    [Senate Hearing 108-588]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 108-588

      CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                        SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                     of the

                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                   __________

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

      CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES

                                   __________

                               FEBRUARY 24, 2004

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                        SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                         PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman
              JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Vice Chairman
    ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah                 CARL LEVIN, Michigan
    MIKE DeWINE, Ohio                    DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
    CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri        RON WYDEN, Oregon
    TRENT LOTT, Mississippi              RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
    OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine              EVAN BAYH, Indiana
    CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
    SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
    JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
                       BILL FRIST, Tennessee, Ex Officio
                  THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota, Ex Officio
                                     ------
                          Bill Duhnke, Staff Director
                   Andrew E. Johnson, Minority Staff Director
                        Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held in Washington, D.C., February 24, 2004..............     1
    Statement of:
        Jacoby, Vice Admiral Lowell E., USN, Director, Defense
          Intelligence Agency........................................    49
        Mueller, Hon. Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of
          Investigation..............................................    38
        Tenet, Hon. George J., Director, Central Intelligence Agency.     5

       HEARING ON CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE
                                 UNITED STATES

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2004

                                           U.S. Senate,
                              Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
    Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Pat
    Roberts, (Chairman of the Committee), presiding.
        Committee Members Present: Senators Roberts, Dewine, Bond,
    Lott, Snowe, Hagel, Chambliss, Warner, Rockefeller, Levin,
    Feinstein, Durbin, Bayh, and Mikulski.
        Chairman Roberts. The Committee will come to order.
        The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence today meets in
    open session to conduct the public segment of its annual
    worldwide threat hearing. It has become the practice of the
    Committee to begin its annual oversight of the U.S.
    Intelligence Community with a public hearing so that our
    members and the public will have the benefit of the
    Intelligence Community's best assessment of the current and
    projected national security threats to the United States.
        Our witnesses today are the Director of Central
    Intelligence, Mr. George Tenet; the Director of the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Robert Mueller; and the Director
    of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby.
    The Committee thanks all of our distinguished witnesses for
    being here.
        The witnesses have been asked to provide a comprehensive,
    unclassified assessment of the nature and extent of the current
    and projected national security threats to the United States.
    The witnesses have also been asked to highlight the significant
    developments in these areas that have occurred since this
    Committee's last worldwide threat hearing last February.
        Obviously, this past year has been extremely eventful.
    While we have made significant progress on the war on terror
    and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction, other threats remain and new threats do continue
    to emerge.
        Saddam Hussein's reign of terror has rightfully been put to
    an end, yet peace and stability in Iraq are still threatened by
    continued attacks. Libya has renounced its weapons of mass
    destruction programs and permitted inspections that are
    international, while other nations, such as Iran, Syria and
    North Korea, refuse to dismantle ongoing weapons programs.
        Non-state purveyors of WMD technologies, such as A.Q. Khan,
    have been identified, yet expansion of these deadly weapons
    remains one of the greatest threats to our national security.
        Although it did not get much press attention, the
    President's February 11 speech at the National Defense
    University announced new measures to counter the threat of the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The President
    called for the modernization of these laws, the restriction on
    sales of nuclear technology and efforts to secure and destroy
    nuclear materials. Taken together with the Proliferation
    Security Initiative announced in May, I think it is fair to say
    that the President has suggested a solid plan to reduce the
    threat of these dangerous weapons.
        The recent revelations about A.Q. Khan's illicit sale of
    nuclear weapons technology does demonstrate clearly how
    accurate and credible intelligence can be used to advance our
    fight against the expansion of these weapons.
        Our Intelligence Community is not perfect. They are not
    capable of carrying the entire burden, nor should we ask them
    to. As the President has pointed out, it is going to take an
    international commitment to effectively deal with both WMD
    expansion and international terrorists.
        While terrorists from the al-Qa'ida and other like-minded
    groups are on the run, they continue to target our U.S.
    interests at home and abroad. And in our own hemisphere,
    despite past U.S. efforts, the impoverished nation of Haiti is
    again descending into civil strife.
        In short, despite our hard-fought victories, the world
    remains a very dangerous place. This morning, the Committee
    will explore these threats and others in an unclassified
    setting. This afternoon, we will conduct a closed session to
    discuss any matters that are classified.
        Now, before we turn to our witnesses, I would like to point
    out that for the last eight months, this Committee has been
    engaged in a comprehensive review of the intelligence
    underlying the Intelligence Community's assessments regarding
    Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and its ties to terrorist
    groups. We have recently begun the process of reviewing the
    draft language for what will be the first of at least two
    reports.
        In October of last year, Director Tenet asked for an
    opportunity to appear before our Committee before we completed
    our work. He will have that opportunity next Thursday in a
    closed session of the Committee. I anticipate that it will be
    the first in a number of appearances as the Committee does
    finalize its reports and begins to consider the recommendations
    for change.
        With this in mind, I would like to suggest to all members
    that this is a hearing on the current global threat. There will
    be many opportunities in the coming weeks for Committee members
    to receive testimony and question any number of witnesses about
    the prewar intelligence in regard to Iraq. We have invited our
    witnesses here today to address the current threats and so I am
    suggesting that members please keep their questions focused on
    that topic.
        Before turning to Director Tenet for his testimony, I turn
    to Senator Rockefeller for his opening statement.
        Mr. Vice Chairman.
        Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you very much, Mr.
    Chairman. And I join you in welcoming our witnesses today.
    There were, I thought, to be four, but INR, evidently, was not
    able to work it out, I think due to a late invitation which is,
    I think, noteworthy, but not worth an opening statement.
        Chairman Roberts. Senator, would you yield on that point?
        Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Of course.
        Chairman Roberts. We have asked INR to come. We asked them
    previously to come. They felt that the testimony by the DCI
    would cover their responsibilities. They have an acting
    director.
        When we asked them again to come just a few days ago,
    knowing of some interest in the press about that, they
    indicated that they would prefer not to appear and said, again,
    that the DCI would cover their responsibilities. It is not any
    situation where they were not asked to come.
        Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Well, I'll let that statement
    stand for the Chairman, who I greatly respect.
        The question I'm wrestling with this morning is whether, in
    fact, we are as a country and as a people safer today than we
    were when the three of you were here a year ago. We fought a
    war against a viciousdictator, but bringing security to Iraq
    remains elusive and we're paying a very high price in blood and
    resources.
        We're also paying a high price in world public opinion,
    which is important, not just for its own sake but in order to
    obtain the cooperation necessary to achieve greater security. I
    worry that rapidly-declining support for the U.S. could further
    undermine stability in the Middle East and stimulate the
    recruitment of a new generation of anti-American jihadists.
        Clearly, we have enjoyed progress in broadening the
    international coalition against terrorism and we have seriously
    disrupted al-Qa'ida's structure and operations, though they are
    certainly by no means inactive for the future.
        But the underlying strategic concerns, in terms of regional
    demographics, economic opportunity, education, ideologies,
    still appear to be moving generally in the wrong direction,
    according to this Senator, in most of the developing world.
    Rapid population growth and uneven economic development in the
    Third World are straining the fabric of many nations. Add that
    to the AIDS crisis, and much of sub-Saharan African seems to
    teeter on the verge of anarchy, much as we are seeing in Haiti
    today. Liberia avoided a complete collapse last year; I'm not
    quite sure how, whether it was us or the Nigerians or some
    combination thereof, or whether we may simply have postponed
    the inevitable by not addressing that.
        The situation in Latin America, while not as dire, except
    for the case of Colombia, is very worrisome. Many Latin
    American countries are unable to keep pace with globalization
    and there is a growing disparity, as everywhere, between rich
    and poor.
        While we're focused on the Middle East today, the potential
    for violence and the strengthening of radical movements in
    other regions seems to be increasing. Economic and political
    desperation, combined with increasing resentment of U.S.
    economic might, our cultural influence, military supremacy,
    make us the target of much of the world's anger; we know that.
        That anger spills over to leaders who cooperate with the
    United States, adding to the instability in some of the most
    dangerous regions of this world. People are angry at us and
    they're angry at their leaders for following along with us or
    they're angry at their leaders just because they're angry at
    their leaders because they're not doing anything to help them.
        Whatever the combination, it doesn't bode well. These are
    not immediate, but they are growing threats that I think we
    need to be addressing. And I fear that we are not addressing
    them, and that we cannot--and I hope our witnesses will respond
    to this--our intelligence and military are structured in a way
    which I'm not sure of their capacity to expand with experienced
    personnel much farther or in time to deal with what we're going
    to have to deal with.
        Our intelligence, law enforcement agencies are doing a good
    job of capturing al-Qa'ida operatives and disrupting terrorist
    plots. The Intelligence Community did a commendable job, in my
    view, in supporting our troops in the invasion of Iraq. But our
    success in supporting tactical operations is of little value if
    we fundamentally misread strategic threats and challenges.
        And I close by forming it this way. It now appears that
    Iran has had a much more advanced WMD capability and much
    closer links to dangerous terrorists than Saddam Hussein ever
    did. But our credibility has suffered because we have not found
    WMD in Iraq, and I fear we now will find it much harder to
    build international consensus, support to deal with Iran,
    should that be necessary, and other countries of such concern,
    for example, North Korea.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and I thank
    the Chairman.
        Chairman Roberts. Senator Warner. Members will have six
    minutes.
        I beg your pardon. It might be certainly more acceptable to
    give the Director his opportunity to make his testimony first
    along with Mr. Mueller and Admiral Jacoby before we turn to
    Senator Warner, although I'm sure he could entertain us for at
    least 30 minutes. [Laughter.]
        I would now recognize the DCI, Mr. George Tenet.
        [The prepared statement of Director Tenet follows:]
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    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GEORGE J. TENET, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
                              INTELLIGENCE

        Director Tenet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Last year I described a national security environment that
    was significantly more complex than at any time during my
    tenure as Director of Central Intelligence. The world I'll
    discuss today is equally, if not more, complicated and fraught
    with dangers for American interests, but one that also holds
    opportunities for positive change.
        I want to begin with terrorism, with a stark bottom line.
    The al-Qa'ida leadership structure we charted after September
    11th is seriously damaged, but the group remains as committed
    as ever to attacking the American homeland. As we continue to
    battle against al-Qa'ida, we must overcome a movement--a global
    movement infected by al-Qa'ida's radical agenda.
        In the battle, we're moving forward in our knowledge of the
    enemy, his plans and capabilities, and what we've learned
    continues to validate my deepest concern that this enemy
    remains intent on obtaining and using catastrophic weapons.
    Military and intelligence operations, as you both have noted,
    by the United States and its allies overseas have degraded the
    group. Local al-Qa'ida cells are forced to make their own
    decisions because of disarray in the central leadership.
        Al-Qa'ida depends on leaders who not only direct attacks,
    but who carry on the day-to-day tasks that support operations.
    Over the past 18 months, we have killed or captured key al-
    Qa'ida leaders in every significant operational area--
    logistics, planning, finance, training--and have eroded the key
    pillars of their organization, such as the leadership in
    Pakistani urban areas and operational cells in the al-Qa'ida
    heartland of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
        The list of associates on page two, many of you know--
    Khalid Shaykh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, Hasan Ghul, Hambali and
    others. We are creating large and growing gaps in al-Qa'ida's
    hierarchy, and unquestionably bringing these key operators to
    ground disrupted plots that would otherwise have killed
    Americans.
        Meanwhile, al-Qa'ida central continues to lose operational
    safe havens, and bin Laden has gone deeper underground. Al-
    Qa'ida's finances have been squeezed, and we're receiving a
    broad array of help from our coalition partners who have been
    central to our efforts against al-Qa'ida.
        Since the May 12 bombings, the Saudi government has shown
    an important commitment to fighting al-Qa'ida in the Kingdom,
    and Saudi officers have paid with their lives. There's great
    cooperation in the rest of the Arab world. President Musharraf
    remains a courageous and indispensable ally who has become the
    target of assassins for the help he's given us. Our European
    partners are working closely with us to unravel and disrupt
    networks of terrorists planning chemical and biological and
    conventional attacks in Europe.
        So there are notable strides, but don't misunderstand me:
    I'm not suggesting al-Qa'ida is defeated. It is not. We're
    still at war. This is a learning organization that remains
    committed to attacking the United States, its friends and its
    allies.
        Successive blows to the central leadership have transformed
    the organization into a loose collection of regional networks
    that operate more autonomously. These regional components have
    demonstrated their operational prowess in Morocco, Kenya,
    Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other countries, and al-Qa'ida
    seeks to influence these regional networks with operational
    training, communications and money. For example, we know that
    Khalid Shaykh Mohammed sent $50,000 to Hambali in Southeast
    Asia to further his operations.
        You should not take the fact that these attacks occurred
    abroad to mean that the threat to the U.S. homeland has waned.
    As al-Qa'ida and associated groups undertook these attacks
    overseas, detainees consistently talk about the importance the
    groups still attach to striking the main enemy, the United
    States.
        Across the operational spectrum--air, maritime, special
    weapons--we have time and again uncovered plots that are
    chilling. On aircraft plots alone, we have uncovered new plans
    to recruit pilots and to evade new security measures in
    Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Europe.
        Even catastrophic attacks on the scale of 9/11 remain
    within al-Qa'ida's reach. Make no mistake: These plots are
    hatched abroad but they target U.S. soil and those of our
    allies.
        So far, I've talked to you about al-Qa'ida, but it's not
    the limit of the terrorists threat worldwide. They've infected
    others with its ideology, which depicts the United States as
    Islam's greatest foe. The steady growth of Usama bin Laden's
    anti-American sentiment through the wider Sunni extremist
    movement and the broad dissemination of al-Qa'ida's destructive
    expertise ensure that a serious threat will remain for the
    foreseeable future with or without al-Qa'ida in the picture.
        Even so, as al-Qa'ida reels from our blows, other extremist
    groups within the movement it influenced have become the next
    wave of terrorist threat. Dozens of such groups exist. I've
    identified the Zarqawi network, the Ansar al-Islam network in
    Iraq, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Islamic
    Movement of Uzbekistan.
        Mr. Chairman, with regard to CBRN, acquiring these kinds of
    weapons we know remains a religious obligation in bin Laden's
    eyes, and al-Qa'ida and more than two dozen other terrorist
    groups are pursuing CBRN materials. We particularly see a
    heightened risk of poison attacks. Contemplated delivery
    methods to date have been simple, but this may change as non-
    al-Qa'ida groups share information on more sophisticated
    methods and tactics.
        Over the last year, we've also seen an increase in the
    threat of more sophisticated chemical, biological, radiological
    and nuclear weapons. For this reason, we take very seriously
    the threat of a CBRN attack. Extremists have widely
    disseminated assembly instructions for an improvised chemical
    weapon, using common materials that could cause a large number
    of causalities in a crowded and closed area.
        Although gaps in our understanding remain, we see al-
    Qa'ida's program to produce anthrax as one of the most
    immediate terrorist CBRN threats that we are likely to face.
    Al-Qa'ida continues to pursue its strategic goal of obtaining a
    nuclear capability. It remains interested in dirty bombs.
    Terrorist documents contain accurate views of how such weapons
    would be used.
        Mr. Chairman, I want to turn to Iraq for a detailed
    discussion. We're making significant strides against the
    insurgency and terrorism, but former regime elements and
    foreign jihadists continue to pose a serious threat to Iraq's
    new institutions and to our own forces. At the same time,
    sovereignty will be turned over to an interim government in
    Iraq on July 1, although the structure and mechanism for
    determining this remain unresolved.
        The emerging Iraqi leadership will face many pressing
    issues, among them organizing national elections, integrating
    the Sunni minority into the political mainstream, managing
    Kurdish autonomy in a federal structure and the determining
    role of Islam in an Iraqi state.
        Meanwhile, Mr. Chairman, the important work of the Iraqi
    Survey Group in the hunt for the Iraq's weapons of mass
    destruction continues. We must explore every avenue in our
    quest to understand Iraq's programs of concern for the
    possibility that materials, weapons or expertise might fall
    into the hands of insurgents, foreign states or terrorists. And
    as you know, we will talk about this subject at length next
    week.
        Despite progress in Iraq, the overall security picture
    continues to concern me. Saddam is in prison and the coalition
    has killed or apprehended all but 10 of his 54 key cronies, and
    Iraqis are taking an increasing role in their own defense, with
    many now serving in various new police, military and security
    forces.
        The violence continues. The daily average number of attacks
    on U.S. and coalition military forces has dropped from its
    November peak, but is similar to that of August. And many other
    insurgent and terrorist attacks undermine the stability by
    striking at those--seeking to intimidate those Iraqis willing
    to work with the coalition. The insurgency that we face in Iraq
    comprises multiple groups with different motivations, but with
    the same goal--driving the U.S. and our coalition partners from
    Iraq.
        Saddam's capture was a psychological blow that took some of
    the less committed Ba'athists out of the fight. But a hard core
    of regime elements, Ba'ath Party officials, military,
    intelligence and security officers are still organizing and
    carrying out attacks. Intelligence has given us a good
    understanding of the insurgency at the local level, and this
    information is behind the host of successful raids you've read
    about in the newspapers.
        U.S. military and intelligence community efforts to round
    up former regime figures have disrupted some insurgent plans to
    carry out additional anti-coalition attacks. But we know these
    Ba'athist cells are intentionally decentralized to avoid easy
    penetration and to prevent the rollup of whole networks. Arms,
    funding and military experience remain readily available.
        The situation as I've described it, Mr. Chairman, both our
    victories and our challenges, indicates that we have damaged
    but not yet defeated the insurgents.
        The security situation is further complicated by the
    involvement of terrorists, including Ansar al-Islam and al
    Zarqawi and foreign jihadists coming to Iraq to wage jihad.
    Their goal is clear: They intend to inspire an Islamic
    extremist insurgency that would threaten coalition forces and
    put a halt to the long-term process of building democratic
    institutions. They hope for a Taliban-like enclave in Iraq's
    Sunni heartland that could be a jihadist safe haven.
        Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish extremist group, is waging a
    terrorist campaign against the coalition presence and
    cooperative Iraqis in a bid to inspire jihad and create an
    Islamic state. Some extremists even go further. In a recent
    letter, terrorist plotter Abu Mus'ab Zarqawi outlined a
    strategy to foster sectarian civil war in Iraq aimed at
    inciting the Shia.
        Stopping the foreign extremists from turning Iraq into
    their most important jihad yet rests in part on preventing
    loosely connected extremists from coalescing into a cohesive
    terrorist organization. We're having some success in this
    regard, and we're keeping an eye on the convergence between
    jihadists and former regime elements. And at this point, we've
    seen very few signs of such cooperation at the tactical or
    local level.
        Ultimately, the Iraqi people themselves must provide the
    fundamental solutions. As you well know, the insurgents are
    incessantly and violently targeting Iraqi police and security
    forces precisely because they fear the prospect of Iraqis
    securing their own interests. Success depends on broadening the
    role of local security forces. It goes beyond numbers. It means
    continuing the work already under way, fixing equipment
    shortages, training and ensuring pay.
        It's hard to overestimate the importance of greater
    security for Iraqis, particularly as we turn to the momentous
    political events slated for 2004. The real test will begin soon
    after the transfer of sovereignty. We'll see the extent to
    which the new Iraqi leaders embody the concepts such as
    pluralism, compromise and the rule of law.
        Iraqi Arabs and many Kurds possess a strong Iraqi identity
    forged over 80 years of history and especially during the
    nearly decade-long war with Iran. Unfortunately, Saddam's
    divide and rule policy and his favorite treatment of the Sunni
    minority aggravated tensions to the point where the key
    governance in Iraq today is managing these competing sectional
    interests. And you know them, Mr. Chairman--Shia, Kurds and
    Sunnis.
        I should qualify that no society--surely not Iraq's complex
    tapestry--is so simple as to be captured in three categories,
    and this is an important point. In reality, Iraqi society is
    filled with more cleavages and more connections than a simple
    topology can suggest. We seldom hear about the strong tribal
    alliances that have long existed between Sunnis and Shia or the
    religious commonalities between Sunni, Kurd and Arab
    communities or the moderate secularism that spans Iraqi groups.
    We tend to identify and stress the tensions that rend
    communities apart, but opportunities also exist for these
    groups to work together for common ends. The social and
    political interplay is further complicated by Iran, especially
    in the south, where Tehran pursues its own interests and hopes
    to maximize its influence among Iraqi Shia after the 1st of
    July.
        The most immediate political challenge for the Iraqis is to
    choose their transitional government that will rule their
    country while they write their permanent constitution. The Shia
    cleric, the Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sistani, has made this
    election process the centerpiece of his effort to ensure that
    Iraqis will decide their own future and choose the first
    sovereign post-Saddam government. He favors direct elections as
    the way to produce a legitimate accountable government.
    Sistani's religious pronouncements show that, above all, he
    wants Iraq to be independent of foreign powers. Moreover, his
    praise of free elections and his theology reflect, in our
    reading, a clear-cut opposition to theocracy Iranian style.
        The Sunnis--just to talk a bit about the Sunnis because
    they're important--they've been disaffected and deposed as the
    ruling class, but some are beginning to recognize that
    boycotting the emerging political process will weaken their
    community. Their political isolation, I believe, is breaking
    down in parts of the Sunni triangle where Sunni Arabs have
    begun to engage the coalition and assume local leadership
    roles.
        And in the past three months, we have also seen the
    founding of national-level Sunni umbrella organizations to deal
    with the coalition and the governing council on questions like
    Sunni participation in choosing the transitional government.
    This is a good development, Mr. Chairman.
        The question of federalism is an issue that will have to be
    resolved. To make a federal arrangement stick, Kurdish and Arab
    leaders will need to explain convincingly that the federal
    structure benefits all Iraqis and not just Kurds. And even so,
    a host of difficult issues--control over oil and security being
    perhaps the most significant--may provoke tension between
    Kurdish and central Iraqi authorities.
        Mr. Chairman, I want to talk a bit about economic
    reconstruction. It's true that the rebuilding will go on for
    years and that the Saddam regime left in its wake a devastated
    and antiquated underfunded infrastructure. But the
    reconstruction process and Iraq's own considerable assets--its
    natural resources and its educated populace--should enable the
    Iraqis to see important improvement in 2004.
        Over the next few years, they'll open more hospitals and
    build more roads than anyone born under Saddam has ever
    witnessed.
        The recovery of Iraqi oil production will help. Production
    is on track to approach three million barrels a day by the end
    of the year. Iraq hasn't produced this much oil since 1991. And
    by next year, revenues from oil exports should cover the cost
    of basic government operations and contribute several billion
    dollars toward reconstruction.
        Much more needs to be done, however. Key public services,
    such as water and sewage and transportation, will have
    difficulty meeting prewar levels by July and won't meet the
    higher target of Iraqi total demand, although work is going on
    in all these areas.
        Mr. Chairman, let me shift to proliferation. We're watching
    countries of proliferation concern choose different paths as
    they calculate the risks versus gains of pursuing weapons of
    mass destruction.
        Libya is taking steps toward strategic disarmament. North
    Korea is trying to leverage its nuclear program into at least a
    bargaining chip and also international legitimacy and
    influence. And Iran is exposing some programs while trying to
    preserve others.
        I'll start with Libya, which appears to be moving toward
    strategic disarmament. For years, Gadhafi has been an
    international pariah. In May of 2003, he made a strategic
    decision and reached out through British intelligence with an
    offer to abandon his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.
    That launched nine months of delicate negotiations, where we
    moved the Libyans from a stated willingness to renounce WMD to
    an explicit and public commitment to expose and dismantle their
    WMD programs.
        The leverage here was intelligence. Our picture of Libya's
    WMD programs allowed CIA officers and their British colleagues
    to press the Libyans on the right questions, to expose
    inconsistencies and to convince them that holding back was
    counterproductive. We repeatedly surprised them with the depth
    of our knowledge. For example, U.S. and British intelligence
    officers secretly traveled to Libya and asked to inspect
    Libya's ballistic missile programs. Libyan officials at first
    failed to declare key facilities, but our intelligence
    convinced them to disclose several dozen facilities, including
    their deployed Scud B sites and their secret North Korean-
    assisted Scud C production line.
        When we were tipped to the imminent shipment of centrifuge
    parts to Libya in October, we arranged to have cargo seized,
    showing the Libyans that we had penetrated their most sensitive
    procurement network.
        By the end of the visit, the Libyans admitted to having a
    nuclear program and having bought uranium hexaflouride feed
    material for gas centrifuge enrichment, admitted to having
    nuclear weapons designs, acknowledged having about 25 tons of
    sulphur mustard CW agent, provided access to their deployed
    Scud B forces and revealed indigenous missile design work in
    cooperation with North Korea on Scud Cs.
        From the very outset of negotiations, Gadhafi requested the
    participation of international organizations to help certify
    Libya's compliance.
        In contrast to Libya, North Korea is trying to leverage its
    nuclear programs into international legitimacy and bargaining
    power, announcing its withdrawal from the NPT, Nonproliferation
    Treaty, and openly proclaiming that it has a nuclear deterrent.
    Since December of 2002, Pyongyang has announced its withdrawal
    from the Nonproliferation Treaty and expelled IAEA inspectors.
    Last year Pyongyang claimed to have finished reprocessing the
    8,000 fuel rods that had been sealed by the United States and
    North Korean technicians and stored under IAEA monitoring since
    1994.
        The intelligence community judged that in the mid-nineties
    North Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons.
    The 8,000 rods that the North Koreans claim to have reprocessed
    into plutonium metal would provide enough plutonium for several
    more. We also believe Pyongyang is pursuing a production-scale
    uranium enrichment program based on technology provided by A.Q.
    Khan, which would give the North Koreans an alternative route
    to nuclear weapons.
        Mr. Chairman, my statement goes on to talk a bit about
    North Korea, but let me talk about Iran, the third country.
        Iran is taking a different path, acknowledging work on a
    covert nuclear fuel cycle while trying to preserve its WMD
    options. I'll start with the good news. Tehran acknowledges
    more than a decade of covert nuclear activity and agreed to
    open itself up to an enhanced inspection regime. Iran, for the
    first time, acknowledged many of its nuclear fuel cycle
    development activities, including a large-scale gas centrifuge
    uranium enrichment effort.
        Iran claims its centrifuge program is designed to produce
    low enriched uranium to support Iran's civil nuclear program.
    This is permitted under the Nonproliferation Treaty, but here's
    the downside: The same technology can be used to build a
    military program as well. The difference between producing low
    enriched uranium and weapons-capable, high enriched uranium is
    only a matter of time and intent, not technology. It would be a
    significant challenge for intelligence to confidently assess
    whether this red line has been crossed.
        Mr. Chairman, we go on to talk about A.Q. Khan. And I've
    talked about that and you know more about that.
        The bottom-line issue on proliferation for us is, in
    support, we have a lot of public success, but proliferators
    hiding among legitimate businesses and countries hiding their
    WMD programs inside legitimate dual-use industries combine to
    make private entrepreneurs dealing in lethal goods one of the
    most difficult and challenging intelligence channels that we
    face. The dual challenge is especially applicable to countries
    hiding biological and chemical warfare programs.
        Mr. Chairman, with regard to ballistic significant missile
    programs, one point. China continues an aggressive missile
    modernization program that will improve its ability to conduct
    a wide range of military actions against Taiwan supported by
    both cruise and ballistic missiles. Expected technical
    improvements will give Beijing a more accurate and lethal
    force. China is also moving ahead on its first generation of
    ballistic missiles.
        My statement talks about Syria.
        And in the final part of the proliferation section, Mr.
    Chairman, we have to remain alert to the vulnerability of
    Russian WMD materials and technology to theft or diversion.
        We are concerned about the continued eagerness of Russia's
    cash-strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace and
    nuclear industries to raise funds via exports and transfers,
    which makes Russian expertise an attractive target for
    countries and groups seeking WMD and missile-related
    assistance.
        Mr. Chairman, we've talked about North Korea. You obviously
    all are aware of the difficult internal situation there and the
    way they've ruled by intimidation and fear, and the accumulated
    effect of years of deprivation and repression.
        With regard to China, let me say a number of things. China
    continues to emerge as a great power and expand its profile in
    regional and international politics. It is also true that the
    Chinese have cooperated with us on terrorism and have been
    willing to host and facilitate multilateral dialogue on the
    North Korean nuclear problem, in contrast to an approach where
    they ignored these problems years ago.
        They're making progress in asserting their influence in
    East Asia, largely on the basis of their economy.
        That said, China's neighbors still harbor suspicions about
    Beijing's long-term intentions. They generally favor a
    sustained U.S. military presence in the region as an insurance
    against potential Chinese aggression.
        Our greatest concern remains China's military build-up
    which continues to accelerate. Last year, Beijing reached new
    benchmarks in its production or acquisition from Russia of
    missiles, submarines and other naval combatants and advanced
    fighter aircraft.
        China is also downsizing and restructuring its military
    forces with an eye toward enhancing its capabilities for the
    modern battlefield.
        Mr. Chairman, I'm going to do perhaps just one more thing:
    talk about Iran. Afghanistan is important. Perhaps we can talk
    about that in the Q&As.
        Iran. I think this is very important. Our view and my view
    is with the victory of hardliners in the elections last
    weekend, government-led reform has received a serious blow.
    Greater repression is the likely result. With the waning of
    top-down reform efforts, reformers will probably turn to the
    grassroots, working with NGOs and labor groups to rebuild
    popular support and keep the flame alive.
        The strengthening of authoritarian rule will make breaking
    out of old foreign policy patterns more difficult.
        The concerns I voiced last year are unabated. The current
    setback is the latest in a series of contests in which
    authoritarian rule has prevailed over reformist challengers.
        The reformists, President Khatami in particular, are in no
    small part to blame. Their refusal to back bold promises with
    equally bold actions exhausted their initially enthusiastic
    popular support. When the new Majlis convenes in June, the
    Iranian government will be even more firmly controlled by the
    forces of authoritarianism. In the recent election, clerical
    authorities disqualified more than 2,500 candidates--mostly
    reformists--and returned control of the legislature to the
    hardliners. The new Majlis will focus on economic reform with
    little or no attention to political liberalization.
        Although greater repression is likely to be the most
    immediate consequence, this will only further deepen the
    discontent with clerical rule, which is now discredited and
    publicly criticized as never before. In the past year, several
    unprecedented open letters, including one signed by nearly half
    the parliament, were published calling for an end to the
    clergy's absolute rule.
        Mr. Chairman, finally, let me just say something about
    Colombia, and I will end there.
        In this hemisphere, it's important to pay attention to
    President Uribe. President Uribe is making great strides
    militarily and economically. Colombia's military is making
    steady progress against illegal armed groups, particularly
    around Bogota. Last year, the army decimated several FARC
    military units. In the last two months, Colombian officials
    have apprehended the two most senior FARC leaders ever
    captured.
        Foreign and domestic investors are taking note. Last year
    the growth rate of 3.5 percent was the highest in the past five
    years. Some of Uribe's hardest work remains ahead. The military
    has successfully cleared much of the insurgent-held territory,
    but the next stage of Uribe's clear-and-hold strategy is
    securing the gains thus far. That entails building state
    presence--schools, police stations, medical clinics, roads,
    bridges and social infrastructure--where it has scarcely
    existed before.
        Mr. Chairman, I will stop there.
        Senator Rockefeller, I will say, if you go to the back part
    of my statement, in the last couple of pages, you'll see the
    kind of implications you drew from stateless zones, disease and
    hunger, their implications for terrorism, and how we at least
    think about these things, because they are very important.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Roberts. We thank the Director, and we move now to
    Director Mueller.
        [The prepared statement of Director Mueller follows:]
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     STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, DIRECTOR,
                    FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

        Director Mueller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator
    Rockefeller and members of the Committee, for this opportunity
    to discuss the world threats facing this nation and how the FBI
    has adapted to meet these emerging threats.
        I'm going to touch on some of the successes of the past 12
    months, but at the outset I would like to say that none of
    these successes would have been possible without the
    extraordinary efforts of our partners in the Intelligence
    Community, and most particularly in state and local law
    enforcement, as well as with the help of our counterparts
    around the world.
        Also at the outset, I should mention that the Muslim-
    American, Iraqi-American and Arab-American communities in the
    United States have contributed a great deal to our success, and
    on behalf of the FBI, I would like to thank these communities
    for their assistance and for their ongoing commitment to
    preventing acts of terrorism.
        In 2003, the United States and its allies made considerable
    advances toward defeating the al-Qa'ida network around the
    world. And since this Committee's worldwide threat hearing last
    year, the efforts of the FBI, along with our state and local
    law enforcement partners--the efforts to identify terrorists
    and to dismantle terrorist networks have yielded major
    successes.
        In Cincinnati, an al-Qa'ida operative was charged with
    providing material support to terrorists.
        In Baltimore, a resident was identified as an al-Qa'ida
    operative with direct associations to now detained senior al-
    Qa'ida operative Tawfiq bin Attash and Khalid Shaykh Mohammed.
        In Tampa, the United States leader of the Palestine Islamic
    Jihad and three of his lieutenants were arrested under the RICO
    statute for their participation in a conspiracy that
    contributed to the deaths of two United States citizens in
    Israel.
        In Newark, three individuals, including an illegal arms
    dealer, were indicted for their role in attempting to smuggle a
    shoulder-fired missile into the United States.
        And in Minneapolis, an individual who trained in
    Afghanistan and provided funds to associates in Pakistan was
    recently arrested and charged with conspiring to provide
    material support to al-Qa'ida.
        Mr. Chairman, it is important to note that we attribute
    these and other recent successes to our close coordination and
    information sharing with other members of the intelligence
    community, with our overseas partners, and with state and local
    law enforcement officials, many of whom participate in our 84
    Joint Terrorism Task Forces.
        As you know, the Joint Terrorism Task Forces team up FBI
    agents with police officers, members of the Intelligence
    Community, Homeland Security and other federal partners to
    coordinate counterterrorism investigations and to share
    information. The Joint Terrorism Task Forces have played a
    central role in virtually every terrorism investigation,
    prevention or interdiction within the United States over the
    past year.
        Our current abilities to coordinate with our partners and
    develop actionable intelligence to prevent terrorist attacks
    are a direct result of our efforts to transform the FBI to meet
    our counterterrorism mission. And while I am going to discuss
    this transformation, first I would like to spend a few moments
    discussing what we see as the greatest threats facing the
    United States.
        As Mr. Tenet has indicated, the greatest threat remains
    international terrorism, specifically Sunni extremists,
    including al-Qa'ida. While our successes to date are dramatic,
    we face an enemy that is determined, an enemy that is
    resilient, an enemy that is patient, an enemy whose ultimate
    goal is destruction of the United States. Al-Qa'ida's
    flexibility and adaptability continue to make them dangerous
    and unpredictable. The enemy still has the capability to strike
    in the United States and to strike United States citizens
    abroad with little or no warning.
        Al-Qa'ida is committed to damaging the United States
    economy and United States prestige, and will attack any target
    that will accomplish these goals.
        There are strong indications that al-Qa'ida will revisit
    missed targets until they succeed, such as they did with the
    World Trade Center. And the list of missed targets now includes
    both the White House as well as the Capitol. In addition, our
    transportation systems across the country, particularly the
    subways and bridges in major cities, as well as airlines, have
    been a continual focus of al-Qa'ida targeting.
        We, too, remain concerned about al-Qa'ida's efforts to
    acquire weapons of mass destruction. The discovery of ricin in
    Europe, al-Qa'ida's clear interest in a range of chemical,
    biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, and its desire to
    attack the United States at equal or greater levels than 9/11
    highlight the need for continued vigilance in this regard.
        Finally, al-Qa'ida retains a cadre of supporters within the
    United States which extends across the country. Indeed, al-
    Qa'ida appears to recognize the operational advantage it can
    derive from recruiting United States citizens. And while the
    bulk of al-Qa'ida supporters in the United States are engaged
    in fundraising, recruitment and logistics, there have been
    cases--some of which I've mentioned previously--there have been
    cases of those apparently involved in operational planning.
        While al-Qa'ida and like-minded groups remain at the
    forefront of the war on terror, other groups, such as
    Hizbollah, Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, warrant equal
    vigilance due to their ongoing capability to launch terrorist
    attacks within the United States. Historically, however, these
    groups have limited their militant activities to Israeli
    targets and have focused on fundraising, recruitment and
    procurement as their main activities in the United States.
        The FBI disrupted several significant Hizbollah cells over
    the last year. In Charlotte, North Carolina, an individual was
    sentenced to 155 years in jail for conspiring to provide
    material support to Hizbollah. In Detroit, Michigan, 11
    individuals, some of whom have admitted ties to Hizbollah, were
    charged with bank fraud, cigarette smuggling and RICO offenses.
    These arrests were the result of a long-term investigation of
    criminal enterprises associated with Hizbollah.
        Mr. Chairman, although the impact of terrorism is more
    immediate and more highly visible, espionage and foreign
    intelligence activities are no less threats to the United
    States national security.
        Given our country's stature as the leading political,
    military, economic and scientific power, foreign intelligence
    services will continue to recruit sources to penetrate the
    United States Intelligence Community and the United States
    government. They will continue to target our national economic
    interests and our research and development base. They will
    continue to attempt to assert political influence through
    perception management operations.
        The loss of sensitive, classified and proprietary
    information critical to United States interests can hamper our
    ability to conduct international relations, can threaten our
    military and diminish our technological base, as well as our
    economic competitiveness.
        Mr. Chairman, I should also mention that the FBI is
    expanding our efforts to address the rapidly growing cyber
    threat as it relates to both terrorism and national security.
    The number of individuals and groups with the ability to use
    computers for illegal, harmful and possibly devastating
    purposes is on the rise. We are particularly concerned about
    terrorists and state actors wishing to exploit vulnerabilities
    in United States systems and networks.
        The FBI has a division dedicated to combating cyber crime
    and cyber-terrorism and we are committed to identifying and
    neutralizing those individuals or groups that illegally access
    computer systems, spread malicious code, and support terrorist
    or state-sponsored computer operations.
        Over the past year, Mr. Chairman, the men and women of the
    FBI have continued to implement a plan that fundamentally
    transforms our organization to enhance our ability to predict
    and to prevent terrorism. As you know, we took the first steps
    toward this transformation in the days and weeks following the
    9/11 attacks and we established a new set of priorities that
    govern the allocation of manpower and resources in every FBI
    program and in every FBI office.
        Counterterrorism is our overriding priority and every
    terrorism lead is addressed, even if it requires a diversion of
    resources from other priorities. Since September 11, we have
    centralized management of our counterterrorism,
    counterintelligence and cyber programs to eliminate stovepiping
    of information, to coordinate operations, to conduct liaison
    with other agencies and governments, and to be accountable for
    the overall development and success of our efforts in these
    areas.
        Our operational divisions at headquarters have analyzed the
    threat environment and devised national strategies to address
    the most critical threats and are implementing these strategies
    in every field office. We have also reallocated resources in
    accordance with these new priorities. For example, we have
    increased a number of agents assigned to counterterrorism from
    roughly 1,300 to 2,300 and hired over 400 analysts.
        Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces have grown from 35 to 84.
    Prior to September 11 we had a little over 900 agents and
    police officers serving on our task forces. We now have over
    3,300 serving on those task forces.
        And to enhance our translation capabilities, we increased
    the number of linguists with skills in critical languages from
    555 to over 1,200.
        Mr. Chairman, over the past year we also have made
    substantial progress in implementing the next key step in our
    transformation, and that is the FBI's intelligence program. The
    FBI has always been among the world's best collectors of
    information. For a variety of historical reasons, the Bureau
    did not have a formal infrastructure to exploit that
    information fully for its intelligence value.
        While individual FBI agents have always capably analyzed
    the evidence in their particular cases and then used that
    analysis to guide their investigations, the FBI has in the
    past, but not across the board, implemented an overall effort
    to analyze intelligence and then strategically direct
    intelligence collection.
        Today, an enterprise-wide intelligence program is
    absolutely essential. The threats to the homeland are not
    contained by geographic boundaries and often do not fall neatly
    into investigative program categories. Consequently, threat
    information has relationships and applicability that crosses
    both internal and external organizational boundaries.
    Counterterrorism efforts must incorporate elements and
    contribute toward counterintelligence, cyber and criminal
    programs. And in order to respond to this changing threat
    environment, we are building our capabilities to fuse, analyze
    and disseminate our related intelligence and to create
    collection requirements based on our analysis of
    theintelligence gaps about our adversaries.
        We have an Office of Intelligence within the FBI which
    establishes and executes standards for recruiting, hiring,
    training and developing the intelligence analytical workforce
    and to ensure that analysts are assigned to operational and
    field divisions based on intelligence priorities.
        We have established a new position of Executive Assistant
    Director for Intelligence, joining the other three Executive
    Assistant Directors in the top tier of FBI management, and we
    recruited Maureen Baginski, an intelligence expert with 25
    years of experience in the intelligence community, to serve in
    this position. She's responsible for managing the national
    analytical program and for institutionalizing intelligence
    processes in all areas of FBI operations. Among her
    responsibilities are those for managing the establishment of
    the formal requirements process that will identify and resolve
    those intelligence gaps, allowing us to fill those gaps through
    collection strategies.
        Finally, in order to ensure that the FBI-wide collection
    plans and directives are incorporated into our field
    activities, all field offices have established a Field
    Intelligence Group, and each of those groups is the
    intelligence component in the field office responsible for the
    management, execution and coordination of the intelligence
    functions.
        For our intelligence program to succeed, we must continue
    to build and strengthen our intelligence workforce. Our efforts
    to recruit, hire and train agents and analysts with
    intelligence experience began shortly after September 11. And
    now we are also taking steps to enhance the stature of
    intelligence and analysis within the FBI and to provide career
    incentives for specialization in these areas. To ensure that
    our intelligence mission is carried out, we are revising our
    field office and program inspections and agent and management
    evaluations to make it clear that developing and disseminating
    intelligence is the job of every office and agent.
        Mr. Chairman, my prepared statement provides additional
    details about the many enhancements to our intelligence
    programs, including increased training, targeted hiring,
    creation of the College of Analytical Studies, establishment of
    career tracks for agents who will devote their careers to
    intelligence, and improvements to our information technology.
        In the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude at
    this point. And again, I will be happy to answer any questions
    the Committee may have. Thank you for the opportunity to give
    this statement.
        Chairman Roberts. And we thank you, Director Mueller.
        Admiral, would you please proceed?
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Jacoby follows:]
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        STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL LOWELL E. JACOBY, U.S. NAVY,
                 DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

        Admiral Jacoby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
    Committee. I appreciate this Committee's strong sustained
    support for defense intelligence and its men and women who are
    deployed around the world.
        Last year I testified that defense intelligence was at war
    on a global scale. That war has intensified. Defense
    intelligence professionals, active duty military, reserves and
    civilians are providing the knowledge and skills essential to
    defeating enemies in Iraq, Afghanistan and the global war on
    terrorism.
        In Iraq, the security situation varies by region. The north
    and the south remain comparably quiet. Attacks in central Iraq
    account for the vast majority of incidents and center in Sunni-
    dominated areas, especially west of Baghdad, around Mosul and
    along the Baghdad-Tikrit corridor, areas that were home to many
    former military and security members. I believe former regime
    elements led by Ba'ath Party remnants are responsible for the
    majority of anti-coalition attacks.
        That said, it appears much of the Sunni population has not
    decided whether to back the coalition or support the
    insurgents. The key factors in this decision are stability and
    a future that presents viable alternatives to the Ba'athists or
    Islamists.
        Foreign fighters, to include al-Qa'ida, are a continuing
    threat. They have perpetrated some of the most significant
    attacks and may be behind others, such as suicide attacks that
    caused high casualties. They are motivated by Arab nationalism,
    extremist religious ideology and opposition to U.S. policies
    and beliefs. Left unchecked, Iraq has the potential to serve as
    a training ground for the next generation of terrorists.
        Mr. Chairman, I returned from Iraq ten days ago. At this
    point, I would like to recognize the exemplary work of the
    Iraqi Survey Group. DIA and defense intelligence personnel,
    intelligence community experts, counterparts from U.S. agencies
    and contractors and coalition members are analyzing new
    information, pursuing leads, inspecting and searching
    facilities and combing through, sorting and exploiting tens of
    thousands of documents in a dangerous and austere environment.
        Forming and managing this mix of professionals has taken
    considerable effort, not just DIA people, but by our national
    and coalition partners as well. The ISG and those who provide
    support for their efforts are to be commended for their
    dedicated efforts as the ISG pursues a full accounting of Iraqi
    WMD programs, counterterrorism in Iraq and the fate of Captain
    Scott Speicher.
        Turning to Afghanistan, last spring's attacks by opposition
    groups reached the highest level since the collapse of the
    Taliban government in December of 2001. Although activity has
    subsided somewhat, attacks continue. The Taliban insurgency
    that continues to target humanitarian assistance and
    reconstruction organizations is a serious threat. Some of those
    organizations have suspended operations. They play a key role
    in bringing stability and progress to this troubled nation.
        Additionally, President Karzai remains critical to
    stability in Afghanistan. As a Pashtun, he is the only
    individual capable of maintaining the trust of that ethnic
    group while maintaining support of other minorities.
        Notable progress has been achieved in the global war on
    terrorism. We have shrunk operating environments for al-Qa'ida
    and other terrorist groups, captured al-Qa'ida senior
    coordinators and disrupted operations. Nevertheless, al-Qa'ida
    remains the greatest threat to our homeland and our overseas
    presence.
        Al-Qa'ida continues to demonstrate it's adaptable and
    capable. While al-Qa'ida's planning has become more
    decentralized and shifted to softer targets, they continue
    attacks, most recently in Istanbul and Riyadh, enjoy
    considerable support in the Islamic world. Al-Qa'ida and other
    terrorist groups remain interested in acquiring chemical,
    biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Hijackings and
    man-portable missile attacks against civilian aircraft remain
    of considerable concern.
        A number of factors virtually assure a terrorist threat for
    years to come. Despite recent reforms, terrorist organizations
    draw from societies with poor or failing economies, ineffective
    governments and inadequate education systems. Demographic
    bubbles or youth bubbles further burden governments and
    economies. For instance, if we look at the percentage of
    population under 15 years of age, 43 percent of Saudi Arabians,
    41 percent of Iraqis, 39 percent of Pakistanis, 34 percent of
    Egyptians, 33 percent of Algerians and 29 percent of Iranians
    fall into this group.
        I'm also concerned over ungoverned spaces, areas where
    governments do not or cannot exercise effective control. Such
    spaces offer terrorist organizations sanctuary.
        I remain concerned about the Islamic world. Many of our
    partners successfully weathered domestic stresses during
    Operation Iraqi Freedom; however challenges to their stability
    and their continued support for the war on terrorism remain.
    Islamic and Arab populations are increasingly opposed to U.S.
    policies. The loss of a key leader could quickly change
    government support for U.S. and coalition operations.
        For example, President Musharraf was recently the target of
    two sophisticated assassination attempts. His support for the
    global war on terrorism, Afghan policy, restrictions on
    Kashmiri militants and attempts to improve relations with India
    are all important initiatives that have increased his
    vulnerability.
        Despite some positive developments, such as recent events
    in Libya, the trends with respect to proliferation of weapons
    of mass destruction and missiles remain troublesome. North
    Korea's reactivation of the Yongbyon nuclear facility and
    revelations over Iranian nuclear enrichment reinforce concerns.
    Other states continue to develop biological and chemical
    weapons capabilities and improve their ballistic and cruise
    missiles. Proliferation of WMD and missile-related technologies
    continues and new supply networks challenge counter-
    proliferation efforts.
        With respect to China and Russia, China continues to
    develop or import modern weapons. China's Liberation Army
    acquisition priorities includes surface combatants and
    submarines, air defense, modern fighter aircraft, ballistic and
    anti-ship cruise missiles, space and counter-space systems and
    modern ground equipment.
        Domestic political events in Taipei are the principal
    determinant of short-term stability in the Taiwan Straits.
    Beijing is monitoring developments in advance of next month's
    presidential elections and referendum, ever concerned about a
    Taiwan declaration of independence. Beijing will not tolerate
    the island's independence and will use military force,
    regardless of the costs or risks. However, we see no indication
    of preparations for large-scale military exercises or other
    military activity to influence Taiwan voters at this stage.
        After nearly a decade of declining activity, the Russian
    military is beginning to exercise its forces in mission areas
    tied to deterrence, global reach and rapid reaction. Moscow is
    attempting to reclaim great power status. Its military spending
    has increased in real terms in the past four years in line with
    its improving economy.
        In closing, defense intelligence is working hard to improve
    the processes, techniques and capabilities necessary to counter
    the current threats and emerging security challenges and to
    take advantage of opportunities. Our global commitments have
    stressed our people and our capabilities. Nonetheless, I am
    confident we will continue to supply our decisionmakers with
    the knowledge necessary for success.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Roberts. We thank all three of you for your
    testimony.
        I would say to members that we are providing six minutes
    for each member, and then if there is time and desire for a
    second round that will also be the case.
        Let me indicate that there has been considerable interest
    in the Committee holding a hearing in reference to the
    recommendations made by the 9/11 investigation by the House and
    Senate Intelligence Committees as of the last session of
    Congress on the recommendations and reforms that were listed in
    that document. That, of course, went to the independent
    commission, which is now the 9/11 commission. And so we will
    have a hearing on those recommendations.
        And it would be the hope of the Chairman that when we
    finally conclude or that we do conclude the inquiry and we make
    the inquiry public after redaction, when we have a public
    hearing, that we come up with the conclusion and also some
    recommendations in regards to a positive effect to address some
    of the systemic challenges we face in the Intelligence
    Community.
        I know that in an even-numbered year where we have
    adjectives and adverbs that are somewhat unique, as opposed to
    an odd-number year, it may be difficult to leapfrog that and to
    get into conclusions and recommendations, but that would be the
    hope of the Chair.
        Both of you have indicated that attacks on coalition forces
    and on the newly-created Iraqi security forces have continued
    at a steady pace. That's certainly not a secret to any
    American. Events have shown us that the sophistication of those
    attacks has increased. There is no sign that the people behind
    the attacks plan to stop. In fact, it appears that the
    opposition has hoped to block or derail any moves toward a
    transition of governing authority.
        I would address this question to the DCI and to the DIA
    Director. First, is this working?
        Second, will coalition forces and Iraqi security forces be
    capable of identifying and also eliminating the main body of
    the oppositionists and the foreign fighters?
        And third, in your opinion, what are the most important
    factors that will determine whether Iraqi Sunnis and Shia will,
    in the long term, side with forces of peace and stability
    rather than continue or accelerate opposition to the new
    government order in Iraq?
        And I would ask Mr. Tenet if he would respond.
        Director Tenet. You asked a number of questions, Mr.
    Chairman.
        First, the transition to sovereignty and a functioning
    state is exactly what the insurgents and the jihadists oppose
    the most. It's the biggest threat to them over the long term.
        Now, in terms of how we're doing against these, I think
    that we would say that, over time, both we and the military,
    particularly at local levels, have very good knowledge of these
    networks, both in terms of the insurgency and the jihadists.
    And we're making progress.
        Security is linked to economics and politics in an
    integrated manner. Security is very, very important.
        The fact that Sunnis are beginning to engage in a political
    process, form umbrella organizations, the fact that Ayatollah
    Sistani is meeting with Sunni notables, the fact that tribal
    elements that constitute Sunnis and Shias are beginning to talk
    about a political process is a healthy thing.
        Clearly, economic developments, particularly in the Sunni
    heartland, dealing with unemployment, taking young men off the
    street, putting them in a job--all of these things work in a
    process interlinked together that makes progress. It's hard.
    We're better than we were 90 days ago. The fact that there is a
    dialogue between Sunnis and Shias and Kurds, as much ferment as
    it creates, is a positive sign that must end up in Iraqi
    sovereignty.
        And the key, ultimately, is--if John Abizaid were here, he
    would say the key is we need to transition from U.S. forces
    being up front, to Iraqis, through police forces, civil defense
    battalions taking the action to be seen as protecting
    themselves.
        One final word about the foreign jihadists: Success here
    for them, they understand that Iraq is a very difficult
    operating environment, even while they operate against us.
    Iraqis are turning them in in bigger numbers. They're talking
    to us about them. They don't belong there.
        As this political process matures, I think we're going to
    be better off, but it will be hard and slow and every day you
    will not have the kind of progress that you want, but we're
    moving in the right direction.
        Chairman Roberts. Admiral.
        Admiral Jacoby. Mr. Chairman, I agree with the DCI that
    certainly the factors are stability and an economic and
    political situation that shows a brighter future than the past
    or present. I also believe thattheir efforts are making
    progress, partly by the fact that people are coming forward and
    providing more information against the former regime elements or the
    foreign fighters.
        But I think one of the more demonstrable factors for
    progress is the fact that the police are now a very clear
    target of attack in an anti-stability kind of an approach and
    police recruits are still lining up in large numbers to be
    trained and join the force.
        And so I think that there are a number of elements there
    that talk about progress, and the focus, as the DCI said, needs
    to be on that evolving situation and the set of institutions
    that need to be in place in order to provide that environment
    for people to see that they are part of the future.
        Chairman Roberts. Let me ask a question in regards to Dr.
    Duelfer who, obviously, is in charge of the Iraq Survey Group.
    In talking to him before he took on that assignment, he
    indicated--and I think Dr. Kay indicated--that there was
    something close to 17,000 boxes of documents that had not been
    exploited.
        My concern is, do we have the translation capability? And
    the indication from some was that it would take a year to
    finally work through all the exploitation of those documents to
    try to make rhyme or reason in regards to the WMD question.
        Do your agencies have sufficient translation resources to
    meet your current mission requirements? Have we been able to
    plus that up I think is the word we use in the Intelligence
    Community?
        Admiral Jacoby. Mr. Chairman, your numbers are about
    right--in other words, the 17,000 boxes and about a year's
    worth of time. The translation capabilities are in place. We
    are at a target of 24-hour operations for linguists and
    translators working those documents. And we do have the funding
    available to pay for the 24-hour operations.
        One of the things I would point out, though, is the bulk
    numbers of boxes are not necessarily indicative of the effort.
    It is a very targeted kind of effort. In many cases, we know
    where those documents came from, and so there's a triage on the
    front end that prioritizes their efforts. And so the areas
    where we would logically find WMD materials move to the front
    of the line and so the backlog and the timeline is far shorter
    for those more profitable areas of exploration.
        Chairman Roberts. My time is expired. I apologize to my
    colleagues, but I note that the Director would like to say
    something.
        Director Tenet. Mr. Chairman, in terms of Arab linguists,
    let me just note that ISG in total has about 320 Arab
    linguists. About 220 of those are sitting in the docex facility
    doing this work. So in terms of--it's a fairly formidable
    capability that Admiral Jacoby has assembled.
        Admiral Jacoby. With more personnel coming onboard this
    month.
        Chairman Roberts. Senator Warner. Oh, I beg your pardon.
    The second time around, I apologize to the distinguished Vice
    Chairman who is now kicking me severely underneath the dais.
        Chairman Roberts. Senator Rockefeller.
        Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Jacoby, we didn't get the other two testimonies
    until--I didn't have them till this morning, but I did have
    yours. And once again, I have to say, like I did last year, I
    thought it was absolutely superb in its scope and what you had
    to say.
        What you just did say, however, raises a question in my
    mind. You're talking about reading of documents and the
    availability of translators--you know, the necessary Arabic
    speakers, et cetera, of different dialects to do that. It's a
    very different matter when you're going through documents than
    it is when you're dealing with human intelligence, with assets,
    with the capacity to do all the other things that have to be
    done, frankly, many of which will probably turn out to be more
    important.
        And so my question would be not just to you, but also to
    Director Tenet, because I noticed when I mentioned this point
    about being stretched thin, that the Director nodded his head a
    little bit.
        It's my impression, in just doing some unclassified
    reading, that with the switches that are being made in Baghdad
    and elsewhere, that there are a lot of rather junior people
    coming in, a lot of retired people being lured back into the
    service and that the Arabic question remains huge for your
    purposes.
        Director Tenet. Sir, I would, say that, obviously, language
    capabilities is something we're working on very hard. I mean,
    we've tripled the number of Arabic speakers in the last three
    years and we won't go into foreign language programs here.
        But the point is I think there was a newspaper story that
    was recently written about Baghdad and Pakistan and it was----
        Chairman Roberts. George, can you pull that microphone
    right up?
        Director Tenet. The truth is that you're asking a
    priorities question, and here's the way we're working the
    priority question. The war on terrorism absolutely has to be
    unaffected by what we do on anything else. So that's covered
    and Iraq has now created a very large drain of people and
    resources.
        The issue is not in terms of Iraq, or in terms of the war
    on terrorism, or in terms of proliferation, or let's say
    another country that we care about a great deal. The issue for
    us will be global coverage against other issues, where the
    truth is we are moving people against the highest priorities.
    And there are issues we're going to have to deal with very,
    very smartly.
        You say we're bringing a lot of older people back. Well,
    we've had a designated reserve cadre now going back four or
    five years; that number's been constant as we bring, as you
    know, more people into the clandestine service and the
    analytical workforce to match youth and inexperience. And we're
    just going to have to do it this way and balance our priorities
    carefully.
        Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you.
        This is for the Director and for the Admiral. I mentioned
    that the United States--we basically invaded Iraq as a reason
    because of our concern about the presence of weapons of mass
    destruction and also the question of links to al-Qa'ida and
    other terrorist organizations.
        It now appears, at least to this Senator, that Iran
    actually had closer links to dangerous terrorist organizations,
    such as Hizbollah and al-Qa'ida, as well as much more advanced
    WMD capabilities, than Iraq did. So how would you compare, the
    two of you, the threat posed by Iran today with the threat of
    Iraq WMD and links to terrorism that you described to this
    Committee last year at this time? Is Iran a grave and gathering
    threat?
        Director Tenet. Well, sir, I think that we've documented
    year in and year out the Iranian ballistic missile program and
    what they've acquired from the Russians and the deployment of
    the Shahab-3 and the development and deployment of longer-range
    missiles. And certainly, in classified closed testimony we've
    talked to you over the years about our concerns about their
    nuclear program.
        With regard to the Hizbollah relationship, that's not new.
    We've talked about Iranian support for Hizbollah for years.
        I think, you know, there are two different sets of issues
    involved in terms of what policy responses people might choose.
    And they are very, very different in this regard. So it's an
    apples and oranges on a gathering situation where there was a
    great deal of concern about in terms of what we didn't know,
    what we were deceived and denied about. And so there was a high
    probability impact in terms of what was being denied to us that
    caused us a great deal of concern.
        In the Iranian case, I think there's been steady work and
    understanding of the Iranian phenomenon, both on the nuclear
    and the ballistic missile side, and in the classified context
    that we've talked to you over the years on chemical and
    biological weapons as well, that Iranposes problems, to be
    sure, things that we've talked to you about consistently year in and
    year out. What you do about them and what policy solutions you choose
    is up to you and others to decide.
        Admiral Jacoby. Senator, I believe the same in terms of the
    capabilities discussion.
        I think one thing that's more crystal clear to us this
    year, although it would have been projected last year, is the
    hardliners and reformists situation. I think it's very clear
    coming out of the elections that the reform movement has lost
    momentum, lost steam. And so we need to be putting the
    capabilities discussion in the context of continued hardline
    leadership.
        Director Tenet. Senator Rockefeller, can I make just one
    other point on this?
        Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Yes, because I would like it--I
    have two seconds left.
        Director Tenet. I'm sorry.
        Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Simply because it seems to me
    you're both avoiding the obvious question that I'm asking: What
    it looks like today, what it looked like a year ago, what would
    you do? You say, ``Well, let's slough it off to the
    policymakers.'' That's a little harder argument to make these
    days than it was before.
        Director Tenet. Well, sir, I would say that what we're
    doing with Iran today--and you've got an IAEA relationship,
    that's a positive thing. I think we need to work through that,
    in terms of since they've opened up and are giving us data, and
    they're complying. That's an important way to get at their
    nuclear program.
        There's a difference in terms of the two societies. If
    you're going to look, you know, Iran has a society that had two
    elections, had a reform movement, has a political dialogue, has
    a certain amount of openness to it. So when you contemplate the
    fact that 63 percent of the Iranian population was born after
    1979, with a new generation, it's a complicating issue in terms
    of how you juxtapose that kind of a society that's trying to
    reform. And while the reformers may be in tough shape, we don't
    want to dissuade them from picking up and continuing what,
    obviously, is a discredited clerical rule, when they may go
    forward in the future. There's a difference between a very
    closed society and an open society with a political dialogue.
        So there are very big differences, notwithstanding advances
    on nuclear issues and on support for terrorism that we've
    documented for years.
        Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Roberts. Senator Warner, I've recognized you
    twice. The third time's the charm.
        Senator Warner. Thank you very much. I've been waiting
    patiently.
        I wish to commend you all on your statements, gentlemen. I
    think they were strong, positive statements reflecting within
    the Executive branch the strongest of support for your
    individual and collective endeavors on the war against
    terrorism.
        We have as a nation, nevertheless, suffered some degree of
    loss of credibility. It's debatable. I think it's going to be
    recoverable in the end, but in the meantime, has this in any
    way affected your ability to make contacts within nations other
    than the traditional governmental contact with your
    counterparts? Has the support of your counterparts been
    noticeably lessened? And has your ability to make your own
    independent contacts with other sources of intelligence
    lessened in any way?
        We'll start with you, Director.
        Director Tenet. No, sir. I would say that if we look at an
    example, whether it's the war on terrorism or contacts with our
    foreign counterparts on proliferation, no, sir, nobody has
    changed their attitude toward us. People are as cooperative as
    they've been. We're working toward a common framework. Many of
    our colleagues saw it the same way we did. And so, no, I see no
    diminution in the willingness of people who work with us in
    intelligence channels to get our job done.
        Senator Warner. So the professionals have stayed out of the
    fray of the political exchanges, particularly with some of the
    nations in Europe, and you feel that your contacts with those
    counterpart agencies are as strong as ever?
        Director Tenet. Sir, notwithstanding political
    differences----
        Senator Warner. Yes.
        Director Tenet [continuing]. Our relationship with our
    European colleagues is very, very strong. And even in cases
    where there are very big differences politically, terrorism
    is--for example, we have very big differences of view with the
    French on policy issues, for example, but on terrorism
    excellent cooperation across the board.
        Senator Warner. I think that's reassuring.
        Director Mueller.
        Director Mueller. I would agree. Over the last couple of
    weeks, I've had opportunities to meet with counterparts from
    France, Germany. Yesterday I met with the German Interior
    Minister. Our relationships have been excellent with him over
    the last couple of years. They are still superb with our
    counterparts in Germany and France. Our relationships could not
    be better, regardless of what else happens.
        Admiral Jacoby. Senator Warner, my counterparts, if
    anything, are coming forward with more offers of cooperation
    and more opportunities as we seek them out, so, no sir, no
    problems.
        Senator Warner. Director Tenet, the Armed Services
    Committee had the opportunity to hear from Dr. Kay. And I've
    also had a long discussion with General Dayton and Dr. Duelfer
    before he departed.
        Can you assure this Committee that particularly your agency
    and that of the Department of Defense are giving the strongest
    of support to continuing the search for weapons of mass
    destruction under the Iraq Survey Group?
        Director Tenet. Yes, sir, I was out in Baghdad last week
    and I can tell you that it's as strong as ever and there's a
    very good reason----
        Senator Warner. Of resources and people and the like?
        Director Tenet. Yes, sir, that was absolutely the case.
    There was a lot of work going on out there. They're doing a
    great job. I had the pleasure to meet with them and talk to
    them. They're generating a lot of leads. They're working on a
    lot of issues and cooperation is very good.
        Senator Warner. Director Mueller, under your jurisdiction
    comes the seaports of America. We're very proud to have a very
    large one in my state. I didn't hear in your opening statement
    any particular emphasis on working with the local authorities
    and other agencies of the government in giving us the maximum
    protection for those ports which particularly are highly
    vulnerable to terrorist attack.
        Director Mueller. Senator, I would tell you, wherever we
    have a seaport that is a potential target, our Joint Terrorism
    Task Forces work exceptionally closely with our counterparts at
    the federal level but also at the state and local level. In
    some cases--I'm not certain--actually I think in Virginia
    Beach, particularly in that area, there have been extraordinary
    measures. By extraordinary I mean measures above and beyond
    just the Joint Terrorism Task Force----
        Senator Warner. I'm acquainted with that.
        Director Mueller [continuing]. That are taken to assure the
    protection of those seaports. So we have the basic level, the
    Joint Terrorism Task Force, but in many of our areas we have
    enhanced cooperative efforts.
        Senator Warner. Good.
        Admiral Jacoby, with reference to Haiti, it's a rapidly
    transitioning event there. What is the probability that this
    country couldonce again experience the exodus from that nation
    seeking refuge on our shores in the event that the instability
    progresses at a rate that it's now, I think, just about on the brink of
    capitulation? Would you give us a more in-depth survey about Haiti and
    the problems of the boat people again?
        Admiral Jacoby. Senator, the northern half of the country
    basically now has been--police posts and other government
    facilities have been abandoned.
        We're watching closely for any preparations for exodus,
    sir. And I can report to you at this point that we have not
    seen that, nor any typical signals, in terms of moving of boats
    and so forth in the northern part of the country. We haven't
    seen that yet. But it is certainly a concern and it's a focus
    of attention.
        Senator Warner. Director Tenet, the conflict between Israel
    and the Palestinian people continues to, I think, fuel a lot of
    discontent in that area of the world, including far reaches
    into the situations in Iraq, Syria and otherwise. To what
    extent can you assure this Committee that your agency is doing
    everything it can to work toward the success for the program
    laid down by our President, the road to peace?
        Director Tenet. Well, sir, we're obviously and have been
    intimately involved in the past, but I must honestly tell you
    that we need two partners to come together to give us the
    ability to do much. And right now we do not have two parties of
    equal mind or capability or will.
        So quite frankly, we're watching this from a very important
    intelligence-gathering dimension, maintaining our contacts with
    both sides. But in truth, we need the Palestinian Authority to
    step up. We need people to come to the table to work with us to
    exert a willingness. We've laid down specific reform plans for
    those services, their consolidation under a single leadership,
    a minister of interior who reports independently to a prime
    minister. We need more help in this regard to really get back
    to the point where we did the work we did in 1998, 1999, 2000.
    We're not there right now, Senator.
        Senator Warner. Well, that's a frank assessment. And I wish
    to commend you personally for the manner in which you've met
    the challenges here recently, Director Tenet. They've been
    quite significant.
        Let's move, then, to Syria. I thought we'd have more
    emphasis on that situation because the tentacles of that nation
    are very disturbing as it relates to our situation in Iraq and,
    to some extent, Iran. Could you expand on that?
        Director Tenet. Sir, I'd like to talk about Syria more
    extensively in closed session, if I could.
        Senator Warner. All right.
        Director Tenet. Obviously, the border between Syria and
    Iraq is something that concerns me.
        But I've got some things I'd prefer to talk about in closed
    session. And, obviously, there are proliferation matters here,
    there are matters about the continuing harboring of Palestinian
    rejectionist groups whose public relations outfits may have
    been shut down but the operations haven't been shut down. So
    there's a whole slew of issues to talk about here.
        Senator Warner. In Afghanistan, there are many positive
    signs, but one that concerns us greatly is the continuing
    proliferation of the drug trade and the dollars that flow from
    it, which are fueling many of the activities in opposition to
    the coalition forces' effort to bring about a greater degree of
    democracy. It seems to me that that is not receiving the proper
    level of attention. Could you comment on that?
        Director Tenet. Sir, I'd say the following: It is an
    important issue. More important, we need to get the
    southeastern provinces along the Pakistani border and that
    security situation under control.
        While Admiral Jacoby referred to the fact that we are
    concerned about Taliban suicide attacks and attacks on soft
    targets, it is also true that the Taliban cannot operate
    against us in set military maneuvers because of what we do back
    to them.
        So we've got to sort of get reconstruction moving in the
    right direction. President Karzai, we have to be in the
    position where he offsets what people produce from narcotics
    with alternative programs. We have to clarify the security
    situation.
        And the sequence, sir, I would say, we've got to get there
    and do more, but we've got to have a sequence here that makes
    sense that results in the government spreading out broader, he
    extending his influence onto that border, with us in a better
    way and then we've got to get to narcotics. It's just a
    sequencing issue that we have to pay attention to.
        Senator Warner. Close out on Usama bin Laden: Has there
    been any lessening, in your opinion, of the efforts by our
    nation and other nations to capture him or otherwise to
    determine his whereabouts? Because that remains a very
    important issue to the American people, and there's so much
    criticism that Iraq has drained off that emphasis. I do not
    find that to be the case. I hope you can assure us that is not
    the case.
        Director Tenet. No lessening of the effort, sir.
        Senator Warner. Admiral.
        Admiral Jacoby. No lessening, sir.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Roberts. Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Let me ask Director Tenet first about the
    unsettled military and political situation in Iraq which is
    directly threatening our troops on a daily basis, threatens
    regional stability and American security.
        Press reports state that CIA officers in Iraq are warning
    that the country may be on a path to civil war. My question is
    this: Would the transfer of sovereignty by June 30, if there's
    no consensus on the procedures of governing between the
    transfer of sovereignty and the holding of direct elections,
    would that transfer of sovereignty be destabilizing?
        Director Tenet. Sir, obviously, this is an issue that
    they're all working on right now that I don't have enough
    transparency into. It's between the U.N. special envoy and
    Ambassador Bremer.
        Senator Levin. I'm asking you for an intelligence
    assessment.
        Director Tenet. Yes, sir. I think it's important to have a
    continuum and those agreements lashed up. I do think that
    moving to some transfer of sovereignty in the long term, with
    an idea for when elections may occur, how a transitional law,
    whatever body is elected, all of which has to be known and laid
    out in a program--and I think that will actually work to our
    benefit.
        Senator Levin. And if there is no such agreement before the
    transfer of sovereignty, then what?
        Director Tenet. Well, sir, at this moment, the civil war
    scenario, it's obviously something we watch very carefully.
        But given what I said in my statement about what I see as
    the increasing coming out of Sunnis, their interaction with
    Shias, I think Iraqis understand, particularly with the kind of
    jihadists targeting against Shias that's been exposed, this is
    not a road they want to go down.
        Senator Levin. There have been a number of compliments to
    Dr. Kay here today and before. Do you agree with Dr. Kay's,
    your chief weapon inspector, statement that the consensus
    opinion is that the two trailers that were found were not
    intended for the production of biological weapons? Do you agree
    with him?
        Director Tenet. No, sir, there is no consensus on that
    question.
        Senator Levin. What is your opinion?
        Director Tenet. Well, sir, we have two bodies----
        Senator Levin. And what is your opinion?
        Director Tenet. At this moment, I'm sitting right in
    themiddle of a big debate. I have analysts in my building who still
    believe that they were for BW trailers. I have Defense Intelligence
    Agency analysts who have posited another theory. And the community has
    not--we don't have enough data, and we haven't wrestled it to the
    ground yet.
        Senator Levin. Vice President Cheney just a few weeks ago
    said the following, that those trailers were, in fact, part of
    the biological weapons program and that he deems them
    conclusive evidence that Saddam, in fact, had programs for
    weapons of mass destruction. Do you agree with Vice President
    Cheney?
        Director Tenet. Well, sir, I talked to the Vice President
    after my Georgetown speech. I don't think he was aware of where
    we were in terms of the community's disagreement on this. I've
    talked to him subsequent to that. I've explained the
    disagreements. I've told him that there's one side that thinks
    one thing and one side that thinks another thing. So, in
    fairness to him, I think he was going off of an older judgment
    that was embodied in a paper.
        Senator Levin. Was that older judgment the one that is
    still on your Web site?
        Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
        Senator Levin. Why is it still on your Web site?
        Director Tenet. Sir, we just keep adding. We had a piece of
    paper at a moment in time. We've added David Kay's piece of
    paper. I've put my Georgetown speech on it. For transparency
    and giving people a sense of where we are at any moment in
    time, I think it's a good thing.
        Senator Levin. What is the Intelligence Community's
    assessment of whether or not 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta met
    with Ahmed al-Ani, an alleged Iraq intelligence officer in Iraq
    in April of 2001?
        What is your assessment?
        Director Tenet. Sir, I know you have a paper up here that
    outlines all that for you. It's a classified paper. My
    recollection is we can't prove that one way or another. Is that
    correct?
        Senator Levin. The Washington Post says that the CIA has
    always doubted that it took place. Is that correct?
        Director Tenet. We have not gathered enough evidence to
    conclude that it happened, sir. That's just where we are
    analytically in the----
        Senator Levin. It's not correct, then, that you doubt that
    it took place?
        Director Tenet. Sir, I don't know that it took place. I
    can't say that it did.
        Senator Levin. All right.
        Last November, the Weekly Standard published excerpts from
    an alleged classified document that was prepared under
    Secretary of Defense Feith's leadership. It was dated October
    27, 2003. This document was sent to the Senate Intelligence
    Committee. It alleged an operational relationship between Iraq
    and the al-Qa'ida terrorist organization. It's become quite a
    cause celebre.
        Did the Department of Defense consult with the CIA before
    sending that document to the Senate Intelligence Committee?
        Director Tenet. Can I just check, sir? I don't know myself.
        Senator Levin, I have to take it for the record. There's no
    precise knowledge sitting behind me at this point.
        Senator Levin. Relative to the uranium allegation, the
    allegation that Iraq was seeking uranium in Africa, you took
    personal responsibility for the error----
        Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
        Senator Levin [continuing]. In the State of the Union
    address----
        Director Tenet. I did.
        Senator Levin [continuing]. Even though you had apparently
    personally urged the NSC Deputy Director, Stephen Hadley, not
    to make that claim a few months earlier.
        And my question to you is this: A week before the State of
    the Union address, President Bush submitted an unclassified
    report to Congress on January 20, 2003. In that document, he
    said that Iraq had failed to explain its ``attempts to acquire
    uranium.'' So it's not just that that statement was made in the
    State of the Union message; it was made in a very visible
    public way in a report to Congress, which the President was
    required to file pursuant to the legislation authorizing him to
    proceed to war.
        My question to you is whether or not the CIA cleared that
    January 20 document.
        Director Tenet. Sir, I do not know and I'll take it for the
    record and get back to you.
        Senator Levin. Are you familiar with the document?
        Director Tenet. Personally, no.
        Senator Levin. Thank you. My time is up.
        Chairman Roberts. Senator Hagel.
        Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony and time this
    morning.
        Director Tenet, I want to refer in your testimony to the
    specific area that you addressed regarding economic development
    in Iraq. And if I may read from your testimony, you noted: ``By
    next year revenues from oil exports should cover the cost of
    basic government operations and contribute several billion
    dollars toward reconstruction. It is essential, however, that
    the Iraq-Turkey pipeline be reopened and oil facilities be well
    protected from insurgent sabotage.''
        My questions are these. First, this is a----
        Director Tenet. I'm sorry, sir. What page are you on? I
    apologize.
        Senator Hagel. I'm working off of page 10 on the draft.
    It's a draft. I don't know where it is in yours.
        Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
        Senator Hagel. My first question is, this is the first time
    I have seen in writing from any Administration officials
    reference to ``contributing several billion dollars toward
    reconstruction.'' The Foreign Relations Committee, other
    committees that I sit on and I'm aware of up here have not had
    the opportunity to explore that reconstruction possibility. In
    fact, we have been told that, most likely, the oil revenues
    would cover just operating costs. Now you're saying that it
    would add several billion dollars.
        I want to address that as well as that you rightly
    appropriately note that that's contingent upon the Iraq-Turkey
    pipeline reopening and the security of those facilities. If you
    could also address where we are on the reopening of the
    pipeline, what are we doing to address your very important and
    significant point that these oil revenues are absolutely
    contingent upon the two factors.
        Director Tenet. Sir, on the where we are on the pipeline,
    I'll just have to come back to you. I have an expert here who I
    know knows this and we did believe when we wrote this that it
    would have a contributing effect toward reconstruction. That's
    at least our analytical judgment. Now, if we're off by that,
    we'll come back but I don't think we have a different view.
        I can't take you much farther than what I've said, sir.
        Senator Hagel. Okay. Director Tenet that's fine and you'll
    provide then answers for the record on all the points.
        Also, I noted in your testimony on a couple of occasions,
    you referenced--I believe this is from your statement--
    ``managing Kurdish autonomy in a federal structure.'' I then
    assume that means that the accepted position of the
    Administration is that, in fact, Kurdistan is going to be an
    autonomous region.
        Director Tenet. Sir, actually, that's all being negotiated
    on the ground in terms of what those provisions are going to
    look like,how much decentralized authority and control the
    Kurds may or may not have. And at this moment, it is an issue, and I
    posit it as an issue, but Jerry Bremer and the people on the ground are
    working on this right now. So I just raise it as something that is out
    there that has to be dealt with and I don't know where the process will
    end.
        Senator Hagel. So, as far as you know, that decision has
    not been made that, in fact, Kurdistan will be an autonomous
    part of a federal system.
        Director Tenet. I think this is a product of very fluid
    discussions and negotiations on the ground. All I do is raise
    the issue and say this is something that has to be dealt with.
    And I can't really posit where they are today.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you.
        On Afghanistan, picking up on a question that Chairman
    Warner addressed, the doubling of opium production--which is
    not good news for any of us, doubling of opium production last
    year--what's your analysis of elections? And I would also be
    interested in Admiral Jacoby's answering this question as well.
        Director Tenet. Well, sir, the first thing I would say is
    that the loya jurga that was recently concluded was very
    successful by anybody's account. Karzai did extremely well.
    Fahim Khan, his Vice President, is backing him strongly. That's
    important from the Panjshiri concept, from that context, to
    make sure that there's unity between two communities of
    different stripes even if there's--I don't know--there's been
    some reporting that suggests there might be slippage in the
    election process because of mechanical issues.
        One of the other things that I say in my statement is while
    warlords are something that Karzai has to deal with, they
    appear disunited. He appears to have a good strategy to think
    about dealing with them.
        And as these PRT teams--these reconstruction teams that
    NATO gets in the country--starts to get out and extend the writ
    of the government through assistance, it's going to make this
    all better. So reconstruction--we have to keep our eye on the
    reconstruction ball and move it forward.
        Karzai appears to be the most popular man in the country,
    and we'll see. But what's come out of this loya jurga process
    is the most hope for this country in many, many years.
        Senator Hagel. I've gotten--and I do want to get your
    comments, Admiral Jacoby--but I've gotten as recently as two
    days ago assessments from people on the ground and officials
    who know about what's going on over there--very significant
    reports of intimidation, which I know you have factored into
    your thinking on this, especially with intelligence--and if you
    want to go deeper into that this afternoon----
        Director Tenet. If we're talking about Taliban-based
    intimidation----
        Senator Hagel. As well as other intimidation to hold people
    back.
        Director Tenet. The shift in strategy is away from set
    pieces in fighting us to going after NGOs, softer targets and
    suicide operations. So this is an issue that we have to deal
    with, because this is the most effective way for them to
    operate against us and thwart this change. Particularly in the
    southeastern provinces, the concern is that this kind of
    activity wedge its way up into Kabul. Now you're talking about
    singletons who can do things.
        So this is something we're very mindful of. This tension
    exists. There's no doubt about it. I don't want anybody walking
    out of here thinking Afghanistan is totally safe. It's in a
    heck of a lot better place than it was. But the Taliban
    remnants operating over the Pakistani border into Afghanistan,
    back and forth, is still an issue that we are dealing with
    quite hard.
        Senator Hagel. I even received reports regarding the north
    on this, as well.
        But, Admiral Jacoby, would you----
        Admiral Jacoby: I second what the DCI just said, that last
    part being the key part from our standpoint; the ability to
    establish that stability and keep the reconstruction efforts on
    track is absolutely the key from our standpoint.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Chairman Roberts. Senator Snowe.
        Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to welcome all of our witnesses here today.
        Director Tenet, you mentioned in your speech at Georgetown
    that the analysts never said there was an imminent threat with
    respect to Iraq. In the National Security Strategy that was
    issued back on September 17, 2002, the President outlined his
    strategy of preemption, and noted that, ``When the threat is
    imminent, the nation has the right to conduct preemptive
    operations.''
        Obviously, from the President to the Vice President to
    Secretary Powell and so on, words such as ``grave threat,'' ``a
    danger that is grave and growing,'' ``a serious and mounting
    threat,'' ``continuing threat''--if it wasn't an imminent
    threat in your mind, how would you have characterized or
    assessed the threat at that point in time?
        Director Tenet. I would have characterized it as something
    that was grave and gathering, something that we were quite
    worried about--quite worried about the nature of surprise.
        One of the second key judgments we've said in our National
    Intelligence Estimate is that we are very worried about what we
    don't know, not on the short side, but our concern was that,
    through deception and denial, there was much that we did not
    know.
        And given the history of deception and what the U.N. didn't
    find and his pattern of activity, our concern was that these
    programs--in fact, we state quite clearly in our estimate--
    these programs have gotten bigger, that he has chemical and
    biological weapons.
        So that the risk calculus, I think, that you carry forward
    to a policymaker who then has to think about all this is: Can I
    be surprised? I have been surprised previously. What do you
    want to do about it?
        Senator Snowe. And so you would agree with the
    characterizations that were made by the President, the Vice
    President, Secretary Powell, in that respect, but not with the
    National Security Strategy that was issued in September 17, the
    basis of preemption?
        Director Tenet. I've just characterized, Senator Snowe,
    characterized what I think and how I was thinking about this at
    the time. I haven't parsed everybody's words and I don't want
    to do that.
        Senator Snowe. Well, no, because you made a very explicit
    statement on that and obviously I think it sends, you know, a
    mixed message. I was going back and reviewing exactly who said
    what when and I think that is important for all of us to put it
    in context. And I notice that the National Security Strategy
    did include the basis for a preemptive action was an imminent
    threat. So we're talking about either parsing words, nuances,
    what's immediate as opposed to imminent.
        Director Tenet. Or where are you going to be surprised and
    how soon are you going to know, and when you're surprised, are
    your options limited for what you may want to do about it?
        And that's always, I think--I don't want to go over into
    the policymaker's venue here, but I think from our perspective
    one of the things we have always worried about--and the history
    matters here. Surprised in 1991 about a nuclear weapon,
    consistently surprised about what he didn't--well, not
    surprised, but fully knowledgeable about things that he never,
    as UNSCOM left in 1998, fully documenting things they could not
    document.
        And then we had things like procurement activities that
    caused us concern that were clearly intended to deceive and
    deny, reconstruction of dual-use facilities that caused us
    concerns, and we'll talkabout this next week when we talk about
    it in closed session, but there were clear evolutions based on things
    that people were quite worried about, notwithstanding the fact it
    wasn't all perfect and we always obviously know we're looking at the
    tradecraft now, but there's a historical context here of how we've
    thought about this fellow that goes back eight or nine years and that's
    the context we tried to bring to it.
        Senator Snowe. Now, I understand that. But in terms of
    policymakers, that makes it extraordinarily difficult. When you
    start nuancing words--and you were right in saying, you know,
    intelligence is an inexact science; I think we all agree with
    that. Therefore, calibrating the threat in the types of words
    that are used become ever more important under that scenario.
        Director Tenet. Yes, ma'am, but I will also say that, you
    know, whether it stands up or it doesn't stand up over the
    course of time is something we're going to look at quite
    carefully.
        When you look at the key judgments and what we said, we
    said he had chemical and biological weapons. We said that with
    high confidence. We talked about mobile production facilities.
    We ascribed confidence levels. But we said things quite
    assertively in our key judgments that caused the policymaker to
    have and look at this thing in a way that he or she had to
    assess risk.
        Those are just the facts as we know them today. We can go
    back and, of course, we will and look at all of this work. And
    make judgments about did we word everything carefully, did we
    have the right context and everything. That's appropriate. We
    need to go do that as professionals.
        But that's the context.
        Senator Snowe. I'm just wondering then, would you think
    that we then took this action on Iraq on a lesser standard than
    imminent?
        Director Tenet. Well, I don't want to go back--see, now
    we're into a realm of what all the policymakers were thinking
    about this. And I don't want to go back and parse their words.
    But I think what we looked at--for example, there was a
    question raised with me when we talked about this once before
    where the question was raised: Isn't Kim Jong Il a more
    immediate threat than Saddam Hussein is? And my answer at the
    time was Kim Jong Il's progress in the developing of these
    weapons have left us with little option to deal with him in a
    very complicated environment.
        If you go back and look--for example, let's just look at
    where we are today, for purposes of the argument. If you go
    back and look at--just look at, I know to date we didn't find
    chemical and biological weapons. Look at the ballistic missile
    program and in fact we were dead on in terms of where that was
    going.
        So let's posit for example that, as David Kay did in his
    interim report, that if he had seed stocks, he could quickly
    surge to produce biological weapons with a ballistic missile.
        Now, what do you do about that? Do you do something about
    it now or do you wait for it to get more difficult? And that's
    the conundrum we faced our policymakers with.
        They made a choice. We're looking, obviously care a great
    deal about how right and how wrong we were. I've said it's
    either going to be all right or all wrong. And we've never been
    on the ground like this before to figure it out,
    notwithstanding the fact that we're going to find places, to be
    sure, where we could have done a better job in our own
    tradecraft in assessing some of this. But that's the real
    conundrum people were left with.
        Senator Snowe. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Roberts. Senator Chambliss?
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Director Tenet, there's a media story out this morning
    that's generated a lot of emotion in folks and it's the one----
        Director Tenet. On my part, too, Senator.
        Senator Chambliss [continuing]. One relative to a name that
    was supposedly provided to the CIA by the Germans on one of the
    individuals who I believe flew into the south tower.
        Director Tenet. Sir, what I'd like to do in open session is
    say to you, first, go back to page 186 of the Joint
    Intelligence Committee Open Study and then go back and look at
    your classified report, what you did with the House
    Intelligence Committee and the JIC inquiry--go back and look at
    page 186, and then go look at the classified piece of paper in
    your classified report.
        And then what I will tell you is, in 1999, the Germans gave
    us a name, Marwan--that's it--and a phone number. And we didn't
    sit on our hands and I'm not going to go through the rest of it
    in open session. They didn't give us a first and a last name
    until after 9/11, with then additional data. And let me just
    leave it there.
        But I would urge you go back and look at your unclassified
    and classified report, because that's as far as I want to go
    here.
        Senator Chambliss. Well, you've confirmed what my sources
    have indicated to me, and that is that this was really
    piecemeal, kind of, information that was given to us. Prior to
    9/11, we did not have, as this media report indicates, the name
    of an individual and the telephone number of an individual and
    asked by the Germans to follow that individual. Is that a fair
    statement?
        Director Tenet. Sir, sir, I'm going to be careful in open
    session.
        You got a name, named Joe, and here's the phone number--
    Joe's phone number, no last name. And we did some things to go
    find out some things, okay. We can give this all to you, okay.
    We never conclusively got there because we didn't have enough,
    but we didn't sit around.
        But I would urge you to go look at your classified page on
    this. Take a look at it. That's all I want to say in open
    session.
        Senator Chambliss. Director Mueller, I was pleased to hear
    you talk about your Office of Intelligence that you've created.
    And with reference to that, you talked about the increase in
    translators that you have and the increase in analysts. Now,
    have you moved those people in there? Do you feel comfortable
    with where you are from a resource standpoint with regard to
    operating this Office of Intelligence from a intelligence
    gathering, translating and analyzing standpoint from a real-
    time perspective?
        Director Mueller. Let me say the '04 budget, once it was
    passed, gave us substantial additional resources that we are
    bringing on board this year. We made some requests also in the
    '05 budget. It is an ongoing process.
        I wouldn't say we're where we want to be at this point, but
    we've made substantial strides. And the monies accorded to us
    by Congress and the Administration will, by the end of this
    year, give us the cadre of analysts that will bring us a great
    deal closer to our goal.
        Senator Chambliss. And as you and Director Tenet and
    Admiral Jacoby know, I have been very focused on this issue of
    information sharing. And with relevance to this Office of
    Intelligence, what is your relationship with CIA and DIA as
    well as NSA relative to sharing of that information back and
    forth with that office?
        Director Mueller. There was one part of the previous
    question I didn't answer and that was with regard to linguists.
    There are certain dialects we still have problems with, but we
    have doubled, if not tripled, our linguists in a number of the
    Middle Eastern languages. So we're on the way to success there.
        In terms of information sharing, the Office of
    Intelligence, under Maureen Baginski, is an element of it. But
    the information sharing is at all levels of our organization. I
    get briefed at 7:15 in the morning. I get a briefing at 5
    o'clock. And at those briefings, I have individuals from the
    CIA, DHS, sitting in in my briefings. I have an FBI senior
    supervisorsitting in at George's meetings.
        We have had over the last couple of years what the 9/11
    commission has called ``transnational intelligence
    operations.'' That is where we have operations that may have
    come to the attention of the Agency overseas which have
    tendrils within the United States. And we have put together
    teams to address them and done it exceptionally successfully.
        The exchange of information from the top down to the ranks
    between our two organizations is far better than it was before
    September 11, and is truly remarkable.
        The advent of the TTIC, the Terrorist Threat Integration
    Center, and some other mechanisms that allow our analysts to
    sit together and share information from our various databases
    has also contributed to that sharing of information.
        I'm not certain--I can say we're not where we ultimately
    want to be. There are things that we are still doing, in terms
    of communications with other agencies, communications with
    state and local, but we've made substantial strides.
        And I might let George add to that from his perspective, if
    you give me that opportunity.
        Director Tenet. I think that the power of the integration,
    Senator Chambliss, particularly in TTIC, where now you're going
    to have 14 databases--there are FBI criminal files, there are
    CIA operational traffic, in addition to data from all other
    places--coming together in one place for purposes of doing
    threat analysis is an unprecedented development.
        Now, to be sure, we have a long way to go to achieve
    everything we want to achieve, but from where we were in
    setting up this organization to where we are today, and then
    when you look at what we're doing across the community,
    particularly with FBI and the Intelligence Community, I think,
    you know, Senator Rockefeller asked the question, ``Are we
    safer today?'' Yes, we are, in this regard, because of the
    advances that we've made. You know, you can't protect against
    everything but we're in much better shape than we've ever been.
        Senator Chambliss. Are those computers talking to each
    other as well as people talking to each other?
        Director Mueller. There are communications systems that are
    talking to each other, yes.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Roberts. Senator Feinstein.
        Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Tenet, I'm going to follow up on what Senator Snowe
    began. Of the key judgments in the unclassified version of the
    NIE, I want to read three and then I want to ask you what your
    judgment is today about these three.
        The first is that ``Baghdad has chemical and biological
    weapons.'' That's right at the top. The second is, ``Baghdad
    has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents,
    probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin and VX.'' And the
    third is, ``All key aspects--R&D, production and
    weaponization--of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and
    most elements are larger and more advanced than they were
    before the Gulf War.''
        What is your view of these judgments today?
        Director Tenet. Yes, ma'am. I want to go back to what I
    said at Georgetown because I did give provisional judgments in
    that speech on each of these.
        Senator Feinstein. No, I'm asking for your view--the
    Intelligence Community's view today. Are these in the hands of
    someone else? Were they nonexistent then? Are they hidden? What
    is your best judgment today?
        Director Tenet. Well, I have to tell you I don't want to
    guess, but I think that we are still looking with ISG on the
    ground.
        Let me give you an example. When David Kay first came back,
    he came back and told us about clandestine BW research
    facilities, controlled by the Iraqi Intelligence Service, that
    we didn't know anything about. Now the question for us is: What
    does that mean? Are there production facilities that the IIS
    controlled? And the truth is, we're still working through
    people and documents. And at this point, I tried, in the speech
    I gave, to convey where I thought we were.
        But what we will do when Charlie Duelfer raises his hand
    and says that's about as much as we can do, we have to write
    another National Intelligence Estimate that will take all of
    this data on board, inform them about what we found and ask our
    analysts to say, what would you say today on the basis of all
    the data that you have at your disposal?
        We have not yet said take the initial October 30 report--or
    whenever he was here--and said rack and stack these against
    your judgments--what would this have done if you'd known about
    all of these BW finds; what would this have done to your
    judgments at the time? We simply haven't done that yet.
        Senator Feinstein. Well, I'm one for whom this is very
    difficult, because there are very positive judgments made in
    this report and we all know what the result has been. And, you
    know, people voted to authorize use of force based on what we
    read in these reports.
        And I think when we send our military out and find nothing
    and then Dr. Kay goes over and finds nothing, for the
    Intelligence Community, I guess you believe something's going
    to materialize. In terms of weaponization and deployment and
    then finding nothing, it's a pretty bitter pill to swallow with
    respect to the value of intelligence, particularly in a
    preemptive war.
        Director Tenet. Well, Senator Feinstein, we're going to
    talk about this more next week. I'm now looking at all of this,
    as you are looking at all of this. As a professional, I care
    about whether we're right or wrong, how we did our tradecraft,
    what we believe.
        Analysts sat down, and the three individuals, primarily our
    National Intelligence Officer, who wrote this have been doing
    this for a very long time. They believe what they wrote. They
    didn't do it cavalierly, and they didn't do it frivolously and
    they believe they had a connective logic and a tissue to get
    them to their judgments.
        So I believe you have to keep working and looking. I
    believe you have to know whether this material may have slipped
    over a border or fallen into somebody's hands or may be used by
    insurgents against us at some point. We have a responsibility
    to keep doing this. And we really didn't take charge of this
    until July. We're spending a lot of money, and we've got a lot
    of people doing it. But from a professional perspective, we
    darn well better know, one way or another, and be damn honest
    about it at the end of the day because we have that
    responsibility. And that's how we feel about it.
        Senator Feinstein. Thank you. I'd like to continue that
    this afternoon.
        Director Mueller, good morning.
        Director Mueller. Good morning.
        Senator Feinstein. The PATRIOT Act gave your agency new
    authorities, both as a law enforcement agency and an
    intelligence agency. I'd like you, just briefly, to outline how
    you're using these authorities, particularly those which help
    you work as part of the Intelligence Community, such as
    information sharing, and if you could identify any gaps that
    remain that need strengthening.
        Director Mueller. Let me start with the principal benefit
    of the PATRIOT Act to our efforts to protect against another 9/
    11 has been the breaking down of walls between the Intelligence
    Community and the law enforcement community.
        Not all of the breaking down of those walls is attributable
    to the PATRIOT Act. Some of it is attributable to the decisions
    of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court. Now, prior
    to September 11, the exchange of information between the
    Intelligence Community and thelaw enforcement community was
    inhibited by statutes and by court rulings and the like. The PATRIOT
    Act has broken down those walls. Now, the law enforcement community can
    share intelligence with the Intelligence Community. Since 9/11 and
    thanks in part to the PATRIOT Act, the Intelligence Community can share
    intelligence with the law enforcement community.
        Our biggest threat in the United States is, as Mr. Tenet
    pointed out, from groups from overseas who plot overseas, who
    plan overseas, who finance from overseas and then send
    operatives into the United States to carry out an attack.
        In order to be successful against these groups, we have to
    share the information. We have to share the information from
    whence it may come, and whether it comes from the intelligence
    side from the Agency or DIA, and be able to have the
    decisionmakers, the policymakers have in front of them the
    information from the Intelligence Community, as well as that
    which we may have developed in the law enforcement community in
    the United States. And the PATRIOT Act has assisted us in doing
    that and has made us safer.
        There are other relatively minor provisions of the PATRIOT
    Act that we can discuss at a later date, but that is the
    principal benefit of the PATRIOT Act.
        There are certain other issues that were not addressed in
    the PATRIOT Act. We have the lone terrorist, not affiliated
    necessarily with a foreign government or a foreign
    organization, that remains a threat and which we need some
    legislation on. That legislation is pending. But that is
    basically an overall view of the PATRIOT Act and I think one of
    the principal pieces of legislation that we are seeking.
        There is one other area, I will tell you, that has been
    discussed. And that is the issue of subpoenas and our ability
    to get information swiftly in a terrorist investigation. Now,
    quite often we are compelled to use national security letters,
    which are letters that we give to a telephone company, a credit
    card company, where we need information relating to a terrorist
    investigation.
        And these national security letters have nothing behind
    them. There is no judicial process. And all too often we find
    that there are companies that just say, we'll get to it when we
    want to get to it. It's down at the bottom of the line. And our
    concern is often this information, whether it be a telephone
    toll or financial information or credit card information, is
    too important to have under that scenario.
        So one of the things that is being addressed is our request
    for administrative subpoena authority, which we currently have
    when it comes to addressing narcotics traffickers, for
    instance. And so the argument is if we have that authority for
    narcotics cases--drug cases--doesn't it make some sense to have
    comparable authority when it comes to terrorist cases.
        Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much. My time is up.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Roberts. Senator Durbin.
        Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank
    the witnesses for appearing today and for your service to our
    country.
        Director Tenet, it is rare when speculation comes face to
    face with facts, but that's what has happened in Iraq. The
    speculation and supposition that led up to our invasion now
    must face the certainties and near certainties that we have
    uncovered after spending ten months or more on the ground in
    Iraq.
        In the words of Dr. Kay, ``It turns out we were all
    wrong,'' wrong, I might say, in looking in retrospect, about
    the nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, their
    numbers, their location, their threat. It is now declassified.
    I mean, we're as specific as saying: Here are the most likely
    sites you will find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. And
    Dr. Kay has said there was nothing there.
        We were wrong about the al-Qa'ida connection, which was
    alleged before our invasion of Iraq. We were wrong in
    speculating about the Iraqi reaction to our invasion, the
    flowers in the gun muzzles and things that just didn't happen.
    We were wrong about the nature, the complexity, the timetable
    and the cost about rebuilding Iraq.
        There are only two possible conclusions that I think we can
    reach. And if you have a third, please let me know. One is our
    intelligence operations failed in a historic way in accurately
    assessing the threat in Iraq and what would happen after we
    deposed Saddam Hussein or, secondly, that our political leaders
    misled the American people in the build-up to the war. That is
    a very grave assertion, particularly in a democracy.
        If the government misleads the governed in something as
    basic and grave as war and the sacrifice of American life,
    there can be no more serious charge made in a democracy.
        Now I've read your Georgetown speech. And I've tried to
    compare it and to figure out which side we come down on here,
    whether or not those who assert that intelligence failed that
    led to these wrong conclusions or those assert that
    intelligence didn't fail, the politicians just misstated what
    we told them. Let me go to two specifics. You say on page six
    of your Georgetown speech, basically, we didn't find chemical
    or biological weapons.
        Director Tenet. Yes.
        Senator Durbin. All right, I'll give you that. We've gone
    to the identified locations, we found nothing, we've come up
    empty. On September 19, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld told the
    Senate Armed Services Committee, ``We should be just as
    concerned about the immediate threat from biological weapons;
    Iraq has these weapons.'' Now, that directly contradicts what
    you said at Georgetown. You said that we haven't found these
    weapons, we don't have these weapons. Secretary Rumsfeld said
    that Iraq has these weapons. And then you said in the
    Georgetown speech: The Intelligence Community ``never said
    there was an imminent threat.''
        September 28, 2002, President Bush, in his radio address,
    ``The danger to our country is grave and it is growing. The
    Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons, is
    rebuilding the facilities to make more and, according to the
    British government, could launch a biological or chemical
    attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order is given.''
        We can't have it both ways. If you were accurate in the
    information you gave to this government, then how in the world
    can we justify these quotes from the highest elected officials
    in our land before this war?
        Director Tenet. Senator, you've raised a bunch of issues
    and I'd like to----
        Senator Durbin. Please.
        Director Tenet [continuing]. Try and walk through some of
    them with you. First of all, I've now worked in two
    Administrations: Democrat and Republican. I've looked at
    statements about Iraq going back 10 years, so I'm not going to
    go to people's statements. I'm going to focus on the
    intelligence and what we said and what we didn't say and how we
    believed it.
        First of all, I would say to you is it's true at my
    Georgetown speech, if you go back and look at Dr. Kay's interim
    report, he said we haven't found weapons. Obviously, I said we
    haven't found weapons. Obviously we said we judged that he has
    chemical and biological weapons. We also said very clearly in
    the National Intelligence Estimate that in the BW arena it's
    bigger than it was during the Gulf War. I also argued for
    patience. I also argued that it is incumbent upon us to work
    through this to find out whether we were all right and all
    wrong, because we know on the missile side that we were
    generally right on the mark. We did better against the UAV
    programs. We know that he maintained clandestine BW research
    facilities.
        If you go back and read David Kay's interim report, the
    punch line of course was: We haven't found weapons. And after
    being in Baghdad last week and talking to the men and women of
    ISG, they continue to have leads, they continue to have people
    come to them. And for the purpose of understanding as
    professionals whether we were right or wrong, and how we did
    this, we need to find out.
        Senator Durbin. May I ask you this question: If we are
    going to subscribe to a policy of preemption, then we have to
    prepare ourselves to invade countries before it is clear that
    they're an imminent threat. And the only way you reach that
    conclusion is from intelligence. Now we look at the body of
    information gathered by our intelligence agencies leading up to
    the invasion of Iraq, and with hindsight we say we missed the
    mark.
        How can you build a policy of preemption on intelligence if
    we were so wrong in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq? We
    will all concede Saddam Hussein is a bad man, and I'm glad he's
    out of power. But many more arguments were made to the American
    people to justify this invasion. And it turns out that the bulk
    of them were just plain wrong--either bad intelligence or
    misleading the people.
        How can we fight a war on terrorism or have a policy of
    preemption based on what we have just lived through in Iraq?
        Director Tenet. Well, sir, you're fighting a war on
    terrorism very successfully because of intelligence. You got a
    country called Libya to disarm because of intelligence. You got
    A.Q. Khan, who I said last year in my public testimony was the
    biggest purveyor of nuclear weapons that we had to worry
    about--although I didn't name him--and we've dismantled that
    network because of intelligence.
        We understand that the North Koreans were pursuing an
    alternative route to an nuclear weapon using highly enriched
    uranium because of intelligence.
        Now, we're not perfect, but we're pretty damn good at what
    we do. And we care as much as you do about Iraq and whether we
    were right or wrong. And we're going to work through it in a
    way where we tell the truth as to whether we were right or
    wrong.
        But at the end of the day, we followed this for eight,
    nine, 10 years. We had deep concerns about the history, the
    deceit, what he didn't give the U.N. And, as I said in my
    Georgetown speech, we worked hard after 1998 to resuscitate
    sources, and the record was mixed, and we made judgments on a
    narrower band of data. This is a tough business.
        Senator Durbin. Mr. Tenet, I'm out of time, here. And I'll
    just say this: At some point, we have to reconcile the things
    that you've said and the things that were said publicly by the
    Administration. And where they are in conflict, someone has to
    be held accountable. And I don't know if it'll be done today;
    not likely. I don't know if it'll be done by this Committee; I
    hope so. But at some day, in this open form of government, we
    have to reconcile this clear conflict.
        Chairman Roberts. Has the gentleman finished?
        Let's see. I can assure the gentleman, as the Chairman of
    this Committee, that we will continue the thorough job that we
    have done and that as soon as we can work with the intelligence
    agencies in regard to issuing a public report, we will do so.
    And that commitment has been ongoing from the first.
        I'm also interested in the various quotes by Members of
    Congress a year ago, 18 months ago, two years ago, in the
    previous administration, many of which were more declarative,
    more aggressive and more specific than what the Directors
    indicated or anybody in the Administration.
        So this is a widespread or this is a wide net out here, in
    regards to the so-called use of intelligence. That will all be
    dealt with, and it will all be made public. I'd like to yield
    now to the distinguished Vice Chairman for any additional
    questions he might have.
        Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have
    two.
        And I apologize, but this is important to me. I started out
    my statement today just simply by saying that I'm wrestling,
    trying to decide whether the world is safer today than it was
    when we met a year ago.
        Director Tenet, you said that cross-information,
    information-sharing is a lot better. Of course, that's one
    piece. That is not a complicated question. You, all three, deal
    in different ways with that matter every day. It's either, I
    think, a yes or it's a no, not for the purposes of securing an
    answer from you but for the purposes of, as a nation, facing up
    to the truth and what, therefore, how therefore, we're able to
    lead our people and influence our people into doing what is
    going to be necessary to do to make sure that we are safer in
    the event that we are not.
        So my first question is, I would repeat the question: Are
    we safer today in this country than we were when we met a year
    ago? I'd ask all three of you, briefly. I think it's a one-word
    answer.
        Director Tenet. Yes. I'll start with yes.
        Director Mueller. Yes.
        Admiral Jacoby. Yes, sir.
        Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Okay. Director Tenet, have you
    read Admiral Jacoby's testimony?
        Director Tenet. I have not had a chance.
        Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Okay. In it, he says, ``Support
    for America has dropped in most of the Muslim world. Favorable
    ratings in Morocco,''--this won't go on long--``favorable
    ratings in Morocco declined from 77 percent in 2000 to 27
    percent in the spring; and in Jordan, from 25 percent in 2002,
    to 1 percent in May of 2003. In Saudi, expressing confidence in
    the United States, they dropped from 63 percent in May of 2002,
    to 11 percent in October of 2003.''
        Now, you have just answered that the world is a safer
    place, all three of you, and with one word. Would you agree
    that there is some conflict that we need to be thinking about
    seriously in a bipartisan fashion, professionally, as people
    who deal with intelligence and care about and love our country,
    with the fact that these enormous declines of support give hint
    to the creation, as two of you have put in your testimony, the
    creation of a world of increased jihadist activity.
        And, as you indicated, Director Tenet, at the end of your
    testimony you addressed this whole question of poverty and all
    that. You did it very well, as you always do, Admiral. And the
    whole question of more fertile breeding grounds for radical
    political Islam is very much on us.
        Now, these are impacts which don't necessarily change your
    answers because they have not all yet happened. But if they are
    in the process of happening--people are becoming radicalized,
    want to kill Americans more, wherever that might be, or those
    who support Americans--how does that differentiate or separate
    itself from a world being more safe?
        Director Tenet. The way you differentiate it, Senator, is,
    for example, let's pick a place like Morocco. See, part of this
    is what people think of us, and part of this is what people are
    doing inside their own governments to reform their governments.
    Look at a place like Morocco, where they're committed to
    greater economic reform, opening the society to women. You look
    at a place like Jordan in terms of recently signing a free
    trade agreement, the kind of educational and economic
    opportunities the King is trying to bring to the country.
        So all of this, yes, we are outlining for you this movement
    that I'm talking about that you have to go conquer, half of
    this--or defeat--or bring people from alienation to believe
    that the society that they live in offers them educational
    opportunities and a way out and, therefore, not make them
    recruitable. But it's the process of reforming some of these
    societies, their movement to change their own internal dynamic.
        I mean, what's interesting in the Middle East is we are
    sometimes--polling data's interesting--but we are sometimes
    themanifestation of their feelings about their own society and their
    own government and the fact that there is governments who are aligned
    with us.
        So there's an equal push on our part to look at all these
    people and say, you've got to get on with the process of
    reform. You've got to get on with the process of economic
    opportunity. And this is a dynamic process.
        And somehow, there isn't an American who's going to counter
    a Salafist message worth anything. Somehow people also within
    those societies are going to have to counter those messages
    clerically and with their acts and their deeds, because what
    we're doing in the war on terrorism is quite tactical.
        We know how to run them down. We know how to build better
    mousetraps. We know how to bring things together. We're just
    chasing many people all the time. And we're doing it better and
    better all the time.
        But the back-end strategic help for us is not solely--
    certainly not an intelligence issue, but something that we warn
    and talk to you about in our papers, to get people to
    understand that somebody has to get at the business of
    attacking this phenomenon.
        Vice Chairman Rockefeller. And I would agree with that. I
    would also suggest that for every two or three or four or five
    countries that you can name, I can name about 20 where things
    are going in precisely the opposite direction.
        Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
        Vice Chairman Rockefeller. And I'm raising this question
    not to try to score points, to put you on the point, but to say
    we have to be honest with ourselves as professionals who deal
    in this field in that we know that these--in Saudi Arabia, good
    luck. They're making some changes. How long?
        Indonesia--you just go around the world. And we are
    deceiving our people if we don't let them know how tough a
    fight this is going to be. And I think that is what I wanted to
    hear from you. And I think that you've done it in conventional
    ways, but not in ways that----
        Director Tenet. Well, sir, I think in my statement, I mean,
    I apologize here. I didn't mean to interrupt you. But I think
    in my statement when I tried to give you the sense, because
    we're talking to the American people here, I know it's great
    that we've done great work against the central al-Qa'ida
    leadership, but there's a very important concept. We are still
    at war against a movement that we're going to have to get
    after.
        And just because we've been successful at preempting and
    stopping an enormous amount of loss of life here and around the
    world, there's still an enormous amount of sacrifice required
    if we're going to stay at this. People who say that this is
    exaggerated don't look at the same world that I look at. And
    there's going to be an enormous amount of continued focus and
    attention required on this issue. It's not going away any time
    soon.
        Admiral Jacoby. Senator, if I could, that was exactly the
    reason that I put it in my testimony. This is about the
    potential, it's about the long-term, it's about the kinds of
    things that we need to, as an Intelligence Community, put our
    attention and resources and skill mix against because I think
    you asked the question over the last year. What I'm trying to
    lay out in the testimony is the environment that exists and the
    activity by nation states and other movements to deal with this
    issue. And we're in this for the long haul. And it's a major
    issue, sir.
        Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Roberts. Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a
    couple of questions also.
        Director Tenet, I want to go back to Senator Durbin's
    point, because I think it is a valid point and it's certainly
    been the object of where most of the criticism with reference
    to Iraq has been directed.
        Now, after the Gulf War in '92, we know that he possessed
    weapons of mass destruction. We knew at that point in time that
    he had used those weapons of mass destruction. We have
    interrogated individuals, we've made the searches throughout
    Iraq, and we have not found either evidence of destruction or
    disposal of the weapons that we knew he had following the Gulf
    War, nor have we found evidence of possession of weapons of
    mass destruction that may have been manufactured in the
    interim, 10-year, 12-year period, whatever.
        Now, with your experience in the Intelligence Community,
    can you draw any conclusions from those two relative to what
    may have happened to either the original weapons that he
    possessed or weapons that may have been manufactured subsequent
    to the Gulf War?
        Director Tenet. Sir, look, there are three or four things
    we have to--one, when you're talking about the kind of
    magnitude of things you're looking it, you're looking at things
    where you're talking about particularly BW capability; it fits
    in people's garages. So we're not looking at big bulk things
    that you're going to find quite easily.
        Did some of the stuff go over borders? I don't know. Some
    people have posited that it went here or went there. I don't
    know the answer to that question.
        Am I surprised that, for example, given the fact that we
    warned our military to be prepared to deal with chemical
    weapons, that we haven't found chemical weapons, yes, I am
    surprised, because we certainly believed that he would use
    those weapons if the regime was at risk. That's what we
    posited--regime risk and the warning to our military. You know,
    this is a great mystery to me.
        And one of the things we have to do quite professionally is
    look at this and try to figure out what happened here. And
    we'll find out. We may have come to different judgments. All
    I'm saying is, this Intelligence Community and the people that
    did this work didn't have any outcome in mind. They did it
    honestly. This is what they believed. And you're going to look
    through it, and we're going to look through it. And we're going
    to find things that--we're going to find warts. For sure, we're
    going to find things that we think could have been done better.
        At the end of the day, we're going to have to ask ourselves
    the question of do you think they made reasonable judgments,
    and do you think they could have come to different conclusions?
    And we need a little bit of time and patience to figure all
    that out.
        I wish I could tell you I knew the answer to your question.
    I don't.
        Senator Chambliss. Is that part of what the investigative
    team that's still within Iraq is looking for?
        Director Tenet. Yes, sir.
        Senator Chambliss. You're going to wish you'd never given
    that speech in Georgetown by the time we finish dissecting it.
    [Laughter.]
        But in that speech you made the quote on an issue that we
    have talked about over and over again. And that is, you said
    that we did not have enough of our own human intelligence. We
    had difficulty penetrating the Iraqi regime with human sources.
        Now, we've talked about this in private sessions, but what
    can you tell us today for the American public to be able to
    understand were the difficulties, number one, in penetrating
    the Iraqi regime and what efforts did you make to penetrate
    that regime?
        Director Tenet. Well, sir, after 1998 when we lost the
    U.N., we obviously realized that because of our intimacy and
    involvement with the U.N.--which has since been blown in public
    and everybody knows it--when we were on the ground, we
    recognized that we had to reconstitute our own unilateral
    capability. It's an effort that Charlie Allen, who you know,
    launched on my behalf as the Associate Deputy Director of
    Central Intelligence.
        And here's the bottom line on the HUMINT side. Yes, we
    recruited a number of people that are all on the periphery. His
    scientists and the people that you cared about never came out.
    We never got access to them in a way that would have been
    beneficial. And essentially, we didn't have our own, kind of,
    unilateral access that we would have all liked--not because of
    a lack of effort, but because of how he ran this target, how
    closely he controlled this society.
        But at the end of the day, my judgment was we didn't have
    enough of our own. So let's not make any excuses and get on
    with it. And we had other HUMINT and we had liaison reporting
    and we had defector reporting, all of which is--some of which
    was very interesting and compelling to us. As much as we used
    that kind of data in terrorism or other issues, we don't
    dismiss people; we vetted it. Some of it, we're finding today,
    there were discrepancies, and such is the nature of this
    business.
        Go look at what happened in the pre-war run-up and take a
    look at the quality of HUMINT and support to the military. You
    know, this is excellent across the board. And General Franks
    would say so and General Abizaid would say so. Different
    environment, different tactics, different strategy, and that's
    where we are, sir.
        And you know, as I know, when I said in the speech we're
    rebuilding our HUMINT capability, it by no means means that
    we're there yet. I mean, we went through, as I said--you know,
    when I first became Deputy Director, there were 12 people being
    trained. Nobody looked at recruiting. Nobody looked at the
    infrastructure. Nobody much cared about it, as near as I can
    tell.
        And we've come all the way back to put ourselves in a very
    healthy situation that we're going to need another five years
    of creativity and support to really get the country back to
    where it needs to be. There's no simple shortcut here.
        Senator Chambliss. And what date in time was that when you
    became Assistant Director?
        Director Tenet. 1995, I think, sir--1996, some time. It's
    been so long.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Roberts. Senator Durbin.
        Senator Durbin. Thank you.
        I'd like to ask both Director Mueller and Director Tenet
    about a concern I have. And that is that we have as our goal
    the integration of various agencies and cooperation of these
    agencies. In fact, we created the Department of Homeland
    Security in an effort to integrate and coordinate at a higher
    level. And now, in his January State of the Union address, the
    President announced the establishment of the Terrorist Threat
    Integration Center to coordinate threat information among FBI,
    CIA, and Department of Homeland Security, merge, and analyze
    information collected domestically and abroad.
        In September of 2003, the President issued a directive
    creating the Terrorist Screening Center, which has a mandate to
    develop and maintain, to the extent permitted by law, the most
    accurate and current information possible about individuals
    known or suspected of being involved in terrorism.
        The Terrorist Threat Integration Center is in the CIA. The
    Terrorist Screening Center is out of the FBI.
        And I asked Director Ridge the other day, Secretary Ridge,
    did you lose the battle at the table? Weren't you supposed to
    be the coordinating group? When they gave out stove pipes, did
    you lose? Were you gone that day? Tell me, how are you working
    to coordinate what apparently, or to most people on the
    outside, you'd think would all be together in one place that is
    now in separate agencies?
        Director Mueller. Well, let me start if I could, and make
    an initial distinction between collection and the analysis
    function. There are people that say one big integrated agency
    is what we want. With integration, you therefore will have the
    pulling together of all these dots that everybody's looking
    for. But when it comes to collection within the United States,
    traditionally and for very good reasons, the FBI has been a
    collector. When it's overseas, it has been the CIA.
        When you take a subject matter such as terrorism, which
    requires the bringing together of the information that has been
    collected by the CIA and collected by the FBI, because it's a
    transnational intelligence challenge, there has to be a
    mechanism both on the operational side as well as on the
    analytical side to pull it together.
        And what the Terrorist Threat Integration Center does, on
    the analytical side, is take the information from both of our
    agencies and analyze it, not collect but analyze it with access
    to all of our databases so that you can do a search.
        Currently, within the various databases by the persons we
    have assigned from the various agencies, including the
    Department of Homeland Security, if you've got a subject, you
    want to do an analytical product, you want to analyze a threat,
    you have access to all the intelligence information that has
    been gathered by the various agencies.
        When it comes to the other agency that you mentioned, the
    Terrorist Screening Center, the purpose of the screening center
    was two-fold. First of all, it is to take the various lists
    that were in a variety of different components and assure that
    you have a list that has names on it that have been vetted with
    properly being on that list, because things happen if you are
    on that list. And so it's a put-together list of those that
    have an association with terrorism.
        But the second part of it also is when somebody comes in
    through the border or somebody comes to our attention, there
    has to be follow-up on it. In the United States, it is the
    joint terrorism task forces that are responsible for doing the
    follow-up on a person who is on that list.
        Senator Durbin. That suggests what we hope will be
    achieved; and that is the coordination of different agencies
    and the coordination of this information.
        Now, Director Mueller, your inspector general's audit at
    the end of December was troubling--and I'm sure you read it--
    when he talked about what he found at the FBI. He said the
    FBI's efforts--and this is on the FBI's efforts to improve
    sharing of intelligence and information--and he stated, ``The
    process for disseminating intelligence was ad hoc and
    communicated orally from manager to staff. One CIA detailee
    characterized the informal process as disorganized, noting that
    information does not flow smoothly within the FBI, let alone
    externally. In the eight months the CIA detailee had been at
    the FBI, the detailee said, `Information goes into a black hole
    when it comes into this building.' ''
        Director Mueller. Well, a couple of things about that.
    Senator, I'd like to go back. Number one, it was done some time
    ago, and we've made tremendous changes since then.
        Senator Durbin. This is a report of December 2003.
        Director Mueller. I know, but the work that went into that
    report was done some time ago.
        But I think that is perhaps--and I'd like to go and look at
    the report because I don't have it in front of me. But I don't
    think that is an accurate description of where we are. We are
    not where we want to be, but we are well on the way there in
    terms of integrating intelligence and information within the
    FBI, as well as in our efforts to disseminate it throughout the
    Intelligence Community.
        We did not have, prior to September 11, something called a
    reports officer. We have put out, since September 11, to the
    Intelligence Community in excess, I think, of 2,000 reports
    now. They're not only reports that go out throughout the
    Intelligence Community, but also reports that are used
    internally within the FBI.
        I would take exception to that portion of the report that
    you have read. I think we've made tremendous strides. As I've
    indicated before in answer to previous questions, we have the
    Office of Intelligence. I have Maureen Baginski, who has come
    over from the NSA, as the headof the Office of Intelligence to
    make certain that we increase our ability to share the information
    within the FBI, but also without or outside the FBI.
        I don't think that is a fair characterization.
        Senator Durbin. Would you be kind enough to respond, then,
    if you would, in writing to that report from your inspector
    general?
        Director Mueller. Absolutely.
        Senator Durbin. Thank you.
        Chairman Roberts. Admiral Jacoby, you and your analysts
    have done, I think, an outstanding job in keeping myself and
    this Committee informed of our ongoing efforts to find out what
    happened to Captain Scott Speicher. I want to thank you for
    that.
        Could you give us an update on the current status of this
    effort in terms of trying to ascertain his fate?
        Admiral Jacoby. Yes, Mr. Chairman. First, I looked at the
    most recent notification that came to Congress and it is still
    basically up to date. There are a relatively small number of
    active leads still being pursued by the ISG in Iraq. There's
    still some forensic work being done by FBI laboratories on the
    beam with the initials on it and some other materials which
    have been brought back. And we don't have a final report from
    them.
        It remains an active case. As I have promised you all the
    way through, our assumption is that we will continue to look
    for Captain Speicher as if he is alive until such time that we
    find out otherwise. And that's where we are, sir.
        Chairman Roberts. I truly appreciate that. I think it's not
    only on his behalf, but for every man and woman who wears the
    uniform.
        Director Mueller, in a speech in New York, December 19,
    2002, you stated, ``Worldwide we have prevented as many as 100
    terrorist attacks or plots including a number here in the
    U.S.'' In the year since you made that statement, or years now,
    how do you assess the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland?
    Has it simply increased or diminished or we're doing a lot
    better? You know, where are we?
        Director Mueller. Well again, this goes back to Senator
    Rockefeller's question of are we safer today than we were a
    year ago or two years ago?
        Chairman Roberts. But has the threat increased or
    diminished or changed?
        Director Mueller. I think the threat has changed because of
    the taking away of the sanctuary of Afghanistan, because of the
    taking away of a number of their principal leaders. I think the
    threat has changed to the extent that it is much more
    fragmented. It is fragmented throughout the world. And we
    cannot look at a relatively organized structure, hierarchy,
    within al-Qa'ida and expect that to be the nucleus of the
    planning for future attacks.
        What we can anticipate is that various groups around the
    world with a desire to kill Americans, whether it be overseas
    or within the United States, may be planning, may be going to
    persons who were loosely or perhaps even closely affiliated
    with al-Qa'ida for the technical training on the explosives or
    the financing, but are basically random players throughout the
    world.
        And it is a changed threat, in my mind, to the United
    States, no less of a threat than we had perhaps a year ago,
    perhaps a more significant threat. But we are safer because of
    the actions that have been taken against al-Qa'ida and the
    actions that have been taken by Homeland Security, by the FBI
    and by the CIA and by others within the United States.
        Chairman Roberts. Director Tenet, I'm going to paraphrase,
    since everybody else seems to be or has a penchant of quoting
    things in the press. Basically I'm paraphrasing from Chairman
    Goss of the House Intelligence Committee in statements that he
    has made or allegedly made--I'll call him up and apologize
    later. In regards to 1998 on, upwards to Iraqi Freedom and the
    kickoff of that, one of the things that the Chairman indicated
    was everybody said we should have connected the dots, we should
    have done better in regards to the NIE. But he indicated that
    there were not many dots to connect.
        And you had, sort of, alluded to that in regard to our
    collection assets, in regard to HUMINT, in regard to MASINT, in
    regard to SIGINT, that we had to go back in and reconstruct
    from '98 on what UNSCOM was doing. And I'm extremely concerned
    about that, given the priority that Iraq had received by all of
    our national security experts.
        Could you, sort of, comment on that, in regard to whether
    or not Chairman Goss pretty well nailed it on the head?
        Director Tenet. Well, I don't know, since I'm testifying in
    front of him this afternoon, I don't know that I want to take
    him on in open session. Let me go back, Senator, for the record
    and give you my view of it, Okay?
        Because it's that internal access that was most important.
    Obviously, you've got imagery, and you've got signals
    intelligence, which were important to us. But it's the internal
    access piece that I think is the piece that created the
    greatest perturbation in our coverage here and our knowledge.
    So let me come to you for the record and give you my sense of
    it.
        Chairman Roberts. I appreciate that. I'm going to ask you
    one other question, and then I know you want to go to lunch.
        Has the Intelligence Community noted any increase or any
    diminution of Cuba's support to terrorism since September 11,
    2001?
        And the second part of it is, what is the likelihood that
    the resumption of U.S. trade with Cuba could hasten the
    economic and political reform in Cuba?
        Director Tenet. I'd respectfully take those for the record,
    sir.
        Chairman Roberts. All right. Thank you for coming. The
    hearing is closed.
        [Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]