[Senate Hearing 108-754]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-754
ASSESSING AMERICA'S COUNTERTERRORISM CAPABILITIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
AUGUST 3, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Michael D. Bopp, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Michael Stern, Deputy Staff Director for Investigations
David Kass, Chief Investigative Counsel
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Kevin J. Landy, Minority Counsel
Amy B. Newhouse, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Collins.............................................. 1
Senator Lieberman............................................ 2
Senator Coleman.............................................. 19
Senator Durbin............................................... 22
Senator Specter.............................................. 28
Senator Akaka................................................ 29
Senator Shelby............................................... 31
Senator Dayton............................................... 35
Senator Lautenberg........................................... 39
Senator Carper............................................... 41
Senator Levin................................................ 45
WITNESSES
Tuesday, August 3, 2004
John O. Brennan, Director, Terrorist Threat Integration Center... 5
John S. Pistole, Executive Assistant Director for
Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of
Investigation.................................................. 7
Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, Assistant Secretary for
Information Analysis, Department of Homeland Security.......... 9
Philip Mudd, Deputy Director, Counterterrorist Center, Central
Intelligence Agency............................................ 10
Philip Zelikow, Executive Director, National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States....................... 50
Christopher A. Kojm, Deputy Executive Director, National
Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States........ 50
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Brennan, John O.:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 73
Hughes, Lt. Gen. Patrick M.:
Testimony.................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 81
Kojm, Christopher A.:
Testimony.................................................... 50
Joint prepared statement with Mr. Zelikow.................... 96
Mudd Philip:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 89
Pistole, John S.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 77
Zelikow, Philip:
Testimony.................................................... 50
Joint prepared statement with Mr. Kojm....................... 96
APPENDIX
Hon. Chuck Hagel, a U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska,
prepared statement............................................. 71
Chart entitled ``The 9/11 Commission's Recommendation for
Restructuring the Intelligence Community''..................... 105
Table of Organization Chart...................................... 106
Letter from Hillary Rodham Clinton, dated August 2, 2004, to
Senators Collins and Lieberman................................. 107
Letter from Hillary Rodham Clinton, dated August 2, 2004, to
President Bush................................................. 109
Article dated August 3, 2004, The Washington Post, entitled
``Intelligence Reform And False Urgency,'' by Chuck Hagel...... 111
Questions and Responses for the Record from:
Mr. Brennen.................................................. 112
Lt. Gen. Hughes.............................................. 132
Mr. Zelikow and Mr. Kojm..................................... 142
Mr. Pistole, Federal Bureau of Investigation................. 160
Questions for the Record for Mr. Mudd from: (Responses to these
questions were not received by press time.)
Senators Collins, Shelby, Akaka, and Durbin.................. 181
ASSESSING AMERICA'S COUNTERTERRORISM CAPABILITIES
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TUESDAY, AUGUST 3, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M.
Collins, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Collins, Coleman, Specter, Shelby,
Lieberman, Akaka, Durbin, Dayton, Lautenberg, Carper, and
Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS
Chairman Collins. The Committee will come to order. Good
morning, today the Governmental Affairs Committee holds its
second hearing on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
calling for a restructuring of our intelligence organizations.
The 9/11 Commission provides a highly detailed picture of our
intelligence structure on that tragic day. Ultimately, our
Committee's responsibility is to recommend how this structure
should look in the future. We must act quickly to consider this
report and to complete our assigned task of reporting
legislation by October 1, and indeed we are acting quickly,
starting with our hearing last week.
As we move with both deliberation and speed, we should use
the Commission's recommendations as a thoughtful and informed
guide. That does not mean that this Committee will be a rubber
stamp. The final shape of our restructuring legislation will be
determined by what we learn at these hearings. The informative
and insightful testimony we heard last Friday from the
Commission Chairman, Tom Kean, and the Vice Chairman, Lee
Hamilton, was a very good start. The testimony focused, as our
Committee has, on the two most important recommendations
regarding the Executive Branch; first, establishing a National
Counterterrorism Center and, second, creating the position of a
National Intelligence Director.
Yesterday, the administration acted on some of the same
issues that we are considering today. I applaud the President's
swift and decisive action to move forward with some of the
Commission's most significant recommendations. The fact that
two of its highest priorities are the restructuring
recommendations before this Committee emphasizes the importance
of our work.
The two panels of witnesses before us today, one from the
intelligence agencies and the other from the 9/11 Commission
staff, will discuss the improvements that have been made to our
post-9/11 intelligence capabilities, the weaknesses that still
remain, and the solutions that we should consider.
Progress has been made since September 11. The CIA's
Counterterrorism Center and the FBI have undergone substantial
changes. The Department of Homeland Security and the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center are entirely new. But as one of our
witnesses here today, TTIC Director John Brennan, told the 9/11
Commission in April, ``We, as a Government and as a Nation, are
not yet optimally configured to deal with the terrorist
threat.''
We can learn a lot from TTIC since, in many ways, the
proposed National Counterterrorism Center would be a more
robust version of it. This Committee has closely followed the
development and implementation of TTIC, and it has held two
hearings on its structure and its authority, an issue that has
been of particular interest to Senator Levin and me.
The proposed center would be a ``Super TTIC.'' If this more
powerful version is to succeed, it must get what it needs, both
in resources and in its place in the priorities of the agencies
that collect intelligence. At times, getting the resources it
needs, especially the expert and experienced personnel, has
been a challenge for TTIC.
The difficulty in resolving the resource and authority
issues involving TTIC demonstrates how important it is for
Congress to clearly define in legislation the authority and
parameters of the proposed center. The intelligence structure
that stood for 50 years during the Cold War performed well
under many administrations and many different agency heads. The
new intelligence system we are building for the war against
terrorism must do the same. We have an obligation not just to
the Americans of today, but to Americans of generations to come
to accomplish that mission.
Senator Lieberman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman. Thank
you again for calling this second hearing on the 9/11
Commission recommendations so quickly.
The new specific terror threats that we have learned about
in the last few days, the very fact that this morning this
capital has checkpoints for vehicular movement that were not
there yesterday, reminds us that we do not live in normal
times, and therefore our normal ways of doing business here on
Capitol Hill are no longer acceptable. Our country is under
threat of attack, so we must move, and move rapidly, to repair
what the 9/11 Commission has documented as the vulnerabilities
in our intelligence apparatus.
I thank you, Madam Chairman, for taking quick and decisive
action in scheduling these hearings. Our hearings will be
followed, as we have learned, by many hearings throughout this
month, both here in the Senate and on the House side.
Yesterday, President Bush also acted quickly in response to
the 9/11 Commission Report. I was pleased and encouraged that
the President has embraced the two major recommendations of the
9/11 Commission, which is the creation of a National
Intelligence Director and the creation of a National
Counterterrorism Center.
I am troubled that the recommendation the President is
making for the National Intelligence Director appears to lack
the powers that the Commission wants it to have, particularly
the power over the budgets of the constituent intelligence
agencies. And I think the challenge to us here, and in some
ways the danger, is that we will create a new office, but not
give it the strength to overcome the stovepiping and lack of
clear command authority that the 9/11 Commission documented.
Today, we are going to focus on the second of the two major
recommendations, the creation of a National Counterterrorism
Center. There, the President's recommendation seems to embrace
the Commission's proposal, although there are a lot of details
for us to fill in, hopefully, in cooperation not just with one
another, but with the White House.
After studying what went wrong before September 11 and how
the Federal Government has responded since September 11, the
Commission concluded that we are still not maximizing our
intelligence investments and efforts to perform our most
important task, which is protecting the security of the
American people from Islamist terrorist attack. The Commission
found that there are still stovepipes, a lot of work going on
within the stovepipes, but often not sharing of information
between them and no one in charge, as Governor Kean and
Congressman Hamilton said to us in testimony last Friday.
In its report, the 9/11 Commission concluded that a number
of intelligence problems--for example, uncoordinated watch
lists, the failure to share information, the failure to connect
dots--made it more difficult for the United States to foresee
and stop the terrorist attacks of September 11.
In the place of those weaknesses that they saw, the
Commission recommends this National Counterterrorism Center,
designed to forge an unprecedented unity of effort, as the
Commission describes it, against Islamist terrorism. It would
replace the time-worn, Cold War-era stovepipe approach. All the
information available to our government about terrorist threats
to our homeland, whether from the CIA, the FBI, State, and
local officials or open sources would be shared and analyzed in
this one place to stop terrorists.
But the National Counterterrorism Center, as recommended by
the 9/11 Commission, would not only be a fusion center, it
would also be a command center for domestic and foreign joint
intelligence planning. And this is a very significant, in some
ways revolutionary, change. After integrating all sources of
information, the center would analyze and shape strategies to
stop terrorists in their tracks before they are able to do
damage here in America.
The National Counterterrorism Center would not execute
those operations, as I understand the Commission
recommendation, but would help map the plan, call the plays and
assign operational responsibilities to the appropriate
agencies. For the first time, one entity would be able to look
across agency boundaries and the foreign-domestic divide to
make sure that intelligence is being shared, that joint plans
are in place and that those plans are being implemented. And
someone, the Director of this center, will be accountable,
finally.
The National Counterterrorism Center, as I read the 9/11
Commission's report, should be seen by comparison to the
Pentagon as a unified combat command, and the Director of the
center would be the unified commander of our intelligence
forces in the war against Islamist terrorism. It is very
important I think to separate, for clarity, this
Counterterrorism Center, which is focused on the war against
Islamist terrorism and the National Intelligence Director
overhead who oversees that terrorism center's work against
Islamist terrorism, but also all of our intelligence apparatus,
foreign and domestic, dealing with weapons of mass destruction,
particular regions of the world, particular problems that we
are concerned with.
So this is a bold approach, as the Commission acknowledges,
but no one can seriously argue, after the 9/11 Commission
Report, that the current approach has been adequate to meet
these radically new Islamist terrorist threats of the 21st
Century, and no one can argue that the threat we face is not
grave and demands this kind of imagination and bold action.
So, Madam Chairman, I look forward to hearing the views of
our witnesses today on the Commission's recommendation on this
Counterterrorism Center. We have before us commanders, in their
own right, of the front-line intelligence troops in the war on
terrorism.
I know that there are questions about the proposal the
Commission has made. I have some questions myself, but what I
know most of all is that the status quo failed us on September
11, and unless we change it, it will fail us again, for when
everyone is in charge, no one is in charge; when everyone is
calling their own plays, there is no team, and the defense of
the American people suffers as a result. Thank you, Madam
Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
I want to welcome our first panel of witnesses. This panel
consists of officials from four of our most important
intelligence agencies. I am very sure that their experience and
expertise will help the Committee complete the task before us.
I want to thank each of you for your long commitment to public
service. Each of you have served honorably and well, and we
very much appreciate your joining us today.
John Brennan is the Director of the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center, known as TTIC, the intelligence agency
created by the President in the aftermath of the September 11
attacks. I recently had the privilege of visiting TTIC several
weeks ago. I think I was the first official visitor to your new
headquarters, and I was very impressed with the work that is
being done.
John Pistole is the executive assistant director for
Counterterrorist and Counterintelligence at the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. Again, this Committee has a long relationship
with Mr. Pistole. We have worked together on several issues,
including the terrorism financing investigation.
Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes serves as assistant
secretary for Information Analysis at the Department of
Homeland Security. We welcome you here today as well.
And, finally, we will hear from Philip Mudd, the deputy
director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who clearly plays
a key role.
We welcome all of you, and we are going to begin with Mr.
Brennan.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN O. BRENNAN,\1\ DIRECTOR, TERRORIST THREAT
INTEGRATION CENTER
Mr. Brennan. Good morning, Chairman Collins, Senator
Lieberman, and Committee Members. It is an honor to appear
before you today to talk about the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center, TTIC, and the President's decision to establish a
National Counterterrorism Center.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Brennan appears in the Appendix
on page 73.
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As this Committee knows, the President has embraced the
Commission's recommendation for the creation of a centralized
organization to integrate terrorist threat information.
Yesterday, in the Rose Garden, the President formally announced
that he will establish a National Counterterrorism Center and
take other actions designed to continue the process underway
since September 11, 2001, of strengthening America's ability to
win the war on terrorism. This is a natural extension of the
work and successes the administration has already achieved
through the establishment of TTIC.
In his State of the Union speech, in January 2003, the
President called for the creation of an integrated center to
merge and analyze all threat information in a single location.
On May 1 of last year, that vision became a reality with the
stand-up of TTIC. Over the past 15 months, TTIC has endeavored
to optimize the U.S. Government's knowledge and formidable
capabilities in the fight against terrorism.
For the first time in our history, a multi-agency entity
has access to information systems and databases spanning the
intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security, diplomatic
and military communities that contain information related to
the threat of international terrorism. In fact, TTIC has direct
access connectivity with 26 separate U.S. Government networks,
with more networks coming on-line, enabling information sharing
as never before in the U.S. Government.
This unprecedented access to information allows us to gain
comprehensive insight to information related to terrorist
threats, to U.S. interests at home and abroad. Most
importantly, it enhances the government's ability to provide
this information and related analysis to those responsible for
directing, disrupting, deterring and defending against
terrorist attacks.
In addition, there currently exists within the TTIC joint
venture real-time collaboration among analysts from a broad
array of agencies and departments who sit side-by-side, sharing
information and piecing together the scattered pieces of the
terrorism puzzle. These partners include not only the FBI, the
CIA and Departments of State, Defense and Homeland Security,
but also other Federal agencies and departments, such as the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Health and Human Services and
the Department of Energy.
As envisioned by the President, this physical integration
of expertise and sharing of information enables and empowers
the key organizations involved in the fight against terrorism.
Collectively, they are fulfilling their shared responsibilities
in a fused environment, doing business jointly as TTIC. This
fusion and synergy will be further enhanced when CIA's
Counterterrorist Center and the FBI's Counterterrorism Division
co-locate with TTIC in the coming months.
This integrated business model not only capitalizes on our
respective and cumulative expertise, but it also optimizes
analytic resources in a manner that allows us to cover more
effectively and comprehensively the vast expanse of terrorist
threats that will face the homeland and U.S. interests
worldwide for the foreseeable future.
This integration of perspectives from multiple agencies and
departments represented in TTIC is serving as a force
multiplier in the fight against terrorism. On a strategic
level, TTIC works with the community to provide the President
and key officials a daily analytic product on the most serious
terrorist threats and related terrorism information that serves
as a common foundation for decisionmaking regarding the actions
necessary to disrupt terrorist plans.
Rather than multiple threat assessments and disparate
information flows on the same subject matter being forwarded
separately to senior policymakers, information and finished
analysis are now fused in a multi-agency environment so that an
integrated and comprehensive threat picture is provided. If
there are analytic differences on the nature or seriousness of
a particular threat, they are incorporated into the analysis.
As is evident, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
embodies several of the characteristics envisioned by the 9/11
Commission Report for the proposed National Counterterrorist
Center. TTIC is an existing center for ``joint intelligence,
staffed by personnel from the various agencies'' and well-
positioned to ``integrate all sources of information to see the
enemy as a whole.'' It is likely for those reasons that the
Commission recommends that TTIC serve as the foundation of a
new National Counterterrorism Center. As a long-time proponent
of structural reform of the Intelligence Community, I fully
support the integration concept and the establishment of a
National Counterterrorism Center.
In the weeks and months ahead, I look forward to working
with TTIC's partner agencies, the Congress and the White House
to build upon TTIC's strong foundation and create a National
Counterterrorism Center. The potential benefits of a National
Counterterrorism Center are enormous. So too, however, are the
challenges associated with government transformation. I have
experienced those challenges firsthand over the past 15 months
in the establishment and development of TTIC. Together, we will
need to determine how to implement the National
Counterterrorism Center in a thoughtful and evolutionary manner
so that we do not adversely affect ongoing activities in the
global war on terrorism which are so ably led by my colleagues
on this panel. We all have a special obligation in this regard.
In conclusion, I believe the benefits to be gained from the
integration concept, as envisioned by the President and called
for by the 9/11 Commission, strongly support the creation of a
National Counterterrorism Center, and I look forward to working
with you to implement a national counterterrorism system that
maximizes the security and safety of all Americans wherever
they live or work. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Mr. Pistole.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN S. PISTOLE,\1\ EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman,
and Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to
be here today and to address you. I would like to take a brief
opportunity to address the work the FBI did with the 9/11
Commission in my introductory remarks here.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole appears in the Appendix
on page 77.
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As you are aware, the FBI has worked closely with the 9/11
Commission and its staff, and we commend it for its
extraordinary efforts. Throughout the process, we have
approached the Commission's inquiry as an opportunity to gain
further input from outside experts. We took its critique
seriously, adapted our ongoing reform efforts and have already
taken substantial steps to address its remaining concerns. We
are gratified and encouraged that the Commission has embraced
our vision for change and recognized the progress that the men
and women of the FBI have made to implement that vision. We
agree with the Commission that much work remains to be done and
will consider its findings and recommendations as we refine our
continuing transformation efforts.
Following the September 11 attacks, Director Mueller
implemented a comprehensive plan that fundamentally transformed
the FBI with one goal in mind, establishing the prevention of
terrorism as the Bureau's No. 1 priority. He has overhauled our
counterterrorism operations, expanded our intelligence
capabilities, modernized our business practices and technology
and improved coordination with our partners. In terms of
priorities, Director Mueller established a clear set of 10
national program priorities that ensures that all terrorism-
related matters are addressed before resources can be dedicated
to other priorities.
To implement these new priorities, since September 11, we
have increased the number of special agents assigned to
terrorism matters by 111 percent, the number of intelligence
analysts by 86 percent and the number of linguists by 117
percent. We have also established a number of operational units
and entities that provide new or improved capabilities to
address a terrorist threat. These include things such as the
24/7 Counterterrorism Watch or CT Watch, the National Joint
Terrorism Task Force, the Terrorism Financing Operation
Section, deployable ``fly teams'' which lend counterterrorism
expertise wherever it is needed, and we have played a key role
in establishing the Terrorism Screening Center and Foreign
Terrorist Tracking Task Force, and of course have added
substantial assistance to the Terrorism Threat Integration
Center. We have also created the Terrorism Reports and
Requirements Section, the Counterterrorism Analysis Section and
other aspects of the operational side of the FBI which has
allowed us to perform our duty.
We also centralized management of our CT program at
Headquarters to ensure consistency of CT priorities and
strategy across the organization to integrate CT operations
domestically and overseas, to improve coordination with other
agencies and governments and to make senior managers
accountable for the overall development and success of our CT
efforts.
In terms of the intelligence program, the FBI is building
an enterprise-wide intelligence program that has substantially
improved our ability to direct strategically our intelligence
collection and to fuse, analyze, and disseminate our terrorism-
related intelligence. After passage of the USA Patriot Act and
the issuance of related Attorney General Guidelines, and the
ensuing opinion by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
of Review that brought down the wall that sharply limited the
ability of law enforcement intelligence officers to share
information, we quickly implemented a plan to integrate all of
our capabilities to better prevent terrorist attacks. Director
Mueller elevated intelligence to program-level status, putting
in place a formal structure and concept of operations to govern
FBI-wide intelligence functions and establish Field
Intelligence Groups--or FIGS--in every field office.
The new workforce. The FBI is actively working to build a
workforce with expertise in intelligence. While much remains to
be done, we have already taken substantive steps to ensure this
transformation. On March 2 of this year, Director Mueller
adopted a proposal to establish a career path in which new
special agents are initially assigned to a small field office
and assigned to a wide range of field experiences. After
approximately 3 years, agents will be transferred to a large
field office, where they will specialize in one of four program
areas--intelligence, counterterrorism and counterintelligence,
criminal matters, the traditional work of the FBI or cyber
matters--and will receive advanced training tailored to their
area of specialization. We are in the process of implementing
this new career track now.
We are also establishing a formal intelligence officer
certification that can be earned through a combination of
intelligence assignments and training. When fully implemented,
this certification will be a prerequisite for promotion to the
senior ranks of the FBI.
We have also implemented a strategic plan to recruit, hire,
and retain intelligence analysts. The bureau has selected
veteran analysts to attend events at colleges and universities,
as well as designated career fairs throughout the country. We
have executed an aggressive marketing plan, and for the first
time in FBI history, we are offering hiring bonuses for FBI
analysts.
In our special agent hiring program, we have updated a list
of critical skills we are seeking in candidates to include
intelligence experience and expertise, as well as foreign
languages and technology.
We continue to grow the Field Intelligence Groups--or
FIGs--established in all 56 field offices and are on track to
add some 300 intelligence analysts to the FIGs in fiscal year
2004. The FIGs conduct analysis, direct the collection of
information to fill identified intelligence gaps and ensure
that intelligence is disseminated horizontally and vertically
to internal and external customers, including our State, local,
and tribal partners. We currently have 1,450 FIG personnel,
including 382 special agents and 160 employees from other
government agencies.
It is important to note that the FBI's intelligence cadre
is not limited to intelligence analysts, but also includes
agents, language analysts, surveillance specialists, and
others. It takes all of these specialists to perform quality
intelligence production at the FBI. The FBI's plan to create a
cradle-to-grave career path for intelligence professionals at
the FBI parallels one that has existed and functioned so well
for our agents and has been codified in our Concept of
Operations for Human Talent for Intelligence Production.
To support information sharing, each Joint Terrorism Task
Force (JTTF) has a special agent or intelligence analyst
dedicated to producing raw intelligence reports for the entire
national security community, including State, municipal, and
tribal law enforcement partners and other JTTF members.
Understanding that we cannot defeat terrorism without
strong partnerships, we have enhanced the level of cooperation
and information sharing with State and municipal law
enforcement, and through our 84 Joint Terrorism Task Forces and
dissemination through vehicles such as the FBI Intelligence
Bulletin, the Alert System, and the Terrorist Screening Center.
We also improved our relationships with foreign
governments, in both law enforcement and intel services, by
building on the overseas expansion of our Legat Program, which
the Congress has supported so vigorously, by offering
investigative and forensic support and training, and by working
together on task forces and joint operations.
Finally, the FBI has expanded outreach to minority
communities, and in concert with DHS, has improved coordination
with private businesses involved in critical infrastructure and
finance.
As the Commission points out, we have much work still to
do, but we have made great progress and continue to move
forward in accordance with a clear plan. With the support and
understanding of lawmakers and the American people, I am
confident we will be successful in completing our
transformation and ultimately prevail against terrorists and
all adversaries who do harm to our Nation.
The FBI looks forward to an ongoing public discussion of
ways to support further information sharing and collaboration
in the intelligence and law enforcement communities and thanks
the 9/11 Commission and this Committee for your service.
Thank you for inviting me here again today. I look forward
to any questions you may have.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. General Hughes.
TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK M. HUGHES,\1\ ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
General Hughes. Good morning, Chairman Collins, Senator
Lieberman, and distinguished Members of the Committee, I am
privileged to appear before you today to discuss the role of
the Office of Information Analysis at the Department of
Homeland Security and the context of the 9/11 Commission and
yesterday's announcement by the President to support the advent
of the National Intelligence Director and the establishment of
the National Counterterrorism Center.
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\1\ The prepared statement of General Hughes appears in the
Appendix on page 81.
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It has been my honor to serve in the U.S. Intelligence
Community since 1970. During that period, many changes have
occurred. Many changes have been the focus of our best efforts
to gather and provide the information our Nation needs to
defend, protect and sustain our way of life. Many of the
changes that have occurred, however, have been driven some by
technology, but many by success and unfortunately some by
failure. I, personally, believe it is important to remember
some of the successes over those years.
Since September 11, we have not had a major attack in the
United States, but we have seen such events from afar, and we
know that we can suffer an attack again. I see the next
evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community that we are now
beginning in that long and complex context. What makes this
period and the changes we are discussing today so important is
the fact that our homeland is, indeed, directly threatened and
the consequences of that threat are so critical to our future.
Thus, we all want to get the details of whatever changes we
make right. The pathway to the transformation of our
Intelligence Community is just beginning.
At the Department of Homeland Security, we are working hard
to coordinate and integrate the intelligence and information
necessary to protect our people and our critical
infrastructure. Our efforts are dependent for success on our
Federal partners, notably the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center, the Central Intelligence Agency, and especially in the
domestic context, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and on
our partnerships and interaction with the States, localities,
and municipalities of our country, the tribal groups and
interaction with the private sector and, of course, with the
citizens of this great Nation.
We still have much work to do, but we have made tremendous
progress. And the dedication and devotion of duty of those who
do the work of intelligence at the Department of Homeland
Security is unparalleled. Our goal will be to continue this
landmark work by supporting and participating in the National
Counterterrorism Center and by supporting and working with the
new National Intelligence Director toward our common purpose to
defeat terrorists and prevent terrorism here in our homeland.
Thank you very much for the chance to address you this
morning. I am looking forward to your questions.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Mr. Mudd.
TESTIMONY OF PHILIP MUDD,\1\ DEPUTY DIRECTOR, COUNTERTERRORIST
CENTER, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Mudd. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, and
others here. This is really a privilege to be here today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mudd appears in the Appendix on
page 89.
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We are now years into a war with the terrorist network
whose members planned and conducted the attacks of September
11. With the 9/11 Commission recommendations available to us
now, we have a critical piece in place that helps us toward a
better organization of our agencies as they engage in a war
that is likely to last, in my view, for many years.
The President yesterday announced in the Rose Garden that
he will establish a new National Center and take other actions
designed to continue the process underway since September 11,
2001, of strengthening America's ability to win this war. I
believe the President's establishment of this National Center
will build on the concepts already in place in TTIC and the DCI
Counterterrorism Center which I help manage. This government
has the most powerful counterterrorist capability on the
planet. We must commit to ensuring that we coordinate
effectively across the government so that we attack and destroy
this target with a unified approach.
A National Counterterrorism Center, coordinating across the
U.S. Government's analytic and other elements, will strengthen
this effort, in my view. Assigning responsibilities across the
government through NCTC planning could ensure that missions are
clear and accountability well-defined. A center that could
improve the link between foreign intelligence and homeland
defense would be a valuable addition.
In short, the Kean Commission is right in focusing on the
importance of collaboration and cooperation across the
government and right to ask for an entity that is charged with
ensuring and facilitating cooperation.
As the President said, this remains a Nation in danger and
at war, so as we try to improve our intelligence capabilities,
I would recommend that we ensure that we protect what works
well along the way. The President is right in counseling care:
In the midst of calls for great change, we are prosecuting a
war with great success. Since September 11, we have made
strides toward partnerships across and beyond the government,
including the DHS, the CIA, the FBI, and the U.S. military and
foreign partners, steps that have given us a powerful weapon
against this adversary.
The CIA is a flexible organization, and we operate in that
fashion so that we can adapt quickly to changes in world events
or patterns we observe in this enemy. Since September 11, with
the help of the Congress, we have had more resources to fight
this war. We have closer collaboration with law enforcement. We
are supporting not just military units from Washington, we are
living with them, we are fighting with them, and we are sharing
intelligence with them on the battlefield. We should look at
additional change in the context of the substantial change we
have already undertaken.
The challenge posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates remains
daunting. Despite the increase in resources we have committed
to this mission, the combination of the global reach and
relentless drive of this enemy means that we are fighting this
war every day on many fronts, around the globe, with officers
who are stretched. This war is hot. And due to the operational
successes of the officers in CTC, the place I manage, and our
partners in this government around the planet, the volume of
information we have flowing in is huge.
We are succeeding against this adversary because of the
dedication and capability of our officers. I salute these
officers. They are heroes to me. We also succeed because of
partnerships we have strengthened in recent years. We have
joined forces with our colleagues in law enforcement and the
armed services to make this country safer. We see the results
today in terrorists dead or captured. That said, this
adversary, as we saw over the weekend, remains a deadly threat
to us around the world. And so are other terrorist groups.
This cooperation I have mentioned across government is
reflected in the number of detailees from other agencies that
we have in the Counterterrorist Center and in the way the DCI
has directed us to fight this war. For example, the Acting
Director has continued the practice of chairing a meeting each
evening that includes not only the CIA officers but also
representatives from other agencies across the U.S. Government.
Part of what makes that meeting successful is the ability of
these individuals to reflect the richness of their home
agencies, each of which brings unique talents, capabilities,
authorities, and perspectives to the table.
The alliances we have worked to build during the past 3
years, including the global relationships that we cultivate,
are critical. This war requires close cooperation with law
enforcement and military entities that have capabilities that
the CIA does not and should not have. As we study proposed
changes, we need to ensure that change improves our alliances
with these partners, law enforcement and military, and with the
Department of Homeland Security, which has helped link us
critically with State, local, and private sector authorities.
The details of the Commission's proposals are not specific
enough for me to judge their impact on our ability, for
example, to retain close coordination with the officers who
represent the FBI within the Counterterrorist Center. But what
I do know is that this partnership with people like the Bureau
is an integral part of counterterrorism operations and the way
that the adversary has lost. We need it to continue in the
Counterterrorist Center and to expand upon it in the new
National Center.
Let me offer a few additional thoughts based on CIA's
experience with counterterrorism operations since CTC was
founded in 1986. We need clear, clean, short lines of command
and control. Opportunities to roll up a terrorist or prevent an
attack demand immediate action. This is a war of speed.
Analysts in the center are critical to its operations and
critical to keeping policymakers apprised of current and future
threats. The synergy between analysts and operations officers
is the great strength of the Counterterrorist Center, and the
information-sharing partnership between analysts and operators
in the CTC could not be stronger. Our analysts reflect the day-
by-day, and sometimes minute-by-minute, pace and scope of our
operations, and our operators understand the target better by
virtue of their partnership with analysts.
This partnership has created a unique fusion: Our analysts
may write intelligence for the President one day and help
operators interview a terrorist the next. And we have many who
do so. Counterterrorism tasks require a combined application of
knowledge and tools in ways that sometimes do not allow us to
distinguish between analysts and operators. The center I help
manage needs officers like these to sustain its energy and
effectiveness. So as we work to build the new National Center,
I want to make sure that we enhance the important partnerships
like the ones we have now in the center.
My perspective from the trenches of this war is that my
colleagues and I welcome organizational change that will help
us accomplish our mission. We welcome a dialogue on what change
is needed. And, finally, I want to thank you for listening to
what I have said today about the proposals you are considering,
and I want to offer from myself personally whatever I can do to
help you implement this initiative. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. We will now begin a 10-minute
round of questions.
Mr. Brennan, I want to start with you. I very much
appreciate hearing your strong support today for the creation
of a National Counterterrorism Center which, in many ways, will
build on the TTIC model. But I want to go back to the statement
that you made to the Commission in your testimony in April
where you said that, in your judgment, the Federal Government
was not ideally configured to deal with the terrorist threat.
If you were going to design the intelligence structure for
the U.S. Government, what would you recommend?
Mr. Brennan. I would recommend that there be an opportunity
to understand all of the different parts of the U.S. Government
involved in intelligence. It is an exceptionally complicated,
complex system of many different components doing various parts
of the mission.
One of my concerns is that over the years there has been
the development of individual initiatives in different parts of
that community to include individual statutes that have set up
different types of initiatives and departments that have not
taken into account fully the overall architecture that needs to
be in place to make sure that all the different parts of the
Intelligence Community work together in a fused and integrated
manner. As the President talked about his support for a
National Intelligence Director, I think it is taking into
account the tremendous breadth and depth of the Intelligence
Community and the need to ensure that there is appropriate
engineering of the different parts of that complex
architecture.
And what my recommendation would be is that just like
Goldwater-Nichols, which really revamped the entire military
structure, which took many years on the Hill here--it took
about 4 years before Goldwater-Nichols was actually passed--
that understanding of those different parts of that very
complicated system are fully understood and are put together
and optimize the contributions of each. The 9/11 Commission
Report provides a high-level view of some of that architecture,
but there really is tremendous engineering that needs to go on
to make sure we understand the connections, the intricacies,
the mutual dependencies that go on.
So my recommendation is that it needs to take into account
the many different and, in fact, growing elements of the
Intelligence Community right now to make sure we do not lose
any of the synergy and we build upon it. So my comment about we
are not optimally configured is because we have not taken that
step back to put together that system of systems that allows
all those different parts to work together as seamlessly as
possible.
Chairman Collins. In your scenario, would you have a
National Intelligence Director?
Mr. Brennan. In my scenario, I would have somebody at the
top who is able to oversee and orchestrate the many different
elements, like the President raised yesterday, the concept of a
National Intelligence Director. I don't want to say that would
be a position like in the diagram shown in the 9/11 Commission
because I have some disagreements with what is in the 9/11
Commission Report. I don't think some of those recommendations
take into account how these different pieces need to fit
together. But I do endorse the concept of having somebody at
the top, yes.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Mudd, I want to get a better
understanding of how disputes are resolved in the current
system. It is the issue of who makes the final call when there
is a dispute over intelligence tasking.
For example, let's say that the United States has a
satellite that is trained on Iran and the CIA wants to have
that satellite moved to oversee a possible new al Qaeda
training camp in Afghanistan. But the Department of Defense
says, no, it is really important that it remain trained on
Iran.
Under the current system, who resolves a dispute over where
a satellite should be positioned or where resources should be
allocated to collect intelligence?
Mr. Mudd. I am not an expert on satellites. We spend a lot
more time on human operations. Let me try that same question
with human operations and give you a perspective.
I don't see many disputes. I see a lot of conversation, and
the conversation goes like this: When we are operating
overseas, typically, if we are in a wartime experience, as we
are in Afghanistan and Iraq, we provide support to the U.S.
military with the capabilities we have. When we are running
foreign operations overseas to collect intelligence and conduct
covert action, typically that is something that is run by the
Central Intelligence Agency with the support of other agencies.
And then when you have domestic intelligence collection
capabilities, that is typically run and led by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation with our support.
So primacy depends on what kind of operation you are
talking about and where you are operating, but in terms of the
people sitting at this table, it is quite cooperative. The
resources----
Chairman Collins. But who makes the call? Who decides? I
mean, one of the problems that the 9/11 Commission identified
over and over again was the feeling that there was not a person
in charge.
Mr. Mudd. Again, when we are talking about military
operations in Afghanistan, the military is running the
operations; we support. When we are talking about clandestine
operations under the authorities that we have, which are
unique, we get support and we run them; we can decide. And when
we are talking about domestic operations, the FBI does and
should decide; we support them.
Chairman Collins. General Hughes, the 2002 Gilmore
Commission also recommended the establishment of a National
Counterterrorism Center. But under the Gilmore conception, the
center would be responsible for fusion of counterterrorism
intelligence but not for planning of counterterrorism
intelligence operations. This is a question that I am going to
ask the entire panel, but I will start with you, Mr. Hughes.
Should the NCTC have an operational role?
General Hughes. I think as described in the President's
vision of the NCTC, there is some connection to the planning
effort. I hate to characterize it because these are the kind of
details that have to be worked out, but I believe the idea is
to have enough planning expertise, especially at the strategic
level, to oversee the kind of interface that has to occur
between intelligence operations and intelligence activities and
the operational activities undertaken by agencies to carry out
missions.
Chairman Collins. But in your judgment, should there be a
planning role? We have a different recommendation from the 9/11
Commission than the Gilmore report, and what I am asking is,
given your 30 years in intelligence, do you think that the
center should have an operational planning role?
General Hughes. Well, I am not quibbling with the question,
but I do have to put it in context. The tactical and perhaps
operational activities should--they have to engage in their own
planning in order to undertake operations. That is what my
experience has taught me over the years. But there is a role
for planning at the strategic level especially to integrate
features of broad planning that will affect everyone. And to
that degree, I support the planning role at the National
Counterterrorism Center. I don't think that we should try to
centralize the kind of planning and the kind of activities that
result from that planning at the national level. I believe
those should be decentralized to the operating agencies. That
is my personal view.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Mr. Pistole.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, I believe the NCTC should have an
operational role from the perspective of the planning that you
mentioned and the development of intelligence requirements, the
setting of those requirements, identifying gaps that may exist
in existing intelligence. Where I think the distinction comes
into play is in the operational execution of that planning.
For example, if there is a determination that there is a
lack of intelligence collection in Chicago, for example,
looking at a domestic issue, concerning Hezbollah, well, then,
they should turn to the FBI and say we have identified a gap in
intelligence collection there, we think the FBI should take
steps to address that. And then the FBI would be responsible
for implementing the steps that would solve that gap. And that
would be through additional human intelligence, FISA coverage
of certain targets. The whole range of investigative activity
that the FBI currently has would be brought into play to
address that.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Brennan.
Mr. Brennan. I believe that the role of the center as far
as overseeing some type of joint operational activity has to be
very carefully crafted from the standpoint of ensuring that
analysis maintains its independence and its integrity. Analysis
will inform operations as well as policy, but you want to make
sure that when you bring them together, you make sure that
analysis does inform it, but it still maintains its
independence and integrity.
Also, you have to be very careful about the types of
authorities that we give to this planning group and
responsibilities. The 9/11 Commission Report says that the NCTC
would assign operational responsibilities but would not direct
the execution and implementation of those plans. But it says
that the NCTC would be accountable for tracking the progress of
the case and ensuring that the plan evolves with it.
And so I would need to understand better exactly what are
we talking about there as far as the role of this NCTC, and I
would also associate myself with Mr. Mudd's comments about
speed is of the essence. And you want to make sure you don't
put in place anything that is going to, in fact, hamper the
ability to move forward very quickly on that type of
operational activity.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Mudd, you are in luck because my time
has expired. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Gentlemen, in
different ways I have gotten to know each of you, to work with
you some, and I have great respect for each of you. Let me give
you an impression and invite you to correct if I am wrong.
My impression from your opening statements and the first
round of questions that Senator Collins has asked is that you
don't fully embrace the 9/11 Commission recommendations, which
would inevitably deprive each of the agencies you represent of
some of the autonomy you have now because you would be
accountable, including most importantly in budget, to the
National Intelligence Director.
I believe that, as I read the 9/11 Commission Report, to
take it one step further, in creating the National
Counterterrorism Center they intend for all of your operations
to be fused into that center and that you would no longer have
the separate existence.
And remember, as Senator Collins has said--and I know you
have read the 9/11 Commission Report--it is a chilling
retelling of how September 11 happened, and it is an indictment
of the status quo. Just to repeat the catch phrases, but they
mean something, we had a lot of good work going on in
intelligence, but it was in stovepipes, too much failure to
share information, and no one in charge. Last Friday, Tom Kean
and Lee Hamilton said there is still no one in charge, and they
have still heard examples of one or another of the agencies
that you represent failing to share with someone else.
So we are operating in an emergency climate, and obviously
I want you to say what you think is right, but I also want you
to deal directly with this appeal from the 9/11 Commission for
revolutionary change--not unprecedented, very much like what
Goldwater-Nichols did to the military to force people to work
together.
In this case, we are in the middle of a war. We are under
an imminent threat of attack now. So while we in Congress want
to do this thoughtfully, we cannot delay very long, no more
than a military commander in the field whose forces are having
trouble with a strategy they are following or their
organization would not change that as quickly as he could to
turn the tide toward victory.
The 9/11 Commission recommended a National Intelligence
Director with control--who is in charge--and they guarantee
that Director is in charge by giving him or her budgetary
control over the constituent agencies. The President
explicitly, according to Andy Card, does not intend to do that.
I worry that would create a kind of Potemkin National
Intelligence Director, where you see the facade but there is
not real authority behind it.
How do you each feel about the National Intelligence
Director having budget authority over the agencies you
represent? Mr. Mudd, since you did not get a chance with
Senator Collins, I invite you to respond first.
Mr. Mudd. If I could go back to Senator--no. [Laughter.]
I think I would say I embrace the panel recommendations. I
think the National Intelligence Director is a good idea. I do
think there is a question that has to be answered about the
difference between coordination and direction, and I think that
is something that the Congress and the White House and others,
the Acting Director, should work on in the coming weeks.
I think there is a lot of work to do. The President
announced an outline yesterday. I am not quite sure where that
outline is going, although I think the umbrella ideas that were
presented on the NID and the National Center are good and
should be implemented.
The one thing I would say, which is in my area of
expertise, counterterrorism, is to return to what I said
earlier. We need to keep structures that allow us to operate
with a speed that doesn't give us hours or days but sometimes
minutes.
For example--and I will be specific--if you look at page
404 of the 9/11 Commission Report, in the midst of describing
what I think is a good idea on the NCTC, there is a description
of a case study that I think would prevent us from effectively
engaging the enemy and prosecuting the war. It makes it too
hard to move quickly. So I would simply say I will leave it to
others to think about the macro issues. I am not an expert
there.
Senator Lieberman. You don't have a position on the budget
authority in the National Intelligence Director?
Mr. Mudd. No, I don't, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Let me just say very quickly in response
to a question that Senator Collins asked you, part of why I see
the budget authority in the Director as important is for the
appropriate allocation of resources. For instance, the Pentagon
is in charge right now of all the satellites, the imaging, etc.
It could be--there is a natural tendency for the Pentagon
to want to use what it controls for its purposes. It might be
that the National Intelligence Director at a given moment,
seeing a particular threat of Islamist terrorism coming toward
our homeland, would want to say, no, sir, we want those
satellites now focused on this or that imaging focused on this.
And if the Director does not have that budget authority, I fear
that the individual stovepipes will, not for evil reasons, just
for institutional inertia, would focus on their priorities, not
what may be national priorities.
General Hughes, maybe with all your experience in so many
ways, I should ask you to get into this now.
General Hughes. Well, sir, I too support the National
Intelligence Director concept, and I think there are many ideas
here. I will address just the one that you ask about, the
budget.
I think it is important to have central authority over the
resource based and the breadth and depth of the resources
across the U.S. Intelligence Community focused in a person who
can allocate, as you said. I think that is vital.
I don't think we have had major problems in my experience
in the past. There have been a few cases perhaps where disputes
have arisen, but generally speaking, the characterization in
our earlier conversation about working things out has worked.
But, once again, I associate my views with the others here
about speed, about precision, about the nature of the threats
we are engaged in now. And I personally believe that some kind
of direction from the central authority with regard to the
allocation of resources and the control of some of the
budgetary process is vital.
Senator Lieberman. OK. I appreciate that. Mr. Pistole.
Mr. Pistole. I think there are compelling arguments both
pro and con on the budgetary authority. I think the key, in
addition to that, is that the person, the NID, has the
authority--and I think one of the things that Andy Card
mentioned yesterday, one of the key criteria is the access and
the respect and confidence of the President. And whether that
means budgetary authority to direct that satellite as outlined
in the scenario, I think that still the details have to be
worked out. But I think having that confidence of the
President, being able to take the direction and be accountable,
I think that is one of the 9/11 Commission's key
recommendations, that there is accountability, that there is a
quarterback in charge, this person having that authority and
responsibility, if that is delineate in budgetary terms, again,
compelling reasons for that. If not, then there has got to be
some reason for saying this is why that is not the case.
Senator Lieberman. Mr. Brennan.
Mr. Brennan. As the President said, the National
Intelligence Director needs to have--be able to oversee the
national intelligence program and budget, and I fully endorse
that. And I think it is going to be up to the White House and
to Congress to actually define what that means as far as
oversee.
I would particularly focus on the issue of reprogramming
authority, be able to move resources during the course of the
year so we do not have to go through the process, which is
frequently time-consuming.
Senator Lieberman. Very time-consuming.
Mr. Brennan. It is. In addition, though, on satellites,
moving satellites, there's a difference between needing the
money to move a satellite and be actually able to have
programmatic authority on that. The DCI has an Associate
Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, Charlie Allen,
who chairs a very well-run National Intelligence Collection
Board that can move that satellite based on the priorities that
are identified.
Senator Lieberman. And that is the kind of authority I
would like to see the NID continue to have, and I think if you
give him budget authority, as a few of you have said in one
degree or another you think he should have, then I think it
guarantees that authority.
As I read the 9/11 Commission Report--and we are going to
have some top staff on later, and I will ask them to clarify
this--but my reading is that they are recommending that the
four fusion centers that you represent, plus two more that are
not here--one at the Northern Command and one in the Department
of Justice--be eliminated and that all be put together in the
National Counterterrorism Center. In the Commission's view, Mr.
Pistole, you personally or the position you hold would become a
deputy to the National Intelligence Director. But I wonder
whether you read it the same way I do, that for efficiency in
operations, in effect, and expense, these six centers would be
fused into one big National Counterterrorism Center.
Mr. Pistole. Senator, clearly, there is envisioned an
integration and fusion of resources in a way that goes beyond
what exists today. But that is not something, as I think you
said earlier, that would be separate--there would not be
separate existence for each agency. Clearly, the intent, I
believe, is that we have our independent functions as directed
by an overarching authority. The person that you refer to is
actually my colleague, the Executive Assistant Director for
Intelligence, Maureen Baginski, who would be that deputy under
that format. So the operations of the FBI and the CIA and the
Department of Homeland Security would all be conducted within
our agencies, but in a coordinated fashion that has not
happened.
Senator Lieberman. My time is up, actually. I will come
back. I was going to ask if any of you see the 9/11 Commission
Report as I do, which is they are recommending the end of the
fusion centers and that they all be fused into one big one. No?
OK. I take the silence as a negative. We will ask the
Commission staff how they see the recommendation. Thanks, Madam
Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Senator Coleman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Let me first
start by thanking you for your leadership. It is unprecedented
that we are here in recess. I don't know if the Senate has ever
come together on recess to hold Committee hearings before, but
I want to thank you and Senator Lieberman for the speed with
which you have moved.
We are here at a time of war. Sometimes we forget about
that. We are talking about macro change in the way we handle
intelligence, but we are at a time of war.
The 9/11 Commission Report was an indictment of the status
quo on September 11. And we are going to struggle here with
figuring out how quickly we can move, whether we can get
something done before we get out of here in October, how
quickly do we have to put together some legislation.
My question, and understanding we are at a time of war,
understanding that the 9/11 Commission Report is a very serious
indictment of the status quo on September 11, if we were to
suffer an attack between now and the election, there is going
to be another commission, another review of what happened, are
we going to see another condemnation of the status quo today?
Mr. Mudd, you talked about substantial change being made. I am
trying to understand what it is that we have to do to make sure
that we are maximizing our efforts to protect the American
people against terrorism. Tell me today, if you can, each of
you, a very quick assessment of today versus September 11, and
what is it that you need from us to ensure that the American
public is protected in a better way than where we are sitting
right now? Mr. Brennan.
Mr. Brennan. A lot has happened since September 11. What I
wouldn't want to have happen is for there to be a tragedy
because we moved precipitously. I have tremendous respect for
what the Commission has done, the scholarship shown in the
report. But I strongly disagree with Governor Kean's comment on
Friday that the system today does not work. The system today
works better than it ever has before. The status quo on
September 11 was certainly insufficient. Could it work better?
You betcha. We can improve ourselves, and we need to. And that
is why continuing to change and to go through transformation of
government is important. But moving precipitously does not take
into account the tremendous interconnectedness that is the
result of legacy practices and procedures and statutes over the
past 50 years. So we have to move thoughtfully, but what I
don't want to do is, to move and to have a dropped piece of
information because, in fact, we went through rapid change very
quickly. And this does not, quite honestly, the 9/11 Commission
Report, provide the detailed type of engineering blueprint that
we need in order to undergo that transformation.
Senator Coleman. Mr. Pistole.
Mr. Pistole. I think the most significant changes from the
FBI perspective have been in the areas of the collection,
analysis, and dissemination of information. The FBI has been
accused in years past of being a good collector, but not doing
a good job of analyzing or sharing the information. There has
been wholesale change in that since September 11, and I think
our partners here at the table would agree with that based on
the access to information, for example, through TTIC that non-
FBI personnel have access to FBI files online, people in CTC
and IAIP at DHS have access to that information. That is a
clear change from pre-September 11 time.
What do we need you to do? The key question I think in one
of the areas is in defining the lanes that each agency has
responsibility for in terms of this new directorate and this
NCTC. How does that all flesh out when it comes down to
operations, where the rubber meets the road? How does that
actually--how do we take that overseas intel and transform it
into something here today that we can act on? So that would be
the key for me.
General Hughes. The entire organization that I represent is
reflective of post-September 11 change. We did not exist. We do
now, and I think tremendous differences have been made. The
single biggest difference--and one that I think we all ought to
be both pleased and proud about--is the connection between the
Federal Government, especially in the intelligence context, the
information that the Federal Government produces and holds, and
the State, local, and municipal authorities and the private
sector. That connection, which we are making more robust every
day, is vital to our collective success. And I would like to
offer that as the best possible example of change and
improvement that has occurred, and I think it is continuing to
evolve. I don't want to give you the impression I think it is
perfect. It is not. We have much to do. But the fact is we are
on the right track in that regard.
Senator Coleman. Mr. Mudd.
Mr. Mudd. I think it is fundamental to keep in mind that as
the adversary changes, so must we. We have to keep changing. We
cannot say we have reached a point where we are comfortable
because even if we were comfortable, the adversary will morph.
That said, I think that the change that we have undergone
in 3 years has been fundamental, partly because the tragedy of
September 11 allowed a global coalition of services to be
galvanized in a way that was not possible before that. The
world is focused on this target. We are toe-to-toe with the
target every day.
Let me mention two things about things that we could use
help on. First, we talk about resources. This is a war of
people. Every person makes a difference in this war.
Second, the thing I fear most and that you can help with, I
fear that there will be a sense around the world that after bin
Laden and Zawahri are gone, that we can lose the edge, that we
can lose our commitment. In fact, I think the dedication to
maintain the commitment to this fight must be higher after they
are gone. We are in a war of a generation.
Senator Coleman. One of the complaints of the Commission
has to do with this issue of who is in charge, and no one is in
charge. It is being repeated that no one is in charge.
Mr. Mudd, as I listened to your testimony, I got a sense--
and the others can respond to this--that what you have now is a
collaborative relationship. People have their jurisdictions.
The FBI has their jurisdiction. The CIA has jurisdiction, DCI,
and Defense have jurisdictions. Hopefully the walls are broken
down so you are not in that silo effect that the Commission
condemned and that was part of the problem on September 11. But
my sense is that rather than having an executive fiat, one
person saying this is it, what you have is a conversation that
results in action.
Two questions for you. The way the present structure is,
does that facilitate the type of speed that you need? Or could
you operate more quickly if you had a single person in charge?
But then the concern that I see is if you had the single person
in charge, how would you get the minority perspectives? And how
would you get to the President the contrary analysis from
someone who is--the decision is made, but someone has got
something concerning them. How would you see in a structure
with the single head that information getting through?
Mr. Mudd. First, I think in terms of thinking about speed--
when I think about the National Counterterrorism Center, I
think about the essential responsibility of the government to
ensure that we act with unity of effort. We must have this,
whether it's in the NCTC or elsewhere, and this is one reason I
feel so strongly about the proposal. We've got to have unity of
effort. And that means sitting us all down at the table and
saying what are we doing.
In terms of speed, I see that a bit differently, and I
think the weekend was a good example of this. Whether or not
you have a planning mechanism, we sit there real time on the
phone and pass information. This has been one of the things
that's changed so fundamentally, the thinking about information
sharing and information exchange in the wake of September 11.
For example, I hope I'm not speaking out of school, General
Hughes and I were on the phone last night about passing
information to local authorities. You talk about
responsibility. This is not my responsibility. I fully cede
that to the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI. It is
my responsibility to act quickly when DHS asks for clearance of
information. We did that in minutes last night.
Senator Coleman. Any of the gentlemen want to respond to
that? Let me then, folks, I want to get to the issue of no one
in charge. That is a condamnation of what is happening today,
that somehow decisions are not being made. Can somebody help me
understand that? Do we have to move quicker? I do not want to
wait for legislation. If no one is in charge and it is
impacting the safety and security of Americans today, I want to
understand that, and I would hope folks would move quickly. So
help me understand whether the status quo today is somehow
resulting in decisions not made or a lack of speed in
responding to existing threats.
Mr. Pistole. No, Senator, absolutely, at least from a
domestic perspective, I can speak clearly, that any actionable
information that we receive--and part of this is the focus on
the interdependence among our various agencies, that if there's
overseas intelligence that's gleaned, let's say, from Pakistan,
the information from the weekend, that translates into action
the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI takes to follow up
on. There is no impediment to that action being taken. Whether
that means the FBI seeking an emergency FISA to go up on
somebody here in the U.S. that has some connections, whether
it's the Department of Homeland Security taking actions to
harden targets, none of that--there are no impediments to that
action being taken. So the impression, if you have, that there
are impediments is, I believe, not founded.
Mr. Brennan. Senator, I would say that you have to define
what do you mean by in charge of what? The terrorism challenge
has so many different dimensions from the standpoint of
operations, investigations, mitigation, defense, analysis,
collection, integration, etc. It reaches almost every part of
the U.S. Government. It reaches worldwide. And you know, when
you think about all of that, to have one person in charge of
all those things that fundamentally affect the statutory
responsibilities and authorities in the different agencies and
departments throughout the government, it is a real challenge
to try to ensure that there's a system that will ensure that
there's going to be contrary views that will be able to get up
to senior policy makers. So again, it's a design issue. What do
you want to construct architecturally, from a national
architecture standpoint on the terrorism challenge.
And the U.S. Government, still I say, is a product of the
past 50 years of individual initiatives. We have to take a look
at ourselves and say, how can we best be configured in the
future?
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Senator Durbin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and
thank you to all of you who are testifying here today.
Madam Chairman, let me join in the chorus of those who are
praising you for calling this hearing. It is unusual for us,
having decided to go about our own business back in our States
and with our families, to return to Washington. I know
Washington's glad to see us. We are glad to be here. I cannot
think of anything more important that we could be doing at this
moment in time than considering the 9/11 Commission Report and
our response to it.
But let us be very candid and honest about the situation
and the circumstances that we face. We have to make certain
that we are driven more by September 11 than by November 2.
This has to be about September 11 and the tragedy that came to
America, and not about a pending presidential election. We have
to make certain that the decisions that we make here and the
process that we follow is one that is extremely serious. It
took some 20 months for the 9/11 Commission to complete its
work. The fact that many are urging that we finish our work in
a matter of hours, I think will not do justice to the task that
faces us.
Let me be specific. Mr. Brennan, you gave high praise to
the President's announcement yesterday, and talked about TTIC
and what it has achieved. If I am not mistaken, it was January
2003 when TTIC was originally created, and I believe you were
brought to head it up in March of that year; is that correct?
Mr. Brennan. The President announced its creation in
January. I was brought in to help design it in March. It was
stood up on May 1 of last year.
Senator Durbin. I am happy that happened. I cannot see a
dime's worth of difference between what the President endorsed
yesterday and what TTIC did or was created to achieve over a
year ago. And I look at the way that your agency is presently
being managed, and I salute you for all that you are achieving,
but I think you would concede that there have been some
fundamental barriers and obstacles which you have faced, not
the least of which is the fact that it is a pickup team that
you are using to run this Agency. It consists not so much of
dedicated staffers, but those who have been loaned to you by
other agencies, assignees from other agencies like the FBI and
the Department of Homeland Security.
According to a Congressional Quarterly Report last night,
the White House had hoped to have 300 analysts at TTIC. A March
2004 report stated it only had 123, 18 from the FBI, 12 from
the Department of Homeland Security. They expected the FBI to
produce 65, and Department of Homeland Security to assign
between 30 and 45. And the simple problem is, there just are
not enough good people. You have had to pick up staff from
other agencies to try to move forward. You have reached less
than half of the assigned staff level that you had hoped for,
and I think that is an indication that as we talk in glorious
terms about creating boxes and moving them around an
organization chart, the final analysis, it is a question of
having talented and creative people in these agencies doing the
work.
The second issue, and one that troubles me, and I raised it
at the last hearing, is this whole transfer in sharing of
information. If the 9/11 Commission said nothing else, it said
we have to reach the point where we are sharing this
information. As Mr. Mudd said, this is a war of speed. The
information has to be shared.
Currently, TTIC, as I understand it, the analysts there
access intelligence only from their own agency's databases,
according to the Center's Directors. That means CIA analysts
must request FBI analysts to check FBI databases and report if
they find anything of interest. That does not sound like an
efficient way to protect America.
So if what the President is suggesting is more of the same,
dusting off the old press release, we are not getting anywhere.
I think what the 9/11 Commission challenged us to do was to
give more authority to this National Counterterrorism Center by
way of budgeting, by way of staffing, so that we can start
forcing some merger of not only talented people, but valuable
information.
I would appreciate your response, Mr. Brennan.
Mr. Brennan. First of all, I have to correct the record in
terms of access to information within TTIC. We have CIA
analysts in TTIC who are able to access FBI case files through
their electronic databases and systems. We have FBI analysts
who are able to access the CIA's operational traffic. So what
we're doing is trying to ensure an integrated structure there.
And you're absolutely right, if they only had access to their
own individual systems, that wouldn't work. That's why we in
fact have designed a system not to do that.
Senator Durbin. So is there full integration of the
databases then of the FBI and the CIA? If you are an FBI
analyst and you know something that you think is of interest
that needs to be followed up, to protect America, can you get
into the CIA database?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, you can. The issue is what do you mean by
an integrated database. We have access to these 22 networks,
and on those networks are countless databases and data
holdings. What you don't want to do is to mix all of that
together, because first of all it's not mixable in its current
form, because individual agencies have designed their systems
according to their own individual standards.
Now, what we are doing is bringing those systems in and
networks in, so we can design an architecture that allows us to
search against them simultaneously, and in fact, we are doing
that now. We are not at that stage, but you have to be able to
do an integrated federated search simultaneously.
Senator Durbin. I would like to stick with this point
because I think this gets to the heart of it. The question is
whether or not we have an overarching architecture where we can
at some day hope to integrate these systems and to integrate
the information, and share the information. If I am not
mistaken, we are currently in the situation where the Border
Patrol, collecting fingerprints, cannot share them with the
FBI, some 5 years after they have been tasked to do it. So what
we have is a lack of integration of this technology base and
this architecture.
When I raised this issue in the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security, OMB screamed bloody murder: This is our
jurisdiction. You stay away from it. We are the ones who
integrate architecture of computers. And so we did nothing. I
am wondering today, when we are talking about what you are
doing and what we hope to achieve with the 9/11 Commission
Report, are we finally tackling the bottom line here, that even
after new titles and new boxes on the organization chart, we
need the people and the architecture to make this mesh and work
together?
Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir. I think you're making the point that
I made earlier, which is that there needs to be a national
architecture, from a business process standpoint as far as the
roles and responsibilities of those different entities, but in
addition, an information technology architecture. The U.S.
Government is the product of, again, the past 20 years of the
revolution that has taken place in information technology. This
Congress has funded individual initiatives and individual
agencies. So what we find right now are disparate systems, and
we're trying to bring it together.
Senator Durbin. Can you for a moment understand my
frustration? It is 3 years after September 11. This is not a
new idea or concept that we would create this architecture, and
here we are 3 years later, almost 3 years later, saying, boy,
we are going to have to do this soon, are we not? What has
stopped us? What has stopped the Executive Branch? Is it the
Congress? Have we held the Executive Branch back from
establishing this new architecture so these computers can merge
their information and make us a safer Nation?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, the architecture is so complicated.
You're talking about multi-level security systems, top secret,
secret, classified, unclassified. You're talking about
something that touches all different government agencies and
departments. You're talking about moving information from
overseas and making sure that it can cascade throughout the
government and down into the State and local level in law
enforcement. You're talking about a very intricate and
interdependent system that is not yet in place. It needs to be.
The U.S. Government needs to understand how we can make sure
information moves, but the bumper sticker comments about we're
not sharing information doesn't take into account the
complexity of the issue.
And when I look at the 9/11 Commission Report, the
recommendation on information sharing is that information
procedures should provide incentives for sharing to restore a
better balance between security and shared knowledge. It
doesn't address any of the issues regarding the technology
challenges and the tremendous resources required, the policies
and protocols and procedures that have to be put in place.
Senator Durbin. Mr. Brennan, with all due respect, 2 years
ago, when we debated the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security, I proposed this Manhattan Project to do exactly what
you suggested. It was stopped by the OMB. It was not approved
by the Administration. It did not go forward. And today we are
in the same conversation. I really believe that unless and
until we make a commitment, a bipartisan commitment to get this
done, we are going to continue to feel the frustration and be
unable to offer the protection the American people are asking
for. Organization charts are important, but the bottom line,
who is working for the Agency? What tools do they have to make
America safer? And the most important tool, as I see it, from a
technology viewpoint, is still something off in the future.
That to me is troubling.
I hope this Committee hearing moves us, not only toward a
better organization chart, but toward putting the people in
place as well as the equipment in place, technology in place,
to make it happen. I think that is the thing that troubles me.
The FBI--I just have a short time--but the FBI computer system
on September 11 was decrepit. It was embarrassing. I know
efforts have been made because I have worked with Director
Mueller, over and over again, to bring more modern computer
technology to the FBI. I think most Americans would be shocked
to learn where you were on September 11. I hope things are
better today. Are they?
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely, Senator. Tremendous strides have
been made. There's still a ways to go, but the key is that
everybody within the FBI and those people who are working to
access the FBI databases have full visibility of the
information that previously, as you said, prior to September
11, simply was not there.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Specter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SPECTER
Senator Specter. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I would like to focus for just a moment on the timetable
which we are going to be following, and offer a slightly
different perspective than the one which we are moving on at
the present time.
The Chairman has gotten national acclaim for having a July
hearing and a series of three August hearings, unprecedented,
and deservedly so. Senator Frist and Senator Daschle did the
right thing in asking for a bill by September 30, and when they
did that, I think they did it in the context that it was
mission virtually impossible, but this Committee can do it. I
have a little different view as to what kind of a timetable we
ought to be undertaking.
The month of September is likely to be filled with
disagreements as we move on the appropriations process, and
likely to have a continuing resolution from what I have seen in
my years around here. I think that if we were to turn out a
bill in early September, and I know that is a mighty tall
order, but let me give you one person's perspective, that we
have floor time to take it up and to move ahead with it.
We have had a lot of experience in the field, and there
have been a lot of witnesses testifing. I know that from the 9/
11 Commission General Hughes testified and Mr. Pistole
testified, and you go over the list, virtually everybody has
testified, Powell, Albright, Cohen, Rumsfeld, Myers, Tenet,
Berger, Clarke, Freeh, Reno, Mueller, and Ridge, and we are
going to hear from some of them again, but we have a pretty
good idea as to what your views are.
We argued about this when we debated the Department of
Homeland Security in the fall of 2002. Senator Lieberman and I
introduced the bill 30 days after September 11. It took a long
time to get administration support, and then we were debating
this point about having the new cabinet officer have the
authority to direct. Many of us have been working on a
correction to that, because we did not get that authority, and
it comes in the background where there is a generally
recognized view that had all of the information been under one
umbrella, September 11 could have been prevented, and that is
our charge today, to make sure that does not happen again.
For the past many weeks Senator Lieberman and I and our
staffs have been working on a bill, so we have been thinking
about this for a long time. I have been thinking about it since
1996 when I had proposed a similar idea in legislation when I
chaired the Intelligence Committee. Then when the 9/11
Commission wanted a bill introduced with their provisions,
Senator McCain and Senator Lieberman were the leaders there,
and Senator Bayh and I joined them to say we would introduce
that bill, not saying we agreed with all of it, and it ought to
be in the public milieu for analysis and decision.
My own ideas, as I expressed to them last Friday, are to
disagree with the double hatting. The 9/11 Commission has said
that the new national Director ought to have subordinates in
charge of the CIA, the FBI, and Defense Intelligence, which
would remain in those departments subject to the Secretaries,
but also responsible to the Director, and maybe that is what we
ought to come out with. I do not know. It is something that we
are going to have to consider and we are going to have to
debate it. At this stage my view is that we ought to take the
bull by the horns, create this new national Director--and I
compliment the President for coming out with it--and take the
counterintelligence out of the FBI, and take a big segment of
counterintelligence out of the Defense Department--the CIA is
already separate--and really provide some authority including
budget authority.
But the point is, what kind of a timetable are we going to
be on? And at a time when America is under the threat of
attack, we are on the spot, and we are doing exactly what we
should be doing, we are here working. And Senator Collins is
exactly right when she says we have got to get it right, and we
cannot do it hastily. We have got to get it right.
But the legislative process is a long-term process, moving
beyond what this Committee is going to do, going to the floor
debate, and a lot of reanalysis. Then it is going to go through
the House and it is going to go through a Conference Committee.
We want to get it right, but this Committee is not going to be
the last word.
This is not a good analogy, but it has some relevance. The
Judiciary Committee reported out a bill on asbestos a year ago,
knowing it had a lot of problems with getting it out of
Committee to move it along the legislative process. And I can
see this Committee finishing the hearings in August, and we are
having more hearings, August 16 and 17. I can see the House
having hearings. And I can see us having bills. I am going to
submit one in the next few days for the consideration of the
Committee. We are going to have the 9/11 Statute. We will put
the chairs out there, and we will sit down and we will really
get down to business, and we will start to hear arguments from
a lot of people who know a lot about this subject, have had a
lot of experience with it, who are on this Committee, and then
we will have the floor debate, and then we will have a
conference. But I can see passing a bill in early October.
We have passed legislation when we have had to, and that is
what I would like to offer for consideration by the Committee
and I have got a call in to the leadership. Our leader is in
China, so it is a little hard to reach him, to give him my
ideas as to where we ought to go, but we could move ahead.
People are going to get very antsy around here in early to
mid October because of the elections there, and a lot of us are
up for election. We are going to be here instead of campaigning
because our duty is to be here, but if we look backwards on the
clock, I think we can do our job and get it done by early
October.
On to the subject matter, General Hughes. You have a lot of
experience in the field. You were the head of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and we had a lot of conversations across
the table when I chaired the Intelligence Committee in 1996.
You took over as head of DIA in February 1996. Can the National
Director of Intelligence run the job he has to do effectively
without budget authority; and could you have run the Defense
Intelligence Agency if the budget authority had been in the
Director of Central Intelligence?
General Hughes. Yes. I think the National Intelligence
Director can have budget authority, and the intelligence
organizations that are subordinate to him in that regard can
effectively operate. I think it's one of partnerships, however,
and cooperative interaction, and it does depend a lot--I think
John Brennan may have said this--about how that is defined and
what it is that you do with the resource authorities that you
are given.
Senator Specter. If you do not have the budget authority,
how can you set priorities? If you do not have the authority to
pick the people, is not a national director just a shell game
and a shell operation?
General Hughes. Generally, I think you're right. Once
again, I personally believe that the personnel engaged in the
work of intelligence for our country should be fungible across
the intelligence organizations, and indeed, under George Tenet
that began to occur and is occurring now, that a CIA officer
can serve the DIA, and a DIA officer can be in the FBI, and a
FBI officer can be over at the Department of Homeland Security.
I think that's actually on track to get where you would like to
see it go.
What we're talking here, is a little bit different
category. We're talking about monies that were apportioned out
of a broad central budget line, and then given for use----
Senator Specter. General Hughes, I hate to interrupt you.
My time is almost up, but I am going to be within my time. We
are going to debate that. That is going to be a hot subject for
this Committee and the floor, where budget authority goes and
what we are going to do by way of appointing authority.
When I took a look at all the people who testified before
the 9/11 Commission, I am reminded of a comment made by
Congressman Morris Udall a long time ago. He was at a place
where members were speaking, and Morris Udall made a comment.
He said, ``Well, everything has been said, but not by
everybody.'' And in this context I think everything has been
said by everybody, so I am going to push an expedited schedule.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Senator Akaka.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I want
to compliment you for moving so swiftly on these hearings, and
thank you for your leadership on this Committee.
The Governmental Affairs Committee has anticipated and
focused on national issues that we believe will seriously
affect the future well-being of our great country. And I want
to make the point that we should remember, the establishment of
an intelligence directorate concerned with terrorism is not a
new issue for this Committee. During the Committee markup of S.
2452, Senator Lieberman's bill to establish a Department of
Homeland Security, Senator Levin, Senator Thompson, and I
worked with Senator Lieberman on an amendment to form a
directorate of intelligence within DHS as a focal point for
information relating to the plans, intentions, and capabilities
of terrorists. Unfortunately, our concept of a directorate of
intelligence was not included in the administration's bill,
H.R. 5005, which was enacted to establish the Department.
As we revisit this subject, I hope that some of the issues
that we worked out in a bipartisan manner can be implemented
this time around.
You have all testified that your respective organizations
have made great strides since September 11 in the area of
counterterrorism. You have also testified that you support the
creation of NCTC and believe that it will build on your current
capabilities. What specifically are you not able to accomplish
now that NCTC will? Mr. Brennan.
Mr. Brennan. The intention and purpose of the National
Counterterrorism Center is to ensure that we build upon the
TTIC foundation to ensure even greater integration and
collaboration across the community. It is bringing it to
another level, this issue of trying to make sure that there is
some type of orchestration from the standpoint of the joint
planning that comes out of the intelligence knowledge that we
are able to accrue.
So from the standpoint of making sure that there is this
orchestration, as well as understanding of what the respective
roles and responsibilities are, a National Counterterrorism
Center in fact is going to try to bring into it more of those
elements throughout the community that are engaged in the
battle against terrorism.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Pistole.
Mr. Pistole. Senator, I believe it institutionalizes some
of the policies and practices that we are currently engaged in,
and it gives that ownership and responsibility the 9/11
Commission addressed, who's in charge, who's the quarterback?
That's what it provides for.
In terms of a the day-to-day operations, I think it simply
allows the clear delineation of who's responsible for what
activity at what time and it enhances the information sharing
that we are all working toward, but with having this new
directorate overall, it again institutionalizes that in a way
that we don't have.
Senator Akaka. General Hughes.
General Hughes. I see it as a place where you can achieve a
strategy for action that is more difficult if you're dispersed.
I see it as a place where you can discuss and come to
conclusions that could be centrally acted upon. And I see it as
a place to achieve synergy that might not otherwise be
achievable.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Mudd.
Mr. Mudd. The CIA, I think, has three traditional missions:
That's the collection of information, the analysis of that
information, all foreign related, and the conduct of covert
action. We can conduct those in the Center.
There are things outside the Center that we need help on.
The first is to ensure that we are all coordinated in action,
and we need coordination of action. And then the second is to
ensure that as we look at foreign intelligence, that we fuse it
with other sources, particularly domestic sources, so the
President gets one view that reflects what everybody thinks.
Senator Akaka. One of the justifications for establishing
the NCTC is to consolidate operations and address the lack of
information sharing within the Intelligence Community by
staffing representatives from the various intelligence agencies
into one cohesive environment. However, we must ensure that
detailing capable personnel from other agencies and departments
to staff the NCTC does not undermine the intelligence and
national security efforts of those entities. Simply putting a
nameplate on a door will accomplish little unless the offices
inside are filled with qualified people. My concern with
staffing the NCTC is my same concern with staffing any Federal
office--making sure that we have the right people in the right
place at the right time. I fear that the creation of another
intelligence center will just worsen the problem.
My question to all of you is, what is the current state of
recruitment and retention of skilled analysts and linguists in
your respective agencies, and are you concerned that the
creation of the NCTC will lead to the loss of your best
personnel, which could compromise your agencies' capabilities
to fight terrorism? Mr. Brennan.
Mr. Brennan. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center relies
on the partner agencies to assign analysts to us. So we don't
do any direct hiring ourselves.
I am concerned about making sure that we are able to
optimize the use of every single analyst throughout the
government. That's why I think it's important that we have a
framework that we all understand the delineation of
responsibilities to make sure that any redundancy is thoughtful
and is intentional, as opposed to non-intentional.
And so what we're trying to do now is to make sure that we
understand what our respective roles are because the analytic
resources are so precious we want to make sure we're able to
cover the entire horizon of challenges that are out there. The
last thing I'd want to do is for National Counterterrorism
Center to deprive analysts from those operations, investigative
and other elements within the CIA, the DHS, and the FBI, that
need those analysts to drive their operations and
investigations appropriately.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Pistole.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, Senator. I think the 9/11 Commission
Report indicated the importance of what Mr. Brennan just
touched on in terms of having the analytic cadre still close to
the operations that are ongoing, whether in the CIA, the DHS,
or the FBI. The challenge as I think you have touched upon, is
that we all need those analysts, and we are all aggressively
competing for the best and the brightest to come work for us,
and then we take those and train them, and assign them, whether
it's to TTIC or to CTC or perhaps DHS IAIP. So that is one of
our greatest challenges.
We have been successful in the FBI of hiring hundreds of
top flight analysts, but the challenge is to continue with that
on into the next year, and we've taken great strides, as all
the agencies have, to do that, but you have touched on one of
the key points.
Senator Akaka. General Hughes.
General Hughes. I think the answer is yes, that there are
fears about shortage of personnel and competition, and not
being able to continue the departmental missions if the best
and brightest of our capability goes elsewhere. That's
certainly true. It is a very competitive environment, and there
are very few people that are experienced in regard to the
Homeland Security mission. So we're trying to build a cadre of
people, and at the same time deal with the requirements that
were given to support organizations like the National
Counterterrorism Center. I believe it's going to take a lot of
leadership and a lot of consideration of the issues to work
this out.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Mudd.
Mr. Mudd. Sir, you do raise an issue of concern. We're
dealing with a broad government, but it's a government, and
when you get right down to it, that has a limited pool of
expertise, and we share this expertise across agencies, so you
have to think, as you create one agency or affect another, that
there is a relatively small pool of people who can do this.
And I would also mention that on your question about
recruitment, the ability of--to bring people in is one thing.
The ability to ensure that you can spend 5, 7, or 10 years to
develop that person where they can really bring strength to
target and degrade the enemy, this is a long process, because
we can't just recruit them. To develop an expert operational
analytic is a multi-year process.
Senator Akaka. Madam Chairman, my time has almost run out,
but again, I want to say thank you for this hearing. It will
certainly help us assess the capabilities we have and need to
create. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Shelby.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SHELBY
Senator Shelby. I ask that my complete statement be made a
part of the record.
Chairman Collins. Without objection.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Shelby follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR SHELBY
Madam Chairman, I commend you for acting so expeditiously in
putting together a series of hearings on implementing the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Especially with the Senate in
recess and a major election on the horizon, the difficulties of pulling
this off should not be underestimated.
Having served on and chaired the Intelligence Committee, I have to
admit to a certain level of satisfaction at seeing some long-overdue
measures finally beginning to take shape. As I have pointed out in the
past, only with the creation of new government entities and the
reorganization that entails can the United States hope to prevent a
recurrence of the tragic events of 9/11.
It is ironic that more than a half-century after passage of the
National Security Act of 1947, which was itself the product of a
devastating surprise attack on the United States, one of its key
provisions may finally come to fruition: The creation of a National
Intelligence Director. The United States was caught by surprise by the
Japanese fleet for the same reason we were caught off-guard by the
terrorist strikes of September 11, 2001. This nation's failure to
construct an intelligence structure that ensures that information
reaches those who need it in a timely manner and who have the authority
to act has been at the core of numerous disasters over the last 50
years. The work of the 9/11 Commission, though, has provided us with
the intellectural, moral and political foundation upon which to build
the requisite governmental structure at last.
The President's announcement yesterday of his decision to follow
the Commission's recommendations was mostly welcome news. The President
has agreed that the Intelligence Community has continued to lack the
oversight and coordination that was envisioned in the 1947 Act. It
would be irresponsible in the extreme to not support him in
implementing this recommendation. Unfortunately, the President's
proposal omits a key requirement for effective reform: A National
Intelligence Director must have budgetary authority over the whole of
the Intelligence Community with the sole exception of military tactical
intelligence, which should remain the provenance of the uniformed
services. Those agencies that provide intelligence necessary for
strategic decision-making must fall under the purview of the new
Director. The Central Intelligence Agency--once again, the irony
shouldn't be missed of an agency created to address the shortcomings
that resulted in Pearl Harbor--should no longer be lead by the same
individual who oversees the entire community.
The Director of Central Intelligence had the statutory authority he
needed, but never the political support to do the intended job. Title
50 of the U.S. Code clearly stipulates that the DCI had budgetary
authority over the Intelligence Community. In practice, it never
occurred. As with the outcome of Pearl Harbor, the events of 9-11 have
created the political momentum to force the fixes that should have been
in place decades ago.
Similarly, the establishment of a National Counter-Terrorism Center
(NCTC) is the long-overdue reaction to our failure to properly take the
necessary measures to fix a problem most of us knew about long ago. The
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) was, conceptually, the right
idea. Problem was, it was the right idea poorly executed. The CIA, for
which I have tremendous respect, was not the right venue for an
operation oriented toward protecting the American homeland as well as
U.S. assets and interests overseas. The insular, highly-secretive
nature of the CIA was not conducive to the mission of the TTIC, which,
to be effective, must interact on a daily basis with the FBI, Homeland
Security, and other organizations.
Madam Chairman, I again commend you for holding these hearings, and
look forward to working with you and Senator Lieberman to implement the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. However, I also remain
committed to ensuring that the actions and reforms we undertake are
done with thoughtful, measured progress. Taking action simply for the
sake of taking action will not secure our homeland and it certainly
will not honor the memory of those who lost their lives on September
11, 2001.
Senator Shelby. Some of us over time have proposed the
creation of a national intelligence directorate to oversee all
intelligence gathering, someone with total control and
accountability. That is the budget too. I believe today's
system, as you have heard many times in your experience, is far
too disjointed, although you have made a lot of progress. I
have to concede that.
I think what we are faced with here today, Madam Chairman--
and you and Senator Lieberman will be in the leadership here is
that we must make certain the changes we propose
architecturally here in legislation, will accomplish the goals
that we set forth. In other words, if we do not accomplish the
goals, the end game, then we are wasting our time, and we
cannot afford that. America cannot afford that.
I think it begs the question, what is the No. 1 problem in
the Intelligence Community, made up of some 15 agencies, I
suppose? Is it the lack of gathering of information? Is it the
lack of analyzing information? Is it the lack of disseminating,
sharing of information? Or is it all of them? I do not know.
But all of these questions have been raised from time to time.
I think Senator Durbin raised an important question
earlier. What are we going to accomplish here if we put
together a all-source or whatever you want to call it,
terrorist center, analysis center, building on what Mr. Brennan
has been doing, and I think we can learn from that. But what
will that be? Will it be an entity standing on its own? Will it
be fed by the other agencies? Will it be the prime entity in
analysis of information?
I think it was said earlier that the agencies--and we will
talk about the CIA, Mr. Mudd. The CIA still would have some
type if analysis center, you would envision, would you not,
dealing with terrorist information?
Mr. Mudd. That's correct. The center I manage is both
operational and analytical.
Senator Shelby. What would you envision the CIA having if
we were to create the big entity for analysis and so forth, in
other words, a counterterrorism center?
Mr. Mudd. I'll answer that, sir. I'd like to say, in
response to what you first raised, which is the question about
the biggest problem we face. I would say it's people, trained
people to conduct this war. You can talk about management,
budget, etc., but getting people to fight the war.
In terms of what the center does, the counterterrorist
center that I manage now, and what it should do. The two
operational capabilities are pretty straightforward. That's the
collection of information, the conduct of covert action at the
director of the President. There's also a responsibility, an
analytic responsibility we have, both to support our operators,
and that responsibility is very complicated. We haven't talked
about that much here, but it's difficult to understand. I'd be
happy to explain later. And to reflect what we know from our
operational information and other foreign intelligence
information, via TTIC to the President. TTIC can help us fuse
other information that's collected, for example, domestic
information to ensure the President has a panoramic picture.
But the center I have now has a fabric of operators and
analysts that I think has proven very effective in the war, and
I think, in response to a comment earlier about what we
envision for this, I don't think we envision that the new
center would control all the operational or analytic assets
across our community. I think the vision would be that the
visibility, the transparency across the community, and having a
place that can coordinate so that we are maximizing limited
resources exists, and that's why I think we need such a center.
Senator Shelby. As a big gatherer of information, which
your agency would do, you could not just gather it and throw it
out raw doing nothing to it, could you? Because you also are
tasked with other things at the CIA, not just terrorists, which
is very important for all of us, and what they would do, how
they would attack us here or around the world, but other things
that you deal with. Is that correct?
Mr. Mudd. I think that's correct. I think what you're
talking about here is balance.
Senator Shelby. Balance in millions.
Mr. Mudd. The fusion mission is critical. It's a mission
that we cannot--let's be absolutely clear here--we in the CIA
cannot conduct this ourselves, but we also have other missions
that go beyond that have led to success in the war that I think
we should continue. So fusion's important. It's not only
important to ensure we have people who get a picture
comprehensively of the data, but it's to ensure the President
has a picture that doesn't reflect six different agencies
saying six different things.
Senator Shelby. General Hughes, at Homeland Security, you
bring with you, as Senator Specter alluded to, your experience
at DIA. What do you believe is the No. 1 obstacle or problem
that we must overcome with your help and the Agency's?
General Hughes. I have to agree with my colleague, Phil
Mudd. People and the shortage of people, and especially the
people who have experience and training. In my endeavor we're
kind of making that up as we go along, and putting in place
some training mechanisms. That's our biggest issue. That's my
direct answer.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole, at the FBI you are charged with fighting
terrorism, and that is a big departure to some extent from what
you have done in the past. I know you have made progress. What
is your biggest problem? Is it recruiting the right people, and
training the right people, as they have said?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, Senator, that's in large part is the
greatest challenge. We have an expression in the
Counterterrorism of the FBI, that we don't have problems, we
just have opportunities to demonstrate character, and we have
lots of those opportunities in terms of recruiting, training,
and deploying the right people. We have thousands of ongoing
terrorist investigations here in the United States. We need the
dedicated cadre of people who can focus on those, do both the
strategic and the tactical analysis that goes with that, and
then to integrate all of that with our partners here to make
sure that we have the broad brush. So it is the challenge of
the people--the personnel.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Brennan, you bring to the table recent
experience of setting up a new organization, it has to be
trained people, people you can train and everything, because
you cannot wait, can you?
Mr. Brennan. That's correct, Senator. The concept of a
shortage of people is a relative one. The more efficient you
are, the more you can do with the finite number of people, and
I am an advocate to making sure that we're able to use those
people as efficiently as possible across the different entities
involved in terrorism.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Brennan, according to the President's
announcement, the new center would subsume the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center, your center. That of course would entail
removing a unified, coordinated analysis and assessment
operation from the CIA basically. What will be the future of
terrorism analysis within the CIA after this, assuming it moves
with legislation? In other words, what would the agencies'
terrorism desks look like after the NCTC is operational?
Mr. Brennan. One of the things that's important to keep in
mind is that the Terrorist Threat Integration Center is not a
part of the CIA. In fact, we are a stand alone entity.
Senator Shelby. It is just housed there?
Mr. Brennan. Well, in fact, we moved out to a new facility
about 4 weeks ago.
The responsibilities of TTIC, the NCTC, the CIA, and others
in the future I think has to be part of a framework. I would
argue that TTIC or the NCTC has to be the center of gravity on
analysis. And so that there be a clear understanding of what
the NCTC or TTIC is responsible for. But what we have to do is
to identify the universe of analytic requirements across the
government, and then assign responsibility for those different
parts of that responsibility, just to make sure we understand
what the CIA will be doing. And so there needs to be a
framework that we are all going to be operating under, under
some type of centralized orchestration that I think the NCTC
can provide.
Senator Shelby. The USA Patriot Act provided Executive
Branch agencies more authority, as we all know, to share
information and to conduct domestic investigations than
heretofore had been the case. Mr. Pistole, you are right into
this. With the establishment of a National Counterterrorism
Center, what additional authorities if any will be needed to
further remove impediments to information sharing, if you can
envision this? In other words, what obstacles do you see or
foresee to bridge the gap between foreign and domestic
intelligence gathering and sharing?
Mr. Pistole. As you mentioned, Senator, the USA Patriot Act
has done great things for the Intelligence Community, law
enforcement community in that respect. The one issue that
remains unresolved which we could use your help on is obtaining
administrative subpoena authority in counterterrorism
investigations. We have that in drug investigations. We have it
in health care fraud investigations. We don't have that in
counterterrorism investigations, which is an impediment to the
timely collection of documentary information, maybe evidence.
So that's one legislative fix that would be beneficial for us.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Brennan, what are two of the biggest
lessons from your center that would be instructive for the
future for us to learn as we set up the architecture here?
Mr. Brennan. First of all, how difficult and complicated it
is. As I said, I'm a long time proponent of reform, and it's
one thing to sketch it on a board, it's another thing actually
to implement it on a day-to-day basis, and so therefore, it's
very complicated and difficult.
And second, to make sure that we take into account the
entire architecture, because what we have found out is that if
you move something in one part of that architecture, it has
impact somewhere else where you may not have even anticipated,
so you may have to make sure that you understand the totality
of what is being affected.
Senator Shelby. Madam Chairman, I know my time is up. I
have a number of questions for the record. Could I submit those
for the record?
Chairman Collins. Certainly, without objection.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Senator Dayton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAYTON
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to join
with the others in commending you for this hearing, and Senator
Lieberman, you working together to bring us all together here.
Director Brennan, you, in your remarks, state that the
President called for the creation of this integrated center to
merge and analyze all threat information in a single location,
which then became TTIC, and then you go on to say that: As
envisioned by the President, this physical integration of
expertise and sharing of information enables and empowers the
key organizations involved in the fight against terrorism. And
then you go on to say that: Fusion and synergy will be further
enhanced when the CIA's Counterterrorist Center and the FBI's
Counterterrorism Division co-locate with TTIC in the coming
months.
When is that going to occur and why has that not yet
occurred if that physical co-location is such an important part
of your effectiveness?
Mr. Brennan. Well, as you can imagine, trying to bring
those three entities together, the TTIC, the Counterterrorism
Division of the FBI, and the Counterterrorism Center from the
CIA, requires a physical infrastructure in order to accommodate
that. We have recently moved into this new building, a new
facility. We, at TTIC, are there in totality. The FBI and the
CIA have also started to move their individuals into the
building. What we are doing is--the Counterterrorism Division
is still going to be responsible for the operational activities
that the FBI runs. So it's three parts of this building right
now that we are moving toward.
I think what we have to do is look at that in terms of the
National Counterterrorism Center and to see whatever type of
modifications might need to be made as a result of that. But
there's a physical infrastructural requirement whenever you do
something like this.
Senator Dayton. You mean the Federal Government did not
have a building in West Virginia somewhere, where you could all
immediately move? [Laughter.]
Mr. Brennan. There are a lot of buildings, sir, but you
have to make sure it has the connectivity requirements and the
Oklahoma City Standards, and all sorts of things.
Senator Dayton. Director Pistole and Director Mudd, that
neither of you in your remarks mentioned this co-location. Is
this intended? When will it occur, and is it desirable in fact
to occur?
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely, Senator, it is desirable, and
we're in the process. It's simply a matter of the build-out of
the different areas. The TTIC area was the first to be built
out. The Counterterrorism Division, we've moved in less than
100. We should have that all complete by the end of September
in terms of all those people from Counterterrorism Division are
moving out.
Mr. Mudd. Sir, in terms of the physical location, the issue
here was simply the setting up of the infrastructure at setup.
We started moving a few weeks ago. One of the other issues you
should take note of is that there isn't sufficient space there
for the entire center that I manage, so one of the difficulties
we'll have--but I think this is a difficulty we can overcome--
is managing in two places about three miles apart. But it's a
good idea. We should be talking to each other. I think co-
location is underrated in terms of the importance for
cooperation, and we have started moving.
Senator Dayton. So if it is important, why was not a space
found that could allow your entire operation to co-locate? You
already have overgrown the space or the space is already
inadequate for the three operations? I do not understand.
Mr. Mudd. I look at this as a first step. I mean, again,
we've spent the last couple years fighting the war. We're
starting to focus more on future and infrastructural issues.
Senator Dayton. Just talking about finding a space that you
would move into that would be sufficient from the outset to
house all three of the operations that are valuable to co-
locate, as I understand it correctly. Now you are already
saying that there is not sufficient space in that site to house
your entire operation?
Mr. Mudd. That's right. You're talking about thousands of
people in an infrastructure that's quite----
Senator Dayton. All the better to move everybody at one
time into one location.
Mr. Brennan. Senator, I would just say that there are
options for expansion there as far as potentially co-locating
other elements.
Senator Dayton. Why would you move into a space that is not
adequate to begin with?
Mr. Brennan. We needed to move very quickly into a place
that had the----
Senator Dayton. Fifteen months.
Mr. Brennan. There were the options in fact to build out
there.
Senator Dayton. It seems to me this is sort of endemic in
government, and you talk about the need to move swiftly in
these matters and not to move precipitously, but then to move
and not even from the outset be moving into space that is
adequate to bring these three entities which were supposed to
be co-located according to the purpose of TTIC, starting
presumably from the outset, or as close to it, and now we are
15 months later, and two of the entities have not moved in yet,
and one of the entities is not even going to be able to move in
its entirety because there is not enough space in the space
that you are moving into. I just think that is more--very
counter-productive I would say.
We have 15 different agencies, entities that are, we're
told, involved in intelligence gathering operations. Are there
any of those 15 that in your respective judgments could be
consolidate or merged?
General Hughes. I think that the roles and functions can,
and indeed the National Counterterrorism Center would be a
reflection of that to some degree. But the departmental
requirements and the operational requirements at the
organizational level still have to be accounted for by some
reflection of an organizational entity in those departments for
intelligence. So I have thought a lot about that over the
years, and I think we're pretty much stuck with the kind of
idea that each organization needs an intelligence entity of
their own that is immediately accessible to them.
Senator Dayton. Any of the other three of you care to
suggest a consolidation or a merger of an entity or agency?
Mr. Mudd. I am not sure I have a suggestion on the
consolidation part. I would say looking at CIA capabilities
that a lot of these are set up by specific authorities from the
President and via statute. So one of the things I would have to
consider in looking at that and one of the things that is
specific to all the agencies we manage is that we do have
specific responsibilities by law, including, for example, in my
agency covert action. So if you just say, CIA, go someplace
else, I would say there are some significant legal issues to
consider aside from all the cultural and other issues. So that
is all the comment I would have.
Mr. Brennan. I would say intelligence reform transformation
should take into account the broad array of intelligence
agencies that are out there, and I think one of the worthwhile
things to do is to take a look and see whether or not there can
be structural reforms made, because over the years the
development and the building of different intelligence
capabilities needs to make sure that it fits into part of a
broader architecture. And so I would say that it is a
worthwhile review that needs to be looked at.
Senator Dayton. Who is going to be able to advise us on
that?
Mr. Brennan. Well, I think there are going to be
discussions as they move forward with the National Intelligence
Director that is going to take a look at the broad array of
those intelligence agencies that would fall under that person's
responsibility.
Senator Dayton. But you are not prepared today to recommend
any specifically that could be merged or consolidated of the 15
agencies?
Mr. Brennan. I am trying to run TTIC today and prepare for
the NCTC.
Senator Dayton. All right. It seems that this is one of the
dilemmas that we encounter, that if we have these entities and
they are all going to remain separate and disparate, then we
are going to have to put another layer of coordination on top
of the other layers of coordination. That is exactly the
problem that we run into. As has been said earlier, no one is
in charge and no one is, therefore, ultimately accountable. And
it seems that the President's proposal, without budget control
or personnel control, is going to be subjected to pretty much
the same outcome in terms of the coordination.
Let me just ask, and maybe it parallels what Senator Shelby
just said, but if we could set aside the Commission's report,
set aside the President's response, what today, if anything,
needs to be improved? And what is not working that should, or
what should our end goal be if we make any changes in the
status quo? I will leave that to the four of you. Is it working
well enough now that we should, aside from all the publicity
and attention and everything else, just let you continue to
operate it the way it is today?
Mr. Brennan. Senator, I think it is certainly moving in the
right direction. I think the more fusion of capability and the
more integration of capability that we can apply against the
targets and the mission of the U.S. Government's Intelligence
Community, the better off we are going to be. That fusion
integration has to take place close to the mission. We have
tremendous capability within the U.S. Government across all of
the different collection agencies and analytic agencies. What
we want to make sure is that we put together a framework that
really maximizes and leverages those capabilities. And so that
fusion and integration against that effort is really going to
be able to be a very strong force multiplier for us, and a
National Counterterrorism Center is a way to try to bring it
together as close to the target as possible.
Senator Dayton. General Hughes.
General Hughes. I would like to use one word that I think
probably would solve a lot of the issues we have talked about
and perhaps some that remain. We ought to strive for greater
interoperability among us. These disparate organizations have
been brought together a great deal now by improved
communications and automation, and I think I agree with John
Brennan that we are on the right track. But that goal should
remain foremost in our mind to make us all interoperable so we
do not have different policies, we do not have different
capabilities that are somehow disparate and not integrated in
some way. And that should be our collective goal, in my view.
Senator Dayton. My time is up, Madam Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Lautenberg.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I join the
others here who commend you for the haste with which you bring
attention to this matter. And it is for me something that
Senator Specter said in his recall of the process was a
valuable introduction, I think, into the discourse and the
planning.
I don't think that we ought to create any images out there
in the countryside that suggest that we are going to be able to
deliver this complicated package in short order. We are not
going to find the cookie cutter answer to our problems and say,
hey, listen, this would do it.
There are fundamental questions that have not even been
asked, like: Where are we going to get the people with the
language capacity? America has never been a place where
languages have been in the forefront of education, multi-
language training. Even as you search for people to fill these
positions that we are going to need, we are competing with the
structure across this country, whether it be in the
municipalities or the States or places like the port
authorities that exist around the country, the regional
aviation authorities, all these people searching, all these
organizations searching for qualified people, competing with
the needs that we will have if we restructure this.
I am not for delay, but I am for thoroughness, I must say.
I think that it is fair to say that we have had operations that
have been meaningful, improving our security as we have gone
along in these last 3 years, what we experienced on September
11 was such a milestone in the way we view things. And I make
no excuses for lack of action on data. It crossed two
Presidents' tenures, etc. But to suddenly think that, well,
retroactively if we had only pushed Button A, Button B, called
this one or called that one, we might have prevented this. The
madness of people who were hijacking airplanes, willing to
commit suicide, it was unheard of. It was almost the equivalent
of the dropping of the A-bomb. It was never conceived before in
mankind, and it changed the world's thinking.
And I look today at an op-ed piece that was written by a
colleague of ours, by Chuck Hagel, that appeared in The
Washington Post. And, Madam Chairman, I want to introduce this
statement of Senator Hagel's into the record.\1\
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\1\ The article appears in the Appendix on page 111.
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Chairman Collins. Without objection.
Senator Lautenberg. And I will take a little moment to
excerpt some things from what he said: ``But if we allow the
current national consensus for intelligence reform to become a
tool in the partisan rancor of Presidential politics, we risk
doing enormous damage to our Intelligence Community. We must
not allow false urgency dictated by the political calendar to
overtake the need for serious reform.''
And he goes on to say, ``A mistaken impression has
developed that since September 11, 2001, little has been done
to improve our intelligence capabilities.'' That is not true.
He said, ``We are unquestionably a safer Nation than we were 3
years ago--even as the intensity to hurt us increases all over
the world.''
So I think that when Senator Specter talked about the
process, we cannot ignore it, and we cannot just lay the blame
on bureaucratic turfdom. That is, in my view, about the weakest
thing that we could say. People who head these organizations
are conscientious leaders. They do not want to see any
Americans killed through neglect or oversight.
And so we should not jump into this thing without realizing
that, listen, we have got a huge problem on our hands. We have
the prospect of a new government coming in in January. I am not
talking about party. I am talking about just a change in
government. And you cannot ignore what changes that might
bring. Will President Bush rethink some of the things that he
has been unwilling to do now, that is, to allow budgetary
authority with the new Director of Counterintelligence? Or
should we consider the fact that maybe like the Federal Reserve
Bank, a professional executive order be brought in not subject
to the change in administration, but to have a term of office.
I have advocated that for a long time for the FAA. Give
ourselves a chance to work out the long-term projects.
The understanding that the data upon which this last alert
was presented is kind of old information. And what does that
say? And what do we want to accomplish, I ask you in your
thinking, when we put out an alert like that? Would we want to
shut down the financial center of the world on the basis of the
data that we have acquired? Or should we simply move the
mechanism into place to protect people, and without sending out
these warnings that you cannot go here, you cannot go there?
I got calls in my office in New Jersey because a building
in Newark was identified as a possible target. ``Should I go to
work today? I have an appointment with my child to go to the
doctor.'' People are worried sick. And we add to the frenzy, we
add to the anxiety. But, frankly, I do not think that we add
much to the security, to the prospect that we would want to
tell people not to go to downtown Manhattan where the financial
center of the world exists and operates and is essential to the
well-being of all of us, not just because of the financial
consequences but because of the living consequences that take
place.
And so I ask, Should we be looking at a fixed term for a
Director of the National Intelligence? Is that something that
has ever occurred to any of you? Does anybody want to comment
on that?
Mr. Pistole. I can comment, Senator, from the FBI's
perspective of having a Director with a 10-year fixed term, and
there is obviously a benefit of that from the perspective of
independence of administration, in terms of policies,
procedures. There is obviously a downside depending on which
way you look at it. But from the FBI's perspective, where we
strive to be independent in what we do, having a Director with
a fixed term of 10 years, that transcends administrations, is a
benefit.
Senator Lautenberg. Anybody disagree with that? Mr. Mudd.
Mr. Mudd. My only thought on this is, first of all, sir, I
don't have strong views on the term. I do believe that whoever
serves must have the confidence of the President, and I think
it is important to ensure a mechanism, however that mechanism
works, to give the President the authority to appoint someone
who he is comfortable working with.
The only other thing I would say is, having watched
Director Tenet over time sacrifice his family, sacrifice his
time, I do not think 10 years is something you could reasonably
expect a DCI to do. It is not possible.
Senator Lautenberg. Would you at all be concerned about the
possibility that a President could influence decisions that
might redound to his either personal philosophy or political
campaigns or things of that nature? Would you suggest that this
person who would head the national organization be situated
right in the White House as they gather data from across the
world and confer exclusively with the President's chief person?
Or should there be some other means of review? Should the
Congress be included in a way that is direct and readily
available?
Mr. Mudd. Senator, I do not believe that the individual
should sit in the White House, and I think the President made
the right decision in that regard. We have a community that has
spent many decades trying to build a tradition that says we
should provide unvarnished and unbiased information to the
President. And I think it is good to keep some air gap between
the White House and the National Intelligence Director. And as
I said, I think the President made the right decision in that
regard.
Senator Lautenberg. Anybody else?
Mr. Brennan. I fully agree. I do not think the National
Intelligence Director should be in the Executive Office of the
President. There needs to be some independence and separation
there.
General Hughes. I certainly share that view, and one of the
hallmarks of this community has been to be, maybe sometimes
irritatingly so, independent. We ought to be able to tell the
truth, unvarnished and unbiased.
Senator Lautenberg. These questions seem rather elementary
in their focus, but put them all together, they spell enormous
complication. And the other thing that I would ask in closing
is that when we look at distribution of resources, we look at
the risk in the areas that we are evaluating in terms of
funding. We have not been able to do that so far.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thanks, Madam Chairman.
A lot of questions have been asked by a lot of Senators
already. I recall a comment that Senator Specter made earlier
in his remarks. He led off by quoting Mo Udall, who is one of
my favorite people. And I did not realize that it was Mo Udall
who said--what did he say? ``All the questions have been asked
but not everybody has asked them.''
I heard another Mo Udall quote last week. A bunch of people
had gathered at a fundraiser, and he said, ``There is good news
and bad news.'' He said, ``The good news is we have all the
money we need in the campaign. The bad news it is in your
pockets.'' [Laughter.]
I think the good news here is a lot of good ideas are in
your minds, and in the minds of those who testified last Friday
and those who are going to testify after you here today. And
part of our job is to get that good information not out of your
pockets but out of your minds and into our own, to a way where
we can take that information and turn it into a legislative
form.
I find value in a panel like this, and particularly with
the panelists to follow, to help me develop a consensus about
what is the right path to follow. And we have diverse points of
view. People have thought about this, worked a lot in these
fields. There are going to be some areas where you are going to
agree and some that you will disagree. But what I really look
for is for areas of consensus.
When you look at the 9/11 panel's recommendations--the
parts where you think they got it right and the parts where you
think they got it wrong--which recommendations do you think we
should ignore?
I think I will start off with you, Mr. Mudd, and then we
will ask General Hughes and Mr. Pistole and others. Thank you.
Mr. Mudd. I guess what I would do generally as we sort of
start down this road is to think about questions I would ask
generally and questions that I thought through as I stepped
through this. I will try not to be tactical. I will try to be
strategic. There are two questions, and I think they have been
raised, to quote Mo Udall, ``have been raised before.''
The first question, of course, that has been debated
heavily is the question of authorities, the difference between
a National Intelligence Director who directs and a National
Intelligence Director who coordinates. I think that is a
critical question that I am sure this Committee and others will
be considering.
The second question, obviously, relates to how exactly you
structure the National Counterterrorist Center. Do you
structure an organization that coordinates? Do you structure,
as someone suggested earlier, an organization that controls
everything? I would argue for an organization that coordinates
myself, but there is clearly room for debate here.
Those are the two fundamentals. There are some lesser
issues here, but since those are the strategic issues of the
day, that is how I think about it.
General Hughes. I think the Mo Udall quote went something
like that everything has been said, it just has not been said
by everyone. And in this case, when you ask a complicated
question, in a short period of time you want a simple answer.
It just does not work.
Some of the ideas and some of the thoughts and the
Commission's work, which I think is wonderful--I really do. I
give them tremendous credit, and I think it was great work and
will serve the Nation very well. But it is complicated, and it
takes some time and some care to get it right. And I would just
like to echo things that have been said here before by Members
and by members of the panel here, and, that is, some of this
should be thought through very well.
Kind of on the tail end of your question here, what we
should not do, I would kind of like to answer it in a positive
way, if I can. Form ever follows function has been a reasonable
piece of wisdom that has proven through the test of time to be
worth considering. If we make the form, we might change some of
the functions, and so I would like to just ask for everyone to
consider the possibility that some of these functions are not
well understood yet, and some of the ideas behind the structure
have not yet been completely formed or understood, and they
should be before we put the form in place.
Senator Carper. Thanks, General Hughes.
Mr. Pistole. Senator, I think that the one recommendation
that I would give is to be precise, and by that I mean be
precise in what the language is, what is developed from that,
because I think one of the things that we have all experienced
in this post-September 11 environment is that ambiguity creates
voids or problems that we all try to solve, and in doing that
we probably do not work as efficiently as we should as a U.S.
Government, writ large. And so anything you can do in terms--
whether it is budgetary issues, authority issues, whatever that
may be, the more precision you can have in delineating
responsibilities and authorities, the better we will be able to
carry out those responsibilities in a clear, coordinated
fashion.
Senator Carper. Thank you. Mr. Brennan.
Mr. Brennan. Senator, I think the 9/11 Commission got it
right at the 100,000-foot level in terms of what they called
for. In each of the recommendations, it points out what should
happen. ``Should'' is a very powerful word, but with ``should''
comes a number of questions about how it should happen. All
people should live in harmony. How are we going to actually
accomplish that?
So a lot of the ``should's'' here I think are right in
terms of the end state and the objective. But like Mr. Pistole
said, there is a lot of precision that is required as far as
how do you get to that ``should'' end state. And this, for all
of its scholarship, it really just skims the surface of a lot
of these very important and complicated issues.
Senator Carper. Mr. Pistole, let me ask you a question.
This would, I think, just be for you, and the issue deals with
dual hatting. Under the Commission's proposals, as I recall,
there are three deputies the new National Intelligence Director
would operate through. They would also be deputies in their
home agencies.
Now, some have suggested that this just is not workable,
and people in key positions like these deputies cannot answer
to two bosses. I think it was the former CIA Director and
Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutsch who said--if I
remember the quote so I get this right, ``Requiring the
National Intelligence Director to function through three
double-hatted deputies who would simultaneously be running
their own agencies would sharply limit his executive authority.
The National Intelligence Director could become no more
relevant than the drug czar.''
Now, as someone who is involved in running your own
operation within the FBI and also for participating in the
joint venture of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, could
you just please comment for us on how workable or really how
desirable you think the structure proposed by the 9/11
Commission is with its double-hatted deputies?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, Senator, and, again, just to clarify, it
would be my colleague, Maureen Baginski, who is the Executive
Assistant Director for Intelligence, who is envisioned for one
of those three deputy positions, with the possibility of a
fourth deputy, the Under Secretary for Homeland Security for
Information, IAIP. That is one of the challenges where that
precision becomes, I think, very important because if that
person and the three deputies or four deputies are expected to
have a full-time job of running their own agencies' operations
and still have a full-time job of reporting to the Director of
National Intelligence, that is problematic.
There is obviously the responsibility of reporting and
informing which could be done through the mechanism that they
have set up, but I think the challenge will be in the details
of what is envisioned by that deputy position. What does the 9/
11 Commission recommend in terms of that responsibility? So I
think you have hit a good topic on the head there.
Senator Carper. Well, my last question for each of you, and
I would ask for just a brief answer. A lot of questions have
been asked of you. More are going to be asked later today and
in the weeks to come in this room.
Give me a question that we have not asked you today that we
should have. Give me a question that we have not asked today
that we should have asked.
Mr. Pistole. If I could just start, that is something that
most FBI agents ask at the end of an interview of somebody, so
that is a good approach. But I will defer to my colleagues.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. Mr. Brennan, give me a question we should
have asked that we have not?
Mr. Brennan. ``Are the recommendations of 9/11 workable?
Are they doable in totality?'' I don't think they are. I don't
think we would do a service to this Nation if we took these as
they are stated and ran with them with haste. I just don't
think that there is sufficient engineering, design, and
consideration of all the complexities here.
Senator Carper. Mr. Pistole.
Mr. Pistole. I would disagree somewhat because I think the
Commission's recommendations are a blueprint. The question is
in the details of implementing.
Senator Carper. General Hughes.
General Hughes. A similar answer. I would pose the question
like this: Have we considered carefully the facts that we can
understand and the unintended consequences and the
possibilities before we act? Because this is vitally important
to our security.
Senator Carper. Mr. Mudd, give me one question?
Mr. Mudd. ``What are the things we have learned from
September 11?''
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you all, and thank you for
your service to our country.
Thank you, Madam Chairman. Notice I was the only person on
the Committee who has not praised you for holding these
hearings during the middle of our----
Chairman Collins. And I will remember that. [Laughter.]
Senator Carper. Well, I will see you--what is it? The 16th?
Chairman Collins. Yes, you have a chance to redeem
yourself.
Senator Carper. I will try.
Mr. Mudd. I would like to point out, Senator, the panelists
also have not praised the Chairman, but we will not----
[Laughter.]
Chairman Collins. Senator Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Madam Chairman, let me begin by heaping
praise on you and Senator Lieberman for calling these hearings.
I want to make up for Senator Carper's faux pas. [Laughter.]
Senator Carper. It is not the first time he has done that
for me.
Senator Levin. We created TTIC in order to fuse
intelligence so that we would have it all coming, relative to
foreign intelligence, to one place and we could make an
assessment, that we would avoid the problems that we had on
September 11 where information that one agency had fell through
the cracks, was not shared with other agencies. Indeed, in some
cases it was not even shared within its own agency in the case
of the FBI particularly.
Now that we have the TTIC in place. What are the
shortcomings in TTIC that the new Counterterrorist Center would
make up for?
Mr. Brennan. The overall framework that we have talked
about before----
Senator Levin. That is too general. I want to get to Mr.
Pistole's point. Give me real specifically, what do you not
have that you need?
Mr. Brennan. We do not have right now the sufficient number
of analyst managers in order to carry out that primary
responsibility for terrorism analysis in the U.S. Government.
Senator Levin. Then you ought to get them.
Mr. Brennan. Right. And we are in the process of getting
them now.
Senator Levin. Fine. Now you have them. Now, is there
anything that you need that you do not have besides analysts?
Because the new Counterterrorist Center will have the exact
same problem. They have got to get analysts, too.
Mr. Brennan. Right.
Senator Levin. Other than that issue, which is an issue for
any center that is going to fuse information, what do you not
have now that you need, specifically?
Mr. Brennan. For the TTIC build-out or for the National
Counterterrorism Center concept?
Senator Levin. To fuse all intelligence, to give us
intelligence assessments of foreign terrorists that fuse all of
the information from all of the sources.
Mr. Brennan. We are on the path to getting all the
technology we need to bring together that architecture so we
can do those federated searches and connect the dots. That is a
process----
Senator Levin. You are on that path?
Mr. Brennan. We are on that path.
Senator Levin. Will this speed it up if we create a new
center?
Mr. Brennan. It will enable it, I believe, as recognition
that it is the center of gravity within the U.S. Government on
this.
Senator Levin. Will it speed up the gaining of technology?
Will we get it faster if we create a new center?
Mr. Brennan. If we are going to be talking about a new
center that is going to have, in fact, more partners involved
in it, because there are five partners in TTIC. But if we are
actually going to extend it with a National Counterterrorism
Center, one of the things we are trying to do is to identify
the universe of information that is out there that has any
relevance to terrorism.
Senator Levin. Is there any reason you cannot extend the
TTIC to include those other elements?
Mr. Brennan. We are in the process of doing that right now.
Senator Levin. All right. Other than what you are in the
process of doing, what are we going to accomplish by creating
the NCTC?
Mr. Brennan. OK, well, that is then a different issue,
which is putting into this construct then this joint
operational planning and responsibility and orchestration. That
is the major difference between TTIC now and this.
Senator Levin. OK. That is the operational piece. I am not
talking about that. I am talking about in terms of assessing
information and intelligence to give us one assessment from all
sources of all intelligence related to foreign terrorism. The
assessment side, that is what I am focusing on, because that is
where the major failures were. The major failures were
assessments, information that did not get to where it had to
go, information which was ignored, information which was not
shared. On the information side, on the assessment side, is
there anything that this new center is going to do other than
hopefully have more analysts, which you can get, other than
adding elements of sources of information, which you are in the
process of getting, is there anything that it is going to add
on the assessment side to what TTIC is doing or in the process
of doing?
Mr. Brennan. Analysis has many different aspects to it. It
is not just doing assessments. Those are the finished products
that go out. It is also empowering the analytical capability
that is going to empower the operational activities. So, again,
part of an overall framework that is going to make sure that
the National Counterterrorism Center is hooked up and provides
the information and establishes the sharing mechanisms, because
information sharing is a very complicated issue, to make sure
that a very sensitive piece of information that the CIA
collects is able to get to the Department of Homeland Security
and then beyond to the Federal and State level.
Senator Levin. You cannot do that now?
Mr. Brennan. Right now, we are, again, on that path. It is
a build-up in 14 months.
Senator Levin. When you get to where you are going, will
you be able to do the same thing that the NCTC can do?
Mr. Brennan. Without the operational function. I think that
is what is envisioned.
Senator Levin. Exactly right.
Mr. Brennan. Right.
Senator Levin. Putting aside operational function.
Mr. Brennan. Right. I think that was the plan, to keep
moving forward with the TTIC model.
Senator Levin. OK. So putting aside the operational side,
in terms of accumulating, giving assessments and giving
estimates, you can do the same thing on the path you are on
when you reach that goal as the projected NCTC can do?
Mr. Brennan. That is exactly right as far as what our
analytic capability is going to be able to allow us to----
Senator Levin. So it is the operational issue which is the
key question, whether we want to add that to the--or have that
exist in the NCTC.
Now, very quickly, if you can, each of you tell us, what
are the--putting aside the issue of you do not want this new
entity to go into the Executive Office of the President. You
have all said that. What are the two top differences between
your individual views and what the 9/11 Commission has
recommended? General Hughes, let me start with you.
Just, specifically, quickly, the two differences that you
have with the 9/11 Commission, other than you would not put
this new entity, if we create it, in the Executive Office of
the President.
General Hughes. Well, the 9/11 Commission is a broad
treatment of many problems that now require details to put into
effect, and those details are not yet present in common
understanding. That is one.
Senator Levin. That is not one. I am talking about specific
recommendations that you disagree with, other than the
Executive Office of the President issue. There are a lot of
recommendations.
General Hughes. Sure. I will give you--I can only give you
one.
Senator Levin. That is good. I will settle for one quick
one.
General Hughes. The three deputies should not be three, if
we have deputies, and that's a question we have to discuss.
There should be four. We are quite different from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
Senator Levin. All right. You want four deputies instead of
three. Should they be dual-hatted?
General Hughes. A very complex issue for me. I,
personally----
Senator Levin. Is that a yes or no?
General Hughes. Yes.
Senator Levin. Mr. Mudd.
Mr. Mudd. The specific structure laid out on--I think it is
Page 413--I agree with Mr. Brennan, I do not believe that
National Intelligence Director structure is workable.
Senator Levin. You do not believe what is workable?
Mr. Mudd. That the structure that is laid out on the
diagram on Page 413----
Senator Levin. And what specifically is not workable?
Mr. Mudd. It is too diffuse an effort, and I am not sure I
buy the dual-hatted piece myself.
Second, if there is a vision that every element of
everything we should do should be consolidated in one center,
and I am not sure that this actually advocates that, I would
not support that.
Finally, and very specific, there is a paramilitary
recommendation in here that I do not believe we should pursue.
Senator Levin. Which is to put all of the paramilitary
activity into the Department of Defense.
Mr. Mudd. That is correct, sir.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Mr. Pistole.
Mr. Pistole. The one that I would question is on the dual-
hatting of the deputies and question----
Senator Levin. Is there a second one besides that?
Mr. Pistole. That is the major one, no.
Senator Levin. And do you agree that the Executive Office
of the President should not be the place where this is located?
Mr. Pistole. I think that is a policy matter that I don't
have a strong opinion on.
Senator Levin. You were the only one that did not give your
opinion on that one.
Mr. Brennan, in addition to what you have already said,
because you have been very clear about it, specifically, two
recommendations that you disagree with.
Mr. Brennan. Again, the structure, I do not think it will
work. There are issues about the CIA, in terms of what you want
the CIA to do, and I think that is a very legitimate issue that
has not been addressed here. They still have all sorts of
analyses and clandestine services under the CIA, but they have
taken out paramilitary, and I think the CIA should get back to
its roots, in terms of clandestine operations activities,
espionage, covert action, and that should be the focus, and
that should be the real sort of driver of that U.S. activity.
Senator Levin. Do you all agree that TTIC right now has the
primary responsibility for terrorism analysis, except
information relating solely to purely domestic terrorism? Do
you all agree with that?
[Witnesses nodding yes.]
Senator Levin. By the way, I am glad that is clear because
Senator Collins, Chairman Collins and I spent a year trying to
get that statement, as to who has primary responsibility for
terrorism analysis. It took one year for all of the agencies to
get that in writing. We are not moving quickly enough, folks,
if it takes a year, when we are in the middle of a war, for
four agencies to agree on who has primary responsibility for
intelligence analysis.
The intel assessments--I guess this is my last question--
which are now done, the assessments and analyses which are now
done by TTIC, Mr. Brennan, where do they go from you?
Mr. Brennan. Depending on what they address, they go many
different places. There are many different constituencies that
are out there for the receipt of those assessments. What we do
is make sure that we have a robust dissemination system, and
what we in fact have now is something called TTIC On-line,
which is a top secret website that gets out to people.
Senator Levin. Do they all go first to the DCI?
Mr. Brennan. They go simultaneously to hundreds and
thousands of people.
Senator Levin. But does the DCI have a role in those
assessments and in those analyses before you conclude them?
Mr. Brennan. No. TTIC has the final review authority and
release authority for those assessments.
Senator Levin. And so the Director of the CIA and the DCI
does not influence--well, it could influence--but it does not
have any role directing, deciding what goes in those analyses
now and those assessments.
Mr. Brennan. Since TTIC has stood up, never has there been
an assessment that has had to go through the DCI.
Senator Levin. And you understand that would be the same
with the NCTC or do you not know what that would be?
Mr. Brennan. That is my understanding as well that the head
of the NCTC would have that final release authority.
Senator Levin. Release, but would have no role in terms of
the assessment or in terms of the analysis.
Mr. Brennan. Well, the analysis----
Senator Levin. I am looking for independence. We did not
have independence.
Mr. Brennan. Exactly. We want to make sure, especially in
NCTC, that analytic independence is maintained separate from
operations and policy considerations, yes.
Senator Levin. And separate from the National Director?
Mr. Brennan. As far as the National Director has oversight
over the entire system, but I think there needs to be, from the
part of the NCTC head, that analytic, integrity and
independence that is going to put things out. And that is the
way it is right now, and I expect it to be that way in the
future.
Senator Levin. Thanks.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
I want to thank our witnesses on this panel. You have been
extremely candid in your assessment and in responding to our
questions. We appreciate your service. We will be in touch as
we continue this investigation or examination.
Yes, Senator Lieberman?
Senator Lieberman. I just want to add a final word of
thanks, join Senator Collins in doing that, and to say I was
very taken with the fact that, in the first go-around, about
what you are most lacking, each of you said adequately trained
personnel. And we have got to figure out how to help you
create, in some sense, a marketing campaign like the old
``Uncle Sam Needs You'' because intelligence is the front line
of the war on terrorism.
And I just believe there is a generation of Americans out
there who would respond to that call to duty if we frame it in
the right way. And I hope you will think about that, and you
will ask us, and your respective agency heads will come back to
us and ask us for the money to fund that because that is
critical.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Mudd.
Mr. Mudd. Just one comment. We can recruit them, we can
train them, we just need to have the flexibility with you to
get enough of them.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. I have just one observation. Thank you,
Madam Chairman.
I think in all major legislation initiatives, there will
always be winners and losers. The details will come from the
architecture coming out of this Committee, and it will spell it
out. I think we need to be very careful as we approach this not
to weaken or perhaps begin the dismantling of the CIA because I
think that is very important because the CIA does things for us
other than just dealing with counterterrorism, which is very
important.
And I think, Madam Chairman, as we move along here, we
better be very careful in that regard.
Senator Levin. Madam Chairman, will the record be kept open
for all of us for questions?
Chairman Collins. It will, indeed. We have another panel,
just so that people understand that, and the record is going to
remain open for 5 days for additional questions of these
witnesses, as well as our second panel.
Again, I thank you very much for your testimony this
morning, and I call forward the second panel of witnesses.
[Pause.]
Chairman Collins. The Committee will be in order.
We will now hear from two individuals who, as the lead
staff members of the 9/11 Commission, have devoted the last
year and a half to understanding the events that led up to the
September 11 attacks and our Nation's antiterrorism
preparedness and response.
Philip Zelikow is the Executive Director of the Commission.
He also is director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs and
is a professor of history at the University of Virginia.
Christopher Kojm is the Deputy Executive Director of the 9/
11 Commission. He is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence Policy at the State Department and served as a
senior staff member on foreign policy for Representative Lee
Hamilton, the Vice Chair of the Commission.
We welcome you here today. We very much appreciate the
extraordinary public service that you have rendered over the
past year and a half, and we look forward to your statement.
Mr. Zelikow, we will start with you.
TESTIMONY OF PHILIP ZELIKOW,\1\ EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
ACCOMPANIED BY CHRISTOPHER A. KOJM,\1\ DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
UNITED STATES
Mr. Zelikow. Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, and Members
of the Committee, thank you for inviting us to appear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The joint prepared statement of Mr. Zelikow and Mr. Kojm
appears in the Appendix on page 96.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This Committee is preparing recommendations to the Senate
for government reorganization, especially for counterterrorism
and intelligence. You have already heard from our chair and
vice chair. They summarized the Commission's recommendations.
We are here to follow up on specifics, specifics about the
recommendations, specifics about why the Commission made
certain choices and specific responses to some of the concerns
that have been voiced, but before plunging into details, we
urge you to keep the big picture in view.
The Commission made recommendations about what to do, a
global strategy and how to do it, reorganizing the government.
Today, we do not have a government capable of implementing the
global strategy we recommend.
Confronting a 21st Century set of threats, we recommended a
21st Century set of strategies, and we were compelled to look
at a 21st Century approach to government. These are not just
catch phrases. The Commissioners brought vast accumulated
experience in both the Executive and Legislative Branches of
Government. I have worked in every level of government--
Federal, State and local--and either for or with almost every
national security agency we have. Chris Kojm spent 14 years on
the Hill and over 4 years more as the State Department's
representative to the Intelligence Community.
We are practical people, but with our Commissioners, we had
to think globally, across the world and across America's
Governments, from a firebase near Kandahar to a firehouse in
Lower Manhattan. We had to think in time charting the way our
government has performed yesterday, today, and tomorrow, and we
had an exceptional opportunity to research, reason, consult,
and decide what it all meant.
Returning to that big picture, let us focus for a moment on
two of our five main organizational recommendations for
counterterrorism and for intelligence.
Counterterrorism. The Executive Branch of our government is
organized in accordance with the best management principles of
1950. We have large, vertically integrated industrial-sized
behemoths. What, therefore, happens is that each of the
agencies does its job and then tries to get others to cooperate
and vice versa. If they need a lot of help from other agencies,
they create their own interagency processes.
The CIA, for instance, runs an interagency meeting at 5
o'clock almost every day to enlist help in working on the daily
threats. But that is only the best-known example. Analogous
meetings occur in meetings run by the FBI, by the Military
Central Command, by the Military Special Operations Command and
so on.
As for intelligence, each major agency tries to build its
own Fusion Center. This was the basic pattern before September
11. Take, for example, the Moussaoui case. Moussaoui was
arrested in August 2001 because of his suspicious behavior at a
Minnesota flight school. The FBI in Minneapolis took charge of
the case, worked it hard, and ran into frustrating problems in
pursuing the investigation.
None of the senior managers at the FBI heard about the case
or these problems, but good news--the arrest was brought to the
attention of the top official at the CIA. DCI Tenet was told
about the case in late August. ``Islamic Extremist Learns to
Fly'' was the heading on his briefing.
We asked him--I asked him--what he did about that. His
answer was that he made sure his working-level officials were
helping the FBI with their case.
``Did he raise it with the President or with other Agency
counterparts even at the FBI?''
``No,'' he answered, ``with some heat. After all, it was,''
he insisted, ``the FBI's case.''
There is one example of the pattern--vertical integration,
even a willingness to cooperate, but no joint analysis, not
joint planning, no connection of the case to the national
intelligence picture of imminent attack, no involvement by the
White House. No one there even learned about the case until
after the September 11 attacks. Other illustrations can be
found in the report, especially in Chapter 11 and Chapter 8.
Since September 11, we saw evidence of an enormous
expansion of effort with more numerous and stronger
participants, including three unified commands in the Defense
Department and an entirely new Cabinet Department working in
the same outdated, redundant and fragmented system, producing
energetic, often effective, but disjointed analysis and action
managed by constant improvisation led by a greatly 50-percent
enlarged White House staff and proliferating interagency
working cells around the government.
Since terrorism poses such a revolutionary challenge to old
ways of Executive management in our national security
bureaucracy, counterterrorism requires an innovative response.
Mr. Kojm. One source of inspiration for us was in national
defense. During World War II, the United States created a joint
staff that works for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Plans and operations were still mainly formulated by the
different services--the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines--but
the Joint Staff tried to coordinate their efforts. Experience
showed this coordination was not good enough. Since the passage
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the structure has changed
again.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff became
much stronger. The Joint Staff developed joint analysis and
joint planning for joint action. Then, those plans were
directed and executed by combatant commanders or the military
departments. The military processes are far from perfect, but
few, if any, commanders would prefer to go back to the old
model.
Our recommendation calls for a National Counterterrorism
Center. The Director of the NCTC should be the President's
principal adviser on counterterrorism, intelligence and joint
operations.
The NCTC Directorate of Intelligence--its ``J-2''--should
have primary responsibility in the U.S. Government for analysis
of terrorism and terrorist organizations from all sources of
intelligence, whether collected inside or outside of the United
States. It should be the reference source for all source
information about suspected terrorists, their organizations,
and their likely capabilities. It should propose relevant
intelligence collection requirements for action by national and
departmental agencies inside and outside of the United States.
It should have primary responsibility in the U.S. Government
for net assessment and warning about the terrorism danger,
comparing enemy capabilities with assessed national
vulnerabilities.
The NCTC Directorate of Operations--or the ``J-3'' in
military parlance--should have primary responsibility for
providing guidance and plans, including strategic plans for
joint counterterrorism operations by the U.S. Government. The
NCTC would not break the formal chain of command for Executive
agencies, just as the Joint Staff today is not part of the
formal chain of command between the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and combatant commanders.
If the heads of Executive departments disagree with the
joint plan, then the NCTC should accede or take responsibility
for elevating the issue to the National Security Council and
the President in order to obtain needed decisions. The NCTC
should have substantial overall responsibility and
accountability. It must track cases, monitor the implementation
of plans and update those plans to adapt to changing
circumstances inside and outside of the United States.
Organization of national intelligence. The present
organization of national intelligence embodies the same
management weaknesses we identified in counterterrorism, but on
a much larger scale and touching many other subjects. Our
report identified various weaknesses.
President Bush has acknowledged the need for a National
Intelligence Director separate from the head of the CIA.
Senator Kerry shares this judgment. We hope you will agree.
Our recommendations flow from several aspects of the
September 11 story. In December 1998, DCI Tenant sent a memo to
the senior managers of the Intelligence Communities saying they
were at war against bin Laden and his associates. A maximum
effort was needed. There was no evident response. We critiqued
the DCI's management strategy for this war, but since he would
have been hard-pressed to implement even an ideal strategy,
there was less incentive to devise one.
We view this recommendation as an enabling, empowering
idea. There are many particular management issues in the
Intelligence Community: Reallocating money, improving human
intelligence, improving the quality of all-source analysis and
better integrating open-source information. These are just a
few. Only a modern management structure can enable the
Intelligence Community to achieve these goals. Only such a
structure can achieve the unity of effort and efficiency needed
where funds are not unlimited and hard choices must be made
across agency lines.
In national intelligence, the work is done by a number of
agencies, vertically integrated with weak central direction or
control. The private sector has increasingly turned to other
management approaches to get lean, horizontal direction across
the large operating divisions. This is sometimes called the
Matrix Management Model. It is employed by firms like Citigroup
and General Electric.
In national defense, two innovations were key. One was the
horizontal direction provided by the Joint Staff, the other was
the establishment of more powerful unified commands for joint
action. The military departments had the job of organizing,
training and equipping the capabilities to be used by these
joint commands. There are, thus, two lines of authority to the
Secretary of Defense; one goes to him from the unified
combatant commands, such as CENTCOM, SOCOM and NORTHCOM.
Another goes to him from the military departments--Army, Navy,
and Air Force.
Another source of inspiration for us was the emerging view
within the CIA in favor of what one manager called ``the
integration imperative'' for working on key targets. Some
writers have called for the creation of ``joint mission
centers,'' bringing together experts from several disciplines
working together on a common problem like terrorism or
proliferation.
Borrowing some of these ideas from the private sector and
from government, the Commission thus recommended a National
Intelligence Director and a different way of organizing the
intelligence work in the government.
Mr. Zelikow. The National Intelligence Director should be
the principal intelligence adviser to the President and the
National Security Council. Certain authorities must be clear:
The Director should receive the appropriation for national
intelligence. Such appropriations are now made in three
programs: The National Foreign Intelligence Program, the Joint
Military Intelligence Program, and the Tactical Intelligence
and Related Activities Program all to the Secretary of Defense.
These programs should be consolidated into two--a national
intelligence program appropriated to the National Intelligence
Director and consisting of the current NFIP and probably much
of the current JMIP, and a departmental appropriation for
systems and capabilities that will only be used by the
Department of Defense.
The overall appropriation should be unclassified, as should
the top-line appropriation for the principal intelligence
agencies. Congress and the American people should be better
able to make broad judgments about how much money is being
spent and to what general purpose.
The Director should have hire and fire authority over the
heads of the national intelligence agencies and the principal
intelligence officers of the Defense Department, the FBI, and
the Department of Homeland Security.
The Director should be able to set common standards for
interoperability across the Intelligence Community for
personnel, in part, to facilitate joint assignments, for
security, to reduce unnecessary or inadvertent compartmentation
and for information technology.
The National Intelligence Director should have two
principal lines of authority, both crossing the foreign-
domestic divide. The first line of authority should extend to
National Intelligence Centers organized for joint missions.
These centers, the unified commands of the Intelligence
Community, should provide all-source analysis drawing on
experts from a number of agencies. Guided by their analytic
work, they should be able to propose collection requirements
and task assets. Conflicting demands would be resolved by the
National Intelligence Director.
The National Intelligence Director's second line of
authority should extend to the national intelligence agencies
and the departmental entities that should be the capability
builders for the Nation's intelligence. They should hire,
organize, train, and equip the people and operate the major
systems and platforms.
The CIA would take the lead in foreign intelligence,
concentrating on training the best spies and analysts in the
world.
The Defense Department would take the lead in defense
intelligence, honing that craft and acquiring and operating key
national technical systems.
The Homeland Security Department and the FBI would take the
lead in homeland intelligence, harnessing the great potential
knowledge accumulated in the new department and fostering, with
the leadership of the National Intelligence Director, the FBI's
management reforms to improve its performance as an
intelligence agency.
In the exercise of the second line of authority, over the
capability building agencies, we propose that the National
Intelligence Director would share authority with the department
head who owns and operates those capabilities for the Nation.
These key managers, such as the Director of the CIA, should
be the NID's deputies. These shared authorities exist now, of
course, in the status quo. In the status quo, the balance of
authority favors departmental direction, not national
direction. We propose altering that balance.
The alternative to shared authorities would be to place the
capability-building agencies under the authority of a single
official, in effect, creating a Department of Intelligence. We
were not convinced of the need to take that further step.
One issue that has arisen is the question of whether to
place the NID or the NCTC in the Executive Office of the
President.
One, we ask you not to lose sight of the overall goal. The
authorities of the Director and the organization of
intelligence work are critical, wherever they reside.
Two, we recommended the Executive Office of the President
because of the need for proximity to the President and the
National Security Council and because of the centrality of
counterterrorism in contemporary national security management.
Three, if not put in the Executive Office of the President,
one alternative would be to create a new agency as a home for
the NID and the NCTC. Lacking any existing institutional base,
such an option would require authorities at least as strong as
those we have proposed or else it would create a bureaucratic
fifth wheel that would make the present situation even worse.
Another alternative would be to place the NID and/or the
NCTC in another existing agency or department, such as the CIA
or the Defense Department. These alternatives then have their
own serious drawbacks, such as the risk of confusing the mainly
foreign responsibilities of the CIA and the circumscribed
domestic responsibilities of the Defense Department, with the
broader domestic and foreign span of control being exercise by
both the NID and the NCTC.
Placing the NID in the Executive Office of the President
would have little effect on politicization. Those dangers have
always arisen from the functions and relationships that go with
the job, regardless of where the person sits, whether at
Langley, the Pentagon or in the Eisenhower Executive Office
Building. Those dangers should be offset by selecting a person
who believes the President is served by rigorous truth-telling
and by making the NID and NCTC Director fully accountable to
Congress.
To keep the bright line between policy and intelligence,
there is no substitute for the integrity of the person selected
for the job, no substitute for probing questions by
policymakers, and no substitute for rigorous congressional
oversight.
In closing, we wish to caution, as Chairman Kean and Vice
Chair Hamilton did last Friday, against cosmetic change.
Creating a National Intelligence Director that just
superimposes a chief above the other chiefs without taking on
the fundamental management issues we identify is a step that
could be worse than useless.
Also, please do not forget the strategy, the substance at
the heart of our recommendations. Do not forget, though it may
be the work of others, the other organizational suggestions we
make, especially in information sharing and for reshaping the
oversight work of the Congress.
Many voices will rightly caution you against undue haste,
but the Commission did not act with undue haste in developing
these recommendations, as it built on ideas that, in some cases
have been debated for more than 20 years. President Roosevelt,
Secretary Stimson, and General Marshall did not act in undue
haste when they created the Joint Chiefs of Staff to cope with
weaknesses made evident by war. The Congress and President
Truman did not act with undue haste in rapidly adopting a
National Security Act in 1947 that, among other things, created
a Secretary of Defense vehemently denounced at the time as an
unnecessary bureaucratic layer.
A rare opportunity has emerged to recover common purpose
and take common action across partisan lines, even amid a hotly
contested election. Such opportunities take the measure of
leaders. We have been deeply impressed by the readiness of our
Nation's leaders in both parties to step up and call for prompt
action. The response of the Congress, of the Senate and House
leadership and of this Committee has already moved into
unprecedented ground. You have already stepped beyond what was
probable to consider what is possible. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you for your testimony. All of us
have scheduling pressures this afternoon, but Senator Specter
does have a plane that he is trying to catch. So I am going to
allow him to do the first round of questions.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Gentlemen, congratulations on a fine report, and
congratulations to your colleagues on the staff. We know how
much credit is due the staff, so we thank you.
Starting with the issue of double hatting, and taking for
example the double hat in the Department of Defense, you
already have the very forceful testimony of Secretary Rumsfeld
in opposition. How can it really work if you have a national
director telling the deputy in Defense what to do, and the
deputy in Defense has to respond to the Secretary, and
inevitably there will be a situation where the Secretary of
Defense will disagree with the National Director, and will tell
the deputy in Defense what the Secretary wants? How can that
person really, as the old saying goes, be accountable to two
masters? Mr. Zelikow.
Mr. Zelikow. The accountability to two masters is a
dominant feature of the status quo, sir. So right now the
Director of the NSA has two masters. The Director of the NGA
has two masters. And, boy, they know it. So the problem is not
whether or not you have two masters or not, it's how you weight
the power between them.
We think right now that balance of power is heavily tilted
towards departmental priorities to the department that owns
their budget. And we suggest that balance needs to be altered
so that national priorities are dominant. If there's a
conflict, sir, then that needs to be taken to the National
Security Council and the President.
Senator Specter. It is very ``problemsome'' in my opinion
to structure reorganization, where you are going to have to
take the problems to the President. He is a pretty busy guy.
Picking up on the issue of budget, do you think a National
Director of intelligence has a chance to be successful, Mr.
Kojm, if the Director does not control the budget?
Mr. Kojm. Senator, I think it's highly problematic at best
if he does not control the budget to conduct the responsibility
we believe he needs to conduct.
Senator Specter. Mr. Zelikow, when we talk about splitting
off the counterintelligence of the FBI, I think that can be
done. You have the CIA for foreign intelligence. But when it
comes to the Department of Defense and you have the strategic
intelligence, how do you structure intelligence in the
Department of Intelligence Agency so that the battlefield
issues remain under the control of the Secretary of Defense as
opposed to the intelligence matters and other lines?
Mr. Zelikow. I think, sir, you have to avoid disrupting the
operational control of the executive agencies over their line
people in the field, and we try to avoid doing that. Sir, the
problem is this is the problem the private sector routinely
confronted in the 1960's and 1970's as they adopted the matrix
organization models that are now commonplace and have been now
for 20 years in most of the large multinational corporations.
This was actually innovated a lot in the aerospace industry in
response to Pentagon demands. They have to preserve the concept
of unity of effort while responding to multiple bosses.
And to the credit of the Department of Defense, they
addressed this issue very clearly and early in the 1980's. They
have, in effect, a joint staff that provides joint plans, but
does so without inserting the joint staff into the operational
chain of command.
Senator Specter. The issue about putting the National
Director in the Executive Branch in a nonconfirmed position
would characteristically not provide for congressional
oversight which is a very strong recommendation that the 9/11
Commission has made. Would it be giving up just too much not to
have--and the President has come forward with a national
director to be confirmed by the Senate, so you are going to
have the traditional oversight. How do you reconcile the strong
9/11 Commission position on tough oversight with the creation
of a national director who would not be subject to
congressional oversight?
Mr. Zelikow. I think we understand the President and the 9/
11 Commission as being in agreement on the issue of Senate
confirmation of the National Intelligence Director. What has
not yet been specified is whether the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center also would be Senate confirmed. On that
point the Senate was silent, and the Commission has not been
silent.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Why do you not go ahead?
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
I want to follow up on the testimony that we heard earlier
today from the director of TTIC in response to questions that
Senator Levin raised, and also in my private conversations with
Director Brennan. It is evident that he has had difficulties in
getting the resources, particularly the trained experts that he
needs to staff the center. What would make the scenario any
different when it comes to a National Counterterrorism Center?
I think the idea of a fusion center staffed with our very best
experts is the way to go, but I know from visiting TTIC that
many of the analysts, while very hard working and bright, are
extremely young and inexperienced. What would be different
about the center that would allow it to avoid those same
problems?
Mr. Zelikow. Thank you, Senator. I listened to that panel
too, very impressive officials, outstanding officials. And they
all described that personnel problem, and it was like four
doctors all saying the patient has a terrible fever. But then
you say yes, and what's causing that fever? I mean, why is it
that they're having these personnel problems? And it's a
fundamental issue of supply and demand, as demand is
outstripping supply. Why is demand outstripping supply? It's
because all the vertically integrated bureaucracies have to
take first claim on their own, they are creating redundant
capabilities, and the joint entity has no capacity to attract
or compel the attendance of the best and the brightest.
Under the proposal we suggest, backed by the authority of
the proposed National Intelligence Director and the President,
the NCTC should be much more likely to recruit outstanding
analysts, including experts in using single-source information
like those at the NSA. What TTIC now does is it makes due with
the analysts other agencies can spare.
I think there was actually a rather acute question on that
point that called attention to the disparity between TTIC's
manpower goals and what it's been able to attain, because first
the agencies satisfy their own pressing demands, including
their own fusion centers. You can make those joint assignments
more attractive to the personnel if you have joint personnel
policies set across the Intelligence Community that encourage
and facilitate joint assignments. Personnel standards that we
propose also should be set by the National Intelligence
Director.
Chairman Collins. One of the major differences between the
proposed center and TTIC is the Counterterrorism Center would
have a role in operational planning. Your recommendation in
that regard is different from the conclusion reached by the
Gilmore Commission back in 2002. That commission also called
for the creation of a national counterterrorism center, but did
not give the center, or propose that the center have an
operational role. That is going to be a major issue for this
Committee to decide. Would you elaborate more on the
Commission's belief that the center should have an operational
role?
Mr. Zelikow. Yes, ma'am. Two things informed us that were
unavailable to the Gilmore Commission. First, we studied the
September 11 story, and problems in transnational operational
management, as we elaborate in Chapter 11 and other places, are
just central to that story. Second, we spent a lot of time
trying to understand how the system is working today, and the
problems of joint planning and joint operational management are
actually--they're not terribly visible to Congress because
they're very much inside the Executive Branch, but they are
absolutely central.
If you were to go as we did--and we went at a particularly
bad time--to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and look at how they're
working the hunt for bin Laden across agencies on both sides of
that border with differential legal authorities, and look at,
well, where is the joint strategic plan for the hunt for bin
Laden? Where is the person who is in charge every day of the
integrated strategic plan that updates that plan every day of
how we're hunting bin Laden?
There is no such joint integrated plan. There isn't a joint
integrated planner for that hunt. There is instead a number of
disparate agencies with different legal authorities all doing
their thing, and then meeting every day in a series of meetings
in many places, trying to make it all converge.
Chairman Collins. I support most of the Commission's
recommendations, although I may differ on the details. But one
that causes me considerable concern is the recommendation that
paramilitary operations be transferred from the CIA to the
Pentagon. Over and over when I talk to intelligence experts,
they question the wisdom of that transfer and point out that
the CIA has an agility that the Pentagon lacks. Why did you
reach the conclusion that responsibility should be transferred
to the Department of Defense?
Mr. Zelikow. Senator, we concluded that the country cannot
afford building basically two Fort Braggs, one in North
Carolina and one out of Camp Perry, and that we need to have
two capabilities to both operate and train people to operate
crew served weapons, small unit assault tactics and so on. We
saw in the September 11 story where the CIA--and it's in the
report--where the CIA took the lead in designing a major small
unit assault operation, a capture operation in 1998. And
because the CIA did it, it was regarded as an amateur operation
and was not seen as credible by national policy makers. It went
by the Joint Staff, and they said, ``Well, it looks pretty good
but we take no ownership of it.'' Had the Special Operations
Commander at the time, General Bocanavan, come in and said,
``This is my plan and I think it works,'' we think that whole
capture operation story is a different story.
I'll add that there are a number of issues which we can't
get into in open session, having to do with legal authorities
and operations in the field that are complications.
I think it's frankly, the culture issues you see is
basically the elephant versus the gazelle stereotype. The
problem is those culture issues partly arose precisely because
of these organizational stovepipes. I think if you--and instead
we'd say, ``Well, we have to keep those organizational
stovepipes because these people have evolved into elephants and
gazelles.'' That's just not, we think, the right management
approach. I think a better approach would be to try to address
the culture issues by getting the CIA and DOD cooperating on
the ground, training exercises and joint planning, so that
special ops is challenged to develop that kind of agile culture
working with the CIA, and I think they'll meet that challenge.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Madam Chairman.
Thanks to the two of you for your extraordinary service to
the Commission. I must say, I listened very intently to your
testimony today, and again, I thought it was eloquent. I
thought it was bold, and I thought it was, for me, ultimately
convincing, just as the Commission's Report was. You are going
to need to continue to have all those characteristics, and so
are Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton, because you can
feel the resistance building to the changes, or if not a direct
confrontation or opposition to what the Commission has
recommended and embraced, but maybe not with all the details.
So as I said earlier, I was encouraged by the President's
embrace of the National Intelligence Director yesterday, but
troubled that he is reluctant or opposed to giving the director
the budgetary authority needed to be strong.
We got some of the same from the panel that preceded you of
four extraordinary public servants, and yet extraordinary
within those stovepipes, and I think still reluctant to--I
believe Lee Hamilton said--smash the stovepipes. The stovepipes
are now cooperating more, but there is no real coordinating. As
you just said a moment ago, almost 3 years after September 11,
there is still nobody in charge of the hunt for bin Laden, not
to mention the overall Intelligence Community. So we have a
battle ahead of us, but it is critical that we fight it and we
win it.
Let me ask you to comment first on the President's
statement yesterday, what you understand to be his position on
budget authority for the NID. Incidentally, General Hughes did
seem to support it this morning. I appreciated that. A couple
of the others were uncertain. Then there is some language about
the Counterterrorism Center in the President's statement that
seems to suggest action, planning, jointness, but not clearly.
How do you read what the President said yesterday, and what is
your reaction to it?
Mr. Zelikow. And I'd like to ask Chris also to comment on
this question.
I saw the President's statement yesterday and the
elaborations of it as a constructive opening for the
development of important ideas into concrete detail. I was
struck by the four panelists this morning at the constructive
tone they all adopted to the recommendations.
Senator Lieberman. That is a very good point with regard to
both the President and the four, that even though there may be
disagreements and some resistance to your recommendations, but
we are beginning a dialog here.
Mr. Zelikow. Yes. And from our point of view, the way
forward here is not to point fingers, but is instead to look
for people who want to roll up their sleeves and work together.
When I heard people's whose work I admire very much say, ``I
basically agree with what they're trying to do. I have all
these questions about details. I really want to get into the
design work,'' that's terrific. Then we can really have a good
constructive discussion on how to proceed.
Senator Lieberman. Let me focus the question. John Brennan
said today that he thought that your proposal was unworkable.
That was the term that he used.
Mr. Zelikow. Well, in an earlier answer, he seemed to like
the NCTC idea very much. It was the overall structure of the
Intelligence Community and the Goldwater-Nichols structure we
proposed that I think both he and Mr. Mudd regarded as
unworkable.
Look, it's hard. If they have a better solution that they
would like to propose, a chart of their own, even at the
100,000 foot level, we'd welcome examining constructive
alternatives, and comparing and contrasting them, and try to
find the most attractive features that you judge to be worth
writing into law.
Senator Lieberman. But for now you would say that what you
have recommended is the best you have seen yet?
Mr. Zelikow. Look, it's hard to actually come out there and
actually be--and say, ``Here is what we want,'' rather than
just kind of poke potshots at the weaknesses of other
proposals.
Senator Lieberman. But you would not have done your job if
you did not make specific recommendations. Let me ask you a
question that Senator Levin asked Mr. Brennan. Apart from the
absence of joint operational planning, which is clear you are
adding to the Counterterrorism Center, how will the
Counterterrorism Center be different from the Terrorism Threat
Integration Center, TTIC?
Mr. Zelikow. Well, the intelligence side of it would be I
think pretty significantly different, but the operations side
of it is totally different.
Senator Lieberman. So how would the intelligence side be
different?
Mr. Zelikow. On the intelligence side, let me just cite a
few striking points. First, we all agree that the NCTC and the
TTIC should be the knowledge bank, primary responsibility, the
words you fought for for years, Senator Levin, but it would
draw strategic analysts for this purpose from the present CIA
Counterterrorist Center, which was a matter left open in a
letter the administration sent to you. It would draw key
analysts from the Pentagon as well. I hope you notice that the
Department of Defense did not sign the letter that was sent to
you, Senator Collins, and to you, Senator Levin, and did not
have a witness at the table here today. So it's not clear--I
think the NCTC would very much see DOD as a full player in
that.
Second, we think they would do a much better job of
recruiting the personnel they need for the reasons I cited in
answer to a previous question.
Third, the NCTC would have the net assessment function.
That job was assigned in the letter sent to you, Senator
Collins, and you, Senator Levin, to the Department of Homeland
Security.
Further, the NCTC should have the power to use its analysis
to guide collection. You will remember in that same letter that
you coaxed from the administration, it said it might give TTIC
such authority, but the mechanism for doing so was going to be
defined later.
Our proposal allows NCTC to draw the authority, that
mechanism, from the authority granted to the National
Intelligence Director.
And finally, the current TTIC is of course expressly
forbidden from being involved in operations, but we believe,
like the military and diplomats and people in finance and law
enforcement, that the integration of analysis and action is
essential to both.
Senator Lieberman. Mr. Zelikow, my time is up. Let me ask
you a quick question and ask for a quick answer. I read the
report as recommending that most of the existing fusion centers
be eliminated and concentrated in the National Counterterrorism
Center; was I right?
Mr. Zelikow. Not entirely, sir. We don't see this as just
kind of one giant center, the blob that absorbs all the others.
We instead see this as the center in which you do the strategic
analysis, but every one of the executive departments will still
need an intelligence unit to support its executive work.
So, for instance, let's take the military analogy. The
military is going to conduct an operation. It has a J-2, an
intelligence unit attached to the unit in the field. It draws
information from the knowledge bank, say, in the case of ground
operations, the National Ground Intelligence Center, that is
the institutional memory of the Army about geography, the enemy
order of battle. It draws what it needs from the knowledge
bank. It uses its own intelligence unit to support operations,
and then from what it learns in that operation, it passes
information back to be deposited in the knowledge bank for
future reference by another operator.
So the key executive departments still need their own
intelligence support, their own J-2s, in effect. And that's
quite right. The CIA CTC will turn into that. It will become
the DO targeting center in a way that it really has been for
most of its history. But you still have the central--there
would be no question as to who has responsibility for strategic
analysis and institutional memory.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. Thanks, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I am trying to sort out whether we are operating at 10,000
feet here or whether we are operating on the ground. I must
tell you that I do not know right now. I came to this with an
openness to support a National Intelligence Director. We can
have debates about budget authority and where it is placed. I
share Madam Chair's concern about the recommendations regarding
paramilitary operations. My comment on that is I think we need
to be careful in all this discussion of reflecting on the
context in which we are operating. In 1998 context, clearly you
are going to have the problems that, Mr. Zelikow, you
expressed, but I do not know if that is the case today. What I
heard from the panel before was every one of them saying we
have changed the way we operate, we have changed the way we
think. And I think we have to keep that in mind. We cannot be
going back to 1998 reality to construct a 2004-2005 solution.
The other concern I have is what I heard from that other
panel, is that the problems are not structural problems, they
are human problems, and a great concern about form following
function, and what we have here--excuse me--actually, function
following form. You have got, here is the structure now. This
is going to change the way in which we operate. I must comment
that--and I raised the question--I did not hear a single thing
from the panel today that says we are not doing something we
should do, that is critically impacting national security
because we do not have this new structure. We can do some
things perhaps a little better. We need to reflect on it.
But I did not hear, particularly in regard to this question
of no one in charge, I did not hear from anybody today that
there is something that we are missing because we do not have a
National Intelligence Director. So I think we just have to be
careful as we analyze this thing, what is it that we are
getting? My concern is will we be able to do that in a month?
Let me raise one other issue though, and that is the
congressional oversight function, because it is very clear from
this report that congressional oversight is critical, is
absolutely key. The question I have is do we have the capacity
to do that? I would like to have a better understanding from
you of what kind of time, what kind of effort, what kind of
focus are Members of this body supposed to have to do the kind
of job that you expect them to do to make this work?
Clearly, in the past--we have a lot of committees we serve
on, we have a lot of things that we do. We have a Committee
that people put time and energy into, but clearly the type of
oversight that is required has not been done in the past. So
help me understand better what you are really expecting from
Members of this body to do the kind of job that you think they
need to do to perform the kind of oversight function you are
expecting of this Congress.
Mr. Kojm. Senator, let me start on your personnel question.
We on the Commission share the view that the most important
thing is the people, and getting the right people and giving
them the right training. We began our recommendations precisely
on this point, and nothing is more important than recruiting
and keeping and rewarding such people in government.
This is also why we believe the National Intelligence
Director must have control over personnel policies. We've got
many different policies across the Intelligence Community, many
policies across Executive Branch agencies. At least with the
Intelligence Community we surely need to draw these policies
together precisely so we can achieve the objectives you
outline.
The panel this morning talked about conversation and
cooperation. That's all important, and that's all highly useful
and puts us in a far better place than we were 3 years ago. But
we still do believe that alone is not enough to meet the
national security challenge in front of us, and we still do
believe in the importance of a quarterback calling the signals.
Let me turn to your question about oversight. Both the
Chair and Vice Chair, Kean and Hamilton, if we had to sum up in
one word, they believe stronger powers in the Executive Branch
for the National Intelligence Director, for the
Counterterrorism Center, but equal powers, stronger powers of
oversight, to keep the very checks and balances that I know so
many members of this panel have already cited as important.
How is oversight well done? Well, I think there's a very
good example on this Committee. Its oversight panel has done
superb work over many years, and even though it has not had a
day-to-day focus on the budget, the oversight panel of this
Committee has come up with hallmark proposals and things that
work their way into legislation that have made a real
difference for this country.
I am presumptuous in telling this panel that oversight work
is hard. You all know that, and you do it quite well. I think
our single point would be is you need single committees dealing
with single problems. The homeland security issues just cover
so many committees across government. The intelligence panels
don't have all the powers that they need to get their job done.
One can dispute whether it should be a joint panel or
combining authorization and appropriation. We just want you to
come away with the central point, stronger oversight
committees, and we leave it to the experts to design them.
Thank you.
Senator Coleman. Just to follow up in the 30 seconds I
have, and maybe I need more time than that. Would it be fair to
say that oversight in the past failed, that we did not have the
kind of oversight that we need today?
Mr. Kojm. With respect to the Intelligence Community and
its 15 elements, it's hard to do that oversight task
responsibility well and correctly, and we know that the
committees worked hard at it, and did, I am convinced, to the
very best of their ability. I think our point is not to
criticize actions of the past, but to set up structures for the
future that can enable good people working hard to accomplish
those goals. Thank you.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
One of the issues raised in the 9/11 report is a lack of
skilled analysts, especially in the area of foreign languages,
available for recruitment by the Intelligence Community. I was
interested to hear from each of our witnesses on the first
panel that recruiting, training and deploying skilled personnel
is their most pressing need. I agree with their assessment,
which is why several of us on this Committee have offered
legislation to address the need to hire people to fill the
void.
The Senate has passed our bill in November 2003, which has
not been acted upon by the House. I hope my colleagues will
join me in my effort to encourage the House to take up S. 589.
I would like to follow up on something you said earlier.
You stated that the NCTC will not have the same personnel
problems as the TTIC because it will likely have the ability to
recruit the best and the brightest people before they go to the
other intelligence agencies. Are you concerned that this will
deplete the number of qualified personnel at organizations like
the CIA and the FBI?
Mr. Zelikow. Senator, I would like to more optimistically
envision a world of fruitful competition. You may remember
there was a time when no self-respecting, high-flying military
officer wanted to work on the Joint Staff. Now it is
indispensable for the high-flying military officer to get an
assessment on the Joint Staff. Now, that does not mean that the
Air Force feels it cannot find good officers anymore. So you
want to create incentives for joint work.
But beyond that, measures perhaps like your legislation,
Senator, need to be taken to change the whole supply-side
equation. Senator Coleman, you asked, How does having a
National Intelligence Director make a difference? It makes a
difference because then you have a management strategy, maybe 4
or 5 years ago, that addressed the supply side of the equation.
I earlier talked about the demand side. Everybody wants people.
The supply side of the equation means years ago you had said we
are confronting Islamist terrorism. What is our personnel need
going to be for that? What kind of resources and language
training slots and the whole slice of things that go with that
do we need across the community? And then there is a budget and
a management strategy that goes with gearing up. That time
passed.
Now we still need to have that capability, that flexibility
to have agile management strategies to do the supply-side work
to address your concern, Senator.
Senator Akaka. One reason that demand is outpacing the
supply of skilled analysts and linguists is because our schools
do not promote the study of languages. Our school curricula do
not always match the needs of society, nor is public service
always honored.
Did the Commission discuss any changes to our education
system to address these deficiencies?
Mr. Zelikow. We did, sir, not at great length. In Chapter
3, we actually called attention to the problem in getting
people who would study Arabic in American higher education and
some of the trends that were creating that problem. There is
perhaps a role for both government and the private sector in
incentivizing higher education to devote resources. I think
that some of that is already happening now, and all of you know
that in the past the government has done things, such as in the
National Defense Education Act during the Cold War, to try to
incentivize the study of languages that might otherwise not
draw as many students as one would wish.
Senator Akaka. Yesterday, President Bush, as we all know,
announced that he will create the NCTC by Executive Order and
he called on Congress to amend the National Security Act of
1947 to create a National Intelligence Director. Until the NID
exists, the NCTC will report to the Director of the CIA.
I am concerned that if Congress does not agree with the
President and decides against creating a National Intelligence
Director, which is a possibility, the NCTC will remain housed
under the CIA and could end up being a second TTIC.
Will you comment on the risk of implementing one
recommendation without the other and whether the two concepts
are dependent on each other?
Mr. Zelikow. Sir, the NCTC will not work as a subordinate
entity of the CIA. It is just as simple as that. Let me give
you one example, but there are many. One example is the NCTC is
supposed to run intelligence operations across the foreign-
domestic divide, including, say, in Honolulu or in Phoenix. The
head of the CIA should not be the person who is responsible for
overseeing domestic intelligence operations. That is already
forbidden by law, and that is not a provision of law we propose
be repealed.
Senator Akaka. Would you like to comment, Mr. Kojm?
Mr. Kojm. No. I would simply agree with my colleague.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. My time
has expired.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I want to join with others in thanking you for your
extensive and exhaustive work. It has been a great service to
all of us and your country. Thank you very much.
I want to go back to some of the events that you chronicle
in the report on September 11 itself and some of the
discrepancies particularly involving NORAD. A week after
September 11, NORAD issued a public chronology in response to
some of the initial reports that they had failed to defend our
domestic airspace during the hijackings. And their chronology
dated September 18, 2001, stated that the FAA notified NORAD of
the second hijacking at 8:43 a.m., that FAA notified NORAD of
the third hijacking at 9:24, that FAA notified NORAD of the
fourth hijacking at an unspecified time, that prior to the
crash in Pennsylvania, Langley F-16 Civil Combat Air Patrol
remains in place to protect D.C., and then in public testimony
before your Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated--and
I don't know whether this was under oath or not, but that at
9:16 they received hijack notification of United 93 from the
FAA. Your report notes that hijacking did not actually occur
until 9:28 a.m., 12 minutes after they said they received that
notification. In that testimony also before your Commission,
NORAD officials stated that at 9:24 they received notice of the
hijacking of the third plane, American Flight 77, which your
Commission's report also states is untrue, that NORAD was never
notified that plane was hijacked. And they also testified
before your Commission that they scrambled the Langley,
Virginia, fighters to respond to those two hijackings, yet the
taped remarks, according to your report, at both NORAD and FAA
reportedly documented that order to scramble was in response to
an inaccurate FAA report that American Flight 11 had not hit
the first World Trade Tower and was headed to Washington. And
your report notes that erroneous alert was transmitted by the
FAA at 9:24 a.m., 38 minutes after American Flight 11 had, in
fact, exploded into the World Trade Tower.
Can you give me any way to reconcile their stated versions
and yours?
Mr. Zelikow. No, sir. We addressed that directly on page 31
and 34 of the 9/11 Commission Report. We did more or less as
you have just done, contrasted NORAD and FAA prior statements
with the conclusions the Commission has reached.
As you may know, sir, in public testimony, which was sworn,
officials of both NORAD and FAA have acknowledged that the
Commission's account of these facts is accurate and their prior
accounts were indeed incorrect.
Senator Dayton. Do they explain how it is that they came to
recognize the veracity of yours and the inaccuracy of their
own?
Mr. Zelikow. Sir, we all regard it as a learning process,
and I think further questions about the learning process that
they are in are directed to those agencies.
Senator Dayton. Thank you. Also, there were various reports
based on sources shortly after September 11 that stated that
very shortly after the Pentagon was struck at 9:34, ``Pentagon
officials ordered up the Airborne Command Post, used only in
national emergencies.'' There is another reference in another
article to an AWACS plane being sent up at about that time. Are
you aware of an AWACS or Airborne Command Post being sent aloft
at that--again, this is between 9:35 and 10 a.m.? Because the
report does not mention one.
Mr. Zelikow. No, sir. The aircraft you are referring to has
to do with continuity of government issues that we chose not to
discuss in the report for reasons of classification. We are,
however, aware of the aircraft movements you refer to and
tracked the movements of that and other relevant aircraft
completely. If they had borne in any material way on the
September 11 story, we would have discussed it in our report.
Senator Dayton. All right. So is the implication that they
are aloft and were organizing an air defense of the United
States at that point in time, domestic air defense, is that----
Mr. Zelikow. No, sir. That aircraft had nothing to do with
organizing American air defense and played no part whatever in
the command and control issues that NORAD faced that morning.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
Regarding the 15 agencies, entities of the Federal
Government now engaged in intelligence-gathering activities,
are there any that you could recommend to us be merged or
consolidated?
Mr. Zelikow. Sir, we did not take on the next issue of
whether or not you need all these separate agencies, but we did
do this: We did suggest that some of the agencies that are now
in the Intelligence Community actually do not really need to be
there. For instance, the State Department's Intelligence
Research Bureau should just work for the Secretary of State. It
should be an intelligence support entity for that Department,
and it does not have to obey the dictates of the Intelligence
Community.
One of the problems we heard about now is sometimes when
you want to obstruct action, you call a meeting with all 15 of
the agencies there as a way of inducing sclerosis. We were
trying in our recommendation to find a way of simplifying and
strengthening the capability-building structure.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
One of the things that we learned hopefully from the events
of September 11 is that there was no accountability for the
failures to do the jobs that were assigned to people. We had in
the very case that you gave us in the Minneapolis case, we had
that information going to the bin Laden desk at the FBI and
national headquarters, and they did nothing with that
information. We had in the case of the CIA folks overseas who
saw the two people who they knew were part of al Qaeda go to a
meeting, get to the United States. They were involved in the
attack on the USS Cole. Then they later got to the United
States. The CIA people had the job of putting them on a
watchlist and did not. So the FBI was never alerted. That later
resulted in the CIA Director being informed of this and saying,
well, that is the FBI's job.
But before you get to that, you have people who did not do
their job. It was not just stovepipes. That was a problem. The
FBI was not notified by the CIA, not because of the stovepipes,
but because the people who were responsible to notify the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Border Patrol, the
FBI, the people in the CIA who were supposed to do that did not
do that.
What do you do about accountability? I mean, that is a
failure inside the existing system. Now, that led to TTIC, and
TTIC was supposed to solve this problem. But you still have
failure to do one's job. Did you address that issue?
Mr. Zelikow. Yes, to some extent. There are two levels. Did
they do a job that was clearly defined and understood and it is
just a case of mis-, mal- or non-feasance? If so, that is a
proper matter for internal discipline by those agencies. And in
the case of both of the agencies you mention, we are aware of
the Inspector General work that is being done now by both the
CIA and the FBI.
Senator Levin. Do you know if----
Mr. Zelikow. It was important that we knew about that work
and knew where they were going with those reports.
Senator Levin. Has there been any discipline?
Mr. Zelikow. As far as I know, sir, neither the FBI nor the
CIA have taken any disciplinary actions. Their IG reports are
in different stages.
The second point I would just stress very briefly is their
jobs were not well defined, which is a symptom of the problems
in operational management we discussed earlier.
Senator Levin. All right. We had the FBI Director and the
CIA Director in front of us over at the Joint Intelligence
Committee hearings, and they said these people did not do their
job. The jobs were defined. They were supposed to notify the
FBI when they knew that terrorists that were part of the al
Qaeda group came to the United States. They were supposed to do
that, and they did not. But, anyway, we will leave it at that.
Mr. Zelikow. Let's just not--be sure not to scapegoat low-
level employees for management failures that go higher up.
Senator Levin. I agree with that.
Mr. Zelikow. They deserve to be dealt with. Others should
do that and people should do that, but we wanted to avoid that
temptation.
Senator Levin. No, I agree with that. But you also have to
have some accountability in the process at all levels. I don't
want to scapegoat anybody at lower levels. I agree with you
with the upper management failures, miserable failures, but,
nonetheless, people who had assigned jobs to do did not do
them, and there has been no accountability at that level
either. I don't think you want to let anybody off the hook at
any level, do you?
Mr. Zelikow. No, sir. We are against letting people off the
hook. [Laughter.]
Senator Levin. I would hope so.
Now, your recommendations that you say have been received
so favorably, it seems to me when you analyze them have been
really not received so favorably. Everybody says, yes, create a
czar. We are supposed to have now a DCI, a Director of Central
Intelligence, who has control presumably over both the analysis
and the operations inside the Intelligence Community. It is
supposed to be centralized now, that is, Director of Central
Intelligence, the CIA Director as well.
But let me go to your specific recommendations to see why
it is you believe that there has not been greater support for
your recommendations at the White House.
First, they do not want to put it in the Executive Office
of the President. That is a key recommendation. Second,
apparently on program purse strings, that is not accepted.
On hire and fire authority that you would give that
Director over agency heads in the Intelligence Community,
outside of the operations of the NCTC, we have silence on that
one.
So just take three big recommendations in terms of what we
heard from the White House yesterday. First, the President does
not want to put it in the Executive Office of the President;
second, apparently does not accept control over the purse
strings; and, third, at a minimum silence, is on the question
of giving that new Director hire and fire authority over agency
heads and top personnel in the Intelligence Community.
Don't you consider that--those are not details. That is not
like at 100,000 feet there is a great deal of acceptance here
in the White House, which is a pretty important actor in this
whole process. You have got some real rejection of two key
principles and silence on another key principle. So I want you
to comment on that.
Mr. Zelikow. On the EOP point, yes, they are against it.
Senator Levin. On the what?
Mr. Zelikow. On the Executive Office of the President
point, yes, they are against it. They want to create a new
agency. OK. Maybe that is a good idea. Then let's step up to
that idea and work it. They have not explicated that idea. That
is a big idea. We have made a comment on it in our statement.
On the budget and personnel issues, we prefer to think of
what they did as a constructive beginning in a situation where
they have not really made up their own minds what they want to
do.
To be fair to them, they have had this now for about 10
days. Everybody agrees this needs to be handled thoughtfully.
You heard the panel earlier this morning. We would rather
encourage them to sit down and focus on the details and see
where we go from there.
Mr. Kojm. Senator, I think we heard ice breaking
yesterday--support from the President for a National
Intelligence Director, support for a National Counterterrorism
Center, for joint intelligence and joint planning of
operations. These are fundamental breakthroughs that many who
have looked at the Intelligence Community over two decades have
understood the problem and made recommendations and, frankly,
have gotten nowhere. We think we have gotten somewhere as of
yesterday.
But even though the ice broke, there is still a lot of
water that you have to paddle that is pretty dangerous to get
across, and we are going to devote ourselves to that effort.
Senator Levin. My time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and for
the extraordinary work that they have done on this report. We
very much appreciate your assistance, and we look forward to
working closely with you as we proceed with the remainder of
the Committee's work.
The hearing record will remain open for 5 days. We hope you
will be willing to respond to additional questions from the
Committee Members.
Again, thank you very much for your service, and this
hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:53 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
[The op-ed from the Washington Post, August 3, 2004,
follows:]
INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND FALSE URGENCY
By Chuck Hagel
We stand at a moment filled with potential for bringing about the
responsible intelligence reforms needed to meet the threats of the 21st
Century. But if we allow the current national consensus for
intelligence reform to become a tool in the partisan rancor of
presidential politics, we risk doing enormous damage to our
intelligence community. We must not allow false urgency dictated by the
political calendar to overtake the need for serious reform. This is an
enormous undertaking filled with consequences that will last a
generation.
There is no debate about the need to reform our 20th Century
intelligence infrastructure. Yesterday President Bush and Sen. John F.
Kerry publicly discussed several reform ideas that Congress will
consider. But there is much work to be done to bring about the right
reforms. Policymakers must not shy away from this responsibility; we
must embrace it. The stakes could not be higher. While inaction is
unacceptable, serious consequences will come with reform. Policymakers
owe it to the American people to understand these consequences before
they act.
A mistaken impression has developed that since September 11, 2001,
little has been done to improve our intelligence capabilities. This is
not true. We are unquestionably a safer nation today than we were three
years ago. The legislative and executive branches of government have
been reviewing and adjusting our intelligence--the gathering,
processing and management of it--since September 11. We are vastly more
prepared to respond to biological or chemical terrorist attacks than
before September 11. Our border security, documentation, information
sharing and coordination among government agencies have all been
improved. Last month, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on
which I serve, issued the first part of our report on intelligence
failures prior to the war in Iraq. We have began the second phase of
our report, which will include recommendations on reform of our
intelligence community. We have heard and will continue to hear from
current and former members of that community, intelligence experts and
policymakers responsible for making decisions based on the intelligence
they are provided.
In 2001 the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
chaired by former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, provided
the president with a comprehensive review of the intelligence community
and recommendations.
Last month the 9/11 Commission, led by former New Jersey governor
Tom Kean and former Indiana representative Lee Hamilton, produced a
remarkable bipartisan document that offered recommendations for
improving our intelligence and security structures. All Americans owe
them a debt of gratitude for their work.
This year President Bush designated a bipartisan panel to examine
U.S. intelligence capabilities. The commission, led by former senator
and governor Chuck Robb of Virginia and federal appellate judge
Laurence Silberman, has been given a broad mandate to ``assess whether
the Intelligence Community is sufficiently authorized, organized,
equipped, trained and resourced to . . . support United States
Government efforts to respond to . . . the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, related means of delivery, and other related threats
of the 21st Century.'' They are to report their findings to the
president by March 31.
In addition to the intelligence committees, Senate and House
committees are studying reform of our intelligence community. Some will
hold hearings during the August congressional recess. The work of
intelligence reform cuts a wide swath across our government. All these
hearings in committees of jurisdiction are critical for any reforms to
succeed.
The American people should have confidence that our intelligence
system is the finest in the world. This is no reason to ignore the
reforms needed to meet the threats we face, but it is reason for the
American people to feel secure. They should not be misled into
believing that they are at risk because of an incompetent, inadequate
intelligence system. Panic is not the order of the day. Responsible
reform is the objective.
Our society is the most open, transparent and free society in
history. Because of this, we will always face risks. The leaders
charged with keeping this country safe should never be satisfied that
we have done enough. There will always be room to improve our
intelligence and security systems.
We will reform our intelligence community. The responsibilities of
leadership require our action. But we must not rush haphazardly through
what may be the most complicated and significant government
reorganization since World War II. By the time the commission that
President Bush empaneled to examine U.S. intelligence reports to him
next March, we will have completed a massive series of investigations
and hearings and a decisive presidential election.
The consequences of the decisions we make regarding intelligence
reform will ripple far beyond our shores. The security of the next
generation of Americans and global stability depend on our ability to
wisely answer history's call. We must match the timeliness of our
actions with wisdom and reason. This requires responsible reform.
The writer is a Republican Senator from Nebraska.
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