

**PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL
FREE PRESS**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

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FEBRUARY 26, 2004
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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2004

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Alexander, Biden and Feingold.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN. This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

We are looking forward, this morning, to a discussion of public diplomacy. As a matter of personal privilege, I want to mention that we've invited members of the International Center of Indianapolis to attend this hearing. They are here to hear you, Ms. Tutwiler and, likewise, the other witnesses. We're especially pleased that they can join us.

Today, the Foreign Relations Committee will examine American public diplomacy and the development of free media in emerging democracies.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, we have examined more deeply the standing of our Nation with people around the world. Americans are troubled by examples of very anti-American hatred in the Islamic world, and they are frustrated by public opinion in allied countries that seems increasingly ready to question American motives or blame American actions for a host of problems.

In an era when allied cooperation is essential in the war against terrorism, we cannot afford to shrug off negative public opinion overseas as uninformed or irrelevant. We must clearly and honestly explain the views of the United States, displaying the humanity and generosity of our people, underscoring issues of commonality, and expanding opportunities for interaction between Americans and foreign peoples. Even the most enlightened public diplomacy will require resources and hard work over a period of decades.

I am pleased to welcome a good friend of the committee, Margaret Tutwiler, the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Secretary Tutwiler holds one of the most difficult jobs in the U.S. Government, in my judgment. She is in charge of explaining and promoting American interests and policies around the world, and she oversees the State Department's efforts

to foster greater understanding through educational and cultural exchanges. We are fortunate to have an official of her experience and gravity in this difficult role.

Secretary Tutwiler understands that our definition of diplomacy must clearly be expanded. Diplomacy now includes the contentious public debate between democracies and dictatorships, as well as dialog with populations that are skeptical of American power and the freedom that we represent. As I stated in a committee hearing 2 weeks ago with Secretary Colin Powell, boosting the effectiveness and frequency of our communications with foreign populations will require a sea change in the orientation of the State Department, particularly as it relates to training, language expertise, and avenues of professional advancement.

We are cognizant that Secretary Tutwiler has only occupied her post for a few months; therefore, we are asking her to focus much of her discussion on her plans for the near term.

Following Secretary Tutwiler's testimony, the committee will hear from a distinguished panel of experts on the development of free media in the world, particularly in emerging democracies.

Mr. Gene Mater is an advisor to The Freedom Forum. He served with American units after World War II that helped to reestablish a free press in Germany. Mr. Mater was a CBS News executive, and helped run the late International Media Fund.

Mr. Adam Clayton Powell III is a professor of journalism at the Annenberg School of Communication at the University of Southern California. He has had a long career in public television, and has promoted the development of free press in Africa and elsewhere. Mr. Powell is also an expert in the new media technologies, including the Internet.

Our final witness is Mr. Kurt Wimmer, a media law specialist with the firm of Covington & Burling. He has extensive experience in the newly democratic nations of Central Europe, including the former Yugoslavia.

A fully successful United States foreign policy requires that we make progress in building democratic institutions internationally, especially free and open media. Societies that are built on the foundation of a free press are far less likely to abuse human rights or threaten American security.

Democracies, however, may differ with American policies. That is their right in a free world. The U.S. Government, through various programs, has long been involved in training journalists around the world and establishing newspapers, magazines, and radio and television stations.

These programs, however, are not centralized in one bureau or agency. Many are orphans to other assistance programs. They often are effective in training journalists, but they stop short of ensuring the media in a developing country has the necessary legal protections, follows basic rules of fairness and equal access, and can sustain itself financially.

In addition, these existing U.S. media programs are not established in ways that leverage Federal Government spending with the assistance of America's vibrant media sector. There is a strong desire by our finest journalism schools, newspapers, broadcasters, and advertising enterprises to help build free press and open media

in the world. We also need to engage all the new media, such as the Internet and wireless companies.

After a review of government programs regarding the development of a free press in the world, I have concluded that U.S. Government initiatives do not go far enough to ensure that developing nations have a free, fair, legally protected and financially self-sustaining press and media.

In response, earlier this week I introduced the International Free Press and Open Media Act of 2004. To better organize and focus these efforts, my legislation directs the Secretary of State to provide funding to the National Endowment for Democracy for the work of a free-press institute.

For more than 20 years, the National Endowment for Democracy [NED] has been leading American efforts to help build the required democratic institutions of a free society. President Bush's proposed 2005 budget doubles the funding for the work of the endowment. Having served on the board of the endowment for a number of years, as have some of my Senate colleagues, I can attest that the independence of the NED is central to the success of its initiatives to help develop a free press in the world.

This bill seeks to employ the uniquely independent organization of the NED to accomplish a mission that complements public diplomacy, but is separate from it. The U.S. Government maintains important public diplomacy programs where the goal is to communicate American views to the world. But developing a free press in emerging democracies goes beyond advocacy of American views. It requires us to have a tolerance for criticism, to take into account cultural differences, and to commit to long-term projects. The National Endowment for Democracy is well suited to this mission. And by creating a free-press institute within the NED, we would also provide private-sector media companies with a means to contribute their expertise and resources to the construction of an international free press.

I thank our witnesses for joining this discussion. I look forward to their insights on public diplomacy and the development of free and open media.

I look forward now to the opening statement of my distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., RANKING
MEMBER

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I'd like to begin by, not only complimenting you on calling this hearing, but on your legislation. I think it's first rate, and I look forward to joining you and trying to help you pass it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, today we're going to look at the State Department public diplomacy programs, and we're not focusing on international broadcasting. And as I understand it, we are going to have an extensive hearing on that at a later time, so—but I think that is, I'd just say at the outset, one area where I think we've had some recent reason for optimism and some successes, I think. Not to suggest we haven't, as well, in the State Department.

I don't mean to imply that. But I'm looking forward to that set of hearings, as well.

The challenge of the Administration and for all of us is—as American government officials—I think is fairly monumental, but I kind of look at this as the century of hope. I really think this is an opportunity that we have, because of the tragedy of 9/11, to begin to focus on 1.2 billion people in the world, who, quite frankly, we've, not out of any animus, but not really understood the Islamic world, the differences within it. It's a little bit like what—on occasion, in the past, when I'd travel to other parts of the world, other continents, people would talk about Europe and its attitude. Well, what do you mean, Europe? There is no European attitude, per se. The attitudes in Denmark are markedly different than the attitudes in Athens, in Greece, and so on. but we have tended to think of this as, sort of, a homogeneous notion of a group a hundred and—or 1.2 billion people, and I think this has given us an opportunity to—out of pure necessity, but we can turn it into a real positive—beginning to focus on how we better understand and communicate our values.

I might add, at the outset here, my objective, I say to Ms. Tutwiler, is a little different than we usually talk about, in terms of public diplomacy. My objective, I would be very happy if the Lord came down and stood in the area between you and I, and said, look, you've got a choice. We'll guarantee you that over the next 10 years, 1.2 billion Muslims of the world will understand America's position thoroughly, they'll understand—not accept it, not agree with it, not embrace it, not become pro-American, just understand it—understand our motives and understand our objectives and understand what we're saying, I would say, I'll take that. I'll take that. But we tend to think of public diplomacy in terms of we're going to convince people that they have to, or should, adopt our views, our values, our system. And I think that may be a bridge too far. But I'll get back to that in my questions.

The challenge for this administration, and for all of us, as I said, is monumental. And to state it plainly, of late the American presidency and American policy are increasingly unpopular in other parts of the world. The polling data has been consistent over the past 2 years—actually have been consistent over the past 4 years; it just has had—as those who are real baseball fans would say, more pace on the ball the last 2 years, and it's been consistently bad.

The most recent report by the Pew organization issued in July 2003 indicates that in “most countries”—this is not just the Muslim world—“most countries, opinions of the U.S. are markedly lower than they were a year ago. The war has widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans,” the study indicates, “further inflamed in the Muslim world, softened support for the war on terrorism,” in both the Muslim world, as well as in other parts of the world, “and significantly weakened global support for the pillars of the post-World War Two era—the U.N., and North Atlantic Alliance.” The report continues: “the bottom has fallen out of support for America in most of the Muslim world. Negative views of the U.S. among Muslims, which had been largely limited to the countries in the Middle East, have spread to Muslim populations in In-

onesia and Nigeria, support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism also has fallen in most Muslim publics.”

This is not a very pretty picture. And I’m not laying this at the foot of the administration. Let me make it clear to you, Margaret. I’m not—I mean that sincerely. This is a circumstance that is, all of a sudden, like a—as we Catholics might say, a bit of an epiphany here. I mean, it’s just, like, whoa, look at where we are at the moment, based on what we haven’t done in the past—what we haven’t understood, what we haven’t done, and what we are doing over the past 30 years. So this is not, you know, the fault of an administration, in my view. But it’s not a pretty picture.

The image of America overseas is perhaps a natural price of our status as a global superpower, and I think there’s a piece of that. You know, it’s—I think, everybody’s—we, who do foreign policy for a living and have been doing it for decades, sometimes there are those among us who like to make it sound mysterious, because the more mysterious and complicated it is, the more intelligent we must be if we can master it; so we talk about the first tranche and the second tranche, instead of the first part and the second part, and we dress it up to make it sound very important and make us sound very important. But I think it’s pretty simple. I think all foreign policy is, is the logical extension of human relations with a whole lot less information to go on. A whole lot less information to go on.

And so the result is that we’ve been unable to adequately explain U.S. policy. My dad used to say, before he passed away, “I don’t mind you being mad at me for a reason that is, in fact, factually accurate. The real problem is when you’re angry with me for something that isn’t factually accurate.” And part of, I think, the problem we have around the world is, I don’t think the factual rationale for what we’ve done and not done has been able to be adequately explained.

But part of it is simple, and that is that, you know, nobody likes the guy who walks into the junior prom, and every girl turns and says, God, isn’t he handsome? Or no one likes the girl who walks into the senior prom and says, boy, she is beautiful. Every other girl doesn’t go, oh, don’t we love her for being so beautiful? I mean, and that’s kind of the position we’re in, in part, no matter what happened, no matter what we did. If we did everything absolutely right, we are so dominant around the world.

I will not mention the high-ranking French official with whom I had this conversation, but he started with me on American jeans—meaning pants, you know; we used to call them dungarees when we were kids—and, you know, “too many of the French are buying”—and I said, whoa, whoa, whoa. Where’s the trade agreement that says you must buy our jeans? Don’t blame me for your population wanting to look at our culture. I don’t like my kids listening to rap. Don’t complain to me about us polluting your society. That’s your problem, not ours.

And so there’s so much dominance on our part, even when we do everything exactly according to Hoyle, there’s going to be resentment. But this is something more. This is something more that’s happening here.

And as the President likes to say, “We’re a nation at war.” But one of my criticisms, some within this administration at a policy level, is that they seem to think that this war against terrorist organizations is merely one that’s going to be waged on a military battlefield or in a military context or a military quasi-police context. But it’s actually, in my view, a battle of ideas. This is ultimately a battle of ideas. All the major problems we face, none of them are soluble by a military solution alone. The military may be necessary, but it is not the only answer to the real problems that we face.

This is a battle of ideas—a global struggle between the values, basically, of liberal democracies and ideologies of intolerance and destruction, and it has been engaged. It matters now, it seems to me, how we organize ourselves through this struggle, and whether we’re willing to invest in this struggle.

Now, again, it’s understandable, in my view. This is a process. I often say, you know, if your granddaughters or grandsons and mine, years from now, are writing their senior thesis in some great American university, and the topic is, you know, did they get it right at the beginning of the 21st century, the kid who’s going to get summa cum laude is the one whose title of his or her essay will be, “Why were they surprised that they didn’t get it right? Look how much has changed.”

So this is a process. I can’t think of any other time in history, where so much has changed since the Wall coming down, to the advent of international terror, to the unification of Europe and its self-preoccupation with that, a historical event, why we should be surprised we haven’t figured it out yet; not just here in the Nation, but in the world. It’s a process.

But I’m optimistic about this process. I’m convinced, Margaret, and I say to my colleagues, that an essential ingredient in the solution or a new policy prescription as to how we deal with our place in the world has to be a robust program of public diplomacy. And we have to make, as the National Security Advisor said about helping to transform the Middle East, We have to make a generational commitment to a serious and sustained effort to engage foreign publics. Unfortunately and, as I said, in ways, understandably, this administration’s commitment to this issue has been a bit tentative at the outset. That’s understandable, in my view. This is all new. This is all new, in terms of the scope and the volume that the chairman and I and others, speaking with different points of view, are talking about.

The President’s budget in fiscal 2005 contains a slight increase for international exchanges budget of about \$25 million. Most of these increases are devoted, quite understandably, to exchanges in the Middle East and other regions important to the war on terror. But this increase contrasts with reductions in exchanges funding, that used to be provided under the SEED or Freedom Support Act accounts. And it may be that a decade has passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and we have many new friends in Central Europe, but, as the Iraq debate has demonstrated, we consistently need to cultivate those friendships.

I would respectfully suggest the willingness or the ability to, in a sense, rob Peter to pay Paul, take money out of the SEED pro-

grams and put them in the Middle East is—all you have to do is understand, Europe doesn't like us. Europe is not happy about us. And, ironically, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, is the one place where we have—we have more support than we do in the rest of Europe. And I would argue that the need to communicate our point of view is equally as important, in a strange sense, among our allies and our newfound allies, as it is among those who we are trying to introduce, in a sense, to us.

It may be that over the decade, as I said, the focus seems like it should change, but I would argue, and will argue throughout the next year this debate goes on, that that would be a mistake. It's obvious, in central Asia and even Russia, that democracy is hardly flourishing. And we have to stay involved, in my view.

After September 11, the President invited ideas, from me and others, about improving public diplomacy. And he was generous with his time—I spent—alone, in my case, I spent over an hour with him. He asked what I thought, he was sincere, he meant it, and he asked me to put together a document, which I did, as to what I think we should do. I'm proud of it, but there's no pride of authorship, in the sense that this is the only proposal, a proposal on international broadcasting that I refer to as Initiative 911. And the problem—I think the President was more than intrigued by it; I think he agreed with most of it, at least he said he did—but there's a problem, it has a price tag. It's a half a billion dollars. Half a billion dollars the first year, and \$265 million every year thereafter. The half a billion related to the infrastructure we'd need to set up, people you need to hire, foreign nationals, the transmission stations, et cetera. But I'm going to, at our next hearing on broadcasting, talk a little bit about that.

Let me try to conclude here, Mr. Chairman. To paraphrase a statement made by the first President Bush in his inaugural address, when it comes to public diplomacy, we appear to have more will than wallet at this point. Money alone is not going to solve the public diplomacy problem. There is no question about it. But I'd respectfully suggest the public diplomacy problem will not be solved without spending a helluva lot more money. Money alone is not going to do it, but I don't care if you're the Lord Almighty and you come down and reorganize all we have and limit the same amount of dollars we're spending totally on public diplomacy now, it will not get the job done for the immense task that is before us.

We have proven programs in educational and citizens exchanges, cultural diplomacy, international broadcasting, all of which are working and important, but, I would argue, all of which are underfunded. And we only hurt ourselves and our national interest by our parsimony.

Ambassador Tutwiler, I commend you for taking on this difficult job, but I think it's exciting. You must be excited. I mean, it's daunting, and you know you've got 6,000 interest groups and areas and positions coming down upon you for your time, attention, and agreement, but, as I've said when people say to me, why did you ever want to stay in this job for another term, I can't think of a more exciting time in my lifetime that I could be sitting on this committee than right now. It is dangerous, but it is also, I think, just filled with so much opportunity if we're smart enough and if

we can get it right. And I'm not smart enough alone, by a longshot, but we can do this. And I think you—taking this job on is an awesome responsibility. I'm glad you were willing to do it. But I think it's also exciting, and I think together we may be able to do something really, really special over the next couple of years to enhance the interest of our country and the understanding of our positions around the world.

So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me the time. I thank you, Margaret, for taking it on, and I look forward to your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this hearing today on State Department public diplomacy programs. I know we are not focusing on international broadcasting today, but I think that is one area where we had some significant success stories recently, and I hope we will turn our attention to it in the near future.

The challenge for the administration, and for all of us as American government officials, is monumental. To state it plainly, America and American policy is increasingly unpopular. The polling data has been consistent over the past two years—consistently bad.

The most recent report by the Pew organization, issued in June 2003, indicates that in “most countries, opinions of the U.S. are markedly lower than they were a year ago. The war [in Iraq] has widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans, further inflamed the Muslim world, softened support for the war on terrorism, and significantly weakened global public support for the pillars of the post-World War Two era—the U.N. and the North Atlantic Alliance.”

The report continues: “the bottom has fallen out of support for America in most of the Muslim world. Negative views of the U.S. among Muslims, which had been largely limited to countries in the Middle East, have spread to Muslim populations in Indonesia and Nigeria, support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism also has fallen in most Muslim publics.”

This is not a pretty picture. I want to emphasize that I am not blaming the Bush administration. The image of America overseas is perhaps the natural price of our status as a global superpower. It also stems from disagreements in foreign nations with U.S. policy. But is also the result of a failure adequately to *explain* U.S. policy. And we can certainly do something about that.

As the President likes to say, we are a nation at war. But this war against terrorist organizations is not merely waged on the military battlefield; it is a battle of ideas—a global struggle between the values of liberal democracy and ideologies of intolerance and destruction.

It matters how we organize ourselves for this struggle—and whether we are willing to invest in it. We must make, as the National Security Adviser said about helping transform the Middle East, a “generational commitment” to a serious and sustained effort to engage foreign publics.

Unfortunately, and in ways that are perhaps understandable, the administration's commitment to this issue has been relatively modest. For example, the President's budget for fiscal year 2005 contains a slight increase for the international exchanges budget of about \$25 million.

Most of these increases are devoted, quite understandably, to exchanges in the Middle East and other regions important in the war on terrorism. But this increase contrasts with reductions in exchanges funding that used to be provided under the SEED and Freedom Support Act accounts. It may be that over a decade has passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and we have many new friends in Central Europe. But as the Iraq debate demonstrated, we constantly need to cultivate friendships. And it is obvious that, in central Asia and even in Russia, democracy is hardly flourishing, and we have to stay involved there.

After September 11, 2001, the President invited ideas from me and others about improving public diplomacy. He was very generous with his time. I gave him a proposal, developed with the assistance of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, to provide a significant expansion of U.S. international broadcasting to Muslim countries. It would have cost about half a billion dollars in the first year, and about \$225 million in additional annual costs thereafter. The idea was dismissed by the administration as too costly.

To borrow a statement made by the first President Bush in his inaugural address, when it comes to public diplomacy, we appear to have more will than wallet.

Money alone will not solve our public diplomacy problems. But I respectfully suggest that we need to invest a lot more in public diplomacy. We have proven programs in educational and citizen exchanges, cultural diplomacy, and international broadcasting—all of which are underfunded. We only hurt ourselves, and the national interest, by such parsimony.

I welcome Ambassador Tutwiler. I commend her for taking on this very difficult job. I look forward to hearing her views.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Senator Biden.

Secretary Tutwiler, we're delighted that you're here. You have heard some enthusiasm from us already about you. We look forward to your testimony, if you would proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARGARET DeB. TUTWILER, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Ambassador TUTWILER. Thank you very much.

Senator BIDEN. Madam Secretary, I apologize for continuing to refer to you as Ambassador. I'm sorry.

Ambassador TUTWILER. Anything.

Senator BIDEN. Ambassador, Secretary, significant person, author—

Ambassador TUTWILER. Margaret. It's fine. Margaret is fine.

Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear here today.

Mr. Chairman, in the 2-years that I served as Ambassador to Morocco, I experienced firsthand the many public diplomacy challenges facing our Nation, especially in the Arab and Muslim world. I have a much better understanding of how our country is viewed, both the positives and the negatives, because of that service.

Over the past 2 years, much has been written and debated about the effectiveness or in-effectiveness of the United States Government's public diplomacy activities and programs overseas. Helpful and responsible reports that all of you are familiar with by Ambassador Djerejian's Advisory Group, Dr. Abshire's Center for the Study of the Presidency, Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation, have served to help us examine that which our government is doing well and that which can be improved. Many of their insights and recommendations, we can all agree upon.

As we all know, and both of you gentlemen have pointed out, our country has a problem in far too many parts of the world, especially in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, a problem we have, regrettably, developed over many years, as Senator Biden pointed out, through both Republican and Democrat administrations, and a problem that does not lend itself to a quick fix, a single solution, or a simple plan.

Much of what I learned about foreign views of our country has been from listening, engaging, and interacting with foreigners from all walks of life, and much of what I learned was troubling and disturbing. Regrettably, as we all have said here today, in too many nations, too many of their citizens have a very different view of the United States than we would obviously desire.

In the brief time that I have been serving as the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, I've gained a greater un-

derstanding and appreciation of what the Under Secretary's office, the three bureaus, the public diplomacy offices at the six regional bureaus, and our overseas posts do in the field of public diplomacy. In my opinion, just as it has taken us many years to get into this situation, it will take many years of hard, focused work to get out of it.

I believe our strategic goals are clear. We need to continue to focus and deliver meaningful programs and activities in those areas of the world where there has been a deterioration of the view of our Nation. That deterioration, as we all know, is most stark in the Arab and Muslim world. At the same time, we must work equally hard in those areas where the opinion of the United States has not changed, to date.

We should listen more, not only to foreign audiences, but to our own public diplomacy personnel overseas. Today, all PD officers are able to communicate and share ideas and information across all regions through a new interactive Web site devoted to public diplomacy, a site which was developed and operational in less than 2 months.

Effective policy advocacy remains a priority, of course, and I believe that we basically do a good job of advocating our policies and explaining our actions overseas. Audiences may not agree or like what we say and do, but we are communicating our policies to governments and influential elites, including the foreign media. Our senior officials, Ambassadors, and embassy staff are out there explaining, every day, U.S. policy goals and initiatives. We can all, of course, do much better.

We must do a better job of reaching beyond the traditional elites and government officials we interact with. We have not placed enough effort and focus on the non-elites, who, today, much more so than in the past, are a very strong force within their countries. This must be a priority focus now and in the future.

We only have to look at the outreach activities of many U.S. corporations overseas to see the value of being present and engaged in neighborhoods that we, in government, have, for too long, neglected.

We need to support those programs and activities that go to the bottom line of halting and reversing this deterioration. We need to constantly ask ourselves, as public servants, "Is this activity or program still effective in today's world?" If it is, we should keep it. If it is judged to no longer contribute, then we should let it go.

We must develop effective mechanisms for evaluating program impact and effectiveness of all our programs and activities overseas. We must continue to pursue new initiatives and improve older ones, in the hope of reaching younger, broader, and deeper audiences.

I believe we can all agree that programs that bring Americans and foreigners together, whether in person or even in a video or press conference, create greater understanding. We have numerous activities and programs in which we are doing this. I have highlighted and given details on many of them in my written testimony. However we do it, we must engage, listen, and interact, especially with the young. They obviously are the key to all of us living in a future peaceful world.

Interagency coordination is essential to the effectiveness of public diplomacy. The new State USAID Joint Policy Council and the State USAID Management Council are intended to improve program coordination and public diplomacy, as in other areas, and help ensure the most effective use of program resources in both the Department and USAID.

Regrettably, all too often our important and meaningful assistance to developing countries is going unnoticed and unappreciated, while other nations' assistance to these same countries is widely known and appreciated. This must change. Government-wide, we have to do a much better job of ensuring that the United States' efforts are widely known well beyond the foreign government officials we meet with. We can no longer afford for recipients overseas to have no idea that people of the United States provided assistance to their country and to their citizens.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say, again, that we all know there is much work to be done. We all know that our public diplomacy programs, those I have mentioned and others, must advance our national interest and do a better job of explaining not only our policies, but also who we are as a people. In the world of finite funding, we must ensure that our public diplomacy resources are used as effectively as possible. We must prioritize every day, and ask ourselves, "Is this activity I am doing getting the job done for the United States?"

We must listen to our field force. Today, the State Department has approximately 1,200 employees working in the field of public diplomacy. I would maintain that every American, regardless of agency or department, has to make an extra effort to communicate, to listen, and engage with not only our traditional audiences, but to audiences to whom we previously have not given as much time or effort. We must move beyond the walls of our embassies overseas and foreign-government offices. I am realistically optimistic that we can achieve, over time, a better, healthier, and much more accurate impression of our Nation and people. No one, especially myself, underestimates the challenge and difficult task at hand.

The public diplomacy officials I work with are reaching, questioning, and searching for more effective ways to enunciate our policies and have our values understood. We will continue to make mistakes, but I truly believe we will ultimately all get there together. We have absolutely no choice, in my opinion. We must do this.

And I thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Tutwiler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT HON. MARGARET DeB. TUTWILER, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Good morning. Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

In the years that I served as Ambassador to Morocco, I experienced, firsthand, the many public diplomacy challenges facing our country, especially in the Arab and Muslim world. In the two months that I have been serving as the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, I have gained a greater understanding and appreciation of what the Under Secretary's office, our three bureaus, the public diplomacy offices of the regional bureaus, and our overseas posts do in the field of public diplomacy.

Over the past two years, much as been written and debated about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the U.S. Government public diplomacy activities and programs overseas. Helpful and responsible reports by Ambassador Ed Djerejian's Advisory Group, Dr. Abshire's Center for the Study of the Presidency, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Heritage Foundation have served to help us examine that which our government does well and that which can be improved. Many of their insights and recommendations we can all agree upon.

As we all know, unfortunately, our country has a problem in far too many parts of the world today, especially in the Middle East and South East Asia, a problem we have regrettably developed over many years through both Republican and Democratic administrations, and a problem that does not lend itself to a quick fix or a single solution or a simple plan. Just as it has taken us many years to get into this situation, so too will it take many years of hard focused work to get out of it.

I believe our strategic goals are clear. We need to continue to focus on those areas of the world where there has been a deterioration of the view of our nation. That deterioration is most stark in the Arab and Muslim world. At the same time, we must work equally as hard in those areas where the opinion of the United States has not changed to date.

We should listen more, not only to foreign audiences, but to our own PD personnel overseas. Shortly, all PD Officers will be able to communicate and share new ideas amongst ourselves and across all regions through a new interactive Web site devoted to the concerns of public diplomacy.

Effective policy advocacy remains a priority, and I believe we basically do a good job of advocating our policies and explaining our actions. Audiences may not agree or like what we say and do, but we are communicating our policies to governments and influential elites, including in the foreign media. Our senior officials, Ambassadors and embassy staff are out there explaining U.S. policy, goals and initiatives. We can all, of course, do better.

We must do a better job of reaching beyond the traditional elites and government officials. We have not placed enough effort and focus on the non-elites who, today much more so than in the past, are a very strong force within their countries. This must be a priority focus now and in the future. We only have to look at the outreach activities of many U.S. corporations overseas to see the value of being present and engaged in neighborhoods that we in government have for too long neglected.

We need to support those programs and activities that go to the bottom line of halting and reversing this deterioration. We need to constantly ask ourselves, "Is this activity or program still effective in today's world?" If it is, we should keep it. If it is judged to no longer contribute, then we should let it go. Developing effective mechanisms for evaluating program impact and effectiveness is a priority. I have pulled together a team from our three bureaus to work with the regional bureaus and posts abroad to begin a comprehensive review of all public diplomacy programs. This will be a first step in establishing a continuing process of performance measurement and program evaluation.

We must continue to pursue new initiatives and improve older ones in the hopes of reaching younger, broader and deeper audiences.

I believe we can all agree that programs that bring Americans and foreigners together, whether in person or even in a video or press conference, create greater understanding.

As Under Secretary, I would like to see us expand our exchange programs however we can. Last year, the State Department directly sponsored over 30,000 academic, professional and other exchanges worldwide. Exchange programs constitute the single largest part of the State Department public diplomacy budget, \$316,633,000 in FY-2004, which regrettably is \$28,713,000 less than the President's request including a rescission of \$3,367,000. Within this amount, we must set priorities.

Allocation of exchange resources already reflects the priority of the Arab and Muslim world. 25% of funding for exchanges will go to programs in the Middle East and South Asia in FY 2004, compared to 17% in FY 2002. We have restarted the Fulbright program in Afghanistan after a twenty-five year hiatus. Twenty Afghan Fulbrighters will arrive next month. Just a few days ago, 25 Iraqi Fulbright students arrived here for orientation prior to beginning their regular studies.

Through our School Internet Connectivity Program, 26,000 high school students from the Middle East, South Asia, South East Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus currently collaborate in online projects on current affairs, entrepreneurship, health, and civic responsibility with U.S. students.

Expanding the circle of opportunity is the concept behind Partnerships for Learning (P4L), an initiative of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), which seeks to extend our exchange programs to undergraduate college students

and also high school students. P4L has initiated our first high school exchange program with the Arab and Muslim world. Today, 170 high school students from predominantly Islamic countries are living with American families and studying at local high schools. Another 450 high school students from the Middle East and South Asia will come here in 2004 for the next academic year. Small numbers, but a beginning.

In addition, seventy undergraduate students, men and women, from North Africa and the Middle East will come to the U.S. beginning next month for intensive English language training prior to their enrollment in university degree programs.

In other forms of engagement, since 9/11, the Bureau of Public Affairs has organized over a thousand digital video conferences between American officials and experts and foreign audiences. In the past year, we facilitated nearly 500 interviews and press conferences with senior officials from the Department of State for foreign media outlets. The Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) has quadrupled its output of Arabic language translations for distribution.

Public Affairs worked with our Embassy in Jakarta to broadcast this year's State of the Union Address live, with simultaneous interpretation in Bahasa Indonesian. Print and broadcast media covered the address extensively. One national radio station carried the entire broadcast live, reaching millions in this predominately Muslim nation.

These are exactly the kinds of initiatives I believe we should be pursuing. A new initiative which I am exploring is the idea of micro-scholarships for English learning and to attend our American Schools overseas. The U.S. has been incredibly successful with micro-credits for entrepreneurs and small businesses. Why not take that same concept and apply it to education and English language learning?

Another program which holds promise is American Corners. In recent years we have had good results from our American Corners program which as you know constitutes partnerships between our embassies and local institutions like libraries, universities and chambers of commerce. These corners are a source for information outreach at the grassroots level.

We currently have more than 100 American Corners around the world. In FY04, we are planning on opening 194 more in 64 countries. Of these 194, IIP is working with Near Eastern Affairs and South Asia bureaus to establish 58 more American Corners in those regions, including ten in Afghanistan and fifteen in Iraq in FY 2005.

Just last month, we opened two new American Corners in Bosnia, Herzegovina, in Zenica and Tuzla, cities with sizable Muslim populations and religious teaching centers.

Virtual consulates, could be another tool for reaching wide audiences. The virtual consulate concept is a commitment by personnel in a U.S. Mission overseas to periodically travel to a chosen outlying district in order to make live personal presentations and informally mix with the people of the visited region. The travel is supported by a special Web site that celebrates connections between the Americans and the people and institutions of that region.

English teaching: To strengthen English teaching programs, ECA is devoting an additional \$1,573,000 to these programs. This is not enough, but it is a start. Whether through direct teaching or training instructors, English language programs offer great scope for advancing public diplomacy objectives. For example, over the past five years, Embassy Damascus estimates that it has trained over 9,000 of Syria's 12,000 English-language teachers, a excellent example of meaningful outreach.

Book Programs: IIP has developed "book sets" about American history, culture and values for younger audiences around the world. Embassies donate these "book sets" to local libraries and primary/secondary schools. As of September 2003, embassies worldwide had distributed over \$400,000 worth of book sets. We are examining our overseas book buys and journal publications as well.

Private Sector Cooperation: We have created a new position in my office to explore ways to draw on the expertise of the private sector to advance our public sector objectives. We can expand public-private partnerships, initially focusing on key industries such as technology, health care and education.

There is much more we can do in the field of sports. We know from past experience that an effective outreach to youth is through sports activities.

Through ECA's new Culture Connect program, America's cultural leadership directly communicates with elite and non-elite foreign youth about our country and values. We currently have ten Culture Connect Ambassadors, and we are going to expand the program this year.

Television offers a powerful tool for public diplomacy and public affairs. We are using co-operative programming with local broadcasters and exploiting new distribution channels and technologies to create a fuller, more accurate picture of the U.S.

for general audiences abroad. Over the past two years, we have funded several hundred foreign journalists both for broadcast and print media overseas, more than half of which have been in Muslim majority countries. We intend to increase these types of journalist tours.

Speaking of television, I cannot neglect to mention the launch of *Alhurra*, the new Middle East satellite television network of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, on which I serve as the Secretary's representative. *Alhurra* is on the air in twenty-two countries in the region; it will go 24/7 in mid-March. Arabic media reaction is skeptical, as we would expect. But ordinary viewers have been responding much more positively. To quote just one e-mail received by *Alhurra's* Web site:

What you have started is very big step towards real democracy implementation and education in the Middle East. The mission is clear, just pray that you are successful in communicating your message and mission to those who need it.

However we do it, we must engage, listen and interact—especially with the young. They are the key to a future peaceful world.

Interagency coordination is essential to the effectiveness of public diplomacy. The President's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), whose mission is to support economic, political and educational reform in the Middle East and North Africa, integrates policy, public diplomacy, development and technical assistance programs throughout the region. We will continue working with the White House to insure close coordination of our messages. The White House coordinates a daily conference call on public diplomacy vis-à-vis Iraq. The new State-USAID Joint Policy Council and the State-USAID Management Council are intended to improve program coordination in public diplomacy, as in other areas, and help ensure the most effective use of program resources in both the Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Regrettably, all too often, our important and meaningful assistance to developing countries is going unnoticed and unappreciated, while other nations' assistance to these same countries is widely known and appreciated. This must change. Government-wide, we have to do a much better job of insuring that the U.S.'s efforts are widely known well beyond the foreign government officials. We can no longer afford for recipients overseas to have no idea that the people of the United States provide assistance to their country.

In closing, Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden, let me say again that we all know that there is much work to be done. We all know that our public diplomacy programs, those I have mentioned and others, must advance our national interests and do a better job of explaining not only our policies, but also who we are as a people.

In a world of finite funding, we must ensure that our public diplomacy resources are used as effectively as possible. We must prioritize and ask ourselves, "Is the activity I am doing getting the job done?" We must listen to our field force.

Today the State Department has approximately 1,200 employees working in the field of public diplomacy. I maintain that every American, regardless of Agency or Department, has to make an extra effort to communicate, listen, and engage with not only our traditional audiences, but to audiences to whom we previously have not given as much effort and time. We must move beyond the walls of our embassies overseas and foreign government offices.

I am realistically optimistic that we can achieve over time a better, healthier and much more accurate impression of our nation and people. No one, most especially myself, underestimates the challenge and the difficult task at hand. The public diplomacy officials I work with are reaching, questioning and searching for more effective ways to enunciate our policies and have our values understood.

We will continue to make some mistakes but I truly believe we will ultimately get there. We have no choice. We must.

Thank you—I will be happy to take your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Tutwiler.

Let me just mention, for the benefit of the Senators assembled, as well as our witnesses, that as we came in this morning, we found that a very complex unanimous-consent agreement has been reached by the leadership of the Senate on progress on legislation on the floor today. It appeared that the first vote would occur at 10 a.m., which was about 5 minutes ago. But, obviously, it has not occurred. And the Chair has received word that the vote will occur more likely at 11 a.m. However, the agreement calls for two more

votes that were estimated at 11:30. Hopefully, we will have some respite.

Let me suggest that we will try to have 8-minute limits for Senators' questions. I hope Senators will be able to confine their enthusiasm to the 8 minutes, including your answers.

In that way, we will proceed through our questions, and we will hear testimony from our second panel of witnesses, hopefully, before we all scatter for the first vote. In any event, just for the benefit of the witness and the audience, we will be back and forth in this process. This is a suggestion for the management of time while we are proceeding with this hearing.

Let me start the questioning, Ambassador Tutwiler—or Secretary Tutwiler, by asking what sort of indicators does the Department now have? What kind of indicators might we construct, to see how well we are doing? I appreciate it may not be as precise as the Pew poll, which asks the question, do you like America, or don't you, or whatever they ask. The Pew poll finds a very large percentage of people in the negative. But even if you had that simplistic a situation, and you found, after a while, that 20 or 30 percent more people found favor with the United States, that would indicate something. I am just curious, with regard to messages that we have, quite apart from overall sentiment, or even disaggregated by age groups, or by ethnic groups within countries, or, through our Ambassadors or through others, what kind of polling do you have? Do you divine anecdotally whether we're making progress?

Ambassador TUTWILER. Correct. Concerning literal polling, that is not something that falls under public diplomacy at the State Department; that comes under INR. PD does give them a small amount of money, to be candid, to do some specific things, basically on judging attitudes. And so we work very closely with them. They do excellent work, in my opinion. I knew that from my previous service in the State Department, with Secretary Baker. But day in and day out, that has not been one of my priorities.

But I will tell you, as far as measuring effectiveness, it is a very legitimate concern, both of the Congress and of this administration and of the State Department. And since 9/11, there are some tools that are being applied, and we're actually learning things, which is a good thing.

Having said that, I would also say, and I believe that, that you alluded to such, some of this is not measurable. I'm not positive how we measure an 18-year-old's year experience in, say, Nashville, Tennessee, or my hometown of Birmingham, Alabama, the effect that is going to have over that individual's lifetime for the United States.

So we are trying. As you know, ECA is spending over a million dollars and doing a second set of interviewing on exchange students that come here. Public Affairs is doing more in the area of actually tracking where our product is seen. And IIP, the third bureau, is doing the same thing. So we are trying. We recognize it and know it is important, and we're going to keep pushing ourselves to find new ways to check, for ourselves and for you, the effectiveness of what we're doing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, one of the enthusiasms that has been expressed, both at your confirmation hearing and today, and that we

have for you, is that you are, in addition to being a State Department person, you are a political person. You understand the trends of popular opinion, and the importance of moving people, and persuading them.

Now, as you say, this may be segmented technically. You have INR doing the polling, and other people doing the scholarships and the exchanges, and so forth, not all under your purview. I suppose that the committee, maybe unfairly, is looking to you for some overall guidance, and maybe even some degree of administration of these affairs.

To take the example that you just utilized, it's very clear, I think, from the past, that students coming to the United States, studying in this country, whether they came as civilians or military students or at various ages, frequently return to their home countries with leadership modes and attitudes that are very different and that make an enormous difference in the quality of life of their countries; but even more importantly, a quality of life that begins to mesh their values with ours. In other words, they like human rights; they believe in the rights of women; they believe in free expression. They may not fully believe in it, but, on the other hand, they've come a long way. In some cases, they become very powerful advocates, armed and articulate with language abilities and expression. That is difficult.

On the other hand, it's important that we have some method of gauging how many of these students there are, tracking them, seeing—

Ambassador TUTWILER. Right.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. What they do. The reason I'm onto this accountability thing, is that you mention that there are 1,200 people in public diplomacy. Now, somebody who doesn't share the enthusiasm of Senator Biden and Senator Hagel and me, might very well say, that is a lot of people. What are those people doing? What kind of an impact are 1,200 people making on this thing? And here are all these people all over the world who testify that they don't like us. Who are they? This is why, even as we push ahead—and we have to—we really have to be able to make a case to the American public of how we're doing. I don't ask you for all the answers to that, but, as a person who is very savvy in both diplomacy and politics, please try to think through public indicators, public diplomacy with the American people, even as we are proceeding to do this work elsewhere.

Ambassador TUTWILER. I understand exactly what you're saying. And my world, like all of your worlds, is politics plus foreign policy. And part of what I hope I have brought back is an approach, when I continue to talk about we must do a better job of reaching non-elites. That's another word for masses. The reason I say that, sir, is that for decades we have done, and still do, and are trained to do, basically a good job of government-to-government bilateral work, Foreign Ministry to State Department, Finance Ministry to Treasury, et cetera. We have also put a great deal of our emphasis on opinion leaders and elites. Many of the individuals you talk about that we've brought over here, if we went back and looked—and I'm not against it—are really from an elite element.

Well, the world has changed, as we all know, and as Senator Biden talked to and as you have talked to, radically changed. And it was before 9/11, in my mind. And with the access of information in many, many parts of the world now, which we advocated for decades, you have enormous populations—enormous—in some instances, have never met an American, much less know about us.

And so one of the things I hope to bring back to this is—in terminology that my colleagues at the State Department will not like, is a grassroots effort. What are we doing to reach these masses that have no opinion of us, have not traveled here, probably will not get a scholarship to come to the United States because there are very powerful political forces in their countries. And we have simply got to find an allocation of our time, as public servants overseas, to spend more time engaging, in my opinion, with this political force that is real and that exists and has, regrettably, very little knowledge about us.

If I may, one more thing. You're correct, there are 1,200 employees basically working in public diplomacy. I would remind your audience that that is worldwide, that is in over two hundred and, what, forty posts. That is not a lot of people. And when you look at the numbers, which I did since I've gotten back, in the 1990s there were 2,400. So those are the cuts that have been taking place in public diplomacy.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much for that forthcoming answer. We had one hearing in our committee in which we tried to bring together, as I remember, the State Department, Immigration, Treasury, to discuss the impact of our homeland security on the problems that you have to face. Now, that's even a more daunting problem when you have to deal with all these other Cabinet people. But the fact is, public diplomacy is affected by the problems that students have trying to get in the country, or tourists, or business people. Maybe for good reason. But, at the same time, somebody has to exercise some overall common sense, some direction, in terms of the public diplomacy aspect.

I hope your voice will be heard. We will try to make our voices heard along with you.

Ambassador TUTWILER. I will try. If I may, sir, may I answer you this way? When I talk about—it's easy to talk about big picture, here's what we should be doing. One attempt I've made in the time I've been this is—as you know, on February 4, I said to the—in the House testimony that I was looking at micro-scholarships for non-elites. Well, I can tell you today and report that we're doing them.

The CHAIRMAN. Good.

Ambassador TUTWILER. And that is in less than 2 months. We are starting in five countries, and we have—I'm looking for money to bring from other parts of the State Department. But we're doing it. And that's something we've never done before. We're reaching down into this audience that is so important, and we're going to, without having to address the visa problem or the expense of coming here, for basically less than a thousand dollars a person, we can give someone an opportunity to learn English for a year. And we are about that business, and we are doing it, and it has started.

The CHAIRMAN. Great.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Madam Secretary, I'm enthusiastic about your sense of how to proceed here. You know the numbers. The four of us, five of us, know the numbers. You have, in Iran, if memory serves me—this is from memory, don't hold me exactly to the numbers—but I think over 60 percent of the Iranian population is under the age of 15 or 14; 60 percent of the Arab world is under the age of 18. And we've got a problem. We've got a problem. We have a phenomenal opportunity.

I know we're going to do this later, about broadcasting, but just one example, Radio Sawa. We went and got a guy—we, all of us, went and got a guy who made hundreds of millions of dollars here—I think hundreds of millions—coming up with an idea called Westwood One. You know, when you fly back and forth across the Nation, and you put on your headsets, and you hear programming on the phone. This is the guy that put that together. Then he ended up owning some big companies and has done very well.

So I took a page from—and I mean this sincerely—from my Republican colleagues about engaging the private sector. This guy came and sat down and said, hey, look, I'm confident we can put together the first-rate, most-listened-to radio station in the Middle East in a matter of months. And everybody looked and said, come on, give me a break.

You know who the best-known people in Egypt are? The same people who are the best-known people in America. Britney Spears is a helluva lot better known than Joe Biden or Dick Lugar or the distinguished Senator from Tennessee, whether that's good, bad, or indifferent. Every rock star—rock stars are the single best-known people in Egypt, in Iran. And so that's what these kids listen to.

So, guess what? Through their ingenuity they put together a station that's now the single most-listened-to station in the Middle East. And guess what? It has news as part of it. You've got to get 'em to listen to something. They ain't gonna turn on, you know, C-SPAN2. They're not going to turn on public-access television. Seriously. It works.

Now, how we measure the effect of this, that's a different question, and that's a hard deal, which leads me to my first question. I'll submit it in writing. I don't expect you to go into it now. But over the next month or so—I'm not even looking for an immediate answer—I'd like to know what the mission statement is, if you will, as to what we mean by public diplomacy, what it is. What do we mean by it?

I, like many of my colleagues, have made it a habit the last 2 years of not only hiring staff that has expertise in Arabic, Islam, and people from the great universities we bring in here, who have Ph.D.'s in these subjects, but I also have made it a practice, as my colleagues have, of bringing in some of the best-known Arabic scholars, Muslim scholars, and scholars on the Middle East in the country. And I bring them in regularly, in groups of two to six people. And they are willing to sit there—one of the great advantages of this job, it's the ultimate—I mean, it is an intellectual feast, to take a phrase from former Judge Bork, and being able to get anybody you want to come and talk to you, from Nobel laureates to whatever.

At any rate, they all say—when I started off talking about public diplomacy in terms of changing minds, they said, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa. That should not be the goal of public diplomacy, to accept American foreign policy, accept our values, accept—but to understand, to arm moderates within the Muslim world, with arguments against the fundamentalists as to why we aren't the same, whether we agree or not. For example, I'd be delighted if, tomorrow, Iran turned into a democracy—it wasn't even pro-U.S., it was a democracy. I'm not looking for it to be pro-U.S. I'm just looking for it not to be anti-U.S. and anti-democratic.

So I'd like to know—not now, but in a statement at some point—what you all think is the objective here. What's the mission statement of public diplomacy?¹

And the specific question I have, before my time runs out here, is that—and it goes off what I thought where the chairman was going. We have, sort of, inherent conflict you're going to run into, and you already have. We want very much to increase exchange programs. All of us here, I think. I think it's bipartisan and universal. But we're running into a problem now, and that is, let's assume tomorrow there was a consensus here to increase exchange programs by 100,000, and fund them. There is a countervailing force here that says, whoa, whoa, wait a minute. In order to be admitted into this country on an exchange program, we've got to think of this differently. There's new hoops—and I'm not being critical; this is something that has to be worked out—new hoops that people have to go through.

There is an enthusiasm and the knowledge on the part of the American public to know we've got to spread the word here about who we are. I think the average guy in any town in my city, in a rural community—we're one of the most rural states in America, in terms of population of our cities—and they understand we've got to get our message out, but they also are worried about, you mean you're going to bring in 10,000 Arab kids, 10,000 Muslim kids to our universities? You're going to bring 'em in?

So I'd like, also, for the record, for you to have your staff lay out for us what kind of hurdles we have to overcome, if there are any, as we increase the exchange programs and meet this new understandable desire to track anybody who comes into the country as it relates to an education visa here.

And the last point I'd like, for the record, for you to take a look at is, I'm of the view, a little bit like what the Senator and former Senator—the chairman and former Senator Bradley and I, in different iterations, tried to do back in the early 1990s, which was not only increase the exchange programs for college students, but also for high school students. And it seems to me there needs to be an aggressive new—or an imaginative new program, either in-place, in-country or here, exposing that portion of particularly the Islamic world, that is overwhelmingly young, to American language, American books, American—Western, if you will, ideas—not to brainwash them but to give them an opportunity to understand where we are.

¹ See response of Under Secretary Tutwiler to the request for mission of public diplomacy in a letter to Chairman Lugar, which includes U.S. Department of State Public Diplomacy Strategy Report, March 1, 2004, on page 50.

So I would very much like you to give me a sense of what you are thinking about exchange program, in terms of cadres of people we're looking at, whether it be the traditional emphasis on college and post-graduate, or there should maybe be a new emphasis in a way that I'm not quite sure how it would work, in terms of high-school-age students.

So my time is up. I will stop. If you wish to comment, fine. I understand if you want to do it all in writing.

Ambassador TUTWILER. I will comment briefly. No. 1, I agree with you, defining "public diplomacy," those are two big words, in political terms, we could drive a Mack truck through. And so it has been done, it's been bureaucratically done. I know what you're asking. I will take an attempt at what it means. But within that framework, I think we both agree that it is wide enough in its meaning, and broad enough, that it's also left up to how it's implemented.

No. 2, I am more than well aware, having served as Ambassador through the new visa policies of the United States, what that has—the difficulties that have been associated with it. I will tell you, the first year as Ambassador in Morocco, it was very difficult that summer. As you know, we continue to get—we continue to massage it, we continue to get it better as a nation. And it is something that obviously all of us have on our radar screens when we talk about bringing people here.

On high schools, we are doing that. It started before I came into this job. I am very focused on it, based on experience of living in an Arab Muslim nation of 30-plus-million, the majority of whom are all young. So we are in sync with you. We are on that. And it's something that we hope to get more high schoolers and more engaged with high schoolers.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator HAGEL.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Madam Secretary, good to see you again. We're glad you're on the job. We are enthusiastic and supportive, as you have noted this morning, and we want to help in every way that we can.

Ambassador TUTWILER. Thank you.

Senator HAGEL. I appreciated your testimony, specifically a couple of points of focus. One, on non-elites and your analysis. And I think you are exactly right. That non-elite universe requires specific focus on the younger people. And, again, I think you have focused exactly on the right elements here. Now, how you do that, how we accomplish it, that's another matter, as you have noted.

The first question I have is how does the State Department currently integrate public diplomacy policy, public affairs policy, into the policymaking process? For example, do you have a seat at the table on policy issues regarding Iraq, the Middle East peace process, Afghanistan? How does that all work within the fabric of policymaking, your piece of this?

Ambassador TUTWILER. Correct. There is not a formalized system of that, to be honest with you; nor was it when I served before in the State Department. As you know, Secretary Powell 100-percent understands the importance of communications and public diplo-

macy. So throughout all levels of the State Department, there are individuals, who have the PD component, who sit in various meetings that go on all day long at the State Department on Iraq, on Afghanistan. We coordinate, in an informal way, or at least it's been my style, an informal way with the Pentagon, with the NSC, throughout the State Department. And then there are formalized meetings that go on.

So whether it's me personally or it is other qualified individuals in the State Department, yes, there is coordination, and, yes, there is public diplomacy input.

Senator HAGEL. And you feel that you are adequately positioned to implement the things that you are talking about, as you noted, certainly Secretary Powell wants done and the President wants to accomplish. And so your sense, that you have all the integration you need to carry out your mission on all the policy issues, whether it's Iraq or the Middle East peace process.

Ambassador TUTWILER. Well, I could never say you have everything that you need. But I also can say that, in my mind, in some respects, they are two different entities. On the one is particularly a meeting of formulation of policy. And what is the PD component if you do this, if you do that, this will cause this reaction. On the other is what I like to call the world of deliverables and, hopefully, tangibles that public diplomacy should be delivering, whether it is an enunciation in someone else's language and culturally sensitive of a policy, or it is a book, or it is building a soccer field, or it is our Culture Connect Ambassadors we're sending over.

So, in my mind, they're two very distinct tasks, to be honest, and they are, yes, intertwined, but they're different—they're different taskings in the way, at least, that I have always done it.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Next question. There are interpretations as to how engaged this administration is in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I am a Senator who believes that we should be more engaged. I don't think we've been enough engaged. But let's take that for a moment and put that aside. And my question is this. If we were more engaged, if we were more proactive on that issue, do you believe that would be beneficial to our public diplomacy efforts in the Arab world and in the Muslim world? If that was the perception, which is not there now, as you know, from every measurement. In fact, I think it's the core of our entire problem that we have in the Middle East.

And that's obviously debatable. But if we were more engaged, from whatever standard or plateau—we are engaged, in your opinion or Secretary Powell's—I don't think enough, but I don't expect you to say that—but if it was more engagement, would that help us accomplish what you are trying to accomplish in the minds of the Arab Muslim world?

Ambassador TUTWILER. Well, you're absolutely correct, Senator, that I cannot agree with you. Of course this administration is engaged with the President, with Secretary Powell, et cetera, et cetera.

Having said that, I understand what you're asking, and it's something that I—not whether we were engaged or not, but the policy—that I had to wrestle with, sitting as an American in Morocco. And I actually, most sincerely, believe that, to a degree,

sometimes policies, whatever they are—whether they're liked or not liked—are used as excuses in other countries, overseas. And I used to say, with all due respect to my Arab friends, if the situation that is causing you so much concern was resolved this afternoon, peacefully, at 3 o'clock, it would not create one job in your country, it would not build one new hospital, it would not build one new school. And so what I did, in my mind, was, as Ambassador, part of my job was—and I did it aggressively—was to articulate and to defend and try to explain, in a way that was culturally sensitive to the audience of where I was living, our policies.

And on the other hand, I went out and tried, as aggressively, to engage and to listen and to participate and to help countries—someone here this morning mentioned the moderates and the reformers—to actually make things better in their country and to let them know that the United States was participating in those activities, as well as the constant policy debate, which, you are absolutely right, consumes an enormous amount of conversation.

Senator HAGEL. And it's a perception issue, as well. Whether you agree with the policy or not—

Ambassador TUTWILER. Correct.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. In the minds of the Arabs in the Muslim world, either we're engaged, not engaged, and to—your point is a good one, and you're right—there will always be other issues. And that is incumbent upon the leadership of those nations to deal with their own internal problems. So I understand that.

Let me ask, before I get cutoff here, Madam Secretary, the new television network—

Ambassador TUTWILER. Right.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. That you've put together, which has gotten a significant amount of attention—here's my question. How does Alhurra differ—describe, if you can, the differences from previous U.S. Government broadcasting efforts. Is it different?

Ambassador TUTWILER. I can't answer that question for you. I don't know of another attempt that the United States Government—and maybe it's from ignorance, and I could find out—has done to launch a 24/7 television broadcast in another language. But, again, it could be my ignorance.

[The following follow-up response was subsequently supplied.]

It is different. Alhurra is the first U.S.-funded 24/7 satellite TV news and information channel. Its programming and approach are based on strong market research in the Middle East to determine both audience preferences and the most effective way of reaching a region which is, at the moment, highly anti-American. Alhurra has drawn almost exclusively on private sector expertise both in its staffing and in companies it hired to help in research, graphics and branding. One of the channel's main goals is to become accepted as an important, reliable source of news and information in the very crowded Arab media market.

Ambassador TUTWILER. I can tell you that I've paid close attention. I am not responsible—as you know, it's on the BBG, but I am very interested in this. It is, again, one of the tools that we are using, as we are Radio Sawa and a multitude of tools.

We've all read the initial, in the first week, negative regional Arabic press. Well, I have two thoughts on that. No. 1, they're paying attention, and we are getting a lot of conversation about something that we are doing. And, No. 2, if you—I started, yesterday, seeing

editorials that people were sending to me that were actually Arabs questioning Arabs on, "What's there to be afraid of?" I can tell you, third, that, unsolicited—some have been negative, but the vast majority from individuals living in Iraq and living in countries in the region, I've read their e-mails into the television headquarters, and they've been very positive and very interesting, over, "Thank you for doing this, America," those types of things.

Now, who knows? The jury is out. I personally, as we know, believe that it is an effort that we should have probably started as a Nation 9 years ago, when Arab broadcasting started and there was access to information. We didn't, so we're playing catch-up. Not a good position to be in. But I believe that it is an effort that is well worth the commitment that the Congress has made and that this administration and President Bush has made.

Senator HAGEL. Madam Secretary, thank you. And we're glad you are doing what you're doing.

Ambassador TUTWILER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, for holding this important hearing. And I really do feel this is a very important topic.

I want to thank both Secretary Tutwiler and the private witnesses for being here today; in particular, Secretary Tutwiler for her manner and approach, which I think is really positive and helpful in this area.

And I'd like to take a minute to stress how important it is, as you have done, to improve our public diplomacy efforts. I think sometimes it's misunderstood. This isn't about some kind of an emotional need on the part of Americans to be liked or to bow to global public opinion; this is about our interest. It's about the capacity and willingness of others in the world to cooperate with the United States at a time when we face threats from a global terrorist network, which obviously requires, therefore, a global response. This is about American power, our power to persuade, to inspire, and to lead. And this is about the power of others, and their capacity to distort our intentions, to try to paint a picture of an intolerant, aggressive, rapacious power that most Americans would not recognize and would surely reject.

So this is, by no means, a marginal issue. It is an essential one. And as you've been candid enough to say, when it comes to this essential issue the news is not all good. Study after study finds that America is losing support and losing credibility around the world, and we have to do better.

Let me follow on the very thoughtful remarks you made that just about every member of the committee took note of about appealing to non-elites. Let me just put this in slightly different terms. Not only should this apply to non-elites around the world, but let me suggest that this concern should apply to non-elites in our country. We will not succeed if the elites in this country are trying to engage the non-elites in other countries. In other words, the American people, in general, need to be urged—we all need to be urged—to reach out to the rest of the world and to get involved in exchanges and visitor programs and other opportunities.

Senator Hagel and I are talking about some of these matters. In a way, it's an obvious thing, but, on the other hand, when people hear that, they think Peace Corps. Well, Peace Corps is a great thing, typically associated with younger people. What I'm talking about here is, you know, police officers, high school students, farmers, teachers—I mean, how do we basically convey to the American people that there's a wonderful and essential role for each and every American to play in trying to connect with the rest of the world? And I don't mean, obviously, only by connecting with those who come over here for exchanges, but to take their skills and abilities overseas. This is not a call that, as far as I know, Americans have ever heard, in our history. It hasn't been necessary. This country has been so blessed with our location and our resources. But I think things did change in this regard on September 11, and I'd like to hear your thoughts on that.

Ambassador TUTWILER. You, I think, will be pleased with my thoughts on this. We actually, right now—there's an existing structure that was started shortly after 9/11 that are called Culture Ambassadors that actually are what you would expect from the arts, the traditional arts. Well, what we're looking at right now, and have been, and exploring, is having citizen Ambassadors—just as you say, a fireman, a policeman, a nurse, a teacher that would be a citizen Ambassador, and ask them to, yes, in this instance, go overseas to meet with colleagues from their profession. They are not famous people, but they are Americans that would enlist that we would enlist them and say, would you please come help us?

Just yesterday, I was exposed to, which is very interesting, a program that started in a college in North Carolina, in Greenville—and I apologize I can't pull out of my memory the name—where they, on their own—it's a small college—have started with four countries—China, Switzerland, Gambia, and I can't remember what the fourth one was. They have now, open interactive classes, where the college students in America get credit, and the students in the other country—Japan was the other one—get credit. And it's very interesting. It's high-tech. And basically, with the equipment and the training and everything, it's less than \$3,000 a class. And I just was exposed to this yesterday. I'm going to pursue it.

And so it is exactly the kind of thinking that you're talking about over how do we not just use government officials or famous Americans, how do we engage our non-elites, to use your phraseology, our normal Americans, in this effort to help us. Because we do need everybody's help. Government officials cannot do this by themselves.

Senator FEINGOLD. I'd just follow on, I can't tell you the number of people that I meet, who—maybe they've retired fairly young—

Ambassador TUTWILER. Right.

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. From state government, and they have a decent pension, and they're certainly not wealthy, but they're very eager to do something different. And to facilitate ways to use their skills and their wisdom in this way seems to be about one of the best things that we could do for our country. It seems obvious at one level; on the other hand, it's a massive undertaking to try to really facilitate people's ability to do these things. And I'm

pleased to hear your agreement that that's something we should do.

In the past, our public diplomacy efforts have, to a degree, ignored the fact that antagonism toward America is not always based on misunderstanding or irrationality, but is sometimes based on actual opposition to U.S. policy. At the same time, too often our efforts seem to focus on selling or delivering a message, rather than a two-way exchange. And I strongly believe that the active listening is a valuable show of respect for others in and of itself, and we need to do more of it—holding meetings, taking questions, making official Americans available for dialog and exchange, and for hearing people out. I talked with you about this before, and with many of your colleagues at the State Department, especially in the African Bureau. But I believe it is worth raising again and again, because it is not always easy to embrace the really difficult options. But in this case, I believe that the really difficult option is the most effective and meaningful one. Can you tell me what we are doing to listen more today?

Ambassador TUTWILER. Yes; we actually have, today, in place—and I—there's an Under Secretary of State who just did this in Brussels for us. He's in the Middle East right now, is doing it. We're asking every senior administration official, government official from the administration, who travels overseas to give us an hour to 2 hours of their time and to do exactly that, to go show up at a neighborhood that we traditionally have never been in, to go sit in a classroom where they're teaching English, and not give a speech, but to listen and to engage and to just talk about being an American, answer questions about our policy. In so many examples, they have never seen an American. And so it is actively something that we are encouraging our officials to do, our Ambassadors to do, and our State Department and other agency officials who are living overseas.

And one of my jobs is to try to get buy-in to this and to convince people of the value to the United States of taking time to do exactly what you are suggesting. So we actually are trying to do that right now, and are having some initial success.

Senator FEINGOLD. I'm pleased to hear that, and look forward to learning more about what's happening on that.

One final more specific question. What can you tell me about the administration's plan to use \$1.2 million to support public diplomacy initiatives in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, as a part of the East African counter-terrorism initiative?

Ambassador TUTWILER. I can't answer that off the top of my head, but I'll get you an answer.

Senator FEINGOLD. If you can get that for me, I'd appreciate it Madam Secretary.

Ambassador TUTWILER. Sure.

[The following response was subsequently supplied.]

On January 21, the Department of State notified Congress of its intent to use \$1.2 million to enhance public diplomacy efforts in five target countries in support of the President's East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative. The target countries are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Earlier this month, the notification of our intent to obligate FY 2003 and prior year Economic Support Funds expired without objection, and these funds are now available for apportionment and allotment.

In November 2003, the African Bureau Public Affairs Office met in Addis Ababa with Embassy Public Affairs Officers from the target countries and military information officers to specify the Public Diplomacy tools that would best encourage strong public support for the Global War on Terrorism and counter extremist views, both secular and religious. Specific components agreed upon and ready for implementation now include three broad areas:

- Increasing media outreach and information dissemination in East Africa;
- Supporting English language and teaching programs in East Africa and providing target audiences with a better understanding of core democratic values, including tolerance;
- Conducting exchange and speaker programs on core values of democracy and governance.

Target audiences will include moderate elites, government, civil society, media and youth. We expect funds to be allotted to post by midMarch.

Senator FEINGOLD. And I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

Senator Alexander.

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, welcome. It's been very helpful to hear your comments, and I'm glad you're on the job.

Ambassador TUTWILER. Thank you.

Senator ALEXANDER. I wanted to underscore a couple of things, then ask you a question that's a little bit above my pay grade, but may not be much above yours. I want to underscore what's been already said about foreign students.

In my travels around the world, whatever country I'm in, it's typical to see a Minister of Agriculture who was at Texas A&M, and a Minister of this who was at the University of Tennessee. So, in many ways, since World War II our most effective diplomacy has been students from other parts of the world who have gone to our colleges and universities for a whole variety of reasons. So anything we can do to rationalize this conflict between security and admission of qualified foreign students to our colleges and our universities is in our interest.

Second, I want to underscore and congratulate you on your focus on broadcasting. We all agree with this, but I think sometimes we even take for granted the importance of television. In the world we live in, nothing's important unless it's on television, so they say. We see the effect it has, disproportionately almost, to Putin's popularity in Russia, on our own Presidential primaries. We see what it's done to university budgets with college basketball. We really don't know how to handle it. And when we get in a region of the world where we have an imbalance on television, it's particularly devastating. So we can have all the programs we want, but if we're not competitive, in terms of what's being seen on television, we're really not at the starting gate.

So I would hope that we—if it takes more money, more effort, more television stations, better programming, I would hope that would be a first priority, and I'm sure that's already well in your mind.

Here's my question that I was thinking about. I wonder if we need a new Bush doctrine about our position in the world and how we conduct ourselves. You know, the most visible American is our President. We have a Bush doctrine about terrorism, which is, in rare cases, "where we think you might hit us, we may hit you

first.” But I wonder if we need one about how we act in a world where we have so much power, where our values are not always welcome and just to let people know how we’re going to handle ourselves in this situation.

For example, I can remember, at the end of the first Bush administration, we convened a group of education secretaries, and what they all worried about was our culture. They were afraid of it and what it might do to their countries. And we have the ironic situation of the whole world watching our Super Bowl, which, in a way, exemplifies the best of America—we play by the rules, everybody competes, anything is possible—and then they also watch our halftime, which is a sort of a celebration of public indecency. And that’s why they’re throwing television sets out of hotel rooms in countries around the world. They don’t want that part of our freedom. That’s one problem.

Another is, part of our Americanism is to export our values, but we have a complex set of values, and not all the world wants all those values. And then third, as was mentioned here, is, we’re the big boy on the block.

So should our President, at a time like this, construct a doctrine that we all say to the world, to say—that somehow exercises our strength, but, at the same time, demonstrates our ability to show humility and restraint and modesty, even, in a time like this. And then, from that doctrine, we might project an America in everything we do that is seen as a little bit different.

Ambassador TUTWILER. I don’t know the answer to your question. I’ve never given it any thought, to be honest with you. It’s a really, really good question. I also know, from previous service, I would never want to suggest that a President or a White House should do something. But I will, with your permission, give this some thought and think about it.

I can also totally be in agreement with you over—I think that we, as Americans—we go around telling everybody about globalization. We’re good at that. But have we really absorbed, ourselves, globalization? And when you talk about whatever program it is, we’re proud that it’s seen, and we advertise, 200 countries, 90 countries. But I think that we also need to think of what we are beaming to vast populations, who have not traveled, who are not educated, who are forming opinions of us. And I mean that with respect to all the people who produce our product. I’m not in a bashing mode; I’m in a mode—as Senator Lugar was saying, we all are trying here, we’re all trying to figure out how to navigate through this situation.

But I think that we, as Americans, need, ourselves, to remember that we are, and our products are, also going global and how people are using that to form opinions of us, and sometimes not in the most favorable opinions of us.

Senator ALEXANDER. And if I may, Mr. Chairman, just say one other thing, when Samuel Huntington did his book in the mid 1990s about the clash of civilizations, what it suggested to me was that if we’re going to have a clash, at least we should understand what our civilization is. And I’ve found, as I’ve begun to study that, there’s quite a bit of disagreement in our own country about what it means to be an American, what American identity is. We have

dropped the teaching of U.S. history from many of our courses, we've watered it down in many cases, we dropped civics. And for us to be effective citizen Ambassadors of what it means to be an American, we have to know that ourselves. And so I would think there's an important case for a good—for reemphasizing at home who we are and what are the principles that unite us as Americans, so we can speak about them more accurately to the rest of the world.

Ambassador TUTWILER. Thank you.

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Alexander.

And we thank you, again, Secretary Tutwiler, for your testimony, for your responses. We look forward, as is obvious, to working closely with you and probably to having a return conversation, in due course, as to how things are proceeding.

Ambassador TUTWILER. Thank you very, very much, and it's good to be with all of you this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. At this stage, the Chair would like to call to the witness table, our second panel, Mr. Gene Mater, of The Freedom Forum of Arlington, Virginia, Mr. Adam Clayton Powell III, visiting professor of Annenberg School of Communication, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, and Mr. Kurt A. Wimmer, of Covington & Burling, in Washington, DC.

Gentlemen, we're very pleased that you are with us this morning. Let me indicate, as I suggested earlier on, that we would like to proceed with your testimony. We are checking with the Senate floor to see what the vote situation may be at the present time. I'm informed that it is likely that a vote may occur around 11:10. But then my last prediction was 11, so this seems to be moving backward. That gives us, hopefully, time for your testimony. We may pause the hearing before coming back for questions.

Each of your statements will be made a part of the record in their entirety. I would ask you to summarize, and hopefully you could do this in 5, 6, or 7 minutes. That way we will be able to hear from all three witnesses before we have an interruption. If we don't have an interruption, we will continue with our questioning, as we did with the previous witness.

I would like to call upon you to testify in the order I introduced you, which would be, first of all, Mr. Mater, then Mr. Powell, and then Mr. Wimmer.

Mr. Mater, we'd be pleased to have your testimony.

STATEMENT OF GENE P. MATER, THE FREEDOM FORUM

Mr. MATER. My testimony is more of a statement of why I'm here. And I'd like to note that my professional background includes a range of print and broadcast experience in the United States and abroad.

My media work began in 1945, in Germany, when I was assigned to an Army psychological warfare team that was later integrated into military government. In that capacity, I started several German newspapers and helped establish the post-war German news agency. And 45 years later—

The CHAIRMAN. We're trying to amplify your voice a little bit so that everyone can hear.

Mr. MATER. And I am here as a broadcaster. But not a technician.

Forty-five years later, after working as a reporter and as an editor on three U.S. newspapers, working as a newsman in Europe, and then holding various management positions at CBS—once again I was helping to start media outlets, this time in Central and Eastern Europe and various parts of the former Soviet Union after the fall of communism. Because of this experience, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and to share what I have learned.

As one who believes that a democratic society cannot exist without a free press, I suggest that Senator Lugar's proposed legislation can go a long way in helping other countries achieve what we enjoy.

I would like to offer two major comments about the thrust of the proposal. First, teaching Journalism 101 is necessary, but what is equally important is teaching how to run any media outlet as a profitable venture to assure sustainability and the strength needed to fight efforts at government control.

And, second, I would urge that the efforts to carry out the assigned task be given to U.S. professionals and professional organizations, rather than to groups, government agencies, and individuals having no media experience of their own.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, sir. I appreciate that civic comment about the business side of this, in addition to the content and the importance of that.

Mr. Powell.

**STATEMENT OF ADAM CLAYTON POWELL III, VISITING
PROFESSOR, ANNENBERG SCHOOL OF COMMUNICATION**

Mr. POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, for this invitation to participate in today's hearing on a topic of great importance.

I'd like to, first, follow the example of my former colleague, Mr. Mater, and explain why I am here. I am a visiting professor and senior fellow at the University of Southern California's new Center on Public Diplomacy. It's very much a project under construction, and we feel it's an important one, for reasons that have been articulated this morning by you and others.

We are studying cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges, the full range of soft power as it is practiced, not only by the United States, but also by other countries. Clearly, the French have a public diplomacy policy. If you go up Massachusetts Avenue to the South African Embassy, you'll find that that embassy has a Counselor for Public Diplomacy, with a very specific portfolio of how to project South African culture and education here in the United States. And following the example of the Djerejian report and others, we are also attempting to devise measurements of effectiveness, something which came up earlier this morning, of public diplomacy efforts. And, finally, we're looking at some aspects of public diplomacy, which, to us, may be obvious, but, when you travel to other countries, you find that it becomes something of note.

The Ambassador from Hungary to the United States, Andras Simonyi, just recently gave a briefing at the State Department, ti-

tled “How Rock and Roll Helped Lift the Iron Curtain,” on the influence of American music. And we’ve been combing over the data from Radio Sawa, as many have, but we may underestimate the influence of Radio Sawa and other American international broadcasters, that the music itself may be a message.

The Hungarian Ambassador said that when Marvin Gay sang “What’s Going On,” it had lines like “escalation is not the answer,” that this was—we viewed that as a protest song. In Eastern Europe, they thought this was evidence of freedom in the United States. So what Britney Spears’ lyrics may mean in the Arab world may be somewhat different from what we interpret them.

We hope for the better.

But to turn specifically to today’s hearing and to the legislation which you have introduced, Mr. Chairman, as the University of Southern California’s new Center on Public Diplomacy focuses on this issue, we feel this proposal could be an important contribution to strengthen media, civil society, and transparency in all emerging democracies.

We all know an independent press is essential for a truly open and pluralistic democracy. Without independent media, governments are, at best, only partially transparent; the rule of law, at best, incomplete; and multiparty elections not truly open and free. Strengthening independent media remains among the most effective and enduring tools for multiparty democracy available to us today.

Independent editors and advocates of free media across the globe are asking for assistance in many ways, including training programs, assistance with facilities, and expert advice on drafting laws and constitutional provisions to guarantee free press in their country. It’s important to respond to these full range of requests, both to address the needs identified by leaders of emerging media in different parts of the world and to ensure that these emerging media possess the means to survive and flourish in often difficult and dangerous terrain.

Many organizations in this country have been providing these forms of assistance, including U.S. Government agencies such as USAID and Voice of America and other government broadcasters, educational institutions across the U.S., and non-governmental organizations, including the International Center for Foreign Journalists, Committee to Protect Journalists, Internews, and others, including The Freedom Forum, which is represented here by Mr. Mater. An even larger number of organizations based outside the United States, in governments and education and NGOs, are also active in this area, often with minimal resources.

In addition to government resources, we’ve seen support for independent media from the Knight Foundation and other independent foundations and nonprofit institutions here in the United States, from major media organizations, and even from individuals. These typically modest investments generate significant returns that sustain this value work throughout the world.

Scholars, from Joseph Nye, at Harvard, to my colleague, Manuel Castells, at USC, have long noted the importance of the free flow of information and ideas to a healthy society. And in recent years, we’ve seen examples of courageous independent media that make

a difference in their country's struggles for democracy. Examples from Radio B92, in Serbia, to the Lusaka Post, in Zambia.

B92 and the Post are also examples of how support from outside of their countries to promote free media and democratic values have worked. When B92 was forced off the air by the Serbian Government, assistance came, not only from the Voice of America, which stepped in to broadcast its programming, but also from the European editors groups, and also the Dutch streamed B92 signal on the Internet from a server in Holland. And when the Zambian Government closed the Post newspaper and threw its editor in jail, protest came not only from the U.S., but also from NGOs around the world, especially in Africa and Europe.

These and other cases suggest an approach that can improve the effectiveness and the cost effectiveness of any coordinated American effort in this area. U.S. assistance, even through the National Endowment for Democracy, should be coordinated and leveraged with assistance from other countries and from NGOs of different nations, and we feel this would be great advantageous.

Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Powell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADAM CLAYTON POWELL III, VISITING PROFESSOR AND
SENIOR FELLOW, USC CENTER ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

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B92 and The Post are also two of many examples of how support from outside their countries helped promote free media and democratic values:

When B92 was forced off the air by the Serbian government, assistance came not only from the Voice of America, which stepped in to broadcast B92 programming:

in addition, European editors' groups came forward to support B92, and the Dutch streamed B92's signal onto the Internet from a server in Holland. B92 went back on the air, and you can also still hear it on the Internet, at www.B92.net

And when the Zambian government closed The Post and threw its editor in jail, protests came not only from the U.S., but also from NGOs around the world, especially across Africa and Europe, which took up the cause. After international protests, the editor was freed and the newspaper was back on the newsstands. And as with B92, you can see the Lusaka Post on the Internet every day.

(A disclosure: these were among the campaigns that were joined by the Freedom Forum, where I worked for many years running training programs for journalists, media managers and educators in Africa, Asia, Central Europe and Latin America.)

These and other cases suggest an approach that can improve the effectiveness—and the cost-effectiveness—of any coordinated American effort in this area:

U.S. assistance, even through the National Endowment for Democracy, should to the extent possible be coordinated and leveraged with assistance from other countries and from NGOs of different nations.

This should reap a number of benefits, including:

A plurality of sources of funding and in-kind assistance will only enhance the credibility of the independent media we seek to encourage,

Coordination with organizations with similar missions can reduce rivalries and competition that might be counterproductive, and

Working with other countries and international NGOs can only strengthen the ability of the Endowment to marshal resources to respond fully to the challenges of those who would shutter and control a media longing to be free.

Thank you once again for this opportunity to participate in today's proceeding. We look forward to providing you with any further information that you might find of use.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Powell.
Mr. Wimmer, would you give us your testimony.

STATEMENT OF KURT A. WIMMER, COVINGTON & BURLING

Mr. WIMMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Hagel, members of the committee. I'm grateful for the honor to appear before you today. I've been in hearing rooms like this in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Russia, but never at home, so it's a great day for me. Thank you.

I am speaking to you today on behalf of The Media Institute, a nonprofit foundation, dedicated to the first amendment, located here in Washington. I am also privileged to be chair of the board of governors of IREX, the International Research and Exchanges Board, an NGO that has worked for free media in about 15 countries across Europe and Eurasia. I'm also speaking for the more than 30 lawyers at Covington & Burling, who have been working in about 20 countries on these sorts of issues, and from whom I've drawn a lot of the ideas that I'll mention today.

As this committee knows, truly free and independent press can really provoke change in new democracies. The press can galvanize sustained political reform, it can expose corruption, it can promote transparency, it can ensure effective democracy, and it can foster an environment in which business can come in and invest in transitional economies.

But the press can't do its job if it's stifled by unfair media laws, if it is continued to be subject to unfair libel litigation, and if its journalists continue to be jailed and assassinated. There's a tremendous amount of work that needs to be done to foster true freedom of expression in countries outside our borders. And, as Pro-

fessor Powell pointed out, there are a lot of countries and organizations that are involved in this.

From our 10 years of work here, it's clear to me that the U.S. really does have a leadership position to maintain in this area. No other country holds freedom of expression as a primary policy goal in the way the United States does. And we also have a history of accomplishing the fostering of independent media in a way that's effective and efficient. And I think we can continue that and build on it.

I do think your legislation is a great step forward, and I wish it success.

Let me suggest five modest points that I hope that can be central, going forward.

The first is that current programs really have been successful and ought to be continued as new structures are considered. As I mentioned before, we've been working in about 20 countries, and on the ground in 15. In these countries, we've seen real change attributable to the work of USAID-sponsored programs, and real vision in how these are administered. We've worked with hard-working, dedicated media professionals, in difficult countries, who are committed to sustaining independent media. In our experience, these professionals really do appreciate the help and leadership of the United States.

Just a few examples. As this committee well knows, independent media in Serbia contributed to the will of the people in overthrowing the Milosevic regime, which would have silenced these media without the assistance of USAID, IREX, and others. In numerous cases, repressive media laws would have been passed in Central and Eastern Europe had it not been for the opinions of U.S. experts that put at least a shadow of a doubt behind these proposals and slowed them down. And in Bosnia and Kosovo, you now have independent local media for the first time. These have been real success stories, and they've been achieved at a cost that really must be considered modest compared to the more general foreign policy obligations of the United States. If we make a wholesale change while these programs are midstream, I think we endanger these successes, and I hope that they can continue.

My second point is that our commitment really has to be long-term in scope. There are no quick fixes. Fostering truly independent media takes time, and reforming a legal system requires a true long-term commitment. This committee has been precisely right to insist that funding for programs not be ended until it can be established that a free, protected, and independent media exists in each country. Countries that outwardly seem to graduate to more mature legal systems still have the need for progressive media laws that fully protect freedom of expression.

One great example, from the headlines today, is Macedonia. We've spent a lot of time and effort in Macedonia. We've sent teams of lawyers there twice to work on a broadcasting law, to work on an information law. During both visits, there were hostilities that broke out, which, of course, made me nervous, as the person who would put these young lawyers on a plane. But there's still so much more that needs to be done. Libel law needs to be reformed. Three journalists have been convicted of criminal defama-

tion, and have been jailed. But even though there's much more to be done, I've learned, just in the past couple of days, that the budget has been cut back so dramatically that there may not be media programs in Macedonia. I think it's a mistake.

A third goal is public diplomacy and international broadcasting. I support that 100 percent. But I do think it needs to be separated from fostering independent media. Our goal in fostering independent media is to promote a first amendment environment in which these media can really voice opinions. And sometimes they voice opinions that are critical of the U.S. Government. I think that's something that we need to live with. And Serbia, again, is a great example of media that we helped to sustain being critical of NATO bombing efforts, but, nonetheless, accomplishing the goals of the U.S. Government in regime change. So I think that was positive.

Fourth, we really need to fully engage the power of the most important media companies in the world—our own. As Senator Feingold pointed out, this notion of citizen Ambassadors is really important, and we've had a number of those. Mr. Mater points out his work. We have teams of journalists, teams of producers, going over all the time for IREX, Internews and others. But I think if we follow the ideas in your legislation, Mr. Chairman, we'll foster an environment in which you'll get more and more involvement by the U.S. media, and I think that's a very powerful force that can be harnessed to make a lot of changes.

And, finally, I think we need a really effective mechanism to measure our progress. And it's clear that we have to stay until the job is done, but how on earth can we find that out? And I think there are some mechanisms, such as the media sustainability index that IREX does that really are useful and that can be fostered.

So I thank you for your attention, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wimmer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KURT A. WIMMER, COVINGTON & BURLING

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden and Members of the Committee:

I am grateful for the great honor and opportunity of appearing before you today. The development of free, fair, legally protected and self-sustaining media in the developing world is of paramount importance to the interests of the United States in the current global environment. Because my colleagues and I have worked so hard to help to develop free expression in developing democracies, it is both gratifying and encouraging to me that this Committee is focusing on this issue.

INTRODUCTION

Before I discuss the importance of this issue to our country, let me provide the context for my views. I have been a partner in the law firm of Covington & Burling, in its Washington and London offices, for the past 12 years and a media lawyer for almost 20. In addition, I am privileged to chair the First Amendment Advisory Council of the Media Institute and the board of governors of the International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX).

In my law practice, I have been able to see firsthand the effect of varying international standards of free expression on our U.S. and international media clients. I also have been privileged to see the dedication and perseverance of journalists in developing democracies around the world.¹ Our media law practice at Covington has

¹Our clients in this work have included IREX, the ABA Central and Eastern European Law Initiative, Internews, the International Center for Journalists, the Global Internet Policy Initiative, the Stanhope Centre for Communications Policy Research in London, and the ABA-United

been providing legal assistance and on-the-ground legal advice to the media in developing countries for the past decade in some 20 countries, including Serbia, Kosovo, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Slovakia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkey, Indonesia, Mongolia and, most recently, Iraq.

THE NEED FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR FREE EXPRESSION

Our work has given me a useful vantage point to assess the prospects for change in global free expression. There is no doubt that more must be done. Our First Amendment does not reach beyond our borders, and no country has legal protections to rival ours. In most of the world, the watchdog of the press is muzzled. The media has an invaluable role to play in galvanizing sustained political reform, exposing corruption, increasing transparency in government, ensuring effective democracy and creating an environment in which business will have the confidence to invest in transitional economies. The structural importance of the press, moreover, cannot be overstated in states torn by ethnic factionalism. The press cannot do its job, however, if it is subjected to unfair media laws, if it is prevented from having access to information, if it is stifled by unfair defamation litigation, and if its journalists continue to be jailed and assassinated. Groups and governments from around the world are focusing on these issues. But I am more convinced than ever that the United States must continue to play an essential leadership role for these conditions to improve.

There is no lack of will, vision or courage on the part of journalists living under repressive regimes. Members of this Committee may recall Slavko Curuvija, the publisher of the *Dnevni Telegraph* in Belgrade, with whom I had the privilege of working in the course of our efforts in Serbia. Mr. Curuvija's media outlets had been subjected to ruinous fines by the Milosevich regime for expressing opinion, on a pretext and without hope of legal challenge. By 1998, it was no longer safe for him to publish. But he had found a printer in Montenegro and a sympathetic trucking firm that would hide bundles of his newsmagazine, *Evropijanin*, under shipments of produce. But the ultimate act of censorship finally ended this publisher's crusade. On April 11, 1999, as he walked home with his wife from Orthodox Easter Mass, Slavko Curuvija was assassinated.

Mr. Curuvija's assassination was not an isolated incident. Just a few months before, Zeljko Kopanja, editor of the independent newspaper *Nezavisne Novine* in Bosnia, was the victim of a car bomb—and even after losing both legs, he edited his newspaper from his hospital room. The Committee to Protect Journalists has reported that at least 263 journalists have been assassinated in the past decade. And it has been going on for as long as there have been conflicts between those in authority and those who would criticize authority. My own grandfather, a printer in Luxembourg, criticized the Nazi invasion until his presses were destroyed by the SS.

Freedom of speech is far from free. It is purchased by the sacrifices of those who risk their all, from John Peter Zenger to Katherine Graham. Those who are making these sacrifices in the developing world need our help in building effective, independent media and media laws that can preserve their freedom and protect their speech.

The question, of course, is how we can best use the scarce resources available to accomplish this goal. I applaud the Chairman's leadership in this area and suggest that this Committee bear in mind the following principles that the more than 30 lawyers involved in our team at Covington & Burling have drawn from our work overseas:

- *Current programs are effective, economical and must be continued even as new structures are considered.*

We have worked in 20 developing countries, with Covington lawyers on the ground in 15. Our team has seen real change attributable to the work of USAID-supported programs. We have worked with dedicated, hard-working media professionals who are committed to provoking positive change and who *truly* appreciate the help and leadership of the United States.

The results of the work supported by USAID have been tangible and real. Independent media in Serbia contributed to the will of the people overcoming the Milosevich regime, and this regime would have silenced these media without the brilliant technical assistance of the United States. Repressive media laws would

Nations Development Project. Additionally, I was the sole American member of the United Nations/OSCE Advisory Group on Defamation and Freedom of Information Legislation for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which drafted new libel and access laws for Bosnia that now have been adopted.

have been passed in multiple Central and Eastern European states had it not been for the opinions of American legal experts that raised significant doubts about the consistency of these schemes with European and international legal norms. Our opinion on the draconian Serbian “Law on Public Information” was translated into several languages and distributed broadly to those attempting to oppose it. Independent media in Bosnia and Kosovo are truly local and becoming self-sustaining. New access to information laws have been passed throughout the region, particularly in Georgia and Bosnia, because of the help of United States experts. The evidence in the region is staggering. And it has been achieved at a cost that must be considered modest in comparison to the more general foreign policy obligations of the United States.

If a wholesale change in these sustaining programs is made while they are in mid-stream, their ability to continue to make progress will be jeopardized. Current methods and levels of funding must continue as we consider how to improve the overall scope of our efforts. Consistency is of paramount importance in this field, and we cannot afford to endanger the momentum that these programs have attained over years of hard work.

- *Our commitment must be long-term in scope*

Our experience has shown that there really are no quick fixes, particularly in the area of free expression and independent media. We must make it clear to the world community that our commitment to these goals is long-term and sustaining, that our attention will be focused closely on the countries in which we are working, and that will stay until our goals are attained. This commitment is essential from the moment we begin working—an investment in serious media change, and the credibility necessary to have a place at the table for legislative and legal developments, requires a long view.

This Committee was precisely right to insist that funding for programs in countries in process not be ended until it can be established that a free, protected and independent media exists in each of these countries. We have seen, over and over, the need for sustained legal intervention and assistance. Countries that outwardly seem to “graduate” to more mature legal systems nonetheless continue to have needs for progressive media laws that are in accordance with international legal norms. In one country, for example, we opposed unjust laws until the government changed, and then were privileged to work on the ground with local experts to create new media laws. But regressive elements, including prior restraints, crept back into those laws, and we now have been asked once again to work with local journalists on strategies for dealing with harsh laws. Although the harsh regime is gone, the need for real legal help remains. We must continue our vigilance to ensure against backsliding, which has been all too commonplace in our experience.

The typical trajectory of legal structures necessary for a free press demonstrates the need for long-term involvement. *First*, there is the basic and obvious need for free expression, equitable distribution of broadcast licenses and allocation of spectrum. *Second*, it is essential that defamation reform be accomplished, and this is an area where much remains to be done in virtually all of the countries in which we have worked—libel suits by public officials, often criminal in scope, remain a danger across Europe, and independence of courts is an essential but challenging element in reform. *Third*, freedom of access to information must be assured. This is a long-term project—it cannot be accomplished by mere passage of a Freedom of Information law, but by changing the hearts and minds of judges and bureaucrats who control information flow. *Fourth*, press freedoms must be assured in all media, particularly the Internet. Damaging new media laws continue to be proposed in countries across Europe that must be opposed.

If we assume we have done our job after the first, most preliminary, step, we have done little to truly establish independent media. We must sustain our efforts and assist in the creation of a truly workable legal system. The amount of work is formidable—for example, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe published in January 2004 a summary of proposed media legislation in 10 countries that runs to 22 single-spaced pages. Without U.S. assistance, many of these laws will be passed in forms that will not protect free expression and foster independent media. Given the amount of work that has gone into the region, this would be a tragedy.

- *Our work must be clearly separated from short-term policy goals and political influence*

Public diplomacy and international broadcasting are important complements to fostering freedom of expression and independent media, but they should maintain their separate character. I take second chair to no one in my support and admiration for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and have been privileged to do some work

for it. Its work is essential in providing an independent voice in parts of the world that have little access to independence in their local media. And it is of course important for public diplomacy efforts to ensure that the views of the United States are heard in the developing world.

But this is not identical to the goal of fostering independent media. Our efforts to build a truly free press must be separate from any appearance of content or political influence. We must have the courage to build a press that is so independent that it can criticize us. Again, Serbia provides an apt example. The same independent media that gave voice to opposition to the Milosevich government were also harsh critics of the NATO bombing campaign and, in some cases, U.S. policy. Yet, the voicing of opinions with which we would not agree is not a failure—it is a measure of our success. A commitment to fostering true independence requires respect for the value of the First Amendment, and acceptance of criticism is at the heart of this value.

I am not an expert on government mechanisms in all three of these areas. But I do worry that a single office overseeing all three will be seen as muddling the firewalls that must exist between them and undermine our credibility in attempting to establish a free and independent press.

- *In this effort, we must fully engage the power of the most important media in the world—our own*

The United States media is, to be sure, involved in current efforts overseas. IREX, for example, has sent consultants and trainers from CNN, The New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, ABC and other media companies into the region. But we have not tapped the full potential of our world-leading media in fostering free speech and independent media in the developing world.

Our timing is right in involving the media more comprehensively, because U.S. media is cognizant of the need for freedom of expression internationally more comprehensively today than ever. The Internet, as well as increasing international newsgathering efforts, have illustrated the decreasing size of the journalistic world in graphic terms. Consider:

- Barrons Magazine has a handful of Web subscriptions in Australia. The Australian High Court has forced its owner, American publisher Dow Jones, to defend a libel case under strict liability that would never be permissible under the First Amendment simply because Barrons is available on the Internet.
- Andrew Meldrum, an American journalist working for the Guardian, a London newspaper, was prosecuted in Zimbabwe for publishing statement claimed to be inaccurate under an “information law” that clearly violates international legal standards. He was prosecuted in Zimbabwe even though the Guardian does not publish there simply because a prosecutor managed to access it via the Internet.
- Until a federal court in California applied the First Amendment to stop it, Yahoo.com was under orders from a French court to stop publishing information relating to Nazi speech to *any* country, even though that speech was clearly protected by the U.S. Constitution—despite Yahoo’s full compliance with restrictive French hate-speech laws on its Yahoo.fr site.
- In November, the Council of Europe approved an addition protocol to the Cybercrime Convention, under which signatories will be required to outlaw “any written material, any image or any other representation of ideas or theories, which advocates, promotes or incites hatred, discrimination or violence against any individual or group of individuals, based on race.” So far, 20 countries have ratified it.

A new battle is being waged. It is no longer a battle in which our federal courts can be a dependable refuge for our media companies, no longer a battle where Congress can be relied upon to pass laws such as those that protect U.S. newsrooms from searches. The media of the United States are engaged in this battle. Given proper involvement, I believe they will engage directly in our efforts to foster free expression overseas.

The key, of course, will be to find an effective mechanism to engage the media fully. Existing avenues, such as drawing on the media to provide training and support, will of course continue. But considering new mechanisms to engage the media is certainly appropriate.

U.S. media can be tapped for substantive assistance. Our media has long been involved internationally—for example, the Washington Post helped to establish precedent for a reporter’s privilege not to be forced to testify about war crimes in the International Court in the Hague, and the Associated Press and others have filed *amicus* briefs in cases in Croatia and elsewhere. Our media also are focusing in-

creasingly on international standards as they struggle with Internet jurisdiction over libel cases and difficult privacy issues arising from Europe and elsewhere. But if existing media organizations can be tapped to be fully engaged strategically and across the board, significant resources could be brought to bear on problems in developing countries with an energy and focus that we have not yet seen. This could truly move the project forward, and I applaud the Chairman's efforts to explore initiatives that could accomplish this goal.

In this effort, it may be worthwhile to consider tax incentives for U.S. media companies, entertainment companies and sports leagues to contribute highly demanded American content to broadcasters in emerging democracies.² Among the most important elements of ensuring independence in media is sustainability, and compelling programming is an essential element of building a brand and maintaining an advertising base. If U.S. companies can be provided incentives for distributing highly demanded programming, it could make a real difference.

- *Our work, and its ultimate success, should be judged by a rigorous assessment of media independence and freedom*

There is a need for a system to measure, to the extent possible, our success in fostering independent media and a free press. The *Media Sustainability Index* (www.irex.org/msi), which provides a rigorous assessment of media development in 20 countries in Europe and Eurasia, strikes me as having established the right analysis. The MSI measures progress along a five-point scale, using evidence drawn from extensive field work in each country—free speech protected by laws, regulations and cultural norms; professional journalism that is balanced, fair and ethical; a plurality of news sources available to citizens; ethical and profitable management and independent media; and institutions supporting media professionalism and independence. These indices provide a valuable analysis of where we are in each country, and they provide a system of measurement that could be straightforwardly extended to additional countries and regions.

Any serious effort to establish a goal demands a concomitant commitment to measuring whether that goal has been met. Analyses such as the MSI will be an essential component going forward to ensure that we do not end our involvement prematurely.

Once again, I appreciate the opportunity to share these ideas with you. I would be pleased to address any questions you might have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Wimmer.

Let me state the situation. The rollcall vote has commenced, and I think that we will have a recess of 10 minutes, wherein Senators can vote, and you will not have your questions and answers interrupted. So if you can be patient for that period, we'll return. I'm advised we'll not have a second vote; there will be just the single vote. That is good news and may give us, then, opportunities for extensive questioning and dialog.

Is that acceptable to Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Oh, absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. The committee will recess for 10 minutes, or whatever time that Senator Biden and I require to get our votes cast, and we'll be back.

Thank you.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is called to order again.

Let me ask—Mr. Wimmer, you have mentioned IREX. Would you, for the benefit of both the committee as well as those watching this hearing, describe more about that organization? Because it has, as you mentioned, been active in 15 countries. But what happens? Who are the people in IREX, and what do they do?

Mr. WIMMER. Thank you very much, I'd be pleased to.

²For full disclosure, I should point out that Covington & Burling represents numerous media companies and sports leagues.

IREX has a number of different functions. Of course, as the name implies, it does a lot of educational exchanges, and that's a part of the organization about which I'm learning more.

The CHAIRMAN. What do the four letters stand for?

Mr. WIMMER. International Research and Exchanges Board.

The CHAIRMAN. Great.

Mr. WIMMER. So, historically, it was set up many, many years ago, during the Soviet Union days, and did a number of exchanges with the Soviet Union, mostly university age and professors. It has expanded dramatically into Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and is now expanding into the Middle East and doing exchanges, as well. But they also operate the Pro-Media Program, which works in about 15 countries to foster independent media. And what that program does—it's a USAID-supported program—it goes in, sets up centers that are in the country, and works with journalists and media companies there to just provide assistance. And they will help train camera people, advertising sales, promotion, production, everything so that the media can become self-sustaining. So it really isn't public diplomacy or international broadcasting, in terms of getting our viewpoint across, but it is helping to sustain media. And we get involved when there are media laws proposed, and we hear about that through the field offices.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, as you've correctly identified, one of the purposes of the legislation that I've offered and that has been supported by Senator Biden and Senator Hagel, my colleagues here this morning, is to build the institution of the media, recognizing that there may be people writing in papers or on broadcasts who are averse to many of our points of view. We are trying to think ahead, through the vehicle of the National Endowment for Democracy. We've chosen that because it has 20 years of a good track record, election observations, and institution-building. Sometimes you can't transfer these skills, in terms of political organization or governance, to the media. This is going to require some thoughtfulness by veterans of the trail, such as the three of you, as to how this proceeds. As you've suggested, that if American media are to become more active, as organizations in the area, this intersects with this attempt to bring about the training or the building of indigenous forces in each of the countries.

I wanted to outline, for the moment, the IREX experience, because people have been doing some of this already. This is not rediscovery today. The question is how to augment those efforts in a much more comprehensive way as a part of a global program.

Mr. Powell, I'm encouraged by your description of the program that you head. How many people are involved in this? How popular is the subject? Do you have folks coming to your university for the purpose, really, of engaging in public diplomacy?

Mr. POWELL. This is a very new center. The planning began in September, with both the USC School of International Relations and the Annenberg School for Communication. We're drawing on, as you can imagine, many other resources—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. POWELL [continuing]. On campus. Word is spreading quickly among the grad students that this is a field that they should be

getting into. Our first courses will be offered in the fall, and we're finding we have to cap them because the interest is that great. So there is a recognition among—not only among the faculty and among visiting scholars who will be joining us, but, perhaps most gratifyingly, among the students, that this is a field of great importance, and a field where they will want to build not only the scholarship, but their life's work. And so this is a growing area, and, for that and many other reasons, your initiative is most timely.

The CHAIRMAN. This may be a reach, because you say it's a new school, but over half of the students at engineering universities around our country, we hear, at least in frequent testimony, come from abroad. There is a yearning by American industry that more Americans might take engineering, that this would be helpful, maybe, in terms of building jobs here. Nevertheless, huge numbers of students, and a majority in many of the engineering schools, I'm just curious, down the trail, is it likely that students from abroad will come to study public diplomacy? Maybe they come now to study journalism. This would be an interesting inquiry. In other words, how well are we doing in that field already, given the exchange programs you talked about generally, specifically? Do you have any view on that?

Mr. POWELL. Well, the University of Southern California already has, we believe, more international students—students from outside the U.S. than any other university, and the Center of Public Diplomacy is actually already receiving applications from students outside the United States who want to come and study, not only public diplomacy as practiced—history and practice here in the United States, but also how it's practiced across the world to try to improve their own countries' efforts in this area.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mater, earlier on you made the comment—and I commended the comment—about the business aspects of this. What, ideally, should the National Endowment for Democracy or the universities, as you've been listening to this, or IREX, for example, do on the business side? Obviously, sustaining these enterprises is of the essence. Because a lot of people are going back and forth to Iraq now, to Baghdad, there has been flourishing of new papers, new communications. It is not really clear how these all sustain themselves, but probably it is clear that some will not sustain themselves very long. As a practical point of advice, how do you gain this other part of the picture, after you have your message, to finance how you do it, to hire other people to help you sustain the circulation and distribution of what you're going to do?

Mr. MATER. I think that really there are two ways. One is actually to do workshops abroad in which the business side of the newspapers—

The CHAIRMAN. To hold seminars frankly devoted to that subject.

Mr. MATER. This is how we do it. However, perhaps even better than that are exchange programs. You were talking earlier about American media. In the case of Indiana—I do know some of the media people, the Schurz family, for example.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MATER. But as perhaps a typical and good example, there's a woman I know, who runs a television station in Evansville, Indiana, and I paired her and her station with a station in Ukraine.

And there were exchanges where the top three or four or five people from the station in Ukraine came to Indiana, spent time at the station and actually learned, How do you sell advertising? How do you price advertising? How do you get involved with the community? It's more than just business. Community service is a big thing in broadcasting in this country, and it was imparted to those people, as well.

People from Indiana went over to the town in Ukraine, roughly the same size as Evansville, talking about the same size audience. It would be wrong, for example, to take people from a small town in Ukraine, and ship them to New York or to Washington. Washington, being even the eighth largest market, is far bigger than some of the places that I've dealt with. So bringing them to a comparable-sized market worked out very well.

I haven't heard from the Ukrainians, but Lucy Himstedt, who runs WFIE-TV in Evansville, has been in touch with me, and Lucy tells me how successful the exchange has been. So it works even, the pairing of stations in Indiana and Ukraine, but it worked. So that's another way of doing it.

The CHAIRMAN. I would say you would, with Hoosiers, probably enjoy an appropriate pairing. But, nevertheless, I think, you know, the point you make is an excellent one. The size and the scope has to be thought of—

Mr. MATER. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. As opposed to throwing somebody into another milieu just for general knowledge, because by the time you get to the nitty-gritty of how to make a living at this, why, the scope is a very important aspect of that.

Mr. MATER. Yes, that's true. In the case of radio, they have to understand the concepts that we have developed in this country, such as audience flow and so on, and knowing who you're dealing with. This is a major aspect of what we do in this country, the research and the like of that, so we know who we're serving. People over there generally don't, and it's a matter of teaching them.

The CHAIRMAN. I've waited for the expertise of this panel to pose this question. In August, I was privileged to visit Uzbekistan. It was my first visit to that country. And President Karimov heard that I was coming, essentially, really to take a look at what had been the Soviet Union's either biological or chemical warfare laboratories that, under the Nunn-Lugar Act, we were trying to convert, and that ostensibly had been converted. We were going to inspect whether there were now scientists doing good things in these places. In any event, before we ever got to the laboratories, President Karimov appropriated my trip, and insisted that I accompany him in his aircraft, the Samarkand, which was a wonderful experience, historically. Yet his purpose was to have 6 hours of conversation, and much of it was the President's side of the conversation, attempting to talk about human rights, talk about criticism by the United States of his regime and of him personally, and so forth.

I did not make a brief for the President in response to whatever he had to say. One interesting thing that he did have to say was that the American message was not being heard; the Russian message is being heard. So I said, Well, how is this happening? And he said, Well, through radio stations, essentially. Many people in

Uzbekistan listen to the radio. They're beyond the purview of television at this point, although maybe not forever. He was suggesting that I ought to go back, if I were serious about getting the United States message there, and insist that maybe 300 large towers be constructed, that, at least in his vision, would transmit signals all the way from the United States. If necessary, we could have them tune into our programming. In any event, if we wanted to do something out at the capital city of Tashkent, why, it could be picked up at least universally within the country. It was an interesting suggestion, and I've tried it on for size with people in our television electronic markets. They all find it intriguing, but don't really know what to make of this.

Let me just ask you—just thinking of Uzbekistan as a case in point, a country in which the President says—unlike most of the countries polled by the Pew Foundation, or others—at least anecdotally, there appears to be a majority of people who have a pro feeling toward the United States. So you start with that basis. On the other hand, there is not much to sustain that, maybe aside from the pronouncements of the President, himself. Of course, there's some criticism of suppression of other points of view or the media. How do you open this up? Are there technical means to skip over some of the transition stages? Are 300 towers needed? What about the idea of these relay towers or towers that are big enough to pick up signals even from the United States? Is this a practical suggestion? If not, how should we begin on the ground in Uzbekistan?

Any of you have a thought?

Mr. POWELL. Well, if I can take a stab at this.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. POWELL. What we're moving toward—and this may be a bit in the future—what we're moving toward, in Uzbekistan and everywhere else, is leapfrogging much of the technology that we grew up with. Radio is still important in much of the world, as in Uzbekistan, and certainly VOA and other international broadcasters are active on the radio front. What we've found to be extremely cost effective, for very limited resources, in much of the world, including Asia and Africa and Central Europe, is to take America's message, stated indirectly, through the coverage by free media in the United States and by NGOs in the United States, and place the audio on the Internet. You find that this attracts an audience in places that we had not anticipated.

When I was Gene Mater's colleague at The Freedom Forum, we began something called "free radio," which as an Internet radio service, audio files and streaming services placed on the Internet. Anyone could download it. And the only way we found out that—well, the first way that we found out that people were using is, we'd start to get e-mail from Serbia or from South Africa, saying, oh, we're hearing your programs on independent radio station, or on a station in Sarajevo that suddenly started using a 1-hour weekly magazine that we were producing issues about free press. So there is a technology which costs very little, very cost effective, and could be picked up by anyone who was interested.

Now, that doesn't address the language issue, and it doesn't address the issue of actually getting it onto a dial that someone on

a small radio can tune to. But there are these kinds of technologies that are out there which don't require a huge investment.

Also, in much of the world, as you know, satellite-delivered radio and television are becoming important. Satellite radio is something which is fairly new here, with XM and serious radio offering commercial services. But in some of the world, that's an important way of reaching at least elites, and through elites sometimes you can get the word out in a very timely fashion.

Mr. MATER. I might just add to that. Technology is what does it all, in the sense that—when we started RIAS, my colleagues then in Berlin started RIAS in February 1946 to counter what was then the Soviet control of all radio in Berlin—we started it as what was then called wired radio, which went over telephone lines. And then to reach a broader audience, we went over the air. And then we went beyond that, because we wanted to serve more than Berlin. We used repeater stations that could carry the signal into the Soviet zone of Germany. It can be done as you say, but—and RFE has tried to have their broadcast carried locally. It doesn't always work but it is important.

Mr. WIMMER. Mr. Chairman, if I could add, I agree with everything that's been said. There have been a couple of times when the, sort of, analog to the 300-foot tower has been tried. The most successful, of course, was Serbia—Project Pebble, I believe it was called by USAID, which sent B92 back in. And we've seen that sometimes in Croatia, Bosnia, where it's not necessarily a government attempt, but a private broadcaster in one country puts up a big tower to try to reach populations in another.

I really like Professor Powell's idea of using technology rather than building these cross-border broadcasting facilities, which do raise international law issues. But the Internet's a great example, if it can be a sort of a business-to-business approach where the end result is something that's available to a broadcaster in Uzbekistan by the Internet that can be broadcast. Because really the Internet connectivity in Uzbekistan and most of the countries there is so poor that having something streamed in hopes that consumers will pick it up is pretty futile at this point. But if it can be available to broadcasters, who would then put it on the air—I mean, radio is such an important medium of communications in Eurasia, that I think that's clearly workable. And I'm always amazed, when I travel to the region, how many satellite dishes you see, so I think that's also something else that can be explored. It's even better than a 300-foot tower; it's quite a large one.

The CHAIRMAN. Just listening to your testimony, it occurs to me that perhaps the students—maybe students from Uzbekistan, to use this case in point—would come to the United States. You try to work with them on the content, on the principles, on the values, but also on technical aspects. My guess is, while there are students at Southern California in the next year or so, in this country, the way in which television is delivered to many homes in our country can really change very markedly. This is a large debate going on, this bundling of services or consolidation, the discussions of how all that happens. Perhaps the students would be better able to interpret, on the ground in their home countries, what is doable, if they have the capital and the backing to do this. this reinforces again

that the longevity of the project depends upon finance there, as well as assistance we can give.

This goes well beyond the budgetary debates that we're having now. As you said, Mr. Wimmer, in one of your four points, we have to be very thoughtful about cutting back successful things we are doing now, even as we become innovative and reach out, with the NED or with others, for that matter.

Let me ask this question, because it poses a difficult problem for our diplomats, quite apart from the issues of journalism. With the fall of the former Soviet Union and the coming of a new Russia, President Bush, the first President Bush, introduced the Freedom Support Act. Robert Strauss was named as our Ambassador to Russia with a whole portfolio of potential reforms that we thought would be helpful for a new Russia. They included much more of an emphasis on contracts, property rights, rule of law, court systems that handle these sorts of things. His priorities were pretty heavy on freedom of expression and the need for free media and all that accompanies that. A lot occurred in Russia. From time to time, a lot was wound up and didn't work. At the same time, in the current situation, one of the major criticisms of President Putin is that one by one the television media have either gone out of business or have been appropriated by the President or by his followers so that something less than free expression seems to be the case. That is true of some other elements of the media. Here we have a situation in which a lot of Russians have come to study in the United States, or have engaged with some of you, as professionals, as to "how do we do it," and some were doing it very well.

I can remember, before one television station was closed, they asked me to make an appearance, which I did, just as a show of what I felt was important about what they were doing. As I was being interviewed, it was interminable because they had no other programming, I think, that evening.

They were rushing around anticipating somebody might come after them that evening in, sort of, a touch-and-go situation, which is too bad. This occurs not just in Russia, but also with other regimes as they come and go.

How do we handle this, in terms of our public diplomacy? Here, you're beyond just a rudimentary training of people. Some of the financing, allegedly, of the television stations came from the so-called oligarchies, or people who had become very wealthy. That's a long debate itself, as to how they gained their wealth, and the legitimacy of that, and their status. Nevertheless, it is pretty well financed. It was one reason that they made a lot of headway rather rapidly.

Now, do any of you have any comment as we get really into public diplomacy and its longevity, its sustainability? How do we handle those situations? Do we offer a refugee haven for better days? Do we, through our own diplomacy at the highest levels, make known how important we believe this is as a major point of foreign policy? Do any of you have any comment on this scene?

Mr. POWELL. All of the above, Mr. Chairman. And it was interesting to see President Bush making some remarks about Tunisia in this respect, which was quite important. But among the many tools at our disposal, if I could cite an example of something which

we did at The Freedom Forum for years, was to go to a country—Peru, Russia, Zambia, Ghana, a country which is going to have elections maybe 6 months or 3 months down the road—and hold seminars and training sessions on the ground in the country with experts from the United States—some of our former colleagues from CBS News, from other U.S. news organizations—to reinforce, among the editors and others—educators, regional indigenous NGOs and others—what they have at their disposal within the scope of their resources to fight for their independence. And that’s everything from—in Peru, where Fujimori, at the time, controlled almost all the newspapers and almost all of television and radio. We showed them various ways of—whether through e-mailing of files, through regular monitoring of the things we take for granted, the New York Times Web site or the Washington Post Web site, that they could—and you don’t have to—even just have to say it in these terms, because they understand immediately, Ah, this is something the government can’t stop. This is something that is not subject to the censorship in Lima or Moscow or Lusaka, wherever. You see a hunger for these kinds of resources, and a willingness on the part of many courageous people to use them at a time which is most critical, when they’re either at the beginning of or at the height of an election campaign. We’ve found that to be a very, very well-received set of programs, and a set of programs where—which were requested by journalists in many countries. And within our resources, we could do—in my department, I could do about one a month. So—still, it’s 12 countries a year, so you go all around the world. And we saw, from anecdotal evidence, a great positive benefit from that.

Mr. MATER. I would just add a point or two. I meet with many foreign journalists who come to this country—are brought in by our tax dollars, as a matter of fact. I think it’s next week that I meet with a number of Arab journalists, for example. I know there are some Africans the week after that. And in spite of all their problems, I do tell them that democracy is not easy, and how we fight for it in this country.

I think it’s going to take time, but I do think it is important to meet with these people to show the difference between what they’re seeing in their own countries and how we practice journalism in this country. For better or for worse, we practice it one way, but in many of the other countries, there isn’t journalism as we know it; certainly not in China, for example.

But we do meet with them. I meet with them on a regular basis. They’re inquisitive about how to do things. And maybe, little by little, it’ll take another generation, but something more will happen. It will happen in Russia, as well, I think, in spite of what’s happened to the broadcast structure.

But it’s a time-taking problem that will take awhile before it is licked. I don’t think we can pressure Russia into suddenly creating independent television. There are some independent radio stations. And the newspapers are not doing all that badly, although there is pressure. The former Soviet Union—in fact, all the countries in the former Soviet bloc, have a concept of what they call “paid advertising” which is really buying stories. You can get into the news-

paper anytime you want to. It's a different atmosphere. But, little by little, we're working on it.

Mr. WIMMER. I really agree completely with that, Mr. Chairman. The time that it takes to make these changes is huge. Russia's a great example of a very mature country that still has great needs, I think, both for journalism training, because of the tradition of advocacy journalism and the lack of balance in many news outlets, but also real need for media law support. And I know the media lawyers that are active in Russia, and there are perhaps a half dozen that are really active, and it's an enormous country. And they definitely need help. And there are, you know, any number of proposals that could do significant damage if they were adopted that one reads about, and a few of them that we've worked on. So I think that continues to be important.

But I think you're exactly right to say that we also need to look at this as a political matter and as part of our bilateral negotiations with countries such as Russia. For many of the countries that we go to, all we can do is use moral suasion and say, free expression is good. You should change this in your law because of the following reasons. There are many more tools in the briefcase of a diplomat who goes over to negotiate. And I think it would be important.

Mr. MATER. I might just correct something I said. I referred to "paid advertising." It's called "hidden advertising" or "paid editorial."

The CHAIRMAN. Hidden.

Mr. MATER [continuing]. Which is more direct. Every time I meet with Russian or Georgian journalists, or whatever country they happen to be from, and I bring it up, they say, "Oh, yes, it's still going on." Hidden advertising. Indeed, a public relations organization in Moscow, about 3 years ago, actually did a survey and went to the various newspapers and said, "How much does it cost for 500 words?" They all have a price list. It's easy. You can get into the newspapers anytime you want to if you pay for it, which is a very unfortunate aspect of the business. They say they have to do it because they need the money.

The CHAIRMAN. There's one other scene that I wanted to bring before you, just for your comment today. Just during the period of time I've served on this committee in the Senate, there has been a sea change in terms of governments that want to interact with our government. And so, as a result, maybe the chief executive, the president, or the king, or whoever, comes to the United States and seeks, usually through our Ambassador in that country, an audience with the President of the United States. And the President's time is not unlimited. And so, as a result, the competition for these audiences and meetings is substantial. But, in any event, many succeed because it's in our interest, their interest, for these meetings to occur.

Now, in the past, sometimes that was it. Occasionally, the itinerary of the chief executive might be extended to find the Secretary of State, if he was available, and visit the State Department; and then, in more recent times, maybe even to find the Secretary of Defense or the National Security Council Director.

But, in due course, many Ambassadors here on the ground in Washington have advised the chief executive that he ought to have a go at the Congress. It is a much more murky subject as to how you do that, how you actually come from the executive area over here to Capitol Hill. Many have adapted to that situation, and we've tried to adapt our institutions to that.

In the Senate, for example, we had a coffee in the morning, on Monday, with the new President of Georgia and members of his cabinet. Now, he is a former American student, very savvy about all of these things. As is increasingly the case, a large press contingent accompanied him over to the Foreign Relations Committee room in S-116, where these ceremonial occasions occur, including a fairly large cadre of people in the written press. And this is long before he gets to the White House. I saw him on television with the President yesterday, quite an itinerary.

More and more, these intersections occur. They have some risks for the chief executive or the foreign minister or what have you, particularly when they bring along all of their own press with them, and their own press intersects with our press. After all, it's not an exclusive situation outside of S-116. Everybody was there, all asking questions back and forth.

More and more, I've noticed, the chief executives have messages that they utilize our room to make, statements about how they are received, how gracious we are, how much we agree with them, how fine we feel they are.

Now, sometimes it doesn't work. The other instance of this that's historical was President Marcos, for example, using an American talk show on a Sunday to declare a snap election in the Philippines. Now, you'd ask, well, why would President Marcos use American television to announce an election in his own country? Well, because really the relationship between the United States and the Philippines was at stake. He felt, in essence, that we doubted whether he had the backing of the people, and he wanted to indicate to us that he did, so he was going to have a snap election and challenge the United States to come over and watch it. This was, if not the beginning of observations, certainly a leap forward, and it was substantial.

I mention all this because I saw the Philippine Ambassador yesterday. We had a meeting, in this same S-116, with the ten ASEAN Ambassadors. They're about to have another election. Now, this is a different situation, although observers, as I understand, will once again be going—from NED, from the International Republican Institute from the National Democratic Institute, and so forth—over there. But in this particular case, not only did Marcos invite the group—which President Reagan asked me to chair, so I was involved in this—but after we made a finding and announced in the Philippines that the election was filled with fraud and abuse, in essence, Marcos then went onto the Sunday shows. I can remember appearing on a split screen with him on three different shows, in which he was still debating, in the United States, the efficacy of his election and all of this, which is interesting. It finally didn't work, and, as you know. We advised him to wait, which he did, and Corazon Aquino became the President.

I mention this because public diplomacy works both ways. It appears to me that, from the start that Marcos made, it was relatively unsuccessful for his purposes. Others are doing better at it. This may bode well, then, for journalism abroad. As we think about this new program envisioned by my legislation, or however it's amended and modified, we may have an audience there of chief executives, foreign ministers, others, who understand this better, who understand the value to them, of having these contacts.

I would like to ask you how should we approach this from that standpoint. We have to pass the bill here, so I will be seeking the votes of fellow Senators, as well as support in the House and so forth. The initiative comes, after all, after the strong support of the President in the State of the Union Message to double the NED budget and to go after this, so it's not entirely an initiative of my own. There's a pretty good force coming behind us there.

While we're at work here, what sort of diplomacy ought we to be having with others abroad so that we inform them of our debate and so that this is not a covert activity in which the United States is trying to somehow change their minds, but rather a cooperative affair to build their institutions and a capacity for all of us to understand each other better? We have veterans at the trail in this. How would you approach the other governments? What sort of public diplomacy should we be doing, maybe as a committee, as we go about our work?

Mr. POWELL. One suggestion would be to begin with our friends. And I think that it's interesting to find how many governments have public diplomacy entities, some of them called departments of public diplomacy.

There are also—with whom we clearly should establish—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, good idea.

Mr. POWELL [continuing]. A dialog. Then there are the NGOs. The GAO has identified some of them. Freedom House report is committed to protect journalists—many are represented here in this room—who also carry the same message in many of the same places.

Trying to build these kinds of relationships and support from more than one organization can have a number of benefits. I mean, the more sources of funding a courageous editor has, the higher his credibility. The French discovered trying to support a newspaper in Gabon, they just gave French Government money to the newspaper, and it was immediately discredited. Whereas, if they had worked with others, including some French NGOs, they might have had a better result.

Another is just through these dialogs, we find out what we're doing, and we can reduce rivalries and overlapping comparative efforts that might be counterproductive. And, finally, through the National Endowment for Democracy and the support that you're proposing. This could really be the beginning of a real knitting together of a community of interest in this area. And it embraces not only a number of organizations here in the United States, but an even larger number of organizations around the world, some in places you might not expect, like Uzbekistan. And that certainly helps promote exactly what the goals are that we're all trying to achieve that you've articulated so well.

Mr. MATER. One of the first workshops I did after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was in Bratislava—now the capital of Slovakia—then it was still in Czechoslovakia. But I had dinner, the first night, with the Minister of Culture, who asked me, “Why are you doing this?” It was a question, quite frankly, I hadn’t expected. And I said, “What do you mean?” And he said, “You know, you and your colleagues are here, and you’re teaching people how to run independent newspapers. Why?” And I launched into what I told him was a selfish argument, that I had been through one war in Europe, and I didn’t want to go through another one, that stability and democracy required a free and independent press. We discussed it on that level. And, at the end, I convinced him, but I don’t know I can convince everybody. But that was part of the argument. And I have run into that. He was the first, but he wasn’t the last to ask me, “Why are you here?” And particularly since we were private citizens—we were using government money at the time, but we were not working for the government.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that’s a very good point, that when you’re doing the Lord’s work, there’s no need to be bashful about it. Indicate that you’re there really to build institutions.

Mr. MATER. Well, the Minister of Culture, was quite suspicious of our purpose and understandably so, “Why are you here? Why are you doing this?”

The CHAIRMAN. I think that that suspicion probably would be shared by many governments around the world.

Mr. MATER. Well it came up later, too. But, by that time, I was prepared for it.

Mr. WIMMER. I had the same experience on my very first attempt to persuade another government to change its laws. We were beginning a 3-hour meeting with the parliamentarian who had drafted it and headed up the committee, and he said to me, through the interpreter, “Well, I drafted the constitution in 1992, so I know this is constitutional. What do we have to talk about?” It was humbling for me, in that it informed how we did this from that point on, that there are treaties, there are reasons why they should do it legally. But, most importantly, as Gene said, there are reasons to foster independent media that are central to our national security interests.

So I tend to think that in the types of meetings that you discussed, you started the process by introducing this legislation, by centralizing NED, possibly, and by showing that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is concerned about independent media, which is a great indicator of its importance. To the extent that the President or the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense says, in one of these meetings, “Well, Mr. President, we’re very concerned with the state of independent media in Slovakia,” then that carries a really important message.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate your testimony very much, and we look forward to hearing from all three of you, both formally and informally, in the future as we progress along this way. Sometimes Senators make comments about foreign media, about these issues, and these are heard, they are picked up by the public. At the same time, to the extent that our committee, a bipartisan committee, weighs in from time to time, conceivably this may have more effect.

To do so, it has to take some responsibility, thoughtfully and effectively, without reacting to the headline of the morning to examine more institutionally.

Each of you have spent a lot of time thinking about this, philosophically and on the ground, and that's why we appreciate your expertise today. You've been very helpful, I think, in raising questions, for the committee record, that others will read and refer to so that they will have this advice and counsel.

I also thank you for your patience, in waiting through our vote and interruptions. We appreciate the quality of this hearing, which we think has been very helpful and productive.

Thank you, and the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, DC, February 27, 2004.

The Honorable RICHARD G. LUGAR, *Chairman,*
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your committee this week. This letter provides further information on two requests raised by committee members during the hearing.

The first request was for the mission of public diplomacy. Broadly, the mission of American public diplomacy is to engage, inform and influence foreign audiences in order to increase understanding for American values, policies and initiatives and, thereby, to create an international environment receptive to American interests. Building on this, my four public diplomacy strategic priorities are: the Arab and Muslim world; non-elite, non-traditional audiences, especially the young; new initiatives, thinking outside the box; and strategic direction and performance measurement.

For the committee's information and use, I have attached our 2004 public diplomacy strategy report that was requested by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees in the conference report accompanying the FY 2004 Omnibus Appropriations Bill. This report gives greater detail about our mission and our strategic priorities.

The second request was for more information on Economic Support Funding for counter terrorism activities in East Africa. On January 21, the Department of State notified Congress of its intent to use \$1.2 million to enhance public diplomacy efforts in five target countries in support of the President's East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative. The target countries are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Earlier this month, the notification of our intent to obligate FY 2003 and prior year Economic Support Funds expired without objection, and these funds are now available for apportionment and allotment.

In November 2003, the African Bureau Public Affairs Office met in Addis Ababa with Embassy Public Affairs Officers from the target countries and military information officers to specify the Public Diplomacy tools that would best encourage strong public support for the Global War on Terrorism and counter extremist views, both secular and religious. Specific components agreed upon and ready for implementation now include three broad areas:

- Increasing media outreach and information dissemination in East Africa;
- Supporting English language and teaching programs in East Africa and providing target audiences with a better understanding of core democratic values, including tolerance;
- Conducting exchange and speaker programs on core values of democracy and governance.

Target audiences will include moderate elites, government, civil society, media and youth. We expect funds to be allotted to post by mid-March.

I hope this provides the information requested by the committee. Please let me know if there is other information you need.

Sincerely

MARGARET DEB. TUTWILER.

Enclosure: As stated.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY¹
(Revised)

MARCH 1, 2004

This document updates the public diplomacy strategy report submitted to the Appropriation Committees June 1, 2003. The mission of American public diplomacy remains to engage, inform and influence foreign audiences in order to increase understanding for American values, policies and initiatives and, thereby, to create an international environment receptive to American interests. Similarly, the six strategic guidelines described in the report remain valid: to maintain aggressive policy advocacy; to communicate the principles and values which underpin our policies and define us as a nation; to engage wider and younger audiences; to form partnerships with local institutions, media, NGOs and others to extend our reach, increase our credibility and expand our own understanding of others' concerns; to use new and more powerful channels of communication, in particular television and the Internet; to exploit research and analysis to improve our own understanding of the political, economic and information conditions that affect our ability to communicate with foreign audiences.

Building on these guidelines, the new Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, in office a little over three months, is sharpening the focus on four public diplomacy strategic priorities:

- The Arab and Muslim world;
- Non-elite, non-traditional audiences, especially the young;
- New initiatives, thinking outside the box;
- Strategic direction and performance measurement.

THE ARAB AND MUSLIM WORLD

The primary problem confronting U.S. public diplomacy today is the deterioration of America's image abroad. The deterioration is most stark in the Arab and Muslim world, and it is there that we will, first and foremost, focus our public diplomacy energies and resources.

Reflecting this priority, 25% of Department exchange funding will be dedicated to the Middle East and South Asia in FY-2004, compared with 17% in FY-2002. We have restarted the Fulbright program in Afghanistan, after a twenty-five year hiatus, and in Iraq. We continue to rebuild our public diplomacy program in Afghanistan. Public diplomacy offices are heavily committed in Iraq, and public diplomacy will be a significant part of our Embassy program in Iraq later this year. We will establish fifty-eight American Corners in the Middle East and South Asia in FY-2004, including ten in Afghanistan and fifteen in Iraq. The Department's Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) has quadrupled its output of Arabic language translations for distribution in the Middle East. In addition, public diplomacy is a crucial element in the President's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which is coordinating reform policy and programs in the region.

Our public diplomacy focus on the Muslim world extends beyond the Middle East and South Asia to countries with significant Muslim populations in Southeast Asia, Central Eurasia and Africa, as well. Although the public diplomacy challenge may be different in various countries, the need exists to reach out to Muslim populations in all these regions with effective public diplomacy programs. Similarly, as we focus on areas where deterioration of America's image is most severe, we must not neglect those countries where our image is positive; we must ensure that a problem does not develop tomorrow where one does not exist today.

¹Drafted by: Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

NON-ELITE, NON-TRADITIONAL AUDIENCES, ESPECIALLY THE YOUNG

The second strategic priority is to increase the focus of our public diplomacy programs on a new audience, the non-elites, especially among the younger generation. Traditionally, U.S. public diplomacy has focused on educated audiences, those with influence or access to influence and opportunity. We will continue to engage these important audiences, advocating our policies and explaining our actions. We will continue academic and professional exchanges at more senior levels.

At the same time, we must do a better job reaching young non-elites and those who traditionally lack access not only to information about the United States but also to those tools—specifically the tools of education—which will help them participate in the kind of world the United States seeks to advance, a world of political and economic freedom and opportunity. It is in the interest of the United States that these young people see their futures lying with a constructive international system of cooperation and common values rather than with a destructive ideology of anti-Americanism.

Expanding the circle of opportunity is the concept behind Partnerships for Learning (P4L), an initiative of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), which seeks to extend our exchange programs to undergraduate college students and to high school students. P4L has initiated our first high school exchange program with the Arab and Muslim world. Today, 170 high school students from predominantly Islamic countries are living with American families and studying at local high schools. Another 450 high school students from the Middle East and South Asia will come here in 2004 for the next academic year. P4L youth programs extend beyond the Middle East and South Asia, for example, to Malaysia and Indonesia.

In addition, seventy undergraduate students, men and women, from North Africa and the Middle East will come to the U.S. in FY-2004 for intensive English language training prior to their enrollment in university degree programs.

Through our School Internet Connectivity Program, 26,000 high school students from the Middle East, South Asia, South East Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus have collaborated since 2000 with U.S. students in online projects focused on building mutual understanding across the topics of current affairs, entrepreneurship, health, and civic responsibility. The Under Secretary is also initiating a program of micro-scholarships for English learning and to allow foreign students who otherwise would lack access to attend American Schools in their own countries. Micro-scholarships will follow the model of the successful micro-credit programs through which the U.S. has helped numerous entrepreneurs and small businesses in developing countries.

English teaching is a priority program for reaching out to non-elite audiences. ECA is devoting an additional \$1,573,000 to English teaching and creating five new Regional English Language Officer positions in FY 2005, bringing the total to twenty. This is not enough, but it is a start. Whether through direct teaching or training instructors, English language programs offer great scope for advancing public diplomacy objectives. For example, over the past five years, Embassy Damascus estimates that it has trained over 9,000 of Syria's 12,000 English-language teachers, a terrific example of outreach to the successor generation in Syria.

Public diplomacy also reached beyond traditional elite audiences when ambassadors and embassy staff visit local schools and other often neglected venues simply to talk about America. We are encouraging all our diplomats and visiting officials to dedicate a little time to this valuable though low-key outreach.

The report by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, chaired by Ambassador Edward Djerejian, underlined the lost opportunity which exists because the people in countries which receive substantial U.S. assistance do not know that the help is coming from America. Most Egyptians know that the Japanese helped to build the Cairo opera house; few know that billions of dollars in American aid has helped to build water, power, sanitary and other infrastructure systems which contribute to their well-being every day. The State Department and USAID are jointly committed to ensuring that recipients of assistance recognize America's role in helping them. A joint Public Diplomacy Policy Group works to that end as part of the overall State-USAID strategic plan.

NEW INITIATIVES, THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX

Even as we continue to rely on powerful traditional exchange, information and advocacy programs, we need also to search for new ways to reach our audiences, audiences previously outside our focus and also long-standing audiences now subject to new media and other influences with which our public diplomacy must compete. To this end, the Under Secretary has created new positions and hired staff with respon-

sibility for specific functions, including private sector cooperation, sports programming and “book programs.” The responsibilities of these positions are open-ended in that, though focused on specific areas, they are intended to explore all possibilities for creative and effective public diplomacy within their purview. For example, “book programs” should encompass not only traditional books in paper but also distribution through CDs and other contemporary media.

The possibilities for private sector cooperation are nearly boundless, from Sister Cities and humanitarian efforts such as the Wheelchair Foundation project in Afghanistan to Steinway & Sons and Motorola in Iraq. Current interagency coordination tactics play an important role in identifying expanded opportunities for the private sector. Public-private partnerships, corporate social responsibility and strategic philanthropy all have the unique ability to help advance the public diplomacy goals of the State Department. In addition, building alliances with key industries including technology, healthcare and education can work to complement current Administration initiatives.

Public Affairs Officers and public diplomacy staff in the field are a rich source of creative ideas. In order to foster this creativity and spread its reach, the Under Secretary has created the *PD Global Forum*, a web-based discussion site intended to allow unrestricted horizontal communication between PD professionals around the world, sparking ideas, discussion and debate to help us all do a better job. *PD Global Forum* will also be a rich source of support for the young PD officers who now staff many of our posts, often the embassy’s only PD officer. The *PD Global Forum* is indicative of the Department’s commitment to creativity in public diplomacy.

STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

In order to ensure that public diplomacy resources are directed towards strategic priorities and that programs are effective in advancing those priorities, the Under Secretary and the Department are undertaking a broad review of all public diplomacy programs as the starting point for developing a continuing process of program evaluation. Under the direction of the Under Secretary’s office, and drawing on outside expertise, ECA, IIP and PA will work with the regional bureaus and posts overseas with the goal of completing an initial survey of programs by the summer of 2004. The survey should tell us how public diplomacy professionals in the field judge current programs. From this beginning, we plan to develop further mechanisms to evaluate the impact of specific programs in advancing public diplomacy objectives. The ultimate objective is to develop a basis for resource allocation decisions.

Although we expect useful feedback from the survey right away, evaluation will be a long-term process. Foreign attitudes and public opinion are affected by a myriad of factors, many beyond our influence or control. Impact for some programs may not be open to quantifiable measurement. We are, however, committed to developing a culture of measurement for public diplomacy to ensure that limited resources are allocated in the most effective way possible.

We consider an effective program evaluation process to be a necessary component for strategic planning and direction of public diplomacy. The Under Secretary is taking other steps, including the *PD Global Forum*, to strengthen communication and a sense of common purpose in the public diplomacy community of the State Department. Further steps, including the issue of a formal strategic planning office within the Office of the Under Secretary are also under consideration.

CONCLUSION

This revised report is not intended to be a comprehensive recapitulation of State Department public diplomacy programs and issues covered in the June, 2003, report. Key programs highlighted in that report, such as Culture Connect, television co-operatives and IIP’s websites, remain priorities though they are not featured in this update. The current report is a status report of where we stand about three months into the tenure of a new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

This report does not address issues of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). While the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs serves as the Secretary’s representative on the board, the BBG is an independent agency. Department coordination with the BBG is continuous, but any strategy report on international broadcasting should come directly from the BBG.

RESPONSE OF HON. MARGARET DEB. TUTWILER TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION FOR
THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

Background:

Ms. Tutwiler: The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center, named after our esteemed former colleague from the House, Dante B. Fascell, provides timely research, policy seminars and training activities that seek solutions to specific problems in the Western Hemisphere that prove time and again their importance.

The Department of State included funding for the Center in its FY 2004 budget request. The Senate included \$2 million in its FY 2004 Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations Report (S. Rept. 108-144), but no funding was provided this fiscal year. However, in order to carry out important projects, it needs to continue to receive Federal funding in FY 2004.

Question. Would you look closely at the need for such a facility and comment on the value the North-South Center provides? Would you look seriously at the possibility of reprogramming funds for the Center in FY 2004?

Answer. The Department of State values our long partnership with the North-South Center and the positive impact it has had in the Western Hemisphere over the years.

The Conference Report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 (as enacted in P.L. 108-199) does not include funding for the Center. The Center is currently operating on funds remaining in two open cooperative agreements from the Department of State.

Because of the redirection of resources towards the Islamic world and plans for the rebuilding of Iraq, there is little flexibility for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs to fund any expanded activities for the North-South Center. We are therefore unable to commit to reprogramming funds for the Center in FY 2004.

