[Senate Hearing 108-589]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-589
INTERNATIONAL SMUGGLING NETWORKS:
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
COUNTERPROLIFERATION INITIATIVES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, THE BUDGET, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 23, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Michael D. Bopp, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Amy B. Newhouse, Chief Clerk
------
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, THE BUDGET, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
SUBCOMMITTEE
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Minority Staff Director
Nanci E. Langley, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Tara E. Baird, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Fitzgerald........................................... 1
Senator Akaka................................................ 4
Senator Lautenberg........................................... 10
WITNESSES
Wednesday, June 23, 2004
Mark T. Fitzpatrick, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Nonproliferation Controls, U.S. Department of State............ 6
Hon. Peter Lichtenbaum, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Export Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce............. 8
David Albright, President and Founder, Institute for Science and
International Security......................................... 19
Michael Moodie, President, Chemical and Biological Arms Control
Institute...................................................... 22
Leonard S. Spector, Deputy Director, Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies........... 24
Baker Spring, F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security
Policy, The Heritage Foundation................................ 26
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Albright, David:
Testimony.................................................... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Fitzpatrick, Mark T.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 31
Lichtenbaum, Hon. Peter:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 36
Moodie, Michael:
Testimony.................................................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Spector, Leonard S.:
Testimony.................................................... 24
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 62
Spring, Baker:
Testimony.................................................... 26
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 86
APPENDIX
Chart submitted by Senator Akaka................................. 107
Questions and Responses for the Record from:
Mr. Fitzpatrick.............................................. 108
Mr. Lichtenbaum.............................................. 136
Mr. Albright................................................. 145
Mr. Spector.................................................. 151
Mr. Spring with an attachment................................ 158
INTERNATIONAL SMUGGLING NETWORKS:
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
COUNTERPROLIFERATION INITIATIVES
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Financial Management,
the Budget, and International Security,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:24 p.m., in
room SD-342 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Peter G.
Fitzgerald, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Fitzgerald, Akaka, and Lautenberg.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR FITZGERALD
Senator Fitzgerald. This meeting will come to order. I
apologize for the delay in today's hearing. I think it was
supposed to start at 2:30 p.m., and now it is almost 4:30 p.m.
We got interrupted by a series of votes, and I appreciate our
witnesses' patience. I was glad to see you were still here when
I arrived.
I would like to welcome the Subcommittee's Ranking Member,
Senator Akaka, who is one of the leaders in the Senate on
nonproliferation issues. I also would like to welcome our
distinguished witnesses from whom we will hear shortly.
Today we are conducting an oversight hearing to examine the
clandestine trade of weapons of mass destruction and the U.S.
programs and initiatives to counter this dangerous
international security threat.
Beginning late last year, we have seen a series of alarming
discoveries regarding how weapons of mass destruction--nuclear,
chemical, biologica,l and radiological--may be spread around
the world.
An editorial in the Chicago Tribune of February 1, 2004,
entitled ``A Nuclear Weapons Wal-Mart,'' described the
situation this way, ``For those who track nuclear weapons
across the globe, developments over the last weeks have heads
spinning like the special centrifuges that enrich uranium for
nuclear bombs. That is, very fast.''
What is particularly alarming about these discoveries is
the apparent ease with which nations or terrorists wishing to
do us harm may obtain these lethal materials. The editorial
described the nuclear smuggling network that was established
and directed by Pakistani nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan,
to transport nuclear weapons components and related materials
around the globe. As the editorial mentions, upon learning of
Khan's dealings, the head of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, proclaimed that a ``Wal-Mart of
private sector proliferation'' has existed for over a decade.
The editorial concluded with this call on government leaders in
the U.S. and abroad: ``It's not likely that any single
initiative will completely shut down the nuclear Wal-Mart. But
by cooperating on a global scale, law enforcement agents can
make it a lot harder for nuclear black marketeers to do
business.''
This hearing builds on a hearing we conducted last year to
examine North Korea's role in drug trafficking, counterfeiting,
and weapons proliferation. During the hearing we heard
disturbing testimony from our witnesses, including two North
Korean defectors, about that country's weapons program and its
export of dangerous weapons. This past February, Abdul Qadeer
Khan, who is considered to be the father of Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program, signed a detailed confession admitting to the
sale and transfer of materials, designs, and technologies to
produce fuel for nuclear weapons. The Khan trade network may be
one of the most complex and successful efforts to evade
international controls to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons.
Abdul Qadeer Khan directed the trade network in conjunction
with a small group of business associates. Together they
coordinated the manufacture and shipment of nuclear components
from a number of countries to Libya, North Korea, Iran, and
possibly others. While the majority of the shipments were
components for gas centrifuges that are used to enrich uranium
for use in a nuclear weapon, the network also supplied uranium
and nuclear weapons designs to Libya.
The Khan network is disturbing for many reasons, most
importantly for the opportunity it may have afforded rogue
nations or terrorists to circumvent international controls to
acquire not only materials, but also the technology, designs,
and expertise necessary to build a weapon of mass destruction.
The Khan network may already have helped terrorists in this
regard. For example, Osama bin Laden has purportedly called it
a ``duty'' for al Qaeda to develop a nuclear bomb.
The Associated Press reported in March 2004 that al Qaeda
leadership claims to have bought ``ready-made nuclear weapons
on the black market in Central Asia.'' While much progress has
been made in detecting the extent of the Khan network's
operations, many questions remain unanswered. The Washington
Post reported on May 29, 2004 that investigators had been
unable to account for some sensitive parts Libya ordered for
use in the construction of a uranium enrichment plant. The
failure of these parts to arrive in Libya raises the
possibility that the shipments may have been diverted, or that
they were being manufactured by unknown suppliers that have not
yet been revealed.
According to the same news reports, investigators believe
that not only have some suppliers of the network not been
identified, but perhaps some customers as well.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses regarding the
progress in dismantling the Khan network, as well as the
implications this network has for U.S. and international
efforts to stop black market proliferation. The threats posed
by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems is increasingly acknowledged around the world
to be a growing threat. In response, on May 31, 2002, President
Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
which seeks to combine the use of existing national and
international legal authorities with enhanced intelligence
sharing and multilateral coordination to improve the
interdiction of WMD and WMD-related materials transported
around the world. The goal of the PSI is to stop weapons
shipments and deter state or non-state actors from engaging in
the weapons trade.
Thus far, 14 nations including Australia, France, Japan,
Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Singapore,
among others, have joined the United States as core members of
the Initiative, and over 60 nations have signaled their
willingness to cooperate with the PSI in its interdiction
activities.
Additionally, Panama and Liberia, the world's first and
second largest shipping registries, have signed boarding
agreements indicating their willingness to permit ships
carrying their flags to be stopped for inspection. The
cooperation of these two nations in conjunction with the core
member states will allow approximately 50 percent of the
world's commercial shipping fleet to be subject to boarding,
search, and seizure.
As we will hear from our witnesses, the PSI is described as
an activity rather than an organization. As I understand it,
the administration believes that this approach, similar to a
coalition of the willing, will prove more responsive and
adaptable to changing threats than the alternative which would
be the creation of a formal multilateral structure. It is
believed that a formal organization could become bogged down in
competing priorities and the time consuming nature of a
bureaucracy.
The PSI recently celebrated its one-year anniversary and
was high on the agenda at the recent G-8 Summit in Sea Island,
Georgia. Some outside experts, however, have raised concerns
with the approach of the PSI, specifically the time-consuming
nature of its activities and its overall effectiveness. We look
forward to hearing the views of our witnesses on these issues.
We are privileged today to have senior officials from the
Departments of Commerce and State who will address the role of
export controls and nonproliferation policy, and the work of
the PSI and its future plans, respectively. I look forward to
hearing from them on how these aspects of U.S. policy help
prevent the spread of WMD and WMD-related materials throughout
the world.
We also have with us today a distinguished panel of
independent experts in proliferation policy. I look forward to
hearing their evaluations of current counterproliferation
initiatives. I especially look forward to hearing their
thoughts regarding the threat posed by WMD smuggling networks,
as well as how efforts like the PSI may help detect and deter
future networks from forming.
Before I introduce our witnesses, I would like to recognize
the Subcommittee's Ranking Member, Senator Akaka, who may wish
to make an opening statement. Senator Akaka.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Chairman Fitzgerald, thank you very much for
holding this hearing. It is a great tradition of this
Subcommittee and the full Committee to focus on international
security issues. This hearing is a very worthwhile contribution
to the Subcommittee's continued efforts to improve the
government's ability to address threats to our Nation.
It was more than a year ago that President Bush announced
the Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI. Since then,
there have been major developments in counterproliferation,
most notably the decision by Libya to end its weapons of mass
destruction programs. The Libya case brought into the open what
was once only whispered about in the corridors of the
intelligence community. That is the black market in WMD
materials.
Although much has been written about the A.Q. Khan network
operating out of Pakistan, with tentacles in many countries, we
still have not fully unraveled this network, and there are
other people directing similar operations. Arresting Khan did
not destroy this ``network.'' His was only one of many now
facilitating the transfer of WMD-related materials. Never
before has there been so much demand by so many for WMD
materials. As an illustration of these extensive networks for
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, I wish to point out
a chart on either side of this room, prepared by my staff,
based on published reports.\1\
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\1\ The chart referred to submitted by Senator Akaka appears in the
Appendix on page 108.
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What these charts illustrate is that there is a web of
relationships, some private, some governmental, that tie
illicit activities by either rogue states or terrorist groups
to legitimate companies and countries. To focus on stopping
activities between rogue countries and terrorist groups would
be to place a barrier only partway across the flood of
destructive weapons. We need to broaden and intensify our
efforts because it is only a matter of time before hundreds of
thousands of people are killed in an attack by a weapon of mass
destruction, nuclear, biological, or chemical. Yet, rather than
aggressively doing all we can to prevent this, the United
States, sends at best, mixed messages.
For example, even though the Central Intelligence Agency
has identified a bomb exploded by terrorists as a more likely
threat than a missile launched by a rogue state, we are
spending billions of dollars to develop a national missile
defense system that may not work, and against a threat that
does not yet exist.
For example, even though countless reports have identified
radioactive material in the former Soviet Union as providing
the most ready source of material to terrorists, funding
requests for programs to secure Russian nuclear materials and
eliminate weapons grade plutonium production have decreased.
Even as we decry the development of nuclear weapons by
other states, this administration is investing millions in
developing a new earth-penetrating nuclear weapon and millions
in making new nuclear weapons easier to test.
What we need to do is clear. A simple six-step program
would have a tremendous impact: (1) Accelerate efforts of
control at radioactive materials worldwide; (2) Accelerate
negotiations with the Russians to reduce the number of nuclear
warheads and the number of weapons on alert status; (3) Set an
example by eliminating spending on new nuclear weapons; (4)
Ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; (5) Negotiate
a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty; and (6) Develop
and strengthen existing export control systems.
These are only a few steps of a broader agenda, but they
are critical components. What is so disappointing is how few of
these obvious measures have been adopted.
I am pleased that we have with us today such distinguished
witnesses from the administration and the public to discuss
these important issues, and I welcome them to the Subcommittee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Our first witness is the Hon. Peter Lichtenbaum, Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration at the U.S.
Department of Commerce. In his role at the Department of
Commerce, Mr. Lichtenbaum is responsible for policies regarding
controls on the export of dual-use items for reasons including
national security, nonproliferation, and foreign policy. He
also manages the Bureau of Industry and Security's
participation in multilateral export control regimes and chairs
the Inter-Agency Advisory Committee on Export Policy. Prior to
his work at the Commerce Department, Mr. Lichtenbaum was with
the law firm of Steptoe and Johnson, where he practiced in the
firm's international group. He also served in the Treasury
Department, where he worked on international law and economic
policy issues.
Our second witness is Mark Fitzpatrick, who is Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation Controls at the
U.S. Department of State. As Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Mr. Fitzpatrick oversees programs regarding countries
potentially involved in proliferation, interdiction and
sanctions cases, cooperative efforts on export controls and
border monitoring, as well as other nonproliferation assistance
programs. Prior to serving in his current position, Mr.
Fitzpatrick served as Director of the Office of Regional
Affairs in the Nonproliferation Bureau. The Nonproliferation
Bureau compiles and coordinates policy on regional issues
involving weapons of mass destruction in specific areas such as
Iran, North Korea, and Libya.
Again, I would like to thank you both for being here. I
would like to especially thank you for your patience, given our
votes this afternoon. In the interest of time, we will include
your full statements in the record, and we would ask that you
limit your opening remarks to 5 minutes if possible. I will let
either of you begin as you choose, whoever wants to go first.
Mr. Lichtenbaum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Akaka, and Members of the
Subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to testify here
today. Mr. Chairman, as you said, we are here to discuss a very
important topic, the U.S. efforts to address the threat posed
by international networks who are seeking weapons of mass
destruction.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to defer
to Mr. Fitzpatrick from the State Department to begin our
discussion of the administration's counterproliferation
initiatives and I will then discuss the role of export controls
in promoting a nonproliferation policy.
Senator Fitzgerald. That is fine. Mr. Fitzpatrick.
TESTIMONY OF MARK T. FITZPATRICK,\1\ ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Peter.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Fitzpatrick appears in the
Appendix on page 31.
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Mr. Chairman, Senator Akaka, thank you for the opportunity
to speak to you today about the status of efforts to prevent
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and in
particular, the Proliferation Security Initiative. As you said,
I have a prepared statement that has been submitted for the
record, so I will confine my oral remarks just to some of the
main points in that statement.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains a
serious challenge to our national security. The next steps in
the administration's nonproliferation agenda were clearly
established by President Bush's February 11 speech at the
National Defense University, which also highlighted the reality
that the path to proliferation does not always lie in a
straight line between supplier and recipient.
We continue to learn about black market operatives who deal
in equipment and expertise related to weapons of mass
destruction. The extensive network operated by Pakistani
nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, and now being shut down by U.S.
and UK led diplomatic and intelligence efforts is the starkest
example of the problem--a shadowy black arms market in which
the most dangerous of weapons technology, parts, and materials
moved across four continents. Its existence alerts us to the
dangers of whether there could be other networks still in
operation. Moreover, the threat of onward proliferation is not
limited to non-state actors such as A.Q. Khan, but extends to
proliferant states cooperating between themselves. This
compounds the danger.
Against this backdrop the United States has taken a number
of efforts to enhance our ability to detect and prevent illicit
procurement or shipment of WMD missiles or related
technologies. These efforts include strengthening multilateral
regimes and treaties, enhancing export controls and enforcement
measures, preventing nuclear smuggling, and taking decisive
action against WMD missile and advanced conventional weapon
procurements. In the interest of time I will not elaborate on
these efforts orally, but note that I address them in detail in
my prepared remarks.
I would like to focus though on the Proliferation Security
Initiative, PSI, which was announced by President Bush a year
ago. The PSI, as you said, Mr. Chairman, is a set of
activities, not an organization, activities that provides
opportunities for groups of states to work together to address
operational and information requirements for effective action
against proliferators. Its emergence reflects the reality that
even as we continue to support and strengthen existing
nonproliferation treaties and regimes, proliferators, and those
who facilitate procurement of deadly capabilities, are
circumventing existing laws, treaties, and controls.
The PSI was envisioned as a flexible instrument. Its
statement of interdiction principles published last September
serves as the blueprint for PSI activities. These principles
make clear that all PSI activities are consistent with national
legal authorities and relevant international law and
frameworks.
As the number of states participating in and supporting the
PSI grows, we are focusing on concrete, practical activities to
establish states' understanding of and capabilities for what
will be involved in interdicting cargoes. States are becoming
involved in PSI activities in a variety of ways. Some are
participating in informational meetings. Others are
participating in interdiction training exercises, and still
others are stepping forward with new ideas to advance the
Proliferation Security Initiative.
For example, in August, Denmark will host a container
security workshop, bringing governments and industry experts
together to discuss how we can make water-based cargo shipping
more secure against proliferation.
Mr. Chairman, you asked about future plans. The United
States is pursuing boarding agreements with key flag states to
facilitate maritime interdiction cooperation. We have signed
two agreements to date, with Liberia and Panama, and have many
more under active discussion and consultation. Additionally, we
are considering what mechanisms might facilitate cooperation in
air and ground interdiction arenas.
In part, because of the sobering lessons learned from A.Q.
Khan's activities, the President in February called for the
work of PSI to be expanded to focus on shutting down
proliferation networks and bringing those involved to full
justice.
A year after its creation, the PSI is today a successful
initiative that resonates with countries worldwide. Its simple
tenets make good nonproliferation sense. States understand
that, by working together, we will have a greater impact than
by acting alone. Our partners are responding by establishing
practical cooperative partnerships to defeat proliferation. As
a result, the PSI is poised, through either actual interdiction
or the deterrent of threatened interdiction, to impact
significantly the international proliferation networks and
supplier-recipient relationships among proliferators.
In conclusion, let me emphasize that the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and related materials
remains a challenge to international security. I hope my
testimony has shown the resolve and commitment of the Federal
nonproliferation community to develop solid creative responses
to the danger of proliferation, and in particular, responses to
illicit procurement of WMD and missiles.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify here today.
I look forward to hearing more about your concerns and to
addressing your questions.
Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you. Mr. Lichtenbaum.
TESTIMONY OF PETER LICHTENBAUM,\1\ ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE FOR EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Mr. Lichtenbaum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Lichtenbaum appears in the
Appendix on page 36.
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The mission of the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry
and Security, or BIS, is to safeguard U.S. national security,
foreign policy, and economic interests through implementing
U.S. export control policy on dual-use commodities, software,
and technology. In addition, BIS is charged with enhancing
compliance with those controls and enforcing them worldwide. We
also promote the development of effective export and transit
control systems in key countries and transshipment hubs, i.e.,
controls relating to foreign origin products in addition to
U.S.-origin products. In that regard, clearly our work relates
to what Senator Akaka mentioned about developing and
strengthening existing export control systems.
BIS's principal objective is to ensure that direct exports
from the United States and re-exports of U.S.-origin items from
third countries are consistent with national security and
foreign policy interests, without imposing unnecessary
regulatory burdens on U.S. exporters or impeding the flow of
legitimate trade.
When dealing with the international WMD networks which are
our subject here today, it is critical to promote compliance
abroad with our controls, and to that end Commerce has been
very active. We conducted four international export control
outreach seminars in 2003 with the goal of providing key export
control related information to companies that use U.S. original
parts for manufacturing, companies that use U.S.-origin system
software technology to develop foreign-made products, and
companies that re-export U.S. items.
Over 1,000 people attended the BIS conferences which were
held in Japan, South Korean, Singapore, and China, and came
away with a better understanding of our rules.
However, clearly, controlling the use of U.S. technologies
alone is not sufficient to hinder procurement by international
WMD networks, as many of the most sensitive items are available
in countries throughout the world, and that is a critical
challenge for our export control work.
It is imperative, in my view, that the U.S. Government work
with international suppliers in order to effectively control
the export of these sensitive items. To that end, the United
States is leading the efforts to strengthen the four
multilateral regimes which are the traditional mechanism for
international cooperation in this area. In particular, we are
working to improve the control lists, for example, by ensuring
that we control any item that is of particular interest to
terrorists, and controlling the export of any item intended for
use in a WMD program or delivery system through catch-all
controls. We think we are making excellent progress working
with the State Department toward those ends.
But it is not enough to just work in the traditional export
control regimes because only a small portion of countries in
the world are members of these regimes, and therefore, BIS
participates in U.S. Government efforts to build a more
effective international system of export controls beyond these
regimes and by assisting other countries to develop and enforce
effective export controls. The importance of those activities
is shown by the A.Q. Khan case, which involved technology and
components exported from countries who were not members of the
regimes.
As part of the State Department's Export Control and
Related Border Security Assistance Program, or EXBS, BIS
conducts technical exchanges with more than 30 countries that
need assistance in this area. Working with other U.S. agencies
we design specific programs toward the needs of each country,
and then give them training that is customized to their needs.
During the last fiscal year, for example, we conducted 74
bilateral technical exchange workshops and one multilateral
conference, as part of the EXBS Program. We helped countries
draft legislation and helped companies in those countries adopt
effective compliance programs because, as Senator Akaka
mentioned, it is not just a question of working at the
governmental level, but also doing outreach to the private
sector, who may be legitimate countries. There is a long list
of countries that we have worked with, many of them in the
former Soviet Union. We have developed software that is
specifically designed to help companies comply with their
national export control rules. We also developed software that
helps Customs officials in these countries identify the
products that are of most concern to us, because it is often
the question of having the training to know when a product that
is at the border is an item of concern.
Russia, for example, has begun deploying this product
identification tool that we developed in its regional Customs
centers in preparation for deployment to more than 150 Customs
posts.
We also have another major initiative outside of the EXBS
Program to strengthen controls in other countries. In 2002 we
launched a Transshipment Country Export Control Initiative, or
TECI, and that initiative focuses on transshipment hubs:
Cyprus, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Malta, Panama, Singapore, Taiwan,
Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates.
Some of these countries do have export control systems in
place, but none of them participate in all four of the
multilateral regimes that I mentioned. All are major hubs for
high tech products and they all operate near countries of
concern. Some of them, as you mentioned, have been implicated
in some of the recent developments of concern.
Under TECI, BIS has already made significant progress. We
have developed a public/private partnership on best practices
for export controls. We have placed attaches in Hong Kong and
Abu Dhabi, and we visited many of the TECI countries at senior
levels, including Hong Kong (where I was a month ago), Malta,
Panama, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates, in order to
emphasize the importance of strengthening export control
systems.
I think all of these efforts provide countries with the
knowledge and the ability to fulfill their commitments to the
United Nations. As you know, the United Nations recently
passed, at the President's suggestion, UN Security Council
Resolution 1540, which calls on countries to adopt effective
export control systems.
Finally, with respect to the PSI, which Mr. Fitzpatrick
discussed, although the State Department and the Defense
Department are properly providing most of the policy and
operational leadership, we have participated actively in the
development of the Statement of Interdiction Principles, the
strategies for outreach to other governments, and particularly
are focused on the outreach to industry because we think
industry can really play a very important role in leveraging
the resources of government in order to make the PSI effective.
So that gives you an overview of our important initiatives,
working with other agencies to counter proliferation of WMD
technologies. We are strengthening export controls here at home
and abroad, and I would be happy to answer any questions that
Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you very much. Senator
Lautenberg.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG
Senator Lautenberg. I will try to be brief, but I commend
you for holding this hearing. I think it is a particularly
important hearing and I commend the Chairman for holding it.
In these days of lots of concerns about the capacity of
rogue organizations, rogue countries, to be able to buy
materials that are ultimately available to make weapons of mass
destruction out of them, we know that delivery systems have
been perfected in lots of places. We saw them used, as a matter
of fact, in the first Gulf War when missile were fired from
Iraq to Israel and Saudi Arabia as well. So we are concerned
about the finding of the recent Harvard University report. The
authors there found that not nearly enough is being done to
keep nuclear fissile materials away from terrorists and rogue
states, Iran, Libya, North Korea, to name just the most
obvious. The principal conclusion of the authors is that fewer
fissile materials were secured in the 2 years after the
September 11 attacks then in the 2 years leading up to that
horrific day. According to the authors, it will be well over a
decade before nuclear fissile materials located in over 140
countries worldwide are adequately secured. Until then such
materials are vulnerable to acquisition by terrorists and
nations that support them.
In the post-September 11 world the prospect of terrorists
acquiring nuclear weapons of mass destruction is particularly
alarming. Counterproliferation efforts are urgently needed, and
I am pleased that our G-8 partners pledged at the meeting in
Sea Island earlier this month to address and curb the spread of
nuclear fissile materials.
And as we have learned from revelations about the A.Q. Khan
network operating in Pakistan, once fissile and other dangerous
materials are out on the world market, it is darn hard to track
them down.
I would like to raise several critical questions that our
witnesses and we need to address with regard to
counterproliferation efforts. First, how well we secured
nuclear fissile materials outside of the former Soviet Union.
At one point we appropriately focused on our nonproliferation
efforts on that region with programs like the Nunn-Lugar
Initiative. We cannot do that any longer. Our
counterproliferation efforts cannot be limited to Russia or its
neighbors any more, as we heard from----
Senator Fitzgerald. Mr. Lichtenbaum and Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Senator Lautenberg. Our counterproliferation efforts cannot
be limited to Russia, or its neighbors any more. They must be
extended to places like Malaysia and Sudan.
And second, how well have we closed loopholes that let
nations develop nuclear weapons programs under the cover of
nuclear energy programs? Recently the International Atomic
Energy Administration has been having problems getting Iran to
cooperate with its inspections because Iranian officials claim
they have the right to develop nuclear energy as they see fit.
Third, how well are we developing a global network for
border security? I am particularly concerned about export
control at our seaports, where over 95 percent of all
containers being shipped worldwide are not being inspected.
Fourth, what are we doing diplomatically not only to reduce
regional tensions but to send a stern message that smuggling
nuclear fissile materials and weapons, or engaging in related
trade, is totally unacceptable? I am afraid that the alienation
of so many of our allies in other matters might come back to
haunt us in this regard. I worry that we are going to have less
cooperation in nonproliferation efforts as a result of our
diminished credibility worldwide.
Finally, I would like an update on Libya. I have had an
active interest there since the downing of PanAm 103, and I
have been suspicious from the start by Muammar Qadhafi's sudden
desire to reform and to rehabilitate Libya's international
standing. Libya's murderers, who went out and killed 38 of my
constituents in 1988, along with 140 other Americans, nearly
100 British citizens in the PanAm 103 attack--and I am cautious
that Libya has destroyed some of its weapons programs--but I
would like to hear from our witnesses about Libya's previous
role in global smuggling networks and its ties to Khan and his
nefarious deals.
It is a useful hearing, Mr. Chairman, and if we can get
answers to some questions, we will have made a good deal of
progress.
I thank you and I thank our witnesses for their testimony.
Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you very much, Senator
Lautenberg.
I would like to direct this question to either of you. I am
curious about the Proliferation Security Initiative. You both
described it, or it has been described in many printed
materials, particularly in this brochure that they put out,
that the PSI is an activity, not an organization. Does that
mean there is no organization to this activity? Do we not have
to have somewhere an organization, a bureaucracy there? How do
we get things done? Little League Baseball is an activity, but
there is an organization. There are people organizing the
activities that are part of it. So I am curious about that.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Mr. Chairman, in one sense you are looking
at the organization. My colleagues in the State Department are
part of what might be described as a loose organization among
participating governments, the 14 core group countries, and the
additional dozens of countries that have expressed an interest
in working together in some part of PSI.
We do not believe that it is necessary always to establish
a formal bureaucracy, a secretariat in a foreign capital, where
the focus can sometimes become more on the apparatus of the
bureaucracy than on the actual functions involved. So we find
that in bringing the core countries together, the experts
together, the intelligence, the defense operational experts
together in various settings, that we can create the
wherewithal to be able to effectively interdict.
We want to be able to create rapid response mechanisms, to
know the points of contacts in the intelligence, law
enforcement, and diplomatic communities, so that when we spy an
activity, or one of the partners spies an activity, we can
immediately coordinate resources of those countries that can
bring resources to bear and take effective action.
We did that in the case of the BBC China that you noted in
October, and partly to address Senator Lautenberg's question
about Libya.
Senator Fitzgerald. Was this set up by an Executive Order
or what created the PSI?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. It was initiated by the President in a
speech in Poland over a year ago. It has not required a great
deal of additional financial resources because we have been
putting together the structure through existing diplomatic
resources.
The State Department is the lead on the policy, but the
Defense Department is the lead on many of the operational
activities.
Senator Fitzgerald. You only have 14 nations involved. That
leaves a whole lot of nations that are not involved, and there
are no formal treaty obligations behind this, so it is all
voluntary. It almost seems like we are not taking this
seriously enough. Do we not have to try and get as many nations
as possible locked in under formal obligations if we are not
going to let trafficking go on?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. One of the areas of formal obligations
that we are trying to lock nations into are the boarding
agreements that we have been undertaking with the countries
that are the largest flag state-nations--Liberia and Panama--as
I mentioned, and a dozen or so other countries with whom we are
now actively pursuing such formal legal arrangements. As a
reult, if there is a vessel flying the Liberian flag that is
known to be carrying, or thought to be carrying lethal weapons
of mass destruction, we now have a legal basis for interdicting
that ship. So I do not think there is any lack of
organizational structure to this.
The 14 countries are the ones who inaugurated it, but
beyond these there is a spreading tier of other countries that
we want to bring into it. The coastal states, the flag states,
the transshipment states and the transit states, these are all
the countries to whom we're reaching out. And as I noted, there
were more than 60 countries that have expressed an interest.
Over 60 countries attended the one-year anniversary meeting in
Krakow last month.
Senator Fitzgerald. How can we be assured that the PSI
activities are receiving adequate resources, or that they are
not diverting personnel and funds away from other important
activities, if we have no organization that we can look at, see
an organization chart, and fund through the annual budgetary
process?
I imagine you have many duties in the Department of State
and this is just one of your duties. If there is no formal
structure to the PSI, how do we know either that you are
putting enough time into the PSI or that you are not shirking
your other duties? I would imagine there would just be lots and
lots of people involved. How many people in the administration
through the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and State, would
be involved in the PSI?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. My colleague tells me it is probably three
dozen or more, who on a daily basis are involved in this. I
mean, obviously we have to shift priorities, and this is one of
our greatest priorities, so the time that I personally used to
spend on worrying about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, I
now spend on PSI, for example.
Senator Fitzgerald. We do not have any PSI offices inside
the government?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Under Secretary Bolton is the head of the
effort of the State Department that overlooks PSI, and
underneath him, Assistant Secretary John Wolf and my staff.
Senator Fitzgerald. But there would be one person in charge
at DOD and one person at Commerce? Is there any one person who
is in charge overall?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Sir, the National Security Council-led
Policy Coordination Committee for Proliferation Strategy is the
mechanism that coordinates inter-agency, and I think we could
point to one individual in each of the agencies that are
responsible for this. I hesitate to do so outside the State
Department though.
Senator Fitzgerald. OK. I understand that you may have had
some successes that you are reluctant to publicize, at least I
hope you have had some cases where you have been successful in
interdicting weapons of mass destruction, but I am wondering if
you might be able to discuss any reasons for the reluctance to
inform the public of any interdiction successes?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Sir, the reason for not publicizing some
of the activities of the PSI is that intelligence sources are
often the reason we know about activities, and so as not to
jeopardize those intelligence sources and methods, this
activity really cannot be discussed in this kind of a hearing.
Senator Fitzgerald. OK. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lichtenbaum, the other day the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency stated, ``The present system
of nuclear export controls is clearly deficient. The system
relies on informal arrangements that are not only non-binding,
but also limited in membership, and many countries with growing
industrial capacity are not included. Moreover, at present
there is no linkage between the export control system and the
verification system.''
A system that is deficient when it comes to nuclear
material and weapons controls puts all humanity at risk. My
question to you is what is the administration proposing to
correct these deficiencies? Either one of you may answer that.
Mr. Lichtenbaum. I think we may both answer, because it is
an excellent question, Senator.
With respect to the comment about the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, which is the existing multilateral export control regime
in the nuclear area, it is correct that theNSG has a limited
membership. The goal is not to have a universal membership, but
to have a membership among the countries who are significant
nuclear suppliers. In part that is because that group operates
by consensus, so that it is important to only have countries at
the table who are significant nuclear suppliers, rather than
having a global coverage in membership, and thus having every
country in the world be able to have a veto over actions of the
NSG.
I might add that consensus rule has on occasion been very
important to the United States, so we have historically been a
strong supporter of a consensus rule that applies not only in
the NSG, but also in the other multilateral regimes.
I think the NSG and the other regimes have shown themselves
able to adjust to changing world circumstances and the growth
of countries and suppliers where necessary. They have
established criteria for membership, and in the case of the
NSG, I might draw to your attention the recent accession of
China to the NSG, which obviously recognizes the reality of
China's status as a nuclear power, its increasing acceptance of
responsibility in the export control area, and therefore,
properly includes them in the organization that deals with
nuclear export controls.
I think where necessary the NSG has shown itself able to
include countries who are nuclear suppliers.
With respect to the linkage between the NSG and the IAEA, I
might defer to Mr. Fitzpatrick on that if he would care to
comment, because I know he has a background with the IAEA,
having served in Vienna, and it is a particular responsibility
of the State Department.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Senator Akaka. I think
Secretary Lichtenbaum answered the question well. I might only
add that in addition to the formal membership of regimes, many
countries outside the regime conform their controls to regime
standards, and this is often one of our bilateral diplomatic
goals, to encourage a country--for example, India--to conform
their regimes. They cannot be part of the nuclear suppliers
group because they do not accept full scope safeguards, but
they can conform their export controls to that of the regime,
and we are encouraging them to do so.
Regarding the linkage, I have to read more about what the
Director General ElBaradei proposed. It is helpful that the
Nuclear Supplier Group membership is centered in Vienna, in the
same capital that the IAEA has its headquarters so that there
are informal linkages. But it would probably be impossible to
have too formal of a linkage. If all 100 plus countries that
are part of the IAEA were in a suppliers group that operates by
consensus, nothing would ever get done.
What we are trying to do in the Nuclear Suppliers Group is
plug the loopholes that have allowed some states to acquire
nuclear weapons or to come near to acquiring nuclear weapons
capabilities under a facade of pursuing peaceful programs. One
of the initiatives that President Bush announced in his
February 11 speech was to preclude states that do not now have
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities from acquiring those
capabilities. Draw a line beyond those that have it and no
more, would prevent the likes of Iran, for example, from
acquiring enrichment technology. And at the G-8 Summit last
week in Sea Island, the G-8 countries, all of them, agreed that
it would be prudent to, for at least 1 year, to suspend any
expansion of technology to states that do not already have it
in enrichment and reprocessing. We would like to make this 1
year become a permanent moratorium.
Senator Akaka. My time has expired. I have further
questions, and I will have questions on China, too. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Fitzgerald. Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lichtenbaum, are there amounts of dual-use technology
and materials that we are aware of that U.S. companies are
exporting throughout the world, and obviously if these things
were to get into the wrong hands, they could be used to develop
terrible weaponry. Do we have any ideas about how much of this
dual-use material or technology is being exported by U.S.
companies?
Mr. Lichtenbaum. I guess there would be various ways to
measure the volume of dual-use technology or items that are
being exported.
Senator Lautenberg. Even if we got it down to the incidents
of this happening.
Mr. Lichtenbaum. One way to answer it, and the only way
that I can provide to you here, although I would be happy to
provide more ways for the record, Senator, would be in terms of
the overall U.S. GDP. My recollection is that the amount of
licensed trade--that is, items that we require an export
license for at the Commerce Department--is somewhere around 1
percent of U.S. GDP, so it is very small as a matter of the
overall U.S. economy.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes, but the U.S. economy being the
size that it is, if it is 1 percent, I mean we are talking
about a substantial sum of----
Mr. Lichtenbaum. That is certainly true.
Senator Lautenberg. What do we do about that? I mean the
biggest cover for these surreptitious activities is dual use,
right? They say, ``We just want to use it for nuclear energy.''
And what the steps that follow are, I guess, traceable but not
obvious. What do we learn if we do find out that material has
been shipped in the belief that it is going to be used
primarily on the energy side?
Mr. Lichtenbaum. The dual-use items that you are talking
about would be our items that are controlled for nuclear
nonproliferation reasons, and those we would have subjected,
when we issue a license, to license conditions. We license them
not just in general for export, but for export to a particular
end user for a particular end use. That is inherently part of
the obligation of the exporter, to make sure that they comply.
There may also be additional conditions that they are required
to follow. Frequently we impose license conditions that talk
about access to the item or disclosure of technology being
limited to certain individuals within the foreign end user,
etc. So we have, we think, a well crafted set of commitments
that U.S. exporters have to comply with as a condition of
exporting a nuclear item to another country.
Certainly, we cannot, under any reasonable scenario, be
monitoring every license all the time to make sure that those
rules are followed. We do post-shipment verifications. Where we
think there is especially sensitive items or end users that are
particularly--we think they are worthy or we would not grant
the license, but where we think there is a question perhaps, we
would then go and do a post shipment verification, make sure
the item is where it is supposed to be.
Senator Lautenberg. I do not know how big the opening is
there for skullduggery, but the fact is that, as you say, you
cannot really monitor it once it is shipped and arrives
someplace else. What about re-exportation, how can you verify,
or can you verify that the listed recipient of the final
destination for export is an accurate assessment of the
shipment's ultimate use? It really is kind of the same
question, and I guess I do not know what tools you have to do
that, but it is something.
When you describe, Mr. Fitzpatrick, the organization that
is there to keep an eye on these things, it is a relatively
small thing, but problems that might ensure are enormous.
Let me go on to a different area. When Mr. Khan confessed
that his network was engaged in smuggling weapons into Libya,
North Korea, among other rogue nations, was the administration
aware of these deals with these states considered to be
sponsors of terrorism before Mr. Khan's confession, do we know?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Senator, I regret that the question
inevitably strays into the area what we knew through
intelligence information, and I am just not able to answer that
question in this sort of a structured hearing.
Senator Lautenberg. I see. The disclosures about weapons
programs in Libya, are they accounted for in transactions that
were made through A.Q. Khan network, the materials that were
sent to Libya, was there an accounting of that material that we
have an awareness of?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Sir, that is a question that we are
intently focusing on right now. We want to be sure with as much
confidence as we can, that Libya has accounted for all the
materials that came into its possession. Considering all of the
information that we have through intelligence, and through what
the IAEA has reported about its own investigations, we need to
be able to determine with a good deal of certainty that Libya
has completely come clean on all of it.
As you know, we have taken out of Libya the most dangerous
materials, a planeload in February and a shipload in March. I
am not able to tell you now, because we have not finished our
consultations with Libya and with the IAEA, but I hope that in
the coming months we will be able to give you an affirmative
answer to that question, but it is very much the question that
is on our minds.
Senator Lautenberg. We would be very interested. I am
suspicious, as are many of the families of PanAm 103 who lost
loved ones, that there is a full intent to become a member of
the family of nations that are on this side. So we thank you.
We would ask that you inform us if you do get anything.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes it for me, and I thank you
very much. Thank the witnesses.
Senator Akaka [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg.
Mr. Lichtenbaum, I said that I would return to China.
China and the United States, after years of negotiations,
recently concluded a new agreement on improved end use
verification procedures to monitor the ultimate use of dual-use
exports to China. The concern is this could allow for increased
U.S. high technology exports to China. As you know, Chinese
assistance is essential to restricting North Korean WMD-related
exports, both because many of those exports may transit Chinese
air or sea corridors. However, China has not yet become a
member of PSI.
I wonder what your view would be to conditioning U.S. high
technology exports on a state's participation in the PSI? If
our goal is universal adherence to the program, is this not one
way to get it?
Mr. Lichtenbaum. Thank you, Senator, for a very thoughtful
question.
The question of U.S. high technology exports to China is a
very important one, as it has both significant economic
implications for our country, given the size of the Chinese
market, as well as national security implications in light of
any potential that high technology items could be diverted, and
therefore it is a question that the administration focuses on
very intently, as I can testify from my personal experience
since coming into office.
I think the balance to be struck in the high technology
area has to be developed on a case-by-case basis, so it is
difficult to say that if you join PSI, therefore we will open
the floodgates and allow you access to our high technology
goods. From my own experience working the export control cases,
case-by-case through the inter-agency process, it is critical
that we make those judgments in order to protect U.S. national
security on a case-by-case basis, and so I would be reluctant
to see export controls used as the carrot to entice China to
join the PSI.
I would think that it would also be perhaps ineffective in
terms of achieving the goal that we all want to achieve, which
is China's strong participation in the PSI, and I would welcome
Mr. Fitzpatrick's thoughts on this, but I would think that
countries' participation in PSI would be most effective if they
themselves believe in the program, and believe strongly that it
makes sense in terms of their own security interests and the
world's security interests for them to participate. Therefore,
if they were to join in order to obtain some other benefit, but
without fully being on board for the program, it might not be
the most effective way to have them participate. So my view
would be that it is important for the United States to continue
its work with China to persuade them of the benefits of the
PSI.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you. Once more I have to say that
Secretary Lichtenbaum has put the point very well.
China does support the goals and objectives of PSI, but the
proof is in the pudding, and we can point to a factual basis
for this. China has been willing to cooperate on a case-by-case
basis in stopping proliferation, and in fact, cooperated on a
particular case involving chemicals that were destined to North
Korea's nuclear weapons program. This was a very high priority,
to stop such material going to the North Korea program, and
China cooperated in stopping this.
Secretary Powell referred to this case in a recent speech
in Texas. I wish I had the exact date, but this is, I think,
something we can point to.
That does not mean China's cooperation has been fulsome,
but on a case-by-case basis they have been cooperative, and we
are strongly encouraging them to do more.
Senator Akaka. I really appreciate your responses, and I
have further questions that we will submit for the record, and
I will keep it open for another day for other questions from
Members of the Subcommittee.
But I want to thank you very much, Mr. Lichtenbaum and Mr.
Fitzpatrick for your presence here. Thank you for being
patient, and thank you for being helpful. This will help us
determine what we need to do to help our country in PSI and in
WMD matters. So thank you very much.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
I would like to call forward the next panel. David
Albright, Michael Moodie, Leonard Spector, and Baker Spring.
May I ask the panelists to contain your testimony, and to
keep it to 5 minutes.
Our first witness on this panel is David Albright,
President and Founder of the Institute for Science and
International Security. The institute is a nonpartisan
organization dedicated to informing the public of policy issues
affecting international security. The Institute's work focuses
in part on efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and to
enhance the transparency of nuclear arsenals throughout the
globe. Dr. Albright has published numerous assessments of
secret nuclear weapons programs around the world. From 1992
through 1997, he actively collaborated with the International
Atomic Energy Agency to analyze Iraqi documents and past
procurement activities. In 1996 he was the first non-
governmental inspector of the Iraqi nuclear program.
Next is Michael Moodie, who is President and Co-Founder of
the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, a research
organization that addresses the challenges to global security
and stability. The Institute's work focuses on the elimination
of chemical and biological weapons and responses to emerging
national security threats. Mr. Moodie has almost 30 years of
experience working on international security issues in
government, the policy research community and academia. For
example, from 1990 through 1993 he served as Assistant Director
of the Multilateral Affairs of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, where he advocated U.S. policy relating to
arms control in the Geneva-based conference on Disarmament and
the United Nations first committee.
Our third witness is Leonard Spector. Good to have you back
here. You were with Senator Glenn. Mr. Spector is Deputy
Director at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies. Mr. Spector leads
the Center's Washington office, and also serves as editor in
chief of the Center's publications. Prior to joining the Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, Mr. Spector served as Assistant
Deputy Administrator for Arms Control and Nonproliferation at
the National Nuclear Security Administration in the Department
of Energy. While serving at the Energy Department Mr. Spector
was responsible for the development and implementation of arms
control and nonproliferation policy, domestic and multilateral
export controls, civilian nuclear programs in the United States
and abroad, as well as initiatives in regions of the world with
proliferation activities.
Our fourth and final witness is Baker Spring, who is the
F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy at the
Heritage Foundation. Mr. Spring's research focuses on U.S.
national security issues, including arms control,
nonproliferation policy and missile defense. Mr. Spring has
written extensively on these topics and others, including
nuclear proliferation in North Korea, transforming the U.S.
military, and the future of the United Nations. Prior to
joining the Heritage Foundation, Mr. Spring served as a defense
and foreign policy expert in the offices of former Senator
Paula Hawkins of Florida and Senator David Karnes of Nebraska.
Again, I would like to thank our witnesses for taking time
out from a busy schedule to be here today to testify. I did ask
you to keep it to 5 minutes, and we will include your
statements in the record. Let me call on Dr. Albright to begin.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID ALBRIGHT,\1\ PRESIDENT AND FOUNDER,
INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. Albright. Thank you for having this hearing and
inviting me to speak.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Albright appears in the Appendix
on page 45.
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One of the biggest surprises about the Khan network was its
sheer audacity and scale. It intended to provide Libya a
turnkey gas centrifuge facility, something typically reserved
for states or large corporations in industrialized nations with
full government support and knowledge. The plan called for the
network to provide thousands of gas centrifuges, detailed
project designs for the centrifuge plant, down to where the
toilet paper would go in a bathroom, centrifuge designs,
manufacturing equipment and technology to make more centrifuges
indigenously, and ongoing technical assistance to help Libya
overcome any obstacles in assembling and operating the
centrifuges in the plant.
If Libya had continued with its nuclear ambitions and the
network had not been exposed, Libya could have succeeded in
about 4 or 5 years in assembling its centrifuge plant and
operating it to produce significant amounts of highly enriched
uranium.
Armed with this HEU, Libya would have known how to turn
that HEU into nuclear weapons. The reason is simple. The
network provided Libya with information to build a workable
nuclear weapon. Libya received almost all of the detailed
nuclear weapon component designs, component fabrication
information, and assembly instructions for a workable nuclear
device.
Much remains to be discovered about this network before its
operations are fully understood or its complete demise can be
celebrated. It is necessary for governments and the
International Atomic Energy Agency to be persevering in
investigating this case. If these investigations are not done
thoroughly, the risk will be greater that a similar network
could rise again from the remnants of the disbanded Khan
network.
The first unfinished task is identifying all the network's
key players and their activities. Many legal investigations of
members of the network have started. Momentum may in fact be
increasing around the world to prosecute the key players in
this network. But a critical task remains, determining all the
players and their activities. The ultimate goal should be
prosecuting them as fully as possible under both export control
laws and laws involving exports to terrorist states as Libya
was labeled, and this process will likely take years.
It is also critical to determine the network's customers,
and this effort again will take considerable time. Although
Khan has admitted that he provided centrifuge items to Libya,
North Korea, and Iran, little has been reported about other
recipients of centrifuge and nuclear weapons assistance. In
addition, many details of this assistance remain unknown,
particularly in regards to North Korea. A key question is
whether Iran or North Korea also received nuclear weapons
design information like Libya did. Questions remain whether
Syria was a customer for centrifuge or nuclear weapons
assistance, although Khan has denied selling anything to Syria.
Finally, did terrorists receive any information or other
assistance from the Khan network?
Another unfinished task is understanding the entire supply
chain of the network. In the case of Libya the network focused
on making what are called P2 centrifuge components outside
Pakistan. The Libyans have stated they placed an order for
10,000 P2 machines, which translates into a total of about one
million separate components, a staggering number of parts,
given the sophistication of gas centrifuge components. The
network was assembling a significant cast of experts,
companies, suppliers, and workshops to make all these
components. The organization of this project was quite
impressive.
But investigations of the supply chain of the network are
unfinished. It is not known if all the key workshops and
companies have been identified. Components may have been made
but not delivered to Libya, and components may also have been
made for customers other than Libya.
The final task I would like to mention is the retrieving of
centrifuge designs and manufacturing instructions from the
network. The key to the success of this network was its virtual
library of centrifuge designs and details manufacturing manuals
and other types of instructions. A key task is to track down
the members of this network who have this kind of a sensitive
centrifuge information, prosecute them and try to retrieve as
much of this information as possible.
However, retrieving all the centrifuge information may not
be possible since copies can be made and hidden for years if
desired. Thus, even if the retrieval effort is reasonably
successful, the centrifuge information may form the core of a
future network aimed at secretly producing or selling gas
centrifuges.
A priority and a major point of discussion today is
preventing other illicit networks similar to the Khan network
and nuclear smuggling through less elaborate methods. In
addition, steps are needed to increase the probability of more
quickly discovering such efforts, and certainly the first
priority is fully investigating and dismantling the Khan
network. Investigations need to continue and intensify in a
range of states including Malaysia, Switzerland, Britain,
France, Italy, Spain, United Arab Emiates, Germany, and Turkey,
to just name a few.
More information is needed from states that benefited from
this network, particularly Libya, Iran, and eventually North
Korea. In addition, Pakistan's cooperation is critical. The
Pakistani Government has provided useful information to the
IAEA and other states, and it appears committed to providing
more information. However, the Pakistani Government should
permit the International Atomic Energy Agency and perhaps other
governments direct access to A.Q. Khan and his associates
involved in this network in Pakistan.
The successes of the Khan network should shatter any
complacency about the effectiveness of national and
international nuclear related export controls to stop or sound
an alarm about illegal of nuclear-related exports. Although the
Proliferation Security Initiative is useful and important, it
cannot fix the fundamental weaknesses of the current export
control regime. The Khan network was masterful in identifying
countries that had weak national export control laws, yet
adequate industrial capability for the network's purposes.
These countries were both inside and outside the Nuclear
Suppliers Group.
Although many suppliers to the network did not know the
actual purposes of the materials they provided or the parts
they were contracted to make, they were often in countries
where the authorities were unlikely to carefully scrutinize
exports or encourage curiosity about the actual end use of an
item. The network also knew how to obtain for its illicit
endeavors necessary subcomponents, materials, machine tools and
other manufacturing equipment from countries in Europe with
stringent export control systems.
Certainly improvements can be made in the traditional
export control system, including expanding the membership of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group and sharing more information about
actual procurements among NSG members and with the IAEA, but
these steps are by themselves insufficient. The new UN Security
Council Resolution 1504 is also an important step, but it does
not go far enough to significantly reduce the risk posed by
nuclear smuggling.
The current system lacks an aggressive intrusive
verification investigation organization that can provide
greater confidence that states are implementing effective
export controls and can devote its resources to detecting
illicit nuclear and nuclear-related procurements.
What is needed is a universal treaty-based system
controlling nuclear export activities that is binding on states
and includes a means to verify their compliance. Under such a
treaty or agreement, countries would implement a set of nuclear
and nuclear-related export control laws and regulations and
criminalization procedures similar in nature to those required
by UN Security Council Resolution 1540. The agreement, however,
would also mandate the International Atomic Energy Agency to
verify compliance, ensure the adequacy of those laws, and
investigate illicit procurement activities. Signatories would
inform the IAEA of all sensitive nuclear or nuclear-related
exports, and the IAEA would have the mandate and legal rights
to verify that the transactions are indeed legal. It would
verify that a country's declarations about its nuclear or
nuclear-related exports or imports is accurate and complete.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Albright, will you try to wind this up?
Mr. Albright. All right. The IAEA is a logical choice to
undertake this role. It is already pursuing investigations of
illicit procurement activities by Iran and Libya as part of its
safeguards responsibilities under the Nonproliferation Treaty.
By linking its safeguard system with export control
verification and monitoring, the IAEA would be in a far better
position to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear activities
and detect cheating in a timely manner. By performing a task
that governments have been unable to do, the IAEA, under such a
treaty-based system, would significantly increase U.S. and
international security. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Mr. Moodie.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL MOODIE,\1\ PRESIDENT, CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL INSTITUTE
Mr. Moodie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
appear before the Subcommittee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Moodie appears in the Appendix on
page 52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I would like to begin by suggesting that perhaps I am
something of an outlier on this panel. That is not because I
think that the problem of the illegal transfer of materials and
equipment related to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
is not important, it is. But the chemical and biological
dimension of this issue is a special challenge. Little
information is publicly available on trafficking of chemical or
biological agents of equipment, especially compared to
trafficking of nuclear materials.
More to the point, in my view it is not helpful to try to
apply approaches used for dealing with a problem of nuclear
trafficking to the issue as it relates to chemical and
biological challenges. A chemical or biological equivalent of
A.Q. Khan may exist, but he or she would be extremely difficult
to identify. In my view three reasons argue for the need for a
different approach to the chemical and biological problem.
First, the inherently dual-use nature of chemical and
biological materials and equipment. The requisite materials and
technologies for making chemical and biological weapons are
widely available. In the case of biological agents many can be
found in nature. For both chemical and biological weapons key
elements are readily found in legitimate biotechnology and
chemical industries around the world where they are used for
perfectly legitimate commercial and scientific purposes. This
combination of availability and legitimate use makes it more
difficult to identify potential CBW programs and track related
illicit activities, including transfers. In the life sciences
this problem is exacerbated by the very small quantities that
may be needed to be transferred to bolster a weapon's
capability. When snippets of protein are all that you need, the
notion of controlling transfers of such material becomes a less
than useful option.
Second, the global diffusion of the capability to exploit
such elements means the technology development and application
no longer conform to natural patterns of the past. There are a
number of key dimensions of the global technology diffusion
phenomenon with potentially important security implications for
the United States that I note in my statement. These
developments have created new economic and commercial realities
which in turn produce opportunities to overcome some of the
traditional barriers to acquiring chemical and biological
weapons and open new pathways to successful proliferation. But
perhaps the most challenging problem related to technology
diffusion is the latency of weapons development capabilities
inherent in that diffusion with little or no safety margin for
timely and effective responses to a decision by a potential
proliferator to pursue breakout.
Third, this latency highlights a third reality, that the
problem is more and more about knowledge. This is again
especially true with respect to the life sciences. Although it
is still an exaggeration to claim that yesterday's Nobel prize
winning research is today's standard bench practice and
tomorrow's high school science fair project. It is becoming
less and less of a stretch. If the necessary materials can be
isolated from nature or gained for legitimate scientific and
commercial purposes, and they can, and if the critical
equipment is available to support business and other economic
activity, and it is, then the crucial factor is what people
decide to do with those capabilities. The challenge is shaping
decisions about how science and technology will be used. The
task is to manage the risks associated with the use of that
science and technology in such a way that the potential for
misuse is minimized.
In this context it is still important to learn what we can
from the historical experience we have available, and in my
written testimony I discuss a number of historical examples. I
also focus on some international initiatives to combat the
illicit transfer or smuggling of weapons of mass destruction,
including PSI, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the G-8
Global Partnership. I do not have time to review these
discussions in detail, so in conclusion let me summarize my
observations based on looking at these two sets of issues.
First, they further highlight the differences between the
application of this approach and the nuclear field on one hand
and in the chemical and biological arenas on the other. The
fact of the matter is that controlling materials and equipment
is more possible in the nuclear arena because they are
significant in size and signature. One could also argue that it
matters more in the nuclear arena because gaining access to
nuclear materials remains a key hurdle to overcome in
developing a nuclear weapons capability. This is not the case
with respect to chemical and biological weapons for which
access to the materials and equipment is not the problem, so
much as a range of other technical and engineering challenges.
Second, these cases often underline the difficulty of
stopping illicit chemical and biological trafficking. The
details of the illicit transfer in the three historical cases I
looked at largely came to light only after the fact, suggesting
how hard it is to be successful in stopping chemical and
especially biological trafficking on a proactive basis, and it
will only become more difficult as trends such as global
technology diffusion continue.
Third, these difficulties reflect a point made earlier,
that in dealing with chemical and particularly biological
weapons proliferation, the key factor is not material or
equipment, but knowledge. With respect to both the life
sciences and chemistry, it is a very different world from that
which existed even a decade ago, and our knowledge in these
fields and what we will be able to do with that knowledge will
only accelerate in the period ahead. The resulting science and
technology, however, is neutral, and the issue will be the uses
to which that science and technology will be put. Because
chemistry and biology will not disappear, we live in a world in
which the potential misuse of these vital sciences is a
permanent risk. The challenge to governments and the broader
community is to find ways to manage those risks successfully.
Efforts to control or eliminate the illicit trafficking of
chemical or biological materials and equipment will make a
contribution to risk management efforts, but they are unlikely
to be decisive in and of themselves. To the extent they will
matter, it will be to the degree that they reinforce other risk
management efforts. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Moodie. Mr. Spector.
TESTIMONY OF LEONARD S. SPECTOR,\1\ DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
Mr. Spector. Thank you, Senator, for the opportunity to
testify this afternoon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Spector with an attachment
appears in the Appendix on page 62.
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Last week the Monterey Institute Center for
Nonproliferation Studies released an important new book which
is directly relevant to the hearings today, entitled ``The Four
Faces of Nuclear Terrorism.'' A core conclusion of that study
is that today the nuclear threat posed by other nuclear armed
states is being eclipsed by a new type of threat, that of
nuclear instruments in the hands of non-state terrorist
organizations. This reality requires a profound change in the
way the United States thinks about national security policy.
It is fair to conclude that at this point in history
terrorist organizations are the only entities that are seeking
to rain nuclear destruction on the United States without regard
to the potential consequences to themselves or to the
innumerable innocent victims of such action. Moreover, even in
those instances where nuclear assets in the hands of states
cause U.S. policy makers deep concerns, in virtually all of
these cases the foremost source of their apprehension is the
possibility not that the states themselves will use these
assets against us, but that these assets will come into the
hands of terrorist groups, who are all too eager to do so.
For this reason, as the Subcommittee analyzes the dangers
posed by clandestine nuclear smuggling networks, it is crucial
to focus, not only on the suppliers, but also on the customers
for their dangerous wares.
It appears that A.Q. Khan brought his network to his
customers--Iran, Libya, and North Korea. There has been no
evidence made public as yet to indicate that the Khan network,
itself, provided nuclear wherewithal to al Qaeda or other
terrorist groups, although it is known that certain individual
scientists in Pakistan were working with al Qaeda.
The U.S. and international response to A.Q. Khan's
activities, which include pressing Pakistan and other states to
close down his network, intensifying interdiction efforts
through the Proliferation Security Initiative, and pursuing a
series of diplomatic efforts to constrain Libya, Iran, and
North Korea, are all to the good. But these efforts are not
tailored to addressing the most crucial threat, which is
nuclear terrorism.
Here the customer is not really susceptible to diplomatic
carrots and sticks, and the network that connects terrorists
and nuclear materiel is as likely to be comprised of
interlinked terrorist cells that reach into poorly secured
nuclear centers, as it is to be comprised of unscrupulous
nuclear companies, technicians, and middle men that offer their
commodities on the international marketplace as Dr. Khan did.
Moreover, terrorists are highly unlikely to seek to
manufacture nuclear material. They are much more likely to try
to find the material ready made at a poorly secured site, let
us say in Russia or perhaps Pakistan, and to use that to
fabricate and improvised nuclear device, or they may seek to
acquire nuclear weapons themselves.
For these reasons it is essential, even as we attempt to
rollback networks, as David Albright and others have urged,
that we also focus on securing these materials at the source.
This means accelerating programs to secure, consolidate and
eliminate weapons usable nuclear materials, and also
intensifying efforts to consolidate nuclear weapons, and where
possible, in line with existing arms control undertakings, such
as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-92, to
eliminate these weapons.
In managing nuclear weapons material, moreover, it is
crucial to recognize and to act upon the fact that terrorists
will be most interested in highly enriched uranium, which they
could fabricate far more easily into a nuclear weapon than they
could fabricate plutonium. So we need to put HEU first when we
try to go about securing these materials.
We, in our study, thus urge the United States to
dramatically revise its efforts to protect fissile materials
abroad so as to make securing, consolidating and eliminating
highly enriched uranium the leading and most urgent task,
taking clear precedence over addressing the dangers posed by
plutonium which nonetheless must remain an important priority.
Our motto should be, put HEU, high enriched uranium, ``at the
head of the queue'' I have also attached a chapter of the
conclusions of our book to my testimony, which I hope you will
be able to include in the record of this hearing.
I would also add that UN Security Council Resolution 1540,
adopted earlier this year, and which is binding on all UN
member states, is an extremely valuable step forward because it
addresses not only the export control dimension, but also the
security of nuclear materials, and requires states to adopt
strong measures in both of these areas. It remains to be seen,
however, whether the resolution will be effectively
implemented, and a particular concern is the lack of specific
standards in the resolution that states would have to meet.
Just to make one final point as I close, the U.S.
Government now has a very wide range of initiatives aimed at
trying to constrain the dangers that are the subject of this
hearing. They are very effective or can be very effective when
they all work together and form a web of initiatives, a multi-
layered defense, to protect this country from the ultimate
nuclear danger. But we need our congressional oversight process
to monitor these various and very diverse initiatives. This
Subcommittee, being a part of the Governmental Affairs
Committee, is uniquely placed to monitor how all of these
different elements are interacting together, to identify the
areas of success, and to probe for gaps and urge that they be
addressed.
Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Mr. Spring.
TESTIMONY OF BAKER SPRING,\1\ F.M. KIRBY RESEARCH FELLOW IN
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Spring. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, appreciate the
opportunity to testify, and I will try and be very brief, given
the hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Spring appears in the Appendix on
page 86.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Chairman, the policy of the United States for combating
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has used four
tools. These tools are deterring attacks on the United States
and its friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction,
maintaining the ability to defend against such attacks,
preemptive attacks against those that would threaten the United
States and its friends and allies with weapons of mass
destruction against whatever capabilities they may possess and
arms control.
The trick is to fashion these four essential tools into a
coherent policy for combating proliferation that is properly
suited to countering the capabilities that either now or in the
future could be in the hands of rogue states and terrorist
groups.
The Bush Administration is pursuing a number of specific
initiatives to attack the proliferation threat posed by
international networks that traffic in weapons of mass
destruction and weapons technology by limiting access to
sensitive materials and interdicting relevant shipments in
transit. These include the Proliferation Security Initiative,
the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Container Security
Initiative, the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
Program, and the initiative under the International Shipment
Port Security Programs. Obviously, it is a wide variety.
I categorize several of these initiatives, and the PSI in
particular, more as arms control activities because they are
designed to keep weapons out of the hands of hostile actors, as
opposed to direct defense activities.
As we look at these kinds of programs, I think that we
should have several guidelines that help us make judgments on
what will be effective and how best to pursue these kinds of
initiatives. The first of these is to make sure that we use the
initiatives to foster a healthy competition with the
institutions of the treaty-based nonproliferation regime. In
other words, that they can go hand in hand, but we hope that we
would spur strong actions on both sides.
The second guideline is to resist the temptation to build
these particular initiatives into cumbersome international
bureaucracies. We have those international bureaucracies. They
have strengths, but they also have important weaknesses, and
having a diversity of institutions, some more bureaucratic than
others, I think, is appropriate.
The third guideline is to design the initiatives to harness
the power of sovereign states. Former Secretary of State
Schultz has spoken to this issue. I think that it is important
that the state-based system be used to the fullest extent
possible in terms of combating proliferation.
The fourth guideline is to avoid what I call quid pro quo
deals, particularly in these kinds of informal initiatives.
They may be necessary in the context of the Atoms for Peace
Program, for example, but in narrowly-pursued initiatives, I
hope that we do not end up watering down what is the objective
or purpose of these initiatives.
Specifically, I have several recommendations, and most of
these are particularly appropriate for the Proliferation
Security Initiative among those that are being undertaken by
the Bush Administration. The first is to focus on cracking down
on the domestic sources of proliferation, inside cooperating
states uncovered in the investigation of the A.Q. Khan network.
Unfortunately, as it has been revealed in the press at least--
and I do not know how accurate they may be ultimately, but that
PSI countries, for example, have been sources of technology
that have gone to that network and then on to other suspect
actors.
The second is that with these initiatives I hope that we
would forswear international employees and rely on the
government employees to perform the bureaucratic functions of
these initiatives. I know that the Chairman of the Subcommittee
expressed concern about this, but I think it is actually a
source of strength.
The third recommendation is to establish new initiatives.
The ones that I would be focused on are on international
organizations or initiatives that would use individual member
states to focus on dismantling weapons programs in countries
that agree to that, like Libya, hopefully in the future like
North Korea, instead of relying exclusively on the
international bureaucracies in the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons or the International Atomic
Energy Agency. In other words, I would like to see some tiger
teams go in and accompany the international bureaucracies in
terms of dismantlement.
The same would extend to another initiative that I envision
on verification. That is, if the dismantlement process proceeds
and other transparency measure are undertaken, that
verification is not left up solely to the international
bureaucracies.
The final recommendation that I have is something that has
been pursued in the PSI in terms of outreach to other states
that are not core participants, but are cooperative in terms of
their attitudes, and that is by pursuing it on a regional
basis. I think the Japanese, in particular, did this very
effectively with regard to the PSI in terms of fostering
support from those countries in Asia that have agreed to at
least cooperate with the overall initiative.
My bottom line message, I think, Mr. Chairman, is that the
international structure is still based largely on the nation
state system, and to the extent that we can reinforce the
nation state system in order to pursue these goals, as well as
benefit from it, I think that the counterproliferation
initiatives that the Bush Administration is undertaking will
serve as a very useful, indeed, I think, indispensable element
of a comprehensive policy for countering proliferation in all
of the important categories that we have talked about here
today.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your statements.
I have questions for you, Mr. Albright. On June 24, 2003,
the European Union issued a document entitled ``Basic
Principles for an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction.'' I am certain you are familiar with this
resolution. The EU detailed a plan of action that called for
promoting universal adherence to multilateral agreements
relating to weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery, strengthening the biological and chemical weapons
conventions, criminalizing the export or brokering of WMD
related material, and strengthening export regimes, and there
are others.
I would appreciate any thoughts you might have, or any of
the others might have on the EU plan, either now or for the
record. Was there, for example, any recommendations you
disagreed with? The Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency has called for far-reaching changes to the
nuclear nonproliferation regime, and one particular proposal is
to make export controls which are now voluntary and legally
binding. Again, what are your views on this idea, and do you
see any drawbacks to adopting it?
Let me stop with those two, and start with you, Dr.
Albright.
Mr. Albright. Thanks. I probably know less about the EU
deal than you may think. I would say though that I think the EU
is trying to put down a marker and a commitment to multilateral
solutions, which in general I agree with. I think the idea that
is prevalent here of a coalition of the willing driving our
foreign policy just does not work. I think that has been our
experience historically. You do need binding commitments that
are legally enforceable to make progress in these areas, and I
think the EU has the right idea.
In terms of export controls, I think I do support trying to
create a treaty-based system of export controls. I have been
evaluating illicit procurement for 20 years, and it is just so
difficult to stop it with the existing system. People like A.Q.
Khan make fun of the existing system. You can look in his
statements and find how he basically says, ``Whatever you do, I
will get around it.''
So I think we need a fundamental restructuring. I think
what ElBaradei has proposed of a treaty-based system is very
sound. In my testimony I have tried to convey support for that
idea and begin to talk about it, particularly where the
International Atomic Energy Agency is used as the verification
and monitoring agency. The IAEA exists. It is actively working
in this area now, working in Libya, Iran, and on the A.Q. Khan
network. It probably has more expertise about the Khan network
than any other body, including any government, about what that
network was doing. I think those kind of activities at the IAEA
should be generalized and the IAEA given a mandate to actually
work in this area of export controls and monitoring.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Moodie.
Mr. Moodie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think any step that
reflects a commitment on the part of states to strengthen our
ability to deal with proliferation is to be welcome. But I
think that we have to be cautious in that because it is easy to
talk a good game and harder to play it. I think that
historically we have consistently had a problem with the
response of the international community, including some of our
friends in Europe, to problems of noncompliance. I think we
have to be sure that the actions of our allies are matching
their rhetoric when it comes to dealing with some of these
issues.
In that regard I think the question of how the Europeans
will respond to what we are seeing in Iran is a very
interesting case study, and how they will play this now that
the IAEA has in a sense expressed its displeasure at the
Iranian experience. What the Group of Three will do, what their
colleagues in the European Union will do, I think is going to
be a very interesting measure of how seriously they take their
nonproliferation responsibilities.
With respect to export controls, I think they continue to
play an enormously helpful role in the overall structure of the
nonproliferation efforts, but I think particularly in the
chemical area and especially in the biological area, I think
export controls over time will be of diminishing utility. They
were created in a world with respect to the life sciences and
how those sciences are applied commercially on a global basis.
That is a world that does not exist any more, and that world is
going to change even further, and therefore, the tools we have
like export controls that were designed for that different
world, I think we have to go back and do a very serious
examination as to the nature of their utility in this new
world.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Mr. Spector.
Mr. Spector. I guess I would say we have a treaty that
requires export controls in the nuclear field as well as in the
chemical area, but let me just talk about nuclear. The
Nonproliferation Treaty requires all member states to make any
exports of nuclear goods under International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards. Thus, there is a requirement already that
these goods be controlled and that certain restrictions apply.
The actual list of items that is to be controlled is developed
by the nuclear suppliers countries, but it is also applied by
the Nonproliferation Treaty Exporters Group, and I would think
that all parties to the Treaty are bound by this de facto, if
not de jure. There is also now the Resolution 1540, which
places a mandatory requirement for states to have effective
export controls on weapons of mass destruction related
materials and equipment.
I think if you combine the two of these you have a treaty-
based system for virtually all states, with the handful of
exceptions of the countries that are not in the
Nonproliferation Treaty. But even they are now required, under
Resolution 1540 to be mindful of their exports. So I do not
know that we want to take this that much further. I think the
IAEA has an awful lot to do right now just trying to manage its
safeguards mandate and get this extended with the Additional
Protocol and some of the other measures. So I would be hesitant
to propose that it take on a major new initiative that would
involve a new treaty. I think we would be better off working
with the tools that are now in hand, including the treaty-based
tools that I mentioned.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Spring.
Mr. Spring. I pretty much agree with what has been said
here so far, both with regard to the European initiative and
with regard to some sort of new treaty-based regime on export
controls.
I just have one comment or observation as it relates to the
latter issues on export controls, and that is, that if we go
down this road, we have to recognize that there are weaknesses
in what I call the ``least common denominator'' decisionmaking
process, especially with broad-based multilateral institutions.
And to the extent that we fail to recognize that within these
institutions--Iran, for example--is still for all intents and
purposes a member in good standing of the IAEA, that we will
lose sight of some of the other effective measures, I think
that we can take, that would be among those narrower coalitions
that are the subject of the administration initiatives,
including the PSI.
Senator Akaka. I have other questions for you, and I know
the time is late, and I know we have delayed you here tonight.
I would ask that we place these questions in the record for
you, and you can respond to us. At this time I would want to
keep the record open for additional materials until close of
business next Wednesday, June 30.
I want to thank you for your knowledge in these areas, and
for your responses that will be helpful to us.
So I would like to conclude with this panel. I want to
thank you very much for your participation here, and look
forward to being in contact with you again.
If there is no further business, then on behalf of the
Chairman, Senator Fitzgerald, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:16 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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