

**AFGHANISTAN STABILIZATION AND  
RECONSTRUCTION: A STATUS REPORT**

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**HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS**  
**UNITED STATES SENATE**  
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION

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JANUARY 27, 2004  
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## **AFGHANISTAN STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION: A STATUS REPORT**

**TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2004**

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Feingold, Boxer, Bill Nelson, and Rockefeller.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR, CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is pleased to welcome General James Jones, Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, and Ambassador William B. Taylor, Coordinator for Afghanistan for the Department of State, to assess the international effort to stabilize and to rebuild Afghanistan.

The new Afghan nation is in a fragile state of development, but there are many reasons to be optimistic about its future. The Afghan people are experiencing new freedoms, and families are being reunited as refugees return from neighboring Pakistan, Iran, and elsewhere. The new constitution, approved January 4, 2004, by the Constitutional Loya Jirga, provides all citizens of Afghanistan, men and women, equal rights under the law. Afghan women are going back to school and back to the workplace; they also are participating in the political process. The Constitution reserves 25 percent of the seats of the new Lower House of Parliament for women, and the new Afghan Government cabinet includes two women.

Afghanistan is experiencing important successes in education, healthcare, and the development of a market economy. New businesses are being established with grants and loans from the United States and the international community. The completion of the initial stages at the Kabul-Kandahar road is another sign of progress that brings hope to those who are dedicated to rebuilding Afghanistan.

Solidifying and expanding these successes, however, depends on making further progress on security. Southern and eastern Afghanistan, in particular, are dangerous. The Taliban has been active on the Pakistan-Afghan border, and attacks on United States and Afghan forces, as well as on United Nations and non-governmental organizational personnel, are generating fear. If security is not

achieved, international aid workers and others critical to the reconstruction of Afghanistan will not be able to function.

In addition, Afghanistan's Presidential elections are scheduled to be held in June 2004, followed by parliamentary elections a year later. Yet less than half a million voters have been registered, to date, out of an estimated ten and a half million. The United Nations Assistance Mission is moving to register voters as quickly as possible. We must overcome security and logistical deficiencies so that free and fair elections can take place on time.

With this in mind, our committee is intensely interested in the progress of the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF. The NATO and United Nations decision in late 2003 to expand ISAF outside of Kabul was an important step toward improved security.

The new Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, declared last week that Afghanistan is the number-one priority of the Alliance. The United States is grateful for the wide participation of our allies in the ISAF, which includes forces from 30 contributing nations. We want ISAF to be a multilateral success story that demonstrates the potential for NATO operations and international cooperation in post-conflict situations. But for ISAF to be considered a success, members of the Alliance must improve their commitment to the operation. ISAF deployments and missions have been delayed or downsized by staffing and equipment shortages.

Eight Provincial Reconstruction Teams have been established outside Kabul. This is a step forward for security, but more teams are needed. The current teams must have the capability to operate extensively outside their bases. Only one of these teams, the German force in Kunduz, was established under the auspices of NATO. Of the remaining seven, five are run by the United States, one by the British, and one by New Zealand.

So far, the ISAF has only deployed 5,500 troops to Afghanistan, most of which remain in Kabul. Securing the country will require many more.

I was concerned, 2 months ago when I read statements by Major General Andrew Leslie, a Canadian who serves as Deputy Commander of ISAF. General Leslie stated, "There are 1.4 million soldiers in NATO. Where are they? Why are so few countries stepping up to the plate? The left hand has made the commitment, but the right hand is not ponying up," from General Leslie. He went on to say, "The status quo will only lead to failure."

Numerous other observers also have expressed concern about the pace and scope of ISAF's security efforts. Our allies must back up their ISAF commitments with sufficient resources, troops, organization, and political will.

Last October, President Bush urged Congress to pass the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act to accelerate and to expand our stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The Congress responded, providing more than what was requested. A total of \$1.6 billion in American assistance is available for Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004. The administration reportedly will seek an additional \$1 billion in assistance for Afghanistan in the fiscal year 2005 budget request.

This committee has been supportive of funding for Afghanistan, and we are anxious to hear from our witnesses about whether

these resources are adequate and whether they can be used efficiently and effectively to stabilize and rebuild the country.

Capturing Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists and destroying their infrastructure are only a part of what is required to win the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. The United States and the international community must not only deny the terrorists a base of operations, they must expose the destructiveness of the terrorist ideology and their violent methods. Every day that Afghanistan moves closer to peace, freedom, tolerance, and economic viability, the terrorists are weakened.

Our witnesses today possess extraordinary expertise concerning our operations in Afghanistan. They provide us with an excellent opportunity to sharpen our understanding of the situation and to exercise the committee's oversight role related to Afghanistan.

We welcome the witnesses, and we look forward to their testimony.

Now, when Senator Biden arrives, he will be recognized for an opening statement. We welcome Senator Hagel and Senator Nelson this morning.

And I call now on you, General Jones, for your testimony.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, USMC, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE (SACEUR), SUPREME HEAD-QUARTERS, ALLIED POWERS EUROPE, MONS, BELGIUM**

General JONES. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it's a great honor and a very special pleasure to be with you today to discuss NATO's work and its mission in Afghanistan.

I'm particularly pleased to be reunited with my friend and colleague of many years, Ambassador Taylor. We have known each other for almost 20 years now, I guess, Bill. It's a great pleasure to be here, side by side, on this very special day.

Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me, I'd like to just take a few minutes to set the context of NATO's involvement in Afghanistan by—since this is the first time I've had the pleasure of appearing before your committee—to say a few things about NATO, in general, and then I'll get more specific with regard to Afghanistan.

As we all know, NATO is the transatlantic link that binds Europe and North America in a truly unique and historical security alliance. It remains the preeminent security alliance in the world today. And it would not be an overstatement to say that NATO is currently undergoing the most significant transformation in its 50-year history.

Very simply put, the Alliance is transforming from an organization whose primary mission was the territorial defense of Western Europe to one that is more agile, more capable, and more able to act proactively against the numerous transnational threats inherent in today's international security environment.

In making this historical transformation, NATO is taking steps to exploit emerging technologies, to incorporate new operational concepts, to implement dramatic and far-reaching institutional reforms, and to adopt modern business practices in the use of its resources.

Today, the Alliance is focused on security challenges in areas of instability well beyond its traditional area of interest, and is undertaking operations that are global in scale for the first time.

The Alliance has conducted six highly successful operations just this past year. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Stabilization Force made significant progress toward completing its military tasks under the Dayton Accords. NATO's Kosovo Force, or KFOR, continues to provide security in the region and to assist the United Nations interim administration in Kosovo. We have supported the very successful Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; conducted the first Article IV operation during Operation DISPLAY DETERRENCE, when the Alliance deployed NATO airborne early warning aircraft to Turkey; and continues maritime interdiction operations in the Mediterranean with Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, which is contributing significantly to the global war on terrorism.

Perhaps the most far-reaching operation that NATO assumed this past year was its assumption of the international community's mission in Afghanistan, known as the International Security and Assistance Force, or ISAF.

ISAF was created by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1336, in December 2001, to assist the recently formed Afghan Transitional Authority, ATA, in the maintenance and security of Kabul and the surrounding areas so that the Transitional Authority and U.N. personnel could operate in a secure environment.

ISAF was initially built around the lead-nation concept. The first mission in Kabul was led by the United Kingdom—it was known as ISAF I; followed by Turkey, ISAF II; Germany and the Netherlands, ISAF III. And NATO first became involved with ISAF in response to a request from Germany and the Netherlands for planning and support of ISAF III. In August 2003, NATO, in effect, became the lead for all future ISAF missions when it took command through Headquarters Allied Forces North in Kabul, Afghanistan. The NATO command in Kabul currently comprises 17 NATO nations and 14 non-NATO nations consisting of approximately 6,000 personnel.

Today, ISAF and the Afghan National Army routinely conduct joint patrols in the streets of Kabul, projecting a positive image of security, teamwork, and partnership. In addition, there are hundreds of civil-military projects dedicated to local administration, infrastructure, reconstruction, rehabilitations of schools and medical facilities, restoration of water supply, health, education, and agricultural technical assistance. All instill a new sense of hope among the population in and around Kabul.

ISAF plays an important role in the international community's long-term reconstruction efforts, especially in support of the G8's Security Sector Reform, SSR, efforts. In order to achieve SSR, the G8 nations have identified five pillars they believe essential to this effort. These pillars include demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration, otherwise known as DDR—this is led by Japan; judicial reform, led by Italy; counter-narcotics, led by the United Kingdom; police training, led by Germany, and support to the training of the Afghan National Army, led by the United States.

Key to these efforts is the Provincial Reconstruction Team concept, otherwise known as PRTs. PRTs fundamentally have two components. The civilian element, composed of members of the Afghan Transition Authority, U.N. personnel and non-governmental organization, and they focus on implementing the SSR process. The second element is a military element, which provides the security that helps set the condition allowing the civilian element to achieve its objectives.

There are currently nine active PRTs in Afghanistan: the German-led PRT, which is under ISAF, as of January of this year; and eight PRTs under the Combined Joint Task Force-180, which is a U.S. task force; one of these eight PRTs is British led, one is led by New Zealand, and the other six, by the United States.

On the 30th of September 2003, ISAF assumed the operational control of the German-led PRT in the Kunduz province. The assumption and control of this PRT is to be seen as a pilot program for NATO. It is believed that the expansion of PRTs throughout the provinces will play an essential role in allowing Afghanistan to attain a self-sustaining level of security, stability, and reconstruction.

The North Atlantic Council has asked the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers of Europe to develop a plan for the expansion of the ISAF mission. This work is currently underway at my headquarters in SHAPE. And while we have not yet selected an exact framework for how ISAF will expand, I can tell you the process will likely be one built around a graduated-phased approach tiered to a properly resourced and capability-based force. Specifically, our instructions from the North Atlantic Council direct me to develop a plan for expanding the ISAF mission that can support up to five Provincial Reconstruction Teams. We will also include the ability to expand beyond the directed five PRTs if the Alliance directs us to do so. Key to this planning process are the lessons learned from the PRTs currently in effect and operating in Afghanistan.

General John Abizaid, who is responsible for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, and his Central Command personnel have been immensely helpful in our ability to conduct the current ISAF mission, and equally supportive of our ongoing planning efforts to expand ISAF. In fact, there is a 2-day ISAF planning conference at my headquarters in SHAPE that concludes today, and CENTCOM planners, from its headquarters in Afghanistan, are there in attendance. This cooperative environment in current operations and in the planning of future missions is really the cornerstone of ISAF expansion. NATO's ability to expand the ISAF mission will rely on the proper construction and the operation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

The PRT concept will enable ISAF to facilitate and create an environment that allows for reconstruction and nation-building activities to proceed. Each PRT will be designed to meet specific requirements relative to security, terrain and socioeconomic condition in its region. In this way, the properly sized, efficient military PRT element, working in close cooperation and synchronized with a civilian element, can have a significant effect and influence on a considerable geographic portion of Afghanistan.

We intend to use PRTs as the platform for Security Sector Reform and the activities of the United Nations and the G8 SSR lead nations in order to build Afghan security capabilities and further reinforce the community perceptions of effective, reliable, and accountable governance in the provinces.

Mr. Chairman, I have spoken about the NATO process of deciding how to work in Afghanistan because this mission is a clear demonstration of NATO's new missions in the new century. There is a high level of political ambition among NATO nations to succeed in these missions. But they, as ISAF shows, are complex, expensive, and demanding. We need to proceed with care, but also with resolve, since we cannot fail, either as a nation or as an alliance. Afghanistan is the current test, but there will be others. With your support and that of your committee and other nations, I am confident that we will be successful.

And I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.  
[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, USMC

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the transatlantic link that binds Europe and North America in a unique defense and security alliance. It remains the preeminent security alliance in the world. It would not be an overstatement to say that NATO is currently undergoing the most significant transformation in its over 50-year history. Simply put—the Alliance is transforming from an organization whose primary mission was the territorial defense of Western Europe to one that is more agile, capable, and able to act proactively against the numerous trans-national threats inherent in today's international security environment. In making this transformation, NATO is taking steps to exploit emerging technologies, to incorporate new operational concepts, to implement institutional reforms, and to adopt modern business practices.

Today, the Alliance is focused on security challenges and areas of instability well beyond its traditional area of interest, and is undertaking operations that are global in scale. The Alliance conducted six highly successful operations last year. In Bosnia Herzegovina, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) made significant progress towards completing its tasks under the Dayton Accords; NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) continues to provide security in the region, and to assist the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo; supported the very successful Operation CONCORDIA in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; conducted the first Article IV operation during DISPLAY DETERRENCE when the Alliance deployed NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft to Turkey; and continues maritime interdiction operations in the Mediterranean Sea with ACTIVE ENDEAVOR which is contributing significantly to the GWOT. Perhaps the most far-reaching operation that NATO assumed this past year was its assumption of the international community's mission in Afghanistan, known as the International Security and Assistance Force or ISAF.

ISAF was created by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1336 in December 2001, to assist the recently formed Afghan Transitional Authority (TA) in the maintenance and security of Kabul and its surrounding area so that the Afghan TA and UN personnel could operate in a secure environment.

ISAF was initially constituted on a "lead nation" concept. The first mission in Kabul was led by the United Kingdom (ISAF I) followed by Turkey (ISAF II), Germany and the Netherlands (ISAF III). NATO first became involved with ISAF in response to a request from Germany and the Netherlands for planning and support for ISAF III. In August 2003, NATO became the "lead" for all future ISAF missions when it took command through Headquarters Allied Forces North (AFNORTH) in Kabul, Afghanistan. The NATO command in Kabul currently comprises 17 NATO nations and 14 non-NATO nations consisting of over 6,000 personnel.

Today, ISAF and the Afghan National Army routinely conduct joint patrols in the streets of Kabul, projecting a positive image of security, teamwork and partnership. In addition, hundreds of civil-military projects dedicated to local administration, infrastructure reconstruction, rehabilitation of schools and medical facilities, restoration of the water supply, health, education, and agricultural technical assistance—all instill a new sense of hope among the civilian population in and around Kabul.

ISAF plays an important role in the international communities' long-term reconstruction efforts, especially in support of the G8's Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts. In order to achieve SSR, the G8 nations have identified five pillars they believe essential to this effort. These pillars include: Demobilization, Demilitarization, and Reintegration or DDR, led by Japan; Judicial Reform, led by Italy; Counter-Narcotics, led by the United Kingdom; Police Training, led by Germany; and support to the training of the Afghan National Army, led by the United States.

Key to the SSR effort is the Provincial Reconstruction Teams or PRTs. PRTs have two components; The civilian element, composed of members of the Afghan Transition Authority, UN personnel and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), focuses on implementing the SSR process. Second, the military element provides the security that helps set the conditions allowing for the civilian element to achieve its objectives. There are currently nine active PRTs in Afghanistan: the German-led PRT under ISAF command; and eight PRTs under Combined Joint Task Force-180: one British led, one New Zealand led, and six U.S. led.

On 30 December 2003, ISAF assumed operational control of the German led PRT in the Kunduz province. The assumption of control of this PRT is seen as a pilot program for NATO. It is believed that the expansion of PRT's throughout the provinces will play an essential role in allowing Afghanistan to attain a self-sustaining level of security, stability and reconstruction.

The North Atlantic Council has asked SHAPE Headquarters to develop a plan for the expansion of the ISAF mission. This work is currently underway at SHAPE, and while we have not yet selected an exact framework for how ISAF will expand, I can tell you the process will likely be one built around a graduated-phased approach tied to a properly resourced, and capability-based force. Specifically, our instructions from the North Atlantic Council direct SHAPE to develop a plan for expanding the ISAF mission that can support up to five PRTs. We will also include the ability to expand beyond the directed five PRTs if the Alliance decides to do so. Key to our planning process is the lessons learned from the PRTs currently operating in Afghanistan.

General John Abizaid, who is responsible for Operation Enduring Freedom, and his Central Command personnel in Afghanistan have been immensely helpful in our ability to conduct the current ISAF mission, and equally supportive of our ongoing planning efforts to expand ISAF. In fact, there is a two-day ISAF planning conference at SHAPE that concludes today, and CENTCOM planners from its headquarters in Afghanistan are in attendance. This cooperative environment in current operations and in the planning of future missions is the cornerstone to ISAF's expansion. NATO's ability to expand the ISAF mission will rely on the proper construction and operation of PRTs.

The PRT concept will enable ISAF to facilitate an environment that allows for reconstruction and nation-building activities to proceed. Each PRT will be designed to meet specific requirements relative to security, terrain and socio-economic conditions in its region. In this way, a correctly sized, efficient military PRT element working in close cooperation and synchronized with a civilian element, can have a significant influence and effect on a considerable geographic area of Afghanistan. We intend to use PRTs as the platform for Security Sector Reform activities of the United Nations and the G8 SSR lead nations in order to build Afghan security capacities and further reinforce the community perceptions of effective, reliable and accountable governance in the provinces.

Mr. Chairman, I have spoken about the NATO process of deciding how to work in Afghanistan because this mission is a clear demonstration of NATO's new missions in the new century. There is a high level of political ambition among the NATO nations to succeed in these missions. But they, as ISAF shows, are complex, expensive, and demanding. We need to proceed with care but also with resolve, since we cannot fail, either as a nation or an alliance. Afghanistan is the current test, but there will be others. With your support, and that of your counterparts in the other nations, I am confident we will succeed.

Mr. Chairman I am prepared to answer your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Jones, for your testimony.

The Chair calls now on Ambassador William Taylor.

**STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM B. TAYLOR JR., COORDINATOR  
FOR AFGHANISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASH-  
INGTON, DC**

Ambassador TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to be back, sir. I was here in front of you a couple of months ago, and so it's an opportunity to give you an update. There have been some things that have happened in Afghanistan that have made the glass a little bit fuller. It's not quite full, you won't be surprised to know.

There are hurdles that we need to accomplish, to get over. General Jones has indicated the challenges, in particular on the security side, which, as he indicated and as you indicated, Mr. Chairman, make the other work possible.

Mr. Chairman, if I can just summarize my statement and comment on some of the items that you raised in your opening statement, I would like to just draw the attention to two parts of what we're doing in Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. The statement will be published in full in the record.

Ambassador TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.

You mentioned, and in my statement I talk about, the stabilization phase, which we are in in the political side, in the economic side, as well as in the security side. And then you also mentioned solidifying these programs. And I talked about that in my statement, in terms of institutionalizing that progress so that it can be sustained over time. We have to do some of the institutionalization, the solidifying, at the same time we are working on the stabilization. And the stabilization moves into a solidifying program in each of these areas—in political, economic, and security—and will take some time.

You mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that there is a request, or will be a formal request, for additional funds for our work in Afghanistan that will come up in the President's budget next week. We urge you to take a serious look at this and fully support it. And if there's anything that we can do to answer questions about that, we're very eager to do that.

If I can just say just a little bit on the two pieces of—that is, the stabilization work and the solidification, in your term, or the institutionalization that I have. We began the stabilization work on the political side as soon as the Taliban and al-Qaeda were pushed out of Afghanistan at the end of 2001. The Bonn Agreement, the Emergency Loya Jirga, were elements of that stabilization. And, as you indicated, Mr. Chairman, the Constitution that was just agreed—actually signed yesterday, but agreed on the 4th of January by the 502 members of the loya jirga—is a good first start. It, however, will only be good if it is fully implemented. I mean, there are some—as you indicated, some good things in that. This is a good Constitution. It's a good piece of paper. But it will be more than a piece of paper only if the rights, if the responsibilities, if the organization that are included in that document are actually implemented. And we will be pushing, but this is going to be an important caveat, I believe.

The election is the next big phase—again, that you indicated earlier—and there are big challenges to accomplish that election by

June. The constitution requires the Government of Afghanistan and the U.N. and international community to make every effort to have the two elections—that is the Presidential and parliamentary elections—simultaneous, at the same time, next summer. That will be hard, but that is what the Constitution calls for at the outset. Now, if it's impossible, practically impossible, then there will be other decisions that will have to be made.

On the economic reconstruction, Mr. Chairman, again, we have a stabilization phase and a solidification phase—again, in your words. To stabilize the economy, we and the international community have put in a large amount of assistance to jumpstart the economy. The economy actually is jumpstarted. The IMF reports that it's 30 percent growth last year, 20 percent growth this year—from a very, very low base, I hasten to say—but that's a good start for economic stabilization.

Also in that economic stabilization, I would put the road that you mentioned. We completed—since we last spoke, since I was last up here in front of your committee, USAID completed the first layer of asphalt from Kabul to Kandahar, a major accomplishment that many people said could not be done. But you asked, in October, whether it was done, and I was fairly confident that it was, and we were able to accomplish that.

Those are good first starts, but, as you indicated, there's more to it. There's the solidification, there's the solidification and institutionalization of economic growth that needs to take place following the stabilization. And those, we're talking about the banking laws, and we're talking about dispute settlement resolutions, mechanisms. We're talking about mechanisms that will allow the private sector, both in Afghanistan and the international private sector, to invest in the economy and make it move. That's where the real economic growth is going to come through.

Mr. Chairman, the last is security, and General Jones has given an excellent overview, in particular focusing on the PRTs. But, again, the stabilization—which is still ongoing, there's a lot to be done to push back on the Taliban, who are coming across the border still, are attacking unarmed assistance workers, attacking U.N. workers, attacking engineers on that road that you mentioned. That job is clearly not done. There are problems with narcotics, counter-narcotics work needs to be focused. The warlords and other strongmen in the area, who continue to harass the people of Afghanistan. I would put all of these in the area of stabilization, before we get to the institutionalization.

We are making some progress. We're starting on the institutionalization of the security sector. General Jones mentioned both the police and the Afghan National Army, training and institutionalization of two professional forces that are complementary, and this is going reasonably well. We are, again, facing some hurdles, facing some problems in both of those, but we are making progress. I don't want to, again, be too rosy about the overall effort, but I think, in general, we are going in the right direction.

Mr. Chairman, the President, last week, said that "America is honored to be the friend of Afghanistan," and this is clearly the case, and I think he spoke for the country. As their friend, as the friend of Afghanistan, we need to assure the Afghan people, and

other people who are watching what we do in Afghanistan, that this time we will see the mission through. We didn't before, and we need to assure that we do this time.

And I look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Taylor follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, JR.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to update the committee on our program to accelerate reconstruction in Afghanistan.

Our objective in Afghanistan is clear: to help the Afghan people build a responsible, self-sustaining market democracy that will never again harbor terrorists. Our national security requires that we stay the course until we and the Afghan people have achieved this goal.

When I addressed the committee last October I offered my frank assessment of the hurdles we face as we work toward that objective but also of the progress we are making. At that time the glass was by no means full, but it was far from empty.

I am pleased to report today that while many hurdles remain, the glass is measurably fuller today than it was four months ago. Congressional support has been crucial. The supplemental funding approved by Congress last fall is helping to underwrite a far-reaching program to accelerate the reconstruction of Afghanistan—and that effort is already bearing fruit. The FY04 appropriation that you passed last week will also help. I seek your full support for the FY05 request that the President will send up shortly.

Mr. Chairman, we can usefully think of our effort in Afghanistan in two overlapping phases: stabilization and institutionalization. In each of the three tracks of reconstruction—political, economic and security—we need to stabilize the sector and then build lasting institutions. These institutions take time to build but are crucial if the Afghan people are to build a self-sustaining market democracy.

POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION

The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 and the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002 began to stabilize governance in the immediate aftermath of the victory over the Taliban. Hamid Karzai was selected to head the transitional government and a cabinet was drawn from the many factions of Afghan society. The Constitutional Loya Jirga that finished up on January 4 represents a huge step forward to institutionalize political progress toward an Afghan democracy—part of our objective.

The new constitution took shape through a representative process. It was drafted by a nine-member committee of Afghans last winter, reviewed by a 35-member Afghan commission starting last March, revised following nationwide public consultations that began in June, and ultimately ratified by 502 Afghan delegates to the Constitutional Loya Jirga—an event that was beamed live on TV and radio to Afghan households. About 20 percent of the delegates were women, and the debates included hard bargaining on clauses relating to parliamentary powers and the rights of minorities, including official languages.

At the end of the day, the Constitutional Loya Jirga approved the first nationally mandated constitution in 40 years—a constitution that Afghans can be proud of and that can provide a solid framework on which to build the functioning elements of a stable democracy.

The next big step toward institutionalizing democracy is the election scheduled for this summer. Registration is underway, with the UN reporting that some 500,000 voters—out of an estimated 10.5 million—have been registered to date. The UN is already behind in registration—a million and a half voters should have been registered by now. The Afghan government, the UN, the international community and the U.S. government are now straining to pick up the pace of registration so that the election can take place in June.

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

To stabilize the economy, the international community has provided large amounts of foreign aid to jump start economic growth and begin to rebuild economic infrastructure. The Afghan economy grew at 30 percent last year, and is growing at 20 percent this year—from an exceedingly low base. Since we last spoke in October, USAID completed a layer of pavement on the Kabul-to-Kandahar road, allowing vehicles to travel between the two cities in less than six hours. Survey and design work is already underway for the Kandahar-Herat stretch of the road and the topographic surveys of that section are 80 percent complete.

Also in December Afghanistan completed repair work on the Salang Tunnel, a critical mountain pass linking Kabul to its northern provinces.

It would be hard to overstate the significance of new roads in drawing the country together politically and economically and in offering Afghans a visible sign of progress and hope. Certainly the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat ring road has been a major priority for President Karzai, so much so that he escorted a contingent of delegates from the Constitutional Loya Jirga to the ribbon cutting ceremony for the Kabul-Kandahar leg.

Over the last three months the impact of U.S.-funded irrigation projects has almost tripled, going from coverage of about 55,000 hectares to almost 150,000 hectares.

These projects have begun to stabilize the Afghan economy, but sustained economic growth requires massive, private-sector investment, investment that will not come until the economic foundations of a market economy are put in place. Investment law, a commercial code, banking laws, commercial standards, dispute settlement mechanisms—these establish the economic and regulatory framework necessary for real growth. Some are in place, but sustained effort to create the investment climate capable of attracting foreign and domestic investors will be necessary for years to come.

#### SECURITY

In the security sector, stabilization requires the continued pursuit of terrorists who oppose and threaten the Karzai government, the steady removal of local strongmen who harass the Afghan people, the disarming of local militias and the firm crackdown on narcotics cultivation and trafficking. We have made progress—disarmament is picking up momentum—but stabilization in the security sector has a long way to go.

We have seen progress towards militia disarmament in recent months. In November, Japan and the UN completed the first DDR pilot program in Kunduz, disarming over 1000 combatants and collecting a corresponding number of individual and crew-served weapons. In the reintegration phase approximately two-thirds of the demobilized combatants requested agricultural assistance, job placement, or vocational training.

The Gardez DDR pilot program was completed in December, resulting in nearly 600 combatants registering and turning in their weapons. DDR has also begun in Mazar-e-Sharif, and is scheduled to begin in Kandahar next month.

We have also seen real progress in Kabul. On January 15, ISAF coordinated the transfer of over 100 heavy weapons belonging to the Northern Alliance out of Kabul, including multiple rocket launchers, antitank guns and artillery. Over 800 of the verified 2000 combatants identified for the pilot program have been disarmed and demobilized in Kabul.

Even as we continue to stabilize the security environment, however, we must be working to build Afghan security institutions.

We have trained an additional 1,300 Afghan National Army recruits since October putting ANA strength at 5,780 with over 2,100 more soldiers in training. We reached a major milestone just this month: the capacity to train three battalions simultaneously. That capacity is essential to our goal under the acceleration program of reaching a troop strength of 10,000 by the time of elections this summer.

Over 1,200 new recruits are awaiting training in Kabul—an ethnically diverse group representing 26 of 32 provinces. These recruits are the result of a strengthened recruitment effort in the provinces. Ten new recruitment centers are partly or fully operational and twenty-four more are planned.

Our police-training programs also entered a new phase over the last four months. With new resources available under the supplemental appropriation, we are building seven new regional training centers for national, border and highway police. The training center in Kabul is already complete and centers in Mazar-e-Sharif, Gardez, Kandahar and Kunduz are under construction and will reach full capacity of 750 trainees by the end of next month.

All-told, since last October, German and U.S. police-programs have trained over 2000 new national police officers and over 200 highway patrol officers. With the added capacity of the new training centers coming on line, this puts us on track to reach our goal of fielding 20,000 police officers by the time elections take place next summer.

#### PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

As I reported in October, we are also working with our partners in the international community to deploy civil-military teams around the country to enhance se-

curity, accelerate reconstruction and extend the reach of the central government into the provinces. These provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) contribute to both stabilization and institution building.

In December we established four new PRTs—in Parwan, Herat, Kandahar and Jalalabad, bringing the total number of PRTs to eight. By the end of next month we expect to establish another four PRTs—in Ghazni, Asadabad, Khowst and Qalat. Over the last few months these PRTs have been instrumental in facilitating preparations for the Constitutional Loya Jirga, assisting voter registration teams, defusing tensions among rival militias and supporting DDR efforts and police training. We are examining options for expanding their number still further and encouraging NATO/ISAF to establish additional PRTs.

#### EMBASSY STAFFING

Finally, we are well on our way toward building the team at our Embassy to manage the accelerated reconstruction effort. Ambassador Khalilzad presented his credentials to President Karzai on November 27, 2003, and is being joined by a team of senior advisors to help him implement the acceleration program.

#### CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, we are still very much in the stabilization phase—hunting Taliban and Al Qaeda, jump-starting the economy. Even as these efforts continue, however, we are starting to build the institutions—a constitutional government, credible elections, loyal army and police forces—that will move Afghanistan toward the self-sustaining market democracy that we seek and the Afghan people deserve.

As the President said last week:

The men and women of Afghanistan are building a nation that is free, and proud and fighting terror—and America is honored to be their friend.

As their friend, we need to assure the Afghan people that, this time, we will see this important mission through to success.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador Taylor.

We have good attendance by members today, but we also have lots of questions, so we'll have an initial 10-minute round and then perhaps proceed with another round if there are additional questions of members.

Let me begin by observing that an average American looking at Afghanistan through the press, I think, still sees, essentially, an Afghanistan that is divided into areas controlled by so-called warlords. Circles of influence are placed upon a map, with Kabul as a story by itself. This road that you've described at least offers some entry into the hinterland. Beyond that, a war continues on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. These are principally United States military people fighting that war, even as the NATO groups work in Kabul and move out, as we've described today.

The narcotics situation that you've mentioned appears to be very prominent and growing, maybe because there's less repression, and more ingenuity. Whatever the reason, there are great difficulties there. There is a sense of, not quite hopelessness about the security situation, but the election in June is seen as a bridge way too far. This is a country in which very few people have been registered as voters. The normal format for voting simply has not taken place, and this is already January 27. Frequently the criticism is made that the United States simply has not done enough—nor have the United States and NATO and our allies. Somehow we are hopeful that it will all work out, and we are committing some resources to it. However, in comparison, for instance, to the reconstruction effort in Iraq, Afghanistan is clearly several steps behind—in terms

of emphasis, in terms of resources, personnel—and, not quite an afterthought, but a country to one which more thought has been given in the last few months than had been given for some time before.

All of this leaves the situation in Afghanistan in the balance. It might work out well, but, on the other hand, it might not. It's not really clear, if you're looking at the situation, whether we are winning or losing, how Afghanistan finally is going to fare. The commitment is there, but is it enough? Is it concerted? Is there an overall plan? Do we have really a good idea? Someone—that is, the President of the United States or Secretary General of the United Nations or the head of NATO or somebody—must discern comprehensively how this is going to work out.

This is broadly cast, but I would like both of you to give some idea of why you have confidence that, in the end result, Afghanistan will have a democracy; that the constitution, in fact, will go into effect; that the promises to women that have been involved in this and have been very prominent, in fact are going to occur, notwithstanding backsliding in the warlord areas, notwithstanding attacks such as the attack on the Canadian who was killed in Kabul yesterday in what clearly is still a recurring situation, and not withstanding terrorist attacks upon NATO people, quite apart from United States combatants. Why should we have confidence this is going to work out well? Why should we devote more resources to that fight?

General Jones, would you address that, first of all, from the security standpoint? And Ambassador Taylor, from all the other standpoints?

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, I think that, from my vantage point as a NATO commander and working with General Abizaid in a very close way, I think the United States can be very proud of the work it's done thus far to date, particularly in the military operations. We are not fighting an enemy that is going to be victorious, in military sense; we are fighting essentially an insurgency. We're fighting against different factions, who have some military capability to psychologically demoralize us, but will not prevent us militarily from being successful.

I think General Abizaid would tell you, if he were here, that the number of al-Qaeda, the estimated number of al-Qaeda has been significantly attrited over the past year.

NATO has decided that it wishes to create abilities, as a result of the Prague summit, that will allow it to be more effective in global missions, certainly well beyond the traditional borders of NATO, and has established a footprint in Kabul with a limited mission, but, nonetheless, an important mission, because Kabul represents the center of gravity, truly, for the country—and very shortly after establishing that footprint, in August of last year, decided to expand its reach to include the Kunduz province, under a German-led PRT that is fairly robust and somewhat of an exciting departure from the traditional NATO missions. And now I have received guidance from the North Atlantic Council that it wishes to even do more.

So that is a basis for optimism, at least at the political level, because it is something that the Alliance is committed to doing. The

new Secretary General is lending the influence of his office toward accelerating the process. And it really is the mission that NATO has signed up to at the political level.

We have had, it must be said, some difficulty in generating the military forces that support the political level of ambition, but I believe—and I'm hopeful—that as the operational plan is developed, that it will be developed in such a way that the military requirements to support the level of ambition will be clearly identified and laid before the nations in such a way that they can embrace it and understand it and support it over a measured period of time, and gradually expand, as they have directed the military component of the Alliance to gradually expand the influence, the reach of the Alliance, and bring, I think, great and welcome help to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in the U.S.-led portion of the mission.

So my optimism would be genuine, with one caveat, the caveat being that the military component of the political level of ambition must be resourced and supported. And to the extent that that will be done, I think we can have a profoundly significant effect in the PRT concept, which is, I think, an exciting way in which the government can expand its reach and provide for more security, stability, and reconstruction in Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor.

Ambassador TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I agree exactly with General Jones about the cause for optimism that NATO brings us, allows us to feel. That is, this is a serious institution that is focused now, is committed, and the new Secretary General has indicated this is the top of his priority. That gives me confidence that, on the security side, if we resource it, if we keep our focus on Afghanistan, and if NATO does what it is intending to, is planning to do, if the nations of that Alliance come up to the plate with resources, then, on the security side, we can do that.

Your question also went over to the constitution, to narcotics, to warlords, and the security for the election. My sense, Mr. Chairman, is, again, if we, the international community—if we, through the United Nations, which is strongly committed and is very competent in Afghanistan—are able to, again, keep our focus and bring the resources, then we will be able to prevail, over time. As I indicated earlier, this is not a short-term effort. None of these problems that you described are amenable to short-term solutions. The Governors in provinces, some of whom are not loyal to the center—some people call them warlords—one by one, President Karzai is replacing them. He replaced several more over the weekend, or moved them around, took them from one base of support and took them out of that to somewhere else. He is replacing Governors that have not performed. So there are measures being taken on that. We support President Karzai. We have a government.

The other reason for optimism is, in Afghanistan there's a government that we support, headed up by a very popular leader.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have control over the funds? Are you able to prioritize where our money is going?

Ambassador TAYLOR. You say, do I have control over the funds?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Ambassador TAYLOR. I work very closely, of course, with Secretary Armitage, Deputy Secretary Armitage, and he and I, I be-

lieve it is fair to say, do have control over the funds, but he is the principal man in the State Department who has that control.

Mr. Chairman, you also asked about narcotics. This is a problem that we cannot be, at this point, sanguine about. What we have to do is focus our efforts, and we are doing that, both on the civilian side, with training for the police, which will lead to enforcement of laws that are not now being enforced, and that will lead to, eventually, a reduction. I'm hopeful that next year we will see a reduction, instead of another increase, in the number of hectares under cultivation.

You asked if the United States is doing enough. We could always do more. We are asking you, as you indicated, the Congress, for additional resources next year. We will probably come in the year after that for additional resources. If we can maintain the current level, or even increase it, then we can have expectation, we can be optimistic, in your words, that we will be able to go into—from the stabilization phase into the institutionalization phase, that we will be able to get an economy that can generate the revenues, that will have security forces that can provide stability for the Afghan people, and the political institutions that will allow this government to go into elections and stabilize that part.

So I do have that optimism. We cannot fail. Failure is not an option. It's still possible. We've failed in the past. We could lose our focus, we could lose our attention, so it's still possible, but it is not an option. We need to focus on this thing.

The Taliban, Mr. Chairman, have a saying that I've heard a couple of times in the past couple of months, and that is, "The Americans have the watches, and we have the time." We need to be sure that they are wrong. We need to prove them wrong. We need to show them that we are going to stay there, that they can't outlast us, that we are going to achieve this goal that we've set out on.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jones, I want to compliment you on the job that you're doing in internationalizing the force; and it apparently is working. We have approximately 11,000 troops, U.S. troops, there now in Afghanistan. Is that correct? Do you see that amount being maintained at a level amount for the next year?

General JONES. Senator, it's my understanding, from talking to General Abizaid, that that level of effort will stay fairly constant, subject to reevaluation as NATO adds its own force list. But I think that, from my perspective right now, I would say that it's probably fair to say that it would stay fairly constant for the foreseeable future.

Senator NELSON. What would be your opinion about the interest of the United States being advanced if, say, we doubled the number of U.S. troops there?

General JONES. Well, if we're able to add more troops to the conflict, I think that the central—I think General Abizaid would consider the types of troops that he needed. I think, based on the security environment, he might wish to, for instance, aid—have the type of troops that would be helpful for the reconstruction, more than the combat, depending on the security mission.

On the other hand, if the combat requirements along the border for some reason intensify, and he's able to dedicate—he judges that it's more to our effort to—more to our interest to deliver a death blow finally, once and for all, to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, then he could come in with a different type of recommendation. But, obviously, whether they're NATO troops or U.S. troops, if you bring more to the table, you might be able to accelerate the outcome.

Senator NELSON. Do you anticipate, in the next year, the increase of NATO troops there?

General JONES. Senator, I am engaged in developing an operational plan for the Alliance that will be ready sometime next month, and if the Alliance wishes to proceed with getting more involved in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and expand the ISAF mission beyond Kunduz and Kabul, which I believe the Alliance has shown a political will to do, that will be accompanied by an increase of NATO troops in commitment and capability.

Senator NELSON. And the leadership that you're offering is outstanding, general, as you remake a lot of the old NATO into the new NATO, and certainly this is the application of that and it can help the interest of the United States; indeed, the world.

Final question. In the approximately 2 years that we've been in Afghanistan, give me the approximate level, U.S. troop level, say, at the end of the first year; and now at the end of the second year it's at 11,000.

General JONES. Sir, if I could provide that for the record, I just don't have it off the top of my head, from a NATO perspective, but I will—I'll get that for the record. I want to be exact in that response.

Senator NELSON. OK.

[The following response was subsequently supplied.]

On 31 December 2002, at the end of our first year of conventional operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, we had nearly 9,000 U.S. military personnel on the ground in Afghanistan. (Actual number for 31 Dec 02 was 8,989.) On 31 December 2003, at the end of our second year, the total number of U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan was just over 12,000. (Actual number for 31 Dec 03 was 12,004.)

While our forces deployed to ensure security and stability within Afghanistan remained relatively constant throughout 2003, we did deploy additional U.S. Marine ground and aviation units late in 2003 to support contingency operations. We also assumed additional civil/military responsibilities to mentor Afghani governmental agencies, train and develop the Afghan National Army, and assist in developing their aging infrastructure. The additional force structure we deployed in 2003 enabled us to establish a viable command structure in Afghanistan to oversee operations throughout Central Asia, as well as an Office of Military Cooperation based in Kabul. We also deployed a task force of nearly 800 engineers, and doubled our existing civil/military affairs, psychological operations and training support teams that number nearly 1,400 in Afghanistan today.

Supporting Data: The 3,000 delta between Dec 2002 and Dec 2003 includes:

- USMC ground forces (2/8 Inf) +975
- USMC aviation forces (HMLA 773) +275
- TF Gryphon (Engineers) +800
- CFC-A +175
- OMC-A +100
- CJMOTF +525
- JPOTF +150

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. The implication of my questions are, can the interest of the United States, in stabi-

lizing Afghanistan, which is clearly necessary, can it be promoted with a larger force? And I think that's a question that we should constantly ask, on this committee and on the Armed Services Committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Good question. And we thank you for your willingness to supply it for the record, general.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Welcome, Ambassador Taylor and General Jones.

General Jones, I appreciated very much the opportunity to be with your colleagues at NATO in Brussels last week, and, during that 2-day visit, learned a great deal about some of the issues that you have focused on this morning, as well as Ambassador Taylor. So thank you.

General, I'd like to pick up on a couple of the questions that Senator Nelson addressed, and that is resource capability.

I have heard reports that, in fact, the commitments made by NATO nations engaged now in ISAF operations have not been forthcoming in the way of manpower, resources, and those commitments have not been fulfilled. Could you address that question?

General JONES. Yes, sir, I can. It is true, we're working on a current characteristic of not only the mission in Afghanistan, but all NATO missions, with regard to what we call the force-generation process. The way NATO functions is that, as the NAC—the North Atlantic Council gives guidance to the military component, which is the one I'm honored to lead, we develop concepts of operations, which are then reviewed and approved; then we develop an operational plan, which is reviewed and approved by the military committee and the North Atlantic Council; and then we go off into what we call the force-generation mode, and that's the convocation of all nations now to put the substance where the political will is.

And, generally speaking, historically, we've had a difficult time generating the force that the military commander says is necessary for a mission. We always seem to come up a little bit short. It always takes a little bit longer than we wish.

But as NATO is pivoting almost 180 degrees into the wind to try to tackle real-world missions in real time, instead of getting there late, instead of having a very low level of ambition, in terms of what it wishes to do, the level of ambition has now been raised. You cannot go into Afghanistan, for example, with a force that is not properly resourced, from a military standpoint. That's been one of my anchors with regard to expanding the mission, even to Kunduz.

And we know that recently we've had difficulty in generating just seven helicopters to round out the force to support the expanded mission in Kabul. The political will has been stated, the Alliance has agreed, the donor countries have been identified, and yet we find ourselves mired in the administrative details of who's going to pay for it, who's going to transport it, how's it going to be maintained, and it goes on.

This is part, I think, of NATO's task to transform and reform itself in that context, and we simply have to become better and quicker and more efficient at generating the force to support the

operational plan. And I believe this exercise that we're about to go through, with this very ambitious expansion of NATO's mission in Afghanistan, will be a defining moment for the Alliance as to whether we have, in fact, the internal will and discipline to generate the force in a timeframe and a degree of sufficiency that'll allow us to be successful.

I remain optimistic that the political will has spoken. I understand the guidance that I have been given, and I think serious-minded people understand that this is a defining moment for the Alliance, in terms of how it wishes to proceed for at least the next few years in the 21st century, because Afghanistan is in the boardroom of NATO right now. It is public, it is stated. It is not—it is beyond question that we're going to do—we have the appetite to do some things. Outside the boardroom, in the corridors of NATO, are ongoing discussions that are perhaps even more ambitious, in terms of future NATO missions in other parts of the world.

So this is a defining moment, and we will work very hard to make sure that we resource the force to support the political level of ambition.

Senator HAGEL. General, thank you. I don't think there's any question that you understand this, and I would suspect all your colleagues do; but every day those resources aren't there, we're losing a day.

General JONES. Exactly.

Senator HAGEL. And I made that point, incidently, when I was in Brussels last week. And I think we all, to your point, have a sense of commitment and will, but it must be matched with those resources. Because what Taylor's trying to accomplish, as he has said and you know better than almost anyone, is directly connected to those resources. But thank you, general, very much.

Ambassador Taylor, on the elections, I wanted to go back to some of your written testimony, where you note that—your words, I'll quote from your written testimony, "Registration is underway, with the U.N. reporting that some 500,000 voters, out of an estimated ten and a half million, have been registered to date." If I understand it correctly, the election has been set for June. What is the realistic assumption here that, in fact, that election is going to take place in June?

Ambassador TAYLOR. Senator Hagel, the Afghan Government, the United Nations, and the international community have focused on June as the date of the election, and that group of entities is working toward that. The Bonn Agreement established June 2004 as the target. The constitution recently adopted, signed yesterday, was—it gave a little more flexibility in actually when that would happen; and we would argue that the Constitution now is the operative guideline for the Government of Afghanistan.

We are still targeted for June. There are a lot of things, as you just indicated, on the voter registration that have to happen. Now, actually, today it's 600,000. That's still not close to where we need to be, but it is an indication that there is movement.

They are about to accelerate—the U.N. is about to accelerate this voter registration. Up until now, they've been registering voters in eight cities around the country. They're about to go to all 32 provinces, so there'll be 32 cities around the country where people will

be able to register. And then when the snows melt and the weather is a little better, in the spring, they will go to a phase 3 that will go out to many of the villages in the rural areas.

So there is a plan. It can happen, at least on the Presidential side—that is, in the Presidential election. The parliamentary election, I think will be more challenging, because essentially you have 32 elections.

There's still dispute, actually, about the number of provinces. There have been a couple of suggestions of a couple of new provinces, and there are also questions and disputes about the districts within the provinces, the boundaries. These are important—as everyone in this building knows—these are important questions about parliamentary elections. You need to know how many states there are, how many districts there are. So these issues need to be resolved, are on the way to being resolved, but it's going to be a challenge.

And, again, in direct answer to your questions, we are targeted on June. We are going through some very realistic planning for this right now. If that has to change as of some period of time in the next couple of months, then the Government of Afghanistan will make that decision.

Senator HAGEL. So there's a possibility that they will move that June date, based on the factors that are required to have a transparent, open, honest election.

Ambassador TAYLOR. It's possible. Yes, sir.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

A question for each of you, ISAF responsibilities—I didn't hear a lot from either one of you, partly because you have limited time and focus on your testimony—regarding the eastern border of Afghanistan, specifically the border with Pakistan, that south/south-eastern/eastern part of Afghanistan that is the most dangerous, the most troublesome.

Questions. Are we looking at moving NATO-sponsored PRTs down in that area, cooperation we're getting from the Pakistani Government? Maybe both of you could each round out the general question here about that part of Afghanistan.

Thank you.

General JONES. Senator, from just the pure theoretical construct of how NATO might proceed—as you know, NATO's general level of ambition and missions is centered around the words security, stability, reconstruction, and the like, and this will be the focus of NATO's mission. We are doing an analysis right now, working closely with the Central Command, as to the regions, to better understand the regions in Afghanistan that are ready for PRT-like establishment and presence. And the commander of the U.S. Central Command has suggested that since we've started in the north, that it would be good to stabilize the north with PRTs that might be NATO-led, depending on how we wish to proceed, but gradually take over the—go from north to south, and then, subsequently, to the east, from a NATO perspective.

This is all work in progress right now. But it's clear that the border regions are the one where the combat operations are, and they're the most unstable. But I think we'll just have to wait and see how NATO wishes to proceed, based on the ongoing work that

we're doing with U.S. Central Command as to what's the best way to do this.

But we are really doing detailed analysis of what are the regions and what are the areas that are most ready for this stability, support, and reconstruction, so that we can capitalize on that. Hopefully, that will have the effect of freeing up additional forces for General Abizaid to further sanitize those regions that are having military difficulty, in the classic sense, so that eventually we can expand to the entire country for stability, security, and reconstruction.

But that's generally the state of work between both of our commands right now, and I would expect that—within a few weeks, that NATO will be able to brief a comprehensive plan that will lay out exactly how the Alliance wishes to proceed.

Ambassador TAYLOR. Senator Hagel, exactly as General Jones said, the focus on PRTs getting out into the difficult region, in the south and southeast, is Lieutenant General Barno's—he's the commander on the ground there, whom you met—he's very interested and has concrete plans to put an additional four, maybe five PRTs in the south and southeast. So the original eight are spread around the country. And as General Jones said, Germans are in the north, Brits are in the north, New Zealanders are in the center, ours are—the American PRTs are in the south and southeast, and that's where the next four will go, to continue to add stability and take actions in that area, both on the reconstruction side and on the security side.

You asked about the Pakistan border. Recent actions on the part of the Pakistani authorities should give us some reason to be pleased about their commitment to taking actions in that difficult part of their country. As you know, for a long time neither the Brits, nor the Indians, nor anyone else were able to put forces up into that area along that border, and the Pakistanis have done that a couple of times in the past couple of months. Just about 2 or 3 days ago, Pakistani authorities picked up an al-Qaeda member who had—or, I'm sorry, a Taliban member. They've picked up a lot of al-Qaeda, and have not picked up as many of the Taliban. So this collection the other day of a former Governor under the Taliban regime is an important step, an important indication that the Pakistani authorities are focused on this area. So there's some reason to be optimistic about that, as well, both on the PRT side as well as on the Pakistan-border side.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

The Chair would like to call on Senator Boxer next, with the forbearance of Senator Feingold. I made a mistake in seniority, and I apologize to the Senator. But I'd like to call upon you now, Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thank you. Thank you, Russ.

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both for your service to our country. It's tough service, and it's important service, and I agree that we can't fail.

And since 2002, this committee, on both sides of the aisle, has been calling for more security throughout Afghanistan. And, gen-

eral, you made a statement that I thoroughly agree with. You said, in response to Senator Nelson, “more troops will accelerate the outcome.” And I just think that’s a fact that no one can deny. And for me, it doesn’t have to just be American troops at all. It could be, you know, the NATO troops.

I don’t think PRTs are the answer, because they’re not just security. And I think we have to understand, when you talk about units of PRTs, they’re usually in sixty to a hundred. So I think if we believe what the general said here, that more troops will accelerate the outcome—this committee has really been on this for so long, and I would like to make a comment to back up why I think it’s so important.

The President said, in his State of the Union, “Boys and girls of Afghanistan are back at school.” And, indeed, they are. However, only half the girls are back at school, not all the girls are back in school. And this is a very important point. And why won’t the parents there send their girls to school? Because the security situation is very tenuous in certain parts of the country.

I believe, again, this committee has been singing them one note for a long time here, and we’re still not seeing—and I still don’t see, in your testimony, a realization that we should be moving quicker.

Since August 2002, more than 35 schools for girls in the south and southeast have been hit by rockets or burned down. And we don’t have any human rights representatives here today, but I want to read to you, Mr. Chairman, comments from a Human Rights Watch report issued earlier this month. “Women and girls bear some of the worst affects of Afghanistan’s insecurity. Conditions are generally better than under the Taliban, but women and girls continue to face severe governmental and social discrimination. Those who organize, protest, or criticize local rulers face threats and violence. Soldiers and police routinely harass women and girls, even in Kabul. Many women and girls are afraid to remove the burka, because soldiers are targeting women and girls. Many are staying indoors, especially in rural areas, making it impossible for them to attend school, go to work, or participate in the country’s reconstruction.”

So my first comment is, please send a message back. I think, again, that at least this committee, in a bipartisan way, doesn’t want failure, and we believe that means more security.

I would like—and I have one question at the end, but just one other comment, and then, Ambassador Taylor, I am going to send to you a bill that I’ve just introduced that deals with more attention to the women of Afghanistan.

Last year, when the President sent his supplemental \$87 billion, only \$799 million of that \$87 billion was for Afghanistan. Congress, happily, increased this amount by \$365 million, including \$60 million for women’s programs in Afghanistan, but it well short of what we have to do.

According to CARE International, just 40 percent of the \$5.2 billion in aid pledged in Tokyo 2 years ago has been released, and nearly a quarter of that has been diverted to short-term emergency needs from long-term Afghan reconstruction.

Women are desperate for basic assistance, such as education, healthcare, economic opportunities. So this bill that I've put in—and I'm hoping to get some strong bipartisan support—will give us more funding for women and girls over the next 3 years.

So I would like to send you this bill, along with a chart that just shows what the Afghan women's ministry says that they need, and I wonder if you would just give me some feedback on that. Excellent.

And my last question, or my only question, really, is to the general, and it regards something I've been involved in here for a long time, which is the threat of shoulder-fired missiles. And, as we know, in the 1980s there were hundreds of Stinger missiles given to the Mujaheddin, who were fighting to oust the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. And it was the Taliban that received those weapons, and others like that, or the Taliban developed from the Mujaheddin.

During U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan, U.S. airmen reported that Stinger missiles were fired at their aircraft. Do you have any estimate, general, of how many U.S.-made Stinger missiles remain unaccounted for in Afghanistan? Do you have any estimate of the total number of shoulder-fired missiles now in Afghanistan?

General JONES. Senator, in response to your very specific question, I would have to reply, for the record. I will ask General Abizaid, whose U.S. mission it is to do the combat operations. As NATO commander, my focus is for my NATO missions. But it's a legitimate question, and I would just—would absolutely say that, whether it's Afghanistan or Iraq, the technology of shoulder-fired weapons are of great concern to us, and particularly the loss of any kind of U.S. technology, which would be very serious.

So I will ask that question, and with your permission, I'll get back to you.

Senator BOXER. Thank you.

[The following response was subsequently supplied.]

The information follows:

[DELETED]

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I so appreciate your courtesy. And, Senator Feingold, thank you.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, may I elaborate on one point—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General JONES [continuing]. That the Senator raised that I think might help on the subject of troops?

One of the most important fundamental principles of our efforts, I think, in Afghanistan and Iraq, is the development of the Afghan National Army. It is absolutely critical that we be successful here. And one of the key elements that will allow us to be successful in bringing more security to Afghanistan is, of course, teaching the new Afghan army that it has to be willing to take on an increasing role in this context.

I've been in uniform for 37 years. My first assignment was as a platoon commander in Vietnam, and I witnessed firsthand what it's like to defend a country whose army would not fight for itself. And the fundamental principle of success, whether it's any major oper-

ation as we try to bring freedom and democracy to other countries, is to, first of all, set the conditions by which the newly developed army—and, in this case, an army that has an ambition to become one of almost 70,000 soldiers adhering to the principle of subordination to legitimate civilian authorities, who derive their governance from a democratic means, with all of those implications—simply has got to be taught. And, in my view, the success of the PRTs, from a security standpoint, should not necessarily be seen in terms of the numbers of soldiers, but also in the numbers of Afghan soldiers who are out there side by side learning these principles with our NATO soldiers or our U.S. soldiers, who provide this wonderful example.

But I think it would be a huge mistake if we thought that we could, by ourselves, do this without insisting that, over time, they do more and more, and I just wanted to make that point, because I think it's fundamental to the future success of the entire mission.

Senator BOXER. I think we all agree with that. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Boxer, for your questions, and, General Jones, for your response.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.

General Jones, you just mentioned Vietnam, so I'll followup on that. And as we battle the increasing Taliban in the southeastern part of Afghanistan, recently there was some controversy about civilian casualties. And how do we battle the Taliban, as they infiltrate into the villages and just become part of the fabric of some of these towns, without civilian casualties?

General JONES. Senator, urban warfare is the most difficult type of warfare any military can engage in, from the standpoint of human costs on both sides. It is difficult, but the fundamental pillars of its success are almost universal. It has to do with—and it all has to do with intelligence—it has to do with creating conditions by which the people of the cities and the towns in the hinterland are convinced that their lives will be better if we're successful, and that we are able to provide assurance that they're being protected, to the best extents possible, and that it is in their interest to cooperate and help us identify those terrorists, insurgents who are hiding among them. And when people believe that their—the balance crosses over, and they believe that the quicker they hand these people over and identify them and we apprehend them, the greater their collective security will be, is a turning point in any kind of insurgency.

One of my mentors, in the Marine Corps, General Al Gray, told me that the fundamental rule of guerrilla warfare is, never do anything that's not good for the people, and don't make any more enemies than you've already got. And that's not a bad way to proceed. And if we are able to develop the human intelligence and the cooperation, all the while convincing the people of Afghanistan that we are genuinely there to make their lives better and to give them hope for their children, and their children's children in the future, I think we can prevail.

But urban conflict and the ability of insurgents to terrorize and to threaten people is certainly one of the first lessons of my profes-

sional life, when I saw that firsthand in the battlefield in South Vietnam.

Ambassador TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could just add one thing to that. General Barno has recently observed exactly what General Jones said we'd need to look for, and that is an increase in the local people coming forward and identifying caches of weapons. General Barno and his troops have uncovered 30—or more now, I suspect; this is a couple of days old—caches just this month, just in January, up from—they didn't get that many in all of the 6-months prior. So this may be some indication that we are starting to get the kind of support, the kind of cooperation, the kind of intelligence that we need in order to fight the insurgents and the terrorists.

General JONES. One more point, if I may, sir. It will be a tactic of terrorists who will first try to take us on and to inflict casualties on Americans or on NATO forces. And as they become convinced, as we're seeing in Iraq, that this is not a militarily achievable target, because we are insistent that we will succeed, then they will turn to the targets that are next, the most vulnerable targets, and that's the people themselves and people who are trying to make a difference in this case, in Afghanistan. And so it'll be a very worthwhile and noble challenge to make sure that we protect those people who put themselves at risk to try to make a difference in the countryside.

Senator CHAFEE. And one of the areas, as we strive to do that, to make their life better, is, as the Ambassador mentioned, on the narcotics issue and the growing of the poppy and—obviously it's a lucrative crop, comparatively. And how are we doing in that area?

Certainly this hearing's about stabilization of Afghanistan. It's tremendously destabilizing to have the poppy crops increasing. It's just corrupting of every form of government around it—judiciary, whatever it might be. The warlords or the growers have their own militias to protect their crops. What's our strategy there? Are we eradicating? Are we doing crop substitution, paying them to grow another crop, or having stricter border patrols? How are we doing on that as we try and make their lives better, as the general said?

Ambassador TAYLOR. Senator, this is, as I indicated earlier, one of the most difficult areas. We're not winning this battle yet. But as you've indicated, there are plans, and there is a strategy that the Afghans and the international community are working together on, and it includes elements of each of the pieces that you said. That is, eradication—where in the past, eradication was sporadic, uncoordinated, subject to accusations of favoritism—the Governors eradicated their enemies, but didn't eradicate their friends' fields, that kind of problem. This year, the reason I think we can say that there will be a decline, as opposed to a continued increase, in the number of hectares under cultivation, is that there will be a serious eradication program that will begin very soon, first under Governors and then under the international community sponsorship.

The second is, as you indicated, you have to have alternative livelihoods. You have to have either alternative crops or alternative jobs for people whose fields are being eradicated and they're pushed out of that area, out of the poppy growing, into something else; and that's coming, as well.

Finally, you need enforcement. Right now, the law, which is both a religious law as well as a law from President Karzai, is not being enforced. Poppy fields are rampant, and they are shameless, frankly. In some small towns, in the village square there is these lovely poppy fields, these beautiful flowers are right there in the center of the town. And when you ask the police what they're doing about it, kind of, hands go up, and they say, you know, I've got a thousand policemen, but I have one vehicle and I have two radios. And so it's this kind of enforcement and training, equipping of the police that has to go with the eradication and alternative livelihoods to make this a program.

So I hope I can come back to you—we can come back to you in 6 months and tell you we've made some good progress. We have plans, but we need to demonstrate to you and to the Afghan people and to the world that we're actually going to implement those plans.

Senator CHAFEE. And, obviously, the objective here, as the general said, is to win over the people. And if we're eradicating their livelihood, it is a delicate balance of trying to do the right thing, winning the people over so we can get the proper human intelligence, and providing them with a livelihood.

General JONES. Senator, if I could just comment on that, on your question, which I think is extremely insightful.

I like to use the term narco-terrorism, as opposed to narco-trafficking. I believe that the funding that comes through a lot of—many terrorist organizations comes directly from the illegal trafficking of narcotics. And in the European context, and, actually, in the developed, civilized free world, if you will, this should be seen as an asymmetric weapon by terrorists that's aimed at the heart of our societies.

And, in NATO, we have launched, really, an entire naval operation in the Mediterranean, called ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, to restrict the volume and the corridors, the avenues of approach, if you will, into the Alliance and from there to the United States by the sea lanes of communication.

We've been extraordinarily successful in the past year in making the Mediterranean more safe and more secure than it's been anytime in the last 10 or 15 years with this operation, which is an ongoing, standing naval forces operation. The community of nations is developing a very comprehensive intelligence network so that ships that come through the Suez Canal and try to transit all the way through Gibraltar are routinely scrutinized and run the high possibility of being boarded to look for weapons of mass destruction, illegal human trafficking, narcotics, and the like.

But this is a very, very big problem, and it is as much part of the global war on terrorism as anything else.

Senator CHAFEE. That's certainly our experience in Colombia. There's a lot of money involved, and it's not easy.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

Senator Feingold, thanks for your patience.

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General Jones and Ambassador Taylor, for testifying today.

One issue that I am very concerned about with regard to Afghanistan is whether the United States is devoting adequate intelligence resources to Afghanistan and to the terrorist presence within the country. And I guess I'd like to start off by asking both of you if you think there's been any significant change between the intelligence resources that were focused on Afghanistan in early 2002, versus those that are currently focused on Afghanistan.

Apparently in June, the Washington Post quoted Rand Beers, a counter-terrorism expert who served in this administration, as saying the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan is too small; so small that, in fact, quote, "terrorists move around the country with ease."

Has the situation appreciably changed? Let's start with the general, and then the Ambassador.

General JONES. I believe that—again, I think General Abizaid would be much more expert than I because of our different tasks here, but because of the uniform I wear, I am interested in, obviously, these types of questions. And I think that it's fair to say that the intelligence network that we have in place is yielding greater and greater results as we start to focus more and more on human intelligence.

For over 10 years, we, as a nation, collectively, walked away from the value of human intelligence, and we have discovered that it is an irreplaceable commodity; in fact, it's a fundamental essential requirement of a successful mission against any kind of insurgency, especially with a war on terrorism.

Unfortunately, you cannot just push a button and develop the adequacy and the base immediately. It has to be grown, it has to be developed, it has to be funded. And I believe that we are devoting the resources, and we are materially enhancing our ability to develop good intelligence, and specifically in Afghanistan. But it isn't something that will change overnight, and I think we would always like to have more. But I think that the site picture that we're getting for both our U.S. mission and other missions is considerably better than it would have been had we not made the changes, and had the Congress not supported the funding the changes with the funding it has generously provided.

Senator FEINGOLD. General, I appreciate that answer, but let me just followup quickly. What I also wanted to know was whether the resources that we're devoting to intelligence in Afghanistan are the same as, less than, or greater than they were in early 2002.

General JONES. I will ask General Abizaid for his opinion and respond to you directly on that.

[The following response was subsequently supplied.]

[DELETED]

1. [DELETED]

2. [DELETED]

3. [DELETED]

General JONES. Having talked to him recently—we are both in town for a combatant commanders conference—I believe his answer would be that there is a much greater emphasis, and the resources that have been provided have made a significant difference in his intelligence site picture, as how he leads the U.S. forces and the site picture that he has from intelligence.

Senator FEINGOLD. OK.

Ambassador.

Ambassador TAYLOR. Senator, I would agree. There have been a couple of statements recently, by General Abizaid and other commanders in Afghanistan, that expressed confidence that we will have more success against terrorists—against al-Qaeda, in particular—in this year, in the coming months.

This may indicate an increase in resources. I think General Jones is exactly right, we would could get you something, in some other forum, that indicates the resources that are available.

Senator FEINGOLD. I would appreciate that.

Ambassador, how would you characterize the overall perceptions of the United States and United States policy among the people of Afghanistan? What are our most important public-diplomacy challenges? Which misperceptions are the most damaging, and what are we doing to address those?

Ambassador TAYLOR. Senator, the people of Afghanistan are very supportive of Western presence; and, in almost all cases, they see Western presence, and they think it's American. They see military—General Jones indicated the diverse nature of our coalition, but to many of the people of Afghanistan, these are American soldiers. And they're very pleased that those American soldiers, or those Coalition soldiers, are there.

Their concern is that we will leave too soon. Their concern is that the Americans will not be able to maintain this focus, that we'll not devote the resources that we've indicated we will, that we will not stay the course, and that—in answer to your question on our public-diplomacy challenge, that is what I think we need to be very clear. We need to have the support—we need to be seen to have the support of Congress, of the American people. We need to demonstrate that we are there on the reconstruction side, that we are there for as long as is necessary on the security side, with our forces. It's that kind of commitment that we need to show, and that is the public-diplomacy challenge that we face.

Senator FEINGOLD. I just want to follow on whether there are any misperceptions. I mean, clearly in Iraq we are perceived by many as an occupying force, and that leads to enormous problems. Are there no such concerns on the part of the people of Afghanistan about our presence there? I recognize it's a different kind of presence, but I'm curious about the perceptions if they're perceiving everyone as Americans.

Ambassador TAYLOR. Because of the differences in troop levels and intensity of the troops that are on the ground, there is a much different perception. Again, if you have 130,000 troops in a country—and the countries are comparable in size and population—there will be a perception of the soldiers there that will be different if you have 10,000, as we do in Afghanistan. And as General Jones has indicated, these small teams around the country, these Provincial Reconstruction Teams, as Senator Boxer indicated, we're talking about 80 soldiers, in some cases, plus—and augmented by civilians. So this is not an occupying presence, this is not an overwhelming presence, by any means.

When we went through—I joined several of these Provincial Reconstruction Team patrols in their travels through villages—they

were universally well received. Universally, you see the children out there waving, thumbs up, and crying out that little English that they've got; assuming, again, that it was American soldiers that were going through, that they were on there. This is the reception that we get.

So there's not a misperception at all about our intent there. Again, they're concerned that we stay.

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate that answer. Let me ask you now—I understand the administration aims to train 10,000 Afghan soldiers by June 2004, and then to train an additional 10,800 per year thereafter. Do we have adequate personnel available to accommodate the accelerated ANA training schedule? When I consider what we're trying to do in Iraq, it seems like we have an awful lot of training to be doing right now. What kind of trainer-to-trainee ratio are we going to be able to talk about here in the Afghanistan situation?

General JONES. Sir, the responsibility for training the Afghan National Army is essentially a U.S. responsibility right now. As NATO comes online and assists in the security, stability, and reconstruction, there's no doubt that NATO could also help in this regard. So I think where we are today is, the current strength of the ANA is about 5,700. We've got 2,100 in training. The goal is to get it up to 10,000 by mid-summer. And I think it sounds to me like things are on track. And General Abizaid and I talked about this briefly yesterday, and he's well satisfied with the efforts that are—and the assets that he has to do the required training.

I would like to just emphasize that, should NATO get involved in this in a greater scale, I think there would be an appetite to also provide some assistance there, as well, which would accelerate the process.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, general.

Finally, Ambassador, I guess I want to get your reaction to how we're really defining success in Afghanistan today. And the reason I ask that is because it sometimes appears that we're pursuing a piecemeal approach to bolstering stability and the rule of law throughout the country, and I'm sometimes concerned that—are we setting our goals at "good enough" to, sort of, mask the real gaps between the resources and the needs?

Ambassador TAYLOR. Senator, I think this is a very important question, and the answer that we need to agree, as a government, as a people, is that we will be there until—and in various forms—we will be in Afghanistan until there is an end state—not an end date, but an end state—that we see meets our national security needs.

We are looking for an Afghanistan that is market oriented, that is democratically inclined, that has a stable government that is able to control its borders, as well as its interior, is able to control the drugs that we talked about, it's able to provide for the needs of its people, in terms of education, in terms of health. It's that stable, responsible government that will never again be a harbor for terrorists that we are committed to.

That will take some time. It'll take some time for our military. It'll take a longer time for our reconstruction efforts. And it'll take

a long time—we intend to be there for a long time, diplomatically and politically.

So it is that kind of long-term commitment to an end state that serves our national interest that we need to be committed to, and it's a function of the people of the United States, the people of the Coalition and their parliaments that is important for that kind of commitment.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

We'll have another round among those who are still with us.

Let me just start by simply mentioning that, as we said at the outset, the mission of this committee is oversight. The ongoing activities in Afghanistan have been in our oversight since September 11, 2001. I just made a note, as others have raised questions, that we once again pursued the status of women in the country. We observed where the Stinger missiles are. In previous times, we observed how the road-building is going, as well as access to the country. We studied whether Afghanistan has become a viable economic success, whether people as coming and going through the country, how the situation with the warlords is going. Likewise, we are concerned about the poppies and about training the police and the army in a responsible way.

One thing that you have just mentioned in response to Senator Feingold, Mr. Taylor, is that staying-power issue. That often has been there in earlier hearings, with some doubt as to what the staying-power capacity of our country actually was. I can remember, in a response that was not meant to be just an estimate or a flip response, in some talk-show situation, indicating that probably, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, we were likely to be there at least 5 years. This was greeted with headline treatment, but not necessarily with approval. In essence, at that point a good many Americans felt that was simply too long. In those days, we did not really think about the implications, as you said, of a government that is not only stable, but successful, and that is doing all of these things against very daunting odds, historically, quite apart from the current situation.

I have traced with our staff the fact that in the past year we have held dramatic hearings on Afghanistan, one involving President Karzai, himself. He sat at the same table where you are. This came about, in part, because the President had a mission to see our President. President Bush wanted to have a larger forum, and that was provided.

In the course of that hearing, President Karzai was questioned by Senator Boxer about the status of women. President Karzai was also questioned by Senator Hagel about whether he was really asking for enough, and he encouraged him, when he would meet with President Bush, to ask for enough, in terms of the money, the forces, and what have you. Many felt that this was offensive to the President of Afghanistan. As a matter of fact, in press accounts later, there were general apologies for the brutalization of the President of Afghanistan by the committee. Yet when Senator Hagel and Senator Biden and I saw President Karzai at the World Economic Forum, near Amman, Jordan, in June, he seemed to be in a very good mood, pleased to see us again, despite his treatment

in February before the committee. As a matter of fact, he outlined, with his Finance Minister, a remarkable 5-year economic plan, a pretty good prophecy of how the loya jirga meeting and the constitutional business would go, at a time when these were very imminent questions in our policy in Iraq. Many hoped that somehow a 5-year policy of some sort could come there, in the economy, quite apart from the politics of the country. Furthermore, President Karzai demonstrated that he had a good number of people with him who shared his idealism and his competence, which is really very important.

We appreciate this, and I cite all this because I started my question by asking, why should we be optimistic, given all the daunting circumstances that we have been listing today, and which we have listed previously? I think there are good reasons to point out that extraordinary progress has been made.

I can't overemphasize the importance of General Jones being here today, as SACEUR, and the fact that NATO has made this commitment. Lord Robertson should be given tremendous credit for taking the out-of-area concept out of simply a conceptual phase. As both of you have said, on the ground, NATO must be successful. This is the archetype case, of whether, in fact, we can move beyond simply hunkering down in the borders of the countries that are constituent members, and actually move out into the world.

I want to cite some thoughts that the foreign-policy writer, Robert Kagan, had in the New York Times this past weekend, in which he says, the importance for us—that is, the United States—of making the distinction that we are involved in Afghanistan, or Iraq or other situations, is not simply as a question of our own security, but, in fact, because we fight for the world, and that we always have done so, at least as a part of American foreign policy; the thought that there are broader considerations with regard to all of humanity. It is important, in this case, as a counterweight to current tensions with Europeans, who may say, you were overreaching, or, you are bound to your own security situation, in a unilateral way.

In Afghanistan, NATO is operative, NATO is real, NATO has expanded. European/American cooperation has new avenues. Even if some European countries that were not able, for various reasons, to participate vigorously in Iraq have found it equally important to participate in Afghanistan, more power to them. There is an avenue here in which we are, in fact, working together in the world's interest, finding an interest here. That is important, leaving aside the benefit to Afghans, the importance to our own foreign policy and to our own alliances with NATO.

For all these reasons, I am appreciative of your testimony today. I do not really have substantial additional questions. You have been asked about everything that you should be asked about, and you have offered, for the record, accurate responses to some inquiries that were very important and that may go beyond your immediate recollections, as they would members of this panel.

Do either of you have any further comment about these thoughts? If so, I will entertain those, and then I'll proceed to Senator Hagel.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I can do is echo your sentiments. I mentioned I've been privileged to serve for 37 years in uniform with the United States. I'm particularly proud of the fact that many of these missions have been overseas, where marines, soldiers, sailors, airmen, coast guardsmen, people in uniform, and people not in uniform, representing different agencies of our government and non-governmental agencies have come together to show that the United States, after two horrific world wars, the very, very difficult war in Korea, the Vietnam experience, has emerged from the 20th century alive, strong, healthy, vibrant, and still mankind's best hope and best example for how people of all different types of backgrounds, ethnicity, race, religion, can come and live together in a peaceful society and be a society of great influence on the face of the Earth. I'm extraordinarily proud to be a part of this process, in my 37th year in uniform.

Thank you for pointing out that very important mission.

Ambassador TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I would just add that—two aspects of how the work in Afghanistan furthers our foreign policy. One is, the model that Afghanistan can become of a moderate Islamic democracy in that part of the world. I think this will have great effect if they can succeed, if we can help them succeed in that regard.

And the second point you made is a very good one; that is, the international effort, the international community there in Afghanistan, is really pulling together. As General Jones indicated, the Americans are in the lead on training the army, but the French are running the Officer Training School, and the British are running the NCO Training Academy. The Americans, we're training and equipping the soldiers. Similarly, the Germans are in the lead on training the police. And the Americans are right there with them, extending that training out into these PRTs.

So it is an international effort that does further our foreign policy, and it has specific goals, as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you both.

I'm compelled to add, after General Jones mentioned his 37th year in uniform, that at an earlier period in your career, when I was chairman of the committee almost a generation ago, General Jones accompanied a senatorial party or two to Europe. His participation was very, very helpful in enhancing our understanding. This was while the cold war was still proceeding, and NATO was still evolving. We appreciated your leadership then, just as we do presently.

We are delighted that both of you have honored us with your presence today.

Senator HAGEL.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Two questions. One, we have not heard anything this morning about Iran. I would very much appreciate each of your analysis regarding Iran's involvement/noninvolvement in Afghanistan. Have they been helpful? Have they complicated things? Where, over the last 12 months, has Iran played a role, if any?

Ambassador TAYLOR. They've been helpful, and they've complicated things, both. That is, as several people have observed, there are two Irans. And, on the one hand, they have been contrib-

uting to the reconstruction, economic reconstruction. So the one part of Iran does recognize the importance of a stable neighbor on their border, and have recognized that they can contribute to that stability by helping on the economic-development side. They're building a road that hooks into the road that we're building. That is, they're building a road from the Iranian border to Herat. So, on the one hand, that part of Iran is being constructive.

On the other hand, they are clearly supporting one of the Governors in Herat, who is not supporting the central government, who is not supporting President Karzai's government, and who gets assistance from, and probably encouragement from Iran, which is not helpful.

So, Senator Hagel, it's both. It's both helpful and complicating. Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

General Jones.

General JONES. Sir, I would defer to the Ambassador. I think that's an accurate portrayal. As NATO gets more and more involved in the PRTs and expanding out to the west and everything, I'm sure that we will have a fusion of opinions with regard to the surrounding neighbors and their influence. But I associate myself with the Ambassador's comments.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. One additional question. The role of NGOs in Afghanistan, and the private organizations, PVOs, private voluntary organizations—this, Ambassador Taylor, is more addressed to you—are they playing an increased role? What kind of role? How critical is it, as we have heard the last couple of hours, on essentially getting down as to—General Jones' point is—into the villages and towns across Afghanistan so that the people understand we're there to help make a better life for them? Give me a assessment of the NGO/PVO role in Afghanistan.

And, General Jones, if you have anything to offer, I would welcome your comments, as well.

Thank you.

Ambassador TAYLOR. Senator, the NGOs have been in Afghanistan for a long time. They were there when the Americans weren't. They have been through very difficult times. They've been there through the Taliban time, delivering services—humanitarian services, health, education services—to the Afghan people. So they have been there. They've got a track record. They do things very well. They build schools, and they work with the communities to provide the teachers, the rest of the infrastructure that's necessary for those schools. Same thing on the clinics.

So they have played—and the international NGOs, in particular—have played a major role, continue to play a major role. They are implementing many of the projects that the Americans and other international donors are funding. They have, again, the expertise and the history of working with the people that enable them to do that well.

Another aspect of NGOs that's becoming clearer are the Afghan NGOs. And the Afghan non-governmental organizations are offering themselves, both to international NGOs, but also to international assistance providers, as implementors.

The PRTs are able to go to local NGOs, Afghan NGOs, and hire them to build roads, hire them to build schools, hire them to dig

wells. The PRT military folks and the civilian folks don't do it themselves; they will hire these local NGOs. And it sounds like they are becoming essentially local contractors. And so the Afghan NGO world is moving into a market, a private-sector mode, which I think is very healthy. That's the development of a private sector that we're looking for.

So both the international NGOs, who have been there through thick and thin, as well as this developing Afghan NGO sector is coming along well, making big contributions.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

We thank the witnesses.

Senator Chafee, pardon me. Yes.

Senator CHAFEE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a quick couple of questions, if I could.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator CHAFEE. Ambassador, could you describe what I understand is a tension between the Tajiks and the Pashtuns and how that's working out? From what I understand, the Tajiks, the Northern Alliance, they feel we're the people that kicked out the Taliban, "We want more of a role in government." And could you describe how that's resolving itself?

Ambassador TAYLOR. Yes, sir. And this is a particularly interesting time for that question. We saw, during the Constitutional Loya Jirga, that these ethnic questions and ethnic tensions, as you say, kind of became clearer. Again, as you say, the Northern Alliance came in, with the support of the Americans, and pushed Taliban and al-Qaeda out, in 2001. Most of the Taliban were Pashtun, the tribe in the south and southeast. Not all Pashtuns are Taliban, clearly. So that flavor, that ethnic flavor, colored the government that came into power with President Karzai in December, and then was established, was confirmed by the Emergency Loya Jirga, in 2002.

That Emergency Loya Jirga, in 2002, put together a cabinet under President Karzai, a Pashtun, but the cabinet had elements of the Tajiks, or the Northern Alliance. It was a coalition cabinet that had some Pashtuns; in particular, some Pashtuns, who had been out of the country, who had expertise in certain areas.

Senator Lugar mentioned the Finance Minister, a very important member of the cabinet, who spent a lot of time at the World Bank during the time that the Communists and the Taliban were there. So he brought that expertise, a Pashtun.

The tension comes, often, where the Tajiks, who also are very important members of the cabinet, argue that they stayed, they have been in the country, in Afghanistan, all the time, and some of the Pashtuns left, for reasons that we could certainly understand. There's that tension.

Then you come to the Constitutional Loya Jirga, where the surprise was that the Pashtuns that we had thought were alienated—the Pashtuns were not supporting the central government, weren't supporting President Karzai—they came together. The Pashtuns, who are at least a plurality in the country—maybe a majority, we don't know, they haven't done a census in a long time, but certainly are the single largest ethnic group in Afghanistan—they came to-

gether, the delegates. The Pashtun delegates to the Constitutional Loya Jirga, in December and early January, came together and exerted themselves in favor of a Presidential system that presumably President Karzai will run for and, if the voters of Afghanistan agree, will become the elected President, a Pashtun President.

So the concern, of the Tajiks was, hey, we have been the allies. We have—we were the Northern Alliance. We kicked the Taliban and al-Qaeda out, and there's some nervousness about this move toward a stronger role, a more cohesive role of the Pashtuns.

There was one particular element in the Constitutional Loya Jirga where this came up, and it was on language. There was a real concern about—there was general agreement that there would be two official languages—Dari, spoken in the north, and Pashto, spoken in the south. But then there were concerns, from the Uzbeks and other Turkic-speaking minorities, about what the role of those languages would have. And the Pashtuns, again, who had the majority in the Constitutional Loya Jirga, were ready to vote that, no, we don't need additional official languages, and we've got the votes, and we can push that through.

In the end, a compromise came up, where they didn't need to vote. The Pashtuns didn't need to assert that authority. They came up with a compromise that would allow a third language—Uzbek, for example—to be an official language in the area where it is the majority language.

Now, this, again—going back to something that Senator Lugar mentioned earlier, a model for other countries, this could be a model of tolerance, of at least ethnic tolerance, that they were able come up to. This was not pretty. The tensions were clearly there in the loya jirga, but they were able to come up with compromises that allowed them to move forward and, in the end, pull together. They all, 502 delegates, stood up at the end of the Constitutional Loya Jirga and approved this Constitution, even though there had been some very difficult, very tense times during the loya jirga while these ethnic tensions kind of played out.

Senator CHAFEE. So, from the outside, it seems, as you described it, the Pashtuns gave quite a bit. Did they get something behind the scenes?

Ambassador TAYLOR. They got something in front of the scenes, in the front stage. That is, they got a strong Presidential system, which they are looking for, which almost certainly benefits the entire country. And what Afghanistan doesn't need at this point—and I think, in the end, all the delegates recognize it—Afghanistan doesn't need competing power centers in the executive branch. And there have been suggestions that there be—in addition to the President, there be a Prime Minister. And, in the end, all of the ethnic groups agreed that—better to have a single President elected by the people, rather than have competing powers.

And so they, the Pashtuns, did, indeed—they made some compromises. The Tajiks, the Hazara, the other minorities made compromises. And, in the end, they came up with a Constitution that they all could agree on.

Senator CHAFEE. All right, thank you. I have one more question. This is a hearing on stabilization and reconstruction, and on the ring road. I know there's been some emphasis and talk about the

ring road. And I saw a cartoon where the Martian rover lands, and the first pictures to come back, and up at command central, say, "Whoops, we landed in Afghanistan," and it's really on Mars. So it's some indication of the terrain that's there, and the difficulty of building this ring road. How are we doing on it?

Ambassador TAYLOR. Senator, it is only a little bit of a joke that it looked like Mars. The road from Kabul to Kandahar took, oh, on a good day, without any major breakdowns, which happen often, 15–16 hours in a car, and 2 days in a big truck, while the road was so bad. I traveled that road several times. It was very difficult. The road's terrible. The traffic—even though the traffic is bad—even though the road's bad, the traffic is there, and the big trucks, they pick the side of the road that they want to drive on. So if they were on the other side, then the smaller traffic got out of the way to the left side. This is now a road that you can drive from Kabul to Kandahar in 5 hours, so they've cut it down dramatically.

The other significant element here is that this road from Kabul to Kandahar goes right through the Pashtun belt, it goes right through the area that kind of parallels the Pakistan border, where the problems are that General Jones has mentioned and other people have talked about today. And there were problems, there were security problems. There were people killed. There were Afghan guards killed. There were engineers who were kidnaped and held for ransom by the Taliban. There were negotiations with the local Governors on finally setting them free. Right along that road, through Ghazni, was where the French woman, who worked for UNHCR, a humanitarian organization in the United Nations, was killed, point blank.

Senator CHAFEE. You mentioned you've traveled it—prior to the construction being complete, or after?

Ambassador TAYLOR. Prior. One of my next trips, I intend to drive that road, as does President Karzai, more importantly. He wants to drive that Kabul-to-Kandahar road as a demonstration that Kabul, that many Pashtuns—and back to your first question—many Pashtuns think of Kabul as not their capital. They think of it as, kind of, in the northern part. It's not their home. Their home, they think is in Kandahar. And this road has enabled Pashtuns to go easily to this other city, and that is bringing it together.

Senator CHAFEE. And are we on schedule to—that's, what, about a—not even a third of what the—

Ambassador TAYLOR. It's a quarter. It's a quarter—it's about—a quadrant of the road, and we are now making progress on the next quarter, from Kandahar up to Herat. Other nations are working on the road from Kabul up to Mazar. And the ADP is working on the final quadrant, down to Herat again.

Senator CHAFEE. All right, very good.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just followup Senator Chafee's thought. There has been some criticism in the press as to the quality of the road-building. Is it the kind of road that is going to last for awhile? Do you have any comments before you take your first drive on there?

Ambassador TAYLOR. I do, Senator. Mr. Chairman, the road from Kabul to Kandahar that was completed, well ahead of schedule and to great acclaim, by the Constitutional Loya Jirga, by the way—

many of the delegates went out for the ribbon-cutting, you may have seen—that road is good for—it's a thick layer of asphalt, and it's good for 3, 4, 5 years. It is also true, however, that we're going to go back—USAID is going to go back, with two more layers, to make that a 30-year road or a 50-year road.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Ambassador TAYLOR. It will be there for a long time. We can be driving this road for a long time.

The CHAIRMAN. So that's the—either the understanding or the misunderstanding. The press accounts stated that something had been built, like some of our streets in urban areas, with asphalt, and then that chuck holes would occur and so forth, but you thought of that.

Ambassador TAYLOR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So you're going back, and you're going to make a 30-year road out of it.

Ambassador TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hagel, do you have any further questions?

Senator HAGEL. No thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you, again, and the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

