening the influence of the Taliban and
Al Qaeda to the degree to which the warlords have increased
power and do not answer to Kabul?
Dr. Gouttierre. Initially right after the 9/11 events, and
as we went into Afghanistan with our own forces, I think that
it did. I think it no longer does. I think now it has a
negative impact on the long-term objectives that we and the
Afghans have, and it only in a sense sustains the instability
that permits the conditions that encourage the resuscitation of
the Taliban and Al Qaeda and the border areas.
Senator Biden. Because part of what I think some view--and
these are serious people. They suggest that our ability to
actually devote the resources, in light of our circumstances in
Iraq and the unwillingness of the Europeans to do even more in
Afghanistan is that we are given one of two options. We either
put in significantly more resources, that is, more troops, more
money, not just ours, but the international community, and more
direct effort to bolster Kabul.
For example, one of the things we argued about was whether
every single project should go through Karzai. What value is
there if you give your money directly to Ismail Khan to build a
road or a school? He is the one delivering it. Why call Karzai?
Why call Kabul? If you don't have any military control over
that part of the region because of the warlords' capacity, at
least there has to be some reason why anyone in the provinces
would want to deal with Kabul, and if the money is not
controlled and the projects are not controlled from there, then
who needs it? You become the Mayor of Kabul.
But it seems the realists on the left and the right in our
political spectrum are coming up with what I think will be a
compelling argument to some, not one I agree with, which is,
look, the resources required are significantly larger than are
now committed. That is not going to happen. So we should at
least decide to limit the damage and reduce the objective, the
objective being keep the Taliban from resurging, keep Al Qaeda
out. The only way to do that is invest, in effect, indirectly
in the warlords.
Mr. Schneider. I do not think that is going to get you
where you want to be, Senator. In fact, I think that one of the
conclusions of the United Nations and of others is that if that
position holds and there is a continued support for or at least
acceptance of the warlords maintaining their power base, what
that does in the Pashtun area is essentially allow them to
argue that they need, in a sense, their own warlords. If this
is the way it is going to be, then they say we have got lots of
linkages back with the Taliban. And so you are going to see a
greater degree of political insertion of roots in that area by
the Taliban. What the warlords bring is essentially illegal
activity being accepted as legitimate, and this is not going to
be the basis for building any institutions for the future.
But you are right. There is going to be a need for greater
resources, both military and economic, to be devoted. I do
think, though, that there is an opportunity to get more
European contributions from the Spanish, from Turkey,
particularly in terms of meeting what is now set out by NATO as
their requirements.
Senator Biden. I happen to agree with you. I totally
disagree with what I have just put forward, but I think we
should be realistic and understand where we are.
Mr. Schneider. Understood. That is not acceptable any
longer inside Afghanistan I do not think.
Mr. Perito. No. Senator, the realists among the Afghans
that we talked to pointed out that the U.S. military continuing
to provide financial resources to the warlords creates a
duplicity in our position. It makes it look as if we are on all
sides of the issue.
Mr. Isby. Can I say a good word for duplicity, sir?
Mr. Perito. Are you in charge of duplicity?
Mr. Isby. I will stand up for duplicity, sir. I think we
need to support the people that you call warlords. I do not
call them that. It is a pejorative term. Judge them
individually. They are not our enemies. They are yesterday's
men, but it is going to take many years to phase them out and
their armies. We cannot become an arm of Kabuli power, Kabul
has to rebuild its legitimacy and competence which was reduced
to less than zero in 1978-2001. Marshal Fahim is not our enemy.
The other people that are called warlords are not our enemies.
We do need to engage them to show if you join in with this
process, even though at the end of it, there is only an
honorable retirement for you, it is better than getting out
your Rolodex and calling your foreign supporters for more free
Kalashnikovs.
Senator Biden. Well, let me just conclude by saying that
as I said to you, I think this different school of thought is a
totally legitimate argument. I am not making a moral judgment
about it. As I said at the outset, I think I am right, but I
acknowledge that there is another position.
What you have said is different than what is happening, I
think. What you said is you want to, in fact, treat them as
friends, do it over a process, incorporate them into the
process, and in fact, over time as Kabul grows in strength and
they become more integrated, and end up with, down the road, a
more coherent state.
Mr. Isby. That is the Bonn solution, the process
envisioned at that conference.
Senator Biden. Right. No, I understand that. All I am
suggesting to you is I am not sure that is the alternative that
is being pursued now. It seems to me the alternative being
pursued now is there is not much we can do about this. Period.
And we ought to just focus on a more narrow objective.
But again, this is a legitimate area of debate. I just
think sometimes in this area we do not meet head on what the
significant differences are in terms of policy proscriptions,
and they lead to other decisions along the road.
But I truly appreciate you all being here. I am anxious to
follow up with you, and I really appreciate the courtesy, Mr.
Chairman, of you allowing me to go first and apologize. It is a
longstanding commitment I made to the International Police
Organization to speak, and I am required to do that. So I am
sorry.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.
While you are here, I wanted to recognize the fact that
there are nine journalists from Afghanistan in our hearing
today. Would you please stand wherever you are?
Senator Biden. Welcome, gentlemen, ladies.
The Chairman. We are delighted that you are here, and there
are three ladies in the back. All right. There they are. Very
good.
I just simply wanted to mention that the program that
sponsors you, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, is one that
we have strongly supported. Senator Biden has been a champion
specifically of the program that has brought us all together
today. So before you left, I wanted to recognize that.
Senator Biden. You were kind to mention that. Welcome to
all of you.
The Chairman. Let me continue the questioning by indicating
that I was pleased with your evaluation, Dr. Gouttierre, and
your conclusion that Afghans are very clear about the way they
feel about Americans. They want them in Afghanistan. They want
American leadership and assistance in the reconstruction
process.
Now, what is the basis for that evaluation? In other words,
how do you know that there is that regard for the United
States? I ask this, because very clearly the polling in Iraq is
very different. Iraqis do not like us. We think they should.
They have been liberated and what have you, but they do not
like us at all. As a matter of fact, in a good number of
countries in the area, as the Pew Foundation or others have
gone about asking about popular opinion, we are not doing so
well. Is this different in Afghanistan and if so, why?
Dr. Gouttierre. You really should not give me such an
entree because the opportunity to take a look at this requires
a history lesson in many ways, but I am pleased that you asked
that question because I think it is, in many ways, the key to
our ability to have success in Afghanistan.
I have been involved with Afghanistan--I hate to admit it--
40 years. I hate to admit it because it confesses my age. But I
am pleased to admit it because it has been a very pleasing
experience in terms of dealing with the people.
Right from the very beginning, when I went as a Peace Corps
volunteer, 40 years ago this year, to Afghanistan, the thing
that was very evident was that Afghans really enjoyed playing
hosts to people from other countries if they had well-
intentioned reasons for being there.
We have had a long and wonderful history in Afghanistan, as
I suggested. We have been very much involved with the Afghans
in development projects through the 1950s and 1960s and 1970s.
Afghans remember us as helping them against the Soviets. I
think their biggest disappointment with us was when in the
1990s we were not there during the time when the terrorists
hijacked the country.
We helped to create Kabul University. We helped to build
the Ministry of Education and set up the whole education
process with Afghans, of course. We brought many Afghans to the
United States.
They have never been obsessed with this issue that the
United States has been waging a crusade against Islam. They
have never been focused on this particular issue that the
United States has malevolent intentions in the Middle East.
Probably almost every Afghan would feel that we tilt unfairly
to Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian issue, but that has not
overwhelmed them in their evaluation of the United States.
I think Afghans have always felt positively about us. They
have never been among those included in the question, ``Why do
they hate us?'' Never. And I think our history with them has
helped them to retain that. It has been a positive history, and
we should be proud of that, and we should build upon it.
I am sure each of these journalists here would agree. I did
not read that poem in Persian because I did not think I had the
time, but I would love to do that for them afterwards because
this poem is very indicative of the way Afghans feel. They
believe that they gain from the relationship. They are always a
little apprehensive; like Senator Biden suggested, the young
school girl was saying, do not leave or I will not get the
future I dream of.
I say that often the U.S. is solicitous. There has been a
statement here that the donor process thing in Berlin was a
success. Only if we take the right leadership, because it is
the U.S. leadership that the Afghans are counting on, not just
our money. They identify success that they see in Afghanistan
with the United States. They are also going to identify
failures with the United States.
We are not going to have another country in any part of
that region. Pakistanis do not feel the same way as Afghans do.
Maybe some in Central Asia could feel that way. We know how
Iranians and Iraqis feel, but Afghans are our best possible
allies to do something correct in that region.
I go to bed at night having trouble sleeping, not just
because I am concerned about Afghans, but primarily because I
do not want to see us blow this opportunity to deal with people
who really do want us there, who have given every indication
throughout a long time.
So I said you should not have given me that entree. You are
lucky I have not gone on and on and on with all of the history,
which I could. I am certain others here on the panel could as
well. But it is from 40 years of experience, and they have
always been positive experiences in dealing personally with
Afghans. Even with some of those who are of a questionable,
they always were exceedingly hospitable and always solicitous
of our interests.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate that testimony because
obviously this is why we are having another hearing on
Afghanistan, and we continually are having hearings----
Dr. Gouttierre. A quick interjection, Senator. Senator
Biden said, well, you know, it has always been this way amongst
Afghans. I just get so angry when I hear that because it has
not always been that way. Afghans have not always been fighting
each other, and there is this misconception because the West
has become focused on Afghanistan only with crises and those
crises were the Soviet invasion and this current set of
circumstances.
When I lived in Afghanistan, it was not a perfect place. It
sounds like I am describing Valhalla perhaps. It was not. But
it was a place where I did not worry about my car being
attacked. I could go individually into the depths of the
bazaars in any town without any concern, and Afghans were not
killing each other. There was a reliance on a central
government. It was growing. It was not perfect, but it was
growing. If you took a look at Afghanistan in 1970, let us say,
and you take a look at any other country around that part of
the world today, Afghanistan then was light years ahead of not
only itself but of most of the other countries surrounding it
today. It took a very methodical, sometimes too deliberate, but
methodical and deliberate approach to trying to bring in a
national sensitivity, and it was working, though it was not
perfect. But there is never a perfect democracy and they were
trying through this democratic experiment. It was something
anybody living there would have been tremendously pleased to be
a part of.
The Chairman. Let me follow on from this as the basis for
this question. We established that Afghans like us, and we have
some possibilities here. Now then, the question is, will they
still like us if we do all the things that we are discussing
today, or even some of them? How many of them should we try to
do to at least establish a basis on which Afghans will solve
the problem?
For example, Senator Biden quoted the young lady who was
very worried about her education in the event that we leave,
probably with good reason. But this gets to the heart of a
great cultural change. We have discussed the warlords already
in various ways. As we Americans, along with our NATO allies,
endeavor to establish a system of education that clearly is
open to women--and there is no dispute about that element--and
we somehow dispense with the warlords--some would think that is
important, to enable the central government to work.
Furthermore, should we do something about the poppies--
either we interdict them, start chopping them down or what have
you--in each of these three areas. I sense that there will be
some in Afghanistan who would say that we are overreaching. On
the other hand, some would say perhaps that these are things
that we can do as Afghans if you give us time and money and
some structure and you keep the outsiders from intruding and so
forth.
What I want to hear from the panel is, what are the
appropriate areas in our idealism as to what the best outcome
for Afghans would be, if we devote the time and money? The
committee starts with the prejudice that we ought to do more,
and we have been on the side of always amending relevant
pending bills to do more. You might testify that it is going to
have to be a lot more if we really are serious about
Afghanistan. You are also saying that we should be serious
about Afghanistan. It would be tragic if we were not.
Let us say that we get much more serious. We beef up the
resources, even personnel, tough as that may be given our
commitments elsewhere. We exhort our NATO allies successfully.
Given the good will that we now have, what are the things that
are reasonable to suspect that we will be able to do, or that
we should be advocating? How can we set the stage for Afghans
to implement reforms, which perhaps they must do if they are to
have a cohesive, ongoing democracy?
Mr. Schneider. Mr. Chairman, I would begin by saying that
the fundamental issue is our long-term engagement, that there
has to be an awareness that whatever we do we have to be
engaged with Afghanistan, not for the next 2 years or the next
4 years but for the long term. That kind of engagement and that
kind of commitment is why I suggested an authorization that
would match the 7-year period that the Afghan government itself
has set forth as its next planning phase. That was the basis
for the Berlin conference and the donor discussion. It seems to
me that that answers part of your question because the
proposals and goals in education help reconstruction. All of
those in a sense begin with an Afghan input, and while there
has been support from lots of people, that does depict to some
degree Afghan ownership.
Whether we stay with them throughout that process is going
to be the question, and that will determine whether or not
there is a maintenance of the kind of sympathy for the United
States that was described. If we pull out or if we begin to
ramp down our involvement during this period, I suspect that it
is going to go the other way.
The key issue is, are we going to stay with them and create
the kind of security environment that permits these other
things to take place. I spoke with an aid worker, and I asked
her about going out to some of the rural programs that the U.S.
is funding. I said, ``How do you drive there? I drove to
Gardez.'' She said, ``We do not go really by road. It would
take a car full of shooters in front and a car full of shooters
behind as an escort.''
When you think about that kind of security obstacle to
reconstruction, you know that the situation remains extremely
hard, and it requires continued military engagement and, as you
say, an expanded involvement.
I would also note with respect to legitimacy of the
government, the most important thing we can do, it seems to me,
is to help ensure that parliamentary elections take place and
represent all parts of the country in the context of security
where there is a belief that they can be credible and they can
be fair because they really are going to set the stage for the
next period of development of Afghan institutions. And if they
are not fair, we also will be blamed for it.
The Chairman. Let me interrupt at this point because I
wanted to recognize Senator Feingold. I will ask other members
of the panel who might have responses to my questions to
withhold for the moment, and we will get back to that in
another round.
I just wanted to comment, Mr. Schneider, as I listened to
you, perhaps what we need--and this is never exactly the right
metaphor, but something like the 10 Plus 10 Over 10 program
that we have with Russian nuclear disarmament, for example. In
other words, with the Nunn-Lugar program, we say we are going
to go for 10 years, and therefore you in the G-8, the other
seven, can count on that. The Russians can count on that. That
is 10 years and $20 billion. Maybe it is that kind of
commitment in which in fact no government, including our own,
can appropriate in this place for years down the trail, and yet
there is at least sufficient bipartisan support that that is in
our national interest. It occurs to me maybe as a picture of
what people in Afghanistan and our NATO allies need to see,
maybe not the G-8, but in this case, whoever sort of adds in at
least. There are additions to this program given that kind of
context.
Mr. Schneider. I would agree absolutely.
The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to
thank Senator Biden for calling this important hearing, and I
want to thank all the witnesses for being here.
The last time the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a
hearing explicitly focused on Afghanistan was in late January
of this year, and I remember asking Ambassador Taylor at that
hearing about how we will define success in Afghanistan. He
told me that our mission will be complete when a stable,
responsible government that will never harbor terrorists is
firmly in control of the country.
In the months since that hearing, Americans have continued
to fight and die in Afghanistan, and clearly insecurity
persists in much of the country. It is unfortunate that there
are no witnesses here today from the administration who could
speak authoritatively to current U.S. policy and, most
importantly, to what has changed in the last 4 months. What
progress have we made toward overcoming the obstacles to policy
goals? Do our goals actually remain the same? Do we believe
that our current strategy is working, or do we need to make
changes to achieve success?
When we reflect on the terrible attacks of September 11th,
2001, when we remember when and why we embarked on our current
initiative in Afghanistan, we then recapture the sense of
urgency and priority that I fear is sometimes missing from
discussions of this initiative today.
So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses even more
in the future and also to hearing especially from the
administration sometime soon about where this whole effort
actually stands.
I would like to ask the panel a follow-up on a question
Senator Lugar asked related to the success of U.S. public
diplomacy efforts thus far in Afghanistan. How about U.S.
efforts to explain our policy and practices in Afghanistan to
the rest of the world? How does the Muslim world view the
continuing U.S. intervention in Afghanistan today? Mr.
Schneider?
Mr. Schneider. It is varied. Obviously, there are those
who are linked to the more extreme side of the Islamic world
that criticize everything that we have done and criticize the
international community generally, what the United Nations is
doing.
I think that it is important to note that we generally have
support from many of the Islamic governments in the region, and
after 9/11 and the adoption of the resolutions authorizing the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and
authorizing the intervention in Afghanistan, I think that you
have seen a degree of sympathy that is, unfortunately,
obviously not there in Iraq.
Senator Feingold. Apart from the governments, what about
the Muslim peoples? Do they, in your view, distinguish pretty
clearly between what we are doing in Afghanistan and what is
happening in Iraq, or do they see it as part of the same thing?
Mr. Schneider. I think it is a closer question there. The
level of communication within the Islamic world gets to be
biased to some degree by the kinds of messages that come, and I
would say that it is not quite as clear. In Afghanistan, I do
not think there is any question about the feeling of the people
about getting rid of Al Qaeda and the Taliban and the support
for the international effort, although with a growing degree of
concern about where it is going.
Senator Feingold. How about the recent news? Has the Iraq
prison scandal and the reports of other instances of abusive
treatment that occurred in U.S. military prisons in Afghanistan
and elsewhere affected international perceptions of U.S. policy
in Afghanistan?
Mr. Schneider. That is going to. There was a Human Rights
Watch report 2 months ago. I do not have any question that
given what is going on in Iraq, that there will be--and there
should be--a focus on allegations of mistreatment of detainees,
on whether or not the Geneva Convention is being respected, the
kinds of management of those facilities, and I do not have any
question that there will be a greater negative view on the U.S.
role. And as a result of the publicity around it, I am sure
that there is going to be, unfortunately, a very negative
message coming out.
Dr. Gouttierre. Senator Feingold, I think in Afghanistan
right now, the people of Afghanistan, after nearly 30 years of
instability, violence, war, they are focused on Afghanistan. I
think the issues relating to Iraq come to their attention
primarily in their own fear that the U.S. focus on Iraq will
lead the U.S. from doing what they hope the U.S. will do for
Afghanistan in its reconstruction.
I think also the impact of what we are doing in Afghanistan
right now is not going to register high on any country's
citizens just because we are so shortly into the process. So
little has been made evident that we are nearing any type of
goal. I think that that is going to take time. I always like to
tell people, it is going to take Afghanistan nearly a decade to
put it back where it was in 1973 so that it can begin
developing from there. I think it is going to take us a long,
long time, as has been suggested by a number of comments here.
I cannot remember who said that. I think maybe it was David,
but if it was one of the other of you, I apologize. But we need
to make it very clear that this is not just a 2-year, a 3-year,
a 7-year program you mentioned, Senator. This has to be a long-
term commitment.
I think as we have successes, if we do not muddle through
in our approach, we will continue to sustain the respect and
appreciation of the Afghans, and others will begin to notice.
But we are not going to be able to use this for any spin at the
moment. It is just going to take too much time and too much of
an effort because there is so much left to be done.
Senator Feingold. Recent press reports indicate that
Pakistan has offered amnesty to foreign militants who have been
operating along the border with Afghanistan. What does this
mean for our efforts to eliminate the terrorist presence in
Afghanistan and bring stability to the country?
Mr. Schneider. I personally think it is a very bad idea,
particularly as was originally put out, there was no
distinction between which foreigners they are talking about,
whether they are Afghans or whether they are part of Al Qaeda.
I think that that needs to be looked at very closely, and I
would urge the committee to, in fact, look at that very closely
in order to make a recommendation to the administration and to
Pakistan, with whom we obviously have a very strong
relationship. But to provide amnesty to Al Qaeda forces seems
to me a bad, bad idea.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Isby?
Mr. Isby. Perhaps more importantly it depends who is being
amnestied and where. Certainly individuals carrying
Kalashnikovs are not the issue. The problem is the Taliban
leadership and not only the ``moderate'' Taliban who live
openly in places such as Quetta. I am more concerned perhaps
about madrasas and other institutions that provide money and
funding for cross-border violence than individuals--Uzbeks or
whatever--who may be caught as foot soldiers. So that is the
most important thing.
This is also vital to the focus of Pakistan. The future of
Pakistan is not going to thrive if the people who support the
violence in Afghanistan remain strong and to a large extent
outside the rule of law.
Senator Feingold. Let me ask if the pervasive climate of
insecurity in Afghanistan in recent months has led to increased
popular support for a return to Taliban rule simply out of a
desire to see some order, even if that order is unjust and
repressive. I know that Senator Biden sort of got at this from
a different angle. I just wonder if we could put on the record
any responses to that.
Mr. Perito. Senator, I do not think that is the case. I
think that the Taliban resurgence, thanks to the effectiveness
of Operation Enduring Freedom, is contained along the Pakistani
border. The greater threat to security within the country, as
we have talked before, is the warlords. That is something which
we now we need to begin to focus on.
I believe the solution lies in going after the problem of
narcotics because it is the narcotics trade that provides the
funding to all those people who oppose our goal, which is a
strong democratic and effective central government. Draining
away resources through doing something about narcotics would
begin to really affect the situation.
There is now total impunity for the narcotics trade. The
government has no enforcement capability. That enforcement
capability is coming on line, but it is coming on line very
slowly. That is where we need to place our emphasis. We need to
begin to create disincentives at the same time we create
alternatives.
Mr. Isby. Certainly there is no national economy either,
and that is the key thing. Narcotics enforcement before a
national economy is put in place may not be efficacious. And I
point out this is one reason I have been talking about a long-
term commitment; many of these problems do not have short-term
solutions. The Afghan institutions and the Afghans have to have
ownership of the program to suppress the narcotics trade. They
are going to take years to train, deploy, and get there which
is going to sit poorly with Americans who want solutions now.
Mr. Perito. Can I take this argument on just for a second?
There is a national economy in Afghanistan. It is an opium-
based economy. If opium was a legal commodity, Afghanistan
would be the poster child for international development. In
fact, it is an illegal commodity, and we have an economy which
is based on organized criminal activity. That is our first
challenge. We have only to look at Colombia for an example of
what happens to a society when organized crime becomes the
motivating factor in the economy and the driving force in the
society. We cannot wait. We have to start doing something about
that now.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for your answers.
Dr. Gouttierre. Senator Feingold, I want to quickly----
Senator Feingold. Very quickly because I have got to go.
Dr. Gouttierre (continuing). ----Just ask any of these
journalists if they feel there is a sympathy in Afghanistan for
in any way a return of the Taliban. No possibility. The
lifestyle of the Taliban is an anathema to Afghans. When I
lived there for 10 years in the 1960s and 1970s, it was not
that kind. Women were not wearing veils. Women were working.
Women were even wearing mini-skirts. There was an active,
modern life in that country. The Taliban style of life is not,
in the minds of the Afghan people, a desirable choice.
Senator Feingold. Obviously, I am very pleased to hear
that.
Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, I understand obviously you
have worked hard to keep Afghanistan from slipping off the
agenda of the Congress and the administration. I know you plan
to hold another hearing with representation from the
administration in the coming weeks, and I want thank you for
your continued leadership on this, and I thank the panel for
the answers.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Be assured that we will hear from the administration again. Our
hope today, of course, was to hear from each of you, some
independent benchmarks as to how things are going. We have not
asked any of you to take responsibility for this, as we will do
with future administration witnesses. It is not that they would
have to be overly defensive, but at the same time, you do not
have to defend anybody. You can offer your suggestions, which
are very helpful, I think, for our consideration. As Senator
Feingold has phrased it, I think correctly, we are attempting
to make sure Afghanistan remains very much on the agenda, even
in the midst of other stories currently that are also very
important to us.
Let me just continue the discussion of the narcotics and
the poppies. Mention has been made, for instance, of Colombia
and before then, Peru and the Upper Huallaga Valley. Those of
us who have visited those areas found, just as you have pointed
out today, that this is a daunting problem in terms of
substitution. If you are a farmer and you are making 10 times
as much off of poppies as you can over any visible alternative,
this is a very tough choice in a situation in which people are
very poor to begin with. What clearly is astonishing for most
observers, as you have pointed out, and as I have mentioned in
my opening statement, is that as much as half of the gross
domestic product of the country comes from opium, from the drug
trade. That is a formidable situation. As you pointed out, Mr.
Isby, there has to be an economy.
What are the possibilities for the development of an
economy? If opium is 50 percent now, what could substitute for
it--not just simply agricultural substitution, but what other
industries? You mentioned trade. That opens up possibilities,
but we have also said that the road system and security are
currently, to say the least, pretty dicey, even for
governmental officials now. I am just trying to get some sort
of a road map in mind. Granted, I know that this is a long-term
problem, or at best an intermediate problem, in terms of a
substantial solution. What is the prognosis for some successful
strategy?
Mr. Schneider. If I could just speak specifically to that.
The Chairman. Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. If you look at the plan that was submitted
by the government of Afghanistan with the support of the World
Bank, they identify three major sectors. Actually agriculture
is one of those where they anticipate in the short term, in 1
to 5 years, 10 to 15 percent growth per year is possible in
cereals, in livestock, and in other areas. Also, as you noted,
in industry they focus on transport power as again about the
same level of per-year growth and in services. They do, in
fact, feel that you can have a fairly successful growth over
the course of the next 10 years without having poppies. They
also argue that to some degree it undermines the ability for
the licit economy to take hold because it brings with it the
kind of violence that undercuts the possibility for private
investment.
I would just add that poppy cultivation in the case of
Afghanistan is somewhat different than the case of cocaine
cultivation in Colombia and Peru. The recent surveys that the
UN has done show that the Afghan poppy growers turn only about
27 percent of their land to poppy cultivation, but the bulk of
their land is dedicated to other crops, generally food crops.
So there is a slight difference in the relative impact of
eradication on farm incomes in Afghanistan contrasted to
Colombia where the bulk of their land goes to coca or poppy
cultivation.
The other fact to remember is that the $2.3 billion is
divided, a billion for farmers and $1.3 billion for the
traffickers. So I think that one of the things that we would
argue, at least I would argue strongly, is to go after the
traffickers, focus on interdiction; go after warehousing,
laboratories as a first step. Do not forget about eradication,
but that is the one where you want to be sure that you are not
going after the small farmer and putting him in a situation
where he cannot survive. I think that there is a distinction
there. In fact, you can then link that to the building up of an
alternative rural development program, which everybody
recognizes is necessary.
The Chairman. Mr. Schneider, you mentioned--this I think is
an important point--that the Afghan government itself has a
plan. Now, a year ago roughly, in June of last year, I met with
President Karzai, the Minister of Finance, and other ministers
of the Afghan government at the World Economic Forum conference
outside of Amman, Jordan. On that occasion, the Finance
Minister, as I recall, had a 5-year plan. His plea was both for
help from the United States, first of all, in financing what he
hoped would be our part of it, and likewise for diplomacy with
regard to other countries before a pledging conference that was
due shortly thereafter, in addition to others that might come
along.
I thought this was very important. I contrasted this, for
example, with the fact that in Iraq there was no 5-year plan,
not any plan of that sort, unfortunately. So this is prior to
the constitution's success and other things that have come
along subsequently. I want to highlight that because there is
within this government, if we are talking about how Afghans are
going to try to move to govern themselves, at least this kind
of ongoing line of thought.
What is not clear to most of us is the contents of the
plan. You have illuminated some of that today. This is probably
going to be helpful not only for members of the American
Congress and the American press and so forth, but for everybody
who is thinking about this, who seek some idea of what Afghans
envision, and how, if the money was provided, you would fill in
the gaps, whether it be with the help of our country or
internationally.
Mr. Isby, you were wanting to comment.
Mr. Isby. Certainly. The plan, which Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai
has presented at Berlin, has received general acceptance. I
would say, however, more important than the contents of the
plan itself is the fact that it is a plan. We can see not just
a request for more money, whatever the donors come up with, but
a way to get from here to there that they hope will get them
away from dependence on international aid.
Now, everyone knows that economic plans, as a whole, have a
very poor track record of implementation, but I think the most
important thing, rather than as a road map, is as an example of
how the Afghans can build their own future.
I agree that looking at the things that create a national
economy is important. Currently the Afghan economy is much
broken into regional areas which are low-rent annexes to the
economies of their neighbors. That is one of the reasons why
the emergence of a national economy is going to increase
legitimacy and competence of Kabul, when it acquires functions
other than simply giving out aid money to regions or to other
participants. So making Afghanistan economically viable through
trading, extractive activities, and with the help of the Afghan
diaspora is critical. That is a key advantage they did not have
in the old days. Afghans from overseas have foreign business
contacts. The micro-credit projects the Americans have stressed
can also help there.
The Chairman. Mr. Perito.
Mr. Perito. Yes. There is a difference between Afghanistan
and Colombia that I think is worth noting. Other than three
major provinces in the south, growing opium poppy is a new
experience for most people in the country. This is a recent
phenomenon, and it is one that could be rolled back. We have to
remember that a couple of years ago when the Taliban decreed
that all opium production must stop, it did for 1 year. There
is a cultural impediment against growing opium, and that is the
moral problems that exist relative to Islam. So that is
something we need to utilize for our crusade against narcotics.
Then there are several things that we can do, and we are
beginning to do them. The program to begin to create
alternative livelihoods has now been funded by Congress, and it
is starting in Afghanistan. But this has to be sustained over
the long term.
Mr. Schneider. Could I just add to that?
The Chairman. Yes, of course.
Mr. Schneider. That is one of the areas where, it seems to
me, that we made a major mistake. We had very little available
to fund alternative development for the first several years.
When I was in Afghanistan in November, I asked the embassy and
was told that they had something like $17 million to $20
million available, total, for alternative development. If you
contrast that with the $1 billion farm gate, you can see the
impossible situation. Even today, in terms of the funding that
has been made available through State and INL (Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs), they
essentially have about $30 million total from the FY 2002
supplemental and this last FY 2004 supplemental for alternative
livelihoods. The rest is focused on eradication and
enforcement. It is just not enough.
The Chairman. Let me ask now about Pakistan. We have
touched upon that in several different ways, but each of you
has mentioned that they are neighbors, and they have their
influence in different ways. In the case of Pakistan, the
question was raised, and you responded to Senator Biden, Mr.
Schneider, that it was a mistake on the part of the Pakistanis
to offer amnesty to various people.
President Musharaf is under great pressure from people in
his government and elsewhere. First of all, he faces pressure
from us to pursue Al Qaeda and the Taliban. From time to time,
there are new Pakistani efforts to do that, that have some
vigor. Then after a few weeks, there is less vigor, and the
situation comes to a halt until there is another round, simply
because in that particular area of the country, as President
Musharaf has explained to us in a couple of coffees the
committee has had, as have other Pakistanis, there is a tenuous
Pakistani hold. The Afghan government is not the only one that
sometimes, in terms of its central government, has difficulty.
Some of the territory near the border seems to be among those
provinces that are the most tenuous, and that have the
strangest election results when pressed by us and others to let
democracy work. Democracy does work, but with very adverse
consequences toward Musharaf and the central government.
Now, on the other hand, Pakistanis strongly feel that the
situation would be very much exacerbated by American troops
marching in there and going after Al Qaeda or the Taliban,
either one. At this point, Musharaf's difficulties with regard
to his maintenance and control of the army and civil society
really take a blow and continue taking blows so long as we are
there rumbling about. This is bound to lead to a very
unsatisfactory situation for a while, for those in Afghanistan
who are nearby, because many of our troops are close by on the
border, and sometimes they are engaged in military action.
Sometimes tragic errors occur, and innocent Afghans are killed.
Mistakes are made with regard to intelligence.
So, in the same way that we were talking earlier about how
Afghans like us, in some situations that has turned abruptly.
Yet we would say, listen, we came over here to try to clean up
the Al Qaeda situation and the more orthodox Taliban, and we
are still here for that task. In a way, Afghans understand
that. They just wish we were more fastidious in our work, more
successful with regard to our relationship with Pakistan.
Can any of you foresee some way to offer some blue sky in
this situation?
Yes, Doctor.
Dr. Gouttierre. I think if in the textbook on American
foreign policy failures, the chapter on Pakistan would be the
lead article or the lead chapter. We have not made friends and
influenced people. We have made enemies and lost our influence
there. And that is with a country which at one time was really
very friendly to the United States. I do not think you can find
a Pakistani who would use the term ``reliable'' in describing
the United States in any form of the relationship. Every
politically correct issue that comes before Congress is visited
upon the Pakistanis and our relationship. We have been in and
out, and we are back in again because it is in our interest,
and that is what Pakistanis see.
We have not yet, I think, convinced the Pakistanis that our
presence back in Pakistan is in their interest, and that is
where the blue sky has to be sought. We have had our military
in Pakistan, as well you know. They were a charter member of
the Baghdad Pact, as were Iraq and Iran. It is kind of a sad
story there if you take a look at that one. There is only
Turkey and the U.S. left of no pact.
But in any case, I think the only way we are going to be
able to do this is to find some way to convince the Pakistanis
that we are there in their interest. I think Musharaf
understands that Pakistan's interest was not being advanced by
the influence that the fundamentalists were having upon the
Pakistani citizenry. He came to understand that the pan-Islam
was more important to the Pakistani than any pan-Pakistani or
Pakistani nationalism. I think that is the element we have to
work with.
Pakistan needs a lot of help economically. One of the best
things that could happen to Pakistan is to have access to
natural gas in Turkmenistan, which will have to travel through
Afghanistan because that is the cheapest and most direct route,
and Pakistan has a lot of labor that can be put to work in a
very sophisticated country in terms of certain industries.
Mr. Isby. One hopes the U.S. relationship with Pakistan
will improve. I mean, unfortunately, in the case of the
Pakistani military, even if Musharaf has been brought over to
support our Afghanistan policy, the evidence is less clear that
this is shared by all military. They see the ethnic, the ethno-
linguistic dimension as primary, and their goal is still an
ethnic Pashtun government in Kabul that would follow an
Islamist agenda comparable to what they believe in. They
believe that this is important for Pakistani national security.
One of the reasons that the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan is
important is to say to the Pakistani military that, guys, this
is not going to happen. Instead, work with us. We can deal with
your national security concerns other ways.
Now, it would be great if we had another carrot to offer
the Pakistanis. It would be great if we could wave a magic wand
and create a Northern Ireland solution in Kashmir. That is not
going to happen anytime soon. But Musharaf needs to have things
more concrete than the designation as a major non-NATO ally to
show to his supporters and electorate, to say the future is
with the Americans, not the people killing aid workers. Let us
go with them.
Mr. Schneider. If I could just add one thing, Mr.
Chairman, and that is I think one of the problems in Pakistan
is that we have not emphasized that the government's movement
back to democracy is an important objective in our
relationship. I think we have issued several reports that we
strongly argue that Musharaf in fact could take more action
against the radical Islamist groups within Pakistan without
endangering his political situation. The evidence that we have
had about madrasas continuing to be the source of recruitment
for extremists, both with respect to Kashmir, but also with
respect to, most importantly, to Afghanistan, is clear. And the
steps that Musharaf promised with respect to regulation, of
financing, et cetera, of those madrasas has not taken place.
The Chairman. Well, we could have and should have another
hearing on Pakistan soon. I wanted to raise this because this
is a difficult neighborhood. As all of you know, in terms of
our foreign policy prior to 9/11, our relations with Pakistan
were nil or barely alive. Suddenly Secretary Powell, in a
dramatic meeting I recall somewhere, perhaps over in S. 407 of
the Capitol Building, comes over and says to us, you have got
to lift all of the sanctions on Pakistan, military, economic,
and what have you, now and permanently. This is a new world,
new business.
Well, that was a long drink of water all in one statement.
Many people asked, all of them? Permanently? After all, there
has been an overthrow of democracy. They had a nuclear test,
albeit one in India as well, but we ought to have sanctions on
them too. Powell replied, lift all of them, at the same time on
both.
This is quite an evolution, in fact, almost a revolution in
American foreign policy in the region, in a very short period
of time. The other steps that are required to build on that
relationship--so that both of those countries have confidence
in us, are very important. In the meanwhile, we are discussing
Afghanistan, which is in the midst of all of this. Iran is a
major influence, but that is another story all by itself, as we
try to develop American foreign policy in the region. I
mentioned this simply because it would be helpful if we could
just take Afghanistan in isolation, but of course that is not
possible. We understand that, and you have illustrated that.
Dr. Gouttierre. That is what makes doing it right in
Afghanistan so important.
The Chairman. Yes.
Dr. Gouttierre. That is the point. Pakistan with 150
million people compared to Afghanistan with between 15 million
and 22 million, whatever people find--there are all kinds of
estimates primarily generated by computer programs, not real
counts. It is something that we can deal with, and it is in the
middle. As I said, location, location, location. It is in the
center of it all.
Mr. Isby. But truly, it is harder to deal with things with
the Iranians where we have much less influence, if any, and
also things like the nongovernmental money coming out of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. With the elections coming
up, I suspect the candidates they are going to fund are those
which are committed not to traditional Afghan forms of Islam
but those who have been paid by Wahabis in the past. This is a
time when money is going to be very key. It is also a problem
for the Americans who see reconstruction largely as a secular
process and are not comfortable with its Islamic dimension. We
are going to have to deal with this because, as well as
rebuilding the country and institutions, Afghan Islam has to be
rebuilt because, since 1978, people have been sending money to
Afghanistan for outside strains of Islam from Deobandis, from
Wahabis, many different sources. Very few people have been
helping and nurturing the Afghan practice of Islam which has
been resistant, over 1,300 years, to terrorism and extremism.
The Chairman. This is why I started with Dr. Gouttierre and
his thought that we have some friends in Afghanistan. There is
some basis, therefore, to hope that some day that will be the
case in greater numbers in the surrounding countries as well.
That would be very important for our foreign policy.
Just putting on our hats as people in political life for a
while, you go to constituents and they might well ask why in
the world are we contributing money to the governments of
people who dislike us? Take a look at the polls, and what they
think of us, and so forth! Yet this is a long-term situation.
The polls may change, but maybe not for quite a while.
At least in Afghanistan, the case being made for doing
more, for augmenting the appropriations the administration is
asking for and trying to offer amendments that are constructive
for those programs, is really a viable situation that I believe
has political support in this country. American people want to
see success there, and they are prepared to spend some time
doing that. We, in our own way, have to keep underlining that.
Well, I very much appreciate your testimony today, both
your initial papers, which are a great contribution to our
record, as well as your responses to our questions. We look
forward to staying in touch with you as this progresses.
Having said that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
Afghanistan
A P P E N D I X
----------
Additional Material Submitted by the International Crisis Group
______
elections and security in afghanistan
Kabul/Brussels, 30 March 2004
I. OVERVIEW
Representatives of the Afghan government, the UN and the major
donor countries and institutions will assemble in Berlin on 31 March
and 1 April for the first high-level diplomatic meeting on Afghanistan
in more than two years. The principal objective is to secure
substantial long-term aid commitments--the Afghan government seeks
U.S.$27.6 billion over seven years. In addition to meeting this global
figure, it will be important for donors to make multi-year pledges that
provide a basis for predictability and to increase cash on hand for
immediate projects over the coming year. All this is needed if
Afghanistan's governance and security institutions are to be
reconstructed, development goals met, and poverty alleviated.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The conference will be guided in part by a document, ``Securing
Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and Strategic Pathway Forward,''
that revises cost estimates for national reconstruction. It was
prepared by the Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority, headed
by Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, and includes several technical
annexes produced by the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA) that assess, often frankly, the degree of progress
made in such key areas as disarmament, demobilisation, and
reintegration; police and national army training; and judicial and
civil service reforms. Available at http://www.af. See also, Finance
Ministry, ``Press Release on Berlin Conference,'' 24 March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unless conference participants also set in train discussion of the
political framework within which aid can be effectively utilised,
however, they will only be doing part of their job. In particular,
there is need to:
discuss candidly the security failings and other internal
obstacles that are seriously hindering implementation of the
Bonn Agreement and endangering the success of the September
2004 presidential and parliamentary elections that are meant to
promote accountable, democratic government;
establish much more quickly the promised robust
international security presence beyond Kabul, which is vital to
the disarmament and reintegration (DR) \2\ of Afghanistan's
militias and in turn to fostering an environment in which a
culture of democratic politics can develop; and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ For greater simplicity and in the hope that the usage will
become more common, ICG employs in its reporting the abbreviation DR,
to include, as appropriate to individual situations, the concepts of
disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement, and
reintegration that are elsewhere often abbreviated as DDRRR or DDR.
give greater attention to the legal and institutional
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
infrastructure required for democratic politics.
The international community's failure thus far to extend a strong
security umbrella beyond Kabul is perpetuating, indeed deepening, the
political and economic power of regional commanders. Even Kabul, where
militiamen from Panjshir and Shamali remain concentrated more than two
years after their entry into the capital, is not yet demilitarised.
NATO still lacks troop commitments from its member states to deploy
additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) across northern
Afghanistan by September, as its already slow plan for gradually
extending its presence in the countryside envisages. Nor has it
obtained a commitment of troops for forward-basing rapid reaction
forces as originally planned.
The new Afghan National Army (ANA) has suffered setbacks that limit
its ability to extend the authority of the central government,
facilitate DR, and provide security during the elections. Ministry of
defence control of the recruitment process initially led to a
disproportionate representation of Tajiks in the ANA, a situation that
has prompted the U.S. to establish recruitment centres in Jalalabad,
Kabul, Gardez and Bamiyan in an effort to encourage a more diversified
army. The desertion rate in the ANA reached 10 per cent during the
summer of 2003. A number of measures have been taken to address the
desertion problem but the present strength of approximately 7,500 is
still far short of the 40,000 projected by Coalition officers.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See Dr. Antonio Giustozzi and Mark Sedra, ``National Army:
Technical Annex,'' in ``Securing Afghanistan's Future,'' op. cit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DR programs to cut down the many militias around the country are
going slowly. The proposed establishment of new Special Forces-led
militia units (Afghanistan Guard Forces, AGF) would cut across those
programs, providing a disincentive to DR. There is, moreover, no
publicly disclosed plan for the eventual disarmament and demobilisation
of the AGF. The hazards in the AGF concept include increasing the
authority and armament of militia commanders as well as potential
command and control problems.
President Hamid Karzai has yet to issue either a draft electoral
law or a presidential decree on the provincial and district boundaries
that would form electoral constituencies. The registration of political
parties has proceeded very slowly, in part due to a cumbersome
structure for registration that involves screening by six different
government departments or ministries, but also due to political
pressure exerted by fundamentalist leaders. Only about 1.5 million
voters out of an estimated potential electorate of 10 million have been
registered, and those unevenly. Registration is markedly lower in the
south and southeast in both absolute numbers and the proportion of
women.
There is a real risk that elections under present conditions will
merely confirm an undemocratic and unstable status quo. To avoid this,
the international community needs to make serious efforts over the next
few months to invigorate the disarmament and reintegration process,
guarantee the independence and impartiality of electoral institutions,
and ensure that Afghan authorities create opportunities for non-
militarised political parties and independent candidates to participate
meaningfully in the electoral process.
II. DISARMAMENT AND REARMAMENT
The salient feature of the UNDP-managed DR fund, known as
Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP), is that it is an
essentially voluntary process, with the ministry of defence having
ultimate authority to identify the target personnel. The program is
intended to cover 100,000 militiamen over three years; that figure is
based on negotiations with the ministry not on informed estimates of
the actual number of active-duty and reserve forces affiliated with the
militias. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) estimates
the maximum number of troops in the militias recognised by the ministry
at 45,000.\4\ ICG's own observations at militia corps and division
bases, coupled with interviews with Afghan professional officers,
suggest that the number of active duty personnel is lower still. The
elasticity of membership in militia units and the paucity of
information about district level command structures make any projection
of potential strength inherently speculative.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Ibid.
\5\ See ICG Asia Report No. 65, Disarmament and Reintegration in
Afghanistan, 30 September 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With most militia commanders maintaining only a relatively small
number of combatants on active duty but retaining the capacity to
mobilise many more through ``team leaders'' (sargroups) in each
village, the scope for abuse of the process is considerable. Not
surprisingly, the first ANBP pilot project in Kunduz--which collected
arms from 1,008 former combatants, slightly above the target figure of
1,000-- yielded a high proportion of effectively demobilised
combatants: small farmers who had not seen active combat since the
intervention against the Taliban in the northeast.\6\ Moreover, some
troops ostensibly demobilised during the subsequent pilot project in
Mazar-i Sharif were later re-recruited by their commanders. There is
inherent risk in downsizing, rather than decommissioning militia
units.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Mark Sedra (BICC/UNAMA), ``Disarmament, Demobilisation, and
Reintegration of Ex-Combatants,'' in ``Securing Afghanistan's Future,''
op. cit.
\7\ ICG interview with an ANBP official, 25 March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A major impasse developed in early 2004 over ANBP implementation in
the central region, encompassing the provinces of Kabul,\8\ Parwan,
Kapisa, Wardak, and Logar, and including the key units directly
accountable to Vice President and Defence Minister Mohammad Qasim
Fahim. The main phase of DR there was originally slated for February
but was stalled by the defence ministry. The Army Chief of Staff,
General Bismillah Khan, insisted that all pilot projects should be
completed before the main DR phase was launched in Kabul.\9\ Subsequent
developments led some international observers to speculate that the
ministry was attempting to stall those other pilot programs in order to
protect the militia presence in Kabul. Getting the ministry to field
its operational groups (the units assigned to the ANBP for
registration, collection, and storage of weapons, and other tasks) has
been a persistent problem, as has been delivery of vehicles for the
operational group assigned to the Kandahar pilot project.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Conversely, provincial division commanders interviewed by ICG
in Takhar and Khost, in July and August 2003, argued that DR should be
implemented in Kabul prior to its roll out in the provinces. See ICG
Asia Report, Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan, op. cit.
\9\ ICG interview with a diplomat in Kabul, 13 March 2004.
\10\ ICG interview with a diplomat in Kabul, 25 March 2004. Weapons
that are collected in the program are brought to Kabul and stored at
the Afghan National Army base, under a dual key system that prevents
the ministry of defence from having unilateral access to the storage
containers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defining the scope of the main phase of DR was contentious as well.
The UN and Japan, the program's major donor, maintain that the
objective should be the decommissioning of entire divisions, leading to
a 40 per cent reduction prior to elections in the overall size of the
Afghanistan Military Forces (AMF), as the militias are collectively
known. The ministry proposed instead that the size of each militia be
reduced by 40 per cent, leaving their structures intact and therefore
the formal authority of each of their commanders. DR would thus become
a cosmetic exercise in which militias currently enjoying the status of
divisions would be downgraded to battalions, battalions would be
downgraded to regiments, and so on.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A compromise reached on 25 March 2004 by UNAMA, the ANBP, President
Karzai, and Defence Minister Fahim, in the presence of U.S. Ambassador
Zalmay Khalilzad, entailed only modest concessions by the minister.
Under its terms, a 40 per cent reduction in the size of the AMF is to
be achieved by decommissioning 20 per cent of the units and downsizing
a further 20 percent by July 2004. The decommissioning is projected to
include four Kabul-based units: Division 7, composed of Badakhshani and
Panjshiri troops, linked respectively to former President Burhanuddin
Rabbani and Fahim; Division 10, composed of troops from Paghman, linked
to Ittihad i-Islami leader Abd al-Rabb Rasul Sayyaf; Division 31,
composed of Hazara troops from the Harakat-i Islami faction led by
Agriculture Minister Sayyid Hussain Anwari; and Regiment 42, a Pashtun
unit. Of the units to be decommissioned, the most significant
politically would be Division 10, based in West Kabul, near Sayyaf's
stronghold of Paghman; neither Rabbani nor Anwari wield much authority
in the capital.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ ICG interviews with diplomats in Kabul, 26-28 March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two of the three units in Kabul directly linked to Fahim, Divisions
1 and 8, composed largely of troops from Panjshir and Shamali, are
slated only for downsizing.\13\ The failure to decommission these units
ultimately reflects inadequate pressure on the defence minister from
Coalition members, a result perhaps of the erroneous assumption that
Fahim's present support for Karzai makes the disarmament of his forces
less critical. Unless that pressure is brought to bear by July 2004,
when the status of the three units will again be open to negotiation,
however, Fahim will not only be able to project, but arguably even
enhance his authority during the election campaign. Further progress on
DR, as well as credible reforms in the defence ministry, would be
compromised as a result.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another potential set of hurdles for DR and political stability
lies in a Coalition plan to re-equip and retrain militia units to
support Special Forces units in counter-insurgency operations. First
disclosed in January 2004, the plan originally entailed creating a
Pashtun force for operations in the Pashtun-populated east and
southeast. The prospect of a revamped force drawn from Pashtun militias
was immediately seized upon by General Khan as a pretext to shelve DR
in Kabul. His statements were echoed by other Tajik commanders as well
as non-military personalities associated with the former United Front
(Northern Alliance).
``The [DR] process is moving slowly because most people don't see
it as a just and fair process,'' Mohiuddin Mahdi, a leader of the
Nazhat-i Milli party, told ICG. ``In parts of Afghanistan, arms are
being distributed, new militias are being created. In other parts,
militias are being disarmed.'' \14\ The new Afghanistan Guard Force
(AGF) is accordingly now being reconceived by the Coalition as a
multiethnic force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ ICG interview with Mohiuddin Mahdi, Nazhat-i Milli, Kabul, 13
March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The top-ranking U.S. military and political representatives in
Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David Barno, who commands the Coalition
forces, and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, have publicly discussed the
AGF in terms of a proposal.\15\ Members of the diplomatic community in
Kabul, however, accord it much greater weight. One reason for the
concept is that the U.S. military is simply overstretched in
Afghanistan and will be hard pressed to meet its force requirements for
a spring offensive without significant Afghan auxiliaries. Each of the
Special Forces units deployed in Afghanistan, known as Operational
Detachment Alphas (ODAs), is intended to have twelve members but the
average is now down to eight.\16\ The delay in extending NATO/ISAF
forces beyond Kabul in sufficient size adds to the current security
vacuum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Referring to a question about ``a proposed national guard,''
General Barno was reported to have said it would number between 5,000
and 6,000 troops selected from existing militias under the ministry of
defence's control. ``Security Not Main Issue for Polls: U.S.,'' Dawn, 2
March 2004. Ambassador Khalilzad said, ``We are considering building a
5,000-man Afghan Guard Force to give increased security in the short
term especially in the south and east.'' ``Remarks by U.S. Ambassador
and Special Presidential Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad during Ghazni PRT
Opening,'' 4 March 2004. Also, ICG interview, Tim Wilder, deputy
director for Afghanistan, U.S. State Department, Washington, DC, 11
February 2004.
\16\ ICG interview, Kabul, 9 March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The size, composition and relationship to the ministry of defence
of the proposed AGF are still undetermined. In January 2004, when the
Coalition linked its proposed mandate to election security, the goal
was to have 3,000 troops trained by March and 5,000 by June--the date
by which the Bonn Agreement of 2001 envisaged elections being held.\17\
According to an informed source, the current projected goal involves
having 100 militiamen attached to each ODA. Vetting procedures remain
undefined but the recruits are likely to be drawn from units that have
been handpicked by the Special Forces, in other words, those with whom
they already have field experience.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ As noted in fn. 16 above, General Barno has recently spoken of
a possible 5,000 to 6,000-man force, and Ambassador Khalilzad of a
5,000-man force.
\18\ ICG interview, Kabul, 9 March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The AGF strategy is risky, not least for its impact on DR. Though
the Coalition initially maintained that AGF troops would be paid less
than their counterparts in the Afghan National Army, their wages plus
food, clothing, and accommodation would far outstrip the flat rate of
800 Afghanis per month that militiamen (AMF) receive from the defence
ministry (and often those salaries arrive months late or are siphoned
off by commanders). As a result, resistance to DR is reportedly growing
among AMF troops in the south, who hope that they might instead find
employment in the AGF.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most problematic, however, is the absence of a DR strategy for the
AGF itself. Rearmed, and in many cases remobilised, the AGF would
likely entrench the power of their commanders at a time when donors
expect the Karzai administration to demonstrate its authority in the
provinces. If not included in a DR program, the AGF could pose a
challenge to the new army once the Coalition presence is scaled back.
There is also the problem of countering the predatory behaviour that
Afghan militia forces have engaged in over the last twenty years. If
this is not guarded against in the proposed AGF through careful vetting
of personnel and adequate training, U.S. Special Forces in command
responsibility could be held ultimately responsible for abuses.
III. ELECTION INSTITUTIONS AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
President Karzai announced on 28 March 2004 that simultaneous
presidential and parliamentary elections would be held in September,
three months later than envisioned in the Bonn agreement. The delay
reflects concerns within UNAMA and among donor agencies assisting the
election process about the low levels of voter and political party
registration, as well as the absence of a firm security strategy for
the elections. Much remains to be done in the interim to convince the
Afghan public that the election process will be not only reasonably
free and fair, but also meaningful.
The legal framework for the elections remains unclear. A draft
election law has been under revision by the Joint Election Management
Board (JEMB), the mixed Afghan-UN commission the Afghan component of
which was appointed by Karzai and which has the mandate of managing the
electoral process. It has been anticipated that the law will be
promulgated by the president prior to the Berlin conference. The draft
does not address what is likely to be one of the most controversial
issues: the provincial and district boundaries that will serve as
electoral constituencies. This will instead be dealt with in a
presidential decree, which must be issued at least 90 days before the
election.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ ICG interviews, Kabul, 13 March and 26 March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Registration to date has been markedly uneven, with respect to both
region and gender, according to data collected and analysed by JEMB. As
of late February 2004, the multiethnic central region, including Kabul,
had by far the highest share of registered voters, 42 per cent,
followed by the mainly Pashtun east and the mainly Persian-speaking
west, each at approximately 15 per cent. There were far lower rates in
the Pashtun-majority south and south east, 5 per cent and 3 per cent
respectively. The mainly Hazara central highlands had the highest
proportion of registered women, 42 per cent of the total, followed
closely by the West, at 37 per cent. The lowest proportions were
recorded in the south and south east, where women made up less than 20
per cent of the total.\21\ These disparities, if reflected in the
election, are likely to yield results with a pronounced northern and
central bias.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Joint Electoral Management Board (JEMB), ``Voter Registration
Analysis: Week Ending 26th February 2004.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first phase of registration has been limited to the eight major
urban centres and has included a civic education campaign supported by
the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) and aimed at
government employees. Plans to carry out an accelerated three-week
registration drive during May, with a goal of registering 6.5 million
voters, were shelved in late March due to delays in appointing
qualified local staff and obtaining registration kits and to allow for
prior civic education efforts in rural areas. Postponement of the
elections to September will, according to election officers, compensate
by allowing additional time for registration. To address regional
disparities in both absolute numbers and women registered, an elections
officer told ICG, there have been efforts to mobilise traditional
elements, such as elders in Khost, and clerics. The latter issued a
resolution in Kandahar that addressed in part the need to register
women voters.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ ICG interview, Kabul, 13 March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Afghanistan's new constitution recognises the right to form
political parties, but with certain qualifications. A welcome
restriction, reflected as well in the law on political parties,
prohibits the participation of parties that have ``military or
paramilitary aims and structures.'' Other provisions, however, act as
barriers to free association by barring the formation of parties whose
charters are ``contrary to the principles of [the] sacred religion of
Islam'' or that are based on ethnicity, language, religious sect or
region.\23\ Some authorities have defined fundamental principles of
Islam to include any principle agreed upon by the major schools of
jurisprudence (fiqh); a party whose charter calls for full equality
before the law of women and men could by this reasoning be defined as
contrary to Islamic principles. Prohibiting the registration of ethnic
parties could limit the ability of ethnic groups to seek redress for
perceived injustice or discrimination through the electoral process or
to articulate and advance the demands and interests of their
communities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Constitution of Afghanistan, Article 35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To date, 27 political parties, including both mujahidin factions
and non-militarised parties established after the collapse of the
Taliban, have applied for registration at the justice ministry's Office
for Coordination and Registration of Political Parties and Social
Organisations. Five have been registered,\24\ while eight have
completed the registration process and are awaiting screening for
compliance with the constitution and the political parties law by the
ministries of interior, defence, and finance, the National Security
Directorate (NSD), and the Japanese Embassy, acting on behalf of the DR
program. Many observers believe the registration process has been slow
and may minimise the potential for non-militarised political parties to
participate actively in the upcoming elections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ The following political parties have been registered as of 25
March 2004:
Republican Party of Afghanistan, led by Sebghatullah
Sanjar, a 36-year-old former member of the Emergency Loya Jirga
Commission with a degree in political science from Kabul University.
National Unity Movement, led by Sultan Mahmud Ghazi, a
cousin of the former Afghan King Muhammad Zahir. The formerly royalist
party has been supporting President Karzai since the Constitutional
Loya Jirga.
Party of National Solidarity of Youth of Afghanistan,
led by Muhammad Jamil Karzai.
Party of Islamic Independence of Afghanistan, led by
Faruq Najrabi.
Party of National Unity of Afghanistan, led by
Abdurrashid Jalili, a former member of the Khalq faction of the
communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. ICG interviews,
Kabul, 25-26 March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A ministry of justice official told ICG that most of the new
political parties have been unable to meet the criteria specified in
the law and that some have failed to furnish a list of 700 members, the
minimum required to form a political party. Independent observers
identified other bottlenecks, including administrative difficulties in
getting the ministerial and NSD members of a review committee to
convene. According to the official, a permanent committee is now being
constituted with secondments from each of the concerned ministries and
the NSD, in the hope of expediting the review process. USAID is helping
to identify space for the registration office, which is currently very
limited.
The Kabul-based Republican Party of Afghanistan, led by a liberal
former Emergency Loya Jirga commissioner, Sebghatullah Sanjar, was the
first to be registered. Though the process took two months, Sanjar
holds a benign view: ``They [the justice ministry] carefully assessed
our applications and copies of the national ID cards of our members to
make sure one person was not a member of more than one party at the
same time. These types of inquiries are good and right indeed. We
believe in both lawfulness and political pluralism.'' \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ ICG interview with Sebghatullah Sanjar, Republican Party of
Afghanistan, 14 March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The obstacles encountered by the United National Party (UNP),
formed by former members of the Parcham faction of the communist
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), point to serious
weaknesses in the registration process, however. According to a party
member, the UNP was the first to submit a complete application but has
yet to be registered. ``Apparently, the minister [Abdul Rahim Karimi]
is under pressure by fundamentalist mujahidin such as Shinwari, Sayyaf,
Rabbani and Asif Muhsini, not to register our party,'' the party member
said. ``During a meeting with us the minister acknowledged that he is
under pressure.'' \26\ These allegations, which have also been related
to ICG by international observers, are significant not only because the
former Parchamis have a large national constituency, particularly among
the professional classes in urban areas, but also because the stigma of
being former communists can and has been used against other socially
liberal political actors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ ICG interview with a United National Party member, 13 March
2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Though very few mujahidin parties have yet applied for
registration,\27\ some are in the process of establishing front parties
and nominating new leaders in an attempt to circumvent a prohibition in
the law of parties that maintain armed forces. Sayyaf's Ittihad-I
Islami faction, for example, has been recently reconstituted as Dawat-i
Islami with his deputy, Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai, formally assuming
leadership of the party. Enforcing the intent of the political parties
law will, in the current security environment, pose a challenge for the
registration office.\28\ The likely influence of powerful
fundamentalists on the registration process, the relative vulnerability
of Minister Karimi, an Islamic law professor from Takhar who lacks an
independent power base, and the administrative obstacles would argue
for including on the permanent review committee a member of the Afghan
Independent Human Rights Commission and, for this election, UNAMA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Those that have applied include Jamiat-i Islami, led by former
President Burhanuddin Rabbani.
\28\ ICG interviews, Kabul, 25-26 March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Likewise, maintaining the independence and effectiveness of the
JEMB and the election secretariat is vital to the process. Both non-
militarised parties and international observers have questioned the
effectiveness of the Afghans whom President Karzai appointed to the
JEMB. ``The formation of the election commission [JEMB] has been
entirely based on the relationship of the officials with different
individuals,'' said the UNP member. ``They have not considered the
qualifications and competencies of the people they have appointed
there.'' \29\ That sentiment was echoed as well by Sanjar, who
maintained, ``The election commission lacks adequate experienced and
competent staff to carry out an effective registration process.'' \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Ibid.
\30\ ICG interview with Sebghatullah Sanjar, Republican Party of
Afghanistan, 14 March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The objectivity of a panel whose composition is determined or
unduly influenced by the president, who is himself a candidate, will
inevitably be disputed. The constitution mandates establishment of an
independent electoral commission by the Transitional Administration;
this should be treated as a priority, with criteria for membership
defined beforehand and approval required by the cabinet and the Afghan
Independent Human Rights Commission.
The main obstacle faced by non-militarised parties and genuinely
independent candidates, however, is the lack of adequate security
assurances. ``Young parties like ours won't be able to take part in the
election if ISAF is not expanded to ensure our security outside
Kabul,'' Sanjar said. ``Obviously, we can't compete with provincial
governors who have guns and all [other] resources under their
control.''
Current plans call for the creation of a security ring around voter
registration sites, with successive zones of authority patrolled in
turn by trained police, the Afghan National Army, and either a
Coalition or ISAF quick-reaction force, with medevac, intelligence, and
logistics capabilities.\31\ All three elements of this security
arrangement are tenuous propositions, however. Training for police
officers in the German-administered Police Academy in Kabul and
constables in the seven U.S.-supported regional training centres
established since November 2003 will not keep pace with the numbers
required for election security. The interior ministry is accordingly
attempting to expedite the deployment of 30,000 police for the
elections through a ``train the trainers'' program,\32\ a task that
should be measured against the three-year timetable intended for
training 50,000 constables and 12,000 border guards in the regional
training centres.\33\ The ANA, as mentioned earlier, has problems of
attrition and is stretched by its current deployments as presidential
guard, in counterinsurgency operations in the south east, and since
mid-March, in Herat, following armed clashes between forces loyal to
provincial governor Ismail Khan and the Kabul-backed 17th Division.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ ICG interview, Kabul, 9 March 2004.
\32\ ICG interview with a diplomat in Kabul, 25 March 2004.
\33\ See Mark Sedra, ``National Police and Law Enforcement:
Technical Annex,'' in ``Securing Afghanistan's Future,'' op. cit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the planned measures may well reduce the potential for
interference during the voting itself, security during the campaign
will be contingent on the extent to which DR has been carried out and
international security arrangements extended beyond the capital. At
present, NATO has command over both the ISAF contingent in Kabul and
the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz. Its
planners hope to complete the first of a four-phase NATO expansion
across the country with new PRTs in Maimana and Faizabad by June 2004.
This would be substantially later than conceived when NATO ministers
approved ISAF expansion in October 2003.\34\ At this time, the British-
led PRT in Mazar-i Sharif and possibly the New Zealand-led PRT in
Bamiyan would come under NATO authority.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ ICG interview, November 2003.
\35\ An alternative proposal is to establish satellite missions in
Faizabad and Baghlan, linked to the PRT in Kunduz.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase two of the NATO expansion should be concluded by September.
This entails new PRTs in the towns of Chagcharan, Qala-i Nau, and Farah
and assuming command over the existing PRT in Herat (currently U.S.-led
but expected to be taken over by a European country, an arrangement
that may be reviewed in light of the internal armed conflict in Herat
in late March and the subsequent deployment there of 1,500 ANA troops).
Current and planned PRTs across virtually the entire Pashtun belt,
extending from Kunar province up to the border of Farah province, will
be under the authority of the U.S.-led Coalition and be staffed by U.S.
army personnel. Though these eastern and southern regions are due to be
covered during phases three and four of the NATO expansion, target
dates have not been identified.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The approach taken by Britain in Mazar-i Sharif, and intended to be
echoed by a joint Nordic PRT,\37\ involves an explicit focus on
security, including patrols, support for security sector reform, and
the maintaining of small detachments in neighbouring provinces. If
additional PRTs along this model are established in the northern and
north eastern provinces by June,\38\ they may indeed have a positive
impact on security during the election campaign, even if their presence
would be insufficient to guard against intimidation and election-
related violence in outlying areas. (Phase two of the PRT expansion is
unlikely to have a comparable impact on election security unless it is
completed well before September). However, the emphasis on
reconstruction projects by the U.S.-led PRTs, together with the
diminished staffing levels that are reportedly accompanying their
expansion,\39\ will do little to promote security in the southern and
eastern provinces during the run up to elections. ``It's a hearts and
minds campaign for Americans, not for Afghans,'' a Kabul-based diplomat
said of the Coalition PRTs.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ ICG interviews with a diplomat in Kabul, 16 and 25 March 2004.
See also Nahim Qadery, ``Scandinavians to send troops: Swedish
ambassador visits northern Afghanistan ahead of expected troop
deployment,'' Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), Afghan
Recovery Report, No. 112, 26 March 2004. The report cites Swedish
ambassador Ann Wilkens as saying that Norway and Sweden plan to
contribute a combined force of 60 to 80 soldiers to the British-led PRT
in Mazar-i Sharif, in May or June 2004.
\38\ See comments by Gen. James Jones, NATO Supreme Allied
Commander, in ``NATO ready to take wider role in Afghanistan Command
Structure,'' Financial Times, 11 March 2004.
\39\ As one international observer put it, ``the Coalition is
doubling [the number of] PRTs by halving the number of people.'' ICG
interview, March 2004.
\40\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNAMA has defined a series of benchmarks that will have to be met
prior to elections if they are to be considered free and fair. These
have received the backing of the main diplomatic envoys to Afghanistan.
Security figures prominently among these benchmarks, with stipulations
that include:
. . . a vigorous [DR] program aiming at the cantonment of 100
per cent of heavy weapons and the demobilisation and
reintegration of no less than 40 per cent of the AMF troop
strength, . . . [and] promoting the deployment by NATO and the
Coalition of international military forces, both static and
mobile, in numbers large enough to assist effectively domestic
security forces in the protection of the electoral process
against extremists' attacks and factional intimidation and
interference.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ See UNAMA, ``Holding a Free and Fair Election in Afghanistan''
[undated].
The international community should treat these recommendations as
binding, and elections should be held only when the necessary measures
have been implemented.
IV. EMERGING POLITICAL FAULT LINES
The signal event during the Constitutional Loya Jirga was the
consolidation of Pashtun delegates behind President Karzai, which
ensured the retention in the draft of a strong presidency. Rather than
representing a spontaneous development, this consolidation appears to
have been the outcome of concerted lobbying by Karzai's principal
advisers and allies, including his brothers Qayyum and Ahmad Wali
Karzai and certain high-level Pashtun officials in the central
government. The decision by the pro-Karzai camp to cultivate an ethnic
support base had a profound impact upon the delegates, whose debates
over such critical issues as the extent of presidential powers and the
status of minority languages split decisively along Pashtun and non-
Pashtun lines. An alternative strategy, which would have required a
greater willingness to limit presidential powers in the constitution
and correspondingly strengthen those of parliament, could have avoided
this polarisation and helped maintain the president's standing as a
national figure.
An important element of the pro-Karzai camp's strategy was to
secure the support of Pashtun mujahidin, formerly associated with the
Hizb-i Islami factions led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Yunis Khalis, as
well as Sayyaf's Ittihad-i Islami. The incorporation of former Hizb-i
Islami personalities into the government has accelerated since the
Constitutional Loya Jirga, an indication that the support extended to
Karzai by the party's erstwhile members may be more than a short-term
alliance.\42\ Sayyaf, while promoting a more radically Islamic agenda
than that reflected in the draft constitution, was relatively muted in
his protests when his party's proposals were rejected and is reported
to have played a conciliatory role during disputes over the draft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ In the weeks since the Constitutional Loya Jirga, the
president has appointed a number of former Hizb-i Islami (Hikmatyar)
commanders and political figures to high-level posts, including Bashir
Baghlani as governor of Farah, Khyal Mohammad as governor of Zabul, and
Sabawoon as minister-adviser in the Ministry of Border and Tribal
Affairs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Simultaneously, most delegates from the royalist National Unity
Movement, a mainly Pashtun party with considerable strength in southern
and eastern Afghanistan, abandoned their support for a parliamentary
system during the Constitutional Loya Jirga and threw their weight
behind Karzai. This shift was due in part to pressure exerted upon them
during the delegate elections. According to a royalist leader, party
members in Oruzgan province were threatened with arbitrary detention by
provincial officials if they did not support candidates favouring a
presidential system. But the decisive factor appears to have been
pragmatism. ``We want to support Karzai because he is the person the
U.S. and the West have confidence in,'' the same leader said. ``Without
the support of Western countries, we can't protect our [country's]
independence.'' \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ ICG interview with a royalist party leader, Kabul, 11 January
2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That the President's camp chose to focus its attention on Pashtun
delegates was not in and of itself surprising. Support for a
centralised, presidential form of government is considerably weaker in
the north, particularly among Hazaras and Uzbeks, who have rarely held
positions of leadership at the centre. In addition, Pashtun delegates
had felt themselves marginalised during the Emergency Loya Jirga in
June 2002, when Tajiks associated with the dominant Shura-yi Nazar
faction had leveraged their control of key security institutions to
confirm their positions in the cabinet. The Constitutional Loya Jirga
offered them an opportunity to redress those grievances, particularly
with a dominant Pashtun presence in the Constitutional Commission's
secretariat and the exclusion of the Panjshiri-dominated National
Security Directorate from the Loya Jirga compound.
Since the Emergency Loya Jirga, Shura-yi Nazar has succumbed to
sharp internal rifts, with Vice President and Defence Minister Fahim
now seen to be supporting Karzai, a decision likely informed by his
expectation that the president will name him as his running mate during
the presidential election. The mantle of challenging Karzai has been
taken up Ahmad Wali Massoud, Afghan ambassador to the United Kingdom
and brother of the late Panjshiri commander Ahmad Shah Massoud; Hafiz
Mansour, the editor of the weekly newspaper, Payam-i Mujahid; Mohiuddin
Mahdi of Nazhat-i Milli, and other non-military figures associated with
the former United Front.
They have approached Abdul Rashid Dostum's Junbish-i Milli-yi
Islami, Herat governor Ismail Khan, the Shia parties Hizb-i Wahdat and
Harakat-i Islami and a few minor parties in the hope of forming a
``Front for Justice and Democracy'' that would field a common candidate
during the presidential election. This front would campaign around a
limited set of objectives: proportional representation in parliament
based upon a new census, direct election of provincial governors, and
repeal of all changes made to the text of the constitution following
the conclusion of the Constitutional Loya Jirga.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ ICG interview with Mohiuddin Mahdi, Nazhat-i Milli, Kabul, 13
March 2004. The organisers of the front would object particularly to
the current text of Article 64 (2). The Dari and Pashto texts approved
by the Constitutional Loya Jirga stated that the president's power
included ``determining basic policies of the state with the approval
(taswib)'' of the parliament. The published Dari and Pashto texts of
the constitution replaced taswib with taid, a word meaning
``confirmation.'' According to Front organiser Hafiz Mansour, taid does
not include the right to reject, and was introduced in the text to
weaken the parliament further.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The chief limitation facing its organisers at present is the lack
of firm support from a major regional commander--a circumstance one
ascribed to the militia leaders' opportunism. ``The commanders are
supporting those who are supporting them, who have confirmed them in
their posts, who are paying them,'' he said.\45\ Although the proposed
front's leaders claim to be building a national alliance, their
concerns and appeals are clearly regional and ethnic in nature. In
early January, one privately speculated that the pro-Karzai camp's
cultivation of Pashtun support during the Constitutional Loya Jirga
reflected a ``strategic imperative for Karzai and those around him to
restore Pashtun hegemony.'' \46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ ICG interview, Kabul, March 2004.
\46\ ICG interview, Kabul, 8 January.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The removal on 7 March 2004 of Haji Mohammad Mohaqqeq, a
presidential candidate and former leader of the Hizb-i Wahdat forces in
northern Afghanistan, as planning minister illustrated the continued
sensitivity of ethnic representation at the centre. In a press
conference the following day, Mohaqqeq accused Karzai of firing him
during a cabinet meeting for criticising a decision to transfer some of
his ministry's powers to Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, an ethnic
Pashtun, and in retaliation for announcing his intention to run for
president.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Karzai's spokesperson, Jawed Ludin, claimed that Mohaqqeq had
resigned following a dispute with the president during a cabinet
meeting. Amin Tarzi, ``Dispute Erupts Over Afghan Minister's Purported
Resignation,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although Mohaqqeq had been widely considered an ineffective
minister, he frequently spoke in the name of the Hazara community. In
announcing his presidential candidacy, he said he was doing so to
demonstrate that a Hazara could run for the highest office.\48\ His
dismissal less than two months after the declaration of that candidacy
prompted Hizb-i Wahdat leaders in Mazar-i Sharif to organise a 2,000-
strong demonstration against Karzai on 12 March 2004.\49\ In informal
conversations, ICG found that there was also great resentment among
ordinary Hazaras in Kabul toward Karzai and his perceived ally, the
Hazara Vice President Karim Khalili. The circumstances surrounding
Mohaqqeq's dismissal are thus likely, in the short term at least, to
enhance his standing among Hazaras and diminish Karzai's credibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Hizb-e-Wahdat Islami Afghanistan Political Committee, ``Press
Release: Ustad Mohaqiq will run for president of Afghanistan,'' 20
January 2004.
\49\ Nahim Qadery and Sayed Yaqub Ibrahimi, ``Street Protests After
Minister's Removal: Demonstrators in northern city demand reinstatement
of leading Hazara minister,'' Institute for War and Peace Reporting
(IWPR), Afghan Recovery Report No. 110, 17 March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. CONCLUSION
Political reconstruction in Afghanistan has frequently been equated
with the extension of the central government's authority. Less
attention has been paid to the development of democratic norms. The
country's long-term stability, however, rests on the ability of its
institutions to accommodate the latter process and to provide channels
through which the various components of Afghan society can find
political expression. The debates during the Constitutional Loya Jirga
on the relative powers of the president and parliament, as well as
symbols of the state such as its national and official languages,
underscore the imperative of accommodating these competing interests.
But democratic institutions can only develop in an environment that
allows open discussion about governance, something that continues to
elude Afghanistan more than two years after the signing of the Bonn
Agreement.
Without a reinvigorated DR process, political and economic life in
both the centre and the provinces will continue to be dominated by the
gun or the shadow of the gun. Elections under the prevailing conditions
will only confirm this reality--something that is understood by the
commanders who control the ministry of defence and have steadfastly
resisted efforts to dismantle their militias. The limits of the present
DR process should now be evident: unless the authority responsible for
DR, namely the ANBP, is backed by a credible deterrent, there will be
no incentive for commanders to surrender the bases of their political
and economic influence. That deterrent could be provided through NATO,
the Coalition, or a combination of the two, but neither force is
present in sufficient strength to project its authority over the larger
part of the country or considers that it is presently mandated to take
part in DR.
NATO's planned four-phase expansion across Afghanistan provides a
framework within which to create an interim security regime that would
enable DR and facilitate the rebuilding of Afghanistan's own security
institutions. But NATO's appeal to member states to contribute a modest
three battalions in the north to cover the first two phases of that
expansion has yet to result in a single firm commitment. This limited
first step must be taken very quickly if the near-term objective of
defensibly free and fair elections and the longer-term administrative
and security sector reforms proposed by the central government are to
be realised.\50\ The alternative would be continued accommodation of,
and reliance upon, militia commanders by the central government and the
surrendering of reforms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Early realisation of the NATO plan for two forward bases in
Mazar and Herat with distinct 1,000-strong rapid reaction forces would
also be highly desirable. ``NATO gets aggressive on forces for
Afghanistan,'' Reuters, 10 March 2004. Also ICG interview, Washington
DC, March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The poor integration of Coalition counter-terrorism strategy with
the Bonn political process needs to be replaced by far closer
coordination between the two. The establishment of an Afghanistan Guard
Force without a DR plan or apparently even consideration of its
potential impact on the ANBP and on political stability is a glaring
illustration of the extent to which military planning is proceeding in
isolation from the Bonn process. Donor states, even as they commit with
their checkbooks during the Berlin Conference to helping Afghanistan
over the long haul, should make it an urgent priority to harmonise
these disparate elements by promoting transparency and consultation
between military and political planners. Kabul/Brussels, 30 March 2004
__________
Additional Material Submitted by the United States Institute of Peace
______
establishing the rule of law in afghanistan
briefly
In most of Afghanistan, the rule of law has never been
strong, but after 23 years of warfare it has been displaced
almost completely by the ``rule of the gun.'' In most of the
country, regional power-holders, whether they hold official
positions or not, effectively exercise political, police and
judicial authority through their control of militia forces.
The justice system and law enforcement suffer from a very
low level of human resource and physical infrastructure
capacity. In addition, the discontinuity of regimes over the
last quarter century has left a patchwork of differing and
overlapping laws, and an incoherent collection of security
structures. Rebuilding and reform will require the commitment
of Afghan authorities and foreign donors over a long haul.
No national civilian police force yet exists in Afghanistan.
The approximately 50,000 men working as police are generally
untrained, ill-equipped, poorly paid, and illiterate, and they
owe their allegiance to local warlords and militia commanders
rather than to the central government. U.S. and German police
training programs have begun efforts to shape a national force.
From July 2003 through 2005, the United States plans to conduct
in-service training for 50,000 police in Kabul and at regional
centers. Germany will train a much smaller number of officers
in a more comprehensive program at a reconstructed Police
Academy in Kabul. No efforts appear underway to reform the
parallel and secretive intelligence police under the control of
the National Security Directorate.
Though Afghan and international officials often refer to
rule of law development as a high priority, the necessary
measures are not being treated with urgency, except for police
training. In the justice sector, no strategy has been agreed
upon for the reform and rebuilding process. Donors have left
this task largely to ``lead nation'' Italy, whose performance
and approach is seen by other donors and Afghan officials and
observers as more narrowly focused. Fractious relations among
the Afghan stakeholder institutions and the inability of the
Judicial Reform Commission to play the coordinating and
facilitating role envisioned for it have hobbled the process.
Some progress has been made in law reform, some legal
training programs are underway, and a minimal amount of
infrastructure repair has been performed. Virtually nothing has
been done to update the court structure, establish and apply
qualifications for judicial personnel (Afghan legal experts
consider many judges to be unqualified), ensure widespread
access to legal texts for practitioners and students, develop
court administration, improve the poor quality of legal
education, or address deep-rooted corruption. Defense attorneys
are essentially unheard of. The vast needs for improvement in
the corrections system have been almost entirely ignored.
The burgeoning narcotics trade presents a fundamental
challenge to the future of Afghanistan, and specifically to
efforts to develop a culture of rule of law. The trade earns
Afghan traffickers an amount equal to half the country's
legitimate GDP and nearly five times the government's budget.
Nearly all elements of local and regional power structures use
the proceeds from trafficking to fund their activities and
maintain their independence from the central government. Though
important steps have been taken to create a legal and
institutional framework for counter-narcotics work, it will be
years before the Afghan government has an operational capacity
robust enough to put a dent in the narcotics trade. Unless
U.S.-led Coalition military forces become willing to undertake
at least some counter-narcotics actions, traffickers will
continue to operate with utter impunity, and the perceived
message of tolerance of this activity will continue to
undermine efforts to build the rule of law.
Warlordism--control of local populations through force and
intimidation by provincial governors, militia commanders,
police chiefs, and other power-holders--continues to
destabilize Afghanistan and impede reform of justice and law
enforcement institutions. The most powerful warlords continue
to exercise influence over key ministries and institutions
including the judiciary.
The slow pace of efforts to establish the rule of law has
resulted in part from the inherent difficulties of conducting a
post-conflict reconstruction operation in a country that has
suffered over two decades of modern warfare. But it is also a
consequence of the decision of the United States and United
Nations to limit the international presence and to place
primary responsibility upon the Afghans for providing their own
security and directing their own reconstruction--
responsibilities they have had little capacity to execute.
A corollary to the UN's ``light footprint'' approach has
been to assign certain donors ``lead nation'' responsibility
for particular sectors. In the rule of law area, this has not
worked well. The United States already has significantly
augmented ``lead nation'' Germany's efforts in police training,
putting in place a much larger program. A similar recognition
is needed that greater international leadership and political
attention from a broader array of donors is required in the
justice sector. At the same time, Afghan authorities should
undertake to reform the judicial reform process, either
dissolving or significantly enhancing the stature and
capabilities of the Judicial Reform Commission.
An integrated, holistic approach to establishing the rule of
law is needed. Though significant funds are being put into
police training, even a well-trained force will not be able to
provide genuine law enforcement if there is no functioning
criminal justice system or corrections system in which to place
offenders. At best, such a force will be able to provide some
public order; at worst, the international community will have
enhanced the ability of power-holders to control and abuse the
population without creating mechanisms to protect the rights of
Afghans. A substantial investment in one area of rule of law
will not have a meaningful pay-off in terms of real democratic
governance and stability unless other pieces of the puzzle are
put in place as well.
introduction
Two years after the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan is at a
defining moment concerning its future. The adoption of a new
Constitution on January 4, 2003, delineated the permanent shape of
national institutions and set the stage for holding national elections.
At the same time, security remains an overwhelming concern of Afghans,
and a desire to get out from under the control of warlords remains
their primary aspiration. The country faces the combined challenges of
resurgent terrorism, factional conflict, and rampant narcotics
production. In the south, U.S.-led Coalition forces are engaged in a
running fight against al Qaeda remnants along the border with Pakistan
and against a reconstituted Taliban that retains support among the
Pashtun majority. In the north, the Afghan government is challenged by
recurrent armed conflict among regional warlords, and by the refusal of
provincial governors to turn over revenues to the center. Throughout
the country, there is a near-explosion in the cultivation of poppy.
Traditional growing areas have been augmented by vast new areas brought
under cultivation in the past year. In the absence of disincentives,
production of opium has returned to record levels and the production of
refined heroin has expanded, as has local drug consumption. With
earnings from narcotics amounting to an about half of the country's
gross domestic product, Afghanistan is in critical danger of becoming a
``narco-state.''
In most of Afghanistan, the rule of law has never been strong, but
after 23 years of warfare, it has been displaced almost completely by
the ``rule of the gun.'' Moreover, the discontinuity of regimes over
the last quarter century has resulted in a patchwork of differing and
overlapping laws, elements of different types of legal systems, and an
incoherent collection of law enforcement and military structures.
Provincial governors, militia commanders, police chiefs, and other
power brokers now exercise control through fear and intimidation, and
through manipulation of the traditional shuras (village councils). In
most of the country, regional power holders--whether they hold official
positions or not--exercise political, police, and judicial authority
through their control of militia forces. Their activities are financed
by profits from production and trafficking in opium, and through their
control of roadblocks on transportation routes at which they exact
``taxes'' on travelers and commodities.
In the final days of his tenure, UN Special Representative of the
Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi stated at the closing ceremony of the
Constitutional Loya Jirga (grand assembly) that, ``[t]he people of
Afghanistan are afraid of the guns that are held by the wrong people
and used not to defend them and not to wage a jihad, because the time
for jihad is finished, but to terrorize people, to take advantage for
their own and the people who are close to them.'' The current year will
be critical in determining whether Afghanistan will continue its slow
progress toward representative government, the rule of law, and a
responsible role in the international community, or whether it will
lose ground and slide back toward political and religious extremism and
economic chaos.
background
The Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan
Following the U.S.-led military operation that ousted the Taliban
regime in the fall of 2001, the starting point for rebuilding
Afghanistan was the ``Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in
Afghanistan Pending Re-establishment of Permanent Institutions''--the
Bonn Agreement--signed by representatives of the Afghan people on
December 5, 2001. The Agreement established an Interim Afghan
Authority, and provided the basis for an interim system of law and
governance, employing the 1964 Constitution as its foundation. The
Agreement also laid out a timetable for further steps toward
establishing a new government, constitution, and ultimately elections.
The Emergency Loya Jirga of June 2002 installed a Transitional
Administration, with Hamid Karzai as its president; Karzai later
appointed a cabinet of four vice-presidents, four special advisors, and
28 ministers. Karzai's government, through a constitutional commission,
drafted a new constitution, which was released in early November 2003
and adopted with amendments by a constitutional Loya Jirga on January
4, 2004.
Foreign Military Forces
Annex I of the Bonn Agreement called for the deployment of an
international military force to maintain security in Kabul, with
possible expansion to other areas of the country. In response, the UN
Security Council authorized the creation of an International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF deployed in January 2002, and by summer
had 5,000 troops from 19 countries. ISAF's responsibility was limited
to providing security in the capital, where it conducted routine
patrols with local police. ISAF's purpose was to provide ``breathing
space'' during which the Afghans could create their own security
forces. In October 2003, the UN Security Council, responding to
requests from President Karzai, expanded ISAF's authorized area of
operations to include all of Afghanistan, but did not further define
ISAF's mandate. NATO, now in command of ISAF, so far has been unable to
generate the forces needed for a significant expansion.
ISAF operates separately from ``Operation Enduring Freedom'' (OEF),
the U.S.-led military mission focused on destroying the remnants of the
Taliban and al Qaeda. With 11,500 troops participating, OEF is the most
potent military force in Afghanistan. While OEF does not conduct
peacekeeping activities, it has occasionally engaged in settling
disputes between warlords, usually by dispensing cash or issuing veiled
threats of force. OEF forces have not taken action against narcotics
traffickers or supported law enforcement.
In Spring 2003, the Pentagon responded to the continuing
deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan by authorizing a
somewhat greater involvement in civil affairs and reconstruction by
U.S. military forces. American troops began providing humanitarian
assistance and took on some road and school construction projects. The
Defense Department initiated a program to deploy ``Provincial
Reconstruction Teams'' (PRTs) near major cities throughout Afghanistan.
The PRTs are designed to provide assistance in rebuilding local
infrastructure and ensuring local security, but not to perform police
functions. Of eight PRTs currently operational, one is under NATO
command (the first NATO presence outside Kabul) and will have up to 240
personnel, two are 100-person teams commanded by the United Kingdom and
New Zealand, and the remainder are 30-person U.S. teams commanded by a
senior U.S. officer and including personnel from Special Forces, Civil
Affairs, Army engineers, the State Department, USAID, and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. The PRTs are the centerpiece of the
international community's strategy for stabilizing areas outside of
Kabul and enabling the central government to extend its reach, but
given their limited number and sizes, some observers have questioned
their real impact. In some areas, the central government has relied on
the presence of the PRTs in beginning to remove problematic local
officials, while not challenging the most powerful warlords.
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
The UN model for its mission in Afghanistan is vastly different
from that used in Kosovo and East Timor. In those missions, the UN
established an interim authority that was responsible for civil
administration and for guiding the local population toward democratic
self-government. In Afghanistan, the UN has sought to limit its
involvement and to encourage Afghans to assume responsibility for their
own political reconciliation and economic reconstruction. As a
consequence, the UN mission has limited material resources and no
operational role with respect to the Afghan police, judicial, or
corrections systems.
Under the leadership of Special Representative of the Secretary
General Brahimi, the UN advocated a ``light footprint,'' a euphemism
for a minimalist UN mission. The light footprint was publicly advocated
as a way to ensure space for Afghans to take the leading role in
rebuilding their country, in contrast to the outsider-dominated
approaches of the Kosovo and East Timor missions. The main underlying
rationale, however, was that a light UN footprint would force donor
nations to accept their responsibility for assisting Afghanistan,
rather than putting responsibility on the UN and then underfunding the
mission and blaming it for the resulting failure--as has occurred in
other circumstances. As part of this approach, certain donors have
taken on ``lead nation'' responsibility for assistance to particular
sectors. The ``light footprint'' approach, however, has to some extent
been reflected in the nature of the international community's
involvement in Afghanistan more generally. Despite initial promises of
billions of dollars in foreign largess and a rhetorical commitment not
to neglect Afghanistan once again, international assistance has been
characterized by a relatively light wallet. The ``peacekeeping-light''
mode is also seen in the international community's approach to ensuring
internal security and assisting Afghan law enforcement--for example,
the lack of peacekeeping forces outside of Kabul and the absence of a
foreign police mission.
development of the rule of law in post-taliban afghanistan:
overview and evaluation
The Justice System
Afghanistan cannot be said to have a genuine system of justice at
present. To be sure, there are many appointed judges and prosecutors in
the country, there are laws on the books, and there are occasional
trials, but there is no functioning system. Court management is archaic
or non-existent, central judicial and prosecutorial authorities often
have no technical means of communicating with colleagues in the
provinces, and judicial appointments are routinely made on the basis of
personal or political connections without regard to legal training or
other qualifications. Moreover, the organization of the judicial
apparatus fails to comply with existing law in important respects
(e.g., both the 1964 Constitution--in force until recently--and the new
Constitution call for a Supreme Court of nine members, but the current
Chief Justice has added several more justices); judges routinely make
decisions without reference to written law; there are effectively no
means of enforcing decisions; and despite a theoretical right to
counsel, there are virtually no defense lawyers in the country. To a
great extent, the written law in Afghanistan is not applied--or even
widely known, including by judges and lawyers. As one senior Afghan
judicial official put it, Afghanistan ``has many laws, but no
implementation.'' With apparent good reason, Afghans do not trust the
judiciary, and avoid recourse to it as much as possible.
Though Afghan and international officials often refer to rule of
law development as one of the highest priorities in the reconstruction
process, the necessary measures are not being treated with urgency
(other than recently in the police sector). U.S. funding, for example,
for rule of law activities other than police or counter-narcotics for
FY 2004 is $10 million in State Department funds, plus some limited
(but not yet decided) portion of USAID's $54 million in ``democracy and
governance'' funds for Afghanistan, the majority of which will be used
for elections support, compared to over $110 million for police
training. In 2003, the U.S. spent about $13 million on rule of law
activities other than police, including support for the Judicial
Reform, Constitutional, and Independent Human Rights Commissions. (As
insufficient as these amounts are relative to the needs of the Afghan
justice sector, they make the U.S. the second largest donor to the
sector.) Money aside, relatively little political attention is being
paid to the justice sector; the field has been left largely to ``lead
nation'' Italy, which is widely seen as focused mainly on
implementation of its own projects, rather than coordination of broader
efforts. As a consequence, and despite the presence of some Afghan
officials who are committed to reform, since the fall of the Taliban
little progress has been made toward building a functioning justice
system.
Key issues that need to be addressed in order to turn around this
situation include a flawed reform process, inadequate international
capacity and attention, and a desperately low level of Afghan capacity
in terms of both physical and human resources. The latter--a result of
23 years of war and a low level of development before that, and a
limiting factor in every area of Afghanistan's reconstruction--can only
be addressed over the long haul and through sustained international
commitment. But the first two obstacles can be addressed in the near
term.
Institutional Architecture and the Reform Process
The justice sector in Afghanistan is administratively complex and
highly factionalized. The three main permanent institutions--the
Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General's
office (Saranwali)--are coequal in stature, and for a variety of
political, personality, and turf-consciousness reasons have fractious
relations with each other. While police perform a central role in
criminal justice, the Ministry of Interior has not played an active
role in the justice rebuilding process. The lack of clear legal
guidelines regarding proper institutional roles, and the absence of
steps to provide clarity, has allowed this fractiousness to persist.
The Judicial Reform Commission (JRC) created under the Bonn Agreement
to guide the reform and be a facilitator among the permanent
institutions and between them and the donor community, has instead
become a fourth faction in the sector. The Italian government operation
in Kabul, which, as leader of the donor effort, will need to work to
bridge the differences among the other players, has to an extent become
a fifth faction, having very difficult relations with its natural
partner, the JRC, in particular.
In principle, the JRC should have become the driving force behind
the reform and reconstruction process in the justice sector. In
practice, partly as a result of lack of buy-in from the permanent
institutions, this has not occurred. No consensus has been developed
regarding the proper role of the JRC--whether it should be a policy
body or a project implementer, whether it should take a leading role in
setting the agenda or facilitate support for the priorities of others.
Moreover, the JRC's efforts have been hampered by lack of resources and
a sluggish pace of support from UNDP, the main conduit for the JRC's
funding (of $6 million available for support to the justice sector,
UNDP had expended only $500,000 as of November 2003). Regardless
whether the JRC itself is at fault or whether it has been ill-served by
its partners, it is apparent that the JRC is not performing as
intended. Meanwhile, building the JRC from scratch has been a major
task in a resource-poor situation, and has consumed resources and donor
attention that otherwise could be devoted to building the capacity of
the permanent institutions. Other than some limited provision of
equipment and infrastructure repair in Kabul, the permanent
institutions have received little direct support from foreign donors. A
reform of the reform process is needed.
Coupled with these difficulties, the international effort to
support the justice sector suffers from a lack of strategy and a lack
of capacity. Other donors have deferred to Italy to develop a strategy,
but no clear strategy has been coordinated among donors and
stakeholders. UNAMA in early February 2004 released a ``Proposal for a
Long-Term Strategic Framework'' that offers its view on priorities for
improving the justice system, highlighting the need to strengthen
capacity in the permanent institutions; it remains to be seen whether
the proposals will be adopted or funded. The Consultative Group (CG)
for the justice sector--in which Afghan stakeholders and donors are
supposed to meet to air and address priorities and obstacles--does not
function, unlike the CGs for some other sectors. Furthermore, the
justice sector--including infrastructure repair, institutional capacity
building, training, law reform, and corrections--is relatively lightly
funded. As of November 2003, according to official Afghan government
figures, just over $19 million in assistance was ``disbursed'' during
that year for the justice sector, but with $4.7 million of that amount
unallocated to any projects (and some of the ``disbursements'' not
clearly identified and therefore questionable). In addition, key posts
such as the UNAMA senior rule of law advisor and the UNDP justice
sector project director have been vacant for many months.
Courts, Judges and Prosecutors
The nearly uniform view of observers inside and outside the justice
system in Afghanistan is that the greatest need in building the system
is to improve the quality of judicial personnel. To some extent, the
lack of qualified personnel is part of the broad human resource
capacity deficit plaguing Afghan reconstruction in general. But
particular to the justice system, many judges appointed in the post-
Taliban period, including some on the Supreme Court, do not have a
legal education (secular or Shari'a), and have been educated only in
madrassas. Having little--and in some cases in the provinces no--access
to legal texts, many judges are unfamiliar with the law and make
decisions without reference to it. Moreover, corruption in the
judiciary is considered to be rampant--not surprising in light of
salaries of about $36 a month. Bribery aside, one senior judicial
official commented that it is not possible at present to hold judges
accountable for their conduct because they are under pressure from and
control of ``commanders.'' Some judges and others report that judges
assigned to the provinces are able to perform their duties only if they
are personally in favor with the local power-holder. Corruption and
pressure from local power-holders is similarly widespread among
prosecutors.
Assessing the actual level of activity among judges and prosecutors
is difficult. Reliable data on caseloads appears to be unavailable.
Some who have visited courts in the provinces have reported no apparent
sign of legal proceedings at particular courthouses. According to the
Attorney General's office, there are 3,274 prosecutors in the country,
and they are actively prosecuting a variety of criminal cases--murder,
adultery, rape, and, mostly, theft--with an 85% conviction rate. But,
though there are 341 prosecutors in Kabul center and the districts of
Kabul province, there are only 600 persons (``men, women, and
infants,'' according to the Attorney General's office) in detention in
Kabul--a small number for a city of over two million persons, and an
apparently small caseload for the prosecutors.
In addition to improving the human resource capacity of the
judiciary, a tremendous need exists to begin the arduous process of
determining a sound structure for the court system and developing basic
court management techniques. No work has yet been done to analyze the
number of judges and courts, and their locations, that makes sense for
Afghanistan. The current organigram of the judiciary was developed
haphazardly during the Najibullah and Mujahedeen periods (approximately
1986-1996) in order to create jobs for people in particular places
based on political exigencies. Similarly, no work has been done to
develop a court management system suitable for conditions in the
country. This should include establishing technical means of
communication between the central justice authorities and the
provinces; currently, days, months, or more are required to send or
receive information.
In some other post-conflict/transition situations (most notably
East Germany, and more recently Bosnia and Herzegovina), the problem of
corrupt and/or inefficient judicial personnel has been handled by
serving notice to all, allowing them to re-apply, and re-hiring
selectively. This approach probably is not feasible politically in
Afghanistan.
Under the country's current judicial appointment structure,
improving the quality of judicial personnel will prove difficult. The
Supreme Court is responsible for administering the entire judiciary,
and the Chief Justice has authority (nominally as chair of a committee)
to nominate all judges. The Supreme Court is headed by a Chief Justice
who is a noted religious conservative originally appointed by the
``mujahadeen'' government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani and
reconfirmed by President Karzai. Notably, the Supreme Court has created
within its administrative structure a ``Fatwa Council'' composed of
clerics. The Council reviews questions of Islamic law, and has, on its
own initiative, issued rulings even in matters not actually brought to
the Supreme Court by any parties. Although the President has the final
appointment power under the law, President Karzai reportedly has not
rejected any of Chief Justice Shinwari's judicial nominees, many of
whom do not meet the education and experience requirements of Afghan
law. At a February 2003 U.S. Institute of Peace symposium on rule of
law in Afghanistan, the Afghan participants (including the Minister of
Justice, JRC chairman, two Supreme Court justices, and other senior
legal officials) concluded that judicial appointments should be based
on merit and education, and proposed new minimum qualifications that
should be established; these recommendations have not been implemented.
While there are some differences of opinion within the Supreme Court,
the leadership of the institution is regarded as opposed to any
consideration of enhancing judicial qualification requirements, purging
the judiciary of unqualified personnel, or reforming the structure of
the court system.
As the centerpiece of their efforts to strengthen the justice
sector, Italian officials have decided that the most urgent need is to
extend the justice system to areas of the country where courts
presently are not functioning. They plan to address this need through a
focus on selected district (primary) courts. They have developed a new,
streamlined interim code of criminal procedure, which was promulgated
into law by Presidential decree in February 2004. This interim code has
been the subject of some controversy, as it was prepared by Italian
officials with help from U.S. military lawyers but relatively little
input or support from the Afghan justice institutions, and was
reportedly adopted under strong foreign political pressure. The interim
code officially now replaces the pre-existing code of criminal
procedure throughout the country.
The Italian project will focus first on introducing the interim
code in selected district courts, i.e., those located in provincial
capital cities, which in theory could also hear cases from other
districts in the province where courts are not functioning. They plan
to train an initial corps of 20 judges and 20 prosecutors in this new
code, after which these persons would be assigned to the selected
districts. The Italian program will first be implemented in a pilot
project in Gardez. The remaining districts in which they will pursue
this effort remain to be identified, as does the number of districts
they intend to target and over what time period. Italian and Afghan
officials also need to determine clearly how they will amend or work
around the existing procedure for appointment and assignment of
district judges. Some Afghan and foreign observers have expressed
skepticism regarding this plan, suggesting that an approach that
focuses on use of a new code in a small number of district level courts
could produce inconsistency and isolated pockets of administration of
justice. An alternative strategy would focus on Kabul plus the five
major provincial capitals (Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar,
and Kunduz), and outside of Kabul would focus on the provincial courts
rather than district (primary) courts. (The provincial courts are
appellate level, but have some first-instance jurisdiction.) An
approach that is focused on provincial courts would have a wider
potential impact than one focused on district courts. Outside of these
urban centers the population generally relies on and has much greater
trust in informal systems of dispute resolution (such as decisionmaking
or mediation by shuras and tribal elders). Inside these centers, the
traditional, informal systems tend not to function, and the need is
therefore greater for access to a formal justice process that works. A
soundly functioning provincial court could provide a check on
unreformed district courts throughout its jurisdiction.
Defense Attorneys
Though Afghans have a legal right to defense counsel, defense
attorneys are virtually unknown in Afghanistan. Even in criminal
proceedings, defendants are almost never represented by counsel.
Traditionally, clients have used lawyers for commercial matters, but
even these could be characterized better as brokers or agents, who, for
example, handle payments of bribes to judicial officials. A legal aid
department within the Supreme Court is supposed to provide assistance
to indigent defendants, but according to multiple sources, the office
exists in name only. Understanding of the role of defense counsel is
lacking as well. For example, a senior prosecutorial official said that
a lawyer is only necessary for a defendant who is not literate.
Apparently the only work to build defense lawyering capacity is being
undertaken by a U.S. NGO, the International Legal Foundation, which
launched a small training program in Kabul in August 2003, and which
also provides some training through other organizations.
Legal Reform
Legal reform in Afghanistan has been complicated by lack of clarity
regarding what laws exist in the country. The Bonn Agreement called for
existing law, with some exceptions, to continue to apply, but this
provision ignored the fact that there are significant overlaps and
contradictions among different laws promulgated during different
periods. In addition, all existing significant collections of legal
texts were destroyed during the wars. The International Development Law
Organization in October 2003 completed a digital chronological
compilation of Afghan laws going back to the 1920s, but this has not
yet been indexed or distributed. In 2002, the Institute together with
the American Bar Association and International Resources Group,
collected authenticated versions of several key legal codes, and with
the cooperation of the Ministry of Justice and the U.S. Army, printed
and distributed 1,000 copies. The U.S. Army delivered most of the
copies to regional governors.
While the lack of clarity regarding existing law is likely to
persist for some time, some progress has meanwhile been made in
revising laws and writing new ones. According to the Ministry of
Justice, 12 amended or new laws have been approved by the government as
of November 2003, and several others are in progress. Many of these are
focused on commercial law, and other areas related to regulation of the
economy. In current circumstances, law reform may be the easiest area
of justice sector development; relatively few resources are required,
there is no parliament to contend with (laws are adopted by
Presidential decree after cabinet review), and results can be achieved
just on paper. The real test of law reform, however, will be whether
new and improved laws are actually implemented, and in that regard,
there is so far little change. In order to create a possibility of
implementation, a system will have to be devised for distributing, and
providing training regarding, the new and revised laws to judges,
prosecutors, and legal educators.
Legal Training and Education
As already noted, improvement of the quality and professionalism of
judges and prosecutors is the greatest need in the justice sector.
Legal training and education is fundamental to meeting this need,
particularly in the current situation where purging unqualified
personnel is not politically feasible. Both short-term fixes and long-
term investments are needed. Some attention is being paid to the
former, as several training programs are underway, but no attention is
yet being paid to the latter, which requires taking steps to improve
the currently dismal state of university law faculties. Short training
programs can provide benefits, but major gains in the quality of
administration of justice can only be achieved if investments are made
in the preparation of the next generation of legal professionals.
The largest training program underway for current judges and
prosecutors is being conducted by the International Development Law
Organization (IDLO). This program will provide 50 days (300 hours) of
training to 450 persons over a 16-month period ending in September
2004. There does not appear to have been any outside evaluation of the
quality or impact of this training as yet. The professional skill level
of the participants--even those with 25 or more years of experience--is
very low. They have no experience in producing written opinions, no
experience with defense advocates in the courtroom, and are accustomed
to disposing of issues without any reference to legal texts. Working to
impart the basic idea of making judicial decisions based on actual law
has been an important element of the training. Separately, the Judicial
Reform Commission has initiated a nine-month training program for new
judges and prosecutors. The first class of 150 students began training
in 2003 and is still in progress. A common understanding exists that
responsibility for this program needs to be moved to a permanent
institution, preferably with creation of a national judicial training
center, but no concrete steps have yet been taken in this direction.
The needs of the university law faculties, both secular and
Shari'a, are huge. These include books (libraries were destroyed and
students cannot afford their own texts, even when available),
infrastructure repair, faculty training (most have no more than an
undergraduate degree), curriculum development, and visiting professors
from abroad. Virtually no assistance has yet been provided to law
faculties in Kabul or in provincial capitals.
One factor limiting opportunities to provide training and
assistance for law faculties (as well as law reform and other efforts)
is the lack of trained interpreters and translators who have knowledge
of legal vocabulary. The dearth of qualified linguists in general is a
challenge in Afghanistan's reconstruction process, but it is a
particular problem in justice sector projects where precise use of
legal terminology is essential. A program to train a cadre of
individuals in the necessary skills could facilitate the execution of
many projects.
Customary Law
Outside of the major cities, village councils or tribal elders have
for generations played the predominant role in resolving disputes and
meting out justice. There are indications that this customary system of
law--which varies in form and substance throughout Afghanistan--has
been subverted and manipulated by local wartime and current power-
holders, but to what extent and effect has not yet been closely
examined. Though the issue has not been greatly considered, there
appears to be broad agreement that legal reform should include limiting
the authority of customary law mechanisms, particularly in areas of
criminal justice. Some also believe it will be important to design
connections between the formal and informal systems, perhaps by
crafting procedures for courts to confirm results of customary dispute
settlements. In rural areas for the foreseeable future, fostering the
informal system will be both more realistic and more sensible in the
cultural context than trying to push the formal justice system into
remote areas. In the near term, it will be constructive to study the
nature and current state of customary law practices in order to provide
an information base for future action. USIP is currently conducting one
such study.
Police
Historically, the police were organized as a quasi-military force
on the Soviet model with a two-track system of career officers and
conscripts who chose to serve for two years as police patrolmen rather
than join the army. During the past decades of conflict there has been
no national civilian police force in Afghanistan. Though figures are
uncertain, there are estimated to be about 50,000 men working as
police, but they are generally untrained, ill-equipped, illiterate (70-
90%), and owe their allegiance to local warlords and militia commanders
and not to the central government. Many of those serving as police are
former Mujahedeen who have experienced a lifetime of armed conflict and
are accustomed to acting with impunity. A few professional police
officers remain from the Afghan National Police of the Soviet period,
but these officers have little understanding of the role of police in a
democratic society. In Kandahar, for example, 120 officers out of 3,000
police had received some police training, but it was more than a decade
ago.
The Bonn Agreement provided for the creation of an Interior
Ministry responsible for police and corrections. The border police were
transferred to the Ministry of Defense in January 2002, and
responsibility for corrections was moved to the Ministry of Justice
during 2003. The Kabul police have cooperated with ISAF and helped
reduce the number of armed militia fighters in the city.
In addition to a lack of training and questionable loyalty, the
Afghan police suffer from a lack of uniforms, inadequate equipment and
transportation, dilapidated facilities, and little or no pay. The UN-
administered Law and Order Trust Fund, established in 2002, has
received only $11.2 million of the $65 million requested for two years.
Failure of the international community to provide the required funding
means that the central government lacks the resources to fund the
police outside of the capital, and thus the ability to reduce the
influence of regional leaders. Even within Kabul, as of November 2003,
police had not been paid since May 2003. Low or no pay has resulted in
widespread corruption, further undermining public confidence in police,
who are generally regarded with a mixture of fear and disdain.
For purposes of creating a capacity to handle internal security,
Afghan authorities and the international community determined that it
would be more cost-effective to focus on training and equipping a
national police force than a national army. Given Afghanistan's size
and population, creating a national police force represented a far
greater challenge than any police-related program the international
community has ever attempted. At the request of the UN and the Interim
Authority, Germany assumed responsibility as ``lead nation'' for
training and equipping the Afghan police. This request was based upon
the Afghans' positive experiences with German police assistance
programs prior to the Soviet intervention. Germany's goal was to create
an ethnically balanced force that was familiar with human rights
standards and modern police methods and capable of assisting with the
country's transition to democracy.
Germany developed an initial plan for police training and announced
the commitment of $70 million toward renovating the police academy in
Kabul, providing 11 police instructors, refurbishing Kabul police
stations, and donating 50 police vehicles. The first team of 14 German
police advisors arrived in Kabul on March 16 and the German
Coordination Office was opened on March 18, 2002. The Coordination
Office advised the Interim Authority on police training and reform and
supervised the reconstruction of the Police Academy that formally
reopened on August 22, 2002, with 1,500 cadets in residence. The
Academy provides a five-year recruit training course for officers and a
three-month recruit course for non-commissioned officers.
In November 2003, the Academy had 1,000 officer cadets and 500 non-
commissioned officers in residence. Education requirements for
admission were 12 years for officers and six years for non-commissioned
officers. The student body was composed of 60 percent Pashtuns, 30
percent Uzbeks and 10 percent others. Students came from 26 provinces,
but most were from the Kabul area. Only 11 members of the officer class
and 22 members of the non-commissioned officer class were women.
Germany accepted responsibility for training an Afghan border patrol as
well, but as of November 2003 had trained only 125 officers, who serve
as guards and immigration inspectors at the Kabul international
airport. The future of the new border police is dependent upon the
central government's ability to remove the local commanders and heavily
armed military forces that now control the border and the smuggling of
drugs and other contraband across it.
In 2003, the U.S. State Department established a police assistance
program to provide in-service training for currently serving Afghan
police in Kabul. There are three American and six international
instructors, plus Afghan staff. When fully operational, the facility
will graduate 700 police officers every eight weeks. The U.S. program
aims to train 7,000 police, including 3,000 officers and 4,000
patrolmen, for Kabul. Students in the U.S. program are selected by the
Interior Ministry, and are not vetted by U.S. program administrators.
The program offers the following basic courses that the U.S. has
provided in other post-conflict situations, such as Kosovo and Bosnia:
Transitional Policing (policing in a democracy for officers)
2 weeks
Basic Police Skills (for NCOs and patrolmen) 8 weeks
Instructor Development 2-4 weeks
The Kabul site will be a prototype for seven regional training
centers that will be located around the country and staffed by
international and Afghan instructors. The U.S. expects to train 50,000
police by 2005. The regional sites will be co-located with the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, but will be larger in size, housing up
to 500 students and trainers. The U.S. Congress has provided $110
million in funding for this program.
Corrections
Typical for a post-conflict reconstruction situation, the
corrections system in Afghanistan is the neglected step-child of
justice sector reform. Though corrections nominally falls within
Italy's lead, it has paid limited attention to this area and other
donors have paid none. Afghan authorities also have applied few
resources to address the huge needs of the prison system.
Except for a few limited NGO projects, the UN Office of Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) is the only organization working on prison and jail
improvement projects in Afghanistan. UNODC is currently spending $2
million provided by the Italian government over two years on very basic
renovation (e.g., water, sanitation, kitchens) of the male and female
detention centers in Kabul and three cellblocks of the Pul-e-Charki
prison outside Kabul, and limited training of administrative staff in
the Ministry of Justice, to which responsibility for prisons was
transferred during 2003 from the Ministry of Interior. The
International Committee of the Red Cross has regularly visited prisons,
and to some extent has provided food and water to detainees. Though
information on the situation outside of Kabul is inconsistent, it
appears that all or most actually functioning prisons and detention
facilities (with an unknown number of detainees) are effectively
controlled by commanders or other regional power-holders, rather than
the central government. Prison conditions generally in Afghanistan have
been harshly criticized by those who have examined them, but other than
the work described above, no concrete measures are underway to address
the situation.
Transitional Justice and the Human Rights Commission
Transitional justice--the process of dealing with the legacy of
atrocities and human rights abuses--has taken a backseat in post-
Taliban Afghanistan. Political support, both within and outside the
country, for documenting such crimes and developing mechanisms to deal
with them has been minimal. According to one senior Afghan official, a
serious effort to pursue a war crimes agenda could implicate half the
current cabinet. While the legacy of past atrocities and continuing
human rights violations fail to be addressed, the culture of impunity
will continue to undermine development of a culture of rule of law.
Transitional justice is included within the broad human rights
mandate of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission established
under the Bonn Agreement. Recognizing the reality of the present
environment--that it is difficult to envision a full-fledged
transitional justice process while probable violators hold the reins of
power--the Commission is undertaking two categories of activities to
lay the groundwork for future efforts in this area. First, the
Commission is beginning work on documentation of past crimes, and,
second, the Commission is preparing to launch a ``national
consultation'' on transitional justice that will consider what types of
mechanisms should be adopted. The Commission does not see the Afghan
judicial system as being capable of handling war crimes or other
serious human rights matters any time soon, given that the judiciary is
politicized, many judges are poorly qualified, and corruption is
widespread.
The documentation work has been slowed by security risks for
witnesses and Commission staff, as well as, in the Commission's view,
by the lack of political support, particularly from the United States,
for investigations of past crimes at the current time. Nevertheless,
the process has begun in select areas, where the security situation is
satisfactory and where probable perpetrators are not in official local
positions of power.
The Commission is preparing for the national consultation process
by consulting first with civil society groups. Commission staff hope to
start the national consultation early in 2004. The consultation is
expected to include a media campaign, public presentation of options,
and use of civil society groups and shuras to organize discussions
around the country. The Commission hopes to conclude the process by the
time of elections--now slated for June 2004, but likely to slip until
the late summer or fall. Commission staff predict the consultation will
show popular interest in a combination of a limited number of trials
for major perpetrators, and some form of truth and reconciliation
process, probably using traditional shuras, for most perpetrators. Such
conclusions would reflect the deep-rooted Afghan traditions of both
revenge and forgiveness. This approach would also recognize the need to
balance legal accountability for past abuses with the limitations of
the criminal justice system and the imperative of dealing with the past
through complementary processes that can move Afghan society forward in
a constructive fashion.
key challenges
Narcotics and Organized Crime
A fundamental challenge to the future of Afghanistan, and
specifically to the effort to develop a culture of rule of law, is the
growing domination of the economy by, and the dependence of most power-
holders on, the production of opium and the international traffic in
narcotics. In a situation where there are no disincentives and no
equally lucrative alternatives (opium provides farmers ten times the
income of wheat or other crops), Afghanistan's rural population is
turning increasingly to farming poppies and the production of opium and
its derivatives. Opium production fuels the rural economy and provides
livelihoods for seven percent of the population. At the same time,
nearly all elements of local and regional power structures, who take
most of the profits, use the proceeds from narcotics trafficking to
fund their activities and maintain their independence from the central
government.
Afghanistan is the world's largest producer of illicit opium. The
UN Office of Drugs and Crime reported in its ``Afghanistan Opium Survey
2003'' that Afghanistan produced 3,600 metric tons of opium, or three-
fourths of the world's supply. This amount of opium earned Afghan
traffickers, and to a lesser extent farmers, $2.3 billion, an amount
equal to half the country's legitimate GDP and nearly five times the
government's annual budget. Production was six percent greater than the
previous year, despite poor weather, disease, and limited government
efforts at eradication. In the past, cultivation was concentrated in
only three provinces; by 2003, it had spread to 28 of Afghanistan's 32
provinces. At present, 80 percent of Afghanistan's opium production is
consumed in the region. Pakistan and Iran have an estimated two million
addicts each, and there are growing addict populations in the former
Soviet republics on the Afghan border. At the same time, Afghanistan
supplies 70 percent of the heroin consumed in Western Europe. According
to the UNODC, the international trade in Afghan opiates generates a
total turnover of $30 billion worldwide.
Expansion is fueled by a lack of restraints and the encouragement
of provincial governors, warlords, corrupt officials, and even some
Islamic clerics. In addition, the return to the countryside of large
numbers of refugees with no employment opportunities other than
laboring in poppy fields has contributed to increased production. As
central government authority does not extend beyond Kabul, poppy
growing is not subject to interference by law enforcement authorities.
Experts uniformly agree that counter-narcotics efforts must combine
``carrots'' and ``sticks,'' but essentially no sticks are now being
wielded. While large-scale interdiction and eradication programs may
not be feasible in present circumstances, close observers have said
that even targeted, sporadic seizures and other enforcement measures
would provide some deterrent.
The opium economy also benefits from a well-organized
``agricultural extension'' system sponsored by drug brokers and
traffickers that provides farmers with seeds, fertilizer, advance
credit, technical assistance, and an assured market. Credit may be used
for production of legitimate crops as well as opium, but repayment must
be in the form of opium. Drug brokers buy directly from farmers or from
opium merchants in small towns and village markets. They resell to drug
traffickers, who either supply refiners or exporters. Local refining of
opium into morphine base and production of heroin is increasing.
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has identified some
ten major ethnic-Pashtun traffickers engaged in moving drugs over the
traditional smuggling route between Kandahar and Quetta in Pakistan.
Major traffickers from other ethnic groups are also involved and
control the trade in areas where their kin live on both sides of the
Afghan border. Transportation of narcotics frequently is carried out in
police or military vehicles controlled by provincial governors,
commanders, or other power-holders.
Over the past two years, the Afghan government has put in place the
legal and institutional framework to begin an effective counter-
narcotics program. In January 2002, President Karzai issued a
Presidential decree outlawing the cultivation, production, trafficking,
and abuse of narcotics. In October 2002, the Counter-Narcotics
Directorate (CND) was created as part of the National Security Council.
In May 2003, a National Drug Control Strategy was adopted. In October
2003, a modern, national narcotics control law was enacted. Also in
2003, an initial Afghan government enforcement program resulted in the
claimed eradication of 21,000 hectares of opium in the major growing
areas of Helmand, Kandahar, and Ningarhar provinces. As the central
government had no capacity, the eradication effort was undertaken by
provincial governors, but without independent verification. This raised
suspicions that any poppies actually destroyed probably belonged to
political rivals or farmers who refused to pay for protection.
The government's program has been supported by the United Kingdom,
which is the ``lead nation'' among international donors on counter-
narcotics efforts. The British have provided effective coordination of
international and Afghan initiatives, and have contributed funding and
political support for the government's eradication program. The UK has
pledged $12 million over the next three years to create an anti-
narcotics task force. British customs agents are training a new police
enforcement unit of the CND. They have also promised drug-related
equipment for the Afghan border police.
The UNODC has also played a valuable role in supporting the CND,
particularly in the area of research and advising on strategies for
creating alternative livelihoods. For the first time this year, the
UN's annual report on opium production was produced in cooperation with
the Afghan government. For its part, the U.S. government has promised
to provide assistance for eradication, alternative crops, and effective
law enforcement. Some U.S.-trained Afghan police will be assigned to
controlling opium production, providing the missing ``shock troops''
for a local war on drugs. That said, a robust operational capacity on
the part of the Afghan government is years away.
Taliban and al Qaeda Resurgence
Nearly two years after their defeat by U.S. and allied Northern
Alliance forces, the Taliban has re-emerged as a growing security
threat along Afghanistan's southeastern border with Pakistan. Taliban
forces have staged attacks and have tried to regain political influence
in Pashtun areas. Similarly, al Qaeda's training camps in Afghanistan
have been destroyed and a substantial proportion of its cadre
eliminated, but it retains the capacity to conduct military operations.
From sanctuaries in Pakistan's lawless tribal areas, bands of al Qaeda
extremists have staged cross-border raids on U.S. bases. At the same
time, forces loyal to renegade militia commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
operate in the northern border provinces of Kunar and Nuristan, where
they have declared their own jihad against the United States and
Coalition forces. Taliban insurgents have also attacked and killed
foreign aid workers, Afghan police, and road crews. These events have
caused a dramatic scaling back by international agencies, and a
consequent lack of capacity to provide assistance to a significant
portion of the country.
Warlordism
Other than in the southern and eastern areas, the blame for the
lack of security in Afghanistan falls on a number of heavily armed
regional warlords and their subordinate militia commanders. These local
leaders also remain a major impediment to national unity. They have
refused to disband their private armies, and routinely engage in armed
clashes over control of territory, border crossings, and transportation
routes. They also use intimidation and violence to control the local
population, and rely upon criminal activities including narcotics
trafficking and extortion to finance their activities. In many cases,
the most senior warlords serve as provincial governors or hold other
official positions, but refuse to accept direction from or provide
revenue to the central government. The problem of regional warlords is
particularly serious in the north, where ethnic divisions and personal
rivalries among commanders persist. Conflicts among these leaders pose
a problem for the United States, as the American military provided
money and military support to these leaders in the battle against the
Taliban. The United States continues to provide these regional
commanders with financial support and to rely upon their forces to
engage Taliban remnants. Observers note that many ordinary Afghans
question the U.S. approach and have been disappointed that the
Coalition has not taken a harder stand against the warlords, whom
people consider to be their abusers.
To help deal with the warlord problem, the UN, with Japan in the
``lead nation'' role, has begun implementing a program to disarm,
demobilize, and reintegrate as many as 100,000 soldiers and militia
members. The program began by demobilizing a group of 1,200 fighters in
Kunduz and Paktia provinces in October 2003. On December 9, two
thousand former Northern Alliance soldiers surrendered their weapons in
Kabul and agreed to participate in a job-training program to prepare
for civilian life. Many regard disarmament to be of critical importance
to the stabilization of Afghanistan; whether the efforts that have only
recently been set underway will prove to be substantial and effective
remains to be seen.
As with many areas of the reconstruction process, the warlordism
problem is a direct impediment to efforts to build the rule of law.
Warlords, whether they hold official positions or not, currently
subvert both formal and informal justice processes through intimidation
and interference in areas from the capital to rural districts, and they
largely control whatever law enforcement apparatus exists outside of
Kabul. Even in Kabul, militia men are able to assert control on the
streets, despite a semblance of central government police presence.
recommendations
Move beyond the ``lead nation'' approach for the rule of
law. After two years, it is clear that the ``lead nation''
approach has not worked effectively in the rule of law area.
The significant and multiple challenges in restructuring and
rebuilding Afghanistan's justice sector requires the intensive
involvement of more than one foreign donor. ``Non-lead'' donors
need to engage more dynamically with Afghan institutions on
these issues, rather than leaving Italy to shoulder most of the
task. The lack of strong international leadership in energizing
reform, bridging differences among the Afghan institutions, and
coordinating donors has resulted in drift. Three steps should
be taken to introduce stronger leadership:
--Donors other than the ``lead nation'' should work
more proactively with Afghan authorities and Italy to
help define and drive a reform strategy for the justice
sector and undertake initiatives where they are needed,
as the United States has done recently in police
training. Though the United States already has
significant commitments in other sectors and is already
the second largest donor in the justice sector, it also
has the most at stake and invested in Afghanistan's
reconstruction and the greatest political influence of
any international player in the country, and should not
wait for other donors to act in this area. Other donors
should also step up for particular aspects of the rule
of law portfolio, such as corrections.
--UNAMA should immediately fill its vacant position of
a senior rule of law advisor. The institutional
weaknesses of UNAMA (e.g., its lack of operational
capacity) might limit the ability of such a person to
play a significant role, but a dynamic, highly
qualified individual could still make a difference in
working with the Afghan institutions to push reform,
and in stimulating donors' interest in key priorities.
--The Ministry of Justice and donors should activate
the moribund Consultative Group (CG) for the justice
sector. Consideration might be given to putting a
revitalized Judicial Reform Commission in the chair of
the justice sector CG, instead of the Ministry of
Justice, in view of the persistent institutional
rivalries in the sector. Some criticize the CG process
as being a bureaucratic talk shop, and the usefulness
of Groups for different sectors appears to vary. But
the CG does provide a forum for a variety of donors'
voices to be heard, and for questions to be raised
about the lead nation's approach. It also provides a
mechanism for regular communication between Afghan
stakeholders and donors.
Devote greater resources to developing human resource
capacity through professional education and long-term training.
Realistically, it will be difficult to make significant headway
in improving the quality of law enforcement, judicial, and
legal personnel without extensive efforts to improve literacy
and provide basic education, including for adults. At present,
much of the training provided is wasted or lost on students who
lack the basic understanding and skills necessary to make the
best use of the training provided. There is a specific need to
improve the legal education system, which is being almost
entirely ignored. While quick-impact training has a useful
role, a long-term and deep impact will be achieved only by
preparing the next generation of legal professionals. In
addition, given the relatively short period of training most
police will receive through the U.S. program, regular follow-on
training will be necessary to ensure a lasting impact. Finally,
donors should initiate a program to train a cadre of high-
quality translators/interpreters with knowledge of legal
terminology; the current lack of such capacity is a bottleneck
for all other capacity-building projects.
Work, where possible, to improve the quality of judicial and
law enforcement personnel through professionalized selection
procedures. While a comprehensive weeding-out process for
current personnel is not realistic at present, Afghan
authorities should take steps wherever possible to
professionalize judicial and prosecutorial selection procedures
in accordance with established standards. Any progress on this
front would begin the essential process of reducing the impact
of madrassa-educated personnel in the system, and would
complement short- and long-term training. Similarly, steps
should be taken to adopt a transparent and merit-based
recruiting and selection system for police, who are now mostly
converted militia members. This would include a mechanism for
vetting to ensure that human rights abusers and criminals are
rejected.
Focus the rule of law reform strategy on Kabul and the five
major provincial cities. Efforts toward improving law
enforcement and the judiciary should focus on the major cities
in Afghanistan because that is where the formal justice system
is most used and most needed. Bearing in mind the reality of
limited resources, judicial reform should be focused on the
provincial (rather than district) level courts in order to have
a broad impact in ensuring a reasonable quality of justice. An
improved provincial court could provide a check on as-yet
unreformed district courts throughout the province. The
strategy should include intensive training of police, judges,
prosecutors, and court administrators; enhanced salaries;
improvement of facilities; provision of equipment; improvement
of court management; and replacement of poorly qualified
personnel.
Require Coalition military forces to perform limited law
enforcement functions until Afghan police and law enforcement
capacities come on line. Unless the U.S.-led OEF is willing to
expand its mandate to include at least a minimum of counter-
narcotics activities, it will be years before the Afghan police
are prepared to undertake on their own the kind of high-risk
operations that are required. At present, OEF forces rarely
interfere with narcotics trafficking or heroin production even
if they discover such activity in the performance of other
duties. A limited, but extremely useful, change in the military
mandate would involve intelligence sharing with civilian law
enforcement and a willingness to take action against drug
warehouses and heroin laboratories. This would help correct the
impression of most Afghans that the U.S. military purposefully
ignores the participation of the warlords in the drug trade. In
the absence of any enforcement actions against the narcotics
trade, the perceived message of tolerance of this activity will
continue to undermine the effort to develop a culture of rule
of law.
Reform the judicial reform process. In theory, the Judicial
Reform Commission (JRC) was a sensible idea, given that no
single Afghan institution has authority over all elements of
the justice sector; in practice, it has not been able
effectively to drive reform in the sector.
--One option is to wind down the JRC and shift donor
resources to building capacity in the permanent
institutions. The persistent lack of consensus
regarding the proper role of the JRC, the JRC's having
become another faction in an already factionalized
sector, and the limited time remaining in its currently
defined lifespan militate in favor of beginning now to
wind down the JRC and spin off its activities. Donor
resources now being devoted to or earmarked for
building up the JRC could be redirected to building the
capacity of the permanent institutions directly,
including the Ministry of Justice, Saranwali,
Judiciary, and Ministry of Interior. In order to
provide a new umbrella body for driving reform and
coordinating with donors, creation of a joint body
composed of representatives of the permanent
institutions would seem to have the benefit--in
contrast to the JRC--of buy-in from the stakeholders.
However, such a body probably would mirror the
disputatious relations among the institutions rather
than bridging their differences. Consequently, if the
JRC is disbanded, a new expert advisory body attached
to the President's office is recommended instead, in
particular because the current posture of the Supreme
Court is a primary obstacle to reform, and only the
chief executive has the potential for influence over
that institution. This body should be composed in a way
that would give it greater political clout than the
current JRC, in order to enable it to bridge
differences among the permanent institutions and carry
weight with foreign donors.
--A second option is to substantially enhance the JRC's
political stature and capacity in order to improve its
effectiveness. The continuing need for an umbrella over
and facilitator among the coequal permanent
institutions in the justice sector argues in favor of
maintaining, but enhancing, the JRC. This would entail
reorganizing the JRC to give it a more politically
powerful membership; forging a close relationship
between the Presidency and the JRC, so that the latter
becomes the President's agent in dealing with the
justice sector; and extending the life of the JRC
beyond the coming elections, while clarifying and
enhancing its somewhat ambiguous terms of reference in
a new decree. At the same time, donors would need to
speed the flow of resources to the JRC, supplement its
currently limited technical capacity, and provide
professional management capability. A revitalized JRC
could play a leading role in facilitating regular
dialogue and cooperation among the permanent
institutions, thus helping to ensure an integrated
approach to developing the rule of law.
In either scenario, it is imperative that
organizational arrangements ensure that Afghans, with
international assistance, decide how their judicial
system should look and function, by addressing such
issues as the role of Shari'a and tribal tradition and
the respective roles and authority of the various
institutional actors in the justice sector. Until such
issues are addressed, any new commission or advisory
body--in all likelihood involving personnel from the
various institutions--will continue to be fractious.
Establish a judicial monitoring program. As part of a
renewed engagement with justice sector rebuilding, UNAMA would
be best-placed to establish an independently managed judicial
monitoring arm. Without any systematic observation of how the
system functions in reality, measuring progress, applying
resources, and identifying specific issues to be addressed will
continue to be exceedingly challenging. Monitoring personnel
also could work to foster appropriate disciplinary systems in
Afghan institutions.
Significantly increase funding for corrections programs.
Except for one $2 million program and limited NGO activities,
the dire need to improve prisons and detention centers in
Afghanistan and ensure central government control over
facilities is being ignored. Lack of overhaul of the
corrections system has a direct negative impact on the
functioning of the entire criminal justice system. One or more
donors are needed to step forward and play a major role in this
area. Even if resources for implementation of prison
infrastructure projects are limited in the near term, it would
be possible with more modest resources to build capacity in the
Ministry of Justice for professional corrections planning and
management, and to train corrections personnel. At the same
time, the political and diplomatic work of disengaging warlords
from control over prison and detention facilities in the
provinces should proceed.
about the report
Two years into the process of re-building Afghanistan, and in the
wake of the adoption of a new Constitution in January 2004, this report
evaluates the progress that has--and has not--been made in establishing
the rule of law in Afghanistan. The report assesses efforts by Afghan
institutions and international donors to develop the apparatus of law
enforcement and administration of justice necessary to ensure that the
rights and protections guaranteed to Afghans in their new Constitution
can be meaningfully implemented. Both the reform process and priorities
are analyzed with respect to police, courts, judges and lawyers, law
reform, legal education, and corrections. Key cross-cutting challenges
to rule of law development, such as narcotics and organized crime, are
also addressed. The report is based principally on approximately 70
interviews conducted by the authors in Kabul and Washington during
October and November 2003. Interviewees included officials of the
Afghan government, judiciary, and commissions created under the Bonn
Agreement, the United Nations, the United States and other donor
governments, and non-governmental organizations, as well as independent
observers. This report was written by Laurel Miller and Robert Perito
of the Institute's Rule of Law Program.
The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect views
of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate
specific policy positions.
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