[Senate Hearing 108-496]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-496
LIBYA--NEXT STEPS IN U.S. RELATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 26, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
94-557 WASHINGTON : DC
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Burns, Hon. William J., Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Allen...................................................... 34
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Biden...................................................... 34
DeSutter, Hon. Paula A., Assistant Secretary of State for
Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Biden...................................................... 34
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
(iii)
LIBYA--NEXT STEPS IN U.S. RELATIONS
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G.
Lugar (chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Chafee, Biden, Feingold, and Bill
Nelson.
opening statement of senator richard g. lugar, chairman
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. Today the committee will examine
a non-proliferation success in a country that may have seemed
an unlikely candidate for such progress, even a short time ago.
President Bush announced in December that Libya had
committed to open its weapons program to international
inspectors and to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction.
This pledge followed a series of Libyan steps over the past
year, beginning with the settlement of the Pan Am bombing
claims, that appear to reflect Libya's desire to remove the
burdens of the economic sanctions it has lived with for many
years.
I congratulate President Bush and his national security
team for their persistence in pursuing this objective. Today we
welcome Ms. Paula DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for
Verification and Compliance, and Ambassador William J. Burns,
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, to
discuss American policy in the wake of the Libyan success story
and how the United States can ensure that Libya implements its
commitments.
Since the announcement, Libya has allowed weapons
inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA,
to access its weapons sites. American officials have
transported more than 55,000 pounds of sensitive Libyan
equipment and documents to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in
Tennessee. Access to Libya's weapons program has resulted in a
treasure trove of evidence exposing a nuclear black market that
stretches from Libya to Pakistan and Malaysia.
The seizure last October of a German ship bound for Libya
carrying Malaysian-manufactured centrifuge components that can
be used in making nuclear material helped initiate these
revelations. Some commentators have asserted that Libya took
this dramatic step because of the demonstration of United
States resolve and our military power in Iraq. Others attribute
Libya's action to the success of multilateral diplomacy or the
weight of international sanctions imposed on Libya.
We should not attempt to reduce the positive outcome in
Libya to a single explanation. The Libyan regime faced complex
choices that were framed by numerous economic, diplomatic, and
military factors. For American policy, the bottom line is that
the Bush administration, working with friends in the
international community, was prepared to take advantage of this
breakthrough. Now we must consider how to consolidate this
success and how to expand upon it.
We still cannot assume that Libya is committed absolutely
to a responsible course. We cannot ignore its lack of
democracy, its development of weapons of mass destruction, its
record of support for terrorism, its past pursuit of
destabilizing activities in North Africa and the Middle East.
In addition, this week, the Libyan Prime Minister
contradicted his government's official admission of
responsibility for the Pan Am bombing by saying that Libya
compensated the bombing victims to ``buy peace.'' Our witnesses
may wish to share additional information about this incident
and the administration's response.
Initial reports by IAEA and American officials suggest that
Libya is granting extraordinary access to its weapons programs.
One non-proliferation official familiar with the Libyan
situation commented privately that international authorities
found out as much about Libya's weapons programs in 2 weeks as
they did about Iran's program in 2 years.
As these revelations progress, the United States must
carefully re-evaluate its sanctions policies toward Libya.
Today the White House announced that the United States will
initiate the process of lifting five types of United States
sanctions on Libya, including restrictions that prevent travel
by Americans to that country.
Libya's cooperation on weapons of mass destruction can lead
to further improvements in relations between our countries. As
President Bush has said, and I quote, ``as they demonstrate
good faith, good faith will be returned,'' end of quote from
the President.
We need to assess the effectiveness of each of our
sanction's policies and ask what actions should be required of
Libya before a particular sanction is lifted. We must develop
performance benchmarks to guide our policies with respect to
Libya.
The United States must also ensure that the critical work
of non-proliferation is not delayed or diverted unintentionally
by restrictions on our interactions with the Libyan Government.
Our primary goals should be the complete deconstruction of
Libya's weapons programs, the establishment of foolproof
verification procedures, and the development of our
understanding of how Libya fits into the international
proliferation picture.
The State Department's Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
Fund, the NDF, has played the central role in getting U.S.
personnel on the ground to begin this work. It is important to
recognize that Congress gave NDF the unique authority and
flexibility to respond to unanticipated non-proliferation
emergencies and opportunities, notwithstanding existing
sanctions.
But NDF is a relatively small program geared for short-term
emergencies. It does not have the size, scope, or experience to
do dismantlement operations, to employ nuclear scientists, or
to undertake longer-term non-proliferation efforts. Other
programs will be necessary as we proceed in Libya, and these
programs will require waivers on the lifting of some sanctions
before they can be used.
In particular, the Defense Department's Cooperative Threat
Reduction program is well-equipped to deal with Libya's
biological and chemical weapons. The Energy Department's
Material Protection Control and Accounting program has the
expertise to take apart Libyan nuclear weapons facilities and
safely dispose of radioactive material. The State Department's
experience in re-employing Russian weapons scientists may need
to be engaged to get Libyan scientists out of the weapons
business.
Congress must be kept informed about Libya's progress in
meeting its commitments so that we can identify when and where
our laws or programs may need to change to allow for
application of these various non-proliferation tools. As we
dismantle Libya's weapons of mass destruction programs, we must
simultaneously investigate how the Libyans were able to make
such progress. In Libya, the United States and the IAEA have
been shown evidence of a vast clandestine nuclear network that
the Pakistani scientist, A.Q. Kahn, ran for many years.
In addition, a recent IAEA Director General's report on
Libya states that Libya exported uranium ore concentrate to an
unidentified nuclear weapons state. That nuclear weapons state
returned the material to Libya as refined uranium, which is
useful to a nuclear weapons program. These extraordinary
connections have relevance to our continuing efforts to prevent
proliferation, particularly in Iran.
The United States and the world welcome Libya's declaration
as an example of how the international community can reduce
proliferation threats. Now we must follow through to ensure
that Libya fulfills its pledges, that all weapons and dangerous
materials are controlled, and that our response sets useful
precedents as we pursue non-proliferation goals elsewhere.
We look forward to the testimony and analysis of our
witnesses on these topics. Indeed, we welcome both of you. You
are persons of vast experience in this area as well as in so
many other areas in our government.
I would like to call upon you, Secretary Burns, first of
all, and then Secretary DeSutter. Your statements will be made
part of the record in full. I will waylay your testimony for
just a minute because of the timely appearance of my friend. I
call now upon Senator Biden for his opening statement, and then
we will have the statements of the witnesses.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
RANKING MEMBER
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, again, thanks for convening
this hearing and let me commend our witnesses for their work on
securing Libya's renunciation of WMD. That's quite an
accomplishment.
The agreement with Libya could represent, and obviously
none of us know, an important model for the way in which we
confront new threats to our security. The combination of rogue
states, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism is in fact a
new reality and it requires something beyond what we have done
before. I would note parenthetically that we need something
between the old doctrine of prevention out of the treaty of
Westphalia and deterrence here. There's some new intermediate
doctrine that we haven't worked out and we're wrestling with
that now.
But I've been calling for a new compact with our allies to
deal with these dangers. Just as our allies need to add sticks
to their carrots, we've got to add carrots to our sticks, and
this agreement demonstrates that when it comes to changing the
behavior of rogue regimes we have to apply pressure but also
make it clear that there are some benefits to cooperation if
they comply.
Three previous administrations kept the pressure on Libya
and kept the international community on board with sanctions
and they forced Tripoli to recognize that to end its economic
and political isolation it had to end its denials of
responsibility for the horror of Pan Am 103 and its support for
terrorism and end its request for weapons of mass destruction.
And the Bush administration kept the pressure on.
But--and this is critical in my view--it's also showed a
willingness to engage with Libya and make clear what Tripoli
stood to gain if it gave up its reckless behavior. And it
joined Britain on the diplomatic track that has begun the
process of bringing Libya back into the community of nations,
at least the possibility of that.
To be sure, there's a long, long way to go. The Libyan
Prime Minister's recent comments denying responsibility for Pan
Am 103 underscored the need for strict verification of Libya's
commitments, and the comments were quickly and fully retracted,
as they had to be. But the fact that they had that momentary
relapse evidences this is a work in progress.
But even as we move forward, Americans will never forget
the past and the suffering of hundreds of mothers and fathers,
sons and daughters, sisters and brothers, caused by the
inhumane act of terror. And there's also a long, long way to go
before Libya as a country and Libyans as a people meet their
full potential. Getting out of the terrorist business and
giving up weapons of mass destruction are critical steps
forward, but in my view, and I suspect the view of our
witnesses, only first steps.
To survive and ultimately thrive in the 21st century, Libya
is going to have to embrace the principles of liberal
democracy, secular education, representative government,
transparent economy, a free press, and a strong civil society,
and that's going to take a long time. I'm not Pollyanna-ish
about this.
For now, Libya appears to have made a strategic break with
the past. That's good for Libya, it's good for its neighbors,
and indeed for the security of the people around the world.
That strategic break and our pragmatic response also offers a
road map for dealing, in my view, with other problem states.
This is not a precise formula that can be easily applied to
North Korea, Iran, and Syria, all different in the degree of
difficulty, and none at all certain of positive outcome.
It seems to me we have to continue to make clear that they
stand to lose by seeking WMD, supporting terror, and spreading
instability, and bang that case home. But we also have to
overcome our bizarre fear of spelling out in detail what they
might gain if in fact these rogue states change their minds.
This administration seems to have not paid nearly as much
attention, absent this issue, of the combination, as I said, of
sticks and carrots. I think the formula you all put together
including cooperation and coordination with other friends and
allies is the right formula. Our experience with Libya shows,
as Winston Churchill once said, jaw jaw can often accomplish
more than war war.
I know that our witnesses may be somewhat constrained in
what they can say because we're not in closed session.
Nonetheless, I look forward to them updating us on what
progress has been made and what concerns they have as we move
from here. And again, it's really good to have you here, and
Bill, it's a particular--well, you guys earn a lot of credit.
Congratulations.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Secretary Burns, would you please proceed? If I could ask
you both to summarize comments perhaps in a 10-minute
timeframe, that would be desirable because that will give us
opportunities for questions. We will have a rollcall vote, I'm
advised, about 4 or a few minutes thereafter, so we want to
make certain that we have a full statement by both of you and a
good dialog. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. BURNS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Burns. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's a
pleasure to be here again, and with your permission, I'll
submit my written statement for the record and just summarize
briefly, hopefully less than 10 minutes.
I really am delighted for this opportunity to speak with
you and the other members of the committee on developments in
Libya. They do, as both you and Senator Biden have already
said, represent a major advance in our collective efforts to
halt state-sponsored terrorism and the proliferation of the
world's most dangerous weapons.
After decades of hostility, U.S.-Libyan relations are at a
turning point. Since its historic announcement on December 19,
Libya has taken significant steps to implement its commitment
to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and the missile
systems to deliver them, as well as to cooperate in the war on
terrorism. In so doing, it has begun to clear a path to better
relations with the United States.
Our engagement with Libya will be guided by two overarching
principles. First, Libyan action, not promises or an artificial
time line, will drive U.S. policy. Second, any evidence of
Libyan back-tracking on its commitments will result in a re-
evaluation of our bilateral engagement. We were gravely
concerned by the Libyan Prime Minister's public equivocation
over Libya's acceptance of responsibility for the Pan Am 103
bombing. We sought and received an immediate, official public
retraction. We have been crystal clear that U.S.-Libyan
relations can only be rebuilt if we develop confidence in the
Libyan regime's commitment to repudiate its past record of
support for terrorism and search for weapons of mass
destruction. We will not compromise this principle.
As Assistant Secretary DeSutter will describe in more
detail, Libyan cooperation since it's December 19 commitment to
eliminate weapons of mass destruction and longer-range missile
programs has been excellent. In recognition of that tangible
progress, I met with Libyan representatives in London on
February 6 and previewed the steps announced by the White House
earlier today. These include the lifting of the passport
restriction on travel to Libya, modification of sanctions to
permit travel-related expenditures in Libya, permission for
U.S. companies with pre-sanctions holdings to negotiate the
terms of their re-entry, agreement to open a Libyan interests
section in Washington, the dispatch of a U.S. health delegation
to assess potential cooperation, and an invitation for a Libyan
delegation to come and discuss future educational opportunities
for Libyan students in the United States.
I emphasized in the February 6 meeting that tangible
progress in our bilateral relationship would depend upon
continued good-faith implementation by Libya of its commitments
on terrorism, WMD, and missiles. I also stressed that Libyan
actions to reform its political and economic system, to
institute and respect human rights, and to play a constructive
role in the region will be important factors in shaping a more
normal relationship.
This is a broad agenda requiring greater diplomatic
engagement with Libya. We plan to augment the number of U.S.
diplomats at our interest section in Tripoli as required and
expect to notify the Congress soon about our intention to
establish a free-standing liaison office. This will not
constitute a reopening of our embassy, but reflects the need to
conduct a greater volume of business directly with the Libyan
Government.
Libya remains on the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Before this changes, we will need to confirm that Libya has
implemented a strategic decision to repudiate terrorism as a
tool of foreign policy and to break any residual ties it may
have to any terrorist organization. This evaluation is ongoing.
We place the highest importance on Libya fully adhering to
its Pan Am 103 commitments, including on terrorism. These
undertakings were secured in large measure as a result of the
determination and the courage of the families of the victims of
Pan Am 103. They can take pride in helping push Libya out of
the terrorism business and setting a model for other states,
which will save innocent lives in the future.
Mr. Chairman, U.S. diplomacy, sanctions, and a clear
commitment to take all steps necessary to halt the spread of
weapons of mass destruction helped persuade the Libyan
leadership that a radical course correction was required for it
to safeguard its interests and the well-being of its people.
As Libya takes credible steps to rejoin the international
community, we will continue to seek the guidance and the
cooperation of this committee, the Congress, and many others to
shape an appropriate response, including the easing of other
economic sanctions. We will work closely with you to ensure
that the Congress and the administration deliver a strong
unequivocal message that Libya has made the right choice, in
fact the only choice, for improved relations with the United
States and the international community. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burns follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. William J. Burns
Thank you Mr. Chairman for this timely opportunity to speak with
members of the Committee on a major foreign policy development that
reflects the close cooperation between the Executive and Legislative
branches and constitutes a key achievement in Administration efforts to
halt state-sponsored support for international terrorism and the
proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons.
After decades of hostility, U.S.-Libyan relations are at a turning
point. On December 19, Libya made an historic commitment to eliminate
its weapons of mass destruction programs, and the missile systems to
deliver them, and reiterated its intention to cooperate in the war on
terrorism. Since December 19, Libya has taken significant and, in some
cases, irreversible steps to implement these commitments.
I want to underscore that U.S. policy towards Libya will be driven
by Libyan action, not promises or an artificial time line. Libya's
actions to date have been substantial, serious and consistent with its
pledge to dismantle WMJ) programs and abandon terrorism.
I also want to underscore that when we see evidence of Libyan
backtracking on any one of these commitments, we will immediately
reevaluate our bilateral engagement. For example, there can be no
equivocation by the Libyan government over its acceptance of
responsibility for the Pan Am 103 bombing. The comments by Libyan Prime
Minister Ghanem to the BBC on February 24 were a direct contradiction
of Libya's written statement to the United Nations Security Council,
taking responsibility for the actions of its officials. We sought and
received an official retraction. U.S.-Libyan relations can only be
rebuilt if we develop confidence in the Libyan regime's commitment to
repudiate its past record of support for terrorism and pursuit of
weapons of mass destruction. We will not compromise this principle.
Since December 19, Libya has invited U.S. and U.K. experts, along
with personnel from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, to assist Libya
in destroying the dangerous legacy of its decades-long effort to obtain
and deploy chemical and nuclear weapons, and longer range ballistic
missiles. Libyan cooperation has been excellent, as Assistant Secretary
DeSutter will discuss in more detail. Libyan officials have matched
their public commitment to voluntarily eliminate these programs with
private actions that reflect this historic change of course.
In recognition of the initial steps taken by the Libyan regime to
address our terrorism, WMD and missile concerns, I met with
representatives of the Libyan government in London on February 6 to
begin a political dialogue about the future of U.S.-Libyan relations. I
previewed the first steps that the Administration is prepared to take
in response to concrete actions by Libya to fulfill its commitments.
These steps include: the lifting of the passport restriction on
travel to Libya; the modification of executive order sanctions to
permit expenditures for travel to Libya; the issuance of licenses for
U.S. companies with presanctions holdings to negotiate the terms of
their re-entry, subject to U.S. approval before implementation or the
subsequent lifting of relevant U.S. sanctions; agreement to establish a
Libyan Interests Section in Washington D.C.; the sending of a U.S.
health delegation to Libya to assess potential cooperation in areas
such as disease prevention; and the agreement to receive a Libyan
delegation to discuss future educational opportunities for Libyan
students in the U.S. and related topics. In addition, I reiterated U.S.
interest, working in concert with the U.K., to discuss programs for the
retraining or redirection of Libyan scientists, and commitment to
assist Libya in converting its Tajura research reactor so it would no
longer use highly enriched uranium.
During this discussion, I emphasized that progress in our bilateral
relationship would depend upon continued, good faith implementation by
Libya of its own public commitments on terrorism, WMD, and missiles. In
turn, I underscored the Administration's willingness to reassess the
broad range of sanctions against Libya. I also clarified that while
decisions to ease or lift sanctions will be a function of Libyan action
on WMD, missiles and terrorism, the tenor of our bilateral relationship
and the pace and degree to which relations are normalized in the future
also will reflect Libyan actions to reform its political and economic
system, to institute and respect human rights, and to play a
constructive role in the region.
Evidence of our new relationship with Libya can be seen on the
ground in Tripoli. On February 8, the first American diplomat was
posted to the U.S. Interests Section in Tripoli. We now have five
diplomats in Libya, the first long-term U.S. diplomatic presence in
Tripoli since the 1980 closure of the American Embassy. The work of the
U.S. staff at the Interests Section is complemented by an increasing
number of official U.S. delegations and teams, whose objective is to
support the activities of our WMD experts as well as to engage on
issues of mutual interest. One example of the latter is the Libyan
government's invitation for a U.S. team to conduct a joint search for
the remains of two American airmen, one of whom has been missing since
1943.
At present, the U.S. Interests Section in Tripoli functions under
our protecting power, the Belgian Government. In the near-term, we
anticipate notifying Congress of our intent to establish a freestanding
Liaison Office in Tripoli. It will not constitute a reopening of an
Embassy, but will reflect our need to conduct more ``normal'' business
directly with the Libyan government as a consequence of the work
associated with the our cooperation in eliminating WMD, as well as by
the increased travel of Americans, including American congressional
delegations, to Libya. It is premature at this stage to reopen an
Embassy, which should come later in the process of Libya's
implementation of its WMD, missile and terrorism commitments.
Libya remains on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Before
this changes, we will need to confirm that Libya has implemented a
strategic decision to repudiate terrorism as a tool of foreign policy
and to break any residual ties it may have to any terrorist
organization. This evaluation is ongoing. As we have noted in
successive ``Global Trends in Terrorism'' reports, Libya has taken
steps to distance itself from terrorism and to cooperate in the global
war against terrorism. In 2003, there were further, positive
developments: the Libyan government reiterated assurances to the UN
Security Council that it had renounced terrorism, undertook to share
intelligence on terrorist organizations with Western intelligence
services, and took steps to resolve matters related to its past support
of terrorism, including addressing the requirements of the United
Nations for the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103.
We place the highest importance on Libya fully adhering to its Pan
Am 103 commitments, including on terrorism. These undertakings were
secured in large measure as a result of the determination and courage
of the families of the victims of Pan Am 103. They can take pride in
helping push Libya out of the terrorism business and setting a model
for other states, which will save innocent lives in the future. In
future discussions with Libyan officials, I will continue to emphasize
the importance of this issue for improving U.S.-Libyan relations. I
will also use this newly available channel to raise other concerns we
may have about Libyan policies, including on issues in Africa and the
Middle East.
Mr. Chairman, U.S. diplomacy, sanctions, and a clear commitment to
take all steps necessary to halt the spread of weapons of mass
destruction helped persuade the Libyan leadership that a radical course
correction was required for it to safeguard its interests and the well-
being of its people. As Libya takes credible steps to rejoin the
international community, we will continue to seek the guidance and
cooperation of this committee, the Congress, and many others to shape
an appropriate response, including the easing of other economic
sanctions. We will work closely with you to ensure that the Congress
and Administration deliver a strong, unequivocal message that Libya has
made the right choice, in fact the only choice, for improved relations
with the United States and the international community.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Burns.
Secretary DeSutter.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAULA A. DeSUTTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. DeSutter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Biden, members, for the opportunity to discuss the U.S.
Government's assistance to Libya in its elimination of its
weapons of mass destruction and MTCR-class missile programs.
We've submitted a full statement, but I would highlight several
things from that statement.
Two things I would emphasize to begin. First, the WMD
dismantlement process in Libya is ongoing and moving forward
rapidly. The second is that the Libya success is part of an
overall non-proliferation strategy set forth by the President
and implemented by Secretary Powell and Under Secretary Bolton,
and I am honored to be part of their team.
As a verifier in the world of weapons of mass destruction,
I am not usually full of good news, but the success of Libya is
a ray of light in the otherwise dark world of the WMD black
market. Libyan efforts to date and their cooperation are
consistent with Colonel Qadhafi's commitment to rid Libya of
WMD and MTCR-class missiles. We have removed from Libya
significant and dangerous elements of its nuclear weapons
program and key guidance parts from Libya's most advanced
missile program and are preparing to remove more.
In the first phase of our efforts on the ground in Libya,
which occurred during the last half of January, we removed
detailed nuclear weapon designs that Libya had acquired as part
of its weapons program. These designs had been purchased from
the nuclear black market network of Pakistani scientist, A.Q.
Kahn. The weapons designs were handed over to the joint U.S.-
U.K. team on January 20 and flown out of Libya aboard a
chartered aircraft in the custody of State Department personnel
on January 22.
Later that week, we also removed several containers of
gaseous uranium hexafluoride, centrifuges from Pakistan's Kahn
Research laboratories, some of which were still in their
original packing containers, a large number of additional
centrifuge parts and equipment and centrifuge documentation.
On the missile front, we received a detailed description of
a range of Libyan missile research and development activities
and removed from Libya five SCUD-C guidance sets, including
their gyroscopes, thereby making inoperable all of Libya's
existing SCUD-C missiles, produced with extensive assistance
from North Korea.
All these items and materials were loaded aboard a large
cargo aircraft in Tripoli and flown safely and securely home on
January 26 to Knoxville, Tennessee. The Department of Energy
has stored the sensitive nuclear materials at Oak Ridge.
I haven't had much of a chance to sit back and ponder these
momentous changes, but I would have been amazed 3 months ago if
someone had told me that much of the most sensitive Libyan
nuclear material was in Tennessee and not in Tripoli. This
enormous effort by our teams in Libya and Washington was
accomplished by the remarkable effort of many in the State
Department and other government experts from the Defense
Department, the CIA, and the Energy Department.
It has been a rewarding experience for me to coordinate
their efforts.
I should also emphasize the importance in this process of
the State Department's Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Fund.
Libya has long faced some of the most severe economic and
political sanctions the United States has ever imposed, but the
same restrictions that have so successfully imposed pressure on
Libya greatly restricted our ability to conduct operations
there in order to implement the trilateral elimination and
verification program. NDF has proven indispensable in that it
is one of the few funds available with the requisite fiscal
authority.
The Libyans have also been committed to the process and
their courageous determination to rid themselves of programs
that had lasted decades is one that ought to be commended. I
cannot let this opportunity go without thanking our British
allies who have been true partners in this effort.
While much has been done, it is only a start. Our teams
returned to Libya on February 14 and we are well underway in
implementing the next phase of our project. We have already
brought out of Libya much of the most proliferation-sensitive
nuclear items, but only a small percentage of the nuclear
equipment by volume. Even as I speak with you today, for
instance, our experts are working with Libya to inventory,
pack, and remove a large quantity of additional equipment
related to Libya's nuclear centrifuge program.
We are also working to help Libya convert its Tajura
reactor to low enriched uranium fuel. We will also help to
redirect Libyan WMD personnel to more productive ends, and
we've got at the head of that project one of the people who is
very instrumental in doing the redirection process with Russia.
On the chemical weapons front, there remained a large
stockpile of chemical weaponry and a sizable stockpile of CW
agents still to be destroyed. We have been assisting Libya in
preparing their initial CWC declaration, which is due to the
OPCW on March 6. We will be working closely with Libya and the
OPCW to determine how best to destroy Libya's CW and precursor
agent stockpiles. We will also investigate the status of
Libya's past efforts regarding biological weapons.
On the missile front, we are working with Libya to ensure
that it meets its goal of not retaining MTCR-class missiles or
the capability to produce them.
As an example of the dramatic turn of events, 3 months ago,
our chemical experts in Washington were analyzing what the
chemical weapons facility at Rabta might contain. These same
experts are now walking freely through Rabta.
This first phase of the process also illustrates the
cooperative relationship we have developed, both with the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW,
and the International Atomic Energy Agency. We have enjoyed a
good working relationship with the OPCW and Director General
Pfirter. Also, Under Secretary Bolton traveled to Vienna on
January 19 to join his British counterpart, William Ehrman, for
discussions with IAEA Director General ElBaradei, about how
best to coordinate the trilateral Libya-U.S.-U.K. elimination
and verification project with the agency. Their agreement
formed the basis of a cooperative approach that has worked well
on the ground.
I'd like to now put our dealings with Libya into the
broader context of the administration's non-proliferation
policy. In a post-9/11 world, our enemies are often unseen and
the dangers we face are heightened by the black market WMD
trade. The President has developed a bold strategy to use every
tool at our disposal to halt the spread of these weapons. As he
said in his recent speech at the National Defense University,
there is consensus among nations that proliferation cannot be
tolerated, yet this consensus means little unless it is
translated into action.
The President means it when he says we must translate the
consensus into action. The actions we use depend on the
situation. We use diplomacy at all times, economic pressure
when we can, military pressure when we must. We have made
steadfast efforts over the past 3 years to dramatically change
the cost-benefit analysis of proliferators and would-be
proliferators around the world. We have used the sanctions laws
you wrote and have penalized proliferators by imposing
sanctions on them far more aggressively than in previous
administrations.
We have organized like-minded friends to improve our
collective abilities to interdict WMD-related shipments and
have shown ourselves more than willing to take dramatic action,
even to the point of deposing a cruel dictator in Iraq who was
intent upon developing such weapons. We have isolated and
pressured out states dedicated to developing WMD and engaged
our friends and allies in a range of multinational diplomatic,
economic, and even military coalitions to combat this danger.
Thanks to our efforts proliferation has today become
riskier and more uncertain, and we are now sending the message
that the pursuit of WMD brings not security but insecurity. At
the same time, we have made clear that countries that abandon
such dangerous pursuits can enjoy the prospect of improved
relations with the United States and our friends.
One of the big issues of the day is whether our
intelligence in Iraq was right, and if not, why it went wrong.
I am certainly not here to discuss that issue, but I do want to
discuss in broad terms the effectiveness of our intelligence in
Libya. We had extensive intelligence reporting on Libya's WMD
programs prior to the December 19 announcements. What we have
discovered so far in Libya showed that our intelligence was
right on the mark in Libya, particularly in the nuclear arena.
There are always surprises in intelligence. It's not an
exact science, and in Libya we were surprised by the extent of
some of the WMD programs. But in terms of being able to ask the
right questions of the Libyans, of being able to understand the
goals of the programs, and in understanding their procurement
network, we were well-served by the intelligence community.
Without their excellent work, I do not think we would be having
the success we are having now in Libya.
To summarize, I would say that Colonel Qadhafi made a
historic decision to bring his country into compliance with
crucial treaties banning weapons of mass destruction. This was
not an easy decision for him to make and he deserves credit for
doing so. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Libya have
worked together as a team to eliminate Libya's WMD programs to
normalize relations between Washington and Libya. We only hope
that states with even more advanced nuclear programs like Iran
and North Korea will learn from Libya's example and agree to
rejoin the community of civilized nations and give up these
terrible weapons.
Thank you for inviting me and I would welcome any questions
that you would have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. DeSutter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Paula A. DeSutter
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to discuss the U.S. Government's assistance to
Libya in the elimination of its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and
MTCR class missile programs.
On December 19, 2003, Libya issued a pathbreaking statement,
announcing that Libya had been conducting talks with the United States
and the United Kingdom about weapons of mass destruction, and had
already shown U.S. and UK experts ``the substances, equipment and
programs''--including centrifuges for uranium enrichment and
``equipment to carry chemical substances''--Libya possessed that
``could lead to the production of internationally banned weapons.''
The Libyan government announced that it had, of ``its own free
will,'' agreed ``to get rid of these substances, equipment and
programmes and to be free from all internationally banned weapons.''
Libya also declared that it had ``decided to restrict itself to
missiles with a range that comply with the standards of the [Missile
Technology Control Regime]'' (a range of at least 300 km and a payload
of at least 500 kg). Libya declared its intention to comply in full
with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC), and that it intended to sign the IAEA
Additional Protocol and adhere to the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC). All of these remarkable steps, Libya announced would be
undertaken ``in a transparent way that could be proved, including
accepting immediate international inspection.''
I have been involved in verification for a long time, and the
opportunity presented by Libya's decision is unique. This is one of
those rare times that a state has volunteered to rid itself of its WMD
programs--and it is a first for a state sponsor of terror to do so
without regime change. Helping Libya to achieve success in fulfilling
these commitments is an excellent step in its own right. Perhaps even
more importantly, we must do our best to ensure that Libya's decision
stands as a model for other proliferators to mend their ways and help
restore themselves to international legitimacy.
As President Bush declared on December 19 just after the Libyan
announcement, Colonel Gadhafi had made a decisive commitment that, when
fulfilled, would make the world a safer place. The President pledged
that as Libya fulfills its commitments and demonstrates its
seriousness, the path would be open to better relations with the United
States and other free nations. President Bush expressed his hope that
Libya would thereby be able to help regain a secure and respected place
among nations. But let me emphasize this one point: improvement in
Libyan-American relations is subject to progress on the WMD
dismantlement front.
Before I get into the details of this project let me just say that
Libya's efforts reflect very substantial progress in meeting its
commitment to rid itself of its WMD and MTCR-class missile programs. To
date, Libya has cooperated closely with our teams, with our British
partners and international organizations. With Libya's agreement, we
removed significant and dangerous elements of its nuclear weapons
program and key guidance parts from Libya's most advanced missile
program and stand ready to remove more still.
Assistant Secretary Burns will discuss the political and diplomatic
track and our plans for diplomatic relations with Libya. I am here to
describe our efforts in assisting Libya in dismantling its Weapons of
Mass Destruction and MTCR-class missile programs.
BACKGROUND: U.S. COUNTER-PROLIFERATION POLICY
It may be helpful if I begin, however, by putting the Libya effort
into the context of this Administration's counter-proliferation policy.
With an eye to the terrible threat to U.S. national security
interests--and to the lives and well-being of thousands or perhaps
millions of innocent people--posed by the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) around the world, the President has developed a
bold strategy to use every tool at our disposal to halt the spread of
these weapons. We use diplomacy at all times, economic pressure when we
can, military pressure when we must. The President, indeed the entire
U.S. Government, has demonstrated a strong commitment to the goal of
nuclear, chemical and biological nonproliferation. This commitment has
had a galvanizing effect on the world's views on the trade of WMD.
We have made steadfast efforts over the past three years to change
dramatically the cost-benefit calculations of proliferators and would-
be proliferators around the world. We have penalized proliferators by
imposing sanctions on them far more aggressively than during the
previous administration; we have organized like-minded friends to
improve our collective abilities to interdict WMD-related shipments;
and we have shown ourselves more than willing to take dramatic action--
even to the point of deposing a cruel dictator in Iraq who was intent
upon developing such weapons.
We have isolated and pressured outlaw states dedicated to
developing WMD, and engaged our friends and allies in a range of
multinational diplomatic, economic, and even military coalitions to
combat this danger. Thanks to our efforts proliferation is today
becoming riskier and more uncertain, and we are now sending the message
that the pursuit of WMD brings not security but insecurity. At the same
time, we have made clear that countries that abandon such dangerous
pursuits can enjoy the prospect of improved relations with the United
States and our friends.
ORIGINS OF THE PROJECT
In March of 2003, Libya made quiet overtures to the UK and U.S.
intelligence services about ``clearing the decks'' with regard to WMD.
This matter was handled as a matter of the utmost secrecy within the
U.S. and UK governments. In the U.S., in fact, the secret discussions
that began in March involved only a handful of officials.
Even as the discussions continued in October 2003, the U.S., UK,
German and Italian governments worked together to arrange the diversion
of a shipment of centrifuge components bound for Libya. These
components had been secretly purchased on the international nuclear
black market from the illicit Pakistan-based nuclear smuggling network
headed by Abdul Qadeer Khan. It was clear, at that point, that we knew
a great deal about Libya's secret nuclear weapons program. To its
credit, Libya increased its cooperation with us in October, and
permitted joint U.S. and UK teams to secretly visit a number of WMD and
missile-related facilities in Libya.
During two visits to Libya by these teams--in October and then
December of 2003--Libya made available a great deal of information
about its clandestine programs. The substantial knowledge of the
Intelligence Community regarding Libya's WMD and missile programs was
invaluable during these discussions. These visits laid the groundwork
for all the successes we are pleased to report since Colonel Gadhafi's
groundbreaking announcement on December 19.
THE ROLE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT
After the Libya effort became public in December, the role of
coordinating this remarkable program fell to the State Department.
Today, we coordinate an effort that quickly came to involve not only
multiple bureaus within the Department but also a range of interagency
participants including the Department of Energy, the Defense
Department, and the CIA. The Department's role has been overseen by
Under Secretary John Bolton, under whose leadership I am coordinating
the day-to-day effort, including the interagency Proliferation Strategy
Policy Coordinating Committee.
Within the Department, the Nonproliferation (NP) and Arms Control
(AC) Bureaus have also played instrumental roles, and we have worked
hand in glove with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA). Our effort
has also enjoyed the close personal involvement and support of
Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage--who have been
instrumental in our success so far. The Department of Energy's National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Defense Department's
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) have also contributed vital
personnel and expertise to our incountry operations.
It is also worth emphasizing how cooperatively we have been working
with our British allies in this important project. From the very
beginning--in the secret Libyan discussions in 2003--the U.S. and UK
have worked together very closely. The successes achieved to date stand
as a testament to our two governments' shared counter-proliferation
goals and firm commitment to the Libyan elimination and verification
effort. Our partnership in this project has been crucial to its
success.
ESTABLISHING THE FRAMEWORK
The basic architecture for our approach to the Libyan elimination
and verification project was established in late December of last year.
We began, in early January, by developing a series of papers approved
by the U.S. interagency process and carefully coordinated with our
British partners. These papers spelled out in some detail our proposals
for how to help Libya fulfill its December 19 commitments with respect
to nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile programs.
I'd like to take a moment to sketch the basic contours of this
program. Our program is aimed to assist Libya in promptly identifying
and securing proliferation-sensitive items, eliminating all elements of
its nuclear and chemical weapons programs, restricting its missile
efforts in accordance with MTCR standards, and helping it demonstrate
effective transparency of its biological activities. We also proposed
to help Libya with its declarations to the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW). To facilitate this work, and to help provide confidence
that declaration and elimination activities are based upon complete and
accurate information, we also proposed to conduct surveys and other
activities to evaluate the extent of Libya's programs. We also proposed
a tentative timeline for the first portions of the elimination and
verification effort.
This was an ambitious program, but our four papers outlining our
nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proposals--along with an
overarching ``common elements'' paper, which was translated into
Arabic--were presented to the Libyans by NSC, CIA, and State Department
officials at a meeting in London on January 8. At that meeting, the
three parties agreed upon a ``checklist'' of priority items to be
removed during the first visits of the bilateral and interagency teams
assisting Libya with elimination and verification. That was also the
same week that Libya made its first legal step down the road toward WMD
elimination, by acceding to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
U.S. ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBYA EFFORT
Organizationally, we established a structure that revolved around a
Washington-based coordination effort centered in my bureau but closely
involving experts from the NP and AC bureaus, as well as interagency
participants. We quickly set up experts' groups in the various subject-
matter areas--nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile--to provide
the overall technical guidance and advice needed to direct
corresponding subject-matter teams in Libya. We have since created
additional teams to work on the conversion of Libya's Tajura research
reactor to low enriched uranium (LEU), and on developing ways to
redirect Libyan WMD and missile scientists, engineers, and technicians
to civilian pursuits. These groups work through a small coordination
cell in the VC bureau, which also overseas the work of our in-country
personnel. We selected Ambassador Don Mahley of the Anns Control Bureau
to be the Senior WMD Representative in Libya, where he coordinates the
work of the technical assistance groups and works closely with his
Libyan hosts.
I should also emphasize the importance in this process of the State
Department's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF). Libya has
long faced some of the most severe economic and political sanctions the
U.S. has ever imposed. But the same restrictions that have so
successfully imposed pressure on Libya greatly restrict our ability to
conduct operations there in order to implement the trilateral
elimination and verification program. NDF has proven indispensable in
that it is one of the few funds available with the requisite fiscal
authority. It is hard to express just how central NDF has been to our
successes so far. We have spent around $2.5 million in NDF funds so far
in support of our activities in Libya, and NDF personnel have been
instrumental in working through the innumerable logistical and
paperwork problems that inevitably arise when doing such complicated
things under such unusual circumstances. With NDF, I can assure you,
Congress has been getting huge value for its nonproliferation dollar.
FIRST WMD ELIMINATION PHASE
Pursuant to the January 8 London agreement, the State Department-
led teams arrived in Libya for the first time on January 18. We enjoyed
outstanding cooperation from our Libyan counterparts, who took very
good care of our personnel. They allowed our teams to visit any
location, and they were forthcoming about the myriad aspects of Libya's
WMD and missile development programs.
It was, in fact, remarkable how much the Libyan, U.S., and UK
effort accomplished during its first month. By the time our first teams
left Libya on January 29, we had already eliminated some of the most
proliferation-sensitive aspects of Libya's WMD and missile programs.
Our first step was to remove detailed nuclear weapons designs Libya
had acquired as part of its weapons program. These designs had been
purchased from the nuclear black market network of Pakistani scientist
A.Q. Khan. The weapons designs were handed over to the joint U.S./UK
team on January 20, and flown out of Libya aboard a chartered aircraft
in the custody of State Department personnel on January 22.
Later that week we also removed several containers of gaseous
uranium hexafluoride (UF6), centrifuges from Pakistan's Khan Research
Laboratories--some of which, of the advanced ``P-2'' variety, were
still in their original packing containers--a large number of
additional centrifuge parts and equipment, and centrifuge
documentation.
On the missile front, we received a detailed description of a range
of Libyan missile research and development activities, and removed from
Libya five SCUD-C guidance sets, including their gyroscopes, thereby
making inoperable all of Libya's existing SCUD-C missiles produced with
extensive assistance from North Korea.
All these items and materials were loaded aboard a large cargo
aircraft in Tripoli and flown safely and securely on January 26 to
Knoxville, Tennessee. The Department of Energy has stored the sensitive
nuclear materials at Oak Ridge.
During this U.S./UK team visit, at our suggestion, Libya began
consolidating its stockpile of CW agent at a more secure location in
order better to safeguard it against theft by terrorists and make
easier its eventual destruction. U.S. and UK experts have also been
working closely with Libya to help it prepare its initial CWC
declaration. As part of that effort, Libya allowed U.S. and UK chemical
engineers complete access to the former chemical weapons production
plant at Rabta. Libya also started destroying unfilled munitions in our
team's presence, destroying the first two of its chemical bombs on
January 26. The U.S./UK team carefully videotaped this destruction in
order to permit verification by the OPCW.
COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES
This first phase of the process also illustrated the cooperative
relationship we developed with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). Under Secretary Bolton traveled to Vienna on January 19 to join
his British counterpart, William Ehrman, for discussions with IAEA
Director General Mohamed ElBaradei about how best to coordinate the
trilateral Libya/U.S./UK elimination and verification project with the
Agency. Their agreement formed the basis of a cooperative approach that
has worked well on the ground in Libya.
The IAEA sent two officials--nationals of nuclear weapons states--
to be present as U.S. and UK experts examined the weapon designs in
Libya. These IAEA officials, with agreement of the U.S. and UK teams,
placed the designs under IAEA seal before the U.S. and UK team flew
them out of the country. The documents are in U.S. custody.
IAEA officials also accompanied our U.S. and UK experts while they
inventoried, packed, and moved nuclear-related items out of Libya. At
the request of the IAEA, some items of centrifuge equipment and the
centrifuge documentation were placed under seal. These items were
segregated and stored separately upon their arrival in the United
States.
We have worked with the IAEA in order to help them preserve their
own investigatory interests in acquiring a full understanding of
Libya's handling of safeguarded nuclear material and related
activities. Pursuant to Under Secretary Bolton's agreement in Vienna
with Director General ElBaradei on January 19, the IAEA was invited to
be present when the seals were broken on the Libyan nuclear weapons
designs a couple of weeks ago here in Washington. Two IAEA officials
attended. The IAEA will also be invited to be present when seals are
removed on other equipment or items removed from Libya, including the
UF6 containers and some centrifuge components.
In addition, we have been cooperating closely with the OPCW, which
recently sent its first Technical Secretariat (TS) delegation to begin
working with Libya. Under the terms of the CWC, of which Libya is now a
State Party, the OPCW Executive Secretariat will have to approve plans
for the destruction and verification of Libyan Chemical Weapons
stockpiles, as well as for the elimination of dual use equipment
connected with past chemical weapons efforts. We have been working
closely with Libya to facilitate this effort.
WHAT'S NEXT?
While much has been done, it is only a start. Our teams returned to
Libya on February 14, and we are well underway in implementing the next
phase of our project. We have already brought out of Libya much of the
most proliferation-sensitive nuclear items but only a small percentage
of the nuclear equipment--by volume, at least--has been removed. Even
as I talk with you today, for instance, our experts are working with
Libya to inventory, pack, and soon remove a large quantity of
additional equipment related to Libya's nuclear centrifuge program. We
are also working to help Libya convert its Tajura reactor to LEU fuel.
We will also help ``redirect'' Libyan WMD personnel to more productive
ends.
On the chemical weapons front, there remains a large stockpile of
chemical weaponry--and a sizable stockpile of CW agent--still to be
destroyed. As I noted, we have been assisting Libya in preparing their
initial CWC declaration, which is due on March 6. We will be working
closely with Libya and the OPCW to determine how best to destroy
Libya's CW and precursor agent stockpiles. We will also investigate the
status of Libya's past efforts regarding biological weapons. On the
missile front, we are working with Libya to ensure that it meets the
goal of not retaining MTCR-class missiles or the capability to produce
them.
SUMMARY
A/S Burns will describe the other aspects of our relationship with
Libya as the elimination and verification program progresses. We should
emphasize, however, that progress in eliminating WMD and missiles is
the sine qua non for progress in the political realm.
As a professional verifier and the coordinator of the U.S.
interagency effort, it's my hope to assist and to verify Libya's
fulfillment of its courageous and commendable commitments as rapidly as
we can. I'm happy to say that so far, Libya's work to implement its
December 19 commitments has been outstanding, and every indication so
far has been that these commitments are indeed sincere.
Colonel Gadhafi made an historic decision to bring his country into
compliance with crucial treaties banning weapons of mass destruction.
This was not an easy decision for him to make and he deserves credit
for doing so. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Libya have
worked together as a team to eliminate Libya's WMD programs and to
normalize relations between Washington and Libya. We only hope that
states with even more advanced nuclear weapons programs like Iran and
North Korea will learn from Libya's example and agree to rejoin the
community of civilized nations and give up these terrible weapons.
Thank you for inviting me here today.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary DeSutter. I'll
ask that we have an 8-minute period of questioning for each
member. We'll try to stay as closely as we can to that time
frame so that we may all be heard. We will have time for
additional questions later if required.
I'll begin the questioning. Based upon President Bush's
speech at the National Defense University, which I was
privileged to witness and which I agree was a comprehensive
statement, one of the comments that has been made by others--
not by the President specifically--about the negotiations that
we are now involved in in North Korea, or with the six
countries thinking about North Korea, is less the fact that
North Korea might use a nuclear weapon, but rather the black
market affairs that come with having the materials, whether
they be plutonium stripped off of rods or missile technology or
various things that have been marketable.
One of the amazing things about the A.Q. Kahn story is the
amount of merchandising over the better part of a generation,
not just simply in the last few years. Whether we were
observant of it or not notwithstanding, the fact is that people
have been receiving and shipping back. I think that the
President was making the point that the great danger in the war
against terrorism is the fact that cells, small groups of
people, non-nations, places with no return address, can
appropriate this material, can take advantage of the research,
the trades, the development, the expertise of others on the
cheap. Maybe they can steal it successfully. Certainly our
friends in Russia are deeply worried about Chechnyans doing
precisely that within Russia, leaving aside the manifestations
in the Middle East or elsewhere.
Now, in the case of Libya, this is an extraordinary
opportunity which you are working on, first of all in your
effort to inventory what happened and what is there physically.
For example, in the chemical weapons destruction situation,
what we know is that we enter another year at Shchuchye in
Russia in which we still have not yet constructed the facility
that would be required for neutralization of one-seventh of the
chemical weapons of Russia plus maybe two-sevenths more that
may come in to the common situation. The 40,000 metric tons
minus maybe 600 are still there after all this time.
I hope that your own testimony, your own witness within the
Department, within the administration, will inform the
President, the Secretaries of Defense and State, Dr. Rice, and
others, of how enormous this problem may be. This is expensive
work. Congress has been appropriating money for years for this
facility at Shchuchye, which is still nearing completion.
Hopefully they will get there in 2005.
The fact that you discover the material, even inventory it,
doesn't dispose of it. By taking aircraft out to Oak Ridge,
this does dispose of whatever you take out, such as machinery,
plans, materials. But let me just indicate that even here we
are stymied right now with the Russians in terms of plutonium
destruction that they finally agreed to. In part it's their
fault, they are not negotiating very easily. These are
liability agreements that we need or that the other members of
the G-7 may need. They want to help us, and life is never meant
to be simple in this respect. The destruction of plutonium is
very important, as is the destruction of the chemical weapons.
The appropriation of the nuclear material is very
important. Here we have a new problem. The uranium industry in
the United States, the domestic uranium industry says we're not
sure we want so much of that Russian uranium being brought to
the United States. And we say, hang on here. In terms of
national security, proliferation, you heard the President. We
want to buy the material as we already negotiated, to get it
out of Russia, to get it here maybe for world peace. If you're
in the uranium business locally, you may say, well, it
depresses the price of uranium in the United States. It affects
supply and demand. We're not sure we want so much.
These are facts of life with regard to proliferation
dangers in the world now in terms of the most obvious stores.
In Libya, even as you discover these things, are you attempting
to bring about a program that is utilizing the Defense
Department, the State Department, Energy Department, any other
department? Would it be likely to describe a budget, a
timeframe, to the Congress, to the public? Otherwise, we're
going to have a situation in which we have it pretty well
inventoried, have it pinned down. We will keep asking
questions. Are the Libyans reliable? Is it still there? Are
they selling it someplace? Have we destroyed it yet? Maybe
we'll have a hearing 2, 3, 4 years down the trail with many of
the same questions. We need not go through that exercise if the
planning is comprehensive now.
Let me just conclude by saying I mentioned the Nunn-Lugar
business to begin with simply as a case in point, not as the
definitive way to destroy it. But after arduous work, members
of this committee were very helpful in saying, finally our
government can actually utilize Nunn-Lugar money outside of
Russia. Thank goodness, a no-brainer. And yet, were it not for
a lot of opposition, it would have happened a long time ago.
This is hard for me to understand, but nevertheless these
things occur in political life.
Fifty million dollars could now be spent, and here Libya
comes along and we say, why haven't you used it? Well, hang on
there. You've got sanctions, and if you have any sanctions you
can't use Nunn-Lugar money there. Well, our feeling is we
better lift those sanctions. In other words, we may be forced
to sit there and to say $50 million unavailable, a very small
State Department fund is all we can do, partly because we don't
have the gumption simply to get rid of whatever the sanctions
are so that money can be used. This defies common sense.
Now, you're working at it hard, I know. I raise this
question publicly because it's a serious question. Even after
we get into some degree of flexibility with money, it doesn't
necessarily flow. Ditto for the training of the Libyan
scientists, who sort of like the iteration of the Russian ISTC
program, International Science and Technology, which may want
to be converted to doing better things than weapons of mass
destruction.
Can you give me any confidence level that these are
considerations you have as planners? If you can't give me a
confidence level, how are you proceeding so that there will be
a framework to talk about?
Ms. DeSutter. Thank you, Senator. One of the things that's
probably worth saying out loud is that Colonel Qadhafi's
statement was made on December 19, we are here in the last week
of February, and we have done a remarkable amount of work,
working around the sanctions for the most part.
It has been the best case for a verifier. There are many
cases that we deal with as verifiers that are not best case.
This one is. Why? It is because there was a strategic
commitment that that country has been in the lead in working
on. Our British counterparts are probably going to be taking
the lead on part of the redirection effort, but we will be
right there with them. We are proceeding at pace with all of
that.
Now, while we have been using the NDF money more than any
other funds, that is certainly true, it is also true that I am
pretty aggressive in trying to figure out how to spend whatever
pots of money I can get my hands into, and we're taking a look,
especially as some of the equipment has come back here, can
that equipment be eliminated here.
With regard to chemical weapons and the elimination, we are
working very closely with the Libyans and also with the OPCW
because one of the things is the way the CWC was constructed,
it was to give a strong incentive for countries to enter in
early. Conversion, all of that gets a little bit harder. We're
trying to work through that. We're going to work as hard as we
can to support them as we have bilaterally with other countries
in setting up destruction agreements and to help them any way
we can.
So we are mindful of all of those, we are--the first phases
of this have been primarily what I call elimination by removal,
but we are looking down the road to the rest of this. This will
not, I think, be something, with the exception of, and we have
told the Libyans that we'd like to work out some way with them
to have some ongoing relationship along these lines, just to
make sure that everybody is comfortable with the level of
transparency.
The OPCW, they will be full parties, they are now full
parties of the CWC, and we expect the CWC process to be moving
forward, as well as their relationship with the IAEA. They have
said that they will proceed as if the additional protocol is in
force for them, and that they intend to become parties to the
additional protocol. All those pieces should be moving forward.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much. I point out, as
you know, that even after countries ratify the Chemical Weapons
Convention, the CWC, which we did here in the Senate, and which
the Duma did in Russia, actually getting the job done is
another story. You know the treaty stipulates that we destroy
all of this in 10 years. There's not a ghost of a chance that
that will happen in twice that amount of time, I think, in
Russia. This despite the fact that both sides entered into the
treaty with goodwill. There's money and the need for technical
expertise, for contractors, for all the rest.
Now, maybe other countries, they're not precluded from
helping us in this. I am glad that you mention that you're
looking at other destruction possibilities. They need not all
be ours. In the absence of that, the alternative was a tough
one. We'll face this with the North Koreans if in fact they
agree to give up whatever they have. Who physically will
destroy it? Who will get the job done? You can have one treaty
after another and circumscribe it in 15 different ways. I'm
just trying to get to the nitty-gritty of who actually destroys
it, removes it, eliminates it, because the answer to that will
ultimately tell us whether we are serious about worldwide non-
proliferation.
Ms. DeSutter. Senator, just very quickly I will say that
before we left, when we had our first mission in, the Libyans
did sort of a practice destruction and destroyed two of their
unfilled chemical munitions.
The Chairman. Good.
Ms. DeSutter. And have agreed, and there's a process I
think that very, very soon the rest of those munitions are
going to be destroyed rapidly. I'm about as skeptical as people
get and what we've seen is on the ground it's really working,
they're really doing this, they are really fulfilling their
commitment.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, you are so boringly logical.
You are an anachronism in this place. Your logic is so
compelling it's amazing how it's consistently ignored. You
know, there was a movie years ago, ``Cool Hand Luke,'' about a
chain gang, and there was a guy named Paul Newman in the movie
and he was in the chain gang, and the boss man who was running
the chain gang said, ``what we've got here is failure to
communicate.'' We have got ourselves--not the two of you, just
generically--a failure to communicate.
The administration witnesses use the words, we'll try to
help them. We ain't helping them. It's helping us if we destroy
Russia's chemical weapons. It ain't helping them if we destroy
the weapons in Libya. It is helping us.
I think, and I'm not being facetious, I think that is the
central dilemma. We keep talking about spending Nunn-Lugar
moneys or any other moneys as if we're doing other countries a
favor, and the countries that have these weapons are countries
that, as they say in southern Delaware, ain't got no money.
Russia, with its entire defense budget, is less than $11
billion. They ain't got no money to destroy the weapons to help
them. We need a lobotomy here. We need a mind set in this place
and we need a mind set in this town.
And I have a question I don't expect you to answer because
I'm not being facetious, it's above both your pay grade and
mine, but I'm going to formally ask the question to be
transmitted back to your superiors. Would the administration be
willing to amend Nunn-Lugar to eliminate the prohibition if
there's sanctions in existence to be able to spend the money?
We act like disarming WMD is a favor for somebody else, and I
find this mind-boggling.
And by the way, it's not just the administration. We have
some of our guys and women here in the Senate who when the
distinguished chairman brings up these points, talks about
fungible money, fungible funny money, if we go ahead and spend
our money to destroy--what is it, close to 2 million chemical
tipped artillery shells. If we spend our money to build a
facility to render them useless, drill little holes in the
bottom, take out the offending material, crush the canisters,
dilute the material, that means they'll have money to spend on
other bad things. Give me a break.
I can't fathom what is more threatening to the United
States of America than all these chemical stockpiles, weapons,
and the like. And I'm going to get in trouble with the chairman
here, but the President asked us to come down and talk to him
about pursuing, which we did, in good faith the Moscow treaty.
And the chairman made a very simple point. If we meet the goal
of the Moscow treaty that in 10 years with no benchmarks we're
going to get down to a certain number, it's going to cost
billions of dollars to get down to that number. They don't have
the billions of dollars and we don't seem to have the
inclination to find the billions of dollars to go destroy the
weapons that they may be willing to destroy.
Again, not a criticism of either one of you, but I think
it's important for the public that listens to this discussion
to understand that there's not only the chairman is committed
to the logic of his argument, there's others of us are too. And
I really think the President should think about, with all due
respect, coming up with an agreement whereby we could amend
Nunn-Lugar, that he would support with the political capital he
has in this place now end this mindless debate about whether
we're helping them or helping us, like this is a zero sum game.
And I'm not picking on you, Madam Secretary, because I wasn't
suggesting you didn't think it helps us as well.
And all the reporters out there, I want to remind them,
when we send folks to go destroy those bad things that could be
used against us by terrorists or anyone else, we pay American
contractors to go do it. We don't write a check to the Russian
Government, here, go destroy the weapons. We hire Americans.
Americans go do this by and large. So it's not like we're even
giving them the money.
So I really hope we can start to think about this, because
the degree to which, Madam Secretary, you are successful, and
you have been very successful here, the irony of all ironies
is, the more successful you are, in a bizarre way, the worse
off we may be, in the sense--that's an exaggeration--that you
still got to destroy this stuff at the end of the day.
I want to ask Secretary Burns a question if I may in the
minute or so I probably have remaining, if it's that long. Did
the seizure of the shipment of the centrifuge parts play a part
in Tripoli's decision to finally come clean with the U.S. and
the U.K. inspectors to view multiple sites? I know this is
dangerous psychoanalyzing what the heck made Qadhafi do what he
did and so on--but I mean, how do you guys calculate, because
it's important to figure out whether or not there's lesson from
this that apply to others.
For example, Flynt Leverett, former Senior Director of the
National Security Council and member of the State Department
planning staff, wrote in the January 23 New York Times that
Libya began to seek improved relations with the United States
all the way back in 2001 and was told to settle the Lockerbie
case first.
Leverett goes on to say in that article, he says, ``this is
the context in which Libyan officials approached the United
States and Britain last spring to discuss the dismantling
Libya's weapons program. The Iraq war, which had not yet
started, was not the driving force behind Libya's move. Rather,
Libya was willing to deal because of credible diplomatic
representations by the United States over the years, which
convinced the Libyans that doing so was critical to achieving
their strategic and domestic goals, just as with Lockerbie an
explicit quid pro quo was offered.
``American officials indicated the verifiable dismantling
of Libya's weapons project would lead to removal of our
sanctions perhaps by the end of the year. The lesson is
incontrovertible. To persuade a rogue regime to get out of the
terrorism business and give us the weapons of mass destruction,
we must not only pressure but we must also make clear the
potential benefits.''
Is that a fair analysis in your view? Again, I'm trying to
figure out what got them there and whether or not it's
applicable to other places we know we have to go, and that's my
question. Thank you.
Mr. Burns. Thanks, Senator Biden. I think as Senator Lugar
suggested before, there are a range of factors that entered
into the thinking of the Libyan leadership and Colonel Qadhafi,
and they date back several years.
In answer to your first question, I think it's true that
the interdiction of that vessel was one of those factors. I
think the President's resolve, particularly since September 11,
and the resolve shown not just by the administration but by the
Congress and the American people is another important factor.
I think the fact that sanctions which were begun in the
first Bush administration, sustained through the Clinton
administration, also began to drive home to Libyan leadership
that its isolation was setting it further and further back
economically, socially, and many other ways.
I think the fact that during the course of the Lockerbie
negotiations, which I was involved in the last 3 years, but
which date back several years before that, we were very dogged
in insisting that there are no short cuts here and that you had
to meet the four security council obligations.
I think all of those factors combined helped to bring the
Libyan leadership to the point that it recognized that the best
choice for Libya was to take the direction that it took in the
Lockerbie settlement, which was formalized last September, and
then in the announcement on the 19th of December.
Senator Biden. Along the way, were there explicit carrots
offered as well? If you do this, then this will happen?
Mr. Burns. Well, with regard to the Lockerbie negotiations,
we were very clear in saying that, again, there were no short
cuts, you had to meet those four obligations laid out in
Security Council resolutions, and in return for that there'd be
first suspension, then lifting of the Security Council
sanctions. We made equally clear during that time that that was
not a free ticket for admission to--and bilateral sanctions--we
made very clear on the margins of the Lockerbie negotiations
that weapons of mass destruction were a very big concern for
the United States and would be a very big obstacle in the path
of moving ahead to ease those bilateral sanctions.
Senator Biden. Bilateral sanctions?
Mr. Burns. Yes, sir. And so we wanted to be clear that this
was going to be a step-by-step process in which positive Libyan
steps would be reciprocated by the United States, and again,
there were no short cuts, and that was the same philosophy in
Lockerbie as with regard to WMD.
Senator Biden. Both be complimented. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I commend
you on everything you're doing in the relationship with Libya,
making great progress. Libya does have proven reserves of 440
billion barrels of oil and the quality of its oil and the low
cost of its production are some of the best in the world. In
fact, in 2003, a survey by an oil research company, Robertson
Research, rated Libya the best oil and gas prospect in the
Middle East and the second best in the world.
And how would you respond to the criticism that there's a
double standard because of this dynamic and how we deal with
North Korea, for instance, and Libya? I'll ask Secretary Burns.
Mr. Burns. Well, Senator, I can really only address the
Libya portion of this since blessedly North Korea falls outside
my area of responsibility. On Libya, clearly this is a country
that has enormous potential wealth. It's been mismanaged
economically. One of the things that's most encouraging about
the choice made recently by Libyans is there also seems to be
an interest in economic modernization, opening up the economy.
If the Libyans continue to perform on their obligations,
we've made clear that we're prepared to continue to move ahead
toward easing and ultimately lifting the range of our
sanctions. That will open up opportunities for American
companies, but I think more broadly it'll open opportunities
for the Libyan people to begin to take advantage of that wealth
and open up opportunities for themselves, and I think that
ultimately creates the best kind of lesson or example for
others around the world.
Senator Chafee. Do you think you could take the experience
that you've had with Libya and see it translated somewhat to
North Korea, although, as you say, that's out of your
jurisdiction?
Ms. DeSutter. Senator Chafee, let me take a try at it.
Senator Chafee. OK.
Ms. DeSutter. One of the things that we've seen in Libya is
a genuine--and the reason I say it's genuine is that we've seen
proof on the ground, we're seeing proof in the elimination--a
genuine strategic decision to walk away from the WMD world.
They've walked away from those programs lock, stock, and
barrel. I am convinced of that, Senator Lugar----
Senator Chafee. If I could just interrupt for a second. I
know we use the term WMD all the time. Is there a definition of
that term?
Ms. DeSutter. In this case it is contained in Colonel
Qadhafi's statement of December 19 as then subsequently
reflected in agreement papers that we have with the Libyans. It
includes--they have said that they did not have an offensive
biological weapons program, although they had done some work
early on, that they had conducted, that they had pursued a
nuclear weapons program, that they were pursuing this and they
were pursuing it rather aggressively.
They had a chemical weapons program that was offensive in
nature. We're seeing that being eliminated and----
Senator Chafee. If I could, I'll just interrupt one more
time. To use the example of Timothy McVeigh, I believe he used
a truckload of fertilizer to kill 150-odd people, so the
definition of weapons of mass destruction as you negotiate, is
there a clear, internationally defined definition of that term?
Ms. DeSutter. What they had in, for example, the chemical
weapons program was that they had large stockpiles of sulfur
mustard. They were working on a nerve agent program. They were
working on a binary program. They had aerial munitions that
they had worked to fill. I may have brought one with me, one of
the bottles that they gave us that we're going to constitute
those. There is no question this was an offensive chemical
weapons program.
They had nuclear weapons design documents that they hadn't,
as near as we can tell, built any nuclear weapons, but they had
a program that was designed to give them the material in order
to enable down the road a nuclear weapons program.
Make no mistake. What Libya has agreed to eliminate, what
they are eliminating right now really was in the classic sense
a weapons of mass destruction and their agreement to undertake
the elimination of that program is very, very significant for
everyone. One of the points that I would make in response also
to Senator Biden's question is that the reason we say that we
are helping the Libyans to destroy, along with our U.K.
partners, the Libyan program is not because we believe that it
is not in our interests. It is because what we are assisting in
is their fulfillment of a commitment that they made
unilaterally.
Yes, there was a dialog with the U.S. and the U.K. Libya is
the one that made that decision, Libya is the one that is
eliminating it. To contrast that with North Korea, North Korea
has not made a strategic commitment to give up its nuclear
weapons program, neither in my view has Iran. Those are
significant differences in terms of our ability to achieve the
kind of relations that Assistant Secretary Burns has indicated
we are trying to move forward with in Libya.
These are significant differences. We hope that the Libya
process, that the Libya decision will serve as a guiding
principle and a model for other WMD countries to move forward
to be able to have the kind of relationship with the United
States that we would be happy to have with those countries.
Weapons of mass destruction is a clear impediment to being an
operating member of the international community, as well it
should be.
Senator Chafee. Well, thank you very much. My only comment
would be, yes, negotiations don't start with them. I would
suspect with unilaterally agreeing just to abandon the weapons
of mass destruction program, it's a series of meetings, it's a
serious of negotiations, and to me I don't see that happening
in North Korea. But that's all the questions I have.
Ms. DeSutter. I would just note that Assistant Secretary
Kelly is meeting with North Korea as part of the six party
talks as we speak.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee. Senator
Nelson. All right, I'm going to defer to Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm
curious. After the Six-Day War, Libya's significant and ancient
Jewish community numbered 40,000 and they were expelled and
virtually all of their assets were confiscated by Libyan
authorities. So as we begin this new relationship with Libya,
it would be appropriate to address issues of compensation and
restitution for this community. Tell me what you have been
thinking about on this issue and what plans do you have to
raise this issue with the Libyans?
Mr. Burns. Senator Nelson, thanks for raising the issue.
Our focus up until this point has been very much on ensuring
that the Libyans follow through on their terrorism and WMD
commitments and then beginning to look at ways in which we can
ease our own sanctions to offer some positive reinforcement for
that. I'd be glad to look into the issue that you raised and
get back to you with a clear answer.
[The following response was subsequently received.]
As much as three-quarters of Libya's 40,000 Jews emigrated to
Israel in the years immediately after its founding. The violence
sparked by the Six-Day War in 1967 prompted all but a few hundred of
Libya's remaining 7,000 Jews to flee. Those who remained to witness
Colonel Qadhafi's 1969 revolution saw Jewish communal and personal
properties confiscated and the cancellation of all debts owed to Jews.
We are in the beginning stages of a political dialogue with the
Government of Libya. Our bilateral talks touched upon this issue while
I was in Tripoli and I encouraged efforts to reach a settlement. We
have been in contact with the American Libyan Jewry Association and are
aware of their efforts to pursue compensation.
The U.S. supports the general principle of compensation for
property confiscated by the state, particularly because it promotes the
rule of law, respect for property rights, and tolerance of minorities.
As we have learned from our experience in Eastern Europe and the Former
Soviet Union, issues of compensation and restitution present many
complicated concerns. There is a delicate balance that must be struck
between the interests of the original property holders and current
owners and occupants of confiscated properties. Documenting original
ownership is also frequently difficult. In addition, while we can urge
settlement of claims in principle, there are limitations on the types
of individual cases that we can formally present to Libya.
Senator Nelson. We do it with other countries, so clearly
we ought to. And somewhere in the course of your comments, I'd
love to hear how you think that the Iraq war might have, from
your perspective, influenced Qadhafi in his decisionmaking.
Mr. Burns. Senator Nelson, I think all I would say is that
it's very difficult again to sort of understand the thought
process that produced the historic decision that was announced
on the 19th of December, and that for that matter also produced
the decision to essentially move out of the terrorism business
and reach the Lockerbie settlement.
As I said before, I think there are a variety of factors
that came into play. I do believe that President Bush's
resolve, the resolve of the United States as a whole with
regard to Iraq as well as with regard to the broader war on
terrorism was one of those very important factors in shaping
the decisions that were made. I think we have an interest now
in helping to demonstrate that those were the right choices and
to help show the Libyan people through some of the steps that
were announced by the White House today and hopefully steps
that we can take in the future, assuming Libyan performance
continues, that this is enormously beneficial to the Libyan
people. It opens up opportunities for them that the pursuit of
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction essentially denied
them.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. Senator
Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both of
you for your testimony. Secretary DeSutter, have we uncovered
any information indicating that Libya sought to share
technology relating to weapons of mass destruction with other
states or actors? Is there anything that you can tell me about
this in this forum?
Ms. DeSutter. Senator, we have not gotten any evidence to
that effect to date. One of the things that is certainly true
is that we are certainly learning more as we go on the ground
and we will begin putting a little bit more emphasis on having
additional dialog with them. For the first 2 months, our
emphasis has been on removing things. We'll try to understand
better. But thus far I can say that we have not seen such
evidence.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. Secretary Burns?
Ms. DeSutter. But--I'm sorry.
Senator Feingold. Excuse me. Go right ahead.
Ms. DeSutter. I would just add that a part of why our
emphasis has been on the elimination aspect of this has been
precisely because while we believe the commitment is real,
while we know that the Libyans have made this decision, we want
to preclude that. That's why we took out the most
proliferation-sensitive items early on.
Senator Feingold. I thank you for that. Secretary Burns,
how stable is Libya internally in your view and who is the most
plausible successor to Qadhafi at this point?
Mr. Burns. On the succession issue, I don't at this point
have a clear answer to offer you. It's a political system that
has had its share of stresses and strains. I think there's a
recognition on the part of the Libyan leadership, and Colonel
Qadhafi in particular, that economic modernization beginning to
sort of shift direction in terms of how the economy is managed
and we hope over time in how the political system is managed in
terms of respect for human rights and other issues is a
direction that's going to serve the best interests not only of
the Libyan people but of stability in Libya, because I think
throughout the Middle East you see the reality that stability
is not a static phenomenon. If societies don't adapt and get
out ahead of the pressures, whether they're demographic or
economic or other ones, they tend to stagnate, fall further and
further behind.
And so I hope that the decisions that the Libyan leadership
has made with regard to terrorism, with regard to weapons of
mass destruction are a part of a broader process in which the
economy is modernized, in which there is a greater
institutionalization and respect for human rights in which
Libya's behavior in Africa and elsewhere around the globe
begins to turn in a direction which we would view as more
constructive, and I know that's been a concern of yours over
the years. And that is also something that's an important part
of our dialog with the Libyans, because a more normal
relationship with the United States is going to rest on
tangible progress in the areas of terrorism and WMD, but those
other factors are also going to be important as well.
Senator Feingold. I'm glad you mentioned the human rights
issue, because Libya's record is dismal, and you seem to have
just indicated that human rights are already an important part
of our discussion. In the just released human rights report,
the State Department refers to torture, arbitrary arrest and
detention, political prisoners, and government restrictions on
freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, and
religion.
So you're saying that you're already heavily engaged in
these conversations with the Libyans?
Mr. Burns. Yes, sir. As the most recent human rights report
that the State Department issued yesterday makes clear, Libya's
performance, its record on human rights is poor, just as you
said. We will continue to raise this issue and make clear that
in the interests of a truly healthy relationship with the
United States--but, again, more importantly than that, the kind
of Libyan society that's going to benefit its people, those
issues need to be addressed.
As one example, we raised in my last conversations in
London the value of allowing representatives of international
human rights organizations like Amnesty International to travel
to Libya. After those meetings in London, the Libyans did allow
two representatives of Amnesty to come and observe a trial in
Libya, and I think that's a positive step. And we are going to
continue to try and reinforce some of the comments from members
of the Libyan leadership who have talked publicly, for example,
about the value of looking at prison conditions, of allowing
access for the ICRC, and those are the kind of things that we
want to reinforce, again in the interests of a healthier
relationship with the United States.
Senator Feingold. I thank you for that. Does any budget
transparency exist in Libya? Do Libyans have any idea how much
the government gains in oil revenue annually, and does anyone
have a sense of how those revenues are then spent? Does the
administration plan to meaningfully address transparency issues
before opening the flood gates to new investment in the oil
sector?
Mr. Burns. Well, I think, Senator, one thing that's been
encouraging, if you look at the debate within Libya over the
course of the last year or so, have been the number of Libyan
voices who have been talking about modernizing and opening up
the economy, precisely for the reasons you described, Libyans
who recognize that this isn't a favor to the United States or
the international community. It's in their self-interest to
take those kind of steps, and we will certainly do all we can
to encourage that as we continue to continue our dialog with
the Libyans.
Senator Feingold. This may, like North Korea, be out of
your area, but I think it's very important, and that's the
nature of Libya's current involvement in certain African
countries. To the extent you can, describe the nature of
Libya's current involvement in Zimbabwe.
Mr. Burns. Generally, Senator, as you well know, Libya's
behavior has created significant problems for us in Africa over
the years. Now, there have been indications, both in what the
Libyan leadership has said publicly and in what they have
indicated in private discussions that they are interested in
playing a more constructive role in Africa. That's something
obviously that has to be seen, not just promised, but it's
obviously something that we want to encourage, because it is
possible that Libya could play a more constructive role in
Africa than it has to date.
There have been problems, as you suggested, in Zimbabwe.
There have been problems in Liberia and elsewhere.
Senator Feingold. As far as you know, the less than helpful
involvement in Zimbabwe by Libya still continues?
Mr. Burns. I can get back to you with a clearer answer on
that, but I think we still have concerns about Libya's
behavior----
Senator Feingold. Central African Republic?
Mr. Burns. Again, I think we continue to have concerns
there. As I said, the Libyans are about to host in the next
couple of days an extraordinary summit of the African Union,
and part of their rationale for doing that is to try and play a
more constructive role by contrast to their behavior in the
past.
So, again, we'll see it when it happens, but we will
continue to try and encourage that.
Senator Feingold. Well, instead of keeping--asking you
these, I'll just ask for you to get me what you can on
Zimbabwe, Central African Republic, whether Libya retains any
investments made in Liberia under the Taylor regime, and also
to be sure that these are pursued aggressively.
Mr. Burns. Sure, I'd be glad to, Senator.
[The following response was subsequently received.]
As an active member of the African Union, Libya should play a
constructive role in promoting peace and prosperity in the region. For
the past three decades, Libya has funded and supported various
revolutionary insurgencies and anti-Western regimes throughout the
African Continent. Libya has sought a leadership role in Africa,
typically through lofty, but impractical Pan-African initiatives.
On February 6, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
Affairs William Burns began a political dialogue with Libyan officials
on a broad range of issues, including Libya's foreign policy in Africa.
As our bilateral relations deepen, this issue will remain an important
part of the U.S.-Libya agenda.
Central African Republic
A coup in March of 2003 in the Central African Republic (CAR) ended
the reign of former President Patasse, a long-standing ally of the
Qadhafi regime. Although Qadhafi had previously supported the CAR
leader, both economically and militarily, he stood clear of any
military involvement during the uprising that removed Patasse from
power and led to the installment of General Francois Bozize.
Qadhafi has recognized the change of regime in the CAR and
attempted to reestablish bilateral relations between Libya and the CAR,
as indicated by a meeting between Qadhafi and Bozize in Chad on July 7,
2003.
Liberia (Taylor)
The training and assistance that Qadhafi provided to Charles Taylor
has been a point of concern since the early 1990s when Taylor came to
power. As Taylor lost his grip on power in August 2003, Qadhafi refused
to provide Taylor and his associates asylum.
To our knowledge the only substantial financial interest that Libya
maintains in Liberia is real estate. The UN Mission in Liberia is
considering using one of these facilities as their headquarters.
Zimbabwe
Relations between Zimbabwe and Libya are historically close, with
Libya supporting Zimbabwe's independence struggle and each country's
condemning sanctions imposed on the other. Relations are currently
somewhat strained by the collapse of a barter deal under which Libya
was providing seventy percent of its fuel needs in exchange for a range
of Zimbabwean banking, mining, fuel infrastructure, real estate, and
agricultural assets. The deal collapsed in early 2003 due to disputes
over the values of assets and Zimbabwean failure to hand over assets it
deemed strategic. Attempts to revive the deal in mid-2003 failed and it
appears that Libyan fuel shipments to Zimbabwe have largely ceased.
Libya still seeks to build its influence in Zimbabwe, however, and
reportedly donated 6,000 metric tons of grain in December 2003.
Senator Feingold. Finally, I just want to say, I want to be
clear that I certainly agree with my colleagues that we, as
many of you have said, that we should not wait to move forward
on destroying Libya's WMD even in the absence of progress on
some of the other issues that I've been raising. I just want to
be clear about that. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. Let me
just pick up on Senator Feingold's final comment. We all have
been very aggressive today, as you could tell, about getting on
with this, but so have you been, Secretary DeSutter. You point
out that in a very short period of time 55,000 pounds of a lot
of stuff went out to Oak Ridge. It's there now, and that's
precisely the sort of action that this committee would want to
see, as opposed to a long wind-up, endless negotiations,
finding reasons why you couldn't do it, and so forth. You did
it. The window of history opened and it might not stay open
very long.
Now, that's, I think, the point we're making now. On the
other hand, it could stay open for a long while if American
diplomacy works, quite apart from our effectiveness and
proliferation. I think that the questions that Senator Feingold
raised were important in that respect because many of us are
curious about what the relationships still are with people in
Libya. We do not know that much about their political system,
about leading figures beyond Mr. Qadhafi and others.
In other words, are there ideologues in Libya? Even if
President Qadhafi comes to a point and says, listen, we have an
opportunity to enlist oil companies throughout the world, to
make investments here, to bring wealth to our country, we still
will have extraordinary opportunities to engage in constructive
ways. Yet suddenly down in the weeds there are other Libyans
who have been playing a different game for a while. They're
still fooling around in Zimbabwe or wherever else, because this
is what they've always done. They've been operatives who
thought ideologically something ought to happen in that way.
As to the issue of control, now that we're dealing with the
government, is the government effective? Does it have control,
or is it a set of diverse minds? Has a consensus of the future
course of the country come about? Do you have any feel for
this, or is it too early to tell?
Ms. DeSutter. Senator, one of the things that I would say
is I think it's just that thought process that led Secretary
Powell to refer to this on a number of occasions as a
verification process. What we've seen thus far has been
tremendous, but we are not going to move only so far and not
try to understand the full picture. Thus far, what I can say,
as openings take place, as the dialog continues, we will
continue to learn more that will increase our confidence over
time, but we are continuing to do that. Thus far, the record
that we have seen has been absolutely amazing.
The Chairman. On that basis the President made his
announcement today of the lifting of these five sanctions. Is
this simply because we are optimistic that there's a lot going
on there that ought to be encouraged?
Mr. Burns. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, I think that's exactly
right. I think what's been demonstrated so far with regard to
the issues of terrorism and WMD is an ability thus far for the
regime to follow through on commitments it's made, so that
level of control seems clear.
It also seems clear, as you suggested, that it's important,
and the President made this clear in his own announcement on
December 19, that as Libya takes these steps, it's important
for the Libyan people, for the people involved in the sort of
debate that you described to see that benefits can result from
making the right choices.
That's why we've tried even in this first set of
announcements that the White House made today to look for a
couple of symbolic but I think very useful steps. For example,
sending a team of U.S. experts to Libya to look at ways in
which we could help in the health care system, look at ways in
which we could help Libyans deal with infectious diseases like
trachoma. And that is an indication on our part both of the
value of showing that these are the right choices, but also
ways in which we can help realize those possibilities.
The Chairman. And there are Americans on the ground dealing
with these health problems, as well as other situations that
are going to be observed by Libyans?
Mr. Burns. Yes, sir. There's a team that's leaving in a
couple of days that'll be there for some time and have a chance
to travel around the country and then offer our best advice and
our assessment of steps that could be taken to benefit Libyans.
The Chairman. Let me then pursue this question. The summit
conference of other nations that you described is coming to
Libya. Now, if I were a Libyan statesman at this point, this
would require some very sophisticated reasoning as to what sort
of presentation we're going to make. For example, Libyans may
say a new day has come to Libya and a new day could come for
you. In essence, we've worked out an accommodation with the
United States, with Great Britain, with others, and as a
result, we're headed off to a bright new future.
Now, my guess is that a good number of the states come to
visit with them are still of a mind that the future's pretty
dark. Their relations with us, that is, the United States, are
not all so good. Some are better than others. Having cheerful
Libyans telling them that Americans might be good people, that
they might be worth dealing with may not settle well right off
the bat. We're talking about the Libyans changing their mind
set. They're about to deal with a whole group of people who
have mind sets, and in one conference day or two they may not
be able to change their minds. Still, this is sort of an
important juncture.
In terms of our diplomacy, what, if anything, are we doing
to inform all of the parties who are coming to that meeting of
what we perceive to be the facts on the ground? In other words,
what are we doing so that the discussion that occurs among
these sovereign nations occurs with as much factual background
in the new developments as possible? The news may not always
have spread accurately, given the press in various countries,
or the dissemination of information. Here, it seems to me, we
have a remarkable opportunity for public diplomacy in a very
concentrated way in a concentrated meeting.
Undoubtedly you have worked through that. Can you describe,
or give any confidence level as to what we might do to
influence the meeting?
Mr. Burns. Well, Senator, with regard to that meeting as
well as generally our contacts with Libya's neighbors, we've
tried to be very clear and transparent in highlighting not only
the steps that the Libyan leadership is taking on terrorism and
WMD, but also the kinds of things that we're doing in return.
The President has set the tone for that in his own public
comments. Today's White House announcement is a first tangible
step in that direction. I'll meet with the Libyans again next
month to begin looking at the next phase of steps that we might
take in return for steps that they're taking on the ground.
So I think the results that we're looking for are a process
in which they've followed through on their obligations and
we've also followed through on the President's statement that
the sorts of commitments that Libya has made as they're
followed through open up a real path to better relations with
the United States, and hopefully that will have an impact on
the calculations of other countries in the region.
There's no one-size-fits-all solution, but I think it's a
very important opportunity for the United States to show that
this path can be a successful one, not just for us, but for
Libyans and potentially for others in the region and around the
world.
The Chairman. The reason I stress this is that for the
better part of 15 years more or less, the world rejoiced that
countries, whether it was Brazil or South Africa, came to a
conclusion that pursuing a course of weapons of mass
destruction was not going to be best for their destiny. They
came to these judgments and they got out of the business.
Suddenly we have a terrible reverse. India tests, and right
following that Pakistan tests, and then what seemed to be a
remarkable course of history took another turn that was very
sad. With Libya we have the possibility that history won't go
in a straight line. We once again head back into better
territory, but only if other countries come to a conclusion
that Libya is right, all things considered, and that in this
particular world right now as things stand, going into the
subterfuge of weapons of mass destruction programs as they were
doing not only wastes resources, it's disastrous for the
economy and for the living standard of the people. It is bound
to be a loser vis-a-vis the United States and other nations
that are less and less tolerant of even the potential of
proliferation, quite apart from the country, supposedly in
terms of self-defense, having such weapons.
This is why this meeting they're about to have is not the
be-all and end-all. It's going to be the beginning of several
meetings in which countries come to some conclusions about
their destinies, and maybe advise others. We don't know yet all
of the trades--quite apart from A.Q. Kahn--but of the North
Koreans or of everybody else, but we're going to find out a
great deal. It's all sort of spilling out of the cupboard at
this point.
The question is whether the momentum of that leads us to
truly winding up this situation, or getting our arms around it,
so that there's a very definite change in the quality of
security. I'm optimistic, as you must be, too. We have to be
optimistic in terms of the future of this country and our
security, quite apart from that of other countries. These are
crucial moments to take the right steps decisively and
confidently. Those include diplomacy and public diplomacy, as
well as the physical steps of jerking this stuff out and taking
it to Oak Ridge or wherever we can take it.
Let me ask Senator Chafee, do you have another question?
Senator Chafee. Yes. Just quickly, just following up on
what you're saying, Mr. Chairman, is, as Senator Biden said,
jaw jaw jaw is better than war war war, and I hope that in
North Korea, as you said, the Secretary said, that Secretary
Kelly is there now, and previous meetings have kind of
disintegrated, but I hope they'll continue to jaw jaw jaw and
maybe you'll have the same progress we're seeing here in Libya.
I do have a question for Secretary Burns. What's the
administration's position on congressional visits to Tripoli
and Libya?
Mr. Burns. I think to date, Senator, there have been three
and there's a fourth in the offing now. I think they've had a
very constructive effect. I think the opportunity for Libyans,
both in the leadership and outside of government, to see
Americans, to see representatives of the legislative branch as
well as the executive to the opportunity to reinforce the broad
message that this is the right choice for Libya and for the
future of U.S.-Libyan relations, to hear that from Members of
Congress as well as from those of us in the administration is a
very constructive thing.
So the short answer to your question is that we'll continue
to encourage it and look forward to working with you to help in
both the arrangements and to offer whatever analysis we can.
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Chafee. I have just two
more questions. One is, leaping ahead even further, there is a
certain degree of privatization in the economy of Libya. I'm
unaware of how you would describe this percentage-wise, but at
least the concept is there. At what point is it likely to take
hold to the extent that people will become much more involved?
Not only small private businesses and shops, but even larger
enterprises, are likely to become privatized. Would this create
a whole sea change in terms of the economic organization of the
country?
Mr. Burns. Mr. Chairman, there's a lot of work to be done
in order to make those opportunities a reality. As I said
before, I think what's encouraging is the debate amongst
Libyans themselves, and you hear it from some in the Libyan
leadership about the importance of opening up, modernizing the
economy. It's an economy that's heavily dependent on the public
sector, as you described before, where standards of living for
ordinary Libyans have fallen in recent years by contrast to the
fact that this is a potentially enormously wealthy country.
So that's a debate that we obviously--Libyans are going to
have to sort out for themselves, but that we want to encourage.
And it's not just the United States. This is a place where
Europeans, where others in the region who have begun to embark
on the path of reform can offer some encouragement as well,
because I think that's the way to translate the opportunity
before Libyans now into real progress in their standard of
living and to tap into the wealth that is so obvious in the
country right now.
The Chairman. Is there any background, any history of
privatization or the type of enterprise that we think of? I ask
this, for instance, in the context of that dramatic
announcement on January 1 by Mr. Balcerowicz in Poland, when
suddenly he said we are going to have free convertibility of
our currency, we're going to have free markets in our economy.
This was revolutionary because the whole thing was gummed up
and people said, well, we're ruined.
Of course, politically, this was very costly to the people
that he was associated with in due course. People said there's
just too much too soon. But there was a tradition in Poland, a
sufficient tradition in terms of markets and so forth, so that
people still remembered what they were, even if things had been
state-run and socialized for a long time.
To what extent is there any kind of firmament or background
in the Libyan business that would enable people to make some
decisions that would have ramifications that are pretty quick?
Mr. Burns. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think there is some of
that tradition in Libya. There's certainly the capacity amongst
Libyans to develop that kind of entrepreneurial sector. There
is a lot of years of mismanagement to overcome and that won't
be easy. Then again, you do have a regime that's demonstrated
an ability to make those kind of dramatic choices in other
areas and that certainly suggests that there's at least the
possibility of doing it in this area as well. It's certainly in
the best interests of Libyans, and so I hope that that's the
choice that they'll arrive at.
The Chairman. For the moment, oil companies in the United
States and elsewhere, Europe and so forth, are eager to see how
rapidly things may move along. But clearly for some time have
wanted to be more active in Libya. Presumably the Libyans will
want to work that out, with contractual agreements that are
helpful to the state. How transparent will all this be? We have
to wait and see, I suppose, how much of the wealth will be
distributed, and what this will mean in terms of lubricating
the banking system, the credit system, and the capital of the
country.
There are enormous possibilities. From a standing start,
you have these resources, and suddenly things change. This
leads to the question of how well-equipped is President Qadhafi
to manage this? Does he have a good number of technicians,
other people, economists, wise people, and so forth, around? It
may or may not have been heard before, but nevertheless, what
kind of intellectual capital is available in the country right
now to manage some extraordinary possibilities?
Mr. Burns. Mr. Chairman, there are some in the government
now, including some of the most outspoken advocates of reform,
who have the training, the skills, I think the insights, to
begin to move those reforms forward. As I said, it's, again,
it's not just a question of, as we found in other societies in
the region and the world, of a few people in leadership
positions. You're trying to hold a whole economy and society
around.
But I think the capacity exists. It's going to require a
lot of hard work, determination, a willingness to make those
broad dramatic choices about what's in the best interests of
Libya, and I think the possibility, as you said, is enormous
right now, and we will certainly do everything we can as this
process moves forward, as the terrorism and WMD commitments are
fulfilled, to encourage that and provide what help we can.
The Chairman. How hospitable will Libya be to NGOs, non-
governmental organizations, the people that are not U.S.
Government, but who come to Libya with all sorts of good ideas
with regard to public health, even with regard to democracy-
building. You never can tell what sorts of things might be
induced in the situation. Are we at a point where these people
are likely to be received? How does the evolution go in terms
of outside forces, humane ones, that want to be helpful?
Mr. Burns. Well, Mr. Chairman, it's going to be a little
bit of a novel experience because that hasn't been the record
of recent decades, but as I said, with regard to the example I
offered on Amnesty International, there's been a willingness to
do some things that haven't been done in Libya before, and
certainly with regard to NGOs, private organizations that can
offer help, whether it's in health care or education or
economic modernization, it would seem to me that there are
great opportunities there, and that's certainly something in
our continuing dialog with the Libyans we'll encourage.
I think it's also something that--getting back to Senator
Chafee's question that as congressional delegations travel to
Libya, it's a point well worth reinforcing, so that what we see
is not just an engagement between governments, but between
civil societies as well.
The Chairman. Perhaps Senator Chafee is headed to Tripoli.
Not yet, waiting for the lead. Very well. Do you have other
questions, Senator?
Let me just thank both of you very much. As you can tell,
we're tremendously engaged in the subject, as you are. We
admire the leadership that you've given and that the President
has given on this. We have started acknowledging this in many
ways. Even as we are impatient and hopeful, so are you, we
recognize that.
Please stay closely in touch. You have some friends here,
as you can tell, some advocates for change, which we hope will
be constructive and will come soon. Saying that, the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:01 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
----------
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. William J. Burns, Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern Affairs, to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
by Senator George Allen
Question 1. The Department of State has made numerous
pronouncements about the absolute, non-negotiable requirement for Libya
to compensate the victims of the Pan Am 103 bombing. No such public
pronouncements have been made on behalf of the service men and women
killed or injured in the LaBelle Discotheque bombing. What is the
Department of State's position with regard to Libyan compensation for
the victims of this seminal event in the Libyan war of terrorism
against the United States?
Answer. We are urging Libya to address all outstanding terrorism
claims of Americans, including for the LaBelle Disco bombing. Those
claims are also the subject of litigation in U.S. courts.
Question 2. If the Department supports the claims of the LaBelIe
service men and women, how does the Department intend to notice the
Libyan government that, like Pan Am 103, these claims must be
satisfactorily resolved prior to the normalization of bilateral
relations?
Answer. Libya's response to the UN requirements on terrorism, and
its commitment to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction programs,
has opened the way for direct discussions to chart a path for possible
improvement in relations. Whether and how this will take place will
depend upon how well and how quickly it lives up to all of its
commitments.
We are in close touch with legal counsel for the American LaBelle
victims. In our discussions with Libya, we will continue to urge Libya
to address all outstanding terrorism claims of Americans, including
LaBelle, in coordination with the claimants and their legal
representatives.
______
Responses of Hon. Paula DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for
Verification and Compliance, and Hon. William J. Burns, Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, to Additional Questions
for the Record Submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question 1a. Section 602(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978 requires that the State Department, among others, keep the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee ``fully and currently informed'' regarding
both significant proliferation activities in foreign countries and what
the United States is doing about them.
a. Given that legal obligation, why was this committee not
informed of the lengthy negotiations between the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Libya until agreement was reached and
made public in December?
Answer. The State Department makes every effort to keep the
committee fully and currently informed about the activities of other
nations that are of significance from a proliferation standpoint, as
required by the statute. Since Libya announced its decision to
dismantle its WMD and MTCR-class missile programs on December 19, 2003,
the State Department has briefed several congressional committees and
their staff on numerous occasions.
Question 2a. Please provide the background and full details
regarding the origins of the U.S.-UK agreement with Libya on
dismantlement of its WMD programs.
a. Is it the case that Libya proposed this agreement almost a
year ago?
Answer. Libya approached the UK and U.S. almost a year ago. The
agreement was reached in December 2003. Indeed, Libya did not admit to
having WMD programs until after the October interdiction of the BBC
China.
Question 1b. Section 602(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978 requires that the State Department, among others, keep the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee ``fully and currently informed'' regarding
both significant proliferation activities in foreign countries and what
the United States is doing, about them.
b. Why was this committee not informed of the seizure last
October of a ship bound for Libya with centrifuge parts?
Answer. As noted above, the State Department makes every effort to
keep the committee fully and currently informed in accordance with the
provisions of the NNPA. The fact that these parts were interdicted was
publicly confirmed by administration spokespersons in January. The
effort to interdict these centrifuge parts was carried out by other USG
Departments that are in a better position to brief the committee on how
these events unfolded.
Question 2b. Please provide the background and full details
regarding the origins of the U.S.--UK agreement with Libya on
dismantlement of its WMD programs.
b. Was the United States involved from the start, or did
Libya approach only the UK at first.
Answer. Libya approached the UK, seeking to communicate with both
the United States and the United Kingdom.
Question 2c. Please provide the background and full details
regarding the origins of the U.S.--UK agreement with Libya on
dismantlement of its WMD programs.
c. What was the State Department's role in the negotiations,
and when did it begin.
Answer. The State Department led the interagency U.S. team in Libya
assisting with the WMD elimination. It also participated in the
negotiations with Libya and the United Kingdom on the objectives for
that team between the December 19, 2003 announcement and the entry of
the U.S./UK team into Libya. The State Department was not involved in
discussions prior to the public announcement on December 19, 2003.
Question 2d. Please provide the background and full details
regarding the origins of the U.S.-UK agreement with Libya on
dismantlement of its WMD programs.
d. Who, in the State Department, took part in the
negotiations?
Answer. Under Secretary of State John Bolton and employees of the
Bureaus of Verification and Compliance and Arms Control participated in
those negotiations. The Nonproliferation and Near East Asia bureaus
have also played a role in assisting Libya to eliminate its WMD.
Question 2e. Please provide the background and full details
regarding the origins of the U.S.-UK agreement with Libya on
dismantlement of its WMD programs.
e. If the State Department was not an active participant in
the negotiations, then at what level did it follow the progress
of those talks?
Answer. Senior State Department officials were kept informed of the
discussions.
Question 2f. Please provide the background and full details
regarding the origins of the U.S.--UK agreement with Libya on
dismantlement of its WMD programs.
f. What role did U.S. intelligence agencies play in the
negotiations?
Answer. The CIA participated in meetings and on-site visits to
Libya during the discussions.
Question 2g. Please provide the background and full details
regarding the origins of the U.S.-UK agreement with Libya on
dismantlement of its WMD programs.
g. What role did the Department of Defense play in the
negotiations?
Answer. The Department of Defense participated in formulating U.S.
objectives in negotiations after December 19, 2003, to guide the work
of the U.S.-UK team assisting in elimination of Libyan WMD. The Defense
Department was not involved in discussions prior to the public
announcement on December 19, 2003.
Question 3. Was the initial Libya proposal comprehensive in nature?
In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on
February 24, 2004, George Tenet indicated the Libyans initially offered
only to ``renounce'' their WMD programs without necessarily dismantling
existing programs in a verifiable manner. Can you expand on his
statement?
Answer. We would suggest that the committee refer questions
regarding Director Tenet's testimony to the CIA.
Question 4. Why do you believe the Libyans were reticent at first
on disclosing all details on their programs, especially since it was
their decision to come forward?
Answer. Since its public announcement on December 19, 2003, Libya
has been very open about its WMD and missile programs. There may be
several reasons why Libya was reticent to disclose all details at the
earliest stages of contact, but listing those reasons would only be
speculation. We do note that our ability to confront the Libyans with
substantial intelligence was a major factor in encouraging Libya to
fully disclose its WMD and missile programs.
Question 5. What countries are involved in A.Q. Khan's procurement
network? And what is the U.S. Government doing about that?
Answer. A.Q. Khan has admitted that Iran, Libya, and North Korea
were customers of his network and that he used resources in Pakistan,
the United Arab Emirates and Malaysia to complete the sales. This
network procured parts from all over the world, including Western
Europe, for transfer to countries of proliferation concern. The United
States and other members of the international community are working
hard to unravel and eliminate the A.Q. Khan network to ensure that
sensitive nuclear technology is no longer available on the black
market. The State Department would be happy to have appropriate
officials discuss our efforts with you in person in more detail.
Question 6. Are we accepting Pakistan's assertion that this massive
proliferation proceeded with no government knowledge, let alone
approval? What will Pakistan do to assure the world that this will
never happen again? Will Pakistan provide all the information the IAEA
needs to investigate A.Q. Khan's network and to determine what it
provided to Libya and Iran?
Answer. President Musharraf has assured the administration that the
Government of Pakistan was not participating in any kind of WMD
proliferation activity. President Musharraf understands the importance
of shutting down the A.Q. Khan proliferation network and of Pakistani
cooperation toward that end; he is working toward this goal. We are
urging Pakistan to take steps to ensure that such activity cannot take
place again from Pakistan, and we have an ongoing program to help
Pakistan bring its export controls in line with accepted international
standards. We have also stressed that A.Q. Khan and his collaborators
must not be allowed to resume their operations. In that connection, it
is notable that Khan's pardon is conditioned on his continued
cooperation and that his alleged co-conspirators in Pakistan remain in
detention. Pakistan has said it will share all relevant information
from its investigation with us as well as with the IAEA, and we are
working with Pakistan toward that end.
Question 7. Are we accepting Malaysia's assertion that the
activities of Mr. Tahir in that country were all perfectly legal? What
will Malaysia do to assure the world that this will never happen again?
Answer. The Malaysian police conducted an investigation into this
matter and concluded that Tahir's activities were not in violation of
Malaysian law. In a speech to the U.S. National Defense University on
February 11, President Bush called on all states to criminalize
proliferation. We are ready to assist the Government of Malaysia to
enact and enforce laws that criminalize proliferation activities. We
are also offering to help Malaysia and other countries bring their
export control systems up to international standards so that activities
such as those by Tahir are not repeated.
Question 8. Did any of the five major nuclear powers help Libya's
nuclear weapons program? If so, what are we--and what is the IAEA--
doing about that.
Answer. Not to our knowledge. However, the USG is working with
Libya and the IAEA to learn more about Libya's nuclear suppliers. The
State Department would be happy to have appropriate officials discuss
this with you in person.
Question 9. The Department of State has made numerous
pronouncements about the non-negotiable requirement for Libya to
compensate the victims of the Pan Am 103 bombing. No such public
pronouncements have been made on behalf of the service men and women
killed or injured in the LaBelle Discotheque bombing. What is the
position of the United States with regard to the need for Libya to
compensate the victims of the LaBelle Discotheque bombing?
Answer. We are urging Libya to address all outstanding terrorism
claims of Americans, including for the LaBelle Disco bombing, in
coordination with the claimants and their legal representatives. The
claims of the American LaBelle victims are also the subject of
litigation in U.S. courts and we are in close touch with their legal
counsel.
Libya's response to the UN requirements on terrorism, and its
commitment to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction programs, has
opened the way for direct discussions to chart a path for possible
improvement in relations. Whether and how this will take place will
depend upon how well and how quickly it lives up to all of its
commitments.