[Senate Hearing 108-544]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-544
A FRESH START FOR HAITI?
CHARTING THE FUTURE OF
U.S.-HAITIAN RELATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
PEACE CORPS AND NARCOTICS AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 10, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE
CORPS AND NARCOTICS AFFAIRS
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota, Chairman
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BARBARA BOXER, California
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California................ 4
Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, Chairman of the
Subcommittee................................................... 1
Cummings, Hon. Elijah, U.S. Representative from Maryland......... 12
DeWine, Hon. Mike, U.S. Senator from Ohio........................ 5
Dobbins, Hon. James, Director, International Security and Defense
Policy Center, RAND............................................ 67
Prepared statement........................................... 70
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut......... 18
Franco, Hon. Adolfo, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Latin
America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International
Development.................................................... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Graham, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Florida...................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Heinl, Michael, Co-Author, ``Written in Blood, The Story of the
Haitian People 1492-1995, Washington, DC....................... 75
Maguire, Robert, Director, Programs in International Affairs,
Trinity College, Washington, D.C............................... 77
Prepared statement........................................... 79
Noriega, Hon. Roger, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs, Department of State........................ 21
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Pezzullo, Hon. Lawrence, Former U.S. Special Envoy to Haiti
(Retired), Washington, D.C..................................... 72
Prepared statement........................................... 73
Waters, Hon. Maxine, U.S. Representative from California......... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Appendix
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record by
Members of the Committee....................................... 101
Responses to Questions Submitted by Senator Dodd to Assistant
Secretary of State Roger Noriega........................... 101
Responses to Questions Submitted by Senator DeWine to
Assistant Secretary of State Roger Noriega................. 103
Responses to Questions Submitted by Senator DeWine to
Assistant Administrator Adolfo Franco, USAID............... 104
Additional Information Submitted for the Record.................. 106
Joint Proposal & Position Paper: The Haiti Reconstruction
Fund, prepared March 2, 2004 by The National Organization
for The Advancement of Haitians............................ 106
(iii)
A FRESH START FOR HAITI?
CHARTING THE FUTURE OF U.S.-HAITIAN RELATIONS
----------
Wednesday, March 10, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m. in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Norm Coleman,
Chairman of the subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators
Coleman, Dodd, Boxer, and Bill Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Coleman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and
Narcotics Affairs will come to order.
I'd like to thank our witnesses for coming to this
important hearing, and Congressman Cummings, for being so on
time. And I certainly would like to acknowledge the tremendous
interest in this topic.
Haiti is the second-oldest republic in the hemisphere, a
country of great promise. Unfortunately, that promise has not
yet borne fruit. Haiti is the most impoverished nation in our
hemisphere, has the highest AIDS rate, and a very, very
troubled 200-year history.
The title of this hearing, ``A Fresh Start for Haiti?
Charting the Future of U.S.-Haitian Relations,'' was chosen
very carefully. I believe there is a moment of opportunity here
to come together to think about lending a hand to Haiti to
support a future that is an improvement over Haiti's past. I
look forward to hearing, from our witnesses, practical and
specific ideas to put Haiti on track for a more promising
future.
I know there has been considerable debate in Washington
over the issue of Haiti, and with Aristide's departure, that
division has only intensified. Let me lay out my own view on
President Aristide.
He may have come to office through elections that had the
trappings of democracy, but that does not mean he governed like
a democrat. Aristide broke and politicized the Haitian police,
chose to rely instead on a paramilitary group of supporters to
harass and even kill opponents. He has been accused of drug
trafficking and corruption. Rigged parliamentary elections in
2000 were never resolved. Having lost the trust of the Haitian
people, Aristide decided to resign from the Haitian presidency.
I trust the statements of Secretary of State Powell, and I do
not believe Aristide was kidnapped or overthrown by a coup
d'etat.
There is an important point here. Fair elections are very
important, but democracy has got to mean something more than
just periodic elections. Democracy needs honest governance,
freedom of expression and assembly, protection of human rights.
President Aristide fell short in all these measures, and I
believe the people of Haiti can do better.
There is a legitimate concern regarding U.S. policy toward
a faltering democracy, such as Haiti. What is our international
responsibility to stand with democratically elected governments
that have lost the trust of their people? But our challenge and
focus now is, how do we meet the needs of the Haitian people
today and tomorrow? While Congress has an essential role in
holding the administration accountable on foreign and domestic
policy, I believe we do a disservice to the people of Haiti if
we spend too much time turning their latest crisis into a
political rallying cry in this country. I think there is an
incredible moment of opportunity here for the U.S. and the
international community to join together to make a sustained
and long-term investment in Haiti. Haiti needs our help. It
does not need our bickering.
The deployment of international forces and the distribution
of emergency humanitarian aid is a good start to deal with
Haiti's short-term crisis. I hope the witnesses will shed some
light on how many troops are going to be needed and what is
going to be the role of the U.N., CARICOM, and other
multilateral groups. I also hope the witnesses will discuss
efforts to get food and medical supplies to Haiti's neediest
hospitals and orphanages. I also want to express my hope that
our embassy will get to work on the many pending international
adoption cases.
There is a political process unfolding in Haiti. As
stipulated in Haiti's constitution, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court became interim President upon Aristide's
departure. And according to the principles set out in the
CARICOM plan yesterday, a council of seven Haitians appointed
former Minister Gerard Latortue as interim President.
In the long term, I believe the U.S. needs to make an
investment in the new Haitian Government. We must, however,
keep this government accountable to put our assistance to good
use and to uphold the principles of human rights and good
governance that matter to Americans. I was proud to work with
Senator Nelson on an amendment that sends a message about this
financial commitment, but I believe we need to begin to develop
specific plans. To that end, I will have some specific
questions for our witnesses.
I would like to place into the record an op-ed, which
appeared in the Minneapolis Star Tribune today, by Brian
Atwood, former director of USAID and now dean of the Humphrey
Institute of Public Afairs at the University of Minnesota,
someone my colleagues may remember well. Mr. Atwood appeals to
us to work in a bipartisan way, rather than finger-pointing, to
give Haiti a better future.
[The information referred to follows:]
U.S. Needs To Stop Playing Partisan Politics With Haiti
[by j. brian atwood--minneapolis star tribune, march 10, 2004]
Even an optimist has a hard time being positive about Haiti's
future. After more than a decade of experimentation with democracy,
Haiti is today a failed state. Haiti's elected president is once again
seeking asylum, forced out by armed thugs and major international
powers who lost patience with him.
The controversy today is whether the United States forced President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide out of power, participating in what he has
called a ``coup d'etat.'' One can only believe the denials the Bush
administration has offered, though for reasons unrelated to Haiti, many
will not. No, if Aristide was forced out, it was not at the end of an
American gun. He was instead the victim of longstanding American
neglect.
It may be a very long while before Aristide ever sees Haiti again.
But that is less important than knowing whether Haiti will ever again
be a viable nation state. Will this island, just off the coast of
Florida, end up being an inhospitable prison for its 8 million
inhabitants? Will it become a safe-haven for drug traffickers or
terrorists? Or will it become a stable, functioning polity with an
economy viable enough to satisfy its people's needs?
These are vital questions for our political leaders, for the
answers have serious national security implications--and not just for
the people of Florida. A policy of treating Haiti as if it were
Alcatraz prison may satisfy our need to protect Florida from a huge
influx of refugees, but it will not protect our Nation from the threats
that could emanate from a failed state.
We never did give Haiti's democratic government the support it
needed. We in the Clinton administration tried very hard to support the
new democracy. We made choices that seemed reasonable given the
constraints in Washington, but in retrospect some of those choices came
to undermine that goal.
We insisted, for example, that Aristide serve out the remaining
part of his term rather than staying in office long enough to
compensate for his years of asylum. The consequence was that a popular
president had to leave office after about a year. The subsequent
election placed in office a man widely believed to be an Aristide
puppet. This served neither the new government nor Aristide, as it
undercut confidence in the new president and made Aristide look like a
behind-the-scenes manipulator.
We offered $100 million a year in foreign assistance--a generous
amount--but the needs were closer to $1 billion. Our expectation was
that the World Bank would provide large soft loans to help repair and
create much-needed infrastructure. These resources were never
forthcoming. The great dividend democracy was to provide never became a
reality and disillusionment set in.
Aristide was reelected in 2001 and took office just after President
Bush entered the White House. The Bush administration made it clear
from the beginning that it would not be very friendly. Aristide, after
all, was the president that Bill Clinton restored to power. The
Aristide election was messy. His Lavalas Party claimed national
assembly seats that it most likely stole through ballot-box fraud.
While Aristide's margin of victory put his popular election beyond
dispute, opposition complaints about stolen assembly seats soured the
relationship with the new U.S. administration. Soon, direct aid to the
Haitian government was cut off; the administration used Haiti's
political stalemate as an excuse to do nothing.
It is often said in the democracy-promotion business that elections
do not make a democracy. The institutions and values of democracy take
years to build. When the backdrop is abject poverty, the challenge
becomes immense. New leaders are expected to change these conditions
overnight. In the case of Haiti, the international community, with the
United States in the lead, provided too little help at first and then
turned its back.
Thus, Aristide, an imperfect leader but a man thoroughly capable of
empathy for the poor, was denied the wherewithal to respond to their
plight. It was only a matter of time before the clash between warlords
would fill the political vacuum. This is not unique to Haiti. Conflict
is common in the world's poorest nations.
Yet, there is always hope, even for failed states. Uganda is a
perfect example of a nation that resurrected itself after two civil
wars and years of despotic leadership. Uganda is halfway around the
world, Haiti is not.
There is no question that our leaders in Washington have played
politics with Haiti. Republicans criticized Clinton for sending in the
military and then abandoned a democratically elected president because
they did not like his politics. Democrats saw the constraints more
clearly than the opportunities and were too quick to excuse Aristide's
failures of governance.
It is time to stop playing partisan politics with Haiti and to
start seeing it as a potential national security threat. If our
political parties can work together on this problem, the United States
can help turn Haiti around. It may take a large investment and a
generation, but one thing is certain: We cannot afford a failed state
of 8 million people just off our shore.
Senator Coleman. We have a lot of people who want to speak
this afternoon, so I must ask the panelists to keep their
remarks to just five minutes. Logistics dictate that we need to
be strict on this point if we're ever going to make it through
these three panels and 11 witnesses.
With that, I would acknowledge that my good friend and
colleague, Senator Dodd, will be here later; at that time he
will have an opportunity to make opening remarks.
I would, then, defer to my colleague, Senator Boxer, if she
has any opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am just so pleased to see the Honorable Elijah Cummings
here, the Honorable Maxine Waters here, because I've spoken to
them, I've heard from them on this issue. Mr. Chairman, I think
we're going to benefit from their wisdom. Congresswoman Maxine
Waters was in Haiti.
And I'm just going to make a few statements here,
observations. And I hear, in your remarks, that you're looking
ahead, and you're saying we need to help the people, and I'm
with you a hundred percent. But I have to tell you, we'd better
spend a couple of minutes looking back, because the
ramifications of what has happened, I think, are huge.
And let me start by saying, I have great respect for
Secretary of State Colin Powell. And before the U.S. helped
Aristide flee the country--or some would say, told him if he
didn't flee, he's a dead man, in so many words--Colin Powell
said the following, ``Aristide is the democratically elected
President of Haiti, and we cannot allow a situation to come
about where he is thrown out of power by thugs or by some rebel
movement or the opposition.'' This is what he said. That was
February 18th.
The next day, this is what he said, ``In many cases, it's
just a few thugs that are dominating a particular town or city,
and so what we have to try to do now is stand with President
Aristide--he is the elected President of Haiti--and do what we
can to help him.'' He was still with Aristide on that next day.
But by February 28th, the administration changed its tune.
This is ten days later. An official White House statement that
Aristide's, ``failure to adhere to democratic principles has
contributed to the deep polarization and violent unrest that we
are witnessing in Haiti today. His own actions have called into
question his fitness to continue to govern Haiti. We urge him
to examine his position carefully,'' whatever that means, ``to
accept responsibility, and to act in the best interest of the
people of Haiti.''
So, Mr. Chairman, ten days before, Colin Powell is saying,
he's the elected President and we stand by him. We're going to
do what we can to help him. And ten days later, a signal is
being sent--a very clear signal--that he's got to get out of
the country, obviously calling for his resignation.
Now, my understanding is, Aristide had agreed to power-
sharing plans, he agreed to political compromise. So I need to
understand, from this administration--and I know the witnesses
before us, at this panel, can't answer for the administration--
but I want to know what, in ten days, changed that they would
say, on one day, you're the democratically elected President,
and then, ten days later, send a signal to the thugs there,
don't worry, the United States is with you. And why do I say
that? We have people, like Guy Philippe and Louis Jodel
Chamblain--and I know that our witnesses here know them better
than I. My understanding is--and they've been called murderous
thugs. They've been called murderous thugs. And according to
news reports, Mr. Chamblain shouted, ``We're grateful to the
United States.'' And Mr. Philippe said, ``The United States
soldiers are like us. We're brothers. We're grateful for their
service to our nation and against the terrorists of Aristide.''
So, here we have this situation. Now, who's suffering the
most? The people of Haiti. And that's where I join in with your
comments, that clearly we have to help the people of Haiti. But
we cannot allow what has occurred to go by as if it was just
nothing. Because it was something, something that makes me very
confused about whether we believe it when we tell countries in
the world that if you're democratically elected, you'll have us
to stand with you, and then, all of a sudden, send these
signals out. Whether Aristide was good, bad, indifferent, he
was elected. And the question is, What made that ten-day
change? And that's why I'm really here--two reasons--to find
out what happened that we made this U-turn, and to see what can
we do now to make sure that thugs and murderers don't take over
this country?
Thank you.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, very, very much, Senator Boxer.
I've asked my colleagues, Senator DeWine and Senator
Graham, to participate. This is the first opportunity the
Senate has had to explore this issue, and I felt it important
to get their perspectives.
With that, I would turn to my colleague, Senator DeWine.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE DeWINE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator DeWine. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
allowing me to be here today. And I congratulate you for
holding this hearing, as well as Senator Dodd.
I don't pretend to be an expert on Haiti. I've had the
opportunity to travel there, I think, 13 times in the last 10
years, since I have been in the Senate. There is really no
other nation like Haiti in our hemisphere. Haiti is different.
Haiti is unique. No other nation in our hemisphere is as
impoverished. Today, at least 80 percent of all Haitians live
in dire poverty, with at least 75, 85 percent either unemployed
or under-employed. Per capita annual income is less than $400,
although those figures are really, frankly, irrelevant when you
travel to Haiti, see the unbelievable poverty.
No other nation in our hemisphere has a higher rate of HIV/
AIDS. AIDS is the number-one cause of all adult deaths in
Haiti, killing at least 30,000 Haitians annually, and orphaning
200,000 children. No other nation in our hemisphere has a
higher infant-mortality rate or a lower life-expectancy rate.
No other nation in our hemisphere is as environmentally
strapped. Haiti is really an ecological disaster today, with a
98 percent deforestation rate and extreme topsoil erosion.
But despite its radical differences from other countries in
this hemisphere, Haiti remains in our backyard. It is
intrinsically linked to the United States by history, by
geography, by humanitarian concerns, by the illicit drug trade,
and by the ever-present possibility of waves of incoming
refugees.
Haiti's problems, Mr. Chairman, are our problems, and we
aren't going to be able to do anything about any of these
problems unless Haiti, the United States, and the international
community are all willing to, today, take bold and radical
steps. Business as usual in regard to how we deal with Haiti is
just not going to get it anymore. If we do not want to be in a
position, Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, where we see marines
back on the shores of Haiti every two or three years from now
on, we're going to have to do things differently.
I have several ideas I'd like to share with the
subcommittee.
First, I believe the international community must help
Haiti to restore a democratically elected government, one free
of corruption and the influence and involvement of violent
human-rights-abusing thugs and killers. That obviously means
that the rebels, who we've already heard referenced today by
some of my colleagues, simply cannot be part of this new
government.
Second, I believe that the international community must
free Haiti of its $1.17 billion in foreign debt. And I think
the United States should take the lead in that. That is a debt
that has been passed down from government to government. It is
a debt that burns the Haitian people, that will continue to
keep them in poverty. And it should be done away with, and we
should take the lead in that. I believe that we can set
conditions on that, that we can set conditions of good
governance, and set that over a period of time. But we should
make it clear that that debt should be done away with, and we
should go and work with the international community to do that.
Third, we must increase trade and create jobs, and help the
Haitians work. These are people, Mr. Chairman, who are very
energetic people. They're a hardworking people. They want
nothing more than what we want, and that is to feed their
families. I have introduced, along with Congressman Clay Shaw,
in the House, a trade bill. In the Senate, it is S. 489. If
this bill were enacted, it would help restore jobs and create
new ones. Haiti, at one time in the not-too-distant past, had
at least 100,000 assembly jobs, very simple assembly jobs that
people could take pride in and that fed many, many families.
Today, Haiti has less than 30,000 of these assembly jobs. The
passage of this bill would lead to, very quickly, the creation
of at least another 70,000 to 80,000 of these jobs.
Fourth, we must help Haiti develop a self-sufficient system
of agriculture, and stop the influx of people into Cap-Haitien
and Port-au-Prince, into the slums of these two cities, where
they cannot make a living.
Fifth, we must help Haiti restore the rule of law. The
international community needs to resume programs for mentoring
magistrates and judges, and the new Haitian Government needs to
create a functioning disciplinary body to oversee the entire
judiciary.
Sixth, we must help Haiti establish an independent,
professional national police force, one capable of quelling the
violence of the armed thugs who threaten the streets of Haiti
with abandon.
And, seventh, and finally, the international community
should immediately restore the direct aid to the government
that was suspended under President Aristide so Haiti can
rebuild much-needed institutions and infrastructure for the
delivery of food, humanitarian aid, and healthcare.
Just to put this in perspective, in 1994, prior to
Aristide's reinstatement of power during a time of military
dictatorship under Cedras, our assistance to Haiti was far
greater than it is today. In 1994, we provided, Mr. Chairman,
$69 million. The current budget is for $54 million. We have, at
one time, provided up to $235 million. If we are to make a real
difference--and I don't want to suggest any particular figure,
but we're going to have to be at, at least, the $150 million
that the Foreign Relations Committee reported out last week.
Finally--and I know the bell has rung; let me just make one
final, if I could, comment, and that pertains to the current
situation in Haiti. It is abundantly clear, from the people
that I talk to in Haiti today, both in Port-au-Prince and
outside Port-au-Prince, that while our troops are doing a
tremendous job there, it is abundantly clear to me that there
are not enough troops in Haiti today. And it is a danger to
those troops by not having enough troops, and it is also clear
to me that unless more troops are put into Haiti by the United
States, that we are not going to be able to stabilize the
situation, and that this crucial period of three months before
the U.N. moves in is a very, very delicate timetable, very
delicate period of time, and it's essential that more U.S.
troops be put in.
Senator Coleman. Thank you very, very much, Senator DeWine.
I noted that I specifically asked my colleagues, Senator DeWine
and Senator Graham, to participate in this discussion today.
This is the first time the Senate has had a chance to visit
this issue.
Senator Graham, I defer to you for any opening comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. BOB GRAHAM,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Graham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate your holding this hearing today on an issue that is
extremely important to a near neighbor of the United States,
but also raises issues about U.S. policy in similar
circumstances around the world.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask that my prepared testimony be
placed in the committee record, and I will speak from a
somewhat shortened version.
Senator Coleman. Without objection.
Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, the departure of former
President Aristide, just ten days ago, caused the people of
Haiti to enter a new phase of their efforts to build a
democracy. There has been, there will be, much discussion about
the nature of that departure and the characteristics that
surrounded it. I have spoken and written on those in the past.
Today, I want to talk about what we need to be doing
immediately in order to be of maximum assistance.
I want to associate myself with the comments of a man who
has shown the deepest commitment and compassion to the people
of Haiti, Senator DeWine. I would characterize his remarks as
particularly focused on the mid-range issues in Haiti. I'm
going to focus more on the short-range. What do we do in--
starting with the circumstances that existed--that exist on the
streets today?
The question I'm here to discuss is, What should be the
role of the United States, as a good neighbor, to the 8 million
people living in one of the poorest and, currently, one of the
most violent countries on earth? From firsthand experience over
the past three decades, I know the Haitian people to be
hardworking, to be committed to improving their lives, even in
the face of unimaginable hardship.
Tens of thousands of Haitian refugees have resettled in my
home state. I have come to appreciate their strong commitment
to family, their religious values, the understanding of the
benefits of education to themselves and their children, and to
an entrepreneurial spirit that would improve any community in
America. I know that the United States and the international
community have a strong desire to see Haiti succeed.
We also have the lessons of the past decade to learn from
as we try once again to help the Haitian people build
governmental institutions and a growing economy. The road ahead
will not be easy, nor is the outcome assured. That is why it is
imperative that the United States takes a strong and
constructive role in Haiti at this time.
Let me quote from some statements that were made just
yesterday by the CIA director, George Tenet, relative to the
circumstances in Haiti. Director Tenet said, ``What concerns me
is the possibility that the interim government, backed by
international forces, will have trouble establishing order. A
humanitarian disaster or mass migration remains possible. Anti-
Aristide rebels still exert de facto control over many parts of
the country and have yet to make good on promises to lay down
their arms.''
I am here today to call on the administration and the
Congress to take immediate action to fulfill our
responsibilities and to act in our national interest to
stabilize the situation in Haiti, and to begin to build a long-
term stable, democratic state. I would pose four steps to do
this immediately, and a fifth that has longer-range
implications.
First is security. The tragic events of recent days
indicate that the security forces that we've sent to Haiti,
along with the French, the Canadian, and the Chilean forces who
are there, are not sufficient to maintain order and security. I
would join in the remarks that Senator DeWine has made to that
effect. Additional forces are needed immediately to provide a
level of security that will allow the democratic institutions
to develop, a broad-based provisional government to be
organized, and commercial activity to restart. I happened to
meet a man, in the Miami Airport on Monday, who runs a small
manufacturing plant near the airport in Port-au-Prince. He says
his business has been shut down because the customs service in
Haiti is shut down and they can't clear either materials coming
in or exiting the country. And that put several hundred people,
who earn their living at his plant, in jeopardy of losing their
jobs.
Mr. Chairman, I see and hear that the red light is on, so
if I could just limit myself to one sentence?
Senator Coleman. If you could sum up, Senator Graham, that
would be fine. Thank you.
Senator Graham. Humanitarian assistance--there clearly is a
threat of a humanitarian crisis of catastrophic proportions.
And according to today's news reports, we are engaged in an
urgent appeal to raise $35 million for six months of
humanitarian aid. If necessary, the United States is going to
have to step in and front-load that assistance, particularly
food and medical facilities.
The United States, third, should have a permanent senior
person, who has the respect of the President, the Congress, and
the American people, to serve on a full-time basis as the
President's representative in Haiti.
And, fourth, the political transition, the task of putting
together a broad-based transitional government is going to be
very challenging, yet I see this as a rare opportunity. Success
in Haiti will require a sustained political effort led by the
United States, supported by the international community, that
moves towards free and fair elections and the other components
of a functioning democracy.
And let me just conclude, Mr. Chairman, with a final
comment about the long term. What we have seen now twice in
Haiti--we've seen it in Bosnia, we've seen it in Somalia, we've
seen it in Kosovo, we've seen it Afghanistan, and we've seen it
in Iraq. What have we seen? We've seen the United States
military be called to action, and, with great professionalism
and expedition of time and, in most instances, limited or no
casualties, they've carried out their military mission. And
then what happens? We move to the occupation phase, and
everything seems to collapse. The fact that we had an
occupation in Haiti for the better part of two years just ten
years ago, and now we're back with a Haiti that many would
argue is worse off than it was in 1994, is one illustration of
that.
I think we need to accept the fact that the United States
will have a role in nation-building, in nation-sustaining
efforts. And rather than attempt to deny that fact, let's get
prepared to do it. As an example, there should be a reserve
force of at least 50,000 people, selected from the law
enforcement agencies of the world, who are prepared and trained
to do specifically the kind of work that the streets of Cap-
Haitien and Port-au-Prince require today, and they should be
distributed in terms of their linguistic and cultural
backgrounds so that they can effectively move in and provide
assistance. A similar reserve corps of civil engineers should
be on hand, so we don't have the situation we did in Iraq, of
where Saddam Hussein was able to restore the electric system
more quickly in 1991 after the war, than we were able to
restore it in 2003.
Senator Coleman. Senator Graham, if you could finalize your
comments.
Senator Graham. I would just finalize by saying, I look
forward to working with this committee on all of these issues,
particularly this development of a permanent capability to
respond to the challenges of occupation.
And I thank you, again, for your interest in this very
important subject.
[The prepared statement of Senator Graham follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Bob Graham
With the departure of former President Aristide 10 days ago, the
people of Haiti have entered a new phase in their efforts to build a
prosperous democracy. I am hopeful that the next chapter on Haiti will
have a better ending than the chapter that was just concluded.
There is a need to determine the exact circumstances surrounding
President Aristide's departure, but that is not our undertaking at this
hearing. The question we should be addressing is, What should be our
role as a good neighbor to 8 million people living in one of the
poorest and, currently, most violent countries on the Earth?
From firsthand experience over the past three decades, I know the
Haitian people to be hard working and committed to improving their
lives even in the face of unimaginable hardship. Tens of thousands of
Haitian refugees have resettled in my home state, and I have come to
appreciate their strong commitments to family, to religious values, to
the benefits of education for themselves and their children, and to an
entrepreneurial spirit that would benefit any community in America.
And I know that the United States and the international community
have a strong desire to see Haiti succeed.
We also have the lessons of the past decade to learn from as we try
again to help the Haitian people build governmental institutions and a
growing economy.
But the road ahead will not be easy, nor is the outcome assured.
That is why it is imperative that the United States takes a strong and
constructive role in rebuilding Haiti.
To do this right is our responsibility and is in our national
security interest. If we shy away from our responsibilities or fail to
maintain our commitment long enough, we will find ourselves back again
in Haiti in 2014, just where we are today, 10 years after our last
half-hearted effort to bring democracy there--forced to start
rebuilding from scratch.
As CIA Director George Tenet testified before the Armed Services
Committee on Tuesday:
In this hemisphere, of course, the situation in HAITI is very
fluid. The process of setting up an interim government and
moving toward new elections has just begun. Selection of a
consensus prime minister this week would be an important next
step. What concerns me is the possibility that the interim
government, backed by international forces, will have trouble
establishing order. A humanitarian disaster or mass migration
remains possible. Anti Aristide rebels still exert de facto
control over many parts of the country and have yet to make
good on promises to lay down their arms. Those forces include
armed gangs, former Haitian Army officers, and members of
irregular forces who allegedly killed Aristide supporters
during his exile.
A cycle of clashes and revenge killings could easily be set
off, given the large number of angry, well-armed people on both
sides. Improving security will require the difficult task of
disarming armed groups and augmenting and retraining a national
security force.
The interim government's nascent consensus could also run
aground if hardline Lavalas (pro-Aristide) or Democratic
Platform (anti-Aristide) elements break ranks and seek to exert
control.
I am here to today to call on the administration and Congress to
take immediate action to fulfill our responsibilities and to act in our
national interests to stabilize the situation in Haiti and to begin to
build a stable democratic state.
I would propose a five-point plan that needs to be put into action
immediately:
1. Security
The tragic events of recent days indicate that the security force
that we have sent to Haiti, along with French troops, are not
sufficient to maintain order and security.
Additional forces are needed immediately to provide a level of
security that will allow the democratic institutions to develop, a
broad-based provisional government to be organized, and commercial
activity to restart.
The forces currently in Haiti are obviously not sufficient for the
task. One lesson of our past involvements in nation building is that
you need to use maximum, not minimum, military presence at the outset.
The current incremental approach is a proven recipe for failure.
Already we see the armed groups threatening to re-emerge if
international forces cannot protect the people.
2. Humanitarian Assistance
Haiti is the poorest nation in our hemisphere. The current
political unrest has halted humanitarian shipments to some parts of the
country for weeks.
We all saw news footage of warehouses full of humanitarian supplies
being looted during the unrest. A more vigorous effort to provide
humanitarian food and medical supplies throughout the country needs to
be implemented immediately.
The United Nations on Tuesday issued an appeal for $35 million for
six months' worth of humanitarian aid, but given the desperate
circumstances there, that may prove to be too little, especially if it
arrives too late.
3. Leadership
A project as big as rebuilding Haiti is not a part time job. The
President needs to appoint a senior person to lead this effort on a
full-time basis. This person needs to be experienced in the problems
associated with nation-building and the particular problems of Haiti.
This person needs to be respected by both parties so that they will
be able to effectively argue for the resources that will be required to
accomplish the task at hand. Finally, this person must be of sufficient
stature in the administration that their voice will be heard when
needed.
4. Political Transition
The task of putting together a broad-based transitional government
is very challenging, yet I believe a rare opportunity exists at this
time. Success in Haiti will require a sustained political effort, led
by the United States, supported by the international community, that
moves towards free and fair elections.
This is a particularly challenging task given the history of
elections in Haiti. Nevertheless, it is a prerequisite to building
self-sustaining governmental institutions and a growing economy.
We have recognized the importance of this type of effort in Iraq. I
hope we will recognize its importance just a few hundred miles from our
shores.
5. Nation-Building Capacity
Finally, let me say that there is one lesson that we must take from
our experiences in the past decade or so, not just from Haiti but from
Somalia, Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq--and now from Haiti again.
Some have denied that the United States should have any interest in
``nation building'' or ``nation sustaining'' efforts, but I would
describe that as being a supreme state of denial. It is inescapable
that the United States, as the sole superpower in the world, is going
to have a responsibility--once a dictator has been deposed or another
action taken--to lead the international community in helping countries
such as Haiti get back on their feet and move forward.
In each instance over the past 10 or 11 years, we find ourselves
virtually reinventing the wheel once the military phase ends and the
occupation and rebuilding phase begins. We largely task the Department
of Defense with managing the reconstruction, when that is not their
assigned or chosen mission. And sad to say, while the military phase is
usually a glowing success in which all Americans can rightfully take
pride, the rebuilding phase proves to be much less successful.
But we should emulate the military's ability to recruit, train,
plan and exercise skilled personnel to develop an international
capacity for restoring order and forging a new future for occupied
countries. That capacity must include several key elements:
An international police reserve force with diverse
linguistic and cultural skills that can be called in to restore
and maintain order.
Humanitarian aid coordinators with plans to pull together
both public sector and non-governmental organizations to
address urgent needs for food, medicine and shelter.
Teams of civil engineers to lead the rebuilding of shattered
water, sewer and telecommunications systems and other essential
infrastructure.
Legal and political experts to laws, establish justice
system reforms.
Such a capacity should reside within the United Nations, but the
United States must be the leader in assuring that it is a real and
meaningful capacity--or we will find ourselves repeatedly asking our
taxpayers to bear the greatest burden, as we have in Iraq.
And we need to see such an effort launched soon in Haiti. Or, I
fear that we will find ourselves going back in with a military force in
another 10 years.
Senator Coleman. Thank you very much, Senator Graham.
And, with that, I will turn to our panel and thank them for
their patience. We are honored to have our colleagues from the
House here today. We have with us the Honorable Congressman
Elijah Cummings, Chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus,
and the Honorable Congresswoman Maxine Waters, from California.
Congressman Cummings, would you please begin?
STATEMENT OF HON. ELIJAH CUMMINGS,
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, and to the entire committee, it
is certainly a pleasure to be here today, and I'm pleased that
your subcommittee is having this important hearing on Haiti.
But, more important, after this hearing today, I hope that we
will move to take constructive steps to help the Haitian
people.
I also associate myself with the words of Senator Graham,
Senator Boxer, and Senator DeWine.
While I realize that the title of today's hearing asks the
question, ``A Fresh Start for Haiti? Charting the Future of
U.S.-Haitian Relations,'' I believe that it is extremely
important that we, the United States Congress, get to the
bottom of what has transpired over the last few weeks--indeed,
years--in Haiti.
Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, almost since
the creation of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) in 1969,
we've had a Haiti Task Force on issues facing the people of
Haiti. I might add that that task force is headed by, at this
time, John Conyers, who is with us, Congressman Conyers, of
Michigan, and certainly Congresswoman Barbara Lee, of
California.
As you all know, Haiti is about 700 miles off the coast,
our coast, and about 80 percent of the 8 million citizens of
Haiti live in dire poverty. The truth is, Mr. Chairman, the
people of Haiti desperately need our help. People are literally
dying every day, not because of gunshots, but because they do
not have clean water, adequate food, or medical supplies
readily available. But as we address this issue of helping the
Haitian people with the basic necessities of everyday life, we
also have to gain their trust. Trust will be an important key
to our success or failure in Haiti.
As we look back at what has transpired in Haiti over the
last few weeks and, as I mentioned earlier, the last few years,
I believe that we must clear up and find out how did we get to
where we are today. Our looking back at the past is not meant
to be an indictment of anyone in particular; however, I believe
that we must and can learn from the past.
As the committee members are well aware, the United States,
for all intent and purposes, pulled out of Haiti in 1996. Our
military pull-out was accompanied by our government suspending
or blocking humanitarian loans from going to Haiti. Mr.
Chairman, quite frankly, the United States and the
international community have a trust and credibility problem
with the Haitian people that must be fixed if we are to
effectively and efficiently move forward.
There is a question of trust, and, unfortunately, whether
it is true or not, there is a former democratically elected
president of Haiti saying to the world that he was forcibly
removed from office. This issue must be addressed, and that is
why several members of Congress--not just some members of the
CBC, which I am honored to chair--have called on Congress for
an independent commission to uncover the facts--and I
underscore the facts--which led to President Aristide's
departure from Haiti.
But bigger than the question of President Aristide and how
he came to leave Haiti, we need to know what specific steps the
United States took to defend this democracy.
Members of the committee, as you are well aware, several
countries in the Caribbean, specifically CARICOM countries, are
extremely troubled by the recent turn of events in Haiti, and
hold the United States responsible. So as we move forward, we
need to ensure that we begin to mend fences and fix our damaged
relationships with our Caribbean neighbors. This CARICOM issue
is one of the many issues that Members of the Congressional
Black Caucus discussed in our meeting last week at the United
Nations, with U.N. Ambassador to the U.N., John Negroponte, and
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan.
Mr. Chairman, my reason for discussing this recent history
with the committee today is because I do not believe that the
Haitian people are just going to forget it and look to the
future without some answers. But as we look to the future,
after answering these critical questions, I believe that the
United States must be Haiti's partner and make a long-term
commitment, and sustained commitment, to the people of Haiti.
The reason I'm emphasizing the long-term and sustained
commitment, which Senator Graham referenced, is because we went
through this with Haiti in the mid 1990s, and then we pulled
out. And as a result, we now have to send U.S. troops in again.
One word about our troops, Mr. Chairman, and I know that
you and all of the committee members join me in saying this, I
want to commend them and thank them for their service to our
country. We all owe them a great debt of gratitude.
Mr. Chairman, as this recent crisis was reaching a critical
point two weeks ago, 18 members of the CBC met with President
Bush, Secretary Powell, National Security Advisor Condoleezza
Rice, and White House Chief of Staff Andy Card. When we met
with the President, our message was clear and focused on three
main points that are still salient today.
May I just briefly summarize?
Senator Coleman. Please.
Mr. Cummings. First, we told the President that we must
defend democracy in Haiti. The people of Haiti must have the
final say in their government. It cannot be a puppet
government. Second, the rule of law must be adhered to in
Haiti. Third, and perhaps most important, we must get
humanitarian assistance to the people who need it most in
Haiti.
And so, Mr. Chairman, again, we emphasize that, while we
are extremely concerned about President Aristide and his
departure and the way it was done, we also want to make sure
that the people who are living in dire poverty in Haiti receive
the kind of humanitarian assistance that they need, and we want
the rule of law restored. And the other thing is that we want a
democracy, the type of democracy that we stand up for in this
country over and over again, traveling around the world
defending, that it be defended there in Haiti.
Thank you.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Congressman Cummings.
With that, Congresswoman Waters.
STATEMENT OF HON. MAXINE WATERS,
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA
Ms. Waters. Thank you very much. Senator Coleman, I'd like
to thank you for holding this hearing and allowing us to
participate here today.
I'm very appreciative for the comments I've heard from my
own Senator, Senator Barbara Boxer, and I absolutely love the
recommendations that were given by Senator DeWine here today.
I've worked with Senator Dodd for many years, and I respect all
of the work that he, too, has done on this issue.
I would like to say that it is clear that a coup d'etat
took place in Haiti. We've learned that our government made the
departure of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the
democratically elected leader of Haiti, a precondition to
introducing United States forces to restore order. At the very
least, despite our government's claims to support
democratically elected governments, this administration was
unwilling to take any real steps to prevent President
Aristide's overthrow. Uncovering the truth about our
government's role in President Aristide's departure is critical
to any attempt to chart the future of U.S.-Haitian relations.
I've been involved in U.S. policy towards Haiti since
shortly after President Aristide was ousted in a coup d'etat in
1991. I became acquainted with President Aristide while he was
in exile here in the United States following the 1991 coup. I
joined with other members of Congress to convince President
Clinton to intervene to allow President Aristide to return to
Haiti and resume his position as the democratically elected
President of Haiti. As a result of our efforts, President
Aristide was able to return to Haiti in 1994. Let me just say
that Mr. Randall Robinson was then the executive director of
TransAfrica, an organization that took the lead. He went on a
hunger strike, and almost died, to try and make the return
possible. And many of us were arrested in our attempts to get
the attention of the White House at that time.
Mr. Chairman, the sad reality is that the same people who
supported the 1991 coup were involved in planning this year's
coup. Mr. Andre Apaid is a factory owner in Haiti, born in New
York. He owns 15 factories in Haiti. He holds an American
passport, and he supported the 1991 coup. And he's now a leader
of the Group of 184, who posture themselves as the legitimate
protesters against this government. He has been accused of not
wanting to pay any taxes, angry with President Aristide not
only because he was being forced to pay taxes, but because
President Aristide was insisting on decent wages for the people
who work in the 15 factories that he owns there.
Many of the thugs that were involved in this coup d'etat
are former members of the Haitian military, are members of the
feared death squad known as the Front for the Advancement and
Progress of Haiti, commonly referred to as FRAPH, which was
responsible for numerous human rights violations during the
three years following the 1991 coup. Mr. Louis-Jodel Chamblain
was second in command of FRAPH and was convicted in absentia
for his role in the 1994 Raboteau massacre and the 1993
assassination of Antoine Izmery. Jean Tatoune was a local FRAP
leader, who was also convicted of involvement in the Raboteau
massacre. Mr. Guy Philippe is a former police chief and
military officer, who led several coup
attempts between 2001 and 2003, and is a big, well-known drug
dealer.
I'm convinced that the recent coup involved not only Mr.
Andre Apaid and the armed thugs, but I'm very concerned about
the role that our own ambassador, Mr. Roger Noriega played.
Ambassador Noriega's history is replete with actions against
Haiti, both as Senator Jesse Helms' chief of staff and now as
the Bush administration's Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs.
I've been to Haiti three times since the beginning of the
year. I first went to celebrate the 200-year independence of
Haiti, January 1. While I was in Haiti, I met with President
Aristide and members of the Lavalas Party, as well as Mr. Andre
Apaid and other members of the Group of 184. I was also present
when the international community--where the United States,
France, Canada, the OES, and the U.N. all were represented, and
members of CARICOM--presented the CARICOM proposal to President
Aristide. The CARICOM proposal was designed to limit President
Aristide's power, and provide for the selection of a new prime
minister who would be acceptable to the opposition and able to
exercise more independent power in Haiti. President Aristide
signed off on and accepted CARICOM's proposal. As you know by
now, the opposition, led by Mr. Andre Apaid, refused to accept
the proposal and sign up.
Meanwhile, while they were holding out, not coming to the
peace table, they were giving covert aid to the thugs who had
taken over the cities of Gonaives and the city of Cap-Haitien.
This was led by Mr. Guy Philippe, the drug dealer and the
killer. And they got stronger and stronger as the days went on,
and they openly said, through the press, that they were coming
into Port-au-Prince, and they were going to kill President
Aristide.
In Port-au-Prince, you had what is known as the Chimeres
and Lavalas and the OPs, poor people, gathering to protect
Port-au-Prince. They were gathering with machetes and weapons,
and you could see the confrontation drawing near. We begged
Colin Powell--we begged him--to please send some troops in--we
didn't care if they were United States or international--to
stop what we thought was going to be this confrontation.
Then we learned that President Aristide had been visited in
the wee hours of the morning and told that he had to leave,
that there was about to be a blood-bath, that he would be
killed, many Haitians would be killed. And he maintains that he
was literally kidnapped and put on a plane and made to leave.
Now, he's sitting up in C.A.R., the Central African Republic,
under guard by the Africans and the French.
I said to Colin Powell, just today, as I caught up with him
in committee, they're guarding them, and they said they will
not do anything unless they are told by the United States and
France what they can do. He's ready to leave. He has found a
place that's acceptable to him. What will the United States do
to say to him, ``You're free to go wherever you have been
accepted?'' Now, I think it's very important for the members of
Congress to find out why the United States is holding him
captive and why they won't allow the Central Africa Republic to
release him. I think if they do that and let him go wherever he
has been accepted, and we move with an aggressive program, such
as that which has been described by Mr. DeWine, then we'll be
on our way to restoring government to Haiti.
I would simply say this, and I will wind up--and I know you
would like me to get over with this--I think you're right about
the humanitarian aid, but I think there are some other things
that must be done. The American citizen, Mr. Apaid, who's not
only responsible for being involved in this coup, but the
previous one, should be made to come home, and he should be put
out of Haiti.
The killers--Mr. Guy Philippe, Mr. Louis Chamblain--they
should be jailed. They were already convicted in absentia, and
they are running around now having said that they would put
down their arms, and they're thumbing their nose at the United
States. They don't intend to go anywhere. They want to
reestablish the military, such as they had under Mr. Cedras.
I believe that the constitution of Haiti should be
respected. I believe that there should be elections. And I
think we have to resolve this question of how President
Aristide was made to leave. I think that we have to give
assistance to Haiti to deal with the big drug dealers that's up
on the Dominican Republic border. President Aristide has given
the United States the ability to interdict drugs in Haitian
waters, that's not being used. But that's one of the problems.
It is being used as a trans-shipment point for drugs, and we
are doing nothing to relieve them of the responsibility.
And, lastly, let me just say this. In this aid that we're
talking about--because we were not giving money to the
government, they had no money for infrastructure; they have
literally no water system. Children are dying because the water
is polluted. They die from the bacteria, from diarrhea. The
first thing we must do is help to construct a water system for
clean and potable water in Haiti.
And, with that, I thank you very much for allowing me this
time.
[The prepared statement of Congresswoman Waters follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Maxine Waters
Senator Lugar, Senator Coleman, Senator Biden, Senator Dodd,
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for
allowing me to testify here today. It is clear that a coup d'etat took
place in Haiti. We have learned that our government made the departure
of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the democratically-elected leader
of Haiti, a pre-condition to introducing United States forces to
restore order. At the very least, despite our government's claims to
support democratically-elected governments, the Bush administration was
unwilling to take any real steps to prevent President Aristide's
overthrow.
Uncovering the truth about our Government's role in President
Aristide's departure is critical to any attempt to chart the future of
U.S.-Haitian relations.
I have been involved in U.S. policy towards Haiti since shortly
after President Aristide was ousted in a coup d'etat in 1991. I became
acquainted with President Aristide while he was in exile here in the
United States following the 1991 coup. I joined with other members of
Congress to convince the Clinton administration to intervene to allow
President Aristide to return to Haiti and resume his position as the
democratically-elected President of Haiti. As a result of our efforts,
President Aristide was able to return to Haiti in 1994.
Mr. Chairman, the sad reality is that the same people who supported
the 1991 coup were involved in planning this year's coup. Andre Apaid,
a factory-owner who holds an American passport, supported the 1991 coup
and is now the leader of the Group of 184. Many of the thugs are former
members of the Haitian military or members of the feared death squad
known as the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH),
which was responsible for numerous human rights violations during the
three years following the 1991 coup. Louis Jodel Chamblain was the
second-in-command of FRAPH and was convicted in abstentia for his role
in the 1994 Raboteau massacre and the 1993 assassination of Antoine
Izmery. Jean Tatoune was a local FRAPH leader, who was also convicted
of involvement in the Raboteau massacre. Guy Philippe is a former
police chief and military officer, who led several coup attempts
between 2001 and 2003.
I am convinced that the recent coup involved not only Andre Apaid
and the armed thugs but also our own Ambassador Roger Noriega.
Ambassador Noriega's history is replete with actions against Haiti,
both as Senator Jesse Helms' chief of staff and now as the Bush
administration's Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs.
I have been to Haiti three times since the beginning of this year.
While I was in Haiti, I met with President Aristide and Lavalas party
members as well as Andre Apaid and other members of the Group of 184. I
was also present when the international community and the members of
CARICOM presented the CARICOM proposal to President Aristide. The
CARICOM proposal was designed to limit President Aristide's power and
provide for the selection of a new prime minister, who would be
acceptable to the opposition and able to exercise more independent
power in Haiti.
I believe the demonstrations organized by Andre Apaid and the Group
of 184 were designed to provoke the Haitian police into retaliating
against the demonstrators, who routinely threw rocks, spat in the face
of police officers and defied government orders establishing
permissible parade routes for protests. In the beginning, these tactics
worked and the police responded. However, when President Aristide
learned what was happening, he was able to control the police and
prevent them from carrying out acts of retaliation.
When the police stopped responding to provocations by the
demonstrators, I believe the U.S. Government and the French Government
became involved in exerting increasing pressure on President Aristide,
by refusing to fully support the CARICOM proposal and covertly
supporting the thugs, who were taking over cities and cutting off
supplies of food and water. Meanwhile, the thugs became bolder and
bolder, threatening to carry out a bloodbath if President Aristide did
not leave Haiti. Yet neither Andre Apaid nor the U.S. government ever
admitted they knew who these thugs were or denounced their invasion of
Haiti.
I repeatedly appealed to Secretary of State Cohn Powell to assist
the government of Haiti, yet the Bush administration refused to provide
any assistance whatsoever to stop the violence until after President
Aristide's departure. It is clear that President Aristide's departure
was a precondition to any U.S. efforts to stop the violence. President
Aristide told me that he was forced to leave Haiti on February 29,
2004, after U.S. officials told him that he and many other Haitians
would be killed if he refused. President Aristide apparently is being
held against his will in the Central African Republic.
I urge the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to
investigate the circumstances under which President Aristide and his
wife are being held in order to ensure that they are not being held
against their will. The United States should inform the government of
the Central African Republic that President Aristide should be allowed
to leave the Central African Republic whenever he is ready to do so.
Furthermore, the United States should make certain that he is allowed
to travel to any country of his own choosing that will receive him and
offer him assistance in doing so.
The members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee must
determine the truth about our Government's role in the organization and
execution of the coup d'etat that led to President Aristide's
departure. The American people deserve to know how and why this
administration allowed a democratically-elected government to be
overthrown by a group of heavily-armed thugs.
Senator Coleman. Thank you very, very much, Congresswoman
Waters.
We'll turn to, at this point, unless Senator Dodd has any
follow-up questions, I would dismiss the panel.
Senator Dodd. No, let me join my colleagues on the
committee in thanking our two witnesses here, and also our two
colleagues in the Senate who spoke. I'm sorry I missed hearing
their direct comments. But I thank both our colleagues in the
House, who have been deeply involved in these issues. As Maxine
pointed out, Congresswoman Waters has pointed out, we've spent
a lot of time over the years working on this issue, going back
more than a decade now. And Elijah Cummings, we thank you
immensely, as chair of the Black Caucus, for being here and
expressing your views on this subject matter.
Mr. Chairman, I thank both of our witnesses for being here
and participating.
Senator Coleman. I share in that thanks. I do note that
Congresswoman Jackson Lee intended to be here. I believe that
she's, obviously, unable to make it.
Again, I want to thank my colleagues from the House for
being here. With that, this panel is dismissed.
Before we begin with the second panel, I would turn to my
colleague and distinguished Ranking Member, Senator Dodd, for
any comments that he may have.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Dodd. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, you've
got a lot of witnesses here, and I don't want to take a lot of
time on this, but I do want to express some opening thoughts,
if I can, on the subject matter.
First of all, let me, again, thank Bob Graham and Mike
DeWine for their participation. And, let me underscore, I
gather the suggestions that Senator DeWine made--and I want to
second them; I think they are very sound suggestions. He's been
a terrific advocate on trying to get this straight in Haiti,
and I thank him immensely and thank him for being here.
Bob Graham, of course, has been involved in these issues.
This isn't just a foreign-policy issue for Senator Graham; it's
a local issue, as well, obviously, given the tremendous impact
that his state of Florida feels. Every time there is a
disruption in the normal course of events in Haiti, Florida
feels it very directly. So we appreciate, immensely, his work.
And I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. Often, we'll have a hearing weeks after events, rather
the in the midst of them, to get some sense of it. And I
appreciate, immensely, the fact that this subcommittee is
looking into this issue to find out what went wrong, or,
perhaps even more important, to give us an opportunity to look
forward. Because not only is it important that we analyze what
happened over these last few weeks, but critically important
for the 8 million people who call Haiti their home, they want
to know what can be done to get this right, both from a
security standpoint, as well as economic opportunities, to put
it mildly.
So we're all well aware, obviously, that on Sunday, the
29th of February, a democratically elected government, a head
of government in our own hemisphere, was forced out of office.
An armed insurrection led by former members of the disbanded
Haitian Army and its paramilitary wing, FRAPH, made it
impossible for the Aristide government to maintain public
order.
Now, I know there's been an effort ongoing for--in fact,
for months, for years--to smear President Aristide, and to
denounce him in every way possible. I think those accusations
have gone way beyond the reality. That's not to suggest that
President Aristide did not have serious problems in terms of
his governance of Haiti. I'm not going to excuse his
misbehavior at all. But to suggest somehow that his behavior
constituted a decision that would cause us not to stand up to
support an elected government, I think, is wrong;
notwithstanding the fact that, in 2001, the United States,
Haiti, and 32 other nations, as members of the Organization of
American States, adopted something called the American
Democratic Charter and, therein, pledged to, ``Respond rapidly
and collectively in the defense of democracy.'' Virtually
nothing was done by the United States or other OAS members, in
my view, to come to the aid of the beleaguered Aristide
administration, a democratically elected government. Either
these documents mean something or they don't. And if they mean
something, we ought to be able to stand up and do what we can
to defend these democratic processes. Frankly, it makes me
wonder whether the Inter-American Democratic Charter is worth
the paper it was printed on. I suspect others throughout the
hemisphere do, as well.
I give credit to members of CARICOM who valiantly attempted
to rescue one of their own. Sadly, their urgent entreaties to
the United Nations Security Council to take up the cause of
Haiti fell on deaf ears. President Aristide found himself with
two unpalatable alternatives: to remain in Haiti and face
certain death at the hands of armed thugs advancing on Port-au-
Prince, and likely the deaths of many of his supporters or
others, as well, or resign and accept exile. Now, whatever the
specifics of his Sunday-morning departure from Haiti, I can't
blame him for holding the belief that his departure was
involuntary, nor do I quite fathom how those in the so-called
democratic opposition, who summarily rejected the U.S.-backed
CARICOM power-sharing proposal on three different occasions--
which, I might add, would have diffused the political crisis--
are still at the table with U.S. officials and others
discussing the future of Haiti, while individuals--or the
individual--who signed on to the CARICOM effort is not and is
living in exile.
At the appropriate time, I'm going to ask witnesses this
afternoon what the U.S. response has been to CARICOM's request
for an independent international investigation surrounding
President Aristide's resignation. Whatever the specific
circumstances of President Aristide's departure, it is
indisputable, in my view, that the United States played a
direct and very public role in pressuring him to leave office.
There was no question that President Aristide made mistakes,
and serious ones, during his most recent three years in office.
All of us here recognize that. Poverty, desperation, and
opportunism bred government corruption. As head of state,
President Aristide must assume responsibility for those things
that occurred on his watch. But there is plenty of blame to go
around for the mess in Haiti.
The United States and other members of the international
community must assume, in my view, a heavy responsibility for
what they did not do in Haiti; namely, help Haitians lift
themselves from the desperate poverty and ignorance and despair
which is gripping their country, empowering their government to
serve them. This is the 21st century, and yet 80 percent of the
8 million people, who live on the western wing of the island of
Hispanola, live in abject poverty. Eight out of every ten
people, per-capita earnings of $440 a year in 2002. To give you
some measure of the comparison, the per-capita income for all
of the rest of Latin American and the Caribbean was $3,280 a
year during the same period of time. Not surprisingly, in such
circumstances only half of Haiti's children attend school. Only
about 40, 45 percent can read or write--less than in Iraq, I
might add.
A scarcity of resources has also contributed to the public-
health crisis in that nation. More than 15 percent of the
children don't live past the age of five, and the average life
expectancy is under 50. Haitians also suffer from the highest
rate of HIV/AIDS in the Western Hemisphere. Roughly 6 percent
of the Haitians are infected.
Mr. Chairman, U.S. foreign assistance in Haiti has fallen
far, far short of the needs that I have just mentioned. The
lion's share of U.S. assistance over the last three years has
been P.L. 480 food assistance, daily feeding programs for
thousands of Haitians, mothers and children, to help them stave
off starvation. Child survival and HIV/AID programs
administered through the NGOs have also been a part of the U.S.
aid initiative.
At the moment, Haiti is slated to receive $52 million in FY
2004 assistance. Put that in perspective for you, that the U.S.
military intervention back in the mid 1990s cost us $2 billion
to go in. And I've heard estimates that the protracted cost of
this recent effort in Haiti is going to cost us somewhere in
the neighborhood of a billion dollars. Mr. Noriega, I think,
may take issue with that number, and certainly when he's
testifying, he can do so. But, nonetheless, when you consider
$52 million is all we can come up with to assist this
impoverished country, and yet it's certainly going to cost us
factors 10 or 20 times that amount in order to bring stability
there, which could have been avoided, in my view.
Over the past three years, the administration virtually
zeroed out all direct U.S. economic assistance programs to the
Government of Haiti, zeroed out all--all--domestic assistance
programs. We're kidding ourselves if we think the institutional
incompetence and corruption in that nation is ever going to be
seriously addressed, in Haiti or elsewhere, without direct
assistance.
Official international financial institutions have acted no
better, in my view. The poorest nation in this hemisphere has
been denied access to their resources. The Inter-American
Development Bank and the World Bank virtually turned off their
aid spigot to Haiti for the last three years. Four hundred
million dollars already approved by the IDB loans were
withheld, with annual Federal revenues of only $273 million in
expenses, while 361 million--clearly the withholding of these
funds had a huge consequence on the Haitian economy.
Finally, under pressure, the IDB relented last July, and
began the process of restarting its assistance programs to
Haiti, albeit at a pace that has been inexcusably slow. Under
less-than-ideal circumstances, there is now underway an effort
to organize an interim government to govern until elections can
be organized, as we all know. It is very important, in my view,
Mr. Chairman, that we all understand that no matter how
honorable the individuals chosen to serve in this government
are, they lack electoral legitimacy. It is, therefore, also
important that any interim government does not overreach its
mandate by attempting to make fundamental changes to the
Haitian political landscape, such as the restoration of the
Haitian armed forces.
The principal responsibility of this temporary governing
body must be, in my view, to organize and to conduct
presidential and parliamentary elections, obviously, with
significant international assistance and supervision, within
the next 10 to 12 months. No interim government is going to be
able to succeed unless lawlessness is brought to an end, and
order restored. At a minimum, that is not going to happen
unless armed gangs are disarmed, and quickly.
To that end, I look forward to hearing how the
administration intends to respond to those who took up arms
against the Haitian Government--dangerous individuals, like Guy
Philippe, a former member of the disbanded Haitian Army, and
other notorious human rights abusers--who have taken public
credit for murdering policemen and burning public buildings,
yet continue to move freely and very publicly throughout Port-
au-Prince.
As I mentioned earlier, recent events in Haiti call into
question the administration's commitment to the Inter-American
Democratic Charter, specifically its obligation to come to the
collective defense of struggling democracies like Haiti. The
United States fell far short in recent weeks; others did, as
well. The question for today's hearing is whether that was a
temporary lapse or not.
Our hearing this afternoon, Mr. Chairman, should give the
administration the opportunity to answer this and important
questions related to continued involvement in Haiti. And I
appreciate your indulgence in listening to those opening
remarks. I have some other suggestions I'll make at a later
point in the hearing.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Senator Dodd.
With that, I will introduce the second panel: Mr. Roger
Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere
Affairs, and Mr. Adolfo Franco, Assistant Administrator for
Latin America and the Caribbean, USAID.
Secretary Noriega, you may proceed first.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER NORIEGA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Noriega. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's a
pleasure to be here to speak to the subcommittee about the
topic of Haiti.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Dodd, Senator DeWine, Senator Graham,
a chapter in the history of Haiti has just come to a close, and
the Haitian people are preparing to write a new one. The
resignation of President Aristide, on February 29th, marked the
end of a process that, in its early days, held out a bright
promise to free Haiti from the violence and confrontation that
has plagued that country since its inception 200 years ago.
Sadly, that hope remains unrealized. Responsibility for this
failure resides largely with President Aristide, himself. But
the task before the United States, working with the
international community, is to help the 8 million people of
Haiti break the cycle of political misrule that has caused so
much misery.
Mr. Chairman, let me be clear, the history of Mr.
Aristide's misrule in Haiti proves what we all know to be true,
that a democratically elected government can undermine its
democratic legitimacy by the manner in which it governs.
Nowhere is that principle more firmly enshrined in the
hemisphere than in the Inter-American Democratic Charter
itself. That charter is not an a la carte menu, where a
constitutional government can pick and choose which of the
essential rights they will honor, and which they will violate,
which it will respect, and which it will ignore, and then call
on the solidarity of the international community to bail them
out when they foul things up so badly that they cannot hold
onto power. By his actions and his failures to act, Mr.
Aristide undermined his own ability to govern Haiti.
I don't want to dwell on Mr. Aristide's legacy, which is a
very sad one, but I would like to discuss it thoroughly in my
written statement, which I'll submit for the record.
Suffice it to say, however, that after all the broken
promises, it is no wonder that when one of the largest pro-
Aristide gangs turned against him and rose up in rebellion last
month, the government of Haiti had no effective, let alone
legitimate, means with which to respond.
The message to the hemisphere, when the rest of the world
did not respond to Aristide's demands for international
support, is that we will work together to help good leaders
govern well, but we're not under any obligation to help bad
leaders govern badly. In the end, no country, the United States
included, was inclined to send forces to sustain the failed
political status quo in Haiti. President Aristide decided, of
his own free will, to resign, initiating a constitutional
process that transferred power to the President of the Supreme
Court.
There are several key points that I wish to make regarding
U.S. policy toward Haiti as we move forward with our
international partners to help the Haitian people. Number one,
the United States has been, and will continue to be, a firm
supporter of democracy in Haiti. That is a cornerstone of our
policy.
The United States has been, and will almost certainly
remain, Haiti's leading provider of economic aid. This aid was
never suspended or cut off, as some have claimed. Between 1995
and the year 2003, the United States provided over $850 million
in assistance in Haiti. This was channeled mostly through non-
governmental organizations because of the corruption that's
rampant in the government's system under President Aristide.
Third point, our leadership at the OAS in negotiating
Resolution 822, in September 2002, helped open a door to the
normalized relations between Haiti and international financial
institutions. And since then, IDB loans have begun to flow. We
will continue to support IFI, international financial
institution, lending to Haiti based on technical merits.
Looking forward, our goal is, first, to stabilize the
security situation and provide emergency humanitarian
assistance to Haitians, promote the formation of an independent
government that enjoys broad popular support, and work with
that government to restore the rule of law and other key
democratic institutions in Haiti, while encouraging steps to
improve the difficult economic conditions of the Haitian
people.
The United States is not alone in this process. There are
about 2,400 troops on the ground, mostly U.S., but including
France, Chile--the Canadians are also on their way. Under the
terms of the U.N. resolution approved unanimously by the
Security Council on February 29th, U.S. forces are already
there as part of this multinational interim force to contribute
to a secure and stable environment.
The key elements of the international plan that was
initiated by CARICOM are, as we speak, being carried out, to
name a Prime Minister, who will, in turn, form a consensus
government to lead Haiti forward. This rapid progress is a
positive sign of a commitment on the part of Haiti's political
leadership to a constitutional transition and the full return
of democracy.
As the multinational interim force ends its mission, we
will support the U.N. stabilization force called for by the
U.N. Security Council, and we will work with the United Nations
and the Organization of American States to help the Haitian
people begin to rebuild their institutions, starting with the
Haitian National Police. As I speak, the administration is
engaged in intensive efforts to achieve these goals.
Senator Coleman. If you would summarize the rest of your
testimony, Mr. Noriega, your entire statement will be entered
into the record.
Mr. Noriega. I sure will, sir.
My colleague, Adolfo Franco, of USAID, will testify about
the varied and comprehensive actions that his agency has taken
to support this transition effort.
President Bush has called for a break from the past in
Haiti. Indeed, we must have a break from the past if Haiti is
to go forward. That break will not come in the form of a new
autocrat or demagogue, but by unleashing the incredible
potential of the Haitian people in a positive and productive
direction.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Noriega follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roger F. Noriega
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, it is a pleasure to appear and
to speak before this subcommittee today on the topic of Haiti.
A chapter in the history of Haiti has just come to a close and the
Haitian people are preparing to write a new one. The resignation of
President Aristide on February 29 marked the end of a process that in
its early days held out a bright promise to free Haiti from the
violence, authoritarianism, and confrontation that has plagued that
country since its independence two hundred years ago. Sadly, that hope
remains unrealized. While responsibility for this failure resides
largely with Aristide himself, the task before the United States,
working with the international community, is to help the people of
Haiti break the cycle of political misrule that has caused so much
misery.
As we move ahead, it is important that we understand where the
problems lie. The Haitian people are not to blame for the country's
poverty and lack of development. Rather, the absence of good
government, even the will to govern fairly and effectively, lies at the
heart of the problem. Aristide's legacy of frustrated hope was caused
as much by what he did not do as by the steps he took. At the end, even
his supporters in the international community realized that his rule
had undermined democracy and economic development in Haiti rather than
strengthened it.
Mr. Chairman, let me be clear. The history of Mr. Aristide's
misrule in Haiti proves what we all know to be true--that a
democratically elected government can forfeit its democratic legitimacy
by the manner in which it governs. Said another way, being
democratically elected does not give a leader free license to rule as
he sees fit. Nowhere is that principle more firmly enshrined in this
Hemisphere than in the Inter-American Democratic Charter itself. By his
actions and failures to act, Mr. Aristide undermined his own ability to
govern Haiti.
Let's be very clear. U.S. policy in Haiti and throughout the
Western Hemisphere--indeed the world--is to support democracy and the
strengthening of democratic institutions. On September 11, 2001, the
United States joined the 33 other members of the Organization of
American States--including Haiti--in signing the Inter-American
Democratic Charter. The creation of the Democratic Charter owed much to
the hemispheric concern against the undermining of democratic
institutions in Peru--by an elected government. It acknowledges that
the essential elements of representative democracy go well beyond
merely holding elections, and that governments have the obligation to
promote and defend democratic principles and institutions.
The commitment to strengthening democracy has been the cornerstone
of our policy in Haiti since the restoration of Aristide to power--by
the international community led by the United States--in 1994. This
process was set back by the highly flawed parliamentary elections of
June 1995, badly run local elections in April 1997, and fraudulent
parliamentary elections once again in May 2000. This series of bogus
electoral exercises, and the Haitian government's unwillingness to
govern fairly, opened the door to many subsequent acts of political
violence and intimidation by Aristide against his opponents. Our
approach in encouraging respect for constitutional processes and good
governance in Haiti focused on working with our hemispheric partners
through the OAS and with other friends of Haiti. In June 2001, the OAS
General Assembly approved Resolution 1831 calling on the Government of
Haiti to take steps to create an environment conducive to free and fair
elections as a means of resolving the political crisis created by the
tainted elections of 2000.
On December 17, 2001, the Government of Haiti lashed out at its
opponents with a series of brutal attacks by pro-Aristide thugs on
persons and property. This led to OAS Resolution 806, which called for
the creation of an OAS Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in Haiti
and for the Aristide regime to take vigorous steps to restore a climate
of security.
When the Government of Haiti failed to comply with the terms of
Resolution 806, the OAS responded with another resolution--822--in
September 2002. In this resolution, the Government of Haiti again
committed itself to take a series of actions to promote a climate of
security and confidence leading to free and fair elections in 2003. I
was Chairman of the OAS Permanent Council when Resolution 822 was
approved, and the U.S. delegation did the heavy lifting in negotiating
the document. Resolution 822 took the key step of calling for the
normalization of economic cooperation between the GOH and the
international financial institutions--as a means of providing Haiti
with further incentive to develop its institutions and promote
sustainable development.
In the face of the Haitian Government's non-compliance with the
terms of these resolutions, the Caribbean Community--CARICOM--and the
OAS sent a high-level delegation, which included President Bush's
Special Envoy for Western Hemisphere Affairs, to Haiti in March 2003.
In September 2003, the United States facilitated the OAS effort to send
another special envoy to Haiti, Ambassador Terence Todman, to help
broker a breakthrough in the political stalemate. While all this was
taking place, the United States donated $3.5M to the OAS Special
Mission in Haiti to support its work.
These impressive efforts came to naught. Rather than taking steps
to build political consensus, reign in the rampant corruption that
robbed Haitians of their already meager resources, or promote an
atmosphere of security, Aristide continued to recruit and arm gangs of
thugs to be unleashed against his opponents. In the process, he
undermined what little legitimate law enforcement capacity remained in
the already corrupted and weakened Haitian National Police. U.S. law
enforcement assistance was essentially limited to support of the
Haitian Coast Guard, a rare and largely autonomous police unit that
continued to have professional and competent leadership.
Further undermining the rule of law and the effectiveness of his
government, Aristide turned a blind eye to the rampant corruption and
drug trafficking of those within his circle of power.
It is no wonder, therefore, that when one of the largest pro-
Aristide gangs turned against him and rose in open rebellion in the
city of Gonaives last month, the Government of Haiti had no effective,
let alone legitimate means with which to respond. The rapid collapse of
Government authority throughout Haiti bore testimony not to the
strength of the thugs and gangs who sought to bring him down, but to
Aristide's own failures. By gutting respect for the rule of law and
reverting to authoritarian practices, he undermined his own legitimacy
and demeaned the word ``democracy.''
Under these circumstances, Aristide agreed to what he had
steadfastly rejected before, a plan that would open the door to
consensus government and a way forward to resolve Haiti's political
crisis. This was, of course, the CARICOM Prior Action Plan, with its
own Plan of Action and endorsement by the United States, France and
Canada. For Aristide, this change of heart came too late to save his
government. Nor did his eleventh-hour appeal for foreign military
intervention garner support in the international community. No country,
the United States included, was inclined to send forces to sustain the
failed political status quo in Haiti. In what may eventually be
considered his finest hour, Aristide decided to resign, initiating a
constitutional process that transferred power to the President of the
Supreme Court.
There are several key points that I wish to make regarding U.S.
policy toward Haiti--as we move forward with our international partners
to help the Haitian people:
1. The United States has been and will continue to be a firm
supporter of democracy in Haiti. That is a cornerstone of our
policy.
2. Aristide's departure was never a U.S. demand. We continuously
worked with our international partners to break through the
political impasse and allow democracy to have a chance. Even
France, while calling on February 25 for Aristide's ouster,
remained supportive of our efforts to find a negotiated
solution. While we were convinced that Aristide was a key
obstacle in these efforts, we sought to work with him up until
the very end. These efforts were conducted at the highest
levels of the United States Government, with Secretary Powell
in the forefront.
3. The United States has been and will almost certainly remain
Haiti's leading provider of economic aid. This aid was never
suspended or cut off, as some have claimed. Between 1995 and
2003, the United States provided over $850 million in
assistance to Haiti.
4. The United States did not cut off assistance to Haiti by the
International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Our leadership at
the OAS in negotiating Resolution 822 in September 2002 helped
to open the door to normalized relations between Haiti and the
IFIs and since then IDB loans have begun to flow. We will
continue to support IFI loans to Haiti based on their technical
merits.
Looking forward, our goal is first to stabilize the security
situation and provide emergency humanitarian assistance to Haitians,
promote the formation of an independent government that enjoys broad
popular support, and work with that government to restore the rule of
law and other key democratic institutions in Haiti, while encouraging
steps to improve the difficult economic condition of the Haitian
people. The United States is not alone in this process. Under the terms
of a UN Resolution approved unanimously by the Security Council on
February 29, U.S. forces are already in Haiti, participating in a
Multilateral Interim Force to contribute to a secure and stable
environment. The key elements of the international plan initiated by
CARICOM are, as we speak, being carried out to name a new Prime
Minister who will in turn form a consensus government to lead Haiti
forward. A Tripartite Council and Council of Eminent Persons, both
preliminary steps to naming the new Prime Minister under the plan, were
formed within a week of Aristide's resignation. We expect the Council
of Eminent Persons to nominate the new Prime Minister within a day or
two. The Prime Minister will form a government, in consultation with
the Council of Eminent Persons and in agreement with President
Alexandre, to begin the laborious process of rebuilding Haiti's
democratic institutions. This rapid progress is a positive sign of
commitment on the part of Haiti's political leadership to a
constitutional transition and the return of full democracy.
As the Multinational Interim Force ends its mission, we will
support the UN stabilization force called for by the Security Council
and will work with the UN and OAS to help the Haitian people rebuild
their institutions, starting with the Haitian National Police. As I
speak, the administration is engaged in intensive efforts to achieve
these goals.
We are forming an inter-agency working group to meet 2-3 times per
week to forward the many policy initiatives we are pursuing:
Complete multilateral coordination to define the mission and
end state of the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) now deployed
in Haiti.
Follow up with UN Member States on voluntary contributions
to help defray expenses of the MIF.
Address urgent need for disarmament by working with the new
Haitian government and the MIF or follow-on UN stabilization
force (peacekeeping operation).
Set strategy for reform of police and justice institutions.
An integrated approach is the best solution--pursue
simultaneous reform and strengthening of police, justice
system, and prisons.
Coordinate with and support the UN and OAS Special Mission
in efforts to implement reform strategies for police and
justice system.
Participate in UN, OAS, and international community efforts
to rebuild democratic institutions through human rights
training, support of independent electoral commission,
political party building, development of legislative capacity.
Consider feasibility of forming a truth and reconciliation
commission to examine human rights abuses.
Continue U.S. leadership in forming Haiti's transition
government.
In the shorter term, we are acting to meet the humanitarian needs
of Haiti's people. My colleague Adolfo Franco of USAID will testify
about the varied and comprehensive actions his agency is taking.
Speaking from the Department of State perspective, Ambassador Foley
issued a disaster declaration on February 18. In response, the Office
of Foreign Disaster Assistance, a component part of USAID, provided
approximately $487,000 to support the distribution of emergency relief
supplies and provide emergency medical supplies. Our total direct
bilateral assistance for the period 1995-2003 was $850 million, with
$71 million for fiscal year 2003.
The administration has also acted to shore up the Haitian National
Police. In a larger sense, our participation in the Multilateral
Interim Force (by far the largest of those countries now participating)
and the follow-on UN stabilization force will serve as a security
umbrella for the Haitian National Police (HNP) while we help to reform
and strengthen it. But we have also acted in the short term. President
Alexandre has appointed a new police chief, Leon Charles, a man of
proven integrity and ability, and we will continue to encourage
positive change and reform within the HNP leadership. We have provided
material assistance and supplies to the Haitian Coast Guard, which has
proven to be a reliable partner with the U.S. Coast Guard in conducting
repatriations and cooperating on security matters.
President Bush has called for a ``break from the past'' in Haiti.
Indeed there must be a break from the past if Haiti is to move forward.
That break will not come in the form of a new autocrat or demagogue but
by unleashing the incredible potential of the Haitian people in
positive and productive directions. Nowhere is there written that the
Haitian people must be poor or ruled by tyrants. They deserve leaders
worthy of their trust and respect, who favor the common good over
personal gain. The rule of law must be upheld. Those responsible for
crimes and abuses must be punished. Gangs and thugs cannot be allowed
to hold sway. Support from the United States and the international
community can help--and they will have it--but the long-term job of
building Haitian democracy is up to the Haitians themselves. They,
above all people in our hemisphere, deserve some success.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Secretary Noriega.
Administrator Franco.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADOLFO FRANCO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Franco. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. It's a pleasure to appear before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations to discuss with you the
unfolding humanitarian situation in Haiti, and USAID's
continuing efforts to help the Haitian people realize their
dream of peace, prosperity, and democracy.
I've submitted my complete statement for the record, Mr.
Chairman, and, with your permission, I will summarize that
statement.
Senator Coleman. I appreciate that; thank you.
Mr. Franco. Mr. Chairman, the conflict in Haiti since early
February has severely restricted the movement of commercial
goods and relief supplies, including food, fuel, and medical
stocks. This has hindered USAID's ability to distribute food
assistance to those populations which we normally serve.
Mr. Chairman, I returned from Haiti last night, where I met
with Ambassador Foley, representatives of other donor
organizations, and with major non-governmental organizations
which provide relief supplies. Access and distribution remain
major obstacles for both humanitarian deliveries and regular
commercial activity. USAID and its implementing non-
governmental organization partners report that the primary
humanitarian concern continues to be a lack of security. This
impedes safe passage for the transportation and distribution of
relief supplies that include fuel, water, and other
commodities. Enhanced security will enable USAID and its
partners to resume normal distribution of food and medical
supplies and implement programs to address Haiti's immediate-,
medium-, and long-term needs.
Mr. Chairman, USAID and its partners have now conducted
assessment trips to a number of places in Haiti, including Cap-
Haitien, Port-de-Paix, and Jeremie. USAID is using light
aircraft to transport its assessment teams, and, in some cases,
making use of these aircraft to deliver needed supplies to
organizations outside the capital, particularly in the rural
northwest.
Based on the best information available to us and to our
partner organizations, I want to make it clear, though, Mr.
Chairman, that Haiti currently has enough food to feed its
people, although vulnerable populations, including the very
young and very old are beginning to feel the effects of several
weeks of disruption in the food transportation and distribution
system. To meet these needs, Mr. Chairman, USAID estimates that
with the 20,000 metric tons of food and commodities we have in
Haiti, and by working with our partner organizations, that we
will be able to continue our efforts once the security
situation is fully stabilized.
You may have read that some of this food was looted during
the recent unrest, on February 29th, but I'm pleased to report
to you that I visited the port facilities yesterday, and that
under 10 percent of USAID's food stocks were looted. The
majority of our food remains intact and is in secure storage in
Port-au-Prince, under Marine guard.
Mr. Chairman, the interruption of basic health services,
particularly in the north, due to insecurity and poor road
conditions, represents another point of concern. Recent
assessments by USAID have led to the conclusion that the
current health situation in Haiti is not at an emergency level,
although there are acute shortages of medical supplies,
including antibiotics and oxygen tanks in many health
facilities around the country.
To meet the needs in the health sector, USAID has sent
large amounts of medical supplies to Haiti in recent days and
has provided a grant to the Pan American Health Organization
for additional supplies. In addition, the International
Committee of the Red Cross has increased its staff size, and is
currently providing medical services free of charge in several
facilities, including Canape Vert Hospital in Port-au-Prince.
Mr. Chairman, USAID has responded quickly to the potential for
a humanitarian crisis in Haiti. Although there is a significant
humanitarian concern, we do not have a crisis in the country at
the present time.
When U.S. Ambassador Foley declared a disaster, on February
18th, because of the insecurity, the USAID Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance provided $50,000 to transport and
distribute emergency relief supplies, including 12 medical kits
and 3 surgical kits. These kits are equipped to serve 10,000
people each for approximately 3 months. In addition, USAID
approved $400,000 in funding for the Pan American Health
Organization to purchase additional medical supplies and to
conduct emergency relief services in Haiti.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, USAID continues to monitor the
situation in Haiti closely, and we're working to meet the most
critical needs as expeditiously as we can. We're also working
with other agencies and our implementing partners to develop a
post-conflict program strategy that will ensure the continued
provision of emergency relief, which remains our paramount
concern, and to improve basic services and generate productive
employment over the immediate-, short-, and medium-term.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Franco follows:]
Prepared Statement of Adolfo A. Franco
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is a pleasure to appear
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere, Peace corps and Narcotics Affairs, to discuss with you the
unfolding humanitarian situation in Haiti and USAID's continuing
assistance with helping the Haitian people realize their dream of
peace, prosperity and democracy. The central focus of my remarks is on
what USAID is doing through our humanitarian assistance programs to
mitigate the effects of the social and political unrest on the most
vulnerable segments of Haiti's population. This statement is an update
of my presentation of March 3, 2004 to the House Committee on
International Relations. This testimony reflects current events in
Haiti, especially in the aftermath of President Aristide's resignation
and departure from Haiti. The political situation remains fluid and the
potential continues for further civil unrest and violence perpetrated
by armed gangs. This is evident by Sunday's recent events with the
demonstrations which lead to the deaths of four individuals including a
foreign journalist, and 20 others wounded.
FOOD SECURITY
The ongoing political turmoil and economic deterioration in Haiti
have created the potential for a humanitarian crisis and have affected
numerous aspects of development such as food security, health and
nutrition, and water and sanitation. While sufficient food stocks are
currently in-country and no immediate food crisis exists at present,
this could change quickly in coming weeks, especially in the north, due
to insecurity and disruptions in the transportation and distribution
system. USAID currently has in storage more than 11,000 metric tons of
P.L. 480 Title II food commodities for direct food distribution to
Haiti's indigent populations and children's orphanages throughout the
country. Most of the food stocks are under secured storage in Port-au-
Prince. The World Food Program and European Union also have available
for distribution, stocks of at least 5,000 metric tons, and 3,100 tons
respectively.
HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM
The U.S. Government through USAID is Haiti's largest bilateral
donor. In FY 03, USAID contributed $71 million. Through fiscal years
1995-2003, USAID provided a total of $850 million in direct bilateral
assistance. Prior to the outbreak of violence, USAID had planned $52
million in assistance in FY 04 to programs ranging from health,
democracy and governance, education and economic growth. We are
currently analyzing additional assistance options. To ensure that
quality service delivery continues to benefit those Haitians who are
most in need, USAID assistance is channeled principally through NGOs.
USAID is also the lead donor in addressing critical transnational
issues such as HIV/AIDS and other debilitating infectious diseases, a
seriously degraded natural resource base, respect for human rights and
the rule of law, and trafficking in persons.
USAID uses food aid both to supplement its humanitarian program and
as a development tool. P.L. 480 Title II funds account for more than
one-half of USAID/Haiti's funding. This food-assisted program promotes
improvements in household food security, nutrition, and the welfare of
women, children, and poor, marginal farmers in six out of the nine
districts of Haiti--affecting the lives of 640,000 poor Haitians.
Emergency response is also critical. Last year, over $3 million in
emergency assistance was provided to communities affected by drought
and flooding.
CIVIL UNREST AND THE USAID PROGRAM
Lawlessness continues and the situation remains fluid following the
resignation of Aristide and the appointment of Supreme Court Justice,
Boniface Alexandre as the interim President. The presence of
international security forces has already improved the security
situation in country. Nonetheless, there are a significant number of
weapons in the hands of armed gangs in Haiti, and there have been
violent conflicts between opposition protestors and supporters of the
former Aristide government, as well as, widespread looting, and
robberies of civilians at roadblocks throughout the capital. On March
7, violence broke out during a protest in the capital city of Port-au-
Prince, resulting in at least four deaths and at least 20 injuries.
Aside from this most recent indication of unrest, the situation in
Port-au-Prince has been relatively calm. According to the U.N. Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the situation in
Port-au-Prince is returning to normalcy, as public transport has
resumed and the security situation has become more stabilized. However,
some public services, including the provision of water, electricity,
and communications, are not functioning at normal levels. Basic health
services are also inadequate.
Increasing conflict since early February has severely restricted
movement of commercial goods and relief supplies, including food, fuel,
and medical supplies, creating difficult conditions in some areas, and
for those normally dependent on food assistance. Access and
distribution remain major obstacles for both humanitarian deliveries
and regular consumption. USAID and its implementing partners continue
to report that the primary humanitarian concerns at present stem from
limited access, security, and unsafe passage for transporting and
distributing relief supplies, fuel, water, and food commodities. There
appears to be no massive shortages of food or other essential
commodities at this time as Haiti benefited from good harvests over the
last two agricultural seasons. However, an accurate assessment of the
situation outside of Port-au-Prince has just begun.
Food Availability: USAID's NGO development food aid partners and
the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) currently have approximately 15,000
metric tons (MT) of food stocks in country. The European Union (EU) has
2,500 MT at a warehouse and 600 MT at the port in Port-au-Prince. There
is also an additional 2,000 MT available from other donors. Thus the
total amount of food assistance available from all donors is
approximately 20,000 MT. There are no massive shortages of food or
other essential commodities in Haiti at this time. Pockets of food
insecurity have been reported, and orphanages and institutional feeding
programs in urban areas are vulnerable to prolonged food shortages;
however, USAID and cooperating sponsors are not requesting emergency
programs.
Due to poverty and chronic malnutrition in Haiti, some segments of
the Haitian population are vulnerable to severe malnutrition. However,
daily reports from USAID's four partners in Haiti--CARE, Save the
Children Foundation (SCF), World Vision International (WVI), and
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)--indicate that none believe the
situation requires re-programming of planned food assistance. Region-
specific reports from food aid organizations are summarized as follows:
WVI does not anticipate a food crisis erupting in its
targeted areas of Central Plateau and Ile de la Gonave, even if
distributions stop for a short time because of the strong
coping mechanisms among the populations and the good December
harvest. WVI is currently operating at 100 percent on Ile de la
Gonave.
CRS reported that food supplies for orphanages in Haiti are
limited and some orphanages have begun to run out of food. CRS
is considering using existing funds to purchase food on the
local market for vulnerable orphanages.
On February 22, looters broke into a WFP warehouse in Cap-
Haitien and took 800 metric tons (MT) of food stocks, mainly
vegetable oil and pulses. Despite the loss of food stocks, WFP
estimates that it still has sufficient stocks either in Haiti
or en route to the country to provide assistance to 373,000
people.
WFP reported that the shipment of 1,200 MT of rice scheduled
to arrive at the Cap-Haitien port is on hold until the security
situation improves. According to WFP, a total of 268,000 people
are in need of food in the north and northeast, where prices
have increased since early February.
USAID and WFP have undertaken a rapid assessment in Cap-
Haitien to identify current needs in schools and health
centers. WFP is also preparing a six-month Emergency Operation
(EMOP) to provide assistance to the most affected people in the
north areas of the country. WFP's assistance, in partnership
with other agencies, aims to ensure that children and their
families meet daily nutritional needs in order to prevent a
decline in their nutritional status.
Fuel Availability: Fuel is vital not only for transport, but also
for the continued operation of facilities and equipment such as
hospitals, bakeries, and freight moving equipment at ports. According
to the fuel companies, there is currently enough fuel in storage in
Port-au-Prince to supply the country for two to three weeks, but the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
are concerned that fuel shortages may lead to the shutdown of the
Capital's electrical plant and water treatment station. CARE reported
that there is a potable water crisis in Gonaives due to a lack of fuel.
Although CARE has food stocks in Port-au-Prince, the organization lacks
fuel for transportation, particularly for food distributions in the
north.
Medical Supplies: A major humanitarian concern at present is the
interruption of basic health services, particularly in the north. The
ability to purchase and transport drugs and fuel to health facilities
nationwide has been disrupted in major population centers due to the
sporadic access to banks and insecure travel on the roads. The ICRC has
been organizing regular convoys to both Gonaives and Cap-Haitien in
cooperation with the Haitian Red Cross, and ICRC medical teams have
also been stationed at facilities in these cities.
It is not clear at this time how many medical facilities have been
affected by the recent unrest. Reports from the Hopital Communaute
Haitienne in the Capital indicate that there is an increase in the
number of trauma patients at the hospital and care is hindered by fuel
shortages for generator power and lack of surgical and medical kits.
Similar disruptions of supplies are occurring in Gonaives and other
areas.
Currently there are no reports of an outbreak of the six major
childhood vaccine-preventable diseases. However, increased cases of
diarrhea and fever have been reported throughout the country. The
Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) has sentinel sites in Haiti, of
which 30 percent to 40 percent are still functional and operating.
A Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) epidemiologist recently
arrived in Haiti to reactivate the health surveillance system, as Haiti
lacks adequate surveillance data from health facilities throughout the
country. PAHO will monitor data on measles outbreaks, polio,
diphtheria, typhoid, and violence, as well as acute malnutrition.
According to PAHO, there is a shortage of tuberculosis (TB) drugs and a
disruption of TB programs in the north. Medicins Sans Frontieres-
Belgium is requesting TB drugs from PAHO.
Port-de-Paix Assessment: On March 5, representatives of USAID/OFDA,
USAID/FFP, U.N. World Food Program (WFP), U.N. Children's Education
Fund (UNICEF), and CARE conducted an assessment of the humanitarian
situation in the city of Port-de-Paix, located on the northwestern
coast. The assessment indicated that looters broke into the city's
Department of Health office, and the vaccines in the cold chain may
have been compromised. There have been no reports of measles or any
other disease outbreak in Port-de-Paix. Access to food is also becoming
difficult for the poorest segments of the population, particularly
since the suspension of WFP food distributions. Food prices have
reportedly increased from 25 to 100 percent. Some fuel is available on
the market, though the cost of one gallon has increased from
approximately 23 Haitian dollars to 80 Haitian dollars. Lack of fuel
has affected the city's electricity supply and hindered the local
hospital's ability to sterilize equipment and thereby perform major
surgeries.
Les Cayes Assessment: On March 5, representatives from USAID/OFDA,
USAID/Haiti, CRS, and UNICEF conducted an assessment of the
humanitarian situation in the southwestern town of Les Cayes. The
humanitarian situation has not deteriorated significantly as a result
of the recent political unrest, and the only sector currently affected
appears to be fuel.
Displaced Populations: USAID and its NGO partners continue to
report very limited displacement and no ``sites'' with concentrations
of internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to the U.N. Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), numbers of IDPs
cannot be accurately assessed at present. However, UNOCHA notes that
significant numbers of residents are moving from insecure cities to
other areas or returning to their places of birth in the mountains.
Movements have also been reported from rural areas to main cities.
On February 23, the Government of the Dominican Republic (GODR)
indicated that the Dominican Republic does not have structures in place
to manage a migratory wave of refugees. The GODR also noted that
Dominican authorities have closed the border with Haiti along critical
points. On February 24, the GODR sent 1,200 additional troops to patrol
its border with Haiti. The GODR has declined to state the total number
of troops along the 225-mile border. According to the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, approximately 400 Haitians have fled to the
DR, Jamaica, and Cuba since early February 2004.
u.s. government humanitarian response to haiti's political crisis
On February 18, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti James B. Foley
issued a disaster declaration due to the ongoing complex
emergency in Haiti. As an initial response to the situation,
OFDA has provided $50,000 through USAID/Haiti to support the
transport and distribution of emergency relief supplies,
including 12 medical kits and three surgical kits, valued at
approximately $87,000. Each medical kit is equipped to serve
10,000 people for approximately three months. On February 26,
the medical kits arrived in Port-au-Prince. In addition, OFDA
approved $400,000 in funding for PAHO to purchase additional
medical supplies and to conduct emergency relief activities in
Haiti.
On February 24, OFDA deployed a three-person team to Port-
au-Prince, including a Senior Regional Advisor as Team Leader,
a Health Officer, and an Information Officer.
OFDA has contracted with Airserve for two to three aircraft
to move relief personnel and light cargo around Haiti if
required in the coming days and weeks.
USAID/Food For Peace has significant amounts of additional
food stocks which can be transported to Haiti by sea for food
assistance within 7-14 days if needed.
OFDA has awarded a grant in the amount of $400,000 to CRS
for local procurement and emergency cash grants to institutions
serving vulnerable populations such as orphanages and
hospitals.
The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince is currently developing a
security asset plan that will address protection of people and
USG buildings, transport of goods and people, and security of
NGO partners, such as CRS, WVI, CARE, and Save the Children. A
top priority of the security asset plan is to secure and
protect the airport and port in the Capital.
There are approximately 15,000 MT of USG-procured food
commodities immediately available for distribution in Haiti.
USAID will continue to work with other members of the donor
community to mobilize the additional resources required for the
Haiti post-conflict effort.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the United States and the international community continue
to stand with the people of Haiti. USAID is closely monitoring the
humanitarian impact of the current political crisis in Haiti. With the
presence of international forces in Haiti, the security situation has
improved significantly, and normalcy is slowly returning to the
Capital, Port-au-Prince, and other affected areas. Also, the delivery
of humanitarian assistance has improved. USAID/Haiti and OFDA personnel
are continuing to assess the situation, in order to deploy assistance
where it is most urgently needed. Further, USAID is collaborating with
the interim government of Haiti, other USG Agencies, donors, and
implementing partners to develop a post-conflict program strategy that
will ensure the continued provision of emergency relief and improved
basic services, and generate productive employment over the immediate,
short and medium-term. In addition, USAID is working with other donors
to jointly identify long-term priorities in Haiti.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony.
[Additional information submitted by Mr. Franco follows:]
U.S. Agency for International Development
bureau for democracy, conflict, and humanitarian assistance (dcha)
office of u.s. foreign disaster assistance (ofda)
______
Haiti--Complex Emergency
FACT SHEET NUMBER 5, FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2004 / MARCH 9, 2004
Background
Haiti's 200-year history has been marked by political
instability and weak institutional capacity, resulting in a
severely debilitated economy and an impoverished population.
The current complex emergency is rooted in the country's
inability to resolve a four-year political impasse. Following a
military coup that ousted elected President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide in 1991, the international community intervened
militarily to restore Aristide to power in 1994. In May 2000,
Aristide's party, Lavalas Family, claimed an overall victory in
disputed legislative and municipal elections. In November 2000,
the opposition boycotted the presidential election that
Aristide won unopposed with low voter turnout. On December 17,
2001, the crisis escalated as armed commandos stormed the
presidential palace in Port-au-Prince in an assault that the
Government of Haiti (GOH) characterized as an attempted coup
d'etat.
The electoral controversy paralyzed the Aristide
administration, and Aristide lost popular support due to the
inability of the government to attract investment to the
country, create jobs, or reduce poverty. As a result, growing
lawlessness, instability, and politically-motivated violence
began to overwhelm the country in 2002.
In late 2003, anti-government demonstrations in Port-au-
Prince, Gonaives, Petit-Goave, and other towns began to
increase in size, frequency, and violence. The most recent
surge in conflict and violence began on February 5, 2004, when
members of armed opposition groups seized control of Gonaives,
Haiti's fourth-largest city. Armed groups opposed to former
President Aristide expanded their control throughout parts of
the Central, North, Artibonite, Northeast, and South
departments. The democratic opposition has distanced itself
from the armed groups. Since the takeover of Gonaives,
approximately 130 people have been killed in the violence.
On February 29, Jean-Bertrand Aristide resigned from the
presidency. In accordance with the Haitian constitution,
Supreme Court Chief Justice Boniface Alexandre was sworn in as
President of an interim government. Prime Minister Yvon Neptune
will retain his post until a new Prime Minister is selected.
Situation Overview
Structural and institutional weaknesses in Haiti, closely
linked to the country's historical, socio-economic, and
agricultural development, have had long-term effects on
numerous aspects of Haiti's development, such as food security,
water and sanitation, health, and nutrition. For many years,
Haiti has been the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere,
and is currently the only Least Developed Country in the
Western Hemisphere. The country was ranked 150th out of 173
countries in the 2003 United Nations (U.N.) Development Program
Human Development Report.
Due to the ongoing and chronic nature of Haiti's
underdevelopment, the country is vulnerable to rapid
deterioration of humanitarian indicators in a complex
emergency. However, certain impacts of a complex emergency,
such as malnutrition, are not sudden-onset situations and
typically require several months to develop. Two important
factors may contribute to food insecurity in Haiti: rising or
unstable prices, and a drop in remittances. Haiti is heavily
dependent on remittances, receiving an estimated $800 million
on average annually. In addition to food insecurity, the rising
incidence of disease and displacement may also contribute to a
humanitarian crisis. USAID and its implementing partners are
monitoring all of these indicators as closely as possible.
The U.S. Government (USG), through USAID, is Haiti's largest
bilateral donor. In FY 2003, USAID contributed $71 million.
From FY 1995 to 2003, USAID provided a total of $850 million in
direct bilateral assistance. For FY 2004, USAID has planned $52
million in assistance for programs including health, democracy
and governance, education, and economic growth. To ensure the
provision of assistance to Haitians most in need, USAID
assistance is channeled principally through non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). The USG provides food and food-related
assistance directly and indirectly to 640,000 Haitians.
Current Situation
Security/Political
On February 29, the U.N. Security Council authorized the
immediate deployment of an international military force to
restore order in Haiti. The U.S. has assumed initial control of
the multinational force. Troops from other countries will
support the military force, followed by a longer-term U.N.
peacekeeping mission. There are approximately 1,750 U.S.
troops, 600 French troops, 400 Chilean troops, and a small
contingent of Canadian troops in Haiti. The troops have spread
out throughout Port-au-Prince to secure key areas and
facilities, including the presidential palace, the airport, and
foreign embassies. On March 5, U.S. troops in Haiti moved for
the first time beyond the capital to Gonaives and Cap-Haitien.
The troops will assess the needs of the Haitian national police
in the two cities and determine the possible scope of future
international troop deployments.
On March 4, the Organization of American States (OAS)
announced the establishment of the Tripartite Council,
appointed by the GOH, the Democratic Platform coalition, and
the international community. Council members include Leslie
Voltaire, the Minister of Haitians Living Abroad; former
Senator Paul Denis, a member of the Democratic Platform
coalition; and Adama Guindo, the U.N. Resident Representative
in Haiti. The Tripartite Council has selected the seven members
of the Council of Wise Men, which in turn will propose a new
Prime Minister to interim President Alexandre.
On March 7, violence broke out during a protest in Port-au-
Prince, resulting in at least six deaths and at least 30
injuries. On March 8, hundreds of looters targeted an
industrial park near the Port-au-Prince airport and threatened
passing cars with machetes. International media reported that
multinational security forces were not stationed in the
vicinity during the disturbance. Armed opposition leader Guy
Philippe stated on March 8 that armed combatants would take up
arms if the multinational security force is unable to disarm
the chimeres, or armed Aristide supporters.
On March 8, former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide declared
from exile in the Central African Republic that he was still
the President of Haiti, and called for ``peaceful resistance''
in Haiti. Interim President Alexandre was officially
inaugurated on March 8.
On March 8, the U.N. announced that an assessment team is
scheduled to arrive in Haiti on March 9 to help prepare for the
deployment of a peacekeeping mission to the country by June 1.
The team will make recommendations to U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan regarding the size and composition of the mission.
Humanitarian Assessments
Port-au-Prince port assessment: On March 5, USAID/Haiti
officials and a USAID/OFDA team member conducted an assessment
of the Port-au-Prince port. There are initial indications that
looters stole approximately 10 percent of USG-funded food
stocks. As of March 6, U.S. Marines have secured the port area
where P.L. 480 food commodities are stored. On the evening of
March 6, U.S. Marines exchanged gunfire with would-be looters.
Warehouse officials are attempting to conduct a full assessment
of current food stockpiles; however, this assessment could be
hindered if insecurity recurs in the port area. Non-
governmental organizations, including CARE, Catholic Relief
Services (CRS), and Save the Children-U.S. (SCF-U.S.), will
attempt to move their containers out of the port as security
permits.
Port-de-Paix assessment: On March 5, representatives of
USAID/OFDA, USAID Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP), U.N.
World Food Program (WFP), U.N. Children's Education Fund
(UNICEF), and CARE conducted an assessment of the humanitarian
situation in the city of Port-de-Paix, located on the
northwestern coast. The results of the assessment indicated
that there is a lack of security in the city, as eight separate
armed groups are intimidating and extorting money from the
local population. A committee of notables acts as a liaison
between the population and the armed groups; however, this
group has no legal authority.
The Port-de-Paix assessment also indicated that looters broke into
the city's Department of Health office, and the vaccines in the
cold chain may have been compromised. There have been no
reports of measles or any other disease outbreak in Port-de-
Paix. Since major flooding in December 2003 destroyed Port-de-
Paix's water infrastructure, the city has had a water shortage.
Access to food is also becoming difficult for the poorest
segments of the population, particularly since the suspension
of WFP food distributions. Food prices have reportedly
increased from 25 to 100 percent. Some fuel is available on the
market, though the cost of one gallon has increased from
approximately 23 Haitian dollars to 80 Haitian dollars. Lack of
fuel has affected the city's electricity supply and hindered
the local hospital's ability to sterilize equipment (and
thereby perform major surgeries).
Les Cayes assessment: On March 5, representatives from
USAID/OFDA, USAID/Haiti, CRS, and UNICEF conducted an
assessment of the humanitarian situation in the southwestern
town of Les Cayes. The security situation in the town is
fragile, with narcotic traffickers reportedly influencing local
events. The humanitarian situation has not deteriorated
significantly as a result of the recent political unrest, and
the only sector currently affected appears to be fuel.
The poor water situation in Les Cayes pre-dates the current
political crisis. The water needs to be treated with chlorine,
but there is a lack of public education on water safety. CRS
stated that there have been some cases of typhoid and diarrheal
diseases as a result of the lack of potable water. Health
problems in Les Cayes are also chronic and due mainly to the
lack of potable water. Food insecurity in the town appears to
be primarily due to a lack of purchasing power among some of
the population, particularly in the poor area of La Savanne.
Food prices have increased in Les Cayes by approximately 30
percent.
Cap-Haitien assessment: On March 8, the USAID/OFDA
assessment team traveled to Cap-Haitien with representatives of
WFP, UNICEF, CRS, and CARITAS to assess the humanitarian
situation. The assessment team cited fuel as the main concern
in Cap-Haitien, as in the other towns previously assessed.
Though fuel stations remain open, the price of fuel has
increased from 17 Haitian dollars to between 60 and 80 Haitian
dollars. Stores and schools are also open in the city. No WFP
food stocks currently remain in Cap-Haitien. Since the recent
crisis began in early February, looters have stolen 800 MT of
assorted food commodities from the WFP warehouse, in addition
to 15,000 bags of commercial rice from the port. No major
shipment of food, commercial or humanitarian, has arrived in
Cap-Haitien since the current political unrest began.
The USAID/OFDA team met with the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) in Cap-Haitien on March 8. According to
ICRC, the priority areas for the provision of humanitarian
assistance in Cap-Haitien, and the northern department in
general, are as follows: fuel, vaccines (the re-supply of
vaccines as well as fuel to maintain the cold chain), security
for the ``humanitarian corridor'' from Port-au-Prince to Cap-
Haitien to allow for the transport of food and relief supplies,
oxygen for hospitals, and security for hospitals.
Food
USAID's NGO development food aid partners and WFP currently
have nearly 15,000 metric tons (MT) of food stocks in country.
The European Union (EU) has 2,500 MT of food at a warehouse and
600 MT at the port in Port-au-Prince. Other donors have an
estimated 2,000 MT available. Thus, the total amount of food
assistance available from all donors is approximately 20,000
MT.
WFP is preparing a six-month Emergency Operation (EMOP) to
provide assistance to the most affected people in the north
areas of the country. WFP's assistance, in partnership with
other agencies, aims to ensure that children and their families
meet daily nutritional needs in order to prevent a decline in
their nutritional status. WFP is also preparing a Special
Operation (SO) to increase logistics and communications
capacity.
On March 5, WFP delivered between 12 and 16 MT of food
rations to a hospital and orphanage in Port-au-Prince. This
marked WFP's first food distribution since the outbreak of
unrest in the country in early February 2004. WFP indicated
that, if the security situation does not deteriorate, WFP will
carry out its planned March distributions to 66,000 people at
23 health centers in the capital. All of the 94 schools in
Port-au-Prince that normally benefit from WFP food
distributions remain closed.
Health
According to assessments by the USAID/OFDA team, the current
health situation in Haiti is not at an emergency level.
However, the health care system is experiencing a rupture in
supplies, due to the insecure environment that exists for drug
deliveries and a lack of health staff reporting to work due
insecurity. The poor public health infrastructure is a chronic
problem that needs to be addressed as soon as possible.
The ICRC surgical team working at Canape-Vert Hospital in
Port-au-Prince is providing treatment free of charge for the
wounded. The numbers of injured had decreased, until the
outbreak of violence in Port-au-Prince on March 7. On March 4,
ICRC brought in surgical supplies from the Dominican Republic
to establish a supplementary operating theatre at Canape-Vert
Hospital. Additional beds have also been installed, bringing
the total number to 100. ICRC has provided surgical kits (each
kit contains supplies for 100 surgeries) to hospitals in Cap-
Haitien, Gonaives, Jacmel, and Port-au-Prince. On March 6, an
ICRC convoy traveling from the Dominican Republic across the
Dajabon-Ouanaminthe border arrived in Gonaives with a generator
for the city's public hospital. The convoy also carried fuel
for National Society ambulances and ICRC vehicles. ICRC plans
to bring a surgical team to the hospital in Gonaives, security
permitting.
U.S. Government Response
From February 9 to 11, the USAID/OFDA Senior Regional
Advisor and a USAID/OFDA Regional Advisor traveled to Port-au-
Prince to assist USAID/Haiti and partner organizations with
contingency planning for humanitarian assistance.
On February 18, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti James B. Foley
issued a disaster declaration due to the ongoing complex
emergency in Haiti. In response, USAID/OFDA has provided
$50,000 through USAID/Haiti to support the transport and
distribution of emergency relief supplies, including 12 medical
kits and three surgical kits, valued at approximately $87,000.
Each medical kit is equipped to serve 10,000 people for
approximately three months. On March 4, USAID/OFDA distributed
one medical kit each to Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), CRS,
and World Vision International (WVI), and nine kits to the Pan
American Health Organization (PAHO)-supported PROMESS
warehouse. The PROMESS warehouse will store the nine kits on
behalf of Management Sciences for Health (MSH), PAHO, and
USAID/OFDA. USAID/OFDA has also approved $400,000 in funding
for PAHO to purchase additional medical supplies and to conduct
emergency relief activities in Haiti. In addition, USAID/OFDA
has approved $412,287 for CRS for emergency cash grants to
support local institutions and provide services for most
vulnerable populations.
On February 24, USAID/OFDA deployed a three-person team to
Port-au-Prince, including a Senior Regional Advisor as Team
Leader, a Health Officer, and an Information Officer. On March
7, a Military Liaison Officer joined the team in Port-au-
Prince.
USAID/OFDA has provided $340,981 to Air Serv for emergency
air transport. On March 3, two light planes contracted by
USAID/OFDA with Air Serv arrived in Port-au-Prince. The planes,
each with capacity for nine passengers, are available to the
USAID/OFDA team to conduct assessments and deliver relief
supplies throughout the country as required. Various USAID
implementing partners, including U.N. agencies and NGOs, may
accompany the USAID/OFDA team and USAID/Haiti staff on
assessment trips.
USAID/OFDA has also provided $500,026 in funding to WVI for
emergency relief kits and cash-for-work initiatives.
The Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees,
and Migration (State/PRM) has provided $20,000 to the U.S.
Embassy in Port-au-Prince for assistance to Haitian migrants.
In addition, State/PRM will support the ICRC appeal for Haiti.
The final amount of funding for the appeal is pending approval.
U.S. Government Humanitarian Assistance to Haiti
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementing Partner Activity Location Amount
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAID/OFDA Assistance \1\
USAID/Haiti Transport and distribution of emergency Port-au-Prince and other affected areas $137,000
relief supplies; 12 emergency medical and
three surgical kits
Pan American Health Organization Medical equipment and emergency health Nationwide $400,000
activities
Catholic Relief Services Emergency cash grants Port-au-Prince and the southern peninsula $412,287
Air Serv Emergency air transport in support of USAID/ Nationwide $340,981
OFDA, NGOs, U.N. and other humanitarian
organizations
World Vision International Emergency relief kits and cash-for-work North, Central Plateau, South, West, and $500,026
initiatives Northwest departments, and Ile de La Gonave
Total USAID/OFDA $1,790,294
State/PRM Assistance
U.S. Embassy/Port-au-Prince Assistance to Haitian migrants Nationwide $20,000
Total State/PRM $20,000
Total USG Humanitarian Assistance to Haiti in FY 2004 (to Date) $1,810,294
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ USAID/OFDA funding represents committed and/or obligated amount as of March 9, 2004.
Senator Coleman. Thank you very much, Mr. Franco.
Mr. Franco, you indicated in your testimony that enhanced
security is necessary for the normal distribution of food and
supplies, and you also indicated some concerns about the
interruption of health services up north, again because of
security issues. And I'm not sure whether you or Secretary
Noriega can answer this, but how many troops do we need to
provide the kind of security that would allow for that
distribution of food and supplies? My colleague, Senator
DeWine, has strongly suggested that what we have now is not
sufficient. Can you tell us what we need to make sure that we
can have normal distribution of food and supplies?
Mr. Franco. I'm not really qualified to answer the
question, so I will have Secretary Noriega answer the question,
Mr. Chairman; but I will say this, that the security issue--and
I want to report this, because I've met with all the donor
organizations and also international organizations, OAS
representatives, U.N. organizations, non-governmental
organizations, including CARE, CRS--and every one of the
organizations has said that the key thing is that we have now
secured installations, as I have referenced a port where we
have food, but that distribution remains a problem. The exact
number of what's needed, I have to defer to Secretary Noriega.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
Secretary Noriega.
Mr. Noriega. Mr. Chairman, the assessment of the number of
people that we need on the ground--that is to say troops--will
have to be made by the military. We have approximately--we have
an expectation that the current countries that have committed
troops will, when they have deployment in the next several
days, reach a point of 3,400--about 3,450 persons--on the
ground. We're going to have to look at what their tasks are,
what the geographical coverage that that particular size force
can provide, and what missions they can carry out. And then it
will be the role of the military commanders to ask for
additional resources, if they need it.
Having said that, there are other countries that have
offered support, and we have undertaken an urgent diplomatic
effort to encourage other countries to make those troops
available in the short-run, rather than waiting for the longer-
term peacekeeping mission.
So that's underway. The determination will be driven by the
commanders on the ground and what the missions are that are
required. But I think that there is a political commitment to--
not just on the part of the United States, but other friends of
Haiti--to provide additional resources, if that's required.
Senator Coleman. We had invited a representative from
SOUTHCOM to be here, and they were not able to be here, but
that is important information. There may be sufficient food,
but if it can't get to those who need it; if there's sufficient
medical supplies, but it can't get to those who need it because
of security concerns, then it's like not having it in the first
place. So we will continue to press on that issue. Time is of
the essence, and we want to make sure that there are adequate
bodies on the ground to ensure that food can be distributed.
There was some discussion by some of the witnesses about
the CARICOM relationship. Can you describe the nature of that
relationship today? Is it intact? Talk a little bit about the
strains. And where do we go with the future with CARICOM and
its role in Haiti?
Mr. Noriega. Yes. CARICOM took up the mantle of trying to
find a diplomatic solution toward the end of last year at the
request of President Bush in a meeting with Prime Minister
Manning of Trinidad and Tobago. This was another iteration in
diplomatic efforts, over the last three years, to try to create
a more sustainable political situation on the ground. They made
a valiant effort, and I think that the merits of their plan are
so good that we're still implementing it, although they have
formally disassociated themselves from it.
I was personally involved in the effort to implement that
plan; I went to Haiti, spent some time convincing--trying to
convince--opposition leaders that it was a workable, feasible
plan that we were committed to. We weren't able to convince
them to join in the process because of the scar tissue--
frankly, a lack of confidence in both Aristide and the
international community, which the opposition feels has been
turning its back on his abuses for too long.
Right now, we have--Secretary Powell and I have
communicated with CARICOM leaders to explain the situation
because some of them actually believe that--Aristide's version
of the facts that he was kidnapped, which is, of course,
ridiculous. But we need to convince them that we want to go
forward, and we need to convince them, frankly, that the 8
million people in Haiti still need their help.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, very, very much, Secretary
Noriega.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, again,
for holding this hearing.
Let me, if I can, begin by going back to the Inter-American
Democratic Charter, because in your testimony, Secretary
Noriega, you point out that a democratically elected government
can forfeit its democratic legitimacy by the manner in which it
governs. Said another way, being democratically elected does
not give a leader free license to rule as he sees fit. Nowhere
is that principle more firmly enshrined in this hemisphere than
the Inter-American Democratic Charter itself.
I presume you've read it--of course, you served in the OAS
as an ambassador, so you've been through the charter--and it
does, in paragraph 21, make that indication. At what point did
the OAS decide, by a two-thirds vote, which the charter
requires, that the standard had been met?
Mr. Noriega. The standard--there was a----
Senator Dodd. Standard that it forfeited its democratic
legitimacy. That's in the--you said that's--it's right, it's in
the charter here----
Mr. Noriega. Right.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----but it also says that two-
thirds of the members of the OAS have to vote accordingly.
Mr. Noriega. Right.
Senator Dodd. At what time did the OAS reach the conclusion
you did?
Mr. Noriega. It's interesting about the charter, sir, that
the charter has never been invoked, including its----
Senator Dodd. That's not the question I have for you.
Mr. Noriega. Well, the charter----
Senator Dodd. The charter says they should meet and vote--
--
Mr. Noriega. Yes.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----to reach that conclusion.
Was this a unilateral decision we made?
Mr. Noriega. Every country made a decision for itself not
to invoke the charter, not to put security----
Senator Dodd. So there was no----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----forces on the ground.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----vote at the OAS.
Mr. Noriega. I never said there was.
Senator Dodd. Well, you said--no, here, you said that it
had forfeited its legitimacy.
Mr. Noriega. I said that a government can, and in our----
Senator Dodd. Do you think----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----in our----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----the Aristide government
did, or not? I assume, by your statement--you didn't make that
statement just as an abstract idea.
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----The point that I was making
was that the troubles that Haiti--that President Aristide got
himself into--didn't happen overnight. It was the result of a
systematic abuse of human rights, ignoring the essential
elements of democracy that are laid out in the charter.
Senator Dodd. But that was not an OAS determination.
Mr. Noriega. No, sir, it doesn't----
Senator Dodd. In fact, are you familiar with what was
adopted on the 24th of February by the OAS regarding Haiti?
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----Yes, sir.
Senator Dodd. The resolution?
Mr. Noriega. Yes, sir.
Senator Dodd. Want me to read it for you?
Mr. Noriega. Yes, please, go ahead.
Senator Dodd. Let me read it for you here. This goes on
expressing--I won't give all the preamble stuff, but expressing
its profound regret that the opposition--speaking about the
opposition in Haiti--has not accepted the CARICOM plan, which
offers the best prospects for a peaceful resolution to the
current crisis, expressing the hope that they will reconsider.
Went on to resolve that they call upon the United Nations
Security Council to take the necessary and appropriate urgent
measures, as established by the charter--in the charter to
address the crisis in Haiti--knowing that the OAS has no
ability to militarily intervene in the situation, the
implication, at least for this person reading it, is that they
were urging the U.N. to take some steps five days prior to the
departure of Aristide, on the 29th, to try and step in--to try
and stop this collapse that was occurring, and it goes on and
condemns the opposition for not embracing the CARICOM proposal.
That's what the OAS would say. Isn't that true?
Mr. Noriega. The OAS supported the CARICOM process at the
time. We were urgently supporting the CARICOM process to try to
convince the democratic opposition participation in the
process.
Senator Dodd. So it's not, then, your conclusion that the
Aristide government had lost its legitimacy.
Mr. Noriega. I believe that the--it was--not in a formal
way, no, sir. In the terms of the invocation of the charter, no
country invoked the charter. No country invoked----
Senator Dodd. I didn't ask--I asked you whether or not you
thought they had forfeited the--is that your conclusion----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----In my view----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----or the Bush
administration's conclusion they forfeited?
Senator Dodd. Not in a formal way, sir. We don't make--we
didn't make that decision unilaterally.
Senator Dodd. Obviously, it wasn't done--formally, I mean--
at that point.
Mr. Noriega. The decision we made was that propping up--
merely propping up the Aristide government was not worth
risking American lives.
Senator Dodd. Let me jump to Aristide's departure, if I
can. During your March 1 appearance on Nightline, you stated,
and I quote, that ``President Aristide approached our
ambassador. He made the decision to resign. He chose the
destination.'' That's your statement on March 1.
Later last week, on March 3rd, you told the House
International Relations Committee that Mr. Aristide did not
learn that the Central African Republic was his destination
until the evening of February--on the evening of February 29th,
until about 20 minutes before he landed.
Mr. Noriega. Yes.
Senator Dodd. Which of those statements is accurate?
Mr. Noriega. They're both accurate. But I don't want to
mince words; because I think, quite frankly, almost immediately
when I said that, in the Nightline interview, I thought I
needed--I should have clarified that.
When the plane took off, at about 6:30 in the morning, all
of us thought the plane was headed for South Africa, that it
was on its way to South Africa, which is the destination that
he sought. Within minutes, 30 minutes or so, of the plane
taking off, we heard from the South African Government that
they were not able to take him. So we immediately had to
scramble to find another place. As far as I know, his
destination is still South Africa, and he can go as far as----
Senator Dodd. He didn't make the choice----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----whenever he wishes.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----to go there.
Mr. Noriega. He made the choice to go, and we provided a
plane for him to go to South Africa.
Senator Dodd. That's my question. He didn't make the choice
of the country.
Mr. Noriega. We made a--he made--he decided that he wanted
to go to South Africa. We made an effort to try to get the
permission of the Government of South Africa to receive him.
Senator Dodd. But he did not make the choice to go to the
Central African Republic.
Mr. Noriega. No, and when he----
Senator Dodd. Okay.
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----took off, it was not----
Senator Dodd. Are there any----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----our decision--it wasn't our
decision not----
Senator Dodd. [continuing]. ----other statements you made
that you'd like to correct at this moment? Any other
contradictions?
Mr. Noriega. No, sir, I don't think that--I've explained my
response to that----
Senator Dodd. You've explained it. I want to know if there
are any other circumstances in which an explanation----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----If you have any need for
clarification on any of my statements, Senator, please raise
them with me, and I'll be glad to clarify.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Senator Dodd.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. I want to thank Senator Dodd, because
basically the administration is essentially telling us not to
look back, only forward, and I think we have to look forward,
and we have to do two things: we have to walk and chew gum at
the same time. We have to go forward and protect the people
there and make sure things go well there, but we will have to
get to the bottom of this.
Now, when I--before Senator Dodd came--I read some quotes
of Colin Powell. And Colin Powell said, on the 18th of
February, essentially, we're going to back Aristide; he's the
democratically elected guy. The next day, he reiterated the
same thing. And ten days later, a statement comes down from the
administration essentially saying, gee, he ought to really look
in his heart and ought to get out.
This is odd. This is odd. And then when you put together
these treaties that Senator Dodd--who spoke eloquently on the
floor--that we're looking at, the Santiago Declaration and the
Inter-American Charter on Democracy--if we're just going to
say, well, no one's going to enforce these, what's the signal
to the rest of the world? What is it? What if we just said, one
day, well, we have a nice Constitution, but, eh, let's rip it
up. I don't think that would go over well. And since we are the
leader in the world, and have the greatest democracy in the
world----
Mr. Noriega, I am exceedingly troubled. And these are the
questions I'm going to ask you to answer in writing, because we
do not have enough time today. And I look forward to them. And
I would like to have them back, you know, as fast as you can.
And they're questions raised in an op-ed piece in the L.A.
Times by Jeffrey Sachs. And here's what they are:
Did the U.S. summarily deny military protection to
Aristide? And if so, why and when?
Did the U.S. supply weapons to the rebels, who
showed up in Haiti last month with sophisticated
equipment that last year reportedly had been taken by
the U.S. military to the Dominican Republic, next door
to Haiti?
Why did the U.S. abandon the call of European and
Caribbean leaders for a political compromise, a
compromise that Aristide had already accepted and, by
the way, told his thugs to get out of the streets
because the U.S. asked him to? So his thugs were taken
off the streets, and the other thugs were left on the
streets.
Most important, did the U.S., in fact, bankroll a
coup in Haiti, a scenario that may be possible, given
what we see? And he [Sachs] says, ``It brings to mind
Groucho Marx's old line, `Who are you going to believe,
me or your own eyes?' ''
Now, this whole thing has to be answered. And this one
Senator here--and I know other Senators feel the same way--
believes we're going to get to the bottom of this, like we, in
America, get to the bottom of everything. And, to me, it's just
stunning, and I don't know how we move forward in good faith if
we can't clear the air as to what really happened.
Let me read you the New York Times editorial of March 4th,
The Bush administration's belated and ham-handed
intervention last weekend practically delivered Haiti
into the hands of an unsavory gang of convicted
murderers and former death-squad officers under the
overall command of Guy Philippe, who American and
Haitian officials believe to be a drug trafficker.
Indeed, those who have benefitted most by the
administration's policy toward Haiti are the weak and
divided opposition that rejected political compromise,
and these murderous thugs, like Guy Philippe and Louis
Jodel Chamblain. Philippe and Chamblain went so far as
to thank the U.S. for its Haiti policy.
And I mentioned this in my opening statement, Mr. Noriega.
I don't know if you were here. According to news reports, Mr.
Chamblain shouted, ``We're grateful to the United States.'' And
Mr. Philippe said, ``The United States soldiers are like us.
We're brothers. We're grateful for their service to their
nation and against the terrorists of Aristide.''
How does it make you feel when murderers, like Philippe and
Chamblain, are thanking the United States and putting our
beautiful treasure of our soldiers in their category? How does
it make you feel?
Mr. Noriega. I would--Senator, I have all the time you need
to answer----
Senator Boxer. Well, just answer----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----questions.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ----that question. How does it
make you feel when those two gentlemen praise this
administration and say that the American military are their
brothers, when these are the guys who are murderers and thugs
and drug dealers? How does it make you feel?
Mr. Noriega. I can't make--I can't put myself in their----
Senator Boxer. I didn't ask you to put your----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----crazy thinking.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ----Well, how----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----These are----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ----does it make you feel?
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----violent criminal thugs, who
have no place in Haiti. Contrary to what the editorial said, we
are not delivering Haiti over to these people; we're delivering
Haiti over to 8 million decent Haitian----
Senator Boxer. And what are your----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----people, who finally
deserve----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ----what are you going----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----a chance to----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ----with those people?
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----make decisions about their
future, whose rights have been violated systematically----
Senator Boxer. Okay, and what are your----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----for years.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ----plans to go after those
people?
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----Uh----
Senator Boxer. Those thugs?
Mr. Noriega. In my view, it should be the policy of the
United States that these people be--at the appropriate time,
when the Haitian National Police is prepared to incarcerate
them, they should put them in jail. They should certainly be
disarmed. And they should face criminal charges for their
violations of rights over the long haul and just recently.
Senator Boxer. So--but my point is, if we are in a
situation where we are an occupying force, along with other
nations, I trust, you said when the Haitian police--would you
not move on those people, on those thugs?
Mr. Noriega. The sooner the better, Senator.
Senator Boxer. Fine.
Thank you.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You remember the time you used to sit on this side?
Mr. Noriega. Actually, I sat on that side.
[Laughter.]
Senator Nelson. Was it easier back then?
Mr. Noriega. Just for the record. It was--I didn't have to
pay attention when I was sitting back there.
Senator Nelson. Well, you and I have been at it now for
several sessions, and I want to look forward now. I'll just
state that I think it's been the policy of the United States
Government to have a regime change, and that was not only in
Iraq, but it's also in Haiti. And I think there are a lot of
troubling questions because of that. But for Senator Graham and
me, who are on the receiving end of the destabilization by
people taking the flight in rickety boats, it creates another
difficult situation. And so it is clearly in these two
Senators' interest to see the place stabilized as quickly as
possible.
There's an article out today that says that the Marines are
going to start disarming the militants. Perhaps you already
talked about that. But the nuts and bolts of government, I'd
like to know, what are your plans to come to the Congress for
appropriations to help you stabilize Haiti?
Mr. Noriega. Yes. Senator, on the migration question, I'll
note that in the week before President Aristide resigned, there
were about 900 Haitians picked up at sea in the week--
yesterday, there were none; I think in the week since, it's
probably in the dozens.
On the question of resources, there are resources that are
available from other countries. Our own budget is about $55
million, $53 million. There are international financial
institution loans that are available. We have to assess what
our requirements will be. And we'll have to approach decision-
makers within our administration on whether we need additional
resources from what we have available, and--that would have to
be reallocated to Haiti--and a decision by them if they wanted
to come to Congress to seek additional resources.
Senator Nelson. Well, we have an authorization bill that's
moving forward. And just like last week, I was raising Cain
here with representatives of the State Department with regard
to the future expenditures in Iraq, of which there is a blank
line in the request for authorization for appropriations; so,
too, because of the circumstances here in Haiti, we need to
know, as soon as possible, so that we can fill in that and
start to plan for these. And now that we have a vehicle that is
being considered, we need to do that.
For example, such things as: Are we going to provide
assistance for elections? When can we expect parliamentary and
presidential elections to take place? And are we serious about
the commitment, over a sustained period of time? And you've
heard my comments from this position of the committee. I have
been very bipartisan in my comments, because I think the
previous administration did not give Haiti the attention that
it should have after Aristide was put back in. But neither has
this administration. And we're seeing the result of inaction
and a hands-off policy. So I want to see that sustained level
of commitment by this government, and that is my
responsibility, as a member of this committee, not only to
speak of as a Member of the Senate from Florida, along with
Senator Graham.
I'd like to know, what is it going to cost for your plans
for the reforming of the national police, which is going to be
essential for future stability?
And then I'd like to know, Mr. Franco, about the P.L. 480
funding and what you're going to need from the United States.
You're going to find a bunch of willing Senators here that want
to support you, but we've got to have a coach that'll call the
plays.
That's about it.
Mr. Franco. May I comment very briefly, Senator? Mr.
Chairman?
Senator Coleman. Yeah, very--please. And I appreciate--the
series of questions from Senator Nelson demonstrate that
there's so much more information that we need.
Secretary Noriega, I'll allow you to respond briefly, or
Mr. Franco, but clearly there's a lot more information that we
need, and the record will ultimately reflect that.
Mr. Franco.
Mr. Franco. Just very quickly, Mr. Chairman. We share
Senator Nelson's concerns. But I can tell you that both AID
and--not only AID, but the non-governmental organizations and
the other donors' primary and paramount concern right now is to
make sure that the essential emergency food reliefs, medical
reliefs get back on track. We have plenty of food in country;
we just need to get that distributed.
Simultaneously, Senator, we are doing our level best to get
an assessment as to what future requirements will be, and we'll
get that back to you. We are the largest single bilateral donor
in Haiti. We have been, and I forecast we will continue to be.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I want to get back to the point I made
earlier, and that is that I think we need more troops in Haiti.
And I want to discuss that with you in just a minute.
You made a point that the number of troops that are needed
has to ultimately be decided by the military, and I guess
that's true, to an extent, but I want to take issue with you a
little bit. That's true, to an extent, but really the number of
troops that are needed is determined by what we expect them to
do.
We talked a little bit about--there was a dialogue a moment
ago about the problem with food distribution and movement of
food. And we know that's so essential in Haiti. You can have
food there, but if you don't move it around, you've got a
problem. Schools are not open. I know that from talking to
people, a lot of the schools are not open. The normal going
about of business in Haiti, a lot of that is not going on. Some
of it is, but some of it's not. There is what I would describe,
for want of a better way of describing it, as a fear factor and
a public confidence problem; and it's a psychological thing.
I would maintain that when you try to determine the number
of U.S. troops that are needed, there's a certain number that
you have to get to before you get a critical mass. And once you
reach that critical mass, then everyone sort of figures it out.
We're there. And the thugs and the guys with the guns sort of
get it figured out. And I'm not sure we're quite there yet.
In Haiti, our brave troops face a situation which is, in
some respects, more dangerous and tougher than we faced the
last time we came in. Last time, we had to kind of roll up the
military and deal with them, and we did that.
This time, we've got two different groups--more than two
groups, really--that have been armed. We've got the rebels, who
came in and were marching on, moving toward Port-au-Prince, and
we've got the Aristide gangs that had been, over time, given
guns by Aristide and were armed. And these two groups,
unfortunately, still are armed, and still have guns. And that's
the problem. And they're pretty well-armed.
So that's how I see the situation. And, you know, you and I
have talked privately about it. You don't have to respond now.
But I just wanted to make the point, again. I don't think we've
reached the critical mass yet. And until we reach it, I don't
think you're going to have the security level where we need it.
I don't think you're going to have the public confidence where
we need it. I think once we get there, then things are going to
calm down. And no longer are people in City Soleil going to be
describing to me what I was told yesterday, of these gangs,
these guys riding around with their guns and terrorizing
people, or the description I got yesterday from someone up
north of being shaken down, a hospital being shaken down for
money. You know, as long as that continues, the people aren't
going to be confident that they can go about their business. I
think there's a real problem.
Let me move, if I could, Mr. Franco, to where USAID goes in
the long run. And I appreciate what you say that your immediate
concern is, getting the food distributed. You're doing the
right thing, and we're proud of you trying to do that. But the
long run, where Haiti goes, is something I think this committee
has to look at.
And my time is almost up, and I hope we have a second
round.
One question. Back in 1999, there was a program in Haiti
called USAID Jobs. It's my understanding the program was pretty
successful, leading to an average of $55 per month in wages for
thousands of Haitians. It was a--I don't know if it was--kind
of a--our depression-era, Franklin Roosevelt-type program or
not, but it put a lot of people to work, built some roads, got
some things done. Are we going to try something like that
again?
Mr. Franco. Well, Senator DeWine, we're certainly looking
at that. I know that you met with the Administrator----
Senator DeWine. I did.
Mr. Franco [continuing]. I can tell you that that's one of
the things we're looking at. Since we're looking back a bit--I
think it's important to see what we did right and what we did
wrong. I can tell you that we will be developing a
comprehensive program with our partners, meaning the other
international organizations and other countries that are
working in Haiti, in terms of how we'd respond, and determining
our comparative advantages. Certainly, food for work, and these
immediate jobs programs are things that we are looking at and
will be looking at as one of the immediate responses. We will
be working on something comprehensively with our other
partners, and that's certainly on the USAID agenda.
Senator DeWine. Well, my time is up. I want to talk to you
a little later about agriculture, too.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you very much, Senator DeWine.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to ask Mr. Franco--you indicated that we have an
adequate quantitative supply of humanitarian items--food,
medicine--in country; the problem is one of distribution.
Yesterday, the United Nations issued, ``an urgent appeal for
$35 million for six month's worth of humanitarian aid.'' What
is the $35 million for if the problem is distribution as
opposed to quantity?
Mr. Franco. We just received that request. We are analyzing
it and taking a look at it. But----
Senator Graham. Excuse me, the ``it'' being?
Mr. Franco [continuing]. ----``it'' being the request from
the United Nations.
Senator Graham. We did not participate in the United
Nations decision to make such an urgent request?
Mr. Franco. We certainly didn't at USAID, no.
Senator Graham. Was anybody in the U.S. Government involved
with this?
Mr. Noriega. Not that I'm aware of.
Mr. Franco. We haven't been involved.
Senator Graham. Could you provide us with a written
response which would indicate what was the basis for the U.N.
urgent appeal? Who made the urgent appeal? And do you agree or
disagree with its validity?
Mr. Franco. I certainly will, Senator Graham. I want to
see what it is.
[At the time of publication, Assistant Administrator Franco
had not yet provided an answer to this question.]
Mr. Franco. I wanted to clarify a point. There are
sufficient food stocks in country, currently, for the targeted
populations that have been the recipients in the past. We do
not have, nor is there, a generalized feeding program in Haiti.
Because of the deteriorating situation, I haven't looked at the
U.N. proposal. I have to see what their forward thinking is on
that. The medical area is very much a concern. It is for the
international community and the Red Cross; it might be as part
of the U.N. appeal, as well. So I'll take a look at that, as
well. We're responding as quickly as we can on the medical
front. But I'll get you a written response on that.
Senator Graham. Mr. Noriega, I'd like to ask you some
security questions. What percentage of the U.S. and other
nations' troops that are in Haiti are in Port-au-Prince?
Mr. Noriega. Are which?
Senator Graham. In Port-au-Prince, what percentage of the
totality--and I think you said it was approximately 3,400
troops----
Mr. Noriega. Are in Port-au-Prince? It's my understanding
that the vast majority of them are in Port-au-Prince. And so
far, the plan for the U.N. deployment is that most of them will
stay in or near the capital area. Other countries are beginning
to look at what their mission would look like in other
provincial capitals, which we think is important, that we start
looking at deployments.
Senator Graham. Given the fact that Haiti has an
atrocious--and I think that's a generous word--highway system,
what's the plan to be able--if, for instance, there's an
outbreak in the northern regions, as there was prior to
February the 29th, to get security personnel there?
Mr. Noriega. Senator, I'd have to get you a more detailed
answer on the whole security picture--for example, what the
airlift capacity is and helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft
that's part of the current deployment. But I'd be glad to do
that, sir.
[At the time of publication, Secretary Noriega had not yet
provided an answer to this question.]
Mr. Noriega. And, of course, there are several other
countries involved in this, and they will have their own assets
and logistical tale.
Senator Graham. I mean, I'll just make a comment. It sounds
as if we have an Afghanistan solution here, where we are giving
some protection to the capital, and the other 6 million
Haitians, who live outside of Port-au-Prince, are pretty much
naked.
Mr. Noriega. I think it's fair to say, Senator, that the
current mission and the tasks for the U.S. deployment is very
much centered on the capital. But I think you're raising valid
points, and we certainly have considered the importance of
deploying outside the capital, to the provincial capitals.
There's a lawlessness there that's prevailing, and we do need
to address that. You're exactly right, sir.
Senator Graham. It seems to me that one thing we've learned
in the number of places that I mention in my remarks, from
Haiti to now Iraq, is that there is a correlation between the
number of security troops on the ground and the incidence of
lawlessness. I think we had our highest percentage, per capita,
in Kosovo, and we had the lowest incidence of violent actions
in Kosovo, which leads you to believe that there is some
correlation between the degree of presence and the degree of
security. I think it's critical that we reevaluate what it is
we're trying to accomplish in Haiti, insofar as security, and
then evaluate the number of people we've got on the ground to
carry out that mission.
Mr. Noriega. Senator, the comments you've just made on
security, and that Senator DeWine made, really echo what I've
heard among decision-makers in the executive branch, that the
number depends on the mission and the tasks, and those are
decisions that are made by civilian policymakers, and then you
ask your military people to give you their best judgement about
what sort of forces need to be on the ground. And then this is
a decision we have to make with our international partners in
perhaps a division of labor. But we're into, now, I think, the
tenth day of a deployment. We've got 3,400 people on the
ground, and we're--or, I'm sorry, it's probably close to 2,800;
we're going to build up to 3,400 in the days ahead. And then
we'll have--but we're also, at the same time, looking for other
countries that are willing to put large numbers of forces on
the ground in the very near term.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Senator Graham.
We have an outstanding third panel. We have about 50
minutes left. I know there's a strong desire on the part of my
colleagues to continue the questioning. I'm going to ask my
colleagues if they can limit their questions in this second
round. I'm going to ask one question with just a brief
statement. But, again, we have an extraordinary third panel
that I'd certainly like to get to, and I know Ambassador
Dobbins, who's on that panel, has some time constraints.
First, just a very quick statement. I hope we look forward.
We have to look forward. There are 8 million Haitians who need
us to look forward. There are a quarter of a million Haitians
who are HIV-positive that need us to look forward. And whether
it's the security concerns that Senator Graham has raised or
the litany of questions that my colleague, Senator Nelson, has
raised, employment concerns, infrastructure concerns,
environment, et cetera, et cetera--so we need to look forward.
That has to be our focus. We will be letting down the people of
Haiti if we don't get about doing that.
A very narrowly focused question for some of the moms and
dads in Minnesota and, I think, throughout America, there is
concern about international adoptions. A number of our families
adopt kids from Haiti. Secretary Noriega, you and I talked
about that while some of the conflict was going on. Can you
tell me what is being done for the kids in orphanages? Is there
food being provided? Can you tell me whether the process of
adoption, and adoptions, are still ongoing? Has it been
interrupted by the political turmoil? Are families still
getting the kids that they worked with and gone through that
whole process? There's a lot of fear and anxiety out there that
I have heard, and I'd just like my parents to have a better
understanding of what the current situation is.
Mr. Noriega. Senator, the government, right now, is not
functioning in a normal way. It will be a number of weeks, I
think, before we could say that that's happening again. And, of
course, in these adoption cases, it's very important that all
of the steps be carefully followed. So there will be a period
of time, I think, where we can't necessarily expect these--
depending upon where a person is in the process of adoption, it
will be difficult to culminate some of those adoptions.
However, it is a priority for us--it has been throughout the
crisis--to identify if there are some people that we can move
the children out if they're at that stage, and we continue to
treat that as a priority. And I know that orphanages are
certainly a part of our target population in terms of feeding
programs.
Mr. Franco. If I could just add, Mr. Chairman, just to
complement what Secretary Noriega said, orphanages are,
unfortunately, one of the areas that have been most adversely
affected--I alluded to that in my testimony--and particularly
in the northwest part of the country. And they are dependent.
They are part of our targeted food programs. So that is a
paramount concern. We had a survey done yesterday, and we are
taking some immediate relief supplies to the northwest to
address that concern.
Senator Coleman. I appreciate that, thank you.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thanks. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And, again,
thank you for these hearings.
Let me ask you, Mr. Noriega--I, too, I think, obviously
looking forward is going to be very important, what we do from
here. But I don't want to minimize at all, in any way, what
happened here. Because there are precedents being set. And, as
such, I think they pose some serious questions in the
hemisphere. Certainly Venezuela comes to mind, Peru comes to
mind.
You talk about losing political legitimacy becoming a
standard by which we would no longer support a democratically
elected government; then, I can only imagine how Alejandro
Toledo must be feeling this evening if that becomes the
standard, since I think the latest polls show him about 7
percent favorable in Peru. And I'm worried that that message
being sent out--that losing political legitimacy means if you
ask other nations to step up to your assistance when you're
being threatened, that we will not respond.
So, I think it's important we dwell on this a bit because I
want to know what happened. I want to know, for instance,
whether or not President Aristide, at any point, asked the
United States to militarily step in, since the opposition
rejected any offers to accept the CARICOM proposals. I want to
know what happened here. He [President Aristide] says, of
course, he was kidnapped. We said, ``No, look, we gave him a
choice,'' I presume, that he could stay, with no defense from
the United States, and face whatever happened to him, or we'd
fly him out of the country. Now, what I want to know is, at any
point did we offer, or were suggestions made, that we might
want to use the force to bring some stability? I'm told that we
are talking about maybe two or three hundred. In fact, I think
you and I, in different settings, agreed that the number of
armed thugs who are operating in the northern part of the
country numbered no more than about two or three hundred
people. Is that correct?
Mr. Noriega. I think it's grown since then.
Senator Dodd. Well, I mean--no, then; when the thing----
Mr. Noriega. At the time?
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----I'm talking about the----
Mr. Noriega. That's right, sir. I----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----So we're----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----agree with that.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----talking about a relatively
small number of people, at least that was the conclusion.
Mr. Noriega. Yes.
Senator Dodd. The suggestion that we might have been able
to respond to that with a small enough force to come in--was
that ever a possibility? Did we suggest that? Did Aristide ask
us for that? Did we reject that?
Mr. Noriega. Essentially, President Aristide did ask for
that in his many phone conversations with representatives of
the international community. And our CARICOM partners very much
appealed to us to be able to do that. We made a--Senator, I
have to say that there's a big difference between Alejandro
Toledo and the way he's governing and Aristide.
Senator Dodd. Well, see, I'm just using an example. All
right, I don't accept that. You don't like that example. Forget
about it. I'll just----
Mr. Noriega. But, Senator, the----
Senator Dodd. But let's get back to the point. He asked for
the help, and we said no.
Mr. Noriega. Right. And I--but I think--yes. We were not
willing to put American lives on the line merely to keep him in
power, and----
Senator Dodd. We made that decision on our own.
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----Each country made its
decision not to do that, and every country could have put
people in.
Senator Dodd. Well, clearly, the United States is a leader
in all of this. This wasn't--we're not sitting around with
coequals. Obviously, the U.S. is the principal player.
Wouldn't you agree with that?
Mr. Noriega. We made we made a decision for ourselves that
we were not willing to do it.
Senator Dodd. So we made a decision----
Mr. Noriega. It was a difficult decision----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----That's----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----Senator. I----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----about----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----I concede that. By all
means.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, the reason I raise that is
because I'm going to ask, tomorrow in a letter to the inspector
general of the USAID, to look into the programs of the
International Republican Institute (IRI). We've raised this
issue before, and I want to go into it with you here because
clearly we've been involved with the opposition for some time.
We've expended public monies on behalf of the opposition. I
want to get into some discussion with you briefly with you here
about that support because clearly we have made, at some point
here, a choice, or at least with public monies, we've made a
choice.
Now, I've raised the issue, Mr. Noriega, with you on
previous occasions, and I would assume that you're up to date
on what the IRI has been doing with respect to Haiti in the
last ten months. Is that fair?
Mr. Noriega. Yes, sir. They've been supporting democratic
opposition.
Senator Dodd. As I understand it, USAID, in September
2002, approved a two-year $1.2 million grant to IRI for its
Haiti program, is that correct?
Mr. Noriega. That's my understanding, yes, sir.
Senator Dodd. All right. The approval of this new grant was
conditioned on the IRI country director, Stanley Lucas, being
barred from participating in this program for a period of time,
because the U.S. ambassador in Haiti had evidence that he was
undermining U.S. efforts to encourage Haitian opposition
cooperation with the OAS efforts to broker a political
compromise. Is that not true, as well?
Mr. Noriega. I've heard that, yes, sir.
Senator Dodd. Well, is that not--no--heard it--is it true?
Mr. Noriega. I've seen it as a record----
Senator Dodd. Didn't you agree----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----of my----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----wasn't that a--didn't we
reach that agreement, that he would not be a part of it----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----The----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----as a result of the U.S.
ambassador's request?
Mr. Noriega. Yes, sir. That's----
Senator Dodd. All right.
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----my understanding, yes.
Senator Dodd. I'm sorry? Yeah, I know. All right.
But I want to get into what role did the Western Hemisphere
Bureau play in USAID officials' decision in Washington
approving the circumvention of these restrictions on IRI
because I gather Mr. Lucas is back involved. What role, if any,
did your office play in his re-involvement?
Mr. Noriega. None. That's a grant-management decision, and
there was a difference of opinion as to whether or not the
understanding was violated. I wasn't a party to the decision,
but AID, which manages that grant, reached an understanding
that--and we were--we were consulted--my front-office deputy
was consulted on the decision to go ahead and go with--go
forward with the program because of the fact that there was
apparent misunderstanding.
Senator Dodd. All right. Now, as I understand it, between
December of 2002 and January of 2004, IRI has conducted
numerous training sessions in the Dominican Republic with more
than 600 Haitian opposition figures. Is that correct?
Mr. Noriega. Yes, sir. It's my understanding--and the
participation in these things is--it's very broad-based. And
IRI does its training in the DR because in 1999 its country
team leader, one of them, was threatened by the point of a gun
by an Aristide thug and was--essentially they were run out of
the country. So this is getting to a point where we're sort of
blaming the victims here in this process. I think that these
people, as they do everywhere in the world, are doing
honorable, good work, promoting our values and----
Senator Dodd. I'm not questioning--I just want to know the
details of what's going on here. Is Stanley Lucas still
involved?
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----As far as I know, he is
still part of the program.
Senator Dodd. Can you assure this committee that Mr. Lucas,
the IRI staff, and participants in the training programs have
had absolutely no involvement or contact with Guy Philippe or
other members of the Haitian armed forces of FRAPH?
Mr. Noriega. I have never heard that, and, to my knowledge,
it wouldn't be the case. It certainly wouldn't be acceptable.
Senator Dodd. Yeah. But do you know----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----We know----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----whether or not----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----we know who this----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----that's the case?
Mr. Noriega. Pardon me, sir?
Senator Dodd. So you know whether or not that's the case?
Mr. Noriega. I have never heard that assertion. And if it
were the case, we would certainly stop it. We knew who Guy
Philippe was and that he had a criminal background. He would
have no role in--whatsoever in----
Senator Dodd. Well, I want you to inquire, if you would. I
want you to make----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----Please do. Yeah, I'll be
glad to----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----whether or not we had--
whether or not the IRI staff or people--if Stanley Lucas had
any contact with FRAPH officials or Guy Philippe.
Mr. Noriega. I will certainly do that.
[At the time of publication, Secretary Noriega had not yet
provided an answer to this question.]
Senator Dodd. Let me quickly--let me just jump--because one
of the concerns--and I'll come back to you, Mr. Franco, on
this--I want to know what discussions, if any, the U.S. Embassy
in the Dominican Republic has had about U.S. concerns with
Haitians residing in the DR who are plotting against the
Aristide government.
Mr. Noriega. If we had contact with the Haitian----
Senator Dodd. What discussions the U.S. Embassy and the
Dominican Republic has had about U.S. concerns with Haitians--
--
Mr. Noriega. Yes, sir.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----residing in----
Mr. Noriega. Yes, sir. We have had discussions with them,
because we wanted to make sure that these people were watched.
And we believe that the Dominican authorities were taking it
very seriously, and that they were prepared to take--as I
understood it, prepared to take legal measures if these people
crossed a certain line. But I'm speaking specifically of Guy
Philippe, for example.
Senator Dodd. Yeah. Have there been any contacts between
Dominican officials and Guy Philippe?
Mr. Noriega. Not that I'm----
Senator Dodd. Or other well-known Haitian dissidents?
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----not that I'm aware of.
Senator Dodd. All right. And I wonder if you might--over
the last several years, the United States has given fairly
significant amounts of lethal and nonlethal defense assistance
to the DR. The committee received the following notices, and
let me recite what they are.
January 23rd, 2002, $2.7 million in a variety of
defense equipment and material, including
communications equipment, training aids, tents,
clothing, and individual communication devices.
January 23rd, 2002, 20,000 excess M-16s to replace
older, obsolete, and nonfunctioning weapons, valued at
$2.7 million. The notice also stated that the older
weapons would be replaced on a one-for-one basis, and
destroyed upon completion of the transfer.
May 15th, 2002, $784,000 for radios and antennas.
March 27th, 2003, one million rounds of excess
ammunition for use in M-16s, valued at $150,000.
What I want to know, Mr. Noriega, is, has the
administration verified that this defense equipment has been
used for the purpose it was intended, and, very specifically,
whether or not the verification of the 20,000 obsolete weapons
that the M-16s would replace have been destroyed, as required?
Mr. Noriega. Senator, to the best of my knowledge--and I'll
have to get you this in writing--no transfer of weapons from
the United States Government to the Dominican Republic has
taken place since 1991.
[At the time of publication, Secretary Noriega had not yet
provided an answer to this question.]
Mr. Noriega. And you're citing explicit notifications, and
I don't doubt--I don't doubt that you have them in front of
you, but I specifically asked for an accounting of these
things, and, under this--under the U.S. program--that was in--
to the best of my knowledge, none of those rifles--20,000
reconditioned M-16 A1 rifles has ever been delivered. We expect
that they would be delivered--the first 2,300 of the weapons
may be delivered in April or May. They have not been delivered
to date.
Senator Dodd. I have another----
Senator Coleman. Senator Dodd, I will----
Senator Dodd. Yeah.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. ----enforce this, some time
limitations here.
Senator Dodd. Yup.
Senator Coleman. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
You said that when President Aristide asked for protection
from the 200 thugs or so that you estimated were there, that
you said no, because you were fearful it wasn't worth putting
American troops on the line for him. And I'm wondering, do you
think U.S. troops have been placed in added danger because so
many of Aristide's supporters believe that the U.S. Government
forced him from office, and that's causing some instability in
the country? Do you fear a little more for our troops because
of that?
Mr. Noriega. In light of the public statements that give
credence to that falsehood, some of which have come from--
unfortunately, from U.S. officials, including some in the
Congress--in light of the fact that those falsehoods have been
given some credence, perhaps it has caused some in Haiti to
hold a grudge against the United States.
Senator Boxer. What falsehoods?
Mr. Noriega. That----
Senator Boxer. What Members of Congress said falsehoods?
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----I will----
Senator Boxer. Name them.
Mr. Noriega. The suggestion that Aristide was kidnapped is
one that has been made in the public domain.
Senator Boxer. Well, didn't he say that?
Mr. Noriega. He has----
Senator Boxer. Hasn't he used that word?
Mr. Noriega. He has said that, and that's been----
Senator Boxer. And hasn't he been----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----that's a falsehood.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ----quoted?
Mr. Noriega. And it's been repeated in the public domain,
ma'am.
Senator Boxer. Yes, it has been repeated that he said that.
But you're accusing Members of Congress, or whomever you're
accusing, of spreading falsehoods, when they're quoting
Aristide.
Mr. Noriega. I said they gave credence----
Senator Boxer. And I'm asking you----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----to those falsehoods.
Senator Boxer. So the answer to my question is yes, you
think that U.S. troops are in added danger because so many of
Aristide's supporters believe him, that the U.S. Government
forced him from office.
Mr. Noriega. I'm not on the ground, but I think it's a
logical conclusion, yes.
Senator Boxer. Okay. That's why I think it's so important
to get to the bottom of this, because you're insisting there's
no truth to any of that.
Mr. Noriega. Yes.
Senator Boxer. That in no way was Aristide forced out by
America. And that's why I don't agree with my Chairman today,
who I really appreciate his holding this hearing and allowing
us such leeway here, that you don't look back. If you're right,
and there's not a whisper of truth to the fact that we forced
him out or that guns were given to the opposition, you ought to
welcome a in-depth investigation on this.
But I have to say--and, Mr. Chairman, again, we just
disagree on this point; we are in total agreement that moving
forward is crucial for the Haitian people, and we need to do it
for the children, for the women. And if we don't get, you know,
an adequate request here, I'm going to lean on my colleagues
here, all of whom, I think, have in their heart what I consider
to be true compassion for the people, and I'm going to help--be
part of a coalition to get to the Haitian people what the
Haitian people need. That goes without saying.
But whether it was Pearl Harbor, where there was an
investigation as to how that happened, whether it's 9/11, where
we move forward with 100 percent agreement on going after bin
Laden and the terrorists, we still have a commission, and the
President is looking back--and he has said he will now not put
a time limit on his time spent with the commission, and I am
very glad about that--or whether it's looking into weapons of
mass destruction and that whole intelligence failure, we look
back. This is America. The truth shall set you free. And you
cannot move forward in a successful way if you do not figure
this out.
So I would just say, Mr. Noriega, I've watched you in front
of the House, I've watched you here, and I just think, putting
together all the pieces, that the story isn't exactly as you
would tell it, because it doesn't add up. For the greatest
country in the world to be fearful of 200 thugs--my goodness.
And to tell someone, ``You can stay, but, unfortunately,
there's a group of murderous drug dealers and thugs that are
armed to the teeth who are going to get you, or you can go,''
that's not a choice. That is not a choice. And if you were
honest about it, you'd know that wasn't a choice.
If I told you, Mr. Noriega, that you would have to come sit
on our side of the aisle or you might be beat up by somebody,
you might even sit on our side of the aisle.
You know what I'm saying. So I have to just say, I'm
troubled by this. I think in the long run we're going to get to
the truth, and we have to get to the truth. And I know Senator
Dodd wants to get to the truth. And I hope that Senator Lugar
wants to get to the truth because it's our job to do that. And
I want to do that very much.
Mr. Noriega. Senator----
Senator Coleman. Senator----
Mr. Noriega. Mr. Chairman, I'll stay as long as necessary.
If you watched the House hearing, I was there for four hours. I
wasn't given an opportunity to answer any of these questions
that might shed some light on this, and I'm still not being
given the opportunity to answer some of the questions about
what our thinking was. But we'll cooperate with any inquiry,
I'll stay here as long as you want. I'll come back up and
visit. But I'll be glad to answer any questions that you have
that----
Senator Boxer. You----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----might set the record
straight.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, with due respect, I know what
your answer is. You said it wasn't worth sending any military
into the country, at President Aristide's request, because it
wasn't worth putting their lives on the line. You said that. I
know what the facts are. Colin Powell, on the 18th of February,
said we'll never let thugs take over Haiti; Aristide's elected.
He repeated it twice, then, ten days later, there's a whole
other--I mean, this isn't a matter of your having X-number of
minutes.
Mr. Noriega. Well----
Senator Boxer. It's a matter of what you have already
said----
Senator Coleman. Let me----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ----on the record.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. ----if I may, and I'm going
to enforce time constraints on my colleagues. But, Mr. Noriega,
if there's a question you are asked that you don't have a
chance to adequately answer, I'd certainly give you that
opportunity.
Mr. Noriega. Sure. Specifically to the point of what
happened--and I'm not going to abuse the opportunity, Senator--
Mr. Chairman--specifically on the question of what happened
between when Secretary Powell made his statement, I think, on
February 13th----
Senator Boxer. 17th.
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----17th--and I think he might
have said it on the 13th, because I couldn't remember--it was
maybe a Friday the 13th--where he made the statement about not
allowing these thugs to overthrow a constitutional government,
there was hope that there was a way we could do that by
supporting a sustainable political settlement. In the
intervening weeks, that became--it became clear that we weren't
able to do that. And there's a reason for that, and it's--I
mentioned before, that opposition wouldn't agree to the plan.
But we also noticed other things. We noticed that the--while
the Haitian National Police was going----
Senator Boxer. I hear you.
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----we noticed that while the
Haitian National Police was going----
Senator Boxer. Senator Dodd, Secretary Powell's quote on
the 17th and----
Mr. Noriega. Okay, 17th and 18th. We also know that in the
intervening time, that President Aristide's people were arming
his criminal gangs and thugs with guns, while the Haitian
National Police was going without guns. We know that the palace
sent gangs to attack the Coast Guard facility, because they
wanted to be able to preserve the migration card. The Haitian
Coast Guard personnel fought a pitched battle defending
themselves from Aristide's mobs, who had set on them because
they wanted to prevent our ability to repatriate people,
because they wanted to have the migration card, to be able to
continue to play that card.
So those few elements that were--could have actually helped
maintain the rule of law were being undermined even at the very
last minute, and we had to make an assessment of whether this
was a reliable guy, and this was a reliable partner in any sort
of political process. And we--and, frankly, we reassessed that
it wasn't--he couldn't be part of any sustainable solution.
We----
Senator Boxer. Even though he agreed to the deal, and the
rebels didn't, right?
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----And at the same time, he was
taking these measures, most of the violence--and this was our
assessment--most of the violence--in Port-au-Prince, in
particular--was the result of Aristide's gangs setting on
people, looting and----
Senator Boxer. Right, but----
Mr. Noriega. [continuing]. ----killing and attacking----
Senator Boxer. [continuing]. ----he had agreed to the plan,
and the opposition didn't. That's the point.
Mr. Noriega. He agreed to sign his name on another scrap of
paper.
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Mr. Noriega. But he continued to conduct himself in the
same way that he had for a decade. We put the man back in power
in '94 once. We did this before. And in the intervening decade,
we learned a thing or two about whether he was a reliable
interlocutor. We were willing to try to uphold some sort of
political solution if there was some sort of balanced solution.
That wasn't possible. He demonstrated that he was more
interested in a violent solution. And, frankly, we decided not
to create a doctrine where every poor, failed, irresponsible
leader can dial 911 and ask for U.S. marines to come and
surround the palace to protect them.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
I'm going to turn to Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is the first that I have heard, Mr. Chairman, that
Aristide's thugs had moved on our U.S. Coast Guard facility.
Mr. Noriega. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. And what happened?
Mr. Noriega. They fought into the night, and eventually----
Senator Nelson. Fought with whom?
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----These mobs set on this Coast
Guard facility called Killick, which is five miles north of----
Senator Nelson. And who were they fighting, our Coast Guard
people?
Mr. Noriega. They were--no, I'm sorry, they were fighting
the Haitian Coast Guard people.
Senator Nelson. Oh, it was the Haitian Coast Guard.
Mr. Noriega. Yeah, the Haitian thugs were--Aristide's mobs
and gangs were attacking a Haitian Coast Guard facility. These
are people that we had, earlier in the day, cooperated with to
repatriate some people to Haiti. They're a very professional
bunch, these Coast Guard folks, very professional. They were
really heroes that night. They had to get in their boats and
take to sea to avoid the violence. And the next day, they
showed up for work again. They're heroes. And their commander
has now been appointed by the new President to be the interim
chief of the Haitian National Police. His name is Leon Charles.
So it was clear that that was a calculated effort to prevent
our ability to repatriate people, so that they could continue
to throw people into the sea, to be used as a lure to lure us
to committing military in there again to save Aristide's skin
one more time. And this was--and we can show you some
information that will bear that out, Senator, in a very
compelling way.
Senator Nelson. I'm curious, at this time of violence,
including this--I thought you had first said that they were
attacking our U.S. Coast Guard. You're talking about the
Haitian Coast Guard. But I'm curious, at this time, you all--
the policy of the government was not to enact temporary
protected status of Haitians who were in detention in Miami,
and who were going to be sent back to Haiti at this particular
time of violence. Isn't that a very poor choice of timing?
Mr. Noriega. It was a very difficult decision, Senator, but
it was a decision that if we did not--if we did not demonstrate
that we were willing to put these people back, that we would,
instead, have tens of thousands risk their lives. It was a
very, very difficult decision. I was personally involved in
that, and I admit that it was a very, very difficult decision.
I think, in the long run, it saved lives. And I'll note that,
in the week before--as I mentioned before, in the week before
Aristide's departure or resignation, there were 900 people that
took to the seas. In the weeks since, Admiral Loy said this
morning it was zero.
Senator Nelson. Now, I'm not talking about the people that
were picked up at sea, the 900.
Mr. Noriega. No, I--that's right, sir.
Senator Nelson. I'm talking about the ones that----
Mr. Noriega. That's right.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. ----were in detention in
Miami, had been there for months.
Mr. Noriega. Yup. Yup. Yes, sir, you're right. I'm----
Senator Nelson. During that two weeks of violence, how many
of them were returned?
Mr. Noriega. As far as I--I don't know, sir. I'll have to
get you the number. But I remember looking into this quite
explicitly to see if there was any possibility that we could at
least leave those people were they were.
Senator Nelson. Well, that's got the Haitian community----
Mr. Noriega. I'll get you an answer.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. ----in Miami up in arms. You
can see why. I mean, the people had been there for awhile,
they're in detention, and then all of a sudden the government
policy is, we're going to ship them back in the middle of all
the bloodshed and the violence.
Mr. Noriega. Senator, I'll get you an answer in writing on
the numbers that were repatriated.
[At the time of publication, Secretary Noriega had not yet
provided an answer to this question.]
Senator Dodd. Did anyone object to that? Did anyone raise
their voice at the time about this?
Senator Nelson. In the administration.
Senator Dodd. No, I know you----
Senator Nelson. The two Senators over here were raising
Cain.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----But I'm curious about
whether or not anyone expressed any outrage about that.
Mr. Noriega. There were concerns expressed on----
Senator Dodd. Was the issue----
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----all sides.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----raised with you?
Mr. Noriega. It was----
Senator Dodd. Were you involved in the decision?
Mr. Noriega. In terms of the repatriate----
Senator Dodd. All right.
Mr. Noriega [continuing]. ----these persons, no, I wasn't
involved in the decision. There wasn't a decision; there was a
policy, a standing policy, of returning people. Now, whether
they--we did so in the last ten days, I don't really know. You
probably know better than I do, but I can get you an answer on
that.
Senator Nelson. All right. A year ago, you said to me that
you were positively disposed to and would work to get the
administration to move on Senator DeWine's legislation, which a
number of us here are helping him with, which is aimed at
creating Haitian jobs in the garment industry. What position
has the administration taken on this in the last year?
Mr. Noriega. As I--our position hasn't changed, Senator, as
the legislation hasn't moved. But as I've said in discussions
with Senator DeWine, I think this is a very favorable time to
be raising this issue, and we'll work with them to try to get--
be as forward-leaning as we possibly can to do this because I
think that creating those jobs--restoring, really--restoring
those jobs in the assembly sector can contribute greatly to the
recovery of Haiti. And there are American investors who know
those workers and want to get back in there and open their
operations up. And they may be willing to move as quickly as
anybody, to go in and start their operations back up. So we do
need to take a look at that, and that'll be part of our
strategy, Senator.
Senator Nelson. You know, a couple of years ago we passed
the Caribbean Basin Initiative, but Haiti was left out. And
Senator DeWine is trying to fill the hole. And it's beyond me
that we wouldn't be doing this long before. All you have to do
is give a wink and a nod from the White House, and that
legislation will fly out of here. I would encourage your
positive promotion of that legislation.
Mr. Noriega. We'll certainly consult with our USTR
colleagues and--but I think you made a very good point,
Senator, and we'll continue to work with you on that.
Senator Coleman. I'll turn to Senator DeWine, but associate
myself with Senator Nelson's comments regarding that--the
treaty, the trade agreement and the necessity to move forward
very quickly.
Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Let me first say that, Mr. Secretary, I agree with your
comments about Leon Charles. I've had the opportunity to meet
him, on several occasions, as he's head of the Coast Guard, and
I was glad to see that he was appointed the interim head of the
police, and he certainly is a professional and is someone who
I'm sure will bring credit to the current position that he is
in.
I think that, as we have discussed, Haiti, for the next
several months, you know, is in an absolutely critical time,
and I'm not going to belabor my point, the point several other
of my colleagues have made, about the number of troops that
we're going to need. And I've already made that point, to get
through that period of time and bring about the stability.
But now is the time, though, also, to plan for what happens
beyond that. And, you know, $52 million a year is just not
going to get it, from this administration, and from this
government. We're going to have to have other countries
involved; there's no doubt about it. But we're going to have to
take--you know, whether we like it or not, we're going to have
to take the lead. I don't know what the magical figure is, but,
you know, the committee has come up with--this committee has
come up with authorization of, you know, a total of $150
million. Anybody who has studied what is going to have to take
place in Haiti, I think, would come to the conclusion that
that's, frankly, the minimum, and that's just not going to be a
one-year shot; that's going to be for a number of years. When
you're looking at humanitarian assistance, we're doing the bare
minimum now, and that's in the low 50s, and that's just
humanitarian assistance. That's no money going to the
government. We're going to have to deal with elections.
Elections are not cheap. We're going to have to deal with
building back the police, infrastructure for the country. We're
going to have to deal with the ecological disaster that is
Haiti today, and get some real long-term, sustainable
agriculture programs going in that country. That absolutely has
to take place. We're going to have to deal with the rule of law
issue, with the courts. Those are long-term projects.
No one does them any better than the United States. We do
it the best. You know, we had good programs in there before; we
can do that again and bring in the Justice Department. So these
are long-term, sustainable programs that we're going to have to
put in place--USAID, other U.S. agencies. And so, you know,
we've got to start doing that.
But as my colleague from Florida just said, you know, the
cheapest thing we can do is pass Senate Bill 489, which is the
trade bill. And I just really appreciate your comments. You
know, now's, as you say, a favorable time to do this. This is
at no cost to the United States. It's not going to cost us any
jobs. Probably anybody who really understands the industry
would say it'd probably create some U.S. jobs. And it's going
to do something for Haiti that nothing else can do, and that is
create jobs down there. They had 100,000 not too many years
ago, before the embargo, the well-intentioned embargo, took the
assembly jobs down, almost overnight, from 100,000 assembly
jobs down to now probably 30,000. And when you go in there and
talk to people, you know, these are, by Haitian standards, jobs
that people line up for, that people want. For every worker in
there who is working an assembly job, they support, you know,
20 or 25 other people. It has a tremendous multiplier effect in
the economy.
So if we're talking about bringing stability to Haiti, and
if we're talking about giving a shot in the arm to the new
coalition government that's going to emerge, bringing stability
to the country, giving hope to the people, you know, passage of
this trade bill is a very, very tangible thing that we can do.
And so, you know, support from this administration is certainly
very, very welcome and would be very, very much appreciated,
and I think it could be part of a package of things that will
really make a difference.
So we thank you for your good comments. And I thank my
colleagues, from Florida. And, Mr. Chairman, thank you, again,
for holding the hearing.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Senator DeWine.
Mr. Noriega. Senator, if I may just comment very, very
briefly on that. I would say that it's important that we--if
there's anything that bothers me, it's the--what we read in the
newspapers, that this is a hopeless situation and that we're
going to--it's just a waste of money. Because I don't believe
that for a moment.
Senator DeWine. Nor do I.
Mr. Noriega. We put hundreds of millions of dollars in
there, and people are saying we've got nothing to show for it.
Well, I think there's a reason for that. I think we do have
some things to show for it. I mean, helping people just live
from year to year is a good thing. But I think that it will be
a better investment--that it's not predicated on our simply
keeping one person in office and accommodating one person's
irresponsible behavior. And you can ask Mr. Dobbins about this.
We stood up the Haitian National Police Force. It was a good
investment; they were great people. But he'll tell you that,
almost immediately, Aristide dumped a bunch of his thugs into
the middle of this thing, and then he wouldn't pay for it. And
then they committed political killings in broad daylight. And
we, frankly, didn't do enough to respond to that. And you can
ask him whether he thinks we should have done more. We had
farcical elections, one after the other, and we wouldn't let
the international community condemn that, because we wanted to
uphold Aristide as some sort of a symbol of restoring
democracy.
Those mistakes that we made, the original sin, really, of
our engagement, was that it was all about one person, and so
you can ask a little bit about the experiences they had in
those days, and I can assure you that we will have--we will
learn--we have learned from those things. We've learned from
those mistakes. And this will be based on the interests of the
8 million Haitian people, and not just one or two individuals.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Noriega. And thank you,
Senator DeWine.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for this
hearing and the opportunity to elucidate some issues in which
the United States might be of assistance to Haiti.
I want to associate myself with two remarks Senator DeWine
has just made. One, I have observed, for the better part of 30
years, on a very close basis, the quality of the people who
have come from Haiti. I have to assume that the people who have
stayed in Haiti share those similar characteristics, and they
are people who have great potential if they can be liberated
from this history of violence and oppression. Second, as it
relates to jobs--as I indicated in my remarks earlier--by
chance I ran into a man who employs several Haitians, and he
said that they're about to lose their job because of the
collapse of the basic commercial system, such as the customs
services.
I wonder if you might give some attention to this. What can
we do, as we're dealing with these other security and
humanitarian issues, to get the economy, at least that which
already exists, maintained?
Mr. Noriega. Senator, you've put your finger on the first
part of it; we have to get ahead of the security curve.
Senator Graham. But will you give some attention and give
us a report as to what your assessment is, the requirements to
get the economy that did exist moving and what the United
States is going to do to try to get it back to pre-February
29th standards?
Mr. Noriega. It's a high priority. We have the port--well,
I hope we don't get back to those standards, because there was
a corrupt customs system that just sort of strangled the
private sector. But we've got the port open again. We've got to
get the customs operating again, and those are high priorities,
jump-starting the economic growth.
Senator Graham. Would you give us a report as to what
specifically is going to happen to get the economy going?
Mr. Noriega. Do you want that right now, Senator?
Senator Graham. No, not----
Mr. Noriega. Oh, okay. We'll get you----
Senator Graham. I'd like to get that in writing.
Mr. Noriega. Absolutely. By all means.
[At the time of publication, Secretary Noriega had not yet
provided an answer to this question.]
Senator Graham. I'd like to move to another question, and
that is our intelligence. I'm concerned that the situation
seemed to have emerged so rapidly and at a much more intense
level than apparently policymakers in Washington were aware of.
What is your assessment of the quality and credibility of U.S.
intelligence services in Haiti to facilitate the decision-
making process of policymakers in Washington?
Mr. Noriega. Yes. Well, Senator, it's a sensitive area, and
I probably would give you a fuller answer. But I'm satisfied
that we had access to timely intelligence. Events were fast-
breaking in the final weeks; I concede that point.
Senator Graham. Are you saying that the policymakers knew
what the situation was sufficiently--that is----
Mr. Noriega. I----
Senator Graham. But the question is----
Mr. Noriega. I think----
Senator Graham [continuing]. ----How did we use the
information?
Mr. Noriega. The real deterioration of the security
situation in Aristide's tenuous situation came with the
uprising in Gonaives. We knew that this was a relatively small
band of people. What we could not have--what we did not know
was how quickly the police would capitulate, and we did not
understand, I think--and this is not really an intelligence
failure; but we did not understand how much dissatisfaction
there was with Aristide and that people would actually welcome
these people as if they were liberating territory. And then
these other folks came in from the Dominican Republic, former
members of the army and some of their small gangs. But these
are relatively small numbers of people, and I guess we didn't
really appreciate how brittle the institutions were and how
they crumbled. The Haitian National Police people disappeared
almost immediately.
Senator Graham. I may pursue some further questions on that
privately. But let me just conclude. I'm concerned that one of
the things that's important to the United States' credibility
in Haiti and globally is that we be consistent. And it seems to
me as if, during the crucial days leading up to February the
29th, we did not live up to that standard. Senator Boxer gave
some of the quotes. I would just add a couple of more.
According to the New York Times, on February the 13th,
Secretary of State Powell stated, ``The policy of this
administration is not regime change.'' Then on the 18th of
February, in the New York Times, Secretary Powell was quoted as
saying, ``We cannot buy into a proposition that says the
elected President must be forced out of office by thugs.'' Then
on February the 26th, we voted, in the OAS, our delegate, our
ambassador, for a resolution that resolves to call upon the
United Nations Security Council to take the necessary and
appropriate urgent measures to establish, in the Charter of the
United Nations, to address the crisis in Haiti.
Question. Did our representative of the United Nations, Mr.
Negroponte, did he urgently pursue this resolution that the
United States had voted for?
Mr. Noriega. The U.N. Security Council members--he met with
them, and the consensus was to issue a statement of the
president of the council, which was issued, that called for a
political settlement. The council did not act, at that point.
Senator Graham. And then subsequent to February 29th,
Secretary Powell stated that the reason that the United States
did not send security in before President Aristide's departure
was because we did not want to, ``prop up the regime.'' And
that seems quite a different statement than the ones that he
made consistently throughout earlier February and the fact that
we voted, the United States of America, for this OAS
resolution.
Mr. Noriega. We were prepared to send folks in if it were
part of a political solution. When it became clear that that
wasn't going to be the case, we made a difficult decision that
it was not sustainable, not an effective use of American
military force, and we didn't.
Senator Graham. Then what did the former chairman of our
joint chiefs of staff mean when he said, ``We cannot buy into
the proposition that the elected president must be forced out
of office by thugs''?
Mr. Noriega. I'll be glad to ask him to clarify his
statement, but I think what he meant----
Senator Graham. The fact that you have to ask the Secretary
of State for clarification is the most telling statement how
uncertain and unsustained was our statement of policy position.
Mr. Noriega. What you just said was a very valid point. Let
me attempt to clarify that. At the time he made that statement,
it was before we knew conclusively that the democratic
opposition was not going to join in the process, the power-
sharing process. And then we saw actions by President Aristide
to resort to violence and to continue the use of criminal gangs
to intimidate opponents and to attack even our interests, I
think, if you consider the importance of the Coast Guard
facility there to be able to return people. We saw that this--
that without the--some sort of balanced approach, that it was
not sustainable to just come in and say we're going to support
Aristide.
Frankly, I think that where we would be today is, he would
be in the palace with his thugs, and we would be protecting him
from other thugs while other criminal gangs would be out
exacting a price, and we would be there as bodyguards for
Aristide. That, frankly, is not a particularly appealing
scenario, either. And we had to think in those terms. We had to
be concerned about also creating a doctrine where we have an
obligation to send U.S. military in to support anyone that asks
for it. That's just simply not a very good policy from our
standpoint. It's one thing to say that we respect
constitutional order; it's another thing to say that it creates
an obligation to automatically deploy U.S. forces to surround a
national palace to protect a leader.
Senator Graham. Well, I'll just close that--we ought to go
back and revisit the Santiago Accords and the Inter-American
Democratic Charter because it seems to me, by plain English,
that we have, in effect, accepted the responsibility of coming
to the protection of a democratic government that's under
siege, or follow the procedure laid out in Article 21, which is
to suspend that nation from participation in the OAS and, thus,
from the OAS's responsibility to protect. And we did not follow
that legal procedure.
Mr. Noriega. Can I just comment on that, very briefly? It's
a very telling point to me that the Government of Haiti, in all
of the last several years, since that charter was approved,
never invoked the self-help mechanism of Article 17. And the
reason was, we came to understand, that it would create an
obligation on their part to respect the essential elements of
democracy and, they felt, would put them on a course toward
suspension because they were systematically violating all of
the essential elements of democracy. On several occasions--as
Chairman of the Permanent Council, I asked the Ambassador of
Haiti, ``Why don't you use Article 17?'' I never got an
effective answer. That was 18 months ago. That was in July of
2002, I think it was. And they never did. And the reason was,
President Aristide knew that he did not measure up to those
standards of respecting the essential elements of democracy, as
laid out in that charter.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, just before Senator DeWine
leaves----
Senator DeWine. I'll come right back. I'll come right back.
Senator Nelson. Well, I just want to say, he's getting
ready to offer--and I'm going to help him--an amendment to the
budget resolution, tonight, to take the administration's
position from $50 million for Haiti to $150 million, which--
it's a generally agreed-upon figure. If you could get a signal
from the White House agreeing to that, we could pass his
amendment tonight on the budget resolution.
Mr. Noriega. I'll get on the phone, sir.
Senator Coleman. Let me--we're going to end this panel. My
colleague, Senator Dodd, assures me that he has a narrowly
focused question on a local issue. I am going to yield to him
for that purpose only.
Senator Dodd. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.
Well, just one--I wanted to ask Mr. Franco one quick
question. There was a fellow--someone at USAID, who
countermanded the Ambassador's decision regarding Stanley
Lucas, and do you know who that is, Mr. Franco?
Mr. Franco. That countermanded----
Senator Dodd. The decision by the American ambassador not
to have Stanley Lucas involved in the IRI program.
Mr. Franco. Well, the best of my recollection on this,
Senator Dodd, is--and I had conversations with Ambassador
Curran at time about this--he requested that we work out an
accommodation. It would have been his preference, I think, not
to have Mr. Lucas involved in----
Senator Dodd. Who countermanded--who countermanded that?
Mr. Franco. I don't think anyone countermanded. I think
there were discussions and an agreement reached with Ambassador
Curran on how we would proceed with the IRI grant and what Mr.
Lucas's participation would be in that grant. Subsequent to
that, based on the agreement we had with Ambassador Curran, I
think there was a mistake made by IRI, in terms of what his
participation would be, and there was a violation of that
agreement that Ambassador Curran, IRI, and we had all worked
out.
Senator Dodd. Well, as I mentioned, we've got the--I've
asked the Inspector General to take a look at the whole thing.
Have you examined, by the way, the $1.2 million, how that
money's been expended? Have you been following that?
Mr. Franco. Yes, we have, sir.
Senator Dodd. Okay, fine.
Mr. Franco. One--oh, I'm sorry.
Senator Dodd. No, just--I wanted to--and I'll make a
request--I have the--there's a Haitian Health Foundation which
I know you're aware of; it's out of the Diocese of Norwich,
Connecticut, Dr. Jerry Lowney, who's been very--been living
there for years--going down--Dennis, from my old congressional
district--go to Haiti on a regular basis to perform voluntary
medical services in the town of Jeremie, way out in that far
peninsula point.
Mr. Franco. I'm aware of that.
Senator Dodd. And they've currently got a couple of grants
pending.
Mr. Franco. Yes.
Senator Dodd. And they're worried about how this is all
going to work out, and I'd appreciate it if you'd take a look
at those.
And, lastly, Mr. Chairman, let me just say here, I--Senator
Graham has made the point again--aside from--and, obviously,
we're going to go forward, and I applaud what Senator DeWine
and others are doing. But the precedent-setting nature of how
we handle this situation--these agreements and charters must
mean something. If they don't mean anything, then what are we
doing them for, and why do we hold others to a standard that we
aren't willing to meet ourselves.
And I say this to you, Mr. Noriega, but knowing of the
statements made by the Secretary of State, knowing how our
ambassador votes on the 24th of February, knowing we turned
down Mr. Aristide, despite a request to stand in assistance,
knowing we're dealing with a small group of thugs at the time,
knowing that we have support going on for meetings with
opposition groups in the Dominican Republic, and so forth, this
looks very messy, to put it mildly. And I think it's further
evidence of people's uneasiness about the conduct of foreign
policy.
Mr. Aristide wasn't in the palace in Haiti by some coup. He
was there because he was elected twice, overwhelmingly, by the
people of Haiti. Now, I know that you and others have always
had a problem with Mr. Aristide. But the people of that country
elected him twice. He stepped down from office, served in
private life, when Mr. Preval was Prime Minister, ran again for
election under the constitution. That's the first time I know
of in Haitian history that we've had a democratic transition of
government like this. And we walked away from this.
I'm profoundly concerned that others are going to see that
example in Haiti as a further rationale to maybe engage in that
sort of conduct again if they don't like the new government
that emerges here.
So I'm--I don't want to dwell on this particular point, but
I don't think you can just brush by it and say, well, that's
history. That's over with. We may regret certain things, but
we're not going to worry about it too much. I worry about it
very, very much, because these charters either mean something
or they don't. And if we're going to sign onto them, then we
ought to be willing to stand up and try and defend them.
Secretary Powell did that, in my view. The Secretary of
State did it for several days. For whatever reason, he was
overridden by someone else's sense of decision or sense of
agenda here, and I regret that deeply.
But I appreciate very much having the hearing today.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
Mr. Noriega, I'm not going to actually--I'm actually going
to--I'd prefer not to debate this point. Let me close.
Mr. Noriega. Right.
Senator Coleman. Because I've heard the answer.
Mr. Noriega. But I have to----
Senator Coleman. And let me----
Mr. Noriega. It's not that point. I was--on IRI, but----
Senator Coleman. Very briefly.
Mr. Noriega. I just wanted to note, for the record, that
George Fauriol, who's the project director--vice president of
IRI--he's project director of IRI in Haiti, spent a great deal
of time on the phone with opposition leaders trying to convince
them to join in this power-sharing deal. I got one e-mail from
him at 12:34 in the morning, around February 24th. So he was
working very hard trying to get these people to buy into that
deal. And that, frankly, is the role he should have been
playing. And I didn't want to leave the impression that somehow
IRI wasn't playing a bona fide role here.
Sorry, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for your
indulgence.
Senator Coleman. Thanks. And I was going to say, and I'll
say to my friend and colleague, obviously there are some
different perspectives on this. It's clear that there's a
perspective that says Aristide never lived up to these
agreements, never wanted to live up to these agreements, and
never invoked those agreements, and that between the time that
early statements were made by Secretary Powell, there was a
series of actions and conducts of incitement of violence that
significantly changed the situation. We may want to revisit
that at some point in time, but I really do hope that we can
figure out a way to move forward.
I'm going to call the second panel. I'm going to apologize
to the second panel that they've waited so long. But the future
of Haiti is at stake.
Mr. Franco, you are compelled to say one last thing before
we move on?
Mr. Franco. I want it to end on a very positive note, Mr.
Chairman, about the Haitian Health Foundation, Senator Dodd.
The president of the Haitian Health Foundation is in Port-au-
Prince today. We dispatched a plane yesterday to pick her up
for consultations in Port-au-Prince, and we delivered supplies
to the orphanage there.
Senator Coleman. On that very positive note, I appreciate
participation. Thank you, gentlemen.
Our second panel is made up of Ambassador Jim Dobbins,
former U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, and currently Director of
International Security & Defense Policy at RAND; Ambassador
Lawrence (Larry) Pezzullo, former U.S. Envoy to Haiti, retired;
Mr. Michael Heinl, co-author, Written in Blood, The Story of
the Haitian People 1492 to 1971, and Dr. Robert (Bob) Maguire,
Director of Programs in International Affairs, Trinity College.
[Pause.]
Senator Nelson [presiding]. Ambassador Dobbins.
Ambassador Dobbins. Senator?
Senator Nelson. You don't have to stand. You can sit.
Ambassador Dobbins. No, no, I'm going to. Don't worry.
Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Please.
Ambassador Dobbins. Would you like me to start?
Senator Nelson. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES DOBBINS, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, thank you.
Thank you, Senator, and thank you to the committee for
inviting me and the rest of the panel here today.
I think, for those of us who were involved in America's
intervention in Haiti of a decade ago, we ask ourselves, and I
expect you'll ask us what went wrong. Why wasn't this fairly
significant effort of more enduring value? And I think there's
several answers to the question.
The easy answer is, it's President Aristide's fault. And I
think that's an accurate answer insofar as it goes. President
Aristide did fail to seize the many opportunities that were
offered to him and to Haiti to move forward. He consistently
blocked necessary economic reforms. He refused to disassociate
himself from elements of his support that were corrupt. And he
never worked to ensure that the many elections, which he was
going to win in any case, were free and fair and above-board.
I think that many people are unhappy about the manner of
President's Aristide's departure. I suspect fewer are unhappy
about the fact of his departure. And I suspect fewer still
would like him to come back. Although given Haiti's penchant
for endlessly repeated tragedy, I don't think it's an
eventuality that one could absolutely exclude at this stage.
I think it's too easy, though, to blame Haiti's problems
and current plight on President Aristide, and I think we miss
an opportunity to critique our own mistakes of the past decade,
of which there are numerous.
Reflecting on the decade, let me just go through the
lessons that I draw from it.
First, that exit strategies and departure deadlines are
incompatible with the enduring reform of failed or failing
states. In the aftermath of Somalia, the Clinton administration
went in with a very narrow political margin. It committed
itself to leave within two years. It felt constrained to make
that commitment. Worse still, it felt constrained to keep the
commitment. Two years is simply too short a time to fix a
society as broken as is Haiti.
Second, that institution-building in failed states required
significant resources. In the aftermath of the American
intervention, U.S. aid to Haiti went to the astronomical level
of $200 million a year. In the light of subsequent American
nation-building efforts, this is a pitifully small sum. Bosnia,
only two years later, received seven times more assistance, on
a per-capita basis, despite the fact that Haiti was much more
needy than Bosnia. Kosovo received four times more. And today
Iraq is receiving 30 times more assistance, on a per-capita
basis, than Haiti did at the absolute peak of American
interest. These sums are simply too small to underwrite the
kind of fundamental reforms that would make our interventions
of lasting significance.
Third, Haiti is too polarized to conduct its own elections.
The opposition wouldn't trust Aristide. If these elections are
organized by the new government, Aristide supporters aren't
going to trust them, will refuse to run, and then will try to
discredit the process. I believe the U.N. or the OAS needs, not
only to support a Haitian-government-run election, it needs to
actually run the election and be the ultimate arbiter when
disputes arise.
Fourth, we need to provide direct assistance to the Haitian
Government. Even the Clinton administration was disposed to put
most of its assistance through NGOs because it was worried
about accountability and possible misuse of funds. This is
applying a band-aid to the situation in Haiti. Haiti needs
institutions. It's not going to get institutions unless we help
fund those institutions and unless we use those institutions to
deliver assistance to the Haitian people.
Fifth, we need to move quickly to push through basic
economic reforms. It's natural enough in these kinds of
situations to focus on the security and the political aspects
because those seem an early ticket out. And I think, back in
the mid '90s, we didn't put enough emphasis on doing the basic
economic reforms--things like the electric company, the
telephone company, the port, the other things that Haiti needs
to become a functioning society and a magnet for investment--
until our influence had diminished to the point where we simply
couldn't push them over the barrier.
Sixth, security is more than police. We built up a good
police department. But the best police department in the world,
if it doesn't have courts to try criminals, and prisons to put
them in, is left with no choice when it catches a criminal but
to kill him or let him go. And either of those ultimately
corrupts the force, as it did corrupt the force that we built.
Seventh, don't cut off assistance to Haiti unless you're
willing to invade. Haiti is simply too weak, its institutions
too dependent on foreign assistance, to survive a prolonged
period of international isolation. We cut off assistance to
Haiti in 1991, and we had to invade in 1994. We cut off
assistance in 2000, we had to invade in 2004. It follows almost
as the night the day. So you either have to stomach the
government that's there, and assist them, or you have to
determine that you're ultimately going to intervene once again.
And, finally, the lesson I draw is that reconciliation in
Haiti has to begin in Washington. Of all of America's nation-
building missions, all of which have been controversial, none
has been more controversial than Haiti, and none has been more
partisanly controversial than Haiti. Haiti's leaders have
learned that if you don't like American policy, just wait until
the next election. It's all too often that Haiti's political
leaders would rather listen to their patrons and their
champions in Washington than to the American Ambassador. And
America's not going to be able to exercise its full influence
and its potential influence in Haiti unless it does it on the
basis of a bipartisan consensus. We've had Democratic policies;
ultimately, they didn't work. We had Republican policies; they
obviously didn't work. I think we should try to give a
bipartisan effort a real shot.
Now, having said we made a number of mistakes, we didn't do
everything wrong back in the early '90s, and we ought to look
at some of the things we did right and try to emulate them.
First of all, we put in a very large, capable force, and we
established security in Haiti within days. There is a danger
that we're now doing in Haiti exactly what we've done in
Afghanistan and Iraq, which is dribble forces in, fight the
problem, deny that more is necessary, never secure control of
the streets, and fight a rear-guard battle for months or years
thereafter. We really ought to follow the more-is-better
dictum, which several Senators here have already made.
Second, we put in significant numbers of police. For the
first time ever, a thousand armed international police were put
in as part of that peacekeeping force. This was an innovation
in international peacekeeping, which has been imitated since,
and ought to be imitated again in Haiti.
Third, the transition from the U.S.-led phase to the U.N.-
led phase went exceptionally smoothly in Haiti during the
Clinton intervention. We worked closely with the United
Nations. It was a seamless transition. The United States
participated significantly in the U.N. phase of the operation.
The military part of the U.N. peacekeeping effort was commanded
by a U.S. general, and there were significant U.S. troops in it
serving under U.S.--under U.N. control, without the slightest
incident. And we all know that only the United States has
significant influence in Haiti. The United Nations is an
important instrumentality through which we can appropriately
and legitimately exercise that influence, but it's not an
alternative to a continued American engagement, and I certainly
hope that this administration will look at the very successful
record of U.N. and U.S. collaboration in the mid '90s when it
looks at how to design the next phase of our engagement there.
I think that's--those are my lessons and conclusions,
Senator.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Dobbins follows:]
Prepared Statement of James Dobbins\1\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local
legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
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I would like to thank you and the committee for inviting me to
testify today on Haiti. It is said that history repeats itself, first
as tragedy and then as farce. Haiti, sad to say, goes only from tragedy
to tragedy. American Marines are engaged in our fourth intervention in
Haiti in ninety years. Jean Bertrand Aristide is the thirty third
Haitian President to be driven from office, in his case for the second
time.
Those of us who worked to organize the last American intervention,
in 1994, thought we had given Haiti the opportunity to break this cycle
of misrule, poverty and instability. Our hopes have been disappointed.
More importantly, so have those of the Haitian people.
Even as America reluctantly launches upon another round of nation-
building in Haiti, it is worth examining what went wrong with the last
effort and why those hopes were disappointed.
The short answer is that President Aristide failed to avail himself
of the multiple opportunities he was provided, from 1994 onward, to set
Haiti on the path to democracy and prosperity. He blocked the economic
reforms that would have made Haiti more attractive for foreign private
and public investment. He refused to disassociate himself from
supporters with records of corrupt or abusive behavior. He never worked
sufficiently to create a level electoral playing field, even when his
own overwhelming popularity would have assured him and his party
ultimate victory.
President Aristide is preeminently responsible for his and Haiti's
current plight. While there may be a good number here and in Haiti that
regret the manner of his going, fewer, I expect, regret that he has
gone, and even fewer would like to see him return. Given Haiti's
penchant for cyclical tragedy, however, such a turn of events cannot be
excluded.
To blame Haiti's current crisis exclusively on President Aristide
is to miss an opportunity to learn from our own mistakes over the past
decade. Even against the background of Aristide's intractability,
different American decisions at multiple points over the past decade
would have produced different and better results. Personally, I draw
the following lessons from this decade.
(1) Exit strategies and departure deadlines are incompatible
with enduring reform of failed states. In the wake the Somalia
fiasco, nation-building became a term of derision. In 1994 the
Clinton administration's political margin for another such
operation in Haiti was exceedingly narrow. President Clinton
felt constrained to promise that the American troop commitment
would last no longer than two years. Worse still, when the time
came, he still felt constrained to keep that commitment. Two
years is too short a period to fix a society as profoundly
broken as Haiti.
(2) Institution building in failed states requires
significant resources applied over extended periods. American
and international assistance to Haiti, even at the peak of the
Clinton administration's interest, was, in comparison with
subsequent more successful efforts, very low. Only two years
later Bosnia received seven times more assistance on a per
capita basis. Kosovo received four times more. Today, Iraq is
receiving more than thirty times more American assistance, on a
per capita basis, and one hundred times more in absolute terms
than Haiti received in the immediate aftermath of the last U.S.
intervention. None of these other societies is remotely as
needy as is Haiti, and none of them lies on our very doorstep.
(3) Haiti is too polarized to conduct its own elections.
Since 1995 each Haitian election has been worse organized than
the last. How much of this was due to incompetence and how much
to willful manipulation has been hard to establish. Opposition
parties were never willing to give the Haitian electoral
authorities the benefit of the doubt in these matters. One must
anticipate that the political forces associated with Aristide
will be equally suspicious of any election organized by his
successors. As it has done in Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia and East
Timor, the international community needs to do more than
support Haitian authorities in organizing the next elections.
The UN or the OAS should organize and oversee the balloting and
be the final authority in adjudicating any disputes that arise.
(4) Provide significant assistance directly to and through
the Haitian government. Donors have long preferred to provide
the bulk of their aid to Haiti through NGO's in order to ensure
accountability and appropriate use of their funding. The result
is to simply apply band-aids, as foreign experts and
organization temporarily provide what should be government
services to individual Haitians, without doing anything to
build up the capacity of the Haitian government.
(5) Push through basic economic reforms while U.S. and
international leverage is at its maximum. It is natural to
focus initially upon matters of security and politics, which
seem to offer the keys to an early exit. The most difficult
reforms to introduce in Haiti, however, will be economic ones,
putting badly mismanaged state monopolies, like the electric
and telephone monopolies, and the port on a sound commercial
basis. The earlier these steps are embarked upon, the likelier
it is that progress can be made before international interest
and influence begins to wane.
(6) Security is more than police. Rebuilding the Haitian
National Police is the easiest of the reconstruction tasks
before us today, because it is the institution that was
adequately funded in the mid 1990's. This time around, equal
attention and adequate funding should be given to judicial and
penal reform.
(7) Don't cut off assistance to Haiti unless you are willing
to send troops. In the early 1990s the imposition of sanctions
on the Cedras regime led to large-scale refugee flows and the
1994 U.S. intervention. A decade later the international
communities' decision to cut off assistance to the Haitian
government again after the flawed 2000 Senate elections was
perfectly justified but quite unwise. Unable to deliver even
minimally on his electoral promises, Aristide's popularity
waned, and his reliance on force increased, just as had that of
the Cedras regime in similar circumstances a decade earlier.
Without formal and legitimate instruments through which to
govern, Aristide was forced to rely, even more than he
otherwise might, on informal and illegitimate sources of power.
Absent international support, Haiti's already weak institutions
disintegrated to the point where a few hundred armed criminals
credibly threatened to take over the country. Haiti's next
government will come to power through a similar reliance,
however unwilling, upon criminal and abusive elements in the
society. This cycle can be broken only through a long term U.S.
and international effort to develop Haitian institutions for
governance.
(8) Reconciliation in Haiti must begin in Washington. All of
America's nation-building missions have been controversial at
home, but none more so than Haiti, and none in so partisan a
manner. Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have had
critics and supporters in both parties. With Haiti, the debate
has been the bitterest, and conducted most along party lines.
American influence has been less effective as a result. Haitian
political leaders have learned that if you do not like U.S.
policy, just wait till the next election. Haitian factions
often listen more to their advocates in Washington than the
American Ambassador. Against the background of the last decade,
it is fair to say that neither the distinctly different
Democratic or Republican approach to Haiti have yielded great
results. The time has come to construct a bipartisan effort to
help Haiti break its endless cycle of misrule, poverty and
chaos.
It would be wrong to suggest that we did nothing right in Haiti a
decade ago. There were aspects of the 1994 intervention that were
successful and should be emulated. Nearly one thousand international
police were introduced in 1994 along with the military peacekeepers, an
innovation in international peace operations. The transition from the
U.S. led multinational coalition to the UN run peacekeeping mission six
months after the arrival of U.S. troops was well prepared and nearly
seamless. U.S. troops continued to serve in Haiti under UN control. An
American General commanded the UN force. The U.S. and the UN
collaborated closely and without friction.
Only the United States has real influence in Haiti. The more united
we are at home, the more decisive that influence will be. The UN is the
appropriate institutional framework through which the U.S. can bring
that influence to bear. The UN is in no sense an alternative to
American leadership and engagement. As we look toward the transition
from U.S. to UN control over peacekeeping in Haiti, therefore, we
should not view this as an opportunity for American disengagement, but
rather a means to share the burden more broadly and to secure full
international and local legitimacy for the sustained efforts, which
must ensue.
Senator Nelson. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Pezzullo.
STATEMENT OF HON. LAWRENCE PEZZULLO, FORMER U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY
TO HAITI (RETIRED), WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ambassador Pezzullo. Let me begin with one, I think,
central issue here, and that is the question of bipartisanship.
Senator Nelson. Try it again.
Ambassador Pezzullo. The question of bipartisanship. I
mean, we've already heard here, and at other hearings, the
finger-pointing and the constant questioning of our role, our
position, our attitude. It gets to a point where we forget the
Haitians. And I think, as much as we can look at the failures
of Haitians to govern themselves, these are a traumatized
people, for good reason, and they can't look back much to their
history to find lessons. So, indeed, their lack of confidence
is basic. But when they look at a Washington, and hear a
Washington, constantly questioning itself, not necessarily
Haiti--and I would question the expertise of the people who
talk about Haiti--the arrogance we show--we wouldn't be that
arrogant about our own country very often, but we're very
arrogant when it comes to making judgements about what's going
on in another country, what the attitudes are, who they are,
what--where they fit into--you know, detrimental to their own
capacity to govern their own land. That's fundamental.
Now, as to where we are and where we go, I do think we
should be looking ahead--very clearly looking ahead. And I
think several things are basic. One, Haitians have to put this
together. There's no question in my mind that, without them,
really putting this thing together in a constitutional way is
not going to work. I don't believe you have to bring in
everybody in the world to run it for them. I do think they have
to abide by, first of all, their constitution, which Aristide
constantly winked at. The president of Haiti is not the chief
of government; he's the chief of state. The prime minister is
the chief of government. Aristide absorbed both those
positions. The prime minister is responsive to the parliament.
Aristide's prime ministers were never responsive to a
parliament. They considered parliament a unnecessary body. So
they undercut the very basic aspects, the basic institution of
the country, they undercut. And you've got to begin there.
What's promising to me is that this new democratic group
has followed a pattern already very constitutional, which
ultimately, if followed--and we should insist that they follow,
and aid should be tied to their following; no question in my
mind--that constitutional process should bring them to a point
where they do have an elected president, they do have a new
elected prime minister, they do have a new parliament. And that
parliament and prime minister and president should adhere to
the tenets of their own constitution.
Without a governmental process in place, a political
process in place, foreign assistance rarely works. We
constantly talk about foreign assistance as if it's some
magical thing. It's not really a question of absorptive
capacity; that's sort of a technical term people like to use.
It's really the capacity of institutions of government,
politically, to deal with intelligence. And it's not the
expertise from outside. I mean, there are a million people who
have worked in assistance around the world who can tell you
what happened at Turkey ten years ago, and what happened in
Vietnam, and what happened in every other country you can think
of. The fact of the matter, it has to be built into the home
environment, into the home psyche.
So you need a government, to begin with, that adheres to
its own laws, that has competent people in place. And after
that--and this would be my concern--you stay very, very close
to it. You just don't talk about levels of aid; you talk about
implementations of aid, you talk about the order of the aid,
you talk about researching what happened to the aid, you go
back and study. There is a terrible fallacy in the aid field,
and you find it in the World Bank, in AID, and everywhere.
They'll spend forever studying the details of a program--
feasibility studies, study after study, expert visits, and so
on. But once the aid is finalized, forget it. Nobody ever goes
back in. They're too busy looking at the other program, and the
next one, the next one. Terrible. Terrible for the recipient
because they know nobody watches. Terrible for the process
because you say it failed. And terrible for those who say, what
are we throwing our money down a rat hole for. It's got to be
followed very carefully, by us and by other donors.
At the same time, there has to be a respect, which I'm
afraid we fail to offer to recipient countries, especially to
this new, nascent government. We should step back and give them
at least the respect of a new nation trying to govern itself
and be very intrusive, in the sense of wanting to know, but not
going beyond that. That takes a lot of skill and patience, and
a little less over-the-shoulder coaching from the United
States.
So my cardinal concerns would be bipartisanship here, but
really bipartisanship, respect for the Haitians, but forcing
them to adhere to their own constitutional structure.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pezzullo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lawrence Pezzullo
Mister Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate your
invitation to testify on the subject of ``A Fresh Start for Haiti.
Charting the Future of U.S.-Haitian Relations.''
Once again events in Haiti have commanded the attention of the
world community and make urgent the need for the United States and
other international actors to restore public order and help Haitians
build for the future.
a. haitian initiatives and responsibilities
Since Haitians have to take the lead in reconciling their
differences and setting the foundation for a viable future, let me
outline first the critical steps Haitians must take and then speak of
the supportive contributions the United States and other external
actors can make.
It would be a mistake to underestimate the difficulties that lie
ahead for the Haitian people and those who are chosen to lead the
country. They have been deeply traumatized by recent events and draw
few useful lessons from Haiti's history of governmental failure. But
staring into an abyss has a way of focusing attention. I believe the
leaders of the democratic opposition to the former government recognize
the hazards and opportunities that lie ahead and are up to the
challenges.
1. The Haitians have moved quickly to initiate the CARICOM proposal
by forming a tripartite commission, which, in turn, will appoint a
group of elders to select a new Prime Minister. That process must
proceed quickly. Any delay in selecting a new Prime Minister will
perpetuate the current leadership vacuum and offer opportunities to
dissident elements interested in perpetuating conflict and or seeking
partisan gains. Any remaining rebel forces must be urged to commit
themselves to support the new government and to turn in their arms to
police authorities.
2. The new PM must form a broad-based interim government of
``national reconciliation'' that commits itself to abide by the Haitian
Constitution in governing and overseeing a transition to a newly
elected democratic government. National reconciliation must be more
than a slogan, given the polarization of Haitian society engendered by
the last government. The interim government would be well advised to
call upon the advice and resources of international organizations that
have focused on the strengthening of ``civil society.''
3. The interim government must honor the international commitments
and obligations of the previous government. It also must appeal to the
international community, (a) to provide peacekeepers until a revamped
police force can maintain public order, (b) to continue humanitarian
assistance programs and (c) to provide technical and economic
assistance in fields ranging from job creation to executive training.
4. The interim government would be well advised to open a public
dialogue with the Haitian people to keep them informed of government
activities and plans and to seek their support and cooperation. That in
itself would be an innovative departure from the paternalistic
tradition of the past, especially if it incorporated a feedback
mechanism to help the government keep its finger on the public pulse.
It would be a good way to begin making public officials accountable.
b. u.s. policy
The United States has been drawn into the current Haitian crisis as
it has on many occasions in the past. This time we should try to do it
right. It will take discipline and subtlety; neither of which comes in
large supply during crises and especially in a presidential election
year. Already much of what passes for debate in this country has been
finger pointing. That's the worst way to start, if we hope to play a
constructive role in helping Haiti.
We need the statesmen in both political parties to come forward and
set a tone of bipartisanship: the quicker the better. Otherwise,
whatever positive contribution we might make in the Haiti situation
will not have the congressional support needed, and we will find
ourselves debating the wrong issues, sending the wrong signals and
ultimately working at cross purposes with the democratic forces in
Haiti that desperately need our mature counsel, support and assistance.
Assuming we can attain some degree of discipline and focus on our
contributions in Haiti, the policy should be one of nonobtrusive
involvement. That would require us to be deeply involved every step of
the way as the new interim government organizes itself, sets priorities
and begins implementing programs. We must insist that, inter alia, it
abides by the Haitian Constitution, is broad based, is conferring with
the public, is meeting its international obligations and begins early
on to make plans and seek assistance to hold national elections. Our
technical and economic assistance programs should be monitored closely,
audited and reviewed regularly. (Below find suggested areas of U.S.
Government Assistance.)
Involvement at the level of intensity noted requires political and
social skills of a high order. The success of our involvement hinges in
large measure on the quality of our personnel engaged in the Haiti
crisis.
It is easy to lap over into obtrusiveness when involvement is as
intensive as recommended. It is one thing to insist that programs be
implemented effectively, quite another to be seen as dictating.
Haitians are not alone in thinking that the United States marches to
the beat of its own drum, indifferent to the interests of people in the
Third World. To be effective in helping the new Haitian leadership find
its own way that stereotype must not be given credence. After all, the
prime objective in Haiti is to build a new political culture based on
the rule of law, which encourages greater citizen participation and
attracts self confident and capable people to enter public service. Big
Brother will not get you there.
c. suggested u.s. government initiatives
Leadership in calling donor conference for new Haitian
Government
Continued leadership in Peacekeeping
Immediately unfreeze suspended assistance program funds
Support programs that build civil society and encourage
other donor's contributions
Support electoral preparation and encourage other donors to
offer assistance
Initiate job-creation programs
Encourage IFIs to invest in infrastructure projects and
ecology
Reinstitute police training program
Reopen program to build independent judiciary
Consider Haiti for inclusion in ``Free Trade'' agreements
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Ambassador.
Ambassador Dobbins, do you need to catch a plane?
Ambassador Dobbins. No, no, I changed my plans. But thank
you very much, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Well, thank you.
Mr. Heinl.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL HEINL, CO-AUTHOR, ``WRITTEN IN BLOOD, THE
STORY OF THE HAITIAN PEOPLE 1492-1995,'' WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Heinl. I thank the committee for the invitation to
speak.
I was asked, in the committee's invitation, to ponder three
things. First of all, is this moment an opportunity for a fresh
start in Haitian-American relations? Second, can Haiti be,
quote, turned around, unquote? And, finally, what kind of help
does Haiti need?
The current situation is an opportunity to change the
nature of our engagement with Haiti. But whether all parties
will or can avail themselves of it is very much an open
question. For the good of both countries, the cycle of paying
attention to Haiti only when a crisis is brewing or when
American economic or geopolitical interests are perceived as
being at stake, can and must be broken.
Haiti and its problems are problems of the hemisphere.
Failure on the part of those interested in Haiti to frame and
implement short-, medium-, and long-term policies will lead to
growing dangers in the Western Hemisphere from disease, ever-
worsening environmental degradation, violence, unchecked drug
trafficking, and overwhelming refugee outflows.
The United States, for its part, has to evolve towards
Haiti a consistent, long-term policy which will bring to bear
our treasure and influence in ways which will benefit both
Haiti and the United States. Our relationship need not be a
zero-sum game. We can advocate policies that protect the
interests of the United States and its citizens without acting
to the detriment of Haiti and its people.
The goodwill that characterized the Haitian reception of
foreign troops in 1994 is more muted and less widespread in
2004. The foreign community has a narrow window to convince
Haiti's urban masses that its intentions are benign.
Woodrow Wilson said of Mexico, ``I will teach the Latin
Americans to elect good men.'' Much of this governessy attitude
towards Haiti still prevails in the international community.
Indeed, even the framing of the question (Can Haiti be turned
around?) suggests that Haiti is some sort of barge that can be
towed hither or yon with little reference to those most
affected, the Haitians. Haitians of all classes must have a
sense of ownership of the process of rebuilding their country
and its institutions.
Key to everything will be security. Funds must be ensured
for prompt payment of salaries to judges, teachers, and police.
Foreign troops will be required in Haiti long enough to train
and mentor police, and to instill an ethos of independence,
honesty, and professionalism. At least ten years will be
required for this. Emergency job creation for the unemployed
urban masses will go far to lower the temperature while longer-
term solutions are implemented. In this process, the Haitian
Government will have to be held to far stricter standards of
accountability than heretofore.
Aid to Haiti falls into three categories: short, medium,
and long term. While Haiti's needs are great, its absorptive
capacity, with all due respect to Ambassador Pezzullo, is
limited. Donor nations need not equate quality or efficacy of
aid programs with amounts funded, particularly at the outset of
this process.
What follows is a short list of some of the items that need
to be addressed.
Short term: one, secure the country, so interrupted feeding
programs can be resumed. Reduce the number of weapons in
circulation. Two, get emergency generating capacity in to
assure stable electricity supply in the major cities,
particularly Port-au-Prince. Several barges from Hydro Quebec
anchored in Port-au-Prince harbor supplying current to Port-au-
Prince's poor would buy time for other reforms. Three, start or
revive public-works programs to get cash into the economy.
Four, back-salary payments should be made immediately to
police, judges, teachers, and other public-sector employees.
Five, freeze payments on all Haiti's international debt. Most
new aid should be structured as grants, rather than loans.
In the medium term, Haiti's medium-terms interests have
long been apparent. First, potable water programs. Second,
harbor dredging and rebuilding in provincial ports. Only by
reviving the moribund economies of the provinces will the
flight to major urban centers diminish. Three, funding of AIDS
treatment and prevention on the lines developed by Paul Farmer
in the Plateau Central. Also, nationwide campaigns against
malaria and tuberculosis need to be undertaken. Four,
preferential U.S. tariffs for products made in Haitian assembly
plants. Five, reforestation. Six, rural electrification and
irrigation. Seven, regularization of land titles, and a look at
ways to encourage Haiti's diaspora to invest their talents and
money in the motherland.
In the long term, addressing all of the above issues will
be so much writing on water if the foreign community does not
enable Haitians to effect a sea change in the culture that has
brought them to this point. Writing in 1929, after 14 years of
American occupation, the British Minister in Port-au-Prince
observed the failure of American aid programs, ``with their
batteries of experts in Buicks and promises of prosperity on
the Illinois model.'' This has been the fate of most foreign
aid to Haiti. This may be one of the last opportunities for
Haiti and the international community to get it right.
Thank you very much.
Senator Coleman [presiding]: Thank you, Mr. Heinl.
Dr. Maguire.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT MAGUIRE, DIRECTOR, PROGRAMS IN
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, TRINITY COLLEGE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Dr. Maguire. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for
having me here today.
I did submit a statement, which I would like put into the
record, please, and I'll summarize.
Senator Coleman. Without objection.
Dr. Maguire. I've kind of been waiting 25 years to talk to
you guys. So here's the chance.
We've heard a lot about Secretary Powell's comments, back
and forth, on Haiti, and I would say that two weeks ago, one
thing he said is that he was disappointed in Mr. Aristide. And
I believe we are all very disappointed in Mr. Aristide. There
was much to be disappointed about.
But I think as we've heard today in some of the back and
forth that has occurred, we also need to express our
disappointment in the opposition to Mr. Aristide, for their
intransigence, their failure to engage over time, and their
determined objective to broker their way into power. I think it
was quite shocking that they rejected Secretary Powell's
pleadings to come to the table, to accept the CARICOM solution,
and to avoid what has happened today.
In sum, I think we're not seeing, in the past years in
Haiti, a struggle over issues, ideas, and principles, but more
a matter of power struggle and a power grab. Hopefully,
however, the process that's underway now will lead Haiti to a
new political future, with fresh faces, and maybe some old
faces that earn democratic credentials.
I also think that Secretary Powell's disappointment should
be extended to the policies and practices that were enacted on
his watch, especially over the past three years.
As I have outlined in this briefing paper of my Haiti
program at Trinity College, our policies toward Haiti have
evolved from ones of engagement to ones of estrangement, where
we have been working assiduously to isolate the government,
withhold resources from it, and punish it. And, in so doing, we
have been sacrificing our leverage and influence over the
government.
I would echo a comment that I just heard on the panel here,
that governments do merit some respect, especially if they're
democratically elected. Haiti is not going to be Switzerland
overnight. We have to accept that Haiti is going to have fits
and starts and many mistakes. And when we sacrifice our
leverage and influence, we turn our back on that government.
Concurrently, I think we've been seeing in Washington a
parallel presumptive policy working to strengthen the
opposition, emboldening it, and suggesting that there are
signals from Washington that its zero-option policy had
Washington support. This is not my analysis alone. This
analysis comes also from our former ambassador in Port-au-
Prince, who said, at his July 2003 speech to the Haitian
American Chamber of Commerce, that:
There's an incoherence in Haiti that has troubled me,
the incoherence of the way Washington's views are
interpreted here. Those of you who know me will realize
that since I arrived here as President Clinton's
ambassador, and then President Bush's, I've always
talked straight about U.S. policy and what might and
might not be new policy directions. But there were many
in Haiti who preferred not to listen to me, the
President's representative, but to their own friends in
Washington, sirens of extremism or revanchism on one
hand, or apologists on the other hand. They don't hold
official positions. I call them the chimere of
Washington.
I think it's very important that we look into this. Who are
these chimere in Washington, and what were they doing, and what
were they saying, and what signals were they sending to Haiti?
I think we need to respect this concern that our ambassador
had.
It seems to me that--over the years, we've seen a kind of
gradual strangulation of the Government of Haiti, pushing Mr.
Aristide and his government more and more into a corner, with
predictable results. As your maneuvering space shrinks,
sometimes you make bad decisions, sometimes you strike out and
harm yourself. And with fewer and fewer resources, the
government was left managing scarcity.
I do disagree with Mr. Noriega, in the sense that we did
cut off assistance to the Government of Haiti. As I understand
it, all we have assisted has been the Haitian Coast Guard.
With fewer and fewer resources, the government was left
managing scarcity. And in the Haiti political reality,
regardless of who you are, this means managing power, and it
means turning to the gangs.
We've seen, now, the departure of Mr. Aristide. I think the
phrase that comes to my mind right now is a pyrrhic victory. As
the country has descended into lawlessness, gunmen, revenge,
and the settling of scores throughout the countryside, the
infrastructure has also deteriorated. As bad as it was, it's
gotten worse. We hear about the humanitarian crisis that is
emerging. I spoke yesterday with Dr. Paul Farmer, and he has
tremendous concerns about this, and attacks that have occurred
on his hospital in the Central Plateau by the so-called rebels.
We've seen the virtual Balkanization of the country into
competing gang fiefdoms, and they're all well-armed. I'm very
concerned that Haiti is vulnerable right now to become much
more engaged in narco-trafficking. We've heard in past years
that 9 to 13 percent of the cocaine that comes in to the U.S.
goes through Haiti. Yesterday, I saw a citation that it was 25
percent.
I have five recommendations, but I'm just going to mention
a couple of them, because several have already been mentioned.
I would agree with the bipartisan approach, but I think one
of the things we need to do to make sure we have a bipartisan
approach is to attend our own wink-and-nod tendency toward
Haiti. And if we're going to disarm the chimeres in Port-au-
Prince and in Haiti, I think, figuratively, we must disarm the
chimeres of Washington, as well. We need to talk straight with
Haiti.
I think, as well, in terms of the issue of disarmament,
while I applaud the initiative taken yesterday by the multi-
national force to go out and disarm, this is going to be very
tough, because Haiti is much better armed now than it was ten
years ago, when there were 21,000 troops and the Aristide
government was asking for disarmament. It didn't happen then
because our mandate was force protection.
One thing I would point out, Haiti does not manufacture
guns. Not a single gun is manufactured in Haiti. They all have
to come from somewhere. Where do they come from? If we're going
to disarm, we also have to move to stop the illicit flow of
guns into Haiti, and there's just so much out there about the
Dominican Republic that I think we really do have to get to the
bottom of this.
I'll just stop there, gentlemen, and close.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Maguire follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Maguire, Ph.D.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to speak before you and
other members of the subcommittee. I am happy to have this opportunity
to share my insights and analysis on Haiti. I have followed Haiti and
Haiti-US policy issues for 25 years. Over that time I have come to know
the country both from the ``bottom-up'' through work at the Inter-
American Foundation, a U.S. government agency, where I held
responsibility for its grassroots development programs in Haiti, and
from the ``top down'' through work at the U.S. Department of State in
the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs and scholarly activities at
Johns Hopkins, Georgetown, and Brown Universities. I continue my
involvement with Haiti as the Director of the Trinity College Haiti
Program in Washington, DC, a program that has been supported by the
Ford and the Rockefeller Foundations.
TODAY'S HAITI
Today, in the streets of Port-au-Prince and throughout the Haitian
countryside, we have been seeing the kind of murder and mayhem that
characterized the country between 1991 and 1994, following a violent
coup d'etat carried out by Haiti's army, leading to three years of
brutal de facto military rule. Gunmen roam with impunity. Civilians are
fired upon by armed thugs and snipers. Bodies mysteriously appear, some
of them face down with hands bound and bullet holes in their backs.
Rampaging mobs of civilians and erstwhile soldiers and members of
paramilitary death squads attack public and private property, looting,
burning and destroying in a practice that Haitians call dechoukaj, or
uprooting. U.S. and other international troops, hustled into Haiti to
protect the lives of their nationals and to try to stabilize this
situation find themselves drawn increasingly into the middle of Haiti's
muddled environment of anger, frustration, and fear, as their mission
``creeps'' to include disarming the multitudes of Haitians with
weapons.
From the Central African Republic, Haiti's suddenly exiled
President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, insists that his removal was a
coercive one while, concurrently, in Port-au-Prince a new, provisional
President is sworn in under the watchful eyes of ambassadors and
envoys, and a new Prime Minister is named by a group of citizens who
now form a national political advisory board. All of this has this
veteran Haiti-watcher thinking, Mr. Chairman, that we are seeing a case
of ``deja vu all over again.''
MULTIPLE DISAPPOINTMENTS
Two weeks ago, Secretary of State Cohn L. Powell stated that he had
been ``disappointed'' with Haiti's now-deposed President, Jean-Bertrand
Aristide. Secretary Powell is correct in this statement, as there is no
doubt that Mr. Aristide provided much to be disappointed about. I will
not elaborate here, as Mr. Aristide's detractors have already
undertaken that task with much gusto.
I wonder, however, if Mr. Powell has also been disappointed in
Haiti's self-proclaimed democratic opposition, a group of political and
economic leaders who have also given us much to criticize and regret.
The single-minded intransigence of this largely ad hoc. group toward
achieving its one, unifying objective--the removal of Mr. Aristide from
office--has motivated it to behave rather undemocratically. Its leaders
failed to engage in true democratic process as measured by elections
and by negotiated solutions to political problems. Instead,
particularly in recent months, they have appeared to practice that
deeply rooted Haitian political practice of giving a ``wink and a nod''
to violence in the street if you believe it furthers your political
objectives, emulating, unfortunately, a strategy amply employed by Mr.
Aristide in recent years.
And, over the past three years, they have acted with a veto from an
empty chair at the negotiating table, repeatedly undermining or
thwarting internationally-led attempts to find a solution to Haiti's
political crisis. This included their rejection in late February of the
urgings of Secretary Powell to accept the plan presented by CARICOM to
achieve a peaceful, mediated solution to Haiti's longstanding crisis
that would have permitted Haiti's elected President to serve out his
term, while providing them with a shared role in the country's
governance.
This failure of U.S. influence when push came to shove in late
February is doubly distressing since the personalities who comprise
this opposition have been widely perceived as allies--even sycophants--
of Washington. Among these personalities are individuals who have
participated for years in an array of political strategy meetings
organized by the International Republican Institute using U.S.
Government funds, and who have repeatedly visited Washington over the
past three years. And, at least one of the highest profile leaders of
this faction, Mr. Andre Apaid, is a U.S. citizen.
As I scan this political landscape, Mr. Chairman, I get a strong
sense of deja vu all over again, as self-styled and unelected political
chiefs broker their way into power. In their mind's eye, again taking a
page from deeply rooted Haitian political practice, the means justify
the ends. And what are those ends? Allow me to state, Mr. Chairman,
that what we have been seeing in Haiti over the past years is not a
political struggle of competing issues, ideas, and principals. It is
nothing more than a struggle among the political class and its allies,
and the now-unseated government and its allies to seize, and/or to hold
on to, power.
Let us hope that the dust of confrontation and violence settles in
Haiti and that moderate, reasonable voices, with viable ideas, will
emerge from among those struggling for power, and that some true
democratic credentials will begin to be earned. Let us hope, also, that
new democratic voices, less tainted by participation in the tragic
political confrontations of the past, will come forth to relieve the
country of its largely failed leadership on both sides of the current
political equation. Hopefully, the process currently underway to lead
Haiti through to new parliamentary and then presidential elections will
provide that opportunity.
THE CONDUCT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI
In terms of disappointment, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, I also wonder whether this sense of Mr. Powell has
extended to those who have been largely responsible for the conduct of
U.S. policy toward Haiti since January 2001. As I have outlined in
Trinity College Haiti Program Briefing Paper Number 8, U.S. Policy
Toward Haiti: Engagement or Estrangement, published last November, over
the past ten years, U.S. policy toward Haiti has evolved from one where
our government was constructively engaged with the government of Haiti
in an attempt to nurture democratic institutions and democratic
practice in this country trying to find its way out of 200 years of bad
and mostly authoritarian governance, to a policy that worked to isolate
the Haitian government, withhold resources from it, punish it, and push
it into a corner.
Concurrently, as we constantly chastised that government, our
efforts focused more and more exclusively on working with Haiti's
opposition groups. In following this path, we sacrificed carefully
constructed leverage and influence with Haitian elected political
actors, many of whom are already pre-disposed to be distrustful of the
United States as a dominant force in Haitian political reality that has
not always made choices that have worked toward the benefit of Haiti's
people.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit Briefing Paper
Number 8 as a part of my written testimony since it elaborates this
analysis in much greater detail than I have an opportunity to do in
this testimony today.
Not all in Washington abandoned that leverage and influence we
worked to achieve over many years. As I reminded the Honorable Cass
Ballenger of North Carolina, at a hearing on Haiti called by his
subcommittee last week, in March 2001, I escorted to his office several
high Haitian government officials who had traveled to Washington only a
month after the inauguration of Mr. Aristide to his second term in
office to participate in a symposium on Haiti at Trinity College. Among
them were Mr. Yvon Neptune, who at that time was the President of
Haiti's Senate, and Mr. Leslie Voltaire, then the Minister for Haitians
Living Overseas and currently the government's representative on the
new tripartite commission established last week in Haiti. Also a part
of the Haitian government delegation were two ministers who, even
though members of the opposition, had accepted Mr. Aristide's
invitation to join his government's cabinet. One of these ministers was
Mr. Marc Louis Bazin, Mr. Aristide's principal opponent in the 1990
election who, subsequently, briefly served as the Prime Minister of the
1991-1994 de facto military regime. What better example could we have
had of the potential for political reconciliation in Haiti than Mr.
Aristide and Mr. Bazin working together. Sadly, because Mr. Bazin had
rejected participation in the bitter opposition to Mr. Aristide (at
that time called the ``Democratic Convergence''), his credentials as a
member of the opposition working within the Lavalas government were not
accepted by Aristide's opponents in Haiti and in Washington.
On that same day, I escorted this high level Haitian delegation to
the office of one of the members of this committee, Senator Dodd. Much
to the credit of both Mr. Ballenger and Senator Dodd, they were open to
meeting these Haitian government officials and engaging them in
constructive conversation. And the Haitian officials were anxious to
engage them and others.
Sadly, Executive Branch officials in Washington reacted quite
differently to this March 2001 opportunity for dialogue. Not only did
ranking officials choose not to engage these Haitian government
officials, but, in the run-up to the symposium, they urged me not to
invite them to Washington. This, Mr. Chairman, is my own personal story
of a golden opportunity the Bush administration lost to maintain and
strengthen U.S. influence and leverage in Haiti, and to assist Haiti
emerge from its dark political past. Surely, this is not the only time
that this kind of opportunity was lost.
Rather than taking advantage of this and similar opportunities, it
seems to me that our government was not only busy isolating Haiti's
elected government, but, through various intermediaries and political
operatives in Washington, it was allowing signals to travel to Port-au-
Prince that emboldened the opposition and its ``zero option'' policy of
intransigence by suggesting that the opposition had Washington's
support.
THE CHIMERES OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
This is not my assessment alone. This concern that presumptive
policy signals were being sent to Port-au-Prince from Washington, and
that those signals were highly damaging to efforts to resolve what was,
back then, a relatively reparable political crisis, was shared by none
other than the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti. In his farewell address in
Port-au-Prince last summer to HAMCHAM, the Haitian-American Chamber of
Commerce, the career diplomat who headed our embassy in Haiti, the
Honorable Brian Dean Curran, reflected on Haiti's long-standing
political crisis remarking:
There is an incoherence (in Haiti) that has troubled me: the
incoherence of the way Washington's views are interpreted here.
Those of you who know me will realize that since I arrived here
as President Clinton's Ambassador and then President Bush's, I
have always talked straight about U.S. policy and what might
and might not be new policy directions. But there were many in
Haiti who preferred not to listen to me, the president's
representative, but to their own friends in Washington, sirens
of extremism or revanchism on the one hand or apologists on the
other. They don't hold official positions. I call then the
chimeres of Washington.
And who, pray tell, might these irregular actors be? I would
suggest, Mr. Chairman, that this subcommittee takes steps to get to the
bottom of this. It might begin by heeding the supposition of the
Washington Post that the International Republican Institute has played
an important role in the ``wink and nod'' messages from Washington sent
to the opposition. In its February 19th edition, the Post
editorialized:
In particular, it (the administration) has declined to
exercise its considerable leverage on the civilian opposition
parties, some of which have been supported by such U.S. groups
as the International Republican Institute and which have
rejected any political solution short of Mr. Aristide's
immediate resignation.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that our policy--and
practices--toward Haiti in recent years have been driven,
unfortunately, by a deeply rooted animosity to one man--Jean-Bertrand
Aristide--that has been held among a relatively small but powerful
group of actors in Washington. Policies rigorously enacted under the
auspices of this zealous group in order either to emasculate Mr.
Aristide politically or to force him out of office, as we are
witnessing today, have put the country and its citizens at grave risk,
while concurrently creating potential spill-over effects both in the
Caribbean and on to our shores.
To achieve the narrow political goal of getting Mr. Aristide, the
chimeres of Washington have, in essence, enacted policies that have
devastated Haiti. What better example can one identify of being willing
to throw out the bathwater in order to get the baby.
ACTS OF DESPERATION
As I reflect on the result of these policies of isolation, non-
engagement, constant criticism and punitive action I get the sense of
the gradual strangulation of an elected government. As the noose around
its neck tightened, it was pushed increasingly toward ill-advised and
desperate acts. The suspension of international assistance was a
particularly key element of strangulation. The government of Mr.
Aristide, like all governments in this tragically poor and resource-
starved country, was deeply dependent on external assistance in order
to enact government programs. During his inaugural address of February
7, 2001, Mr. Aristide took a quite unusual--perhaps even
unprecedented--step for a Haitian President when he outlined a series
of social welfare, infrastructure development and investment goals of
his government, suggesting that his term in office be judged according
to his ability to meet these goals. These plans were derived from the
Lavalas Family party's ``White Paper'' for Haiti, an unusual attempt--
for Haitian political parties--to set forth a platform that directed
itself toward the country's multitude of social, economic and
environmental problems.
Sadly, following the virtual complete suspension of bilateral and
multilateral aid to his government as a result of the May 2000
election's eight flawed senatorial vote counts and the Haitian
government's bewildering failure to address this issue, few resources
were available to the government to work toward these goals. As Mr.
Aristide and his government were pushed more and more into a corner,
predictable results emerged. With fewer and fewer resources to manage,
the government was left to manage scarcity and, became increasingly
desperate and corrupt. And, in Haiti's political reality, managing
scarcity means managing power, with equally predictable results. Mr.
Aristide, presiding over a resource starved government under constant
assault from political opponents both in and beyond Haiti, took to the
streets, aligning his government with impoverished urban youth--the now
infamous chimeres of Haiti--who, by way of organized gangs, served as a
means of managing the maintenance of power.
Mr. Chairman, when I was a boy growing up in the New Jersey suburbs
in an area that had just recently been farmland, I occasionally
encountered a rabbit that had found its way into my back yard that was
enclosed with a chain link fence. Sometimes, I attempted to catch the
rabbit, gradually backing it into a corner of the fence as what I
perceived as the best strategy to do that. I never did manage to catch
one of those elusive critters, but I remember how the rabbits that I
managed to back into the corner of the fence became increasingly
desperate as their maneuvering space shrank. In fact, I recall vividly
on one occasion how a panicked rabbit that I had edged into the corner
acted with such desperation that bashed itself against the fence,
injuring itself in its attempts to elude my grasp. Aghast at the blood
streaming from the animal, I quickly backed away. This was the last
time I tried cornering a rabbit in order to capture it. It was not my
goal to force self-inflicted damage.
I relate this story, Mr. Chairman, because I think of it when I
reflect on what has happened in Haiti over the past several years. As
the government of Haiti was increasingly backed into that corner, it
acted more and more like that panicked rabbit of my youth, injuring
itself in desperation. Ultimately, as its maneuvering space shrank, the
government, in its increasing desperation to escape the trap, inflicted
many wounds on itself. What a tragedy of huge proportions.
A PYRRHIC VICTORY
The departure of Mr. Aristide, at least for now, has been achieved.
Those who have sought it for quite some time are now rejoicing in their
political victory. But their victory is proving to be a Pyrrhic one as
Haiti has descended deeper and deeper on the slippery slope of
lawlessness. Revenge killing and settling scores--in Port-au-Prince and
elsewhere in the country--have become the new ordre du jour. Prisons
throughout the country have been emptied, reinforcing the unfortunate
reality of criminal impunity. Secondary cities, towns and villages
across the land have become the domain of gang leaders establishing
fiefdoms in what is now a balkanized country. And, with the descent
into lawlessness comes the prospect of Haiti's emergence as a kind of
narco-trafficking free state, as the countryside's runways and ports
fall within the domain of the local warlords, many of whom already have
a history of involvement in drug trafficking.
The victory is Pyrrhic also, Mr. Chairman, because it was achieved
through the slow strangulation of Haiti's capacity to respond to the
humanitarian, social and environmental challenges and crises before it.
And, in recent weeks, we have seen in particular a rash of significant
damage to the country's already weak humanitarian and development
infrastructure, as roads and ports have been severely damaged and
destroyed, and public and private buildings looted and burned. This
destruction has included attacks by marauding armed rebels on such
medical installations as the highly-respected hospital in central Haiti
operated by Dr. Paul Farmer's Partners in Health organization, where
two members of the staff have been murdered, the hospital's only
ambulance has been commandeered, and medical staff and patients have
been constantly threatened by the bandits.
Perhaps the most Pyrrhic element of this victory, however, has been
its achievement at the expense of the Haitian population's faith in
democracy. This is illustrated most vividly by the enthusiastic welcome
given by some to the return of the gunmen. While there should be no
doubt that this welcome has been fueled by a realistic sense of self-
preservation by those who do not have the guns, by the gratitude of
those released from Haiti's jails and their families, and by former
military and paramilitary figures who have been waiting patiently for
such an opening to occur, this welcome is also fueled by another
factor. Haiti's citizens are deeply disappointed, indeed, disgusted,
with the comportment of all of the country's political leaders who,
over the past decade, have been so intent on their own, personal
struggles to maintain or attain power that they have sacrificed their
country. To coin a phrase, Haiti's politicians have been fiddling while
Rome has been burning.
This disenchantment with democracy is an enormously tragic and
dangerous development. Haitians have harbored ``dreams of democracy''
since the 1986 ouster of the Duvalier dictatorship. Their dreams have
repeatedly been turned into nightmares. It is in everyone's interest in
this room that we work together to deflect that disenchantment and
restore faith in the resolution of disputes through participation,
engagement, the peaceful mediation of differences, rule of law, and the
rejection of all forms of political intimidation, violence and
recidivism.
BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DEJA VU
So, where do we go from here?
I will leave to others the debate and the necessary investigation
over the circumstances of Mr. Aristide's abrupt departure from Haiti on
February 29th, 2004. Surely, the removal--regardless of how it
occurred--of a democratically-elected leader prior to the completion of
his term is a set-back to Haiti's democratic process and a threat to
other nations in the hemisphere; indeed around the world. Regardless of
whether or not Mr. Aristide is restored to the presidency to complete
his term of office ending on February 7, 2006, however, there are
several steps we can take, actions we can support, and principles that
can guide us that will contribute toward a sustained resolution of
Haiti's seemingly unending internal and external political warfare.
Bipartisanship in Washington
First, from a Washington and U.S. perspective, we must forge a bi-
partisan approach toward Haiti. Of course, this being Washington and
ours being a democracy, we will agree to disagree over certain
specifics. But, even amid our disagreements, we must be prepared to
examine our role in Haiti's affairs in a more even-handed manner that
does not chose sides, stem from deeply rooted personal animosities, or
seek to profit from Haiti's misfortunes.
In this regard, it is of great necessity that the chimeres of
Washington be removed from any real or perceived role in the future of
U.S. policy toward Haiti. We must put an end to ``wink and nod''
messages coming out of Washington. These messages--and actions that
reinforced them--have caused considerable damage not only to Haiti, but
also to the credibility of Washington's leadership on Haiti and around
the world. I would urge you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, to examine the roles of these chimeres, who, as the U.S.
Ambassador suggested, were aiding and abetting Haiti's tragedies.
Specifically, I would urge you to clarify the validity of various
allegations that have been leveled at the International Republican
Institute for its role in exacerbating and reinforcing an atmosphere of
political intransigence and violence in Haiti. I would urge you, also,
to explore alleged links among Haiti's resurgent gunmen once based in
the Dominican Republic and drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, and
money laundering.
Political Inclusion in Haiti
Second, I would urge us to support policies and practices that will
reinforce the notion of political inclusion in Haiti. Let us work--
successfully this time--not to play favorites, but rather to get all
the legitimate political actors in Haiti under its political tent. It
is of vital importance that Haiti's once and future political actors
all participate in the governance of their country and accept the
responsibilities that come along with it. To this end, the framework
offered by CARICOM that is now moving forward is an excellent one. Acts
of dechoukaj and political intimidation aimed at politicians and their
supporters, including appointed and elected officials of the Aristide
government and the Lavalas party, and the urgent flight from the
country of these political actors, is not.
Ending the Political Culture of ``Winner Takes All''
Third, and directly related to the need to have all legitimate
political actors gain inclusion in governance, we must support steps to
put an end to Haiti's tried and true political practices of ``winner
takes all'' and ``loser undermines the winner.'' In this regard,
Haiti's electoral laws that prescribe a winner takes all approach
toward each and every elective office should be re-examined. In my
view, Mr. Chairman, this approach, particularly in a country that has
had one dominant party (Fanmi Lavalas--FL) competing with many smaller
ones, and that may now have a weakened FL competing with a newly
fragmented political opposition, has only exacerbated polarization and
confrontation. Some form of proportional national representation,
perhaps in Haiti's Chamber of Deputies, would help to ensure broader
political participation. A party that captures, say, 10 percent of the
votes nationwide, could be awarded 10 percent of the seats in that
parliamentary body. This would both bring that element into the process
and force upon it the responsibilities of governance.
Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle
Fourth, there is an immediate need to move against the armed thugs
and convicts who have been freed from prison, as well as against armed
street gangs of all stripes, and to reestablish some semblance of rule
of law. In this regard, Haiti's civilian-led police will require
immediate and long-term strengthening and support, while the country's
judicial system requires the same. The thugs must not find their way
into the police force. Putting this genie back into the bottle will be
a difficult, but necessary element not only to allow the country to
move forward, but to provide a needed push toward ending impunity. The
return of the army and of the FRAPH gunmen and criminals is in the best
interests of only those particular individuals, not of the Haiti, its
citizens, and the international community.
In this regard, Mr. Chairman, the announcement made yesterday that
international forces already in Haiti will actively undertake disarming
of the Haitian population is a welcome one. This task, of course, will
be an elusive one, fraught with problems and may even lead to spates of
violence and bloodshed, but it is a necessary one. It is quite
unfortunate that disarmament did not take place in 1994/95, when there
were 21,000 troops in Haiti and the restored government was asking for
it. At that time, narrowly defined rules of engagement focused on force
protection inhibited effective disarmament of Haiti's soldiers,
paramilitary members and others in the population with guns. Sadly, in
the intervening 10 years, more weapons have entered the country, making
today's task--to be undertaken by 5,000 troops--a much more difficult
one.
For effective disarming to occur, Mr. Chairman, and for Haiti not
to become immediately re-armed once it does, we must also pay attention
to the sources of Haiti's weapons. Not a single gun is manufactured in
Haiti. They all must come from somewhere. In this regard, it is
important that we get to the bottom of allegations that illicitly
acquired weapons have been flowing into Haiti from the neighboring
Dominican Republic, as well as ``rebel commandos.''
Stay The Course
Fifth, we need to be prepared to stick with Haiti over the long
haul. Staying the course will mean that our attention to Haiti can not
be merely intense and short term, as it was in 1994/95, and then
leaving the country to its own devices, while enacting partisan-driven
policies in Washington that harmed gains that had been made. In this
regard, I wholeheartedly agree with the statement made yesterday by UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan that Haiti will require a decade (or even
more) of intense international community commitment in order to avoid
the repeat of the ``band-aid'' scenario of 10 years ago.
If the term nation-building gives some of this subcommittee a case
of heartburn, perhaps it would help to think of it another way--say,
``nation-nurturing''--where we provide active and sustained support to
the non-governmental--and governmental--bodies in Haiti that will
develop the country and its required institutions. In other words, we
do not have to build Haiti, but we should have a long term commitment
to all Haitians to help them rebuild their own country.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Mr. Chairman, the tragic developments in Haiti, some of which are
still unfolding, are to some considerable extent the result of U.S.
policies and practices that have sacrificed the well-being of Haiti to
achieve a narrow political goal--the removal of one man from elected
office. These policies and practices have not served Secretary Powell;
they have not served President Bush; they have not served the United
States Congress, they have not served the American people, and they
have surely not served the long-suffering people of Haiti.
Again, I thank you for this opportunity to share my thoughts and
analysis with you, and I stand ready to work with all of you to help
improve the way the government of the United States relates to and
works with its Caribbean neighbor.
Thank you.
----------
U.S. Policy Toward Haiti: Engagement or Estrangement? \1\
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\1\ A publication of the Haiti Program, a unit of Programs in
International Affairs at Trinity College, Washington, DC.
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DR. ROBERT MAGUIRE
Inquiry into the size of a country, usually elicits a straight-
forward answer. In the case of Haiti, that answer, from a US point of
reference, is generally something like, ``about the same size as the
state of Maryland.'' The question of Haiti's size, however, when posed
two decades ago to a wizened Haitian community leader, evoked an
intriguing, figurative answer. ``Haiti,'' the old man stated, gesturing
with his hands and arms, ``is like an accordion. Sometimes it is large
and sometimes it is small.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Haiti: Dreams of Democracy,'' 1987, a documentary film
produced by Jonathan Demme.
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From the perspective of U.S. foreign policy, Haiti over the past
200 years has fit this pattern of a metaphorical accordion: sometimes
large and sometimes small. And, without doubt, there have been times
when the accordion's bellows have opened very wide. If nothing else,
geography--that is, Haiti's proximate location to the U.S.--demands
that American policy-makers watch their southern neighbor closely and
maintain at least a minimal engagement.
At times, American policy makers have watched Haiti with deep
concern over the impact of developments there on the U.S. Certainly
this was the case in the aftermath of Haiti's independence in 1804,
when American leaders, particularly in its plantation South, feared
that the Caribbean country's ``virus of freedom'' would spread to the
slave plantations in the Carolinas, Georgia, Maryland and Virginia.
Other times, American engagement in Haiti has evolved far beyond
observation to direct intervention, most notably during the 19-year
U.S. military occupation of 1915 to 1934.
Had U.S. policy makers in the late 1980s and 1990s used the
accordion metaphor, they would have proclaimed its bellows to be wide-
open. Great attention was paid to Haiti in the period leading up to and
following the demise of the Duvalier family dictatorship in 1986, and
then again in the period following the 1990 presidential election of
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, his subsequent removal from office in 1991 as a
result of a violent military coup d'etat, and his later restoration to
office as a result of a UN-sanctioned and U.S.-led military
intervention. Today, Haiti's geographical proximity, a variety of
developments there linked to ongoing U.S. policy interests, and the
presence in the United States of a large and growing Haitian-born and
Haitian-American population combine to keep the bellows of that
metaphorical accordion open.
As much as U.S. officials and policy makers at times may have
wanted those bellows to close tightly so Haiti would ``just go away,''
this simply does not happen. And it will not happen short of a highly
improbable geological episode that will either physically displace, or
submerge, the island that Haiti shares with the Dominican Republic!
The exact nature of the engagement the U.S. maintains with Haiti,
and the relationships it spawns, has varied over time since 1804 and
among differing sets of actors. Looking at the broad sweep of the U.S.-
Haiti relationship over the past two hundred years, however, the New
York-based National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR) has concluded
that the hemisphere's two oldest republics ``share a long, sordid love-
hate relationship,'' adding that ``unfortunately, the last three years
have fit tragically into that pattern.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Yon Sel Dwet Pa Manje Kalalou: Haiti on the Eve of its
Bicentennial,'' National Coalition for Haitian Rights, Policy Report
September 2003, p. 34.
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THE ``THIRD RAIL'' OF U.S. HAITI POLICY
Before exploring the nature of the U.S. relationship with Haiti
over the past three years it is useful to reflect on contemporary U.S.
policy maker's views of that country as both a foreign and a domestic
policy issue, particularly given its proximity to U.S. shores. A key
underlying factor of this hybrid policy focus is migration, a
phenomenon that bridges both foreign and domestic issues and that has
been characterized by at least one U.S. diplomat as the ``third rail''
of U.S.-Haiti policy. And, as those who ride mass transit systems such
as the Washington, D.C. Metrorail know, the third rail is the hot one
that threatens to burn those who touch it.
Since the late 1970's brought the first significant wave of Haitian
boatpeople onto the beaches of South Florida, migration has been a hot
rail of U.S.-Haiti policy. To keep from being burned, a succession of
administrations--from that of Ronald Reagan, through those of George H.
W. Bush and Bill Clinton, to the current administration of George W.
Bush--viewed Haitians fleeing by boat as unwelcome economic migrants
and not political refugees. Accordingly, each developed immigration--
and interdiction--policies aimed specifically at keeping Haitians in
Haiti, or sending them back.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ For an overview of the evolution of U.S. immigration policy
toward Haiti see ``Haitian Migration to the U.S.: Issues and
Legislation,'' Ruth Ellen Wasem, Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Issue Brief, February 28, 1992. See also, ``Haiti and Asylum Seekers: A
Chronology of Major Events,'' Ruth Ellen Wasem, CRS Report for
Congress, June 23, 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, the specter of Haitian boatpeople arriving on the beaches of
South Florida puts fear not only in the minds of policy makers, but
also in the hearts of politicians seeking either elective office in
Florida or the American presidency. As demonstrated in November 2000,
electoral victory in Florida is a political prize that hangs by a
thread. How Floridians react at the ballot box to issues surrounding
Haitian boatpeople, including policies in Washington toward Haiti that
may be perceived as either provoking their outpouring or keeping them
in Haiti, could be the difference between electoral victory or defeat--
in Florida and, by extension, in a Presidential race.\5\ To this end,
issues linked to Haitian boatpeople have received unrelentingly tough
responses from the current Bush administration, which has even
associated the arrival of illegal Haitian migrants with U.S. terrorism
vulnerability.\6\ In view of the weight of Florida in American
electoral politics and of the heat generated by Haitian migration over
the past four presidential administrations, it is easy to understand
why migration, in terms of U.S.-Haiti policy, is viewed in Washington
as a hot rail issue.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ In regards to the fragility of Florida's political prize, the
growing population of naturalized Haitian-Americans in South Florida--
and the extent of its participation at the ballot box--is potentially
key as an electoral ``swing vote'' in the Sunshine State. According to
2000 U.S. Census data, the number of Haitians residing in Florida is
228,949, a 117 percent increase since the 1990 census. (``Newcomers
from around world set up shop in Broward,'' Fort Lauderdale Sun-
Sentinel. January 12, 2003.)
\6\ The tough response of the Bush administration to Haitian
boatpeople was demonstrated in October 2002 with the detention and
subsequent removal of the 211 Haitians who washed up near Miami Beach
(a handful are still in detention). The administration has justified
this tough and ongoing response, at least in part, by linking Haitian
boatpeople with the illicit arrival of foreign terrorists on U.S. soil.
For a discussion of how Haitian boatpeople have been linked with
terrorism vulnerability, see, ``The War Comes Back Home: Can John
Ashcroft fight terrorism on our shores without injuring our freedoms?''
Richard Lacayo, Time, May 4, 2003. For a discussion of Haitian
boatpeople policy options see, ``Next Steps for U.S. Policy Toward
Haiti,'' Robert L. Bach and Robert Maguire, November 6, 2002, posted at
http://www.trinitydc.edu/academics/depts/Interdisc/International/
Haiti Program.htm
\7\ Given that the first significant wave of Haitian migrants
arriving by boat on U.S. shores actually occurred toward the end of the
Carter administration, an argument can be made that five successive
administrations have been seized by the issue.
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THE LAST THREE YEARS: WHAT KIND OF ENGAGEMENT?
For the Clinton administration, neighboring Haiti was certainly a
wide-open accordion, receiving attention highly disproportionate to its
size and to other global issues. To appreciate how large an issue Haiti
was for that administration, think back to such developments as:
the efforts--and ultimate success--of Clinton to rally
international support around United Nations Resolution 940 that
sanctioned the U.S.-led multinational military intervention in
1994 to displace an authoritarian military regime and restore
democratically-elected government;
the creation within the U.S. Department of State of the
ambassadorial level post of Special Haiti Coodinator, and the
post-intervention shuttle diplomacy between Washington and
Port-au-Prince of such senior officials as the U.S. National
Security Advisor, and;
the visit to Haiti by President Clinton in 1995, the first
of a sitting U.S. President since that of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt in 1934.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Roosevelt visited Cap Haitien in July 1934, a month prior to
the end of the U.S. Occupation of Haiti.
This attention to Haiti underscores not just the country's
dominance as a policy issue, but also that the approach toward Haiti
under Clinton was one of direct, and sustained, engagement at the
highest levels of the U.S. government.
The Democratic administration's high level executive branch
engagement did not play well with everyone in Washington, especially a
number of key elected officials in the U.S. Congress who sat on the
other side of the political aisle and their allies in such think tanks
and political advocacy organizations in the nation's capital as the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Heritage
Foundation, and the International Republican Institute for
International Affairs. While some were simply critical of the
disproportionate attention bestowed upon Haiti by the administration
vis-a-vis other global hot spots, others took issue with the
administration's approach to Haiti's problems.
These latter critics received a boost when the political balance of
power in Washington shifted following the November 1994 off-year
congressional elections that brought control of the U.S. House of
Representatives to Republican lawmakers. Coming less than two months
after Clinton's successful efforts to restore elective government to
the coup-ravaged Caribbean country, the shift of political power in
Washington provided an enlarged platform for critics to attack the
administration's Haiti foreign policy ``success'' and to place
constraints on follow-up actions. Those leading the charge against
President Clinton and his Haiti policy tended also to be relentlessly
critical of the highest profile beneficiary of that policy: Jean-
Bertrand Aristide.
Verbal criticism evolved into congressional action aimed at
constraining, stalling, or undermining Clinton's Haiti policy
initiatives. One such action was the passage of the Dole Amendment,
which set stringent conditions on the release of aid to the Haitian
government.\9\ Combined with continued unsettled conditions in Haiti
and reports of such post-intervention concerns as questionable
legislative elections, episodic incidents of politically-linked street
violence, increased drug trafficking, and delays in economic
privatization, congressional actions eventually had the effect of
limiting U.S. assistance to the Haitian government, including aid to
support the critically important, yet exceedingly fragile, newly formed
Haitian National Police.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Section 583 of P.L. 104-107, the Dole Amendment, became law on
January 26, 1996. It ``prohibited assistance to the Government of Haiti
unless the President reported to Congress that the Haitian government
was conducting thorough investigations of political and extrajudicial
killings and cooperating with U.S. authorities in this respect.'' See,
statement of Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, House of Representatives Appropriations
Committee, March 21, 1996.
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Following the controversial vote-counts that accompanied Haiti's
May 2000 legislative and municipal elections, there was little prospect
for the Clinton administration to argue successfully before Congress
for the continuation of direct bilateral assistance. The failure of
Haitian officials to respond to and quickly resolve the 2000 election
controversy added strength to those critical of the administration's
policy and took the wind from the sails of perplexed policy makers.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ For an analysis of the May 2000 elections see, Robert Maguire,
``Haiti's Political Gridlock,'' Journal of Haitian Studies, Vol. 8 (2),
Fall 2002, pp. 30-42.
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Republican-led legislative branch efforts to constrain the Clinton
administration's engagement with Haiti turned out to be a type of
preseason practice in view of the outcome of the November 2000 U.S.
presidential election. Following the January 2001 transition to the
administration of President George W. Bush, some individuals who had
been highly critical of the Clinton administration's Haiti policy moved
from legislative, advocacy organization and think tank positions into
executive branch posts with varying degrees of responsibility over
policy creation and oversight. Others who remained in influential
legislative, advocacy and think tank jobs experienced heightened access
to, and consideration from, executive branch policy makers.
In early 2001, the U.S. approach toward Haiti began to move in a
different direction. The new administration began its tenure by stating
that the ``Eight Steps to Address the Post-2000 Election Political
Crisis''--an agreement hammered out in December 2000 by then-former
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake during his last ``shuttle
diplomacy'' mission of the Clinton administration--was ``an appropriate
road map to get started.'' \11\ The administration then began to scale
back direct engagement with the Haitian government, abandoning the
position of Special Haiti Coordinator in the State Department and
removing such senior officials as the U.S. National Security Advisor
from day-to-day involvement with Haiti.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Testimony of Sec. Powell, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Senate, Secretary of State Nomination, Part II, January 17, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the discontinuance of high level, direct engagement from
Washington, the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince assumed the principal
role for direct contact with the Haitian government. Concurrently, in
Washington, Bush policy makers, while maintaining support of the
diplomatic efforts of the Organization of American States to resolve
the political crisis in Haiti that flowed out of the flawed 2000
elections, intensified their use of the OAS as a forum for strenuously
voicing concerns about the Haitian government. Voicing those concerns
at the OAS for the administration was a new U.S. Representative to the
hemispheric organization, appointed to this post from the staff of
Republican Senator Jesse Helms, one of the most vociferous critics of
the Clinton Haiti policy.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Roger Noriega was appointed U.S. Ambassador to the OAS in
2001, a post he held until his confirmation as U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs in July 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By mid-2001, a definitive trend had emerged. Washington's relations
with Haiti had moved away from the direct engagement/dialogue approach
of the Clinton administration toward less direct engagement through the
embassy in Port-au-Prince and the OAS. Concurrently, several
Washington-based think tanks and nongovernmental organizations with
active ties to Republican leaders in the White House and on Capitol
Hill, most notably the International Republican Institute for
International Affairs (IRI), emerged as stronger voices addressing
U.S.-Haiti policy issues.
As these operational shifts took hold, other voices, critical of
the new direction of Haiti policy, spoke out. One such voice, the
aforementioned NCHR, has characterized the Bush administration policy
toward Haiti over the past three years as ``a policy of willful neglect
and containment, a policy driven by an almost pathological aversion to
direct engagement.'' \13\ This apparent aversion to direct engagement
created a policy dynamic in Washington that appears to be taken from a
page in the book of Haitian political strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Op. cit., ``Yon Sel Dwet''
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A NEW POLITIQUE DE DOUBLURE
In the late nineteenth century, when successive, regionally-based,
Afro-Haitian military chieftains managed to gain power in Port-au-
Prince, the capital city's own, mixed-race (mulatre) economic and
political leaders ``easily manipulated their dark-skinned puppets,'' a
political strategy ``Haitian historians have labeled . . . politique de
doublure (government by understudies).'' These alliances, albeit often
short-lived, between the puppets and the urban elites ensured a
mutually advantageous consolidation of political and economic
power.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Haiti: State Against Nation, The Origins and Legacy of
Duvalierism, Michel-Rolph Trouillot (Monthly Review Press: New York,
1990), p. 76.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In view of recent U.S.-Haiti policy trends, a twenty-first century
politique de doublure has emerged, only this time based principally in
Washington, not in Port-au-Prince. Two somewhat distinct sets of
understudies have been active over the past three years. One set of
Washington-based U.S.-Haiti policy doublure is those whose voices are
stridently critical of the Haitian government and supportive of its
political rivals. These understudies, with apparent connections to the
Bush administration and influential Republicans in the U.S. Congress,
are listened to carefully, particularly in Port-au-Prince, where they
are viewed as having significant influence over U.S. policy and as
speaking for the administration.
One Washington-based understudy that has gained particular
prominence in this regard is the aforementioned International
Republican Institute (IRI). The organization's determined, ongoing
efforts to organize and support political opposition to the Aristide
government have raised eyebrows in Washington, particularly among some
members of Congress on the Democrat side of the aisle who have
expressed concerns about the Bush administration's policy toward
Haiti.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See, for example, the exchange between Mr. Noriega and Senator
Christopher Dodd (D-CT), ``Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, The Nomination of Roger Noriega to be Assistant Secretary of
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs,'' May 1, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second set of understudies in Washington's world of Haitian
doublure is those who are less critical of the government in Haiti and
less supportive of that government's opponents. Among these
understudies are eight U.S.-based consulting firms, or lobbyists, who,
during the last six months of 2002, received total representation fees
in excess of $1 million from the Government of Haiti. Their fees,
tracked as part of the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA), are a
matter of public record. Fees and funds exchanged between the first set
of understudies and their associates in Haiti, however, are not a
matter of public record.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Op. cit., ``Yon Sel Dwet,'' The NCHR notes that while it is
possible to ascertain the amounts paid to Washington-based agents of
the Haitian government on account of FARA regulations, it is not
possible to ascertain the amount of support from Washington--and the
IRI in particular--to opposition groups in Haiti (pp. 6 & 7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This second set of voices, although not speaking from positions of
power within or aligned to the executive branch and therefore not
generally viewed as successfully influencing administration policy,
contributes to a cacophony on Haiti that exists in the U.S. capital and
that bounces along a north to south axis between Washington and Port-
au-Prince. Characteristic of this cacophony is limited direct dialogue
between policy protagonists and the tendency of various players--in
Washington and in Port-au-Prince--to speak at each other, not with each
other.
The emergence of Washington's own brand of politique dedoublure has
been noted with considerable dismay recently by a U.S. Ambassador to
Haiti. In July 2003, in Port-au-Prince, during a farewell address to
the Haitian-American Chamber of Commerce (HAMCHAM), the American envoy
reflected on Haiti's longstanding political crisis, stating, ``There is
an incoherence (in Haiti) that has troubled me: the incoherence of the
way Washington's views are interpreted here. Those of you who know me
will realize that since I arrived here as President Clinton's
Ambassador and then President Bush's, I have always talked straight
about U.S. policy and what might and might not be new policy
directions. But there were many in Haiti who preferred not to listen to
me, the President's representative, but to their own friends in
Washington, sirens of extremism or revanchism on the one hand or
apologists on the other. They don't hold official positions. I call
them the chimeres of Washington . . . When you want to understand U.S.
policy, you will listen to my successor, an experienced and coherent
career diplomat, and not to the chimeres.'' \17\
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\17\ ``Reflections,'' Brian Dean Curran, Port-au-Prince, Haiti,
mid-July 2003 (unpublished). In Haiti, Chimeres are partisan political
street activists prone to taking extreme measures, including violence,
to represent their viewpoints.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Ambassador's comments reinforce the supposition that U.S.
engagement with Haiti over the past three years increasingly has become
the domain of diverse Washington-based understudies. They also suggest
that the answer to the engagement-or-estrangement paradigm posed in the
title of this essay is neither one nor the other. Rather, U.S. policy
toward Haiti over the past three years, viewed as part of a continuum
of a long term, sordid love-hate relationship, has devolved into a
particular admixture of ``estranged engagement.''
THE PILLARS OF U.S.-HAITI POLICY
Following his reflections on Washington's chimeres the U.S. envoy
to Haiti summarized his country's current policy orientation, ``(L)et
me be clear and coherent about U.S. policy toward Haiti. The United
States accepts President Aristide as the constitutional president of
Haiti for his term of office ending in 2006. We believe the legislative
and territorial elections of May 2000 were seriously flawed and that
the government of Haiti bears the principal responsibility for
rectifying them. We strongly supported OAS efforts to bring about a
negotiated compromise between the parties leading to new elections . .
. We continue to support (OAS) Resolution 822 . . .''\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Ibid. OAS Permanent Council Resolution 822, ``Support for
Strengthening Democracy in Haiti,'' was passed on September 4, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A more complete enunciation of Bush administration policy toward
Haiti was made in mid-2002 in a speech delivered in Washington by the
State Department's then-Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.
``Our objective in Haiti is clear,'' the official stated. ``We desire a
fully democratic Haiti--one that is more prosperous and more respectful
of human rights. With a robust democracy, the Haitian people will enjoy
a better standard of living.''\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ ``U.S. Haiti Policy: Remarks by Ambassador Lino Guitierrez,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,'' Dinner Discussion,
Inter-American Dialogue Conference ``Haiti and Development
Assistance,'' Washington, DC, May 22, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The State Department official then elaborated that ``our Haiti
policy rests on four pillars, all equally important (author's
emphasis). We seek to:
``Support efforts to strengthen democracy and improve
respect for human rights;
``Provide humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable
Haitians, and actively promote sustainable economic
development;
``Discourage illegal migration, which threatens maritime
safety and the lives of those who risk dangerous sea travel;
and
``Stem the flow of illegal drugs through Haiti to the U.S.''
Are these four policy pillars really equal? An answer to this
question is suggested by the NCHR in its recent report. ``It is
clear,'' analyzes the human rights organization, ``that, while
concerned with the political gridlock and subsequent deterioration of
human rights in Haiti, the U.S.'s priorities--as judged by the areas in
which it has actually poured resources and taken concrete steps to
address the problem--are narco-trafficking and refugee flight by
boat.'' The United States, continues the NCHR assessment, ``is quietly
preparing for a potential implosion (in Haiti). In addition to making
plans to build a proverbial fence around the country, in an effort to
avoid a humanitarian disaster, the U.S. has also increased its
emergency food aid program to the country.'' \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Op. cit., ``Yon Sel Dwet,'' pp. 34-35
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comments from U.S. government officials support this conclusion.
The State Department official cited above acknowledged that
``mitigating humanitarian distress is among our immediate priorities.''
\21\ The former American envoy to Haiti acknowledged an impending
Haitian humanitarian crisis, linking it directly to migration, that hot
rail of U.S.-Haiti relations. ``In the United States,'' he elaborated,
``we also see the crisis in terms of a steadily increasing outward flow
of illegal migrants.'' In response to this crisis and the subsequent
migratory flow, he told his audience in Port-au-Prince that, ``(t)he
United States this year has increased its assistance to Haiti to $70
million. The traditional migrant source zones will be particularly
targeted for assistance.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Op. cit. ``U.S.-Haiti Policy''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In view of the current U.S. approach of less-than-direct engagement
with the government of Haiti, at issue is how this aid is delivered.
The U.S. Ambassador addressed this topic in his Port-au-Prince speech
when he reminded his audience, ``As you know our assistance program in
Haiti reflects our ongoing unwillingness to deal directly with the
government for political reasons. U.S. assistance is delivered to the
people of Haiti through NGOs and the private sector.'' \22\ In his
speech in Washington, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Western Hemisphere Affairs also addressed the issue of how the
United States delivers humanitarian assistance to Haiti, stating that
the U.S. chooses ``to channel our assistance to the Haitian people
through international and local non-governmental organizations.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Op. cit., ``Reflections''
\23\ Op. cit. ``U.S. Haiti Policy''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several aid-related developments, however, appear to contradict
this apparent approach of engagement with the people of Haiti
accompanied by estrangement from their government, and to reinforce the
supposition that all policy pillars are not created equally. The first
of these developments, direct U.S. bilateral support of the Haitian
Coast Guard, also suggests that U.S. assistance is even more strongly
linked to the migration issue than alluded to by the U.S. Ambassador in
his Port-au-Prince speech. Aid channeled to this Haitian government
entity not only strengthens its ability to curtail migrant flows but
also reinforces its ability to engage in surveillance and pursuit of
drug traffickers.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Op. cit., ``Yon Sel Dwet,'' p. 34
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, through its support of OAS Resolution 822, the U.S. has
cast its vote to de-link Haiti's political crisis from the suspension
of direct, multilateral funding of the Haitian government. Although the
U.S. maintains that its bilateral aid is not channeled through the
Haitian government, through its support of OAS Res. 822, it now
supports the resumption of multilateral assistance to that government
by way of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank,
both of which are heavily dependent on U.S. government funding. Or, as
stated by the U.S. Ambassador in Port-au Prince, ``(W)e are encouraging
the IDB to be prepared to move quickly, but appropriately, as soon as
arrears are paid. The World Bank should not be far behind.'' \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Op. cit., ``Reflections'' The Government of Haiti paid $32
million in arrears to the IDB in July, thus opening the door for about
$200 million in loans from that organization. In early October, the
World Bank's private sector financing unit, the International Finance
Corporation (IFC), approved a $20 million loan for investment in a
trade free zone near the Dominican Republic border, the bank's first
loan to Haiti since 1998. (``World Bank arm OKs first loan to Haiti
since 1998,'' Anna Willard, Reuters, October 10, 2003.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOWARD ANOTHER U.S.-HAITI POLITIQUE?
In recent months, several other developments have further
complicated the picture of ``estranged engagement'' sketched out above.
Altogether, they may be indicative of a gradual shift of the Bush
administration away from understudies and chimeres toward more direct
engagement with its Haitian counterparts.
One development relates to the important policy pillar of narco-
trafficking. In a somewhat surprising move last June, the Aristide
government arrested and expelled the alleged, notorious Haitian drug
kingpin, Jacques Ketant. Then, in mid-October, Haitian authorities
followed with the arrest and expulsion of another notorious drug
kingpin, Eliobert Jasme, a.k.a. ED1, a prominent Port-au-Prince
businessman.\26\ Both Ketant and Jasme are in U.S. custody in South
Florida. Ketant, according to one official, is ``singing like a bird.''
Which tunes, exactly, he is singing, are yet to be revealed. The fact
that Mr. Ketant is chirping loudly, however, poses considerable risk to
President Aristide and his government, particularly if the supposed
drug kingpin alleges, as many of his political detractors already have,
that neither President Aristide nor his government have clean hands
insofar as Haitian drug trafficking and the riches it brings are
concerned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ ``Haiti hands accused drug trafficker to U.S.,'' Reuters,
October 16, 2003. in between the arrest and expulsion of Kettant and
Jasme, the Government of Haiti arrested and expelled two other high
profile drug traffickers, Eddy Aurelien and Carlos Ovalle (a Columbian
resident of Haiti). They, also, are in the hands of U.S. authorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Speculation abounds in Washington and Port-au-Prince as to why
Haitian authorities have moved when they did to arrest and expel two
notorious drug traffickers that the U.S. has requested for some time.
Given the great importance of action against drug trafficking as a key
U.S. interest in Haiti, much of that speculation revolves around the
question of whether the government of Haiti is giving the U.S.
something of great importance to set the stage for receiving something
in return. Might that something be a reduction of U.S. political heat
on President Aristide and his administration, particularly in so far as
it relates to allegations of government collusion with drug
traffickers, accompanied by more resolute support from Washington of
the Aristide government's stated intentions to take steps to resolve,
at long last, the controversial results of the 2000 legislative
elections? In addition to lowering the political heat, one must ask, of
course, whether or not any quid pro quo might also have something to do
with lowering the heat along the dreaded third rail of migration,
especially as U.S. elections appear just over the horizon.
Concurrent with movement by the Government of Haiti on the narco-
trafficking front, are developments on the policy front linked to the
arrival of Washington's new envoy to Haiti. \27\ In public statements
and, reportedly, during a September 19 private meeting with President
Aristide, Washington's ambassador has enunciated several key components
of the U.S. stance vis-a-vis the current Haitian government, along with
obstacles toward heightened U.S.-Haiti political cooperation.
Specifically, the U.S. Ambassador has reiterated the legitimacy of
Aristide's February 7, 2001 to February 7, 2006 term of office, while
calling firmly for there to be no change vis-a-vis the Haitian
constitutional parameters that govern presidential terms in office.
Also, the envoy has identified U.S. administrative and security
concerns regarding legislative elections in 2004, setting forth key
steps to address them.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Ambassador James B. Foley arrived in Port-au-Prince in mid-
September, 2003.
\28\ Key issues addressed by Ambassador Foley during his Sept. 19
meeting with President Aristide, summarized in an article in Haiti's
LeMonde newspaper, included changes to strengthen the objective
electoral oversight capacity of the Haitian National Police, improved
election security vis-a-vis steps toward disarmament of the civil
population (i.e. ``popular organizations''), and the constitution of
the long-awaited Provisional Electoral Commission required to oversee
elections. The security issue included specific concern regarding
fugitive gang-leader Amiot Metayer. Metayer was found murdered in late
September. (See ``Un certain `plan americain' dononce mais deja en
marche,'' Haiti en Marche, 15 au 21 Octobre 2003, XVII (37).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another recent development is linked to the involvement in Haiti of
a well-respected and prestigious American diplomat. In the June meeting
of the OAS General Assembly in Santiago, Chile, U.S. Secretary of State
Powell suggested that if tangible progress had not been made soon by
the Government of Haiti toward the achievement of steps set forth in
OAS Resolution 822, an OAS re-assessment of the situation should
occur.\29\ As a result, Terence Todman, a retired U.S. diplomat, and
only one of a handful of Americans who hold the penultimate Foreign
Service Officer rank of Career Ambassador, has been present in Haiti
frequently since August of this year. Mr. Todman, who is also a native
of the U.S. Virgin Islands, is working under the auspices of the
Secretary General of the OAS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ ``U.S. Commits Another $1 Million to OAS Efforts in Haiti--
Colin Powell,'' OAS Press statement GA-09-03, June 9, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether the designation to the OAS of this prestigious U.S.
diplomat in response to the U.S. Secretary of State's recommendation
represents a shift in the Bush administration from its understudy
orientation toward more direct engagement is another matter for
speculation. While few in Washington believe that there will be a
return to the high-ranking Washington/Port-au-Prince shuttle diplomacy
of the previous administration, there is little doubt that this
involvement of a senior American diplomat represents a modified policy
approach. One indication of the potential impact of the retired
diplomat's engagement emanates from Port-au-Prince, where his visits
have been compared in significance with that in 1978 of then-U.S.
Ambassador to the UN Andrew Young. Young's visit resulted in important,
albeit temporary, gains in the respect of human rights during the Jean-
Claude Duvalier regime. Hope runs strong among at least some Haitians
that this new U.S.-recommended initiative will be instrumental in
breaking the seemingly endless political gridlock that is choking their
country.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ ``Nouvelle configuration politico-electorate,'' in Haiti en
Marche, XVII (30), 27 Aout, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Washington and Port-au-Prince await the incorporation of Special
Envoy Todman's findings and recommendations into upcoming reports of
the OAS Secretary General, speculation abounds that the perspective of
the West Indian native and senior U.S. diplomat may be inclined toward
breaking that gridlock through increased engagement with a President
Aristide and Haitian government that will more robustly address U.S.
concerns. That engagement would be paralleled by less U.S. patience
with the ``zero option'' political delaying tactics of Aristide's
understudy-influenced opponents. Should this be the case, the currently
stalled OAS diplomatic initiatives toward easing Haiti's political
crisis, as written into Resolution 822, may begin to move forward.
A FINAL CONSIDERATION
In reference to the tenor and direction of current U.S.-Haiti
relations, the NCHR suggests that it is strikingly apt to consider the
axiom that ``an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.'' \31\ In
the long run, a policy of estranged engagement that heightens the risk
of implosion and humanitarian crisis in Haiti is in no one's rational
interests. All this approach has accomplished is to make things worse
for all involved, especially ordinary citizens in Haiti who are already
suffering tremendously not just from unmet expectations, but from
increased violence, insecurity, and deprivation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Op. cit. ``Yon Sel Dwet,'' p. 35
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In spite of all its faults and blemishes, ``Haiti,'' the NCHR
points out, ``is not nearly as much of a Pandora''s Box as some of the
world's other hot spots. Effective, respectful diplomatic engagement in
Haiti,'' the organization states, ``does not dictate a protracted,
prohibitively costly ``nation-building'' exercise for the U.S.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Ibid, p. 36
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In view of the ``ineffective . . . utter failure over the past
three years'' of the U.S. policy of estranged engagement ``to compel
positive change in Haiti,'' \33\ time is overdue for Washington to
reassess its approach toward Haiti. Developments such as U.S. support
through OAS Res. 822 of the de-linking of economic aid from the
political crisis, the engagement with the OAS of Ambassador Terence
Todman, the arrest and hand-off of drug traffickers, the reiteration by
the new U.S. ambassador of the legitimacy of President Aristide, and--
not mentioned previously--indications of renewed U.S. consideration to
complement the current OAS effort to assist and strengthen the Haitian
National Police, all point in this direction.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Ibid, p. 35
\34\ For an assessment of lessons learned in the creation of the
Haitian National Police force, see, ``Building the Haitian National
Police: A Retrospective and Prospective View,'' Janice M. Stromsem and
Joseph Trincellito, Trinity College Haiti Program, Haiti Papers, Number
6, April 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Experience as a child and a parent, a student and a teacher, and a
worker and a supervisor have all indicated to this writer that positive
feedback and positive reinforcement are a much more effective means of
getting something done--and done well--than are negative steps that
result in estrangement. In that regard, a policy of direct, positive
and effective engagement might lead to salubrious developments for all.
Perhaps it is still not too late, especially with Haiti's bicentennial
upon us, for the perpetual U.S.-Haiti love-hate relationship to focus
more on the former and less on the latter.
Senator Coleman. Gentlemen, thank you very, very much.
Ambassador Dobbins, I didn't get a chance to listen, but
I've read your comments. I think you talk about the need for
reconciliation in Washington. I was wondering whether you think
that's possible, after watching the discussion that we just
went through. Can we put aside some of this, kind of, ``Where
were we yesterday,'' in order to actually do the things that
have to be done in Haiti? Do you have a sense for whether
that's possible?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, I think you can answer better
than I can the degree to which one can put aside questions
about the exact manner in which President Aristide left. I
suspect, based on the discussion I heard today, that that's
going to be difficult.
But the question is whether you can simultaneously move
forward, that issue aside, recognizing it's going to be
addressed, and that may be painful, on a program which I think
should be broadly acceptable to, you know, a wide selection of
the country and the Congress. I didn't hear much disagreement
in this panel or in any of the other panels about what we
should do from here on. And so I do think it would be worth
trying to work out something that had broad bipartisan support
and was forward-looking, even as we, you know, continue to look
into, and perhaps dispute, the recent history.
Senator Coleman. And my sense, by the way, as we look to
the future, I think there is broad bipartisan support for those
things that have to be done.
I know there was discussion about giving direct aid to the
Haitian Government. And my question is, in terms of giving aid,
talk to me a little bit about accountability, and also--if we
continue to work with the government and continue to work with
the NGOs--is there a sense that we just have to do both in
order to meet the needs that are out there?
Ambassador Dobbins. Some of my colleagues probably can give
you a more precise answer. My feeling is that if you're going
to help Haiti build the institutions it needs, you're going to
have to accept lower levels of accountability, higher levels of
diversion, and less control over how the money is spent than
ideally you would like. It doesn't mean that you put all of
your money through the Haitian Government. It's a question of
proportionality. But our preference for accountability and for
avoiding politically controversial outcomes when we provide
assistance has, I think, led us to starve the Haitian
Government of what it needs to develop the capacity to govern
well one day, in order to meet our short-term political needs--
I mean, political needs to avoid being criticized for misusing
our resources.
Senator Coleman. Mr. Heinl.
Mr. Heinl. Yes, I would like to add to that, to just say
that, in the short term, the NGOs really are probably the most
effective way just to get things going; because the state of
paralysis in the Haitian Government is such, for whatever
reasons, many of which have been addressed today, that it will
not be an effective instrument in the immediate future to take
the kinds of steps that we need to take right now to at least
stabilize the situation and prevent it from getting any worse.
Senator Coleman. Mr. Pezzullo, do you want to respond?
Ambassador Pezzullo. Well, I ran a large NGO, and I do
think they do marvelous work. But, by and large, NGOs cannot
really help a government reorganize itself.
Somebody mentioned, here, a change in basically the
climate, the political climate, the culture of Haiti. I think
that's key. In my prepared remarks, which I deviated from,
you'll find them.
I do think the new Haitian government would be well
advised, early on, to open up a new dialogue with the Haitian
people and bringing them in, in a real sense. There are all
kinds of programs now developed at Inter-American Development
Bank, AID--they call them transparency, and so on. But what
they do, in effect, if you are diligent in following them, is,
you start to bring the various segments of the society into the
process of governing--education, training, participation of one
sort or another. This does a lot of things for them. First, it
builds up a sense of confidence, a sense that they're part of
the process. It also eventually brings accountability. One of
the great failures of most governments is the lack of
accountability. People get into authority, they don't have a
process to keep them accountable, and they slip off. Everybody
slips off.
So I think that type of program should come right out of
the government. And I would urge them, if they're thinking of
any initial program, to go to the World Bank or go to the
Inter-American Development Bank and do that, and do it quickly.
On the institution-building, this is a long process. It's
not a rebuilding of police forces; it's building up the
capacity within the society to fill major positions in
government. It's just not the minister; it's all the people
with him.
In Haiti, they have some real problems with status
institutions, which Aristide was urged very strongly to get rid
of, to privatize, because they are always the focus of graft.
That's the electric company, the port facility, the airport.
These were great places for people to make money and to put in
cronies. Privatize them. Let them pay taxes. Let the government
benefit from that and demand services.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
We'll have a further conversation another time--this was
all about rule of law, and we didn't touch upon that, but I'm
very interested in that, both in Haiti and at some other areas.
But I would turn to my colleague, Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank
all four of you. And, at least in the case of two you, I've
known for some time. And Larry Pezzullo, Larry, it's a pleasure
to see you again. We've dealt with each other a lot over the
last 20 years. I haven't seen you in a long time. You look
wonderful.
Ambassador Pezzullo. Thank you. Same to you.
Senator Dodd. Nice to have you back before the committee.
And Jim Dobbins is someone I've admired for a long time. He's
been a real hand when it comes to the Western Hemisphere, and
it's nice to see you back. And I've had a chance to listen to
you on a couple of occasions when you've testified on Haiti and
other matters.
Let me ask all four of you just one quick question. One of
the discussions going on--I mean, I--again, I mean, we're all--
I think, all--there's no question that certainly President
Aristide contributed, not insignificantly, to the set of
problems that we have, and I don't want to keep on dwelling on
the point, but I--maybe I'm old-fashioned, but the idea of
standing up for democracies, I thought, was something we kind
of tried to do, even--and if we start using a standard of
failed leadership in countries, and that's going to be a reason
we start undermining elected governments, we're going to have
a--going to have a lot of work on our hands, as I look around
the world.
But one of the things that President Aristide did that I
think most people applauded was to disband the army. And the
only case I know was the case of--was Pepe Figueras, in Costa
Rica, back in the early 1950s, when he successfully led a
revolution there and got rid of the military, and they have a
national police force and so forth, but, nonetheless, made the
case, I thought, successfully, and a case can be made in a lot
of other places around the region, that this is much of a
rationale for it anymore.
Now, there's talk by this interim government about
reconstituting a military in Haiti again. And I wonder if all
four of you would make a quick comment on the wisdom--put aside
whether or not the interim government is a legitimate
government to start making decisions like that, but just the
whole idea of bringing a military force back into Haiti, given
the history of problems that have been associated with Haitian
military in years past. Obviously, I'm editorializing in my
questions here how I feel about it, but I'd be interested in
your comments on it.
Why don't we begin with you, Mr. Heinl.
Mr. Heinl. I think the debate over the Haitian army is much
like the debate over the word ``marriage'' in this country.
Everyone's focusing on----
Senator Dodd. Don't get me into that.
Mr. Heinl [continuing]. ----everyone's focusing on the word
``army,'' and not focusing on what actually an army should or
should not be doing for a country the size of Haiti. If
President Aristide had had some sort of national force, he'd
probably still be in power. But, instead, in 1995, he disbanded
the army----
Senator Dodd. I don't disagree. He probably regrets it
dearly.
Mr. Heinl. I'm sure. He disbanded it, because the army's
role traditionally had been in making coups, and he had been
ousted himself, of course, as we all know, in 1991. But whether
you call it a national constabulary, an army--or maybe one part
of the national police force needs to be truly national, as
opposed to local law enforcement personnel--I suspect, in a
country of 8 million, that there is need for more than 5,000
keepers of the peace, and that would be how I would view
answering your question.
Senator Dodd. Jim.
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, I think I tend to agree. I do
think that it would be a mistake to try to reestablish the
Haitian army, given its reputation for abuse and the divisive
nature of the institution in Haiti. It would send all the wrong
signals.
On the other hand, the Clinton administration had to be
persuaded to support Aristide's decision to disband the army.
It wasn't a decision the Clinton administration had come to on
its own. Its intent was to seek to reform and professionalize
the army.
I do think--I have always had reservations about having a
single security force in a country like Haiti, or, indeed, any
country. I mean, no country that I know of, certainly not the
United States, would repose all of its authority and all armed
power in a single monopoly force, which always has the
possibility of becoming abusive. And, therefore, some division
of labor, with a couple of whatever you call them, a
constabulary and a local police force, or something, would
certainly make sense, just from a, you know, good-governance
point of view.
The question is, Can Haiti afford it? That's the real
question. Haiti needs a decent police force. It needs law and
order. You don't want a bunch of guys with tanks and M-16s
providing that. So you've got to give them a decent police
force. Then if you've got enough money left over so that you
can also give them a constabulary that can do rural policing
and border patrol and that sort of thing, go ahead.
Ambassador Pezzullo. Well, the plan that we were putting
before--Aristide agreed to it--was to reduce the size of the
military and really get rid of the heavy weapons company, get
rid of the infantry company, both of which were silly, and turn
it in, basically, to an engineering brigade that can fix roads
and take care of public-works types of things, and rescue.
Something like that, two or three thousand people, might make
sense at some point. But certainly I would think that the
interim government would stay away from this issue and tend to
its--to try to put together the basis for, first of all, an
election, which, I agree, is going to be very troublesome and
difficult, and getting very good people in place in government
ministries, so you can show that, indeed, you can govern the
country.
Dr. Maguire. I think, in part, this whole idea of restoring
the army has come about because of the celebratory way that
some of these commandos were welcomed into communities, and I
think we need to look at that for the answer, as well.
Obviously, there's a strong sense of self-preservation among
Haitian people. You celebrate the guys coming in with the guns.
And especially when they knock down all the prisons and let all
the prisoners out, I'm sure the prisoners and their families
were glad to celebrate that, as well. As well, of course, when
the Haitian army was disbanded, it didn't go anywhere. It
stayed there, and people had their guns cached away, and
they've brought them back out, and this is maybe why we saw the
numbers grow as the number of towns fell.
But I look at this in another way, as well. I look at it in
a way that I think Haitians have become very disenchanted with
democracy and with their so-called political leaders, of all
stripes. For the past five or six years, they've been
squabbling, fighting for power, blocking the Congress, abusing
power in the palace, and, in a sense, fiddling while Rome's
burning. So I think we need to restore the faith in democracy
in the Haitian people, and it's not going to happen through an
army; it's going to happen by having leaders who have to act
responsibly when they are before the Haitian people, not just
fight over power.
Senator Dodd. Yeah. Well, I agree with that. I appreciate
your quick comments.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. That's been very helpful.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Well, this has been a very interesting panel. Thank you all
very much. You all have a great deal of expertise and a lot to
bring to this discussion. And I know we can't get into all the
details about Haiti today, and all the things that need to be
done, but, you know, when you fly into Haiti, the first thing
that strikes you from the air is the deforestation and some of
the ecological problems that they have in Haiti today. And I
wonder maybe if some of you could--maybe we'll start with Mr.
Dobbins--could on that, because they're related to the
agriculture problem, they're related to the feeding problem,
they're related to the problem that so many of the people who
live in the countryside have--for the last many years, have
been going into Port-au-Prince and then going into Cap-Haitien
and--you know, all these problems are related. And as the
United States and the other countries and the new Haitian
Government begin to try to address all the different problems,
it seems to me that this is one of the problems that has to be
addressed, the agriculture problem, ecological problems.
Ambassador Dobbins.
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, let me say, I think what's
important in a transitional period like this, where you have an
opportunity to make important changes, is that you have a
strong sense of prioritization of effort, because you can't do
everything at once.
There is a temptation, particularly in a country as poor as
Haiti, to put the bulk of our money into poverty alleviation
and some of the other programs you've mentioned. I would argue
that, at least for the next year or two, the priorities are the
following.
First, security. If you don't have security, you waste--
everything else you spend is wasted. So put your first dollars
into security, into building the police and the other
institutions of rule of law.
Second, basic governance, just being able to provide the
most basic public services, and not having to be dependent on
NGOs for those public services; being--you know, creating the
Haitian Government capacity to provide the most minimal kinds
of government service that any government should provide.
Third, the economic--not economic development--just the
economic reforms that create a market environment for minimal
investment, and the ability of people to trade and engage in
commerce and make money.
Senator DeWine. Such as?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, such as either privatizing or at
least putting, on a commercial basis, things like the port, the
telephone company, the electric company, and creating a
commercial code that gives people some confidence in
investment.
Senator DeWine. Basic things, I might--if I could
interrupt--basic things that were recommended to the Aristide
government and----
Ambassador Dobbins. And which he refused to do.
Senator DeWine [continuing]. ----government and were
rejected.
Ambassador Dobbins. Exactly.
Senator DeWine. Or, not rejected--they weren't rejected;
they just weren't done.
Ambassador Dobbins. Right. Now, maybe--I mean, there's lots
of countries that won't privatize things like this, and we have
to respect that. But if you can't privatize it, you can
commercialize it, you can insulate it and put it on a self-
sufficient basis.
Senator DeWine. Right.
Ambassador Dobbins. So something has to be done.
The next priority is political reform, creating a civil
society, free press, political parties, et cetera. And, only
lastly, large-scale infrastructure and traditional development.
Now, if you've got enough money to do them all at once, go
ahead and do them all at once. But I would argue that if you
have limited funds, you should prioritize them in that
sequence.
Senator DeWine. Good. Any other comments?
Ambassador Pezzullo. You know, that makes good sense. I
mean, I have no argument with that. What you, I think, all
know, and maybe don't articulate, is the fact that the denuding
of Haiti, the ecological disaster they have there, is due, in
large measure, to the use of coke. They've been cutting down
trees faster than people can plant them. I mean, if you went
back 20 years, 30 years, you'd find AID and various
institutions building trees like crazy. But they were cutting
them down as fast as you grew them. So you've got to find a
substitute for coke.
By the way, that's a problem all through Africa, too. You
find most of the people, you know, cutting down every damn
shrub you can find and ruining the soil. You know, they've come
up with solar stoves and various and sundry ideas, but if you
don't break with that custom--and I'll bet you most Haitian
women would not understand cooking with anything but charcoal--
you have a dilemma of major proportions that you just don't,
you know, think away or wish away.
Dr. Maguire. Senator DeWine, I'm absolutely delighted with
your focus on agriculture. My first book on Haiti was called
Bottom-Up Development in Haiti, and it focused on peasant
farmers. One of the things I learned in doing that research was
that I continually met people who were small farmers and had
been for their whole lives. The only implement they had was a
machete, and they had never once seen an agricultural field
agent to help them do anything.
So if we can get some investment out to the farmers,
they'll do the same for Haiti as they've done in the Dominican
Republic, the backbone of agriculture in that country, as well.
I think the small farmers understand the tragedy of the
environment. They just have very few choices. And in the best
of all worlds, we could see people carrying the soil back up
onto the hills, onto the terraces and making them work again.
And, finally, I would say, in the creation of jobs--I've
been saying this for years--but if there's some way you want to
create jobs in Haiti, it's not necessarily to have them in the
cities only, which is going to attract how many people for
every single job, and create more problems in the city. If you
give a farmer a couple hundred dollars, one of the first things
he'll do is hire somebody to work with him.
Senator DeWine. Good, thank you very much.
Senator Coleman. Gentlemen, our votes have begun. We've got
a series of stacked votes.
I want to thank you. This has been an outstanding panel, a
lot less discord amongst us based on what you're doing and
saying. And, in the end, I think that's important, because we
really do have to respond, and we have to have a vision, and
you have been extraordinarily helpful in helping us shape that
vision. So I want to thank you for your participation.
The record of this hearing shall remain open for another
ten days. I want to thank everybody for attending.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:58 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record by Members
of the Committee
Responses to Questions Submitted by Senator Dodd to Assistant Secretary
of State Roger Noriega
Question. What efforts are being taken by the U.S. within the
World Bank to provide assistance to Haiti through the LICUS fund?
Answer. U.S. officials have consulted regularly with the World Bank
to discuss Haiti's economic situation, needs, and possible responses by
the Bank and other donors. Bank relations with Haiti are currently
limited by the fact that Haiti is in non-accrual status, with arrears
of approximately $41 million as of March 31, 2004. Haiti was placed on
non-accrual status in September 2001 and operations were suspended at
the end of 2001. Haiti will need to clear its arrears to the World Bank
before regular lending can resume. Haiti will need bilateral support to
do so and as such, the World Bank has suggested that bilateral donors
join together to support Haiti in clearing these arrears.
U.S. officials from State, Treasury, and USAID discussed with the
World Bank staff on March 22 the possible alternatives the Bank is
considering. Bank staff discussed these options further at the Haiti
Donors' Contact Group Meeting March 23. Our understanding is that Haiti
may be eligible to receive resources as a Low Income Country Under
Stress (LICUS), and if designated as a post-conflict country, Haiti
could be eligible for additional assistance. The Treasury Department is
supporting rapid development of these assistance options by the World
Bank.
Question. Why has Haiti not been a recipient of LICUS assistance
given that it is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and its
citizens rank as some of the poorest in the world?
Answer. The LICUS Trust Fund was created on Janurary 15, 2004 to
assist Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) who are currently
ineligible to receive International Development Association (IDA)
assistance due to their arrears with the Bank. The resources are
directed toward supporting urgent social needs and assisting
governments with the implementation of reforms necessary for re-
engagement with the international community.
Haiti is one of the 26 countries the Bank has classified as LICUS
in FY 04, based on a rating of 3.0 or less on the Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and governance rating scales (based on
FY 02 ratings). The Treasury Department is working with the World Bank
on moving this forward.
Question. What is the assessment (in dollars) of damage to the
infrastructure of Haiti as a result of the recent civil unrest which
brought an end to the Aristide administration? What efforts have been
made to solicit funds from countries for the reconstruction of Haiti?
How much money has thus far been donated?
Answer. No official, comprehensive financial assessment has been
made of damage to the infrastructure of Haiti as a result of the recent
civil unrest. Reports from the Haitian business community estimate
damage to private businesses in Port-au-Prince at $250-300 million.
U.S. Embassy and military sources in Haiti have observed substantial
damage, easily in the millions of dollars, to Haitian government
buildings in Port-au-Prince and to police stations countrywide.
Donors agreed at the World Bank Contact Group Meeting March 23 that
a comprehensive, multi-donor needs assessment for Haiti should occur in
May, following a donors' meeting with the Government of Haiti in Port-
au-Prince in April at which time the government will discuss its
assistance priorities.
On March 9, the United Nations issued a flash appeal for $36
million in immediate assistance to Haiti. The U.S. sent an instruction
to all embassies on March 10 to support the appeal and solicit
additional assistance for Haiti from other countries. The UN reported
as of March 23 some $6 million in commitments in response. Since the
Embassy issued a disaster declaration February 18, the U.S. has
provided over $3 million in emergency assistance to support the
transport and distribution of food and medicines and to purchase
medical supplies, including $900,000 to ICRC (the Red Cross), $400,000
to the Pan-American Health Organization, and $300,000 to UNICEF.
Question. As outlined by the Haitian Constitution, the Prime
Minister is to be appointed by the President from among the members of
the Parliament. Will the Parliament of Haiti be restored with
sufficient legitimacy to provide the next democratically elected
President of Haiti with candidates for Prime Minister? What is the
proposed date of the next Parliamentary election?
Answer. We are working with the Government of Haiti, Haitian civil
society, and the international community to ensure the legitimacy of
the next election. The first step is for Haiti's interim government to
form a broadly-based electoral council in line with the international
plan of action for Haiti. That council, in cooperation with the
international community, will set the date for elections. Although a
recent political accord committed to local parliamentary and
presidential elections in 2005, no specific dates for elections have
been proposed, and some time will be needed to organize free and fair
elections. We are engaged with the Organization of American States
(OAS), the United Nations, and other donors to develop plans and
support for elections in Haiti.
Question. Article 149 of the Haitian Constitution states that ``an
election shall be held at least forty-five (45) and no more than ninety
(90) days after the vacancy occurs, pursuant to the Constitution and
the Electoral Law.'' What assistance is the U.S. Government providing
either through bilateral or multilateral efforts to uphold the Haitian
Constitution and ensure that a democratically elected President comes
to power within these parameters?
Answer. According to Article 191 of the Haitian Constitution, the
Permanent Electoral Council is responsible for organizing and
controlling all electoral procedures. Prior to Aristide's resignation,
the U.S., the OAS, and our international partners were working with the
Government of Haiti and the opposition to create a Provisional
Electoral Council (CEP) as a first step toward elections to settle the
then-existing political crisis. We envision that the interim government
will continue to work with the international community to assure that a
CEP is put in place. The lack of a CEP makes it impossible to schedule
a free and fair election within the parameters envisioned in the
Constitution.
There is also a complete lack of any electoral infrastructure in
Haiti. The international community will work with Haiti to provide the
necessary equipment, training, and technical assistance to hold an
election and to assure that voters are registered. While we recognize
the importance of holding elections as soon as practicable, what is
most important is that the elections be free and fair. It is important
that the Government of Haiti neither rushes into elections nor allows
itself to be pressured into an improperly run election. Haiti and the
international community must have time to fully rebuild the electoral
infrastructure.
Question. What actions are being taken by the international
stabilization force to assist in the apprehension of individuals either
accused or convicted of human rights violations such as Guy Philippe
and Louis Jodel Chamblain? Please report to date the number and types
of light and heavy weapons recovered from disarming rebel groups.
Answer. The Multinational Interim Force (MIF) in Haiti comprises
some 3,600 personnel from Canada, Chile, France and the United States
throughout Haiti. Its primary mission is to restore order and to
support the Government of Haiti's efforts to re-establish public
security. It is supporting Haitian National Police in the disarmament
of illegally armed civilians in accordance with Haitian law. Any
illegally armed civilians encountered by present patrols will be
immediately disarmed to ensure force protection of the MIF. Threats to
the protection of the MIF will not be tolerated. Additionally, when MIF
personnel encounter any acts of violence, they will intervene to
protect life. The Haitian National Police will remain the lead in the
disarmament process. To date, MIF units have collected, confiscated or
seized a total of 91 weapons, which included shotguns, handguns, CS
grenades, knives, machetes, and night sticks.
MIF forces will also develop intelligence and conduct missions
aimed specifically at weapons caches owned by any of the violent
factions inside the country. We have strongly encouraged all civilians
to lay down their weapons and disarm to ensure the safety and security
of Haiti. Multinational forces are there to help the people of Haiti
and to expedite the restoration of security and stability to the
country.
Decisions on arresting and prosecuting human rights abusers must be
taken by the Government of Haiti. We have made clear to the government
that such persons should have no role in the government and that those
who used violence for political goals must lay down their arms. Louis
Jodel Chamblain was convicted in a Haitian court of human rights abuses
and, thus, the question of his apprehension will be for the Haitian
justice system. Similarly, any questions related to Guy Philippe will
also be for the Haitian government. However, the international
community has made clear to interim government of Haiti officials that
persons guilty of crimes should be held accountable for their crimes.
______
Responses to Questions Submitted by Senator DeWine to Assistant
Secretary of State Roger Noriega
Question. Public reports suggest there are links between former
Haitian presidential security guards, and the deaths of and attacks on,
a number of opposition members. Can you provide us with any and all
documents that would substantiate these allegations?
Answer. The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs is undertaking a
review to identify documents responsive to this request and will notify
the committee, under established Department of State procedures, when
this review has been completed.
Question. A few years ago, USAID had a very successful Hillside
Agricultural Program. At a relatively modest cost, the program was
designed to sustainably increase agricultural productivity and income
through the promotion of sound agricultural practices, the introduction
of high-value crops, and better marketing. In other words, it was
designed to teach the people of Haiti a sustainable way to feed
themselves.
Yet, while the five-year plan that was laid out in 1999 indicated
that 228,000 farmers would be reached by 2004, clearly, in 2004, this
objective hasn't been reached. Our agricultural development efforts
have been completely zeroed out in recent years. Where do you expect
these initiatives to fall in the administration's overall priorities
for Haiti?
Answer. We recognize the importance of the Hillside Agriculture
Program and are pleased with what it has achieved despite cuts in
funding.
In Haiti's current fragile situation, our first priority has been
to provide emergency assistance to the most vulnerable and to prevent
the spread of communicable diseases. To this end, since the Embassy
issued a disaster declaration February 18, we have provided over $3
million in emergency assistance to support the transport and
distribution of food and medicines and to purchase medical supplies.
Our ongoing assistance programs for Haiti are focused on health and
nutrition; about 40 percent of our assistance budget has gone to each
of these. This assistance is designed to reach Haiti's most vulnerable
populations, notably children up to age five and their mothers, and
HIV/AIDS patients. This allocation also reflects relative availability
of funding from the Child Survival and Health (CSH) and P.L.-480 Title
II accounts.
While funding of economic growth programs has been cut, it has not
been zeroed out. Microfinance programs continue and are successful in
creating Haitian-managed microfinance institutions that provide the
means for thousands of Haitians to start or continue agricultural and
business activities.
Going forward, USAID is re-examining needs and assistance
priorities in Haiti. Economic growth and job creation is clearly needed
if Haiti is to recover from the damage incurred during the political
crisis that preceded former President Aristide's resignation.
Question. Even without the recent violence and unrest, 40 percent
of Haitians have no real access to basic health care or medical
services. What is the status of Haiti's hospitals and clinics? Are they
all open and equipped to take patients? Are NGOs and international
organizations able to access and deliver medicines, water, propane gas,
and medical supplies? What are the immediate steps USAID plans to take
to assist in opening hospitals and clinics and delivering medical
supplies?
Answer. Haiti's hospitals and clinics are operating but with
reduced services dur to difficulties in transport and distribution of
medical supplies, shortages of fuel, and the absence of some health and
humanitarian workers due to evacuation or local insecurity.
With the re-establishment of relative security in most parts of the
country thanks to efforts of the Multinational Interim Force (MIF),
these problems are being addressed, and NGOs and international
organizations are generally able to access and deliver medicines and
other supplies. The U.S. took the lead in the UN Security Council to
pass UNSC Resolution 1529 on February 29, which authorized creation of
the MIF, and has been the lead MIF participant, with over 1,900 troops
in Haiti as of April 2.
Since the U.S. Embassy issued a disaster declaration February 18,
the U.S. has provided over $3 million in emergency assistance for Haiti
to support the transport and distribution of food and medicines and to
purchase medical supplies. This assistance has been given in the form
of grants to implementing organizations such as ICRC (the Red Cross),
the Pan-American Health Organization, UNICEF, World Vision, and
Catholic Relief Services.
______
Responses to Questions Submitted by Senator DeWine to Assistant
Administrator Adolfo Franco, USAID
Question. Public reports suggest there are links between former
Haitian presidential security guards, and the deaths of and attacks on,
a number of opposition members. Can you provide us with any and all
documents that would substantiate these allegations?
Answer. The answer to this question does not fall under the purview
of USAID.
Question. A few years ago, USAID had a very successful Hillside
Agricultural Program. At a relatively modest cost, the program was
designed to sustainably increase agricultural productivity and income
through the promotion of sound agricultural practices, the introduction
of high-value crops, and better marketing. In other words, it was
designed to teach the people of Haiti a sustainable way to feed
themselves.
Yet, while the five year plan that was laid out for this effort in
1999 indicated that 228,000 farmers would be reached by 2004, clearly,
in 2004, this objective hasn't been reached. Our agriculture
development efforts have been completely zeroed out in recent years.
Where do you expect these initiatives to fall in the administration's
overall priorities for Haiti?
Answer. The Mission's economic growth program continues to target
large numbers of the rural and urban population who fall beneath the
poverty line. USAID provides targeted assistance to increase their
incomes. Support for environmentally sound hillside agricultural
production systems and improved marketing continue to receive high
prority. To consolidate past gains, in FY 2000, the Mission made the
strategic decision to provide more extensive technical assistance to a
smaller number of beneficiaries covering a smaller geographic radius.
The program builds on its most successful activities: coffee, cacao,
mangos, and other non-traditional export crops for ethnic markets. In
FY 2003, the hillside agricultural program increased the revenues for
more than 35,000 farmers of targeted crops, and in the case of mango
production, increased farm gate prices by as much as 44 percent.
The success of this targeted approach resulted in an increase in
Haiti's reputation worldwide, particularly in coffee and cacao, with
both products commanding top prices, so that all Haitian farmers
producing these crops for export are benefiting. The Hillside
Agriculture Program has been one of the Missions' most successful
programs and has resulted in not only increased productivity and income
to hillside farmers, who are among the country's poorest citizens, but
increased food security and established a growing reputation worldwide
in Haitian coffee and cacao.
Question. Even without the recent violence and unrest, 40 percent
of Haitians have no real access to basic health care or medical
services. What is the status of Haiti's hospitals and clinics? Are they
all open and equipped to take paitients? Are NGOs and international
organizations able to access and deliver medicines, water, propane gas,
and medical supplies? What are the immediate steps USAID plans to take
to assist in opening hospitals and clinics and delivering medical
supplies?
Answer. Not all hospitals and clinics are yet fully operational and
receiving clients/patients. Many report difficulties, especially in
terms of fuel for generators, lack of oxygen for surgical operations,
lack of propane gas refills for refigerators for the cold chain, and
lack of drugs and other medical commodities.
Fourteen medical kits, each of which supports 10,000 patients for
three months, have been distributed by USAID/Haiti to more than
fourteen sites (some were divided in half so that smaller sites could
be covered). These kits include drugs and non-pharmaceutical supplies,
and are flown in on pallets. We have planned for 10 more kits under the
Draft Haiti Emergency Response Plan.
USAID/Haiti's key health partners, Management Sciences for Health,
Family Health International, and PSI, are all working with their
international and local NGO networks to ensure that supplies of
propane, and other commodities that are required for making clinics
viable are being procured and delivered. USAID food cooperation
sponsors are all working at capacity to make sure that food aid
supplies continue to reach those most in need.
Under the Draft Haiti Emergency Response Plan, USAID has proposed
several kinds of water purification methods, from the emergency tablet
distribution, to more sustainable locally asssembled water purification
tanks for villages, with chlorine and other purification methods.
USAID also plans to make available, under the Emergency Response
Plan, 3 million packets of ORT salts, serious diarrheal diseases,
endemic in Haiti and a major threat to the lives of those under 5 years
of age, are on the rise, and clean, potable water is in shorter and
shorter supply.
USAID rented aircraft have enabled early assessments and provision
of critical supplies by USAID and its partners.
__________
Additional Information Submitted for the Record
joint proposal & position paper
The Haiti Reconstruction Fund
prepared march 2, 2004 by
The National Organization for The Advancement of Haitians
Statement of Interest
Two organizations with stakes in the economic and social well-being
of Haitians and Haitian-Americans--the National Organization for the
Advancement of Haitians and PromoCapital Haiti S.A., a Haitian/American
investment bank--have combined to present this statement on the
constitution of a Haiti Reconstruction Fund and to offer our services.
In our roles as advocates for the Haitian-American community, business
people striving to strengthen the economic and social fabric of Haiti,
active participants in the Haitian private sector, bridge-builders
between Haitians and the Haitian Diaspora in the United States, we work
with a broad spectrum of business people, chambers of commerce and
trade associations, government officials, consumers, service providers,
American policy makers, Haitian-American constituents, Haitian citizens
and friends of Haiti and of the Haitian-American community.
The National Organization for the Advancement of Haitians, Inc.
(NOAH) was founded in 1991 as a not-for-profit, social policy
corporation, in response to the refugee crisis resulting from political
unrest in Haiti. NOAH serves as a national, nonpartisan organization
dedicated to the restoration and preservation of democracy in Haiti.
PromoCapital is a joint venture between members of the Haitian-
American Diaspora, shareholders of PromoBank (the fourth largest
Haitian bank), and members of the Haitian business community.
PromoCapital's mission statement reads: ``To bring together a team of
prominent Haitian and Haitian-American leaders with adequate expertise
and experience to create an investment infrastructure with global
horizons and limitless potential to contribute to the future welfare of
our community in Haiti and in America, while at the same time providing
ethical and socially responsive investments with equitable returns and
benefits. . . . An institution which promotes financial independence,
autonomy and security for Haitians and Haitian-Americans.''
Recognition of Issues
Well before the events of the past few days, the Haitian economy
had been on the brink of disaster. Over the past 40 years, there has
been a steady and significant erosion in the capitalization of the
Haitian private sector due to several factors: uncertain political
environment, uncoordinated macroeconomic policies, structural
weaknesses of the private sector itself, high levels of corruption and
market distortions, reckless economic incentives built into the local
financial markets, etc.
The recent events that started on February 27, 2004 have pushed the
private sector much closer to the brink and portend extremely difficult
days ahead, not only for the Haitian private sector itself, but also
for the entire banking system, the government, Haitian consumers, and
the country as a whole.
The losses suffered by small and large businesses alike in the
metropolitan Port-au-Prince area alone during these events are quite
significant:
At least 12 bank branches in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan
area were looted and destroyed. Considering that there are less
than 300 bank branches in the country as a whole, and that each
branch represents an investment of at least $500,000, the
damage is quite significant. Sogebank, Unibank, Capital Bank
and Socabank--all private Haitian banks--were the most
seriously hit;
Over 20 gas stations belonging to private businessmen and
affiliated with Dinasa (successor to Shell Oil Corporation),
Texaco, Total and other companies were completely destroyed by
fire after having been looted;
An untold number of warehouses belonging to shipping
companies, importers, non-governmental humanitarian
organizations were looted and ransacked;
Three auto dealerships (to our knowledge) were looted and
their car fleet stolen; and
Stores located along John Brown Avenue--one of the main
commercial strips downtown--were systematically pillaged.
And the list goes on. This is on top of the attacks on public
institutions like police stations, buildings housing government offices
and non-governmental organizations, etc.
It will probably be days before a full and accurate accounting of
the aggregate losses throughout the country can be obtained. Media
reports have mentioned extensive damages in Cap-Haitien, Gonaives, and
Port-de-Paix in the North. The situation in other cities, especially in
the South, is not yet known but we can also expect that several
businesses and public institutions were vandalized and/or destroyed.
Impact on the Country
This catastrophe will have several negative consequences for the
country as a whole:
Loss of jobs. It is expected that many businesses will be
unable to resume operations due to the magnitude of the losses.
This will also mean the layoffs of hundreds, if not thousands
of employees of the private sector in a country with an already
high unemployment rate. The effects on society as a whole will
be quite severe. It is estimated that, on average, each
employee supports four to six family members;
Business bankruptcies and impaired loan portfolios. The
extensive damage suffered by many businesses will probably lead
to a high rate of loan defaults, thereby impacting a banking
system that was already under stress. Given the hit that the
two largest banks, Sogebank and Unibank, themselves suffered,
it is quite conceivable that we could quickly experience a
serious banking crisis;
Stress on BRH, the Central Bank. Haiti does not have an
insurance institution like the FDIC which insures depositors'
money, nor does it have mechanisms in place for general
business insurance. Therefore, any impact of bankruptcies by
the business sector will be felt directly by the Banque de la
Republique d'Haiti, the Haitian central bank. We do not believe
that the Central Bank has the resources to withstand any type
of severe banking crisis at this point, either from a
management or from a financial standpoint;
Informal sector affected as well. The losses suffered due to
the looting of warehouses will impact not only the importers
and business owners, but also the informal sector which has
many roles in the Haitian economy--merchantwomen, welders,
mechanics, small grocery stores, photocopy service providers,
distributors of goods sold by wholesalers, and a whole host of
other micro businesses--and constitutes an important percentage
of the employed population. This consequence is more likely to
be overlooked because the informal sector in Haiti is usually
ignored, but the reverberations within the ranks of the
informal sector--and the families that are supported by it--
will be felt much more keenly than by those in the private
sector;
Long-term deterioration of the economic fabric. The economic
fabric of the country, which was already weak to begin with,
will get even weaker if nothing is done. The effects of such a
weakening would become increasingly important over the long
term as it will speed up the business decapitalization process;
Negative impact on fiscal receipts by the Government. The
fiscal impact for the government will be significant as the
government can ill afford to lose the taxes it collects from
the private sector, which represent a substantial percentage of
its overall tax receipts. The budget of the country could
suffer, which would certainly negatively impact the development
of programs in public health, education, infrastructure just to
name those; and
Insurance. We are operating on the assumption that, not
knowing the total amount of the losses and the specific terms
of the insurance policies in effect, a substantial amount of
losses will be incurred above and beyond the potential
insurance payments.
Proposed Course of Action
We are proposing the creation of the Haiti Reconstruction Fund.
This Fund would be structured along the lines of the Fund set up for
the reconstruction of Iraq or Liberia and would be open to the
participation of United States agencies as well as international
financial institutions already engaged in Haiti. In addition to funding
emergency light infrastructure work--for the damages to public
institutions--another of its chief objectives would be to provide
assistance to all existing businesses (large and small, formal and
informal) and institutions which have been impacted by the looting and
the destruction which occurred since the end of February 2004.
While we stress that humanitarian relief is critical at this point
to assist the large number of low-income families who have been
adversely affected by the political events and the attendant downturn
in the economy, it is just as critical that attention be paid to the
economic rebuilding of Haiti as well. The two efforts are interlinked
and must receive the proper attention they deserve.
We offer to take the lead on the initial assessment of the damages
that have occurred and on the formulation of an emergency intervention
policy.
Benefits to Haiti and to the United States
The benefits to Haiti are evident, as the issues we have listed
above are quite critical and must be addressed in short order. Every
day that goes by will only increase the toll on the business community
and on the country.
Rightly or wrongly, there is a perceived ambivalence towards the
nation-building effort undertaken by the United States in Haiti. The
perception among many in the Haitian-American community, residents of
Haiti, and the general public, is that the United States never
completed the mission it had set for itself in 1994 and disengaged
prematurely from the nation-building process. We believe that the
creation of the Haiti Reconstruction Fund will go a long way towards
restoring the confidence of Haitian-American taxpayers and Haitians in
the sincerity of the United States to strengthen the institutions of
that country, to contribute to the development of its economic fabric,
and to stimulate the already substantial trade between the two
countries. We believe that, by focusing on critical economic issues,
all parties involved in the development of Haiti will recognize that
economic development--and the attendant benefits--are just as important
as political ones for the future of a more stable and prosperous Haiti.
The Haitian Reconstruction Fund will establish in everyone's minds that
the United States is taking a leadership position in that regards.
Closing
We thank you for this opportunity to contribute to the reflection
on the development of a coherent and inclusive policy towards Haiti. We
hope these thoughts and concrete suggestions will prove beneficial to
your work. We will aid the discussions in any way we can.
Dr. Joseph Baptiste,
Chairman, NOAH.
Henri Deschamps,
Chairman and CEO, PromoCapital Haiti.