[Senate Hearing 108-440]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-440, Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2400
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
----------
MARCH 3, 10; APRIL 2, 2004
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005--Part 5 EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
S. Hrg. 108-440, Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2400
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
__________
MARCH 3, 10; APRIL 2, 2004
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
93-575 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2005
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina BILL NELSON, Florida
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN CORNYN, Texas HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Role of Defense Science and Technology in the Global War on
Terrorism and in Preparing for Emerging Threats
march 3, 2004
Page
Uhler, Dr. Dale G., Acquisition Executive and Senior Procurement
Executive, Special Operations Acquisitions and Logistics
Center, United States Special Operations Command............... 7
Waldhauser, Brig. Gen. Thomas D., USMC, Commanding General,
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory; Vice Chief, Office of
Naval Research................................................. 12
Cartwright, Brig. Gen. Charles A., USA, Deputy Commanding General
for Systems of Systems Integration, United States Army
Research, Development, and Engineering Command................. 17
Sega, Dr. Ronald M., Director, Defense Research and Engineering.. 31
Killion, Dr. Thomas H., Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Research and Technology, Chief Scientist.............. 38
Cohen, Rear Adm. Jay M., USN, Chief of Naval Research............ 45
Engle, James B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Science, Technology, and Engineering........................... 52
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs of the Department of Energy
and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs of the Department of
Defense
march 10, 2004
Longsworth, Paul M., Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration,
Department of Energy........................................... 119
Bronson, Lisa, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology
Security Policy and Counterproliferation....................... 129
Counternarcotics Program
april 2, 2004
O'Connell, Hon. Thomas W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.................. 167
Clingan, Rear Adm. Bruce W., USN, Deputy Director of Operations,
U.S. Central Command........................................... 172
Mixon, Brig. Gen. Benjamin R., USA, Director of Operations, J-3,
U.S. Southern Command.......................................... 174
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, DC.
THE ROLE OF DEFENSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON
TERRORISM AND IN PREPARING FOR EMERGING THREATS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in
room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Pat
Roberts (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Roberts, Allard,
Collins, Reed, and Clinton.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Elaine A. McCusker,
professional staff member; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew W.
Florell, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Darren M. Dick,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Derek J. Maurer, assistant to
Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Graham; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy;
Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Richard Kossler,
assistant to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator
Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN
Senator Roberts. The subcommittee will come to order. Good
morning, and thank you all for joining us today. This morning,
the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities meets to
receive testimony from representatives of the Department of
Defense (DOD) on science and technology (S&T) programs and
their role in the global war on terrorism and also in
confronting emerging threats.
I'd like to thank the witnesses and I would really like to
thank those who have provided the demonstrations in the back of
the room for their participation.
I would urge all members, and when they come in, I will
urge them again, and I would urge all those in the audience to
take a look at the demonstrations that we have in the back of
the hearing room.
These displays, I think, have helped us all better--I know
they have helped me--appreciate and understand the role that
S&T plays in equipping, training, and also protecting America's
fighting force, i.e., the warfighter.
Let me say from the outset that as I went around the back
of the room, and I apologize for missing some of the
demonstration projects, but it indicates to me how important it
is that we somehow meet the goal of 3 percent of defense
spending for S&T and maintain the technological lead that is
absolutely essential if we're going to continue to be
successful in the global war on terrorism.
We have some stand-off equipment in regards to check
points. We have Mr. Omni-Directional Inspection System (ODIS)
over here on the floor, whom we could use by the Hart Building
and probably speed the--I know speed doesn't work very well in
the Senate, but at least to get Senators and also our visitors
and other important people into the buildings. Why, ODIS could
certainly do that job.
We have some unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that can do
the same thing in regards to check points. In the back, we have
the Omni directional system. Actually, that's displayed and
that's ODIS. We have 20 of the ODIS in operation as of right
now--no. We have 20 and 10 are in operation.
Mr. Ranking Member and Senator Collins, I don't know why I
got into all this, but at least give me a little slack here and
I'll be all right.
We have a new bandage back there, and I can't read my
writing, but basically it's made up of shrimp cells and
vinegar. We have 3,000 of these. We need probably 303,000. It
could be applied to a shrapnel wound or any other wound that is
experienced in combat and save lives immediately.
We have another testing device over there right next to
this bandage. It's C-H-I-T-O-S-A-N. I don't know how you
pronounce that. We'll have to get a better acronym if we're
going to work that out.
Then we have the taser and the shock demonstration. I urge
everybody to go back there with the little black box. Put your
finger on the little projectile and see how that feels. I did
that three times and my finger is numb. You can see what would
happen if that were used on an individual in terms of crowd
control. If you had that kind of capability set back from what
was happening in Iraq last night and the crowd control in the
future, or something that would happen here in the Capitol area
or, for that matter, anywhere. You can see where we're headed.
I was impressed with the Phraselator that deals in 53
languages. I spoke English and it came back to me in Iraqi.
Then we have a whole series of other demonstrations back there.
Part of the big challenge with those projects is to have
interchange and interoperability and a funding source that is
constant so we can not only get these things out and have them
tested in theater, but to have the funding so that we can
proceed and then usually have a second development, a third
development, so on and so forth.
There's an outfit back there called Portable Iris
Enrollment and Recognition (PIER) 2.3. I just read in the paper
today, Senator Reed, that the Federal Bureau of Investigations
(FBI) and the Border Patrol say it's going to take 4 years to
somehow get the data on fingerprinting to match up in terms of
the database that the Border Patrol has and the FBI has.
Yet, we have an outfit back here that's about this big and
this high in regards to focusing on the iris fingerprinting amd
facial recognition.
Basically that goes into a database. Why on Earth we could
not get some kind of a--I don't know what to call it--you have
to get that kind of unit in the hands of the FBI and the Border
Patrol rather than spend 4 years trying to work on the
fingerprinting. But you can see some of the options here.
We have Tactical Aircraft Directable Infrared
Countermeasures (TADIRCM). We need to have an agency in charge
of better acronyms. That's all there is to it.
We worry about surface-to-air missiles from terrorists
attacking commercial and military aircraft. This is something
that could provide us not guaranteed protection, but basically
in flying the no-fly zones that we used to fly, much improved
safety for our pilots.
With all the concern about commercial aircraft, I think
that's the kind of thing that we're talking about. I told one
of the reporters here this has application not only for the
warfighter but also for homeland security.
All right. Enough of my editorials about the fine
demonstrations. I want all of you after this is over--they're
going to stay 15 minutes--to get in line and quick step right
around there so you can see what these companies and
contractors are doing.
Our first panel today represents technology operators and
the warfighter and will inform us about the value of S&T
programs from the perspective of those who receive new
capabilities and put them to use.
Our second panel represents the S&T executives and will
also address the design and the mission of technology and
transition as well as priorities and budget for the S&T
portfolio.
As demonstrated here today, decades of investments in basic
and applied research have led to a force that is better
equipped and protected. Many times you have a hard time
explaining to our colleagues the value of basic research, but
that is one area that we must certainly protect.
Our military possesses new standoff detection,
surveillance, and, when needed, lethal capabilities.
What we don't have on display, but that represents another
key return on our investment, is people. That's the chemist or
the material scientist or the physicist or the computer whiz or
the graduate student who will craft innovations for our future
fighting force.
So today's agile and adaptive fighter will continue to face
new battlefield challenges. We learn, they learn, and then we
learn again.
We require an educated, well-trained resource pipeline from
the researcher to the trigger puller to the operator to the
field commander and on up. A vital question we plan to explore
today involves whether we have enough of the right people
trained, at least in part through funding and programs that are
provided here.
We have seen this morning examples of the transition of
technology from the vision stages to the lab to the prototype
to the demonstration to testing and fielding, which really
forms the key component of our military might and capability.
We must continue in our determination and our ability to adapt
to emerging challenges and improvise existing capabilities in
new ways.
This involves, as I said before, basic research, including
the creation of new tools and devices even before we fully
realize what their use might be. It is a hard sell, but it is
very important.
This subcommittee oversees a set of bridge programs that
are designed to ensure that we cross the technology so-called
``valley of death'' in both directions, avoiding the
disappearance of research results onto the shelf, where they
never see any transition or use, and allowing for operators'
feedback into the research pipeline.
Our investment in these transition programs has increased
32 percent over the last 3 years, and we look forward to your
comments on the effectiveness of this investment in meeting our
Nation's needs.
I have questions on the long-term viability of our current
investment strategy and concern about the Department's apparent
deviation from its projected 3 percent goal for S&T.
I know Senator Reed and Senator Collins share my view that
this is a goal we should meet. We have not met it, and we have
not met that goal in this year's budget. But in terms of
increased funding from year to year, we are headed in the right
direction.
Now, in thinking about any future threat and asking
ourselves from a national security perspective what really
keeps us up at night, we are always led to the next question,
what have we done and what more can we do. S&T is a very key
part of that answer.
We look forward to hearing from each of the witnesses.
Please know that your full written testimony will be included
in the record. Most senators can read, all staff can read, and
so you can summarize your comments if you so choose to allow
time for questions and answers for both of our panels today. I
would ask that you very briefly summarize your remarks--
something I am not doing, and I apologize.
Again, I thank you for being with us this morning. I now
recognize our distinguished ranking member, Senator Reed, for
any comments he wants to make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
thank the witnesses and also thank all the individuals that
made these very interesting and informative displays possible
this morning.
This hearing gives us an excellent opportunity to see how
investments in S&T can save lives and increase the
effectiveness of our forces all over the globe. From armor
protecting soldiers from rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) to
UAVs, to new precision munitions, we have seen how advanced
technologies have enabled the success of our forces in the
global war on terrorism and in operations in Iraq. We are all
very grateful that the organizations that are represented here
have been so responsive to the needs of our combatant
commanders and their specific emerging technology requirements.
I hope that in this hearing we can examine all the important
pieces that must be in place to ensure that the rapid
deployment and development of technology is possible.
For example, I hope the witnesses can describe how they
work with their contractors, defense labs, and the industrial
base to ensure that we can rapidly manufacture these innovative
technologies on demand and in sufficient quantities.
In particular, it would be interesting to learn how our
investments in manufacturing technologies and in our technical
workforce contribute to this capability to surge production.
I also hope that we can examine the funding mechanisms that
are used to support the rapid transition of these technologies.
Most government funding processes are extremely rigid and slow.
So it is remarkable in many cases that money can be moved fast
enough to address any emerging requirement in a timely fashion.
I hope the witnesses can make clear whether funding has
been included in special technology transition accounts or
supplemental appropriations, whether it required reprogramming
funds from other critical needs or whether new funding
mechanisms need to be devised. That's something that we can
work on in this subcommittee.
Finally, I hope we can discuss the S&T programs that
develop these technologies in the first place and provided us
the possibility of meeting some real needs in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
As I visited Iraq last July, the first thing that my
National Guard military police (MP) men and women told me was
they needed armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
(HMMWVs). The Army has been responding and the kit that's being
developed by the depots is one response to that.
So I commend all of you for your response to these
individual needs of the soldiers and marines in the field.
We should always remember that the technological advantage
that we currently enjoy should not be taken for granted. It has
been earned through years of stable investment in S&T and the
hard work of scientists, engineers, universities, small
businesses, governmental labs, and the defense industry.
It was the research investments of the 1980s and the 1990s
that have led to the Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided
munitions, unmanned vehicles, and instantaneous communications
that are making the difference for countless young people
serving today. We must ensure that these investments are
continued for the sake of those who will serve tomorrow.
This hearing brings into sharp focus the role that S&T
plays in the current operations of our military. That is why it
is so disappointing that the President's 2005 budget request
cuts S&T by $1.5 billion as compared to last year's
appropriated levels.
The request also does not meet the goal of investing 3
percent of the DOD's budget in these innovative S&T programs. A
concern I share with the chairman.
The reductions in these programs may severely impact the
work that is done by our Nation's high-tech small businesses as
well as the university research programs that are training the
technical workforce of the future.
I look forward to learning how these budget decisions were
made and how they will impact our ability to continue to
produce the critical lifesaving technologies that we are
highlighting today.
Once again, welcome to our distinguished witnesses and I
look forward to their comments. Thank you.
Senator Roberts. I thank my colleague and friend.
Senator Collins, would you have any opening comment?
Senator Collins. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I
will just submit my statement for the record and look forward
to hearing from our witnesses.
Senator Roberts. I truly appreciate that.
[The prepared statement of Senator Collins follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Susan M. Collins
The past 2 turbulent years have demonstrated that an investment in
innovative research and development (R&D) will help to ensure that our
Nation's military accomplishes its vital missions.
The continuing source of ingenuity provided by our R&D community
has demonstrated that it is instrumental in the war on terrorism.
Defense R&D runs across a broad spectrum of projects from widely known
programs to those which receive scant attention. But each program is
necessary to our continuing efforts to provide for national defense and
engage the enemy abroad. Our soldiers should have the best tools
possible for their missions. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,
and members of today's panels, our soldiers deserve nothing less.
Our science and technology (S&T) community has produced or is
continuing to develop technologies that only a few decades ago were
unknown or deemed impossible to achieve in our own lifetime. From
directed energy weapons to advanced bandages to language converters to
microsatellite technologies, the United States is continuing to make
investments in its own security and, consequently, our long-term
freedom from terrorists and future adversaries.
In my home State of Maine, several companies are rising to the
challenge of providing effective, high-tech answers to current and
future needs. Applied Thermal Sciences (ATS) in Sanford, for example,
is developing technologies in advanced composites, laser welding, and
propulsion systems. Technology Systems, Inc., in Wiscasset, is
producing the first commercial solar-rechargeable autonomous underwater
vehicle. The Sensor Research and Development Corporation (SRD) is
developing novel chemical and biological sensor technologies.
I look forward to hearing the testimony of our distinguished
witnesses and the effort the Department of Defense (DOD) is making in
providing critical technologies to the war on terrorism.
Senator Roberts. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I have just a very brief
comment. First of all, I want to thank you for holding this
hearing and then just review briefly a couple of points.
The Secretary of Defense told Congress that the U.S.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) will have an expanded role
leading the global war on terror.
I'm pleased to hear in this morning's testimony that the
DOD has made great strides in advancing not only the state-of-
the-art technology leading to new technical capabilities, but
also the bureaucratic transformations necessary to speed these
new capabilities into the field with the warfighters.
I'm hopeful that Congress can help this year by getting the
S&T program budget closer to the Secretary's goal of 3 percent
of the total defense budget and providing additional
authorities or resources through the technology transition
initiative for rapid prototyping and fielding of emerging
technologies that will sustain our battlefield superiority for
decades to come.
I'd just like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for this
hearing.
Senator Roberts. I thank my colleague and friend.
On our first panel, we have Dr. Dale Uhler, who is the
acquisition executive and senior procurement executive at the
Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics Center of the
United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
We are also pleased to have General Thomas D. Waldhauser of
the United States Marine Corps. He's the commanding general of
the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, something I visited what, 7,
8 years ago, which is about half the size of this room, and
you've done a splendid job of expanding that whole operation.
He is also the vice chief of the Office of Naval Research.
We are also pleased to have General Charles A. Cartwright
of the U.S. Army. He is the deputy commanding general for
systems of systems integration from the United States Army
Research, Development and Engineering Command.
Dr. Uhler.
STATEMENT OF DR. DALE G. UHLER, ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE AND
SENIOR PROCUREMENT EXECUTIVE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACQUISITIONS
AND LOGISTICS CENTER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Dr. Uhler. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is truly an honor and a privilege to report to
you.
Senator Roberts. Could you pull that microphone right up
close to you? This room is famous for its echoing effect. So
speak loudly and have at it.
Dr. Uhler. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it's truly an honor and a privilege to report to
you this morning on the topic of special operations technology.
I'll keep the opening remarks short as you requested, but would
like to enter written testimony in the record.
Congress, through title 10, U.S. Code, chapter 6, section
167, empowered the commander of SOCOM to develop and acquire
special operations' peculiar equipment, material, and services.
This is equivalent to what the military departments do for
their respective programs. So we consider ourselves extremely
fortunate to have that authority and capability.
We've implemented and streamlined cost-effective processes
to provide the SOF soldiers, sailors, and airmen with the
technology they need. Our fundamental acquisition philosophy in
SOCOM is to field in an expedited manner the 80 percent
solution while working with our actual warfighters and industry
to address the remaining 20 percent of the requirement.
In essence, we've really bought into the concept of spiral
development and evolutionary acquisition.
One of the things that really helps us is our ability to
leverage very heavily the research and development programs
that are occurring in the military departments, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Department of Energy
(DOE) labs, and other Government agencies.
We also survey industry on a continuing basis and use a
buy-and-try approach for Government and commercial off-the-
shelf items. When we get our hands on these, we have our
warfighters perform user evaluations of these potential systems
and then we make appropriate modifications, retest, and field
the acceptable products.
We have an especially close relationship with our SOF
operational users, which really facilitates our ability to make
all this happen.
We also have the advantage of having our acquisition
organization collocated with headquarters SOCOM and, thus, we
have daily contact with our SOF warfighters.
We have small, short decision cycles and the support we
receive again from the Services, DOD, and Congress have been
major contributors to our effectiveness.
With our expanded role in the global war on terrorism,
we've gotten increased resources from Congress and also from
the DOD which has helped us to even more expeditiously field
solutions that our warfighters need on a daily basis.
People are our most important asset. That said, we have a
parallel situation that says maintaining and improving the
material capabilities for our people is also our most difficult
challenge because these people are on the tip of the spear.
They need new capabilities as quickly as we can get them and
they need the best ones that we can field and provide.
In conjunction with the war on terrorism and the fruition
of some of our flagship research and development (R&D) programs
as they move into procurement we are changing our focus in the
S&T arena and we're focusing now on three major initiatives.
One is the individualized platform. We firmly believe that
the individual is the indispensable element of our SOF and we
need to develop enhanced protection, armor, lightweight
sustainment systems, night vision devices, and better weaponry.
We also need to manage the SOF personnel signature in all
environments so that he remains invisible to the enemy, yet the
enemy becomes visible to him regardless of concealment.
At the same time, we need to do this without increasing
weight and complexity. Speaking of weight, power and power
sources have been and continue to be both a major problem and a
critical need for our SOF forces.
At this point in time, approximately one-third of the
weight carried into combat by our individual SOF soldier comes
from batteries. We urgently need power sources that are small,
lightweight, and inexpensive, while at the same time providing
high power, long endurance, interchangeability, and multiple
recharging features.
These batteries and our fuel cells must give off little or
no signature and offer our SOF users an extended operating
capability without suffering degradation or requiring resupply.
We also need to know what the battlefield around the
individual SOF operator or team is comprised of. Consequently,
we are pursuing a family of unmanned and semi-autonomous or
autonomous systems, for air, land, sea, and possibly space
sensors in the future which will range in size from tactical to
micro and nano.
This will give us the persistent intelligence and denied
area access to meet the needs of our SOF operators as they
determine the landscape around them and go into harm's way.
Systems must also possess a reduced logistical footprint
and withstand the rigors of the various climates and operating
environments in which we work.
In conclusion, we've worked hard to wisely use our
resources to sustain systems when it makes sense, to integrate
new technologies into legacy systems, and to acquire new
technically-advanced systems. We intend to continue this focus
in our concept of rapid prototyping and fielding and we also
want to aggressively leverage the S&T and R&D investments of
our military departments as well as the other Government
agencies and industry.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before
you this morning.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Uhler follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Dale G. Uhler
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I am
Dale Uhler, Acquisition Executive for the United States Special
Operations Command (SOCOM). Thank you for the honor and privilege of
providing you with a perspective on SOCOM's science and technology
(S&T) strategy.
INTRODUCTION
A real strength of SOCOM is the commander's acquisition authority,
which is similar to that of the military departments (MILDEPs). Among
the responsibilities assigned to the Commander, SOCOM, under title 10,
section 167, is that of developing and acquiring ``special operations-
peculiar'' equipment. Special operations-peculiar equipment is based on
technologies that enable our operators to become faster, stealthier,
more precise, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. With exceptional
support from Congress, the Secretary of Defense, MILDEPs, defense
agencies, other government agencies (OGAs), and our industry partners,
these authorities have been instrumental in equipping today's world-
class Special Operations Forces (SOF) team to perform a broad range of
SOF missions.
We enhance those authorities through aggressive application of
acquisition policy and guidance, organizational flexibility, and
streamlined procedures that facilitate rapid response to the needs of
our warfighters. SOCOM is accustomed to and comfortable with change and
has a tradition of ``out of the box'' transformational thinking.
A guiding principal of our acquisition policy has been to embrace
and respond to change. Our system has been built to recognize not only
the critical need to respond quickly, but also to adequately sustain
the combat forces that protect us and our interests throughout the
world. Our dialogue with and planned leveraging of other DOD
developers' efforts to integrate SOF requirements into new equipment,
coupled with our willingness to take calculated fielding risks when
necessary to improve our capabilities on the battlefield will continue
to play a major role in our success. SOCOM's aim in pursuing
technological transformation is to guarantee our forces remain relevant
in any fight, and ensure we minimize risk to our Nation's vital
interests while providing reliable support to the overall Defense
Strategy.
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM/THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY
As we develop the tools to conduct our expanded mission in the
fight against terrorism, SOCOM has transformed from the traditional
train, organize, and equip mission to a capability to plan and execute
the global war on terrorism. Our near term objective is to continue to
realign our requirements and programs to better address the war on
terrorism mission. As such, we will be eliminating those legacy systems
that do not support the global war on terrorism and using the saved
resources to invest in future capabilities. Our programs must be
transformational, not merely a re-invention of what we are doing today,
and SOCOM must continue to invest in making our SOF more capable in all
tactical environments. To this end, our research and development (R&D)
activities are being refocused to exploit technologies in the following
areas:
Individual As A Platform
The individual is the indispensable element of our force. We need
to develop enhanced protection, armor, lightweight sustainment systems,
night vision devices and better weaponry. The SOF warrior must be able
to manage his signature in all environments, and see the enemy
regardless of concealment. We need to do this without increasing weight
and complexity.
Power
Power sources have been, and continue to be, both a major problem
and a critical need for SOF. One-third of the weight carried into
combat is from batteries. SOF urgently needs power sources that are
small, lightweight, and inexpensive while providing high power, long
endurance, interchangeability, and multiple recharging features. These
batteries/fuel cells must give off little or no signature and offer the
SOF user an extended operating capability (months) without suffering
degradation or requiring re-supply.
Sensors
We are pursuing a family of unmanned, semi-autonomous and/or
autonomous systems (air, sea, land, and, in the future, space) ranging
in size from tactical to micro and nano, which will use persistent
intelligence and denied area access technologies to meet the needs of
SOF operators. These systems must be simple to operate, possess a small
manning and logistical footprint, and withstand the rigors of various
climates and operating environments.
SOCOM ACQUISITION
The nature of the global war on terrorism forces a technology
developer to move quickly to understand the operator's needs and to
satisfy them with state of the art technology. To facilitate this
process, our professional staff maintains constant liaison with our
component commands and visits deployed forces to ensure that we
understand the need in the context of the mission. Often, prototype
equipment is made available for user evaluation before designs are
finalized. The use of concept-based experimentation and demonstrations
to ensure that the product we are providing is, in fact, the best
solution to an identified deficiency is an integral part of our
approach to S&T development. This includes early hands-on prototype
assessments conducted by uniformed SOF operators. These assessments
typically provide invaluable feedback concerning factors such as
weight, ergonomic design considerations, military utility, and the ease
with which the system can be employed, learned, and sustained. Such
feedback saves considerable expenditure of scarce resources by
identifying problem areas at the prototype stage rather than during
production. To accomplish this, the Command has a Special Operations
R&D Support Element (SORSE) to assist in the development of new
equipment. SORSE includes operators who are fully qualified in a wide
variety of combat skills. As noted above, it is their early and expert
involvement that allows us to streamline development and to produce
fieldable equipment in minimum time.
We are often told that SOF items of personal equipment (helmets,
boots, etc.) are in high demand by the other Services. In fact, we use
Service equipment to the maximum extent possible. When mission
requirements dictate special gear, we first seek to modify the standard
item and, if that is not possible, we turn to commercial vendors to
meet the requirement. In all cases, we work closely with the MILDEPs to
ensure that whatever we field is sustainable.
Special operations elements are deployed throughout the world as
our first line of defense against the global war on terrorism. Much of
the legacy equipment we use to ensure a redundant mission capability is
wearing out and we are now faced with the choice of modernizing or
simply sustaining the current capability. To help us with the decision
process, we are continually seeking transformational options, those new
equipment or equipment concepts that will truly enhance our
capabilities and allow us to address new missions and execute existing
tasks better.
SOCOM is a highly professional organization in which training is a
way of life. Maintaining the capabilities of deployed forces provides
unique challenges, so we pursue technology to assist us with training
sustainment. Recent advances in ruggedized language systems and
computer-based training are being effectively used by our deployed
forces, but more needs to be done in this area.
The core capabilities of SOF typically require leading-edge
technologies to meet the requirements for rapid deployment, precise and
decisive employment, and sustainment while operating far forward of
conventional support structures.
The focus for SOCOM's S&T investment strategy, therefore, is how to
effectively apply and invest available resources to achieve those SOF-
peculiar capabilities. Much of the basic and advanced research efforts
behind our S&T program requirements are similar to those of the MILDEPs
or OGAs. Therefore, cooperation and coordination with ongoing MILDEP,
Defense Agency, and OGA technology development programs plays an
important role in SOCOM's technology development strategy. We
aggressively interact and coordinate with other S&T organizations. This
includes participation in reviews, cooperative developments, collocated
liaison personnel, Service advisors, and information sharing. We are
putting in place new Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) with the MILDEPs to
further enable a mutual focus on key cooperative efforts and
transitions. We are proud of the progress we have been able to make
delivering advanced technology into the hands of the SOF operator, but
we can and will do better. We could not have been, and will not be,
successful without the continued support of the larger R&D community.
As the opportunity presents itself, we suggest modifications to
those R&D community projects of interest to encourage them to move in a
direction that could also satisfy a SOF need. R&D efforts that are kept
in-house are those that contribute most directly and specifically to
SOF core tasks and that are least likely to be realized or supported by
the MILDEPs, Defense Agencies, or OGAs. We highly value the close
partnerships we currently enjoy with the MILDEP laboratories, Defense
Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), Defense Agencies and other
national laboratories, as well as academia and industry.
SOCOM also strives to ensure that our materiel capability solutions
are based on requirements identified by our SOF warfighters in the
field. Concurrent with the development and fielding of new equipment
will be the development of changes in SOF doctrine based on that
equipment, the development of training programs to ensure that our
operators know how to use and maintain their equipment, and the
initiation of sustainment programs to keep their equipment operational.
EXAMPLES/SUCCESSES
The SOCOM Acquisition and Logistics Center (SOAL) exhibited
exceptional adaptability in response to the demands of sustaining
forces during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). The SOAL has been responding to combat mission needs and
urgent deployment acquisition requests from deployed and deploying
units. Our efforts have resulted in the rapid fielding of numerous
equipment items and systems to satisfy the requirements of SOF
elements. The support of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
and Congress, who provided supplemental resources, was the key to our
ability to rapidly field those requirements without having to break
other programs that are also important to SOCOM mission accomplishment.
The Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration (ACTD), a joint U.S. Army/Marine Corps/SOCOM
program, identified the Pointer unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system to
satisfy a multi-Service requirement. Operator evaluations fed into an
R&D cycle, and the developer made significant improvements to the
Pointer system. The Pointer system continued to grow through the MOUT
ACTD and a number of upgrades were made to the system to meet SOF
requirements. A Combat Mission Needs Statement (CMNS) was received in
December 2001 and initial deliveries began in March 2002. A second CMNS
delivered 20 more systems into the hands of SOF operators in October
2002. The ACTD program office formed a cadre to train SOF operators in
the tactical employment of the system concurrent with operational
testing. The training cadre deployed to Afghanistan in November 2002 to
conduct additional training, perform intermediate level repairs, and
implement a software upgrade to the system. SOF user feedback on the
Pointer system was used to refine later iterations of the Pointer
system and assist the contractor in developing its successor, the Raven
UAV. The Raven UAV leveraged all of the lessons learned through
developing and fielding Pointer and packaged it in a system less than
half the size of Pointer. The first Raven was delivered in May of 2003.
In December 2003, a third CMNS was issued by SOCOM, this time for the
procurement of Raven systems. These systems are successful because of
the constant user feedback that fed our R&D process over the last 3
years. The success of these systems also illustrates the inherent
utility of the spiral development and evolutionary acquisition
processes available for our use.
People are SOF's greatest asset. Rapidly applying medical
technology to save lives is a top priority. An excellent example is our
one-handed tourniquet. This tourniquet provides SOF with a vastly
improved capability to self-provide immediate trauma care for combat-
induced wounds. The requirement for such a device was forwarded by SOF
operators to SOCOM's Biomedical Initiative Steering Committee (BISC)
which supports the Special Operations Medical Technology (MEDTECH)
program. The BISC focused on accelerating fielding of the tourniquet.
SOCOM, through the BISC, worked closely with the U.S. Army Institute
for Surgical Research and SOF operators, to develop and evaluate
multiple prototypes. We were able to field prototype tourniquets to
deployed SOF operators in 2002.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION PROCESS
We have learned from both the experiences of the MILDEPs and our
own early experiences that transitioning new technologies into
fieldable equipment is a difficult challenge that, if not solved,
denies needed capabilities to our SOF users. Within our structure, we
are addressing this challenge by transforming our technology transition
process to function like ``an interstate instead of a traffic jam.'' In
SOCOM, as throughout DOD, technology development is an integral part of
the acquisition process. Our Advanced Technology Directorate is
collocated with our program executive officers (PEOs) and other
acquisition professionals. This collocation enables continuous
collaboration, as well as the early agreements and necessary planning
for successful technology transition. This process, coupled with our
close cooperation with the user, enables us to adequately plan for the
resources required to support the new capability.
As we look to the future, we will continue to rely heavily on the
MILDEPs, defense agencies, OGAs, academia, and industry partners to
leverage their intellectual and development capabilities. We will use
technology roadmaps built upon SOCOM's Technology Thrust Areas (TTAs)
drawn from Special Operations Technology Objectives (SOTOs) reflecting
the commander's refocus on the global war on terrorism to guide our
research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) efforts. In
addition, we will continue the judicious use of ACTDs to focus on
system of systems approaches to reduce sensor to shooter lag time. We
will strengthen our collaboration with the MILDEPs through efforts such
as the Army's Future Force Warrior (FFW) program to develop and
demonstrate revolutionary capabilities for the individual soldier and
small team using a holistic and synergistic approach.; Navy projects to
improve intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in denied
littoral areas; and Air Force programs such as the Air Force Research
Laboratory's Battlefield Air Operations kit to develop technologies to
better locate, identify, designate, and transmit target information.
CONCLUSION
In closing, S&T programs are crucial to Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld's goal to provide transformational capabilities to the DOD. I
believe the successes the DOD has enjoyed in science and technology are
significant.
Now, and in the future, SOCOM will continue to pursue technologies
that improve its ability to execute the global war on terrorism, while
remaining ready to deal equally with the demands of both our
warfighting and peacetime roles, missions, and responsibilities.
It has truly been an honor for me to come before you today to tell
you about our successes and the future S&T focus at SOCOM in support of
the ``quiet professionals.'' Most of all, thank you for your continuing
support of our SOF warfighters.
Senator Roberts. We thank you very much, Dr. Uhler.
We now have General Thomas D. Waldhauser.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. THOMAS D. WALDHAUSER, USMC, COMMANDING
GENERAL, MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING LABORATORY; VICE CHIEF,
OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH
General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator Roberts.
Chairman Roberts, Senator Reed, distinguished members of
the subcommittee, it is my privilege as the Commanding General
of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory and as Vice Chief of
Naval Research to address you today.
Prior to September 11 and the global war on terror, naval
S&T worked diligently and productively on delivering
technologies to the operating forces through the well-
constructed R&D process.
This approach certainly has merit for supporting the
deliberate development and fielding of future warfighting
capabilities. As we noted, however, this approach was not
always responsive to some of the emergent needs of those tasked
to fight in the harsh and challenging environments of locations
such as Afghanistan and Iraq.
Nevertheless, the ``business as usual'' mindset has
changed. To adapt, the S&T community has had to take its
traditional approach to technology push and requirements pull
and make them equally capable of timely and responsive support.
This also gave the S&T community the opportunity to be even
more relevant.
My experience during the early days of Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan clearly laid out to the S&T
community critical needs such as updated aircraft, electronic
countermeasures, dust palliatives that mitigate unsafe dust
levels in austere environments, persistent intelligence, as
well as reliable over-the-horizon and on-the-move
communications.
For the S&T community, OEF served as a real-world
laboratory for what it takes to fight on an extended
battlefield with dispersed locations in support of the global
war on terrorism.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), it was my experience
that the S&T support was making an incredible shift from the
traditional approach of delivering capabilities to the
warfighter through expectations and formal programs of record
to one that also accommodates a more proactive and responsive
methodology.
My formal statement gives several examples of this process.
As marines head back to Iraq, the level and commitment and
desire from the S&T community to support those going back into
theater remains unchanged. Moreover, standing working groups
and cells within the Office of Naval Research and the Marine
Corps Warfighting Laboratory now work in tandem with
operational forces, the Marine Corps Systems Command, and the
Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development Center in Quantico
under the leadership of the deputy commandant for combat
development in defining requirements, identifying capability
gaps, and determining potential technology solutions and
finally delivering necessary capabilities to the warfighter.
In summary, the more traditional approach to S&T support to
the warfighter has been energized and has become somewhat more
responsive. At this time, however, we must ensure we continue
not only to satisfy emergent needs in the global war on terror,
but also to continue to judiciously invest in higher-risk,
long-term discovery and invention.
Thank you for this opportunity this morning and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Waldhauser follows:]
Prepared Statement by Brig. Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, USMC
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Roberts, Senator Reed, distinguished members of the
subcommittee; it is my privilege to serve as the Commanding General of
the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory at the Marine Corps Combat
Development Center and as the Vice Chief of Naval Research at the
Office of Naval Research. Thank you for the opportunity to share my
views on the important issues associated with naval science and
technology (S&T) as they impact the global war on terrorism and the
Marine Corps' operational abilities to successfully wage that war. I
would like to address the contribution of naval S&T based upon my
experience as an operational commander and from what I have observed
and learned since recently assuming a leadership role in naval S&T. To
put my thoughts in context, I would like to lay out how S&T supported
the warfighter prior to the global war on terrorism, and then discuss
how I saw this support adapt from the period of Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan to Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and
since that period how I see naval S&T supporting the warfighter today
and into the future.
PRE-GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
Prior to the global war on terror, naval S&T worked diligently and
productively on delivering technologies to the operational forces
through the well constructed research and development (R&D) process,
gleaning technology opportunities through basic research, discovery and
innovation, and exploitation and deployment into formal programs of
record within the systems commands. The requirements process was
generated through universal needs statements articulated periodically
by the operational forces and vetted through a concept based
requirements system. Both the Navy and Marine Corps conducted
aggressive concept based experimentation in partnership with the
operational forces. The identification of operational requirements and
the servicing of these through the combat development process worked
well, but were often protracted. The tendency was to respond to
requirements of the operational forces using a requirements pull
methodology. This approach was probably appropriate for supporting the
deliberate development and fielding of future warfighting capabilities.
As was soon seen, however, this approach was not particularly
responsive to the emergent needs of the men and women who would be
asked to fight the global war on terrorism.
POST-GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
Business as usual changed rapidly and permanently as a result of
September 11 and the initiation of the global war on terrorism. While
S&T clearly still needed to conduct basic research, which could
identify cutting edge technologies for the future warfighter, it was
also recognized that S&T needed to focus attention on today's
warfighters engaged in current operations. To adapt, the S&T community
has had to take its traditional approach to technology push and
requirements pull and make them equally capable of timely and
responsive support as well as deliberate support.
The global war on terrorism presented the S&T community with new
challenges; but more importantly the global war on terrorism has given
the naval S&T community the opportunity to be even more relevant to the
warfighter. I think it would be useful for us to briefly look at S&T
involvement in our two most recent operations: OEF and OIF.
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
From my perspective, OEF was a ``come as you are'' operation. I was
the Commanding Officer of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU),
forward deployed to the Northern Arabian Sea after the attack of
September 11. This Marine unit was the initial conventional force on
the ground in Afghanistan. As such, there was little opportunity for us
to identify S&T needs or for emerging S&T to be pushed. What OEF did
provide was a tremendous number of needs that could be supported by
emerging S&T. OEF clearly laid out to the S&T community critical needs
such as aircraft electronic countermeasures, effective dust palliatives
to mitigate unsafe dust levels in austere operating environments, more
pervasive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) at the
tactical level, as well as reliable over-the-horizon and on-the-move
communications. For the S&T community, OEF served as a real world
laboratory for what it takes to fight on extended and dispersed
locations in support of the global war on terrorism and battlefields of
the future. Additionally, OEF underscored the need for a streamlined
processes for the S&T provider as well as the combat developer to fast
track the needed capabilities to the warfighter.
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
Based upon my experiences in OIF working with the British Royal
Marines, and as part of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), again as
the commander of the 15th MEU, I believe there was a real sea change in
the manner in which naval S&T was approached. What I observed in OIF,
and what I have learned since assuming my current position, validates
that S&T support is making a credible shift from the traditional
approach of delivering capability to the warfighter through
experimentation and formal programs of record to one that also
accommodates a more proactive and responsive methodology. Operators,
combat developers, and technologists are now working more closely in
S&T working groups, focusing on the delivery of viable cutting edge
technologies to the warfighter.
To illustrate how the S&T community has responded to the challenges
of the global war on terrorism, I have selected a few examples of
successful efforts resulting in the rapid fielding of advanced
capabilities provided to the operating forces as a result of
warfighting requirements that leveraged technology.
The Marine Corps' Dragon Eye unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is a
great example of how ``technology push'' can work. Originally conceived
of as part of an effort by Office of Naval Research and Marine Corps
Warfighting Lab to enhance small unit organic surveillance, the Dragon
Eye combines advanced technologies in hand held computer devices,
batteries, electric motors, wireless data communications, and optics.
This combination has yielded a man-portable, easy to use UAV that can
move with combat forces and provide overhead imagery directly to a
battalion or smaller sized unit. The success of this UAV, and the
initial response from the operating forces lead to a plan to build and
field these systems. The subsequent onset of OIF, caused us to re-
prioritize available funds and complete the initial fielding in time to
support our marines during combat operations in Iraq. Twenty Dragon Eye
aircraft deployed with elements of the 1st Marine Division during OIF.
After action feedback from the war confirmed the value of a man-
portable small unit level UAV and the Dragon Eye UAV is now a program
of record with initial full fielding starting in May 2004. Moreover,
marines presently returning to Iraq are relying on this capability to
provide them with intelligence gathering observation.
As part of naval S&T's long-term investment in urban combat
innovations, the critical need for squad level communications became
apparent to enable small units to rapidly coordinate the complex
tactics of building-to-building and room-to-room combat. Our British
partners in this effort suggested we try a commercial off-the-shelf
radio called the Personal Role Radio (PRR). Low-cost development of
this commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) item enabled this to be
interoperable with our newest small unit tactical radios and we now
have communications systems that support units down to the lowest
tactical level. Responding to a request by 1st Marine Division, who
participated in the PRR experiments, radios were purchased for the
deploying infantry units. The PRR will now be part of a Marine Corps
wide fielding program. As I can personally attest, this simple and
highly effective addition to the equipment of the marines in Iraq was
an extremely relevant and timely addition.
A third example of successful transition of an experimental system
to combat forces in Iraq focuses on the individual rifleman. The
Advanced Combat Optic Gun (ACOG) sight exploits what hunters and
competitive marksmen have known for years. A quality optic on a quality
rifle will enable an average shooter to regularly hit a target at
greater distances. After conducting experiments with the ACOG, which
confirmed the advantages of this sight, the S&T community provided the
test sights along with additional sights purchased to support marines
deploying to Iraq. The response from marines in combat confirmed that
plans for full fielding this device are right on target.
Another great example of how the development of experimental
prototypes can be rapidly transitioned to operating forces to meet
contingency requirements is seen with the Pre-First In Command and
Control (Pre-FICCS) project. The Office of Naval Research and the
Marine Corps Warfighting Lab had previously conducted tactical
experiments with this system. Pre-FICCS offers the commander a highly
mobile and fully operational level command and control suite. The
configuration can be as a small as two Highly Mobile Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs). Comparable conventional command and control
suites are many times larger and considerably cumbersome to move. When
faced with the deployment to Iraq, the S&T community made this system
available to I MEF. This turned out to be a crucial technology that
enabled the MEF commander to rapidly establish forward command and
control that could keep pace with the rapid advance during OIF.
Although the normal interest in what the S&T community provides the
warfighter deals with advanced equipment, the same organizations are
also involved with non-material solutions that in some cases provide
even broader and more significant changes to the way we fight. The
Marine Corps Warfighting Lab has dedicated an effort to develop
advanced tactics, techniques and procedures aimed specifically at the
challenges of urban combat. After a strenuous series of experiments
conducted during the late 1990s, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
developed a comprehensive revision of our tactical urban doctrine as
well as a supporting training program to compliment this effort.
Initial units that participated in these experiments and conducted
these revised urban tactics, used the skills extensively in the
villages and cities of Iraq. To ensure our marines now returning to
Iraq have the absolute best training available, the Marine Corps
Warfighting Lab is sponsoring an intense training effort for all of the
units returning to Iraq that will better enable them to conduct
stability and support operations in urban terrain.
Most recently, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab has re-oriented our
main experimentation program titled Sea Viking to support marines
deploying for OIF-II. In its original form, Sea Viking aimed at the
transformational capabilities the Marine Corps will need to operate on
the dynamic battlefields of the future.
Although the re-deployment to Iraq of Marine forces scheduled to
conduct the Sea Viking experiments changed the immediate Sea Viking
goals, this presented another opportunity for the S&T community to
provide direct support to deploying forces while still maintaining the
transformational momentum of the Sea Viking program. One of the central
technology areas being pursued by Sea Viking involves on-the-move
command and control of dispersed forces operating on an extended
battlefield. Sea Viking experiments planned to use a surrogate command
and control system called the Experimental Tactical Communications
System (ETCS). ETCS is based on the commercial IRIDIUM satellite
telephone network. S&T development has modified this commercial system
to achieve a tactical networked architecture that supports voice and
data communications extending to any user, worldwide. A portion of this
architecture will provide portable unit, individual vehicle, or
individual marine position location information that is interoperable
with current command and control systems.
By revising the Sea Viking program, the Marine Corps now plans to
deploy ETCS with elements of the I MEF returning to Iraq, while still
maintaining the integrity of the Sea Viking long-range experiment
goals.
The S&T efforts I have addressed are only a small representation of
the tremendous work that a number of people and organizations
successfully undertook to support the warfighter in OIF.
While the context of OIF has changed, (some refer to it as OIF-II,)
the level of commitment and desire of the S&T community to support
those going in harms way remains unchanged. For example, standing
working groups and cells within the Office of Naval Research and at the
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory work in tandem with the operational
forces, the Expeditionary Force Development Center and the Marine Corps
Systems Command, under the leadership of the Deputy Commandant for
Combat Development in defining requirements, identifying capability
gaps, determining potential technology solutions and finally delivering
sorely needed capabilities to the warfighter. Examples of these range
from counter improvised explosives devices (IEDs) technology to
explosive resistant coatings. These types of efforts are outlined in
weekly S&T support to OIF-II situation reports that are disseminated
widely within the Department of the Navy. Additionally, the Iraqi
Freedom Combat Assessment Team the Marine Corps deployed to Iraq to
leverage and act upon lessons learned includes S&T personnel. This team
is only one way the Naval Services are insuring that there is an open
line of communications between deployed warfighters an the S&T
community.
In summary, as an operator I see this as a good news story. The
more traditional approach to S&T supporting the warfighter has evolved
into a more proactive, responsive and supportive process, which will
pay great dividends to today's warfighter as well as tomorrow's
warfighter. While my comments today have principally focused on how the
S&T community has become more responsive to the warfighter, I think it
is important to note that these efforts would not have been possible
had it not been for the long-term vision and commitment of those
professionals involved in planning and executing S&T programs. We
leverage today their past work and while we have focused on their many
successes it must also be noted that S&T development is inherently
risky. Every fielded success probably has a matching effort that ended
up in the dustbin. Consequently, we must ensure that especially today
we not only satisfy the emergent needs of the global war on terror, but
also continue to judiciously invest in higher risk, long-term discovery
and invention.
Senator Roberts. We thank you, General.
We turn now to General Charles A. Cartwright. General, you
are recognized.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. CHARLES A. CARTWRIGHT, USA, DEPUTY
COMMANDING GENERAL FOR SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, UNITED
STATES ARMY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING COMMAND
General Cartwright. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
on behalf of the soldiers and civilians of all the Army labs,
thank you for this opportunity to appear here today. I would
like to thank each of you for the tremendous support you
continue to provide for our men and women in uniform wherever
they serve.
Scientists and engineers from all our labs are deployed
around the world to provide the combatant commanders and their
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines immediate access to labs
and centers to rapidly bring technology solutions and equipment
improvements to the warfighters.
Providing the right technology to the warfighter faster is
our primary focus in supporting operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan and around the world.
Our laboratories and R&D centers have rapidly responded to
immediate warfighters' requirements. You only saw two here this
morning.
Other innovations include speech and language translation
with DARPA, a ground standoff mine detection system, electronic
countermeasure systems that provide protection for convoys and
fixed sites, M1A1 grill rear doors, and Stryker slat armors.
This has all been made possible by teams from our
laboratories, centers, depots, arsenals, and industries in
fabrication testing and installation rapidly to the field. We
provided these and many more items that are required to fill
the critical capability gaps for the warfighter.
The command has increased on-the-ground visibility
throughout the deployment of civilian and military S&T
assistance teams to Iraq and Afghanistan to assist our S&T
teams already assigned to the combatant commands.
These technologists on the point for the soldier have the
flexibility to quickly reach back to the command's laboratories
and centers to solve requirements in nearer time.
In supporting the development of the Future Combat System
(FCS), we have changed how we have done business in the past to
move quickly, spiraling new and emerging technologies into
systems being developed and fielded to our current operating
forces. This is having a direct impact on the current as well
as the future force.
Capabilities at the 50 to 70 percent level, versus the 90
percent level, are now considered acceptable to provide an
immediate solution to our forces. A sample of some of these
technologies is the suite of sense-through-the-wall systems, a
lightweight counter-mortar radar system, change-detection using
high resolution and overhead imaging, and close-in active
protection systems, just to mention a few.
While this new command is changing how the Army
accomplishes its research, development, and engineering
activities, we have also taken significant steps in making sure
we work in partnership with the combatant commanders, the
combatant developers, and the testing community to determine,
provide, and test solutions to warfighters' needs.
We have developed ties with other Service laboratories,
DARPA, DOE laboratories, and universities to leverage their
resources. This joint approach is helping us ensure a clear
path to the success in our future warfighting missions.
Today the Army is both at war and continuing development
along the Army's campaign plan. As we move from our current
force to the future force that is strategically responsive and
dominant at every point on the operational spectrum, the
Nation's S&T assets are essential to that success.
We must provide the technology solutions essential to the
current and future warfighting needs across that spectrum for
both joint and Army operations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify
before this subcommittee. I'll be happy to answer any questions
from you or the members of the subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of General Cartwright follows:]
Prepared Statement by Brig. Gen. Charles A. Cartwright, USA
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on behalf of the
soldiers and civilians of U.S. Army Research, Development, and
Engineering Command (RDECOM), thank you for this opportunity to appear
today. The men and women of RDECOM are deployed around the world to
provide the combatant commanders, and their soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and marines immediate access to labs and centers within RDECOM to
rapidly bring technology solutions and equipment improvements to the
warfighter.
To see our activities in context, it is important to understand the
operational environment we face now and in the future. The nature of
future warfare is expected to look less like Operation Desert Storm and
more like what has been played out in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, and
more importantly, the attack on the United States on September 11,
2001. In the old paradigm, we balanced the Soviet Union's superiority
in quantity with our superiority in quality. In the new paradigm, we
must have superiority in both quantity and quality. We can expect
symmetry at the strategic and operational levels of warfare but
asymmetry at the tactical level, as our enemies cannot win
conventionally. As we are seeing currently, there will likely be a
blurring among the strategic, operational and tactical levels. We can
also expect increasingly sophisticated opponents exploiting all types
of weather conditions and terrain (with urban increasingly likely) and
employing both military and paramilitary conventional and
unconventional forces. In both current and future warfare, we face the
leveraging by adversaries of the global proliferation of weapons
technology.
To meet the technological challenges of the current and future
operational environment, the RDECOM was established in October 2003 as
a Major Subordinate Command of the Army Materiel Command (AMC). RDECOM
includes the Army Research Laboratory (ARL), Army Research Office
(ARO), Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) and seven
Research, Development and Engineering Centers (RDECs). They are the
Aviation and Missile RDEC (AMRDEC), Natick Soldier Center (NSC),
Armament RDEC (ARDEC), Communications and Electronics RDEC (CERDEC),
Tank Automotive RDEC (TARDEC), Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
(ECBC) and Simulation Training and Technology Center (STTC). A major
part of the RDECOM's mission is to plan and execute the majority of the
Army's science and technology (S&T) programs. The RDECOM is structured
to enhance synergy across technology organizations, eliminate
redundancy, improve the capability to do program and system
integration, and improve the prioritization of programs. The RDECOM has
three major objectives: (1) get emerging technology to the warfighter
faster; (2) integrate research, development, and engineering across all
areas of the Army, other Services, universities, and all other sources;
and (3) demonstrate the agility to rapidly take advantage of
technological opportunities no matter where they may arise. To achieve
these objectives requires new and innovative approaches to all aspects
of the development of technology for the warfighters.
RDECOM is decisively and aggressively engaged in supporting current
operations. The command created the Agile Integration Demonstration and
Experimentation (AIDE) organization, which functions not as a brick and
mortar institution, but as a vital collaboration center to accelerate
the delivery of technological solutions for warfighter requirements.
The AIDE organization succeeds by helping the individual labs and
centers, as well as the Program Managers (PMs), Program Executive
Officers (PEOs), and the Rapid Equipping Force (REF).
RDECOM's AIDE deploys Science and Technology Assistance Teams
(STATs) into theaters of operations and charges them with the role of
liaison between the warfighters and the labs and development centers
across the Army. Their role is to not only keep RDECOM informed of
warfighter emerging requirements, but to also be our forward eyes and
ears for scientists and technologists in our working centers.
Additionally, the AIDE's Field Assistance in Science and Technology
(FAST) teams, which are assigned to combatant commands, keep the
scientists and engineers in RDECOM informed and orchestrate quick
responses to the warfighters' needs. RDECOM also has numerous
scientists, engineers and contractor personnel deployed in the theater
of operations who are working side by side with solders to maintain and
operate equipment employing new technologies that are being used in
support of Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF).
Some examples of how the command is supporting current operations
today are: ARL/TARDEC has implemented an expedient solution in which
Army scientists and engineers designed a novel configuration of steel
bars and steel armor that can be added to the doors of the High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) to protect crews from
rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) attacks as well as small arms fire;
4,800 HMMWV application armor kits are in production by the Army's
depots and arsenals and being deployed in theater, along with M1A1 rear
grill door armor and Stryker ``bar armor.'' The Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and ARL developed the Pacbots
(portable backpack robots) deployed to Afghanistan to clear caves and
buildings. TARDEC, with cooperation from Utah State University,
developed omni-directional under vehicle inspection systems to foreign
devices and contraband; and CERDEC developed and fielded an electronic
countermeasure (ECM) system that provides force protection in convoy,
fixed site and check point missions against booby traps and remotely
detonated weapons. By modifying an electronic warfare (EW) technology
that has been fielded to defeat certain weapons, the research and
development (R&D) community has created a number of systems that can be
used by our soldiers to prevent the enemy from being able to use their
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the vicinity of our operations.
We are getting these new devices to the field as quickly as possible
and will continue to do so while continuing to employ advances in
electronic technology that will allow us to defeat the changing threat
as our adversaries rapidly adapt. NSC developed Phraselator for fixed
phrase speech translation from English to Dari, Pashto, or Arabic for
use by special operations, civil affairs, military police (MPs), and
medical personnel. ECBC developed chemical detection lab in Baghdad.
AMRDEC integrated the Hellfire missile on a Predator Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV). CERDEC developed a Well Camera System that is an
alternative to lowering a soldier into a well to identify hidden caches
of weapons and munitions; CERDEC developed and fielded two prototypes
of the Ground Standoff Mine Detection System (GSTAMIDS), which is a
remotely controlled vehicle-mounted mine detection system using a
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) vehicle (Meerkat) controlled by a
follow-on vehicle (Buffalo). ARL developed a new sniper detection
system for use in Iraq.
In addition to supporting current operations, RDECOM is heavily
involved in moving future technologies into the current force. The
RDECOM supports PM Future Combat Systems (FCS)/Lead Systems Integrator
(LSI) by inserting advanced technology as it becomes available to
increase FCS capabilities, using a spiral development acquisition
approach. However, it is transitioning a number of technologies that
are in development for PM FCS LSI, for use in current operations. Also,
RDECOM supports the Army Chief of Staff's Focus Area effort through
interaction with the Future to Current Task Force. The Task Force is
working to provide future capabilities to an army that is in combat
today: providing some of the FCS-like technologies that have been in
development for the last 4 years. It is vital that we focus a portion
of our S&T on deliverable, affordable products within shorter
timeframes while the remainder continues to develop our ``next
generation'' capabilities. The key enabler for this is to take shorter
technology jumps and transition incremental improvements to the soldier
rather than wait decades for revolutionary materiel and doctrinal
changes. Sometimes a 70-percent solution that is available now can be
better than a 99-percent solution that will be ready for fielding 3
years from now. For example, the First Strike Ration prototypes out of
NSC were demonstrated under a previously completed Science Technology
Objective (STO), but deployed to OEF and consumed by elements of the
75th Ranger Regiment. After receiving constructive comments from the
deployed soldiers, the NSC team improved the nutrient-laden ration,
deployed the rations again, and now receives continuous requests for
them.
Another example of moving technology forward is the Suite of Sense
Through the Wall (STTW) system, which will provide mounted/dismounted
soldiers with the capability to detect, locate and ``see'' personnel
with concealed weapons and explosives who are hidden behind walls,
doors and other visible obstructions. This capability has direct
application to the operating forces requirements for military
operations in urban terrain (MOUT), prisoner/checkpoint screening or
hostage recovery operations.
An additional example where RDECOM is inserting advanced
technological equipment for the warfighter is with the Lightweight
Counter Mortar Radar (LCMR), which provides the capability of 360
degree detection of mortar fire out to ranges which are beyond the
effective range of most mortar weapons and locating the firing weapon
with accuracy sufficient to engage with combat air support. The radar
weighs approximately 120 lbs and disassembles for transport. The radar
reports target locations to a Personal Data Assistant (PDA) that can
communicate with the radar wirelessly so that the radar operator need
not remain with the radar. The PDA also provides radar control and
receives and displays system status and fault messages.
IED Change Detection is being developed by CERDEC to detect IEDs
along travel routes using high resolution aerial/overhead imagery. It
uses day and night sights and is currently mounted on manned and
unmanned aviation systems. The data is sent to a Change Detection Work
Station, where a warfighter views day-to-day thermal or TV imagery that
is collected by the airborne asset. This system helps an operator to
identify and locate ``new'' environmental changes on a route which
could indicate the presence of IEDs or landmines.
The Active Protective System (APS) is the hit avoidance portion of
the manned FCS platform against anti-tank threat munitions prior to the
threat munitions making physical contact with the platform. The
Integrated Army Active Protective System (IAAPS) is an integrated FCS
system that uses soft kill electronic sensors and countermeasures
(jammers and decoys) and a hard kill active protection system (physical
interruption) to protect a vehicle from direct fire and top attack
threats with growth potential for kinetic energy (KE) threat defeat.
RDECOM is developing the following two APS programs for integration
into the current force in order to increase survivability of our
warfighters.
The Full Spectrum Active Protection (FSAP) Close-In Layered Shield
(FCLAS) is a cross-technology solution integrating radar, digital
signal processing and explosives in a small, self-contained interceptor
ready for loading into a smoke tube or an upgraded FCLAS tube. It
detects, tracks, and defeats RPGs.
The Close-In Active Protection System (CIAPS) consists of a radar
staring in all directions that can detect an incoming threat at very
short range and launch one of an array of pre-positioned interceptors
to intercept and destroy the threat shaped charge warhead before it
hits the protected vehicle. It is effective against anti-tank guided
missiles (ATGMs) as well as RPGs and can defeat threats launched from
very short range.
The command not only collects lessons learned from the FAST and
STAT Teams, but each RDEC also has teams that deploy with the soldiers
to gather on-site operational lessons learned. For example: One of the
NSC's programs is called the Operational Force Interface Group (OFIG),
which is in place to gather soldier feedback on equipment. The OFIG
conducts numerous visits to operational units, after redeployment,
where they survey hundreds of soldiers about their equipment. The OFIG
also has teams that deploy to the area of operations to gather soldier
feedback on problems with equipment. The NSC also has a ``Greening
Program,'' which allows engineers, project officers and scientists the
opportunity to participate in a field training exercise with a unit for
a 4- to 5-day period.
In order to ensure that the RDECOM has knowledge of and access to
the best technologies in the world, the command has established
International Technology Centers (ITCs) throughout the world. As
regional representatives, the Command's ITCs understand and anticipate
U.S. technology requirements and initiate proactive, innovative
approaches to expanding contacts with foreign military R&D
organizations, foreign commercial industry and foreign universities
involved in S&T. Based on their discoveries, to include non-
developmental items (NDI), they recommend to the laboratories, RDECOM-
AIDE, PEOs, PMs and the REF, potential opportunities for cooperative
projects, commercial contracts, university studies, etc., that will
leverage international S&T in support of Army Campaign Plan.
RDECOM has established a formal relationship with the TRADOC
Futures Center (FC). This relationship insures the integration of
technology into holistic Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material,
Leader Development, and Personnel (DOTMLPF) solutions for the
warfighter. The RDECOM becomes the entry point for the FC for all AMC
S&T products through multiple channels that includes resident liaison
officers assuring that the FC is cognizant of emerging technology
enablers and the potential to deliver capabilities to the warfighter.
The FC/RDECOM team provides a decisionmaking framework for Army
leadership by analyzing S&T developments linked to operational
capability to validate the S&T investment. The command plays an
integral role with the FC in addressing shortfalls in future operating
capabilities (FOCs) and providing the technologies to assure that
warfighter capability goals are met. The command's technology
integrated product teams (IPTs), including strong FC participation,
insure that all pursued efforts will result in operationally relevant
solutions to warfighter requirements and that the warfighter
requirements are met. The focus for this new command has been in the
power and energy, lethality, robotics, modeling and simulation,
countermine, supportability, survivability, networking, nanotechnology,
and biotechnology areas.
The role of RDECOM is to provide a single integrated strategy
toward the research, development and engineering of materiel solutions
addressing user requirements. One major player in the strategy is that
of experimentation. The linking of experimentation insures that RDECOM
technology demonstrations are operationally relevant, while providing a
venue to develop operational concepts for new technologies in FC
experiments. By adhering to a Code of Best Practices for
Experimentation, and institutionalizing the system engineering
processes and disciplines throughout the RDECs, RDECOM provides a broad
base of consistent and innovative approaches to developing the DOTMLPF
solutions for the warfighter today and tomorrow. Using a variety of
tools, ranging from hardware platforms, through virtual simulations, in
either stand-alone or integrated mode, the centers perform a variety of
experiments, from discovery, through hypothesis testing, and
demonstration, leading to a developed and refined military capability.
One of the tools that the command will use is the Modeling Architecture
for Technology, Research, and Experimentation (MATREX) STO, that is
developing a persistent, secure, distributed, and reusable environment
where models can be ``plugged'' into an established architecture as
needed and then ``played'' for engineering analysis, evaluations,
supportability, and technology trade-offs in support of Army
transformation. The MATREX will be a key enabler of Simulation and
Modeling for Acquisition, Requirements, and Technology (SMART)
initiatives throughout the command and the Army that will enable the
Army to field equipment to the warfighters more speedily. Together with
the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Army Test and
Evaluation Command (ATEC), RDECOM plays a vital role in experimentation
and development, from concept to fielding.
But most importantly, we have worked closely with the Air Force and
Navy R&D community and the national labs to ensure we are on a clear
path to success in our warfighting missions in the 21st century.
Today the Army is both at war and continuing its efforts towards
transformation. As we move from our current force to the future force
that is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the
operational spectrum, the Nation's S&T assets are essential to success.
We must provide technology solutions essential to current and future
warfighter needs across the full spectrum of Army operations. Our
diverse S&T programs will enable the Army to support evolving and
emerging capabilities.
The RDECOM fields the technologies which sustain America's Army as
the premier land force in the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to testify before the
subcommittee. I would be happy to answer any questions you or the
members of the subcommittee may have.
Senator Roberts. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
gentlemen for your testimony this morning and for your presence
here.
A key aspect of success and rapidly transitioning these
technologies through the current operation has been the ability
to find the money to develop and produce the needed systems.
I wonder if each of you might share the various mechanisms
that you're using to find the money to move things out of R&D
and into the field.
Dr. Uhler.
Dr. Uhler. Yes, sir. As I mentioned, what we tend to do is
pay a lot of attention to what's occurring in the other
military departments and the laboratories within government, as
well as where industry is. We aggressively participate in their
planning processes and we also try to look and see what's
occurring in industry and academia.
When we see a good idea--and this isn't just from our
technologists that are doing this, this is also from our
operators who are constantly exposed to interaction with their
counterpart forces around the world--we take a quick look at
that. We go out and buy it. We bring it in. As I mentioned, we
test it quickly and then we get it in the hands of our
operators for further evaluation.
The advantage we have is that our operators are highly
trained, mature, and skilled compared to the normal types of
folks that are in the other Services because they spend more
time training and they have a limited focus in their objective.
Consequently, we can take some calculated risk in fielding
this to them sooner than going through the full-blown
development, testing, and evaluation process. That's where we
tend to collapse the time needed to field capabilities.
We can take a relatively commercial item and bring it in.
If it looks really useful, we can field it very quickly by
using our own in-house testing and give it to the field
operators. We make modifications as they demand from there.
Senator Reed. What funding sources do you use to under----
Dr. Uhler. We use our existing R&D and S&T funding that we
have. We've been fortunate to be well-supported in our budget
requests by the committee. So it's done well for us.
Senator Reed. General Waldhauser, do you have any comments?
General Waldhauser. Sir, at the warfighting lab, one of our
main functions is to go ahead and test and evaluate these new
technologies for the operator. So once we determine perhaps
that there is something there that could work and may be of use
we coordinate with the operating forces, we also coordinate
with those who would be involved in a transition later on, if
required, and work through the Office of Naval Research and
with our own program and resources in the Marine Corps to move
money around, if necessary, to do that.
So far in the time I've been in the job, my experience has
been that this has gone fairly well. We have not had any major
problems in doing that.
Senator Reed. General Cartwright.
General Cartwright. Sir, in the Army, there are a couple of
means to look at answering your question. First, a combatant
commander comes in with what's called an operational needs
statement. He goes into our G3, who runs what in the Army we
call the Army Strategic Programming Board.
Those funds there, sir, are operational global war on
terrorism funds and it looks at how to fill an immediate need
and whether it can be applied to our rapid equipping force,
i.e., I can turn a solution around in 90 days, or do I reach
inside one of the labs for this 50 to 70 percent solution and
deploy those in small numbers.
The second thing is, through Dr. Sega's help in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), working with the combatant
commanders helping us identify both money and critical
capabilities--particularly I'll use the improvised explosive
device (IED) change detection, which they're funding right now,
to be able to field those needs. The testing is actually done
by those combatant commanders, in conjunction with those
combatant commanders, to field those things.
The third way to look at it, sir, is the Army has put a
huge investment into FCS. When we say ``system,'' it's really a
unit. It's called a unit of action. That unit of action--one of
the chief's goals for task forces when he came in, was task
force modularity. That was to look at how to move the current
Army more to the future Army as it stands now.
That investment in FCS--we're seeing some of the systems I
mentioned this morning--and the light-weight armor that you see
to my right over there, we're pulling those technologies out of
the FCS and applying those to current needs today. So I use
those funds that we're doing with FCS or, as we say, you pull
them off the bench and apply those to warfighting needs at this
time.
The third thing is we're learning from our brothers in
SOCOM how to really get at how to do agile development and
fielding with the combatant commander and turn solutions
around.
As I mentioned, we have S&T advisors on the combatant
command staff. We actually have today 31 scientists--both
military and civilian--deployed at the division, at corps
levels in the area of responsibility (AOR) who are providing us
both a capability and a need of how to turn those solutions
around.
Those solutions, sir, we either take out of the work we're
doing for FCS or the doors and the kit that we did on HMMWVs,
we take that out of the S&T dollars and then are repaid back
through the global war on terrorism as that becomes available
through the Army Strategic Programming Board that's run by our
G3 in the Army.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
General Cartwright, one of the most obvious needs has been
armoring of these HMMWVs both with the kits and with acquiring
more armored HMMWVs.
Do we yet have enough of the kits to provide for all of our
requirements?
General Cartwright. Sir, as the chief said before the full
committee last week, the requirements have grown to about
11,000. This kit to your right is only one of the solutions.
We're pulling up-armored HMMWVs from all over the world and
shipping them to the AOR.
We're also using industry kits that were all tested to the
same requirements to meet both small arms, RPG, and IED
threats.
The kit that you see to your right, sir, by the end of May,
we will produce about 6,300 of these. In fact, today there are
a little over 1,300 of these kits. It was started in December
and we are already installed in-theater with these kits to move
to the requirement to do that, sir.
Senator Reed. Just focusing for a moment on this, and
there's probably a hundred other items that we could focus on,
what lessons have you learned from this experience about the
industrial base, about our ability to surge the production,
about the manufacturing technologies program and making sure
that we can produce these things? Are there any initial
lessons?
General Cartwright. Sir, as you well know, starting up an
industry is tough. The RHA that's used on this, they run the
mills twice a year. If you don't have your orders in, you don't
get it. They're actually running 24/7 on special runs to be
able to do that.
On the electronics industry, sir, as long as we can pull,
and we're pulling a lot of commercial technologies right now,
particularly in the surveillance arena from the commercial
industry, I have a fairly strong industrial base out there.
The piece we've learned is how to be agile in all of our
processes, whether it be funding, authorities, or how do I meet
the requirement or that capability that's coming into me today
that says I need this now. It may be more than a couple hundred
thousand dollars.
The Department is learning from SOCOM, and with help from
Congress, how to become the agile, expeditionary force that
will go into any part of the world at any point in time and be
able to meet that threat that we are going to meet.
An industrial-based issue, particularly in electronics, is
that what we use today may be a threat tomorrow. So what I'm
using today, I now have to defeat tomorrow. In the electronics,
it's fairly good. It's when I particularly want to get into the
heavy industries is where they start up mills, just from the
sheer start-up costs, sir.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much indeed. I'm sure
this subcommittee would like to hear more about the lessons and
also anything we can do to facilitate your flexibility and your
ability to be rapid in your response.
Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, welcome.
Dr. Uhler, I am directing these questions primarily to you,
but I would hope that General Waldhauser and maybe General
Cartwright would also chime in and talk about this a little
bit.
I'm comfortable with the concept of spiral development with
missile defense and whatnot. I appreciate General Cartwright's
response to some questions I had that he responded to already
with Senator Reed.
I guess the follow-up question is, and you've talked a
little bit about lessons learned, but are you sharing your
successes and failures with other people in acquisition
activities and acquisition officials throughout the DOD,
including the space acquisition community? Are you
communicating back and forth on your lessons, both the
difficulties that you run into as well as successes?
Dr. Uhler. Yes, sir. In fact, one of the first meetings I
had when I was appointed to this position was with Mr. Wynne.
One of the things we talked about was the fact that he
encouraged us to keep taking advantage of the capabilities we
have with this new look at spiral development and evolutionary
acquisition and to continue to bring to him and the rest of the
community the methodologies that we've used.
One of the things he also said that he was interested in us
doing was attending the semiannual conferences that he convenes
to exchange those types of lessons. It's where he gets the
whole acquisition community together down at the Defense
Systems Management College at Fort Belvoir and we talk through
these. He invites the acquisition executives from the three
military departments and also from SOCOM, and that is a good
exchange.
I also have done speaking engagements and am committed to
do more at the Defense Systems Management College for their new
students in their program management course, explaining to them
how we do these types of capabilities and changes within SOCOM.
At the same time, I have a good relationship with my
counterparts in both the S&T community and the acquisition
community and other military departments. So we do, in fact,
share our lessons learned and our experiences.
One of the things that's so nice about the collaboration
that we enjoy with them is that the authorities that you all
gave us to function like a military department were for SOF-
peculiar equipment.
What we tend to do is again look at what the Services have
developed for their own common items of equipment in terms of
helicopters, for example, and then we add to their basic air
frame and capability those things that we need for our special
operations mission.
As a result of that, we're continually talking about what
modifications we're making based on their common production
line and depot facilities. That gives us another interchange
mechanism that is very effective on showing how we can help
each other do business.
Senator Allard. In your statement, Dr. Uhler, you mentioned
your command's updated acquisition priorities included the
divestment of legacy systems that are not desired for the
global war on terror.
My question is, does the 2005 budget describe the legacy
systems being terminated or are we to expect additional program
budget information or reprogramming requests to terminate
additional systems?
Dr. Uhler. Actually, I'll put a slightly different twist on
that. What we really have done is, as we laid out the fiscal
year 2005 budget, we said certain systems are going to finish
their development, move into production, and at the end of
production, they will go into sustainment.
So, as those systems which are currently being used in the
field reach the point where we can say we now have a better
product and no longer need to continue to field those systems,
we will do so.
In fact, that's what's reflected in the fiscal year 2005
budget, and you'll see more of that in the out years as we
bring those systems to fruition, have replacements for them,
and use that money that's freed up to reinvest in the new
systems.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
This question is for all three of you, and it's a problem
that we have been struggling with. This issue concerns the
Reserve and National Guard units' training and equipment and
access to technologies, because with this higher operations
tempo (OPTEMPO), we have seen and heard disturbing reports
about reservists and Guard members not receiving adequate
equipment, or at least not the equivalent of Active-Duty
Forces.
What I'm wondering is, have there been any lessons learned
about how we can better equip and train on the newest
technologies the Guard and Reserve units that are called into
active duty, General Cartwright?
General Cartwright. Yes, ma'am. The Army is using a couple
of initiatives. One is called the Rapid Fielding Initiative,
which started about a year ago. Under the chief's direction, it
will equip every unit with the exact same equipment, whether it
be active or Reserve. Those units deploying on OEF-II now,
whether they be from the Guard, Reserve, or active component,
will have the exact same equipment, whether it be knee pads or
rifles.
As far as training goes, one of the lessons we have
learned, ma'am, is we have what we call, in conjunction with
the combatant commander, an IED task force. That IED task force
has actually gone to every Guard brigade and done training on
IEDs.
Both here and before the unit crosses into Iraq, they'll
get training on what the tactics, techniques, and procedures
should be. They train on how to be able to do that before they
go into theater. Those are two of the initiatives in the
lessons learned that we're doing.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
General Waldhauser.
General Waldhauser. Ma'am, I can't speak directly on the
equipment side of the house, but I can talk about the training
to a certain degree.
The Warfighting Lab, in conjunction with coalition partners
and other agencies within the Marine Corps, has put on a
training evolution in southern California for all battalions
going back to Iraq. This has to do with cultural sensitivity,
IED awareness, and how to work in the environment that the
marines will find themselves in very shortly.
I would say that the Reserve units, the battalions that are
going back with the marines, have participated in that
training. They've essentially received the same training that
the active-duty units have.
Senator Clinton. General, would you mind submitting to the
subcommittee an answer with respect to equipment?
General Waldhauser. It's now taken for the record, and I'll
do that.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Waldhauser did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
General Cartwright, I know that General Kern has visited
Watervliet Arsenal. Since the War of 1812, Watervliet Arsenal
has played a vital role in arming our military. It is our
Nation's only manufacturing facility for large-caliber cannons
in volume.
At that same facility, Benet Labs performs scientific and
engineering activities that range from basic research through
design for production and engineering support for the
production of its design team.
This collocation of the arsenal and Benet Labs allows for
complete life-cycle management from idea through research,
engineering, prototype testing, and finally full-scale
production. There isn't, so far as I know, any other collocated
facility, and certainly no other arsenal, that has this kind of
resource.
When I visited Watervliet and Benet Labs, obviously there
were a lot of questions about their future. I was impressed by
what I saw there and I certainly have been impressed by the
role that they've played in the last 2 years. I think that
having that facility available and open and operating, no
matter what conditions we confront, is essential to meeting our
security needs.
Are you familiar with Benet Labs and Watervliet Arsenal,
General?
General Cartwright. Yes, ma'am, I am.
Senator Clinton. What are your thoughts on their future
role?
General Cartwright. Ma'am, I'll speak only to Benet since
they are one of my labs that's actually owned up there. I'll
give you a couple examples of the work Benet is doing right
now.
One of the things they're doing is looking at tank tubes,
particular the Abrams tank tube. Over a life cycle, the tube
will actually bend. One of the technologies they're looking at
is going to actually use a process to re-straighten the
barrels, which would be applicable for anything from large
caliber to small arms, to be able to restraighten barrels.
The second technology they're looking at in cooperation
with Lawrence Livermore is a process called laser peening. It
actually allows the metal to be harder. You shoot the laser at
the metal and it allows it to be harder than it actually is and
it lasts a lot longer. Those are two of the pieces that Benet
Lab is doing.
So it's not only supporting the arsenal, but it's looking
at using them across a lot of the products--particularly laser
peening. I can use it for tank tubes or tori tubes, but could I
use it for fan blades on jet engines.
Senator Clinton. So that could be part of a
transformational recapitalization strategy with respect to a
number of items?
General Cartwright. Yes, ma'am. We're looking at that
across all the labs, and it goes back to the chief's direction
as to how do I take future technologies and put them to current
use today, because we can't wait until 2010 to bring the
technologies in. I need the technologies now.
We're looking at that across all our labs, the industries,
and the arsenals to say, how do I bring those in today? Because
the old 90-percent solution is a day gone by when I can give
the soldier a capability they need.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Senator Roberts. The thought occurred to me that at Fort
Riley, Kansas, we have the best tank firing range in America. I
guess maybe relocating all that to Kansas wouldn't be what the
answer is then.
Senator Clinton. I think a memorandum of understanding and
partnership would be the--jointness is what I think it would
represent.
Senator Roberts. Well, everything has to be joint today, so
I would certainly take that under consideration.
I have two quick questions. Well, they're not quick, but
let me make the observation that our ability to maintain what's
called battlefield superiority obviously requires control of
the information systems against increasingly sophisticated
adversaries employing computer network attacks.
You go to almost every one of these demonstrations back
here and they're all highly computerized, and we just talked
about a computer database with a problem at the FBI and the
Border Patrol.
Would any of you like to talk a little more about efforts
underway to combat this potential weakness?
The exercises that I've attended, some with Senator Reed,
are very impressive. This new technology is very impressive.
Usually one of my first questions is, what if the satellite
goes down? What if you have an adversary who is very skilled in
regards to combating our information technology?
Where are we in terms of efforts underway? We are so
reliant on these kinds of systems. If that is taken away by
somebody wearing jeans, a Madonna T-shirt, whatever the latest
brand of tennis shoes would be, and maybe a ball cap, where
we're all outfitted in a high-tech way to combat that and they
take it down, what do we do? What are we doing S&T-wise to
offset that? Anybody?
General Cartwright. Sir, you're correct. About the only
thing that doesn't have software in it now is a bayonet.
Senator Roberts. I'm sorry. I didn't hear that.
General Cartwright. About the only thing that doesn't have
software in it is a bayonet. If you look at the next generation
of weapons, particularly rifles, they will have software in
them.
So information assurance is key, whether it be the computer
on your desk today that you get your e-mail on in a classified
or an unclassified method, or whether it's the soldier on the
battlefield using reach-back systems to order those spare parts
or to be able to destroy or neutralize an enemy's system.
There are several ways we're doing that. There are S&T
objectives that we're doing. There are actually 6.3-Advanced
Technology programs in our labs now to combat that, and as you
well know, a lot of the information assurance.
I tell people that engineers recreated a wheel thousands of
years ago in the engineering world. In the software world,
we're about 50 years old in the art of learning this. I say
learning it because every day it changes. A lot of it has to do
with the ability I call, ``the attack and defend.'' To be able
to defend yourself, you have to know how the attacker will
attack you.
Now, there are both classified and unclassified programs
that we'll work on to take care of that, but the issue becomes
how smart I am in protecting my own systems. That knowledge, a
lot of times, comes from learning the attackers and the methods
they're going to use.
A lot of the systems we use today use commercial software
in the reuse business because that's how you cut down the time
needed for developing the new software. There are programs to
ensure that the commercial software you get and that source
code will do exactly what you want them to do, when you want
them to do it.
It is an area that is going to get more complex, because
the other thing I would tell you is we've seen policies grow in
the last couple of years in the areas of information security,
information operations, and data fusion.
That's my real worry. Do policies affect how we protect the
battlefield? As I said, the only thing that's not going to have
software in it is going to be a bayonet.
What I may use on the tactical battlefield is also
applicable in the civilian world, and we have to be very
careful that we don't cross that boundary in protecting our own
soldiers. A soldier on a battlefield now can reach back and
touch your computer with the reach-back capabilities,
particularly in the logistics world of being able to order that
spare part in real time.
Senator Roberts. Any other comments by any other of the
witnesses?
General Waldhauser. Sir, I have nothing significant to add
to that, but I'd like to take that one for the record.
General Waldhauser did not respond in time for printing. When
received, answer will be retained in committee files.
Senator Roberts. All right. Dr. Uhler.
Dr. Uhler. From our perspective, our situation is a bit
less complicated than that of our sister Services. We focus on
smaller unit operations.
We tend to rely to a large extent on the best practices and
the technology that's coming out of the military departments
and also the DOD agencies.
We spend a lot of time also worrying about low probability
of intercept, low probability of detection for communications
capabilities. We have a lot of alternate means to circumvent
those types of situations if we do discover a vulnerability or
suspect that there are problems with our situation.
So we think we're in fairly good shape just following that
practice right now.
Senator Roberts. Well, some of those answers could be
answered in a classified presentation, which we hope to have if
we can fit it in with a very busy schedule.
The year was 1999. I was privileged to chair the Emerging
Threats Subcommittee when it was first formed by Senator
Warner, Senator Lieberman, and Senator Coats. I think I made a
statement--well, I know I made a statement that given the
attack on the World Trade Center, that if the attacker had
known or the terrorist had known where the grid was or had a
copy of the grid of the towers there, that 6,000 people
wouldn't come out suffering from smoke inhalation. They
wouldn't have come out.
Now, at that particular time when I said that and quoted
Osama bin Laden and then asked people what really kept them up
at night, that was the lead question and that's what I'm going
to ask you.
I had no idea that somebody would be using--I don't think
any of us did--aircraft as missiles. I'm not saying that we
were that prescient, except that virtually every panel we had
before us kept warning over and over again that something like
this could happen.
So my question to you today is, when you look out 10 to 20
years in the future, what is the technological challenge and
future threat that concerns you the most? In other words, what
keeps you up at night?
As you look down the road, not only at what we're going
through now, but also the rapid change and the revolutionary
change that we have in technology and the change in threat now
with the global war on terrorism, what's the one thing that
really is of concern to you in this field?
We'll start in reverse order with General Cartwright.
General Cartwright. Sir, it's the ability to be able to
defeat a technology that we may use in our everyday lives. It
deals with your question of information security. We may have
the greatest technology in the world that we use every day in
our lives, but the next day the bad guy has figured out how to
use that against me.
To take that technology down, I might take that technology
away from every one of us. How we work through that ability to
be able to take that down may also affect how we do our
everyday lives.
Technology is turning so fast. You have nano and you have
biotechnology coming on faster. In fact, I looked at a uniform
yesterday that was built out of nano materials. I got in it. A
guy put a hose against me. I was perfectly dry.
Do we understand what those technologies are going to be,
and then if we start using them and the bad guy uses it against
us, how do I take that down and not affect our everyday lives
that we all take for granted that we grew up with and that we
live with?
That's probably my greatest fear, sir. I have civilian
scientists and military scientists and engineers that are
coming in now that are just doing absolutely great things. They
love it. They love it because of the support from this
subcommittee and OSD and everybody because we're actually
giving them real projects. The advance of this technology
coming so fast really has them excited.
But we're going to use that in our everyday lives and the
bad guy is going to use it too. I don't want to take that
technology away from anybody when he starts using it against
me.
Senator Roberts. Sobering thoughts.
General, any comments?
General Waldhauser. Sir, I would answer the question this
way. I think presently the people we work with, the S&T
community, the universities, the laboratories, everyone is
extremely excited to make a contribution.
My concern is, over the long-term, the ability to maintain
the level of support we have right now in the community, to
maintain the contributions that are being made, and to be able
to harness what exactly is out there. What is the art of the
possible? I think we have to be able to do that for the long-
term. There has to be some type of incentive to keep the ground
swell of support that we see right now. We have to maintain
that for the long term, 10 to 15 years from now, because the
technologies change so rapidly, the threats change so rapidly.
We have to have the momentum on our side so that next time
around, wherever or whenever that may be, whatever threat
emerges or whatever technology solution is there, we have to be
able to rapidly harness that effort and then move forward to
find the solution.
Senator Roberts. So basically you're telling us that the
goal of providing at least 3 percent of the DOD budget to S&T
should be attained, and then you wouldn't have to worry so much
about a particular surge requirement where you'd probably have
to rely on a supplemental or whatever it is?
In other words, you want a consistent and constant funding
commitment not only during times when we are obviously involved
in personnel tempo, OPTEMPO, and the global war on terrorism,
and we're stretched all over the world, but also during other
times as well?
Am I sort of paraphrasing what you're saying?
General Waldhauser. Yes, sir. If we have a relatively level
commitment when something arises, the ability to find a quick
solution would be that much easier as opposed to having to ramp
up if we did not have a constant effort over time.
Senator Roberts. So we'd have 11,000 of these units in
theater right now. That's probably not the best example in the
world, but at least it's the one I remember.
Dr. Uhler, do you have any comment?
Dr. Uhler. Yes, sir. When you think about the kinds of
missions our SOF can be called upon to do, they can be sent
anywhere in the world on an instant notice and encounter the
full range of sensors and threat weapons that exist. So my
biggest concern is how do we make those individuals not only
invisible, but also invulnerable to those various types of
environments in which they must operate?
They don't have the support structure associated with them
that the larger units do and so, again, these individuals are
our most important asset. How do we protect them and how do we
keep them from being seen and injured?
Senator Roberts. Okay. We thank you for being here and we
thank you for your contributions and your perseverance. We will
go to the next panel.
I would like to welcome our second panel. We have with us
Dr. Ron Sega, who is the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering; Dr. Thomas Killion, who's the acting Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology and
the Chief Scientist; Rear Admiral Jay Cohen of the United
States Navy, the Chief of Naval Research; and James B. Engle,
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science,
Technology, and Engineering.
Gentlemen, if you can summarize your comments, we would
appreciate it, and we'll begin with Dr. Sega.
STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD M. SEGA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING
Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, Senator Allard, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today to talk
about the S&T program for the DOD. Thank you for allowing my
written testimony to be submitted for the record.
S&T remains postured to support both the near-term global
war on terrorism and the transformation of the DOD. We're
excited about the capabilities and possibilities that continue
to be opened by S&T throughout the Department.
Secretary Rumsfeld stated in last month's fiscal year 2005
budget testimony that the Department and Congress have a common
challenge, to support the troops and to make sure they have
what they will need to defend the Nation in the years ahead.
The Department's S&T program is vital to support our troops
and is simultaneously developing the capabilities for our
future forces. While there are still many challenges, I believe
the S&T program has been productive over the last year and the
increasing emphasis on accelerating transition of technology is
showing positive results.
The president's budget request for fiscal year 2005 is up
approximately 1.5 percent in real growth from the President's
budget request in fiscal year 2004.
As the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, I
serve in the role of the Department's chief technology officer
and have established five priorities. In the written testimony,
there are many examples and I will forego some of those.
Number one, to integrate the DOD S&T and focus on
transformation, and to establish three cross-cutting
initiatives for the Department. There are many initiatives
within each of the Services as well.
The National Aerospace Initiative will help us enable high-
speed and hypersonic flights and have access to space, space
technology, and the Energy and Power Technologies Initiative
will enable a more electrical force by creating new ways of
power generation, energy storage and conversion and management
of electrical power.
The Surveillance and Knowledge Systems Initiative is
enabling command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR).
Senator Roberts, it gets to the question you have on
information assurance. This is very important. For a network-
enabled, network-centric approach to the future, the network
has to be there.
We are also working on sensing knowledge management and
communications in that initiative. You'll hear from the
components, the Services, and some of their transformational
activities in their work in the global war on terrorism.
Number two, address the national security science and
engineering workforce. We've begun addressing this need. It
establishes things such as increasing the number and stipend in
national defense graduate fellowships and also working with
freshman initiatives and K-12 programs.
It's just a start. We are currently examining future
workforce needs to ensure that we have the best technical
talent available for national security R&D.
Number three, expand the outreach to the combatant commands
and Intelligence Community. We've strengthened our ties with
the combatant commands. In fact, we have a liaison officer from
my office currently at Central Command (CENTCOM) forward in
Doha, Qatar as we speak to continue that linkage.
We've redone the joint warfighting S&T plan. This year for
the first time, we've aligned with the joint functional
concepts. The chapters are cosponsored by the joint staff or
combatant commands and it is tying and aligning our program
with the needs of the warfighter.
We're testing more technical capabilities through a variety
of mechanisms. The one you're probably most familiar with is
the advance concept technology demonstration (ACTD).
We're also increasing our collaboration in S&T planning
with the Intelligence Community. I think that has been a
positive initiative.
Number four, to enhance technology transition. The
relevance of research and engineering efforts hinges on the
rapid and effective transition of technology to fielded
military forces.
The Department partnered with Congress to establish a quick
reaction special projects program. It is critical that this
program continue and expand. It allows the execution year
flexibility to meet new needs and new technical opportunities.
It's important for the value and as an effective mechanism in
this near-term technology transition.
The three components include the Quick Reaction Fund, the
Technology Transition Initiative, and the Defense Acquisition
Challenge Program. All, I believe, are working well and we
appreciate your support.
Other mechanisms, and we have a whole host to address
different situations, include the ACTDs and Title III as two
other examples.
Number five is to accelerate the technical support for the
war on terrorism. As General Cartwright had just alluded to,
there is an integrating function that we established on
September 19, 2001, called the DOD Combating Terrorism
Technology Task Force.
The leadership, technical leadership of the Services,
agencies, and subject-matter experts, and then shortly after
that, folks outside of the DOD, have come together to look at
technologies, move forward quickly, and match those with the
needs of the combatant commanders.
We had three phases, one to address issues in Afghanistan,
the next for preparing combat operations and potential needs in
Iraq, and the third phase is concentrated primarily on force
protection.
Some of the areas included in that you see in this room.
Others include other aspects of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), electronic countermeasures, language
translation aids, and automated biometrics.
In conclusion, the technology development results are
largely achieved through long-term stable investments in S&T.
Although the fiscal year 2005 President's budget request does
focus on transformational technologies, it also maintains the
flexibility to respond to near-term operational requirements
and technology opportunities. The balance has been and remains
important.
I believe the DOD's successes in technology and
transformation are significant, and I appreciate the
opportunity to come before you today and tell you about them.
We appreciate the support the Senate Armed Services Committee
has provided the Department.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sega follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Ronald M. Sega
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to talk about the science and
technology (S&T) program of the Department of Defense (DOD). S&T
remains postured to support both the near term global war on terrorism
and the transformation of DOD. We are excited about the capabilities
and possibilities that continue to be opened by S&T throughout the
Department. Secretary Rumsfeld stated in last month's fiscal year 2005
budget testimony that the Department and Congress have a common
challenge: ``to support the troops and to make sure they have what they
will need to defend the Nation in the years ahead.'' The Department's
S&T program is vital to the support of our troops and is simultaneously
developing the capabilities for our future forces. While there are
still many challenges, I believe the S&T program has been productive
over the past year, and the increasing emphasis on accelerating the
transition of technology is showing positive results.
As the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, serving in the
role of the Department's Chief Technology Officer, I have established
five priorities. These priorities facilitate the Secretary of Defense's
goals. Our research and engineering goals are to:
- Integrate DOD S&T and focus on transformation
- Enhance technology transition
- Address the national security science and engineering
workforce
- Expand outreach to the combatant commands and Intelligence
Community
- Accelerate technical support to the war on terrorism
Taken together, these priorities provide a sound strategic roadmap
to support the transformation of the DOD, and where technology can
help, address the immediate challenges of the global war on terrorism.
We have strengthened the programmatic oversight processes over the past
year to better ensure that the goals and objectives of the Department
are met. We have revised the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology
Plan (JWSTP) to better integrate and align our S&T program with the
needs of combatant commands and the joint functional concepts. We have
instituted focused reviews of the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) activities to ensure the best integration of the DARPA
research and results into the Department's coordinated research and
engineering program. We have expanded reviews with the components to
assess technology maturity and enhance technology insertion in support
of defense acquisition programs.
INTEGRATE DOD S&T AND FOCUS ON TRANSFORMATION
This goal strives for an integrated program across the DOD Services
and agencies that is aligned with transformational goals of the
Department. Two enabling elements for this goal--how much the DOD
invests in S&T, and into what technologies the Department invests its
S&T dollars.
The fiscal year 2005 President's budget request is a solid budget
proposal for S&T programs. The DOD request for S&T in fiscal year 2005
is $10.553 billion, or 2.62 percent of the overall DOD request. The
budget request achieves about 1.5 percent real growth in S&T, when
compared to the fiscal year 2004 President's budget request. The
Department's S&T investment has increased from $7.8 billion to $10.5
billion in the last 3 years of the President's budget requests.
We are mindful however, that additional funding, without focus,
will not ensure transformation. We have focused the budget request on
several important technology areas that should enhance transformation
and deliver critical military capabilities, and in addition, provide
technology solutions to support the global war on terrorism. The fiscal
year 2005 President's budget request continues the direction of
aligning S&T dollars to support the Department's six critical
operational capabilities as outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
These capabilities are: protect bases of operations, deny enemy
sanctuary, project and sustain US forces, enhance space operations,
assure information operations, and leverage information technologies.
Additionally, we continued with three broad, cross-cutting initiatives
that address the development of DOD critical transformational
technologies. These three initiatives have matured over the past year.
They are the National Aerospace Initiative (NAI); Energy and Power
Technologies, and Surveillance and Knowledge System (SKS). Finally, we
continued to identify potential technologies for acceleration in
support of initiatives for force protection of our remarkable men and
women deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq.
An important point to emphasize is the continuing importance of
basic research to enable the development of future military
capabilities. In the past 20-30 years, basic research has spawned such
advances as the Global Positioning System (GPS), Stealth, and Night
Vision devices. The pace of technology development is increasing so the
generation of new ideas through basic research remains a high-payoff
component of the S&T program. The fiscal year 2005 President's budget
request for basic research is $1.3 billion. Although the investment
level for basic research remains constant, the payoff continues to
produce significant discoveries, sometimes on a critically shortened
time-scale. For example, the success of the thermobaric weapon is
directly linked to the basic research in DOD. The thermobaric weapon
went from basic research through operational testing in 90 days. Basic
research also closely links the DOD with universities that provide a
great breadth of leading edge research, some that can be applied in the
very near-term. For instance, the technology used to decontaminate the
Senate offices and Federal facilities in the aftermath of the anthrax
attack come from an ongoing university-based basic research project.
The university linkage is also key in the education of the future
defense workforce.
COMPONENT INITIATIVES
The Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) is a complex
transformational initiative that networks combat and support vehicles,
unmanned air and ground systems, and soldiers together as an integrated
system. As this system matures, it will provide a revolutionary
capability to move, shoot, communicate, and defend. A technology
solution called ``ZEUS'' is a good example of enhanced technology
transition in support of the global war on terrorism. ZEUS involves a
high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) mounted laser
neutralization system for unexploded ordnance. ZEUS is currently
fielded in Afghanistan. This technology has neutralized 10 different
types of ordnance totaling 210 targets. The improved standoff range for
ordnance neutralization enhances the safety of our troops.
The Air Force's major transformational projects derive from the
envisioned joint battlespace infosphere capabilities. Those would
provide technology for applications ranging from decision quality
information to demonstrations of small and micro satellites that could
dramatically enhance our ability to conduct enduring space operations.
This movement to the transformational aspects of space and information
is central to the Air Force's investment profile, and will support the
entire Department.
The Navy's transformational programs include the electric ship
which is an ``umbrella'' program to integrate an array of technologies
that could provide an integrated propulsion, support, and weapons suite
to maximize the capability of future naval operations. For the global
war on terrorism, the Naval Research Labs developed and prototyped
Dragon Eye, a successful project currently deployed in Iraq. Dragon Eye
is a lightweight, person portable unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with a
changeable sensor package. One such package allows for the collection
and detection of chemical, biological, and radiological agents and
provides a stand-off surveillance capability.
Our investment in DARPA continues to emphasize high-risk, high
payoff research and development in a number of strategic thrust areas,
as outlined in the DARPA Strategic Plan. I would like to highlight a
DARPA-Service collaborative project that is supporting transformation
in the Department and should ultimately provide a unique surveillance
capability. The Organic Air Vehicle (OAV) is a small, man-portable UAV
that can fly and hover using a large horizontal fan. The UAV has been
tested in 9-, 15-, and 29-inch diameter versions--and each can carry
different payloads. This vehicle is being developed as a component of
the Army's FCS. DARPA's programmatic agility, when linked with Service
programs, accelerates technology development and transformation.
CROSS-CUTTING INITIATIVES
One of the joint transformational technology initiatives is the
NAI, which consists of research and development (R&D) in hypersonic
flight technology, affordable and responsive space access, and an
increased focus on space science and technology enablers.
NAI provides an integrated technology roadmap for the DOD to
increase our capability in several mission areas such as high speed/
hypersonic flight, access to space, and space technologies. For
example, hypersonic capability could provide an air breathing option to
conduct strikes from strategic distance in a short amount of time,
reducing vulnerability of future systems, and help to deny enemy
sanctuary. In the fiscal year 2005 budget, the Department increased
hypersonics funding primarily in support of the Air Force-DARPA Single
Engine Demonstrator (SED). The objective of the SED program is to
flight test the Air Force Hypersonic Technology (HyTech) scramjet
engine using endothermic hydrocarbon fuel accelerating a vehicle from
boost (approximately Mach 4.5) to approximately Mach 7. The NAI also
has the potential to capture American interest in aerospace technology,
while providing needed technical capability for the warfighter.
A second transformational technology thrust is Energy and Power
Technologies. This thrust involves a coordinated investment across the
DOD to improve power from systems such as microbatteries for soldiers
to massive generators for ships. This initiative is investing in
technology that could develop batteries with over five times the energy
density, fuel cells that are reliable and safe to use in the
battlefield, and capacitors that will decrease size needed to store
electricity on ships by a factor of 5-10. The initiative is also
focusing on ``electric'' weapon systems such as high power microwaves,
lasers, and electromagnetic guns that will provide greater options for
our forces.
The third cross cutting initiative is SKS. SKS is a broad-umbrella
program to develop capabilities to achieve information and decision
dominance through integrated communications, command, control, and
computers and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems
(C\4\ISR). This initiative seeks to bring about major improvement in
sensing, communications and networks, knowledge management, and
information security to provide superior decisions on shorter time
scales than can be made by potential adversaries. Instead of treating
each component separately, SKS has the goals of detecting objects in
the area of interest (battlespace) through enriching sensors (optical,
radar, acoustic, etc); moving the sensed information to present a
coordinated picture of the area of interest; using advanced software to
make sense of the information; and presenting this knowledge-based
result to assist decisions. By using such an integrated approach, the
goal is to allow our forces to react faster and smarter than potential
adversaries. The initiative should continue to make the vision of
network centric warfare a reality.
ENHANCE TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION
The relevance of research and engineering efforts hinges on the
rapid and effective transition of technology to fielded military
forces. In partnership with Congress, we established the Quick Reaction
Special Projects (QRSP) program, a flexible continuum of technology
transition projects that moves products from the DOD to the warfighter
quickly. The QRSP includes three technology transition projects: the
Quick Reaction Fund (QRF); the Technology Transition Initiative (TTI);
and the Defense Acquisition Challenge Program (DACP). We leverage the
Foreign Comparative Test (FCT) and the advanced concept technology
demonstration (ACTD) programs to get the best technologies to the joint
warfighters in the shortest time possible.
The QRF meets critical warfighter technology requirements that
cannot wait for the traditional 2 year budget cycle. In fiscal year
2003 we started six projects, three of which have already deployed to
support the war on terrorism in Iraq. We have continued rapid
technology insertion from the QRF in fiscal year 2004. This year, funds
were provided for the development of a HMMWV mounted wideband microwave
based integration system, called PING, to identify concealed weapons.
PING has seen positive results in testing. We also used the funds to
demonstrate and test ordnance disposal robots, a capability that has
saved lives in Iraq.
Last year we initiated the congressionally-directed TTI. TTI
provides bridge funding for critical technologies that have recently
been evaluated for procurement and enables the Services to speed
transition to acquisition programs of record. For example, the water
purification pen provides warfighters the ability to purify water in
unsanitary conditions. It is now available via the General Services
Administration (GSA) catalog for purchase from all government agencies.
This technology transition was accomplished 18-24 months earlier than
the normal acquisition process due to our ability to use TTI, and is
being used today by warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Under the direction of our new Comparative Test Office, the DACP
and the FCT program inject the very best domestic and foreign
technologies into existing capabilities, supporting the Department's
spiral development strategy. Through the FCT program, we significantly
enhanced the Army's Automatic Chemical Agent Detector Alarm (ACADA).
The advanced power supply for this sensitive Chem/Bio detector was
obtained from the United Kingdom. The power supply improved unit
reliability and significantly reduced equipment weight. Over 22,000 of
these detectors are deployed worldwide, protecting forces in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and even those of us sitting here in the Capitol
region.
In the DAC program, we selected 23 proposals from nearly 300
submittals. One example is an especially promising technology which
provides hemoglobin substitute for blood transfusions project known as
the Restore Effective Survival in Shock (RESUS). We believe RESUS has
the potential to dramatically increase the survivability of our troops.
This remarkable polymerized hemoglobin is compatible with all blood
types, can be stored for 3 years without refrigeration, and is pathogen
free. The support Congress has provided to the QRSP program has enabled
execution year flexibility to support new needs of the operational
force and new technology opportunities.
The ACTD program is our flagship technology transition process for
matching innovativeng technologies with joint and coalition operational
concepts. This program earned a reputation for anticipating emergent
threats and fielding transformational capabilities for combatant
commands. Sometimes referred to as our ``try before you buy'' approach,
ACTDs look for the 80-percent solution to jump start the acquisition
process through fielded, hands-on demonstrations. For example, we
successfully demonstrated the high-speed lift capability of the Theater
Support Vessel ACTD in real-world operations during Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). Our Language and Speech Translator ACTD enabled us to
quickly decipher confiscated documents which led to the location of
several high profile Iraqi leaders. These and many other successful
ACTDs draw the thanks of warriors engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) and OIF.
ADDRESS THE NATIONAL SECURITY SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING WORKFORCE
The third goal is a broad national strategic issue involving the
availability of scientists and engineers who are American citizens.
Warfighting capabilities demonstrated on the battlefield since
Operation Desert Storm are derived from the Department's technological
capabilities developed within DOD R&D laboratories, industry, and
universities. These capabilities were built on the intellectual capital
and competitiveness of the scientists and engineers, educated years
earlier, who conceived the scientific ideas and engineering
applications that became our present warfighting capabilities. We
produced stealth technology, the global positioning system, night
vision devices, precision weapons and pioneered the development of the
internet through the ``ARPANET'' with the U.S. technical talent
educated primarily in the 1960s and 1970s.
We now see warnings that America's advantage in defense-related
scientific and engineering intellectual capital is eroding. The
significance of this problem is outlined in the Report of the U.S.
Commission on National Security in the 21st century (Hart-Rudman
Report) which stated: ``Second only to a weapon of mass destruction
(WMD) detonating in an American city, we can think of nothing more
dangerous than a failure to manage properly science, technology, and
education for the common good over the next quarter of a century''. The
decreasing numbers of experienced scientists and engineers in the DOD
draws from the available pool of high quality scientists and engineers
who are U.S. citizens. The numbers of U.S. citizens in graduate schools
studying defense related disciplines has decreased in the last decade
according to National Science Foundation, National Science Board and
National Academy of Sciences reports.
We are responding to this issue. A science and engineering
workforce initiative is needed to reinvigorate our national security
R&D capability to ensure that we have the best qualified and motivated
scientists and engineers engaged in national security R&D. To begin to
address these issues, over the past year the Department has increased
the individual stipend and total number of National Defense Graduate
Fellowships. In addition, we are continuing to examine our future
workforce needs to ensure that we will have the best technical talent
available for national security R&D.
Expand Outreach to the Combatant Commands and Intelligence Community
We are enhancing the connectivity between the combatant commands
and the Intelligence Community and the DOD technology community. Over
the past year, we have revised our S&T strategic planning approach,
leading to a wholly revised ``Joint Warfighting Science and Technology
Plan'' that was cooperatively developed by the combatant commands,
Joint Staff, and S&T executives. We have also initiated several
technology net assessments in partnership with the Intelligence
Community to reduce the possibility of technology surprise in the
future and better inform our S&T investment plans.
ACCELERATE SUPPORT TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM
Maturing and fielding technology continues to be our most important
near term goal. Within a week of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the
Department established the DOD Combating Terrorism Technology Task
Force (CTTTF). This Task Force is still ongoing, and is in its third
major phase. The first phase accelerated technologies for homeland
defense and the initial war in Afghanistan; the second phase delivered
technology in support of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The current
third phase is identifying and accelerating technology for deployed
force protection. The Task Force is comprised of S&T senior leaders
from all DOD components, flag-level officers from the Joint Staff and
selected combatant commands, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the
Department of Energy (DOE), and now the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). The CTTTF continues to provide a valuable forum to examine the
technology alternatives to address immediate operational needs to
support the global war on terrorism.
Phase I, in the fall of 2001, resulted in such capabilities as the
BLU-118B (thermobaric weapon) with applications to caves and tunnels, a
backscatter gamma ray system to inspect cargo in closed containers, and
a nuclear quadripole resonance system that can detect small quantities
of explosives. We also sponsored a rapid study to determine radiation
levels needed to kill anthrax spores--knowledge that supported the
detailed response to the anthrax attacks of 2001.
In Phase II, the CTTTF reacted to a broad set of operational issues
that emerged leading up to and including support for OIF. Technologies
were accelerated to fielding for several specialized, unique weapons
which focused on specific, anticipated threats. Notable among these was
the AGM-114N Thermobaric Hellfire which built upon previous efforts
supported by the CTTTF in development of thermobaric weapons which were
employed in Afghanistan in OEF. The CTTTF sponsored the Passive Attack
Weapon to rapidly transition an Advanced Technology Development
prototype program to production, fielding 230 weapons in 160 days. This
effort included weapons production, development of operational tactics,
delivery aircraft certification, field testing, certification, and
deployment.
In the current Phase III, the Task Force's focus has been directed
at OIF force protection capabilities. While specific details on
programs are classified, actions are underway to mitigate effects
stemming from terrorist use of weapons such as Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs), mortars, and rocket propelled grenades. Key focus is on
detection and defeat of IEDs and on predictive analysis capabilities.
The CTTTF will continue to serve as a conduit for matching the
identification of new challenges in the global war on terrorism with
available technologies developed both by the DOD, through commercial
sources, and with other departments of the Federal Government. A key
element of this effort is the need to have in place a process and
funding to quickly identify, and then field, in militarily significant
numbers, a series of new capabilities. The nature of the current
operations indicates that the opponents, while often using low
technology weapons, are very adaptive. We need the processes and
flexibilities to anticipate, respond to, predict, and mitigate their
adaptation cycles if we are to be successful in this long-term
struggle.
CONCLUSION
The sustained investment in S&T over the past decades has enabled
the Department's development of needed new capabilities. To enable
transformation, this investment should continue. Technology development
results are largely achieved through long-term, stable investment in
R&D. Not every technology needs to be transitioned immediately, but a
strong R&D base is critical. Although the fiscal year 2005 President's
budget request does focus on transformation technologies, it also
maintains the flexibility to respond to near term operational
requirements and technology opportunities. The balance has been, and
remains important.
In closing, the S&T program and the objective of Secretary Rumsfeld
to provide transformational capabilities to the DOD are absolutely
intertwined. I have mentioned only a few examples within the DOD S&T
program. I believe the DOD successes in technology and transformation
are significant, and I appreciate the opportunity to come before you
today to tell you about them. We appreciate the support the Senate
Armed Services Committee has provided for the Department's S&T program.
Thank you.
Senator Roberts. We thank you, Dr. Sega.
Dr. Killion, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS H. KILLION, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY, CHIEF
SCIENTIST
Dr. Killion. Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the
fiscal year 2005 Army S&T program and the significant role of
S&T in supporting the warfighter today and achieving the Army's
transformation. I previously submitted a written statement and
request it be accepted for the record.
I want to thank the members of the subcommittee for your
important role in supporting our soldiers who are now at war
and for your support of the Army's S&T investments that will
sustain the preeminence of our future forces. Your continued
support is vital to our success.
We are a Nation at war. Army S&T is charged to provide
America's Army with sustained over-match in land combat. To do
so, the Army S&T program retains a dynamic portfolio of
technology investments that is responsive to the warfighters'
needs both today and for the future. The Army's S&T program is
balanced to provide high payoff capabilities for the future
force while seeking rapid transition of critical capabilities
into the current force. In my remarks, I will focus on four
themes briefly. We're supporting our soldiers today. We are
delivering on the technologies we promised for our FCS and the
future force. We've maintained our commitment to a robust basic
research program for our future transformational capabilities,
and our success depends upon a workforce that has the necessary
expertise and understanding to support the Army's needs.
Army S&T is fully committed to providing our soldiers with
the tools they need to survive and prevail in current
operations. I wish to recognize the support that the Army is
receiving from our sister Services and from OSD in rapidly
transitioning technology to help our soldiers. I can personally
testify to the offers the Army has received from my
counterparts, Admiral Cohen and Mr. Engle, and to the
leadership and resources provided by Dr. Sega. Everyone is
committed to protecting our soldiers' lives with whatever
technology we can bring to the fight.
As you heard from General Cartwright in the previous
session, there are numerous examples of technologies we have
introduced into the global war on terror, including Interceptor
Body Armor, the HMMWVs' Expedient Armor Kits and the Stryker
``Bar Armor.'' Others include the Chitosan bandage, as
demonstrated earlier from Medical Readiness and Materiel
Command (MRMC), to rapidly staunch arterial bleeding. The Zeus
laser system for neutralizing mines and unexploded ordnance and
the Forward Area Language Converter (FALCon) system for
automatically scanning and translating foreign documents for
intelligence exploitation.
We continue to explore gaps in current capabilities for
which we can provide technological solutions. With regard to
the FCS, it remains the highest priority for Army S&T. We have
about one-third of our budget invested in technologies to make
FCS a reality.
In May 2003, the FCS program passed acquisition milestone
B, transitioning from S&T into a System Development and
Demonstration (SDD) program.
S&T continues to play an important role in the FCS program
by providing specific critical technology solutions for
Increment I and beyond.
As part of the Milestone B decision, the Program Manager
(PM) identified 31 critical technology areas that needed to be
addressed. The technologies that address most of these areas
come from the Army S&T community and through our collaboration
with DARPA. We are committed to the continued maturation and
demonstration of these technologies for delivery to the Lead
System Integrator (LSI) prior to the FCS preliminary design
review in 2005. Some examples include the 120 millimeter
lightweight cannon, Robotic Follower and Semi-Autonomous
Robotics for the soldier ``mule,'' Active Protection Systems
against chemical energy weapons and tactical wireless network
assurance use algorithms.
Instead of simply ``hurling technologies over the transom''
to the PM for additional development, we have entered into
detailed Technology Transition Agreements (TTAs) with the PM
and the LSI to ensure that S&T will deliver the products in the
timeframe they are needed for integration into this system of
systems. I believe that the implementation of this TTA approach
will be a very valuable by-product of the FCS experience; it's
a management tool that helps us bridge the gap that will often
exist between the end of an S&T program and the actual
transition of the technology into an acquisition program.
The bottom line is that we are delivering on the
technologies we promised for FCS, helping to make it a reality
by the end of this decade.
We've also maintained our commitment to basic research,
which produces new knowledge to fuel revolutionary advances and
leap-ahead technology for the future.
Technologies in the field today, such as night vision
devices, advanced munitions, various types of armor, and
medical vaccines and treatments, owe their existence to
fundamental research we conducted in the past. Research that we
are conducting today in areas such as nanoscience,
biotechnology, quantum computing, and immersive environments
will enable unique and, in some cases, unforeseeable
capabilities for the future Army. Few people would have
anticipated that the basic research investment in atomic clocks
in the 1950s would result in the GPS on which we all rely so
heavily today.
Finally, I mentioned earlier the support we are providing
to current operations. That support certainly depends on the
technological innovations that we are able to provide to the
warfighter. More importantly, however, I believe it depends on
the expertise and commitment of our scientists and engineers.
Their understanding of the Army's needs, knowledge of the
threat, and recognition of technological opportunities makes
them uniquely qualified to bring relevant technical solutions
to the battlefield. Perhaps the most important contribution the
S&T community continues to make is sending its scientists and
engineers into theater to see the real-life conditions, assess
the problems, and develop rapidly deployable solutions for the
warfighter.
In General Cartwright's testimony, he described the design
of Expedient Armor and Bar Armor for HMMWVs, Strykers, and the
Abrams tanks. These innovations were developed and tested very
rapidly due to close collaboration between the scientists and
engineers in our Army Research Lab. They take it to the R&D
Engineering Center, the Army Test and Evaluation Command and
the PMs office and our industry partners. Individuals such as
these, working with our soldiers, are what truly enables us to
maintain and enhance our land combat advantage for today and
tomorrow.
The Army must maintain a diverse S&T portfolio to be
responsive to the current and future warfighter needs. The S&T
community seeks technological solutions that can be
demonstrated in the near term, investigates the feasibility of
new concepts for the mid-term, and explores the imaginable for
the uncertain, far-term future. In closing, I would like to
thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before
the subcommittee. I will be happy to answer any questions you
and the members may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Killion follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Thomas H. Killion
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to describe the fiscal year 2005 Army science and
technology (S&T) program and the significant role S&T is playing in
support of the warfighter in our current force and in achieving the
Army's transformation to our future force capabilities.
We want to thank the members of this subcommittee for your
important role in supporting our soldiers who are now at war and for
your support of today's S&T investments that will sustain the
preeminence of our future soldiers. Your continued support is vital to
our success.
ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
We are a Nation at war. Challenged to maintain the technological
and tactical advantage over our enemies by developing and exploiting
both lethal, and when possible, non-lethal means. This creates a
serious challenge for the Army. Army S&T is charged to provide
America's Army with sustained overmatch in land combat. To do so, the
Army S&T program retains a dynamic portfolio of technology investments
that is responsive to the warfighters' needs of today and the future.
The Army S&T mission is to conceptualize and develop future leap-ahead
technologies that are necessary to maintain a superior land combat
capability unmatched anywhere in the world while exploiting
opportunities to accelerate the transition of proven innovative
technologies to enhance the capabilities of the current force. The
Army's S&T program is well balanced to provide high payoff needs of the
future force while seeking rapid transitions for critical capabilities
into the current force.
The Army continues in its commitment to transform into a lighter,
more lethal force. However, we are an Army at war and are continually
challenged to achieve this transformation as quickly and as efficiently
as possible. As General Schoomaker so eloquently states, transformation
is an ongoing process that we must work at each and every day. The S&T
investments in the fiscal year 2005 President's budget pursue
technologies that can be matured and rapidly transitioned to system
development and procurement to enable future force capabilities as soon
as possible. We also fund an agile basic research program focused on
enduring Army needs as well as opportunities to further transform the
Army.
We are not an Army alone; we are an integral member of the joint
warfighting team. The S&T program is focused on developing technology
relevant to the needs of the Army and the joint forces. It remains
synchronized with operational concepts development and acquisition
programs to ensure rapid transition into the field. The Army S&T
program continues to exploit technology developments from the other
Services, defense agencies, and commercial industry as well as
international communities to assure that our soldiers get the very best
technology as soon as possible. The future force Army will provide the
Joint Force Commander with a versatile, full spectrum decisive land
combat power while requiring significantly reduced logistics support.
S&T CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
Army S&T has supported the development of technology that has
produced several benefits for the soldier in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Perhaps the most important contribution that the S&T community
continues to make is sending in-house scientists and engineers with the
expertise and experience in critical technologies into the theater to
see the real-life conditions, assess the problems, and develop rapidly
deployable solutions for the warfighter. This community is committed to
getting effective and usable technology into the hands of the
warfighter--saving lives and enabling successful missions. While you
have heard many examples of technology that has come out of S&T in
support of the current operations, such as the Interceptor Body Armor,
the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Expedient Armor
kits, and the Stryker ``Bar Armor'' in previous testimony, I want to
take the time to highlight a few contributions that often aren't
reported but are clearly contributing to our continued success. These
are examples of technologies that play an important role in getting the
job done. One example is the Chitosin bandage. It is a Food and Drug
Administration (FDA)-approved bandage designed by the Medical Research
and Materiel Command (MRMC) to stop severe arterial bleeding within 2-4
minutes of application. This bandage's adhesive nature and enhanced
clotting capability provide wound pressure and bleeding control to
external hemorrhages. This bandage has been deployed to both Special
Operations Forces (SOF) and conventional forces in theater and has been
utilized successfully on a variety of injuries ranging from gunshot
wounds to landmine injuries. Bottom-line . . . it saves lives.
Another example is the Forward Area Language Converter (FALCon), an
optical character recognition and machine translation system on a
portable computer for foreign languages in theater. It was designed and
developed by the Army Research Laboratory and provided to the
Intelligence Community as a quick and reliable way to translate and
analyze captured documents. FALCon can translate up to 47 languages,
including Arabic and Asian languages, and is being used in both Iraq
and South West Asia.
Finally, the Army deployed a prototype directed energy system to
Afghanistan consisting of a commercial kilowatt class laser mounted on
a HMMWV developed by the Space and Missile Defense Command. This system
was successfully used in neutralizing surface mines and unexploded
ordnance.
FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS (FCS)
Supporting the FCS remains the highest priority for Army S&T. We
have about one-third of our budget ($600 million) invested in
technologies that will provide our ground combat forces of this decade
and the next with the dominant, full-spectrum combat power they will
need to carry out their missions swiftly, efficiently, decisively and
as safely as possible, no matter where they are asked to fight. FCS
will be a multi-functional, multi-mission, reconfigurable system of
systems designed to maximize joint interoperablity, strategic and
tactical transportability, and commonality of mission roles, including
direct and indirect fire, reconnaissance, troop transport,
countermobility, non-lethal effects and secure, reliable
communications. In May 2003, the FCS program passed Acquisition
Milestone B, transitioning from S&T into System Development and
Demonstration (SDD). The Project Manager (PM) for FCS continues to use
the Boeing-led Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) team to identify and
integrate technologies from the Army, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), and other Service and industry programs to
develop an FCS that will satisfy the capabilities described in the
approved Operational Requirements Document.
FCS has adopted an Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy, which will
allow the Army to increase the capabilities of the system of systems
over time through spiral and incremental development processes. The
initial instantiation of FCS (Increment 1) will be designed to provide
certain ``threshold'' capabilities. The subsequent versions will
deliver increased functionality to achieve ``objective'' capabilities
as quickly as possible. Army S&T continues to play an important role in
the FCS program by providing specific critical technology solutions for
Increment 1. As part of the Milestone B decision, the FCS PM identified
31 critical technology (CT) areas that needed to be addressed. The
technology solutions to address most of these areas come from the Army
S&T community in collaboration with DARPA. Eighteen S&T programs that
were not quite as mature as desired by the May 2003 decision to enter
SDD were identified in the PM FCS risk mitigation plans as being
essential for Increment 1. Army S&T is committed to the continued
maturation and demonstration of these technologies for delivery to the
LSI prior to the FCS Preliminary Design Review in 2005. Some examples
are: 120mm Line of Sight/Beyond Line of Sight Cannon, Mid-Range
Munition, Robotic Follower and Semi-Autonomous Robotics for the Soldier
``Mule,'' Active Protection against Kinetic Energy weapons, and
Tactical Wireless Network Assurance algorithms.
We continue to mature and demonstrate these critical enabling
technologies, providing the promised products on schedule for
integration into FCS. Instead of ``throwing technologies over the
transom'' to the PM for extensive additional development, we are
entering into Technology Transition Agreements (TTAs) with the PM and
LSI to ensure that S&T will deliver these products within the timeframe
they need for integration into the system of systems. I believe that
the implementation of the TTA approach will be a very valuable by-
product of the FCS experience--a management tool that will help us
bridge the gap that often exists between the end of an S&T program and
the actual transition of the technology to an acquisition program.
In addition to the efforts supporting Increment 1, S&T now has
moved our main emphasis to developing capability-enhancing technologies
for the Increment 1 spirals and for Increment 2. Dr Tether and I have
agreed to continue the Army/DARPA FCS partnership for fiscal years 2004
through 2007. We have identified a set of focus areas that represent
some of the greatest challenges for the FCS and future ground combat,
namely: Networked Battle Command On The Move, Autonomy With Intent,
Find the Enemy, and Affordable Combat ID. We have agreed to co-fund
about 15 high risk-high payoff programs at DARPA to find technology
solutions that, when spiraled into FCS, will provide the next leap
ahead in capabilities.
FUTURE FORCE WARRIOR
Another major S&T investment is the Future Force Warrior (FFW). FFW
will provide capabilities to the individual soldier that are achievable
only at the platform-level today. Through networked connectivity to the
FCS-equipped maneuver unit of action (UOA), FFW will enable
revolutionary lethality, mobility, survivability, and sustainability
for the individual soldier while reducing logistics demands. By the end
of 2007, the FFW program will demonstrate increased individual soldier
lethality and survivability through netted communications and fires
while reducing the soldier's physical, fighting load from over 90 lbs
to less than 50 lbs. The program develops a lightweight, low-
observable, enhanced-armor protective fighting ensemble that includes
lightweight, high-efficiency power sources; embedded physiological
monitoring and limited medical treatments; embedded training; and
networked sensors to enable unparalleled situational understanding.
BASIC RESEARCH
The Army's basic research program produces new knowledge to fuel
revolutionary advances and leap-ahead technology that enable Army
transformation. The program invests in world-class expertise
(government, academic and industry) and state-of-the-art equipment. It
balances its investment between in-house Army specific research and
leveraging external scientific research that can be used for military
applications. For example, few people would have anticipated that the
basic research investment in atomic clocks in the late 50s would have
resulted in the Global Positioning System (GPS) that is so prevalent
today.
Army in-house basic research focuses on military-unique problems,
providing the underlying understanding that will enable technology
development for the current force and future force technologies such as
novel penetrators, lightweight durable armor, and energetic materials.
In-house exploration research helps maintain ``smart buyer''
capabilities essential to the Army; utilizes Army unique facilities;
and supports researchers in areas critical to the Army
The Army maintains an extramural basic research program that is
balanced between its two major components: (1) the single investigator
program that invests in the brightest minds at our leading universities
and is a key source of next-generation of scientists and engineers with
an understanding of military problems; and (2) larger scale
partnerships with universities and industry to take advantage of
commercial investments and the cutting edge research at outstanding
universities in areas critical to the future force. The external basic
research program gives leverage to the power of academia and industry;
focuses world-class research on Army challenges; allows flexibility to
capture new discoveries; and, complements internal efforts. The Army
continues to exploit the opportunities created by these organizations
to accelerate development of transformational capabilities to a
lighter, smarter, faster force.
The Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT) at the University of
Southern California continues to be an excellent example of how these
centers attack Army problems with new and different views. ICT
leverages academic and Hollywood expertise to perform fundamental
research in simulation environments and virtual human depiction for
training, mission planning and rehearsal. It has worked with the
Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC), Infantry School at Fort
Benning to develop cognitive leadership training aids that leverage
both Microsoft's X-Box game console (Full Spectrum Warrior) and
``gamer'' PCs (Full Spectrum Commander). In fact, Full Spectrum
Commander is currently being adapted for Afghan National Army training
in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
The Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies (ISN) at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology focuses and adapts nanotechnology
research to significantly enhance soldier survivability. Investment
areas are nanofibers for lighter materials, active/reactive ballistic
protection (to solve the energy dissipation problem), micro-
climatemicroclimate conditioning, signature management, biomonitoring/
triage and active control components.
Last month we opened the Institute for Collaborative
Biotechnologies (ICB) at the University of California, Santa Barbara.
The ICB integrates biosciences with the physical and engineering
sciences to provide an understanding of the biological construction of
novel materials such as biologically-derived, functional electronic,
magnetic and optical materials; integrated multi-modality sensing;
biologically-derived network concepts; and, sense and respond actuation
capabilities. This will influence the development of technology that
improves military capabilities in the areas of precision strike,
signature management, network design and implementation and
``identification of friend or foe.''
Collaborative technology alliances are industry-led partnerships
between industry, major universities, historically black colleges and
universities/minority institutions (HBCU/MI), and government. The
strategy takes advantage of the large industry investments in areas of
high importance to the Army such as communications and networks;
robotics; advanced sensors and decisions architectures; and power and
energy. This collaboration combines the practicality of industry with
the creative research capabilities of universities and the operational
knowledge and warfighter expertise of Army laboratories to leverage
state of the art technology for the soldier.
Centers of Excellence support the advancement of technologies
directly related to the enduring needs of the Army by funding
universities where state-of-the-art research programs are coupled with
broad-based graduate education programs to increase the supply of
scientists and engineers in the areas of interest. This strategy
focuses critical mass of effort on enduring challenges.
MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (MANTECH)
The Army MANTECH Program is designed to improve readiness and
reduce total ownership cost of Army systems through the implementation
of new and enhanced manufacturing technologies. In 2002, the Army
focused its MANTECH efforts to address high priority projects that will
enable affordable production and sustainment of the FCS and future
force in four major investment areas: armor; electronics/power systems;
munitions; and sensors. The Army MANTECH Program places a strong
emphasis on transitioning technology, directly involving the technology
developers, acquisition program managers and industry.
The Army's newest Center of Excellence, the Flexible Display Center
(FDC), was established on February 10 at Arizona State University at
Tempe (ASU). ASU will partner with industry, other universities, and
the government to advance flexible display technology and
manufacturing. The Army's goal is to have rugged, low-power flexible
displays provide enhanced information and situational awareness for the
soldier and vehicle platforms. The FDC will provide the innovative R&D
for materials, devices, and manufacturing processes to solve critical
challenges in the performance and fabrication of flexible displays. The
payoff to the Army is a transformational capability for a lighter,
smarter, faster future force.
A good example of the return on investment that the Army MANTECH
program has achieved is the Enhanced Manufacturing Processes for Body
Armor Materials project that ended in May 2001. This effort helped
reduce the cost of the composite plates that go into the Interceptor
Body Armor vest from $850/plate to $500/plate. Through December 2003,
500,000 plates have been produced for the Army and the Marine Corps.
For a total shared investment in the MANTECH program of $1.5 million,
we have realized a total of $175 million in cost avoidance. With the
Army's plan to field Interceptor Body Armor to all of its deployed
forces, we expect this cost savings to significantly multiply.
CONCLUSION
The Army must maintain a diverse S&T portfolio to be responsive to
current and future warfighter needs. The S&T community seeks
technological solutions that can be demonstrated in the near-term,
investigates the feasibility of new concepts for the mid-term, and
explores the imaginable for the uncertain, far-term future. In closing
I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify
before the subcommittee. I would be happy to answer any questions you
or the members of the subcommittee may have.
Senator Roberts. We thank you for your testimony.
Admiral Cohen, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JAY M. COHEN, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
RESEARCH
Admiral Cohen. Good morning, Chairman Roberts, Senator
Reed, Senator Allard, it's a great honor and privilege for me
to appear before you this morning.
I will keep my comments very short because your questions
are far more important than anything I might have to say.
Senator Roberts. You're not going to show us what's behind
that----
Admiral Cohen. We're going to keep that the mystery of S&T.
Senator Roberts. Is that classified or is that----
Admiral Cohen. It is not classified.
Senator Roberts. Not classified. All right.
Admiral Cohen. It's just self-serving.
Senator Roberts. What about what's sitting on that chair
with the hole in it?
Admiral Cohen. What's sitting in that chair, sir, is the
result--you've already heard in the testimony this morning of
the cooperation that is going on led in large measure by Dr.
Sega amongst the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Army, and the Air
Force, but also the other DOD agencies.
After the tragedy of Khobar Towers, the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA) came up with a coating that they were
able to apply to the inside of masonry structures. I know
you've seen pictures of that being tested. That is the coating
that you see right there. It can be applied in different
thicknesses. It's called explosive-resistant coating.
After the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, where 17 of our
sailors were so tragically killed, we looked with DTRA at
applying that to the inside of the hulls of our ships, not on
the outside, but on the inside. We determined that if we had
that, we could prevent penetration of the hull material that we
currently use by an explosion about the size that occurred on
the U.S.S. Cole. We might have grotesque deformation, but we
would not have penetration.
Senator Roberts. Now, does the U.S.S. Cole have that on it
now?
Admiral Cohen. It does not. We are looking very hard at
using this under the existing insulation and Navy leadership,
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), et cetera, and the ship
builders are looking at this.
Senator Roberts. Have you outfitted any ship with this yet?
Admiral Cohen. We have not outfitted any ship with it yet.
We're looking to put it on X-Craft, which is the congressional
experimental high-speed vessel, which is aluminum. As we're
moving to aluminum, this technology becomes even more
attractive. But what we have done--and I don't know if you had
a chance to see the video. I know Senator Dole had a chance to
see it.
Senator Roberts. Right.
Admiral Cohen. But what we have done, working with the Army
at Aberdeen, in addition to their kits that they're using for
the vertical protection from the IEDs and the shards, is we've
looked to apply this underneath, just like undercoat, on the
HMMWVs. I'm going to keep this unclassified so that against
mines and other threats, we would protect the soldiers and the
marines who are on convoy duty. As you saw from that video, the
results are the HMMWV is destroyed. But with this on the
bottom, the passenger compartment is maintained intact.
Now, this also had 50 caliber bullets shot at it and you
can see the effect it had. Those bullets are retained. Now,
this is heavy. It's expensive. But this is the value of S&T
being rapidly deployed.
Senator Roberts. I apologize to my colleagues and I
apologize to you for interrupting your prepared remarks.
But how on earth are you going to keep that HMMWV traveling
at 50 miles per hour through a hot zone with that kind of
weight?
Admiral Cohen. Well, you're looking at a complex structure
there. I will tell you that the Army is very focused on this--
and Dr. Killion will correct me if I'm wrong here--and they
will not go below a thousand pound load carrying capability in
their HMMWVs.
The kit that you see, the four doors and the side
protection, adds between 600 and 800 pounds. We're looking to
limit this to under 200 pounds, which would still fit in the
window, and I'm focused more on our deploying marines right now
who may have slightly different standards on this in the field
than the Army does. But we are already seeing the ball joints
and the springs failing much earlier than we had ever
anticipated.
So you push the balloon here, because you don't know the
logistics problem it's going to create. But I will tell you as
an aside, I am prepared to go to Chrysler, Ford, General
Motors, Dean Kamon, and others and have them look at everything
we know about nano, everything we know about structural
integrity, all of the modeling simulation we've done, the
appliques and the sandwich approach, and let's see if we can
design a HMMWV-like vehicle knowing what the future holds for
us in the global war on terrorism with suicide bombers, et
cetera, so that we can better in the future deploy our sailors
and marines in that environment trading the platform for the
person.
The South Africans have a large vehicle that's called the
Water Buffalo, I believe. It's way too big for a HMMWV kind of
vehicle, but it shows promise in the intelligent design against
these asymmetric threats.
Senator Roberts. Again, I'm sorry I interrupted, but I
think it's very valuable that you point out the hands-on or the
actual event occurrence and what you face with technology. As
you improve one particular area, you have to, as you pointed
out, fill out that other balloon.
Please proceed with your comments.
Admiral Cohen. Yes, sir. I was going to say that I'm just
an old naval line officer and, in fact, I'm getting older. But
4 years ago when I was ordered--and they were called naval
orders--to be the Chief of Naval Research, I did not have,
although I have a postgraduate degree, an S&T background. I'm
just an old submariner.
But I can tell you, Senators, that in the time I have been
privileged to be the Chief of Naval Research, and it is unique
in all of our Services, I have learned the value of sustained
investment in basic research at a critical level.
I have learned that it is only the Federal Government, with
its great resources and the staying power year to year, that
enables the discovery and invention that generates the
innovation that powers our economy and empowers our fighting
men and women in the defense of our freedoms. I thank you and
the American taxpayer for that investment. It is absolutely
critical.
Now, the question is always asked, what do those science
projects do for me today? We've talked about atomic clocks. The
previous speakers had an opportunity. You asked very insightful
questions.
In late November, the Secretary of the Navy, Gordon
England, came to me and said, ``we're going to deploy more than
40,000 marines in March and April to Iraq.'' He said,
``Admiral, I want you to put out a very broad net, not just
Naval Research, not just Naval Research Lab, not just the other
Services, I want you to go to academia. I want you to go to
industry. I want you to go to other departments of the
government. I want you to go international.''
I provided what's now called ``the Sears catalogue'' by
your staff, and they have it, and I will just hold it up. We
have many of the logos--you're nothing without a logo--that
show literally the hundreds of groups that we went to.
On December 12, my birthday, we set up at the Naval
Research Lab right here on the Potomac, the quadrangle there.
We made it like Tikrit. It was 35 degrees. Secretary England
came. He brought Navy and Marine Corps leadership.
Instead of giving a quad chart and viewing graph briefs, we
demonstrated the cutting edge S&T from industry, from other
Services, international, et cetera. Some of it worked. Some of
it didn't work. That's S&T. I get paid to take risk. I have the
privilege of failing occasionally in my job.
Based on that meeting, Secretary England has been holding
biweekly meetings with Navy and Marine Corps leadership to
ensure, number one, that our marines have the capability to
provide their mission as they go to Iraq, but also to ensure
that they have the maximum protection that our technologies can
provide to the marines.
You saw some of that in the demonstration at the back of
the room. I'm so proud to be part of the Navy, Marine Corps,
civilian, and uniform leadership that values our fighting men.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Cohen follows:]
Prepared Statement by RADM Jay M. Cohen, USN
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of
the Navy's fiscal year 2005 naval science and technology (S&T) budget
request.
The last year has demonstrated how new technology and new
operations have transformed the nature of the battlefield and the speed
of operations. I want to highlight some of the contributions from the
naval S&T portfolio that have delivered new capabilities to our fleet
and force. These are examples of how Congress' sustained and stable
investment in science and technology in the past delivers the
technological superiority for our sailors and marines today.
Let me tell you about some of the S&T success stories from
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). You will remember that I came before
this subcommittee a few years ago and brought a prototype for
demonstration of the Dragon Eye, a small unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV),
for small unit tactical reconnaissance. The Dragon Eye is small, light,
easy to transport, and easy to fly. This UAV has transitioned into the
Marine Corps Force and will accompany the First Marine Expeditionary
Force (I MEF) when it deploys to Iraq later this year.
We have long supported the development of unmanned underwater
vehicles. The Remote Environmental Monitoring Unit (REMUS) is a low-
cost autonomous underwater vehicle. Originally designed to conduct
coastal surveys in support of science, it was adapted for military use
with support from the Office of Naval Research and the U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM). Capable of performing rapid environmental
surveys, REMUS also functions as an underwater mine reconnaissance
device for the Navy's Mine Countermeasure Program. A half dozen of the
REMUS autonomous underwater vehicles went with the Navy Special
Clearance team to the Arabian Gulf to help clear the ports of Umm Qasr
and Az Zubayr. Equipped with side scan sonar, REMUS was used to
systematically survey 2.5 million square meters of waterways. This was
the first time that an unmanned underwater vehicle was used in
conjunction with other mine countermeasure units in a wartime
situation. The team had the first REMUS in the water within several
hours of arriving in Umm Qasr.
Another UAV used in OIF is the Silver Fox. Built as a small
tactical UAV, Silver Fox uses off-the-shelf avionics and can fly
autonomously using differential Global Positioning System (GPS).
Weighing only 22 pounds, it can be launched by hand or catapult from
various platforms. Once airborne, Silver Fox uses an infrared and high-
resolution color zoom camera to relay reconnaissance information
instantaneously to a remote laptop computer. Powered by a 0.91 cubic
inch engine, this fixed-winged aircraft can reach speeds close to 65
miles per hour and operate at an altitude of 1,000 feet with a range of
up to 150 miles. We are working to increase the flight endurance beyond
the current 10 hours. We are using the 4 pound payload capacity for
small state-of-the-art detection systems. Silver Fox's 5-foot fuselage,
detachable wings, and tail fins fit into a supersized golf bag making
storage and transportation simple and efficient. Unlike other UAV
systems, which require a skilled radio-control operator or pilot,
Silver Fox is easy to fly and allows the operator to program routes
into a laptop computer.
Those are some of our highlights for the near-term--``Today's Navy
and Marine Corps.'' Naval S&T is a sustained journey from discovery to
deployment in which innovation (invention) and experimentation
(validation) transform the operating forces. This is a continuous
cycle, so I would like to discuss the ``Next Navy and Marine Corps''
(roughly the forces that will emerge over the next 5 to 15 years), and
finally the ``Navy and Marine Corps After Next''--which we will see in
15 to 30 years.
A great deal of our transformational effort is lodged in the Future
Naval Capabilities (FNC). S&T enable Navy transformation by achieving
the FNCs' goals. The key to successful transformation is the strong
business partnership among scientists, industry, requirements,
acquisition, and warfighters.
We have focused a major portion of our S&T portfolio on FNC for the
``Next Navy and Marine Corps.'' Approximately two-thirds of our 6.3
(Advanced Technology Development) funds and about 40 percent of our 6.2
(Exploratory Development) funds are invested in the FNC. The FNC
process delivers maturing technology to acquisition program managers
for timely incorporation into platforms, weapons, sensors, and process
improvements. Each of the current 12 FNC focus areas is planned and
reviewed by an integrated team with representation from the Office of
Naval Research, a Program Executive Office (PEO), the Navy and Marine
Corps requirements community, and the fleet/force user community. This
gives us constant validation of the relevance of the technologies, and
strong buy-in and commitment to transition plans. We have recently
strengthened alignment of the FNC process with the naval capabilities
development process, which establishes our program requirements and
priorities in Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and FORCEnet.
The current FNCs, in no priority order, are:
Advanced Capability Electric Systems--The future of
naval warfare is electric. Warships will have revolutionary
power plants that permit new hull forms and propulsors, reduce
manning, streamline logistics, power advanced sensors, and
enable future high energy and speed-of-light weapons. We have
already successfully transitioned the Aircraft Electrical
Servicing Station, a solid state, re-programmable, reliable,
high quality deck edge power source for aircraft servicing, and
the Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Targeting Vehicle, which
demonstrates key hybrid electric components such as Li Ion
Battery Pack, power electronics, and in-hub wheel motors in an
integrated system demo. In fiscal year 2005 we will transition
work on our Ships Service Fuel Cell to the DD(X) program. Fuel
cell technology has the potential to significantly reduce fuel
consumption, and can also provide distributed power generation,
improving the ship's ``fight through'' ability. This FNC is
aligned most closely with Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea
Basing.
Autonomous Operations--This program is pursuing a
dramatic increase in the performance and affordability of naval
air, surface, ground, and underwater autonomous vehicles--
unmanned systems able to operate with a minimum of human
intervention and oversight. The Autonomous Operations FNC gives
us a great potential to operate effectively in what would
otherwise be denied areas. It contributes to Sea Shield and Sea
Strike. In fiscal year 2005, for example, we will transition
the Modular Mission Payload Architecture to the Fire Scout
Vertical Tactical UAV. The prototype system is being used to
control the ISR payload on the Spiral 1 Spartan USV, which is
currently deployed on the U.S.S. Gettysburg in the Middle East.
Fleet/Force Protection--We have very capable ships,
aircraft, and ground combat vehicles. It's our business to
ensure that they don't fall to the sorts of asymmetric threats
our enemies pose. This FNC, aligned with Sea Shield, is working
to develop effective organic means of protection: weapons,
sensors, countermeasures, stealth and damage control. It has
already transitioned the initial phase of the ES Detection of
Low Probability Intercept (LPI) Periscope Detection Radars
project to Office of Naval Intelligence as part of their
Cluster Pennant Program. In addition, this S&T program is
transitioning as an upgrade to Naval Sea Systems Command's
(NAVSEA) AN/BLQ-10 Submarine ES System.
Knowledge Superiority and Assurance--Information
technology is as crucial to naval superiority as it is to any
other aspect of contemporary life. This program is developing
our ability to distribute integrated information in a dynamic
network with high connectivity and interoperability. It will
ensure knowledge superiority, common situational understanding,
and increased speed of command. This FNC is a key enabler of
FORCEnet. It recently provided a prototype Image Processing and
Exploitation Architecture tool to the I MEF for deployment on
UAVs in Iraq and Afghanistan. This tool provides a geo-
referenced composite picture of imagery that builds over time
as UAV sensors conduct searches of areas of interest. The
picture provides a substantial enhancement to standard imaging
techniques that only provide a view of what the sensor sees at
any particular point in time. The Knowledge Superiority
Assurance FNC has also provided tools that significantly
improve our ability to process signals intelligence and weather
information in-theater. In fiscal year 2005, this FNC plans
several transitions to significantly improve time-sensitive
decisionmaking, apertures, networking, interoperability, and
the next generation common picture.
Littoral Antisubmarine Warfare--This program is part
of our shift in emphasis to littoral, expeditionary operations.
The antisubmarine warfare (ASW) challenge in coastal waters is
a tough one so, we are focusing scientific efforts on enhancing
our ability to detect, track, classify, and engage enemy
submarines by using a layered tactical ASW approach. We do this
by first countering enemy submarines near shore, followed by
addressing threat submarines prior to their torpedo launch, and
then countering any threat torpedoes after launch. Each layer
by itself will effectively address its individual objective;
and when the layers are viewed in their entirety, it offers an
effective ``system-of-systems'' approach that we believe will
adequately address the ASW problem. A number of products have
transitioned to acquisition systems including Sonar Automation
Technology processing techniques that provide automated
detection and classification operator alerts to submarines and
surveillance platforms, reducing operator workload and
increasing performance capability. Sea Shield is benefiting
from the products of this FNC.
Littoral Combat and Power Projection--This FNC has two
major thrusts: Expeditionary Logistics (aligned with Sea-
Basing) and Littoral Combat (essential to Sea Strike). This FNC
focuses on deploying uniquely capable combat and logistics
systems necessary to deploy and sustain the fleet and the force
without building up a large logistical infrastructure ashore.
This year, the Expeditionary Logistics Program successfully
tested a set of automated Logistics Command & Control/Decision
Support Tools essential to the Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF). They have set the stage for transition of a Ground
Logistics Command and Control Combat Service Support
``Toolkit''. The toolkit will provide proactive rapid request
support for personnel, equipment, and services, logistics
mission planning and execution support, after-action assessment
tools, and situational awareness projection onto the Marine
Corps common operating picture. Littoral Combat FNC plans a
fiscal year 2005 transition of the EX-45 Stabilized Gun Mount
which will use advanced software to sense and compensate for
motion about train and elevation axes. The gun mount which
additionally houses an Embedded Video Tracker is compatible
with the MK-19 40mm, M2 .50 caliber and M240G 7.62 weapon
systems. The stabilized, adaptive mount coupled with an auto-
tracking feature will significantly enhance warfighting
capability in both surface vessel and vehicular applications.
Also planned for transition in fiscal year 2005, the
Expeditionary Decision Support System (EDSS) software
application is designed to support operations ranging from
amphibious landings to combat operations ashore. Resident
within the application are scheduling engines, computational
models, performance algorithms, and the ability to
collaboratively access common databases. EDSS's high degree of
military utility has garnered substantial warfighter interest
and as a result has deployed with Marine Expeditionary Units
(MEUs) and Naval Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) in support
of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and OIF. The Direct
Reporting Program Manager Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (DRPM
EFV) will transition the secure wireless local area network
(LAN) and related technologies to enhance the information
exchange between individual EFVs, between EFVs and dismounted
troops, as well as between EFVs and the ships and operations
centers with which they operate.
Missile Defense--This program is focused on technology
enabling and supporting lethal engagements of theater missiles,
manned and unmanned aircraft at extended ranges in defense of
naval forces and assets afloat and ashore. Products being
worked will offer ways to expand the battlespace rapidly,
identify contacts accurately, and engage threats effectively
and efficiently. This year, as part of the Composite Combat
Identification project, the Missile Defense FNC will transition
advanced algorithms to correlate real-time track files with
signals intelligence data and other information files resident
in the EP-3E ARIES II surveillance aircraft. When this
capability is operational, derived identification information
will be provided to fleet tactical users in real-time. As part
of the Reactive Materials Warhead project, test results and
warhead design parameters of a first generation reactive
materials warhead will be available with the goal of high
lethality against cruise and ballistic missile targets. In
September, there will be an important demonstration at the
Combat Systems Engineering Design facility of our Distributed
Weapons Coordination capability. These automated battle
management algorithms will provide real time priority threat
evaluation considering all air threats and all defended assets,
at sea and ashore. Recommendations of Preferred Shooter will
also be developed considering location, current weapons load
and optimal end-game geometry for both ballistic missile
defense and defense against ``air breathing'' threats. In early
fiscal year 2005, we will complete development and testing of
highly mobile X-band radar technology in the Affordable Ground
Based Radar project as a risk reduction concept demonstration
for the Marine Corps Multi-Role Radar System (MRRS). The
Missile Defense FNC is a strong contributor to the Sea Shield
and FORCEnet pillars of the Navy's Sea Power 21 operational
concept.
Organic Mine Countermeasures--Because they are cheap,
and able to seed the battle space with a menace far out of
proportion to their numbers, mines have been and will continue
to be deployed against us by terrorists and their state
sponsors. We're working to give our forces an organic--that is
to say, an inherent--and stand-off ability to detect,
characterize, and neutralize mines wherever they may be
encountered. Closely aligned with Sea Shield, this FNC has
transitioned several important products. One of them, the REMUS
autonomous underwater vehicle, in now in the hands of our
operating forces in Iraq where it helped clear the rivers to
speed supplies to troops. It was also pressed into service in
the weeks immediately following September 11 to help secure
ports on both of our coasts. I might mention that REMUS emerged
from a basic oceanographic research program--another piece of
evidence that overnight successes are long in preparation.
Time Critical Strike--We are substantially reducing
the amount of time it takes to hit critical mobile targets,
like theater ballistic missiles launchers, command centers, and
weapons of mass destruction. One of this FNC's products, the
Affordable Weapon System, a loitering cruise-missile-like
system that can carry a variety of payloads, is currently
transitioning to the acquisition community for development this
year. Time Critical Strike is aligned with Sea Strike.
Total Ownership Cost--This FNC uses advanced design
and manufacturing processes to significantly decrease the cost
of buying, operating, and maintaining Navy systems while
promoting increased system readiness. We are working to reduce
total lifecycle costs during design and manufacturing as well
as increase savings realized from reduced manning and better
environmental compliance. Aligned primarily with Naval
Enterprise, this FNC has transitioned a number of programs to
the user community. The Total Oil Monitoring System is designed
for real-time, online applications and will transition to Navy
surface ships to monitor critical machinery. The Rapid Cure
Ship Tank Coatings Program has been demonstrated in 14 ship
tanks and voids. Aircraft corrosion sensors, developed under
the Corrosion and Corrosivity Monitoring System Program have
been installed on an H-60 helicopter for flight testing. The
Turbine Engine Technology Program delivered a thermal barrier
coating with significantly reduced thermal conductivity that
was selected for inclusion in the F135 (Joint Strike Fighter)
engine. In fiscal year 2005, we will transition a Portable Wide
Area Non Destructive Inspection Imager that maps surface
corrosion and subsurface defects without removal of paint.
Payoffs include faster, more reliable aircraft inspection,
improved prognostics, longer aircraft life, lower repainting
costs and improved safety.
The relatively mature technologies managed in FNCs do not spring up
overnight. In many cases they are the result of long term investments
in research and invention programs in 6.1 and early 6.2 funding
categories. We focus our research and invention investments on areas
where the Navy is the only significant U.S. sponsor (such as Ocean
Acoustics and Underwater Weaponry), and on S&T Grand Challenges whose
solution would provide significant advances in naval capability (such
as Naval Materials by Design). A stable, long-term discovery and
invention program is essential to keep our pipeline full of enabling
technologies and to attract the Nation's best scientific talent to
focus on naval problems.
Finally, I would like to talk about the ``Navy and Marine Corps
After Next''--the fleet and force we will see in 15 to 30 years. We are
continuing to support our Grand Challenges and the National Naval
Responsibilities as well as our Innovative Naval Prototypes. The Naval
S&T Grand Challenges are large, difficult, challenges that, if met,
could give us decisive capabilities 15 to 30 years in the future. We
encourage the Nation's scientific community to achieve breakthroughs in
difficult but achievable scientific challenges like Naval Battlespace
Awareness, Advanced Electrical Power Sources for the Navy and Marine
Corps, Naval Materials by Design, and Multifunctional Electronics for
Intelligent Naval Sensors. The National Naval Responsibilities are
fields in which the Department of the Navy is the only significant U.S.
sponsor. These include fields like Naval Engineering, Ocean Acoustics,
and Underwater Weaponry. If the Department of the Navy didn't invest in
them, it is unlikely that anyone would. It is vital to keep such fields
healthy, not only for the sake of our own capabilities, but to avoid
technological surprise as well.
I am excited about what I call Innovative Naval Prototypes. These
are the capabilities that promise to fundamentally change how we
prepare for and fight wars. Examples include: the Free Electron Laser,
the Electromagnetic Railgun, hypersonic missiles, the x-craft, and
superconducting electric drive motors. The Secretary of the Navy and
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) are committed to making the
electric ship our ship of the future and we are providing the S&T. We
are well down the path to building the electric propulsion and weapons.
The 36 megawatt motor effort is underway and we are using the lessons
learned from ongoing testing of the 5 megawatt motor. The Free Electron
Laser is progressing to its next demonstration at 10 kilowatt. In
addition, we are working collaboratively with the other services, as
directed by Congress, on electromagnetic rail gun technology for the
future.
Construction is underway on the high speed, experimental vessel
called Littoral Surface Craft--Experimental, or ``X-Craft.'' This high
speed aluminum catamaran will test a variety of technologies that will
allow us to improve our capabilities in littoral, or near-shore,
waters. The X-Craft will be used to evaluate the hydrodynamic
performance, structural behavior, mission flexibility, and propulsion
system efficiency of high speed vessels. X-Craft will eventually be
fitted with an advanced lifting body component. The lifting body
component is a streamlined underwater appendage that will dampen low-
speed ship motions, increasing the operational envelope for helicopter
and small craft operations. Liquid polymers will be used on the surface
of the lifting body to evaluate drag reduction.
The X-Craft will be the first Navy purpose built ship to
demonstrate mission flexibility. Mission flexibility will be
demonstrated through interchangeable ``mission modules'' housed in the
X-Craft's large Mission Bay in standard 20-foot container boxes. The
Mission Bay will be capable of housing 12 containers, permitting the
vessel to be quickly reconfigured to support a variety of potential
missions, including battle force protection, mine countermeasures,
amphibious assault support and humanitarian support. A multi-purpose
Stern Ramp will allow X-Craft to launch and recover manned and unmanned
surface and subsurface vehicles up to the size of an 11 m Rigid-Hull
Inflatable Boat (RHIB). From its flight deck, X-Craft will be able to
support 24-hour-a-day operations for up to two MH-60S helicopters.
In conclusion, the Nation's return on investment is clear. Naval
transformation depends on a long-term, stable and sustained investment
in S&T. We validate through a cycle of ongoing experimentation and
validation so we can transition new capability to the warfighter.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
Senator Roberts. Secretary Engle, you're next.
STATEMENT OF JAMES B. ENGLE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
AIR FORCE FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ENGINEERING
Mr. Engle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee, and staff. I also very much appreciate the
opportunity to be here today and to testify on the 2005 Air
Force S&T budget.
The United States Air Force is continuing to transform to a
capability-based and focused expeditionary air and space force.
We are doing this through the development of our concepts of
operations (CONOPs) for each of the seven major tasks that the
Air Force must accomplish to support the combatant commander.
Our goal is to make the warfighting effects and the
capabilities we need to achieve them the drivers for everything
we do. In fact, we are specifically focused on this area in our
S&T program.
We have taken the effects and the capabilities required by
the seven concepts of operations and the transformational goals
and mapped them to the long-term challenges and the short-term
objectives identified in the congressionally-directed S&T
planning review we completed in 2002.
Let me just briefly highlight some of the most exciting
work we're doing in this area that's relevant, I think,
particularly to the testimony on transitioning work that we're
doing to our warfighters.
We have increased our investment in space communications
technology considerably. The objective here is to identify,
develop, and demonstrate wide-band technologies needed to build
a space-based laser communication network that can provide
higher data throughput.
Along with the movement of information, protection and
assurance of that information to the commander in the field is
equally important. Our work at Rome Labs in New York is world
class in this particular area, in both computer network defense
and attack as well as assurance of information to the
warfighter.
We have completed and transitioned the initial breakthrough
work on laser eye and sensor protection developed at our Human
Effectiveness Directorate at Brooks City-Base in Texas and the
Materials Lab at Wright-Patterson. These efforts have been
rated world class by our Air Force Scientific Advisory Board.
Also world class is the space weather research being done
at Hanscom up in Massachusetts. We will put the Communications/
Navigation Outage Forecast System (C/NOFS) satellite in orbit,
which will help us provide the warfighter with a space weather
forecast.
We're also very proud of the work that we're doing on the
research for the protection of facilities and equipment that
Admiral Cohen spoke about. We've done considerable work on
elastomeric coating polymers, which are coating this thing
right here. We are, in fact, putting the polymer that's been
developed under the DTRA on the Pentagon. Right now, as we
refurbish the Pentagon and other buildings, it's incredibly
effective in this particular capacity with a very thin coating.
In addition, we're continuing to explore the use of these
kinds of polymers embedded in fabrics for less-rigid
structures, such as tents and field equipment, for protection
of our forces in the field.
Another exciting effort that we see in the near term
demonstrated back here is the Vehicular-Mounted Active Denial
System (VMADS) being jointly developed with the U.S. Marine
Corps. It is a defensive millimeter wave system used for
perimeter defense that we have developed down at Phillips Lab
or at our Directed Energy Lab in Albuquerque.
It is a directed energy weapon and it omits that nonlethal
feeling, Mr. Roberts, that you had to experience three times
while they were photographing you; just to make sure we have
the right photograph. It is very effective. If any of you would
like to have a demonstration of the full body blast, let me
know and we can arrange that.
We are working hard for our SOF by reducing the weight and
integrating the kit that they use. We call this equipment the
Battlefield Air Operations Kit, and improvements are being
realized by using very rapid spirals to speed development,
prototyping, testing, production, and fielding.
As a result, our special tactics warriors will soon have a
digital machine-to-machine capability that helps them quickly
connect to the right aircraft with the right munitions on board
guided precisely to the right target at just the right time.
These new automated processes help reduce the time it takes
to target the terrorist threat, while at the same time reducing
human error in the targeting process.
We're also working hard to defend against Man-Portable Air
Defense Systems (MANPADS), and that's also demonstrated in the
back. I think that is some of our most exciting work, which I
think we're going to see fielded more and more, not only within
our force structure, but internationally as well.
In addition, Closed-Loop Infrared Countermeasure (CLIRCM)
multi-spectrum missile warning system is coming online soon and
will be the next generation. We are rapidly trying to get that
mature and into the field as well.
We strive to focus on those technologies that we believe we
will need to transition over the next 10 to 15 years,
principally in our program. But as Dr. Sega and the rest of my
colleagues have pointed out, because of the operational
necessity of today we have found very effective ways to take
the work that is the basis of our technology and transition it
quickly to our warfighter.
At the same time, we have to balance that against the long-
term and make sure that we have that tech-base viable in the
10- to 15-year period. One of the most important methods to
determine if you're investing in the right things is to maybe
dissect some legacy systems and see if the technologies you've
invested in in the past have found their way into the
developmental or operational systems we have today.
One excellent example is the F/A-22 aircraft. A wealth of
technologies have been transitioned into this aircraft and they
can be traced back to an investment of approximately a billion
dollars in the Air Force S&T over the years. Examples of these
transitioned technologies include low observable materials,
advanced two-directional thrust vector nozzles, new supercruise
non-afterburning turbine engines, fly-by-wire integrated flight
controls, solid state active transmit and receive radar, and
thermoplastic composite structures, just to name a few.
Additionally, a number of information-related technologies
have transitioned into operational use, including the highly-
effective information data wall that we're currently using in
Afghanistan and Korea, multi-layer communications securities
being used by several government agencies, software-defined
reprogrammable radios, and secure communications that are
adaptable for coalition operations.
In conclusion, the Air Force is fully committed to
providing the Nation with the advanced air and space
technologies required to meet America's national security
interests around the world and to ensure we remain on the
cutting edge of system performance, flexibility, and
affordability.
The technical advantages we enjoy today are a legacy of
decades of investment in S&T. Likewise, our S&T in warfighting
capabilities of the future will be substantially determined by
today's investment in S&T.
To meet all of the demands of our laboratory, the Air Force
is working to increase our S&T funding. Our fiscal year 2005
President's budget request is for $1.9 billion. This includes
$1.4 billion in core S&T, which represents an increase of over
$80 million or almost 5 percent real growth compared to the
President's budget of fiscal year 2004.
As we face the new millennium, our challenge is to advance
technologies for the expeditionary air and space force as we
continue to move aggressively into the realm of space
activities.
The Air Force S&T program provides for the discovery,
development, demonstration, and timely transition of affordable
transformation technologies that keep the Air Force the best in
the world.
As an integral part of the DOD S&T team, we look forward to
working with Congress to ensure a strong S&T program tailored
to achieve our vision of a superior air and space force.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to
present testimony and thank you for your continuing support of
the S&T program.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Engle follows:]
Prepared Statement by James B. Engle
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, and staff, I very much
appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the fiscal year 2005
Air Force science and technology (S&T) program. The United States Air
Force is transforming to a capabilities-focused Expeditionary Air and
Space Force. We are doing this through the development of the concept
of operations for each of the seven major tasks the Air Force must be
capable of accomplishing to support our combatant commanders. Our goal
is to make the warfighting effects and the capabilities we need to
achieve them the drivers for everything we do. This is especially true
in our S&T program. We have taken the effects and capabilities required
by the seven concepts of operations and mapped them to the long-term
challenges and short-term objectives identified in the congressionally-
directed S&T Planning Review completed in February 2002. Not
surprisingly, we have a high correlation between our S&T programs and
the capabilities required by these concepts of operations. This is
because the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) closely links the
technologies reflected in its S&T plan to warfighter capability needs.
The United States Air Force is committed to an S&T program that
enables us to achieve our vision of becoming an integrated air and
space force capable of rapid and decisive global engagement. By
continuing our investment in transformational technologies that support
a reduced cycle-time, spiral development acquisition process, the Air
Force will retain its dominance of air and space in future conflicts,
against both traditional and asymmetrical threats.
Innovation is a vital part of our heritage and is key to ensuring
the Air Force will meet the challenges of tomorrow. Transforming our
warfighting capabilities towards this end will involve continued
innovations in how we train our forces and how we think about employing
our forces to defend our Nation, as well as continued advances in our
technology. We must be prepared to counter regional instabilities, the
worldwide availability of advanced weapons, and other emerging and less
predictable acts of terrorism against our Nation and allies. We are
developing transformational technologies that permit flexible forces to
operate far from home, on short notice, and for extended time periods.
However, we must also be able to afford transformational innovations
once we develop them in order to re-capitalize the Air Force to fulfill
our vision. To meet warfighting capability objectives, we invest in the
most promising and affordable technologies in order to win decisively,
protect our forces, and minimize collateral damage.
S&T BUDGET/SENIOR LEADERSHIP INVOLVEMENT
We continue to be faced with the reality of a fiscally-constrained,
but operationally-demanding environment. The high operations tempo
(OPTEMPO) the Air Force has sustained in support of peacekeeping
operations and conflicts, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, has placed a
great burden on our people and the supporting logistics.
In spite of these rigorous demands, the Air Force is working to
increase S&T funding, while maintaining a balanced S&T portfolio. The
Air Force fiscal year 2005 President's budget request for S&T is $1.9
billion--this includes $1392.8 million in ``core'' S&T efforts, which
represents an increase of over $80 million or almost 5 percent real
growth compared to the President's requested amount for similar
``core'' S&T efforts in fiscal year 2004. The most significant change
in the S&T President's budget request results from the integration of
programs that were devolved last year from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) to the Air Force S&T program. This includes the
University Research Initiative program and the High Energy Laser Joint
Technology program.
The Air Force understands the concerns of Congress regarding the
level of support for these devolved programs and continues to work hard
to ensure these programs support the diverse multiple military
objectives inherent in joint programs. Furthermore, the OSD continues
to provide policy guidance and oversight for these efforts.
In a separate action last year, the Seismic Research Program for
detection of nuclear explosions was transferred back to the Air Force
from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). We continue to work
with the OSD, the Air Force Technical Applications Center, and the Army
to invest in a seismic research program that addresses operational
nuclear explosion monitoring needs. Under the guidance of the OSD-led
intergovernmental steering committee, the Air Force is funding research
to increase the understanding of seismic wave propagation at regional
distances of less than 2,000 kilometers.
One area in which the Air Force has increased its investment is in
space communications technology with initiation of the transformational
communications technology development program. This program will
identify, develop, and demonstrate the wideband technologies needed to
build a space-based laser communications network that could provide
higher data throughput to transform our military satellite
communications infrastructure.
Warfighter and senior Air Force leadership involvement in the
planning, programming, and prioritizing of Air Force S&T continues to
be a priority. For example, the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, along with the Air Force Service Acquisition Executive and the
Air Force Materiel Command Commander, conduct a full portfolio review
of the S&T program similar to the former S&T summits. In addition, the
Integration Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment process involves
several levels of senior Air Force leadership, including the chief and
all the four stars, and further promotes a greater understanding within
the Air Force of the S&T program and its link to warfighting
capabilities. The Capabilities Program Execution Review provides a
forum in which the commander of each major command is afforded a
focused look at his portfolio and an opportunity to resolve issues at
the system/program level and provide insight to the S&T program.
Finally, the Applied Technology Councils (ATCs), which are discussed in
greater detail later in this statement, bring together acquisition
product centers, logistics centers, major user commands, and laboratory
personnel to review and discuss S&T efforts--ATCs foster top-level user
involvement in the transition of technology from the laboratory to the
system developer to the operational user.
TRANSFORMATION
The Air Force continues to transform from a Cold War to a post-Cold
War air and space force. As we do so, we must prepare for new forms of
terrorism, attacks on our space assets, attacks on our information
networks, cruise and ballistic missile attacks on our forces and
territory, and attacks by adversaries armed with chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, or high explosive (CBRNE) weapons. To address
this post-cold war reality, the Air Force has established a process of
transformation by which it will achieve and maintain the ``advantage
through changes in operational concepts, organization, and/or
technologies that significantly improve its warfighting capabilities or
ability to meet the demands of a changing security environment.''
Critical to this transformation is the ability to mature and translate
a vision into actual operational capabilities in order to prevail in
conflict and avert technological surprise.
When examining the concept of combat transformation, it is
important to note several fundamental points. First, transformation is
not the result of a one-time improvement or change, but rather a
continuum of sustained and determined efforts. Second, meaningful
transformation requires integrating expanding capabilities with those
of the other Services and non-military elements of national power.
Third, transformation is more than new ``gee-whiz'' technologies. It
includes adapting existing capabilities and using them in new ways,
changes to the organizational structure to increase effectiveness, and
changes in doctrine and concepts of operations to include training and
tactics that determine force deployments. Fourth, transformation should
not be achieved at the expense of ongoing operations in support of the
Department of Defense (DOD) strategy of maintaining adequate readiness
and infrastructure, conducting critical recapitalization, and
attracting quality personnel. To achieve rational transformation there
must be a careful balance between these requirements, which all compete
for limited resources.
To institutionalize transformational changes, the Air Force will
capitalize on three core competencies. One, developing airmen to ensure
they receive the education, training, and professional development
needed to provide a quality edge second to none. Two, integrating
operations to enhance combat capabilities that are pivotal to
maximizing the air and space environment. Three, the technology-to-
warfighting vision of translating technology into operational
capabilities. These three core competencies are the foundation of
success and will ensure we remain dominant in air and space operations.
Transformation further translates into Air Force operational
concepts--more commonly known as Concepts of Operations (CONOPs). Air
Force CONOPs provide the long-term roadmaps to get the right
capabilities at the right time and place for the joint warfighter.
Implementation of these CONOPs require new and sometimes revolutionary
changes to existing CONOPs and organizations, and refocusing technology
developments. The CONOPs form the basis of the Air Force investment
strategies for technology development, system acquisitions, and support
decisions. The Air Expeditionary Task Force is an overarching CONOP
that uses the capabilities provided by the following six supporting
CONOPs:
Global Strike provides the capability to maintain
battlespace access for all required joint/coalition operations;
Space and Command, Control, Communications, Computers
and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C\4\ISR)
provides persistent space and air situational awareness and
executable decisionmaking information to the Joint Forces
Commander;
Global Response provides intelligence and strike
systems to attack fleeting or emergent, high-value or high-risk
targets by surgically applying power anywhere on the globe
within hours;
Homeland Security leverages Air Force capabilities
with joint and interagency efforts to prevent, protect, and
respond to identified threats;
Nuclear Response provides the deterrent ``umbrella''
under which conventional forces operate and, if deterrence
fails, avails a rapid scalable response; and
Global Mobility provides the capability to enable
rapid, timely, and effective projection, employment, and
sustainment of power in support of global interests.
The Air Force goals to achieve transformation include information
superiority, air and space superiority, precision engagement, global
attack, rapid global mobility, and agile combat support. The Air Force
S&T program has been planned and focused to support the Air Force
CONOPs and goals. The Air Force Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment
(CRRA) process supports the CONOPs by identifying and analyzing current
and future capabilities, capability shortfalls, health risks, and
opportunities. Part of the CRRA process is to provide information on
these identified technology gaps and shortfalls to the S&T program
planners to provide direction and focus to the S&T capability planning
process. The CRRA process is transformational as it concentrates on
desired battlespace effects vice specific air and space platforms.
WORKFORCE
The Air Force scientist and engineer (S&E) workforce is another
area where senior Air Force leadership involvement plays a pivotal
role. Both Secretary Roche and General Jumper are deeply involved in
shaping our future S&E workforce. Air Force civilian and military S&Es
are highly motivated and productive, but we need to be vigilant in
continuing to recruit and retain the best and brightest individuals.
The Air Force is unique in that approximately 20 percent of its
laboratory S&E government workforce is active duty military. It is from
this cadre that we draw the technical competence needed in our military
Service leadership to operate an ever more technical force. In
addition, this gives us a direct link to the warfighter, which in turn
helps us to focus technology development on warfighting capability
needs. Some of these military S&Es come directly from operational
commands, while others will serve and support combatant commanders in
operational commands later in their careers.
The Air Force is committed to shaping its S&E workforce with the
vision to enhance excellence and relevance of S&T into the 21st century
and appreciates the support Congress has already provided. This
challenge requires the Air Force to maintain a dominant edge in
warfighting capabilities and also requires us to provide clear
direction and growth for our S&E workforce. However, we, as do others,
find it a significant challenge to recruit and retain S&Es. The Air
Force has several initiatives, both civilian and military, that address
recruitment and retention issues.
Civilian initiatives include the recruitment of college students
with critical S&E skills via recruiting incentives, a robust marketing
effort, and a co-op central funding program that hires college students
while still in school. Central funding for recruiting bonus and
retention allowances for journeyman level S&Es also promises to provide
much needed assistance with civilian recruitment and retention.
On the military side, we're employing the Airman Education and
Commissioning Program and the Technical Degree Sponsorship Program to
recruit additional S&Es into the military workforce. We are in the
process of examining the impact of bonus programs such as the Critical
Skills Retention Bonus on retention and will assess future Air Force
requirements for this and similar bonus programs.
The Air Force is committed to its S&Es and published a ``Concept of
Operations for Scientists and Engineers in the United States Air
Force'' last year. We also baselined the requirement for the Air Force
S&E workforce and, upon analyzing this baseline requirement, found that
while our military and civilian authorizations were about right, our
actual demographics were seriously short in some key areas. We continue
to shift our focus towards retaining the workforce we have and infusing
it with the vitality of new S&Es to meet tomorrow's need. During the
next 7 years, we are investing nearly a third of a billion dollars to
support the retention and reshaping of our technological workforce. As
we replenish our S&E workforce, we are providing career guidance and
mentoring that will enable us to meet our 21st century challenge. Once
the National Security Personnel System is implemented it could also
produce positive results in shaping our S&E workforce. Again, we
express our thanks to Congress for your continued support.
MAXIMIZING OUR S&T DOLLARS
We will continue to leverage technology to achieve new levels of
combat effectiveness. Our strategy is to pursue integrated technology
capabilities that support our warfighter's highest priority needs. In
addition to transformational technologies, we must also pursue the
fundamental enabling technologies that will improve tomorrow's Air
Force. As technological superiority is increasingly a perishable
commodity, we work hard to optimize our S&T funding, by not only
``inventing the future'' ourselves, but also by speeding the transition
of new technologies to our warfighters.
One way of identifying technologies for rapid transition to the
warfighter is through our ATCs and the Advanced Technology
Demonstrations (ATDs). The councils are composed of two- and three-star
generals from AFRL, our logistic centers, our acquisition product
centers, and our major user commands who formally prioritize proposed
ATD programs. We hold an ATC meeting with each major command twice
every year and have commissioned 34 ATDs that have transition funding.
The ATC process is extremely important in linking the S&T program to
the system developers, the logisticians, and, finally, the operational
user. This process facilitates technology transition to operational use
and secures user commitment for resources to do systems design and
development and fielding of the technology. Currently about 50 percent
of our Advanced Technology Development (6.3) budget is committed to ATD
programs.
Since deployed technology may remain in use for decades, the Air
Force S&T program not only focuses on enhancing performance, but also
on sustaining our fielded warfighter capabilities. Emphasizing
affordability from the very beginning through training of our
management, and science and engineering staff, as well as through an
in-depth review of technology development efforts, increases our
potential to reduce the costs of technology early in the system
development process and throughout a product's life cycle.
We maintain an excellent balance of military, civilian, and
contractor expertise, which allows us to be very selective about
investing in high payoff technological opportunities. We constantly
seek opportunities to integrate Air Force planning and leverage our S&T
funds by cooperating with other Services, agencies, the private sector,
and international partners. For example, we rely on the Army as the
lead Service for defensive chemical-biological technology development.
The Air Force also has inter-agency efforts, such as our program in
aging aircraft, which is focused on detection and management of
corrosion and fatigue in aging structures. It is closely coordinated
with the civilian aging aircraft research programs at the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). Our partnership with the industrial and
university research base is very strong. In fact, we outsource over 70
percent of our S&T funding to universities and industry. Finally, the
Air Force is involved in international cooperative technology
development efforts for S&T, such as the non-destructive inspection,
tactical missile propellants, and aircraft battle damage repair efforts
conducted with the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, among others.
Another example of international cooperation is the multi-domain
network management program with Australia and Canada. This program is
developing the technology concepts and tools for creating and managing
secure computer networks with our coalition partners.
LEGACY PROGRAMS
Over the years, the best and most reliable way to judge whether you
are investing in the ``right'' technologies is to look at legacy
systems that are in development or operational use and see how the
technologies you invested in previously have transitioned into these
``products.'' An excellent example is the F/A-22. A wealth of
technologies that transitioned to the F/A-22 can be traced back to an
investment of approximately $900 million in Air Force S&T over the
years. These technologies include efforts such as low-observable
materials, advanced two-directional thrust vectoring nozzles, new
supercruise non-afterburning turbine engines, airframe design, mission
integrated transparencies, solid state active transmit and receive
radar, thermoplastic composite structures, and fly-by-wire integrated
flight controls. In the space arena, examples of technologies that have
transitioned into space ``products'' include radiation-hardened
electronics to protect our satellites from the harmful effects of
radiation; longer life, lighter weight lithium ion batteries; compact,
more efficient solar cells for more effective processing of sunlight
into electrical power; composite bus structures that are lighter weight
and stronger; hall thrusters for orbit change and orbit maintenance;
and enhanced antenna designs that provide for more efficient
communications. In addition, a number of information-related
technologies have transitioned into operational use including the
highly effective information data wall that is currently being used in
Afghanistan and Korea, multi-layer communications security being used
by several government agencies, and software defined reprogrammable
radios for secure communications and adaptable for coalition
operations.
Some technologies, such as those being implemented as spiral
upgrades to the Battlefield Air Operations (BAO) Kit that is used by
Air Force ground controllers who call in air strikes, were rapidly
transitioned into use during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The BAO Kit
is one of the Secretary of the Air Force's top priorities and continues
being developed in several different acquisition spirals as the
technology matures. The technology transitioned from S&T into
developmental and operational products is extensive and provides the
confidence that S&T funding is being wisely invested. The Panoramic
Night Vision Goggles (PNVGs) are another prime example and provide
operators a significantly wider field of view than the ``soda straw''
view of earlier goggles. Technology transition into operational use is
the ultimate metric for assessing the value of our S&T investment.
WORLD CLASS RESEARCH
The quality of our program is assessed by the Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board (SAB) through yearly reviews. The SAB conducts an in-
depth review of half of the S&T program each year, covering the entire
program over a 2-year period. Twelve technical areas have been
identified as world-class research during the last cycle of reviews--
let me highlight a few of these areas that were identified as world-
class.
The Directed Energy Directorate's Starfire Optical Range at
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, is leading the adaptive optics
research for use in large ground-based telescopes to image satellites
and propagate laser beams through the atmosphere. This will enable
high-quality, ground-based observations of space objects and
propagation of laser beams through a turbulent atmosphere. Satellite
images using this technology can provide real-time status information
that cannot be obtained in any other manner.
Our Propulsion Directorate's Hypersonics Technology (HyTech) work
at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is acknowledged by the SAB as
world class and is the cornerstone of future hypersonic capabilities,
such as destroying time-critical targets and responsive access to
space. Our HyTech program has continued to advance the state-of-the-art
in scramjet engines and completed the first ever ground test
demonstration of a scramjet producing positive net thrust begun in
2001. In February 2003, HyTech tested a flight weight scramjet ground
demonstration engine operating at Mach 4.5. While the 2001 Performance
Test Engine used copper heat-sink hardware and weighted 1,500 pounds,
the 2003 ground demonstration engine used JP-7 fuel to cool the
scramjet engine walls and weighed less than 150 pounds. This marked
another first for the HyTech program--demonstrating the structural
durability of a hydrocarbon fueled, actively cooled scramjet. Testing
at Mach 6.5 has been completed. United States industry developed this
particular engine in collaboration with Air Force scientists and
engineers.
Another SAB-rated world-class research program is the Warfighter
Skill Development and Training efforts worked by our Human
Effectiveness Directorate at Brooks City-Base, Texas. Specific research
areas include Integrated PNVG and Distributed Mission Training. The
Integrated PNVG will improve situational awareness and terrain
avoidance at night through its wider field of vision and improved
resolution. It will also provide protection from laser target
designators, laser rangers, and laser threats through compatibility
with existing laser eye protection technologies. Distributed mission
training will provide an integrated set of training, simulation, and
mission rehearsal technologies that will improve warfighter
capabilities and mission readiness by enhancing operator and team
performance skills. Technologies will increase operational readiness by
providing more effective methods and approaches to train and assess
personnel. These technologies will contribute to a more highly trained
and flexible cadre of personnel at a reduced cost.
Working closely with operational users and the Human Effectiveness
Directorate at Brooks City-Base, AFRL researchers in the Materials and
Manufacturing Directorate at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio,
continue to develop and transition new laser eye protection
technologies that provide aircrews with improved eye protection. The
world-class multi-disciplinary approach anticipates future threats and
needs, and assures that next-generation hardening technologies will
address the agile laser threat. The Laser Eye Protection program is
enabling aircrews to conduct day and night air operations without
visual jamming or personal injury. The Materials and Manufacturing
Directorate also conducts world-class research to improve the
affordability, durability, and performance of advanced aerospace metals
by integrating modeling and simulation into all aspects of the program.
The potential cost savings when qualifying metallic materials for
insertion into Air Force weapon systems are significant. Revolutionary
work on thermomechanical process modeling and probabilistic
micromechanical modeling of failure and durability will change the way
materials are developed and implemented in air and space applications.
Our research in Electro-Optical Warfare at Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio, will allow future laser-based sensor systems to
penetrate moderate cloud cover, obscurants, and camouflage. This will
provide improved target detection and identification for our weapon
systems. ``See and Avoid'' sensors will ease restrictions on unmanned
air vehicle (UAV) operations in civilian airspace and allow autonomous
operation in conjunction with manned aircraft. These technologies may
also be applied as low-cost missile warning sensors to affordably
protect military and commercial aircraft from surface-to-air missiles.
Also, experimental research in infrared countermeasures is developing
threat adaptive techniques for robust defeat of current and future
infrared weapons and sensors.
Space Weather research at Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts, is
another SAB-rated world-class technology development program. We
continue to develop a modeling capability that specifies and forecasts
space weather from the Sun to the ionosphere. In conjunction with this
modeling capability, our Solar Mass Ejection Imager, launched in
January 2003, is greatly increasing our ability to forecast solar-
induced ionospheric disturbances that adversely impact communications
systems and spacecraft.
At Edwards Air Force Base, California, the Propulsion Directorate
is working on world-class research in polynitrogen propellants. The
goal is to enable high performance monopropellant rocket propulsion
systems with revolutionary performance. By improving the specific
impulse of the propellant, we will have environmentally benign exhaust
and reduced signatures. This could potentially improve storage,
manufacturing, and rocket engine size.
COMBATING TERRORISM
While the traditional focus of S&T has been on developing long-term
capabilities, the Air Force S&T program also contributes to the current
needs of the Nation and our troops deployed in hostile areas. One
example of an Air Force project receiving a great deal of attention
since September 11 is the Elastomeric Coating Polymer, which the Air
Force developed to protect key buildings and installations from close
proximity explosions, such as air dropped weapons or truck bombs. This
easy-to-apply spray coating provides greater structural integrity of
exterior walls and prevents dispersion of debris as well as separation
of wall elements. In addition to protecting lightweight shelters, this
polymeric coating is currently being applied to the interior of the
outer walls of the Pentagon.
Another transformational effort is the Vehicular Mounted Active
Denial System (VMADS). The VMADS is being jointly developed with the
U.S. Marine Corps and is a defensive millimeter wave system with many
potential applications, including perimeter defense. It is a directed
energy weapon that emits a non-lethal, non-damaging beam, which heats
up the skin of a potential adversary when in close proximity to the
system. The resulting temporary pain causes the person to flee.
Yet another effort of significant interest is something called
PING. PING is a standoff, microwave-based interrogation unit that has
reliably identified AK-47s, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), and
suicide bomber apparatus in field demonstrations. PING operates by
illuminating potential threats and then categorizing the return
reflected off metallic objects found in a crowd of people using a
laptop computer and specialized software to determine specific weapon
types. Metallic substructures on weapons resonate at unique, natural
frequencies that permit automatic identification of concealed weapons.
The PING demonstration unit is vehicle-mounted and can be positioned up
to 100 meters away to monitor persons or groups of people entering a
checkpoint for concealed weapons. The unit can also be remotely
operated. This Air Force S&T program has been briefed to the Army and
we are optimistic that PING will rapidly transition into operational
use.
In the war on terror, Air Force Special Tactics Combat Controllers
are changing the very nature of warfare. By performing operations deep
in enemy territory, they help determine who the terrorists are, where
their weapons are located, and who the innocent civilians are. Then,
they precisely control the elements of airpower to defeat the terrorist
threat, while taking care to spare innocent civilian casualties and
minimize collateral damage. Then, these same Special Tactics Combat
Controllers are there to provide instant battle damage assessment. We
call these deep engagements BAO.
The Air Force is accelerating new technology to these special
tactics warriors in the form of significant improvements to their BAO
Kit of equipment. As a result of this Air Force enterprise, our special
tactics warriors will soon have a digital machine-to-machine capability
that helps to quickly connect the right aircraft, with the right
munitions, guided precisely to the right target, at just the right
time, to achieve the desired effect. This new automated process helps
to reduce the time it takes to target the terrorist threat, while at
the same time reducing human error in the targeting process.
Working collaboratively with the special tactics warriors, the Air
Force ``BAO Tiger Team'' has also partnered with a national team of
industry to field significant enhancements of increased capability,
while reducing the weight and size of the individual BAO Kit equipment.
They are performing these improvements by developing, prototyping,
testing, building, and fielding these BAO Kit improvements in very
rapid spirals. These new BAO capabilities will help to save American
lives, and the lives of innocent civilians. BAO provides a
revolutionary and highly effective way to combat the terrorist threat.
TRANSFORMATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES
There are many other Air Force technology areas that deserve
special mention. Let me highlight just a few examples. As mentioned
earlier, there's our transformational communications technology
development program, whose laser communications technology efforts
promise to increase data transfer rates at least ten-fold compared to
current radio frequency communications systems. Additionally, laser
communications use a narrow beam, which decreases the likelihood of
intercept and increases resistance to jamming. While laser
communications have a high potential to revolutionize satellite
communications, there are technical challenges to overcome such as
precision pointing and tracking, weather constraints, and adapting the
equipment for use in space. We continue to work on the technology
challenges and are implementing the results of our recently concluded
study to determine the best architecture for implementing laser
communications technologies to complement and integrate with radio
frequency-based systems.
To increase aircraft survivability and operational efficiencies,
the Air Force is developing the F/A-22 and F-35--Joint Strike Fighter,
aircraft that can carry and employ weapons from both external and
internal weapons bays. To increase the number of weapons the flight
vehicle can fit into its internal weapons bays, part of our investment
strategy focuses S&T funding on developing and demonstrating smaller
precision weapons.
One of the small munitions currently being flight demonstrated at
Eglin Air Force Base is the Low Cost Autonomous Attack System (LOCAAS)
technology program. The LOCAAS is a 100-pound class powered munition of
which the primary target set is moving and relocatable targets. This
ATD program will demonstrate the effectiveness and military utility of
this type of munition for the Lethal Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
(SEAD), Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Attack Operations, and Armor/
Interdiction mission areas. LOCAAS will integrate a laser radar
precision terminal seeker with autonomous target recognition
algorithms, a multi-modal warhead, Global Positioning System (GPS)/
Inertial Navigation System (INS) mid-course guidance, and a miniature
turbine engine with a fly-out range of 100 miles.
In fiscal year 2005, the Air Force will conduct a cooperative
program with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) using the small
diameter bomb. A test program on the RAAF F-111 aircraft in Australia
is scheduled for the first quarter of the fiscal year 2005. This will
be an important test for both nations--the U.S. is able to test
munitions release at supersonic speeds and Australia benefits from the
test results. These results could enable maturation of the
computational simulation codes for separation of symmetric and
asymmetric miniature weapons, providing for a reduction in the risk and
cost of weapons certification efforts for aircraft with internal
weapons bays such as the F/A-22, the F-35--Joint Strike Fighter, and
unmanned combat air vehicles.
To continue the trend of miniaturization of space platforms, the
Air Force is also conducting the Experimental Spacecraft System (XSS)
series to demonstrate increasing levels of microsatellite technology
maturity. Following the successful XSS-10 mission in January 2003, we
plan to launch the XSS-11 microsatellite in late 2004. XSS-11 will
demonstrate fully autonomous operations and provide experience with
command and control in proximity operations to another space object
over several months. If successful, this could provide the capability
to repair, refurbish, and perform maintenance operations from unmanned
microsatellites.
One of the most transformational and quickly deployable
technologies available today is command, control, and communications
technology, also known as information technology. This technology is at
the heart of our Moving Target Indicator Exploitation program, which is
developing web-enabled automated tools to exploit data from current and
future sensor systems such as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar System (JSTARS). The effort is focused on four technology areas:
ground moving target tracking; motion pattern analysis; behavioral
pattern analysis; and sensor resource allocation and scheduling, which
provide the capability to track moving targets and get the information
to the operations center.
BREAKTHROUGH TECHNOLOGIES
In recent years, we have all come to appreciate the success of
unmanned vehicles. We hear over and over again the tremendous
operational advantages that systems such as Predator and Global Hawk
are bringing to warfighters from all Services. Over the first two
decades of the 21st century, advances in micro UAVs will provide
significant additional capabilities to our Armed Forces. Micro air
vehicles utilize advances in microscale aerodynamics, electronic
miniaturization, munitions, and propulsion to package sensory and
weapons payloads into highly reliable, on-demand systems. These systems
will provide unprecedented levels of situational awareness in the most
severe threat environments. Whether we are operating in urban
environments, sensing biochemical dispersion through the atmosphere, or
looking over the next hill, our troops will have the awareness needed
to fight and survive. These systems will provide the persistent
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in high threat
environments needed by our troops on the ground and our airmen in the
air. When called for, swarms of these vehicles will cooperate together
to generate both lethal and nonlethal effects.
In the next 50 years, advancements in nanotechnology will provide
the greatest change in how man operates since the invention of powered
flight itself. Nanotechnology is a science and a series of disciplines
that works at the atomic and molecular level to create structures,
materials, and devices through improved molecular organization. By
working with elements at the level of nanometer scale, we have access
to the building blocks of nature. This will fundamentally change the
way materials and devices will be produced in the future. The ability
to synthesize nanoscale building blocks with precisely controlled size
and composition and to then assemble them into larger structures with
unique properties and functions will revolutionize segments of the
materials and device industry. The benefits that nanostructuring can
bring include lighter, stronger, and programmable materials; reductions
in life cycle costs through lower failure rates; innovative devices
based on new principles and architectures; nanosensors and
nanoprocessors; and use of molecular/cluster manufacturing, which takes
advantage of assembly at the nanoscale level for a given purpose.
Another significant breakthrough technology that will change the
way we develop systems is our work in biotechnology. Biology has
developed unique materials and processes that may be exploited in non-
biological systems. Our research is focused on studying the science
necessary to incorporate biological components and organisms into Air
Force systems. For example, in biomemetics, we research the adaptation
of natural biological sensor in reptiles. The natural infrared sensors
in reptiles do not need to be cooled. We hope to adapt this biological
process to Air Force sensor applications that normally require
cryogenic cooling.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION
The majority of Air Force S&T is contracted with industry and
universities. This promotes relationships between the S&Es conducting
the research and lays the foundation for technology transition. Strong
connections between the technology supplier and the end user help speed
transition of technology to the warfighter. In addition, the various
transition programs in which the Air Force participates further cement
this foundation. Air Force technology transition efforts include ATD
projects, Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contracts, and
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) among others.
The ATCs discussed earlier were initiated in fiscal year 1999 to
foster top-level user involvement in the transition of technology from
the laboratory to the system developer to the operational user. As
noted, these councils review and approve Air Force ATD projects and
ensure that the major commands plan for the transition of successful
technology by tying approved ATD projects to planned Major Command
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) funding.
Another Air Force technology transition tool is the CRADA--an
agreement between a government laboratory and a non-Federal party under
which the laboratory provides personnel, facilities, equipment, or
other resources (but not funds) with or without reimbursement and the
non-Federal party provides funds, people, services, facilities,
equipment, or other resources to conduct specific research and
development efforts that are consistent with the agency's mission.
These efforts along with many other programs, such as Dual-Use S&T,
Independent Research and Development (R&D), Mentor-Protege, Personnel
Exchanges, etc., are mutually beneficial to the Air Force and the
contractors and universities with whom we collaborate. Technology
transition is a key component of the Air Force S&T program and is vital
to our pursuit of national security requirements.
SECTION 253 STUDY
Section 253 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002, Public Law 107-107, directed the Air Force, in cooperation
with the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences,
to carry out a study to determine the effect of S&T program changes of
the past 2 years. The Air Force Science and Technology Board (AFSTB) of
the National Research Council prepared a written report, which the
Secretary of the Air Force forwarded to Congress as directed. The
findings contained in this report indicated that overall the Air Force
has made considerable progress during the past 2 years in strengthening
its S&T program. The AFSTB noted that great progress has been achieved
in increasing the visibility of the S&T portfolio within the Air Force,
but challenged us to continue working to stabilize funding levels,
strengthen our workforce, and reestablish the ``development planning''
process. As the report indicated, however, we have already begun many
initiatives targeted towards strengthening these areas and will
continue to pursue them in the future. In fact, at almost $2 billion,
the fiscal year 2005 President's budget request for Air Force S&T is
funded at a level to achieve the distinctive capabilities supporting
Air Force Core Competencies. In addition, we have also taken steps to
strengthen our scientist and engineer workforce through various
recruitment and retention initiatives. Finally, the Air Force has
shifted from a threat-based approach to a capabilities-based approach
to making investment decisions and providing for requirements
generation planning. This transformation will be key to our ability to
determine what is necessary to support our defense strategy in the
years to come. ``Development planning'' will be a vital and fully
integrated part of the Air Force's new capabilities-based planning
process.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Air Force is fully committed to providing this
Nation with the advanced air and space technologies required to meet
America's national security interests around the world and to ensure we
remain on the cutting edge of system performance, flexibility, and
affordability. The technological advantage we enjoy today is a legacy
of decades of investment in S&T. Likewise, our future warfighting
capabilities will be substantially determined by today's investment in
S&T. As we face the new millennium, our challenge is to advance
transformational and enabling technologies for an Air and Space Force
as we continue to move aggressively into the realm of space activities.
The Air Force S&T program provides for the discovery, development,
demonstration, and timely transition of affordable technologies that
keep our Air Force the best in the world. As an integral part of the
DOD's S&T team, we look forward to working with Congress to ensure a
strong Air Force S&T program tailored to achieve our vision of a
superior Air and Space Force.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again, for the opportunity to present
testimony, and thank you for your continuing support of the Air Force
S&T program.
Senator Roberts. We thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you gentlemen for your testimony. You've all highlighted the
critical role that S&T plays in the defense of the Nation.
Dr. Sega, you pointed out that the President's request was
an increase from his last request, but it's a decrease from the
money you had last year, am I correct?
Dr. Sega. That's correct, sir.
Senator Reed. That raises the question, do we have money?
Are you still committed to the DOD goal of 3 percent funding
for S&T programs?
Dr. Sega. The goal of S&T investment at 3 percent of the
total obligation authority (TOA) remains a goal of the
Secretary of Defense.
Senator Reed. How fast will we reach that goal if we're
going backwards with this budget request?
Dr. Sega. I can't answer that.
Senator Reed. Dr. Killion, again for the record, is the
position of the Army that 3 percent is a number you support?
Dr. Killion. We support the goal of 3 percent. In fact, the
Army has significantly increased its investment in S&T over the
last several years. It's actually approached that goal in the
President's budget.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Cohen.
Admiral Cohen. Navy leadership, both civilian and
uniformed. You have testified to the value of S&T, but they
have not committed to any percentage for S&T. I will tell you
that the Marine Corps exceeds 3 percent. People say, well, they
have a small budget in S&T, but to them it's a big budget.
Senator Roberts. Well, they've had to put up with baling
wire for so damned long, it's about time.
Admiral Cohen. Yes, sir. They've done very well. I'm
married to a Marine Corps junior and she got marine and
submarine confused. I don't know how that happened. But she
keeps me on the straight and narrow.
For the Navy, I'm very pleased to tell you that the fiscal
year 2005 budget that you have in front of you stops the
decrease in the Navy line that we saw both in fiscal year 2003
and fiscal year 2004. As we look through the Future Years'
Defense Plan (FYDP), that is sustained.
Senator Reed. Mr. Engle.
Mr. Engle. Senator, we support the 3 percent overall as a
DOD goal for S&T investment. I would quibble slightly in that
the contribution from each of the various components or
Services plus DARPA make up the total 3 percent.
As the Air Force looks at it, we see that our share of that
3 percent is probably less than a 3 percent number. Our goal is
to hit about 2.4 percent of our TOA, which would probably fit
nicely into an overall DOD goal of 3 percent.
So we are moving in the right direction. Right now we're
not at 2.4 percent, but we have committed to try to migrate in
that direction with the goal of hitting 2.4 percent in the 2007
time frame.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
We all recognize that with additional resources, you could
do additional things. Could you provide a list to the
subcommittee of those unfunded priorities that you have in a
priority list as best you can? I think everyone is agreeing to
that for the record. Thank you very much.
[The information referred to follows:]
Dr. Sega. The Department of Defense supports the President's fiscal
year 2005 budget request. The science and technology (S&T) program is
balanced to meet near-, mid-, and far-term needs to provide options for
responding to a full range of military challenges both today and into
the uncertain future. The Department's investment in S&T develops the
technology foundation necessary to produce transformational
capabilities. We are working with the military departments and defense
agencies to ensure sufficient funding is directed toward projects that
advance the six QDR transformation operational goals. Some of the
technologies that support the QDR are the National Aerospace
Initiative, the Energy and Power Technologies, Surveillance and
Knowledge Systems, Future Combat Systems, Objective Force Warrior,
Electric Ship, High Speed Sea Lift, and Directed Energy Weapons, and
Advanced Space Systems.
Dr. Killion.
List of Army Science and Technology Unfunded Priorities
Close In Active Protection System $23.3 million.
Admiral Cohen.
Mr. Engle. Yes, like many areas in the Air Force, we could wisely
invest additional funding in our S&T program if it were available. One
of the most important efforts currently ongoing within our S&T program
continues to be the work we're doing to enhance the Battlefield Air
Operations (BAO) Kit equipment carried by the Air Force Special Tactics
Controllers who perform critical operations deep in enemy territory.
Using very rapid spirals to speed development, prototyping, testing,
production, and fielding, the Air Force continues to work to realize
significant enhancements to these kits, while reducing weight and size.
The following list is a representative summary of high priority S&T
efforts, including enhancements to the BAO Kit, for which the Air Force
could use additional funding in fiscal year 2005. A more detailed,
comprehensive list has been provided to the Senate Armed Services
professional staff as requested.
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effort
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BAO Kit Enhancements....................................... $14.482
Integrated Striker Targeting and Connectivity.............. 10.000
Directed Energy for Airborne Demonstration................. 12.100
Space Force Enhancement.................................... 37.000
------------
Total.................................................... $73.582
------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the other areas that is so critical is the
scientific and engineering workforce. You've all either
explicitly or implicitly referred to that in your testimony.
Again, for the whole panel, what unique role can you play
to help ensure the scientific and engineering workforces? Are
there any particular areas of endeavor in science, a particular
field of science or engineering that requires more attention?
Dr. Sega.
Dr. Sega. Senator, that's a great question and one that we
are in the process of assessing in more detail.
The trends in terms of individuals receiving especially
advanced degrees, physical sciences and engineering, in our
country and overseas are being examined and the needs inside
for the DOD and defense-related work are being looked at.
There are key disciplines that would probably share the
greatest need. For example, in some of the energy-related
disciplines for high-power, the needs for directed energy for a
more electric force requires expertise and background and
education in high-power switches, power supplies, capacitors,
those types of things.
Subdisciplines of electrical and mechanical engineering
materials would be important. We would suspect that we would
see a base that we want to address, areas in nuclear
engineering, nuclear physics, areas of high-speed flight,
hypersonic flight, the aerodynamics, the propulsion, and
aerothermal considerations.
We are at the point now of going through and identifying
with more rigor where the demand is versus the potential
supply. In our case, much of the work needs U.S. citizens to
accomplish it.
Senator Reed. When do you anticipate finishing this report
or study?
Dr. Sega. That question is properly referred to Dr. John
Hopps, who is the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Laboratories and Basic Sciences, an office that we stood up,
one of the only offices stood up since being in this position,
to focus on laboratory, space, and sciences workforce and
education.
Senator Reed. Can you provide us with your findings at a
more appropriate time?
Dr. Sega. We will.
Senator Reed. Admiral Cohen, do you have a comment?
Admiral Cohen. Senator, the short answer is we play a
critical role in this area. The young people in this country
today are turning away from science and math. When you ask them
why, they say because it's hard. The statistics speak for
themselves.
Probably $1 million I spend each year as Chief of Naval
Research that I am most proud of is the monies that we provide
through our Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) units,
69 of them, all around the country, for rising juniors, rising
seniors, and graduate students to come work in our
laboratories, the Naval Research Laboratory and all of our
warfare centers, including the Naval Underwater Warfare Center
in Newport. They work alongside our scientists and engineers
who take them on as mentors. Many of them take them into their
homes.
Now, we don't expect all of them to come into government
service. About 20 percent are. We're in our third year of doing
this and when you look at that group of young Americans, you
don't have to worry about diversity. We get them from all over
the country. You're looking at the face of America. It's really
uplifting.
In the junior highs and high schools, we send our Reserve
officers who are located all around the country to be involved
with science fairs. We work with Dr. Bob Ballard and the JASON
Group, as well as the National Science Foundation, to try and
inspire the young people of the importance of S&T.
I was raised on Mr. Wizard. We need a better name for Bill
Nye, ``The Science Guy.'' It sounds a little geeky to me, but
Rita Colwell and I have had that discussion. So we play a
critical role and this is critically important for the future
of this country.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Engle, your comments.
Mr. Engle. Just briefly, Senator Reed.
The Air Force is very concerned about this issue. Secretary
Roche and General Jumper, when they came to office a few years
ago, saw this, I think, primarily because of Dr. Roche's
background in industry--and the difficulty of finding talent in
the engineering career fields particularly--and brought that
and highlighted it inside our service.
We have, over the last 2 years, focused our senior
leadership on this problem, expended a considerable amount of
money to try to make sure that we are well-postured with the
scientists and engineering talent we need to continue what is
probably one of the most high-tech organizations on Earth.
One difficulty, which I resonate with my colleague, Admiral
Cohen, is that we, as the Services and DOD, with John Hopps'
good work notwithstanding, we can't do this alone. This is
really a national problem.
We need to invigorate our youth in the areas of science,
mathematics, and engineering. We need to build a cadre of young
people that can grow up and feed not only the DOD but, as Dr.
Hopps would tell you, interdepartmental demand for scientific
and engineering talent. This is, I think, something that we
really need to focus on nationally.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Dr. Killion.
Dr. Killion. Just as an example similar to the Junior NROTC
program that Admiral Cohen talked about, one of the things the
Army did last year was stand up a program called E-
CyberMission, which was intended to go out via Web-based
competition and excite our youth in the seventh and eighth
grades in interest in science, math, and engineering to come up
with projects. We competed it nationally and actually brought
the regional winners here locally for an awards ceremony that
included the Chief of Staff of the Army, and my boss, Mr.
Bolton, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology.
We're continuing that. One of the things that the chief
said at the awards ceremony last year, because we had cut it
off at eighth grade, was that we're going to expand it to ninth
grade the next year because he got so much feedback from the
eighth grade participants that they really wanted to continue
this year.
It's an early entry into getting our young people excited
about science, math, and engineering, something we vitally need
to do. It's important for us in the Army. It's also a
contribution that we can make to our communities out there to
help them and help our future industrial base.
We have other programs in high school, like our science and
engineering apprenticeship program. We have a very strong
program going up here at Walter Reed Army Medical Center where
we bring young people from disadvantaged areas in the
metropolitan area in to serve in the laboratory and learn
important skills and get exposed to where the opportunities
will be in the future.
So I think we have some very vital programs in that area.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
When you're in combat, it certainly brings into focus your
shortcomings and your merits, your various military equipment
and tactics.
The Third Armored Calvary Division, which is stationed in
Fort Carson, will return home later this summer and that
calvary regiment has been subjected to the full spectrum of
small arms fire, I believe, from IEDs to RPGs, and other
shoulder-fired weapons.
My question is, could you describe your priorities and
investments in the fiscal year 2005 budget for advanced armor
and crew survivability technologies? A follow-up question: Can
we or are we fast-tracking these technologies for introduction
to the armored vehicle fleet?
Dr. Sega. I'll start and just introduce it knowing that
most of the knowledge and the work is being done in the
Services.
On October 16, Secretary Wolfowitz sent a letter to Members
of Congress on the issue of force protection. He had asked me
to lead the task force and just facilitate bringing in the
input of the technical community as well as those that
represent the warfighting community, the combatant command, and
the joint staff.
From CENTCOM a prioritized list of items came in this
letter, totaling about $335 million, to do in a rapid fashion.
In that was included the armor, the protection pieces to
include the Interceptor Body Armor and up-armoring HMMWVs. It
included aspects of surveillance to include lightweight
countermortar radars, aerostats, and UAVs. It also included
some detect and defeat technologies, including electronic
countermeasures and detection types of things.
So in this fiscal year, we are accelerating work in force
protection technologies and bringing them to the field. I think
that's a good news story.
One request that we would have for Congress, and we're
working together as a team, requires some of the reprogramming
from current budgets, whether it is the standard budget or that
of the supplemental, to augment and move towards some of the
force protection technologies. We appreciate expeditious
movement of reprogramming actions when they apply in this area.
That's an introduction, and I'll pass it along.
Dr. Killion. Actually, Dr. Sega introduced a number of the
areas. We can certainly provide a more detailed lay-down in
terms of the specific investments if you're interested in that.
But just to give some of the highlights, I would include
improvements, for example, in Interceptor Body Armor. We have
ongoing programs that continue next year in terms of providing
the same level of protection at a reduced weight burden for the
individuals. So you could get about a 25-percent reduction in
the weight associated with those plates. It may not seem like a
lot, but it is important to somebody who's carrying that weight
around with him in all of his operations when he has to move
around and wear those protective devices.
In terms of protection for vehicles, some of the early
warning capability that Dr. Sega mentioned, we're continuing to
work that through our Communications and Electronics Research,
Development, and Engineering Center (RDEC). We are exploring
active protection systems, devices that can intercept and
deflect or destroy incoming rounds to protect our vehicles and
installations.
Lightweight armor, new versions of armor. That Armor
Survivability Kit is an expedient solution. The best we can do
near term is an affordable capability that meets the weight
burden associated with non-up-armored HMMWVs. As Admiral Cohen
was talking about, we have a limit on how much weight we can
put on them without ending up breaking the axles or making them
less mobile than we want them to be. That kind of new armor
we're looking at is ceramics to provide equivalent or higher
levels of protection and is a byproduct of the work that we're
doing for the FCS. We're working on lighter-weight vehicles for
the future.
Another example is the change detection capability. We are
looking at taking advantage of some work that was done under
the Joint Area Clearance ACTD and applying software into our
tactical and manned aerial vehicle system which will allow us
to fly along a route and then later fly the route again and
automatically identify where there have been changes along that
route, where we might be able to show that somebody came out
and placed a device along that route. Therefore, we would have
better advanced warning that there might be some kind of device
out there, so we could go out and examine it.
So there are a variety of investments. It would probably be
best to follow-up, if you'd like, in terms of giving you a
specific profile.
Admiral Cohen. Senator, for the naval forces, we have
traditionally followed a philosophy of active protection and
defense in depth, destroy the enemy before they come close
enough to destroy you.
We've talked a little bit about the applications of some of
those underlying technologies with our Army and Marine Corps
brethren, and I am the Chief of Naval Research, so we do have
the Navy and the Marine Corps.
We had previously briefed a product called Quick Clot. This
is now commercially available. In OIF, the application was just
carried in your pocket. We lose most of our soldiers who are
not killed immediately by bleeding out in that golden hour when
we might get them to a field hospital. We believe this has
saved 17 or 19 lives during OIF.
So looking at that golden hour, you've heard statements
here about the improvements in body armor and it's been on ``60
Minutes.'' The ceramic armor that Natick labs and the Army have
worked on so well has really reduced the number of fatalities
that we're seeing in Iraq and the ongoing operations today.
The unintended consequence of that is a significantly
increased number of amputees, because we're protecting the
body, but we're losing the arms or the legs. I have classmates,
and I know many of you have friends and associates from the
Vietnam War and other conflicts, where you don't want to see
them in a T-shirt because they have leg tendons in their
forearm, but it's their forearm.
I don't want to raise any hopes here. But a month ago, we
started through the Naval Research Lab working with Naval Air
Technical Data and Engineering Service Command (NATEC) and
working with anyone who will come to the table for an
initiative along the lines of when you get in an airplane to
fly it, you put on a flight suit. Well, our young kids in Iraq
are suffering these IED injuries by making patrols in HMMWVs
and four-by-four convoys, et cetera. We've talked about ISR and
the need for that, et cetera.
But under the rubric of what can you do to better protect
the person and win that mission scenario, we're looking at
leggings and stockings made out of what could be some exotic
materials. It may not prevent the cuts. It may not prevent the
shrapnel. But it may prevent the arm or leg from being blown
off so that we then have the ability during that golden hour to
take that soldier, take that marine to the field hospital and
save the appendage.
Now, I'm not promising anything here. But I'm telling you,
you push that balloon. We did it with the body armor. Now we're
having the amputees. I'm absolutely committed to this and so
that's something that the Navy can do working with our other
Services.
Senator Allard. Okay. Let me move on to the next question
here. A lot of our sources have been reporting that countries
of concern are turning more and more to burying their
facilities and defense installation as well as offensive.
We've looked at--the subcommittee, which I've chaired and
Senator Reed is on there too--various nuclear options on how
you go after these deeply buried targets.
My question to you is, are you looking at non-nuclear ways
of us getting after these deeply buried targets?
Dr. Sega. Senator Allard, the short answer is that we are
working on a variety of penetration options for buried
structures. Depending on the details, the type of penetration
munitions varies. But work is ongoing and there are several
activities--maybe Secretary Engle could pick up on this--of our
work in terms of providing additional options for deep
penetration munitions.
Mr. Engle. Yes. I guess we're doing quite a bit in this
area. Our principal customer, as you probably are aware, is
Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Admiral Ellis, who has been given
this mission for prompt global strike and hard and deeply
buried targets is a big part of that.
There are some hard physics involved here in that you can
dig deeper and bury yourself to a point where there's not a
whole lot of things that we can build that will get that far
down and do the job. But we have some fairly effective ways to
penetrate. Again, we can certainly provide details for those on
a classified level.
There are some large devices that we've looked at as well.
Big Blu is one that might have come to your attention that
we've looked at pretty heavily. It is a large explosive device.
Then there are some other tactics that you can take to deal
with these. If they are hardened and deeply buried and you can
figure out how they communicate out and turn that off,
sometimes that solves the problem for you. Then they can just
live down there for as long as they'd like and really not
affect the outcome of the combat.
What we have looked at is some very good technology that
helps us understand the connectivity of the communications
systems that the enemy might use that emanates from those
hardened bunkers, whether they're deeply buried or not, quite
frankly.
There's also some work that we have done with some radar
systems that look like they might be able to affect
communications systems in deeply buried places with kinetic
effect. That's something that we're looking at.
I guess there are a broad array of technical approaches in
this area, but I will tell you quite frankly, it is very
difficult if you want to blow up something several hundred
meters under the ground and know that it's blown up. This is a
very difficult task technically.
Senator Roberts. Senator, as Senator Reed and you and I
have discussed, this is an extremely important topic to follow-
up on in the classified portion of the hearing that we hope to
have in the remaining days of this Congress. It's extremely
important and I certainly appreciate you bringing it up.
Senator Allard. Thank you. One more question, if I might,
Mr. Chairman, just real briefly.
There's a gap between taking these research concepts and
then actually bringing them into some kind of weapons
development system.
My question is, how would you assess the success of your
Technology Transition Initiative and the Quick Reaction Special
Project to bridge this gap? Do you require any special
authorization from this subcommittee to sustain or improve
these technology transition tools?
Probably Dr. Sega would be one of the best to answer to
this.
Dr. Sega. Senator Allard, we appreciate and thank Congress
for providing the funds for the Quick Reaction Special Projects
Program which includes the Quick Reaction Fund. As of today, we
have committed or expended all of that fund for fiscal year
2005 based on needs.
A lot of good ideas and people are ready to go on
technologies, principally in the force protection area. The
Technology Transition Initiative, one good example of that is a
small water pen that was developed and there were some
residuals that were provided in the field in Afghanistan. It
works really well. The Technology Transition Initiative was
applied to that to accelerate the production of those and the
Defense Acquisition Challenge program also is an effective
mechanism for transition.
There are certain technologies that you can move quite
rapidly and the base that our panel has talked to in terms of
S&T being stable, strong, and in a place where you can draw
from is critically important.
We have an acceleration from the discussion of this
Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force in September 2001,
the thermobaric weapon. It converted a Blu 109 2,000-pound bomb
with a different fill. Well, in September, it was still at the
basic research stage.
Through the month of October, the team did work at Indian
Head to identify a leading candidate. By November, we had done
aesthetic testing in Nevada, a collaboration between the Navy,
the Air Force, and the DTRA, and there was a flight test on
December 14, 2001. So 90 days start to finish on that one.
Then Congress provided quick reaction munitions funds in
fiscal year 2002, $15 million. Thirteen million dollars of that
went to a thermobaric hellfire application. So advanced was the
technology that another generation flew off four different
variances and went from R&D to being built and deployed, and
they were used in OIF.
Now, there's further application of that technology
forward. So there's two examples where we have been able to
accelerate the technology development and then a transition and
an initial order of the Marine Corps for thermobaric hellfires.
The Defense Acquisition Challenge program allows a
mechanism for some of the spiral development into the programs
of records which are longer. I think we're making progress. I
also think we have a long way to go.
Senator Allard. You don't need any legislation?
Dr. Sega. I believe that the mechanisms we currently have,
not only those three but also the Quick Reaction Special
Projects, provide that crucial speed piece of near-term
execution in some areas we couldn't anticipate really in
submission of the budget. There's no need, so we wouldn't have
guessed when the budget process was going.
Some new technologies arise that we would not have
anticipated. It is important to us to have flexibility during
execution here.
Other programs that are a little further off on the
horizon--more like 2 to 5 years--are the ACTD process and areas
where we do not have the adequate base. In those programs, we
use some of the ``Defense Procurement Act, Title 3'' mechanism.
So there are several mechanisms to employ new technology
transition. I think we're okay regarding the mechanisms. But if
someone disagrees, please say so.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Dr. Sega, you stated that one of your
primary goals both last year, and I think you referred to it in
your testimony here this morning, was to improve the outreach
and the coordination with the Intelligence Community.
Now, having some interest in that, we are taking a look in
the Intelligence Committee at the pre-war intelligence on post-
war Iraq.
I guess my question is, are you benefitting--and by
``you,'' I mean the S&T programs--from intelligence
requirements in accelerating the technologies that are needed?
Both accelerating and the anticipation of what you might need
like we see with the new armor add-ons over here, and
countermeasures for future threats. Is there a Grand Central
Station arrangement between you and the 14 agencies that
compromise the Intelligence Community?
I would add that some of the intelligence that we gleaned
or that was predicated or that was provided to the policymakers
and to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and to the
Pentagon, one would expect would be obvious, we expected a wave
of humanitarian problems. Actually, that did not occur. We had
a lot of infrastructure degradation and a lot of sabotage, but
that other event did not happen.
I know that some expected a lot of flag waving and thanks
in regards to public demonstrations. I think that went on for
about 24 hours until we got to the current situation.
But if, in fact, the terrorists worldwide were using their
favorite ploy, i.e., truck bombs, explosives, mortars, RPGs, so
on and so forth, it would appear to me that the Intelligence
Community and the S&T community ought to fit together not only
in terms of anticipation, but also lessons learned, and
anticipate what we might need a little better down the road.
I'm not--well, I won't get into the inquiry that we are
conducting, but I think we could sure as hell do better. I'm
concerned about that. If you would, please comment for me on
your relationship with the Intelligence Community and how
that's working out both in terms of anticipation and in terms
of accelerating what you need.
Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman, we have made that a priority and
we're making progress on it. From about the second week of the
advent of the Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force in
2001, they have been part of that process.
We have developed the surveillance and knowledge systems
initiative with the Intelligence Community as part of the road-
mapping process of what S&T efforts should go on.
We are working toward coordinating the program and sort of
synching up when we need to have the pieces ready to coordinate
in the budget process. So we do have funding coordination, if
you will, on the programs that----
Senator Roberts. Who are you coordinating with? Is that
DOD? Is that CIA? Is that FBI? Is this a whole shooting match
or what--who do you deal with in regards to these kinds of
priorities and the laundry list that you are putting together?
I don't mean that as a pejorative.
Dr. Sega. I understand that. I have to admit it's not well
institutionalized and we're working on----
Senator Roberts. Should it be institutionalized?
Dr. Sega. I would have to think more about how we would do
that and what the pros and cons and the mechanisms of----
Senator Roberts. If any of you have any ideas on that, if
you could provide that to the subcommittee, or if you want to
say something right now, please feel free to do that.
Dr. Sega. Sir, there is the structure called the Science
and Technology Intelligence Coordinator (STIC). I may have
gotten the term wrong. From that, there is a list of critical
areas, critical technologies. Myself and Secretary Cambone have
brought together the technology and intelligence folks to take
a look at assessments as we look at knocking off, if you will,
this list of items, these technologies.
Senator Roberts. Well, you went down some of those earlier
in your comments in terms of your priorities. But it just would
seem to me as we're going through--we used to do that. We
pushed and pushed and pushed on the subcommittee to have joint
exercises. There was a lot of objection to that because of
limited budget dollars and what the Services want to do.
Well, we have two dandies right now, one in Afghanistan and
one in Iraq, and maybe one in Haiti by the time we're through
with it. So it just seems to me that if there's ever a time
where we could--I don't know if we need to say
institutionalize, but maybe we ought to create--is STIC
recognized as this Grand Central Station that I am referring
to?
It's one thing to try to get the 14 different agencies in
the Intelligence Community to take down their stovepipes and
have better coordination. I think we've achieved a great deal
on that since September 11, especially.
Then the thought occurs to me that that obviously would
apply in regards to the priorities of the S&T community on
lessons learned and where we go and what we provide the
warfighter as soon as we possibly can, anticipating what we
would need based on the best intelligence that we have.
Dr. Sega. Within the last few months, under the National
Security Technology Council, a subcommittee has been formed on
national security R&D. I co-chair it along with Dr. Don Kerr
from the CIA. That includes an interagency group beyond the CIA
and DOD that has interagency participation and that's under the
Office of S&T Policy (OSTP) sponsorship. So there is that
interagency mechanism.
What I referred to earlier on these assessments was more
detailed. For example, nanotechnology is looked at to better
inform our S&T investments for DOD needs, but also to help
inform what investments we should be making for R&D for the
intelligence function as a customer.
Senator Roberts. Okay. I'm sort of an event-oriented
person. I think most Senators are. I'm not a chart guy,
although we do have awards for the best chart when we get into
that. But the lights don't go off or you lose Members.
But in the event-oriented thing, and this is how things
work around here, I think, to a certain extent, you read in the
fountain of all knowledge, The Washington Post, where it's
going to take the FBI and the Border Patrol 4 years to get
back-up technology and better coordinate it so that they can
work together on the fingerprinting necessary for Border
Patrol. Four years? Yet we have a device back here at PIER 2.3
that can provide an amazing kind of identification security.
It would just seem to me rather than horsing around for 4
years trying to get your fingerprinting computer base worked
out so you can share it, why wouldn't you just move to
something like this and do it?
We're already having application of this kind of
technology, and I'm not trying to sell this product. But it
seems to me that they have a very unique advantage or service
that can be provided at this particular time. How do you plug
that in with your intelligence?
I know the CIA has a great interest in this product. I know
the marines already have it and they want more. Yet I have read
in the paper that there may be six different reasons why this
wouldn't work in regards to the example I'm using.
It seems to me there has to be a better coordination
between the Intelligence Community, including the FBI, and I
know that's outside your circle that you're working in in
regards to Secretary Cambone, et cetera.
That's a rambling road speech. That's really not a
question.
Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman, let me give you an example of,
though it may not be systematic across the board at this point,
which I do not believe it is, but there are some examples where
there are models that are working and the details we may follow
on in a different session.
But in terms of looking at explosive devices, currently in
Iraq and in the CENTCOM theater they go to a combined
explosives exploitation cell. I believe that's in Baghdad. I
believe it has representation from the Intelligence Community,
but I could be wrong on that.
The next stop is at the Terrorist Explosive Device Analysis
Center in Quantico. I've been down there to look at that. The
primary management of that facility with defense dollars is
FBI. So there's a level of exploitation of the explosive
device.
Then it goes to the proper places, whether Services or
others, to understand how it works and then understand how to
potentially defeat it.
So as a limited example, there is a coordination process to
run something quickly through from start to finish. But in a
systematic sense, I've given you a couple coordination points
and activities. I've probably mentioned almost half a dozen at
this point.
Senator Roberts. Well, we'll follow-up on that. I apologize
for taking time here. We're getting toward the noon hour. But
I'm very happy to learn that and I think that would be very
valuable information for members of the subcommittee and the
full committee. I was not aware of that in regards to Quantico.
Obviously, what we're experiencing in Iraq in regards to
the dangers there applies directly to homeland security and
what we're facing on the domestic front.
So I appreciate your commentary and we might have staff get
together and you can better inform us and educate us as to how
those channels are working now.
Senator, do you have any additional questions?
Senator Reed. No, I do not.
Senator Roberts. Unless somebody has anything else that is
absolutely important, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you so
much.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts
S&T BUDGET
1. Senator Roberts. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, and Mr.
Engle, the Department of Defense's (DOD) budget requests and statements
from DOD officials clearly emphasize applied research. What is the
departmental view of the role of basic defense science and technology
(S&T) and what is the guidance with regard to future budgets for these
programs and for the larger S&T portfolio?
Dr. Sega. New military capabilities and operational concepts emerge
from basic research. Basic research is a long-term investment with
emphasis on opportunities for military applications far into the
future. Additionally, it contributes to our national academic and
scientific knowledge base by providing substantial support for all
science and engineering and the education of our future scientists and
engineers. Basic research investments over a long period of time have
contributed significantly to new warfighter capabilities--low
observables (stealth), lasers, infrared night vision, and
microelectronics for precision strike, to name a few. Many of these
advances were unpredictable. No promising avenue of research should be
neglected. Although areas of emphasis may change, it is important to
maintain a balanced portfolio in order to deal with unforeseen
developments. Investments in basic research should help prevent
technological surprise by our adversaries. We have consistently
supported investment in basic research that, at a minimum sustains 0
percent real growth. The overall fiscal year 2005 budget request for
S&T funding exceeds 0 percent real growth by 1.8 percent. The Secretary
has established a long-term goal to fund S&T at 3 percent of the total
Defense budget. This goal is becoming difficult to achieve because the
projected top line of the total DOD budget is increasing more rapidly
than the programmed increasing rate of S&T funding.
Dr. Killion. The Army's basic research program seeks new knowledge
and understanding to achieve revolutionary advances in technology that
can be translated into transformational warfighting capability. The
program invests in world-class expertise (government, academic, and
industry) and state-of-the-art equipment.
The Army maintains a diverse S&T portfolio that has three major
components: (1) exploiting basic research to (2) accelerate technology
opportunities in applied research and (3) transition technology to
systems through the advanced technology development programs.
Investments within these three accounts work synergistically to provide
the most capable technology solutions to satisfy our warfighting
requirements. As we develop technology for the future force we are also
seeking opportunities to transition advanced technology to the current
force that is engaged in the global war on terrorism.
Admiral Cohen. The majority of the Navy's S&T portfolio is divided
into two areas: (1) discovery and invention; and (2) exploitation and
deployment.
The strength of the Office of Naval Research (ONR) is its basic
research (6.1) investment in discovery and invention. ONR's fiscal year
2005 budget request for basic research funding is $477 million. Navy's
basic research investment funds long term research in the enabling
technology for warfare areas such as command, control, communications,
computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR);
underwater weaponry; underwater acoustics; naval architecture; and
expeditionary warfare. They are absolutely critical to maintaining our
future naval battlespace supremacy.
We rely on the expertise of the naval research enterprise at the
Naval Research Laboratory and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory,
other government labs, as well as academic institutions, to pursue long
term, high risk, high payoff, basic research.
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), used to develop the fiscal year
2005 President's budget request for S&T, supported 3 percent annual
real growth. However, the Navy S&T accounts reflect the balance of
priorities among the competing requirements of the fiscal year while
attempting to be responsive to the DPG.
The most critical element of support for long-term, high risk
scientific research is to provide stable investment funding. The Navy
fiscal year 2005 6.1 budget meets the DPG goal to provide no less than
0 percent real growth for basic research.
Mr. Engle. The Air Force depends on and fully supports its basic
research program to provide for future long-term warfighting
capabilities. Air Force core basic research is funded at $217.3 million
in the fiscal year 2005 President's budget--an increase of almost $13
million or almost 5 percent real growth over the fiscal year 2004
President's budget. Total basic research funding within the Air Force
also includes the University Research Initiative and High Energy Laser
Research, which were devolved to the Air Force from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) in fiscal year 2004. Basic research funding
stemming from these devolved programs is also up from the fiscal year
2004 President's budget by almost $11 million or almost 8 percent real
growth. We expect to maintain at least 0 percent real growth in future
years. Overall, core funding for the total Air Force S&T portfolio has
increased over $80 million or almost 5 percent real growth in the
fiscal year 2005 President's budget when compared against similar
funding in the fiscal year 2004 President's budget. We do not expect
any significant changes to the current fiscal year 2005 President's
budget funding in the upcoming budget cycle.
2. Senator Roberts. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, and Mr.
Engle, what is the correct funding balance, by percentage, within the
S&T accounts between basic (6.1), applied (6.2), and advanced
technology development (6.3)?
Dr. Sega. Determining the correct funding balance of S&T investment
is not a precise science; rather, I believe it is a strategic decision.
The Department's investment in S&T develops the technology foundation
necessary for our modernization effort, and fosters the development of
``leap ahead'' technologies that produce transformational capabilities.
DOD must continue to invest broadly in defense-relevant technologies
because it is not possible to predict in which areas the next
breakthroughs will occur. The traditional guidelines have been to fund
basic research at approximately 15 percent, applied research at
approximately 35 percent, and advanced technology development (ATD) at
approximately 50 percent of the total DOD S&T budget. This breakout has
had success in leading to the discovery of new scientific knowledge and
maturing these scientific discoveries into technology demonstrations
that provide options for future military capabilities.
Dr. Killion. The Army is committed to a strong S&T program that
does not rely on specific investment goals within the S&T accounts. I
think specific percentage targets would be too rigid. We need to
maintain the dynamic portfolio management that we are using to
accelerate the pace of our transformation through technological
advances. As knowledge is gained in the basic research program we
increase focus on areas of dramatic payoff. When our warfighting
customers have the system development and acquisition resources, we
increase investments in ATD to speed transitions of selected technology
based upon our soldiers' needs. We balance the need to sustain
investments over time to achieve ``breakthroughs'' in science with the
need to seize on opportunities for rapid technology transitions as they
present themselves. In this way we are being responsive to the dynamics
of the science and technology environment and the business environment
of resource allocations beyond the S&T program.
Admiral Cohen. The S&T investment portfolio is driven not by
arbitrary percentages within the S&T accounts, but by a careful
strategy of investment in promising research and technology at whatever
stage it may be. As the Chief of Naval Research, my goal is to balance
the Navy's S&T portfolio between two broad investment areas: (1)
discovery and invention; and (2) exploitation and deployment.
Discovery and invention focuses on discovering and understanding
new phenomena that may hold promise for the ``Navy after next.'' This
includes all of our 6.1 investment and a portion of our 6.2 investment.
Our investment in nanotechnology in the 1980s is an example of our
support for long term, high-risk, high-payoff basic research. We are
just at the beginning of delivering the benefits on nanotechnology,
such as nano-coatings for submarine pumps. I believe it is crucial for
the 6.1 budget to be stable to protect the long term basic research
that develops the bold ideas that transforms warfare 10 to 30 years in
the future.
Exploitation and deployment, primarily 6.3 and a portion of 6.2,
funds the transformational effort supporting ``The Next Navy and Marine
Corps.'' Our future naval capabilities program, in close cooperation
with the requirements, fleet/force, and acquisition communities, is
transitioning components and systems to solve operational challenges.
The other major effort in exploitation and deployment is our Innovative
Naval Prototypes, large scale, high-risk, long term projects that may
change warfare. Ongoing programs include development of the
electromagnetic gun, the free electron laser, and electric ship
propulsion.
Mr. Engle. The Air Force maintains a balance between
transformational and enabling technology developments in support of the
warfighter. Air Force S&T is funded at a level to achieve the
warfighting capabilities that support Air Force core competencies. This
includes funding of approximately 18 percent or $345.5 million for
basic research, 42 percent or $786.2 million for applied research, and
40 percent or $763.7 million for ATD. Historically, this division has
proven successful in providing transitionable technology at a pace we
can afford to acquire, while preserving the scientific base for future
warfighting needs. Currently, we are skewed slightly to the 6.3
funding, which reflects the Air Force's interest in getting technology
into the hands of the warfighter because of the urgency of current
events.
DARPA'S STRATEGIC PLAN
3. Senator Roberts. Dr. Sega, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2004 contained language directing the Secretary of
Defense to set up ``appropriate means for review and approval'' of the
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency's (DARPA) strategic plan. What
means for review have been established and what role will the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), play in DARPA's strategic
plan?
Dr. Sega. As the DDR&E, I have oversight responsibility over DARPA.
The initial DARPA strategic plan was actually published in February
2003 and was coordinated and vetted through the DOD and then approved
by me prior to release. I have instituted a top-to-bottom review of
DARPA program with my office directors. We also have instituted a
detailed review of the DARPA's internal budget to ensure consistency
with DOD goals. Finally, I will review and approve DARPA's strategic
plan prior to submission to Congress in response to 10 U.S.C. 2352.
CURRENT PROGRAM AND SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT
4. Senator Roberts. Dr. Sega, the DOD's S&T programs have an
important role to play in providing enhancements for current and future
programs and systems. Please briefly outline such efforts in the
following areas: blue-force tracking; force protection; and secure
networks. In addition, could you please briefly outline the DOD's
coordination efforts for S&T in all unmanned systems activities?
Dr. Sega. In my testimony I outlined and discussed five research
and engineering priorities that directly impact current and future
programs and systems, including: Integrating S&T with a focus on
transformation; enhancing technology transition; addressing the
national security science and engineering workforce; expanding outreach
to the combatant commands and intelligence community; and accelerating
technical support for the war on terrorism.
The Secretary of Defense places high priority on Joint Blue Force
Situational Awareness (JBFSA), formerly referred to as ``blue force
tracking.'' Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) amplified the role of JBFSA in support of battlespace
awareness, command and control, force application, and logistics for
the coalition forces. The JBFSA Overarching Integrated Product Team is
formulating the investment strategy and program roadmap in coordination
with the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
Functional Capabilities. The JBFSA Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) is providing the prototype enterprise architecture
and common operational picture for theater commands to improve
detection, tracking and identification of all blue and friendly forces.
Our near-term force protection initiatives are focused on
activities of the Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force (CTTTF) to
rapidly accelerate technologies to mitigate effects stemming from
terrorist use of weapons such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs),
mortars, and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). The CTTTF matches
emerging laboratory technologies with operational challenges in the
global war on terrorism. A number of ACTDs impact force protection. For
example, the Counter Bomb/Counter Bomber ACTD detects either suicide
bombers or command initiated terrorist conventional and non-
conventional explosive devices. The Active Denial System (ADS) ACTD
will demonstrate long-range, anti-personnel, non-lethal force options
to commanders using a powerful millimeter wave transmitter on
stationary and mobile platforms to heat the skin and cause pain in
threat personnel.
Our initiatives to secure our networks and protect information
include integration of emerging commercial technologies, exploration of
new software capabilities and developing capabilities for managing
network infrastructure, implementing autonomic response to cyber
attack, and segregating information for releasability based on content
and role of the user. There are a number of ongoing activities across
the spectrum of communications and networking, including the active
Network Intrusion Defense (ANID) ACTD which provides rapid correlation
and visualization of cyber events, collaboration between ad-hoc virtual
teams of experts and autonomic execution of pre-planned responses where
appropriate, consistent with operational activities. Additionally, the
Coalition Information Assurance Common Operational Picture (C-IA COP)
ACTD is instituting a view of network status and health as it pertains
directly to operational plans and activities by integrating defense
cyber warfare tools with network management capabilities and processes.
The Content Based Information Security (CBIS) ACTD is developing a
revolution policy engine implementation which will enable information
protection within a common shared network space while permitting role-
based access to releasable information to those network users who have
clearance and authorization. These are specific examples of many
activities in this important area.
For unmanned systems, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV) Planning Task Force's UAV Roadmap consolidated the
Services' and components' developmental activities related to UAVs and
provided a path for future technology investment. This document is used
to review the UAV S&T activities and to optimize areas for cooperation
between programs and projects. Within USD(AT&L), there is excellent
coordination between the offices responsible for the oversight of
unmanned systems development, enabling the leveraging of S&T efforts.
An example of this leveraging is the fiscal year 2004 Joint Unmanned
Systems Command and Control (JUSC2) ACTD, developed primarily to
support ground-based robots by the Joint Robotics Program Office, will
be used to demonstrate the integration of surface and airborne unmanned
systems.
RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN NATIONALS
5. Senator Roberts. Dr. Sega, traditionally research conducted
within the 6.1 basic and 6.2 applied research accounts has been viewed
as fundamental in nature and therefore not subject to restrictions on
publication or on participation by foreign nationals. Is the DOD
reviewing this policy with a view toward possibly issuing a new
security directive to clarify when such restrictions are appropriate
and when they are not?
Dr. Sega. The DOD is not reviewing its policy allowing foreign
nationals to participate in fundamental research programs nor is DOD
reviewing its policy that fundamental research findings are freely
published and shared broadly within the scientific community.
In 1985 President Reagan established the national policy on
openness in American fundamental research with National Security
Decision Directive (NSDD) 189. DOD supports NSDD-189. Fundamental
research is exempt from the export license requirements in both the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR).
While the DOD continuously reviews security policies, our policies
with respect to fundamental research are not under active review at
this time. We are reviewing and clarifying our policies with respect to
the ITAR and the EAR to make clear when export licenses are required
for the sharing of technical information with foreign nationals. With
rare exceptions, both the ITAR and EAR provide export license
exemptions for fundamental research.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
LIGHTWEIGHT COMPOSITE METALS
6. Senator Collins. General Cartwright, how can lightweight
composite materials help the Army meet its needs in developing its
future force, and how do you believe the proposed Center of Excellence
at the University of Maine can help the Army meet its objectives?
General Cartwright. The Army has great interest in affordable
composite materials because they have improved properties over many
materials currently in use. Key material properties of composites could
be exploited in applications such as lighter weight structural
components in vehicles to achieve longer component life and reduced
vehicle fuel consumption, and improved ballistic protection with
reduced weight burden.
The Army is aware that the University of Maine has proposed the
establishment in Maine of a U.S. Army Center of Excellence on Advanced
Structures and Materials in Construction. Currently, higher Army
priorities and funding requirements associated with current military
operations mean that discretionary funding is insufficient to implement
such a Center of Excellence focused specifically on structures and
materials in construction. However, the Army does have an existing
Center of Excellence for Materials to conduct research on metals,
ceramics, polymers, and composites. This center is affiliated with the
Army Research Laboratory through cooperative agreements awarded
competitively. The University of Maine may respond to the Broad Agency
Announcement expected in June 2005 for the Center of Excellence's next
5-year contract.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
FUEL CELLS
7. Senator Levin. General Cartwright, do you see fuel cells playing
a key role in the development of future Army ground vehicles?
General Cartwright. We see fuel cells as an emerging technology
with potential benefits for specific applications where the fuel cell
represents a ``best fit'' when compared with other current and emerging
power technologies. Fuel cells have certain inherent advantages such as
low noise, high efficiency, high energy density and a potential for low
maintenance that are very attractive. However, the technology also has
inherent challenges such as high unit cost, low power density, and
special fuel requirements. When fuel cells are fielded as power
subsystems, consideration must be given to the overall size, weight,
and volume of the entire weapon system as well as the infrastructure
required. If pure hydrogen is required to feed the fuel cell, a number
of issues must be addressed including safety concerns associated with
on-board storage and transportation. Additionally, if high energy
density hydrocarbon fuels are used, they must first be desulfurized and
converted to hydrogen. This reforming process adversely impacts the
overall efficiency of the system.
Considering these limitations and given the current state of the
technology, the Army's first step is to concentrate on the development
of low- to mid-power systems where acoustic silence and high energy
density are essential. Fuel cell auxiliary power units (APUs), both
stationary and mobile, show near-term promise. APUs can be used to
provide supplemental energy during periods of vehicle silent watch.
Both cost and complexity are high for fuel cells. As we continue to
obtain data through our lab testing, we must also concurrently keep an
eye on the business case in order to make a meaningful capability
transition for the soldier.
8. Senator Levin. General Cartwright, what is your plan for
developing Army fuel cells for stationary and ground vehicle purposes?
General Cartwright. The Army is formulating a strategy for
developing the necessary power and energy components and systems to
achieve the levels of power and energy required to ensure that future
systems will be more efficient, survivable and lethal. Fuel cell
development is part of the plan. The first and most important step is
to identify appropriate applications.
Currently we are working jointly with the other Services, other
Government agencies, the Department of Energy (DOE), DARPA, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), industry, and academia to develop fuel
cell systems that can function in an integrated environment.
In addition, the Tank-Automotive Research, Development, and
Engineering Center's (TARDEC) National Automotive Center has conducted
numerous demonstration projects for fuel cells in cooperation with
commercial industry partners. These will continue to be evaluated for
both combat and non-combat applications. The Portable and Mobile Power
S&T program includes fuel cell work for both vehicle APUs and battery
rechargers for soldier power. This ongoing program is being
restructured and coordinated with a new program, to include
investigating small vehicle prime power. The Army also oversees a
number of other projects, including work in Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR), Small Business Technology Transfers (STTR),
Multidisciplinary Research Program of the University Research
Initiative (MURI), and the P&E Collaborative Technology Alliance (CTA)
for developing fuel cell components as well as for logistic fuel
reforming.
For installation scale applications (e.g., power for buildings),
the Corps of Engineers, in cooperation with Research, Development, and
Engineering Command (RDECOM), is installing Solid Oxide Fuel Cells
(SOFC) and Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) fuel cells at several Army
and DOD sites. This work will yield meaningful performance and
reliability data to support transitioning fuel cells that will provide
energy security for fixed sites and forward base camps of the future.
ENERGY SOURCES
9. Senator Levin. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, what efforts are
underway to develop the energy-efficient installation of the 21st
century?
General Cartwright. The Army is following DOD policy to invest in
cost-effective renewable energy sources, design energy efficient
structures, and regionally consolidate Defense requirements to
aggregate bargaining power to secure energy at lower cost. The Army is
doing all we can to reduce costs and ensure that the program goals are
achieved. We defer to Dr. Sega for the DOD position.
Dr. Sega. It is DOD policy to invest in cost-effective renewable
energy sources, energy-efficient construction designs, and regionally
consolidate defense requirements to aggregate bargaining power to get
better energy deals. Energy management on DOD installations is focused
on improving efficiency, eliminating waste, and enhancing the quality
of life while meeting mission requirements. Accomplishing these
objectives will reduce costs and ensure that the program goals are
achieved. The DOD energy program for facilities is decentralized with
DOD component headquarters providing guidance and funding, and regional
commands or military installations managing site-specific energy and
water conservation programs. The funding of energy projects is multi-
faceted, using a combination of Federal appropriations and private
funds. Installations are responsible for maintaining awareness,
developing and implementing energy projects, ensuring that new
construction uses sustainable design principles, and meeting energy
goals.
In addition, there is a DOD-wide science and technology initiative
in Energy and Power Technologies (EPT) that has potential payoffs in
this area. This EPT initiative is broad-based and focuses on enabling
technology supporting energy generation, storage and use. For instance,
the initiative invests in batteries, advanced fuel cells, ultra large
capacitors, high-efficiency electronic components, and so forth. We
anticipate that many of these technology components will also benefit
the energy efficient installation of the 21st century.
10. Senator Levin. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, how will such
efforts develop a hydrogen infrastructure, utilize alternative energy
sources, and utilize advanced vehicle propulsion?
General Cartwright. The Army is developing a 21st century base
concept that includes a provision for ``energy security.'' As such, the
Army is investigating facilities and resources that can be used to help
jump-start selected alternative energy projects in coordination with
other government agencies and industry. The 21st century base will most
likely include facilities to generate hydrogen, which would enable use
of efficient fuel cell powered administrative and non-tactical
vehicles. In some cases, the Army may be able to provide infrastructure
and facilities for testing concepts that would be problematic to
execute in the short term if attempted elsewhere. Additional
cooperative work with industry and other government agencies is planned
to evaluate base hydrogen infrastructures, reforming of fuels and/or
utilization of natural gas. Other alternative energy projects,
including integrating wind, solar, fuel cell or other capabilities into
mini-grids, are being considered to help to reduce dependence on more
traditional energy supplies.
Dr. Sega. The DOD is committed to creating opportunities to install
renewable energy technologies and purchase electricity generated from
renewable sources to enhance energy flexibility when it is life-cycle
and cost-effective. In 2002, funding was set aside by Congress to
assess the renewable energy potential of U.S. military installations.
DOD created a Renewable Energy Assessment Team, led by the Air Force,
to explore solar, wind, and geothermal energy resources at military
installations. In fiscal year 2004, additional funding was set aside to
further this effort, which is scheduled to be complete in November
2004. Also, the DOD, in partnership with the DOE, is using several
military bases as demonstration sites for fuel cell-powered
administrative vehicles development under DOE's FreedomCAR program. In
addition, DOD has stationary fuel cell systems installed and
operational at over 30 military bases across the country. Military
bases provide an ideal environment for the controlled demonstration of
fuel cell vehicle and stationary power applications, where the DOD has
benefited by obtaining extensive practical experience in operating this
advanced energy source.
In addition, there is a DOD-wide S&T initiative in EPT that has
potential payoffs in this area. This EPT initiative is broad-based and
focuses on enabling technology supporting energy generation, storage
and use. For instance, the initiative invests in batteries, advanced
fuel cells, ultra large capacitors, high-efficiency electronic
components, and so forth. We anticipate that many of these technology
components will also benefit the energy efficient installation of the
21st century.
HYBRID VEHICLES
11. Senator Levin. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, what
investments are being made in fiscal year 2004 to develop hybrid
vehicles?
General Cartwright. The Army has several major S&T objective
programs specifically aimed at developing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV)
technology for Future Combat Systems (FCS) vehicles in Increment 1 and
for future spirals. In these programs we are developing components
(including advanced power electronics, electric motors, batteries,
switches, and inverters) and HEV architecture that will provide greater
power and energy at reduced weight and volume. This will enable
vehicles to perform more efficiently and achieve greater lethality,
survivability, and agility. Our fiscal year 2004 investments in these
enabling technologies total $59.8 million in applied research, ATD and
manufacturing technology (MANTECH) and $2.1 million in congressionally
directed efforts.
In addition to efforts supporting FCS, Army S&T is partnering with
the automotive industry to address HEV and hybrid hydraulic
technologies for current and future tactical vehicles. The Future
Tactical Truck System (FTTS) ACTD focuses on integrating HEV technology
into current and future light, and medium/heavy tactical vehicles and
evaluating/quantifying the military utility of HEV technology. The FTTS
ACTD is a $50 million effort over 4 years. Contract awards are
anticipated in the July-August 2004 timeframe for vehicles that will be
used to conduct the performance evaluations and military utility
evaluations.
Finally on the acquisitions side we have been looking at HEV
technologies for high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs).
Due to need to support ongoing warfighting operations this effort has
been put on hold.
Dr. Sega. For tactical vehicles, the DOD continues to focus our HEV
efforts through two main programs--the HMMWV acquisition program and
the FTTS ACTD program. The HMMWV electric propulsion effort, identified
in the August 2003 report to Congress titled ``The Feasibility of
Fielding Hybrid Electric Vehicles in the Defense Fleets,'' has been
deferred as a result of HMMWV upgrade efforts to support ongoing
warfighting operations. The ongoing ACTD effort will feed the follow-on
HMMWV electric propulsion effort. The FTTS ACTD is the primary funded
Tech Base effort within DOD in pursuing the demonstration of hybrid
vehicles. The goals and designs for tactical vehicles are components of
this program. Field testing of vehicles, to demonstrate hybrid electric
propulsion performance, is planned to begin in 2005. Lower level
efforts include the Joint Marine Corps/ONR/DARPA Reconnaissance,
Surveillance, and Targeting Vehicle (RSTV) program and the Army
National Automotive Center Dual-Use Tactical Truck Hybrid projects.
For combat vehicles, the Army is aggressively pursuing hybrid
electric drive as a prime candidate for the FCS Increment 1 propulsion
system. The FCS Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) has let several
subcontracts for the development, test, and evaluation of hybrid
systems to assess the cost-benefit of these systems in achieving
desired capabilities.
12. Senator Levin. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, what agreements
are in place or planned for the testing, demonstration, transition, and
acquisition of these systems?
General Cartwright. The leading power pack concept being considered
by the FCS LSI is a HEV design. Component and subsystem technology
deliveries for the FCS HEV architecture are detailed in Technology
Transition Agreements among the program manager (PM) unit of action
(UOA), and the vehicle subcontractors who are part of the LSI industry
team, and the RDECOM.
U.S. Army Tank Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) will be
procuring a limited number of HEVs for the FTTS to be used in the
military utility assessment in the near future. Award(s) is expected in
the July 2004 timeframe.
Under the FTTS program, the ACTD Implementation Directive calls for
hardware deliveries beginning in January 2006, with a military utility
assessment scheduled for the March through September 2006 timeframe.
The effort to upgrade the HMMWV fleet that was described in the
report to Congress last year has been put on hold in order to do other
medications to accomplish more urgent upgrades in support of the war.
Dr. Sega. The only current agreements regarding the demonstration
and transition of HEV technologies exists within the Army's FTTS ACTD
program. General Cartwright addresses this program in his response.
With respect to planned agreements to acquire these systems, the
DOD's investment in hybrid electric (HE) technology programs exist at
both the component and system levels in an effort to advance HE
technologies and provide a more successful transition into acquisition
programs. Current and future efforts in developing advanced power
electronics, electric motors, and energy storage devices will enable HE
technology to overcome transition hurdles. Improvements in on-board
energy and power densities enable a more viable propulsion alternative
for integration into military platforms, thereby achieving desired
operational capabilities. This work also benefits the commercialization
of HEVs by increasing the knowledge base, industrial base, and
ultimately, making the technology more affordable for the users.
In addition, the future demand for increased electrical power to
satisfy the emerging energy needs of advanced weapons and survivability
systems makes the successful demonstration, transition and acquisition
of HE technologies even more critical for future systems. The DOD's EPT
initiative promotes the tri-service advancement of HE technology. These
systems, along with an architecture that can accommodate the insertion
of advanced technologies such as fuel cells and high temperature
superconducting devices, will provide the infrastructure for the future
military fielding of HE platforms.
ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
13. Senator Levin. Dr. Killion, active protection is a key part of
the FCS. What efforts are underway to address close in active
protection from kinetic threats as well as RPGs?
Dr. Killion. Army S&T is working on several synergistic approaches
to address the various types of threats to our medium and light
vehicles and we are attempting to determine what the right combination
of lightweight armor and type(s) of Active Protection Systems (APS) are
best for the different platform classes. The close-in threats you
mention are particularly difficult to counter because of the close
proximity of their employment (in the case of the chemical energy (CE)
munitions) and the short response times required to defeat them
effectively (i.e., fractions of seconds for both CE and kinetic energy
(KE) munitions).
The Integrated Survivability ATD (IS ATD) program is addressing
both CE and KE threats launched from distances beyond line of sight.
With respect to CE threats, we have successfully demonstrated defeat of
RPGs, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and tank fired high explosive
anti-tank (HEAT) rounds using either an electronic warfare system or
countermeasure (CM) launched to intercept the threat. We have done this
with the protected vehicle both static and moving. This technology is
being transitioned to PM FCS for application in Increment 1. Now we are
beginning to focus on defeating tank fired KE threats. Proof-of-
principle testing has demonstrated that a number of different warhead
approaches may be available to either break or deflect the threat KE
round at an acceptable distance from the vehicle. The IS ATD is
expected to demonstrate KE defeat from a static system in 2005 and
demonstrate an on-the-move system in 2006. Concurrently the IS ATD is
designing and demonstrating armors since, after a successful intercept,
a significant amount of residual debris may still impact the vehicle.
It is important to note that use of APS will not eliminate the need for
armor; but it will help reduce the amount of armor required.
The Army currently has two different efforts to address CE threats
launched at distances of less than 50 meters. The Full Spectrum Active
Protection Close in Layered Shield (FCLAS) program is in the early
stages of development. The system comprises a mortar-launched munition
and a warhead that integrates a tracking and a fusing (detonator)
radar, digital signal processor, and explosive CM into a small, self-
contained interceptor. The interceptor can be launched from vehicle-
mounted tubes similar to smoke launchers. Multiple systems would be
placed on the protected vehicle to achieve full 360-degree coverage.
The preliminary FCLAS system design is complete and the contractor is
currently awaiting component delivery to build a full up system. The
next round of FCLAS range testing is scheduled for November 2004.
The Close-in Active Protection System (CIAPS) program uses a suite
of vehicle-mounted staring sensors to detect incoming RPGs and ATGMs
and launches a CM to defeat the incoming threat. The system has
multiple CM launchers to provide full azimuth coverage. The program has
developed a prototype system mounted on a light armored vehicle. Live-
fire range testing of this prototype system is being conducted at this
time.
14. Senator Levin. Dr. Killion, how much is being invested in this
area in fiscal year 2004 and requested in fiscal year 2005?
Dr. Killion. The Army is spending $13.3 million in fiscal year 2004
and $46.1 million is budgeted in fiscal year 2005 to address vehicle
survivability against CE and KE threats through the three efforts.
15. Senator Levin. Dr. Killion, is a formal program being developed
to advance these efforts given their high operational priority?
Dr. Killion. We are making great strides in each of these APS
programs and are investigating the viability of applying the individual
close-in APS systems (from FCLAS and CIAPS) or some combination of
solutions (from the IS ATD) on current platforms as well as in the FCS.
However, before we commit to any formal strategy for developing and
deploying APS, we must develop a confidence in their performance and
explore the tactics, techniques, and procedures that would ensure that
the risks to personnel and materiel are manageable. We are actively
working these issues, but at this time there is no planned System
Development and Demonstration (SDD) for either FCLAS or CIAPS.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
SEMICONDUCTOR CAPABILITIES
16. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, DOD has recognized that cutting-
edge and domestically produced advanced semiconductors and components
are essential to our network centric warfare and defense
transformation, and therefore to our national security. As your
Department is aware, world semiconductor processing leadership is now
being systematically transferred to China, with design and research and
development (R&D) leadership widely expected to follow. DOD has put in
place a ``trusted foundry'' approach to assure a secure supply of
domestic integrated circuits that can meet DOD's current needs. While
the trusted foundry approach mitigates the near term urgency of
diminishing supplies of domestic circuits, it remains a short-term
solution. As recognized in the October 10, 2003, directive of Deputy
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, DOD needs to make major progress on
initiatives to retain U.S. semiconductor R&D leadership and a healthy
U.S. industry sector. As the Deputy Secretary's directive suggests,
funding key research initiatives and maintaining a healthy U.S.
commercial integrated circuit industry is critical to sustaining the
technological leadership the U.S. must have for intelligence and
security reasons.
In light of the Deputy Secretary's directive, what specific R&D
initiatives, funds and programs will you commit to, in order to retain
domestic semiconductor capabilities and ensuring a healthy U.S.
industry base?
Dr. Sega. The DOD continues to explore innovative approaches to
ensure access to cutting-edge microelectronics. The Trusted Foundry
Pilot program will satisfy immediate and near term requirements. Long
term solutions are being explored, such as the recently initiated
Defense Science Board (DSB) study to address the multitude of complex
issues governing the health, stability, and technological future of the
U.S. semiconductor industry. The Department has also initiated a SBIR
theme to leverage cutting edge transformational technologies to address
inspection and measurement of ``trust'' in microelectronic components
of known or uncertain pedigree.
The DOD is pro-actively advancing the technology at two U.S.-based
foundries utilizing research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
funds to meet critical needs for radiation hardened electronics. The
DOD S&T programs, such as DARPA's Radiation Hardened by Design effort,
will continue to address this important need. The Department will keep
Congress informed of the progress.
The DOD continues to increase its investments in militarily
relevant advanced electronics S&T such as wide band gap devices, focal
plane array sensors, maskless lithography and spintronics. These S&T
investments are focused on enhancing future defense capabilities and
may also provide benefits to the commercial sector.
The DOD maintains a dialogue with leaders from industry and
academia to foster support for educational programs for training the
next generation engineers. Since 1999, the DOD has been supporting
microelectronics research as part of its Government Industry Co-
sponsorship of University Research (GICUR) program. The program has
supported ground-breaking research with a long-term horizon, as well as
education and training in selected areas of strategic importance. The
current program is managed as part of the DARPA Focus Research Center
Program involving four major university-based microelectronics research
centers (with the participation of more than 30 major research
universities). These centers are at the forefront of research at the
subnanometer scale focusing on providing solutions for the future
generations of electronics.
The electronics S&T investment strategy for the DOD will
incorporate the findings of the DSB study with the results of ongoing
S&T activities within our SBIR programs, DARPA, and the Service
laboratories, as well as our efforts with the U.S. microelectronics
industry, to achieve the objectives of the Deputy Secretary of Defense
for secure defense electronics.
LAB WORKFORCE
17. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, when the National Defense
Authorization Act became law on November 24, 2003, DOD research
personnel were excluded from the National Security Personnel System
(NSPS) established for the DOD, to continue to provide the flexibility
granted by section 342 of the National Defense Authorization Act of
Fiscal Year 1995 and section 1101 of the Strom Thurmond National
Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1999. The research labs were
given flexibility to establish innovative human resources systems
necessary for scientific and technical excellence. The congressional
intent for this was confirmed by the passage of section 1101 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, chapter 99,
section 9902(c), where the labs are to be excluded from NSPS until
after October 1, 2008. Moreover, the law states that after that date
the labs may be included in NSPS only if the Secretary determines that
the flexibility provided by NSPS are greater than those already
provided to the labs.
In a January 6 letter, Senators Voinovich, Collins, DeWine, and
Sessions, along with myself, expressed our concern regarding DOD's
intent to standardize the personnel flexibility currently enjoyed by
the labs under a Best Practices Initiative that mirrors the not yet
established NSPS, which would undercut broad initiatives and authority
the labs already have. The February response from Dr. David Chu insists
on moving the defense laboratories to the Best Practices Initiative,
despite congressional disapproval of this position as summarized in the
January 6 letter. This move clearly violates congressional intent.
Implementing Best Practices, an integral part of NSPS, on the lab
personnel is contrary to the section 9902(c). What are your intentions
regarding efforts to include the labs in NSPS?
Dr. Sega. The ``Best Practices'' personnel demonstration system
will not be imposed on any of the labs. However, if the labs want to
take advantage of some of these flexibilities, we will work with them
to implement the improvements. We will continue to utilize and improve
the flexibilities and features of the laboratory personnel
demonstration systems until 2008. At that time, a comparison will be
made with the flexibilities available under NSPS to consider potential
conversion options, if appropriate.
BASIC RESEARCH FUNDING (6.1)
18. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, Federal funding for basic research
(6.1) in S&T is vital for our Nation's national security and economic
growth. It is through our investment in basic research that we ensure
our ability to remain competitive and maintain a strong defense in an
increasingly globalized economy. As southeast Asian nations
aggressively pursue global leadership with targeted R&D subsidies and
industrial policies, it is crucial that our defense capabilities remain
at the leading edge of technology. This can only be sustained by
continued investment in basic research. How does your 5.3 percent cut
in 6.1 relative to fiscal year 2004 appropriated levels support our
ability to remain ahead of other nations in defense technology?
Dr. Sega. Our technological capabilities relies on a strong 6.1
program that is well integrated into an equally robust RDT&E program.
The 6.1 investments provide new knowledge and understanding that
transition to new defense technologies within 6.2 and 6.3. Ultimately,
other RDT&E programs incorporate those technologies into products or
processes for military systems. While there are abundant scientific and
technical opportunities to be exploited with additional 6.1 resources,
there also must be a good balance in the investments among all of the
components of RDT&E if research results are to be translated in a
timely way into technologically superior, fielded systems. The amount
requested for 6.1 in fiscal year 2005 reflects our carefully considered
judgment on the best programmatic balance within available RDT&E
resources. The fiscal year 2005 President's budget request for DOD 6.1
is 0.2 percent higher in real terms, after adjusting for inflation,
than the DOD request for fiscal year 2004. I urge your support for the
full amount requested for 6.1 in fiscal year 2005.
GICUR PROGRAM
19. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, for the second straight year the
administration has chosen not to provide funding for the GICUR program,
and only requests $10 million in DARPA for the Semiconductor Technology
Focus Centers program. While a small program, this program leverages
funding from the industry primarily the semiconductor industry which
provides $3.00 for every one provided by the government to support
critical fundamental research being conducted at selected universities
around the Nation. My understanding is that if the research being
supported by this program is not done now, it could have impacts upon
our ability to continue to increase computing capacity in the future,
which will in turn have detrimental consequences for both our economy
and national defense. The administration's limited funding of this
program also is inconsistent with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz's
directive of October 10 to DOD to develop efforts to support
semiconductor research leadership. What effect will this have on
advancing and retaining the domestic semiconductor research, design,
and manufacturing base that DOD will depend upon in the future?
Dr. Sega. The GICUR program is a joint effort with the
Semiconductor Industry Association. Since 1999, DOD has provided funds
totaling approximately $35 million, while industry has provided
matching funds of approximately $74 million, or industry has provided
approximately $2.00 for every DOD dollar provided.
The research being performed in the five national semiconductor
technology research centers (involving about 35 major research
universities) is critical to the U.S. leadership in this important
industry. These university research centers perform research that
focuses on providing solutions to overcome the projected difficult
technological challenges that are expected to occur as deep sub-
nanometer dimensional scales are reached in the 2005-2010 time frame.
The Focus Centers are developing solutions and paths around and beyond
these technical challenges.
If the research being performed by our universities is curtailed or
eliminated, there will be a major impact on the ability to provide
critical research results needed to solve the problems associated with
future generations of nanoelectronics systems. Not only will the
research be impacted, but there will also be an impact on the education
of future scientists and engineers in critical technical areas of
interest to DOD. This will significantly impact the future U.S.
leadership position in electronics and computers.
DOD, through DARPA, plans to continue to support this very
important initiative.
20. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, what role does this unique
partnership of government, industry, and academia play in training
future scientists and engineers in this critical field?
Dr. Sega. During the entire period of the GICUR program, the
microelectronics research program has provided support for significant
numbers of university faculty, post-doctoral researchers, graduate
research assistants, and undergraduates. This program is one of the
sources of support for research in silicon-based microelectronics and
nanoelectronics. It has also been a resource for the training of
graduate students.
In fiscal year 2003, the DDR&E Basic Sciences Office initiated an
undergraduate research assistantship program. DOD provided $1 million
per year in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 to support this
undergraduate education program. The intent was to provide support for
a minimum of 5 years. Industry provided approximately $600,000 each
year to augment the DOD funds. This program is focused on attracting
undergraduate students to these technical areas and to get them
interested in pursuing graduate programs in microelectronics. The
combined approach of attracting and supporting undergraduates and
graduate students should impact the education of scientists and
engineers in this critical S&T area.
21. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, how has the GICUR program and
basic semiconductor research in DOD contributed to the developing of
new defense capabilities?
Dr. Sega. Semiconductor integrated circuits are at the core of
nearly every defense and weapon system today, and future platforms are
likely to have even greater dependence on advanced semiconductors. In
this program, we are conducting research and developing technologies
that will impact future generations of integrated circuits. Researchers
in the Focus Center program are developing solutions to the future
technological challenges facing the semiconductor field, to enable
faster and lower power transistors, greater computational and signal
processing functional power, higher performing mixed signal circuits,
and much more. The interesting thing in this program is that we are
partnering with the semiconductor industry and the equipment industry
in sponsoring and managing the program. Highlighted below are a few
examples of program successes:
Developed design concepts allowing robust operation of
deep submicron transistor circuits in noisy and radiation
sensitive environments of interest to the Department.
Invented and patented an interconnect method that
allows revolutionary, wafer-level packaging and test of multi-
thousand Input/Output (I/O) integrated circuits for the next
generation Digital Signal Processing (DSP), microprocessor, and
Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) chips.
Developed platform-based design concepts that enable
rapid design of reprogrammable ``system on a chip'' products
which are being adopted as standard operating practice within
the design community.
Identified critical metrics for the performance of 10
nm transistors for future generations of ASICs which includes
non-classical silicon devices, carbon nanotubes, and molecular
and quantum dot structures.
At the same time, we have an excellent path for transition and
exploitation of the good ideas and concepts that are developed in the
course of the program. Future defense capabilities will be impacted as
Focus Center technologies are developed and transitioned to production,
where they will be used to make fundamentally higher performing
integrated circuits that will give our systems their tactical and
strategic advantages over those of our adversaries.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
22. Senator Reed. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, given that
terrorists are trying to develop or acquire chemical and biological
weapons, chemical and biological defense have become more important. I
note that the fiscal year 2005 R&D funding request for chemical and
biological defense, which is intended to develop badly needed improved
technology, is down $146 million from fiscal year 2004, and down $78
million from 2003. How can we provide the needed level of S&T
investment and technology development if we are reducing our funding
levels?
General Cartwright. RDT&E funding for the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program is under the oversight of OSD as directed by Public Law
103-160. Army S&T defers to OSD on this question.
Dr. Sega. The primary difference between funding amounts for fiscal
year 2003 through fiscal year 2005 as reflected in the fiscal year 2005
budget request is that fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 have
received congressional adjustments. The table below shows that the
RDT&E budgeted core program submit has been relatively stable since
fiscal year 2003. The fiscal year 2005 budget reflects an actual
increase of $30 million compared to the fiscal year 2003 core budget
submit and a $39 million decrease compared to the fiscal year 2004 core
submit program. These differences reflect RDT&E changes as programs
transfer from RDT&E to production.
23. Senator Reed. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, since chemical
and biological defense technologies are developed in a joint program
office, how do you work to transition these technologies into the hands
of combatants in the various Services?
General Cartwright. The Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical
and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD) is responsible for the acquisition of
technologies to meet the system specifications, delivery schedules, and
quantities needed by the warfighter as portrayed through the Joint
Requirements Office (JRO-CBD). Army S&T defers to the JPEO-CBD on this
question.
Dr. Sega. The JPEO-CBD is the primary organization responsible for
the acquisition of CB technologies to meet the needs (e.g. system
specifications, delivery schedules, and quantities) of the warfighter
as specified in capabilities documents developed by the JRO for
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense (JRO-CBRN).
The JPEO-CBD contains seven joint program offices; Collective
Protection, Decontamination, Individual Protection, Guardian,
Contamination Avoidance, Medical Systems, and Information Systems,
collectively managing 67 product lines. Each product manager is
responsible for coordinating work with the Services to: (1) procure
products within the defined JRO requirements, (2) test products to
specification in both developmental and operational testing
environments as defined by the Services, (3) test products for
interoperability with existing battlefield systems, (4) develop the
necessary training and doctrine to support fielding, use, and
maintenance of the equipment, (5) provide guidance to the Services on
operation and support costs and (6) field equipment to the warfighter
within the required schedule.
24. Senator Reed. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, what types of
chemical and biological protective gear and sensors have you sent over
to Iraq and Afghanistan and which of them are new? What have you
learned from this experience?
General Cartwright. The JPEO-CBD has responsibility for this area.
Army S&T defers to the JPEO-CBD on this question.
Dr. Sega. The attached list provides the chemical and biological
protective gear and sensors that were sent to Iraq in support of OIF.
OIF data is the most readily available information and provides the
most current lessons learned for the services. The JPEO-CBD sponsored a
detailed OIF after-action survey that was conducted by the U.S. Army
Natick Soldier Center. This systematic Joint Service survey sampled
1,569 service members who had personal experience with 29 different CBD
materiel systems during OIF. Detailed results are documented in a March
17, 2004 report. The report identifies the number of survey
respondents, common themes, good and bad points, and user suggestions
for each system. It is organized around the six joint project managers
(JPMs) in the JPEO-CBD who have life-cycle responsibility in the areas
of individual and collective protection, contamination avoidance,
decontamination, medical countermeasures, and CBD specific information
systems. Based on technical analysis of the survey, action is being
taken, where appropriate, to improve tactics, techniques, operational
procedures, training and/or equipment issues.
Chemical and Biological Protective Equipment and Sensors Supplied for
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Chemical and Biological Protective Equipment
M40A1 Mask (Army, Marines, limited use Air Force and
Navy)--Protective mask for individual warfighter. Protects
against all known chemical and biological agents and
radiological particulates.
MCU-2A/P Protective Mask (without blue tint eye lens)
(Air Force/Navy)--Head eye respiratory protection for ground
forces.
Protective Mask Carrier (Army, Marines, Air Force, and
Navy).
M7 Voice Amplifier for M40 Mask (Army, Navy, Marines).
M42 Mask (Army)--Protective mask for combat vehicle
crewman. Protects against all known chemical and biological
agents and radiological particulates.
M45 Mask (Army/Special Operations Command (SOCOM))--
Protective mask for aircrew and special operations personnel.
Aircrew Eye and Respiratory Protection (AERP) (Air
Force)--Protective mask for aviators
M48 Mask (Army) Protective mask for Apache aircrew *
A/P22P-14(V) (Navy/Marine Corps)--Chemical-Biological
Aviator Mask. Protects against all chemical and biological
agents and radiological particulates.
M41 Protective Assessment Test System (PATS) (Army,
Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps)--Mask Fit Validation Testing
Equipment.
Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology
(JSLIST) (Army, Marines)--Two piece garment, with integrated
hood, that provides protection from chemical and biological
contaminants.
Saratoga Suit (Marines, Navy)--A legacy two-piece
chemical protective suit with integrated hood.
Chemical Protective Undergarment--Part of the Army
Aviation Ensemble.
Aircrew Battle Dress Uniform (ABDU) (Army)--Two piece
garment that provides aircrew with protection from chemical and
biological contaminants.
CWU-66P (Air Force) Single piece garment that provides
aircrew with protection from chemical and biological
contaminants.
Black Vinyl Overboot (BVO) and Green Vinyl Overboot
(GVO) (Army/Marines/Navy/ Air Force).
Chemical Protective Footwear Cover (CPFC) (Marines,
Navy).
25 mil butyl gloves and 7 mil butyl gloves (Army,
Marines, Navy and Air Force).
Chemically Protected Deployable Medical System (CP
DEPMEDS)--Provides Army DEPMEDS Combat Support Hospitals with a
capability to sustain operations in a nuclear, biological, or
chemical (NBC) environment by integrating environmentally
controlled collective protection elements into the hospital. *
Chemical Biological Protective Shelter System
(CBPSS)--Provides a mobile, contamination free environment for
forward medical treatment units. *
Collectively Protected Expeditionary Medical System
(CP EMEDS)--Provides the Air Force air-transportable
expeditionary medical facility with a capability to sustain
operations in an NBC environment by integrating environmentally
controlled collective protection elements into the hospital. *
Collectively Protected Small Shelter System (CP SSS)--
Provides CB agent protection inside the AF Small Shelter System
shelter to create a ``shirt-sleeve'' environment. *
Collectively Protected Hospital Surgical Expansion
Package (CP HSEP)--Provides a surgical wing expansion to the
Air Force EMEDS air-transportable expeditionary medical
facility with the capability to sustain operations in an NBC
environment by integrating environmentally controlled
collective protection elements into the wing. *
Collectively Protected Hospital Medical Expansion
Package (CP HMEP)--Provides additional beds with integrated
environmental collective protection elements to the Air Force
EMEDS air-transportable expeditionary medical facility,
allowing it to sustain operations and treat additional patients
in a NBC environment. *
Interim Collective Protection System (ICPS) for the
Modular General Purpose Tent System (MGPTS)--Provides a
positive pressure, filtered air, toxic free shelter for
protection against chemical or biological weapons attacks and
radioactive particles. *
M20/M20A1 Simplified Collective Protection Equipment--
Provides a clean-air shelter for use against chemical or
biological weapons attacks and radioactive particles.
M291 Skin Decontamination Kit
M17 Decontamination System
M295 Equipment Decontamination Kit
Chemical and Biological Sensors
M8 Chemical Agent Detector Paper
M9 Chemical Agent Detector Paper
Automatic Chemical Agent Detector and Alarm (ACADA)
M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit
M21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL)
Chemical Agent Monitor
Improved Chemical Agent Monitor
M8A1 Chemical Agent Alarm System
M272 Water Testing Kit
M93A1 Fox Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Reconnaissance System
Biological Integrated Detection System
Joint Portal Shield Biological Detector
Dry Filter Unit (DFU) Biological Detector *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Denotes systems--those with initial operational capabilities in
fiscal year 2000 or later.
25. Senator Reed. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, both the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) have significant investments in S&T to meet chemical and
biological threats, ranging from sensor systems to vaccines. How do
your organizations connect with these non-DOD entities to coordinate
activities and promote rapid technology transition?
General Cartwright. The President defines executive branch
responsibilities and authorities for homeland security in Homeland
Security Presidential Directives (HSPD). The President's Homeland
Security Council (HSC) was established in HSPD-1, The Organization and
Operation of the HSC. The HSC promotes coordination and cooperation
across the executive branch. This includes rapid technology transition
of weapons of mass destruction countermeasures. The HSC, through HSPD-
4, The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),
and with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy,
established and operates interagency R&D working groups on
countermeasures to weapons of mass destruction. Senior representatives
from the DOD--the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs--
Health and Human Services and Homeland Security, for example, meet
regularly in a working group focused on development and availability of
medical countermeasures to biological threats.
Scientist-to-scientist interchanges are promoted across the
executive departments' laboratory systems, such as in sensor systems
technologies between the Army's Edgewood Chemical and Biological
Command and the National Laboratory scientists working on Bio Watch for
urban monitoring. There are substantial efforts underway to leverage
and share critical infrastructure and scientific resources. For
example, the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services,
Agriculture, and Homeland Security participate on a Board of Directors
for the National Interagency Biodefense Campus that is located at Fort
Detrick, Maryland. Fort Detrick was the DOD's biological weapons center
until our unilateral renunciation of biological weapons in 1969. Since
then, its unique facilities and system infrastructure for safely
conducting high security, biocontainment R&D has been used by the DOD
for discovery, development, and testing of medical countermeasures to
biological agent threats. Excess laboratory capacity was turned over to
the National Cancer Institute for discovery, development, and testing
of medical products for the war on cancer. The Department of
Agriculture maintained its Foreign Weed Science biocontainment
laboratories at Fort Detrick. The DHS has joined with these other
departments to exploit this infrastructure for biosecurity and
biological defense programs. This is a preferred location, pending
completion of environmental, cost, feasibility and related analyses,
for the establishment of the Homeland Security National Biosecurity
Analysis and Countermeasures Center that will house the BioThreat
Characterization Center and the National Bioforensic Analysis Center.
In addition, the Army currently supports the DHS's portfolio
managers in the development of their technology roadmaps, especially in
the areas of sensors, vaccines, and chemical/biological protection.
Army representatives are currently co-located with DHS representatives
to provide timely information and coordination in the development of
policies and priority definition.
Dr. Sega. The DOD and non-DOD entities, including the NIH and DHS,
continue to coordinate and promote science and technology activities
and rapid technology transition in the formal intergovernmental setting
of the President's National Science and Technology Council (NSTC).
NSTC's Committee on Homeland Security and National Security, (co-
chaired by DOD and DHS representatives, Michael Wynne and Charles
McQueary, respectively), is our primary venue for interaction. The
committee structure is further complemented with various subcommittees:
National Security Research and Development, Radiological/Nuclear
Countermeasures, International, Chemical/Biological/Radiological
Countermeasures for Health, Standards, and Interagency working groups
for WMD Medical Countermeasures and Biometrics. Further, the DOD,
coupled with these and other non-DOD entities, continues to promote
technology transition in this and many other focus areas through
project-level sharing in activities such as those of the Technical
Support Working Group (TSWG). There is also an initiative to identify
medical countermeasure areas of common interdepartmental (DHS,
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and DOD) interest where
we can collaborate, by establishing a Memorandum of Understanding that
facilitates cooperation and collaboration.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION
26. Senator Reed. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, what else could
you do to improve coordination and technology transition? How do you
work to ensure that, where appropriate, the technologies your
organizations are developing are available for use by first responders
and other non-DOD personnel?
General Cartwright. RDECOM currently has initiatives that represent
an effort to identify, select, and promote promising new, advanced, and
leading edge technologies, as candidates for early technology transfer
and insertion into military programs. Currently a number of our
laboratories have specific support agreements in specialty areas such
as chemical and biological protection with organizations such as the
Department of Justice and the NIH. The Army does not have any
agreements that leverage some of our most critical technologies such as
communications, sensors, and command and control from a system
perspective. These critical technologies and systems are currently in
use by soldiers in urban and civil applications in Afghanistan and
Iraq. This is allowing the Army to create new standards that can be
utilized by first responders and other non-DOD personnel.
To better focus and direct the very broad technology base
represented by the RDECOM laboratories, the RDECOM commander has
recently stood up a DHS working group chaired by his Deputy Commanding
General for Operations. This working group is the single point of
access for all activities wishing to obtain RDECOM technologies for the
purposes of DHS/DOD technology transfer and will maintain a database of
products and leverageable efforts which can be made available to
appropriate first responder representatives.
The Army has specific support programs where major customers such
as the New York City Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PA NY/NJ) have requested
assistance for them with large system integration efforts, but these
are handled in an ad hoc fashion and there is no well defined method
for states to gain easy access to Army expertise.
A new mechanism we are implementing to get technologies developed
by the Army labs to the developers faster is Technology Transition
Agreements (TTA). The TTA would be appropriate between an Army S&T
organization and an outside agency's acquisition office/program. A TTA
is intended to formalize and document the needs and timelines for the
critical technologies being developed by the S&T community. The TTA
documents exactly what is to be delivered and when it will be
delivered. The TTA would give the acquisition office/program a format
to succinctly define and formalize the transfer of technologies once
the need was established. Transitions to first responders and other
non-DOD organization could be handled in a similar manner.
Dr. Sega. The DOD has an active technology transfer program to
ensure technologies developed are available, where appropriate, for use
in the private sector. In general, we use a variety of tools including
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (over 2,000 in fiscal
year 2003) and Patent License Agreements (over 350 in fiscal year 2003)
to work with the private sector in jointly developing technologies for
use or in licensing the private sector entities to use DOD-developed
technologies. Our annual report to Congress, which was signed on June
8, 2004, and forwarded to Congress, gives specific examples of
technologies and products which have been made available through our
technology transfer program. We have ongoing efforts at many of our
local activities to transfer technologies for first responder use. One
example is the Homeland Security Technology Office at Kirtland Air
Force Base in New Mexico. The mission of this office is to share Air
Force technologies and knowledge with the local first responder
communities. We have also reviewed how best to accomplish this on a
Department-wide basis and have established a partnership intermediary
at the University of Pittsburgh. This partnership arrangement has
allowed us to establish a DOD Technology Transfer Center of Excellence
for First Responders at the University. This center will be working
with established activities such as the Office of Law Enforcement
Technology Commercialization, the Emergency Response Technology Program
at the National Technology Transfer Center, the DHS, and regional first
responders groups to ensure the user group needs are being satisfied
with the technologies we are transferring.
27. Senator Reed. Dr. Sega, how much fiscal year 2003 and fiscal
year 2004 money has been proposed or approved for reprogramming thus
far to support the transition of technologies to Iraq and Afghanistan?
Dr. Sega. Last October, the DOD approved a decision to develop and
field Rapid Reaction/New Solution (RR/NS) technologies to support force
protection, primarily to counter IEDs in the area of operation. The
cost of this effort is $70 million. We received $35.1 million in fiscal
year 2003 funds ($9.9 million Below Threshold Reprogramming (BTR)) and
$25.2 from a Prior Approval Reprogramming (fiscal year 2004-2006 PA)
which has been approved by Congress. Of the fiscal year 2004 funds, $9
million will be absorbed within the Quick Reaction Special Projects
program. An additional $1.8 million was provided from a BTR. Part of
the remaining fiscal year 2004 $24.119 million (fiscal year 2004-2014
PA) reprogramming received congressional approval on April 24. Only
$15.819 was approved by Congress due to the $8.1 million decrement for
the ADS by Senator Stevens. Of the $70 million required, $61.9 million
was provided for this work.
28. Senator Reed. Dr. Sega, what has been the source of that
funding, and what are the consequences on the programs that are the
sources of that funding?
Dr. Sega. The funding requirement for the RR/NS is $70 million. The
funds came from fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 funds as follows:
Fiscal Year 2003 funds
-- $25.2 million came from a Prior Approval
Reprogramming Fiscal Year 2004-2006 PA approved by
Congress on March 1. Of that amount, $19.5 million came
from reducing the number of sites (from 95 to 90) where
the Global Information Grid (GIG) Bandwidth Expansion
effort would be implemented. The reduction of sites was
less a priority than the requirements to increase
protection for U.S. and coalition forces.
-- $9.9 million was realigned via a BTR from numerous
programs to minimize the impact.
Fiscal Year 2004 funds
-- $9 million was absorbed within the Quick Reaction
Special Projects program.
-- $1.8 million was provided from a Below Threshold
Reprogramming from numerous sources where the impact,
similar to fiscal year 2004-2006 PA, was minimal.
-- $24.119 million was to come from fiscal year 2004-
2014 PA reprogramming which received congressional
approval on April 24. However, only $15.819 million was
approved due to the $8.1 million decrement for the ADS
by Senator Stevens. Funding in this reprogramming
action became available due to inflation rates being
lower than previously budgeted.
OPERATIONAL TESTING
29. Senator Reed. Dr. Uhler, General Waldhauser, and General
Cartwright, the Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
(DOT&E) is responsible for approval and oversight of operational
testing prior to deploying new systems, to ensure these systems work in
battle. In his last annual report to Congress, he warned that if we
circumvent a rigorous acquisition process, ``. . . our warfighters may
get weapons without knowing their operational capabilities and
limitations.'' As you develop technologies to rapidly field to the
warfighter, how do you ensure proper operational testing is done?
Dr. Uhler. The Operational Test and Evaluation Division within
SOCOM has the staff responsibility to independently report to the
Commander, SOCOM, findings and assessments regarding operational
testing of SOCOM equipment and systems. Further, these independent
assessments are provided to the appropriate milestone decision
authority for consideration in making acquisition decisions through the
issuance of either System Production Certifications or Fielding and
Deployment Releases.
Operational Test and Evaluation within SOCOM is governed by SOCOM
Directive 71-5, Operational Test and Evaluation. SOCOM Directive 71-5
addresses Combat Mission Need Statement/Urgent Deployment Action (CMNS/
UDA) test requirements.
Each acquisition program has a standing Test Integrated Working
Group (TIWG), made up of members from the program office, supporting
operational test activity, the SOCOM operational test office, the
requirements office, and depending on the system, user representatives.
Early user tests and operational assessments for SOCOM systems are
conducted by partner operational test activities from the Services and
national test assets.
The use of Test and Evaluation Master Plans (TEMPs) or System
Acquisition Master Plans (SAMPs) guide the conduct of a system's test
program. It is the SOCOM policy that equipment, including that being
fielded under CMNS/UDA authority, is not released to Special Operations
Forces (SOF) units without an operational assessment, verified by the
SOCOM Operational Test and Evaluation Division. This also applies to
systems and hardware developed through the ACTD Technology Insertion
and Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT) programs.
These measures ensure that proper operational testing is done and
each system's capabilities and limitations are identified.
General Waldhauser. To clarify part of the question, the DOT&E is
responsible for approval and oversight of Major Defense Acquisition
Programs, and those programs he chooses to specially designate for
oversight. We are unaware of any Marine Corps experimental programs
under DOT&E oversight.
As demonstrated recently by the Small Unit Remote Scouting System,
aka ``Dragon Eye'' UAV and the PTS-180 ``Viper'' laser range funding
system, experimental or non-traditional programs can be transitioned
quickly from experimental demonstration to systems of record, while
preserving the need to independently and objectively verify suitability
and effectiveness for the acquisition decisionmaker. The Marine Corps
Operational Test and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA) provides the
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) with an objective evaluation of
those requirements. Because the experimental programs cannot be
evaluated against traditional requirements documents, MCOTEA has
attempted to enumerate the performance and suitability characteristics
of the system to assist the decisionmaker in assessing the risk of
fielding the system to the operational forces. The ``Dragon Eye''
system has been a template for success in testing and evaluating
experimental systems with an immediate tactical need in the operational
forces. Another area MCOTEA has been able to contribute test oversight
is the observation and documentation of special armor plating for
deployed vehicles. In addition to reducing the procurement risk to the
MDA, MOCTEA can also provide an invaluable database of information to
the warfighter in terms of employment considerations based on system
performance. This also helps in the development of tactic, techniques
and procedures. If provided the necessary resources, MCOTEA is capable
of providing independent documentation of performance and reliability
for a broad range of experimental programs.
General Cartwright. The streamlined procedures discussed are not
intended to field systems but are, instead, addressing critical
operational needs with immediately available solutions. These efforts
are more aptly characterized as experimentation with soldiers actively
participating and providing user feedback. Prior to sending any
materiel into theater, the operational commander must agree that the
materiel answers a critical need and the Army Test and Evaluation
Command (ATEC) must determine the materiel to be safe. Once deployed,
ATEC may continue to evaluate the materiel by conducting an operational
assessment using a task force concept that places evaluators in-theater
with the operational units that received the materiel. This feedback is
extremely valuable to the developers, especially if it is gathered in
an operationally relevant environment, and can cut months, or even
years, off from the developmental schedule. Additionally, it serves to
focus and refine the requirements documentation processes and reduces
the likelihood of discovering significant performance issues during
formal operational testing when it eventually occurs. Successful
efforts become candidates for handoff to the Program Executive Officer
community for insertion in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and
eventual fielding.
30. Senator Reed. Dr. Uhler, General Waldhauser, and General
Cartwright, the concepts of ``spiral development'' and ``capabilities-
based acquisition'' are being implemented throughout the DOD. The idea
is to keep requirements flexible to get new technologies to the
warfighter quicker. With such flexible requirements, how do you know
what you are deploying is ``good enough''?
Dr. Uhler. SOCOM has inherently embraced the concepts of spiral
development since our beginnings in 1987. Our development community
works hand-in-hand with our warfighters to understand their needs and
translate them into achievable requirements. We begin by defining the
most technically feasible implementation of the solution that can be
achieved in the shortest timeframe with respect to the approved
requirement and then augment it with an evolutionary (spiral)
development plan to achieve the 100 percent solution. After initial
fielding, we continue to work with our user to incorporate their
feedback and continually enhance the product to achieve the maximum
capability for our user. These evolutionary cycles of development allow
risks to be taken for products used specifically by our SOF. This
benefits our warfighter and allows SOCOM to quickly react to real world
material deficiencies.
General Waldhauser. Currently, the evaluation of the ``good
enough'' measure of performance is established against the approved
requirements or capabilities. However, in some cases, the experimental
programs provide a capability where none previously existed. In those
cases, the capability is documented and quantified so that decision
maker can adequately evaluate the capability against the procurement
and support costs for the system. In other cases, the experimental
capability replaces, improves or enhances an existing warfighting
capability. In that situation, the MCOTEA can quantify the performance
and suitability increase (or decrease) that is offered by the new
system, if the choice is made to conduct a baseline comparison test.
The decisionmaker can then use this information to reduce the risk of
the decision. Each of the Service Operational Test Agencies is in the
process of transforming their test process to respond to capabilities
based testing versus requirements based testing. Adding experimental
programs to this new methodology is a natural fit in the evolution of
operational testing.
General Cartwright. Rather than limiting us to search for
``perfect'' solutions, flexible requirements are what enable us to seek
the ``good enough'' capabilities, especially for our current force.
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), as the warfighters'
representative, provides key insights and sets the threshold
requirements utilizing professional military experience and judgment
available through the proponent schools, concept and capability
developers, and professional experimentation forces. TRADOC, Army Test
and Evaluation Command (ATEC), and RDECOM have established a teamed
approach that provides a framework for Army leadership to determine
``good enough'' by analyzing experiment-ready technology to meet
warfighter needs, linked to operational capabilities. The linking of
experimentation and technology demonstrations insures that the
demonstrations are operationally relevant and provide a venue to
develop operational concepts for new technologies. RDECOM has
established technology Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) that look across
the command, services, industry, academia, and international
organizations to provide enabling technology enablers to the
warfighter. These IPTs have strong warfighter participation from TRADOC
headquarters and proponent personnel. Again, this teaming assures that
only ``good enough'' operationally relevant experiment ready solutions
are put forward for incorporation into the Doctrine Organization
Training Material Leavership Personnel Facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions
for consideration by decision authority for release to the warfighter.
31. Senator Reed. Dr. Uhler, General Waldhauser, and General
Cartwright, what criteria are used during operational testing to ensure
the system works well enough, and who approves the criteria?
Dr. Uhler. Test and evaluation within SOCOM is governed by SOCOM
Directive 71-5, Operational Test and Evaluation. SOCOM Directive 71-5
addresses CMNS/UDA test requirements. Criteria used during SOCOM
operational testing and assessments are derived from the requirements
documents. Measures of effectiveness and suitability--the test
criteria--are directly related to validated capabilities requirements.
For CMNS/UDAs, the criterion for minimum acceptable system performance
is the successful attainment of the key performance parameters/critical
operational issues of the requirement.
Independent assessment of system operational effectiveness,
operational suitability and safety of use is conducted by the SOCOM
Operational Test and Evaluation Division. Concurrence to field
equipment and systems to SOF is addressed by issuing either a System
Production Certification (SPC) or a Fielding and Deployment Release
(F&DR). These documents are signed by the Chief, Operational Test and
Evaluation, the Director of Logistics, and the system's responsible
SOCOM PEO.
General Waldhauser. For traditional acquisition systems, the
criteria under testing are derived directly from the approved
Operational Requirements Document or Capabilities Documents, the
Operations and Organizational Concepts, and from the Operational Mode
Summary/Mission Profile. Criteria are directly cited from those
approved requirements documents, and in some cases derived from those
documents in a group setting by all the stakeholders.
The new capabilities based system defines the requirement in the
Initial Capabilities Document, the Capabilities Development Document
and the Capabilities Procurement Document. MCOTEA has not yet tested a
system based on these requirement documents.
Approval of the criteria for testing is achieved in several
documents. The entire test strategy is published and approved in the
Test and Evaluation Master Plan. This document is signed by all the
stakeholders, and by the DOT&E for oversight programs. Additionally,
MCOTEA, using a proposed test scope letter, informs the MDA of
anticipated operational test content and requests concurrence on this
scope as adequate to support pending acquisition decisions. The test
plan is completed in a teamed environment, and is approved by the
Director of MCOTEA for programs not on oversight, and by the DOT&E for
oversight programs.
In the absence of requirements documents, the MCOTEA establishes a
test planning group, and works with representatives from the combat
developer, the material developer, the functional advocate and
representatives directly from the operating forces to establish
meaningful criteria for evaluation in a capabilities based test. This
process is not nearly as exhaustive or defendable as the deliberate
requirements process, but facilitates a much more rapid test and
evaluation of a capability that has been determined to be of reasonable
risk and benefit by the Warfighting Lab.
General Cartwright. Testing criteria are derived from the
Operational Needs Statement (ONS) submitted by the deployed commanders.
Specific criteria are developed by an IPT assembled from the
operational commands; the PEO/PM that has, or eventually will have,
fielding responsibility; RDECOM; and TRADOC.
32. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, what is the status of the
proposal to establish a limited liability company at the Aberdeen Test
Center?
General Cartwright. In response to legislation allowing for pilot
programs to be established at select DOD Test and Evaluation Centers,
Aberdeen Test Center proposed a Limited Liability Company (LLC). The
LLC would consist of Aberdeen, academia, and private industry.
Public Law 107-314 Sec. 241(e)(3)(A), dated December 2, 2002,
provided that ``Not more than one public-private partnership may be
established as a limited liability company.'' Further legislation was
drafted to define the parameters of the LLC. There were several
concerns with the proposal forwarded to the Department of the Army and
the proposed legislation was subsequently rewritten. The rewritten
proposal, which went from DOD to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), was captioned 10 USC Sec. 2374c, Centers for Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation Excellence: public-private
partnerships. Based on recent discussions with the Army Business
Initiative Council (BIC), it appears that OMB has not concurred with
the proposal and sent the proposed legislation back to DOD.
TRAINING
33. Senator Reed. Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, and Mr. Engle, how
are you working to ensure that our next generations of military leaders
are well-trained and well-versed in S&T?
Dr. Killion. The Army believes it is vital that military leaders
understand not only what S&T can do for the warfighter today, but how
S&T investments help sustain U.S. land combat dominance today and for
the future. The Army has taken several steps to ensure Army leaders
have an understanding of S&T. First, the Defense Systems Management
College has incorporated information on Army S&T goals, plans, and
investments in their courses available to senior Army Acquisition Corps
leaders. Second, the Army created a uniformed scientists and engineers
program through which selected Army leaders with advance degrees are
provided hands-on professional development training at the Army's
laboratories and Research, Development and Engineering Centers (RDECs).
Third, the Army's RDECOM sends representatives to the Combined Arms
Center at Fort Leavenworth to participate at seminars to inform Army
leaders about the role S&T plays in enhancing Army capabilities.
Finally, the Army's TRADOC, which is responsible for developing and
implementing professional military education and training across the
Army, plays a key role in the Army S&T community through their futures
center and participation in S&T planning processes.
Admiral Cohen. My highest priority, as the Chief of Naval Research,
is to be the Navy's and Marine Corps' advocate for the S&T. It has been
a tremendous challenge. At every opportunity, I argue for a stable,
sustained investment to support long-term, high-risk transformational
breakthroughs.
In addition, I have several initiatives that also serve to educate
the Navy and Marine Corps about the benefits of S&T:
The Naval Fleet/Force Technology Office puts
scientists and engineers in the fleet and force, with the
customer, to use their expertise to solve current and future
operational challenges with S&T. These advisors not only work
with the current naval leaders but also interact heavily with
more junior personnel, tomorrow's leaders, to educate them
about the possibilities that S&T can provide.
Naval research leaders and program officers work daily
with Fleet/Force personnel to develop longer term capability
based options requiring a concerted S&T investment to achieve.
This involvement not only helps develop a better product but
also provides insight for the fleet/force to the processes
needed to mature cutting edge technology.
Tech Solutions aligns Department of the Navy S&T
resources to enable rapid technology-based solutions to
problems that have a detrimental effect on the ability of the
fleet/force to train, operate, and fight. Due to the rapid
delivery, fleet/force personnel are able to see tangible
results of S&T.
Finally, my experience is that our young military leaders know the
benefits of S&T and are our best advocates. The current war on terror
has resulted in several technologies being accelerated, at the request
of the warfighter, in order to field a new capability or address a
shortfall.
Mr. Engle. Under the Air Force's new Total Force Development
construct, we are making progress in developing senior leaders with
technical expertise. Our Scientist and Engineer Development Teams, in
conjunction with the Air Force Senior Leader Management Office, are
responsible for implementing Total Force Development. They are
identifying general officer and colonel leadership positions that
require science, engineering, and technology backgrounds plus the
supporting base of personnel needed to grow these future leaders. With
this requirement identified, we have put in place career development
guides which will help us develop future technically competent leaders.
A critical part of these development plans is advanced education. To
meet this need, under our Vector Blue Initiative, we are increasing
opportunities available to our officers to pursue advanced technical
degrees that will make them competitive for future technical leadership
positions.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
34. Senator Reed. Admiral Cohen, there is continuing concern about
the use of sonar by the Navy and its effects on marine mammals. Is the
Navy making investments to develop alternative undersea imaging and
sensing technologies so that military requirements can be met in a more
environmentally-friendly way? What areas of research require investment
so that we can develop these capabilities?
Admiral Cohen. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is making
investments to investigate the development of a full complement of
technologies to effectively implement anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in
all places throughout the year and under all operating conditions;
however, active acoustics is and will remain a necessary part of that
complement. Effective ASW requires a mix of imaging and sensing
technologies, including active acoustics. This is primarily because the
marine environment, which changes with location and time of year, very
strongly affects any given technology. In addition, the way submarines
operate affects the use of any given technology. Fortunately, the mix
of possible technologies complements each other to some degree. For
example, acoustic technologies work well in many places during the
winter while non-acoustic technologies work well in many of the same
places during the summer. Active acoustic technology often works well
against submarines operating deeply submerged while non-acoustic
technology often works well against submarines operating near the
surface.
ONR is investing in the development of more effective passive sonar
as well as the development of non-acoustic capabilities, including
magnetic and optical sensors, with the goal of reducing reliance on
active acoustics as a means of anti-submarine force protection. ONR is
also developing more effective active sonar technology that the Navy
hopes will reduce adverse effects on marine life through reduced source
levels, alterations in signal characteristics and focusing of emitted
sonar beams. ONR research into the interactions of marine life and
sonar sounds will help guide our search for reduced environmental
impact from active sonar, while preserving and enhancing the
effectiveness of this vital fleet protection asset. Taken together,
these programs should enable the U.S. Navy to keep up with the
challenges posed by advancing foreign submarine technology while
simultaneously reducing the potential risks to marine life from active
sonar.
LANDMINES
35. Senator Reed. Dr. Killion, the administration recently
announced a new policy of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines
which details how we plan on using those weapons in future conflicts.
In the past, the Army has invested in technologies that would produce
mine systems that would meet Army requirements as well as being
consistent with the rules of the Ottawa Treaty governing landmine use.
Congress has also urged the Army to develop these kinds of systems as
part of the FCS. What is the status of the development of these
intelligent, Ottawa-compliant landmine systems?
Dr. Killion. Funding in Program Element 0603606A Project 683, Anti-
Personnel Landmine Alternatives, has been used to evaluate and develop
distributed surveillance unattended sensors (autonomous, seismic,
acoustic, and day/night imaging sensor systems) and communication,
command, and control systems (ad-hoc, wireless, networked inter and
intra-field sensor communications, and information management tools) to
be used with man-in-the-loop over watch fires. These evaluations have
included soldier-in-the-loop live-virtual modeling and simulation
experiments to evaluate new concepts and doctrine. Output of the
simulation experiments have been used to determine specifications and
requirements for the distributed networked sensor systems.
The new U.S. landmine policy, announced on February 27, 2004,
commits DOD to end the use of persistent mines (both anti-personnel and
anti-vehicle) and endorses the continued use of self-destructing/self-
deactivating mines of both types. In compliance with Fiscal Year 2003
Appropriations Committee Report language directing ``that the Army
clearly define the requirements for a next generation intelligent
minefield and ensure compliance with the Ottawa Treaty,'' DOD will
consult with the Appropriations Committee concerning the impact of the
new policy. Coordination for this consultation is in progress.
36. Senator Reed. Dr. Killion, how much are you investing in these
technologies in this budget request?
Dr. Killion. Approximately $2,949,000 in fiscal year 2005.
37. Senator Reed. Dr. Killion, what significant technical
challenges remain to producing a system that meets Army requirements
and is compliant with the Ottawa Treaty?
Dr. Killion. Significant technical issues exist and will remain
since the Army requirements for an Anti-Personnel Landmine Alternative
system and the parameters of Ottawa are not congruent. PE 0603606A,
Project 683, Anti-Personnel Landmine Alternatives does focus on the
following significant challenges related to remote networked sensor
surveillance systems for man-in-the-loop over watch fires and command-
detonated munitions:
(1) Improving low cost, low power unattended imaging and non-
imaging sensors to enable more reliable identification of
combatant-noncombatant;
(2) Developing low power, long range, antijam communications
technologies; and
(3) Developing automated, networked sensor field dispensing
techniques and developing the hardened low cost sensors and
communications devices required for such dispensers.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORIES
38. Senator Clinton. Mr. Engle, the Information Directorate of the
Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) develops systems, concepts, and
technologies to enhance the Air Force's capability to successfully meet
the challenges of the information age. I was disappointed that your
testimony did not include a discussion of your vision for the Air Force
Research Laboratories in Rome, New York. Can you give a description of
the role that Rome Labs will play in the AFRL's future?
Mr. Engle. The Rome Research Site in Rome, New York, continues to
play a pivotal role in the Air Force's achievement of the warfighting
capabilities needed to support our core competencies and will continue
to do so. The Rome Research Site has long been a key contributor to the
Air Force S&T program and to the Nation as a whole. One of the most
transformational and quickly deployable technologies available today is
command, control, and communications technology, also known as
information technology. This technology is at the heart of our Moving
Target Indicator Exploitation program, which is developing web-enabled
automated tools to exploit data from current and future sensor systems
such as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).
Perhaps one of the most exciting technologies to come out of our lab at
Rome is the information data wall. This data wall has proven highly
effective and is currently being used in Afghanistan and Korea. In
addition, several government agencies use multi-layer communications
security developed at Rome and software-defined reprogrammable radios
for secure communications and adaptable for coalition operations have
also transitioned into operational use.
The Information Directorate at Rome is at the center of a growing
national resource focused on communications technology. We believe the
future for this enterprise is to lead the way for our national security
needs in information technology and use this expertise to continue to
grow this vital Center of Excellence in the Rome area.
LABORATORY PERSONNEL ISSUES
39. Senator Clinton. Dr. Sega, the DOD intends to convert employees
at the Defense laboratories excluded from the NSPS by congressional
action into the Best Practices Initiative through a regulatory action
and then convert them again into the NSPS personnel system at some
future date. What are the implications of such a double conversion on
the lives and careers of our scientists and engineers?
Dr. Sega. We value our scientists and engineers in accomplishing
the mission of the laboratories, their lives and careers are certainly
of paramount importance to the Department. It is because of the value
placed on our scientists and engineers that we are working to establish
the most flexible personnel framework possible. The DOD will not impose
the ``Best Practices'' personnel demonstration system on any of the
laboratories.
40. Senator Clinton. Dr. Sega, what are the costs of the conversion
of the laboratory demos to the Best Practices Initiative?
Dr. Sega. While ``Best Practices'' will not be imposed on the
laboratory demonstrations, some labs may voluntarily choose to
implement some of the flexibilities found in Best Practices. Salary
costs would not be affected if the labs were to adopt any of the
flexibilities found in Best Practices--employee base salary would be
preserved. Unlike the General Schedule system, the lab demonstrations
do not provide periodic within-grade increases to basic pay. Thus, if a
lab chooses to implement these features of Best Practices, there is no
need to ``buy in'' lab demonstration employees--that is, to pay them a
percentage of the next within-grade increase, based on the time each
employee has already served toward the next increase. Another point to
consider is that there are costs not operating under a single personnel
framework, which entail the maintenance of redundant payroll and
personnel data, policies, and administration.
41. Senator Clinton. Dr. Sega, has any independent analysis been
performed that has indicated that the Best Practices Initiative will
improve the ability of the affected organizations to perform their
missions?
Dr. Sega. Many private and public analyses have been accomplished
over the last four decades to examine the defense laboratory structure,
and as an integral part, assess the laboratory personnel framework. The
flexibilities available in Best Practices are based upon a review of
use and impact of the flexibilities available and independent analysis
performed by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). OPM's evaluation
let us know what was working in the demonstration projects and what
could be improved.
INFORMATION ASSURANCE
42. Senator Clinton. Mr. Engle, as indicated by other witnesses
during the hearing, information security is becoming a growing concern
for both forces deployed overseas as well as our military activities at
home. Please highlight the efforts that the Air Force S&T program is
making to address our information security requirements. How are the
products and innovations stemming from Air Force research being
transitioned for use by the DHS and the private sector?
Mr. Engle. The Rome Research Site in Rome, New York, is the center
of expertise for command, control, communications, and intelligence
(C\3\I) technology development, including information security
requirements. The Information Support Server Environment (ISSE) Guard
initiated by the Air Force in 1990 to meet the needs of the Air Force
and also of the U.S. Intelligence Community, has become an enabling
information security development effort and is a prime example of how
the Air Force S&T program is addressing information security
requirements. ISSE Guard provides for the multi-level security needed
in or between information networks. Since its inception, the ISSE Guard
solution has been a mix of best-of-breed commercial items combined with
government-sponsored/developed software needed to satisfy military and
intelligence requirements. ISSE Guard has been installed and is being
used in a variety of Service/Defense agencies, such as the U.S. Air
Force Technical Applications Center, U.S. Space Command, National Air
Intelligence Center, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (formerly
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency), U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Navy Warfare Development
Center, U.S. Army South, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
(ODCSINT), among others.
The Information Directorate at the Rome Research Site works with a
large customer/collaborator group, including the DARPA, the
Intelligence Community, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and other
Services. In addition, the nearby Griffiss Institute is a collaboration
of industry, academia, and government in the area of information
assurance. While our mission at Rome is in support of Air Force
warfighting capabilities, some of the technologies being developed may
also benefit other organizations and the private sector. The close
working arrangement that the Information Directorate enjoys with these
various organizations facilitates the transition of information
technologies into operational use by both government and the private
sector. In fact, the Joint Defensive Planner (JDP) developed by the
scientists and engineers at Rome is currently being used for homeland
defense. This program automates the defensive planning process and
functions with Service operators who are separated geographically. The
JDP program allows planners at widely distributed locations to use
common planning software and databases to exchange concepts, overlays,
and analyses of options. The JDP program can support multiple clients,
interface with other Service tactical planners, and enable access to
the JDP application through the Web.
SBIR PROGRAM
43. Senator Clinton. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, and Mr.
Engle, the budget materials submitted to Congress include a negative
assessment of the DOD SBIR program. What is your assessment of the
value of small business research and the SBIR program as part of the
overall DOD S&T strategy?
Dr. Sega. Small business research and the DOD SBIR program play an
important role in developing and maturing needed technologies in
support of the DOD S&T program. The negative assessment to which you
refer is the OMB assessment which focused on commercialization of SBIR
technology. This is only one of the goals of the SBIR program. The four
goals are to: stimulate technological innovation; increase private
sector commercialization of Federal R&D; increase small business
participation in federally funded (DOD) R&D; and foster participation
by minority and disadvantaged firms in technological innovation. We are
committed to increase our tracking of commercialization in the future
to improve our OMB assessment. However, we place as much importance on
the other goals of the program, and believe that SBIR is meeting all
the intended goals.
Dr. Killion. Small business research and the Army SBIR program play
a critical role in developing and maturing technologies needed to
support the Army's S&T strategy. My staff provides guidance to the Army
SBIR PM to ensure that solicited topics are current, relevant and
aligned with the strategy. The current SBIR budget of $228 million will
be invested in Phase I and Phase II proposals selected for award that
support future force and FCS objectives. Through SBIR and other similar
small business research programs, we have learned that the very best
ideas do not necessarily come from the laboratories of large
corporations or even from our government laboratories. Most often,
innovative technologies are invented by creative individuals and small,
entrepreneurial companies whose workers truly think ``outside the
box.'' With the strong participation from the Army S&T community, there
is a greater chance of SBIR successes that will achieve current Army
research goals, thereby leading to increased opportunity for
incorporation into the acquisition process.
Admiral Cohen. I believe that this is in response to the Government
Performance Results Act (GPRA) rating from OMB on the overall DOD SBIR.
Please recognize that all information was not available to OMB at the
time of the evaluation.
The Navy's SBIR program is working extremely well. A number of SBIR
technologies have been integrated into the Navy's ongoing programs. A
number of Navy SBIR small businesses have been acquired by large
businesses and several products that are being used in the IRAQ which
are a result of the Navy's SBIR program. Some examples:
Flight certification of Silver Fox is underway and
training of marines has been scheduled with the goal of
providing this UAV capability to I Marine Expeditionary Force
(MEF) in Iraq. As soon as higher resolution sensors can be
integrated into Silver Fox an upgraded version will also be
provided.
A Persistent Area Surveillance System that includes a
360 degree camera that was demonstrated on 12 Dec 2003, has
been identified for possible deployment to Iraq to provide
surveillance of high interest areas.
LogisTech, Inc.--Provides platform protection from
corrosion. Has received over $500 million in DOD PHASE III
funding to date. Now provides product to Iraq.
SAVI Inc.--Solved the problem of total asset
visibility for DOD. Developed a ``smart'' barcode label. On the
surface, it looks like a barcode you see at the grocery store.
Beneath the surface, however, a radio frequency identification
(RFID) chip and an antenna system carry product information,
which can be captured by an special reader. Used for DOD
container shipments overseas.
Science and Applied Technology (now AKT Missiles)--
Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) development,
design, demonstration and transition to SDD and production a
multi-sensor fuzed weapon system to defeat advanced surface to
air threats employing countermeasure techniques including
counter shutdown. Over $750 million in sales over 10 years. The
company has grown from less than 10 employees to over 200.
The Navy's SBIR/STTR Program is a mission oriented program that has
a dual use component. One of the metrics that we use internally to
judge the success of the program annually is a comparison of SBIR funds
in a given year to the Phase III (non-SBIR funds) provided to Navy SBIR
companies by Navy acquisition programs. For example, in fiscal year
2003, the Navy SBIR program had $200 million for award of contracts to
small businesses in Phases I & II of the SBIR program. The Navy
acquisition programs provided Navy SBIR participating companies in
excess of $275 million.
Likewise, in fiscal year 2002 the Navy SBIR program had $156
million and SBIR companies received in excess of $195 million in Phase
III awards from Navy acquisition programs. These figures don't include
funding received by the Navy SBIR participating companies from non-Navy
DOD and other government agencies, prime contractors and the private
sector. The accompanying chart highlights our success in this area.
Dr. Engle. The Air Force is a strong supporter of the DOD SBI
program. This program and the small business research it encourages
play a vital role in the Air Force S&T program. Although the OMB has
expressed concerns that, in some cases, the SBIR program funds
companies with poor performance and overestimates commercial successes
stemming from Federal funding by treating additional investment the
same as product sales, these have not been significant issues for the
Air Force. We are sensitive to the capabilities and contributions of
small businesses as they interact with us in this program and we have
efforts in place to increase their success. For example, the Air
Force's Mentor-Protege program provides funding to small businesses
that have successfully transitioned efforts to larger companies so that
they can mentor other small businesses towards similar successes. The
Air Force has also deployed an e-business solution called the SBIR
Shopping Mall, which links small businesses that have or are completing
SBIR efforts with large businesses, Air Force product development
offices, and logistics centers. The Air Force also has a history of
funding those efforts that contribute to both military and commercial
capabilities and have successfully transitioned to SBIR Phase III,
which is the phase in which commercialization occurs.
The National Science Foundation estimates that small company
investment in research and development in the U.S. is about $40 billion
for 2003. The SBIR program provides DOD and the Air Force a valuable
tool to leverage this national innovation engine. Phase I and II of
this program allow us to solicit and exploit this vast investment in
the U.S. Although the management of this program requires significant
effort to ensure return on investment, the payback is worth it. As
already stated, the Air Force is a strong supporter of the DOD SBIR
program and its contributions to the Air Force S&T program. However,
one change to the way we currently do business could potentially
improve the SBIR program and, in the process, address OMB's concerns. I
believe we could improve transition of SBIR efforts to military systems
and/or commercialization success by raising the ceilings for SBIR Phase
I and Phase II efforts. Raising these ceilings will provide additional
funding to mature technologies and should improve the transition of
efforts to SBIR Phase III or commercialization.
44. Senator Clinton. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, and Mr.
Engle, the assessment also indicates that the administration will
``seek to get highly successful awardees to enter the mainstream of
defense contracting.'' What are your plans to execute this plan?
Dr. Sega. The DOD has two initiatives to facilitate the rapid
transition of SBIR technologies, products, and services into DOD
acquisition programs. First, we require the services to solicit letters
of interest from their DOD acquisition' programs in order to
demonstrate interest in transitioning the successful projects to
defense acquisition contracts. At this time, approximately half of the
SBIR projects have received statements of interest. Second, we have
developed a Phase II Enhancement policy under which we provide a Phase
II company with additional SBIR funding if the company can match the
funds with non-SBIR funds from DOD acquisition programs or the private
sector. Generally, enhancements will extend an existing Phase II
contract for up to one year and will match up to $250,000 of non-SBIR
funds. These initiatives have been extremely effective in attracting
DOD acquisition and outside investor money as well as attention to SBIR
projects. We strive to increase the awareness of SBIR projects in the
acquisition community through these initiatives and we believe that
this will enable small businesses to compete within the mainstream of
defense contracting.
Dr. Killion. The Army has established two formal initiatives
recently to facilitate the rapid transition of SBIR technologies,
products, and services into DOD acquisition programs. First, at least
50 percent of the SBIR topics that are solicited must be either co-
authored by an acquisition program official or include a memorandum co-
signed by the laboratory topic author and a DOD acquisition program
official, stating that if the technology is successful, the acquisition
program would be interested in providing non-SBIR funding during or
after phase II to integrate the technology into the program. This year,
over 75 percent of Army topics were endorsed in this manner by an
acquisition official. Second, under the Phase II Plus Program, the Army
provides up to $250,000 in matching SBIR funds to expand an existing
Phase II that attracts investment funds from a DOD acquisition program
or a private sector investor. Phase II Plus allows for an existing
Phase II Army SBIR effort to be extended for up to 1 year to perform
additional research and development. Since its inception, the Phase II
Plus Program has selected and funded 110 projects and continues the
Army's emphasis on enabling the development and commercialization of
dual-use technologies and products. These two initiatives have been
extremely effective in attracting DOD acquisition and outside investor
money to SBIR projects to support the Army S&T strategy. We strive to
increase the awareness of past and present Army SBIR projects in the
acquisition community through conferences, brochures, and Web sites,
and by facilitating networking efforts of the small businesses.
Admiral Cohen. With the Navy's SBIR program this is occurring in
several ways:
(1) SBIR small businesses that have developed technology that is
beneficial to the Navy/DOD have been purchased by the large prime
contractors. Such acquisitions allow new small businesses to engage in
SBIR. Below is a list of some of those small businesses that have been
acquired:
DSR, Inc.--Multi-Purpose Processor (bought by General
Dynamics) provided lower cost and improved performance of
weapons systems with commercial off-the-shelf equipment. Over
$200 million in Navy Phase III--partnered with Lockheed Martin.
Microcom, Inc.--Improved Transponder. Funded as second
source and bought by Loral--now L3 Communications.
Science and Applied Technology (now AKT Missiles)--
Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile Development.
Solopsis Corporation developed Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC). Purchase by Raytheon.
Darlington Incorporated developed Combined Wide Area
Network (COWAN) Technology purchased by EDO Corporation.
(2) Small Businesses are teaming with large businesses or selling
product directly to the government. Below is an example of large
business interested in Navy SBIR:
``Raytheon, with 2002 sales of $16.8 billion, is an industry
leader in defense, electronics, space, information technology,
and business and special mission aircraft. The company has
launched a unique SBIR partnering initiative through its
Integrated Defense Systems (IDS) business to leverage both Navy
and Raytheon resources. The initiative championed by IDS
President Dan Smith, uses the Navy's SBIR capacity to generate
new technologies to help fill gaps in Raytheon IDS' own annual
technology roadmap for a dozen-odd defense programs--including
the Navy's revolutionary DD(X) and other new platforms. . .''
Quote from ``Transitions'' Volume 1, Issue 1, the Navy SBIR
Newsletter.
(3) Currently the Navy provides an opportunity for all small
businesses that are awarded a Navy SBIR Phase II to enter the Navy's
``Transition Assistance Program'' (TAP). This is a 9-month program
designed to provide small SBIR firms (which are typically scientific or
technically oriented) some business acumen. The 9 months are culminated
at the Navy Opportunity Forum on 3-4 May 2004. The small companies
brief their technologies to venture capitalists, Navy/DOD acquisition
program managers, and Navy/DOD prime contractors. The outcome of the
presentations provides a unique opportunity for large and small
businesses to work together.
Mr. Engle. The Air Force fully supports the administration's plan
to encourage successful SBIR awardees to actively participate in the
mainstream of defense contracting. We believe this could make a
meaningful contribution to the U.S. industrial base by increasing the
number of trusted sources available to support Air Force contractual
needs. There are several efforts currently underway to assist small
businesses, including extended intellectual property rights that can
extend well after the end of Phase III vice the normal 5-year period,
an extended Phase II program that uses SBIR funding to help transition
promising Phase II efforts that aren't quite ready for Phase III, and
the Mentor-Protege program under the Air Force's Small and
Disadvantaged Business Utilization office that provides funding to
small businesses that have successfully transitioned efforts to larger
companies so that they can mentor other small businesses towards
similar successes. The Air Force's SBIR Web site also provides a
``shopping mall'' of current SBIR efforts to provide insight to the
larger companies and hopefully generate interest in the various efforts
ongoing within these small businesses. This Web site also links to the
U.S. Small Business Administration SBIR/STTR Web site for an even
broader look at what's currently ongoing.
45. Senator Clinton. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, and Mr.
Engle, do you plan to establish and fund more formal Phase III programs
for SBIR contractors who have successfully executes Phase II SBIR
contracts?
Dr. Sega. Phase III is the goal of every SBIR effort, and
represents the commercialization phase of the program. In Phase III,
the successful company markets the products or services developed in
Phase II, either to the government or in the commercial sector. As you
are aware, no SBIR funds can be used in Phase III. The two initiatives
described in the previous answer help facilitate the transition of
small business research from Phase II to Phase III. We believe these
projects will successfully market and compete for follow-on contracts,
without separate funding.
Dr. Killion. Phase III is the goal of every Army SBIR effort, and
represents the commercialization phase of the program. In Phase III,
the successful company markets the products or services developed in
Phase II, either to the government or in the commercial sector. As you
are aware, no SBIR funds can be used in Phase III. Besides the two
initiatives described previously to help facilitate the transition of
small business research from Phase II to Phase III, the Army maintains
data on successful Phase II and Phase III projects which is maintained
on a Web site for ready access. The Army also publishes this data in a
yearly commercialization brochure that is disseminated widely
throughout DOD and the small business community. This visibility helps
to facilitate the transition of successful Phase II projects. Also, the
Army established a Venture Capital Initiative recently with the mission
to discover, invest in, and support companies and programs developing
innovative mobile power and energy technology with potential
application to U.S. Army needs. This program uses a range of investment
approaches, including making equity investments, project partnering,
research sponsorship, licensing arrangements, and others. It also acts
as a bridge between the Army and the innovation community
(entrepreneurs, established companies, universities, researchers, and
venture capitalists) to develop business relationships. The Army aligns
all SBIR projects with the S&T strategy that is supportive of Army
acquisition programs, thereby creating a Phase III market for the small
businesses that participate in the Army SBIR Program.
Admiral Cohen. The Navy views SBIR as an important component in its
toolbox for developing technologies/products to perform its mission.
Some acquisition programs such as PEO--submarines have a formal method
of providing incentives to prime contractor's awards to incorporate
SBIR awardees. However, the majority of acquisitions have not used this
method but rely more on the Navy's SBIR program to ``show them.''
The Navy's SBIR program attempts to connect its SBIR topics to
acquisition programs in the Navy. Approximately 80 percent of the
topics in the Navy section of the DOD solicitation are associated with
a mission need associated with the sponsoring Navy acquisition program.
We rely on the guidance of the Navy SBIR technical monitors to provide
guidance to the small business relative to which acquisition programs
may be interested in a company's technology and the Navy TAP to provide
the small business the tools to enable them to make contacts in the DOD
acquisition/prime contractor community.
One of the metrics that we use internally to judge the success of
the program annually is a comparison of SBIR funds in a given year to
the Phase III (non-SBIR funds) provided to Navy SBIR companies by Navy
acquisition programs. For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Navy SBIR
program had $200 million for award of contracts to small businesses in
Phases I & II of the SBIR program. The Navy acquisition programs
provided Navy SBIR participating companies in excess of $275 million.
Included below is a chart highlighting our past success.
Mr. Engle. The Air Force is a strong supporter of the SBIR program
and encourages small business contractors to participate in this highly
effective program. Our principal objectives are to stimulate
technological innovation by small businesses, to increase small
business participation in meeting Federal R&D needs, and to increase
the commercialization of technology developed through Federal R&D
efforts. Phase III is the phase in which this commercialization occurs
and the Air Force has a history of funding those efforts that
contribute to both military and commercial capabilities and have
successfully transitioned to Phase III. We plan to continue to fund
Phase III efforts when it can be demonstrated that there are Air Force
benefits to be derived from these investments.
[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
AND THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Pat
Roberts (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Roberts, Reed, and
Akaka.
Majority staff members present: Elaine A. McCusker,
professional staff member; Paula J. Philbin, professional staff
member; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
minority counsel; William G.P. Monahan, minority counsel; and
Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger and Nicholas W.
West.
Committee members' assistants present: Darren Dick,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant
to Senator Cornyn; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka; and Andrew
Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN
Senator Roberts. The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities will come to order. The subcommittee meets today
to receive testimony on the defense nuclear nonproliferation
programs of the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) programs of the Department of Defense
(DOD).
We welcome our witnesses: the Honorable Paul M. Longsworth,
who is the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation within the National Nuclear Security Agency
(NNSA) under the DOE; and Ms. Lisa Bronson, who is the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and
Counterproliferation. The programs for which you are each
responsible are critically important to the national security
of the United States. In a major address on this topic at the
National Defense University (NDU) on February 11, the President
indicated, and I am quoting here: ``The greatest threat before
humanity today is the possibility of a secret and sudden attack
with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear
weapons.'' He was referring, of course, to the threat of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) getting into the hands of
terrorists.
The President proposed to expand the U.S. and international
nonproliferation efforts both in the former Soviet Union (FSU)
and in other countries. Speaking of CTR, he said: ``Under this
program we are helping the FSU states find productive
employment for former weapons scientists. We are dismantling,
destroying, and securing weapons and materials left over from
the Soviet WMD arsenal. We have a lot more work to do there.''
The President also called on the international community to
cooperate on nonproliferation beyond the FSU. He said: ``We
will retain the WMD scientists and technicians in countries
like Iraq and Libya. We will help nations end the use of
weapons-grade uranium in research reactors. The nations of the
world must do all we can to secure and eliminate the nuclear,
chemical, biological, and radiological materials.''
Now, the reason I went into that in some detail is that I
do not think the speech received the press it deserved in
regard to the international effort to address this very key
question. I know we are getting a lot of press about the events
of the day in Iraq and the events of the day in an even
numbered year, but in regards to the NDU speech I think the
President certainly highlighted what needs to be done.
In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004, the DOE and the DOD were given the authority to use
nonproliferation and CTR funds outside the FSU.
We look forward to your testimony regarding your current or
anticipated nonproliferation activities in new countries. For
instance, the DOE has just announced a program aimed at funding
science projects for former Iraqi WMD scientists. We are
prepared to continue this discussion in closed session as
necessary.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request demonstrates the
administration's continuing commitment to these threat
reduction and other programs. I strongly share that commitment.
The vast majority of these programs have been successful, but
there have been some unfortunate past instances where the
United States taxpayer dollars were invested in projects that
never came to fruition.
I am sure you would agree that continued support for these
very critical programs requires both that the American people
understand how they contribute to U.S. national security and
that the programs be managed well to ensure that the American
taxpayers are getting the maximum return on their investment.
In that spirit, the subcommittee looks forward to your
testimony in support of your fiscal year 2005 budget request
for these very important nonproliferation programs. I thank you
for your service, I thank you for your time and effort. I thank
you for taking time out of your busy schedule to appear before
this subcommittee.
I will now turn to my distinguished friend and colleague,
Senator Reed, for his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me
join you in welcoming Administrator Longsworth and Secretary
Bronson. Thank you very much for being with us today. I want to
thank the chairman for scheduling this hearing on an
extraordinarily critical and timely subject.
Preventing the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological
technology, materials, and weapons is vitally important to our
Nation's security and to international stability. Our witnesses
today are responsible for many of the important
nonproliferation and threat reduction programs that are
actively engaged to address the dangers presented by nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons. These are challenging
problems.
I want to particularly thank the people in the DOD and the
DOE who have been working the field on these programs, often in
very difficult circumstances, over the last 10 years. They are
committed Federal and contractor employees who understand the
importance of what they do.
The cooperative efforts in Russia have been ongoing for
over 10 years and, while much has been done, much remains to be
done. For example, the effort to destroy Russian chemical
weapons is finally aggressively under way. This effort is a
truly cooperative effort, with substantial funding and support
being provided by Russia, the United States, and the
international community.
To be successful, however, the program will require the
continued support of the administration and Congress. For
example, the authority of the President to waive certain
certifications needed to keep this program on track will expire
in fiscal year 2004. I believe the DOD will be seeking
permanent authority to allow annual waivers of the
certifications. Permanent authority is important to ensure that
the program runs smoothly from year to year. I hope that we
will be able to support the President's request in this year's
National Defense Authorization Bill.
Both the DOE and the DOD have expanded their programs in
the republics of the FSU outside of Russia, expanding the work
with countries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia,
Ukraine, and others. It is important to building strong
relationships with the United States. While what is required in
each country is unique, there are opportunities to address
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) issues.
I look forward today to discussing what your organizations are
doing to expand the work in these countries.
In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004, the DOD was authorized to conduct CTR activities outside
the FSU and the DOE was authorized to conduct materials
protection control and accounting activities outside of the
FSU. We would like to hear what each of you might do utilizing
this authority.
There are still challenges to be met, including the
plutonium reactor shutdown program, mixed oxide fuel program,
biosecurity and bio early warning programs, and the resolution
of the current standoff between Russia and the United States on
liability issues. I would very much like to get your thoughts
on these and other challenges today.
Again, welcome. We look forward to hearing from you.
Thank you, Senator Roberts, again for holding this hearing.
Senator Roberts. Senator Akaka, do you have any opening
statement to make here?
Senator Akaka. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for calling this hearing.
I welcome our witnesses. The programs you administer I feel
are very vital to our national security and I am concerned the
President or his people may not be giving you the priority that
you deserve.
I have a longer statement that I would request to be made
part of the record, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
Thank you Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing. I welcome our
witnesses. The programs you administer are vital to our national
security, but I am concerned the President is not giving them the
priority they deserve.
The Department of Energy (DOE) plays a vital role in maintaining
the security of our country.
In that regard, I am pleased to see that the Off-Site Source
Recovery Project has been transferred from DOE's Office of
Environmental Management to the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), where there will be a greater focus on safety
and security. I am also pleased that the funding level for this project
is now more in line with the importance of its mission. I have
introduced legislation, S. 1045, on this program which was incorporated
into the pending energy bill. I am pleased to see that DOE is taking
action to secure domestic radioactive sources.
However, when it comes to the administration's approach to nuclear
weapons, I have a number of concerns.
The time and resources being devoted to research and development
(R&D) of new weapons technology, such as the Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator (RNEP) and new low-yield nuclear weapons, are taking away
from other nonproliferation and threat reduction programs.
As I have said before, these weapons systems are not needed and
will require an ongoing funding commitment that we cannot afford. On
the one hand, the administration is asking for an increase in funding
for nuclear weapons by 5.4 percent. While on the other hand, the
resources for programs critical for preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons to terrorists is only increased by 1.1 percent, with cuts to
some key programs.
The President's budget priorities are sending the wrong message to
would-be proliferators. We seem to be telling states that when it comes
to nuclear weapons development, ``do as we say, not as we do!''
When the administration seeks funding both to increase our test
readiness and for new weapons research, while reducing the budget for
nonproliferation programs, why should other countries not see that as a
green light to develop nuclear weapons?
We can't have it both ways.
The U.S. cannot expect other nations to agree to give up their
weapons while we seek to develop a newer, more usable nuclear arsenal.
Moreover, the failure by the administration to accelerate the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program is disturbing. Last spring,
a Harvard study noted that a dramatic acceleration of the CTR program
is clearly needed. The CTR and other DOE nonproliferation programs are
the primary means we have to prevent weapons, weapon-usable materials,
and the expertise in the former Soviet Union (FSU) from falling into
the hands of terrorists.
Just yesterday, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee,
the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet said, ``Russian
weapons of mass destruction materials and technology remain vulnerable
to theft or diversion. We are also concerned by the continued eagerness
of Russia's cash-strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace,
and nuclear industries to raise funds via exports and transfers--which
makes Russian expertise an attractive target for countries and groups
seeking weapons of mass destruction and missile-related assistance.''
We cannot afford this risk.
We should heed the advice of experts at Harvard and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and develop an accelerated plan to take
control of nuclear material at the most vulnerable sites worldwide.
By not doing this, the President is leaving the door open for
terrorists to steal nuclear weapons.
We must close that door.
I welcome our witnesses, and I look forward to their testimony.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, I am concerned that the
President's budget priorities are sending the wrong message to
would-be proliferators. We seem to be telling states that when
it comes to nuclear weapons development, ``Do as we say, not as
we do.''
When the administration seeks funding both to increase our
test readiness and for new weapons research, while reducing the
budget for nonproliferation programs, we ask ourselves why
other countries should not see that as a green light to develop
nuclear weapons. In a way, we cannot have it both ways. The
U.S. cannot expect other nations to agree to give up their
weapons while we seek to develop a newer, more usable nuclear
arsenal.
Moreover, the failure by the administration to accelerate
the CTR program is disturbing. Just yesterday in testimony
before the Armed Services Committee, the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet said, ``Russian weapons of mass
destruction materials and technology remain vulnerable to theft
or diversion. We are also concerned by the continued eagerness
of Russia's cash-strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical,
aerospace, and nuclear industries to raise funds via exports
and transfers, which makes Russian expertise an attractive
target for countries and groups seeking weapons of mass
destruction and missile-related assistance.''
At this point we need to really consider whether we can
afford this risk.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Senator.
We now recognize the Honorable Paul M. Longsworth, who is
the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation,
NNSA, within the DOE. If you have to repeat that to everybody
in regards to what you do, you probably spend a great deal of
time doing that.
Paul, your entire statement will be made part of the
record. Every golden word will be ensconced for memory and
shining the light of truth into darkness, so you feel perfectly
free to summarize if you so wish. We recognize you at this time
and thank you again for appearing.
STATEMENT OF PAUL M. LONGSWORTH, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Longsworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
I do want to thank you for holding this hearing today. It
is a pleasure to be back here before the subcommittee to
discuss the important activities that we conduct in the
nonproliferation arena.
Before discussing specific activities, I want to first
again thank this committee for its continued support for the
very important efforts that you have all laid out. On behalf of
the men and the women and the scientists and technicians that
carry out this work in these far-flung locations, I want to say
thank you on their behalf as well.
In my oral statement I would like to briefly describe the
specifics of our nonproliferation activities, address the
critical components of our 2005 budget, and highlight some key
accomplishments we have made. Mr. Chairman, as you have
requested, I will discuss some of the challenges that we face.
You quoted the President's speech and I think it bodes
restating. He said at the NDU in February that, ``The greatest
threat before humanity today is the possibility of a secret and
sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological or
nuclear weapons. America and the entire civilized world will
face this threat for decades to come.'' The President went on
to say that, ``We have to address this challenge with open eyes
and unbending purpose.''
I would say that that is what the programs in the Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation Office do. We carry out programs in 70
countries across the world to prevent the spread of WMD and in
many cases we are reversing the capabilities to support WMD
programs. Our mission has seven principal components: We
conduct cutting-edge nonproliferation and national security
research and development (R&D); we secure nuclear weapons and
North Korea and radiological materials at potentially
vulnerable sites in Russia and throughout the world; we reduce
the overall quantities of nuclear and radiological materials;
we bolster border security overseas; we support international
nonproliferation and export control regimes; we help downsize
the nuclear weapons infrastructure in the FSU; and we work to
mitigate the risks and consequences at nuclear facilities
worldwide.
By addressing key elements of the proliferation spectrum,
these activities play an essential role in stemming
proliferation of WMD.
While our nonproliferation programs are international in
scope, our activities also support the global war on terrorism
by removing the raw materials that a terrorist might use to
attack the U.S. or our interests abroad. In all of these cases
our programs directly strengthen U.S. national security.
Our mission goals form the crux of a multi-layered
capability that reduces the incentive for terrorists and drug
states to obtain WMD and reduce the access and the wherewithal
to obtain such weapons. All of our program efforts are designed
to bolster national security in the United States. We do not
conduct foreign aid. We carry out projects that directly
enhance U.S. national security interests.
Our fiscal year 2005 budget is $1.35 billion. That is
roughly a 1 percent increase over 2004, but it is a 60-percent
increase over the 2001 appropriation. Some would argue that our
budget is flat-lined. I think they would be wrong.
We have moved into an era of global burdensharing. In 2002,
President Bush proposed that the G-8 member nations join
together to form a global partnership to step up proliferation.
The President committed the U.S. to spend $10 billion initially
in Russia over 10 years on such an initiative. Since then our
partners in the G-8 have committed to spend up to $10 billion
over 10 years to match the U.S. funding.
The President has now proposed an expansion of the global
partnership, both in terms of donors and recipient nations, to
address proliferation threats worldwide. This burdensharing
must be accounted for when we do an overall assessment of how
much funding is going into nonproliferation programs globally.
Let me just briefly walk through a few budget highlights in
our fiscal year 2005 request. In the area of fissile materials
disposition, this is by far our largest program. It accounts
for about 43 percent of our total budget. The President's
request includes $649 million for this work, of which $549
million is for plutonium disposition.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request seeks funding to begin
construction of both the U.S. and the Russian mixed oxide (MOX)
fabrication facilities in 2005. We are currently targeting May
2005. We must resolve liability with the Russian Federation
soon in order to meet that schedule, but this request reflects
the U.S. commitment for proceeding with plutonium disposition.
In the area of plutonium reactor shutdown in Russia, not
only are we pursuing the disposition of weapons-usable
plutonium, we are also working hard to get Russia to shut down
its last remaining plutonium-producing reactors. They have
three remaining reactors. We are on a schedule now to shut
those down by 2008. We will shut down two by 2008 and we hope
to shut down three by 2011. This is a program that actually was
transferred from the DOD to the DOE.
By shutting off these reactors, we will reduce the
production of 1.2 metric tons of new plutonium each year. So
every year that we do that sooner is another 1.2 metric tons of
plutonium that will not be created.
We expect to complete design by the end of 2004, and by
that time we will have a firm, validated cost estimate for this
project.
In the area of material protection, control, and
accounting, the President's request includes $238 million,
which includes efforts to secure Russian warheads, plutonium,
and highly-enriched uranium (HEU). It also includes our Second
Line of Defense and Megaports programs, which are intended to
detect illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological
materials at border crossings, airports, and seaports. The
objective of that program is to detect and stop weapons-usable
material before it arrives at the U.S. border.
In some smaller areas, which are by no means unimportant,
we have requested an increase for the Off-Site Source Recovery
Program. This recognizes the serious global threat that
radioactive source materials might be used in radiological
dispersal devices. This is a new effort for the NNSA and we are
assuming responsibility for this program after it was
transferred to us from the Office of Environmental Management.
We estimate the initial program funding will be $5.6 million,
with a projected cost of about $40 million over the next 5
years.
If you allow me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to walk through
a few of the accomplishments we have achieved. I think these
are important to go through because we are not very good at
tooting our own horn. I think the folks that do this work
throughout the world have achieved many laudable successes.
I will start with the most obvious one. It is in Libya. The
DOE played a key leading technical role to support the
operation to verify Libya's pledge to dismantle its WMD. In
North Korea, we are participating in the six-party talks on a
technical level and we are beginning to develop the tool kit
that will be necessary to support the complete, verifiable, and
irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons
program when that occurs.
In the area of materials protection, control, and
accounting (MPCA), we have accelerated the time line for
securing the 600 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material
at 55 sites in Russia and Eurasia, and we have accelerated that
schedule by more than 2 years. From 2002 to 2003, we tripled
the amount of new fissile material that is under safeguards and
secured in Russia, and are operating at about the same pace
this year.
With the Russian Navy, we have completed 77 percent, or
about 30 sites, of the 39 Russian nuclear navy sites where they
store warheads, and we will be finished with that we think at
the end of 2005. We are expanding our work with the Strategic
Rocket Forces (SRF) to secure warheads at their sites. We have
added three additional sites this year and hope to add
additional sites in the near future.
In the area of our Second Line of Defense program, we are
continuing to install radiation monitors at sites throughout
Russia and we plan to install this year 25 new sites in
Kazakhstan and 25 sites in the Ukraine. Worldwide, we expect to
be at 165 locations with nuclear trafficking detectors by the
end of fiscal year 2005.
In addition, we are very close to completing installation
of radiation detectors at the largest seaport in Europe, the
port of Rotterdam. That will be completed by mid-summer. We
expect to conclude other letters of intent and agreements with
other countries, most notably China, which has three very large
ports, and we hope to do those in the April-May time frame.
Under our Russian highly-enriched fuel return program, we
have repatriated HEU fuel, fresh fuel, from Yugoslavia,
Romania, and Bulgaria. This material in total was sufficient to
make several nuclear weapons.
Finally, in our R&D program, an often overlooked part of
our program, we continue to have a 100-percent on-time payload
delivery record for nuclear explosion monitoring satellite
capabilities.
So we have accomplished a lot, but there are many
challenges and I would like to walk through those just briefly.
Liability is the largest challenge we face right now. We are in
a disagreement with Russia about what is an appropriate level
of liability protection for U.S. workers and the U.S.
Government. American contractors must have adequate liability
protection in Russia and elsewhere, and we are urging the
Russian government to seek a quick ratification in the Duma of
the CTR umbrella agreement that contains full liability
protections for U.S. work.
CTR ratification will facilitate agreement on a number of
other critical nonproliferation programs which are currently
not being renewed until that agreement is ratified, most
notably the mixed oxide fuel program and the Nuclear Cities
Initiative (NCI).
Transparency is another area that is a challenge. Achieving
adequate transparency is an ongoing problem for many U.S.
nonproliferation initiatives within the Russian Federation.
Assuring that we are in fact securing the materials and
facilities intended to be secured is challenging. It takes
technology and it takes access. The NNSA is continuing to work
bilaterally and multilaterally to ensure that our mutual goals
are met in this area.
I mentioned access. That is an ongoing problem. Our
nonproliferation programs often require access to other
countries' most sensitive facilities. In Russia, considerable
progress has been made accessing the less sensitive sites, but
we continue to be blocked from some of their most sensitive
sites that have ongoing defense activities.
We have established a working group that the Secretary and
his counterpart, Minister Rumyantsev, formed to break down
those barriers, and we believe it is working pretty well. It
goes without saying that reaching agreement on access at these
sites is a major challenge and will require patience and
steadfastness on our part.
Finally, concluding contracts and agreements is a complex
process that often delays our work in Russia as well. Even
though there is agreement in principle to undertake a given
nonproliferation program, actually implementing the program
requires time. The Russians have a fairly large bureaucracy.
They inherited it from the Soviet era. It did not go away, and
we face normal bureaucratic challenges there.
Some of the solutions are: First and foremost, Secretary
Abraham has developed a close working relationship with his
counterparts in Russia in order to identify and address
roadblocks to our progress very quickly. This has worked very
well and he has committed to work with Mr. Rumyantsev's
successor once they meet.
To summarize, I would just like to draw your attention to
the progress that our programs have made in recent years and
the programs that have been accelerated and adapted to meet the
complex and unpredictable security threats that we face. In his
February 11 address, President Bush outlined the path forward
to better strengthen the global nonproliferation regime, to
control exports, and to further restrict access to nuclear
technologies. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
will continue to address these myriad of threats across the
proliferation spectrum and we will do that in concert with our
other Federal agencies.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Longsworth follows:]
Prepared Statement by Paul M. Longsworth
INTRODUCTION
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this subcommittee, for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the activities of the
National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation. Before discussing our specific activities, I
want to express how critically important I consider your contributions,
both past, present, and future, to the United States' efforts to
prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Of course, it
goes without saying that our ability to address the myriad of
proliferation threats that confront us requires that the U.S. Congress
fully understand those threats, and that its Members are confident that
the money they are authorizing and appropriating to NNSA's programs is
being used effectively and efficiently to both meet and exceed the
goals to which this funding is directed. Your continued support for our
programs demonstrates the committee's long-standing commitment to
furthering nonproliferation throughout the world. I appreciate your
strong support and I look forward to our continued work together.
There have been concerns raised in the past that our
nonproliferation programs are akin to an aid program to Russia rather
than a focused element of our Nation's agenda to prevent WMD
proliferation. As it is a cooperative effort, U.S. and Russian
nonproliferation objectives are not mutually exclusive, and substantial
progress has been made. I hope this presentation will help to ease
these concerns by drawing attention to the critical role our programs
play in stemming the spread of WMD throughout the world, and enhancing
our national security.
In his recent speech at the National Defense University (NDU) in
February, President Bush stated, ``The greatest threat before humanity
today is the possibility of secret and sudden attack with chemical or
biological or radiological or nuclear weapons . . . America, and the
entire civilized world, will face this threat for decades to come.'' To
meet this challenge, the President asked that we confront it ``with
open eyes, and unbending purpose.''
The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has expanded and
accelerated its programs to address this proliferation threat. We now
work with more than 70 countries to prevent the spread of WMD, and we
are continuously adapting our activities to meet today's complex and
unpredictable proliferation threats posed by ``rogue'' states and
terrorist networks.
I would now like to briefly describe the specifics of our
nonproliferation activities, address critical components of our fiscal
year 2005 budget request, highlight key accomplishments we have made,
and outline current challenges that we face.
MISSION
Today, we are faced with a number of proliferators, rogue states,
and terrorist networks that threaten United States and international
security by actively pursuing WMD capabilities, technologies, and
expertise. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation plays a
prominent role in responding to these WMD proliferation threats. We
recognize the broad scope and complex nature of this threat, and
understand that our programs must identify and address potential
vulnerabilities within the nonproliferation regime before terrorists or
rogue states exploit them.
Our mission is to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of
WMD, while mitigating the risks associated with peaceful nuclear energy
operations. We implement this mission by:
Conducting cutting-edge nonproliferation and national
security research and development (R&D);
Securing nuclear weapons and nuclear and radiological
materials at potentially vulnerable sites in Russia and across
the globe;
Reducing overall quantities of nuclear and
radiological materials;
Bolstering border security domestically and overseas;
Supporting international nonproliferation and export
control regimes;
Downsizing the nuclear weapons infrastructure of the
former Soviet Union (FSU); and
Mitigating risks at nuclear facilities worldwide.
By addressing key elements of the proliferation spectrum, these
activities play an essential role in strengthening United States and
international security. Our efforts are making the world more secure.
But the nonproliferation regime still faces serious challenges from a
few rogue states and terrorist threats seeking the capability to obtain
WMD, and from those states that facilitate such activity or often
appear indifferent to it. Lastly, we continue to receive reports of
illicit efforts to acquire nuclear or radiological weapons technologies
and materials.
BUDGET
The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program works to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and materials to terrorist
organizations and rogue states. For fiscal year 2005, the
administration requests $1.35 billion to support activities to reduce
the global WMD proliferation threat. Total dollars spent, however, is
not the only measure for judging overall program effectiveness. It
should be measured on accomplishments, which I will talk about later.
This $1.35 billion is a 1 percent increase over fiscal year 2004, but
it does not reflect the total funding for nonproliferation worldwide.
We have moved into an era of global burdensharing. In 2002, President
Bush proposed a new G-8 initiative on proliferation, and our partners
have committed to spend up to $10 billion over 10 years to help
decrease the proliferation threat, initially in Russia. The President
has now proposed an expansion of the global partnership's donors and
recipients, to address the proliferation threat worldwide. This
burdensharing must be accounted for in the overall assessment of
nonproliferation spending.
One of the key obstacles we have encountered this year is a
disagreement with Moscow regarding liability protection for plutonium
disposition work performed in Russia. Even with the liability issue
being worked on at high levels of the administration, lack of
resolution to date has resulted in a 10-month delay in the start of
construction of a mixed oxide (MOX) facility in Russia as well as a
similar facility in the United States. The President's fiscal year 2005
budget request seeks funding to begin construction of both the U.S. and
Russian MOX facilities in May 2005, as we work to resolve the liability
issue this spring. This reflects the U.S. commitment for proceeding
with plutonium disposition.
Not only are we pursuing the disposition of weapons-useable
plutonium, we are also working hard to stop Russia from producing more
plutonium that could be used for nuclear weapons. We have assumed the
responsibility from the Department of Defense (DOD) for shutting down
the last three plutonium production reactors in Russia and replacing
them with fossil fuel plants by a targeted 2008 and 2011 timeframe.
This will result in the cessation of Russia's annual production of 1.2
metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium. Under the Elimination of
Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program, we have selected the
Washington Group International and Raytheon Technical Services to
provide oversight for Russian contractors who will actually be
performing the work at two Siberian sites. We are preparing preliminary
designs for the planned fossil-fuel replacement plants and validating
cost estimates for the program. As more of the engineering design work
is completed, we will be better able to refine the overall cost and
schedule for the replacement fossil-fuel plants. We expect to complete
the detailed designs by the end of calendar year 2004, at which time we
will be able to provide Congress with firm cost estimates.
Given recent threats to the United States, it has become
increasingly clear that protecting and securing nuclear materials and
detecting nuclear and radioactive material at foreign ports, airports,
and border crossings is a very high priority. Our budget request for
Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPCA), which includes our
Second Line of Defense programs and Megaports Program, is $238 million.
Of that, $15 million will go toward moving ahead with our Megaports
Program to train law enforcement officials and equip key international
ports with radiation detection equipment to detect, deter, and
interdict illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive
materials. We are scheduled to complete work at ports in Greece and the
Netherlands by late summer 2004. We have made a number of security
improvements to nuclear Navy sites in Russia and we are now focusing
resources on securing Strategic Rocket Force (SRF) sites.
In addition to this work, we are also pursuing a dialogue with
other countries, including China. We hope that these activities will
lead to broader MPCA cooperation in the coming years.
In fiscal year 2005, NNSA assumes responsibility for the Off-Site
Source Recovery Project from the Office of Environmental Management.
The requested program funding is $5.6 million, with a projected cost of
about $40 million over the next 5 years to substantially reduce the
risk of these source materials being used for radiological dispersion
devices. The program works closely with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) to prioritize source recovery.
I would now like to detail our core mission activities and
highlight some of our most recent accomplishments in each of these
areas.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
The President's recent speech at the NDU included several
nonproliferation measures designed to strengthen U.S. national
security. Among his proposals, the President underscored the need to
address the demand for the most critical elements of the nuclear fuel-
cycle, enrichment and reprocessing, as well as a renewed, stronger
approach towards the implementation of safeguards.
The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is working directly
with the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and with the Zangger
Committee to strengthen the nuclear export control regime, that
includes making the adoption of the International Atomic Energy
Agency's (IAEA) Additional Protocol a condition of supply and banning
the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Recognizing the
need to work with emerging nuclear technology suppliers and
transshipment states, we increased our work in the area of export
controls by $6 million.
Our work to secure nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, and
radiological materials at potentially vulnerable sites in Russia and
elsewhere is one of our most important missions. We are promoting the
further safeguarding and physical protection of nuclear materials at
nuclear sites worldwide, including the states of the FSU and in over 40
countries with U.S.-origin material. The United States and Russia
continue to accelerate cooperative nonproliferation efforts, and we are
making progress. For example, we have accelerated the timeline for
securing 600 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material at 55 sites
in Russia and Eurasia by 2008. To date, we have upgraded the security
of 41 percent of the material and compared to 2002, we tripled the
amount of new material placed under comprehensive upgrades in 2003. We
are also working internationally to consolidate and secure fissile
materials and at-risk radioactive sources. We have upgraded security at
13 nuclear facilities in Eurasia, holding 3.5 metric tons of weapons
grade nuclear material, to meet international physical protection
guidelines. Although our work continues to expand beyond the FSU, we
are still working in the region to improve security at Russian Navy and
SRF facilities--among the most sensitive facilities in Russia. We have
expanded security upgrades of Russian Navy and SRF nuclear weapons
sites and have secured 77 percent (30 sites) of the 39 Russian Navy
warhead sites and initiated security upgrades at three Russian SRF
sites.
Downsizing the nuclear weapons infrastructure of the FSU remains an
important activity. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, we have worked
hard to reduce the potential for diversion of WMD expertise, materials,
and technologies to terrorists and proliferant states. To meet this
objective, we are working to redirect WMD scientists, engineers, and
technicians to peaceful work and reduce WMD complexes by downsizing
facilities and creating sustainable civilian alternatives. Through the
Russian Transition Initiatives Program, we have engaged over 14,000
former weapons scientists at over 200 institutes across the FSU in
peaceful and sustainable commercial pursuits, attracting $162 million
in private sector matching funds and over $140 million in venture
capital and other investments, created 25 new businesses in the closed
cities, and facilitated the downsizing of Russia's nuclear weapons
complex.
Late last year, the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
established the Nuclear and Radiological Threat Reduction Task Force,
which represents another important step in combating the threats posed
by radiological dispersion devices or ``dirty bombs.'' We created this
task force to identify, secure, store on an interim basis, and
facilitate the permanent disposition of high-risk radiological
materials that could be used as a radiological dispersal device, both
in the United States and overseas; and identify the most vulnerable
research reactors worldwide and develop an action plan to mitigate
these vulnerabilities. Working in close concert with foreign countries
and the IAEA, this task force will ensure that the NNSA has the
capability to address the full spectrum of radiological threats,
including locating and securing vulnerable radiological materials
overseas, and recovering and securing unwanted and abandoned
radioactive materials within the United States that pose security and
health risks.
Bolstering border security as a second line of defense is another
important component of our strategy. To implement this core mission, we
develop and employ nuclear detection equipment at key border crossings,
airports, and ports, including major seaports or ``megaports,''
worldwide. We also work hard to assist and train customs officials at
home and abroad to detect the illicit trafficking of nuclear and
radiological materials as well as identify dual-use commodities that
might be used in WMD programs. Our hard work and cooperative efforts
are paying dividends. For example, we have installed radiation
detection equipment at 39 sites in Russia to detect, deter, and
interdict the trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. Russia
has also supplemented our cooperative border security efforts by
upgrading and installing similar radiation detection equipment at many
more of their prioritized border checkpoints. We maintain radiation
detection equipment in more than 20 countries in the Baltics, Central
and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Mediterranean. We launched
our Megaports Initiative at the Port of Rotterdam, which we are
currently equipping with detection equipment at this international,
high-traffic ``megaport.''
We are not alone in our efforts. The international community and
recipient countries have responded with strong support to advance our
mutual nonproliferation interests. The G-8 Global Partnership has
committed $20 billion over the next 10 years to work on
nonproliferation issues in Eurasia. We are working cooperatively with
our G-8 partners to leverage the funding that we have committed to
Russia and the work in which we are involved. In another program, we
are working with India and Pakistan to help them cooperatively work to
find means to stop cross-border infiltration and avoid conflict.
Our cutting-edge R&D program improves the United States' ability to
detect and deter WMD proliferation and strengthen nuclear treaty
regimes such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Our R&D
programs serve as the technical base that provides operational
agencies--including the DOD and the Intelligence Community--with
innovative systems and technologies to meet their nonproliferation
missions. For example, we have tested laser-based remote sensing
systems to detect and characterize effluents from suspect WMD
production facilities, and are designing miniature synthetic aperture
radar sensors to fly on board unmanned aerial vehicles. Our technology-
base programs yielded several radiation detection systems now being
used by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and evaluated at the
test bed that we established at the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey. We have developed and produced nuclear explosion monitoring
sensor payloads for deployment on Global Positioning System (GPS) and
Defense Support System satellites, began designing the next-generation
of space-based sensors, and are developing new tools to lower the
threshold for detecting the yield of any nuclear explosion by two
orders of magnitude. We continue to seek out improved solutions to
emerging proliferation problems, and to coordinate our efforts with our
U.S. Government partners.
Strengthening international nonproliferation and export control
regimes is another essential cornerstone of our efforts. We support
U.S. nonproliferation treaties, initiatives, and agreements and work to
strengthen international safeguards to detect clandestine nuclear
programs and diversion of nuclear material from declared programs. By
working with our international partners, we have accomplished a great
deal to further the world's nonproliferation regime. Some of our recent
accomplishments include Secretary Abraham's signing of the Statement of
Intent on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Nonproliferation
and Counterterrorism with Chairman Zhang Huazhu of the China Atomic
Energy Authority this January in Beijing. Also in January, NNSA
Administrator Brooks testified before Congress to urge prompt action on
the Additional Protocol between the United States and the IAEA, to
strengthen our hand in seeking other states' acceptance of strengthened
international safeguards. In addition, we opened a Cooperative
Monitoring Center in Amman, Jordan that will serve as a regional forum
to discuss technical solutions to proliferation and other regional
security problems. We are spearheading changes to Nuclear Supplier
Group Guidelines to make the prevention of nuclear terrorism an
explicit export control objective.
To reduce stockpiles and available quantities of nuclear materials,
we are working with Russia to irreversibly blend-down at least 500
metric tons of surplus highly-enriched uranium (HEU). At the end of
2003, over 200MT had been eliminated. We are also working with our
Russian counterparts to shut down the three reactors in Russia that are
still producing weapons-grade plutonium, and we are coordinating with
them to return Russian-origin spent fuel to Russia. We further reduce
quantities of weapons-usable HEU by converting research reactors in the
United States and abroad to use low-enriched uranium (LEU) and working
to eliminate 174 metric tons of HEU in the United States. The Office of
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation also is working proactively and
cooperatively with Libya and international partners to dismantle
Libya's WMD infrastructure. Currently, we are playing a leading
technical role in the support of the operation to verify the
dismantlement of Libya's nuclear program, and are playing a similar
role in preparing for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible
dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. In 2003, we
helped remove 17 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU from Bulgaria and
returned it to Russia for safe storage. We also worked with Russia and
the IAEA to return approximately 14 kilograms of fresh Russian-origin
HEU from Romania to Russia to be down-blended and used for civil
nuclear purposes.
Our final core mission objective is to mitigate risks at nuclear
facilities worldwide. To reach this goal, we are providing assistance
to Russia and Eurasian countries to establish enhanced emergency
response programs, and we are working cooperatively with Russia to
improve the safety and security of its nuclear weapons during
transportation and storage in connection with dismantlement. We are
focused on improving nuclear emergency management practices worldwide
by working with the IAEA and other western countries. For example, we
worked to strengthen the IAEA's notification capability in the event of
a nuclear emergency and are assisting Ukraine, Russia, and Japan in
establishing emergency management training programs.
CHALLENGES
Preventing the proliferation of WMD materials, technology, and
expertise is a major undertaking, and developing a multi-layered
approach to address these threats has not been without its challenges.
In implementing our nonproliferation programs, liability issues,
transparency, access, and concluding contracts and agreements will
remain challenges in the years ahead. Since our nonproliferation
programs are cooperative in nature, the progress we make is largely
dependent on complex negotiations with Russia and other countries.
Consequently, we will continue to face challenges in our work,
particularly in Russia. I will now discuss these challenges in more
detail.
LIABILITY
Resolving liability issues with the Russians remains a key
challenge. American workers and contractors must have adequate
liability protection in Russia and elsewhere. We are urging the Russian
government to seek quickly Duma ratification of the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) umbrella agreement that contains full liability
protections. CTR ratification will facilitate agreement on a number of
our critical nonproliferation programs, including the construction of
U.S. and Russian MOX facilities to dispose of 34 metric tons each of
surplus plutonium and continuing cooperative projects under the Nuclear
Cities Initiative (NCI).
TRANSPARENCY
Achieving adequate transparency is an ongoing problem for many U.S.
nonproliferation initiatives with the Russian Federation. Assuring that
we are, in fact, securing the materials and facilities intended has
been challenging. The NNSA will continue to work both bilaterally and
multilaterally to ensure that our mutual goals are met and that
cooperative programs remain objective, are preventing the proliferation
of WMD, and promote long-term self-sustainability.
ACCESS
Nonproliferation programs often require access to other countries'
most sensitive nuclear facilities. In Russia, considerable progress has
been made accessing less sensitive sites. While we have had some
success, we must continue to work to gain access to Russia's more
sensitive sites and facilities. A working group has been established by
Secretary Abraham and Minister Rumyantsev to address this issue and is
testing new procedures for access to more sensitive Minatom facilities.
It goes without saying that reaching agreement on access to these sites
is a major challenge and will require patience and steadfastness on our
part. After access agreement is reached, we must assure that its terms
are honored.
CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS
Finally, concluding contracts and agreements is a complex process.
Even after there is agreement in principle to undertake a given
nonproliferation program, actually implementing such a program requires
time to bear fruit. Achieving concurrence on written agreements to move
forward is often the first challenge to overcome. As a recent example,
the Russian interagency must digest an agreement to return Russian-
origin spent fuel back to Russia and dispose of it to reduce the amount
of global HEU. While we expect this review to happen in the near
future, it is indicative of the substantial efforts that both sides
must undertake. After the requisite agreements are in place and agreed
to by both parties, objective and realistic milestones have to be
developed before any contract can be awarded, and performance metrics
established to address how those milestones will be met. Overall
program success is incumbent on sound fiscal stewardship, and we
believe that we are taking the necessary steps to effectively maximize
program success rates.
There are a number of steps we have undertaken to meet these
challenges. First, the Secretary of Energy has developed a close
relationship with the acting Minister of Atomic Energy and overcoming
these challenges in the nonproliferation arena has been a priority.
Secretary Abraham intends to continue to work constructively with the
acting Minister or his successor. Second, at the working level, experts
from our programs leverage over a decade of experience and
relationships with their Russian counterparts to resolve contentious
issues through sustained negotiations.
The subcommittee's support is also critical to overcoming these
challenges and to the overall success of our programs. Although I am
optimistic that we will be able to work through these challenges, your
continued support will play an important role as we create and
implement solutions to overcome current obstacles.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, I would again draw your attention to the progress our
program has made in recent years and the acceleration with which we
have expanded our activities to meet the complex and unpredictable
security threats of our time. In doing so, we have strengthened the
security of our Nation and are making the world a safer place. Working
in concert with other U.S. Government agencies, the Office of Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation will continue to promote high-level political
commitment among our cooperative country counterparts to establish an
effective, comprehensive capability that can proactively react to an
evolving threat environment. Our focus is on stemming the proliferation
of WMD materials, technology, and expertise, and we will continue to
work diligently and responsibly to counter that threat.
Mr. Chairman and members of this subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you
and members of this subcommittee may have.
Senator Roberts. Paul, thank you very much for your
statement.
We now hear from Ms. Lisa Bronson, who is the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and
Counterproliferation. Lisa, the same goes for you as it did for
Paul. Please feel free to summarize and please be assured that
virtually every verb, adjective, and adverb will be in the
record.
Please proceed and thank you for coming.
STATEMENT OF LISA BRONSON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR TECHNOLOGY SECURITY POLICY AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION
Ms. Bronson. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Reed. Thank you for inviting me to discuss the DOD CTR program.
My written testimony submitted for the record reviews some of
the important work accomplished during the last 2 years. I will
not repeat it here this morning.
Mr. Chairman, the achievements noted in my written
testimony represent a reduction in the threat posed by the
former Soviet WMD stockpile to the United States and its
allies. Threat reduction has always been a key measure of how
well CTR is doing. Another measure is how well we ensure that
the taxpayers are getting value for the money they invest in
nonproliferation through the CTR program.
The Heptyl and Vodkinsk situations, which involve
significant losses in CTR investments, reminded us that there
is a third important measure of success for this program. That
is the extent to which our partner countries truly cooperate in
CTR.
In his February 4, 2004, testimony before the full
committee, Secretary Rumsfeld was asked why the President's
fiscal year 2005 CTR budget request for $409.2 million is lower
than that requested in fiscal year 2004. The question implies
that the annual budget request is the single measure of
progress and the single indicator of commitment. It is an
important metric, but there are three others: actual threat
reduction, value for U.S. investments, and increasing the
recipients' stake in the success of specific projects. Measured
against the aggregate of these four metrics, the CTR program
continues to be a vital component in the U.S. Government's
national security strategy.
My written testimony describes the underlying rationale for
our budget request. Mr. Chairman, we have reported to you in
detail on the $106 million loss suffered by CTR in the so-
called ``Heptyl situation,'' in which Russia did not tell us
that liquid rocket fuel destined for a CTR-constructed
neutralization facility had been diverted to commercial uses.
We have also had extended discussions about the Vodkinsk
situation, in which CTR invested nearly $100 million in designs
and site preparation for a solid rocket fuel elimination
facility that was abruptly blocked by local Russian
authorities.
These two situations delivered a severe blow to the
credibility of our Russian partners and caused us to rigorously
review how we do business. My written testimony describes our
management changes in detail.
Mr. Chairman, it could be argued that the array of
management changes implemented over the past 2 years risks a
slowdown in CTR project execution. With the recent losses in
Russia, we had no choice. We are carefully balancing our three
goals of threat reduction, value for taxpayers' investment, and
increased participation by partner countries. In some cases,
simultaneous achievement of all three goals creates extra steps
in project execution. In our judgment, this results in a better
program.
During the past 2 years we have significantly improved our
responsiveness to Congress. We have resolved the backlog of
reports and notifications. Some 24 reports and notifications
have been delivered in the past 2 years. For the first time
since the inception of the requirement, the CTR annual report
was delivered on time in early February of this year.
In March 2003, we began a 6-month comprehensive project by
project review of the CTR program, building on the overall
administration review conducted in 2001. This rescoping review
for Russia revalidated the contribution of all project areas to
current threat reduction areas, with some important
adjustments, described in detail in my written testimony.
The importance of continuing elimination of submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), as well as the silos and launchers
from which they are removed, was revalidated. However, CTR will
cease to regrade the silo sites once current commitments are
fulfilled. This function will be turned over to Russia. We
concluded that silo regrading, while an important safety
matter, did not contribute to CTR's core threat reduction
mission and could reasonably be assumed by Russia.
CTR will continue to de-fuel nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs), seal the reactors, and remove and
eliminate the missile launcher components. However, the
practice of cutting up the bows and sterns will be turned over
to Russia. We concluded that the work on bows and sterns did
not contribute to threat reduction because it is not essential
to the disabling of the submarine as a whole and elimination of
the launcher compartment. In addition, this is an area where
Russia can reasonably be expected to increase its stake in the
success of this project.
The rescoping review for Russia will ultimately affect
approximately $185 million. These funds will be reallocated to
other CTR projects.
As a result of our review of Ukrainian projects, we decided
to cancel a CTR project that would have built a hydro-mining
system to remove solid fuel from previously demilitarized SS-24
missile stages and convert the byproduct to mining explosives
that would be turned over to Ukraine for sale. This project was
significantly over budget and presented further cost escalation
risks. Technical aspects of safely storing the propellant
byproduct and converting it into mining explosives were also
unresolved after significant expense.
All warheads and proliferable components have been removed
from the 163 rocket motors, which are in safe storage built by
CTR. Accordingly, the threat from these missiles has already
been eliminated. We have offered Ukraine an alternative, less
risky means of disposing of these motors. After understandably
tough consultations, we recently received an expression of
interest from Kiev.
Overall, we assess that over $100 million in CTR activities
previously programmed for Ukraine did not make a direct
contribution to threat reduction. These funds will be
reallocated to other CTR activities in Ukraine, including the
bio-weapons and WMD proliferation prevention project areas.
Mr. Chairman, reviewing, revalidating, and rescoping these
project goals in Russia and Ukraine will help ensure that CTR
remains focused on current threat reduction priorities. Our
adjustments to project areas are designed to ensure that CTR is
returning real nonproliferation value for the taxpayers'
investments. Our insistence on increased Russian participation
in certain ongoing projects is directed toward increasing
Russia's stake and accountability in the CTR program.
Of course, none of these works can go forward until we have
completed the fiscal year 2004 congressional notification
requirement of section 1304--Mr. Chairman, excuse me for a
moment. Sorry, I lost my place. Let me begin again.
Senator Roberts. I do that a lot. You go right ahead.
Ms. Bronson. The pages stuck together. My apologies.
Senator Roberts. You at least admit it. We do not admit it.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Bronson. Mr. Chairman, we estimate that there are
approximately 40 institutes that were part of the Soviet
biological weapons program. These institutes often contain
extensive collections of dangerous pathogens. They face threats
from within--underemployed experts--and from without--poorly
secured facilities and weak inventory controls.
We address this former Soviet biological weapons threat by
balancing carefully the risks of proliferation against Russia's
compliance with international commitments. In Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, and Georgia, CTR's biological weapons proliferation
activities continue. In addition, an agreement to support
Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention (BWPP) work in
Ukraine is nearing completion, and we hope to expand this
project area to the Kyrgyz Republic later this year.
Of course, none of the BWPP work can go forward with fiscal
year 2004 funds until the congressional notification
requirements of section 1304 of the National Defense
Authorization Act are met. I do not anticipate problems meeting
this requirement for Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and
Georgia.
However, Russia poses unique challenges in this area. We
continue to be concerned with Russia's compliance with the
Biological Weapons Convention. Keeping Russia's bioweapons
technology, pathogen collections, and expertise out of
terrorist hands strengthens U.S. national security. However,
those national security benefits need to be carefully weighed
against the inherent risks of engagement. The risk of misuse
can never be reduced to zero, but we are using policy and
implementation strategies to minimize this risk and allow us to
focus on the goal of biological weapons proliferation
prevention.
In conclusion, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz wrote his Russian
counterparts in mid-2003 to urge their prompt action on a
pending CTR legal agreement. He told these senior officials
that, ``We are reviewing all CTR project areas for consistency
with U.S. nonproliferation goals, as well as good stewardship
of U.S. resources.'' Secretary Wolfowitz's message captures
what we have done with CTR since the Heptyl and Vodkinsk
situations and through the course of the rescoping review.
CTR has been reducing the threat of WMD since it began over
a decade ago. We have revalidated that goal and the
contribution of our activities to that goal in an exhaustive
review. However, we have also been reminded that, even if we
protect Americans from the threat of WMD proliferation, we must
constantly improve our processes to ensure that Americans
receive true value for their investment.
One of the recent lessons in this regard is that the
original concept of a cooperative program pays dividends by
increasing our partners' stake in the success of the assistance
activities they receive. Reemphasizing the ``C'' in ``CTR'' is
an important way to keep this key U.S. threat reduction program
on solid footing in its second decade.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to respond to any
questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bronson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lisa Bronson
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM
Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, thank you for inviting me to discuss
the Department of Defense (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
program. It has been 2 years since this subcommittee received testimony
on the CTR program, when Assistant Secretary J.D. Crouch II appeared
before you on March 6, 2002. Today, I would like to review some of the
important work accomplished since then.
In December 2003, the Fissile Material Storage
Facility at Mayak, Russia--some 7 years in construction--was
completed and certified by Russian regulators. The Mayak
project will consolidate and securely store more than 25 metric
tons of Russian weapons-origin plutonium.
In March 2003, construction on the Chemical Weapons
Destruction Facility (CWDF) at Shchuch'ye began after 11 years
of planning and negotiation. This facility will destroy all of
Russia's nerve agent inventory, thus eliminating a significant
proliferation concern. On March 18, 2003, Russia formally
committed to destroy all of its nerve agent weapons at
Shchuch'ye.
As of December 31, 2003, six countries have pledged
$69 million to CWDF infrastructure, helping to ensure that this
key project can begin operations on schedule.
In February 2003, Russia signed the Nuclear Weapons
Storage Site Security Protocol, granting CTR unprecedented
access to help consolidate and secure decommissioned nuclear
warheads.
DOD completed vulnerability assessments for six of
these sites and began designing comprehensive security upgrades
for each. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) will shortly
designate the next 10 sites for security enhancements. In
addition, CTR has procured and transferred to the MOD 123
``Quick Fix'' fencing and sensors sets for installation at
nuclear weapons storage sites, including the 12 noted above.
The Quick Fix sets are designed to provide interim security
upgrades to individual weapons bunkers. In all, DOD expects to
provide comprehensive security upgrades at more than 32 long-
term nuclear weapons storage sites, including Quick Fix and
more permanent measures.
In 2003, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan signed legal
agreements with us to provide the foundation for our Weapons of
Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI).
Kazakhstan and Ukraine are ready to sign similar agreements.
Georgia and Kazakhstan supplied us with dangerous pathogen
samples as our Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention
(BWPP) program moved forward.
In May 2003, we began destroying rail-mobile
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and
missiles in Russia.
In Autumn 2003, we delivered 60 small-arms training
sets and 1,200 hand-held radios to support nuclear weapons
storage security forces at all 60 sites we believe to be active
or used for training.
In December 2003, we completed and commissioned
systems to enhance security at the Kizner and Planovy chemical
weapons storage sites in Russia.
HOW IS PROGRESS MEASURED?
Mr. Chairman, the achievements noted above represent a reduction in
the threat posed by former Soviet WMD to the United States and its
allies. Threat reduction has always been a key measure of how well CTR
is doing. Another measure is how well we ensure that the taxpayers are
getting value for the money they invest in nonproliferation through the
CTR program. The Heptyl and Votkinsk situations, which involved
significant losses in CTR investments, reminded us that there is a
third important measure of success for this program. This is the extent
to which our partner countries truly ``cooperate'' in CTR. CTR has
never been traditional foreign assistance, and increasing the stake
that recipient countries have in the execution of CTR projects has
proven an essential measure of success.
In his February 4, 2004, testimony before the full committee,
Secretary Rumsfeld was asked why the President's fiscal year 2005 CTR
budget request for $409.2 million is lower than the fiscal year 2004
request ($450.8 million). There are a number of reasons for the modest
decrease. The question implies that the annual budget request is the
single measure of progress and the single indicator of commitment. It
is an important metric. But there are three others: actual threat
reduction, value for U.S. investments, and increasing recipients' stake
in the success of specific projects. Measured against the aggregate of
all four metrics, the CTR program continues to be a vital component of
the U.S. Government's national security strategy. The President and his
administration remain firmly committed to his 2002 pledge of $10
billion over 10 years for nonproliferation and threat reduction
programs in the former Soviet Union (FSU), including--but not limited
to--CTR. Yearly programmatic requirements mean that some annual
requests, as for fiscal year 2005, will be slightly below the $1
billion average; others will be slightly above.
It is important to acknowledge that, of the 62 CTR program areas
Congress has funded since the program's inception, 51 of those areas
are now complete. This reflects the large amount of former Soviet
nuclear weapons inventory and infrastructure that CTR has helped
eliminate or secure. Many of CTR's original array of projects are
reaching completion. These include projects that were capital-intense
in their early construction phases. CTR's fiscal year 2005 program plan
includes only two ``infrastructure-heavy'' projects: the Shchuch'ye
chemical weapons destruction project already under way, and
infrastructure supporting nuclear weapons site security enhancement
projects. Newer areas of CTR focus--biological weapons nonproliferation
and WMD-PPI--do not require capital-intense construction projects to
achieve their threat reduction goals.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request for Strategic Offensive Arms
Elimination in Russia--which accounts for strategic systems work--is
the same as it was for fiscal year 2004: $58 million. No money is
requested for this capital-intensive work in Ukraine for fiscal year
2005 because our threat reduction goals have been accomplished and we
have sufficient funds to eliminate the 163 remaining SS-24 solid rocket
motors by detonation or burning, pending Government of Ukraine
agreement on the technical approach and process.
The change from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2005 is caused
primarily by the initiation of construction at the Shchuch'ye CWDF.
Construction of the CWDF began in 2003, requiring a boost in fiscal
year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 spending. Consistent with similar
construction projects, customized, long-lead equipment that will be
inside the facility was ordered in 2003 and more will be ordered in
2004. Thus, the construction spending plan for the CWDF, adjusted for
delayed commencement, always included high spending at the onset of the
project. Decreased spending on Shchuch'ye, reflected in the fiscal year
2005 CTR request, tracks with completion of the capital-intense
construction phase, not a decrease in commitment. In fact, the actual
schedule to complete Shchuch'ye has been accelerated in accordance with
President Bush's direction: we plan to complete construction by
February 2007 and transfer custody to Russia by September 2008.
The authority Congress has granted to the President to waive the
conditions on the Shchuch'ye project has been critical to our progress
on this essential nonproliferation and threat reduction project. We
urge Congress to make that waiver authority permanent beginning in
fiscal year 2005, to that we can continue to work with Russia both to
resolve the concerns underlying the congressional conditions on the
Shchuch'ye projects and to allow the earliest possible destruction of
Russia's nerve agent.
The aggregate fiscal year 2005 request belies the number of
important new CTR projects that will move forward without large capital
infrastructure investments. These include the WMD-PPI and projects
designed to address potential biological weapons proliferation. A
summary of the fiscal year 2005 budget request is attached.
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
Mr. Chairman, we have reported in detail to you and other
committees on the $106 million loss suffered by CTR in the so-called
``Heptyl situation,'' in which Russia did not tell us that liquid
rocket fuel destined for a CTR-constructed neutralization facility had
been diverted to commercial uses. We have also had extended discussions
about the Votkinsk situation, in which CTR invested nearly $100 million
in designs and site preparation for a solid rocket fuel elimination
facility that was abruptly blocked by local Russian authorities.
Although the two situations were very different, they collectively
represented a severe blow to the credibility of our Russian partners
and caused us to rigorously review how we do business.
We asked the DOD Inspector General (IG) to review CTR
from top to bottom. The last of the IG's four reports that
responded to this request was issued last month. The IG's work
has been instructive and our staffs ultimately developed such
close working relationships that the IG accompanied one of the
DOD teams that meet semi-annually with Russian counterparts.
In 2002, we did a baseline risk assessment of all CTR
projects for weaknesses similar to the Heptyl situation--
reliance on good faith Russian promises or assumptions. Today,
legal commitments have replaced good faith obligations whenever
CTR-provided infrastructure or equipment is used to carry out
elimination projects.
Six of these new agreements already have been signed.
Based on our ``post-heptyl'' approach, we are awaiting
signature of two additional agreements by the Russian MOD
before any new work on the associated projects (enhancement of
additional nuclear warhead storage sites and nuclear warhead
rail transport car replacement) will be initiated. New legal
commitments are introduced as needed to respond to new
assistance requests.
Each new project proposal is considered only after
methodical analysis of ``Heptyl-like'' risks. This is the
potential for the recipient country to use CTR assistance for
purposes other than those intended. If the risk can be
mitigated by legal and implementation strategies, then the
proposal can be reviewed on its merits. If the risk cannot be
mitigated the project will not be pursued.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics created the office of the Deputy
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical
Demilitarization and Threat Reduction (CD&TR)) with special
oversight over CTR implementation. CD&TR and the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA), implemented several management changes
to reduce our risks. These changes follow DOD acquisition
management processes to promote a disciplined, business like
approach to mitigate risk:
First is the adoption of the Milestone
Decision Authority (MDA) system, which is modeled after
the Defense Acquisition Board process. The MDA is the
one person responsible for balancing requirements with
risks, and approving and overseeing cost, schedule, and
performance baselines.
Second, we evaluated all projects against
cost, schedule, and political risk, and assigned the
appropriate level MDA for each project. Each project
will have a baseline approved and monitored by a MDA.
Third, we adopted the Integrated Product Team
(IPT) system to include all the stakeholders in the
implementation process, so tradeoffs between risk and
requirements can be made in a cooperative and working
atmosphere.
Fourth, we adopted a new reporting system to
alert higher management of any issues related to cost,
schedule, and performance.
Finally, we are opening up more overseas
offices in the FSU to allow for better onsite
management. These include offices in Tblisi, Georgia to
support biological weapons proliferation prevention,
Perm, Russia for solid ICBM elimination, and
Shchuch'ye, Russia for chemical weapons destruction.
Other offices may be opened up as our work expands.
Mr. Chairman, it could be argued that the array of management
changes implemented over the past 2 years risks a slow down in CTR
project execution. With the recent losses in Russia, we had no choice.
We are carefully balancing our three goals of threat reduction, value
for taxpayers' investment, and increased participation by partner
countries. In some cases, simultaneous achievement of all three goals
creates extra steps in program execution. Our judgement is that this
results in a better program. For example:
The program of semi-annual ``executive reviews'' with
Russian agencies responsible for CTR projects has been a
vehicle to streamline communication, if not actually expedite
projects. The executive reviews have transformed the way we do
business with Russia by putting a premium on regularized
transparency, accountability and open dialogue. Since July
2002, five executive reviews have been held and our teams
report that their Russian counterparts have been progressively
more responsive and better prepared.
In 2003, the Russian Aviation and Space Agency (RASA)
volunteered to pay for refurbishment of three open-burn
stands--potentially a $65 million expense--to help keep the
mobile missile elimination project area on track after the loss
at Votkinsk. RASA also readily agreed to new legal commitments
we proposed to limit our risks on other aspects of the mobile
missile elimination project area. This was the first time
Russia independently increased its stake in a threat reduction
project's success.
We are also improving our business practices within
the U.S. In the past, the complicated process of releasing
appropriated CTR funds for actual obligation took over 180
days. This involved certification or waiver of eligibility for
the recipient country and congressional notification. For 2004
funds, a certification or waiver was executed for most CTR
countries, including Russia, on November 7, 2003, only 37 days
into the fiscal year. The waiver authority has proven an
important threat reduction tool with respect to Russia, and as
the waiver authority expires at the end of fiscal year 2005, we
will urge that Congress make this authority permanent in the
next legislative cycle (2006).
Finally, we have significantly improved our responsiveness to
Congress. During the past 2 years, CTR policy and implementation staff
have worked very hard to resolve a backlog of reports and
notifications--some 24 reports and notifications have been delivered.
For the first time since the inception of the requirement, the CTR
annual report was delivered on time in early February of this year.
Congressional oversight of the CTR program is important and welcomed. I
estimate that the CTR policy and implementation staff spent an average
of 5,300 hours per year during the past 3 years responding to reporting
requirements and audits. We appreciate the move by Congress to
consolidate several of those reporting and notification requirements
into a single ``CTR Annual Report.'' This allows us to provide the same
amount of information in a more efficient manner.
THE FIRST PROJECT-BY-PROJECT REVIEW
Since September 11, 2001, DOD has refined the CTR program to ensure
that it effectively addresses new threats associated with the global
war on terrorism, even as we continue to pursue the program's
longstanding goals and project activities. In March 2003 we began a 6-
month, comprehensive, detailed, project-by-project review of the CTR
program, building on the overall administration review of non-
proliferation and threat reduction assistance in 2001.
We evaluated the Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination and Nuclear
Weapons Transportation/Security project areas against several criteria:
actual contribution to threat reduction, support to national strategy
and the global war on terrorism, best value for taxpayers' money, and
the extent to which our Russian and Ukrainian partners have had an
increasing stake in, and responsibility for, a project's success. We
chose these project areas because they included a number of activities
that had been under way for many years--certainly prior to the changes
in U.S. strategy brought on by the September 11 attacks. We did not
review the chemical weapons destruction, BWPP, or WMD-PPI project areas
because they are more recent projects that are clearly in line with our
current nonproliferation priorities.
The review resulted in the revalidation of a majority of Strategic
Offensive Arms Elimination and Nuclear Weapons Transportation/Security
projects in Russia including the rescoping of 20 projects. All current
contractual and other commitments in Russia will be fulfilled. The
review resulted in the revalidation of our general approach in Ukraine
with extensive refinements to certain projects.
We reviewed Ukrainian and Russian projects separately because of a
significant difference in key acquisition milestones. The Ukraine
review was completed in March 2003, approved by the U.S. interagency in
April and briefed to Ukrainian officials in May. The Russia review was
completed in August 2003, approved by the interagency in October and
briefed to Russian officials in November.
Russia
The rescoping review for Russia revalidated the contribution of all
project areas to current threat reduction efforts, with some important
adjustments.
Liquid-fuel missiles: The importance of continuing
elimination of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
and ICBMs as well as the silos and launchers from which they
are removed was revalidated. However, CTR will cease to regrade
silo sites once current commitments are fulfilled. This
function will be turned over to Russia. We concluded that silo
regrading, while an important safety matter, did not contribute
to CTR's core threat reduction mission and could reasonably be
assumed by Russia.
Solid-fuel missiles: Most of the activity in this area
is yet to begin, as mobile SS-24 and SS-25 missiles are just
beginning to be decommissioned. The importance of eliminating
these strategic systems, as well as their launchers, as rapidly
as Russia will turn them over was reaffirmed. However, CTR will
refrain from eliminating a number of SS-N-20 missiles that have
already been decommissioned until Russia turns over additional
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) for
dismantling. As a matter of policy, CTR always insists that
launchers (silos, mobile launchers or SSBN launch compartments)
be turned over for elimination if we are to eliminate the
associated missiles. Eliminating the missiles alone could
facilitate modernization of overall Russian force structure.
SSBN dismantlement: CTR will continue defueling SSBNs,
sealing the reactors, and removing and eliminating the missile
launcher compartments. However, the practice of cutting up the
bows and sterns will be turned over to Russia. We concluded
that the work on bows and sterns did not contribute to threat
reduction because it is not essential to the disabling of the
submarine as a whole and elimination of the launcher
compartment. In addition, this is an area where Russia can
reasonably be expected to increase its stake in the success of
this project area.
Spent Nuclear Fuel. CTR will continue defueling SSBN
reactors and securing the fuel in specially designed casks.
However, the project to refurbish a building for long-term
storage of the casks at the Mayak nuclear complex will be
suspended once designs are complete. There is enough storage
space at the shipyards where SSBNs are dismantled to
temporarily store these casks pending final disposition by the
Russian Federation. CTR is prepared to improve security at the
shipyard storage areas if necessary. The Mayak refurbishment
project was judged to be an unnecessary infrastructure
requirement that did not contribute to threat reduction.
Nuclear Weapons Security/Transportation. We
revalidated the value of supporting Russian transportation of
warheads to secure, central storage sites with improved
inventory controls. However, CTR will turn over to Russia
responsibility for the personnel reliability and emergency
response support activities under this project area. These
activities will be at low cost to Russia, and provide an
opportunity to increase Moscow's stake in the success of this
project. In addition, CTR will continue transferring
responsibility for certain nuclear weapons storage site
security projects to the Department of Energy (DOE). The DOD
and DOE have worked closely on these complimentary efforts over
the past 2 years. Among other issues, storage sites more
closely associated with DOE activities were shifted to the DOE
for security improvements. These sites were often sites linked
to Russian naval facilities.
The rescoping review for Russia will ultimately affect
approximately $185 million. These are funds that will be reallocated to
other CTR projects, or that will shift to DOE through the transfer of
certain nuclear weapons storage security responsibilities.
Ukraine
As a result of our review, we decided to cancel the CTR project
that would have built a hydro-mining system to remove solid fuel from
previously demilitarized SS-24 missile stages and convert the byproduct
to mining explosive that would be turned over to Ukraine for sale. The
project was significantly over budget and presented further cost
escalation risks. Technical aspects of safely storing the propellant
by-product and converting it into mining explosives also were
unresolved after significant expense. All warheads and proliferable
components have been removed from the 163 rocket motors, which are in
safe storage built by CTR. Accordingly, the threat from these missiles
has been eliminated. We have offered Ukraine an alternative, less risky
means of disposing of these motors. After understandably tough
consultations we recently received an expression of interest from Kiev.
We also cancelled CTR projects in Ukraine that would have
neutralized fuel from air-to-surface missiles, and destroyed liquid
rocket fuel tank farms and concrete aprons where strategic bombers once
sat on alert. We concluded that these projects no longer supported
CTR's central threat reduction and nonproliferation mission because
this infrastructure, in its current form, could not be used for any
threatening activity or proliferated outside Ukraine. The requirements
to eliminate this infrastructure are not complex or expensive, and were
judged readily assumable by Ukraine. We revalidated projects to destroy
strategic bombers still in Ukraine, as well as several old nuclear
warhead storage bunkers, the designs for which could be exploited.
Overall, we assessed that over $100 million in CTR activities
previously programmed for Ukraine did not make a direct contribution to
threat reduction. Of that total, approximately $30 million had already
been appropriated. These funds will be reallocated to other CTR
activities in Ukraine, including the biological weapons and WMD
proliferation prevention project areas.
Mr. Chairman, reviewing, revalidating, and rescoping these project
goals in Russia and Ukraine will help ensure that CTR remains focused
on current threat reduction priorities. Our adjustments to project
areas are designed to ensure that CTR is returning real
nonproliferation value for the taxpayer's investments. Our insistence
on increased Russian participation in certain ongoing projects is
directed toward increasing Russia's stake and accountability in the CTR
program.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION PREVENTION
Mr. Chairman, we estimate that there are approximately 40
institutes that were part of the Soviet biological weapons program.
These institutes often contain extensive collections of dangerous
pathogens. They face threats from within--under-employed experts; and
from without--poorly secured facilities and weak inventory controls. We
address this former Soviet biological weapons threat by balancing
carefully the risks of proliferation against Russia's compliance with
international commitments. In Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia,
CTR's BWPP activities continue. In addition, an agreement to support
CTR BWPP work in Ukraine is near completion and we hope to expand this
project area to Kyrgyz Republic this year. CTR helps to reduce the
biological weapons proliferation threat by:
Consolidating and enhancing the security of dangerous
pathogen collections at biological institutes to help prevent
their theft, diversion, or accidental release;
Eliminating infrastructure, equipment, and facilities
previously used to perform biological weapons related research,
testing, and production;
Engaging former biological weapons scientists in
peaceful pursuits by refocusing research priorities and
projects, increasing transparency at biological institutes,
promoting higher standards of ethical conduct, preempting a
potential ``brain drain'' of scientists to rogue states and
terrorist groups, and providing U.S. access to scientific
expertise and pathogens to improve public health and enhance
preparedness against biological threats;
Implementing a Biological Weapons Threat Agent
Detection and Response (TADR) project in Central Asia and the
caucasus to access medical intelligence, consolidate pathogen
collections into central labs, modernize diagnostic
capabilities to minimize need for pathogen retention at
vulnerable field stations, and develop a network of trained,
ethical scientists to prevent, deter, and contain either a
naturally occurring outbreak or a bioterrorist attack.
Of course, none of this work can go forward with fiscal year 2004
funds until the congressional notification requirements of section 1304
(National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004) are met. I do
not anticipate problems meeting this requirement for Kazakhstan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Georgia. Outside Russia, cooperation on BWPP
activities has been very good. We have had prompt agreement on the
legal architecture to cover this CTR project area. In addition, a
number of countries readily provided samples of dangerous pathogen
strains native to their regions. DOD management and technical teams
made nine trips in support of BWPP overall during 2003. Our teams
traveled to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to discuss anticipated projects
and toured three Uzbek and two Kazakh institutes to record observations
and photographs to support future work. These teams also reviewed the
ongoing threat and vulnerability analyses of these institutes and
evaluated recommendations for emergency security upgrades proposed by
the CTR contractor on these projects.
Russia poses unique challenges in this area:
We continue to be concerned with Russia's compliance
with the Biological Weapons Convention.
We are also concerned about the solvency of certain
Russian laboratories being assisted by CTR.
Russia has still not provided a sample of its altered
anthrax strain. A research grant was made with the clear
understanding that the altered anthrax strain would be provided
to the U.S. The Russian government has obstructed the release
of this strain. This is inconsistent with the spirit of
cooperation against the bioterrorism threat to which Presidents
Bush and Putin agreed in November 2001.
We are also concerned that Russia has not been more
forthcoming on developing an efficient legal architecture
through which to provide CTR assistance. This assistance is
currently provided through the International Science and
Technology Center agreement negotiated by the Department of
State. While it is possible to carry on CTR activities in this
manner, it is inconsistent with CTR's strategy of using
project-related implementing agreements.
Sound implementing agreements are one of the ways we manage program
risks that are inherent in CTR's work. We also took several important
steps in 2002 and 2003 to manage the proliferation risks associated
with Russia's collections of pathogens and biological infrastructure.
In September 2002, the administration adopted
interagency guidelines for U.S. efforts to engage the former
Soviet biological weapons community, which take into account
our concerns about Russia's failure to fully comply with its
Biological Weapons Convention commitments. These guidelines
help U.S. agencies support nonproliferation policy choices by
providing project evaluation and selection criteria and by
establishing a coordination mechanism for agencies involved in
bio-related assistance to Russia.
We refined and added to the internal DOD review
mechanism that is designed to mitigate risks associated with
Cooperative Biological Research (CBR) projects. A new CBR
project proposal is reviewed by a DOD Advisory Board consisting
of biodefense, counterproliferation, technology security and
intelligence experts. Proposals are studied for dual-use
potential, scientific and technical merit, relevance to
national strategy, risk of diversion, and feasibility. These
projects are also scrutinized using the MDA review process.
The DTRA and the Department of the Army concluded a
memorandum of understanding in January 2004 that will help
ensure a supply of seasoned U.S. personnel to support CTR's
cooperative biological research program. These personnel, under
the auspices of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Disease (USAMRIID) will help to bring western
standards of research transparency and conduct to the former
Soviet biological weapons community. The experience of the
USAMRIID personnel also helps limit the risk of CTR assistance
being surreptitiously diverted for purposes inconsistent with
international law.
Keeping Russia's biological weapons technology, pathogen
collections, and expertise out of terrorist hands strengthens U.S.
national security; however, those national security benefits need to be
carefully weighed against the inherent risks of engagement. The risk of
misuse can never be reduced to zero, but we are using policy and
implementation strategies to minimize this risk and allow us to focus
on the goal of BWPP.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION-PROLIFERATION PREVENTION INITIATIVE
The WMD-PPI is designed to address the vulnerability of the FSU's
porous borders to WMD smuggling. DOD intends to build capabilities of
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine to stem the potential
proliferation of WMD.
During 2003, the CTR staff began building the necessary legal
framework for assistance to the four WMD-PPI recipient governments.
Much progress has been made, with agreements signed between the DOD and
Azerbaijan in January 2004, and between the DOD and Uzbekistan in
October 2003. Ukraine has notified us that it is ready to sign, and we
are in final negotiations with Kazakhstan. Discussion of requirements
with these recipients is also at a mature stage, and obligation of
funds will begin this year. We will provide equipment, training, and
other support to help develop self-sustaining capabilities to prevent
the trafficking of WMD materials across recipients' borders. WMD-PPI is
being implemented in close coordination with other U.S. agencies to
ensure it complements ongoing government assistance projects.
Our plans include providing Uzbekistan the ability to detect
radiological materials at key border crossings. This project area will
be designed to transition into the larger DOE ``Second Line of
Defense'' program once DOE is better positioned to assume
responsibility. This activity helps WMD-PPI leverage pre-existing
relationships in Uzbekistan during a period of increased DOD activity
in the area.
A key element of WMD-PPI will be a Caspian Sea WMD maritime
interdiction project. We will provide surveillance radars and boarding
and maritime interdiction equipment, to include small vessels, to
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to build their capabilities to police their
own borders against illicit WMD trafficking. An essential aspect of
this project will be inclusion of WMD-related training both for
operation of the equipment as well as follow-on maintenance
requirements. This is a capabilities-based WMD non-proliferation
activity: CTR's goal is to do what is necessary to build the
capability, and then eventually turn it over to Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan to execute as their contribution to the global war on
terrorism and WMD. Our initial plan calls for a 5-year project timeline
to create the necessary capabilities.
In Ukraine, WMD-PPI will assume a larger place, along with the
BWPP, now that strategic infrastructure projects have been cancelled or
wrapped up more quickly. Notional plans include building Ukrainian
capabilities to detect and interdict smuggled radiological materials in
the Transnistria region.
EXPANDED AUTHORITY
The administration appreciates the new authority granted the
President to use up to $50 million annually in existing CTR
appropriations outside the FSU. Section 1308 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for 2004 provides this important flexibility in the
global war on terrorism. Enactment of this provision was a truly
significant modernization of CTR's basic authorities. It allows our
important work to go forward while improving readiness for a variety of
contingencies in the global war on terrorism where DOD might bring
special non-proliferation expertise to bear. On February 11, the
President called for the expansion of the G-8 Global Partnership
Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, of
which CTR is an important part, to address WMD proliferation threats
worldwide. He specifically mentioned retraining WMD scientists and
technicians in countries like Iraq and Libya, and the need to secure
and eliminate WMD and radiological materials worldwide. The ability to
use CTR outside the FSU is an important tool to help realize the
President's proposal; we urge Congress to maintain the new authority.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz wrote his Russian
counterparts in mid-2003 to urge their prompt action on a pending CTR
legal agreement. He told these senior officials that ``we are reviewing
all CTR project areas for consistency with U.S. nonproliferation goals
as well as good stewardship of U.S. resources. The amendment we have
requested is reasonable and will facilitate the important cooperative
nonproliferation work DOD has undertaken . . . through the CTR
program.''
Dr. Wolfowitz's message captures what we have done with CTR since
the Heptyl and Votkinsk situations, and through the course of the
rescoping review. CTR has been reducing the threat of WMD since it
began over a decade ago. We have revalidated that goal and the
contribution of our activities to that goal in an exhaustive review.
However, we have also been reminded that even as we protect Americans
from the threat of WMD proliferation, we must constantly improve our
processes to ensure that Americans receive true value for their
investment. One of the recent lessons in this regard is that the
original concept of a ``cooperative'' program pays dividends by
increasing our partners' stake in the success of the assistance
activities they receive. Re-emphasizing the ``C'' in CTR is an
important way to keep this key US threat reduction program on solid
footing in its second decade.
ATTACHMENT
FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST
Russia: Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)
The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $58.5 million for
SOAE--unchanged from fiscal year 2004. SOAE assists Russia in
eliminating strategic delivery systems and infrastructure. One of the
larger project areas under SOAE relates to Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM
and Mobile Launcher Elimination, where $29.1 million is requested for
fiscal year 2005. Other funds eliminate SLBMs and liquid-fueled ICBMs
and their launchers. The program supports placement of spent naval
reactor fuel into casks for long term storage, destruction of the
launcher section and sealing of the reactor compartment.
Russia: Nuclear Weapons Storage Security (NWSS)
CTR's NWSS program assists Russia with safe and secure storage for
nuclear warheads. We requested $48.6 million in the fiscal year 2005
budget for this program. All of the funds are directed toward the Site
Security Enhancements project, which provides urgently needed security
enhancements to the MOD nuclear weapons storage sites and select
temporary transshipment points for movement of deactivated warheads.
DOE provides comprehensive security enhancements to storage sites on
all Russian Navy and some Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) bases. These
activities are closely coordinated with DOE and other U.S. agencies.
Russia: Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security (NWTS)
We have requested $26.3 million for the NWTS program, which will
provide safe and secure transport of approximately 1,500 nuclear
warheads from deployed sites to dismantlement or enhanced security
storage sites. This is a $3.1 million increase over the fiscal year
2004 budget. This increase reflects an anticipated increase in railroad
shipping tariffs and a need to replace aging warhead cargo railcars.
Russia: Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) Construction
In December 2003, CTR completed work on and transferred custody of
the FMSF to the Russian Federation. This facility provides a secure,
centralized storage facility for weapons grade fissile material. DOD is
negotiating a transparency agreement to ensure the quality and quantity
of material stored at the FMSF. DOD may require funding to design,
construct, test, and certify a system to assess whether the contents of
the fissile material containers to be loaded in the FMSF are of the
desired quality and quantity.
Russia: Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention
Overall funding requested for the BWPP program in fiscal year 2005
rose slightly from $54.2 million in fiscal year 2004 to $54.9 million.
The BWPP funding request reflects the administration's firm commitment
to combat biological weapons proliferation as part of the war on
terrorism. DOD anticipates obligating approximately $20 million of
fiscal year 2005 funds for BWPP activities in Russia.
Russia: Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD)
The budget request for the CWD program in Russia is $158.4 million,
a decrease of $41.9 million. The reduction results primarily from the
fact that we have passed the high point of the construction funding
curve on the CWDF at Shchuch'ye. In addition, we will complete work on
the Chemical Weapons Production Facility Demilitarization project at
Volgograd this year.
The CWDF saw a significant increase in fiscal year 2004 spending
due to initiation of construction in March of last year. Since the
design for the entire facility was over 80 percent complete, the
construction drawing sets for many buildings were approved for
construction. DOD has authorized construction of those buildings using
the prior-year funding. The fiscal year 2005 funding level ($155.2
million) continues to meet the President's direction to accelerate the
CWDF consistent with the rebaselined schedule that calls for
construction completion in February 2007 and transfer of custody to the
Russian Federation by September 2008. Congress, in fiscal year 2002,
conditioned all future funding for construction at Shchuch'ye on its
certification of six conditions; the administration continues to press
Russia on the two that remain unfulfilled: a full and complete
accounting of the size of the Russian chemical weapons stockpile, and
the completion of a practical plan for eliminating nerve agents.
NON-RUSSIAN FSU STATES: BWPP
The budget request for BWPP increased slightly from the fiscal year
2004 level of $54.2 million to $54.9 million. DOD anticipates
obligating $34.9 million toward non-Russian FSU states in fiscal year
2005, a significant increase from fiscal year 2004. This increase is
due primarily to the expansion of the CBR project area and Biosecurity
and Biosafety projects in the region, as well as continued
implementation of the biological weapons TADR project in Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, and Georgia. Ukraine and the Kyrgyz Republic have expressed
interest in BWPP program activities and CTR staff are negotiating the
necessary legal framework to support such assistance.
For CTR's Biological Weapons Infrastructure
Dismantlement and Restructuring program, DOD is requesting $1.7
million for fiscal year 2005 to continue eliminating remnants
of Soviet biological weapons-related infrastructure in Georgia
and Kazakhstan.
For CTR's CBR project area, DOD is requesting $7.1
million for fiscal year 2005. This will continue projects in
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to help prevent the proliferation of
biological weapons expertise, enhance transparency, improve
standards of conduct of former biological weapons scientists,
and leverage their extensive expertise. There is currently one
project in Kazakhstan and two in Uzbekistan; CTR plans to
develop new projects in both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as well
as in Georgia. In addition, we hope to be able to move forward
with this project area in Ukraine during fiscal year 2005.
For CTR's Biosecurity and Biosafety project area, DOD
is requesting $12.6 million for fiscal year 2005. We will
continue projects in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia. We
hope to initiate projects in Ukraine and the Kyrgyz Republic
under this project area.
For CTR's TADR project area, DOD is requesting $13.5
million for fiscal year 2005. Under this project area, CTR
promotes biosecurity and biosafety at biological facilities in
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia by strengthening dangerous
pathogen detection and response networks, facilitating the
discovery of the diversion or accidental release of biological
materials and allowing the removal of dangerous pathogen
collections from existing sentinel stations and consolidation
of them in central reference laboratories. We hope to initiate
projects in Ukraine and Kyrgistan.
NON-RUSSIAN FSU STATES: WMD-PPI
As in 2003 and 2004, we are requesting $40.0 million in fiscal year
2005 to support WMD-PPI, which is designed to enhance Kazakh, Azeri,
Ukrainian, and Uzbeki capabilities to prevent, deter, detect, and
interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and related materials. While this
is not a security assistance program, DOD is coordinating with other
U.S. agencies to finalize the overarching strategic plan for export
control and border security assistance to these states. This initiative
builds on the foundation created by the CTR Defense and Military
Contacts program.
In implementing the WMD-PPI, DOD has developed projects designed to
produce comprehensive operational capabilities based on the interagency
approved U.S. strategic plan and country/regional requirements. These
projects will provide not only equipment and related training, but also
self-sustaining operations and maintenance capabilities.
Senator Roberts. Ms. Bronson, I thank you for an excellent
statement. Thank you for summarizing your very important
points, especially in regards to your emphasis on the
cooperative nature of these programs.
I am not going to get into a personal history of this, but
this subcommittee was first formed on the suggestion of Senator
Warner, Senator Lieberman, and Senator Coats, and I did have
the privilege of chairing it at its first beginning. Obviously,
the Nunn-Lugar program and the other programs have a life of
their own in terms of value. But we have experienced serious
problems and we have come up with some requirements, as a
matter of fact, the requirements that basically saved the
program from the criticisms that were being voiced in the
House, and agreed to by the Russians and many delegations that
would come here.
Under the circumstances, I think that your comments are
right on point.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your testimony. Both witnesses and the
chairman referred to the President's speech, and it was a
sobering but also a very ambitious challenge to all of us. I
wonder how the budget for this year measures up to the
challenge and to the scope of the problem. I know, Secretary
Bronson, you said it is only one measure of what you are doing,
but as I understand it the DOD budget goes down by $40 million.
There are significant cuts of programs, but deferral in some
cases of programs that were anticipated to begin.
Can you comment on how the resources match the nature of
the challenge and also the President's commitment to do a great
deal more about it? Secretary Bronson?
Ms. Bronson. I would be happy to do that. While my written
testimony goes through line by line our budget request, you
have raised an important point. If you look at the size of our
budget request in fiscal year 2003, we asked for $414.4
million. Last year, for 2004, we asked for $448.6 million. This
year, as you have correctly pointed out, we have asked for
$409.2 million.
The vast majority of that extra $40 million or so was
specifically asked for in 2004 to help us with the Shchuch'ye
chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF). In 2003 and 2004,
we went ahead and we got over what I would refer to as the
heavy infrastructure construction bump in this project. We are
spending this year and we began to spend the money to go ahead
and complete the construction and buy the capital-intensive
equipment for that facility. We are not going to have those
same kinds of up-front costs in 2005 and 2006.
The amount of money we are requesting for the strategic
offensive arms elimination is exactly the same as we asked for
last year. The amount of money that we are requesting for BWPP
activities is a bit more than we are for last year. The amount
of money that we are requesting for an important new program,
the WMD proliferation prevention initiative, is also more than
we asked for last year.
These two programs, the BWPP and the program for assisting
the countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia to deal with
their porous borders, these are not capital-intensive projects.
These are projects where we can achieve results without the
kinds of expenditure of money that we have to spend in a case
like the CWDF.
So I would urge close review of what we are trying to do
and what we are trying to do with the money, in addition to
scrutiny of the actual amount that we have asked for, Senator.
Senator Reed. Well, I thank you. That is a very thoughtful
response. I am going to turn to Mr. Longsworth in a moment. It
strikes me too that in a situation where your theater
operations have been expanded outside of the FSU, which would
argue probably for more challenges and more money, also there
is a refocusing on the war on terror, not just the traditional
sort of dismantling of national weapons depots and national
weapons systems like in the FSU. Also, the impression I have is
that every time we turn around we discover the scope of this
problem is much bigger than we ever thought, and also time does
not seem to be on our side.
We all will carefully look at the budget. It seems to me
that we can and should do much more, but I thank you for your
very careful and thoughtful response.
Mr. Longsworth, I would ask you the same question,
essentially.
Mr. Longsworth. Our budget, has a 1-percent increase. As I
noted in my testimony, that is augmented by the contributions
from other G-8 nations, which are also spending increasing
amounts of money in Russia. In our budget, I agree with what
Ms. Bronson said--some of the things that will have the
greatest impact on stemming proliferation are not high dollar
activities. We have a $7 million increase in our export control
program. That is a very small amount of money that pays big
dividends in terms of detecting and creating a capability in
other countries to detect and address proliferation that comes
through their ports or across their borders.
So it is not all about large capital projects. Some of
these activities do not require large amounts of money to get a
big bang. So we have focused on those. Our radiological
dispersal device (RDD) program, where we are helping other
countries to secure, consolidate, and in some cases dispose of,
RDD-usable materials, again those are not large dollar amounts,
but again it gets a big bang for the buck, no pun intended.
Senator Reed. I am not going to touch that, Mr.
Administrator.
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Let me focus on a specific area, and that is
the emerging news from Pakistan about proliferation, about
diversion of materials. Can you comment in general--we will
start with you, Mr. Longsworth--about what you may be doing in
Pakistan today?
Mr. Longsworth. I think what the U.S. is doing I would
prefer to defer to closed session.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Secretary Bronson, similar?
Ms. Bronson. Yes, I think that is best discussed in a
closed session.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
As I mentioned before, in your testimony, Secretary
Bronson, you discussed the review of the CTR program which was
completed in August to ensure that it effectively addresses new
threats associated with the global war on terror. From a
programmatic perspective, what does this mean? Were programs
cancelled, postponed, transferred, or created? Is the CTR
program going to shift its focus to support other
administration initiatives?
Can you fill us in on the programmatic effect of this
review?
Ms. Bronson. The programmatic effect with respect to Russia
was that we revalidated all of the project areas that we are
currently working on. This includes the project areas on liquid
fuel missiles, solid fuel missiles, SSBN dismantlement, spent
nuclear fuel, and nuclear weapons security and transportation.
While we revalidated these project areas we rescoped
certain specific aspects of them to make sure that the CTR
money was used specifically to reduce the threat. For example,
in the area of SLBM and ICBM elimination, we used to pay for
the regrading of the silos after the dismantlement took place.
For the most part, this is not an activity that contributes to
actual threat reduction. So our judgment was, number one, that
does not contribute to actual threat reduction; number two, it
is a task that can be taken on by the Russians; number three,
it is relatively inexpensive and within the Russians'
capabilities. That is a more appropriate task for the Russians
to do and we keep our money focused on the actual reduction of
the threat.
The same kind of rationale was in effect when we looked at
the solid fuel missiles. For example, we are only going to
dismantle the number of missiles that are related to the actual
launchers that are also turned over for destruction, or the
actual SSBN launch compartments that are turned over for
destruction. That is because we want to be sure that we do not
inadvertently contribute to the modernization of the Russian
force. If we get launchers and missiles together, then we can
be sure that we are actually contributing to the reduction of
the threat, and this is another type of activity that was
revalidated in our review.
Another example is with the----
Senator Reed. Excuse me for interrupting, but the thrust of
my question was more about how this new focus on the global war
on terrorism affects programmatic issues.
Ms. Bronson. I misunderstood the question. I thought you
were asking more about the rescoping. With respect to the
global war on terrorism, what we have done over the last 2
years is to look at two projects in specific. One is the WMD
Proliferation Prevention Initiative (PPI). This is the
initiative to go ahead and create infrastructure, training, and
capabilities in countries like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan so
that they can be partners in the global war against terrorism
by doing a better job of policing their own borders.
So what we have done in the last 2 years is gone ahead and
complete implementing agreements with a number of countries in
the regions. We have made in the area of five specific visits
to the region for the purpose of assessing how we can improve
their border security, how we can improve their training, and
what kinds of equipment that these countries in the region
would need to increase their ability to police their borders.
Similarly, in the area of biological weapons proliferation,
we have been working with a number of countries to enhance
their ability to better detect either unusual outbreaks of
disease or events that could be precipitated by biological
weapons terrorism, so that they can be part of the overall
network in combatting potential bioterrorism.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me just follow up with two specific questions about
dismantling of SSBNs in the FSU. Recently there were some
changes you made in these arrangements. Will that affect the
overall number of submarines that we will propose to or will be
able to dismantle? I understand also there has been a recent
decision not to build a spent fuel storage facility. Will that
impact the number of these submarines that can be dismantled?
Ms. Bronson. The overall number of submarines that can be
dismantled will not be affected by what we have done. The key
rate-limiting step in the number of submarines that we can
dismantle is the number of submarines that Russia is prepared
to turn over to us.
Senator Reed. But is there a relationship between what we
do and their willingness to turn submarines over to us?
Ms. Bronson. We have found no relationship between the two,
Senator.
Senator Reed. So even though we have made changes in terms
of--as I understand it, previously there was a complete
dismantlement of the submarine into scrap and now the proposal
is just to remove the nuclear components, but not funding or
allowing the dismantling, leaving basically the remaining part
of the ship. That will not inhibit the willingness of the
Russians to turn these ships over to us?
Ms. Bronson. We briefed the Russians on this and when we
briefed them they had no objection.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you.
One final question and then I would like to recognize, on
behalf of the chairman, Senator Akaka. I understand, Mr.
Longsworth, that you recently announced a program to work with
Iraqi scientists. Can you just describe in general details how
this program will be structured? Are these nuclear weapons
scientists or just scientists in general, and how will you
address the perennial issue of liability?
Mr. Longsworth. Let me start at the tail end of your
question. It is interesting that with other countries we have
not had the same liability roadblocks that we have had with
Russia. Other countries are willing to accept the liability
standard that we have asked for, again to protect U.S. workers
and companies.
Senator Reed. Can I just interject? It is my understanding
that there are arrangements with Russia that have liability
protections that are already up and running. But we are asking
for more expansive protections in general now. I guess it begs
the question, if we can get some programs up and running with
one form of liability, why do we have to change the score?
Mr. Longsworth. We have suspended several programs that had
separate liability provisions in them, most notably the 1998
Plutonium Disposition Agreement and the NCI agreement. The rest
of our programs are attached to the CTR umbrella agreement,
which has not expired yet, and Ms. Bronson can talk more about
that.
Today, our programs use CTR liability protections as their
umbrella agreement.
Senator Reed. Again, I diverted you for a moment. Just a
quick point on Iraq and then I am going to cease work.
Mr. Longsworth. Yes. This is a cooperative effort we are
doing with the nations in the Persian Gulf region. This is not
a U.S. initiative. This will not have a U.S. face on it. It
will have an Arab face on it. We are cooperating with the other
nations. They have formed an organization that will go into
Iraq and, much the opposite of what we are trying to do in
Russia--in Russia we are trying to make sure that scientists
that leave the lab have some soft landing so that they do not
go work for a rogue element. In Iraq it is the opposite. We are
trying to bring the scientists back and give them legitimate
work. So it is the inverse of what we are trying to do in
Russia.
But we will provide some funding. Regional partners will
provide additional funding. The intent is to employ scientists
that could support WMD programs. It is WMD across the board. It
is not just nuclear, because you need physicists, you need
chemists, you need engineers in all of those types of weapons
programs. So this is something that will address WMD generally.
Obviously, our principal interest parochially for our program
is nuclear, but the people that we will employ could work in a
broad range of WMD programs.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts [presiding]. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Longsworth, I want to tell you that I am pleased that
the Off-Site Source Recovery Program is receiving more support.
I am pleased about that. I have been urging this for a while,
and I want to thank you for taking this on and bringing it to
this point.
You said in your testimony that, given recent threats to
the United States, it has become increasingly clear that
protecting and securing nuclear materials and detecting nuclear
and radioactive materials at foreign ports, airports, and
border crossings is a very high priority.
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir.
Senator Akaka. Yet, the fiscal year 2005 budget request is
$238 million, while the budget request for fiscal year 2004 was
$249.5 million. So my question to you is, what part of the
program will have to be sacrificed due to these cuts?
Mr. Longsworth. Actually, it is an anomaly of the way
budgets are presented. There was a significant add-on to our
request in fiscal year 2004. So it looks as though the budget
is decreasing. It is actually increasing if you normalize that.
I believe we got almost a $90 million plus-up for Megaports.
Our ability to absorb that funding is limited. We have to
sign agreements with the host countries, we have to go do site
surveys. All of these activities take time. Now, I will say we
cannot engage in negotiations with a government unless we, with
these foreign governments, have the obligational authority. So
we do have to have the money in our account before we can sign
an agreement with a foreign government.
But I think we are spending at about the rate we can spend.
I do not know that we can spend much more than we have already.
Again, the reason it looks like it is a decrease is simply that
we got a very large additional plus-up from Congress in fiscal
year 2004. So fiscal year 2005 looks like it is decreasing, but
the trend line is certainly up.
So I guess the short answer to your question is nothing
will not be done. In fact, we are able to accelerate because of
that plus-up. Again, the people that work in this program--
there is one woman who I think she has been home 1 week out of
the last 10, and she is traveling all over the world getting in
place these agreements with the governments. So we are
accelerating that work significantly.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, I am pleased that NNSA is
working to stop Russia from producing more weapons-grade
plutonium. But I am concerned about the budget cuts in this
program as well. You know better than I the risk to Americans
should terrorists obtain this nuclear weapons-grade material. I
am certain you share my sense of urgency in this area, and my
concern about what may happen in the event of thefts.
I was just reading an account where in 1993, back there in
Russia, some of the material was stolen. The person stole it
because the person wanted money and sold it. So we are very
concerned about this.
So could you explain to me how the program can stay on
target, considering the proposed reduction in fiscal year 2005
funding?
Mr. Longsworth. Again, I think the reduction--you think you
are referring to the MPCA program. The Second Line of Defense
program is actually embedded in that number. So when you hear
about that budget line item, it includes not only securing
material but also it includes the programs that will detect
whether that security has failed so that you can detect any, as
you said, any individual who is trying to steal and traffic the
material.
One of the reasons it looks like a decrease is what I
mentioned before, that because that Second Line of Defense
budget is embedded in that broader MPCA budget, it looks like
it is decreasing.
In addition to that, we have accelerated our warhead
security work with the Russian navy, and that work is beginning
to decrease because we are finishing. We are actually going to
complete most of that work this year and probably completely
done by the end of 2005.
Those are major capital projects that we are just
finishing. We are ramping up, and there is an increase for SRF
sites that we will be adding. Again, I noted we added three
sites. We hope to add some additional sites later this year.
Overall I think we are working at a pace that is as fast as
last year, and last year was three times faster than the year
before. So we are working at a pretty good pace. We are about
what Russia can absorb at this point in terms of funding.
Again, I have often said, and the Secretary and Ambassador
Brooks have said, we are not limited by funding right now; we
are limited by Russia's ability to absorb the funding that we
provide. Some of the challenges I mentioned, like access,
liability and other things, affect Russia's ability to absorb
funding.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Ms. Bronson, the CTR is an important program to prevent
weapons and weapons-usable materials and expertise from falling
into the wrong hands. Experts are calling for an acceleration
of the program. Yesterday, DCI Tenet emphasized to us in
testimony before the full committee his concern that terrorists
are trying to obtain WMD, including nuclear material from
Russia.
I understand from your testimony that your fiscal year 2005
budget of $409.2 million does not represent a decrease in
overall funding for the program, and yet in your testimony it
is noted that in fiscal year 2004 it was at $450.8 million. I
am concerned that there is not enough money to accelerate the
program in the way that is needed and the experts say that is
needed.
If these threats are real, Madam Secretary, why are we not
accelerating this program?
Ms. Bronson. I have spent many hours looking at how one
could go ahead and accelerate this program. If I were to walk
through each area, I can walk you through where we have looked
at that and we have not been able to find places where we can
accelerate.
For example, in the area of the destruction of ICBMs and
the destruction of ICBM silos, we can only destroy those as
fast as the Russians will turn them over to us. In the area of
SLBM launchers and in the area of SSBNs, we can only destroy
them as fast as the Russians will turn them over to us.
I would point out that in our budget the amount of money
for strategic offensive elimination is the same as it was for
last year. In the area of nuclear weapons storage security, we
are asking for a little bit more than we asked for last year.
Here there is an important problem, and the problem with
nuclear weapons safety and security is that we cannot make any
more progress until Russia signs the additional legal
commitment that we asked them to sign so that we can protect
the taxpayers' money.
We gave the Russians that document in December 2002 and we
still do not have it signed yet, and that is despite a
tremendous amount of pressure that we have put on the Russian
government. So we cannot accelerate that because the Russians
will not go ahead and sign the agreement.
In the area of nuclear weapons transportation security,
last year we asked for $23.2 million. This year we have asked
for more, $26.3 million. In that area as well, Senator, we have
a commitment agreement that we provided to Russia in December
2002 that they still have not signed. That commitment agreement
is a commitment that they will only use the new cargo cars to
support consolidation or dismantlement of nuclear weapons. We
have to get a legal agreement that they will not use those
cargo cars to modernize their force or for purposes that have
nothing to do with threat reduction. So we cannot accelerate
that until the Russians go ahead and sign that agreement.
In the area of biological weapons proliferation, we have
asked the Russians to go ahead and sign with us a specific
biological weapons implementing agreement. The biological
weapons area is the only area where we do not have a specific
implementing agreement. To date the Russians have been
intransigent and will not go ahead and sign that agreement.
We are unable to go ahead and pursue additional funding to
biological weapons proliferation issues with Russia until we
get better assurances concerning their biological weapons
compliance.
Now, in the area of chemical weapons destruction I am
pleased to report that, after we lost 4 years, in large part
because of Russian behavior, we have been able to accelerate
that schedule and gain back 29 of the months of the 4 years
that we lost. So we are accelerating there, and in fact part of
the money that we had for last year's budget is being used to
accelerate the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction facility
in accordance with the specific direction that we have from the
President.
In the areas of WMD proliferation prevention, we have two
agreements signed, we have two more we hope to have signed in
the next few months, and we are looking to go ahead and
accelerate, consistent with good spending of money, the
projects to go ahead and make those porous borders in the
Caucasus and in Central Asia more safe.
Senator Akaka. Well, I am glad to hear about those
accelerations. I was just worried also about the remarks that
were made by DCI Tenet that terrorists are trying to obtain
WMD, including nuclear material, from Russia at the present
time, and looked upon this as part of the possible
acceleration.
Also, what are we doing, and are we doing everything we
can, to prevent fissile material from getting out of Russia;
and also these other nuclear materials, as well as WMD?
Ms. Bronson. Well, in December 2003 the fissile material
storage facility in Mayak was finally completed. This facility
will store securely more than 25 metric tons of Russia's
weapons-origin plutonium. In addition, in 2003 we agreed on the
principles to monitor the material that will be stored in that
facility. We have been negotiating now for some 7 years a
transparency agreement with Russia. It is our hope that we will
complete that transparency agreement in the first half of this
year.
With respect to nuclear weapons security, we signed
protocols in February of 2003. We visited six major storage
sites to work on the security of those sites, and we will visit
four more of those sites this year.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your responses.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Senator.
I know each of your departments has taken steps to improve
the effectiveness and the efficiency of the CTR programs, as
you have just gone into in answer to the Senator's question.
The DOD, for instance, has instituted a program to have semi-
annual executive reviews with its Russian counterparts to
identify and rectify the potential problems. As you have
indicated, some of these issues have proved very persistent and
difficult to resolve.
Is there anything we might do in legislation that would
help strengthen your position as you negotiate with the
Russians on matters that continue to prove difficult in regards
to access and liability, not to mention fungibility? What could
we do to help you in that regard? Let me go back to the not so
thrilling days of yesteryear, when the House had determined to
pretty well cut this program out, and we put forth in this
subcommittee basically some mandatory steps that the Russians
had to fulfill, and in doing so convinced our House
counterparts that it was a worthwhile program. Senator Lugar
personally did a great job in terms of making that point and,
as chairman of the subcommittee at that particular time, we
thought we had made some real steps forward. But I know that
there are a lot of problems that continue.
As a result of putting in these contingencies or these
mandatory requirements, we had a Russian delegation, several of
them, come to Washington and thank us for doing that and saying
that they would work certainly toward these goals and basically
thanking us for saving the program.
I must confess that my service on the Intelligence
Committee has prevented me from doing the homework that I need
to do, and I apologize for that, despite able staff, in regards
to some of the more difficult issues. But I am perfectly
willing and open to suggestion in regards to any legislation
that might be helpful.
Would you like to comment?
Mr. Longsworth. Actually, I would----
Senator Roberts. Or should we leave well enough alone?
Mr. Longsworth. Well, no. Let me start with some of the
problems that we face. I think we are concerned by a number of
developments in Russia, and Russia today is not the Russia it
was 5 years ago or 10 years ago.
Senator Roberts. No, they are in a lot better shape.
Mr. Longsworth. They are, and we are seeing their economy
is doing fairly well. It is primarily resource-based, oil and
gas exports. It is not robust, but it is growing. They have an
ability to pick up some of these burdens, and in fact are in
many cases in our programs, picking up some of the burdens of
the efforts that we do on a cooperative basis.
I think we are also concerned by the rise and the increased
influence of the Federal security services with regard to
programs that we carry out in Russia. Many of our access
problems were laid to denials that come from the Federal
Security Services.
I think continuing to emphasize the importance of this
work----
Senator Roberts. Pardon me for interrupting. Where do we
have programs where we do not have access?
Mr. Longsworth. We have secured a large percentage of the
material in Russia. We have secured a larger percentage of
sites. The most sensitive sites are what we refer to as the
serial production enterprises. These are their most sensitive
sites. They have ongoing national security and nuclear weapons
missions. Just as we would be very sensitive about allowing
foreigners into our sites, those are the sites where we have
the most difficult access. There are ways to work around it,
but there are tedious details and it is very--there are tough
negotiations on how to get in there.
Senator Roberts. Well, we are not in closed session, but it
seems to me that my memory comes somewhere in the neighborhood
of bigger than about an 18-site bread box. I went to Obelinsk.
I have been to one other so-called ``Secret City'' that was
opened up through the NCI and other programs. I did not get
over to see the Shchuch'ye chemical plant. Senator Lugar does
that and has posed for a very powerful picture of, I think, a
suitcase and some things that you could put in the suitcase if
you were of a mind to do that, and it indicated the importance
of the Shchuch'ye project, despite a General Accounting Office
(GAO) report, by the way, that was very critical. That will be
a question of mine down the road if you want to respond to it.
But we simply could not get access. Of course, on the other
side of it, we had a lot of problems in regards to
transportation--how much the transportation would cost, who
would get access, who would go, if you had to use a pole vault
to get over the damn fence. That was not the case, but it
almost was.
So I guess what I am asking you is, just generally in terms
of access, has it gotten better, worse? Where are we?
Mr. Longsworth. For us it is about the same. It is always
difficult. We do have a pilot at one of their most sensitive
cities, just one, and it is going fairly well. We have a
commitment that once that pilot is under way, about halfway
through, they will identify the second site.
This is a large breakthrough because these sensitive
facilities have the greatest volume of material--a fewer number
of buildings, but there is more material in those buildings. It
is what I would refer to as kind of the last bastion of fissile
material that we need and want to secure.
So it is about the same. We do have a pilot that is
successful, but even that has lots of fits and starts in that
work.
Senator Roberts. I basically interrupted you to answer my
question in terms of legislation. We did put into legislation
these requirements. I do not know whether we need to take
another look at that under the current situation and get your
advice and counsel. You could probably provide that for the
record or if you had any, just any comments that you would like
to make now.
Mr. Longsworth. I would prefer to provide that for the
record, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The administration's support for addressing the global threat of
proliferation of WMD, both in states of the FSU and around the world,
is reflected in the President's fiscal year 2005 budget submission,
which requests $1.35 billion for this work. For more than a decade, the
DOE, and now through its NNSA, has played a central role in the United
States' effort to improve the security of under-secured nuclear
warheads and weapon-useable nuclear materials in the Russian Federation
and other independent states of the FSU. But the security of the United
States, including the war on terrorism, urgently requires reducing the
proliferation risk of nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological
weapons and materials, warheads, technology, and expertise in countries
beyond the borders of the FSU.
Senator Roberts. All right, that is fine.
They have not met two of the six congressional conditions
for assistance, although, as you have indicated, they are
close, ``they'' meaning Russia, to meeting the one that
requires the submission of a practical plan for the chemical
weapons destruction. I understand the administration will be
seeking permanent waiver authority for Shchuch'ye in the fiscal
year 2005 request.
I go back again to the GAO report, which was not exactly
glowing in regards to Shchuch'ye. I remember going over that in
some detail and thinking that we needed to provide security
more than we needed to commit the funding, with all the
problems that were connected with that plant.
If all that is correct, would you please provide the
administration's rationale for seeking permanent waiver
authority? Is it in any way problematic when Congress grants
only annual waiver authority rather than the permanent waiver
authority that the administration has requested previously?
Ms. Bronson. Senator, you ask an excellent question. Let me
begin by underscoring the absolutely critical role this
subcommittee played in the development of those six conditions.
Those six conditions in my view allowed us to get off of square
one. They put sufficient pressure on the Russians, they put
Russia on sufficient notice, and they were absolutely
invaluable in our being able to move forward in this area.
We do believe that we are going to receive a practical plan
from the Russians later this spring, and that leaves us with
the final condition which has not yet been met, which is to
satisfy our questions about the actual numbers concerning the
stockpile. I do not believe that we are going to be able to
resolve those tough issues about the size of the stockpile down
to the level of detail that is going to satisfy that condition
this year. I am reminded of the opening comment that Senator
Reed made this morning. The desire for a permanent waiver on
Shchuch'ye is not to go ahead and remove the pressure from the
Russians, but the desire for the permament waiver for
Shchuch'ye is designed, as Senator Reed mentioned, to help us
keep the program running smoothly from year to year.
Senator Roberts. So it is the consistency issue that you
are talking about?
Ms. Bronson. Yes, Senator.
Senator Roberts. With all the questions that we have about
access, liability, fungibility, the heptyl plant, and the
Votkinsk--help me with that pronunciation?
Ms. Bronson. ``Vot-kinsk.''
Senator Roberts. All right. It is $206 million that went
down the drain. If the American people know about $206 million
that ended up in a very futile situation--and you have gone
over that in your testimony--a $106 million loss suffered by
CTR in the so-called ``heptyl situation,'' in which Russia did
not tell us that the liquid rocket fuel destined for a CTR-
constructed facility had been diverted to commercial use. In
other words, we build this facility, we think that we are going
to be housing the liquid rocket fuel, which of course was the
entire intent, and then we got into a big whoops--okay, we have
this facility; bring us the rocket fuel; well, we do not know
how to tell you this, but we do not have any; we have used it
for commercial purposes.
What in the hell are we doing with that facility now? Do we
have a flag on it? What I am saying is that if you get into
these kind of things and we do not have enough cooperation and
we get into basically a screw-up like that, that becomes the
headline in regards to CTR, despite all of the goodwill and the
wishes and the speeches that we have made down through the
years. Then you add in another $100 million, that is a $206
million whoops. If you are a taxpayer you are going to say: I
do not understand this, more especially with an improved
economic situation in Russia.
I am being the devil's advocate. What did we do with that
facility? Did we paint it, or what did we do with it?
Ms. Bronson. First of all, your comments are exactly right,
Senator. What Russia did with respect to the heptyl situation
was inexcusable. What we have gone ahead and done with the
facility is we have made a decision to go ahead and take those
parts of it that we can salvage and reuse for other parts of
the program, so that we are going to try to get back as much
from that investment as we can.
But I am not going to kid you, Senator. We are not going to
get that much back. So our goal has been to ensure that in
every single project area that we are undertaking now or that
we will ever undertake, we will not get ourselves into the
situation where we rely on good faith assurances by Russia.
Anything that we are relying on Russia to do or any assumption
about their behavior must be turned into a legal agreement
before we will go ahead and spend taxpayers' money in the
future.
Senator Roberts. I am concerned that, on the waiver
authority, if we grant the permanent authority--explain to me
again how that works? You have the permanent authority, but
annually you come to Congress and say, yes? What are you
telling us if you have the permanent authority as opposed to
annual authority that we would grant?
Ms. Bronson. If we have the permanent authority, each year
as an independent determination, we would have to go ahead and
assess how the Russians are doing on their six conditions that
were laid out.
Senator Roberts. Yes.
Ms. Bronson. We would have an obligation to come and tell
you whether or not we thought those conditions were met, and if
the conditions were not met--including the one that I believe
will not be met by the end of this year, which is the final
accounting of the amounts. Then we would have the ability to
each year make an independent judgment as to whether or not
failure to meet that condition outweighs our security interests
in going ahead and continuing to get that facility to a
position--and I am talking about the Shchuch'ye facility--so
that we can destroy the nerve agent, which is in a most
proliferable form.
The nerve agent that Shchuch'ye will destroy is in rocket
form. It is in artillery shells. It is in our national security
interest not to slow down the progress on getting that facility
up and running so that we can destroy it.
But each year the administration would have to go ahead and
decide whether or not the value we would get from destroying
those, the proliferation value from destroying those shells
filled with nerve agent, outweighed the fact that the condition
had not been met.
Senator Roberts. Other than the funding for this program,
what is it that this subcommittee, full committee, both the
House and Senate, would have as a peg to hang our hat on in
regards to the waiver authority and exactly what you are
talking about, separating the wheat from the chaff? Okay, here
is one requirement they have not met, but we do not want to
shut down the whole thing because we are making progress in
other areas.
I am not sure about our decisionmaking in that process,
which in my view should be mandatory. It was this
subcommittee's effort that, first, saved the program from the
House again; and second, that the Russians said, yes, we agree
with this, we want to do it. It is my understanding that there
has been very considerable contribution to the project, both
from Russia and from international donors. So we see the value
of it. But in terms of certification, I do not think you can
certify a lot of this. I do not think it is possible.
Ms. Bronson. Well, the one condition out of the six that I
believe we are not going to be able to certify this year is the
condition that calls for us to reconcile the books on the
amounts of chemical weapons. You are correct, we are not going
to be able to certify that that condition is met, and I do not
see a clear way to resolving that.
Now, there are a couple of things that I would just point
out. Last year the authority for the presidential waiver ran
out on September 30. The only way we were able to continue to
spend money toward the acceleration of the construction of the
CWDF was because we had a continuing resolution that allowed us
to do that. We relied on the continuing resolution authority to
continue to spend money up until the middle of November, when
we finally obtained the waiver authority.
The situation we are in right now is we can continue to
spend money under the current presidential waiver authority up
until September 30. If we do not get a permanent waiver or we
do not get a renewal of the waiver, then you run the risk that
everything will have to stop in terms of expenditure of funds
on September 30.
So there are two ways that this could work. If we had some
kind of sense that the yearly waiver authority would be granted
on time, that is not an unreasonable way to go. What would be
better from a business standpoint would be to have the
permanent waiver authority with the understanding that there is
a clear obligation on the part of the administration to go
ahead and make this determination and to report to Congress on
the status of the conditions.
Senator Roberts. We will take a hard look at it. I think
probably the permanent waiver authority is the best way to go,
but you can now certainly report back to your Russian
counterparts that the pleasantly irascible chairman who put in
the requirements to begin with is not very happy with their
cooperation, and we might just yank this back on an annual
basis and give you that authority.
I am not sure that is the best approach, but you can at
least send up some fireworks on that and see what happens.
I understand the state of the art facility at Mayak is
completed and ready to accept the fissile material for long-
term safe and secure storage. The Inspector General, back in
2003, expressed concern that the Russians had not really
committed to storing a specific quantity or type of fissile
material on the facility and that we had not reached an
agreement on the transparency measures so that the United
States can monitor the use of this facility.
Any new information on that?
Ms. Bronson. We have not finished the transparency
agreement. We are going to send back our response to the latest
Russian comments on the current draft of the transparency
agreement. That will be done by the end of March. We will then
send a team to go ahead and enter into the next round of
discussions with the Russians on the transparency agreement
this April.
I am hopeful that by the end of the first half of this year
we will have completed that transparency agreement with the
Russians.
Senator Roberts. Last year the project to refurbish or
build two fossil fuel plants in Russia to enable eventual
shutdown of three old Russian weapons-grade plutonium
production reactors was transferred from DOD to DOE. Has that
gone smoothly, and what steps has the DOE taken to ensure that
once these alternative heat sources are up and running the
Russians will actually shut down the reactors?
In other words, are these projects actually proceeding on
schedule and on cost?
Mr. Longsworth. The transfer went fairly well. We just
transferred the last $17 million from DOD to the DOE. As I
noted in my oral statement, we hope to have a validated cost
estimate for both new fossil plants by the end of calendar year
2004, in December. Those will be the first validated numbers.
The numbers that we received, the cost of the facilities
that the Russians estimated, have never been validated. We have
just completed a bottoms-up assessment. We are trying to
interpret those numbers. But by the end of this calendar year
we will know what it costs to build both of those facilities.
In terms of the Russians' commitment to shut down, it is
encompassed in an agreement that the Secretary signed with his
counterpart in Russia that once the replacement plants are
operational, the Russians have committed to shut down those
reactors. We also, as soon as we begin work on the fossil plant
itself, they have to begin implementing a shutdown plan. So
once construction begins, that triggers the initiation of
shutdown planning.
I might also note that in the interim we have actually de-
rated the power of those reactors such that they are not
producing as much fissile material now. We have powered them
down to about the lowest level we think that they can operate
at and still provide steam and electricity. They are rated to
produce one and a half metric tons a year. We have de-rated
them so they are producing about 1.2 metric tons a year.
All of these steps are positive, but we do want to move
forward very quickly in getting those fossil plants built.
Senator Roberts. Senator Reed asked a good question in
regards to activities outside the FSU, and that sort of ties in
with the President's speech before the NDU. Do you anticipate
any circumstances under which the annual limit of $50 million
for this purpose would be too restrictive?
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir, I do. I can see a circumstance.
Libya is a very good example. In Libya, we had a window of
opportunity. We had to move very quickly, again cooperatively
working with the Libyans, to implement their commitment to rid
their country of WMD. Any inhibitor, that we would have to jump
through a hoop or get a waiver, that just slows us down.
When we first went in there, we were not sure that the door
would be open for very long, so speed was of the essence. We
did that work with the Libyans very quickly. I do worry, Mr.
Chairman, in the future that if an opportunity came up such as
that was presented by Libya that the inhibitors might slow us
down and we might miss that opportunity.
So I do worry about it.
Senator Roberts. Where would you get the money from if in
fact an opportunity actually occurred? I will use an example
that is a non-starter, but say North Korea.
Mr. Longsworth. Well, we hope North Korea is a starter.
Senator Roberts. Well, I hope so, too. But, Kim Jong Il is
not exactly the most cooperative person to be working with.
Mr. Longsworth. Again, assuming in the future that we were
invited in to begin the complete and verifiable, irreversible
dismantlement of their programs, that would be a significant
undertaking.
Senator Roberts. You would just simply ask for a
supplemental or to take the cap off, or what?
Mr. Longsworth. Either of those things, yes, sir. The cap
only applies to things that are not specifically authorized and
appropriated. So if there is a specific authorization for work
or a specific appropriation, then I believe our lawyers have
determined that the cap does not--and I think your staff has
agreed--that the cap does not inhibit those activities. It
would only inhibit those activities that were initiated during
a fiscal year.
But again, I do worry about the cap, our losing an
opportunity to do something quickly because we had to get a
waiver or because we had to go through some approval process.
Senator Roberts. I am through with my questions. Paul, do
you have anything that you would like to sum up with? Or Lisa,
do you have anything else to add before we move to the closed
session?
Mr. Longsworth. I would like to follow up one thing to
summarize what our programs do, related to Senator Akaka's
comments about what we are doing to stop the potential for
fissile material to leave Russia. We have a comprehensive set
of programs that not only secure HEU, plutonium, and RDD
sources at the locations where they are, we then put detectors
in place to detect whether they leave. We also have
technologies that detect whether someone is violating treaties
or to remotely detect proliferation.
We view our program as a meshwork of programs that are
self-supporting and provide defense in depth. All of our
programs are geared toward stopping threats to the U.S. before
they get to our borders. So just, to answer his question--he
asked what we are doing--I think our entire program is focused
on securing, detecting trafficking, and then eliminating
through HEU blend-down programs, plutonium disposition, getting
rid of permanently those materials that are useful for nuclear
weapons.
So I wanted to summarize. I think that is what our program
does at the DOE.
Senator Roberts. I appreciate that. Thank you both, and we
will now move to a closed session.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION
1. Senator Akaka. Ms. Bronson, as I stated at the hearing, I am
concerned that the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program needs to
be accelerated. I understand that getting cooperation from Russia is a
key obstacle. However, I would like the program to continue looking for
ways to accelerate in a responsible way. What would you do more of if
you had the money to do so, including hiring additional staff to manage
activities?
Ms. Bronson. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for
the CTR program coupled with prior year unobligated balances permits
the elimination of strategic systems as rapidly as the Russian
Federation authorizes their elimination. Since the hearing, agreements
that the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation had been
reviewing for over 12 months have been signed. Their signature permits
security upgrades to continue for all nuclear weapons storage sites
thus far identified by the MOD and we are urging the MOD to identify
additional sites. The DOD security enhancement effort is carefully
coordinated with the DOE nuclear weapons site security enhancement
effort. Our joint efforts have permitted the schedule to be
accelerated. The department has reprogrammed funds to maximize the
acceleration of the construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction
Facility at Shchuch'ye. We are continuing efforts to secure dangerous
pathogen collections at all locations where the USG has been granted
access by the Russian Federation. The CTR program has sufficient staff
and has a Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance (SETA)
contractor with SAIC to support the DOD staff. DOD also has contracted
with U.S. integrating contractors to expeditiously implement the
program.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (BWPP)
2. Senator Akaka. Ms. Bronson, I am especially concerned with the
proliferation risks associated with Russia's collection of pathogens
and biological infrastructure. Infectious disease knows no boundaries.
Do you have the resources you need, both in terms of budget and
personnel to combat this problem in the most expeditious way?
Ms. Bronson. Yes. I believe that we now have in place the necessary
personnel and that funding is sufficient to combat this problem in the
most expeditious way possible, consistent with the access that we have
to sites in Russia.
ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
3. Senator Akaka. Ms. Bronson, we are providing more and more
assistance to countries outside the former Soviet Union (FSU), yet the
total budget is not increasing. I am concerned that initiatives in
Russia are being short-changed. How are these things being prioritized?
Ms. Bronson. Programs in Russia are not being short-changed. Our
funding requests are based on our projected needs. The need is directed
related to the rate the Russian Federation decides to remove strategic
systems from the operational force and eliminate them and decides to
grant access to nuclear weapons storage sites and dangerous pathogen
collections. As I stated during the hearing, we had a heavy
infrastructure construction bump for the Shchuch'ye CWDF in 2003 and
2004. We are not going to have that same sort of up front costs in 2005
and 2006. The funding for SOAE remains the same because the Russian
Federation is removing strategic systems from the operational force at
a uniform rate per year. Since my testimony, we have signed new
agreements with the Ministry of Defense that permit security upgrades
to continue for all nuclear weapons storage sites thus far identified
by the MOD and we are urging the MOD to identify additional sites. The
DOD security enhancement effort is carefully coordinated with the DOE
nuclear weapons site security enhancement effort. Our joint efforts
have permitted the schedule to be accelerated. We are continuing
efforts to secure dangerous pathogen collections at all locations where
the USG has been granted access by the Russian Federation.
The funding for CTR activities in Russia relative to other
countries has remained fairly constant. Prior to September 11, 2001,
after which we increased our funding for BWPP and requested funding for
WMD-PPI in Central Asia, we had been active in other countries
eliminating their legacy nuclear systems, specifically in Ukraine,
Kazakhstan and Belarus. Also, the CTR budget in the early years of the
program was smaller than it is today.
4. Senator Akaka. Ms. Bronson, what Russian programs will have to
be cut in order to provide assistance to the other countries?
Ms. Bronson. We have always requested sufficient funding to take
care of all requirements we have in Russia and in other states of the
FSU. As a result, we do not anticipate cutting any programs in Russia
in order to provide assistance to the other countries.
MATERIAL PROTECTION CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING
5. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, I am concerned that the $238
million budgeted for the Material Protection Control and Accounting
(MPCA) program is being spread too thin. Last years budget for this
same program was $249.5 million. The budget includes $15 million for
the Megaports program, which is currently focusing on ports in Greece
and the Netherlands. What Russian programs will have to be cut to
accommodate both the decrease in overall funding and the funding of
programs outside the former Soviet Union and how are these priorities
being set?
Mr. Longsworth. The core mission of the MPCA program remains
upgrading the security of nuclear materials. The fiscal year 2005
budget request supports this priority mission. The core mission's
portion of the request is $174 million, an $8 million increase over the
fiscal year 2004 request, and a $4 million increase over the fiscal
year 2004 appropriation. This budget request reflects plans for major
expansion of efforts to secure sites in the Russian Strategic Rocket
Forces (SRF) warhead sites, as well as accelerated efforts to secure
weapons usable nuclear materials at sensitive Weapons Complex sites of
Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom). The request also accounts
for scope reductions due to completion of upgrades at several MinAtom
facilities and the; Kurchatov Institute in fiscal year 2004. The
request also includes funds for critical security activities in
countries outside the FSU.
The $238 million fiscal year 2005 budget request for MPCA is an
increase over the fiscal year 2004 request of $226 million. The budget
allocation in fiscal year 2004 was increased to $260 million primarily
because Congress increased funding for the Second Line of Defense
program. This increase provided additional resources for the Megaports
initiative and the acceleration of Second Line of Defense activities in
Russia and the FSU. Due to a large ($84 million) supplemental
appropriation received for Megaports in fiscal year 2003, and because
negotiations for implementation of Megaports are still underway in most
countries, the fiscal year 2005 budget request only includes funding
for one additional Megaport.
OFF-SITE SOURCE RECOVERY PROJECT
6. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, as I said in my statement at the
hearing, I am pleased that the funding for the Off-Site Source Recovery
Program (OSRP) has been increased. However, I am concerned that more
could be done to recover radioactive materials. The University of
Hawaii is trying to decommission an irradiator facility that they no
longer need for research. This irradiator contains cobalt-60 sources
which belong to the Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE has agreed to
recover these sources and dispose of them, but funding will have to be
re-prioritized first. Other universities find themselves in the same
position. I am concerned that these universities may not have the
security and trained personnel necessary to maintain these facilities
in a safe manner until the sources are removed. Would more funding
speed up this process and what would you do to move this along, if you
could, without cutting other key activities?
Mr. Longsworth. The OSRP under the Nuclear and Radiological Threat
Reduction Task Force is the National Nuclear Security Administration's
(NNSA) program to address U.S. sealed sources. The OSRP has recovered
over 8,000 sources since 1997, many of these from academic
institutions. The OSRP identifies excess and unwanted sources, and
recovers those sources placing them in secure storage at specific DOE
sites. The OSRP works closely with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to establish the recovery prioritization for excess and
unwanted sources which are of concern for use in a radiological
dispersal device. The OSRP continues to aggressively pursue the
recovery of sources, and the program is planning to expand its scope
and address additional isotopes of concern.
Sources which are to remain in use at academic institutions and
other locations, and require security in place fall under the purview
of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). The DOE stands ready to provide technical
assistance as well as share the expertise that we have developed
internationally for providing enhanced secure storage of in use
radiological materials.
ELIMINATION OF WEAPONS-GRADE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION PROGRAM
7. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, I am pleased to see that the NNSA
is working to stop plutonium production in Russia, but I am concerned
about what seems to be a budget cut for the program. Your statement to
the subcommittee said that you expect to have detailed designs and a
cost estimate to Congress by the end of calendar year 2004. Will the
program be able to stay on target with this reduced funding?
Mr. Longsworth. The Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium
Production (EWGPP) program's relative decrease from fiscal year 2004 to
fiscal year 2005 reflects a +$15.3 million adjustment in fiscal year
2004 associated with the reappropriation of unobligated prior-year
balances that were transferred with the program from the DOD. Please
see page 405 of the Fiscal Year 2005 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
Congressional Budget Request for this adjustment, that page is also
attached here as reference and for insert to the record.
The reappropriation occurred because part of the funds transferred
from DOD expired for additional obligation on September 30, 2003, based
on the original appropriation of these funds. However, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 providing for the
transfer of the program from DOD to the DOE also entitled the
transferred unobligated appropriations to be available for 3 fiscal
years after and including fiscal year 2003.
Without this adjustment reflecting reappropriation of EWGGP funds
transfer from DOD, the fiscal year 2005 request is actually a slight
increase over fiscal year 2004.
No substantial fiscal year 2005 programmatic increase was requested
as the program has sufficient funds for execution of all planned
program and project efforts through fiscal year 2005, when including
the $50.1 million fiscal year 2005 congressional request for the
program.
PREVENTING FISSILE MATERIAL FROM GETTING OUT OF RUSSIA
8. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, when we discussed fissile
material leaving Russia at the hearing, you stated that NNSA
concentrates on a program that approaches this problem with a defense-
in-depth strategy. This program includes, among other things, securing
the materials at their current location and detecting trafficking. I
have noticed what seems to be a trend to devoting increased emphasis to
border protection rather than securing materials at their location. Can
you explain to me why we are emphasizing border protection to a greater
degree?
Mr. Longsworth. Our efforts to secure material in place have not
dwindled in any way. We continue to make good progress in our efforts
to secure contracts for implementation of upgrades at Russian sites. We
recognize, however, that we can never provide total assurance that our
improvements will prevent material from being removed from a site. Our
Second Line of Defense program provides another opportunity to detect
illegal movement across Russian borders and beyond. In applying our
defense in depth strategy, we are expanding the Second Line of Defense
program beyond the borders of Russia to provide additional
opportunities to stop such efforts.
The $238 million fiscal year 2005 budget request for the Office of
International Material Protection and Cooperation is actually an
increase over the fiscal year 2004 request of $226 million. The budget
allocation in fiscal year 2004 was increased to $260 million primarily
because Congress increased funding for the Second Line of Defense
program. This increase provided additional resources for the Megaport
initiative and the acceleration of Second Line of Defense activities in
Russia and the FSU. Due to a large ($84 million) supplemental
appropriation received for Megaports in fiscal year 2003, and because
negotiations for implementation of Megaports are still underway in most
countries, the fiscal year 2005 budget request only includes funding
for one additional Megaport.
The MPCA budget request in fiscal year 2005 (excluding Radiological
Threat Reduction and Second Line of Defense) is $174 million, an $8
million increase over the fiscal year 2004 request, and a $4 million
increase over the fiscal year 2004 appropriation. This budget request
reflects plans for major expansion of efforts to secure sites in the
Russian SRF warhead sites, as well as accelerated efforts to secure
weapons usable nuclear materials at sensitive MinAtom Weapons Complex
sites. The request also accounts for scope reductions due to completion
of upgrades at several MinAtom facilities and the Kurchatov Institute
in fiscal year 2004. The request also includes funds for critical
security activities in countries outside the FSU.
9. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, please explain to me how these
priorities are being set. Has a study been done to show that this
approach is more effective?
Mr. Longsworth. Given our understanding that no one approach will
provide 100 percent effective protection of material or prevention of
illicit trafficking, we do not prioritize between the two approaches,
but rely on the strengths of each to provide a more comprehensive
protective strategy.
With respect to the Second Line of Defense program, our primary
efforts have focused on securing the borders of Russia with the
understanding that the most significant stockpiles of vulnerable
nuclear materials are stored within it. As we expand the Second Line of
Defense program, we are focusing on those countries bordering Russia to
create the next layer of defense. Our priorities are also influenced by
our relationship with these countries and our ability to realistically
implement our programs in cooperation with the host governments. In the
future, we anticipate the program will expand beyond eastern Europe and
the Caucasus region as we try to address smuggling pathways to
countries with known terrorist networks that want to obtain nuclear
material for use in their activities.
COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES
10. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, since NNSA, the Department of
State (DOS), and DOD all have a role in providing border control, I
would like to know about your interagency coordination in this area.
Can you provide me with your plan to assure coordination with the other
agencies?
Mr. Longsworth. The DOE/NNSA works closely with the DOD and the DOS
and other agencies to coordinate programs and issues associated with
threat reduction programs at all levels, ranging from project
management working groups to White House policy coordinating committees
to ensure our threat reduction activities complement and reinforce as
opposed to duplicating efforts.
In order to more clearly outline roles and responsibilities among
the agencies, two Strategic Plans were recently adopted. The first, for
Nonproliferation Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
in Eurasia, was largely driven by the National Security Counsel (NSC)
to address coordination among all relevant stakeholders (DOD, NNSA,
Department of Commerce (DOC), and DHS. The NSC, particularly the
Proliferation Strategy Sub-PCC, will provide broad policy oversight of
agency efforts to implement this strategic plan and overarching
guidance to ensure that assistance supports the U.S. National Security
Strategy in a non-duplicative, mutually reinforcing manner consistent
with agency strengths. The NSC approved this plan in early February.
The second plan, on Interagency Coordination of Nuclear Detection
Assistance Overseas, was coordinated by DOS and is being finalized.
Subject to the guidance of the NSC, global export control and related
border security assistance will continue to be coordinated through the
State/Nonproliferation-chaired Interagency Working Group (IWG) on
Nonproliferation Export Control Assistance. The DOS, DOD, DOC, DHS, and
the Intelligence Community participate in this IWG. Given the increased
funding for this type of assistance, it is even more important to use
this coordination mechanism.
All U.S. Government agencies that fund and/or implement export
control and related border security assistance will coordinate their
annual program plans with other agencies through this IWG. The State/
Nonproliferation-chaired IWG performs a coordination and advisory role,
but exercises no authority over agency programs. Any disagreements over
agency efforts to implement this strategic plan through assistance
programs that cannot be resolved at the IWG or by relevant agency
members will be forwarded to the Proliferation Strategy Sub-PCC. The
IWG will coordinate periodic reviews of the strategic plan to ensure
its effectiveness and coordinated implementation and report its results
to the NSC.
[Whereupon, at 11:09 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005
----------
FRIDAY, APRIL 2, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
COUNTERNARCOTICS PROGRAM
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Pat
Roberts (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Roberts, Warner,
Allard, Dole, and Reed.
Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Paula J. Philbin, professional staff
member; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Bridget E. Ward and Nicholas W.
West.
Committee members' assistants present: Darren Dick,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Derek J. Maurer, assistant to
Senator Collins; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator Dole;
Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; and Elizabeth
King, assistant to Senator Reed.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN
Senator Roberts. The subcommittee will come to order. The
subcommittee meets today, on a Friday--and thank you for being
here--to receive testimony on the status of Department of
Defense (DOD) drug interdiction and counterdrug activities, in
review of the fiscal year 2005 Defense Authorization Request
and Future Years Defense Program.
I want to especially welcome our witnesses: the Honorable
Thomas W. O'Connell, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC));
Brigadier General Benjamin R. Mixon, the Director of Operations
for J-3 within the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM); and Rear
Admiral Bruce Clingan of the United States Navy. He is the
Deputy Director of Operations for U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM).
When the subcommittee last held a comprehensive counterdrug
hearing, clear back in April of 2000, narcotics were basically
emanating from South America and were a significant and growing
national problem. The damage to the health and the welfare of
our Nation was enormous. At the time, Congress was debating
support for Plan Colombia. As we meet today, narcotics do
remain a significant problem, not only because of the harm they
cause to our citizens, but because of the nexus between drug
money and funding of terrorist activities all around the world.
I believe we will hear from our witnesses today that Plan
Colombia was a wise investment, a visionary step. Coca
cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia is down
significantly. The government is reasserting its authority all
throughout the country and I believe is winning the war against
the narcoterrorists.
Unfortunately, narcotics cultivation, production, and
trafficking is on the rise elsewhere, not only in South America
but in Southeast, South, and Central Asia as well. The
potential danger of these drugs in funding terrorist
organizations and their activities cannot be overstated. It is
a threat which must be effectively fought and confronted.
It is important to note that the DOD counternarcotics
efforts are part of the larger and comprehensive U.S.
Government and allied partners effort to reduce the demand at
home, interdict the movement of illegal drugs across our
borders or in transit, and discourage any production abroad.
Each of these areas are equally important and a coordinated
effort is essential.
Most attention of late has been focused on the global war
on terrorism and continued military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Clearly these are the highest priority. But we
must remember that effective counternarcotics activities do
contribute to the war on terrorism, improve our national
security, enhance our relations with other nations, and improve
the readiness of our Armed Forces.
The President's budget request for fiscal year 2005
includes $852.7 million for counternarcotics activities. Now,
this is approximately $57 million less than the appropriated
amount for fiscal year 2004, and I do look forward to Secretary
O'Connell's explanation for this decline. The DOD has had
success in its counternarcotics efforts. Additionally, the DOD
has been proactive in extending its efforts to areas of
increasing concern.
At the request of the administration, this subcommittee led
efforts to provide new authorities to the DOD to assist
countries in the Andean region as well as Central and South
Asian nations in their efforts to eliminate or reduce narcotics
production and traffic. Additionally, responsibility and
authority to support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and domestic law enforcement agencies in their counternarcotics
efforts has been assumed by the U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM). We look forward to our witnesses' testimony on how
these authorities will be used and what progress has been
achieved.
General Mixon, we are all anxious to hear your testimony on
the situation in Colombia. General Hill testified before the
Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday and reported that
great progress has been made by the Colombian armed forces. He
also said that more planning and training assistance is needed
to sustain this momentum and that a modest increase of U.S.
Armed Forces above the current cap of 400 is required. We
certainly look forward to your views on the Colombian military
operations, exactly why the additional U.S. military assistance
is necessary, and what challenges lie ahead.
Admiral Clingan, CENTCOM has had its hands full with the
military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of
Africa. We have all been troubled by reports of increased poppy
cultivation and opium production in Afghanistan. The Joint
U.S.-British counternarcotics effort does not appear to have
been successful in discouraging the narcotics production and
trafficking.
The fiscal year 2004 supplemental appropriation provided
$73 million to support the counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan and the surrounding nations. Your testimony on the
effectiveness of efforts to date and what more needs to be done
will be very helpful to this subcommittee.
I thank our witnesses for your service, your leadership,
and your perseverance, and I look forward to your testimony.
Following statements and questions, we will move to room SR-
232A for a brief closed session.
I will now turn to my distinguished colleague and friend,
the ranking member or vice chairman, if you will, of the
subcommittee, Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
join you in welcoming Secretary O'Connell, General Mixon, and
Admiral Clingan.
Secretary O'Connell is here with a huge burden since
Secretary Rumsfeld has not yet replaced the Principal Deputy
ASD (SOLIC)--that individual left the office last year--and the
position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics Policy has remained vacant since October 2003.
Therefore, Secretary O'Connell is doing yeoman's work without
all the assistance he needs. We hope he can communicate again
our concern to Secretary Rumsfeld about filling these
positions. We know he is going to do a great job since he is a
graduate of the University of Rhode Island, but there is no
need to have him doing three jobs.
The purpose of our hearing today is to review the DOD
request for funding and authority for counternarcotics programs
in fiscal year 2005. This includes international programs,
especially in the Western Hemisphere and Southwest Asia, and
military efforts to support the domestic counterdrug work of
other Federal, State, and local agencies.
We are also here to learn about how resources and
authorities are currently being used in two of the geographic
commands with a critical role to play in reducing illicit drug
activities internationally, SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM.
On the domestic side, the DOD has been providing valuable
intelligence, surveillance, and other support to the other
agencies manning our borders, ports, and shores. The National
Guard, on top of their other duties, plays a critical role in
such drug interdiction efforts.
Outside of the United States, the DOD provides
international support to stop illicit drug production and
trafficking. Two areas of particular interest to this committee
are Colombia and Afghanistan. In Colombia, some progress
appears to have been made. In 2003 the air bridge denial aerial
interdiction program in Colombia resumed, 2 years after the
tragic shootdown of U.S. missionaries in Peru. We heard
yesterday at a full committee hearing from General Hill,
Commander of SOUTHCOM, that in the last year the Colombian
military has successfully captured or killed narcoterrorist
leaders, is increasing the territory controlled by the central
government, and denying that territory to the narcoterrorists.
Also in 2003, as the Department of State's (DOS) recently
released international narcotics control strategy report notes,
the government eradicated illicit crops at a record-setting
pace. Unfortunately, the same report points out that Colombia
remains a major producing country. Indeed, the Office of
National Drug Control Policy in its January 2004 pulse report
on trends in domestic drug abuse found that in 2003 crack and
powder cocaine availability remained relatively stable across
the United States and prices remained stable or declined in
some cities.
There are of course any number of factors to explain this.
However, I hope that Secretary O'Connell and General Mixon can
address these facts and the challenges of reducing coca
cultivation and drug trafficking in Colombia and the Andean
region, especially in the context of the DOD's request for
authority to raise the cap on military and civilian personnel
from 400 to greater numbers.
In the meantime, we face an urgent and potentially
worsening situation in Afghanistan. According to the DOS's
recently released international narcotics control strategy
report and the United Nations' (U.N.) latest global illicit
drug trade report, Afghanistan has produced its highest amount
of opium since 1999, about three-quarters of the world's
illicit opium.
Moreover, the U.N. report indicates that poppy cultivation
could expand further in 2004. The U.N. Office on Drugs and
Crimes estimates that the revenue from opium in Afghanistan is
about $2.3 billion, equivalent to more than 50 percent of
Afghanistan's estimated gross domestic product (GDP). The
potential impact on security and President Karzai's control
over the country is clearly jeopardized by this type of illicit
activity. Indeed, just 2 days ago President Karzai told a
donors conference in Berlin, in his words: ``Drugs in
Afghanistan are undermining the very existence of the Afghan
state.''
The British have had the lead in counternarcotics
activities in Afghanistan but obviously they need help. In
recognition of these facts, the 2003 Iraq supplemental included
$73 million for counterdrug efforts in Afghanistan. I look
forward to hearing from Secretary O'Connell and Admiral
Clingan--about the DOD's strategy and CENTCOM's plans for
employing these counterdrug resources.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. I thank the Senator for his comments.
We have been joined by the distinguished chairman of the
full committee, which obviously gives evidence of the
importance of this subcommittee hearing.
I would repeat again what I said in my opening statement.
We have all been troubled, as seconded by Senator Reed, by
reports of increased poppy cultivation and opium production in
Afghanistan and the fact that the joint U.S. and British
counternarcotics efforts do not appear to have been successful
in discouraging narcotics production and trafficking.
The distinguished chairman has just returned from that
area. The chairman is a great believer in going out and talking
to the troops in regards to our various, very difficult mission
areas that we have all over the world. Mr. Chairman, I think
you have been to Iraq and to Afghanistan and Pakistan at least
three times and perhaps more. I joined you on a couple of those
trips. But I would ask if you had anything that you would wish
to say prior to the witnesses giving their testimony. Welcome,
sir.
Senator Warner. I thank you, Chairman Roberts and Ranking
Member Reed, for the opportunity just to say a few words.
I was in the area of responsibility (AOR) in Iraq and
Afghanistan, just a few weeks ago and you are quite correct in
your mentioning of President Karzai. Both you and the
distinguished Senator from Rhode Island addressed that he
personally is injecting himself into this. He told us he used
to figure, Senator Reed, that opium makes up 60 percent of the
gross national product (GNP) estimated in Afghanistan.
But he also told us--and we are not here to fault the
British, but clearly the initial efforts in Afghanistan have
gone in the wrong direction. Apparently they offered a program
by which if farmers would cease and desist and stop raising
poppies they would get a payment. Well, as your lifetime of
experience in agriculture----
Senator Roberts. Similar to the U.S. farm program, right.
Senator Warner. The farmer down the road said: Wait a
minute; I will start growing them, then get in line for the
payments. Yes, it has a note of humor, but it has a tragic note
of seriousness. These moneys are funding, as my distinguished
colleague Senator Allard and I have discussed, the jihadists
worldwide. Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah are profiting from
the enormity of this sum of money.
Also overlaying this, Mr. Chairman, we learned from General
Jones, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commander
of forces, that he personally, together with others, is looking
toward expanding NATO's role in Afghanistan, and that is not
the role of NATO, to deal with that drug situation. Until that
situation is contained and is subject to a program which can
lead to the cessation of this growth and production, I think
NATO is not likely to further involve itself in Afghanistan.
That concerns me a great deal, because I think it is important
not only for NATO, but for the world to have larger
participation in helping Afghanistan secure its freedom.
Therefore, I did want to hear the admiral's testimony and
will listen to it. As you said, yesterday General Hill, in
discussing the troop cap request before Congress, now said
there is a direct correlation between our additional
participation and hoped-for additional curtailment of drugs
from that area into our country. It is to the benefit of the
United States to do everything we can to continue to choke off
the flow from Central America and most particularly from
Colombia.
So I thank the chairman and the distinguished ranking
member for holding this hearing, and I appreciate the
opportunity to say a word or two.
Senator Roberts. Well, we thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let the
record show that it was through your leadership that this
subcommittee was formed up quite a few years ago--I was going
to say several years. I have had the opportunity and the
privilege of being the chairman for quite some time.
It is called the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee. I think we had better change the name, because
most of the threats have emerged. But we want to thank you for
your leadership in that respect.
Senator Allard, would you have anything to say at this
time?
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I do have a brief comment. I
was also on a trip in this last break to Iraq and Afghanistan
and had an opportunity to visit with President Karzai. He
expressed to me the very same concerns that the chairman of the
Armed Services Committee expressed.
I think this particular hearing is very timely and I would
join you in welcoming our distinguished panel here this
morning. I look forward to hearing what their insights and
recommendations might be.
Yesterday we heard related testimony from our combatant
commanders and the testimony highlighted the increasing
participation of terrorist organizations like al Qaeda,
Hezbollah, and Hamas in the drug trafficking trade. Their
involvement is not limited to the Middle East. Hamas and
Hezbollah are now conducting business in our own back yard, in
General Mixon's Latin America AOR. Indeed, profits from the
illegal drug market are now funding jihadist political and
military activities on a truly global scale.
Two weeks ago I had the opportunity to visit with President
Karzai and discuss specific drug-related concerns across
Afghanistan. He emphasized the immediate problem of combating
both the exploding poppy cultivation and drug trade as well as
the profiteering by the narcoterrorists that directed the
subversive and destabilization actions against President
Karzai's government. Over the long term, however, we need to
assist Afghanistan with establishing broad-based economic and
agricultural alternatives to growing poppies and producing
opium.
Mr. Chairman, again I appreciate your calling this hearing
so that we can better understand the risks surrounding the
illegal drug trade and their relationship to terrorist
activities throughout the world. Thank you.
Senator Roberts. Senator Dole, would you have any comments
you would like to make?
Senator Dole. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed. I
appreciate this opportunity to review a critical aspect of our
homeland defense. The links between international narcotics
trafficking and international terrorism have become
increasingly clear and in the last years Congress has also
recognized this connection. The granting of expanded authority
to use counterdrug funds for counterterrorism missions in
Colombia recognizes that there is no useful distinction between
the narcotrafficker and his terrorist activity.
I look forward to hearing about your priorities and
operations. The war on drugs is often buried in the back pages
and many of your successes will never be covered with much
fanfare. But I applaud your dedication and particularly want to
commend the men and women in your operation, who are meeting
the challenges of this mission with a courage that makes us all
proud.
I would just add that during the 1980s, as Secretary of
Transportation, I was privileged to serve as the first female
departmental head of a branch of the armed services, the United
States Coast Guard, and I was very proud of the work that the
young men and women did there in drug interdiction. So I
certainly look forward to hearing your testimony and continuing
to work closely with you in the months and years to come.
Senator Roberts. We thank the Senator.
Secretary O'Connell, would you please proceed. Let me say
that all of your statement, every golden word, will be made
part of the record and you can certainly feel free to
summarize, either through bullet points or the things that you
really want to emphasize, if you so choose.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS W. O'CONNELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Mr. O'Connell. Thank you, Chairman Roberts. I would like to
thank the distinguished chairman, Senator Warner, for joining
us this morning. Senator Reed, distinguished members of the
subcommittee: It is my pleasure to appear before you today to
discuss the DOD programs and policies that assist nations
around the world in their battle against narcoterrorism. I will
place my longer statement in the record, Chairman Roberts.
Fighting narcotics is a complex process that requires
coordination and funding from all levels of government
agencies, local and State law enforcement, and the foreign
countries we assist. We are increasingly aware of the linkages
between terrorist organizations, narcotics trafficking, weapons
smuggling, kidnapping rings, and other transnational networks.
Terrorist groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) in Colombia, al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and
groups around the world can finance key operations with drug
money.
The DOD, with our counterparts in the DOS and other
government agencies, seeks to systematically dismantle drug
trafficking networks, both to halt the flow of drugs into the
United States and to bolster the broader war on terrorism.
We thank you for the $73 million in funding added in this
year's emergency supplemental to support our efforts in
Afghanistan and neighboring nations. Our fiscal year 2005
counternarcotics budget requests resources to sustain these
efforts. To support similar efforts in Colombia, the DOD will
soon be forwarding to Congress a request for reprogramming $50
million during this fiscal year. I am pleased to report that
the DOD will maintain this emphasis on Colombia by increasing
our efforts in Colombia in fiscal year 2005 by $43 million.
Our international counternarcotics support is predominantly
in response to requests from our principal partners, the DOS,
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and includes
deployments and programs to train and furnish intelligence and
operational support for drug detection, monitoring, and provide
equipment to partner counterdrug forces.
Domestically, the DOD continues to work through NORTHCOM
and the National Guard, with the DHS and law enforcement
agencies, to coordinate the counternarcotics effort. The
National Guard is an exceptional partner to law enforcement in
domestic counternarcotics missions requiring militarily unique
skills, including air-ground reconnaissance, intelligence
analysis and analysts, and training for law enforcement
agencies.
The DOD is maintaining our National Guard support for law
enforcement along the southwest border and adding linguist
centers in California and Washington for additional support.
In terms of the DOD's demand reduction efforts, our view is
that illegal drug use is, of course, incompatible with a
service member's sensitive and dangerous duties. The DOD's
demand reduction policy sets minimum standards of testing rates
at 100 percent, meaning each service member is tested at an
average of once per year. Increased testing begins in fiscal
year 2005, with a goal of reaching 100 percent testing by
fiscal year 2006. This cost-effective drug testing, along with
punitive consequences for members who are identified as drug
users, will continue to deter drug use among military
personnel.
I would like to thank you, Chairman Roberts, Senator Reed,
members of the subcommittee, for the tremendous support you
have provided, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Connell follows:]
Prepared Statement by Thomas W. O'Connell
Chairman Roberts, Senator Reed, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is my pleasure to appear before you today to discuss
the Department of Defense (DOD) programs and policy that assist nations
around the world in their battle against narcoterrorism. I value the
work that you do and congratulate you on your continued leadership.
Each year, my office expends a great deal of time, effort, and
resources to keep drugs from crossing our borders. This is a complex
process that requires coordination and funding from all levels of
government agencies, local and State law enforcement, and the foreign
countries which we assist. We recognize that a portion of the profits
from drug sales either directly or indirectly support terrorist
organizations--another reason we are working hard to reduce the supply
of drugs around the world.
Illegal drug use exacts a heavy toll on American society every
year. It accounts for billions of dollars in direct and indirect costs
including health care, lost revenue due to crime, social welfare costs,
and lost productivity. While cocaine continues to be the single most
serious drug threat, heroin, synthetic drugs, methamphetamines, and
marijuana are also serious, and in some cases, increasing problems.
Global and regional terrorists threatening United States interests can
finance their activities with the proceeds from narcotics trafficking.
Terrorist groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and groups around the world partially
finance key operations with drug money. The DOD, with our counterparts
in the Department of State (DOS) and other government agencies, seeks
to systematically dismantle drug trafficking networks, both to halt the
flow of drugs into the United States, and to bolster the broader war on
terrorism effort.
Domestically, the DOD continues to work through U.S. Northern
Command (NORTHCOM) and the National Guard with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and law enforcement agencies to coordinate
counternarcotics efforts. The National Guard is an exceptional partner
to law enforcement in domestic counternarcotics missions requiring
military-unique skills, including air/ground reconnaissance,
intelligence analysts, and training for law enforcement agencies. The
DOD is maintaining our National Guard support to law enforcement along
the southwest border, and adding linguist centers in California and
Washington.
THE COUNTERNARCOTICS BUDGET
In accordance with statutory authorities, we use counternarcotics
resources as effectively and efficiently as possible to achieve
national and DOD counternarcotics priorities. We focus on programs that
fulfill statutory responsibilities and use military-unique resources
and capabilities, and continue to advance the national priorities of
the National Drug Control Strategy. Our counternarcotics authorities
and funding are an effective combination that supports war on terrorism
efforts and the implementation of the DOD's Security Cooperation
Guidance.
The DOD's July 31, 2002, counternarcotics policy guidance states
that the DOD will execute drug detection and monitoring and other
programs using military command, control, communications, and
intelligence resources, as well as military operational planning
capabilities. This year we have issued new Demand Reduction, Domestic
Support, and International Support counternarcoterrorism policies have
expanded upon this definition. We focus on counternarcotics activities
that will contribute to:
The war on terrorism;
Security Cooperation Guidance;
Military readiness; and
National Security.
In order to best characterize and describe the support DOD
provides, the DOD defined four missions areas to encompass the scope of
the DOD's program. These mission areas are:
Demand Reduction: Drug testing, treatment, and
outreach;
Domestic Support: Active duty counternarcotics
support, National Guard State Plans, National Guard schools,
Aerostat radars;
Intelligence and Technology Support: Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) collection and processing, intelligence
support and analysis, research and development; and
International Support: Detection and monitoring,
intelligence support and analysis, equipment, training, and
infrastructure.
The DOD provides, through combatant commands, the military
departments, and the defense agencies, unique military personnel,
systems, and capabilities that support domestic law enforcement
agencies and foreign security forces involved in counternarcotics
activities, including efforts to counter activities that aid, benefit
from, or are related to narcotics trafficking. This broad-scope support
is provided primarily under the authorities contained in 10 U.S. Code
Sec. Sec. 124, 371-374, 379-381, 2576, 2576a, Title 32 U.S. Code,
Sec. 112, Section 1004, National Defense Authorization Act for 1991, as
amended; and section 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
1998, as amended.
With finite funds and resources, multiple missions to address, and
numerous requests for assistance, the DOD must establish priorities for
its support mission. The areas that receive resources must be where DOD
capabilities will provide the highest impact on the drug threat while
at the same time contributing to the war on terrorism and enhancing
national security. DOD's efforts will be continually evaluated based on
the changing drug threat and participating nations' need.
The Department's Central Transfer Account (CTA) program request of
$852.7 million for fiscal year 2005 for the CTA reflects price growth
of $11.4 million and a program decrease of $67.3 million over the
fiscal year 2004 level of $908.6 million, which primarily reflects the
fiscal year 2004 congressional increases to the DOD's
counternarcoterrorism program. The DOD's fiscal year 2005
counternarcotics budget will continue to fund, within fiscal
constraints, an array of unique and effective programs that support the
National Drug Control Strategy and Department goals.
DEMAND REDUCTION
Illegal drugs are readily available to DOD members and their use is
incompatible with a service member's security-sensitive and dangerous
duties. During the past decade, use of prohibited drugs in the United
States civilian community, especially by young citizens, has increased,
prompting the President to establish a goal of reducing drug use by 25
percent over each 3-year period.
The DOD has assimilated the President's goal of a 25 percent
reduction in drug use over 3 years into its strategic plan. The
approach emphasizes prevention of drug use through pre-accession,
random drug testing, anti-drug education, and treatment. Emphasis is
placed on deterring drug use through cost effective drug testing with
punitive consequences for members who are identified as drug users.
In accordance with the DOD Demand Reduction policy, we plan to
increase drug testing for all military members to a minimum average
testing rate for each Service, the Army National Guard, and the Air
National Guard of one test per member per year. This increase will be
incrementally phased in through the out years. We also plan to increase
drug testing for civilian employees in testing designated positions to
a minimum average testing rate for each agency or component of one test
per testing designated employee per year.
A total of $19.4 million is for the National Guard State Plans and
Service outreach programs, and the young marines outreach program, and
$102.7 million is for the continued support of the DOD Demand Reduction
Programs.
DOMESTIC SUPPORT
Since 1989, domestic law enforcement agencies at the State, local,
and Federal levels have requested military support for their respective
counternarcoterrorism operations. Domestic counternarcoterrorism
operations have historically included support for interdiction of
cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamines coming into the United States;
interdiction of illegal drugs transiting the United States;
identification of domestic marijuana grows and methamphetamine labs;
identification and arrest of drug manufacturers, traffickers and
distributors; and the prevention of drug use among America's youth.
We work closely with NORTHCOM and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense on counternarcotics support to domestic
law enforcement. The focus of this support is managed through Joint
Task Force-Six in El Paso, Texas, which provides active duty and
Reserve missions in areas of engineering support, aerial and ground
reconnaissance, transportation, and logistics support and intelligence.
These counternarcotics missions provide excellent training in real
world situations and enhance domestic security.
Additionally, the DOD is committed to improving information sharing
between DOD and law enforcement agencies in support of
counternarcoterrorism objectives. DOD is installing classified computer
systems and networks in High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
intelligence centers operated by National Guard intelligence analysts.
Active duty and Reserve members are playing an integral role in
arrival-zone detection and monitoring, cross-agency intelligence
fusion, and the development of actionable intelligence.
A total of $219.5 million supports Federal, State, and local drug
law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) requests for domestic operational and
logistical support, and will assist the DLEAs in their efforts to
reduce drug-related crime. Of this amount, $151.1 million is for a
portion of the total National Guard State Plans that supports domestic
law enforcement efforts and the counternarcoterrorism schools; $20.3
million is for Domestic Operational Support, such as NORTHCOM
counternarcoterrorism support to DLEAs and Title 10 National Guard
translation efforts; $32.3 million is for domestic detection and
monitoring efforts (Tethered Aerostats); and $15.8 million is for
command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence support,
such as ADNET.
INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT
The basic nature of the smuggling threat mandates the need for
explicit intelligence if the DOD is to be effective in detection,
monitoring, and interdiction operations. The DOD will continue to
provide critical intelligence support to national policies designed to
dismantle narcotics trafficking and international terrorist
organizations benefiting from drug trafficking. These intelligence
support programs make use of unique DOD capabilities, systems, skills,
and expertise, and directly support the National Drug Control Strategy.
Use of new technology continues to be instrumental in combating
narcoterrorist activities. The DOD will continue to test, evaluate,
develop, and deploy technologies that are used to collect and survey
suspect narcoterrorist smuggling operations in air, land, or sea. Wide
area surveillance will be a technology challenge as legacy systems such
as Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar have surpassed lifecycle
expectations and will require major hardware and software replacement
to lower the risk of system failure. The program will pursue merging
disparate data and sensor feeds into a common operating picture, to
provide worldwide counternarcotics elements with counternarcoterrorism
intelligence and operational awareness.
Ringold translation support will be expanded to include additional
languages critical to the global war on terrorism. Throttle Car is a
critical data warehousing effort jointly funded by the DOD and the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA). Capabilities will be increased to accommodate
capacity increases and ensure readiness.
A total of $103.3 million will be used for intelligence programs to
collect, process, analyze, and disseminate information required for
counternarcoterrorism operations. Technology programs increase the
DOD's abilities to target narcoterrorist activity. A total of $58.6
million is for counternarcoterrorism intelligence support and analysis;
$21.1 million is for SIGINT collection and processing; $10.0 million is
for Service and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) command and
control programs; and $13.7 million is for counternarcotics technology
efforts.
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
Financial, political, and operational linkages exist among
narcotics trafficking, smuggling, and the global expansion of
terrorism. Since September 11, 2001, the DOD has expanded its
counternarcoterrorism mission to include targeting those terrorists
groups worldwide that use narcotics trafficking to support terrorist
activities. In order to support the war on terrorism, DOD
counternarcoterrorism uses its resources in regions where terrorists
benefit from illicit drug revenue and know-how, and is working to
bolster already well-established counternarcoterrorism efforts in U.S.
Pacific Command (PACOM), particularly in Southeast Asia where the U.S.
and its Asian partners face a challenging combination of terrorism/
extremism, drug trafficking, and the serious need for increased
maritime security.
In the CENTCOM area of operation, terrorists/extremists in
Afghanistan and its neighboring countries exploit the abundance of
illicit drugs to support their activities. The DOD is working to break
the links between terrorism and drug trafficking. In Afghanistan, where
drug traffickers have extensive links to terrorists/extremists, the DOD
will provide substantial counternarcoterrorism support to the United
Kingdom (U.K.)-led counternarcoterrorism efforts in Afghanistan, as
well as developing Afghan border infrastructure and border police
capabilities. In other countries in Central Asia and the Middle East,
CENTCOM is currently expanding its counternarcoterrorism efforts to
curb the transit of illicit drugs through international smuggling
corridors. We thank you, therefore for the $73 million in funding added
in this year's emergency supplemental to support our efforts in
Afghanistan and neighboring nations. Our fiscal year 2005
counternarcotics budget requests resources to sustain these efforts.
A total of $40.8 million will be used for emerging threats support
efforts in the CENTCOM, PACOM, and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) AORs
to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail activities related to
substances, material, weapons, or resources used to finance, support,
secure, cultivate, process, or transport illegal drugs. $29.0 million
supports operations in those AORs, including section 1033 support;
$11.8 million is for AOR command and control support.
Cocaine is the primary drug threat in the United States due to its
high demand, availability, and expanding distribution to new markets,
high rate of overdose, and its relation to violence. In 2002, there was
an estimated 250 metric tons of cocaine consumed in the U.S. There were
approximately 2 million people age 12 and older using cocaine in the
U.S. in 2002. Each user consumed approximately 34 grams of cocaine a
year.
Cocaine consumed in the United States originates from coca plants
grown in South America. The average potential production of cocaine
produced in South America in 2002 was over 1,200 metric tons. Of this
amount, approximately 879 metric tons of export quality cocaine
departed South America. Approximately 540 metric tons of cocaine were
exported to the U.S. and another 230 metric tons went to Europe. After
cocaine seizures and consumption throughout the transit zone en route
to the U.S., some 350 metric tons of export-quality cocaine were
available in U.S. markets in 2002.
Colombia produced approximately 680 metric tons of 100 percent pure
cocaine in 2002. Coca leaf produced in other countries, primarily Peru
and Bolivia, is transported across the border into Colombia to be
processed into hydrochloride cocaine. The processed cocaine is then
shipped/exported through other bordering countries or through the
Caribbean and Eastern Pacific to the final destination. Over 500
maritime shipments depart Colombia annually, equating to almost two
shipments a day. Of the cocaine that enters the United States, 72
percent passes through the Mexico/Central America corridor, another 27
percent moves through the Caribbean, and 1 percent comes directly from
South America.
Colombia offers a unique window of opportunity with congressional
approval of expanded authority and the aggressive leadership of
President Uribe. The administration continues to support President
Uribe in seeking a secure and democratic Colombia, including providing
resources in support of Colombia's Plan Patriota.
Supplemental funding ($34 million) in fiscal year 2003 was provided
by Congress for DOD support to Colombia initiatives. With existing
funds and the additional supplemental funding, SOUTHCOM increased
support to the Colombian military, adding to their capability through a
variety of programs. These programs provided critical support in
logistics, mobility, light infantry operations, riverine operations,
command, control and communications, at-sea interception, maintenance,
security, base operations support, and intelligence collection and
dissemination. Congress extended expanded authority to support
Colombia's counternarcotics and counterterrorist efforts for fiscal
year 2004.
Interagency principals have planned to increase assistance for the
Colombian military during fiscal years 2004 and 2005. SOUTHCOM
developed a support package to provide needed assistance to the
Colombian military. This funding will continue to support and expand
upon programs already established during fiscal year 2003 and will
focus on increasing the Colombian military's capability in mobility,
logistics, operationalizing intelligence, planning assistance, medical
evacuation and care, secure communications, and security. To support
these efforts in Colombia, the DOD will soon be forwarding to Congress
a request for reprogramming $50 million during this fiscal year. I am
pleased to report that the DOD will maintain this emphasis on Colombia
by increasing our efforts in Colombia in fiscal year 2005 by $43
million.
A total of $366.9 million will support efforts in the SOUTHCOM AOR,
including detection and monitoring operations to assist U.S. law
enforcement agencies to counter the flow of drugs in transit into the
United States, and supporting nations (such as Colombia) in their fight
against narcoterrorism. A total of $173.0 million is for detection and
monitoring platforms and assets; $142.5 million is for operational
support; and $51.4 million is for AOR command and control support,
including Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S).
The current troop cap limits the U.S. presence in Colombia to 400
military personnel and 400 contractors. SOUTHCOM manages this on a
daily basis, often canceling or postponing personnel travel to
Colombia. To date, the impact has been small. However, in the coming
year as the Colombian military will be conducting full-scale operations
across the country, the personnel cap will begin to have a deleterious
effect on the mission. While U.S. personnel will not be directly on the
front lines, more training and planning assistance will be required for
the Colombian military, since they will be directly engaged on a
broader front to defeat the narcoterrorists. We should support this
effort with manning that reflects the current and future situation on
the ground. Consequently, the administration has requested an increase
of the personnel cap to 800 military and 600 contractor personnel.
CONCLUSION
The DOD appreciates Congress' continued support of the
counternarcotics program. I thank you, Chairman Roberts, Senator Reed,
and the members of the subcommittee for the tremendous support you have
provided. I look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Roberts. We thank you for your statement and we
thank you for summarizing. Without objection, your full
statement will be made a part of the record.
Admiral Clingan, would you please proceed.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. BRUCE W. CLINGAN, USN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OF OPERATIONS, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
Admiral Clingan. Chairman Roberts, Chairman Warner, Senator
Reed, members of the subcommittee: Thank you for this
opportunity to join you today to discuss CENTCOM's role in the
DOD drug program, and in particular our efforts in Afghanistan
to curtail narcotics production and trafficking.
As many of you are aware, currently in Afghanistan there
are more than 10,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and others
conducting counterinsurgency operations and promoting stability
and security. That 10,000 represents a small number of the
service members currently deployed to our AOR, conducting
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, looking hard in the Horn
of Africa to determine what kind of international terrorist
networks are functioning there, and prosecuting the greater
global war on terrorism in the 25 countries that comprise our
AOR. Although the 10,000 soldiers in Afghanistan represent a
small percentage of the Armed Forces we have in the AOR,
clearly their contributions and the importance of their efforts
are hard to overstate.
We have a couple of objectives that we are after in
Afghanistan. Not the least among them are setting conditions
for economic reconstruction and for the ongoing political
process. Countering the growing narcotics trade, which
contributes to the criminal and terrorist activities that
undermine efforts to achieve that stability, are important and
a priority for CENTCOM and the coalition.
In fiscal year 2004, Congress made available to CENTCOM $73
million to further our counternarcoterrorism efforts in
Afghanistan and the bordering countries. For CENTCOM, that
represented a 300-fold increase in our budget for this effort--
not 300 percent, 300-fold. So since October we have invested
ourselves in concentrating on developing a comprehensive plan
that will address the narcotics problem in Afghanistan, along
with our partners in the United Kingdom (U.K.) and the other
interagency units.
This plan, which I have outlined in my prepared statement,
is in execution now and on track to achieve some tangible
effects in this realm in the third and fourth quarter of this
year.
Thank you again for the opportunity to address this
subcommittee and I look forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Clingan follows:]
Prepared Statement by Rear Adm. Bruce Clingan, USN
Chairman Roberts, Senator Reed, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss
illegal narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan, its relation to
narcoterrorism, and the programs we are developing to help counter this
problem in collaboration with other agencies and governments. We
appreciate Congress' support of the Department of Defense (DOD)
counternarcotics program in last year's supplemental appropriations
bill, particularly in regard to our efforts related to Afghanistan.
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is currently focused on defeating
transnational terrorism and creating secure and stable environments in
Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the broader CENTCOM area of
responsibility (AOR) encompasses the geographic and ideological heart
of the global war on terror, a war without borders that spans all 25
countries in the region. The overt war on terror began in Afghanistan.
A stable, democratic, economically viable state there will provide an
alternative to the terrorist vision of a future characterized by
oppression and prolonged conflict.
The narcotics problem in Afghanistan presents a special challenge.
The international community and Afghan leadership, with the support of
the United States and other coalition allies, is addressing this
challenge. The United Kingdom (U.K.) has the international lead in
Afghanistan and with key Afghan leaders, including President Karzai and
Minister of Interior Jalali, is beginning to take action against the
narcotics trade. This problem requires a comprehensive, sustained
effort championed by the Afghan Government. Technical help and
resources from the U.K., U.S., and the international community will
greatly enhance the Afghan Government's effectiveness in combating this
destructive trade.
The CENTCOM counternarcotics program for Afghanistan and the
surrounding Central Asian states is being developed in coordination
with the Department of State's (DOS) efforts to improve law enforcement
in Afghanistan and compliment the programs developed by the U.K. In the
short term, we will focus our efforts on direct assistance to the
Afghan Government that establishes a more effective counternarcotics
capability.
CENTCOM will focus the $73 million made available in the fiscal
year 2004 supplemental for Afghanistan's counternarcoterrorism program
to disrupt the illicit drug trafficking that supports terrorist
elements in Afghanistan. These groups include Taliban remnants, al
Qaeda operatives and leaders, other extremist elements like Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar's Hizb-I-Islami, as well as Afghan criminal gangs and
transnational criminal elements.
The supplemental funding that Congress has approved will assist
coalition, host nation, contractor, and other governmental agencies to:
Monitor traditional overland smuggling routes from
Afghanistan to the bordering nations through the construction
of border control checkpoints and the employment of sensor
technology;
Equip Afghan counternarcotics units and law
enforcement agencies to conduct interdiction operations against
narcotraffickers;
Provide Afghanistan with the communications
connectivity necessary to rapidly respond to narcoterrorist
threats with synchronized interagency operations;
Establish an interagency counternarcotics Intelligence
Fusion Center to gather, collect, process, and disseminate
information leading to actionable intelligence. This will
enhance operations by U.S. law enforcement officers, Provincial
Reconstruction Team law enforcement liaison cells, coalition
forces, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Crimes
and Narcotics Center, U.K. law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, and other governmental agencies represented in the
region;
Conduct an Afghan counternarcoterrorism public
awareness program in concert with the DOS that helps the Afghan
interior ministry develop a public affairs capability;
Provide equipment and other support in concert with
U.K. operations against narcoterrorist activities in
Afghanistan; and
Conduct Maritime Interception Operations and monitor
vessels suspected of transporting narcotics and/or terrorists
based on actionable intelligence.
CENTCOM views narcotrafficking as a significant obstacle to the
political and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan. The revenue
generated from poppy cultivation provides resources for extremists and
the smuggling infrastructure that supports narcotics trafficking
facilitates terrorist transportation and logistics. Local terrorist and
criminal leaders have a vested interest in using the profits from
narcotics to oppose the central government and undermine the security
and stability of Afghanistan. As a result, the DOD counternarcotics
program in Afghanistan is a key element of our campaign against
terrorism.
As important as our contribution to the DOD counternarcotics
program is, the underlying causes for the growth of narcotrafficking
must be addressed. Farmers are hard pressed to cultivate cash crops
that can provide revenue for their families and villages. Poppies are
notoriously easy to grow, and their market value makes it difficult for
legitimate crops to compete. Additionally, narcoterrorists prey upon
farmers who do not produce, contributing to a lack of confidence at the
local level in the capability of the central government to provide
adequate security. We must not only target poppy production and
trafficking, we must also implement holistic initiatives that enhance
the economy and agriculture to provide alternatives to the opium
growers if we are to be ultimately successful in eliminating narcotics
proliferation in Afghanistan and the region.
Thank you for the opportunity to share CENTCOM's strategy,
objectives, and plans.
Senator Roberts. We are going to set a record, Mr.
Chairman, for summarized statements.
Senator Warner. You know how to run a show.
Senator Roberts. This is outstanding.
We would now like to hear from General Mixon. Would you
please proceed.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. BENJAMIN R. MIXON, USA, DIRECTOR OF
OPERATIONS, J-3, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
General Mixon. Yes, sir. It is good to see you again, sir,
and Senator Warner, after spending a very long day with you
last year in Bagram, Afghanistan, and Kabul, if you recall that
evening where we loaded you on a C-130 aircraft late at night.
You may not recall that. I certainly do, and it was an honor
for me to escort you in Afghanistan.
Senator Roberts. I remember that lunch.
Senator Warner. Thank you for that recollection. I remember
that.
Senator Roberts. I am not sure I want to remember it again,
but I remember that lunch. [Laughter.]
Senator Warner. As a matter of fact, we had the same meal
that you were providing the training of the Afghanistan army;
is that not correct?
General Mixon. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. Yes, and they were very proud of that
meal. It was a true Afghan meal.
Senator Warner. That is right.
Senator Roberts. I would recommend it for anybody who wants
to----
Senator Warner. Steady as we go. Thank you very much.
[Laughter.]
Senator Roberts.--enjoy Afghan cuisine.
Please proceed, General.
General Mixon. Sir, I am in a different environment now
than I was in Afghanistan, but an equally important
environment, as you pointed out.
My statement is a little bit longer. If you would indulge
me, I think it is important to outline for you what we are
doing.
Senator Roberts. Please proceed.
General Mixon. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, distinguished
members of the subcommittee: Thank you for allowing me a few
minutes to make some opening comments. We at SOUTHCOM are fully
committed to meeting DOD's responsibilities in the fight
against drugs and narcoterrorists. We fulfil these
responsibilities through detection and monitoring programs,
close interagency coordination, and military support to partner
nations. Our programs cover the entire SOUTHCOM AOR, including
Central and South America and the Caribbean Basin.
Our principal agent for the planning and execution is the
National Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) located
in Key West, Florida. JIATF-S is a one of a kind premier
organization of excellence for multi-service, multi-agency, and
multi-national support to the counterdrug mission. Their
operations, in conjunction with SOUTHCOM, deliver an integrated
approach to meeting DOD mission sets in the war against drugs
and narcoterrorists.
Our cooperation with the Central American countries
continues to strengthen. During the last year, besides our
daily interdiction efforts, we conducted 18 major surge drug
counteroperations. The most significant narcotrafficking
pattern centers on suspect air traffic transitting the Central
American corridor. Using the Cooperating Nations Information
Exchange System, we continue to make great strides in
regionalizing the effort to identify, monitor, and respond to
suspect air and maritime tracks in Central America.
Through numerous maritime professional exchanges and our
Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo helicopter deployment, SOUTHCOM
and JIATF-S continue to develop the Central American partner
nation abilities to accept, hand off, and effect interdiction
and apprehension of illicit trafficking activities.
We also remain strong partners with our Caribbean friends.
Besides periodic multinational and bilateral counterdrug
operations, we also remain committed to assisting in the
maintenance, logistics, and training of their counterdrug and
maritime forces.
We continue our robust military cooperation with our South
American allies, focusing on improving their capabilities to
deal with the narcoterrorists and war on terrorism threats. We
have deployed counterterrorist and counterdrug training teams
to Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Chile, and Paraguay. Brazil,
Ecuador, and Peru have recognized the threat of Colombia's
narcoterrorists to their stability and are taking concrete
steps to curtail it.
Assisting Colombia in their fight continues to be in the
United States' best interest and a top priority for SOUTHCOM.
In close coordination with the DOS, we continue to provide a
full range of support to the Colombian government, its security
forces, and its people. This includes training and equipping
both the military and police, assisting the ministry of defense
in the development of modern budget and logistics
organizations, assisting them in their narcoterrorist
demobilization programs, and providing humanitarian assistance
to populations that are most dramatically affected by this
narcoterrorist war.
Two of our most successful equipment and sustaining
programs remain the extensive support we have provided to the
Colombian army's counternarcotics brigade and the
infrastructure security strategy program, which has
dramatically reduced the number of narcoterrorist attacks on
Colombia's northeastern rural infrastructure. We are also
extensively involved in supporting the Colombian military's
campaign plan.
I would like to emphasize that all of our training and
advising programs operate under strict rules of engagement that
prohibit U.S. service members from participating in combat
operations.
The continuation of expanded authority is the single most
important factor for us to continue building success in
Colombia. This legislation has allowed us to use funds
available for counterdrug activities to provide assistance to
the government of Colombia for a coordinated campaign against
the terrorist activities of its illegal armed groups. Granting
of expanded authority was an important recognition that no
meaningful distinction can be made between terrorists and drug
traffickers in our region. All three of the terrorist groups
operating in Colombia are deep into the illicit narcotics
business.
Another key legislative priority we support is the raising
of the force ceiling, or cap, currently at 400 military and 400
civilian contractors. We at SOUTHCOM seek authorization to
increase the military numbers to 800. In fiscal years 2003 and
2004 we have repeatedly had to curtail training missions to
both the Colombian military and police, cancel intelligence and
reconnaissance missions, staff visits, and limit other
programs, ranging from medical exchanges to officer development
programs.
If granted this authority, we do not envision an immediate
increase in military personnel. This increase will simply allow
us the flexibility to enhance support as required while still
complying with the rules of engagement.
We have continued to support Colombia's air bridge denial
program since its resumption in August 2003. Since the program
restarted, there have been 14 aircraft forced down, 11 of those
destroyed, and 7.9 metric tons of drugs seized. We are prepared
to support the DOS's nonlethal program in Peru upon its
resumption.
Measures of effectiveness in this war are difficult to
gauge. Using calendar year 2002 and 2003 data, which roughly
corresponds to the inception of expanded authorities, the
Colombian security forces have experienced dramatic successes
on all fronts. I would like to cite a few of these examples.
The 2003 homicide rate is the lowest since 1987, pegged at
approximately 52 per 100,000 population. We are also proud of
the capture of over a dozen mid-level members and one senior-
level member of the FARC leadership, and the restoration of
Colombian government presence in all of Colombia's 1,098
municipalities.
In conclusion, we are at a critical point in Colombia's
history. Under the leadership of President Uribe, who enjoys a
very high approval rating, the military and police have
regained areas long held by the narcoterrorists. They have also
dealt serious blows to the leadership of these groups and have
embarked on a strategic offensive to dismantle the FARC.
Colombia's citizens have regained hope and the security forces
are imbued with a renewed sense of momentum and commitment. Our
continued support to them at this point is critical.
Thank you for the opportunity, and I would like to
highlight the great work the men and women do in SOUTHCOM every
day, and I appreciate the opportunity to make this statement
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Mixon follows:]
Prepared Statement by Brig. Gen. Benjamin R. Mixon, USA
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss
the United States Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) role in assisting
Colombia with its battle against narcoterrorism. Every day your
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians at
SOUTHCOM are working hard and employing their skills to accomplish our
missions in this vital endeavor. We are shoring up our own national
security by addressing this challenge at this time and in this place.
Simultaneously, we are laying the groundwork to promote and maintain
future security and stability.
Colombia is at a decisive point in its fight. We are seeing steady
progress toward establishing security and stability in Colombia and we
are confident the Government of Colombia will continue to do so under
President Uribe. President Uribe is a man of vision, principle, and
substance. He is inculcating his government and his Armed Forces with
an aggressive spirit and belief they can win the war against the
narcoterrorists and end the violence. But the momentum he has built and
the progress Colombia has shown is reversible. Consequently, we must
maintain our steady, patient support in order to reinforce the
successes we have seen and to guarantee a tangible return on the
significant investment our country has made to our democratic neighbor.
To outline SOUTHCOM's efforts in this endeavor, I will discuss the
status of SOUTHCOM's support of Plan Colombia, the progress we are
seeing in Colombia, our activities with the Andean Ridge countries, and
the way ahead. Assisting Colombia in their fight continues to be in our
own best interest. A secure Colombia will benefit fully from democratic
processes and economic growth, prevent narcoterrorist spillover, and
serve as a regional example. Conversely, a failed Colombia, serving as
a safe haven for narcoterrorists and international terrorists, would be
a most unwelcome regional model. The center of gravity right now is in
Colombia, and the future health of the region hinges upon what happens
there. While this is Colombia's fight to win, we have the opportunity
to tip the balance by augmenting their efforts decisively with our
unwavering support.
SOUTHCOM'S SUPPORT TO PLAN COLOMBIA
Plan Colombia is a 6-year plan designed to defeat the threat the
Colombians face. This threat continues to come from the three largest
illegal armed groups in Colombia, all named on the Department of
State's (DOS) list of foreign terrorist organizations and two named on
the President's list of drug kingpins: the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United
Self-Defense Forces (AUC). While these groups may retain fragments of
their founding philosophies, they appear to have jettisoned ideology in
favor of terrorist methods and narcotrafficking.
Narcoterrorism threatens the stability of several nations in Latin
America and the Caribbean and erodes the very fabric of democracy by
spawning terrorism, corrupting public institutions, promoting criminal
activity, undermining legitimate economies, and disrupting social
order. The violence and corruption not only threatens our neighbors, it
poses a direct national security threat to our homeland. Illicit drug
abuse is certainly a multi-faceted problem, but our support to Plan
Colombia is effectively addressing one of its most critical components.
Our role at SOUTHCOM is to support implementation of the military
aspects of the plan. The plan addresses the entire depth of Colombia's
complex problem, however, and is by no means envisioned as a simple
military solution. Various other U.S. Government agencies and
departments received funding to support both military and non-military
aspects of Plan Colombia.
Colombia is just completing the fourth year of this 6-year plan.
The first phase of their three-phased plan focused on the Putumayo and
Caqueta Departments of southern Colombia, where approximately half of
Colombia's coca cultivation took place and lasted from December 2000
until December 2002. That phase consisted of challenging illegal armed
groups, finding and destroying cocaine laboratories, and providing
security for intensive aerial eradication of coca, the principal bill
payer for narcoterrorism in Colombia. SOUTHCOM was responsible
primarily for training and equipping a Counternarcotics (CN) Brigade,
fielding Blackhawk and Huey II helicopters, and also training pilots
and crews during the first phase. Secondary efforts provided for
infrastructure upgrades, riverine training, and counterdrug
intelligence support. In Phase II, the Colombians are expanding the
size of the Armed Forces, working with neighboring countries for
combined operations, building forests where coca once grew, and
creating units comprised of campesino soldiers to help guard towns
where government presence was formerly lacking. These initiatives
support continued drug eradication and interdiction. Phase III of Plan
Colombia culminates the entire plan by expanding the government
presence and control nationwide. While it is still too early to predict
the exact end state of Plan Colombia, the progress we are seeing is a
positive development that promises to complete that plan and
institutionalize its successes.
CN BRIGADE
The CN Brigade headquarters and its three battalions are the best-
trained and equipped conventional units in the Colombian Army. Its
mission is to conduct ground, riverine, and air assault offensive
operations against narcoterrorist organizations and provide ground
security for aerial eradications. U.S. military personnel conducted
staff and light infantry training for almost 2,300 troops. In
accordance with Plan Colombia, the CN Brigade was originally designed
to operate in southern Colombia. The CN Brigade has had impressive
results during drug interdiction operations in that part of the country
by destroying coca processing labs, providing security to eradication
operations, and seizing chemical precursors and coca leaf. Most
recently, the CN Brigade captured Nayibe Rojas Valdarrama, aka
``Sonia,'' Chief of Finances and Logistics for the FARC Southern Bloc.
Her capture has led to numerous other related arrests and has degraded
the FARC's ability to conduct narcotrafficking.
The Colombian military synchronized the deployments of the CN
Brigade in Phase I with Colombian National Police and DOS eradication
efforts. The Office of National Drug Control Policy found that
Colombia's coca cultivation decreased by 21 percent in 2003 from 2002.
Because of its success in the Putumayo and Caqueta Departments, this
brigade is now also being used beyond its original scope in other parts
of the country, most notably the Narino Department. We continue to
provide sustainment training to the CN Brigade. In 2003, this unit
transformed its organizational structure to become more flexible and
deployable to plan and conduct offensive operations throughout the
entire country.
HELICOPTERS
Since December 2000, the United States has provided air mobility to
the first CN Brigade using a company of 28 UH-1Ns with a combination of
Colombian and DOS contracted pilots. The UH-1N aircraft are based in
Tolemaida with the Colombian Army Aviation Battalion and are forward
deployed to Larandia for operations. The current operational focus
remains providing air mobility support for counterdrug operations as
well as selected counternarcoterrorism operations. Delivery of the 25
Plan Colombia Huey IIs was completed in September 2002. These
helicopters are also based at Tolemaida and currently focused on
supporting pilot training and infrastructure security. All 14 UH-60L
Blackhawk helicopters procured under Plan Colombia for the Colombian
military began operations in January 2003 after a thorough program of
pilot training. These helicopters also support the CN Brigade, pilot
training, and infrastructure security. While the DOS is responsible for
program oversight and funding for operations and contract maintenance
for all of these helicopters, quality control is provided by a U.S.
Army Technical Assistance Field Team. The Department of Defense (DOD)
retains responsibility for training Colombian Army pilots, crew chiefs
and aviation unit maintenance personnel to fly and maintain Blackhawk
and Huey II helicopters. The maintenance programs are supplemented by a
safety initiative that integrates risk management planning into air
operations. Overall, these helicopters have given the Colombian
military unprecedented mobility. This mobility allows an increasingly
well-trained Colombian Army to maneuver across a rugged landscape, in
parts of the country they have not operated in for years, resulting in
greater operational effectiveness against the narcoterrorists.
ENGINEER AND INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT
The Plan Colombia supplemental appropriation allowed us to complete
large-scale infrastructure improvements that greatly accelerated the
development of increased operational capabilities for Colombia's
forces. In subsequent years, we have continued to provide necessary
facilities to support our training and equipping programs. Among our
more significant engineer projects were the expansion of both fixed-
wing and helicopter facilities at Tres Esquinas, the establishment of a
comprehensive helicopter pilot training school at Melgar and Tolemaida,
improved port facilities at Buenaventura, development of riverine
support and maintenance facilities at Tres Esquinas and La Tagua, and
the development of helicopter operational and support facilities at
Larandia. We are moving now to develop the logistics infrastructure
needed to support Colombian forces as they move outward to re-establish
government control throughout Colombia. We just completed and turned
over a hangar that will improve the operational rate of the Colombian
C-130 fleet by improving their maintenance program. Additionally, in
September 2003, we awarded contracts to establish logistics support
centers, motorpools, and maintenance facilities. As a direct result of
the completion of these facilities, Colombian forces will be better
able to conduct and sustain forward operations.
PROFESSIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Embedded within the training SOUTHCOM and U.S. forces provide under
Plan Colombia is the institutionalization of human rights and the
respect for law by the Colombian military. We have helped the Colombian
Ministry of Defense institute legal reforms through the creation of a
Military Penal Justice Corps, similar to the U.S. military's Judge
Advocate General's corps. On July 29, 2003, the permanent facility for
Colombia's new Armed Forces School of International Humanitarian Law,
Human Rights, and Military Justice opened. This school teaches human
rights and international humanitarian law to attorneys, commanders,
officers, and sergeants. Additionally, hundreds of military, police,
and civilian lawyers have received continued professional legal
education beyond that provided at the school. The Colombian military
legal corps, similar to the method used by our Armed Forces, is also
becoming embedded with the field units of the Army in order to provide
on the spot legal advice to commanders during operations.
SOUTHCOM continues to support Colombian efforts to extend human
rights training throughout its ranks. Colombia is fighting its illegal
armed groups justly, in accordance with democratic values and human
rights. This is instrumental in what we are collectively striving to
achieve.
Under President Uribe's ``Democratic Security Policy,''
extrajudicial executions in 2003 were down 48 percent, assassinations
were down 41 percent, homicides of trade unionists were down 68
percent, and forced displacements were down 68 percent. Further, none
of the units U.S. forces trained have been accused of human rights
abuses. I am confident that President Uribe and the Colombian military
have taken human rights to heart, unlike their adversaries, who commit
the vast majority of human rights abuses. Alledged human rights abuses
by Colombian security forces are now less than 2 percent of those
reported and the institutionalization of respect for human rights
continues.
In 2003, as members of the illegal armed groups demobilized, over
77 percent turned themselves into government forces. If they suspected
that they would be subject to torture and abuse, they would have turned
themselves into nongovernmental organizations and the Church as they
did in years past, before human rights became an integral part of the
Colombian military's ethos. The Colombian Government is not resorting
to rural concentration camps, peasant roundups, massacres,
disappearances or other tactics used by their enemies. Their
professional ethos is also reflected in public opinion that lists the
Colombian military as the second most respected institution in the
country just behind the Catholic Church.
THE URIBE ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRESS
Plan Colombia predates President Uribe by 2 years and will end
coincidentally when he leaves office in 2006. While he has firmly
embraced the plan, he has also brought to office new initiatives and a
long-term vision that extends well beyond that 6-year plan. President
Uribe won a landslide victory by running on a platform of aggressively
defeating and neutralizing the terrorists in his country while
asserting government control of national territory. After years of
failed attempts to negotiate with illegal armed groups, to include a
bold experiment that gave the FARC a safe haven in the southern part of
the country, the people of Colombia had finally had enough of terrorist
groups, especially after seeing how the FARC had used their safe haven
to plot terrorist acts and establish drug base camps instead of
developing their notional politics into a concrete reality.
President Uribe faces enormous challenges, but he is using his
mandate to put deeds behind his words. He has been in office for 19
months, and turning the government from a conciliatory posture to an
aggressively focused one has not been an easy task. We need to be
steadfast in our support of him now to set the conditions for his
longer-term success. The signs of his progress, which have built upon
our support to Plan Colombia, are already becoming evident. Colombia
developed a comprehensive national security strategy that directs all
the tools at the government's disposal toward a common end of defeating
the terrorists. The Colombians now spend nearly 4 percent of their
gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. President Uribe has levied a
war tax on the country's wealthiest citizens. He is increasing police
end-strength to supplement those already planned for the military. The
government has developed a plan to protect travelers along the major
roadways. He is pushing the military and the police to gain control of
areas and neighborhoods dominated by the narcoterrorists.
The military has had growing operational success against the
narcoterrorist organizations across the country, particularly against
the mid-level leadership, and all indications are that they will
continue to take the fight to the illegal armed groups over the next
year. The firm resolve of the Uribe administration, backed by
aggressive military operations, has resulted in increased desertions by
enemies of the state. These desertions are promising, especially since
the government provides a program under which those who leave the FARC
voluntarily are put in protected housing and receive health care,
education, and work training.
Our Special Operations Forces (SOF) have trained the staff and
soldiers of Colombia's best units, giving these units an added edge of
operational effectiveness that is paying dividends. The Colombian Army
has established its own Special Operations Command to coordinate and
oversee difficult and complex operations against the most sensitive
targets. The establishment and training of Commando and Lancero
Battalions, modeled on our own Ranger battalions, has given the
Colombians a unit that can strike high-value targets including enemy
leadership. The Colombian military is also in the process of
establishing a Joint Special Operations Command that will synchronize
special operations among all branches of the Colombian military.
SOUTHCOM's special forces component, Special Operations Command South,
will provide training to this new unit. Currently, U.S. military forces
are conducting deployments in 14 different locations in Colombia,
providing training to 9 major Colombian military units. Additionally,
Planning Assistance Training Teams are assisting the Colombian army's
mobile brigades in operational planning. We have also trained the
Colombian urban counterterrorist unit and continue to upgrade their
capabilities and equipment.
Our SOF also trained Colombian Armed Forces in Arauca to protect a
portion of the 772-kilometer oil pipeline that had been a frequent
target of FARC and ELN attacks. Pipeline attacks are down
significantly. This training was just one part of a nationwide
Infrastructure Security Strategy that protects critical facilities and
reestablishes control in narcoterrorist influenced areas of the
country.
We continue to train Colombia's helicopter pilots, providing their
forces a growing ability to perform air assaults that are key in the
battle against dispersed enemies. We deploy intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance assets in-country that have provided timely,
actionable intelligence to Colombian units. We are training their
staffs with Planning Assistance Training Teams that increase their
ability to plan and execute intelligence driven operations against
illegal armed groups. We are working with Colombian Marines to
establish a third Colombian Training Team that will work with units of
the Riverine Brigade to increase the operational readiness and
proficiency of Colombia's extensive riverine forces. We contracted
logistics to help the Colombians maintain their own C-130 fleet and
provided maintenance trainers to improve the operational readiness of
their helicopter fleet. Toward that end, we are looking forward to
establishing long-term solutions to readiness issues with the
establishment of a National Maintenance Point for Colombia's
helicopters, and a Logistical Automation System that will integrate
supply and fiscal management for parts and materials for the Colombian
military and National Police. We also are assisting in the training of
the Colombian National Police Carabineros (Rural), who have recently
established presence throughout the country.
We continue to provide medical training and assistance to the
Colombian military to improve their health services support to their
combat troops. With our support, the Colombian military now has a well-
established ``Combat Life Saver'' training course. Additionally, they
have adopted our Forward Surgical Team concepts and doctrine and have
moved ahead by establishing four deployable surgical teams.
In civil-military relations, we are helping the Colombians to build
a civil affairs capability that will enhance the communications between
the Colombian military and government with the populace in previously
ungoverned spaces. In the past year, with our support, the Colombian
military has written and adopted a civil affairs doctrine that allows
them to minimize the impact of their military operations on the
civilian population, while at the same time synchronizing humanitarian
assistance with their operations. In the departments of Arauca,
Cudinamarca, Caqueta, and Guaviera--portions of the last three are in
the former despeje--the Colombian military has provided basic medical
care to over 20,000 civilians and rehabilitated a number of educational
and medical facilities. In the next 6 months, they will conduct 39
similar events in conjunction with other Colombian ministries. In
addition, our civil affairs forces have worked with the office of the
Minister of Defense to develop mechanisms that synchronize the
interagency planning requirements needed to re-establish governance in
previously ungoverned spaces. To this end, the Government of Colombia
has establish a Coordination Center for Integrated Action. This
interagency body--consisting of representatives from the office of
President Uribe, the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Education, and
others--develops policies and plans to ensure that as the Colombian
military successfully reclaims terrorist controlled areas that the
other bodies of government rapidly respond, establish presence, and
provide the population with the government services they did not have
while under control of the illegally armed groups.
Beyond our coordinated military efforts, President Uribe has
sponsored political, economic, and judicial reforms. These measures
will assist the Colombian economy as well as free up resources for
increased security measures. President Uribe aims to reduce the
government bureaucracy, eliminate corruption, and enact fiscal reform.
Economically, President Uribe's stance and the promised reforms have
buoyed the country's confidence. The Government of Colombia has
collected 18 percent more taxes compared to last year. Further, tax
collection (as a percentage of GDP) rose from 16 percent in 2002 to 19
percent in 2003. Colombia has raised over $1 billion via bonds since
the new administration took office, and its stock market has increased
by 50 percent this year. Likewise, President Uribe has sought to stamp
out corruption and bolster judicial reform.
This list is just a partial highlight of the coordinated effort the
Colombian Government is making to solve its own problems. President
Uribe has infused his government with energy, organization, and a sense
of purpose. He is getting results now, and will continue to direct all
his resources toward making Colombia a safe, prosperous, democratic
nation.
Under President Uribe, our country's significant investment in Plan
Colombia is beginning to show substantial results. He is fully adhering
to Plan Colombia and already looking well beyond it. Most notably a
subsidiary campaign plan provides a long-term strategy and has been
coordinated across the Colombian services, and the interagency. This
campaign plan details the systematic defeat of Colombia's
narcoterrorists. He is also building the systems that will eventually
return Colombia to the ranks of peaceful and prosperous nations.
President Uribe has only 2\1/2\ more years in office. Consequently, it
is critical--especially this year and next--that he gets our unwavering
support to set all his long-term initiatives firmly into place.
WAY AHEAD
We are seeing the pendulum swing in Colombia, and we will continue
all of our planned training and support as well as seeking new
opportunities to increase that support at this critical moment.
Colombia is the linchpin in the narcoterrorist battle, but we must be
careful not to win the battle in Colombia and lose the war in the
region. As the Colombians make progress, their success will push
narcoterrorists to seek safer areas in which to operate. Already, the
FARC, ELN, and AUC operate across the porous borders of Colombia's
neighbors, and the remote nature of many of these areas makes them ever
more attractive as safe havens. While we are seeing increased
coordination and cooperation among most of Colombia's neighbors, some
of those countries also lack the resources to maintain territorial
sovereignty in these ungoverned spaces. Thus, across the Andean Ridge,
we are working with the bordering nations to increase cooperation
further, fortify borders and strengthen capabilities.
In an ongoing series of multinational exercises (UNITAS,
Amphibious, and Panamax), we are training with the Colombian Navy in a
combined operation. In Peru, we continue to sustain their riverine
interdiction ability, as well as work with the interagency to support
their eradication program and counternarcotics aviation. In Ecuador, we
have supported their riverine capability and worked closely with them
to complete the essential forward operating location at Manta. We are
seeing a welcome acknowledgment of the Colombian border concern by
Ecuador. In Bolivia, we have worked on their riverine capabilities as
well and supported their eradication efforts. Additionally, we have
already seen the Brazilians take up active patrolling on their own
border with Colombia.
As the lead DOD agent for implementing military aspects of U.S.
policy in Colombia, SOUTHCOM will continue to maintain a priority
effort against narcoterrorism. Key in most of our recent endeavors has
been approval by the U.S. Congress of expanded authority legislation.
This legislation has allowed us to use funds available for counterdrug
activities to provide assistance to the Government of Colombia for a
coordinated campaign against the terrorist activities of its illegal
armed groups. The granting of expanded authority was an important
recognition that no meaningful distinction can be made between the
terrorists and drug traffickers in our region. The country's two
largest terrorist groups--the FARC and AUC--are deep into the narcotics
business; the smaller ELN also participates to an extent. Trying to
decide whether a mission against a FARC unit was a counterdrug or
counterterrorist one was an exercise in futility and hampered
operational effectiveness on the ground. Expanded authority has
eliminated the time-consuming step of first evaluating the mission
based on its probable funding source and now allows us to bring to bear
all our assets more rapidly. As just one example, it will allow assets
controlled by Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) to continue
being used to their full potential to provide real-time, actionable
intelligence that is key in conducting effective operations against the
narcoterrorists. Additionally, JIATF-S will take an increased role in
counterillicit trafficking, as many materials other than narcotics use
the same transit routes through our area of responsibility (AOR).
Expanded authority for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, coupled with
increasing the personnel cap, are the single most important factors for
us to continue building success in Colombia. While our efforts are, for
good reason, Colombia-centric, we are not letting others fall behind to
become the next targets for terrorist groups. The cooperative counter
narcoterrorist groundwork we are laying today will further our national
security for decades to come.
CONCLUSION
We are at a critical time in Colombia's history. The elected
government of President Uribe enjoys unparalleled approval ratings over
75 percent. Under his leadership, the military and police are helping
to regain control of areas long held by narcoterrorists. Colombia's
citizens are taking a more active role in their nation's defense and
providing actionable intelligence to the Colombian Armed Forces. There
is a renewed sense of momentum, commitment, and hope as the Colombian
people struggle to save their country, but there is also a finite
window of opportunity beyond which public opinion and support will wane
without significant progress.
We are optimistic about the progress we are seeing in Colombia,
though there remains an enormous amount of work to be done. We are at a
critical point where the progress in eliminating conflict, reducing
tension, and establishing democracy throughout the region could be at
risk if we are not steadfast in our efforts. While our attention is
drawn to another region of the world, we must keep in mind that we live
in this hemisphere, and its continued progress as a region of democracy
and prosperity is paramount to our national security.
I would like to thank the chairman, ranking member, and the members
of the subcommittee for this opportunity and for your continued
support. The men and women of SOUTHCOM are working to their utmost to
accomplish their missions for our great country.
Senator Roberts. We thank you very much, General.
Mr. Chairman, would you like to start off with any
questions you might have?
Senator Warner. I thank the distinguished chairman, but I
think I would like to follow your subcommittee and perhaps do a
little wrap-up here toward the end. So you and Senator Reed and
your other two members should go ahead. I am privileged to come
in on these meetings, but I do not mean to preempt your normal
sequence of recognition.
Senator Roberts. We will hand you the mop and the broom to
get things cleaned up at the end.
Secretary O'Connell, we have heard a great deal about all
of the problems and the challenges in regards to our
counternarcotics activities, both from the standpoint of the
harm that it does, not only to our country but to those
countries where the narcotics are grown, but more especially
what this does in regards to financing terrorism around the
world.
I indicated in my opening statement that the President's
budget has $852 million for counternarcotics activities. That
is $56 million less than the appropriated amount for fiscal
year 2004. Why?
Mr. O'Connell. The central reason, sir, is that, as you
correctly stated, the fiscal year 2005 request is at $852.7
million. That is an increase over our fiscal year 2004 request
and the primary reason for the two differences are: first, the
congressional add-on that took place last year, which I believe
was at $18.2 million; and then the $73 million supplemental
which was added primarily for Afghanistan.
Senator Roberts. Would you anticipate another request in
the supplemental?
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, I am on very dangerous ground. That is
not my area. I do not--I make recommendations to the Secretary,
which I have done, and where the supplementals go----
Senator Roberts. We will not ask you to skate on that
important but thin ice.
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, I have to skate on that. I think you
understand.
Senator Roberts. All right. Let me ask a question, if I
might, for Secretary O'Connell and Admiral Clingan. As has been
stated by the chairman and Senator Allard and everybody that
has been over there to talk to President Karzai, there was a
big mistake made 2 years ago when farmers who were planting
poppies were paid to destroy their crops. I did not mean to
make a joke, but we used to have a farm program in this country
where you paid farmers not to grow anything, but you did have
acreage restrictions. I am not sure that was the case this time
by any means. This obviously encouraged other farmers to plant
poppies so that they would be paid.
Could you give me an indication of what the current focus
of the counternarcotics activities is in Afghanistan and what
alternatives are being considered to curtail the poppy
cultivation that can be offered to Afghan farmers?
Mr. O'Connell. Chairman Roberts, your comments are exactly
on the mark. We were witness to a mistake. Making alternative
offers to the poppy growers was perhaps not a wise move.
In response to your question as to what we are doing now,
when we look at the $73 million----
Senator Roberts. That was a British plan, was it not?
Mr. O'Connell. Exactly, sir.
Senator Roberts. Right.
Mr. O'Connell. In fact, sir, the British do have the lead.
I have been fortunate enough to have four very extended and
frank exchanges with British officials. Some of them express
displeasure at how we were holding up our end of the bargain
and vice versa. But I think we are at a consensus now that, in
conjunction with the Afghan government, the clearly delineated
responsibilities of the Brits and the inclusion of efforts such
as the Germans on the police side, the Italians on the judicial
side, that we do have a coordinated effort under Karzai's
decision that he will lead the eradication through his
governors.
We are going to take our funds, in conjunction with CENTCOM
and, of course, the task force there, and try to put this
counternarcotics effort into the context of the stability
operations that are ongoing in the country. We are not going to
go out and raid the farmers or raid the poppy growers. We are
looking at how we: one, train law enforcement to do this job
themselves; two, how we increase border security and cut down
on the smuggling routes; three, how we can provide intelligence
fusion as well as specialized intelligence support, identifying
the labs and some selective signal intelligence support; and
four, how we can provide increased transportation for the
Afghan forces that are going to be conducting and are
conducting raids on various labs.
We put these together in conjunction with the stability
operations and try to do these things concurrently. Is it a
perfect plan? Will it work? I cannot answer those things. But I
can say, Senator, that I am extremely hopeful that, one, we
have a plan; two, the Brits are on board; three, we are working
together; and four, I think CENTCOM has put together a solid
first crack at this effort against poppies in Afghanistan.
Senator Roberts. Let me change subjects and go to the troop
cap. This is for General Mixon. We are now currently limited to
800 personnel, that is my understanding, 400 military, 400
contractors. Obviously, the administration is asking for an
increase in this cap. You have indicated that that would be the
case in regard to flexibility to respond if in fact that was
needed for some new development.
My question: Why do you not just sort of summarize why you
think you need the additional U.S. military forces in Colombia?
Many Members of the Senate, I can recall when this first
started, had a lot of concern about this. Can you tell me for
what purpose and length of time these forces will be used?
Basically, in light of the heavy deployments elsewhere, are
there sufficient forces, especially in regard to Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Army, available for this
purpose?
General Mixon. Yes, sir. If we break it down into broad
categories of support provided, we would see this support being
directed as required at planning and assistance teams that
would work with their units that are participating in the
military campaign that supports Plan Colombia; logistics and
intelligence assistance that would be provided to them. As we
become more involved in assisting the Colombians and the
reestablishment of governments in their areas, particularly in
the civil-military operations, assistance in that area.
I would tell you that I would not see this going on
immediately, as I said in my statement, but it would allow us
the flexibility to increase that.
In reference to your question on the current strain on the
military forces, you are exactly right and we fully recognize
that. Most of the support that we would provide would not be
unit specific, i.e., organic units that are participating in
combat, with the exception of some potential additional support
that may be required with Special Operations Forces (SOF)-
unique capabilities.
Most of these are individuals who are qualified in the
intelligence, logistics, and operational fields that we put
together on an individual basis and form teams. We bring them
to SOUTHCOM, form a cohesive team, and link them up with a unit
that is participating in military operations.
Senator Roberts. I am going to beg the indulgence of the
subcommittee, and I apologize for this, but I want to add in
that my daughter, whose name is Ashley, who works in Rome with
the World Food Program, told me she was going to travel to
Afghanistan to determine the criteria being met in regards to
the World Food Program, the McGovern-Dole program where you set
up a school, allow young women to attend the school, and then
they are being fed various lunches.
I said that she was not going to Afghanistan, being her
father and a Senator. She indicated that she did not know why
that was the case, and we went into quite a discussion. It
ended with me saying that I would have her fired. That perhaps
was a little strong, but I was very concerned. She said:
``Well, okay, daddy; it is okay; I did not go to Afghanistan; I
went to Colombia instead.''
She was in an area 3 days after the FARC was there and 2
days prior to the paramilitary being there. During those 5 days
they continued that program on a hill under a tree with a
ramshackle building and were able to continue that schooling
and the nutritional supplements that the World Food Program
does provide.
Are we doing any better with stability in regards to those
areas so that those programs can work and we can make some
progress, especially with the education of women, which I think
is one of the biggest answers to terrorism that we can
accomplish?
General Mixon. Yes, sir, we are doing better, and we are
seeing results as far as the local population and their
acceptance of the Colombian military and their approval
ratings. This was mentioned in General Hill's testimony
yesterday.
Also, for the first time in many years the Colombian
civilian population is able to move around the countryside and
around the roads and visit their families and their farms that
are out in the countryside. So yes, sir, we are seeing progress
in that area.
Senator Roberts. I appreciate hearing that.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for your testimony.
Chairman Roberts has raised the issue of the effect of the
operation tempo (OPTEMPO) on activities throughout DOD.
Secretary O'Connell, could you comment on whether this OPTEMPO
increase has affected your ability to discharge your
counterdrug responsibilities?
Mr. O'Connell. Thank you for the question, Senator Reed. I
agree with General Mixon. Certainly the forces are under
strain. But looking at my responsibility for the oversight of
the 48, 49,000 United States SOF, it does not appear so at this
time. In fact, we have been able to use forces that had been in
Colombia previously in other operational areas. General Brown
and I testified the other day before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on posture, and I agree with General Brown that the
force is not overextended at this point.
In terms of the specific counternarcotics work done on the
Special Operations side, we look primarily to SOUTHCOM, of
course, and the Seventh Special Forces Group. I would just like
to point out that the ability of the Colombian military, sir,
to follow the advice and guidance of these wonderful Green
Berets has made a difference of enormous proportions down
there. The Colombian military is now going out into areas which
were previously off limits. They are conducting ambushes, long-
range reconnaissance, and direct strikes against the FARC, and
I think we have all seen that that has had an unbelievable
effect on the morale of the people of Colombia.
To move back to one point that Chairman Roberts made in
terms of increases on the cap, I would like to point out that
because the Seventh Special Forces Group has been able to push
the Colombian military out farther--and, Senator Reed, you
certainly recognize this in view of your military service--we
are talking now about considerably more terrain to cover. So
the helicopter routes are longer, the medical evacuation
requirements, the rearm, refuel, equip, the maintenance
requirements, go up as you obviously have to address more
territory. So that would go to the question of Chairman
Roberts.
But to answer your question, sir, the answer at this time
is no.
Senator Reed. Let me ask another variation on the question.
Are you declining requests for assistance that previously you
would entertain, requests from the Colombians, requests from
the Afghani government through CENTCOM?
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, not to my knowledge. I would defer of
course to the combatant commanders, General Hill and General
Abizaid. I will say, with respect to General Hill, we meet and
talk very often. He is very much into not only the
counternarcotics business, but also stability operations
throughout his hemisphere. He is an astute leader. He
understands very carefully his responsibilities. I think he is
looking to the future, and he will apply our military force and
training any place that it can be beneficial throughout the
hemisphere.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Mixon. I would like to comment on that, sir.
Senator Reed. Yes, sir. Go ahead, General Mixon and
Admiral.
General Mixon. We have never turned down a request from
support since I have been there last July. However, the cap has
caused us to have to shift support to make sure we did not go
over the 400 cap. I would just like to make that point.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
General Mixon. Senator Reed, if I could just add, sir. I
think at least in the press there has been some misperception
that this requested cap increase would be consistent with a
deployment order, and that is not the case. I would hope that
that message was delivered by General Hill yesterday.
Senator Reed. Can I raise another question, General Mixon,
about the cap since you brought it up. You want to go up to
800, but do you have an estimate of what your sort of average,
steady state deployment in country would be?
General Mixon. Sir, today as we speak the number that we
count against the Plan Colombia cap is 332. We had a high about
30 to 45 days ago of 392, and we were making some adjustments.
Senator Reed. Let us assume that the permission is granted.
Do you think you will have close to 800 people on the ground at
all times?
General Mixon. I do not.
Senator Reed. What is your estimate?
General Mixon. We did a best case analysis of this before
we went forward of if we were able to provide all of the
support that we can envision over the life cycle of Plan
Patriota, which is the military campaign plan, and we found it
to be at 726.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral, you have a comment?
Admiral Clingan. Sir, in Afghanistan to my knowledge we
have not denied any request for support specifically from
President Karzai nor the minister of interior.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Secretary O'Connell, in October 2003, Secretary Wolfowitz
promulgated a new international counternarcotics policy which
essentially made a link explicitly between counternarcotics and
counterterrorism. In his words, ``the Department's
counternarcotics support should be oriented to the greatest
extent feasible toward supporting the war on terrorism and
Department security cooperation guidance.'' It seems terribly
logical to me.
We have given explicit authority in the case of Colombia
for the DOD to use counterdrug funds to support Colombian
efforts to fight a unified counterdrug, counterterrorism
campaign. That is one case. To your knowledge, does the DOD
plan to ask for additional authority to use counterdrug funds
for overlapping counterdrug, counterterrorism?
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, I am not aware of any. The combatant
commanders may have specific commands.
But if I could comment on the mechanism that has been
provided for generally the central transfer account, which is
the way we handle certainly the bulk of these counternarcotics
activities----
Senator Reed. I would like you to do that, Mr. Secretary.
But Congress has funded this central transfer account
counterdrug to fight drugs.
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir, exactly.
Senator Reed. Is this now being used in other ways which we
should be at least aware of?
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, it is my belief that it has not been.
Sir, it is extremely difficult to draw that precise line. But
in our planning, in the reporting that we do back to Congress
on what we spend this money for, we specifically aim at the
counterdrug, counternarcotics areas.
The point is, sir, that the central transfer account, the
way it is structured, although it has been under increasing
pressure due to things like inflation and other aspects such as
closing down Roosevelt Roads, which has increased our maritime
patrol costs, allows extraordinary flexibility. I think that
the DOD has been very candid and very honest in how it has
handled and allocated those funds.
We, of course, look very carefully at any reprogramming. I
would be happy to go into some of the bloodier specifics
perhaps during our closed session when we get into contentious
issues. But you have provided very flexible authorities and to
the best of my ability, and I think certainly the combatant
commanders realize and certainly the Secretary, we will focus
that on the intended focus, the intended aim of the money, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I listened to the exchange between Senator Roberts and the
panel with respect to Afghanistan, the drug policy. The initial
approach was a British focus on labs and trafficking. We, with
our strategy, have come in to strengthen security along the
Afghan-Pakistan border. There is one sort of issue, though,
that we have not spoken about directly. That is eradication. Is
that going to play a role? Is that too contentious an issue
within the context of the politics?
Mr. O'Connell. No, I do not believe so, sir, because
obviously eradication has to be part of a strategy. President
Karzai has said he will lead the eradication through his
governors and out into the provincial regions. We do not, in
DOD, specifically do eradication, per se. There may be some
support for eradication in terms of, let us say, provision of
security while eradication is taking place.
But no, sir; it has to be part of the strategy. I would ask
Admiral Clingan if he had a comment on that.
Senator Reed. Admiral.
Admiral Clingan. The Secretary has it exactly right. We do
not participate in any way, shape, or form with regard to
eradication. But many of our efforts complement that process,
in particular the law enforcement capabilities that we endeavor
to enhance and those intelligence efforts can promote success
in the eradication effort.
Senator Reed. Thank you, gentlemen. My time has expired.
Senator Roberts. Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. General Mixon, counternarcotics operations
rely heavily on SOF and National Guard assets. Are your
operations requirements receiving adequate focus and are you
being consulted in the Army's plan to rebalance its forces?
What changes would you like to see in the force mix available
to you?
General Mixon. We are receiving the adequate focus that we
need, Senator Dole, for our activities there. As the military
is looking at its restructuring program, we have been sent
those working papers and provided comment as a combatant
commander on the organization of both the Guard and the Active
Forces. So I feel very comfortable that we are in sync with DOD
on their restructuring programs.
Senator Dole. One other question. The military training of
Colombian units that are vetted for human rights abuses is a
key enabler, I understand, in the success of Plan Colombia.
What role, if any, does the Western Hemisphere Institute for
Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) play in the training? If a role
is being played, in your opinion is this institute producing
the caliber of military professional needed to achieve security
and stability in Latin America?
General Mixon. I am glad you brought up the human rights
aspects of the support and the vetting. The vetting process is
viewed very strictly at SOUTHCOM. In fact, we are the only
combatant command that has an organization in our headquarters
that focuses on vetting.
As it pertains to WHINSEC, they primarily train individuals
rather than units, and their training that they give
individuals we believe has a heavy focus on the human rights
aspects of military operations.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Mixon, your testimony today is indicating that as
far as the Colombia plan is concerned, you see real and
tangible results. We heard similar testimony from your superior
yesterday. You have partly answered this question, but from an
operational standpoint what part of that plan do you attribute
the greatest success to, and then what part of that plan has
been a disappointment? For what part would you consider some
modification if you had to do it over again?
General Mixon. Yes, sir. The part of the plan in my opinion
that has been the greatest success is the close cooperation
between the Colombian military and the Colombian civil
agencies, such as the police and other agencies, to have a
combined and joint effort. They full well know that in order to
win victory for them in Colombia they must reestablish
governance in these areas once the military actions are over.
This is the first time in their history, at least to my
knowledge, that they have worked closely together with all
governmental agencies throughout Colombia to ensure that this
goal is achieved.
That is buttressed by President Uribe's leadership and all
those agencies have his support, not only from the standpoint
of the raising of taxes in Colombia and increased military and
police structure, but also just his physical presence and his
leadership.
Disappointment? I have been in this job since last July. I
have not seen a disappointment per se, but I would like to see
the Colombian military become more joint in the way they use
their capabilities, and they are doing that.
Senator Allard. Do they have various branches like we do?
General Mixon. They do have various branches. With our
advice and assistance, their most recent campaign that is
ongoing in what is literally the heartland of the FARC, they
have established a joint task force with all of their
components--army, navy, marine, and air force--under one single
commander. This is the first time in their history that they
have done that.
So as I say, the lack of jointness has been somewhat of a
disappointment. We see steady progress in that area.
Senator Allard. So if we had another country emerge like
Colombia, then what you would like to see happen is encourage
more cooperation between the various law enforcement and
military agencies, all of them coming together in a joint
effort to implement their efforts against narcotics?
General Mixon. Yes, sir, that is correct. If I could
elaborate on that, what you just said. What we have tried to
encourage all the militaries in our region to do is the same
thing we are doing in the U.S. military and take a 21st century
approach: identify the threats within their organization, their
country, and reorganize themselves accordingly.
Not all countries need a large military. They may need more
police forces. For example, the gangs we are seeing forming in
some of these countries; the police are the ones that need more
force structure and more support versus the military. So we
encourage them along those lines.
Senator Allard. Now, one of the things that I have noted,
it seems like when you have success in one area the drug trade
moves someplace else. I do not know whether you can comment on
this in an open session like this, but in which areas of the
world do you see a potential for, once you move them out of
Colombia and move them out of some of the areas we have had
success in, where do you think they may go to next? If you
cannot give us a specific geographic area that you may see
where they would head, perhaps you could share with this
subcommittee certain factors that you look at that put certain
parts of the world on your watch list for possible inclusion in
the drug trade.
General Mixon. As far as growth in production, the two
principal countries that we will continue to keep an eye on
will be Peru and Bolivia. We know the history that Bolivia has
had, and we also know the culture in Bolivia as far as coca is
concerned. So we will continue to watch those countries in
particular.
Senator Allard. Bolivia at one time had a drug trade. Then
it was brought under control, the way I understand it, and you
think it is still at risk?
General Mixon. It is still at risk. Particularly, the
government, Senator, recently has experienced some turmoil in
that area, and as we watch the various forces that are working
there some of them have links to the Cocalera movement. We are
very concerned about what is going on down there and we will
keep a close eye on it.
Senator Allard. Peru is also a concern?
General Mixon. It is a concern. We will watch it.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I think those are the main
things I wanted to pursue in my time. Thank you.
Senator Roberts. Senator Warner, would you like to make any
comments at this time?
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the ranking
member. Mr. Chairman, we are fortunate, this subcommittee and
indeed the full committee and Congress, that Secretary
O'Connell accepted this post. It is a very important post. It
was created and envisioned right in this room many years ago,
and I participated in the deliberations and the legislation
which established your office.
If I may say, you bring to this office an extraordinary
record of accomplishments: in uniform, the 82nd Airborne, SOF,
intelligence officer, liaison with the British intelligence in
Great Britain. We are fortunate you relinquished other, perhaps
more lucrative, opportunities and accepted this one. You have
the strong support of this committee.
Mr. O'Connell. Thank you, Senator. That means a great deal
coming from you.
Senator Warner. Well, I appreciate that.
I also think there is a direct correlation between the drug
trade, wherever it is in the world, and terrorism. Particularly
I am going to address my questions here to Afghanistan
momentarily. But it is ever so clear there. Perhaps you have
knowledge of it, but there may be evidence you could share with
us that Osama bin Laden and the current operation of al Qaeda
could be receiving funds from the poppy trade in Afghanistan.
Before I proceed further, though, Mr. Chairman, members of
the subcommittee, given the distinguished career of our
Secretary, we should recognize our sympathies to the families
of those members of the private sector contractors lost
recently in Iraq. It was tragic. Many former U.S. military have
gone on to really indirectly serve their country by working for
private contractors. Those individuals are essential to the
work that we are performing in Iraq, primarily the rebuilding
of the infrastructure. It requires a certain amount of security
and we are fortunate that these retired military people have
stepped up.
Is there anything further you could tell us about that
incident here this morning for the record?
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, not for the record, but I know we go to
a closed session. We were talking with Senator Dole just
recently. Of course, that company is home-based in her State.
You are correct that many special operators go to work for
firms like that.
Senator Warner. When you say ``special operators,'' those
following this proceeding might not pick up on that. These are
U.S. military SOF like yourself.
Mr. O'Connell. Many of them would have been Navy SEALs,
would have been Army Rangers or marines or just people who were
willing to go through the training and take on this type of
job.
It is becoming more and more frequent in our society. There
is a high demand for that type of trained person. They take a
very high risk. Certainly I agree with you, Senator; our hearts
go out to not only all the military, but the civilian
contractors that have lost their lives, not only in Afghanistan
and Iraq but around the world. We have hostages in Colombia
today, three Americans, that of course are on our minds all the
time.
With respect to your issue in Afghanistan, sir, can that
country move forward with the basis of the economy being so
tightly tied to narcotics? I think the answer is no. I think we
all realize that. If, in fact, the numbers that have been
kicked around are correct, and 60 percent of the GNP is coming
in some way, shape, or form from the narcotics trade, then I do
not think we are going to be successful.
That is why I am encouraged by the approach that we have
agreed to with the British government, with the Germans, with
the Italians, and particularly the plan that CENTCOM I think
will put into effect with good results. I am optimistic that
this next year will be a signal change in how we approach the
issue.
A lot of it--you just returned from talking with President
Karzai and going out into the countryside--is going to depend
on whether the Afghan people can step up to their own
governance. Are they willing to take the risks to be policemen?
Senator Warner. On that point, just days after we departed,
one of his principal ministers was gunned down. Is there a
linkage yet established, perhaps with the narcotics business?
Mr. O'Connell. Sir, quite frankly, I think the Intelligence
Community has been less than precise on this issue. As we were
talking about, coming over in the car, it is a bit like pickup
sticks there. You pull one drug lord out or someone you feel is
tied into the drug business and there are unintended
consequences. You never know what militia that is tied into, if
it is tied into the government, and what is going to be the net
result.
There are longstanding tribal rivalries and frictions, as
you well know, there, sir. But I think as our intelligence
effort picks up we are going to be able to identify those
people who are, in fact, involved with processing, in fact
involved with shipping, and hopefully get better insight into
what portion of that money goes into supporting groups as, not
only al Qaeda, but the Taliban and potentially other spinoff
groups. But there clearly is a linkage.
Senator Warner. Well, let us take just a minute to focus on
the background, the history of this. We fortunately have
yourself--and General Mixon, I know you have been through this
very country where these drug operations take place in your
assignment over there.
You go back in history--the British Empire tried to conquer
this region in the late 1800s and lost tens and tens of
thousands of soldiers, and finally wrapped up and went home
unsuccessful. That was followed by the Soviet Union that went
in there and lost tens and tens of thousands of soldiers, and
of course there was a very strong civil war in addition.
But this is mountainous country. It is prevalent with old,
historic trails that only a donkey can crawl over. This is not
going to be an easy job, shutting this down, because this poppy
growing has been going on for centuries. Am I not correct?
Mr. O'Connell. Afghanistan, sir, is made by God for growing
poppies.
Senator Warner. I went into this in some detail. I have a
modest interest in agriculture. This is the former chairman.
But you can literally throw the poppy seeds on the ground and
hardly scratch the earth and they take root, and they can
survive under extraordinary drought conditions and produce a
prolific crop.
So this is a daunting and challenging task, and
particularly against the history of others who have tried to
bring into this region some conformity with the laws of man.
But I congratulate General Abizaid. We are fortunate to
have him as the combatant commander. He is an extraordinary
man, and all of us here on the committee have dealt with him
extensively.
In the course of our meeting, we met with General Hillier,
who is the commander of the joint forces over there, and he
expressed great concern about this situation. I want to once
again reiterate, I think it is very important that NATO come
into this AOR and begin to work in it, take up greater
responsibilities, but I do not believe that they are equipped,
trained, or otherwise, or should they be the primary outfit to
tackle this question of the drug trade.
Now, looking through the testimony of the Admiral here, the
U.K. has the international lead. Where was that established?
What is the documentation? My recollection is it goes back into
some U.N.--where was the authority for that derived, Admiral?
Admiral Clingan. Senator, the penultimate authority escapes
me at this moment. I do know that we have an agreement at our
level----
Senator Warner. You mean CENTCOM?
Admiral Clingan. CENTCOM.
Senator Warner. Has an agreement with?
Admiral Clingan. With regard to the U.K., signed by Mr.
Rodman, that establishes our relationship in regard to the U.K.
lead nation efforts in Afghanistan.
Senator Warner. I think that is fine, and I am sure that
they have learned by experience. One or two of the programs
they have initiated, I mentioned are not working. They are
ready to take new initiatives. But they will continue then in
the lead, is that correct?
Admiral Clingan. Yes, they will.
Senator Warner. The $73 million which the Congress of the
United States in its wisdom--and I think it was a very wise
move--provided to fund this program, does that money flow then
to the U.K. directly or how does it transfer?
Admiral Clingan. No, sir. That money will be obligated in
accordance with a plan CENTCOM has developed in concert with
ASD-SOLIC, in concert with the U.K., DOS, and DEA.
Senator Warner. So it will be controlled entirely by us.
But if they are in command and given the magnitude of that
money, they have to have a voice in this matter. Was their
voice listened to as this structure which you outline in your
testimony--were they involved in this?
Admiral Clingan. Our plan has been coordinated with them,
sir.
Senator Warner. Coordinated.
Admiral Clingan. As it has been with the other interagency
initiatives, to make sure that we do not duplicate efforts and
that we in fact are moving ahead in complementary fashion.
Senator Warner. All right. I am not in any way being
critical. I am just trying to get a grasp of it. The U.K. is in
charge. We have this program which you have outlined here, and
it is in coordination with their leadership, and we are in
support or working directly--or just how does it----
Admiral Clingan. Our support to the U.K. effort happens in
some specific realms. For example, in the operational realm, we
currently provide them intelligence support, we provide them en
extremis close air support should some of their teams come into
contact with an enemy force that exceeds their capabilities. We
can extract them from that type of situation as well.
Senator Warner. That is a good example. I want to press on.
Do you know what budget they have allocated to their effort? Do
you know, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir, I can answer that. I believe I got
these figures at the end of calendar year 2003. It was our
estimate--and their records--that they allocated $114 million
over the next 3 years for, among other things, alternative
livelihoods, which we have already discussed, interdiction,
institution building, and specific law enforcement.
They have trained what we think and hope is going to be a
fairly effective enforcement and interdiction unit. We are
providing limited aircraft support to that unit. The U.K. has
indicated that they will shift efforts in terms of helping
support on the eradication side. Even though that is primarily
an Afghan effort, they will be assisting the government in
putting that program together.
As I said, sir, I have met four times with British
officials and I think we have a good way ahead in terms of
intelligence sharing. I have reallocated funds from certain
signals intelligence accounts and overhead imagery accounts
that can assist the British as they are working against various
labs.
Senator Warner. But as old Harry Truman says, the buck
stops on the British desk; is that correct?
Mr. O'Connell. They are the lead agency.
Senator Warner. They are accountable for the overall
operation of this program, in which we have a very significant
supporting role?
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Would you agree that that is correct?
Admiral Clingan. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Now, do they employ just military or a
combination of military and civilians?
Mr. O'Connell. A combination.
Senator Warner. Since there is a reference in here to the
DEA, which apparently are working with----
Mr. O'Connell. Excuse me, sir?
Senator Warner. I beg your pardon. DEA is working with--you
enumerate in here: ``This will enhance operations by U.S. law
enforcement officers, provincial reconstruction teams, law
enforcement, coalition forces.'' Everybody is, fortunately,
pulling together to make this work. But the DEA is working as a
part of our program?
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir, as part of our program. I met
twice with DEA Administrator Karen Tandy and her intelligence
operations and deputy chief specifically on operations in the
Intelligence Fusion Center that we are setting up for better
intelligence sharing. I wanted to give her complete visibility
into our DOD intelligence capabilities that are going not only
to support CENTCOM, but the British, to make sure she had full
access.
Additionally, they can bring a very large amount of
information to the table on routes out of Afghanistan and how
they go into Russia, as an example, through Iran, and into the
U.K. Those three countries in particular are perhaps most
affected by the poppy coming out of Afghanistan.
So in terms of how the DEA works, they have been very
forthcoming. I would also like to add, not only the DOS, but
the Central Intelligence Agency's counternarcotics center has
produced some very good products that I think will lay out for
CENTCOM and the task force there the nature and scope of the
problem, not only border issues, but cultivation issues, lab
processing sites and terrorist financing.
So I think we have a good effort under way, sir.
Senator Warner. Well, when we were there we were briefed by
General Hillier that just within 48 hours of our being there
they rolled up a very significant plant which was refining the
raw material before it was exported. Am I not correct in that?
Mr. O'Connell. That is correct, sir, and we are hopeful for
more in the future.
Senator Warner. This momentum is now beginning to show
clear results?
Mr. O'Connell. I hope so, sir. I will defer to Admiral
Clingan. I think the first eradication actually is starting
today, according to statements that I have seen out of the
Afghan government. They are actually on the ground in certain
areas, I think particularly in the southeast, where eradication
will start.
Senator Warner. Admiral, this is your portfolio. Pick up.
Admiral Clingan. Senator, momentum is building on two
fronts. First is that the fielded forces have been given
recently--as recently as early January and again this month--by
CENTCOM clear direction on their role to play in regard to
dealing with drugs, labs, and other things discovered in the
course of their ongoing operations. So I think not only are
they going to be unequivocally clear in their own mind what
their obligations are when discovering those types of things,
but we are going to enhance the reporting of it so that we get
increased visibility. Specifically, discovery of drugs or a
drug lab or paraphernalia associated with that drug trafficking
trade is going to be a significant activity that gets reported
immediately up the chain of command.
So on the tactical level, momentum is building. On the
programmatic level, we are excited by the $73 million made
available to us by Congress and our efforts will span the eight
items you have seen in my written testimony there. Importantly,
those include stronger border control efforts and the
Intelligence Fusion Center.
Senator Warner. Any facts that you can share with us as to
Osama bin Laden's linkage to this operation?
Admiral Clingan. Sir, there is clearly linkage between
terrorist organizations and the narcotics trade .
Senator Warner. But he is just over the mountain,
presumably, from where much of this is taking place.
Admiral Clingan. Sir, there is no clear and specific
linkage between bin Laden himself and the drug trade that I am
aware of.
His organization clearly benefits. One funding stream for
al Qaeda is narcotics.
Senator Warner. Well then, to me that is a linkage. I am
not presuming that the dollars actually get into his pocket,
but it gets into his organization's pocket.
Admiral Clingan. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. That has been established?
Admiral Clingan. Yes.
Senator Warner. This is very helpful, Mr. Chairman. I just
want to make certain that Great Britain understands that the
buck stops there. We are giving them every conceivable support
that we can to make this work, because in my judgment this drug
situation is a serious roadblock to progress in moving forward
with developing our goals in Afghanistan.
To me, it could become a roadblock to further expansion of
the NATO operation of responsibility. NATO envisions a plan
where they are currently in that one quadrant up there, they
are going to move to another quadrant and another and another,
and perhaps in 18 months or so they will be taking over the
majority of responsibility. Mr. Secretary, is that not the
plan?
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir. There was a meeting that I believe
terminated in Berlin yesterday where many of the NATO nations
in the donors conference offered up various types of support,
various accounts, various amounts. As that is sorted out--I
think Lieutenant General Barno was there--we will be able to
look at how those amounts are coming in, and I am sure the
Afghan Government will look at what amounts can we integrate
into our total counternarcotics strategy and anti-poppy
strategy in Afghanistan.
So there are positive developments, sir.
Senator Warner. Do you share my view that this is a
roadblock?
Mr. O'Connell. Absolutely, sir. A country--and I do not
know that anybody has ever been able to pin down the GNP of
Afghanistan. I think that would be an economist's nightmare,
but it is someplace between $4 and $14 billion. Most experts
agree that around 60 percent of that GNP has some way of being
tied to narcotics cultivation, development, processing, sale,
and transport.
Senator Warner. The emerging Afghan Government, their
security forces are taking up a responsible role in this?
Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir. In fact, when you go back to the
British efforts, they are training what we hope to be an
effective police force that can go around the country.
Senator Warner. Good. I thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for
paying tribute on behalf of the subcommittee and the full
committee to those who went through that very barbarous attack
and the families of those who lost loved ones. That was a
terrible tragedy, and I would certainly agree with Ambassador
Bremer when he was addressing those who were still in the
police training, that there was a choice for Iraq between
barbarism like that--which is hard to understand, because it is
hard to understand why people perform in such a manner, man's
inhumanity to man--and individual freedom and stability.
But I want to thank you for those comments. Like yourself,
I have no illusions. It was in 1921--I forced the chairman to
watch ``Lawrence of Arabia'' on our way to Iraq.
Senator Warner. On the way home, I think it was.
We had finished our trip through Iraq and Afghanistan. We
were on the way home and you played it on the airplane. I
remember it very well.
Senator Roberts. Three hours and 15 minutes.
Senator Warner. Right, and what was the last scene?
Senator Roberts. Well, they rode to Damascus to achieve
PanArabia, and it did not work out very well.
Senator Warner. They turned it over to the Arabs, their own
lands.
Senator Roberts. Basically, what happened was that the
Brits sat there and the power went off and the water went off
and the hospitals did not work, and the tribes got to arguing
again, and they all got back on their camels and went back to
their tribal lands, and everybody scratched their head and
said: What the hell was that all about? Churchill said that the
people of Mesopotamia, i.e., the new Iraq--the British do bear
that responsibility for really creating that country--
represented ``an ungrateful volcano.'' If you carry it a little
bit further and you read the remarks by King Faisal, who was
the king for 10 years----
Senator Warner. Of Iraq.
Senator Roberts. --of Iraq, and you read his summation,
which I will not because it is a rather negative summary of
what he went through; it shows you the tremendous challenge
that we have.
Senator Warner. I just think that history should be the
rear view mirror as we try and achieve our goals in both Iraq
and Afghanistan. Remarkable chapters of history where these
areas have been--people have tried to infuse some sort of
democracy in them without success in years past.
Senator Roberts. The fiscal year emergency supplemental for
the $73 million, which has been referred to by the chairman and
also by the Secretary, it is my understanding as of April 1
that very little of that funding has been obligated. So we will
have an opportunity to do the things that you have talked
about, to study how best to spend those funds. You have already
gone over your plan to ensure the money is obligated in a
timely and effective manner in conjunction with the British,
but I think that is very important.
I just want to say one thing, and then I am going to turn
it over to Senator Reed, and then we will go to the closed
session. If you really look at SOUTHCOM and our neighbors to
the south, the 31 nations under SOUTHCOM, if you look at how
that area of the world affects our daily lives and pocketbooks
in America; the immigration challenges that we have; the trade
challenges that we have; the tremendous opportunity for bulk
commodities and specialty crops here; the energy situation,
with Mexico and Venezuela and people like Hugo Chavez--whose
oil minister was the chairman of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries two summers ago and turned the valve back
and we got into increased gas prices--look at the terrorism
funding; and then also look at the drugs--I do not think you
can make a list any more important in terms of our national
security and the well-being of our people.
Yet it seems to me that, in an area with 360 million
people, where the average age is 14, where the people are
malnourished, that we were doing about the best job that we
could. A lot of infrastructure was taken away during the Balkan
conflicts, and then we have Afghanistan and Iraq and I do not
think it has ever been put back. Talk about miles to cover and
talk about things that we should be concerned with.
There is assistance under the National Defense
Authorization Act, Section 1021, that provides for the DOD to
provide counternarcotics training, equipment, and assistance to
seven additional countries in South America and South Central
Asia, and also to renew the authority in Colombia which has
been the subject of this hearing, and Peru.
I just went down on a delegation with Senator Cochran and
learned for the first time about the three-border area, what we
call the wild, wild South or the wild, wild West or something,
where there is virtually no law, and the proceeds of activities
there obviously go straight to financing terrorism.
I am still concerned that we--I do not want to call it
benign neglect, but I think we ignore at our peril all of these
problem areas that I have just gone into. I know all the rest
of our missions around the world, more especially with the
global war on terrorism, are extremely important and are of a
high priority. But I worry about SOUTHCOM and what could
develop.
That is not in the form of a question. That is just an
observation. If any of you would like to comment on that, why,
feel perfectly free.
Mr. O'Connell. I would agree, Senator.
General Mixon. Yes, sir, I would comment on that if you
would allow me, please. First of all, this was my first
assignment as a member of SOUTHCOM in my 29 years of service in
the United States Army, and I found it to be very interesting
as I became a little smarter on the importance of the region. I
was not aware of it myself, to be perfectly frank with you.
Then as we did the analysis, as General Hill mentioned
yesterday in his comments, we receive approximately 0.22
percent of the DOD budget for operations in that region, and we
currently have deployed in the region a little over 7,000 U.S.
military throughout 29 countries. If you count that dollar
investment, as well as the investment in numbers of U.S.
military, from a military perspective that is a very small
investment for a very big return on what is a very important
region, as you point out.
I have tried to study a little bit about Latin American
history and what makes Latin America Latin America. It dawned
on me as I studied that there are a lot of threats, and you
mentioned them: the tri-border area, the financing of illegal
groups, drugs, illegal gangs--you name it, they are all out
there.
But it became apparent to me that the biggest threat we
have in this region is endemic poverty, and until we can deal
with that and assist these countries in trying to deal with
that particular situation, all these other problems have room
to grow and fester like a sore wound. So that is an area that
requires a multi-agency perspective and action.
We focus on that in SOUTHCOM. We realize that there are not
just military solutions to these challenges. It is an
interagency effort. We work with the interagency group closely
in all of these areas and see how we can best provide military
support within our capabilities.
So that would be my overall comment on the situation that
you just mentioned, sir.
Senator Roberts. Well, I point out that when General
Wilhelm was the commander down there in SOUTHCOM, I think he
counted Cuba and one other country, so maybe when I said 31 and
you said 29 that there was some difference of opinion. But at
that particular time they had just gone through a terrible
hurricane and our National Guard folks were there in uniform
building back bridges, building back infrastructure, helping to
build schools, etcetera.
I do not think we can do that now, with all the stress and
strain on the National Guard and our Reserves. As you have
indicated, with only 7,000 people we are going to pay the
price. We have seen recent elections, and I am not going to get
into any judgment on that other than the fact that President
Lula and President Kirchner of Argentina and Brazil and then
the lame duck situation in Uruguay--I do not think we can
afford to go back to the Nicaragua days of the early 1980s and
find ourselves in that kind of a situation.
I see this thing tilting, for no better description, to not
so much an anti-U.S. bias, but certainly a position independent
of the United States. We see it in trade, where that whole
trade round--why, Brazil and Argentina simply threw a monkey
wrench into that. We have a lot of work to do. As I understand
it, we have other priorities, but I worry about it.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner has raised the issue and has expressed all
of our outrage about the ghastly attack upon the contractors.
It raises some questions, Admiral. First, do we have an idea of
how many of these type of security contractors there are? These
are people who are armed and much different than someone going
in to give advice about a project, like an engineer. But these
are armed individuals whose job is to protect vehicles and
properties and engage if they have to.
Do we have an idea of how many of these we have in country?
Admiral Clingan. Senator, thank you for the question. We do
have an idea. In fact, I would hazard to say that we know
specifically how many contract security detachment personnel we
have. The precise number I am not aware of, but I can certainly
find out.
[The information referred to follows:]
There are approximately 20,000 personnel employed by Private
Security Companies (PSC) in Iraq and the number is expected to grow as
reconstruction efforts accelerate. PSCs provide three distinct security
services including personal security details for senior civilian
officials, nonmilitary site security (buildings and infrastructure),
and nonmilitary convoy security. These services are defensive in
nature.
The overwhelming majority of PSCs (approximately 60 PSCs employed
in Iraq) are hired as subcontractors by companies engaged in the
reconstruction efforts throughout Iraq. Each subcontracted PSC reports
directly to their prime contractor, not the government. The prime
contractors are directly responsible to the Chief of Mission for the
performance of their contract. The exact number of PSC personnel is
difficult to determine because such information is proprietary and may
have privacy implications. Therefore, subcontracted PSCs and their
parent companies generally do not make available details concerning the
prices of their contracts, salaries, or number of employees.
The DOD, DOS, and the Interim Iraqi Government continue to
coordinate to issue uniform guidance regarding PSCs employed in Iraq in
order to have a better accounting of the numbers of individuals
undertaking the security mission for both the United States Government
and the Interim Iraqi Government.
Senator Reed. Your notion would be on the order of some
thousands?
Admiral Clingan. No, sir, significantly less. The contract
Program Security Directive folks are primarily focused on
providing security to the Coalition Provisional Authority and
some other entities on a smaller scale than that.
Senator Reed. The other issue the tragic incident this week
raises is the coordination between military forces and these
civilian security personnel, and also the standard operating
procedures that both sides would follow. One of the questions
that remains unanswered is that apparently this situation took
several hours. It was an attack and then the crowd built up,
etcetera. At no time did the American military units respond to
try to recover the body or somehow disperse the crowds, or
Iraqi security forces.
This whole issue of operations I think is important. Can
you comment upon that, Admiral?
Admiral Clingan. Sir, in this forum I can say that we are
continuing to investigate the circumstances surrounding that.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Let me raise two other countries----
Senator Roberts. On that point, I had hoped we learned that
lesson in Somalia.
Senator Reed. I concur.
Two other countries. First, Pakistan. According to the
International Narcotics Control Strategy report, Pakistan
showed a remarkable rebound, unfortunately, in opium
production, and it is a transit site for some of the opium
leaving Afghanistan. Secretary O'Connell and Admiral Clingan,
can you comment upon the situation in Pakistan with respect to
this increased production, because it conjures up also the
destabilizing effects of drug money getting into the hands of
insurgents.
Admiral Clingan. Senator, thank you for the question. We
are concerned in CENTCOM in regard to narcotrafficking
throughout the AOR and particularly southern Asia, which
includes Pakistan. Part of our plan addresses the bordering
countries surrounding Afghanistan, and clearly watching the
border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan is an area that we
will pay attention to in regard to enhancing border controls.
That and the Stans in the north, those two areas are of
considerable interest to us because of the comment that you
made.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Mixon, we have forces in Haiti today and apparently
Haiti also is at least a transshipment point, if not a
production point. Can you comment upon the situation in Haiti
with respect to drugs?
General Mixon. Yes, sir, I can. First of all, it is a
transshipment point. We do not have any indicators of
production in that area.
I would just comment that at the present time we have
approximately 3,700 total forces in there, including all the
multinational forces in that area. During the first 30 days of
the operations in Haiti, we saw absolutely no flights going
into Haiti as we had tracked over the past. However,
unfortunately, during the last week we have identified at least
one unidentified flight going into the area, which indicates to
us a resumption of it as a transshipment point.
It is our intention, it is General Hill's guidance to the
JTF, that we will monitor that, working closely with JIATF-S,
and we will do everything that we can do to shut it down as a
transshipment point, given the fact that we are on the ground
and present in Haiti. We will do that in conjunction with the
other agencies that are involved.
It is important to note that as a part of the JTF in Haiti
we have formed our naval component around the U.S. Coast Guard.
As of about 3 days ago, they have done close to 100 boardings
of private and small vessels to assure that Haiti does not
operate again as an open transshipment point. So we are going
to take aggressive action in that particular area, because it
will destabilize our efforts.
Senator Reed. I guess the question that that begs is, we
can do that now with 3,000 international personnel on the
ground and with the Coast Guard flotilla out. What happens or
what are we going to do to ensure when we leave that it
continues to not be a transshipment point?
General Mixon. We will continue to do operations, as we
have done, in coordination with the DEA. JIATF-S, that is one
of the areas that they monitor. Ideally, as we begin to reform
the Haitian national police we can work with them to make them
more effective, because really that is where we need to put our
focus. In the past that has been part of the problem and, as we
saw over the last year, there were strong indicators of Haitian
national police involvement in the drug trade.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Now, let me follow up, General Mixon, because the request
for increased personnel in Colombia raises some specific
questions. I think you assured us that you will have sufficient
support from DOD in terms of the individuals you need, so you
are not going to be limited in terms of personnel available.
That is correct, is it not?
General Mixon. There will be a consideration, of course, as
we request those additional personnel, but I think we will get
their support when we do ask for those people.
Senator Reed. How do you envision using these increased
forces? Will they accompany units in the field? If they do, how
far down? How far will they go into the areas of contact?
General Mixon. Yes, sir. They will operate from secure
bases. A specific level--the planning and assistance teams that
we have operating in Colombia today, most of those team members
came from within the components of SOUTHCOM that were not
deployed and have not been deployed. In other words, we did not
go out to the broader DOD.
They operate at brigade level, with one exception. We have
planning and assistance teams that operate in advice to the
Lancero Battalion, which is a Ranger battalion equivalent. Even
at that level, they stay in secure bases, providing planning
and assistance.
If those headquarters move into an area, it is the
responsibility of the military group commander to ensure that
they are moving to a secure base and through his approval is
the point in time when the planning and assistance team can
move to that base. But they are not allowed to leave the secure
base. They are not allowed to go on combat patrols or
participate in combat operations.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Part of the dilemma in Colombia has been the size of the
Colombian military force and its capabilities. Is this request
made in recognition of the progress that the Colombians have
made in terms of having effective units that can go out and
essentially use the skill and the services of these planners?
General Mixon. Sir, that is exactly the point. Their
military has grown and they are doing larger scale operations
where more units are put in the field. Therefore, we see it as
important to provide them the advice and assistance.
I would tell you, to echo what General Hill said yesterday,
the Colombian military and the Colombian Government clearly see
this as their war to win. Whenever we look at their units and
how they are doing operations and the support they may need, we
always go to them first and say: This is what we recommend
where we can help you. Sometimes they say: Yes, we would like
that help. Sometimes they say: No, give us some time until we
are ready to receive that support.
My point is that they do not always come to us and rarely
do come to us for the types of support we offer, but it is an
effort done in conjunction with them and their military
operations.
Senator Reed. We discussed the situation in Iraq with
contractors and Secretary O'Connell pointed out that there are
contractors in Colombia. I will raise the same general
question. What are the operating procedures to support these
contractors, to know where they are in country, and to prevent
a situation in Colombia like we saw in Iraq?
General Mixon. Yes, sir. They operate under similar rules
of engagement. However, the contractors that work for the DOS,
that actually participate in the flying of some of the spray
aircraft, some of the intelligence aircraft that support
military operations, obviously are flying over hostile
territory. We have lost two aircraft in the last year, year and
a half. One resulted in the capture of three Americans who are
still held hostage by the FARC.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you.
Senator Roberts. We thank you for your testimony and we
will now, at your request, move to a closed session. Thank you
very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]