[Senate Hearing 108-460]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-460
AFGHANISTAN STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION: A STATUS REPORT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 27, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Jones, Gen. James L., USMC, Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR), Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, Mons,
Belgium........................................................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Taylor, Hon. William B., Coordinator for Afghanistan, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
(iii)
AFGHANISTAN STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION: A STATUS REPORT
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Feingold, Boxer, Bill
Nelson, and Rockefeller.
opening statement of senator richard g. lugar, chairman
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is pleased to
welcome General James Jones, Supreme Allied Commander of
Europe, and Ambassador William B. Taylor, Coordinator for
Afghanistan for the Department of State, to assess the
international effort to stabilize and to rebuild Afghanistan.
The new Afghan nation is in a fragile state of development,
but there are many reasons to be optimistic about its future.
The Afghan people are experiencing new freedoms, and families
are being reunited as refugees return from neighboring
Pakistan, Iran, and elsewhere. The new constitution, approved
January 4, 2004, by the Constitutional Loya Jirga, provides all
citizens of Afghanistan, men and women, equal rights under the
law. Afghan women are going back to school and back to the
workplace; they also are participating in the political
process. The Constitution reserves 25 percent of the seats of
the new Lower House of Parliament for women, and the new Afghan
Government cabinet includes two women.
Afghanistan is experiencing important successes in
education, healthcare, and the development of a market economy.
New businesses are being established with grants and loans from
the United States and the international community. The
completion of the initial stages at the Kabul-Kandahar road is
another sign of progress that brings hope to those who are
dedicated to rebuilding Afghanistan.
Solidifying and expanding these successes, however, depends
on making further progress on security. Southern and eastern
Afghanistan, in particular, are dangerous. The Taliban has been
active on the Pakistan-Afghan border, and attacks on United
States and Afghan forces, as well as on United Nations and non-
governmental organizational personnel, are generating fear. If
security is not achieved, international aid workers and others
critical to the reconstruction of Afghanistan will not be able
to function.
In addition, Afghanistan's Presidential elections are
scheduled to be held in June 2004, followed by parliamentary
elections a year later. Yet less than half a million voters
have been registered, to date, out of an estimated ten and a
half million. The United Nations Assistance Mission is moving
to register voters as quickly as possible. We must overcome
security and logistical deficiencies so that free and fair
elections can take place on time.
With this in mind, our committee is intensely interested in
the progress of the International Security Assistance Force,
ISAF. The NATO and United Nations decision in late 2003 to
expand ISAF outside of Kabul was an important step toward
improved security.
The new Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,
declared last week that Afghanistan is the number-one priority
of the Alliance. The United States is grateful for the wide
participation of our allies in the ISAF, which includes forces
from 30 contributing nations. We want ISAF to be a multilateral
success story that demonstrates the potential for NATO
operations and international cooperation in post-conflict
situations. But for ISAF to be considered a success, members of
the Alliance must improve their commitment to the operation.
ISAF deployments and missions have been delayed or downsized by
staffing and equipment shortages.
Eight Provincial Reconstruction Teams have been established
outside Kabul. This is a step forward for security, but more
teams are needed. The current teams must have the capability to
operate extensively outside their bases. Only one of these
teams, the German force in Kunduz, was established under the
auspices of NATO. Of the remaining seven, five are run by the
United States, one by the British, and one by New Zealand.
So far, the ISAF has only deployed 5,500 troops to
Afghanistan, most of which remain in Kabul. Securing the
country will require many more.
I was concerned, 2 months ago when I read statements by
Major General Andrew Leslie, a Canadian who serves as Deputy
Commander of ISAF. General Leslie stated, ``There are 1.4
million soldiers in NATO. Where are they? Why are so few
countries stepping up to the plate? The left hand has made the
commitment, but the right hand is not ponying up,'' from
General Leslie. He went on to say, ``The status quo will only
lead to failure.''
Numerous other observers also have expressed concern about
the pace and scope of ISAF's security efforts. Our allies must
back up their ISAF commitments with sufficient resources,
troops, organization, and political will.
Last October, President Bush urged Congress to pass the
Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act to accelerate
and to expand our stabilization and reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan. The Congress responded, providing more than what
was requested. A total of $1.6 billion in American assistance
is available for Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004. The
administration reportedly will seek an additional $1 billion in
assistance for Afghanistan in the fiscal year 2005 budget
request.
This committee has been supportive of funding for
Afghanistan, and we are anxious to hear from our witnesses
about whether these resources are adequate and whether they can
be used efficiently and effectively to stabilize and rebuild
the country.
Capturing Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists and destroying
their infrastructure are only a part of what is required to win
the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. The United States
and the international community must not only deny the
terrorists a base of operations, they must expose the
destructiveness of the terrorist ideology and their violent
methods. Every day that Afghanistan moves closer to peace,
freedom, tolerance, and economic viability, the terrorists are
weakened.
Our witnesses today possess extraordinary expertise
concerning our operations in Afghanistan. They provide us with
an excellent opportunity to sharpen our understanding of the
situation and to exercise the committee's oversight role
related to Afghanistan.
We welcome the witnesses, and we look forward to their
testimony.
Now, when Senator Biden arrives, he will be recognized for
an opening statement. We welcome Senator Hagel and Senator
Nelson this morning.
And I call now on you, General Jones, for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, USMC, SUPREME ALLIED
COMMANDER EUROPE (SACEUR), SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED POWERS
EUROPE, MONS, BELGIUM
General Jones. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
it's a great honor and a very special pleasure to be with you
today to discuss NATO's work and its mission in Afghanistan.
I'm particularly pleased to be reunited with my friend and
colleague of many years, Ambassador Taylor. We have known each
other for almost 20 years now, I guess, Bill. It's a great
pleasure to be here, side by side, on this very special day.
Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me, I'd like to just take a
few minutes to set the context of NATO's involvement in
Afghanistan by--since this is the first time I've had the
pleasure of appearing before your committee--to say a few
things about NATO, in general, and then I'll get more specific
with regard to Afghanistan.
As we all know, NATO is the transatlantic link that binds
Europe and North America in a truly unique and historical
security alliance. It remains the preeminent security alliance
in the world today. And it would not be an overstatement to say
that NATO is currently undergoing the most significant
transformation in its 50-year history.
Very simply put, the Alliance is transforming from an
organization whose primary mission was the territorial defense
of Western Europe to one that is more agile, more capable, and
more able to act proactively against the numerous transnational
threats inherent in today's international security environment.
In making this historical transformation, NATO is taking
steps to exploit emerging technologies, to incorporate new
operational concepts, to implement dramatic and far-reaching
institutional reforms, and to adopt modern business practices
in the use of its resources.
Today, the Alliance is focused on security challenges in
areas of instability well beyond its traditional area of
interest, and is undertaking operations that are global in
scale for the first time.
The Alliance has conducted six highly successful operations
just this past year. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Stabilization Force made significant progress toward completing
its military tasks under the Dayton Accords. NATO's Kosovo
Force, or KFOR, continues to provide security in the region and
to assist the United Nations interim administration in Kosovo.
We have supported the very successful Operation Concordia in
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; conducted the first
Article IV operation during Operation DISPLAY DETERRENCE, when
the Alliance deployed NATO airborne early warning aircraft to
Turkey; and continues maritime interdiction operations in the
Mediterranean with Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, which is
contributing significantly to the global war on terrorism.
Perhaps the most far-reaching operation that NATO assumed
this past year was its assumption of the international
community's mission in Afghanistan, known as the International
Security and Assistance Force, or ISAF.
ISAF was created by United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1336, in December 2001, to assist the recently
formed Afghan Transitional Authority, ATA, in the maintenance
and security of Kabul and the surrounding areas so that the
Transitional Authority and U.N. personnel could operate in a
secure environment.
ISAF was initially built around the lead-nation concept.
The first mission in Kabul was led by the United Kingdom--it
was known as ISAF I; followed by Turkey, ISAF II; Germany and
the Netherlands, ISAF III. And NATO first became involved with
ISAF in response to a request from Germany and the Netherlands
for planning and support of ISAF III. In August 2003, NATO, in
effect, became the lead for all future ISAF missions when it
took command through Headquarters Allied Forces North in Kabul,
Afghanistan. The NATO command in Kabul currently comprises 17
NATO nations and 14 non-NATO nations consisting of
approximately 6,000 personnel.
Today, ISAF and the Afghan National Army routinely conduct
joint patrols in the streets of Kabul, projecting a positive
image of security, teamwork, and partnership. In addition,
there are hundreds of civil-military projects dedicated to
local administration, infrastructure, reconstruction,
rehabilitations of schools and medical facilities, restoration
of water supply, health, education, and agricultural technical
assistance. All instill a new sense of hope among the
population in and around Kabul.
ISAF plays an important role in the international
community's long-term reconstruction efforts, especially in
support of the G8's Security Sector Reform, SSR, efforts. In
order to achieve SSR, the G8 nations have identified five
pillars they believe essential to this effort. These pillars
include demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration,
otherwise known as DDR--this is led by Japan; judicial reform,
led by Italy; counter-narcotics, led by the United Kingdom;
police training, led by Germany, and support to the training of
the Afghan National Army, led by the United States.
Key to these efforts is the Provincial Reconstruction Team
concept, otherwise known as PRTs. PRTs fundamentally have two
components. The civilian element, composed of members of the
Afghan Transition Authority, U.N. personnel and non-
governmental organization, and they focus on implementing the
SSR process. The second element is a military element, which
provides the security that helps set the condition allowing the
civilian element to achieve its objectives.
There are currently nine active PRTs in Afghanistan: the
German-led PRT, which is under ISAF, as of January of this
year; and eight PRTs under the Combined Joint Task Force-180,
which is a U.S. task force; one of these eight PRTs is British
led, one is led by New Zealand, and the other six, by the
United States.
On the 30th of September 2003, ISAF assumed the operational
control of the German-led PRT in the Kunduz province. The
assumption and control of this PRT is to be seen as a pilot
program for NATO. It is believed that the expansion of PRTs
throughout the provinces will play an essential role in
allowing Afghanistan to attain a self-sustaining level of
security, stability, and reconstruction.
The North Atlantic Council has asked the Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Powers of Europe to develop a plan for the
expansion of the ISAF mission. This work is currently underway
at my headquarters in SHAPE. And while we have not yet selected
an exact framework for how ISAF will expand, I can tell you the
process will likely be one built around a graduated-phased
approach tiered to a properly resourced and capability-based
force. Specifically, our instructions from the North Atlantic
Council direct me to develop a plan for expanding the ISAF
mission that can support up to five Provincial Reconstruction
Teams. We will also include the ability to expand beyond the
directed five PRTs if the Alliance directs us to do so. Key to
this planning process are the lessons learned from the PRTs
currently in effect and operating in Afghanistan.
General John Abizaid, who is responsible for Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, and his Central Command
personnel have been immensely helpful in our ability to conduct
the current ISAF mission, and equally supportive of our ongoing
planning efforts to expand ISAF. In fact, there is a 2-day ISAF
planning conference at my headquarters in SHAPE that concludes
today, and CENTCOM planners, from its headquarters in
Afghanistan, are there in attendance. This cooperative
environment in current operations and in the planning of future
missions is really the cornerstone of ISAF expansion. NATO's
ability to expand the ISAF mission will rely on the proper
construction and the operation of Provincial Reconstruction
Teams.
The PRT concept will enable ISAF to facilitate and create
an environment that allows for reconstruction and nation-
building activities to proceed. Each PRT will be designed to
meet specific requirements relative to security, terrain and
socioeconomic condition in its region. In this way, the
properly sized, efficient military PRT element, working in
close cooperation and synchronized with a civilian element, can
have a significant effect and influence on a considerable
geographic portion of Afghanistan.
We intend to use PRTs as the platform for Security Sector
Reform and the activities of the United Nations and the G8 SSR
lead nations in order to build Afghan security capabilities and
further reinforce the community perceptions of effective,
reliable, and accountable governance in the provinces.
Mr. Chairman, I have spoken about the NATO process of
deciding how to work in Afghanistan because this mission is a
clear demonstration of NATO's new missions in the new century.
There is a high level of political ambition among NATO nations
to succeed in these missions. But they, as ISAF shows, are
complex, expensive, and demanding. We need to proceed with
care, but also with resolve, since we cannot fail, either as a
nation or as an alliance. Afghanistan is the current test, but
there will be others. With your support and that of your
committee and other nations, I am confident that we will be
successful.
And I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today.
[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gen. James L. Jones, USMC
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the transatlantic
link that binds Europe and North America in a unique defense and
security alliance. It remains the preeminent security alliance in the
world. It would not be an overstatement to say that NATO is currently
undergoing the most significant transformation in its over 5O-year
history. Simply put--the Alliance is transforming from an organization
whose primary mission was the territorial defense of Western Europe to
one that is more agile, capable, and able to act proactively against
the numerous trans-national threats inherent in today's international
security environment. In making this transformation, NATO is taking
steps to exploit emerging technologies, to incorporate new operational
concepts, to implement institutional reforms, and to adopt modern
business practices.
Today, the Alliance is focused on security challenges and areas of
instability well beyond its traditional area of interest, and is
undertaking operations that are global in scale. The Alliance conducted
six highly successful operations last year. In Bosnia Herzegovina, the
Stabilization Force (SFOR) made significant progress towards completing
its tasks under the Dayton Accords; NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR)
continues to provide security in the region, and to assist the United
Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo; supported the very successful
Operation CONCORDIA in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
conducted the first Article IV operation during DISPLAY DETERRENCE when
the Alliance deployed NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft to Turkey;
and continues maritime interdiction operations in the Mediterranean Sea
with ACTIVE ENDEAVOR which is contributing significantly to the GWOT.
Perhaps the most far-reaching operation that NATO assumed this past
year was its assumption of the international community's mission in
Afghanistan, known as the International Security and Assistance Force
or ISAF.
ISAF was created by United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1336 in December 2001, to assist the recently formed Afghan
Transitional Authority (TA) in the maintenance and security of Kabul
and its surrounding area so that the Afghan TA and UN personnel could
operate in a secure environment.
ISAF was initially constituted on a ``lead nation'' concept. The
first mission in Kabul was led by the United Kingdom (ISAF I) followed
by Turkey (ISAF II), Germany and the Netherlands (ISAF Ill). NATO first
became involved with ISAF in response to a request from Germany and the
Netherlands for planning and support for ISAF Ill. In August 2003, NATO
became the ``lead'' for all future ISAF missions when it took command
through Headquarters Allied Forces North (AFNORTH) in Kabul,
Afghanistan. The NATO command in Kabul currently comprises 17 NATO
nations and 14 non-NATO nations consisting of over 6,000 personnel.
Today, ISAF and the Afghan National Army routinely conduct joint
patrols in the streets of Kabul, projecting a positive image of
security, teamwork and partnership. In addition, hundreds of civil-
military projects dedicated to local administration, infrastructure
reconstruction, rehabilitation of schools and medical facilities,
restoration of the water supply, health, education, and agricultural
technical assistance--all instill a new sense of hope among the
civilian population in and around Kabul.
ISAF plays an important role in the international communities'
long-term reconstruction efforts, especially in support of the G8's
Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts. In order to achieve SSR, the G8
nations have identified five pillars they believe essential to this
effort. These pillars include: Demobilization, Demilitarization, and
Reintegration or DDR, led by Japan; Judicial Reform, led by Italy;
Counter-Narcotics, led by the United Kingdom; Police Training, led by
Germany; and support to the training of the Afghan National Army, led
by the United States.
Key to the SSR effort is the Provincial Reconstruction Teams or
PRTs. PRTs have two components; The civilian element, composed of
members of the Afghan Transition Authority, UN personnel and Non
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), focuses on implementing the SSR
process. Second, the military element provides the security that helps
set the conditions allowing for the civilian element to achieve its
objectives. There are currently nine active PRTs in Afghanistan: the
German-led PRT under ISAF command; and eight PRTs under Combined Joint
Task Force-180: one British led, one New Zealand led, and six U.S. led.
On 30 December 2003, ISAF assumed operational control of the German
led PRT in the Kunduz province. The assumption of control of this PRT
is seen as a pilot program for NATO. It is believed that the expansion
of PRT's throughout the provinces will play an essential role in
allowing Afghanistan to attain a self-sustaining level of security,
stability and reconstruction.
The North Atlantic Council has asked SHAPE Headquarters to develop
a plan for the expansion of the ISAF mission. This work is currently
underway at SHAPE, and while we have not yet selected an exact
framework for how ISAF will expand, I can tell you the process will
likely be one built around a graduated-phased approach tied to a
properly resourced, and capability-based force. Specifically, our
instructions from the North Atlantic Council direct SHAPE to develop a
plan for expanding the ISAF mission that can support up to five PRTs.
We will also include the ability to expand beyond the directed five
PRTs if the Alliance decides to do so. Key to our planning process is
the lessons learned from the PRTs currently operating in Afghanistan.
General John Abizaid, who is responsible for Operation Enduring
Freedom, and his Central Command personnel in Afghanistan have been
immensely helpful in our ability to conduct the current ISAF mission,
and equally supportive of our ongoing planning efforts to expand ISAF.
In fact, there is a two-day ISAF planning conference at SHAPE that
concludes today, and CENTCOM planners from its headquarters in
Afghanistan are in attendance. This cooperative environment in current
operations and in the planning of future missions is the cornerstone to
ISAF's expansion. NATO's ability to expand the ISAF mission will rely
on the proper construction and operation of PRTs.
The PRT concept will enable ISAF to facilitate an environment that
allows for reconstruction and nation-building activities to proceed.
Each PRT will be designed to meet specific requirements relative to
security, terrain and socio-economic conditions in its region. In this
way, a correctly sized, efficient military PRT element working in close
cooperation and synchronized with a civilian element, can have a
significant influence and effect on a considerable geographic area of
Afghanistan. We intend to use PRTs as the platform for Security Sector
Reform activities of the United Nations and the G8 SSR lead nations in
order to build Afghan security capacities and further reinforce the
community perceptions of effective, reliable and accountable governance
in the provinces.
Mr. Chairman, I have spoken about the NATO process of deciding how
to work in Afghanistan because this mission is a clear demonstration of
NATO's new missions in the new century. There is a high level of
political ambition among the NATO nations to succeed in these missions.
But they, as ISAF shows, are complex, expensive, and demanding. We need
to proceed with care but also with resolve, since we cannot fail,
either as a nation or an alliance. Afghanistan is the current test, but
there will be others. With your support, and that of your counterparts
in the other nations, I am confident we will succeed.
Mr. Chairman I am prepared to answer your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, General Jones, for your
testimony.
The Chair calls now on Ambassador William Taylor.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM B. TAYLOR JR., COORDINATOR FOR
AFGHANISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to be
back, sir. I was here in front of you a couple of months ago,
and so it's an opportunity to give you an update. There have
been some things that have happened in Afghanistan that have
made the glass a little bit fuller. It's not quite full, you
won't be surprised to know.
There are hurdles that we need to accomplish, to get over.
General Jones has indicated the challenges, in particular on
the security side, which, as he indicated and as you indicated,
Mr. Chairman, make the other work possible.
Mr. Chairman, if I can just summarize my statement and
comment on some of the items that you raised in your opening
statement, I would like to just draw the attention to two parts
of what we're doing in Afghanistan.
The Chairman. Very well. The statement will be published in
full in the record.
Ambassador Taylor. Thank you, sir.
You mentioned, and in my statement I talk about, the
stabilization phase, which we are in in the political side, in
the economic side, as well as in the security side. And then
you also mentioned solidifying these programs. And I talked
about that in my statement, in terms of institutionalizing that
progress so that it can be sustained over time. We have to do
some of the institutionalization, the solidifying, at the same
time we are working on the stabilization. And the stabilization
moves into a solidifying program in each of these areas--in
political, economic, and security--and will take some time.
You mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that there is a request, or
will be a formal request, for additional funds for our work in
Afghanistan that will come up in the President's budget next
week. We urge you to take a serious look at this and fully
support it. And if there's anything that we can do to answer
questions about that, we're very eager to do that.
If I can just say just a little bit on the two pieces of--
that is, the stabilization work and the solidification, in your
term, or the institutionalization that I have. We began the
stabilization work on the political side as soon as the Taliban
and al-Qaeda were pushed out of Afghanistan at the end of 2001.
The Bonn Agreement, the Emergency Loya Jirga, were elements of
that stabilization. And, as you indicated, Mr. Chairman, the
Constitution that was just agreed--actually signed yesterday,
but agreed on the 4th of January by the 502 members of the loya
jirga--is a good first start. It, however, will only be good if
it is fully implemented. I mean, there are some--as you
indicated, some good things in that. This is a good
Constitution. It's a good piece of paper. But it will be more
than a piece of paper only if the rights, if the
responsibilities, if the organization that are included in that
document are actually implemented. And we will be pushing, but
this is going to be an important caveat, I believe.
The election is the next big phase--again, that you
indicated earlier--and there are big challenges to accomplish
that election by June. The constitution requires the Government
of Afghanistan and the U.N. and international community to make
every effort to have the two elections--that is the
Presidential and parliamentary elections--simultaneous, at the
same time, next summer. That will be hard, but that is what the
Constitution calls for at the outset. Now, if it's impossible,
practically impossible, then there will be other decisions that
will have to be made.
On the economic reconstruction, Mr. Chairman, again, we
have a stabilization phase and a solidification phase--again,
in your words. To stabilize the economy, we and the
international community have put in a large amount of
assistance to jumpstart the economy. The economy actually is
jumpstarted. The IMF reports that it's 30 percent growth last
year, 20 percent growth this year--from a very, very low base,
I hasten to say--but that's a good start for economic
stabilization.
Also in that economic stabilization, I would put the road
that you mentioned. We completed--since we last spoke, since I
was last up here in front of your committee, USAID completed
the first layer of asphalt from Kabul to Kandahar, a major
accomplishment that many people said could not be done. But you
asked, in October, whether it was done, and I was fairly
confident that it was, and we were able to accomplish that.
Those are good first starts, but, as you indicated, there's
more to it. There's the solidification, there's the
solidification and institutionalization of economic growth that
needs to take place following the stabilization. And those,
we're talking about the banking laws, and we're talking about
dispute settlement resolutions, mechanisms. We're talking about
mechanisms that will allow the private sector, both in
Afghanistan and the international private sector, to invest in
the economy and make it move. That's where the real economic
growth is going to come through.
Mr. Chairman, the last is security, and General Jones has
given an excellent overview, in particular focusing on the
PRTs. But, again, the stabilization--which is still ongoing,
there's a lot to be done to push back on the Taliban, who are
coming across the border still, are attacking unarmed
assistance workers, attacking U.N. workers, attacking engineers
on that road that you mentioned. That job is clearly not done.
There are problems with narcotics, counter-narcotics work needs
to be focused. The warlords and other strongmen in the area,
who continue to harass the people of Afghanistan. I would put
all of these in the area of stabilization, before we get to the
institutionalization.
We are making some progress. We're starting on the
institutionalization of the security sector. General Jones
mentioned both the police and the Afghan National Army,
training and institutionalization of two professional forces
that are complementary, and this is going reasonably well. We
are, again, facing some hurdles, facing some problems in both
of those, but we are making progress. I don't want to, again,
be too rosy about the overall effort, but I think, in general,
we are going in the right direction.
Mr. Chairman, the President, last week, said that ``America
is honored to be the friend of Afghanistan,'' and this is
clearly the case, and I think he spoke for the country. As
their friend, as the friend of Afghanistan, we need to assure
the Afghan people, and other people who are watching what we do
in Afghanistan, that this time we will see the mission through.
We didn't before, and we need to assure that we do this time.
And I look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Taylor follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. William B. Taylor, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to update the
committee on our program to accelerate reconstruction in Afghanistan.
Our objective in Afghanistan is clear: to help the Afghan people
build a responsible, self-sustaining market democracy that will never
again harbor terrorists. Our national security requires that we stay
the course until we and the Afghan people have achieved this goal.
When I addressed the committee last October I offered my frank
assessment of the hurdles we face as we work toward that objective but
also of the progress we are making. At that time the glass was by no
means full, but it was far from empty.
I am pleased to report today that while many hurdles remain, the
glass is measurably fuller today than it was four months ago.
Congressional support has been crucial. The supplemental funding
approved by Congress last fall is helping to underwrite a far-reaching
program to accelerate the reconstruction of Afghanistan--and that
effort is already bearing fruit. The FY04 appropriation that you passed
last week will also help. I seek your full support for the FY05 request
that the President will send up shortly.
Mr. Chairman, we can usefully think of our effort in Afghanistan in
two overlapping phases: stabilization and institutionalization. In each
of the three tracks of reconstruction--political, economic and
security--we need to stabilize the sector and then build lasting
institutions. These institutions take time to build but are crucial if
the Afghan people are to build a self-sustaining market democracy.
POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION
The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 and the Emergency Loya Jirga in
June 2002 began to stabilize governance in the immediate aftermath of
the victory over the Taliban. Hamid Karzai was selected to head the
transitional government and a cabinet was drawn from the many factions
of Afghan society. The Constitutional Loya Jirga that finished up on
January 4 represents a huge step forward to institutionalize political
progress toward an Afghan democracy--part of our objective.
The new constitution took shape through a representative process.
It was drafted by a nine-member committee of Afghans last winter,
reviewed by a 35-member Afghan commission starting last March, revised
following nationwide public consultations that began in June, and
ultimately ratified by 502 Afghan delegates to the Constitutional Loya
Jirga--an event that was beamed live on TV and radio to Afghan
households. About 20 percent of the delegates were women, and the
debates included hard bargaining on clauses relating to parliamentary
powers and the rights of minorities, including official languages.
At the end of the day, the Constitutional Loya Jirga approved the
first nationally mandated constitution in 40 years--a constitution that
Afghans can be proud of and that can provide a solid framework on which
to build the functioning elements of a stable democracy.
The next big step toward institutionalizing democracy is the
election scheduled for this summer. Registration is underway, with the
UN reporting that some 500,000 voters--out of an estimated 10.5
million--have been registered to date. The UN is already behind in
registration--a million and a half voters should have been registered
by now. The Afghan government, the UN, the international community and
the U.S. government are now straining to pick up the pace of
registration so that the election can take place in June.
ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION
To stabilize the economy, the international community has provided
large amounts of foreign aid to jump start economic growth and begin to
rebuild economic infrastructure. The Afghan economy grew at 30 percent
last year. and is growing at 20 percent this year--from an exceedingly
low base. Since we last spoke in October, USAID completed a layer of
pavement on the Kabul-to-Kandahar road, allowing vehicles to travel
between the two cities in less than six hours. Survey and design work
is already underway for the Kandahar-Herat stretch of the road and the
topographic surveys of that section are 80 percent complete.
Also in December Afghanistan completed repair work on the Salang
Tunnel, a critical mountain pass linking Kabul to its northern
provinces.
It would be hard to overstate the significance of new roads in
drawing the country together politically and economically and in
offering Afghans a visible sign of progress and hope. Certainly the
Kabul-Kandahar-Herat ring road has been a major priority for President
Karzai, so much so that he escorted a contingent of delegates from the
Constitutional Loya Jirga to the ribbon cutting ceremony for the Kabul-
Kandahar leg.
Over the last three months the impact of U.S.-funded irrigation
projects has almost tripled, going from coverage of about 55,000
hectares to almost 150,000 hectares.
These projects have begun to stabilize the Afghan economy, but
sustained economic growth requires massive, private-sector investment,
investment that will not come until the economic foundations of a
market economy are put in place. Investment law, a commercial code,
banking laws, commercial standards, dispute settlement mechanisms--
these establish the economic and regulatory framework necessary for
real growth. Some are in place, but sustained effort to create the
investment climate capable of attracting foreign and domestic investors
will be necessary for years to come.
SECURITY
In the security sector, stabilization requires the continued
pursuit of terrorists who oppose and threaten the Karzai government,
the steady removal of local strongmen who harass the Afghan people, the
disarming of local militias and the firm crackdown on narcotics
cultivation and trafficking. We have made progress--disarmament is
picking up momentum--but stabilization in the security sector has a
long way to go.
We have seen progress towards militia disarmament in recent months.
In November, Japan and the UN completed the first DDR pilot program in
Kunduz, disarming over 1000 combatants and collecting a corresponding
number of individual and crew-served weapons. In the reintegration
phase approximately two-thirds of the demobilized combatants requested
agricultural assistance, job placement, or vocational training.
The Gardez DDR pilot program was completed in December, resulting
in nearly 600 combatants registering and turning in their weapons. DDR
has also begun in Mazar-e-Sharif, and is scheduled to begin in Kandahar
next month.
We have also seen real progress in Kabul. On January 15, ISAF
coordinated the transfer of over 100 heavy weapons belonging to the
Northern Alliance out of Kabul, including multiple rocket launchers,
antitank guns and artillery. Over 800 of the verified 2000 combatants
identified for the pilot program have been disarmed and demobilized in
Kabul.
Even as we continue to stabilize the security environment, however,
we must be working to build Afghan security institutions.
We have trained an additional 1,300 Afghan National Army recruits
since October putting ANA strength at 5,780 with over 2,100 more
soldiers in training. We reached a major milestone just this month: the
capacity to train three battalions simultaneously. That capacity is
essential to our goal under the acceleration program of reaching a
troop strength of 10,000 by the time of elections this summer.
Over 1,200 new recruits are awaiting training in Kabul--an
ethnically diverse group representing 26 of 32 provinces. These
recruits are the result of a strengthened recruitment effort in the
provinces. Ten new recruitment centers are partly or fully operational
and twenty-four more are planned.
Our police-training programs also entered a new phase over the last
four months. With new resources available under the supplemental
appropriation, we are building seven new regional training centers for
national, border and highway police. The training center in Kabul is
already complete and centers in Mazar-e-Sharif, Gardez, Kandahar and
Kunduz are under construction and will reach full capacity of 750
trainees by the end of next month.
All-told, since last October, German and U.S. police-programs have
trained over 2000 new national police officers and over 200 highway
patrol officers. With the added capacity of the new training centers
coming on line, this puts us on track to reach our goal of fielding
20,000 police officers by the time elections take place next summer.
PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS
As I reported in October, we are also working with our partners in
the international community to deploy civil-military teams around the
country to enhance security, accelerate reconstruction and extend the
reach of the central government into the provinces. These provincial
reconstruction teams (PRTs) contribute to both stabilization and
institution building.
In December we established four new PRTs--in Parwan, Herat,
Kandahar and Jalalabad, bringing the total number of PRTs to eight. By
the end of next month we expect to establish another four PRTs--in
Ghazni, Asadabad, Khowst and Qalat. Over the last few months these PRTs
have been instrumental in facilitating preparations for the
Constitutional Loya Jirga, assisting voter registration teams, defusing
tensions among rival militias and supporting DDR efforts and police
training. We are examining options for expanding their number still
further and encouraging NATO/ISAF to establish additional PRTs.
EMBASSY STAFFING
Finally, we are well on our way toward building the team at our
Embassy to manage the accelerated reconstruction effort. Ambassador
Khalilzad presented his credentials to President Karzai on November 27,
2003, and is being joined by a team of senior advisors to help him
implement the acceleration program.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, we are still very much in the stabilization phase--
hunting Taliban and Al Qaeda, jump-starting the economy. Even as these
efforts continue, however, we are starting to build the institutions--a
constitutional government, credible elections, loyal army and police
forces--that will move Afghanistan toward the self-sustaining market
democracy that we seek and the Afghan people deserve.
As the President said last week:
The men and women of Afghanistan are building a nation that
is free, and proud and fighting terror--and America is honored
to be their friend.
As their friend, we need to assure the Afghan people that, this
time, we will see this important mission through to success.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador Taylor.
We have good attendance by members today, but we also have
lots of questions, so we'll have an initial 10-minute round and
then perhaps proceed with another round if there are additional
questions of members.
Let me begin by observing that an average American looking
at Afghanistan through the press, I think, still sees,
essentially, an Afghanistan that is divided into areas
controlled by so-called warlords. Circles of influence are
placed upon a map, with Kabul as a story by itself. This road
that you've described at least offers some entry into the
hinterland. Beyond that, a war continues on the border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. These are principally United States
military people fighting that war, even as the NATO groups work
in Kabul and move out, as we've described today.
The narcotics situation that you've mentioned appears to be
very prominent and growing, maybe because there's less
repression, and more ingenuity. Whatever the reason, there are
great difficulties there. There is a sense of, not quite
hopelessness about the security situation, but the election in
June is seen as a bridge way too far. This is a country in
which very few people have been registered as voters. The
normal format for voting simply has not taken place, and this
is already January 27. Frequently the criticism is made that
the United States simply has not done enough--nor have the
United States and NATO and our allies. Somehow we are hopeful
that it will all work out, and we are committing some resources
to it. However, in comparison, for instance, to the
reconstruction effort in Iraq, Afghanistan is clearly several
steps behind--in terms of emphasis, in terms of resources,
personnel--and, not quite an afterthought, but a country to one
which more thought has been given in the last few months than
had been given for some time before.
All of this leaves the situation in Afghanistan in the
balance. It might work out well, but, on the other hand, it
might not. It's not really clear, if you're looking at the
situation, whether we are winning or losing, how Afghanistan
finally is going to fare. The commitment is there, but is it
enough? Is it concerted? Is there an overall plan? Do we have
really a good idea? Someone--that is, the President of the
United States or Secretary General of the United Nations or the
head of NATO or somebody--must discern comprehensively how this
is going to work out.
This is broadly cast, but I would like both of you to give
some idea of why you have confidence that, in the end result,
Afghanistan will have a democracy; that the constitution, in
fact, will go into effect; that the promises to women that have
been involved in this and have been very prominent, in fact are
going to occur, notwithstanding backsliding in the warlord
areas, notwithstanding attacks such as the attack on the
Canadian who was killed in Kabul yesterday in what clearly is
still a recurring situation, and not withstanding terrorist
attacks upon NATO people, quite apart from United States
combatants. Why should we have confidence this is going to work
out well? Why should we devote more resources to that fight?
General Jones, would you address that, first of all, from
the security standpoint? And Ambassador Taylor, from all the
other standpoints?
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, I think that, from my vantage
point as a NATO commander and working with General Abizaid in a
very close way, I think the United States can be very proud of
the work it's done thus far to date, particularly in the
military operations. We are not fighting an enemy that is going
to be victorious, in military sense; we are fighting
essentially an insurgency. We're fighting against different
factions, who have some military capability to psychologically
demoralize us, but will not prevent us militarily from being
successful.
I think General Abizaid would tell you, if he were here,
that the number of al-Qaeda, the estimated number of al-Qaeda
has been significantly attrited over the past year.
NATO has decided that it wishes to create abilities, as a
result of the Prague summit, that will allow it to be more
effective in global missions, certainly well beyond the
traditional borders of NATO, and has established a footprint in
Kabul with a limited mission, but, nonetheless, an important
mission, because Kabul represents the center of gravity, truly,
for the country--and very shortly after establishing that
footprint, in August of last year, decided to expand its reach
to include the Kunduz province, under a German-led PRT that is
fairly robust and somewhat of an exciting departure from the
traditional NATO missions. And now I have received guidance
from the North Atlantic Council that it wishes to even do more.
So that is a basis for optimism, at least at the political
level, because it is something that the Alliance is committed
to doing. The new Secretary General is lending the influence of
his office toward accelerating the process. And it really is
the mission that NATO has signed up to at the political level.
We have had, it must be said, some difficulty in generating
the military forces that support the political level of
ambition, but I believe--and I'm hopeful--that as the
operational plan is developed, that it will be developed in
such a way that the military requirements to support the level
of ambition will be clearly identified and laid before the
nations in such a way that they can embrace it and understand
it and support it over a measured period of time, and gradually
expand, as they have directed the military component of the
Alliance to gradually expand the influence, the reach of the
Alliance, and bring, I think, great and welcome help to
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in the U.S.-led portion of the
mission.
So my optimism would be genuine, with one caveat, the
caveat being that the military component of the political level
of ambition must be resourced and supported. And to the extent
that that will be done, I think we can have a profoundly
significant effect in the PRT concept, which is, I think, an
exciting way in which the government can expand its reach and
provide for more security, stability, and reconstruction in
Afghanistan.
The Chairman. Mr. Taylor.
Ambassador Taylor. Mr. Chairman, I agree exactly with
General Jones about the cause for optimism that NATO brings us,
allows us to feel. That is, this is a serious institution that
is focused now, is committed, and the new Secretary General has
indicated this is the top of his priority. That gives me
confidence that, on the security side, if we resource it, if we
keep our focus on Afghanistan, and if NATO does what it is
intending to, is planning to do, if the nations of that
Alliance come up to the plate with resources, then, on the
security side, we can do that.
Your question also went over to the constitution, to
narcotics, to warlords, and the security for the election. My
sense, Mr. Chairman, is, again, if we, the international
community--if we, through the United Nations, which is strongly
committed and is very competent in Afghanistan--are able to,
again, keep our focus and bring the resources, then we will be
able to prevail, over time. As I indicated earlier, this is not
a short-term effort. None of these problems that you described
are amenable to short-term solutions. The Governors in
provinces, some of whom are not loyal to the center--some
people call them warlords--one by one, President Karzai is
replacing them. He replaced several more over the weekend, or
moved them around, took them from one base of support and took
them out of that to somewhere else. He is replacing Governors
that have not performed. So there are measures being taken on
that. We support President Karzai. We have a government.
The other reason for optimism is, in Afghanistan there's a
government that we support, headed up by a very popular leader.
The Chairman. Do you have control over the funds? Are you
able to prioritize where our money is going?
Ambassador Taylor. You say, do I have control over the
funds?
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Taylor. I work very closely, of course, with
Secretary Armitage, Deputy Secretary Armitage, and he and I, I
believe it is fair to say, do have control over the funds, but
he is the principal man in the State Department who has that
control.
Mr. Chairman, you also asked about narcotics. This is a
problem that we cannot be, at this point, sanguine about. What
we have to do is focus our efforts, and we are doing that, both
on the civilian side, with training for the police, which will
lead to enforcement of laws that are not now being enforced,
and that will lead to, eventually, a reduction. I'm hopeful
that next year we will see a reduction, instead of another
increase, in the number of hectares under cultivation.
You asked if the United States is doing enough. We could
always do more. We are asking you, as you indicated, the
Congress, for additional resources next year. We will probably
come in the year after that for additional resources. If we can
maintain the current level, or even increase it, then we can
have expectation, we can be optimistic, in your words, that we
will be able to go into--from the stabilization phase into the
institutionalization phase, that we will be able to get an
economy that can generate the revenues, that will have security
forces that can provide stability for the Afghan people, and
the political institutions that will allow this government to
go into elections and stabilize that part.
So I do have that optimism. We cannot fail. Failure is not
an option. It's still possible. We've failed in the past. We
could lose our focus, we could lose our attention, so it's
still possible, but it is not an option. We need to focus on
this thing.
The Taliban, Mr. Chairman, have a saying that I've heard a
couple of times in the past couple of months, and that is,
``The Americans have the watches, and we have the time.'' We
need to be sure that they are wrong. We need to prove them
wrong. We need to show them that we are going to stay there,
that they can't outlast us, that we are going to achieve this
goal that we've set out on.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Jones, I want to compliment you on the job that
you're doing in internationalizing the force; and it apparently
is working. We have approximately 11,000 troops, U.S. troops,
there now in Afghanistan. Is that correct? Do you see that
amount being maintained at a level amount for the next year?
General Jones. Senator, it's my understanding, from talking
to General Abizaid, that that level of effort will stay fairly
constant, subject to reevaluation as NATO adds its own force
list. But I think that, from my perspective right now, I would
say that it's probably fair to say that it would stay fairly
constant for the foreseeable future.
Senator Nelson. What would be your opinion about the
interest of the United States being advanced if, say, we
doubled the number of U.S. troops there?
General Jones. Well, if we're able to add more troops to
the conflict, I think that the central--I think General Abizaid
would consider the types of troops that he needed. I think,
based on the security environment, he might wish to, for
instance, aid--have the type of troops that would be helpful
for the reconstruction, more than the combat, depending on the
security mission.
On the other hand, if the combat requirements along the
border for some reason intensify, and he's able to dedicate--he
judges that it's more to our effort to--more to our interest to
deliver a death blow finally, once and for all, to al-Qaeda and
the Taliban, then he could come in with a different type of
recommendation. But, obviously, whether they're NATO troops or
U.S. troops, if you bring more to the table, you might be able
to accelerate the outcome.
Senator Nelson. Do you anticipate, in the next year, the
increase of NATO troops there?
General Jones. Senator, I am engaged in developing an
operational plan for the Alliance that will be ready sometime
next month, and if the Alliance wishes to proceed with getting
more involved in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and expand
the ISAF mission beyond Kunduz and Kabul, which I believe the
Alliance has shown a political will to do, that will be
accompanied by an increase of NATO troops in commitment and
capability.
Senator Nelson. And the leadership that you're offering is
outstanding, general, as you remake a lot of the old NATO into
the new NATO, and certainly this is the application of that and
it can help the interest of the United States; indeed, the
world.
Final question. In the approximately 2 years that we've
been in Afghanistan, give me the approximate level, U.S. troop
level, say, at the end of the first year; and now at the end of
the second year it's at 11,000.
General Jones. Sir, if I could provide that for the record,
I just don't have it off the top of my head, from a NATO
perspective, but I will--I'll get that for the record. I want
to be exact in that response.
Senator Nelson. OK.
[The following response was subsequently supplied.]
On 31 December 2002, at the end of our first year of conventional
operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, we had nearly
9,000 U.S. military personnel on the ground in Afghanistan. (Actual
number for 31 Dec 02 was 8,989.) On 31 December 2003, at the end of our
second year, the total number of U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan
was just over 12,000. (Actual number for 31 Dec 03 was 12,004.)
While our forces deployed to ensure security and stability within
Afghanistan remained relatively constant throughout 2003, we did deploy
additional U.S. Marine ground and aviation units late in 2003 to
support contingency operations. We also assumed additional civil/
military responsibilities to mentor Afghani governmental agencies,
train and develop the Afghan National Army, and assist in developing
their aging infrastructure. The additional force structure we deployed
in 2003 enabled us to establish a viable command structure in
Afghanistan to oversee operations throughout Central Asia, as well as
an Office of Military Cooperation based in Kabul. We also deployed a
task force of nearly 800 engineers, and doubled our existing civil/
military affairs, psychological operations and training support teams
that number nearly 1,400 in Afghanistan today.
Supporting Data: The 3,000 delta between Dec 2002 and Dec 2003
includes:
USMC ground forces (2/8 Inf) +975
USMC aviation forces (HMLA 773) +275
TF Gryphon (Engineers) +800
CFC-A +175
OMC-A +100
CJMOTF +525
JPOTF +150
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, thank you. The implication of
my questions are, can the interest of the United States, in
stabilizing Afghanistan, which is clearly necessary, can it be
promoted with a larger force? And I think that's a question
that we should constantly ask, on this committee and on the
Armed Services Committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Good question. And we thank you for your
willingness to supply it for the record, general.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Welcome, Ambassador
Taylor and General Jones.
General Jones, I appreciated very much the opportunity to
be with your colleagues at NATO in Brussels last week, and,
during that 2-day visit, learned a great deal about some of the
issues that you have focused on this morning, as well as
Ambassador Taylor. So thank you.
General, I'd like to pick up on a couple of the questions
that Senator Nelson addressed, and that is resource capability.
I have heard reports that, in fact, the commitments made by
NATO nations engaged now in ISAF operations have not been
forthcoming in the way of manpower, resources, and those
commitments have not been fulfilled. Could you address that
question?
General Jones. Yes, sir, I can. It is true, we're working
on a current characteristic of not only the mission in
Afghanistan, but all NATO missions, with regard to what we call
the force-generation process. The way NATO functions is that,
as the NAC--the North Atlantic Council gives guidance to the
military component, which is the one I'm honored to lead, we
develop concepts of operations, which are then reviewed and
approved; then we develop an operational plan, which is
reviewed and approved by the military committee and the North
Atlantic Council; and then we go off into what we call the
force-generation mode, and that's the convocation of all
nations now to put the substance where the political will is.
And, generally speaking, historically, we've had a
difficult time generating the force that the military commander
says is necessary for a mission. We always seem to come up a
little bit short. It always takes a little bit longer than we
wish.
But as NATO is pivoting almost 180 degrees into the wind to
try to tackle real-world missions in real time, instead of
getting there late, instead of having a very low level of
ambition, in terms of what it wishes to do, the level of
ambition has now been raised. You cannot go into Afghanistan,
for example, with a force that is not properly resourced, from
a military standpoint. That's been one of my anchors with
regard to expanding the mission, even to Kunduz.
And we know that recently we've had difficulty in
generating just seven helicopters to round out the force to
support the expanded mission in Kabul. The political will has
been stated, the Alliance has agreed, the donor countries have
been identified, and yet we find ourselves mired in the
administrative details of who's going to pay for it, who's
going to transport it, how's it going to be maintained, and it
goes on.
This is part, I think, of NATO's task to transform and
reform itself in that context, and we simply have to become
better and quicker and more efficient at generating the force
to support the operational plan. And I believe this exercise
that we're about to go through, with this very ambitious
expansion of NATO's mission in Afghanistan, will be a defining
moment for the Alliance as to whether we have, in fact, the
internal will and discipline to generate the force in a
timeframe and a degree of sufficiency that'll allow us to be
successful.
I remain optimistic that the political will has spoken. I
understand the guidance that I have been given, and I think
serious-minded people understand that this is a defining moment
for the Alliance, in terms of how it wishes to proceed for at
least the next few years in the 21st century, because
Afghanistan is in the boardroom of NATO right now. It is
public, it is stated. It is not--it is beyond question that
we're going to do--we have the appetite to do some things.
Outside the boardroom, in the corridors of NATO, are ongoing
discussions that are perhaps even more ambitious, in terms of
future NATO missions in other parts of the world.
So this is a defining moment, and we will work very hard to
make sure that we resource the force to support the political
level of ambition.
Senator Hagel. General, thank you. I don't think there's
any question that you understand this, and I would suspect all
your colleagues do; but every day those resources aren't there,
we're losing a day.
General Jones. Exactly.
Senator Hagel. And I made that point, incidently, when I
was in Brussels last week. And I think we all, to your point,
have a sense of commitment and will, but it must be matched
with those resources. Because what Taylor's trying to
accomplish, as he has said and you know better than almost
anyone, is directly connected to those resources. But thank
you, general, very much.
Ambassador Taylor, on the elections, I wanted to go back to
some of your written testimony, where you note that--your
words, I'll quote from your written testimony, ``Registration
is underway, with the U.N. reporting that some 500,000 voters,
out of an estimated ten and a half million, have been
registered to date.'' If I understand it correctly, the
election has been set for June. What is the realistic
assumption here that, in fact, that election is going to take
place in June?
Ambassador Taylor. Senator Hagel, the Afghan Government,
the United Nations, and the international community have
focused on June as the date of the election, and that group of
entities is working toward that. The Bonn Agreement established
June 2004 as the target. The constitution recently adopted,
signed yesterday, was--it gave a little more flexibility in
actually when that would happen; and we would argue that the
Constitution now is the operative guideline for the Government
of Afghanistan.
We are still targeted for June. There are a lot of things,
as you just indicated, on the voter registration that have to
happen. Now, actually, today it's 600,000. That's still not
close to where we need to be, but it is an indication that
there is movement.
They are about to accelerate--the U.N. is about to
accelerate this voter registration. Up until now, they've been
registering voters in eight cities around the country. They're
about to go to all 32 provinces, so there'll be 32 cities
around the country where people will be able to register. And
then when the snows melt and the weather is a little better, in
the spring, they will go to a phase 3 that will go out to many
of the villages in the rural areas.
So there is a plan. It can happen, at least on the
Presidential side--that is, in the Presidential election. The
parliamentary election, I think will be more challenging,
because essentially you have 32 elections.
There's still dispute, actually, about the number of
provinces. There have been a couple of suggestions of a couple
of new provinces, and there are also questions and disputes
about the districts within the provinces, the boundaries. These
are important--as everyone in this building knows--these are
important questions about parliamentary elections. You need to
know how many states there are, how many districts there are.
So these issues need to be resolved, are on the way to being
resolved, but it's going to be a challenge.
And, again, in direct answer to your questions, we are
targeted on June. We are going through some very realistic
planning for this right now. If that has to change as of some
period of time in the next couple of months, then the
Government of Afghanistan will make that decision.
Senator Hagel. So there's a possibility that they will move
that June date, based on the factors that are required to have
a transparent, open, honest election.
Ambassador Taylor. It's possible. Yes, sir.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
A question for each of you , ISAF responsibilities--I
didn't hear a lot from either one of you, partly because you
have limited time and focus on your testimony--regarding the
eastern border of Afghanistan, specifically the border with
Pakistan, that south/southeastern/eastern part of Afghanistan
that is the most dangerous, the most troublesome.
Questions. Are we looking at moving NATO-sponsored PRTs
down in that area, cooperation we're getting from the Pakistani
Government? Maybe both of you could each round out the general
question here about that part of Afghanistan.
Thank you.
General Jones. Senator, from just the pure theoretical
construct of how NATO might proceed--as you know, NATO's
general level of ambition and missions is centered around the
words security, stability, reconstruction, and the like, and
this will be the focus of NATO's mission. We are doing an
analysis right now, working closely with the Central Command,
as to the regions, to better understand the regions in
Afghanistan that are ready for PRT-like establishment and
presence. And the commander of the U.S. Central Command has
suggested that since we've started in the north, that it would
be good to stabilize the north with PRTs that might be NATO-
led, depending on how we wish to proceed, but gradually take
over the--go from north to south, and then, subsequently, to
the east, from a NATO perspective.
This is all work in progress right now. But it's clear that
the border regions are the one where the combat operations are,
and they're the most unstable. But I think we'll just have to
wait and see how NATO wishes to proceed, based on the ongoing
work that we're doing with U.S. Central Command as to what's
the best way to do this.
But we are really doing detailed analysis of what are the
regions and what are the areas that are most ready for this
stability, support, and reconstruction, so that we can
capitalize on that. Hopefully, that will have the effect of
freeing up additional forces for General Abizaid to further
sanitize those regions that are having military difficulty, in
the classic sense, so that eventually we can expand to the
entire country for stability, security, and reconstruction.
But that's generally the state of work between both of our
commands right now, and I would expect that--within a few
weeks, that NATO will be able to brief a comprehensive plan
that will lay out exactly how the Alliance wishes to proceed.
Ambassador Taylor. Senator Hagel, exactly as General Jones
said, the focus on PRTs getting out into the difficult region,
in the south and southeast, is Lieutenant General Barno's--he's
the commander on the ground there, whom you met--he's very
interested and has concrete plans to put an additional four,
maybe five PRTs in the south and southeast. So the original
eight are spread around the country. And as General Jones said,
Germans are in the north, Brits are in the north, New
Zealanders are in the center, ours are--the American PRTs are
in the south and southeast, and that's where the next four will
go, to continue to add stability and take actions in that area,
both on the reconstruction side and on the security side.
You asked about the Pakistan border. Recent actions on the
part of the Pakistani authorities should give us some reason to
be pleased about their commitment to taking actions in that
difficult part of their country. As you know, for a long time
neither the Brits, nor the Indians, nor anyone else were able
to put forces up into that area along that border, and the
Pakistanis have done that a couple of times in the past couple
of months. Just about 2 or 3 days ago, Pakistani authorities
picked up an al-Qaeda member who had--or, I'm sorry, a Taliban
member. They've picked up a lot of al-Qaeda, and have not
picked up as many of the Taliban. So this collection the other
day of a former Governor under the Taliban regime is an
important step, an important indication that the Pakistani
authorities are focused on this area. So there's some reason to
be optimistic about that, as well, both on the PRT side as well
as on the Pakistan-border side.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
The Chair would like to call on Senator Boxer next, with
the forbearance of Senator Feingold. I made a mistake in
seniority, and I apologize to the Senator. But I'd like to call
upon you now, Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. Thank you, Russ.
Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for your service to our country. It's
tough service, and it's important service, and I agree that we
can't fail.
And since 2002, this committee, on both sides of the aisle,
has been calling for more security throughout Afghanistan. And,
general, you made a statement that I thoroughly agree with. You
said, in response to Senator Nelson, ``more troops will
accelerate the outcome.'' And I just think that's a fact that
no one can deny. And for me, it doesn't have to just be
American troops at all. It could be, you know, the NATO troops.
I don't think PRTs are the answer, because they're not just
security. And I think we have to understand, when you talk
about units of PRTs, they're usually in sixty to a hundred. So
I think if we believe what the general said here, that more
troops will accelerate the outcome--this committee has really
been on this for so long, and I would like to make a comment to
back up why I think it's so important.
The President said, in his State of the Union, ``Boys and
girls of Afghanistan are back at school.'' And, indeed, they
are. However, only half the girls are back at school, not all
the girls are back in school. And this is a very important
point. And why won't the parents there send their girls to
school? Because the security situation is very tenuous in
certain parts of the country.
I believe, again, this committee has been singing them one
note for a long time here, and we're still not seeing--and I
still don't see, in your testimony, a realization that we
should be moving quicker.
Since August 2002, more than 35 schools for girls in the
south and southeast have been hit by rockets or burned down.
And we don't have any human rights representatives here today,
but I want to read to you, Mr. Chairman, comments from a Human
Rights Watch report issued earlier this month. ``Women and
girls bear some of the worst affects of Afghanistan's
insecurity. Conditions are generally better than under the
Taliban, but women and girls continue to face severe
governmental and social discrimination. Those who organize,
protest, or criticize local rulers face threats and violence.
Soldiers and police routinely harass women and girls, even in
Kabul. Many women and girls are afraid to remove the burka,
because soldiers are targeting women and girls. Many are
staying indoors, especially in rural areas, making it
impossible for them to attend school, go to work, or
participate in the country's reconstruction.''
So my first comment is, please send a message back. I
think, again, that at least this committee, in a bipartisan
way, doesn't want failure, and we believe that means more
security.
I would like--and I have one question at the end, but just
one other comment, and then, Ambassador Taylor, I am going to
send to you a bill that I've just introduced that deals with
more attention to the women of Afghanistan.
Last year, when the President sent his supplemental $87
billion, only $799 million of that $87 billion was for
Afghanistan. Congress, happily, increased this amount by $365
million, including $60 million for women's programs in
Afghanistan, but it well short of what we have to do.
According to CARE International, just 40 percent of the
$5.2 billion in aid pledged in Tokyo 2 years ago has been
released, and nearly a quarter of that has been diverted to
short-term emergency needs from long-term Afghan
reconstruction.
Women are desperate for basic assistance, such as
education, healthcare, economic opportunities. So this bill
that I've put in--and I'm hoping to get some strong bipartisan
support--will give us more funding for women and girls over the
next 3 years.
So I would like to send you this bill, along with a chart
that just shows what the Afghan women's ministry says that they
need, and I wonder if you would just give me some feedback on
that. Excellent.
And my last question, or my only question, really, is to
the general, and it regards something I've been involved in
here for a long time, which is the threat of shoulder-fired
missiles. And, as we know, in the 1980s there were hundreds of
Stinger missiles given to the Mujaheddin, who were fighting to
oust the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. And it was the Taliban
that received those weapons, and others like that, or the
Taliban developed from the Mujaheddin.
During U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan, U.S. airmen
reported that Stinger missiles were fired at their aircraft. Do
you have any estimate, general, of how many U.S.-made Stinger
missiles remain unaccounted for in Afghanistan? Do you have any
estimate of the total number of shoulder-fired missiles now in
Afghanistan?
General Jones. Senator, in response to your very specific
question, I would have to reply, for the record. I will ask
General Abizaid, whose U.S. mission it is to do the combat
operations. As NATO commander, my focus is for my NATO
missions. But it's a legitimate question, and I would just--
would absolutely say that, whether it's Afghanistan or Iraq,
the technology of shoulder-fired weapons are of great concern
to us, and particularly the loss of any kind of U.S.
technology, which would be very serious.
So I will ask that question, and with your permission, I'll
get back to you.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
[The following response was subsequently supplied.]
The information follows:
[DELETED]
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, I so appreciate your courtesy.
And, Senator Feingold, thank you.
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, may I elaborate on one point--
--
The Chairman. Yes.
General Jones [continuing]. That the Senator raised that I
think might help on the subject of troops?
One of the most important fundamental principles of our
efforts, I think, in Afghanistan and Iraq, is the development
of the Afghan National Army. It is absolutely critical that we
be successful here. And one of the key elements that will allow
us to be successful in bringing more security to Afghanistan
is, of course, teaching the new Afghan army that it has to be
willing to take on an increasing role in this context.
I've been in uniform for 37 years. My first assignment was
as a platoon commander in Vietnam, and I witnessed firsthand
what it's like to defend a country whose army would not fight
for itself. And the fundamental principle of success, whether
it's any major operation as we try to bring freedom and
democracy to other countries, is to, first of all, set the
conditions by which the newly developed army--and, in this
case, an army that has an ambition to become one of almost
70,000 soldiers adhering to the principle of subordination to
legitimate civilian authorities, who derive their governance
from a democratic means, with all of those implications--simply
has got to be taught. And, in my view, the success of the PRTs,
from a security standpoint, should not necessarily be seen in
terms of the numbers of soldiers, but also in the numbers of
Afghan soldiers who are out there side by side learning these
principles with our NATO soldiers or our U.S. soldiers, who
provide this wonderful example.
But I think it would be a huge mistake if we thought that
we could, by ourselves, do this without insisting that, over
time, they do more and more, and I just wanted to make that
point, because I think it's fundamental to the future success
of the entire mission.
Senator Boxer. I think we all agree with that. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Boxer, for your questions,
and, General Jones, for your response.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
General Jones, you just mentioned Vietnam, so I'll followup
on that. And as we battle the increasing Taliban in the
southeastern part of Afghanistan, recently there was some
controversy about civilian casualties. And how do we battle the
Taliban, as they infiltrate into the villages and just become
part of the fabric of some of these towns, without civilian
casualties?
General Jones. Senator, urban warfare is the most difficult
type of warfare any military can engage in, from the standpoint
of human costs on both sides. It is difficult, but the
fundamental pillars of its success are almost universal. It has
to do with--and it all has to do with intelligence--it has to
do with creating conditions by which the people of the cities
and the towns in the hinterland are convinced that their lives
will be better if we're successful, and that we are able to
provide assurance that they're being protected, to the best
extents possible, and that it is in their interest to cooperate
and help us identify those terrorists, insurgents who are
hiding among them. And when people believe that their--the
balance crosses over, and they believe that the quicker they
hand these people over and identify them and we apprehend them,
the greater their collective security will be, is a turning
point in any kind of insurgency.
One of my mentors, in the Marine Corps, General Al Gray,
told me that the fundamental rule of guerrilla warfare is,
never do anything that's not good for the people, and don't
make any more enemies than you've already got. And that's not a
bad way to proceed. And if we are able to develop the human
intelligence and the cooperation, all the while convincing the
people of Afghanistan that we are genuinely there to make their
lives better and to give them hope for their children, and
their children's children in the future, I think we can
prevail.
But urban conflict and the ability of insurgents to
terrorize and to threaten people is certainly one of the first
lessons of my professional life, when I saw that firsthand in
the battlefield in South Vietnam.
Ambassador Taylor. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could just
add one thing to that. General Barno has recently observed
exactly what General Jones said we'd need to look for, and that
is an increase in the local people coming forward and
identifying caches of weapons. General Barno and his troops
have uncovered 30--or more now, I suspect; this is a couple of
days old--caches just this month, just in January, up from--
they didn't get that many in all of the 6-months prior. So this
may be some indication that we are starting to get the kind of
support, the kind of cooperation, the kind of intelligence that
we need in order to fight the insurgents and the terrorists.
General Jones. One more point, if I may, sir. It will be a
tactic of terrorists who will first try to take us on and to
inflict casualties on Americans or on NATO forces. And as they
become convinced, as we're seeing in Iraq, that this is not a
militarily achievable target, because we are insistent that we
will succeed, then they will turn to the targets that are next,
the most vulnerable targets, and that's the people themselves
and people who are trying to make a difference in this case, in
Afghanistan. And so it'll be a very worthwhile and noble
challenge to make sure that we protect those people who put
themselves at risk to try to make a difference in the
countryside.
Senator Chafee. And one of the areas, as we strive to do
that, to make their life better, is, as the Ambassador
mentioned, on the narcotics issue and the growing of the poppy
and--obviously it's a lucrative crop, comparatively. And how
are we doing in that area?
Certainly this hearing's about stabilization of
Afghanistan. It's tremendously destabilizing to have the poppy
crops increasing. It's just corrupting of every form of
government around it--judiciary, whatever it might be. The
warlords or the growers have their own militias to protect
their crops. What's our strategy there? Are we eradicating? Are
we doing crop substitution, paying them to grow another crop,
or having stricter border patrols? How are we doing on that as
we try and make their lives better, as the general said?
Ambassador Taylor. Senator, this is, as I indicated
earlier, one of the most difficult areas. We're not winning
this battle yet. But as you've indicated, there are plans, and
there is a strategy that the Afghans and the international
community are working together on, and it includes elements of
each of the pieces that you said. That is, eradication--where
in the past, eradication was sporadic, uncoordinated, subject
to accusations of favoritism--the Governors eradicated their
enemies, but didn't eradicate their friends' fields, that kind
of problem. This year, the reason I think we can say that there
will be a decline, as opposed to a continued increase, in the
number of hectares under cultivation, is that there will be a
serious eradication program that will begin very soon, first
under Governors and then under the international community
sponsorship.
The second is, as you indicated, you have to have
alternative livelihoods. You have to have either alternative
crops or alternative jobs for people whose fields are being
eradicated and they're pushed out of that area, out of the
poppy growing, into something else; and that's coming, as well.
Finally, you need enforcement. Right now, the law, which is
both a religious law as well as a law from President Karzai, is
not being enforced. Poppy fields are rampant, and they are
shameless, frankly. In some small towns, in the village square
there is these lovely poppy fields, these beautiful flowers are
right there in the center of the town. And when you ask the
police what they're doing about it, kind of, hands go up, and
they say, you know, I've got a thousand policemen, but I have
one vehicle and I have two radios. And so it's this kind of
enforcement and training, equipping of the police that has to
go with the eradication and alternative livelihoods to make
this a program.
So I hope I can come back to you--we can come back to you
in 6 months and tell you we've made some good progress. We have
plans, but we need to demonstrate to you and to the Afghan
people and to the world that we're actually going to implement
those plans.
Senator Chafee. And, obviously, the objective here, as the
general said, is to win over the people. And if we're
eradicating their livelihood, it is a delicate balance of
trying to do the right thing, winning the people over so we can
get the proper human intelligence, and providing them with a
livelihood.
General Jones. Senator, if I could just comment on that, on
your question, which I think is extremely insightful.
I like to use the term narco-terrorism, as opposed to
narco-trafficking. I believe that the funding that comes
through a lot of--many terrorist organizations comes directly
from the illegal trafficking of narcotics. And in the European
context, and, actually, in the developed, civilized free world,
if you will, this should be seen as an asymmetric weapon by
terrorists that's aimed at the heart of our societies.
And, in NATO, we have launched, really, an entire naval
operation in the Mediterranean, called ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, to
restrict the volume and the corridors, the avenues of approach,
if you will, into the Alliance and from there to the United
States by the sea lanes of communication.
We've been extraordinarily successful in the past year in
making the Mediterranean more safe and more secure than it's
been anytime in the last 10 or 15 years with this operation,
which is an ongoing, standing naval forces operation. The
community of nations is developing a very comprehensive
intelligence network so that ships that come through the Suez
Canal and try to transit all the way through Gibraltar are
routinely scrutinized and run the high possibility of being
boarded to look for weapons of mass destruction, illegal human
trafficking, narcotics, and the like.
But this is a very, very big problem, and it is as much
part of the global war on terrorism as anything else.
Senator Chafee. That's certainly our experience in
Colombia. There's a lot of money involved, and it's not easy.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Feingold, thanks for your patience.
Senator Feingold. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
thank you, General Jones and Ambassador Taylor, for testifying
today.
One issue that I am very concerned about with regard to
Afghanistan is whether the United States is devoting adequate
intelligence resources to Afghanistan and to the terrorist
presence within the country. And I guess I'd like to start off
by asking both of you if you think there's been any significant
change between the intelligence resources that were focused on
Afghanistan in early 2002, versus those that are currently
focused on Afghanistan.
Apparently in June, the Washington Post quoted Rand Beers,
a counter-terrorism expert who served in this administration,
as saying the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan is too
small; so small that, in fact, quote, ``terrorists move around
the country with ease.''
Has the situation appreciably changed? Let's start with the
general, and then the Ambassador.
General Jones. I believe that--again, I think General
Abizaid would be much more expert than I because of our
different tasks here, but because of the uniform I wear, I am
interested in, obviously, these types of questions. And I think
that it's fair to say that the intelligence network that we
have in place is yielding greater and greater results as we
start to focus more and more on human intelligence.
For over 10 years, we, as a nation, collectively, walked
away from the value of human intelligence, and we have
discovered that it is an irreplaceable commodity; in fact, it's
a fundamental essential requirement of a successful mission
against any kind of insurgency, especially with a war on
terrorism.
Unfortunately, you cannot just push a button and develop
the adequacy and the base immediately. It has to be grown, it
has to be developed, it has to be funded. And I believe that we
are devoting the resources, and we are materially enhancing our
ability to develop good intelligence, and specifically in
Afghanistan. But it isn't something that will change overnight,
and I think we would always like to have more. But I think that
the site picture that we're getting for both our U.S. mission
and other missions is considerably better than it would have
been had we not made the changes, and had the Congress not
supported the funding the changes with the funding it has
generously provided.
Senator Feingold. General, I appreciate that answer, but
let me just followup quickly. What I also wanted to know was
whether the resources that we're devoting to intelligence in
Afghanistan are the same as, less than, or greater than they
were in early 2002.
General Jones. I will ask General Abizaid for his opinion
and respond to you directly on that.
[The following response was subsequently supplied.]
[DELETED]
1. [DELETED]
2. [DELETED]
3. [DELETED]
General Jones. Having talked to him recently--we are both
in town for a combatant commanders conference--I believe his
answer would be that there is a much greater emphasis, and the
resources that have been provided have made a significant
difference in his intelligence site picture, as how he leads
the U.S. forces and the site picture that he has from
intelligence.
Senator Feingold. OK.
Ambassador.
Ambassador Taylor. Senator, I would agree. There have been
a couple of statements recently, by General Abizaid and other
commanders in Afghanistan, that expressed confidence that we
will have more success against terrorists--against al-Qaeda, in
particular--in this year, in the coming months.
This may indicate an increase in resources. I think General
Jones is exactly right, we would could get you something, in
some other forum, that indicates the resources that are
available.
Senator Feingold. I would appreciate that.
Ambassador, how would you characterize the overall
perceptions of the United States and United States policy among
the people of Afghanistan? What are our most important public-
diplomacy challenges? Which misperceptions are the most
damaging, and what are we doing to address those?
Ambassador Taylor. Senator, the people of Afghanistan are
very supportive of Western presence; and, in almost all cases,
they see Western presence, and they think it's American. They
see military--General Jones indicated the diverse nature of our
coalition, but to many of the people of Afghanistan, these are
American soldiers. And they're very pleased that those American
soldiers, or those Coalition soldiers, are there.
Their concern is that we will leave too soon. Their concern
is that the Americans will not be able to maintain this focus,
that we'll not devote the resources that we've indicated we
will, that we will not stay the course, and that--in answer to
your question on our public-diplomacy challenge, that is what I
think we need to be very clear. We need to have the support--we
need to be seen to have the support of Congress, of the
American people. We need to demonstrate that we are there on
the reconstruction side, that we are there for as long as is
necessary on the security side, with our forces. It's that kind
of commitment that we need to show, and that is the public-
diplomacy challenge that we face.
Senator Feingold. I just want to follow on whether there
are any misperceptions. I mean, clearly in Iraq we are
perceived by many as an occupying force, and that leads to
enormous problems. Are there no such concerns on the part of
the people of Afghanistan about our presence there? I recognize
it's a different kind of presence, but I'm curious about the
perceptions if they're perceiving everyone as Americans.
Ambassador Taylor. Because of the differences in troop
levels and intensity of the troops that are on the ground,
there is a much different perception. Again, if you have
130,000 troops in a country--and the countries are comparable
in size and population--there will be a perception of the
soldiers there that will be different if you have 10,000, as we
do in Afghanistan. And as General Jones has indicated, these
small teams around the country, these Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, as Senator Boxer indicated, we're talking about 80
soldiers, in some cases, plus--and augmented by civilians. So
this is not an occupying presence, this is not an overwhelming
presence, by any means.
When we went through--I joined several of these Provincial
Reconstruction Team patrols in their travels through villages--
they were universally well received. Universally, you see the
children out there waving, thumbs up, and crying out that
little English that they've got; assuming, again, that it was
American soldiers that were going through, that they were on
there. This is the reception that we get.
So there's not a misperception at all about our intent
there. Again, they're concerned that we stay.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate that answer. Let me ask you
now--I understand the administration aims to train 10,000
Afghan soldiers by June 2004, and then to train an additional
10,800 per year thereafter. Do we have adequate personnel
available to accommodate the accelerated ANA training schedule?
When I consider what we're trying to do in Iraq, it seems like
we have an awful lot of training to be doing right now. What
kind of trainer-to-trainee ratio are we going to be able to
talk about here in the Afghanistan situation?
General Jones. Sir, the responsibility for training the
Afghan National Army is essentially a U.S. responsibility right
now. As NATO comes online and assists in the security,
stability, and reconstruction, there's no doubt that NATO could
also help in this regard. So I think where we are today is, the
current strength of the ANA is about 5,700. We've got 2,100 in
training. The goal is to get it up to 10,000 by mid-summer. And
I think it sounds to me like things are on track. And General
Abizaid and I talked about this briefly yesterday, and he's
well satisfied with the efforts that are--and the assets that
he has to do the required training.
I would like to just emphasize that, should NATO get
involved in this in a greater scale, I think there would be an
appetite to also provide some assistance there, as well, which
would accelerate the process.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, general.
Finally, Ambassador, I guess I want to get your reaction to
how we're really defining success in Afghanistan today. And the
reason I ask that is because it sometimes appears that we're
pursuing a piecemeal approach to bolstering stability and the
rule of law throughout the country, and I'm sometimes concerned
that--are we setting our goals at ``good enough'' to, sort of,
mask the real gaps between the resources and the needs?
Ambassador Taylor. Senator, I think this is a very
important question, and the answer that we need to agree, as a
government, as a people, is that we will be there until--and in
various forms--we will be in Afghanistan until there is an end
state--not an end date, but an end state--that we see meets our
national security needs.
We are looking for an Afghanistan that is market oriented,
that is democratically inclined, that has a stable government
that is able to control its borders, as well as its interior,
is able to control the drugs that we talked about, it's able to
provide for the needs of its people, in terms of education, in
terms of health. It's that stable, responsible government that
will never again be a harbor for terrorists that we are
committed to.
That will take some time. It'll take some time for our
military. It'll take a longer time for our reconstruction
efforts. And it'll take a long time--we intend to be there for
a long time, diplomatically and politically.
So it is that kind of long-term commitment to an end state
that serves our national interest that we need to be committed
to, and it's a function of the people of the United States, the
people of the Coalition and their parliaments that is important
for that kind of commitment.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
We'll have another round among those who are still with us.
Let me just start by simply mentioning that, as we said at
the outset, the mission of this committee is oversight. The
ongoing activities in Afghanistan have been in our oversight
since September 11, 2001. I just made a note, as others have
raised questions, that we once again pursued the status of
women in the country. We observed where the Stinger missiles
are. In previous times, we observed how the road-building is
going, as well as access to the country. We studied whether
Afghanistan has become a viable economic success, whether
people as coming and going through the country, how the
situation with the warlords is going. Likewise, we are
concerned about the poppies and about training the police and
the army in a responsible way.
One thing that you have just mentioned in response to
Senator Feingold, Mr. Taylor, is that staying-power issue. That
often has been there in earlier hearings, with some doubt as to
what the staying-power capacity of our country actually was. I
can remember, in a response that was not meant to be just an
estimate or a flip response, in some talk-show situation,
indicating that probably, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, we were
likely to be there at least 5 years. This was greeted with
headline treatment, but not necessarily with approval. In
essence, at that point a good many Americans felt that was
simply too long. In those days, we did not really think about
the implications, as you said, of a government that is not only
stable, but successful, and that is doing all of these things
against very daunting odds, historically, quite apart from the
current situation.
I have traced with our staff the fact that in the past year
we have held dramatic hearings on Afghanistan, one involving
President Karzai, himself. He sat at the same table where you
are. This came about, in part, because the President had a
mission to see our President. President Bush wanted to have a
larger forum, and that was provided.
In the course of that hearing, President Karzai was
questioned by Senator Boxer about the status of women.
President Karzai was also questioned by Senator Hagel about
whether he was really asking for enough, and he encouraged him,
when he would meet with President Bush, to ask for enough, in
terms of the money, the forces, and what have you. Many felt
that this was offensive to the President of Afghanistan. As a
matter of fact, in press accounts later, there were general
apologies for the brutalization of the President of Afghanistan
by the committee. Yet when Senator Hagel and Senator Biden and
I saw President Karzai at the World Economic Forum, near Amman,
Jordan, in June, he seemed to be in a very good mood, pleased
to see us again, despite his treatment in February before the
committee. As a matter of fact, he outlined, with his Finance
Minister, a remarkable 5-year economic plan, a pretty good
prophecy of how the loya jirga meeting and the constitutional
business would go, at a time when these were very imminent
questions in our policy in Iraq. Many hoped that somehow a 5-
year policy of some sort could come there, in the economy,
quite apart from the politics of the country. Furthermore,
President Karzai demonstrated that he had a good number of
people with him who shared his idealism and his competence,
which is really very important.
We appreciate this, and I cite all this because I started
my question by asking, why should we be optimistic, given all
the daunting circumstances that we have been listing today, and
which we have listed previously? I think there are good reasons
to point out that extraordinary progress has been made.
I can't overemphasize the importance of General Jones being
here today, as SACEUR, and the fact that NATO has made this
commitment. Lord Robertson should be given tremendous credit
for taking the out-of-area concept out of simply a conceptual
phase. As both of you have said, on the ground, NATO must be
successful. This is the archetype case, of whether, in fact, we
can move beyond simply hunkering down in the borders of the
countries that are constituent members, and actually move out
into the world.
I want to cite some thoughts that the foreign-policy
writer, Robert Kagan, had in the New York Times this past
weekend, in which he says, the importance for us--that is, the
United States--of making the distinction that we are involved
in Afghanistan, or Iraq or other situations, is not simply as a
question of our own security, but, in fact, because we fight
for the world, and that we always have done so, at least as a
part of American foreign policy; the thought that there are
broader considerations with regard to all of humanity. It is
important, in this case, as a counterweight to current tensions
with Europeans, who may say, you were overreaching, or, you are
bound to your own security situation, in a unilateral way.
In Afghanistan, NATO is operative, NATO is real, NATO has
expanded. European/American cooperation has new avenues. Even
if some European countries that were not able, for various
reasons, to participate vigorously in Iraq have found it
equally important to participate in Afghanistan, more power to
them. There is an avenue here in which we are, in fact, working
together in the world's interest, finding an interest here.
That is important, leaving aside the benefit to Afghans, the
importance to our own foreign policy and to our own alliances
with NATO.
For all these reasons, I am appreciative of your testimony
today. I do not really have substantial additional questions.
You have been asked about everything that you should be asked
about, and you have offered, for the record, accurate responses
to some inquiries that were very important and that may go
beyond your immediate recollections, as they would members of
this panel.
Do either of you have any further comment about these
thoughts? If so, I will entertain those, and then I'll proceed
to Senator Hagel.
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I can do is
echo your sentiments. I mentioned I've been privileged to serve
for 37 years in uniform with the United States. I'm
particularly proud of the fact that many of these missions have
been overseas, where marines, soldiers, sailors, airmen, coast
guardsmen, people in uniform, and people not in uniform,
representing different agencies of our government and non-
governmental agencies have come together to show that the
United States, after two horrific world wars, the very, very
difficult war in Korea, the Vietnam experience, has emerged
from the 20th century alive, strong, healthy, vibrant, and
still mankind's best hope and best example for how people of
all different types of backgrounds, ethnicity, race, religion,
can come and live together in a peaceful society and be a
society of great influence on the face of the Earth. I'm
extraordinarily proud to be a part of this process, in my 37th
year in uniform.
Thank you for pointing out that very important mission.
Ambassador Taylor. Mr. Chairman, I would just add that--two
aspects of how the work in Afghanistan furthers our foreign
policy. One is, the model that Afghanistan can become of a
moderate Islamic democracy in that part of the world. I think
this will have great effect if they can succeed, if we can help
them succeed in that regard.
And the second point you made is a very good one; that is,
the international effort, the international community there in
Afghanistan, is really pulling together. As General Jones
indicated, the Americans are in the lead on training the army,
but the French are running the Officer Training School, and the
British are running the NCO Training Academy. The Americans,
we're training and equipping the soldiers. Similarly, the
Germans are in the lead on training the police. And the
Americans are right there with them, extending that training
out into these PRTs.
So it is an international effort that does further our
foreign policy, and it has specific goals, as well.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you both.
I'm compelled to add, after General Jones mentioned his
37th year in uniform, that at an earlier period in your career,
when I was chairman of the committee almost a generation ago,
General Jones accompanied a senatorial party or two to Europe.
His participation was very, very helpful in enhancing our
understanding. This was while the cold war was still
proceeding, and NATO was still evolving. We appreciated your
leadership then, just as we do presently.
We are delighted that both of you have honored us with your
presence today.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Two questions. One, we have not heard anything this morning
about Iran. I would very much appreciate each of your analysis
regarding Iran's involvement/noninvolvement in Afghanistan.
Have they been helpful? Have they complicated things? Where,
over the last 12 months, has Iran played a role, if any?
Ambassador Taylor. They've been helpful, and they've
complicated things, both. That is, as several people have
observed, there are two Irans. And, on the one hand, they have
been contributing to the reconstruction, economic
reconstruction. So the one part of Iran does recognize the
importance of a stable neighbor on their border, and have
recognized that they can contribute to that stability by
helping on the economic-development side. They're building a
road that hooks into the road that we're building. That is,
they're building a road from the Iranian border to Herat. So,
on the one hand, that part of Iran is being constructive.
On the other hand, they are clearly supporting one of the
Governors in Herat, who is not supporting the central
government, who is not supporting President Karzai's
government, and who gets assistance from, and probably
encouragement from Iran, which is not helpful.
So, Senator Hagel, it's both. It's both helpful and
complicating.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
General Jones.
General Jones. Sir, I would defer to the Ambassador. I
think that's an accurate portrayal. As NATO gets more and more
involved in the PRTs and expanding out to the west and
everything, I'm sure that we will have a fusion of opinions
with regard to the surrounding neighbors and their influence.
But I associate myself with the Ambassador's comments.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. One additional question. The role
of NGOs in Afghanistan, and the private organizations, PVOs,
private voluntary organizations--this, Ambassador Taylor, is
more addressed to you--are they playing an increased role? What
kind of role? How critical is it, as we have heard the last
couple of hours, on essentially getting down as to--General
Jones' point is--into the villages and towns across Afghanistan
so that the people understand we're there to help make a better
life for them? Give me a assessment of the NGO/PVO role in
Afghanistan.
And, General Jones, if you have anything to offer, I would
welcome your comments, as well.
Thank you.
Ambassador Taylor. Senator, the NGOs have been in
Afghanistan for a long time. They were there when the Americans
weren't. They have been through very difficult times. They've
been there through the Taliban time, delivering services--
humanitarian services, health, education services--to the
Afghan people. So they have been there. They've got a track
record. They do things very well. They build schools, and they
work with the communities to provide the teachers, the rest of
the infrastructure that's necessary for those schools. Same
thing on the clinics.
So they have played--and the international NGOs, in
particular--have played a major role, continue to play a major
role. They are implementing many of the projects that the
Americans and other international donors are funding. They
have, again, the expertise and the history of working with the
people that enable them to do that well.
Another aspect of NGOs that's becoming clearer are the
Afghan NGOs. And the Afghan non-governmental organizations are
offering themselves, both to international NGOs, but also to
international assistance providers, as implementors.
The PRTs are able to go to local NGOs, Afghan NGOs, and
hire them to build roads, hire them to build schools, hire them
to dig wells. The PRT military folks and the civilian folks
don't do it themselves; they will hire these local NGOs. And it
sounds like they are becoming essentially local contractors.
And so the Afghan NGO world is moving into a market, a private-
sector mode, which I think is very healthy. That's the
development of a private sector that we're looking for.
So both the international NGOs, who have been there through
thick and thin, as well as this developing Afghan NGO sector is
coming along well, making big contributions.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
We thank the witnesses.
Senator Chafee, pardon me. Yes.
Senator Chafee. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a
quick couple of questions, if I could.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Chafee. Ambassador, could you describe what I
understand is a tension between the Tajiks and the Pashtuns and
how that's working out? From what I understand, the Tajiks, the
Northern Alliance, they feel we're the people that kicked out
the Taliban, ``We want more of a role in government.'' And
could you describe how that's resolving itself?
Ambassador Taylor. Yes, sir. And this is a particularly
interesting time for that question. We saw, during the
Constitutional Loya Jirga, that these ethnic questions and
ethnic tensions, as you say, kind of became clearer. Again, as
you say, the Northern Alliance came in, with the support of the
Americans, and pushed Taliban and al-Qaeda out, in 2001. Most
of the Taliban were Pashtun, the tribe in the south and
southeast. Not all Pashtuns are Taliban, clearly. So that
flavor, that ethnic flavor, colored the government that came
into power with President Karzai in December, and then was
established, was confirmed by the Emergency Loya Jirga, in
2002.
That Emergency Loya Jirga, in 2002, put together a cabinet
under President Karzai, a Pashtun, but the cabinet had elements
of the Tajiks, or the Northern Alliance. It was a coalition
cabinet that had some Pashtuns; in particular, some Pashtuns,
who had been out of the country, who had expertise in certain
areas.
Senator Lugar mentioned the Finance Minister, a very
important member of the cabinet, who spent a lot of time at the
World Bank during the time that the Communists and the Taliban
were there. So he brought that expertise, a Pashtun.
The tension comes, often, where the Tajiks, who also are
very important members of the cabinet, argue that they stayed,
they have been in the country, in Afghanistan, all the time,
and some of the Pashtuns left, for reasons that we could
certainly understand. There's that tension.
Then you come to the Constitutional Loya Jirga, where the
surprise was that the Pashtuns that we had thought were
alienated--the Pashtuns were not supporting the central
government, weren't supporting President Karzai--they came
together. The Pashtuns, who are at least a plurality in the
country--maybe a majority, we don't know, they haven't done a
census in a long time, but certainly are the single largest
ethnic group in Afghanistan--they came together, the delegates.
The Pashtun delegates to the Constitutional Loya Jirga, in
December and early January, came together and exerted
themselves in favor of a Presidential system that presumably
President Karzai will run for and, if the voters of Afghanistan
agree, will become the elected President, a Pashtun President.
So the concern, of the Tajiks was, hey, we have been the
allies. We have--we were the Northern Alliance. We kicked the
Taliban and al-Qaeda out, and there's some nervousness about
this move toward a stronger role, a more cohesive role of the
Pashtuns.
There was one particular element in the Constitutional Loya
Jirga where this came up, and it was on language. There was a
real concern about--there was general agreement that there
would be two official languages--Dari, spoken in the north, and
Pashto, spoken in the south. But then there were concerns, from
the Uzbeks and other Turkic-speaking minorities, about what the
role of those languages would have. And the Pashtuns, again,
who had the majority in the Constitutional Loya Jirga, were
ready to vote that, no, we don't need additional official
languages, and we've got the votes, and we can push that
through.
In the end, a compromise came up, where they didn't need to
vote. The Pashtuns didn't need to assert that authority. They
came up with a compromise that would allow a third language--
Uzbek, for example--to be an official language in the area
where it is the majority language.
Now, this, again--going back to something that Senator
Lugar mentioned earlier, a model for other countries, this
could be a model of tolerance, of at least ethnic tolerance,
that they were able come up to. This was not pretty. The
tensions were clearly there in the loya jirga, but they were
able to come up with compromises that allowed them to move
forward and, in the end, pull together. They all, 502
delegates, stood up at the end of the Constitutional Loya Jirga
and approved this Constitution, even though there had been some
very difficult, very tense times during the loya jirga while
these ethnic tensions kind of played out.
Senator Chafee. So, from the outside, it seems, as you
described it, the Pashtuns gave quite a bit. Did they get
something behind the scenes?
Ambassador Taylor. They got something in front of the
scenes, in the front stage. That is, they got a strong
Presidential system, which they are looking for, which almost
certainly benefits the entire country. And what Afghanistan
doesn't need at this point--and I think, in the end, all the
delegates recognize it--Afghanistan doesn't need competing
power centers in the executive branch. And there have been
suggestions that there be--in addition to the President, there
be a Prime Minister. And, in the end, all of the ethnic groups
agreed that--better to have a single President elected by the
people, rather than have competing powers.
And so they, the Pashtuns, did, indeed--they made some
compromises. The Tajiks, the Hazara, the other minorities made
compromises. And, in the end, they came up with a Constitution
that they all could agree on.
Senator Chafee. All right, thank you. I have one more
question. This is a hearing on stabilization and
reconstruction, and on the ring road. I know there's been some
emphasis and talk about the ring road. And I saw a cartoon
where the Martian rover lands, and the first pictures to come
back, and up at command central, say, ``Whoops, we landed in
Afghanistan,'' and it's really on Mars. So it's some indication
of the terrain that's there, and the difficulty of building
this ring road. How are we doing on it?
Ambassador Taylor. Senator, it is only a little bit of a
joke that it looked like Mars. The road from Kabul to Kandahar
took, oh, on a good day, without any major breakdowns, which
happen often, 15-16 hours in a car, and 2 days in a big truck,
while the road was so bad. I traveled that road several times.
It was very difficult. The road's terrible. The traffic--even
though the traffic is bad--even though the road's bad, the
traffic is there, and the big trucks, they pick the side of the
road that they want to drive on. So if they were on the other
side, then the smaller traffic got out of the way to the left
side. This is now a road that you can drive from Kabul to
Kandahar in 5 hours, so they've cut it down dramatically.
The other significant element here is that this road from
Kabul to Kandahar goes right through the Pashtun belt, it goes
right through the area that kind of parallels the Pakistan
border, where the problems are that General Jones has mentioned
and other people have talked about today. And there were
problems, there were security problems. There were people
killed. There were Afghan guards killed. There were engineers
who were kidnaped and held for ransom by the Taliban. There
were negotiations with the local Governors on finally setting
them free. Right along that road, through Ghazni, was where the
French woman, who worked for UNHCR, a humanitarian organization
in the United Nations, was killed, point blank.
Senator Chafee. You mentioned you've traveled it--prior to
the construction being complete, or after?
Ambassador Taylor. Prior. One of my next trips, I intend to
drive that road, as does President Karzai, more importantly. He
wants to drive that Kabul-to-Kandahar road as a demonstration
that Kabul, that many Pashtuns--and back to your first
question--many Pashtuns think of Kabul as not their capital.
They think of it as, kind of, in the northern part. It's not
their home. Their home, they think is in Kandahar. And this
road has enabled Pashtuns to go easily to this other city, and
that is bringing it together.
Senator Chafee. And are we on schedule to--that's, what,
about a--not even a third of what the----
Ambassador Taylor. It's a quarter. It's a quarter--it's
about--a quadrant of the road, and we are now making progress
on the next quarter, from Kandahar up to Herat. Other nations
are working on the road from Kabul up to Mazar. And the ADP is
working on the final quadrant, down to Herat again.
Senator Chafee. All right, very good.
The Chairman. Let me just followup Senator Chafee's
thought. There has been some criticism in the press as to the
quality of the road-building. Is it the kind of road that is
going to last for awhile? Do you have any comments before you
take your first drive on there?
Ambassador Taylor. I do, Senator. Mr. Chairman, the road
from Kabul to Kandahar that was completed, well ahead of
schedule and to great acclaim, by the Constitutional Loya
Jirga, by the way--many of the delegates went out for the
ribbon-cutting, you may have seen--that road is good for--it's
a thick layer of asphalt, and it's good for 3, 4, 5 years. It
is also true, however, that we're going to go back--USAID is
going to go back, with two more layers, to make that a 30-year
road or a 50-year road.
The Chairman. I see.
Ambassador Taylor. It will be there for a long time. We can
be driving this road for a long time.
The Chairman. So that's the--either the understanding or
the misunderstanding. The press accounts stated that something
had been built, like some of our streets in urban areas, with
asphalt, and then that chuck holes would occur and so forth,
but you thought of that.
Ambassador Taylor. Yes.
The Chairman. So you're going back, and you're going to
make a 30-year road out of it.
Ambassador Taylor. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel, do you have any further
questions?
Senator Hagel. No thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We thank you, again, and the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]