[Senate Hearing 108-459]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-459
THE MIDDLE EAST: RETHINKING THE ROAD MAP
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 24, 2004
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Finegold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, statement
submitted for the record....................................... 64
Indyk, Hon. Martin, director, the Saban Center for Middle East
Policy, the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.............. 44
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Kissinger, Dr. Henry A., former Secretary of State,.............. 6
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Malley, Mr. Robert, Middle East and North Africa Program
Director, International Crisis Group, Washington, DC........... 31
Prepared statement........................................... 36
Ross, Hon. Dennis, director and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow, the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC...... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 30
(iii)
THE MIDDLE EAST: RETHINKING THE
ROAD MAP
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 2:35 p.m., in room SR-325, Russell
Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the
committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Sununu, Biden,
Feingold, and Bill Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, CHAIRMAN
The Chairman. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is
called to order.
Conflict in the Middle East is one of our most intractable
foreign policy problems. It has brought not only bloodshed and
suffering to the people of Israel and Palestine, it has
contributed to the poisoned ideology of radical Islamic
extremists who have perpetuated terrorist acts on people in
countries all over the world. American national security would
be dramatically improved by the achievement of an Arab-Israeli
peace agreement.
Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee welcomes
former Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, to help us
rethink prospects for the Middle East Road Map and to consider
new ideas to stop the cycle of violence. We look forward to
having the benefit of his extraordinary expertise as we analyze
United States options.
We are also pleased to welcome our second panel of experts:
Ambassador Dennis Ross, director and Ziegler Distinguished
Fellow of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Mr.
Rob Malley, Middle East program director of the International
Crisis Group; and Ambassador Martin Indyk, director of the
Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings
Institution.
We have asked our distinguished experts to help us
challenge the prevailing pessimism, that as we enter this
election year, no progress can be made toward peace in the
Middle East. Despite election year politics, the United States
must remain engaged in the Middle East peace process. We must
take advantage of any opportunities to promote new strategies
that might lead to a viable settlement.
The United States should explore with our partners in the
quartet--the United Nations, Russia, and the European Union--
whether the momentum of the Road Map can be restored.
We also must encourage Arab nations to take on greater
responsibility for moving the Palestinians toward decisive
actions to stop terrorism.
In addition, as I mentioned in a speech at the Wehrkunde
Conference in Munich a few weeks ago, NATO should consider how
expanding alliance intervention in Middle East security could
improve the climate for a Middle East peace settlement.
Accepted last summer by the Israelis and Palestinians as a
route to a comprehensive and permanent two-state settlement,
the Road Map appears to have reached a dead end. A 6-week
cease-fire last fall bolstered optimism that the violence could
be stopped through the steps in the Road Map. Over the past few
months, however, these hopes have been shattered by suicide
bombings, targeted killings, and charges of deceit and bad
faith. Egypt's effort to reestablish the cease-fire have been
stymied.
Palestinian Prime Minister Abu Qureia has yet to meet with
Israeli Prime Minister Sharon to discuss the Road Map. The
divided Palestinian leadership appears unable or unwilling to
control the extremist and terrorist factions that continue to
undermine the peace efforts.
Claiming that progress through negotiations is impossible
under present circumstances, Israel has announced plans to
unilaterally withdraw from 17 of 21 settlements in Gaza and
disengage from further talks. These moves have been viewed by
some as imposing a unilateral settlement. Others worry that
Israel's move will harden Palestinian positions.
Terrorist groups such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad may attempt to portray the withdraw as a sign of Israel's
weakness that vindicates their use of violence. Others consider
Israel's move an opportunity to create a new opening for a
stalled peace process.
Whether Israel's unilateral approach can reinvigorate the
peace process depends on the details of the plan on how the
Palestinians, other Arab nations, the United States, and the
international community respond. As Secretary of State Colin
Powell stated before our committee just 2 weeks ago--and I
quote--``we want the settlements closed, but we want to know
exactly how that is going to be done and where those settlers
will go and how does it affect settlement activity in the West
Bank. We have to understand the total picture.'' The end of
quote from Secretary Powell.
At the same hearing, Secretary Powell underscored that the
administration is closely following Prime Minister Sharon's
proposals and pressing the Palestinians to come forward with a
plan to control terrorism. He added--and I quote--``I would do
anything to find a magic bullet to solve this one, but the
problem is terrorism, terrorism that emanates from Hamas, from
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other organizations that are not
interested in peace, not interested in a state for the
Palestinian people. They are interested in the destruction of
Israel. Until the Palestinian leadership and authority goes
after those organizations that feel that way, it will be
difficult to get the kind of progress we need moving down the
Road Map.'' The end of quote from Secretary Powell.
Now, despite these difficulties, I believe that the broader
context of events in the Middle East can improve the chances
for a peace agreement. The United States and the coalition
forces are working to bring new freedoms, economic growth, and
political change to Iraq and Afghanistan. If we can succeed in
stabilizing those countries, the political calculations of
leaders and populations in the Middle East will change.
In a recent New York Times editorial, Thomas Friedman cites
numerous examples of leading Arab opinion-makers arguing for
political reform in the Middle East in the wake of Saddam
Hussein's downfall. Already, Libya has opened its weapons of
mass destruction program to international inspectors. Syria has
sent messages to Israel it is ready to restart peace talks.
Moderate Arab nations increasingly are focused on their own
internal economic and security problems, many of which would be
improved by an Arab-Israeli settlement. There are indications
that both the Israelis and the Palestinians have had enough of
violence.
The United States and our allies must be prepared to take
advantage of these trends. Given the new dynamics in the
region, what additional steps can the administration take now
to move the peace process forward? Are there alternatives to
the Road Map or detours that should be considered?
This committee looks forward to our experts' discussion of
these questions this afternoon and their assessments of the way
ahead in the Middle East.
I call now upon the distinguished ranking member of our
committee, Senator Biden, for his opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., RANKING MEMBER
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, it is an honor to have you back. Thank you.
It is great to see you. I have never been at a hearing--and
they began as early as 1973--with you that I have not learned
something, and I mean that sincerely. I am happy to have you
here.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for calling this meeting
and join you in welcoming Dr. Kissinger. I am also eager to
hear from our experts on the second panel as well, all of whom
have devoted many years, collectively more than they probably
want to have me add up, to the cause of peace.
We have assembled a wealth of experience to help us grapple
with one of the most vexing enduring conflicts of our time.
Secretary Kissinger, much has changed in the three decades
since your well-known peacemaking efforts in the Middle East.
Today Israel no longer faces the existential military threat
from the Arab world that it once did. But it faces a more
insidious enemy in my view, one that we share in common, that
is, terrorism. It also is seized with a changing demography
which threatens its very survival as a Jewish state. As the old
phrase goes, Jonah has swallowed the whale. So while Israel has
never been in a stronger position relative to the Arab world
militarily, it still suffers from a very pervasive sense of
insecurity.
Another paradox is that while we have never been closer to
a consensus on the details of a solution, the solution on the
ground seems increasingly distant. A solution is as obvious as
it is elusive. We all know that any viable peace agreement will
have to have a few key components. Israel will have to abandon
the vast majority of its settlements and trade territory for
those they wish to retain. The Palestinians will have to
exercise the right of return to Palestine, but not to Israel.
It seems to me these two factors are the core of any bargain.
And interestingly enough, more than two-thirds of the
people on both sides, Israelis and Palestinians, consistently
say that they favor a two-state solution. The problem is that
neither believes the other side means it, and that has
permeated the people as well as the leadership.
One issue which I cannot dance around is the absence of
responsibility on the part of the present Palestinian
leadership, and here, Mr. Chairman, I think our country should
accept its share of blame for not having lent more support to
Prime Minister Abu Mazen, who we hosted here more than once,
and who made it clear why he resigned. And I believe Israel
could and should have done more as well. Giving Abu Mazen so
little to deliver to his people played directly into Arafat's
hands, and I am not sure when we will get another opportunity
as significant as the one that presented.
But as the saying goes we are where we are. The world does
not stop turning. In fact, it only seems to turn ever faster
when we talk about the Middle East.
We are facing an unprecedented set of challenges in a
region that has become our primary strategic focus of late. We
are struggling to help Iraq move in the direction of stability,
unity, and a representative government. We are facing an Arab
world seething with discontent and badly in need of political
and economic transformation, and we have not yet achieved a
meeting of the minds with our traditional allies in Europe on
an overreaching strategy for the Middle East beyond Israel and
the Palestinians. The Arab-Israeli conflict must be viewed in
the context of this volatile strategic climate and it explains
why making progress, in my view, has never been more important
than now.
But some problems do not lend themselves to immediate
solutions. Secretary Kissinger, I am intrigued by your argument
which essentially boils down to the view that the best we may
be able to do now is to help create the circumstances that
might allow for a solution later.
Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is considering a pull
out of the settlements and military installations in Gaza. If
the move is carefully coordinated with the United States to
ensure a peaceful transition, it could--it could--create the
conditions for a future ``rapid breakthrough'' that you mention
in your written testimony. I am referring to the rapid
breakthrough.
I deeply sympathize with the Israeli predicament, but I am
concerned, as are many Israelis, including some of the
leadership in the opposition party, with whom I have recently
met here, that absent a buy-in from both sides, no lasting
settlement is possible. Indeed, a unilaterally improvised
solution runs the risk of boosting rejectionists in the
Palestinian camp and giving them an excuse to perpetuate
violence.
While the new Palestinian Prime Minister has shown no
inclination to confront Yasser Arafat, there are signs of
ferment among the next generation of Palestinian leaders,
evidenced by the writings of Tom Friedman and others. Those of
us who have visited the region can feel it and see it and taste
it in the young Palestinians with whom we have met.
Strengthening these reformers is not going to be easy, but it
is essential if we are to help the Palestinians achieve the
responsible leadership they deserve and do not now have in my
view.
We must also demand more from the Arab world at large. I
agree with you that among the chief obstacles to peace is the
Arab world's failure to demonstrably accept Israel's existence.
I have suggested to Arab leaders who I have met with throughout
the region and re3cent and not-so-recent visits--including one
with my friends Senator Lugar, the chairman, and Senator Hagel,
and one alone with Senator Hagel--that Arab leaders have to do
something more demonstrable than they have done so far. They
cannot just have a peace plan that they write in another
country and let it be known and, at the same time, not do
anything to normalize relations with Israel. Arab leaders
proclaim support for the Geneva Accord. Yet, they will not
entertain the idea of inviting Geneva's Israelis signatories to
places like Riyadh.
Finally, Mr. Secretary, I want to underscore a point in
your testimony when you say, ``the American role is central.''
Quite frankly, Mr. Secretary--and I do not mean to draw you
into this but to make it clear--I am not at all certain the
White House understands that point. Promoting peace and
securing Israel requires a whole lot of hard work, day in and
day out, the willingness to risk serious amounts of political
capital. And as our next panel can attest to, all of those
things were required in the past, as you know, and are required
in the future.
Benign neglect, punctuated by episodic engagement, imperils
America's strategic interest in the region in my view. We have
no choice but to be involved. Each of us has put forward
thought-provoking ideas on how best to move forward. No one has
any monopoly on the truth and no one suggests that if the Lord
Almighty came down and sat in the middle of these tables and
told us the path, that we would still have much more than a 60
percent chance of succeeding.
This is not to suggest this is not incredibly difficult. It
is like that phrase attributed to G.K. Chesterson who said,
``it is not that Christianity has been tried and found wanting,
it has been found difficult and left untried.'' I think that is
where we are right now in terms of the peace agreement. And to
use a Christian metaphor is absolutely ironic.
But at any rate, I will cease and desist. Thank you for
being here. I am anxious to hear your testimony, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Dr. Kissinger, you, as a person who covers a comprehensive
diet of subjects every day, would appreciate the vigor of our
committee today. We commenced with a classified briefing on
Haiti, which was timely. We had a visit from the new President
of Georgia and six members of his cabinet, a very engaging and
terrific group. We broke a while for our party caucuses and
this afternoon have the climax, an appearance by yourself
before our committee and three distinguished friends who have
meant so much to American history.
So we look forward to your testimony. I would encourage you
to take the time that you require to give the full statement.
It will be put in the record in full in any event, and I would
allow you to proceed as you wish.
STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE
Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, it is always a
great pleasure for me to appear here and especially under
circumstances where I substantially agree with the two opening
statements that have been made, with the one proviso that I
believe the White House has done as much as can be done. But on
the general philosophy of the two statements, I am in general
agreement.
I have submitted a rather lengthy statement, and I will
summarize my views so that we can get to the question period as
efficiently as possible.
The major problem in bringing the conflict to a conclusion
is that the two sides are talking about incommensurable issues,
producing a psychological crisis between them.
The Israelis, living in a state that has never been
recognized by its neighbors in its history and dealing with
countries that consider recognition a concession, are, above
all, concerned with questions of survival. They are militarily
overwhelmingly strong, but their margin of safety is very
narrow. In 1973, they came close to defeat in a surprise
attack, and with the nature of their territory and the nature
of modern technology, they consider their existence inherently
precarious.
For some period, the Israeli peace movement believed in the
possibility of trading land for peace. This belief has been
destroyed by the intifada, and so much of the Israeli
population want victory and the defeat of their Arab
adversaries.
At the same time, they are a middle class society, and the
open-endedness of a terrorist conflict produces a sense of
resignation and a sort of undifferentiated desire for peace,
which is difficult to express for them in concrete conditions.
On the Arab side, I believe there is one overwhelming
obstacle which is the psychological reluctance of the
Palestinians to accept the permanence of the state of Israel.
I had a personal experience of this on the day the Oslo
agreement was signed, and I spoke to one of Arafat's deputies
who said to me that he was returning to Palestine for the first
time in 40 years, and that was a tremendous experience. And I
asked him how would he feel once he got there if he saw the
lights of some Israeli citizens. And he said, the lights I can
see are not what bothers me. What bothers me is that if you ask
me where my home is, I have to tell you it is in Jaffa. And if
you ask my children where their home is--and they have never
been there--they will tell you it is in Jaffa. It is this
psychological undercurrent that, for many Palestinians, if not
most Palestinians, these negotiations are stages in a process
toward the gradual elimination of Israel. The Palestinians have
not yet found it possible to generate a gesture like President
Sadat when he visited Israel in 1977 and produced a
psychological breakthrough that led to a settlement.
On the other hand, despite the stalemate, one has to note
some significant progress. The Israeli Government under Prime
Minister Sharon has agreed to the creation of a Palestinian
state with contiguous territory. The Likud Party had never done
that before. And contiguous territory is the code word for the
elimination of some settlements that stand in the way of
contiguity. Sharon has now announced the unilateral withdrawal
of all the settlements in Gaza, and as I also point out, I
think the fence implies the dispensability of some of the
settlements on the other side of that.
On the Arab side too there have been movements toward
negotiations. Crown Prince Abdullah made a formal proposal for
normalization of relations with Israel after return to the 1967
border.
So some of the preconditions for a solution in my view
exist. The question is, how does one define a solution? And can
one achieve the solution in one step?
The solution that is generally put forward by our allies is
a return by Israel to the 1967 border, the abandonment of its
settlements, and partition of Jerusalem in return for
normalization and some sort of international guarantees. I have
two difficulties with this particular formula.
The first is I have never met an Israeli Prime Minister or
chief of staff who considers the 1967 border defensible. This
is going back over a period longer than I care to admit, but
shall we say over 40 years. I probably could cite a longer
period if I were less vain.
Second, I do not believe that international guarantees are
very meaningful. I had, of course, a personal experience with
the international guarantees that accompanied the Vietnam
treaty in which the guaranteeing powers never even answered our
requests calling attention to the invasion of South Vietnam by
the entire North Vietnamese army. Obviously, this is a separate
case, but I find it difficult to imagine that the European
nations would go to war over the issues that are likely to
threaten Israel's security. And above all, the most serious of
those are terrorism, and to terrorism, the deployment of
guaranteeing troops is not an adequate answer. If the Israeli
army which has a maximum incentive to prevent the terrorist
acts cannot stop them, I do not see how the deployment of an
international force can be relevant to the terrorist problem.
Third, there are some aspects to the negotiations that seem
to me to guarantee a protracted negotiation such as the return
of refugees. I do not believe that any Arab leader can today
sign an agreement that does not provide for the return of
refugees, and I cannot imagine an Israeli leader who will sign
an agreement that provides for anything less. Therefore, this
guarantees in itself a protracted stalemate.
The Road Map is useful as a consensus statement of general
principles. It has some similarities to Resolution 242, and
these general principles usually have the quality that they
have a lot of adjectives that each side defines in a different
manner. For example, with respect to refugees, the Road Map
calls for an agreed just, fair, and realistic settlement. To
the Palestinians, fair and just means the return of most
refugees. To the Israelis, realistic means, at most, a token
return of refugees. So the Road Map is useful in calling
attention to terrorism, in setting up a schedule by which
agreement could be reached, but I do not think that in itself
it can provide us the guide for a breakthrough.
I am agnostic on the issue of whether one should negotiate
an overall settlement immediately or a series of partial
settlements, and I would be open-minded to either approach.
My instinct is that a negotiation for an overall settlement
will have two problems. One, it will be extremely protracted,
and second, at its end, it would still have to have some
interim stages. I cannot believe that Israel would withdraw in
one move to whatever final borders are negotiated before there
is a demonstrated end to the terrorist apparatus on the
Palestinian side and to a demonstrated interval without
terrorist activities. And this cannot happen in a very brief
period of time.
I believe that the security fence that Israel is building
may be a means to accelerate negotiations, and therefore I have
advocated that the United States take a positive attitude,
provided that it is placed in a relationship that defines a
strategic necessity and not simply another form of territorial
expansion.
So what we need is a negotiation on final borders. These
final borders should recognize strategic necessities and
demographic realities. It cannot be in Israel's interest to
acquire additional Arab populations. Indeed, if one were
dealing with a really serious effort at a permanent solution,
one would look for territory that is today an undisputed part
of Israel that is heavily populated by Arab populations that
could be traded for territory of strategic importance to Israel
and perhaps including some of the settlements that are close to
the Israeli border. That would take care of the strategic and
political necessities.
In principle, I agree with the statements that have been
made that the United States must play a major role at the right
moment. Our European allies could make a significant
contribution if they would suspend the flood of paper plans, by
which they seek to improve their position in the Arab world,
and help us in the major problem in which we use our influence
with Israel and they help bring the Arab countries to a
recognition of the importance of putting an end to terrorism
and a genuine normalization of relations with Israel.
I also favor the Mideast Initiative that has been put
forward recently by the German Foreign Minister that is trying
to develop an Atlantic concept of Middle East development
within which the evolution of a Palestinian state could be
placed and within which a specific commitment could be made to
the development of a Palestinian state.
In my view, the overwhelming problem we face now is not so
much to define the word peace as to define a pattern of
coexistence. If one could create a Palestinian state side by
side with an Israeli state, if those borders reflected
demographic and strategic realities, and if a normal life could
develop in such a framework, then one could think that a
fundamental breakthrough has been made. And I think with all
the difficulties that we see, the opportunities for such a
breakthrough objectively exist.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Chairman: The Arab-Israeli conflict has proved so resistant to
diplomacy because the obstacles to a solution are in some respects more
psychological than diplomatic.
Israel is militarily stronger than any conceivable Arab adversary;
it is clearly able to inflict heavy losses on Palestinian terrorist
groups. But it has also evolved into a middle-class advanced society
and, as such, the strain of guerrilla warfare is psychologically
draining, generating an ambivalent rigidity in Israeli society. Prior
to the Oslo agreement, the Israeli peace movement viewed reconciliation
with the Arab world primarily in terms of psychological reassurance;
land would be traded for peace and recognition even though Israeli
concessions were permanent and the Arab quid pro quo would be
revocable. But since the intifada, the vast majority of Israelis no
longer believe in reconciliation; they want victory and the crushing of
their Arab adversaries.
At the same time, there is growing uneasiness over the open-
endedness of the enterprise. With the apparent endlessness of the
intifada and the stalemate in the peace process, a sense of resignation
is growing. The desire to turn on the tormentors is beginning to be
offset by signs of a hunger for peace at almost any price.
Israel finds itself facing the classic dynamic of guerrilla warfare
as it has played out for two generations now. The terrorists not only
do not recoil from terrorism but practice an egregious form of it
because a violent, emotional, (and to bystanders) excessive retaliation
serves their purpose: it may trigger intervention by the international
community, especially the United States, to end the conflict by
imposing a peace. That process gradually reduces Israel's sense of
security even while the world's media and diplomats bewail its alleged
excesses. Torn between a recognition of strategic necessities and the
pull of emotional imperatives, Israel runs the risk of sliding into
institutionalized ambivalence.
On the Palestinian side, expulsion from a territory for centuries
considered Arab is an open wound; accepting the perceived Israeli
intrusion has thus far been beyond Palestinian emotional and
psychological capacities. The internal Palestinian debate is
essentially over how to overcome the Jewish state; one group is arguing
for permanent confrontation, while moderates are willing to move toward
the same objective in stages. Only a tiny minority considers permanent
coexistence desirable.
In the half-century of Israel's existence, no Palestinian leader
has fully recognized Israel or renounced the right of refugees to
return. Even the Palestinian signatories of the Geneva Accord went no
further than to relate the return of refugees to a proportion of
refugees accepted by third-party countries. Government-sponsored public
assaults on the very concept of a Jewish state are unremitting.
The breakthrough in Egyptian-Israeli negotiations took place in
1977, when President Anwar Sadat made his historic trip to Jerusalem
and, among other gestures, laid a wreath on the Tomb of the Unknown
Soldier. There has never occurred a similar act of grace on the part of
Palestinian leaders.
When so little confidence exists, it is difficult to move in one
step from impasse to a final solution. At the same time, there are some
hopeful signs. The formal deadlock may be obscuring the possibility
that, almost imperceptibly, a framework for an agreement is emerging.
In Israel, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's recent pronouncements suggest
that the dominant Likud party is undergoing soul-searching based on the
recognition that the biblical claim to all of Palestine involves a
demographic time bomb as Arabs become a majority and demand control of
the entire land. This change of attitude implies a willingness to give
up much of what Israel gained in the 1967 war in return for Palestinian
acceptance of the 1948 defeat and the division of the land of
Palestine.
At the same time, the Palestinians may be in the process of
learning that they have no military option and that, at least for
tactical reasons, coexistence with Israel is unavoidable. An increasing
number of Arab states would settle for any terms acceptable to
Palestinians.
A forthcoming proposal has come from Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi
Arabia. According to its imprecise outline, Israel would return to the
dividing lines of 1967 in exchange for the normalization of relations
with the Arab states. Literally, this would imply Israeli abandonment
of all settlements and Arab control of the Old City of Jerusalem,
including the holy places. The Abdullah plan does not define what is
meant by normalization, and is silent about such issues as the return
of refugees which would surely be insisted on in an actual negotiation.
This first engagement in the peace process by an Arab state not
having a direct national conflict with Israel nevertheless includes
positions that have produced the existing deadlock. The 1967 ``border''
in Palestine--unlike the Egyptian, Syrian, or Jordanian frontiers with
Israel--was never an international frontier but a ceasefire line
established at the end of the 1948 war. It was never recognized by any
Arab state until after the 1967 war and has been grudgingly accepted
recently by states that do not yet recognize the legitimacy of Israel.
I have never encountered an Israeli prime minister or chief of staff
who considered the '67 borders defensible.
Despite all these obstacles, both sides may be in the process of
reconsidering previous attitudes. The Palestinians have suffered vast
losses and the total disruption of their economy. Israel has learned
that demography threatens its existence; a large and rapidly growing
Arab population undermines the prospects for a state at once Jewish and
democratic. Annexation of significant portions of the West Bank can no
longer be considered a national Israeli interest.
This may be why all the parties have endorsed--with varying degrees
of conviction--a document listing forty simultaneous steps to be
carried out in three stages. Drafted by the United States, Russia, the
European Union, and a representative of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, and labeled the ``Road Map,'' its implementation is
supposed to be supervised by the quartet that drafted it.
Nevertheless, we must be careful not to exaggerate what the Road
Map stands for. It is not a recipe for resolving the Middle East
deadlock. Rather, it represents a reasonable compromise on rather
general objectives. These goals are stated as if they could be achieved
simultaneously by each side acting more or less autonomously.
The Road Map does not establish criteria for verification,
consequences of violation, or the sequence of acts within each stage.
The language veers toward truisms. For example, with respect to
refugees, the Road Map calls for an agreed ``just, fair, and realistic
settlement.'' To the Palestinian ``fair and just'' means a return of
most refugees, and to the Israeli ``realistic'' means, at most, a token
return of refugees.
The negotiators working their way through these generalities have
some positive elements to sustain them. The new impetus to diplomacy
reflects the revolutionary changes wrought by American policy in the
Middle East. The elimination of Iraq as a significant military force
has removed for a considerable period the possibility of an Arab-
Israeli war fought by regular armies. The American insistence that the
Palestinian Authority produce a more representative and responsible
negotiating partner than Arafat has provided the framework to weaken
the terrorist structure on the West Bank.
A combination of these factors has encouraged Prime Minister Sharon
to offer the elimination of settlements established in violation of
Israeli law, to proceed to dismantle the settlements in Gaza, and to
acquiesce in the concept of the creation of a Palestinian state with
``contiguous'' territory--the code word for opening a discussion over
the future of settlements that impede this objective.
If this were a negotiation unencumbered by historical and
psychological legacies, one could note the respect in which the parties
have approached each other: on the creation of a Palestinian state; on
ending the occupation in the greatest part of the West Bank; on the
principle of abandoning at least settlements beyond the dividing line;
on the need to end terrorism. What is lacking is even the minimum of
trust to negotiate the implementation of these principles.
The Palestinians believe that Israel seeks to reduce the
Palestinian state to a series of enclaves surrounded by Israeli
territory and pierced by an Israeli road network--in short, a state
virtually indistinguishable from limited internal autonomy. Most
Israelis are convinced that for the Palestinians any agreement
represents only a stage in an ultimate war of extermination. Arab and
Palestinian newspapers and schoolbooks and Arab and Palestinian
television treat the state of Israel as an illegitimate interloper that
must be removed from the Arab world.
Allied divisions have compounded the problem. Critics attack U.S.
policy for what they consider one-sided support of Israeli policy. At
the same time, almost all European leaders have advocated a solution
which does not meet the realities of the moment or of historical
experience: the return of Israel to the '67 borders with only the most
minor modifications; the consequent abandonment by Israel of all (or
nearly all) of the Israeli settlements established since; partition of
Jerusalem; some accommodation to the Palestinian view on return of
refugees, all this to be imposed by the U.S.
The quid pro quo is an undefined ``normalization'' and perhaps an
international guaranteeing force. The quid pro quo of normalization is
a special characteristic of the Arab-Israeli negotiations. In almost
all other negotiations, mutual recognition of the parties is taken for
granted, not treated as a concession. In fact, nonrecognition implies
the legal nonexistence of the other state, which, in the context of the
Middle East, is tantamount to an option to destroy it. Israel was
established by a U.N. resolution in 1948. No other members of the
United Nations have been asked to pay a premium for recognition.
Nor is an international guaranteeing force a solution. For what
precisely does an international guarantee mean? Against what danger
does it protect and by what means? The historical record of
multilateral guarantees is dismal, especially in the Middle East.
International guarantees are likely to prove empty against
terrorism. If Israel's armed forces with a vast stake in the outcome
could not prevent infiltrations, how is an international or even an
American force going to do it? It is much more likely to prove a
barrier against Israeli retaliation than against Palestinian terrorism.
The probable outcome is that an international force would become
hostages who will either purchase their safety by turning their backs
on violations or, if they risk their lives by serious efforts, they
will incur casualties at which point the governments supplying the
forces will be under pressure to withdraw them.
No progress is possible without a major diplomatic effort by
America. But America should not be asked to break Israel's
psychological back and jeopardize its existence as an independent
state. Having lived unrecognized by its neighbors for most of its
history, subjected to systematic terrorism, surrounded by states
technically at war with it, and aware of an essentially unopposed
publicity campaign against its existence throughout the Islamic world,
Israel will not base its survival on assurances and guarantees without
a clear assurance regarding its security requirements. It needs
defensible frontiers and a strategy that gives it a plausible
opportunity to withstand the most likely dangers.
The end of terrorism must go beyond a cease-fire, which keeps the
threat alive, to the dismantling of the terrorist supporting structure.
Even if dismantling the terror apparatus proves difficult to do
quickly, ending the systematic rejection of Israeli legitimacy and
incitement to terror in the media are within the scope of immediate
Palestinian decision. Above all, Palestinian and Arab leaders must find
a way to convey that they have accepted the permanence of Israel's
existence.
At the same time, Israel needs to take American advocacy of a
contiguous Palestinian state seriously. It implies not only an end of
new settlements but a reduction of the existing ones that impede the
promised contiguous Palestinian state, and the new strategic frontier
must reflect genuine security needs.
The practical implication is that the Road Map's goal of a
comprehensive settlement by 2005 is unachievable. It is unimaginable
that a new Palestinian prime minister precariously extracted from
Yasser Arafat will be in a position to renounce the right of
Palestinians to return to their place of origin in the early stages of
the Road Map process. It is inconceivable that Israel would make a
final agreement that does not contain such a clause or that it would
entertain transfers of populations without a tested period without
terrorism--if then. Thus even if a comprehensive agreement is the
ultimate goal, it must contain within it a prolonged interim period for
testing the commitment to peaceful coexistence.
But if comprehensive peace is not achievable within the time frame
established by the Road Map, the establishment of a provisional
Palestinian state as envisaged in Stage II can be realized. The goal
will not be comprehensive peace, which is a legal concept, but
coexistence, which reflects the absolute precondition for peace.
A ``coexistence agreement'' could be helped rather than hindered by
the fence Israel is in the process of creating, though not in the
present location. A physical barrier is more effective than an
international guaranteeing force. It would facilitate Israeli
withdrawal from the Palestinian cities and the abandonment of
checkpoints that deprive so much of Palestinian life of dignity. By the
same token, Israel must be serious about leaving the territories and
the settlements beyond the security fence to Arab jurisdiction. A
security barrier would provide a line on the other side of which
settlements would have to live under Palestinian rule or be abandoned.
Is the Palestinian objection primarily to the fence, in principle, or
to the ratification of the permanence of Israel that the fence
represents?
The intrusion of the fence beyond the 1967 borders should be kept
to a strategically necessary minimum. But the principle of it is
important: It should not be discouraged by the United States; rather,
the United States should try to shape it to contribute to what seems
the best way to a rapid breakthrough. The alternative of some sort of
imposition conceived by conventional wisdom might well bring peace at
the price of encouraging continued irredentism and turning the
agreement into a prelude for another round of confrontation.
An interim agreement may be the only way to keep the refugee issue
from blocking a settlement. Any agreement deserving the appellation
``final'' must resolve the refugee question. No Israeli government can
settle for less; no Palestinian leader has yet been found to renounce
unambiguously the right of return.
If that problem should prove insoluble, the security fence could
provide a provisional dividing line that makes possible a Palestinian
state even before a final settlement. The territorial adjustments could
be balanced by returning some portions of Israeli territory to
Palestinian rule. Particular attention should be paid to areas where a
return of Arab population would ease the demographic problem. In that
context, a provisional arrangement for Palestinian government in Arab
sections of Jerusalem can be discussed.
Such an approach requires freeing Middle East diplomacy from some
of its formalistic, almost doctrinaire, constraints. Our partners in
the quartet need to view Middle East peace as something more complex
than a device for using the United States to extract concessions from
Israel for little more than the word ``peace.'' The Palestinians must
make a choice between the requirements of genuine acceptance of the
Jewish state and an interim solution that creates a Palestinian state
immediately and marks a major step toward dealing with the settlement
issue, even if it falls short of the entire range of their aspirations.
Israel must abandon a diplomacy designed to exhaust its negotiating
partners and instead concentrate, in close coordination with the United
States, on the essentials of its requirements.
A comprehensive diplomacy to achieve these objectives should have
the following components:
The United States would play a principal mediating role in
the negotiation of an interim agreement, buttressed by a
general statement of objectives for the overall goals,
providing a link between an interim and a comprehensive
settlement. Our European allies could contribute by suspending
the flood of plans by which they seek to improve their position
in the Arab world but in reality radicalize it by raising
unfulfillable expectations:
A major contribution could be the Mideast initiative put
forward by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and in the
process of being discussed by European and American Leaders. A
concept of a Middle East development and political reform
project jointly undertaken by the Atlantic and Middle Eastern
nations would create a context defined by positive goals rather
than inherited hatreds. Any lasting settlement implies ultimate
reconciliation, and a major international effort should be
undertaken to help restore civilian life in the Palestinian
state. Once confidence is restored and true coexistence
evolves, the incentive to maintain the security fence may well
disappear.
The Palestinian Authority needs to reinstitute itself along
more representative lines. The moderate Arab states should
facilitate the negotiations by encouraging adjustments in the
Palestinian position they would not dare on their own.
Europe and the United Nations, backed by the United Sates,
could generate an international commitment to assist in the
creation of a viable Palestinian entity, at first under an
interim agreement and later on when a permanent settlement is
reached. That commitment would imply a level of assistance that
could be effective only in the context of a new set of
institutions.
For both sides, a resolution will be traumatic. For many in Israel,
the abandonment of settlements and the partition of Jerusalem will be
perceived as a repudiation of much of the history of the Jewish state.
For the Palestinians, it will be an end to the myth by which their
society has lived. America's role is central: It needs to overcome the
illusion that America can impose some paper plan and, at the same time,
to move the parties with determination toward a goal that seems, at
last, conceptually within reach.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger.
I will suggest that the committee have 8 minutes per
Senator in the first round of questioning, and then we shall
see if there are additional questions of Senators.
I will begin by asking this question, Dr. Kissinger. You
have mentioned that the refugee issue is deep-seated, perhaps
insoluble in the short run. There is a feeling of place and
possession by many people, which may be perhaps coupled with a
fairly general feeling. It is hard to tell, I suppose, how
pervasive such feelings may be on the part of many
Palestinians. Perhaps some Arab states might feel that Israel
might not be permanent after all, that at some point it might
go away.
And third, some persons in the situation express themselves
through terrorist acts. The call of the United States and
others who are friends of Israel has been for the terrorism to
cease. Someone must be responsible for bringing that to
conclusion. But it is not at all clear how and when.
You are suggesting that perhaps the best we can hope for in
the present issue, may be perhaps utilizing the fence. You have
guided the direction of where the fence ought to go. This
offers at least some basis for, as you say, coexistence of the
parties. Maybe a generation has to pass before the denial of
the permanence of Israel, or the refugee yearnings, or even the
terrorism all pass.
Are you testifying essentially that there could be a degree
of coexistence, and that the United States might be able to
support meaningful talks and negotiations among parties who
might find it possible to coexist? As you have expressed,
perhaps in a greater Middle East strategy in which more
commerce, more wealth, more political and economic prospects
for people who have not had very much finally accrue, that some
of the discontent might be ameliorated. Will you guide me
through that?
Dr. Kissinger. Well, start with the refugees, Mr. Chairman.
I cannot conceive of a negotiation in the immediate future
under which Israel will permit the return of any refugees or of
any number except a number so token as not possibly meeting the
problem. I can understand the Arab position that they cannot
sign an agreement in which they renounce the return of
refugees. If they were willing to do that, of course, the
problem would go away. But that is probably the hardest of all
the steps for the Palestinians to take, and this may have to
wait an evolution as was the case in the German Polish refugee
problem where this was not put at the very beginning of the
process.
So on the other hand, what fuels the terrorism, it seems to
me, is not so much the refugee problem as a general condition
in which there is no normal life whatever on the Palestinian
side. Therefore, the beginning of an effective way toward peace
is to create conditions in which honorable people can coexist.
So if one could come to some agreement about borders, the
future of settlements, the demographic adjustments that I have
suggested, and create a Palestinian state, this would be major
progress.
Now, if in the course of such a negotiation, it suddenly
appeared that the desire for peace had grown so great that the
other issues can be settled too, I would surely not oppose
this. But I would think the immediate objective of the
negotiations should be to see how the Middle East can be moved
from the present condition of inherent terrorism as part of the
political expression on one side and reprisals on the other to
a concept by which the two societies could begin coexisting
with each other, and then let coexistence produce a process.
The Chairman. If a border agreement could be made, a
Palestinian state defined, what are the prospects that the
Palestinian state or the people living in that area might be
able to improve economically? In other words, might their
prospects improve materially enough that they might begin to
like the idea? What is feared, on occasion, even with the fence
idea, is that the commerce between Palestinians and Israelis
might be thwarted, might be stopped, and that the difficulties
therefore for income for the Palestinians might be rather dim
under those prospects.
Dr. Kissinger. I am not suggesting, Mr. Chairman, sort of
buying off the Palestinians and making them happy with whatever
exists today. I believe that a serious effort at defining a
final border between Israel and a Palestinian state should
accompany the creation of a Palestinian state, but that should
take into account the special nature of the 1967 border between
Israel and the Palestinians as compared to that between Israel
and Egypt and Syria and Lebanon.
The other three were international borders that had been
recognized internationally and established through some process
of negotiation that had been given international sanction by
practice. The 1967 border is a more or less accidental cease-
fire line that reflected military conditions as they existed in
1948, and they were not drawn with any idea of being a
permanent border.
So if these two states are to coexist effectively, I think
it is important that the border is drawn in such a way that it
takes care of reasonable Israeli security concerns and, at the
same time, makes adjustments in favor of the Palestinians that
such an approach would generate.
Now, I have advocated the movement, even out of existing
Israel, of Arab populations that are contiguous to the
territory. And when I say movement of the populations, I mean
moving the border so that the populations would be part of a
Palestinian state. This concept is resisted today because
Palestinians do not want to accept yet the notion of the
separation on that basis. But the realities that have produced
terrorism, under which people live, makes it in my view
desirable to make the demographic adjustments of that nature
and to trade them for Israeli settlements that enhance the
security of Israel strategically.
Now, I have also stressed repeatedly in my public
statements that once such a border is drawn, either by
recognizing the security fence or through negotiation, the
Israeli settlements on the other side of that border become
subject to Arab jurisdiction or to Palestinian jurisdiction so
that that border has to be drawn with the consciousness that
the Israeli populations in those settlements may prefer to
return to Israel.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, I am going to ask a couple of specific
questions. Then I would like you to--in my lifetime I have
known of no one who could do it better--talk to us about some
strategic notions here about the whole region, if you will.
But, first, let me ask you. With regard to the notion of
settling on borders now that would--nothing guaranteed--have
reasonable Israeli security built in, since the days I watched
you actively as National Security Advisor and then as Secretary
of State as a young Senator the peace process has always been
talked about in terms of land for peace. And peace, defined by
most Israeli leaders, both Likud and Labor, over the years, has
meant security as it relates to the right of return. In other
words, they attach this notion of right of return, which you
pointed out is the most difficult for Palestinians to deal
with. And I agree with you intellectually that the only way
that may get solved is if there are conditions of coexistence
and a maturation of both societies over a period of time that
allow that to be addressed and both peoples get their arms
around it.
But in establishing borders, is that not a hard call for
the Israelis? Because part of this rationale is their
bargaining chip to get these other serious divisive issues
addressed and settled and that bargaining chip is the land.
Once they give the land, once the border is set, even though it
may not be cast in stone and be an internationally recognized
border--or maybe that is what you have in mind--they are not
likely to get the kinds of concessions they believe they need
from the Palestinians specifically, and Arabs generally. Could
you speak to that for a moment? Maybe I am misunderstanding
your initial proposal.
Dr. Kissinger. Yes. Historically the Israelis have thought
of this as bargaining chips, and the late Prime Minister Rabin
used to say, ``a little bit of land for a little of peace.''
One trouble with that is that peace is not so easily divisible
and another problem is also that almost everything that the
Arab side gives is revocable and almost everything the Israelis
give is irrevocable. They give land and they get----
Senator Biden. A promise.
Dr. Kissinger. But your fundamental question is if one
pursues the course that I have suggested of settling the border
and creating a Palestinian state and leave refugees, does that
not create a situation in which that refugee issue will forever
disturb the relationship.
Well, I think there is another issue that is also not fully
settleable now. That is Jerusalem. There too one can make an
interim arrangement, but the ultimate arrangement--and I think
one would have to decide to what extent these two issues will
be kept open--will balance each other.
Finally, I would not object if, in the course of a
negotiation, they would prove to be resolvable.
Senator Biden. And I understand that.
Dr. Kissinger. It is a very good point you make, that the
dilemma of what I put forward is that if you leave something
open, do you give a pretext for reopening hostilities. And one
has to analyze that in terms of the people who want to reopen
hostilities are really opposed to the existence of Israel and
not to any specific condition.
Senator Biden. Precisely.
Dr. Kissinger. And can one create a pattern of life in
which those who want to destroy Israel itself are marginalized
and therefore a general atmosphere develops? That's the open
question.
Senator Biden. I understand now better what you are saying.
I happen to agree with you. It is easy. You know that old joke
they used to tell about the chicken and the pig in the barnyard
saying they are going to give Farmer Brown a birthday gift, and
the chicken says, let's give him a steak and egg breakfasts.
The cow says, for you it is a contribution. For me it is a
total commitment. Well, it is a little bit like what we ask of
the Israelis.
The point I want to make sure I understood is that it would
require a mind-set change on the part of the Israelis to go the
route you are going, which, easy for me to say, were I an
Israeli leader, I would find worth taking the chance. It is not
my job to tell them their business, but I just wanted to make
sure I understood it.
Dr. Kissinger. I think it requires a mind-set change on
both sides.
Senator Biden. Yes. And by the way, I think that is the
context in which it would happen.
Dr. Kissinger. I think we are beginning to head in that
direction.
Senator Biden. What I am worried about is that we are going
to head in a direction in which Israel is going to be
increasingly at a disadvantage. This is a case where I think
time does not work on the side of the Israelis. What I am
worried about is moving from a point of a two-stage solution to
the acceptance of a notion on both sides that there is only a
one-stage solution, that there is no possibility of a two-stage
solution. And that is a path I would rather not go down at the
moment.
I would like in the few minutes I have remaining--because I
know of no one else who is able to speak to these kinds of
issues better than you. I have been at a loss to understand the
official position of the EU or individual nation states within
Europe because there is no single European view--with respect
to Israel and what solutions they find most appropriate. I
realize they signed onto the Road Map, but I still am not
convinced they share our view. And I would like you to try to
explain to me what I thought in your statement you indicated is
that some of our European allies are using--maybe I misheard
you--Israel to better their position in the Arab world. That is
what I think, but I do not know if that is what you said.
Dr. Kissinger. I did not understand the sentence.
Senator Biden. That the Europeans use their attitude toward
Israel, their position toward Israel to better their European
position in the Arab world.
Dr. Kissinger. Absolutely.
Senator Biden. That is my view. Is that what you said?
Dr. Kissinger. No, I did not say that, but I agree with it.
Senator Biden. Well, I am smarter than I thought I was.
Dr. Kissinger. I said it in a longer sentence.
Senator Biden. What I would like to do for a moment is kind
of explore that because it seems to me that there are really
five parties to any ultimate settlement in the Middle East. The
two critical parties are the Palestinians and the Israelis. The
indispensable party is the United States. But the other parties
are, quote, the Europeans and the Arabs, the Arab leadership.
I have been at a loss to understand why there is not anyone
in the Arab world since Sadat with the possible exception of
the King of Jordan, who has a more strategic vision of Arab
interests, and the interests of a particular Arab country,
whether it be Saudi Arabia or Egypt today or anyone else.
The idea that if the Arab leadership in these countries
were literally willing to recognize the peace process in a
tangible way--that is, invite Israeli diplomats to their
capitals, to visit Israel--that, coupled with a change in
attitude of the Israelis and the Europeans, creates an
environment that is fundamentally different than the one that
exists now.
And I just wondered if you would talk with us for a few
minutes. My time has been up about 2 minutes and 5 seconds.
Maybe on the second round you could tell me what you think they
are thinking. Tell me what the European perspective is, why
they are not being more progressive, for lack of a better word,
and why, beyond the obvious issue of fearing their own
populations in a backlash, Arab leadership has shown so little
imagination out of their own naked self-interest, unless I am
miscalculating what I think they have not done. That is an
awful broad question, but if you could speak to any of that.
Dr. Kissinger. On Europe, what the Europeans mean when they
put forward their proposal is that the United States should
impose it. And if the United States would only impose it, they
think that then the problem would go away, the parties would
live happily together, Europe would furnish some sort of
guarantees, which on the basis of history cannot be credible.
So I think this is an abdication of statesmanship, and it
appeals to anti-Americanism for one thing so that if there is
no progress in the Middle East, it is by definition America's
fault despite the fact that every progress that has been made
in the Middle East historically has come through American
participation in the process. Even the Oslo agreement grew out
of the Madrid Conference.
So part of it is domestic politics. Part of it is the view
that Europe can establish a special relationship in the Arab
world by taking this position.
I do not believe that either of these approaches are in the
long-term interests even of Europe. Europe would make a much
greater contribution if it convinced the moderate Arabs that
this is a problem not only for a small group of Palestinians,
but for all those who want to prevent a fundamentalist or
radical outcome in the Islamic world and, more than that, who
want to give the Islamic world a modern direction in which the
aspirations of the people can be met.
So if this were some seminar at a university, I would say
an ideal outcome would be if the Europeans and we could develop
a common approach that took into account the psychological and
strategic necessities of both sides and presented it with some
degree of understanding, even compassion to both sides.
As for the moderate Arabs, I had the honor of working
closely with President Sadat. When I first met him, I had a
very ambivalent attitude, but one of the very first things he
said to me is this is, above all, a psychological problem and
my contribution to it has to be to show that we genuinely want
peace. He also added, the Israelis have to see to it that they
do not humiliate our people that are dealing with them. That is
a fair request.
So I believe that it may be impossible for Palestinian
leaders by themselves to jump the psychological hurdle that has
to be jumped. And it would be highly desirable, probably
necessary, for the moderate Arab leaders to say this frontier
is one we consider reasonable and you are not traitors if you
accept it. This, of course, means there have to be reasonable
compensations.
Therefore, I agree with the presentation you will hear by
Dennis Ross that even in the process of unilateral withdrawal
of the Israelis, they would be wise to engage the Egyptians and
other moderate Arabs to create a sense of Arab participation in
this as a process. And one of the roles of American diplomacy
should be, and I believe attempts to be, is to bring the
moderate Arabs and the Europeans to a less tactical approach
and to take a more far-sighted look at it.
I did not answer the chairman's question. Is it possible,
you asked me, to bring the Palestinians to a point where they
are prepared to coexist? I think within such a framework and if
we could come up with a Middle East initiative in which the
Atlantic nations were to put before the peoples in the Middle
East what peace can bring through collaboration of the Middle
East nations with the Atlantic nations and under conditions of
peace with Israel, I think one can at least imagine what a
structure would look like.
Senator Biden. My time is up. I will just close with this
comment.
I cannot imagine, Mr. Secretary, notwithstanding the
existence of these young Palestinians we have talked to and
know--I cannot fathom how a solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict, as it relates to the Palestinian question, could be
accomplished at the hands of these new leaders alone, for them
alone to do it. I do not see how it can happen absent the
leadership in the Arab world, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, saying
first it is OK because I do not know how--I think we approached
this the wrong way.
We have to get the Arab world to say under conditions that
are in this shape and form, you go ahead. We will bless you if
you do it. You are not only not a traitor, you are helping us
all. Right now, that psychological leap that was referenced by
Sadat is so high on the part of any Palestinian leadership, I
do not know how it gets accomplished.
Dr. Kissinger. The most important aspect of Middle East
policy is to understand that one has to deal with all these
four or five issues simultaneously, with the moderate Arabs,
the Europeans, the two parties, and other interested groups.
But those are the key elements that one has to move toward this
process.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
I thank my colleagues for letting me go over.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And welcome, Dr.
Kissinger.
Picking up on the theme of your conversation with Senator
Biden, you mentioned in your opening statement the proposal put
forward by Saudi Arabia and Crown Prince Abdullah. I take it
from your comments that you thought there was some substance,
some opening, some hope, and it seems to me it reflects a bit
on what you and Senator Biden were talking about, the moderate
Arab leadership of the Middle East becoming involved. And I
happen to agree with the assessment that to place this on the
Palestinian limited, fractured leadership, as it is, will not
get us where we need to go. And in light of your statement
here, as you note on page 5 of your testimony, no progress is
possible without a major diplomatic effort by America.
So my first question is what do you believe happened to
Crown Prince Abdullah's proposal? Why did it not ever get the
attention that some thought it would?
Dr. Kissinger. The importance of the proposal of the Crown
Prince was that it was the first proposal by an Arab country
that did not have a direct national conflict with Israel. So it
was not one of the neighboring states, and therefore it was an
approach in the name of moderation and peace by a country that
did not have a direct issue with Israel. That was important.
Second, the fact that he spoke of normalization was an
important contribution.
On the negative side of the proposal or on the incomplete
side of the proposal, I do not believe that the 1967 border,
for the reason I gave, can be the dividing line and I think
there has to be a negotiation on that subject.
Second, the concept of normalization needs to be fleshed
out because the way it is defined now, it is something like
diplomatic recognition. Now, diplomatic recognition is the way
most negotiations begin, not how they end. It is a peculiarity
of the Middle East situation that wars break out between
countries that are technically at war with each other and that
the chief nations do not recognize each other's existence,
which has the implication that if the recognition is withdrawn,
the right to existence is questioned. So the normalization
point is something that would have to be elaborated.
So I do not think it can be negotiated just as it is, but
one can take the positive elements in it and from that point of
view, I think it was a contribution. I believe that in a
comprehensive approach it should be taken seriously with the
qualifications I gave.
Senator Hagel. How do you believe we should handle Arafat?
We have obviously tried to marginalize him, not deal with him.
That apparently has not been very effective. What is your
suggestion as to how we deal with Arafat?
Dr. Kissinger. The problem about Arafat is, does he create
the Palestinian mood or does he reflect the Palestinian mood?
Is he a cause or a symptom? Surely he has spent all of his life
as a revolutionary leader, and therefore settling down to civil
administration does not hold a great attraction for him. And
probably he believes that his legitimacy derives from the fact
that he has been an uncompromising opponent, in effect, of
Israel's existence.
The challenge we have put to the Palestinians to come up
with a responsible leadership is a valid request. It is not
clear whether the Palestinians by themselves can generate this
or whether, at a minimum, the other moderate Arab states should
play a role in legitimizing a leadership that deals with the
issue of terrorism and final borders.
Senator Hagel. In your opinion--and you held two of the
most significant, important responsible offices in the
Government of the United States at one time actually--with all
of the responsibilities, commitments that America has today
that consume the time of the President, the Vice President, the
Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor--and the
agenda is long and we know the items, Afghanistan, Iraq, North
Korea, Pakistan, India, Haiti now, others, in addition to the
Israeli-Palestinian issue--are we stretched too thin in having
enough focus of leadership, of resource base, of commitment to
do the things that apparently are not being done in the Middle
East in trying to forge some kind of a process, the Road Map
you spoke of? You talked about a protracted stalemate. We have
not been able to break that stalemate. Is it in any way related
to too many commitments, or does that not have anything to do
with this elusive effort that we have been at since 1948?
Dr. Kissinger. The question has two parts. One is are these
issues so complex that they cannot possibly be dealt with in a
comprehensive way, and the second is can the U.S. Government be
organized to deal with them in a comprehensive way.
With respect to the first question, I would argue that if
they are not dealt with in a comprehensive way, they will not
be dealt with at all effectively because then one always takes
a piece of it and there will be some part that is not--that
disturbs whatever progress you have made.
I believe that it will be seen that what we did in Iraq--
that American actions in Iraq are contributing to an atmosphere
in which peace can be negotiated more effectively between the
Israelis and the Palestinians if only because it removes the
possibility of a conventional war for the foreseeable future
between Arab-organized armies and the Israelis.
It is, however, a fact that in a world in turmoil, in which
you not only have the Middle East but one has to think about
North Korea, how to put China into an international system,
what to do with a Russia that is redefining itself and
reemerging, plus the European integration, that the management
of a comprehensive foreign policy becomes a huge task.
It is inherent in the nature of the governmental process
that the urgent may have priority over the important. If you
ask yourself where do I want America to be 5 years from now,
that is a question you can defer until tomorrow. How to deal
with the latest crisis in Baghdad or a suicide bomber is
something to which you have to respond immediately and that
will absorb your energy. This is a question that any
administration has to deal with, and I believe we are dealing
with it, but it is something that one always has to look at
carefully.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, last year Deputy Prime Minister Olmert
dropped the equivalent of a political earthquake when he said
that major portions of the West Bank settlements should be
disbanded, withdrawn from. This was a political earthquake
because he had been one that had been articulating the whole
Israel, followed by 2 or 3 months with the Prime Minister
making a statement that he thought that some settlements should
be withdrawn, and then when he went in front of the Likud
Central Committee, he was booed for that position. And Prime
Minister Sharon continues to talk about a one-party solution
instead of a two-party solution.
Where do you think that is taking us?
Dr. Kissinger. Prime Minister Sharon, to go back to the
question of Senator Biden, is vilified in Europe as a hard-
liner, as somebody similar to some of the totalitarian types.
But it is not adequately recognized that he has made huge
changes in the Israeli perception of the world. Whatever one
thinks of the settlements, for an Israeli Prime Minister to
announce the possibility of their being abandoned goes against
the whole history of the Zionist movement for which settlement
was a part of the Israeli identity. So I think it is not just a
political move, it is a spiritual move, even though it is not
put in those terms, and for this to become part of the Israeli
internal discussion, however limited it is put forward in its
initial stages.
Now, it is also important, it seems to me, for Sharon and
also for the peace process, that this come about as expression
of Israeli security policy and not as something extorted from
them through American pressure. So it seems to me that the
combination of the security fence and the unilateral
withdrawal, provided the security fence is brought into a
rational relationship with Israeli strategic necessities, it is
a major step toward an ultimate negotiation.
Senator Nelson. If you overlaid in that if the Israeli
policy was to pull out of the Gaza, does that create the
circumstances where then, in your opinion, there would be such
an atmosphere for a settlement?
Dr. Kissinger. I think the objective conditions for a
breakthrough in negotiations exists not necessarily in the next
6 months but, say, within the next 2 years or the next 18
months. Once all the parties recognize, which I think actually
the Israelis have recognized, that there is no deus ex machina,
there is nobody going to hand it all to them, the Americans
will not be able to deliver everything, and the Europeans
recognize that it does not do any good to keep stirring up
unfulfillable hopes, and if we then keep heading toward the
implications of what is almost inherent in some of the
processes that have started, I could imagine a breakthrough,
provided we can find one moderate Arab leader who is willing to
take some responsibility for it. It cannot be done simply by
outside countries.
Senator Nelson. I agree.
What if President Assad of Syria were to suddenly seize the
moment and come forth and say we are going to stop all of the
international terrorist activity that is harbored in Syria?
Would that not be a cataclysmic change that could suddenly
cause a shifting of the tables toward peace?
Dr. Kissinger. Well, I have written in an article about 6
weeks ago commenting on President Assad's interview with the
New York Times, that this is an initiative that should be
explored. If he means that the negotiations can start where
they left off--if he really means that--all that was left in
these negotiations was a strip of land along the Sea of Galilee
of a few hundred yards wide. That, of course, raises questions
of riparian rights and it is not a simple question, but it is a
definable question.
And also, if President Assad were prepared to make a
genuine peace agreement with Israel, while the Palestinian
question still is unsettled, that would create a major
incentive for the Palestinians.
On the other hand, for Sharon to engage in a final status
negotiation with Syria involving settlements on the Golan
Heights at a moment that he is dealing with settlements in Gaza
and the potential settlements beyond the security fence, that
is a really tough domestic question in Israel. And for the
United States to promote a negotiation with Syria and let
Syria, with respect to terrorism, take the step, similar to
Libya's with respect to nuclear weapons, is an important
challenge. If Assad were prepared to get rid of the Hizbollah
in the Bekka Valley and the headquarters of terrorist groups in
Damascus, I think it would be an important step toward peace if
they explored the Syrian option.
Senator Nelson. He told me that he would not cause any
preconditions, and I have asked that question nine ways to
Sunday to make sure that I was hearing what he was saying.
Dr. Kissinger. He would not cause any?
Senator Nelson. He was saying he would not impose any
preconditions. Now, you hear a different opinion, whoever is
speaking, but that is what he said to me eyeball to eyeball
with our U.S. Ambassador sitting there and with his Foreign
Minister sitting there. But, oh, it is a tortuous path.
Thank you.
Dr. Kissinger. I think it is something that should be
explored, always keeping in mind that we must insist on the end
of the terrorist activities from Syrian soil.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
Ambassador.
This arguably is the darkest period of Israel's existence,
this 4-year intifada, and certainly the chaos and the violence
we read about every morning in the papers we condemn. As Robert
Malley said, who will testify in the second panel, the Road
Map, embraced but all but believed by none, as the only route
we have out of this except, as you said, a deus ex machina, is
the Geneva Accords. This in detail addresses all the issues,
the Palestinian right of return, the recognition of Israel as a
state for the Jewish people, Jerusalem, the Temple Mount, the
settlements, and of course, very importantly the disarmament of
militias and their renunciation of terror. This is signed by
Israelis and Palestinians.
And my question is why would members of our administration,
such as Secretary Powell testify 2 weeks ago that he took heat
for meeting with the signatories of the Geneva Accords? And
Secretary Wolfowitz publicly announced some support for the
Geneva Accords, and he took some heat for it from the
administration. Why is that and out of this darkness is some
light that this administration would condemn or renounce?
Dr. Kissinger. The Geneva Accords are a negotiation between
an Israeli who has made important contributions in the past but
who is totally marginalized in Israeli politics and a PLO
representative. If the Israeli Government and Arab governments
came to such a conclusion, I do not think it would be vetoed by
the United States.
There are aspects of it that, looking at, seem improbable
to me. I find it hard to imagine that Israel can live with an
outcome in which access to the Wailing Wall has to go through
some Arab territory no matter what the international guarantee
is. But this gets into fine points that would take us too far.
I am not saying it is not possible for private groups to
get together and draw up paper plans. Governments have not been
able to do that.
But the refugee part of the Geneva Accords I think is
extremely dangerous. The refugee part of the Geneva Accord
establishes a right of return in some proportion to those
returning to other countries, and second, they reopen the
question that the decision will be left to Israel, subjecting
Israel to constant pressure to adjust its attitudes. It is not
definitive from that point of view. But I do not know whether
it is useful to discuss details of an accord made between
private people.
Senator Chafee. I guess that would be my point. As I said,
Mr. Malley will say the Road Map, embraced by all but believed
in by none----
Dr. Kissinger. I do not quarrel with the Road Map.
Senator Chafee. We might quibble about the language on the
right of return. My reading of it is that the Palestinians do
concede the right of return, and it is very specific about----
Dr. Kissinger. The trouble with the Road Map--it is not a
trouble. It is----
Senator Chafee. If I could just finish.
Dr. Kissinger. Oh, excuse me.
Senator Chafee. So my question is, why is this not more
closely looked at as a vehicle of peace if that is our goal?
Dr. Kissinger. There is no reason not to use the Road Map
in a serious negotiation. The Road Map is a good, general
statement of what should be settled in a negotiation. Once one
had a serious negotiation, the Road Map would be one of the
documents one would take very seriously.
Senator Chafee. More so than the outline of Geneva.
Dr. Kissinger. More than?
Senator Chafee. You are saying the Road Map has more
potential than the outlines from Geneva. Do I hear you right?
Dr. Kissinger. The acoustics or my hearing is failing me.
More serious than what?
Senator Chafee. More potential for a resolution of the
various issues, that sticking to the Road Map has more
potential--am I hearing you correctly--than the very, very
specific agreements reached in Geneva?
Dr. Kissinger. I think the Road Map has more potential than
the Geneva Accords.
Senator Chafee. I do not have any other questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Sununu.
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Kissinger, I think in answering a previous question,
you talked about the potential for withdrawal from certain
Israeli settlements, and you said that even as they withdraw,
Israel should engage Egypt. In what way should they engage
Egypt?
Dr. Kissinger. Dennis Ross has submitted a paper to you on
that subject. He thinks that as Israel withdraws, it is going
to create potentials for all kinds of adjustments that need to
be made and that it would be a wise Israeli course to discuss
with Egypt a way by which territory that is begin abandoned or
settlements that are being abandoned, on the one hand, do not
begin a new terrorist wave and, second, can be used in a
constructive way for the development of the Gaza. But I think
you should ask Dennis Ross this question when he testifies
here.
Senator Sununu. I will do my best to do so, but I wanted to
get your assessment of what kind of steps or approaches on the
part of Israel could make a substantive difference.
Dr. Kissinger. What he says and what I believe too--let me
speak for myself and let him speak for himself. What I believe
is that as Israeli settlements are given up, this is such a
significant change in Israeli policy of such major consequence
for the Arab world, that Israel should do it unilaterally where
it can, but it should simultaneously indicate to the Arab world
that the change in Arab conditions is something they would be
prepared to discuss with them and in which the moderate Arab
countries could make an important contribution.
Senator Sununu. In your testimony you suggested that the
security wall facilitates the abandonment of obstacles that
deprive so much of Palestinian life of its dignity. I think
those are pretty accurately your words. But much of the
complaint about the practical implementation, the construction
of the wall is that it has created a new set of barriers, a new
set of obstacles, division in villages, division of farmland,
and division of families. So does that not in part defeat the
purpose or the value that you were describing?
Dr. Kissinger. We are talking really about two walls, one
that may be built unilaterally on the basis of whatever
security needs Israel thinks it has. I do not necessarily
endorse the line for that. The second one is one which is
either parallel or close to what will be the final border.
That, if it is intelligently drawn and thoughtfully drawn,
should minimize the obstacles.
What is now happening, as I understand, in the occupied
territories is that there is plethora of checkpoints and great
impediments to movement. One could imagine that once that wall
exists, the movement on the Palestinian side of the wall would
be essentially unimpeded or much less impeded.
Senator Sununu. But it would seem to me that the situation
you described, the one is a hypothetical and one that might
have the benefits you describe, and the other is the practical
or the real, at least in parts, that is again creating these
divisions.
Dr. Kissinger. I think it is very important to have a
comprehensive effort of development and progress in the Middle
East along the lines that I have described. If it is proved
impossible to do this, then I think Israel is entitled to take
unilateral actions, and we should use our influence--and I
believe we are using our influence in this team that is now in
Israel--to get the wall placed in a way that it reduces the
impediments to Arab dignity.
Senator Sununu. Well, along those very lines, you talk
about American opposition to the wall. I do not know if it was
in your testimony. It might be in the op-ed that you wrote at
the end of last year. But you suggest that America should
reconsider its opposition to the wall, but to the extent that
the U.S. has expressed concerns or opposition, it is along the
lines that you just described having to do with the placement
for just these reasons.
Dr. Kissinger. I think the administration is very close to
the position that I have indicated now.
Senator Sununu. I appreciate that clarification.
Dr. Kissinger. I have not discussed this with the
administration. When I wrote this article, there was opposition
to any concept of a wall. I think now the administration's
view, as I have understood it, is very close to what I have
described here.
Senator Sununu. So you do not believe that the work that is
being done now to address the concerns of the routing, the
division, the obstacles----
Dr. Kissinger. I believe that the mission of Assistant
Secretary Abrams and of Deputy Security Advisor Hadley is
meeting the concerns that I have expressed here.
Senator Sununu. I appreciate that clarification. It seems
to me that that is the difference between the potential of this
being constructive in the ways that you describe or you hope or
the wall being as divisive and as counterproductive as anything
that has been done. It seems to me that the issue of land
ownership, land confiscation is as visceral and inflammatory as
anything that is happening in the Middle East right now.
Dr. Kissinger. I look at the wall as a contribution to
coexistence, not as a means of supporting new settlement
policy.
Senator Sununu. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Sununu, and
thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger, for coming to us, and for
being so forthcoming and comprehensive in your answers. We
appreciate, as always, your attendance at our meetings and the
leadership that you bring.
The chair would like to now recognize the next panel, and
that will include the Honorable Dennis Ross, director and
Ziegler Distinguished Fellow, the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy; Mr. Robert Malley, Middle East program director of
the International Crisis Group; the Honorable Martin Indyk,
director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The
Brookings Institution.
Gentlemen, we thank you very much for coming today. Your
full statements will be placed in the record. Let me ask you to
testify in the order that I introduced you which would be,
first of all, Mr. Ross, then Mr. Malley, and then Mr. Indyk.
Please take a reasonable amount of time. I would suggest
perhaps 10 minutes at least at the first go so we can have
questions. It appears we will have a rollcall vote at about 5
o'clock. That need not end the hearing, but it will punctuate
it at that point as Senators go to vote. Mr. Ross.
STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS ROSS, DIRECTOR AND ZIEGLER
DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST
POLICY
Ambassador Ross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will take 10
minutes and I want to basically offer a perspective on why I
think we are not at a point where we can achieve what is a
comprehensive solution to the problem, but that does not mean
you do not make the effort to transform the situation. I think
what I will do is focus on why we are at that point, why we
need a way station and what the options are for producing a way
station.
But before I get into that, let me offer one observation on
the exchange between Senator Biden and Secretary Kissinger, and
that was really on the role of the Arab states and what they
can do. I am a believer that we do have to see Arab
responsibility, which is something we have not seen. I am a
believer that that is critical for making it easier for
Palestinians both to compromise on issues where, in fact, there
is not a context that has been created for compromise, as well
as to be able to confront groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Having an Arab umbrella would make it much easier to do that.
The problem is we have not seen that up until now, and I
would say the reason we have not seen it is because even though
I think there is a desire on the part of many of the Arab
leaders to see peace, the price they are willing to pay for it
is not that high. The price they see in effectively having to
condition for compromise and confront the Islamists is greater
in their eyes than the price of continuing to face the risk of
ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.
We will have to affect that calculus if we want Arab
leaders to begin to play a very different kind of role. I think
we should. I think it has to be part of what should be the
broader efforts we make in the region, but I think to
understand the context we are in and the exchange that you had,
that is the way one has to look at it.
Let me explain why I think we are not at a point where we
can produce a solution. For the last 3 years, we have had a war
process. We have not had a peace process. There is a legacy
from those 3 years on both sides, on the side of the Israelis
and on the side of the Palestinians. The vast majority of the
Israeli public today do not believe that Palestinians are
prepared to live in peace with Israelis. They do not believe
they accept the idea of a Jewish state next to them. The vast
majority of Palestinians believe the Israelis are not prepared
to surrender control over them.
You cannot go from the current situation to a solution. In
the current context, both sides need a kind of freedom. The
Israelis need a freedom from fear and insecurity, and the
Palestinians need a freedom from the Israelis. You cannot go
from a situation like that to the end result because you don't
have the right context.
So the question is how do you create that context, and I
think you need what I call a way station to get there. Now,
there are really two options for how to do it.
One option is a limited deal, a limited deal that would be
between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority
today. It is a deal that basically would be what I would call
the first serious implementation of the Road Map. Up until now,
the Road Map has never really been implemented, but then again,
the approach of the Road Map was fine as being an umbrella, it
was fine as being a point of departure, it was fine as
providing a set of guidelines. But the Road Map was not
negotiated with the Israelis or the Palestinians, the two
parties who had to carry it out. So if you were going to
implement it, you had to have an agreement where they, in
effect, bought on to the specific obligations, defined them the
same way, understood them the same way, and you could have some
accountability.
A limited deal right now would look something like a
variation of the Road Map, not in fact its precise
implementation, even in terms of the guidelines. It would be a
comprehensive cease-fire. No Israelis would be attacked by
Palestinians on either side of the Green Line for a simple
reason. If Palestinians want to draw a distinction between the
Green Line, what is in and what is out, and they will attack
Israelis outside the Green Line, then the IDF will continue to
carry out targeted killings and it will continue to carry out
arrest sweeps. So if you want to see a comprehensive cease-
fire, the Palestinians in fact have to be prepared, on the one
hand, to stop all attacks against Israelis wherever they are
and the Israelis, in return, would stop the targeted killings
and the arrest sweeps.
Now, to ensure that that could endure for a while, you have
to have some enforcement of the cease-fire. On the Palestinian
side, what that means is they would have to arrest those who
violate it, and it would mean they would have to begin to go
after what I would call parts of infrastructure. The Road Map
called for a dismantling of terrorist infrastructure. The
Palestinians today are probably not capable, certainly not
willing to do that. But there are things they could do if in
fact you were talking about a limited deal, and that would
involve closing down the smuggling tunnels, especially those
that run from Egypt into Gaza. It would mean closing down the
Qassam rocket workshops. It would mean closing down the bomb-
making labs.
Senator Biden. I am sorry. You said smuggling and then
what? I did not hear the next word.
Ambassador Ross. Closing down the Qassam rockets. They are
crude rockets that are made in the Gaza and then fired into
Israel. Closing down those workshops. Closing down the bomb-
making laboratories and arresting those who carry their weapons
in the open as a way of enforcing law and order.
Now, the Palestinians would require something in return for
that. They would require a lifting of the Israeli siege. That
means a lifting of the checkpoints. They would probably also
press for a freeze at least on what they call the wall, what
the Israelis call the fence, what I prefer to call the barrier.
They would require a freeze on working on that, and they would
probably require a freeze on settlement activity.
Now, that is a deal that I can tell you in December, having
been out in the area and having talked to both sides, I thought
was at least something they could talk about, not that they had
agreed to, but it was a basis for discussion. What has been
very clear since December is that Yasser Arafat will simply not
allow that to take place.
A limited deal is a deal that may be done between Prime
Minister Sharon and Prime Minister Abu Ala, Ahmed Qureia, but
it is with Arafat standing behind the curtain. Well, Arafat
does not want to stand behind the curtain. Arafat wants to be a
part of it, and even then, it is not clear for how long such a
limited deal would last.
If you are trying to use this as a basis on which to
implement the Road Map, you will not get to phase two of the
Road Map which calls for a state with provisional borders
because the Israelis are not going to accept the creation of
such a state if the infrastructure for groups like Hamas and
Islamic Jihad still exists. How can you have a state when you
still have independent militias able to operate? And that is
the point where Arafat will draw the line because Arafat is
someone who always preserves an option. He never closes the
door, and he has made it clear, in my judgment anyway, he will
not close down these groups.
Still, you might be able, through a limited deal, to get
real calm for a year or two, and given the current situation,
that could be dramatically better than what we face. I do not
rule it out at this point, but I do not have a high expectation
that it will take place.
And that I think leads you to option two, which is the path
that we begin to see emerging right now, which is a unilateral
pathway, at least in terms of the Israeli declarations. What
Dr. Kissinger said about Prime Minister Sharon should be
reemphasized. He has said things that no other Israeli Prime
Minister has said. They represent revolutionary statements. It
is not just statehood for Palestinians. It is the whole idea of
partition and disengagement. The unilateral withdrawal from
Gaza, the evacuation of settlements. With those statements,
there is not much meaning left to the traditional Likud
ideology. So these are revolutionary statements.
I think, again, we have to put this in a context. Why do we
see a move in this direction? The Palestinians, if they cannot
do a limited deal, if they cannot fulfill obligations under the
Road Map as it relates to dealing with terrorist groups, if
they cannot fulfill their security responsibilities, they leave
the Israelis two choices to handle security. One is a siege.
That is what we have today. In the West Bank alone, you have
anywhere from 140 to 160 Israeli checkpoints. Normal life is an
impossibility in such circumstances. So if you want commerce,
very difficult to carry out. If you want to get your kids to
school, plan on a couple extra hours in the morning and in the
evening. If you want to get medical care, you better hope it is
not an emergency.
Now, do the Israelis impose the siege because they simply
want to inflict punishment on the Palestinians? Many
Palestinians might perceive that or believe it, but the reality
is the siege is there because the siege is designed to prevent
the killing of Israelis. Today the Israelis probably stop 90 to
95 percent of the attempts against Israelis because of the
siege.
The problem with the siege from the Israeli standpoint now,
not a Palestinian standpoint, is a year from now or 2 years
from now, they will still have to stop the same number of
attacks because what the siege does is preserve anger on the
Palestinian side. What the siege does is ensure there is
continuing resentment on the Palestinian side. Israelis can go
after the Hamas operatives and they can stop them or kill them,
but they are going to have a pool of ready new recruits unless
they end the siege.
From an Israeli standpoint, the siege is a bad idea. You
have a current situation where the IDF is put in the position
where they have large numbers of soldiers to protect small
numbers of settlers, not the optimum way to structure your
forces. You have a guaranteed pool of anger and resentment on
the Palestinian side. And from the standpoint of the
demographic issue--Dr. Kissinger referred to it as well--there
is no way, given the demographic trends that Israel can stay in
the territories and be a Jewish democratic state, which is what
Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was talking about and that is
why he called for unilateral withdrawal.
So the siege from a Palestinian standpoint is a devastation
and from the Israeli standpoint, it obviously does not serve
their interests. And that is what leads you to what you are
seeing now, what is the idea of a pull-back out of Gaza and at
least a new security line in the West Bank.
Now, the real challenge is how to make this a way station
that creates a new environment for peace-making, how to ensure
that as the Israelis get out, you do not leave something worse
behind, how to ensure that as the Israelis pull out, you can
reach some kind of coordination so you do it in a way that
actually benefits those Palestinians who would be most
committed to a transformation of the situation.
That is why, in effect, what I have called for is a
coordinated unilateralism. If the Israelis and the Palestinians
cannot do it directly, then it is our role. And there are
several different focal points for us.
One is what we do with the Israelis. When we approach the
Israelis, it should be guided by a series of criteria. For
example, when you are dealing with the issue of the barrier,
focus on the issue of a security line that makes it difficult
to infiltrate, focus on the importance of not absorbing
Palestinians, focus on the importance of the humanitarian
considerations, and focus on the Israelis getting out of
Palestinian life.
We do have a reason to be asking the Israelis questions
about what the Prime Minister has said because it is more a
concept than a plan at this point. But it is a revolutionary
statement and it would be a mistake to subject it to every
microscopic question we can think of because you will, in a
sense, drown that revolutionary idea in what may be a lot of
very small questions.
With the Palestinians, what we should be doing is talking
to Abu Ala, talking to the Legislative Council people. We
should be focused on the very issue of what happens when the
Israelis go. How can the Israelis do it in a way that benefits
you, but what responsibilities will you absorb as they get out?
We, the United States, might be prepared to recognize
sovereignty provided you fulfill your security
responsibilities. We might lead the world in terms of
emphasizing investment and assistance, again, if you assume
your responsibilities.
I would go to the other members of the quartet and have
them go to the Palestinians with the same very clear position.
We can work with you. Here is what we can provide you. I would
have the United States, as well as the other members of the
quartet, even in the area of security, say we are prepared to
provide you the kind of support that you would need. You tell
us what you would need, but you have to be in the lead. One
thing about the history of the Palestinian movement is there
has never been a tendency to assume responsibility, to make
decisions, to be accountable, to have consequences. If others
are going to assume the responsibilities, we are going to
perpetuate that psychology. We should be there in a supportive
position and it could even involve an international presence,
as long as we are backing them up and reinforcing them not
taking their place.
Finally, I will make the point--and then I will close--that
Dr. Kissinger was emphasizing about what I had written. If we
are talking about a Gaza first withdrawal, not a Gaza only
withdrawal, Egypt, being a neighbor of Gaza, has more
capability to affect that than anybody else. They can certainly
help those Palestinians who are prepared to assume
responsibilities materially and otherwise. They can do
something even today. The smuggling that goes from the Sinai
into Gaza is smuggling that goes in one direction. It does not
come from Gaza into the Sinai. They can do a lot more on their
side of the border to stop the smuggling. They can make it
clear that the Palestinians have an opportunity before the
world to show that they are ready for statehood by succeeding
in this area.
I would like the administration now to be focused not only
on talking to the Israelis about what it is they have in mind,
which we should be doing, but also talking to the Egyptians now
about the opportunity and what can be lost, talking to the
Palestinians now, not later, about the kinds of
responsibilities they would have to absorb and what can be
gained, which, by the way, in my judgment would also make many
of the Palestinian reformers see it as an opportunity where
they can do more than they are doing today, and talking with
the other members of the quartet as well about how to take
advantage of what can be a moment. This is a moment. If there
is one thing that characterizes Middle Eastern moments, they do
not last long, and when you lose them, you are worse off.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ross follows:]
Prepared Statement of Amb. Dennis Ross, Director and Ziegler
Distinguished Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
As the prospects for even limited bilateral Israeli-Palestinian
agreements have grown increasingly more remote, Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon has announced his intention to withdraw nearly all the Israeli
settlements from the Gaza strip. It is a revolutionary move that
creates the possibility of change at a time when Israeli-Palestinian
relations are frozen in a pattern of terror, siege, and hopelessness.
Efforts to fill the diplomatic vacuum created by the violence of
the last three years, whether official like the roadmap to peace or
unofficial like the Geneva Accords, have done little to transform the
situation. Moreover, it is hard to find anyone at this point who
believes that Yasir Arafat, who presently controls the Palestinian
security organizations, is prepared to fulfill Palestinian security
responsibilities.
In the meantime, the Palestinian reform movement that seemed so
hopeful last spring withers under the weight of the Israeli siege and
the chaos that Arafat cultivates. Pervasive Israeli control, the
Israeli response to the Palestinian Authority's unwillingness to do
anything to stop acts of terror, produces deep anger among Palestinians
and keeps the reformers on the defensive. Something has to change, and
perhaps it can now that Ariel Sharon, the architect of settlement
construction over the last twenty five years, has declared his
readiness to evacuate settlements.
But if the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and at least partial
withdrawal to a new security line in the West Bank are to create a new
opening, they must be done the right way. They must be done in a
coordinated fashion. Israeli moves can be done unilaterally but not
without an effort to shape Palestinian, Egyptian, and European
responses. They must be part of a strategic effort to create a new way
station to eventual agreement, not a tactical response to pressures of
the moment.
For the Palestinians, the Gaza withdrawal is a moment to
demonstrate that Israeli withdrawals will lead to greater calm, not
greater instability. It is a moment for reformers to reassert
themselves, rightfully claiming that Palestinians cannot afford to miss
another opportunity to advance the cause of statehood. Indeed, it can
be their moment to prove to the world that they are ready for
independence and statehood, and that what they are building in Gaza can
also be applied to the West Bank.
Some have argued that it is best for the international community to
run Gaza after Israeli withdrawal. Leaving aside whether this is
feasible given the American preoccupation with Iraq, I would argue that
it is probably unwise. If the Palestinians are absolved of
responsibility of running their own affairs, the lessons of the past
will never be learned. There will always be someone else to blame,
someone else who should be held accountable, someone else who will have
to take the difficult decisions. Even with all the internal
difficulties that Palestinian security services face today, they know
better than any multinational force how to combat Hamas. True, they are
likely to need help in carrying out their mission and that should be
forthcoming from the outside. But the essential point is that
Palestinians must be in the lead in taking on this responsibility. Will
Yasir Arafat seek to block the Palestinian Authority from confronting
Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade after an Israeli
withdrawal if it means that Palestinians demonstrate to the world that
they are not ready for statehood? Can he succeed in doing so in such
circumstances? If nothing else, now is a time to be making clear to
Palestinians what is at stake and what can be gained but also what is
expected of them after withdrawal.
Palestinians may fear that Gaza First is Gaza Last, but the
combination of having set the precedent of evacuating settlements and
completing the security barrier in the West Bank will inevitably
produce at least a partial pull-back there as well. The issue is not
whether there will be a partial withdrawal in the West Bank. Rather, it
is whether the security barrier, while not being a border, may remain
the new separation line for a long time to come. Once again, it will be
up to the Palestinians to choose. If Israelis in both Gaza and the West
Bank are getting out of Palestinian lives and Palestinians are assuming
their security responsibilities, peace making will be resumed and a
permanent border can be negotiated relatively soon. If the Palestinians
are not prepared to assume their responsibilities, then the
Palestinians may be looking at a reality that will remain unchanged for
the foreseeable future with little prospect of Palestinian statehood
any time soon.
Egypt should see that it too can help in this situation. An Israeli
pull-out from Gaza creates a challenge and an opportunity for the
Egyptians. A challenge because Egypt cannot be happy about the prospect
of a Hamas dominated entity on its border. An opportunity because the
Egyptians can help the Palestinians show the world they are ready for
statehood--and bordering Gaza they are in a strong position to assist
in their doing so. They can certainly do much more to prevent smuggling
of potentially dangerous weaponry into Gaza, assist Palestinian
security forces, and publicly declare that continued terror by Hamas
and Islamic Jihad will threaten the Palestinian cause.
Egypt's stature in the Arab world and its own policy of peace with
Israel certainly would be vindicated by showing that the Palestinians
can succeed. No one is better positioned than President Mubarak to tell
Yasir Arafat that he will be held accountable if he now tries to impede
this opportunity.
For the Europeans, too, who have often been vocal critics of the
Israelis, Israeli evacuation of settlements and withdrawal from Gaza
can only be welcomed. They must not sit on the sidelines. They have
credibility with the Palestinians and it should be clear what European
expectations are. They can provide material help both on security and
economically, provided the Palestinians are prepared to do their part.
In particular, the Europeans should join the U.S. and others in
spearheading a broad construction effort with strict financial
oversight. They should target assistance and investment to create a
successful counterweight to Hamas's social welfare Dawa network. If
there is a targeted infusion of funds and Palestinians see their lives
improve, it is the people and not Hamas ideology that will gain.
Who can pull this coordinated effort together? Only the United
States can do so. If Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is to create a way-
station to eventual peace, the U.S. must fashion a strategy of
``coordinated unilateralism'' and marshal support from an array of
parties in the Middle East and beyond to make it happen. One lesson is
clear from the past: initiatives in the Middle East are never self-
implementing. The Israeli impulse to withdraw from Gaza requires a
major effort from the U.S. to shape it, legislate it, and produce
international support for carrying it out.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ross.
Mr. Malley.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT MALLEY, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
Mr. Malley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing at what I think is a critical time where
not only the Road Map, but many of the traditional tools of
peace-making in the Middle East have to be rethought in a
fresh, creative, and bold way if we do not want the Israeli and
Palestinian people to be further harmed, if we do not want the
two-state solution to be further jeopardized, and if we do not
want our own national interest to be further at risk.
In these brief remarks, I just want to emphasize three
points. The first is why trying to resolve the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is central and vital to our national
interest. The second is why the methods we have tried up till
now to do so have failed, and the third is what options exist
in the future.
It used to be conventional wisdom that resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in
particular was a central vital national interest. Not so
anymore. After the failure of Camp David and the peace process
in 2000-2001, the outbreak of the intifada, and particularly
the events of September 11, it took a back seat to other
issues, fighting terrorism and radicalism in the Middle East,
promoting reform and democracy in the Middle East.
Paradoxically, however, I am convinced--and I think Senator
Biden made that point earlier--that resolving that seemingly
narrow conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has never
been more important now that we have broadened our stake and
broadened the issues that we are preoccupied by in the Middle
East, and that an integral part of our efforts to fight
terrorism and to fight extremism is precisely to resolve or
seek to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
It is our lack of engagement, our lack of resolve that is
hurting us, not the contrary. And I think one hears it anytime
you travel to the Middle East and most of all that those very
reformers and democrats who are so burdened by the fact of the
perpetuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the
perpetuation of the perception, right or wrong, of excessive
U.S. disengagement and excessive U.S. bias. And I think that if
we want to help those people, it is vital that we come to the
core and we try to, once again, resolve the issue because
nothing hurts us more than the current situation, and nothing
would help us more, particularly in the fight against
terrorism, than a successful effort to resolve it.
Now, if we all agree on the fact that it is a vital
interest to try to resolve it, the question is how to do so.
The first answer I think is not the way it has been done
before. And I was part of the way it was done before, and I do
not have any regrets about what we did, but I think that one
has to learn from the past and learn that what has been tried
now for over 10 years has failed and failed and failed again
and it is the situation we are in today.
The recipe of the past was an incremental step-by-step
approach in which Israelis and Palestinians were each asked to
take very sensible, rational steps to lead somewhere as a
mutual confidence-building process, but without really ever
telling either side with any precision what the final outcome
would be. So each side was basically asked to take steps, asked
to take difficult and painful political steps vis-a-vis their
own constituencies without a clear end in sight and without
knowing whether the outcome would justify the steps they are
being asked to take in the interim.
Now, the usual response, each time one of these efforts
fails, whether it is the Mitchell report or the Tenet plan or
now the Road Map, is to say we have to try harder and try
better, and in particular, the United States needs to try
harder and try better, but basically try more of the same. And
in the case of the Road Map, one can say, indeed, that the
Palestinians did not do enough on the security side, that the
Israelis did too much on the military side, that the U.S. stood
on the side lines and Arafat stood in the way. And all that is
very likely to be true, but at some point it is probably wise
to stop blaming the actors and to take a step back and look
again at the script. And the script they were handed is a
script again in which there is no precision as to the outcome
they are being asked to take painful steps to achieve.
And if it was hard in the past through this step-by-step
approach, I would suggest that it is far harder today, in fact,
practically impossible if we look at the 3 years of what Dennis
began to describe, atrocious violence, suicide bombs,
devastating military reprisals on the Israeli part, the
collapse of those very security institutions on the Palestinian
side that are expected to take on the radical extremist groups,
the dwindling of the authority of Fatah, the backbone of the
Palestinian national movement, and the strengthening of Hamas
and Islamic Jihad and other radical groups, a Palestinian
national authority that is no longer national and barely
exercises any authority anymore, the leader of the Palestinian
national movement who is virtually isolated and therefore, for
better or for worse, incapable of making decisions.
And so this notion that today Israel is going to hand over
to the Palestinians responsibility for its security in this
kind of step-by-step approach appears to be completely
fanciful, again more so today than it was in the past. And the
notion that today the Palestinian national authority and Fatah,
weakened as they are today, disorganized, fragmented
geographically and organizationally, are going to be capable or
willing to take on Hamas or Islamic Jihad, particularly at a
time when they have no faith that the Israeli Prime Minister
currently in position, Ariel Sharon, could even come close to
meeting their needs, their basic expectation in terms of a
national movement, seems to me equally fanciful. So I think
that the notion of trying to revive the Road Map as it exists
today is an illusion that was costly in the past and will be
even more costly in the future.
Now, the most obvious manifestations of the collapse of the
Road Map are the actions of Prime Minister Sharon. And I may
not agree with much of what he does, but I do believe he has
foresight and I think that his announcement about taking steps
unilaterally, disengaging Israel from the Palestinians is a
manifestation of an understanding of having reached the
conclusion that the ways of the past will not work, that
bilateral step-by-step negotiations are a thing of the past,
and not a thing of the future, at least in the current context.
We are now at a crossroads in terms of what we do. We can
follow what the Prime Minister has done--and I agree with
Dennis that it is revolutionary and it does have potential,
good potential and bad potential--and follow the path of
Israeli unilateral disengagement. And that is the most likely
outcome, and I will spend some time discussing it. The other is
what I would suggest would be far preferable which would be a
U.S.-led international engagement, and I will get to that in a
minute.
Sharon's ideas at this point are much more of a puzzle than
a plan. He has not said much about how many settlements he
would withdraw from, when, under what circumstances, whether
the IDF would be left behind or not, whether it would be done
in one fell swoop or whether it would be prolonged and over a
period of time, who he would hand authority over of the
settlements that he has evacuated, question after question
after question. But he has broken out of the box, the box of
the Road Map, and I think it needs to be taken seriously. He
has triggered movement and potential movement more than
anything else in the last 3 years.
One cannot predict, again because of the uncertainties,
what will happen when he takes an action. The action itself is
ill-defined and even if we knew what he wanted to do, it is
very unclear how the Palestinians are going to react, in part
because of the picture I painted earlier. There is no
Palestinian Authority to speak of and there is no Palestinian
national movement to speak of. So it is unclear to know how
they and who they are will react. It is also unclear to know
what the Israeli political system will do and what kind of
obstacles it might put on the path of this plan.
But assuming the general outlines, in terms of what Dennis
described, I think one could see potential benefits and
drawbacks, and in many ways, they touch exactly the same areas.
Potential security benefit. Israel's security could be
strengthened if it shortens its lines of defense, if it
evacuates settlements that today are populated by small numbers
of settlers that require a large Israeli military force to
defend.
On the other hand, it could be a security drawback if the
lesson, the message that comes out of this is that violence is
what gets Israel out of the territories and if Hamas and
Islamic Jihad manage to turn it into their victory and to say
violence is what got Israel out of Gaza today, it is what will
get Israel out of the West Bank tomorrow. So, look to what
happens in the West Bank not only in Gaza after an Israeli
withdrawal.
One other potential benefit: strengthening the PA,
strengthening Palestinian security services, again along the
lines of what Dennis suggested. One could imagine a scenario
whereby the settlements are handed over to the Palestinian
Authority, that they use this to give them momentum to rebuild
the Palestinian Authority, to rebuild Palestinian security
services. Flip side: it is handed over to no one. There is
chaos. Hamas is strengthened. Hamas takes over Gaza. Hamas
takes over the settlements.
The third potential benefit. This could be a precursor to
much broader withdrawals in the West Bank itself, and it is
true that the Prime Minister has broken a taboo and he has
delinked these two intertwined concepts of security and
settlements. He, a Likud Prime Minister, has said implicitly
settlements do not bring Israel security, they bring Israel
insecurity. And therefore, one could imagine after Gaza and a
few isolated settlements in the West Bank a broader withdrawal.
Flip side. If in fact this is just a plan to get out of Gaza
and to consolidate Israel's hold on the West Bank by thickening
some of the settlements, by taking more action in east
Jerusalem, by building a fence in certain ways, and by
retaining control over the Jordan Valley.
Both of these scenarios on all three fronts are possible,
and I think the U.S. objective, if it takes the reactive
approach of reacting to the Prime Minister's decision, needs to
simply try to focus on two issues: No. 1, making sure that this
is Gaza first but not Gaza last, which means putting pressure
on Israel not to take action in the West Bank or at least
telling Israel that it will not acquiesce in actions in the
West Bank that will foreclose a two-state solution, and
promoting the kind of coordinated actions that Dennis spoke
about to make sure that whatever is withdrawn from is handed
over to the Palestinian Authority and not to Hamas.
Now, I think it is very clear that even though this is a
revolutionary option and it could have ground-breaking
consequences, it is a limited one because ultimately in its
wake it will leave untouched the fundamental ingredients of the
conflict. Occupation will remain. The Palestinians will still
want to fight Israel, and even if there is a fence, one could
count on the Palestinians to find more lethal ways to
circumvent the fence and to try to attack the Israelis, and we
are reading it in the press even today.
There is another option which is to replace the
incremental, step-by-step approach by an end game strategy.
Three points to describe it very briefly.
No. 1, the United States, together with moderate Arab
leaders, together with the European Union, together with the
United Nations, would put forward a suggested comprehensive
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a blueprint,
not to impose it, to suggest it, to put it out there publicly
with Arabs there, the moderate Arabs that we have all said need
to be involved in this, and only do it once the Arabs have
committed beforehand that they will back the President in this
effort, publicly back him and publicly put pressure on the
Palestinians to accept it. No. 1.
No. 2, as part of this plan, suggest the establishment of a
U.S.-led trusteeship over the territories that ultimately would
become Palestine, to give security guarantees to Israel, to
give guarantees to Israel that those who will govern these
Palestinian territories will not be what I have called the
dwindling forces of the Palestinian Authority, but the
international forces. It also responds to Dr. Kissinger's valid
point that Israel will not withdraw from one day to the next
and give all territories to the Palestinians. No. It would hand
over the territory to this trusteeship, to the United States-
led trusteeship, which in time, as the Palestinians took the
actions they need to take, would be turned over to the
Palestinians.
And third, to maximize the prospects of public acceptance
on both sides, suggest that this proposal be submitted to
referendum. We have seen this idea not only in Prime Minister
Sharon's suggestion of a referendum on the withdrawal from
Gaza, but also in another intractable conflict such as Cyprus
as a way to make it easier for leaders to accept a solution
that they know their publics will accept but that is hard,
given their harder line constituencies, to sign onto.
Senator Biden. Excuse me. Is that referendum you are
suggesting only in Israel or in both----
Mr. Malley. Oh, absolutely in both. And I would say it is
probably more important on the Palestinian side. Absolutely.
I am going to concede up front that I was not born
yesterday, that I do not hold any particular hope that this
plan will be taken up tomorrow by the administration. And I do
not think this is a partisan issue. I think for any Democratic
or Republican administration, this would be considered a risky
endeavor. I know Dennis has said he does not think the
conditions are right. I think Dr. Kissinger said the same
thing, and many people would say that we are in this position
now where we have to be realistic.
I wonder sometimes, though, where is the realism in
pursuing a path that has failed us so often in the past. Where
is the realism in counting suddenly on a change of heart of
leaders who have not changed hearts over all these years for
good political reasons, not because they are stubborn? Where is
the realism in thinking that we have uncounted time in front of
us to salvage a two-state solution? And where is the realism in
thinking that suddenly the conditions for peace are going to
emerge?
I think that is all a surreal realism and the genuinely
realistic approach is the one that I put forward here, and
particularly if you can get the Arab countries--and I think it
is a precondition--to say up front they would accept it so that
you corner those extremists, you isolate the extremists, and
you give voice to the moderate forces that exist today,
submerged but exist today, in the Arab world.
So I would want to leave this committee with three
questions to ponder.
The first is, has the current policy been working? I think
the answer is pretty clear.
The second is, would this alternative approach have a
better chance of succeeding? Again, I think the answer is more
likely yes than no.
And third, if we do not try something different, how long
before the two-state solution becomes a thing of the past and
we will come back here and the next session that you will hold
will not be rethinking the Middle East Road Map, but rethinking
the two-state solution?
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Malley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Malley, Middle East and North Africa
Program Director, International Crisis Group
Mr. Chairman: First, let me express my appreciation to you for the
invitation to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
This hearing comes at a critical time: the traditional tools of peace-
making in the Middle East have all but exhausted their utility. From
the Mitchell Plan to the Road Map, the U.S. has led various attempts to
end the violent confrontation. Yet, for the past three years, the
Israeli and Palestinian people have been consistently and repeatedly
robbed of a normal life, with the daily cost in pain and bloodshed
reaching unprecedented heights. U.S. national security interests also
have been jeopardized as, rightly or wrongly, the perpetuation of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the perception of U.S. disengagement
harm both our image in the Moslem world and, crucially, our struggle
against terrorism. Fresh, creative and bold thinking is vital, lest the
current situation continue or deteriorate further, and lest any
prospect for a viable and sustainable peace vanish for the foreseeable
future.
The International Crisis Group (ICG) has been working in the Middle
East and on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular for over two
years. Here, as we do in some 40 countries around the world, our field-
based analysis identifies the drivers of conflict and, based on that
analysis, we define policy responses for specific countries and the
international community to prevent or mitigate deadly conflict.
I.
Mr. Chairman, when the Road Map was first presented, ICG cautioned
in its report, ``A Middle East Road Map to Where?'' that the plan
``adheres to a gradualist and sequential logic to Israeli-Palestinian
peacemaking, a throwback to the approach that has failed both Israelis
and Palestinians in the past. Its various elements lack definition, and
each step is likely to give rise to interminable disputes between the
two sides. There is no enforcement mechanism, nor any indication of
what is to happen if the timetable significantly slips. Even more
importantly, it fails to provide a detailed, fleshed out definition of
a permanent status agreement.'' Unless the presentation of the Road Map
somehow served as a catalyst for fundamentally new political momentum
in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Washington, we warned, it would rapidly
prove futile. Unfortunately, that is the situation in which we find
ourselves today. The Road Map may be resuscitated in one form or
another and its core ingredients--a call for a two state solution, for
Palestinian security, institutional and economic reform and for an end
to the occupation--will remain. But for now, its role as a political
tool to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace is over, and it is best to
recognize it. If the goal is to break out of the status quo, there is a
need to come up with a new or significantly modified approach.
At the outset, it is important to understand why the Road Map
failed in order to avoid duplicating past errors in the future.
The broad vision put forward, first in President Bush's 24 June
2002 speech, next in the Road Map, was welcome. But in its belief in a
series of mutual, incremental steps and in its lack of a clear and
detailed vision of the ultimate settlement, it repeated what Oslo and
its variants over the years had attempted, always with the same
dispiriting results: agreements not reached or not implemented,
accompanied by an erosion in mutual trust and, in this case, ongoing
violence.
The idea that only incremental steps can resolve the current crisis
flies in the face of the experience of the last decade. With each
successive turn there are renewed calls to try better, try harder, but
basically try more of the same: interim agreements designed to boost
confidence and gradually pave the way for negotiations over a final
deal. True, one can always attribute failure to the shortcomings or
mistakes of the various parties. In the case of the Road Map, some
legitimately lament that the Palestinians did too little on the
security front; that Israel did too much on the military one; that the
U.S. stood on the sidelines and that Arafat stood in the way. But that
this has become an old refrain ought to tell us something about the
process itself--namely, that the setbacks, skirted obligations, clear-
cut violations and violence are not deviations from the process as
currently defined, but its natural and inevitable outgrowth. And that
there is no reason to believe that what has failed before will suddenly
work now, that what the parties have stubbornly resisted doing in the
past they can--with a little additional pressure or persuasion--be
brought to do in the present.
What was missing from Oslo and now from the Road Map is a clear and
well-defined vision of the ultimate goal. Israelis and Palestinians
were reluctant to take difficult interim steps not knowing whether they
would lead to a desired end-result. As a result, they treated the
interim period as a time to shape the final deal through unilateral
steps rather than realize it through joint effort. Both sides were
determined to hold on to their assets (territory in Israel's case; the
threat of violence in the Palestinians') as bargaining chips to be
deployed in the endgame. Because the objective remained vague, neither
side had a sufficiently powerful incentive to carry out its
obligations, the goal always being appeasement of the U.S. rather than
pursuit of desired purpose. And so, each interim step became an
opportunity for a misstep and the logic behind the Oslo process--that
interim measures would gradually boost mutual confidence--was turned on
its head as each incremental violation further deepened the existing
mistrust.
In response, it is often argued that movement toward a resolution
of the conflict should not take place unless and until the Palestinian
Authority dismantles violent groups and reforms its leadership. This is
a highly appealing logic. But it has not worked. And its main victims
are and have been the Israeli and Palestinian people. The Palestinian
people and their leadership undoubtedly need to clamp down on radical
groups within their rank who resort to terrorist attacks against
Israeli civilians. But it is hard to conceive that they will do so,
morally necessary and politically imperative as it is, so long as it
cannot be justified as being required for a clear and desired end-
game--so long, in other words, as these groups are viewed as resisting
the occupier. To maximize prospects that Palestinians will take such
action, they need to see an end to the most brutal Israeli military
actions and be proposed a genuine alternative path to ending the
occupation.
Temporary lulls may be achieved. But the political dynamics of this
conflict inexorably will lead to more violence and counter-violence
until its resolution is in sight. Israelis cannot afford to be giving
in to fear, and see no choice but to respond to every act of
Palestinian violence. Each Palestinian attack both underscores the
relative futility of Israeli military action and makes it all the more
inevitable. For their part, Palestinians cannot afford to appear to be
surrendering to force or to resign themselves to continued occupation,
particularly when they have no faith in the political process that
would follow a cease-fire. Each Israeli operation both takes a toll on
radical Palestinian groups and swells their ranks.
As a result, partial security relaxation on the Israeli side is
likely to lead to renewed Palestinian violence which will trigger
tougher security measures, often with devastating impact on Palestinian
civilians, and which, in turn, will provoke more desperate violence. We
have seen that pattern play itself repeatedly during the past year. In
the current atmosphere, the anticipated virtuous cycle--in which good
will gestures by one side are reciprocated by good will gestures by the
other--is much more likely to turn into a vicious one. Ending the
violence is absolutely vital. But it should not be a precondition for
taking the political step--moving to resolve the underlying conflict--
that has the best chance of achieving that goal. Cases as varied as
Algeria, Cambodia and South Africa illustrate that successful peace
initiatives can and often do take place amidst violence.
For its part, Israel must take steps to dismantle the vast majority
of its settlements, not just in Gaza but in the West Bank as well, and
allow Palestinians to realize their legitimate aspirations. But it is
difficult to imagine it will do so, however counterproductive the
settlement enterprise has turned out to be, before it is provided with
security and persuaded that Palestinians are prepared to accept
Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state, free from violence and the
threat of massive refugee return.
Ultimately, until they know what the endgame basically will be,
Palestinians are unlikely to provide Israelis with the security they
need. And until they are provided with that security and with an
assurance that their needs will be met, Israelis are unlikely to carry
out the political steps the Palestinians require. Put differently,
Palestinians fear that what is portrayed as an interim solution
(partial withdrawals in exchange for an end to violence) will become
final and Israelis fear that what is portrayed as a final settlement (a
two state solution) will only be interim. The mutual suspicion
incrementalism it is designed to remove is precisely the reason why it
cannot work.
Likewise on the issue of Palestinian political reform. Its
necessity is not in doubt, and Palestinians themselves would be first
to agree. But to make a change in Palestinian leadership a precondition
for movement toward a political settlement may well have succeeded in
both preventing political progress and hindering institutional reform
by portraying both as externally-driven diktats designed to promote
U.S. and Israeli interests rather than Palestinian ones. Indeed,
insistence on a change in leadership as a precondition for decisive
movement on the political front de-legitimizes the concept of reform
and undermines those Palestinian activists who have long led the fight
for domestic change. Besides, as experience has shown, efforts to
marginalize Arafat may well weaken his institutional power, but he
retains unparalleled status and legitimacy in the eyes of the
Palestinian people for whom he remains the embodiment of their cause.
Despite his diminished popularity and the at times disastrous mistakes
he has committed, Palestinians will rally around him in times of crisis
and no rival will stand a chance. There is a profound psychological,
emotive component to the Palestinian struggle in which Arafat and the
symbolism that surrounds him plays a central part.
If the incremental and conditional approach was questionable in the
past, it has become far more so today. There have been over three years
of horrendous suicide bombs and devastating Israeli military actions.
Anger and bitterness on both sides is at an all-time high. Trust has
virtually disappeared and the very Palestinian institutions expected to
restore order and clamp down on violent groups have either been
destroyed or collapsed. Radical Palestinian groups, far from being
weakened by repeated Israeli attacks, have become both stronger and
more popular, making all the more unlikely Palestinian efforts to take
them on. Yasser Arafat's virtual isolation has guaranteed that he will
exercise his still considerable influence to thwart any progress that
does not give him a role. Plus, the Palestinian National Authority is
no longer national and it barely exercises authority. Under what logic
would Israel entrust it with its security? For their part, not a single
Palestinian believes that Prime Minister Sharon will be prepared to
reach a settlement even remotely approaching their minimum goal. With
that in mind, and with Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other radical groups
emboldened and empowered, can a Palestinian leader realistically be
expected to take the political risk of confronting them or negotiating
yet another interim deal with Israel?
Under these circumstances, it is very hard to be confident that
Prime Minister Sharon and Prime Minister Abu Alaa will be able to agree
on much or for very long, let alone negotiate their way out of the
current violence. Even if they do succeed, their agreement will be at
the mercy of the first act of violence.
Two alternative ways exist to break the stalemate and make up for
the lack of trust and the parties' inability to move bilaterally. The
first is for one of the two parties to act alone. The second is for a
third party to step in.
II.
A few weeks ago, Prime Minister Sharon announced his intention to
unilaterally disengage, including unilaterally withdrawal from many of
the Gaza settlements and, possibly, some isolated ones in the West Bank
if, within six months, it became clear that the Palestinians will not
fulfill their responsibilities under the Road Map. Sharon's stated
logic is clear: if the Palestinians are not prepared to take steps to
clamp down on violent groups, if they do not have a leadership trusted
by Israel, Israel cannot afford to wait. It will do what it must to
maximize its security and separate demographically from the Palestinian
population. Withdrawing from these settlements will shorten Israeli
lines of defense, remove the burden of protecting small numbers of
settlers with large military forces and, by disengaging from populated
Palestinian areas, reduce friction with the Palestinians. It would be
complemented by completion of the physical barrier or fence intended to
radically restrict movement of Palestinians into Israel. The decision,
should it be implemented, would amount to recognition that the path
laid out in the Road Map is no more, for the time being at least.
It is important at the outset to recognize what Prime Minister
Sharon's suggestion is and what it is not. It is not a long-term
solution but a temporary stopgap. It is not at this point a detailed
plan but a very vague concept. It would not entail merely a unilateral
withdrawal but most probably a series of unilateral steps. But of the
two alternative paths we have laid out--unilateral disengagement or
forceful international engagement--it is by far the more probable and,
as such, deserves careful scrutiny.
Evacuation of settlements is essential, a step called for by the
Palestinians and the international community as a whole. No Israeli
leader has seriously contemplated taking such an initiative in the
absence of a comprehensive agreement--not Rabin, not Peres, and not
Barak. And no Israeli leader has enjoyed the kind of political capital
Sharon has in order to do this. For these reasons, a decision to
evacuate settlements would clearly be welcome. Besides potential
security benefits for Israel, it can lead to greater freedom of
movement for Palestinians in Gaza and set the precedent of larger-scale
settlement evacuation--including in the West Bank--by formally de-
linking settlements from security. Under the right circumstances, it
can serve as a pilot case for the rebuilding of Palestinian Authority
security services and reassertion of law and order, for Palestinian
elections (for the PA as well as for Fatah), Palestinian reform and for
greater international involvement. Should the PA be able to restore
quiet in Gaza, in fact, a unilateral withdrawal could theoretically
help rekindle Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. In short, if done
right, what would begin as a consequence of failed diplomacy could
become a forerunner to renewed diplomacy.
But there are considerable risks for all sides, of which the U.S.
in particular needs to be fully cognizant if it wants to avoid them.
First, a unilateral withdrawal may well be read by Palestinians as
a victory for those who believe that Israel can be forced through
violence to pull out. It will be hard for them to see it otherwise:
even a modest withdrawal was not forthcoming during the premiership of
Mahmoud Abbas--who was committed to a peaceful resolution of the
conflict; now it is being openly considered not as a confidence-
building measure for a courageous Palestinian Prime Minister but as a
defensive reaction to continued armed attacks. Coming atop the Israeli
decision to release hundreds of prisoners (again, a concession that was
not granted to Abbas) in a deal with Hizbollah, this could embolden and
strengthen the more radical Palestinian groups. In this context, some
have evoked Gaza's potential ``Lebanonisation''--a reference to
Israel's decision to withdraw from South Lebanon. While that earlier
withdrawal almost certainly was the right thing to do, images of a
retreating Israeli army carried wide-ranging implications, not least of
all by inspiring Palestinians to launch the intifada.
A related peril is that areas from which Israel withdraws, rather
than fall under the PA's control, could descend into chaos and anarchy
or into Hamas' hands, further radicalizing the Palestinian side,
weakening the PA and reducing the chances of renewed negotiations.
Should Israel--as is anticipated--leave behind either IDF forces or
some settlements in Gaza, these quickly could become the targets of
continued violence as Palestinian organizations claim that armed
struggle is both what got Israel to begin its withdrawal and what will
get Israel to complete it.
There also are potential threats to the Palestinians and to their
future ability to build a viable state. As some Israeli officials point
out, unilateral disengagement would not be a unilateral withdrawal
alone but rather a series of unilateral steps intended to consolidate
Israel's position by refocusing on the West Bank and separating from
populated Palestinian areas. In addition, the Prime Minister may well
be required (if only to placate his harder-line right wing partners
that have threatened to bolt from the coalition) to take
``compensatory'' measures in the West Bank. Under this scenario, the
partial withdrawal from Gaza and perhaps from some isolated West Bank
settlements abutting Palestinian cities, thickening of settlement blocs
alongside the Green Line, strengthening control over strategic areas
such as Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and other border areas, and
completion of the separation fence encroaching into the West Bank would
all become part of a broader plan to force long-term, de facto borders
upon the Palestinians. Altogether, these could deal a fatal blow to
President Bush's vision of a viable Palestinian state, condemning the
Palestinians to isolated, non-contiguous cantons or enclaves and, at
best, a non-viable statelet that they will be free to call a state.
In other words, while some Israelis worry that this could be a road
to more violence, Palestinians worry that it could be the end of their
road to genuine independence.
At this point, the Prime Minister's suggestions constitute far more
a question mark than a plan. Among the significant unknowns are the
following:
When would the withdrawal/settlement evacuation take place?
Over what time period? If it is done in one fell swoop, it
might bolster the impression of a hurried Israeli retreat in
the face of Palestinian violence; if spread out over time, it
might increase the likelihood both of resistance by settlers
and of Palestinian attacks against them.
Will there be a security handoff with Palestinian forces or
will it be wholly uncoordinated?
Will Israel proceed in the face of escalating Palestinian
attacks on the eve of the evacuation?
Will Israel proceed if it asks but fails to obtain U.S.
guarantees--e.g., regarding financial assistance to help
relocate the settlers; acquiescence in the route of the
separation fence or in additional settlement construction in
the West Bank; a commitment not to pressure Israel on a final
status deal?
How many settlements will remain in Gaza?
Will the settlements that are evacuated be destroyed?
Maintained intact? Turned over to the PA?
Will the IDF remain in Gaza and, if so, for how long?
How will Israel react if attacks emanate from Gaza after the
withdrawal--aimed either at remaining settlements, at the IDF
or at Israel proper?
What simultaneous steps will Israel take in the West Bank?
Who will control the Rafah border with Egypt? The Gaza
airport? The seaport? The crossing into Israel?
Will Palestinian workers from Gaza be allowed into Israel?
Will goods be allowed in and out? In particular, what
provisions will be made for the supply of water, electricity,
medical equipment or food in Gaza?
Until answers to these and other important questions are known, it
will be extremely difficult to anticipate the impact of an Israeli
action along the lines suggested by the Prime Minister. Even then,
there will be considerable unknowns as to the Palestinian reaction,
given the vast political changes undergone on their side during this
latest period.
Given those uncertainties, the best course for the United States
would be to maximize the prospect that a process of unilateral
disengagement strengthens Israel's security without jeopardizing the
possibility of a viable Palestinian state or inflicting undue harm to
the Palestinian population.
First, the U.S. should see to it that Israel coordinate any
settlement evacuation with the PA. Coordination does not require
negotiating or even cooperation, and this is an important distinction.
If he ultimately opts for the unilateral route, it will mean that Prime
Minister Sharon has concluded that negotiations with the PA are futile.
It therefore would make little sense from his perspective to sit down
and discuss with the Palestinians the implementation of his move. But
to withdraw without giving the PA any advance notification and the
opportunity to operate a smooth hand-off of any evacuated areas would
be a recipe for chaos and for strengthening radical organizations at
the PA's expense. Conversely, Israel-PA coordination could minimize the
appearance of a hurried and disorderly Israeli retreat, helping both
parties. This may not require direct Israeli-Palestinian discussions,
although they would be preferable, and could instead be done through
back-to-back talks with Washington.
Second, the U.S. and others in the international community should
press the PA to exercise maximum security control over evacuated areas
and assist it in this task. In particular, the PA's security
organizations should take measures to try to prevent violent actions
originating from Gaza.
Third. the U.S. should make clear to Israel that it will not
acquiesce in harmful compensatory measures in the West Bank. These
include settlement construction, activity in East Jerusalem and
building the separation fence in ways that hurt Palestinians and depart
in any meaningful way from the 1967 lines. Movement in Gaza ought to
facilitate future progress in the West Bank, not condemn it. Ensuring
that Gaza first will not mean Gaza last is critical if the U.S. wants
to preserve the possibility of a two state solution.
Fourth, the U.S. should ask Israel to minimize any hardships on the
Palestinian population of Gaza, consistent with legitimate security
concerns. It is hard to imagine Israel allowing free movement for the
Palestinians, either across the border with Egypt, by air or sea, let
alone into Israel. But suffocating the population in Gaza by denying
them basic economic opportunities would be a humanitarian catastrophe
for the Palestinians and--by generating an even more embittered and
radicalized Palestinian people--a political catastrophe for Israel.
Fifth, to the degree possible. the international community as a
whole should provide assistance to Gaza. This could take the form of
economic help, security training to the PA and oversight of reform--the
goal being to turn Gaza into a successful model of international
engagement to be replicated some day in the West Bank. Some have gone
further in this respect and suggested the establishment of an
international trusteeship over Gaza, including the dispatch of foreign
troops. There is reason for caution, however. In the absence of an
overall territorial agreement--which an enduring if reduced Israeli
presence in Gaza and the West Bank would preclude--Palestinians are
likely to continue to resist and the trusteeship therefore will operate
in a hostile environment. How many nations will agree to send troops
under such circumstances? How would the multinational force interact
with the remaining Israeli presence in Gaza, assuming as one must a
less-than-total withdrawal?
Ultimately, it is important to bear in mind the limitations
inherent in any unilateral disengagement however well-implemented it
turns out to be. Once accomplished, most of the underlying ingredients
of the conflict will remain and some may even be exacerbated.
Disentanglement from Gaza and erection of the separation fence may well
limit Israeli exposure to attacks by Palestinians; but at least so long
as the occupation endures, Palestinian militants will have the
motivation to look for other, perhaps more sophisticated and deadly
means to strike. While some have suggested that Israel's suggestion of
a withdrawal from Gazan settlements could pave the way for a broader
bilateral agreement on security and territorial issues, the outlook in
this regard is bleak. To repeat: a unilateral initiative will be taken
if and when Israel concludes that the Road Map process has failed, not
in order to revive it; it will be taken if and when Israel concludes it
has no partner, not as an opportunity to negotiate with one. It is
hard, therefore, to imagine Israelis and Palestinians reaching a
genuine agreement on a withdrawal from Gaza insofar as negotiations
inevitably would put on the table other highly contentious issues:
control over Gaza border areas, the sea and airport, freedom of
movement for Arafat, together with Israeli actions in the West Bank,
such as the construction of the separation fence, to mention but a few.
Imprecise as to its scope or character, unpredictable as to its
effects, unilateral Israeli steps are not and cannot be a substitute
for a political solution. They might well set in motion a process even
its initiators did not have in mind.
III.
ICG has repeatedly argued for replacing the incremental, step by
step strategy of the Road Map with an endgame strategy involving
forceful international presentation, led by the U.S., of a clear,
detailed and comprehensive blueprint for a permanent Israeli-
Palestinian settlement. Both the plan and the means of promoting and
implementing it are described in detail in ICG's three-part report,
``Middle East Endgame.'' In our view, it remains the best and surest
option to produce a fair and sustainable peace and one that, far from
being inconsistent with the Road Map, can most effectively produce its
desired results: an end to violence and to the settlement enterprise,
reform of the PA, and a viable two-state solution. It is at once the
most ambitious and pragmatic process available.
First, the U.S. should present a detailed, comprehensive Israeli-
Palestinian settlement plan. in coordination with, and with the full
backing of other key members of the international community--including
Arab and Moslem states. The U.S. would precondition presentation of the
plan on strong commitments from others, particularly in the Arab world,
to back it, take concrete steps to normalize relations with Israel once
peace has been achieved and take immediate steps to curb any aid to
groups that resort to violence. For Arab states that have been
clamoring for U.S. involvement, the quid pro quo would be clear: commit
to supporting the plan in word and deed, commit to cracking down on
violent groups and to pressing the PA to take action to end the
violence, and the U.S. will present a fair, comprehensive settlement
plan.
It is clear by now, based on the parties' negotiations from Oslo
onward, that a plan that protects the two sides' vital interests can be
put together. Accordingly, the plan would not require either party to
forsake what it considers its fundamental rights or aspirations.
Rather, it would propose a practical solution to the problems they
confront so that they can live in peace and security.
To be clear: an Israeli-Palestinian peace plan cannot be imposed
and this ought to be neither an imposition nor an ultimatum. An imposed
solution would trigger an immediate nationalistic backlash on both
sides, and, from Israel, cries of unfair treatment at the hands of a
trusted ally. Rather, the plan would represent the international
community's best judgment of what a fair, final and comprehensive
settlement should look like and would appeal to the leaderships and
peoples of both sides to embrace it. In other words, regardless of
whether the leaders initially reject the plan, the U.S. and its
partners would continue to promote them.
Second, and as part of this plan, the international community would
propose a U.S.-led international mandate to administer the territory
that will make up the Palestinian state, verify compliance, help
provide security and take control of land turned over by Israel.
Several members of this Committee have evoked the notion of NATO troops
monitoring the birth of a Palestinian state; ICG fully endorses such an
idea in the context of a comprehensive settlement. The mandatory powers
would be the ultimate arbiters, transferring land and full sovereignty
to the Palestinians when appropriate. In other words, Israel initially
will be turning over territory to NATO or some other U.S.-led
multinational force--not to the Palestinians, and the force will help
strengthen Israel's security by patrolling the Israeli-Palestinian
border and Palestine's other international borders and crossing points.
Israel could be offered membership in NATO and a U.S. defense treaty,
and U.S. and European security guarantees would be extended to the
Palestinian state.
As a means of maximizing the prospects of acceptance, Israeli and
Palestinian leaders could submit it directly to their people for them
to approve or reject. This is the very idea Prime Minister Sharon has
suggested as a means of side-stepping resistance by some members of his
coalition to his Gaza withdrawal proposal and to give them political
cover to remain in the government in the event of popular approval. It
also is the concept accepted in the context of efforts to resolve the
issue of Cyprus. A vigorous campaign in which the U.S., but also Arab
and Moslem countries would play a significant part, would build
tremendous pressure for the referendum and affect political dynamics on
both sides. There is no doubt that, if it could be achieved, the most
powerful impact of all would be made by the joint appearance of
President Bush, King Abdullah of Jordan, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi
Arabia and President Mubarak of Egypt to address the Israeli Knesset
and the Palestinian parliament and call on both sides to accept the
comprehensive peace proposal. Given the virtually complete breakdown in
trust, if the peace process is to be jumpstarted, it may well need such
a bold diplomatic move--the contemporary equivalent of President
Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Overall, the goal should be to generate so
much domestic and international support for the referendum that
opposition would become increasingly hard to sustain and the momentum
for change gradually would become irresistible. As opinion polls among
both Israelis and Palestinians indicate, there is every reason to
believe that the referendums would yield the desired outcomes.
Putting forward a comprehensive deal will provide the clarity that
has so far been missing, creating genuine incentives for Israelis
(security) and Palestinians (the end of the occupation) to confront
extremists within their ranks and depriving them of their current
legitimacy. Proposing a U.S.-led mandate will make up for the lack of
trust and provide Israel with the assurance it needs that the
Palestinian state it leaves behind will be stable, and well-governed.
Submitting the plan to a referendum would endow the process with
homegrown, popular legitimacy, while shifting the locus of decision-
making to an arena where the balance of power is far more favorable to
proponents of an agreement.
What is most illogical and tragic about the past three years is
that majorities on both sides appear ready now to accept a final deal
that will end their conflict. Postponing the final outcome--with the
all too certain accompanying risk of major further death, injury,
destruction and misery, not to mention the emergence of an embittered
and vengeful Palestinian youth--cannot be the right answer. Instead, a
process must be devised whereby the latent aspiration on both sides to
end the conflict can be given practical and political expression.
Historical precedent suggests that such an approach can work. To
unlock difficult diplomatic predicaments. In Northern Ireland, in
March/April 1998, the British and Irish governments together worked out
a peace agreement and the U.S. mediator, former Senator George
Mitchell, presented it to the parties. Likewise, in Macedonia, in 2001,
the basics of the Ohrid Agreement had been drawn up before the end of
June by the U.S. and EU negotiators. In both cases, as a result of the
international community presenting the actors with a game plan for the
final outcome, the debate rapidly became a haggling over details rather
than a debate over fundamentals.
Of all the arguments raised against such a proposal, the most
salient is the lack of political willpower in Washington.
For now, U.S. policy has been reduced to the oft-repeated position
that no progress will be made unless and until the Palestinian
leadership takes decisive steps to end the violence. But waiting for a
``reliable Palestinian partner'' to emerge is a recipe for paralysis:
only a credible political process can produce an effective Palestinian
leadership, not the other way around. It is difficult to imagine this
administration--or any other for that matter--taking on the risk of
promoting an overall solution absent the most exigent of circumstances.
The administration has been unwilling to put its muscle behind the far
less ambitious Road Map, it is said. How could it possibly be expected
to do significantly more?
The point, of course, lies precisely there: the U.S. has been
deeply engaged in Israeli-Palestinian affairs for a long time. Year
after year, it has expended precious energy as well as political and
economic capital on behalf of a process that promised little and
yielded even less. Any type of engagement involves risks and costs.
These only ought to be borne for the sake of an enterprise that merits
them. Here, the cost-benefit calculus is clear: a successful U.S.-led
effort along the lines described here would dramatically change our
posture in the region, isolate radical forces, mute the anti-
Americanism that has become so widespread and reassert our position as
defenders of Israel's vital interests without being oblivious to Arab
concerns. Nor would the international forces deployed to the region
face significant risks. In Iraq, the United States is seen to have
initiated an occupation. In Palestine, we would be seen to have ended
one.
It is lack of U.S. action in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not
its leadership, that damages its credibility. To quote Chairman Lugar,
``The search for stability in the Greater Middle East must proceed hand
in hand with the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Too
many Muslims in the region judge the U.S. solely by its perceived
unwavering support for Israel.'' A more dynamic approach such as
suggested here would dry up support for radical groups and greatly
enhance America's capacity to win international support and
cooperation--not least from the Islamic world--in waging its struggle
against terrorism.
The irony is that a solution likely to be embraced by those from
whom the hardest concessions are being asked (the Israeli and
Palestinian people) and that would serve U.S. strategic interests in
the Middle East perhaps more dramatically than any other step it could
undertake, is unlikely to occur at this point because of resistance
from within the United States itself.
For now, the public debate should narrow down to two simple
questions: is the current process working and would the one suggested
stand a fair chance to succeed? The answer to the former is a definite
``no'' and to the latter a possible ``yes.'' Given that, broad pressure
should begin to build in the U.S. as elsewhere to lay the groundwork
for the pursuit of this realistic approach rather than of the costly
illusions for which we and others have paid so dearly over the years.
Some have argued that pushing for a political solution at this
point would be an unwarranted and dangerous reward for terror. But
those responsible for terrorist attacks don't want a negotiated peace;
they call for the elimination of Israel. They do not want refugees
resettled in Palestine. They want them to return to Israel. They do not
want to share Jerusalem. They want it for themselves alone. How can a
peace agreement gratify terrorists when their goal is to destroy any
chance of a just peace?
IV.
Mr. Chairman, for some time now ICG along with many others has
argued that the world knows what the solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict ultimately will be. An amendment now appears in
order: what the world knows is what the solution ought to be. For
events on the ground are making a fair two-state solution increasingly
remote. Israeli settlements, despite recent suggestions floated by
Prime Minister Sharon, have continued to spread throughout the West
Bank. The West Bank is being cantonised and fragmented. The PA's power
has eroded, with its most useful purpose today being to distribute
salaries. The traditionally dominant Fatah is breaking apart
geographically and organizationally. Hamas is becoming stronger,
alongside a plethora of armed gangs, break-away groups and militias
that do not respond to any central command. Arafat, the only
Palestinian figure with a national constituency and legitimacy, and
arguably the only figure still capable of selling a permanent status
deal to his people, is being shunned by Israel and the U.S. Indeed, it
is something of a polite fiction to imagine that an alternative leader
with the requisite authority and legitimacy somehow will emerge.
Reaching a Palestinian consensus that eschews further violence and
clearly accepts the principles inherent in a two state solution
therefore is becoming increasingly difficult and the very existence of
centralized, national institutions, of a Palestinian polity able to
make decisions and make them stick is in doubt.
The shelf-life of the two state solution is not eternal.
Ironically, Palestinian territorial realities, politics and psychology
are drifting away from the two state solution just at the time when
Israel and the U.S. appear to have come to terms with it. A page in the
history of the conflict may be turning before our eyes. The United
States should act now if it wants the notion of an Israel and Palestine
living side by side in peace to become tomorrow's reality rather than
yesterday's unfulfilled dream.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Malley.
Mr. Indyk.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARTIN INDYK, DIRECTOR, THE SABAN CENTER FOR
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Ambassador Indyk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, Senator Chafee. I am very
grateful for the opportunity to address you on this occasion
and for your patience while we make all these presentations. I
will, given the lateness of the hour and the inevitability of a
rollcall vote, be very brief and hope that my longer statement
will be submitted for the record.
I wanted to pick up quickly on something that I heard
Secretary Kissinger say, and I wonder whether you heard it too,
that basically he feels that both sides are moving much more
closely and much more rapidly toward a final status kind of
deal. It is precisely that conclusion which I too have reached.
As a result of three important factors that have developed over
the last 3 or 4 years of the intifada, the exhaustion factor,
the demographic factor, and the shift in the balance of power
that has occurred, we see both sides now, I believe, moving at
least in terms of their publics, substantial majorities on both
sides now supporting what would, in effect, be a two-state
solution, based more or less on the Clinton parameters that the
three of us all worked on at the close of the Clinton
administration.
I will not go into great details about these three factors.
I do in my testimony, but I think it is important just to
recognize that exhaustion on the Israeli side has led the
Israeli people to want action from their government, but they
do not believe in a negotiated solution at the moment because
they do not see a Palestinian partner that is reliable enough
to negotiate with. They are impatient. They want a better
future for their children, and they therefore are the
motivation behind Prime Minister Sharon's revolutionary
statement about a unilateral withdrawal and evacuation of
almost all the settlements in Gaza and some of the outlying
ones in the West Bank. It is that impatience and that
exhaustion which I think we need to take careful note of.
On the Palestinian side, there is also an exhaustion factor
at work. The Palestinian Authority is collapsing, as Rob Malley
has pointed out. The Palestinians themselves are, I think,
disillusioned with the corrupt and failed leadership of Yasser
Arafat. But unlike the Israelis who are insisting that their
government change the approach, the Palestinians seem to be
incapable of insisting on serious change from their government
and seem rather to be prepared to play a waiting game.
Part of the reason for their willingness to play a waiting
game is the second factor, the demographic factor, which is
playing a very substantial role in Israeli calculations. The
fear that within this decade Jews will no longer be a majority
in the state, in the land of Israel that Israel controls
between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, is leading
Israelis to want to separate from the Palestinians. Since they
have concluded there is no hope of negotiating the separation,
that too is what fuels their demand for a unilateral step from
their government.
The Palestinians see this demographic factor at work, see
the Israelis pushing their government to withdraw, and that I
think is another reason why they are prepared to play a waiting
game. Consoled by the belief that time is on their side, that
either Israel will leave the West Bank and Gaza to rid itself
of the demographic threat or they will become a majority in the
land of Israel and then be able to demand their equal rights.
Finally, the balance of power factor, which I think is
really important but little recognized. This is the fact that
as a result of a combination of the toppling of Saddam Hussein
and the evaporation of the Iraqi army, Israel no longer faces a
potential eastern front coalition. And the balance of power in
conventional, even nonconventional terms has shifted so
dramatically in Israel's favor, also as a result of our own
military presence on Syria's border, which is the only country
with a much weakened army that remains on Israel's borders in a
position to have any kind of conventional conflict with Israel,
that this shift in the balance of power makes Israelis more
prepared to take on this idea of a unilateral step that would
even advantage its worst enemies, Hamas, Hizbollah, who will
claim that they were the ones who forced Israel to withdraw
through violence and terrorism. But because the Israelis feel
that their deterrent power has overall increased significantly,
I suspect that they are prepared to allow a weakening of their
deterrent power in order to meet their needs for separating
from the Palestinians.
On the Palestinian side and on the Arab side more
generally, I think this shift in the balance of power have
reinforced a trend that has developed for some time of Arab
states now willing to end the conflict with Israel, as they
have expressed in the Arab League initiative, to normalize
relations with Israel in return for a full withdrawal. And the
Arab states are, I believe, moving more and more rapidly to, in
effect, abandon the Palestinian cause as they focus more on
their own pressing needs and are engaging more and more with
Israel on the side and being prepared to settle with it, even
at the expense of the Palestinians. The Syrian overtures to
Israel for peace make no mention of the need to settle the
Palestinian problem, and that is just one example.
So as a result of all of these changes, I think what we
have now is a situation in which Israelis are demanding a
change from their government and are even willing to give up
territories they have held for 36 years and evacuate
settlements without receiving any commitments from the
Palestinian side. But they are, Mr. Chairman, acting out of
despair of the alternatives rather than out of hope for peace.
Arab states are more willing than ever to end the conflict with
Israel but unfortunately unwilling to take any serious
initiative to do so. The Palestinians have exhausted themselves
but seem incapable of producing a new leadership that could
enter negotiations with Israel, preferring instead to sit,
wait, and wallow in their misery.
What is to be done? Unfortunately, the challenge here lies
not in defining the end game, as Rob Malley has suggested, but
rather in overcoming the structural impediments that prevent
the parties from getting there. And that is, I think the issue
that we need to deal with and come up with solutions for.
The single most important structural impediment is the lack
of a capable, responsible, and accountable Palestinian
leadership, and therefore any attempts to get a modified Road
Map off the ground are simply not going to work. Therefore, any
attempts to resolve the problem with an end game solution are
not going to work because of the absence of this responsible,
capable, accountable Palestinian partner.
So the question is, how can we take the current confluence
of events, the way in which these factors are driving the
parties to consider things that they would not otherwise
consider, take advantage of that to deal with this fundamental
structural impediment?
In essence, what I am suggesting here is that given the
Government of Israel's Prime Minister's decision to take a
unilateral initiative, we need to get behind that, as the other
speakers have suggested, and shape that initiative. And we can
do this in two ways.
One is to try to turn it into a negotiation process, that
is, take the willingness to evacuate settlements, withdraw from
Gaza and significant parts of the West Bank, and use that to
shape a more effective Palestinian leadership that could
respond to it. And I go through, Mr. Chairman, in my prepared
testimony a number of steps that we would need to take.
It would need to be a U.S.-led intervention with the
quartet in the first instance to demand that Yasser Arafat give
up control of the security services. If the Palestinians are to
take control of the areas that Israel evacuates, they must
retrain and reunify the security services. We must make it
clear to him that there will be no more support for the
Palestinian Authority, no financial support for the Palestinian
Authority unless he does so.
Then to have the quartet supervise the implementation of a
political and economic reform process that essentially we have
given up on, even though we started it in the first phase of
the Road Map. And in that way, Senator Biden, to oversee a
process in which the young guard and the reformers could form a
new leadership.
And in that context, what I would suggest is that we do it
as a modification of the Road Map. With a new Palestinian
leadership in which Arafat has stood aside and we have overseen
a reformed leadership come about, have them negotiate with
Israel phase two of the Road Map, a state with provisional
borders. But that would not be implemented until their phase
one obligations of confronting the terrorists would be
fulfilled. In other words, they would have the ability to go to
their people and tell them we have a viable state with
provisional borders agreed on, but we will not be able to
implement it until we deal with the terrorists.
And, of course, I agree with Dennis Ross on this, that we
do need Arab state endorsement for such a process. The essence
of this option is to restructure the Palestinian Authority in
ways that would give it credibility with Israelis and
Palestinians.
The second one is what I would call a modified trusteeship
option. I would call it a receivership option. In effect, we
would get in behind Israel's unilateral withdrawal and lead an
international intervention to take control of the territories
that Israel withdraws from, essentially put the Palestinian
Authority in receivership--it is almost bankrupt at this very
moment--and take on responsibility, using the shell of the
Palestinian Authority to start to restructure the Palestinian
leadership, implement the reform ideas, restructure the
security services, and thereby create a credible Palestinian
leadership that could then take control in the territories
Israel evacuates and also then begin the final status
negotiation that Rob Malley has suggested is the way to solve
the problem.
Either way, Mr. Chairman, we do not have the option
anymore, if Israel is in fact going to take unilateral steps,
of sitting back and doing nothing because that option will, I
believe, surely lead to a failed Hamas-controlled, terrorist
state on Israel's borders in the heartland of the Middle East.
If we want to prevent that, we either have to shape Israel's
urge to unilateralism to create a more available Palestinian
leadership that can negotiate with Israel or get in behind that
withdrawal and do the same thing under our own auspices.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Indyk follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Martin Indyk, Director, Saban Center for
Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution
``GETTING THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS BACK ON TRACK''
Thank you Mr. Chairman for this opportunity to address your
distinguished Committee on an issue of great importance to the people
of the Middle East, Israeli and Arab alike.
For more than three years a conflict has raged between Israelis and
Palestinians, claiming over 900 Israeli lives and over 3,000
Palestinian lives and causing great human suffering on both sides. For
most of that time, the United States has stood idly by, unwilling to
invest the resources, diplomatic energy and Presidential prestige
necessary to helping the parties end this bloody and unnecessary
conflict. I say ``unnecessary'' because the broad outlines of a
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are known and are
acceptable to substantial majorities on both sides. President Clinton
first defined those parameters in December 2000 after lengthy and
detailed negotiations with Israeli and Palestinian officials. The
failure of the Palestinian leadership under Yasser Arafat to accept
those parameters at that time is now broadly recognized on the
Palestinian side, and in the Arab world, as a tragic mistake.
Arafat himself is now trying to recoup what he lost back then
through the vehicle of the Geneva Accords, negotiated by his close
adviser Yasser Abed Rabbo with former Israeli Minister of Justice,
Yossi Beilin. Even Hamas, the Islamic terrorist organization which
preaches the destruction of Israel has recently acknowledged the
pressure of Palestinian public opinion by declaring that it too would
now be prepared to accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and
Gaza, albeit as an interim solution.
On the Israeli side, the Likud-led right wing government of Ariel
Sharon has already formally accepted the two-state solution outlined in
the U.S.-adopted, and UNSC-endorsed, Road Map. Its Deputy Prime
Minister, Ehud Olmert, has also declared that if Israel is to retain
its nature as a democratic and Jewish state it will need to withdraw
from most of the West Bank. And now the Prime Minister himself has
expressed a willingness to withdraw almost all settlements in Gaza and
some outlying settlements in the West Bank, which could serve as the
necessary catalyst to the jump-starting of a new negotiating process.
All these developments are a product of three critical factors that
now dominate the calculations of Israelis and Palestinians: exhaustion,
demography, and the balance of power.
The exhaustion factor: After three years of bloody violence and
terrorism, both sides have had enough. Israelis were prepared to stand
by their government while the terrorism raged. However, now that the
terror is subsiding the economic hardships of a deep recession are more
keenly felt and Israelis are growing impatient. They are looking for a
ray of hope, a sense of a safer and more productive future for their
children. As a consequence, the ground is shaking under the feet of the
Israeli government as the people demand a political initiative.
On the Palestinian side, people are also exhausted by the economic
hardship and the prolonged presence and often heavy hand of the Israeli
army. They too want a way out of the conflict but no longer see the
Palestinian Authority as capable of leading them there. There is
widespread disillusionment with the corrupt and failed leadership of
Yasser Arafat and considerable concern about the way warlords are now
holding sway in the northern sector of the West Bank and the southern
sector of Gaza. The Palestinian Authority is in an advanced stage of
collapse. Only the PA's monthly payments to teachers, health workers,
municipal workers and security personnel are keeping the economy moving
and the PA relevant. But with Arab states growing weary too and the EU
unhappy with Arafat's abuse of its largesse, funds for these monthly
payments are drying up.
The demographic factor: As Israelis worry more about their future
with the Palestinians, they have come to focus on the fact that by the
beginning of the next decade at the latest, if Israel retains control
of the West Bank, Jews will become a minority in the state of Israel.
Israel will then have to choose between maintaining the Jewish
character of the state and its democratic institutions. This concern,
combined with the violence of the Palestinian intifadah and the
participation in it of some of Israel's own Arab citizens, has led the
bulk of Jews in Israel to want to separate physically from the
Palestinians. Since they have concluded that there is no hope for
negotiating this separation as long as Arafat is in control on the
Palestinian side, they are insisting that their government take
unilateral steps to enforce the separation. The controversial security
barrier and Prime Minister Sharon's plan for unilateral disengagement
from Gaza and parts of the West Bank are both direct consequences of
this Israeli urge to seek protection from the demographic threat.
Unfortunately, many Palestinians watching these developments in
Israeli public opinion seem to have concluded that their timeworn
strategy of playing the victim is gaining a new lease on life. Instead
of taking the initiative to change their leadership and reform their
institutions of governance, Palestinians are increasingly opting for a
waiting game consoled by the belief that time is on their side: either
Israel will leave the West Bank and Gaza to rid itself of the
demographic threat; or they will become a majority in the land of
Israel and then be able to demand their equal rights.
The balance of power factor: The toppling of Saddam Hussein and the
evaporation of the Iraqi army, the disarmament of Libya, and the
renewed dominance of the United States in the region, have left Israel
in an immeasurably strengthened position vis-a-vis its Arab neighbors.
This is having profound consequences on the way Israelis view their
security environment. First, the long-feared emergence of an eastern-
front coalition has vanished, leaving in its wake a weak Syrian
adversary that poses no serious threat to Israel (especially with the
U.S. military on Syria's eastern border). That means that Israel's
security justification for holding onto the Jordan Valley and the high
ground in the West Bank has become much less compelling. Second, since
Israel's overall deterrent capability has been significantly
strengthened, Israelis are less concerned about the consequences for
their deterrent power of a unilateral withdrawal in the face of
Palestinian violence.
On the Palestinian side, the balance of power factor cuts both
ways. It strengthens popular support for suicide bombing as the short-
term Palestinian answer to Israel's conventional strength and increases
dependence on the demographic threat as a longer-term strategy. But it
also weakens Arab support for the Palestinian cause as Arab states
reach the inevitable conclusion that they have no military option
against Israel and turn away from the Palestinians to focus on their
own more pressing concerns. One consequence is a greater Arab
willingness to come to terms with Israel despite the absence of a
Palestinian solution. The Saudi and Arab League Initiatives (which
offers Israel full peace and normalization of relations in return for
full withdrawal), Syrian peace overtures, and Libyan meetings with
Israeli officials are all indications of this new trend towards gradual
Arab abandonment of the Palestinian cause.
Mr. Chairman, these three factors are clearly having a dramatic
impact on the environment for Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Israelis are
demanding change from their government and are even willing to give up
territories they have held for 36 years and evacuate settlements
without receiving any commitments from the Palestinian side. But they
are acting out of despair of the alternatives rather than out of hope
for peace. Arab states are more willing than ever before to end their
conflict with Israel but are unwilling to take any serious initiative
to do so. The Palestinians have exhausted themselves but seem incapable
of producing a new leadership that could enter negotiations with
Israel, preferring instead to sit, wait and wallow in their misery.
It would be easy to suggest that all the United States needs to do
in this situation is to intervene with its own Clinton-like parameters
for a two-state solution and use its influence to get both sides to
accept it. Unfortunately, the challenge lies not in defining the
endgame that is now more or less acceptable to majorities on both
sides, but rather in overcoming the structural impediments that prevent
the parties from getting there.
Today, the single most important structural impediment is the lack
of a capable, responsible, and accountable Palestinian leadership. If
the Palestinian Authority were willing and able today to fulfill its
Road Map commitments to stop Palestinian terror and violence and uproot
its infrastructure, a meaningful negotiating process could easily take
the place of Israeli unilateralism. But the PA cannot and will not take
on these responsibilities.
What should the United States do in these circumstances? The Bush
Administration's stated preference is to blame Yasser Arafat and the
Palestinian Authority and do nothing. But if Prime Minister Sharon
decides to implement his plan for unilateral disengagement from Gaza
and parts of the West Bank--as he seems determined to do--the
administration's hand will be forced. If it does not intervene to shape
this Israeli initiative, the vacuum left by Israel's withdrawal will be
filled by Hamas-led extremist elements that could turn the territories
Israel evacuates into a failed Palestinian terrorist state in the heart
of the Middle East.
If non-involvement is no longer an option, then the United States
should choose between two other options designed to overcome the
structural impediment of the absence of an effective Palestinian
negotiating partner.
The Negotiations Option: Sharon's willingness to evacuate almost
all the Gaza settlements and some outlying West Bank settlements could
be used by the United States to justify an active international
intervention on the Palestinian side to reform the Palestinian
Authority and turn it into a capable negotiating partner. Such a U.S.-
led intervention would need to involve the following elements:
A Quartet demand that Yasser Arafat finally relinquish
control of the security services, enabling a serious U.S.-led
effort to unify and retrain them as a force capable of
controlling and disarming the terrorist organizations.
A credible threat that if Arafat does not comply funding
will be cut to the Palestinian Authority (alternative methods
for providing humanitarian assistance would have to be
utilized).
A Quartet-supervised implementation of political and
economic reform of the Palestinian Authority.
A U.S.-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian negotiation to create a
Palestinian state with provisional borders as provided for in
Phase II of the Road Map. However, implementation would only
take place after the Palestinians fulfill their Phase I
commitments to uproot the infrastructure of terror.
Arab state endorsement and support for all these elements.
The essence of this option is to restructure the Palestinian
Authority in ways that would give it credibility with Israelis and
Palestinians. On the Israeli side its credibility would come from its
ability and willingness to fight terror and violence; for the
Palestinians its credibility would come from being seen to be
responsible for an agreement that would lead to the evacuation of
settlements, the withdrawal of the Israeli army and the creation of a
Palestinian state with provisional borders.
The Receivership Option: The alternative to intervening to reshape
Sharon's initiative into a negotiating process is to make arrangements
for intervening after Israel has implemented its unilateral
disengagement. To fill the vacuum left by Israel's withdrawal, the
Palestinian Authority would be put into a ``receivership'' in which the
corporation would still exist but its authorities would be assumed by a
U.S.-led, UNSC-approved, international consortium. The ``receivership''
would need to involve the following elements:
A UNSC commitment to the Palestinian people that the purpose
of the ``receivership'' is to forestall the PA's collapse and
replace it in the shortest time possible with a Palestinian
state with provisional borders run by an accountable and
transparent government.
An intensive effort to restructure the Palestinian security
services to provide them with the capability to enforce law and
order in the territories evacuated by Israel.
A small component of international forces (perhaps NATO
forces) to take control of key security nodes (such as
Netzarim, and the crossing points at Erez, Karni and Rafah) and
to provide back-up for the Palestinian security services.
Oversight of a Palestinian reform process that would
generate democratic political institutions, transparent
economic institutions and an independent judiciary to replace
the failed institutions of the Palestinian Authority.
Arab state endorsement of the ``receivership'' and
involvement in some of its aspects (e.g. Egyptian and Jordanian
training for the Palestinian security services).
Sponsorship of negotiations with Israel to finalize the
borders of the Palestinian state.
Mr. Chairman, neither of these options provides a simple, risk-free
way forward for the United States. And in an election year, with the
demands of Iraq and other hot spots consuming the attention of the
Administration, they may both prove to be bridges too far. But sitting
back and doing nothing is no longer a viable option either. Israeli and
Palestinian exhaustion, the demographic threat and a dramatic shift in
the balance of power have created new conditions that make U.S.
intervention much more likely to succeed. If the choice therefore is
between a failed, terrorist state in the Middle East heartland and U.S.
intervention to restructure the Palestinian Authority, it seems to be
no longer a matter of choice.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Indyk.
Let me just say that we will have a rollcall vote, as I
have predicted, and it may come almost anytime. But Senators
have stayed with this hearing, as you can tell, and we
appreciate your staying with us. So we would like to proceed
with questions. I will try again for the 8-minute limit,
knowing that there is some liberal ruling as required. One of
us may disappear to vote and return. Whoever is here will serve
as chairman while he is here so we can have continuity of the
hearing.
Senator Biden. I may stay just to get that feeling again.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, you can be assured I will
stay.
The Chairman. Well, there is an incentive for you.
Now, let me just say, listening to the last testimony of
Dr. Indyk, one thought that comes to mind is that, as I think
all three of you suggested perhaps, Prime Minister Sharon or
other Israeli leaders have come to this demographic conclusion
that Israel wants to continue to be a Jewish state. To have
people coming and going in great numbers might jeopardize that
at some point, quite apart from how the negotiations come out.
Given the fact that things have not worked out very well, one
way of bringing about some guarantee of that state is to put
the fence up, hopefully in the right places so that it does not
exacerbate the situation, and then let the Palestinians do the
best they can.
Now, given the end of all of the checkpoints that Dennis
Ross suggested, the commerce obviously slows. As a matter of
fact, if the economy is weak now, to use your term, Mr. Indyk,
they really do head into receivership, or however you described
that situation. Furthermore, there is some territory being
given up. There are some assets there that are floating.
Depending upon how the Palestinians look at it, an
international receivership might be created in which we might
be involved. Our European allies and maybe NATO are taking more
of an interest in this, as we heard at Wehrkunde. Maybe even
some Arab states might be interested under the right
circumstances. Under those circumstances, perhaps the
Palestinian state becomes a reality with new leadership in due
course.
The thing I want to query, though, is that one thing that
has always seemed to have stopped each of the situations is
that some persons involved in all of this are not cooperative.
They create terror. It could be five young men who suddenly got
the idea one night, leaving aside all of the high state craft
that we are discussing. Now, maybe these acts are going to
continue anyway. Perhaps Israelis and Palestinians say it is
just the price of living in the area. We are going to have a
number of unstable people for whatever psychological reasons,
and perhaps we just have to understand that and weather through
the storm.
On the other hand, conceivably out of this receivership
does come some type of constructive organization which has
grabbed the interests of the United States, the Western
Europeans, the Arabs. In other words, some economic vitality
might conceivably come to people who are very poor and have
very little prospect.
Earlier on, the suggestion of Dr. Kissinger was that even
if we effect all of that, there will be a psychological
yearning of some Palestinians or others to resettle where they
used to be. The thought is that they are not coming back. Once
the fence goes up and that is it and you circumscribe Israel,
Israel is going to remain a Jewish state unless strange things
happen. Therefore, maybe it takes a generation for this to pass
away. Maybe it passes away. Maybe it does not. Still it is a
factor there.
Likewise, even some of the Palestinians, if they are
restored to some prosperity, still may deeply resent for a long
time the fact, that there is an Israeli state there. They just
do not like the idea. That may be true of a lot of people. Once
again, a generational problem.
Maybe some people still cannot give up terrorism. After
all, in many states all over the world, they have not done so.
But still, I see a formation here of something to work with
that we, that is, the United States, and others could get our
teeth into. The problem will be determining whether countries,
the U.S. included, Europe, Arabs, will be willing to take
casualties. If the terrorists strike now, the Israeli fence may
be up. Now, maybe as you say, they would devise ways of getting
around it anyway, but this is going to be more difficult. The
garden-variety terrorists will probably be doing the terrorism
with whoever is trying to effect this new state in the
Palestinian area in receivership or a guardianship or whatever.
You have a situation almost like the insurgency movement in
Iraq. They are not exactly analogous, but still people are
killing people, sometimes us, and the American people say,
well, now, hang on here. That is not exactly what we signed up
for. You have to go in with eyes wide open.
For the moment, we are not near that stage, but still,
given the circumstances you are describing today, if the Road
Map is not really going to work and if the old plan did not
work and if there are risks in just letting it go forever, then
we have to begin to take a look at the risks. A potential
pragmatic solution in this case may be impelled by Israeli
action. They make a choice. The theological statement that you
have to have the settlements out there for a biblical reason or
so forth may be valid, but abandoned. You come back and you
have something else out there, a trusteeship these days, in
return for a Jewish state in essence. That is a unilateral
decision, but it is a very big one.
On the other hand, the Palestinians perhaps have already
come to recognize that they cannot govern themselves. I do not
see any possibility of their being able to enforce a dictum
against Hamas or anybody else. They are going to need help.
They may or may not want the help now. But eventually they will
because they do not want to starve. The economic conditions
will be rigorous there.
I would ask any of you to comment on this in the short
period of time that I have in my 8 minutes.
Ambassador Indyk. Mr. Chairman, I think you have outlined
very well a lot of the difficulties and dilemmas, conundrums
that would confront us with these kinds of ideas. I will try to
respond to some of them.
I think, first of all, the context in which a U.S.-led
intervention takes place is very important. It needs to be
clear that the purpose of this intervention is to create a
viable Palestinian state with provisional borders. I am not
suggesting we should give up on the Road Map in that regard.
Phase two of the Road Map provides for such a thing. Then once
the state, with its democratic political institutions and its
transparent economic institutions and its capable security
service and its independent judiciary, once those institutions
of better governance are established and the economic
component, which you point to which is very important, there
will be a final status negotiation, that the provisional
borders will not be the final borders. But that is the context
in which the Palestinians can buy into it and see that their
future is not going to be taken away from them by a different
kind of occupation. So that is, I think, point No. 1.
Point No. 2 I will just say is that, yes, you are right
about the problem of how do you deal with the terrorists. Why I
came up with this concept of receivership or trusteeship or
whatever is precisely because we do not have on the Palestinian
side an authority, a leadership that is capable of dealing with
this terrorist threat. But the point is not to take on that
responsibility for ourselves leading the international
community, but rather to get behind a Palestinian security
force that would have that responsibility because it would be,
in the process, helping to build the Palestinian state.
It is in that context not doing Israel's bidding--Israel
will have already withdrawn--not doing the international
community's bidding, but doing the bidding of the Palestinian
people who have an interest in a Palestinian state. And our
role would be to retrain, restructure, and give them the
backing, and if necessary, that might require some special
forces on the ground, but it is the Palestinians who are the
lead component in this.
It is easier to do if you are dealing with Gaza first in
this context. There you have greater Palestinian security
capabilities now still in existence that could be reorganized
and supported for that purpose. That also would give the
Israelis some confidence, if it worked, that there was a way to
deal with the terrorism problem.
The Chairman. I thank you for that.
I want to yield to my distinguished friend. Now, let me say
that having begun the day listening to people talking about the
need for a political context before we do anything in Haiti,
this situation happens elsewhere in the world. I appreciate the
creativity of the three of you in trying to formulate some
sense of how that context might ever come about. We could wait
for quite a while in Haiti right now for the context to happen.
And that is a good point. What do you deal with if there is no
context of this sort? On the other hand, that is a part of our
dilemma today. We feel we cannot just wait indefinitely for
something to happen fortuitously. The structuring, or the
suggestion, of how we do come in, preferably with others, is
very important.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This has been a privilege today. No fooling, fellows. To
hear from the three of you sitting here today is--you talk
about assets. You guys are national assets. For real. I have
always been impressed with at least two of you. I have bugged
you for the last 15 years for ideas, and I have read a great
deal about what the third one of you has said. I truly want to
thank you. I consider it an honor that you are here.
As a staffer behind me suggested, I feel like I have
listened to a concert of the three tenors with the basso
perfundo having gone first.
But I tell you what.
The Chairman. You are the chairman for the moment.
Senator Biden [presiding]. Yes, thank you. I am chairman
for a moment.
Let me say two things and then I have a specific question
for each of you.
Ironically I find two or three extremely consistent threads
that run through all your testimony, including Dr. Kissinger's,
and that is that, Martin, notwithstanding the fact I put such
emphasis on the need to have a circumstance that requires the
Arab states to take some leadership to give leverage to the
blossoming of this Palestinian leadership I think we all think
is there, the truth of the matter is each of you have basically
said the same thing in slightly different ways.
Each of you, with your different approach as to how to
proceed next, acknowledge what we did not use to emphasize as
much before, and that is the active participation of the Arab
states in some way and the active coordination of the European
community and that probably will be the vehicle. So having done
this for as long as you guys have with the degree of expertise
and focus as you have had, that is a change. That is a change
in what we have considered to be the essential elements to
anything moving forward.
Am I correct that in generic terms, there is a recognition
on all of our parts that there is a need for the Arab states,
main Arab states, at a minimum signing off on this and at a
maximum being engaging more and that the Europeans have to be
on the same page for any one of your approaches to have a
chance of working? Am I correct?
Ambassador Ross. Yes.
Ambassador Indyk. Yes.
Senator Biden. The second point I would like to make is
that there is a recognition on everyone's part of the four
witnesses today, as I understood the testimony, that to steal a
line from one of Yates' poems, Easter Sunday 1916 about another
dilemma that still has not been resolved, Northern Ireland and
Ireland, that the world has changed. It has changed utterly. A
terrible beauty has been born. The Middle East has changed in
the last 4 years not because of the intifada alone but because
the world has changed. The world has changed in the meantime
while this internecine war has been going on. The surrounding
circumstances have changed, Martin, as you have laid out in
terms of the region.
The first question I have--and I would like you to take a
quick crack at it, Martin, and each of you to speak to it, if
you would like. You point out why the Israelis are willing to
take a new approach, that they want action and they do not have
anybody to deal with, so they take it unilaterally. They feel
both more and less secure. They are willing to take, at least
in broad strokes, more of a risk because the existential threat
from Arab states is much diminished, notwithstanding the fact
the threat from individual terrorists has increased
considerably, but nonetheless, that sets a condition. And you
went through others.
Martin, my question is, when is, to use a Christian term,
that epiphany going to take place in Europe? When is a similar
epiphany going to take place among the Arab states? I am not
trying to be humorous, but the world has changed. Therefore,
their approach to what they are willing to risk and not risk--
that calculus is able to change too. I do not see it changing
in those other two pieces. So for me, this really crass
syllogism I am putting together is this: the basic premise is
that to get any of these options underway, we need European and
Arab state involvement to some greater degree than we have now.
Circumstances have changed to allow the Palestinians and the
Arabs to maybe be prepared to take chances or a different
approach. But the condition, it seems to me, is there has to be
something that happens to get the Arab states and the Europeans
invested in one of these approaches.
Am I making any sense by my question? Could you speak to
that for a minute?
Ambassador Indyk. Sure. If I might make just one comment. I
thought that you were going to identify three trends that we
were all agreed on.
Senator Biden. Well, there were. I did not go through them
all.
Ambassador Indyk. But the other thing that we are all
agreed on is that there needs to be active U.S. participation.
I think you would agree with that.
Senator Biden. Yes.
Ambassador Indyk. As far as the Europeans, I think they
have actually already got it, or at least the key ones. What I
mean by that is that the critical epiphany that they needed to
reach was that the only way in which they could become helpful
and relevant on the political level was if they had a strong
and close relationship with Israel. That is what gave us such
leverage in this situation because we could take, whether it
was Sadat or King Hussain or Arafat in an earlier life, their
willingness to make peace with Israel and use our influence
with Israel to work out a deal. The Europeans saw it in their
interest to side with the Arabs and therefore ruined their
relationships with Israel, had no relationship of trust, and
therefore could not play an influential role.
I think that what we see with the British, the Germans, and
believe it or not, the French in recent days is an
understanding. That is their epiphany that they have got. Even
though they do not like Sharon, they have got to find a way to
deal with him.
Senator Biden. Quite frankly, I am more optimistic, as
bizarre as this sounds, about the French epiphany than I am the
British and the German, but that is a different question.
Since time is running out, maybe I will not ask each of you
to comment. Rob, let me ask you a question.
This notion of a total plan--if we had a European consensus
and an Arab state willingness, I think there are conditions
upon which that circumstance becomes much more likely.
For example, I go back to a very crude analogy of a very
important political event in American domestic politics. Back
some 15-20 years ago, I was in a room with Bob Dole and the
Democratic leadership and Republican leaders when I used a
phrase to Bob Dole, we all got to jump in the same boat and
know that if any one person starts to cut a hole in the boat,
we all sink. And that was a compromise we reached, which was
very painful, on Social Security to keep it solvent at the
time. We all agreed literally we would not criticize the other
for engaging in this agreement. As a party we would not as
parties use it in our elections.
In a sense, do we not have to get to the same place with
our European friends and our Arab state friends that we are all
in the same boat where we say, OK, we are all signing on to the
same deal in order to create the condition for that Palestinian
leadership to be able to become viable? Because, Martin, as you
talk about it, setting up that circumstance requires, in your
analogy, you've still got to have the Arab states signing off
and you've got to have us getting in.
So, Rob, my question is, is that sort of a condition
precedent to being able to go the route you are suggesting?
Mr. Malley. Absolutely. I think what needs to be done--and
I think you are putting your finger on one of the main pieces
of the puzzle which is the United States cannot do it alone.
One of the lessons we learned from the past--and I think it is
one of the lessons of Camp David--was we did try to do it
alone. I am not saying that had we involved the EU or the
Arabs, who probably were not ready at the time in any event, we
would have succeeded, but certainly alone makes it much harder.
I think we have reached this point. I think this
administration is working much more closely with Arabs and
Europeans, and I think the Europeans and the Arabs too for
their own self-interest, in particular the moderate Arab
states, are much more willing today to sign on to anything the
U.S. does, even things they may not believe in, let alone
things that they would believe in.
I think the kind of plan I put on the table--and I would
not go public with it until you get Arab leaders and European
leaders publicly committed.
Senator Biden. You have just answered my next question. It
increases my respect for your judgment beyond what it already
was.
I am serious.
Look, if I was sitting down in Bush's position, and we just
took over an administration--I would literally split the three
of you up and say, I want you heading to Europe, I want you
heading to the Arab states, and I want you heading to the
region. And I need you to get me a deal with the Arab states
first, and you got to get me a deal with the Europeans. We have
not in earnest, I believe--we have not been in much negotiation
at all of late. And this is not a criticism of the effort the
three of you made in the last administration. I mean it. I was
right there following you guys.
A guy who ran my staff for years and years has more wisdom
than any man that I have ever met. His name is Ted Kaufman. For
real. He does. Every time I would say something about
negotiating our way through something, trying to get to a
solution, I would say, my God, we are wasting a lot of time.
And he said, you know, I had a professor at the Wharton School
who used to talk about a quote that John Wanamaker, the famous
retailer back at the turn of the century, said. John Wanamaker
allegedly said, I know that 50 percent of my advertising is a
waste of time. My problem is I just do not know which 50
percent.
The truth of the matter is that we had to go through
everything we have gone through so far in my view in order to
get to the place where we may be able to set the conditions for
doing what we do now. So none of what I am asking or saying is
in any way even an implied criticism of anything that you guys
in your former roles and present roles as public citizens have
attempted to do. This is an evolving process.
But having said that, can I ask you--and I am going to have
to go vote--whether or not you sense that there is any
inclination on the part of this administration, to use a trite
Washington expression, to think outside of the box right now,
or is it basically live and let live for the time being and
eventually something else is going to have to change on the
ground before we, the United States, are able to react? It
seems counterintuitive to say that because something is
changing on the ground. Something significant is changing on
the ground. Something potentially massive is changing on the
ground with this unilateral movement on the part of the Sharon
government.
So can you give me a sense? I'm looking for how we get--if
the chairman and I agreed fully precisely and signed on to one
of the three approaches you said and we are going to do
everything we can, do we have anybody to talk to in your view?
Ambassador Ross. I think that the administration realizes
there is something that is profound that is happening, but I
would say at this point, at least for my tastes, they are still
too cautious in terms of how they are approaching it from
several standpoints.
One, as I said a little earlier, when you have a
revolutionary move, as is the case on Sharon's part, it is
entirely appropriate to try to get your questions answered and
to be sure that what is there is, in fact, for real and it is
something. But do not bury it with 1,000 questions. There are
maybe 10 questions that are critical and strategic, and you
focus on those, No. 1.
No. 2, do not wait to be satisfied on every answer before
you start working with the others. I am very much concerned
that if the only discussion is with the Israelis, then the
implication is the only responsibility is on the Israeli side
and it is not only on the Israeli side. Ironically it is the
Israelis who are creating the moment by being prepared to take
a step.
Senator Biden. Right.
Ambassador Ross. So do not fortify the sense somehow that
it is only up to the Israelis.
Third, you are going to have to engage in what amounts to
very active diplomacy with the others. With the Europeans,
focus on the fact that there is an opportunity here and here is
the kind of role that we can play together to make something of
it. With the Egyptians, as I said, the last thing that Egypt
wants is for Gaza to become a Hamas stronghold led by Hamas.
Senator Biden. The last time I had a conversation with the
President of Egypt, who is an old buddy of a lot of us
personally here, there was no inclination to talk to anybody.
There is nobody to talk to here.
Ambassador Ross. The critical question right now is if you
have a revolutionary move and if we cannot on our own make sure
that it comes out a certain way, what are the assets we have
available? What are every one of the potential resources that
give us a chance to take advantage of this? We have to talk to
the Palestinians.
By the way, everything that Rob and Martin have said about
the fragmentation I see all the time when I am over there, but
I also see something else. I see reformers. I see a move with
the new guard within Fatah who in the siege environment are on
the defensive, but in an environment where it is clear an
opportunity is coming, they will become much more assertive and
aggressive. And we should be working with them.
We can also make it more difficult for Arafat to block it.
If it is clear there is something profound to be gained, is he
going to stand in the way of that, when it is much clearer that
that can be the case?
But then, again, it is not just us with them. It should be
the quartet members with them. It should be Egypt. We should
try to engage the other Arabs as well. Maybe as a collective
they can do more than they have in the past.
The issue you were raising before about the Europeans and
the Arabs, I think the Europeans are coming to the point of
view of realizing maybe there is something here.
I think with the Arabs, I do not think they see it yet. I
think they still reflect the mythologies. Even the terminology
of what is used, the wall was used today. There are 87 miles
that have been built. Three miles are wall. Eighty-four are
not. There is a mythology that has built up around that. They
have not broken through the mythology to realize what if the
Israelis are getting out of a percentage of the West Bank, what
if they are getting out of all of Gaza? Well, that is an
opportunity. Now, what is your role going to be? How can you
make sure that those who gain from it on the Palestinian side
are those who believe in peace, not those who do not?
So there is a lot that can be done here, but then you have
to be prepared to step up to the plate and do it.
Senator Biden. Guys, I only have a minute left to go vote.
I just want to tell you again with all sincerity how much I
appreciate your contributions not here in this committee today.
We are so used to calling on your time, that we almost take it
for granted.
I hope people are listening not only here but on both ends
of the street. I think there is a great opportunity. I think we
have a chance, to vastly overstate it, to make the 21st century
the century of hope, not one of doom like we are starting it
off. I think what you guys have suggested with the threads that
are the same here, there is real possibility.
Anyway, I thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing
me to be chairman for 10 minutes. It was a nice feeling, but I
am very comfortable with you as chairman as well.
I am going to go vote. Thank you, fellows. I appreciate it.
The Chairman. You did very well.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
The Chairman. But back to normal now.
I call upon Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Since it certainly seems the case now that Arafat will not
cooperate and that there will not be any viable Palestinian
security, it seems like until something changes there that it
is almost hopeless. So what should the United States do? And
let me preface that by just telling you a story.
I had met with the leaders in Egypt before going to Israel,
and General Soliman had told me that he had just had a meeting
with Arafat and Arafat had said--now, this is back in early
January--that within 2 weeks he was going to name a new
Palestinian security chief. So in the next day or so when I was
meeting with the Palestinian Authority, the Prime Minister
Qureia, I said this to him. I said is that going to happen in 2
weeks as General Soliman said. And he smiled and he said, maybe
in 10 weeks, maybe in 52 weeks.
So is it hopeless unless we can get Arafat to cooperate?
Ambassador Indyk. Well, what I have tried to suggest,
Senator Nelson, is the short answer to your question is yes,
that you will not get Arafat to cooperate. Therefore, I think
it is about time that not just the United States, but the
Europeans as well who have been funding the Palestinian
Authority simply go to him with an offer he cannot refuse, to
say that there will be no more money for the Palestinian
Authority unless he gives up his control over the security
services. Period. Take that control away from him and vest it
in the Prime Minister and a security minister and come in and
do what we committed to do in phase one of the Road Map. The
United States took on the responsibility of restructuring and
retraining those security services. If it is done in the
context of an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, then that security
service and that Prime Minister will have an incentive to take
control because the alternative is that Hamas will take
control. So they will, in a sense, have to confront Hamas, but
you have got to give them the ability to do so.
Left to his own devices, Yasser Arafat will do a deal with
Hamas. He is so weak that he will--that is his classic style--
align himself with Hamas and allow them to take over in Gaza.
So in the context of an Israeli unilateral move, I believe it
is an urgent priority to end this game that he is able to play
by simply taking the authority over the security services in
the first instance away from him. And it is not just the United
States. The Europeans have a critical role to play in that
regard and the U.N. and the Russians.
Ambassador Ross. One thing about Arafat, Arafat always
wants to demonstrate that nothing can be done without him, and
he has not much demonstrated that a whole lot can be done with
him.
Now, to followup on what Martin was saying, I think also
here if it is only us, it will not work because then he will
make it a case of us trying to humiliate the Palestinians. It
is the equivalent of the siege which if you humiliate Arafat,
in those circumstances you create the sense of humiliation for
all Palestinians. So there is a coalescence around him. We
would need everybody to accept it.
And here again, I would say we have to have some Arab
support to do it too. There has to be a kind of consensus that
can be presented that says, look, if you do not give this up,
you are destroying the Palestinian cause. This is something
that the Arabs have never been willing to do. They have always
been willing to go to him in private and put pressure on him.
They have never been willing to say it in public. The only
thing he is going to respect is if it is done in public. So you
are going to have to cross that threshold if you are going to
succeed in that fashion.
Mr. Malley. I think we have all had our time dealing with
Chairman Arafat over the years. I think one thing that is true,
as Dennis just said, what is critical for him is to remain
relevant, and I think he is now in a position--whether he would
act differently in other situations or not is a matter that we
could discuss, but he is clearly now put in a position where
the only way he can show his relevance is by being an
obstruction, an obstacle. He has no incentive to be anything
else and the only way he shows that he still is playing a role
is by blocking whatever else is happening.
I personally am not convinced that if he had put before him
the kind of threat that Martin discussed, that it would change
that much for several reasons, one, because his incentive
structure would not be any different, and second of all,
because I think it is more complicated than simply him wanting
to hold onto the security services. I think the Palestinian
political system as a whole, I think Palestinian society as a
whole has invested in him a role that he is only too happy to
play, but that will not simply be removed by transferring
authority, nominal authority, to the Prime Minister.
I also think that if one wants to reach an agreement,
whether it is the kind of agreement I have in mind or others,
one will need his blessing. And if I were an Israeli in
particular, I would want his blessing for that agreement.
Otherwise, the notion of it being a viable, stable agreement
would be merely an illusion.
Now, part of my answer to your question, Senator, is to say
we have to bypass the Palestinian leadership as a whole and
that is why the notion of a trusteeship is one that I put on
the table. But I think again the only way it is a credible
alternative is if it is not a partial trusteeship over Gaza,
for example, but a trusteeship over all the lands that
ultimately will become the Palestinian state and will then be
handed over to leadership that is credible.
Senator Nelson. What do you all think about the Olmert
plan? This is where he had proposed an elimination of 85
percent of the settlements in the West Bank.
Ambassador Indyk. I think two things about Olmert's
statement is important. First of all, that he is giving voice
to what he understands to be a broad Israeli sentiment that
Israel does not have a reason to be in the West Bank and has
very good reason to get out of the West Bank because of the
demographic factors, which he himself cites in this interview.
So I think that that is a very important acknowledgement by the
Deputy Prime Minister of something that now runs quite deeply
through Israeli society.
But beyond that, the fact that he came out when he did with
that statement, the fact that all other contenders for the
Likud leadership find it necessary to stake out a position that
goes against the fundamental ideology of Likud and the other
right wing parties in the government is an indication of how
much the political ground is shifting underneath the feet of
the government and of the politicians. And that is why the
Prime Minister himself is now giving voice to something that he
would never have.
I mean, I feel like I have policy whiplash here, as
Ambassador to Israel, having heard Prime Minister Sharon--you
may have heard it too, Mr. Chairman, also--give you his lecture
about the critical importance to the survival and security of
the state of Israel of the settlements in Gaza, of Netzarim and
Kfar Darom, and one day he stands up and says ``I have come to
the conclusion that those settlements should be evacuated and
then in a final agreement no Jew''--I am quoting him--``will
live in Gaza.'' This is an amazing epiphany, if I can use that
word. But it is because the political reality on the ground in
Israel is shifting dramatically, and that is driving the
leadership to take unilateral steps. The challenge, as I think
we all agree, is to take advantage of that, to shape it in a
way that can be productive for a final agreement.
Ambassador Ross. Just to followup on that, I agree
completely with what Martin said. I would just add the
following, and it gets back to a point you were raising, Mr.
Chairman.
The Israelis are going to ensure that they maintain at
least the Jewish state of Israel, not a one-state solution, but
maybe somewhere down the road, if you cannot get a Palestinian
state soon, maybe there will be one later. But the whole idea
of the fence and the barrier is to guarantee that there will at
least be the Jewish state of Israel, and that is what is
driving it. That is what guarantees it. What Olmert says is a
reflection of that.
And not only does it embody the profound political change
within Israel, but it also reflects something else. When you
build the barrier, as he is putting it, basically on 15 percent
of the territory or less than that in the West Bank, it means
whatever is on the other side of the fence, whatever is to the
east of the fence, sooner or later is not going to be there any
longer in terms of Israeli settlements. And he also said that.
So it has implications very clearly for how Israel will
preserve itself and it has implications as well for the kinds
of settlements that will remain.
Understand one thing. When we were at Camp David and again
afterwards, we knew, when we looked at the configuration of
where the settlements are, that even if you build a fence in,
say, 12 percent of the territory, you can capture more than
three-quarters of all the settlers where they are in that area.
In the Clinton ideas, we talked about 4 to 6 percent annexation
for 3 blocks. That would have accommodated 80 percent of the
settlers, not of the settlements. So you can absorb that, but
the rest of the territory goes. And what Olmert is saying, in
effect, is whatever is to the east is not going to be part of
Israel.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Let me just raise one more question. It has been several
months since Prime Minister Sharon visited the United States.
He made another visit here subsequently, but at that time he
was here for 2 or 3 days. As part of that visit, he invited
Senator Biden and me, among a few others, to come to the 10th
floor of the Mayflower Hotel. It was quite an excursion just
getting there through the security, as the hotel was
reconfigured, into a very small room where we finally found the
Prime Minister.
I had the impression, as he described the fence that
evening--because he had been admonished by our administration
to not do it, and there had been a public reference I think by
President Bush, in their joint press conference--that he wanted
to affirm at least to Senator Biden and to me that he was going
to do it anyway.
Furthermore, I had the feeling that he was expressing at
least subtly, and maybe even more overtly, that the security or
the strategic situation had changed after the war in Iraq and
that in fact Israel is fully capable of defending itself. In
other words, he was going to make certain that there was a
Jewish state, and that the demographic problem would not
overtake Jews in Israel. Furthermore, if there were a lot of
contra-attempts around, Israel militarily was prepared to deal
with it.
Therefore, his visit to us was really to explain the facts.
It was not a supplication for aid. He did not request us to get
heavily involved in negotiations or to work out two states or
what have you. It was really much more direct. I do not think
that has changed, whatever the rhetoric may be.
This leads me to a question. I will play the devil's
advocate for the moment because you have heard today from
Senators, all of whom want to get involved, who are engaging
you. What do we do next? What do we advise the administration
or anyone else to do? What if there had been Senators here at
the hearing today who said, given this context, that it is a
miserable predicament for the Palestinians and very sad for
Arabs who complain about this and are aggrieved and do not like
us? On the other hand, Israel may very well be able to take
care of the problem. At some point, in the event that there are
Palestinians who want some support from somewhere else, they
may ask for it. They may ask Arabs, first of all, but that
might not be forthcoming. So they might ask Europeans. They
might ask the United States. In other words, you sort of turn
the tables, as opposed to our worrying day by day how we impose
ourselves there, or our allies wonder how we get a context for
coming into the picture. We do not get into the picture for a
while.
There are a good number of Americans who, for quite a
while, wanted to take that position, sort of a time-out period.
This is one of these intractable affairs. They could not have
anticipated that Prime Minister Sharon would build a fence,
that he would take these strategic considerations. But he has,
and so, as a result, things have changed, whether everyone has
realized that or not.
Constructive Americans would still say, well, our hopes are
broader for the total Near East or Middle East. In other words,
we believe in the war against terrorism. There must be some
fundamental changes so that the lives of people, hundreds of
millions of them, are improved and so that there is some hope
for young people out there who now may feel hopeless and who
might go into terrorism because of their despair. Beyond that,
we simply believe in freedom, democracy, human rights, rights
for women, a number of other things.
We want to get engaged. We are out there with the war
against terrorism. We had our wake-up call. Suddenly we
discovered countries that we had not been dealing with for
quite a long while.
Yet, there are still other Americans who say, get over it.
That was 9/11 and we responded appropriately. We have got our
homeland defense now. We are mopping up the Taliban and al-
Qaeda between the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan. We are
doing the best we can with the U.N. and others in Iraq, to
bring about some stability there. This will be a distinct
improvement. We are doing much better with diplomacy with the
Europeans, perhaps in Iran, maybe with the six powers in North
Korea. We have had some good fortune in Libya.
You have devoted all of your lives to this issue. This
committee has not been quite so devoted, but some of us, for
quite a long while, have, as Senator Biden pointed out, been
listening to you. Why are we seized with this issue as being
this critically important?
I ask this not to argue you out of telling me why it should
be. I think that somebody probably needs to express the
priority and why we are here today.
Ambassador Ross. Let me put it in the following way. In the
war on terror, there is a military component that is absolutely
indispensable. You have no alternative to it. You have to
defeat those who understand only one way to deal. But to win
the war on terror you have to do things other than in the
military realm, and I am not talking now about the obvious
points about sharing intelligence, law enforcement, financial
flows, and so forth. I am talking about how you create an
environment that shows that hate does not work and that hope is
still there and that there is a reason not to be so angry.
If you take that global statement and you relate it
specifically to the issue of, well, if Sharon is doing this
anyway, and the Israelis can handle it after they get out, why
do we still care, we care because we do not want this to be a
replay of Lebanon in the year 2000 where Hizbollah looked like
the real victor where violence works, negotiations do not. We
do not want Hamas to inherit what happens in Gaza or, for that
matter, in the West Bank. We do not want their model to look to
be successful because if it is successful, the war on terror
will be much harder for us to have to contend with more
generally.
What we want is for Palestinians who believe in peace to be
able to show there is a pathway there. They can take advantage
of it. I think Rob said it earlier. If the Israelis are getting
out of settlements in the West Bank, let us coordinate with the
Palestinians about what the handover is going to be so we do
not have Hamas standing at the top of buildings in Kfar Darom
or Netzarim waving a Hamas flag. We have a big stake in this
when it comes to the broader war on terror. So this dimension
of it is, at least from the standpoint of your question, one we
have to consider.
Mr. Malley. Mr. Chairman, if I could add. I think it is a
very fair question and I would just make three points in
response.
The first one is I am not in favor of engagement for
engagement's sake. I think it is not a matter of sending a
special envoy simply to be there to make phone calls. I think
there is always a risk in U.S. engagement. There is always a
cost and it should be worth the cost. Therefore we should have
objectives that are commensurate to the risk that we take.
All that being said--and here I agree 100 percent with what
Dennis just said--if we want to have an effective policy in the
Middle East and in the war against terrorism, we are going to
need to try to come to terms with this issue and to try to
resolve it. There is no single issue that dominates the minds
of Arabs and of Muslims more than this one, and it is a
constant burden on our efforts. As I said in my opening,
nothing hurts us more than the perpetuation of the conflict,
and nothing would help us more than its resolution. It is the
constant elephant in the room, and anyone who you will talk to
from Indonesia to Morocco to anywhere in the Middle East will
say that. I think that is why it remains at the top of our
national agenda, even though we have so much else to worry
about.
The Chairman. Mr. Indyk, do you have a thought?
Ambassador Indyk. Just one other comment because I agree
very much with what both Dennis and Rob have said, and they
have been very articulate about it.
But I would just like to make a different point, which is
that people who care about the survival, security, and well-
being of the state of Israel should also have an interest in
seeing us engaged because there has been this kind of
simplistic conclusion reached over the last 3 years that
somehow by disengaging we are doing Israel a favor. And over
900 Israeli lives later and with the deep recession cutting
into the hopes and dreams of the Israeli people, Israel is in
trouble. Israel is not better off as a result of our
disengagement. And Israel cannot survive as a Jewish state, the
thing that you have been focusing on today, unless it has
peace, eventually has peace with its neighbors. And it can
achieve that peace--even Dr. Kissinger reached that
conclusion--in the foreseeable future, but it cannot do it
without American engagement.
Ariel Sharon is going to undertake a unilateral
disengagement? No. He is coming here to get us involved in his
unilateral disengagement because he knows he cannot do it
effectively without U.S. engagement. And so that is an
additional reason because of our interest in the survival and
well-being of the state of Israel that we should want to be
engaged.
The Chairman. Well, that is a very good point. I remember
when this committee visited with former Prime Minister Shimon
Peres. He frequently got into the economic issues of the area
and what this might mean for Israel, in addition to surrounding
states. Israel is a small state with relatively few people
given the territory. It could have its borders at this point,
but the commerce and the opportunities that might come from a
greater Middle East participation, obviously, might not work
out under those circumstances without there being diplomacy
and, if not friendship, at least tolerance and a movement to
deal pragmatically.
Well, I thank each one of you for those answers. We are
reassured that we are on the right track in holding the
hearing. We thank you for the investment of your time, which
has been very, very generous, and your wisdom. Thank you very
much.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:47 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
----------
Additional Statement Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold
I thank Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden for calling this very
important hearing, and thank all of the witnesses for being here today.
Over the weekend the terrorist attack on a crowded bus in Jerusalem
reminded all of us once again of the horrific facts of the situation
that Israelis face every day. There can be no justification for
targeting and murdering innocent civilians. This seems so obvious that
it shouldn't have to be said, but I fear that it is not at all obvious
to some of the key actors whose cooperation is crucial to making the
Road Map work.
Along with their Israeli neighbors, the Palestinian people have
suffered greatly, and too many families in both communities have been
touched by tragedy. Both people deserve a just and lasting peace
between two secure states. It is in their interest, it is in the
interest of their children, it is in the interest of stability in the
region, and it is unquestionably in the interest of the United States.
But getting from here to there requires leadership on both sides, it
requires courage on both sides, and--all observers seem to agree--it
requires vigorous, sustained, and extremely high-level U.S. diplomatic
effort. We do not have all of the ingredients in place today. I look
forward to hearing more from my colleagues and from our excellent
witnesses about the prospects for getting these factors in place and
moving this process forward.