    [Senate Hearing 108-440]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 108-440, Pt. 5

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2005

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2400

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
    PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 5

                       EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                   ----------

                           MARCH 3, 10; APRIL 2, 2004

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                2005--Part 5  EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                                     S. Hrg. 108-440, Pt. 5

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2005

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2400

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
    PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 5

                       EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                   __________

                           MARCH 3, 10; APRIL 2, 2004

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 CARL LEVIN, Michigan
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
    PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado               JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               JACK REED, Rhode Island
    SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
    JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada                  BILL NELSON, Florida
    JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri            E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
    SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
    LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina    EVAN BAYH, Indiana
    ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina       HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
                        Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
                 Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

               Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

                         PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman
    WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado               JACK REED, Rhode Island
    SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
    JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri            JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
    SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
    LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina    BILL NELSON, Florida
    ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina       EVAN BAYH, Indiana
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York

                                      (ii)
    ?

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
        The Role of Defense Science and Technology in the Global War on
                Terrorism and in Preparing for Emerging Threats
                                 march 3, 2004

                                                                       Page
    Uhler, Dr. Dale G., Acquisition Executive and Senior Procurement
      Executive, Special Operations Acquisitions and Logistics
      Center, United States Special Operations Command...............     7
    Waldhauser, Brig. Gen. Thomas D., USMC, Commanding General,
      Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory; Vice Chief, Office of
      Naval Research.................................................    12
    Cartwright, Brig. Gen. Charles A., USA, Deputy Commanding General
      for Systems of Systems Integration, United States Army
      Research, Development, and Engineering Command.................    17
    Sega, Dr. Ronald M., Director, Defense Research and Engineering..    31
    Killion, Dr. Thomas H., Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
      Army for Research and Technology, Chief Scientist..............    38
    Cohen, Rear Adm. Jay M., USN, Chief of Naval Research............    45
    Engle, James B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
      Science, Technology, and Engineering...........................    52

     Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs of the Department of Energy
      and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs of the Department of
                                    Defense
                                 march 10, 2004

    Longsworth, Paul M., Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
      Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration,
      Department of Energy...........................................   119
    Bronson, Lisa, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology
      Security Policy and Counterproliferation.......................   129

                            Counternarcotics Program
                                 april 2, 2004

    O'Connell, Hon. Thomas W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict..................   167
    Clingan, Rear Adm. Bruce W., USN, Deputy Director of Operations,
      U.S. Central Command...........................................   172
    Mixon, Brig. Gen. Benjamin R., USA, Director of Operations, J-3,
      U.S. Southern Command..........................................   174

                                     (iii)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2005

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 2004

                               U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
                                      and Capabilities,
                                    Committee on Armed Services
                                                        Washington, DC.

        THE ROLE OF DEFENSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON
                TERRORISM AND IN PREPARING FOR EMERGING THREATS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in
    room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Pat
    Roberts (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Roberts, Allard,
    Collins, Reed, and Clinton.
        Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
    and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Elaine A. McCusker,
    professional staff member; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional
    staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
    professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
    staff member; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew W.
    Florell, and Nicholas W. West.
        Committee members' assistants present: Darren M. Dick,
    assistant to Senator Roberts; Derek J. Maurer, assistant to
    Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
    Graham; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy;
    Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Richard Kossler,
    assistant to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to
    Senator Bill Nelson; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator
    Clinton.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Roberts. The subcommittee will come to order. Good
    morning, and thank you all for joining us today. This morning,
    the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities meets to
    receive testimony from representatives of the Department of
    Defense (DOD) on science and technology (S&T) programs and
    their role in the global war on terrorism and also in
    confronting emerging threats.
        I'd like to thank the witnesses and I would really like to
    thank those who have provided the demonstrations in the back of
    the room for their participation.
        I would urge all members, and when they come in, I will
    urge them again, and I would urge all those in the audience to
    take a look at the demonstrations that we have in the back of
    the hearing room.
        These displays, I think, have helped us all better--I know
    they have helped me--appreciate and understand the role that
    S&T plays in equipping, training, and also protecting America's
    fighting force, i.e., the warfighter.
        Let me say from the outset that as I went around the back
    of the room, and I apologize for missing some of the
    demonstration projects, but it indicates to me how important it
    is that we somehow meet the goal of 3 percent of defense
    spending for S&T and maintain the technological lead that is
    absolutely essential if we're going to continue to be
    successful in the global war on terrorism.
        We have some stand-off equipment in regards to check
    points. We have Mr. Omni-Directional Inspection System (ODIS)
    over here on the floor, whom we could use by the Hart Building
    and probably speed the--I know speed doesn't work very well in
    the Senate, but at least to get Senators and also our visitors
    and other important people into the buildings. Why, ODIS could
    certainly do that job.
        We have some unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that can do
    the same thing in regards to check points. In the back, we have
    the Omni directional system. Actually, that's displayed and
    that's ODIS. We have 20 of the ODIS in operation as of right
    now--no. We have 20 and 10 are in operation.
        Mr. Ranking Member and Senator Collins, I don't know why I
    got into all this, but at least give me a little slack here and
    I'll be all right.
        We have a new bandage back there, and I can't read my
    writing, but basically it's made up of shrimp cells and
    vinegar. We have 3,000 of these. We need probably 303,000. It
    could be applied to a shrapnel wound or any other wound that is
    experienced in combat and save lives immediately.
        We have another testing device over there right next to
    this bandage. It's C-H-I-T-O-S-A-N. I don't know how you
    pronounce that. We'll have to get a better acronym if we're
    going to work that out.
        Then we have the taser and the shock demonstration. I urge
    everybody to go back there with the little black box. Put your
    finger on the little projectile and see how that feels. I did
    that three times and my finger is numb. You can see what would
    happen if that were used on an individual in terms of crowd
    control. If you had that kind of capability set back from what
    was happening in Iraq last night and the crowd control in the
    future, or something that would happen here in the Capitol area
    or, for that matter, anywhere. You can see where we're headed.
        I was impressed with the Phraselator that deals in 53
    languages. I spoke English and it came back to me in Iraqi.
    Then we have a whole series of other demonstrations back there.
    Part of the big challenge with those projects is to have
    interchange and interoperability and a funding source that is
    constant so we can not only get these things out and have them
    tested in theater, but to have the funding so that we can
    proceed and then usually have a second development, a third
    development, so on and so forth.
        There's an outfit back there called Portable Iris
    Enrollment and Recognition (PIER) 2.3. I just read in the paper
    today, Senator Reed, that the Federal Bureau of Investigations
    (FBI) and the Border Patrol say it's going to take 4 years to
    somehow get the data on fingerprinting to match up in terms of
    the database that the Border Patrol has and the FBI has.
        Yet, we have an outfit back here that's about this big and
    this high in regards to focusing on the iris fingerprinting amd
    facial recognition.
        Basically that goes into a database. Why on Earth we could
    not get some kind of a--I don't know what to call it--you have
    to get that kind of unit in the hands of the FBI and the Border
    Patrol rather than spend 4 years trying to work on the
    fingerprinting. But you can see some of the options here.
        We have Tactical Aircraft Directable Infrared
    Countermeasures (TADIRCM). We need to have an agency in charge
    of better acronyms. That's all there is to it.
        We worry about surface-to-air missiles from terrorists
    attacking commercial and military aircraft. This is something
    that could provide us not guaranteed protection, but basically
    in flying the no-fly zones that we used to fly, much improved
    safety for our pilots.
        With all the concern about commercial aircraft, I think
    that's the kind of thing that we're talking about. I told one
    of the reporters here this has application not only for the
    warfighter but also for homeland security.
        All right. Enough of my editorials about the fine
    demonstrations. I want all of you after this is over--they're
    going to stay 15 minutes--to get in line and quick step right
    around there so you can see what these companies and
    contractors are doing.
        Our first panel today represents technology operators and
    the warfighter and will inform us about the value of S&T
    programs from the perspective of those who receive new
    capabilities and put them to use.
        Our second panel represents the S&T executives and will
    also address the design and the mission of technology and
    transition as well as priorities and budget for the S&T
    portfolio.
        As demonstrated here today, decades of investments in basic
    and applied research have led to a force that is better
    equipped and protected. Many times you have a hard time
    explaining to our colleagues the value of basic research, but
    that is one area that we must certainly protect.
        Our military possesses new standoff detection,
    surveillance, and, when needed, lethal capabilities.
        What we don't have on display, but that represents another
    key return on our investment, is people. That's the chemist or
    the material scientist or the physicist or the computer whiz or
    the graduate student who will craft innovations for our future
    fighting force.
        So today's agile and adaptive fighter will continue to face
    new battlefield challenges. We learn, they learn, and then we
    learn again.
        We require an educated, well-trained resource pipeline from
    the researcher to the trigger puller to the operator to the
    field commander and on up. A vital question we plan to explore
    today involves whether we have enough of the right people
    trained, at least in part through funding and programs that are
    provided here.
        We have seen this morning examples of the transition of
    technology from the vision stages to the lab to the prototype
    to the demonstration to testing and fielding, which really
    forms the key component of our military might and capability.
    We must continue in our determination and our ability to adapt
    to emerging challenges and improvise existing capabilities in
    new ways.
        This involves, as I said before, basic research, including
    the creation of new tools and devices even before we fully
    realize what their use might be. It is a hard sell, but it is
    very important.
        This subcommittee oversees a set of bridge programs that
    are designed to ensure that we cross the technology so-called
    ``valley of death'' in both directions, avoiding the
    disappearance of research results onto the shelf, where they
    never see any transition or use, and allowing for operators'
    feedback into the research pipeline.
        Our investment in these transition programs has increased
    32 percent over the last 3 years, and we look forward to your
    comments on the effectiveness of this investment in meeting our
    Nation's needs.
        I have questions on the long-term viability of our current
    investment strategy and concern about the Department's apparent
    deviation from its projected 3 percent goal for S&T.
        I know Senator Reed and Senator Collins share my view that
    this is a goal we should meet. We have not met it, and we have
    not met that goal in this year's budget. But in terms of
    increased funding from year to year, we are headed in the right
    direction.
        Now, in thinking about any future threat and asking
    ourselves from a national security perspective what really
    keeps us up at night, we are always led to the next question,
    what have we done and what more can we do. S&T is a very key
    part of that answer.
        We look forward to hearing from each of the witnesses.
    Please know that your full written testimony will be included
    in the record. Most senators can read, all staff can read, and
    so you can summarize your comments if you so choose to allow
    time for questions and answers for both of our panels today. I
    would ask that you very briefly summarize your remarks--
    something I am not doing, and I apologize.
        Again, I thank you for being with us this morning. I now
    recognize our distinguished ranking member, Senator Reed, for
    any comments he wants to make.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
    thank the witnesses and also thank all the individuals that
    made these very interesting and informative displays possible
    this morning.
        This hearing gives us an excellent opportunity to see how
    investments in S&T can save lives and increase the
    effectiveness of our forces all over the globe. From armor
    protecting soldiers from rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) to
    UAVs, to new precision munitions, we have seen how advanced
    technologies have enabled the success of our forces in the
    global war on terrorism and in operations in Iraq. We are all
    very grateful that the organizations that are represented here
    have been so responsive to the needs of our combatant
    commanders and their specific emerging technology requirements.
    I hope that in this hearing we can examine all the important
    pieces that must be in place to ensure that the rapid
    deployment and development of technology is possible.
        For example, I hope the witnesses can describe how they
    work with their contractors, defense labs, and the industrial
    base to ensure that we can rapidly manufacture these innovative
    technologies on demand and in sufficient quantities.
        In particular, it would be interesting to learn how our
    investments in manufacturing technologies and in our technical
    workforce contribute to this capability to surge production.
        I also hope that we can examine the funding mechanisms that
    are used to support the rapid transition of these technologies.
    Most government funding processes are extremely rigid and slow.
    So it is remarkable in many cases that money can be moved fast
    enough to address any emerging requirement in a timely fashion.
        I hope the witnesses can make clear whether funding has
    been included in special technology transition accounts or
    supplemental appropriations, whether it required reprogramming
    funds from other critical needs or whether new funding
    mechanisms need to be devised. That's something that we can
    work on in this subcommittee.
        Finally, I hope we can discuss the S&T programs that
    develop these technologies in the first place and provided us
    the possibility of meeting some real needs in Iraq and
    Afghanistan.
        As I visited Iraq last July, the first thing that my
    National Guard military police (MP) men and women told me was
    they needed armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
    (HMMWVs). The Army has been responding and the kit that's being
    developed by the depots is one response to that.
        So I commend all of you for your response to these
    individual needs of the soldiers and marines in the field.
        We should always remember that the technological advantage
    that we currently enjoy should not be taken for granted. It has
    been earned through years of stable investment in S&T and the
    hard work of scientists, engineers, universities, small
    businesses, governmental labs, and the defense industry.
        It was the research investments of the 1980s and the 1990s
    that have led to the Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided
    munitions, unmanned vehicles, and instantaneous communications
    that are making the difference for countless young people
    serving today. We must ensure that these investments are
    continued for the sake of those who will serve tomorrow.
        This hearing brings into sharp focus the role that S&T
    plays in the current operations of our military. That is why it
    is so disappointing that the President's 2005 budget request
    cuts S&T by $1.5 billion as compared to last year's
    appropriated levels.
        The request also does not meet the goal of investing 3
    percent of the DOD's budget in these innovative S&T programs. A
    concern I share with the chairman.
        The reductions in these programs may severely impact the
    work that is done by our Nation's high-tech small businesses as
    well as the university research programs that are training the
    technical workforce of the future.
        I look forward to learning how these budget decisions were
    made and how they will impact our ability to continue to
    produce the critical lifesaving technologies that we are
    highlighting today.
        Once again, welcome to our distinguished witnesses and I
    look forward to their comments. Thank you.
        Senator Roberts. I thank my colleague and friend.
        Senator Collins, would you have any opening comment?
        Senator Collins. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I
    will just submit my statement for the record and look forward
    to hearing from our witnesses.
        Senator Roberts. I truly appreciate that.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Collins follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Senator Susan M. Collins

        The past 2 turbulent years have demonstrated that an investment in
    innovative research and development (R&D) will help to ensure that our
    Nation's military accomplishes its vital missions.
        The continuing source of ingenuity provided by our R&D community
    has demonstrated that it is instrumental in the war on terrorism.
    Defense R&D runs across a broad spectrum of projects from widely known
    programs to those which receive scant attention. But each program is
    necessary to our continuing efforts to provide for national defense and
    engage the enemy abroad. Our soldiers should have the best tools
    possible for their missions. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,
    and members of today's panels, our soldiers deserve nothing less.
        Our science and technology (S&T) community has produced or is
    continuing to develop technologies that only a few decades ago were
    unknown or deemed impossible to achieve in our own lifetime. From
    directed energy weapons to advanced bandages to language converters to
    microsatellite technologies, the United States is continuing to make
    investments in its own security and, consequently, our long-term
    freedom from terrorists and future adversaries.
        In my home State of Maine, several companies are rising to the
    challenge of providing effective, high-tech answers to current and
    future needs. Applied Thermal Sciences (ATS) in Sanford, for example,
    is developing technologies in advanced composites, laser welding, and
    propulsion systems. Technology Systems, Inc., in Wiscasset, is
    producing the first commercial solar-rechargeable autonomous underwater
    vehicle. The Sensor Research and Development Corporation (SRD) is
    developing novel chemical and biological sensor technologies.
        I look forward to hearing the testimony of our distinguished
    witnesses and the effort the Department of Defense (DOD) is making in
    providing critical technologies to the war on terrorism.

        Senator Roberts. Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I have just a very brief
    comment. First of all, I want to thank you for holding this
    hearing and then just review briefly a couple of points.
        The Secretary of Defense told Congress that the U.S.
    Special Operations Forces (SOF) will have an expanded role
    leading the global war on terror.
        I'm pleased to hear in this morning's testimony that the
    DOD has made great strides in advancing not only the state-of-
    the-art technology leading to new technical capabilities, but
    also the bureaucratic transformations necessary to speed these
    new capabilities into the field with the warfighters.
        I'm hopeful that Congress can help this year by getting the
    S&T program budget closer to the Secretary's goal of 3 percent
    of the total defense budget and providing additional
    authorities or resources through the technology transition
    initiative for rapid prototyping and fielding of emerging
    technologies that will sustain our battlefield superiority for
    decades to come.
        I'd just like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for this
    hearing.
        Senator Roberts. I thank my colleague and friend.
        On our first panel, we have Dr. Dale Uhler, who is the
    acquisition executive and senior procurement executive at the
    Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics Center of the
    United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
        We are also pleased to have General Thomas D. Waldhauser of
    the United States Marine Corps. He's the commanding general of
    the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, something I visited what, 7,
    8 years ago, which is about half the size of this room, and
    you've done a splendid job of expanding that whole operation.
    He is also the vice chief of the Office of Naval Research.
        We are also pleased to have General Charles A. Cartwright
    of the U.S. Army. He is the deputy commanding general for
    systems of systems integration from the United States Army
    Research, Development and Engineering Command.
        Dr. Uhler.

       STATEMENT OF DR. DALE G. UHLER, ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE AND
     SENIOR PROCUREMENT EXECUTIVE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACQUISITIONS
     AND LOGISTICS CENTER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        Dr. Uhler. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, it is truly an honor and a privilege to report to
    you.
        Senator Roberts. Could you pull that microphone right up
    close to you? This room is famous for its echoing effect. So
    speak loudly and have at it.
        Dr. Uhler. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, it's truly an honor and a privilege to report to
    you this morning on the topic of special operations technology.
    I'll keep the opening remarks short as you requested, but would
    like to enter written testimony in the record.
        Congress, through title 10, U.S. Code, chapter 6, section
    167, empowered the commander of SOCOM to develop and acquire
    special operations' peculiar equipment, material, and services.
    This is equivalent to what the military departments do for
    their respective programs. So we consider ourselves extremely
    fortunate to have that authority and capability.
        We've implemented and streamlined cost-effective processes
    to provide the SOF soldiers, sailors, and airmen with the
    technology they need. Our fundamental acquisition philosophy in
    SOCOM is to field in an expedited manner the 80 percent
    solution while working with our actual warfighters and industry
    to address the remaining 20 percent of the requirement.
        In essence, we've really bought into the concept of spiral
    development and evolutionary acquisition.
        One of the things that really helps us is our ability to
    leverage very heavily the research and development programs
    that are occurring in the military departments, the Defense
    Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Department of Energy
    (DOE) labs, and other Government agencies.
        We also survey industry on a continuing basis and use a
    buy-and-try approach for Government and commercial off-the-
    shelf items. When we get our hands on these, we have our
    warfighters perform user evaluations of these potential systems
    and then we make appropriate modifications, retest, and field
    the acceptable products.
        We have an especially close relationship with our SOF
    operational users, which really facilitates our ability to make
    all this happen.
        We also have the advantage of having our acquisition
    organization collocated with headquarters SOCOM and, thus, we
    have daily contact with our SOF warfighters.
        We have small, short decision cycles and the support we
    receive again from the Services, DOD, and Congress have been
    major contributors to our effectiveness.
        With our expanded role in the global war on terrorism,
    we've gotten increased resources from Congress and also from
    the DOD which has helped us to even more expeditiously field
    solutions that our warfighters need on a daily basis.
        People are our most important asset. That said, we have a
    parallel situation that says maintaining and improving the
    material capabilities for our people is also our most difficult
    challenge because these people are on the tip of the spear.
    They need new capabilities as quickly as we can get them and
    they need the best ones that we can field and provide.
        In conjunction with the war on terrorism and the fruition
    of some of our flagship research and development (R&D) programs
    as they move into procurement we are changing our focus in the
    S&T arena and we're focusing now on three major initiatives.
        One is the individualized platform. We firmly believe that
    the individual is the indispensable element of our SOF and we
    need to develop enhanced protection, armor, lightweight
    sustainment systems, night vision devices, and better weaponry.
        We also need to manage the SOF personnel signature in all
    environments so that he remains invisible to the enemy, yet the
    enemy becomes visible to him regardless of concealment.
        At the same time, we need to do this without increasing
    weight and complexity. Speaking of weight, power and power
    sources have been and continue to be both a major problem and a
    critical need for our SOF forces.
        At this point in time, approximately one-third of the
    weight carried into combat by our individual SOF soldier comes
    from batteries. We urgently need power sources that are small,
    lightweight, and inexpensive, while at the same time providing
    high power, long endurance, interchangeability, and multiple
    recharging features.
        These batteries and our fuel cells must give off little or
    no signature and offer our SOF users an extended operating
    capability without suffering degradation or requiring resupply.
        We also need to know what the battlefield around the
    individual SOF operator or team is comprised of. Consequently,
    we are pursuing a family of unmanned and semi-autonomous or
    autonomous systems, for air, land, sea, and possibly space
    sensors in the future which will range in size from tactical to
    micro and nano.
        This will give us the persistent intelligence and denied
    area access to meet the needs of our SOF operators as they
    determine the landscape around them and go into harm's way.
        Systems must also possess a reduced logistical footprint
    and withstand the rigors of the various climates and operating
    environments in which we work.
        In conclusion, we've worked hard to wisely use our
    resources to sustain systems when it makes sense, to integrate
    new technologies into legacy systems, and to acquire new
    technically-advanced systems. We intend to continue this focus
    in our concept of rapid prototyping and fielding and we also
    want to aggressively leverage the S&T and R&D investments of
    our military departments as well as the other Government
    agencies and industry.
        Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before
    you this morning.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Uhler follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Dr. Dale G. Uhler

        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I am
    Dale Uhler, Acquisition Executive for the United States Special
    Operations Command (SOCOM). Thank you for the honor and privilege of
    providing you with a perspective on SOCOM's science and technology
    (S&T) strategy.

                                  INTRODUCTION

        A real strength of SOCOM is the commander's acquisition authority,
    which is similar to that of the military departments (MILDEPs). Among
    the responsibilities assigned to the Commander, SOCOM, under title 10,
    section 167, is that of developing and acquiring ``special operations-
    peculiar'' equipment. Special operations-peculiar equipment is based on
    technologies that enable our operators to become faster, stealthier,
    more precise, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. With exceptional
    support from Congress, the Secretary of Defense, MILDEPs, defense
    agencies, other government agencies (OGAs), and our industry partners,
    these authorities have been instrumental in equipping today's world-
    class Special Operations Forces (SOF) team to perform a broad range of
    SOF missions.
        We enhance those authorities through aggressive application of
    acquisition policy and guidance, organizational flexibility, and
    streamlined procedures that facilitate rapid response to the needs of
    our warfighters. SOCOM is accustomed to and comfortable with change and
    has a tradition of ``out of the box'' transformational thinking.
        A guiding principal of our acquisition policy has been to embrace
    and respond to change. Our system has been built to recognize not only
    the critical need to respond quickly, but also to adequately sustain
    the combat forces that protect us and our interests throughout the
    world. Our dialogue with and planned leveraging of other DOD
    developers' efforts to integrate SOF requirements into new equipment,
    coupled with our willingness to take calculated fielding risks when
    necessary to improve our capabilities on the battlefield will continue
    to play a major role in our success. SOCOM's aim in pursuing
    technological transformation is to guarantee our forces remain relevant
    in any fight, and ensure we minimize risk to our Nation's vital
    interests while providing reliable support to the overall Defense
    Strategy.

                GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM/THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

        As we develop the tools to conduct our expanded mission in the
    fight against terrorism, SOCOM has transformed from the traditional
    train, organize, and equip mission to a capability to plan and execute
    the global war on terrorism. Our near term objective is to continue to
    realign our requirements and programs to better address the war on
    terrorism mission. As such, we will be eliminating those legacy systems
    that do not support the global war on terrorism and using the saved
    resources to invest in future capabilities. Our programs must be
    transformational, not merely a re-invention of what we are doing today,
    and SOCOM must continue to invest in making our SOF more capable in all
    tactical environments. To this end, our research and development (R&D)
    activities are being refocused to exploit technologies in the following
    areas:

    Individual As A Platform
        The individual is the indispensable element of our force. We need
    to develop enhanced protection, armor, lightweight sustainment systems,
    night vision devices and better weaponry. The SOF warrior must be able
    to manage his signature in all environments, and see the enemy
    regardless of concealment. We need to do this without increasing weight
    and complexity.

    Power
        Power sources have been, and continue to be, both a major problem
    and a critical need for SOF. One-third of the weight carried into
    combat is from batteries. SOF urgently needs power sources that are
    small, lightweight, and inexpensive while providing high power, long
    endurance, interchangeability, and multiple recharging features. These
    batteries/fuel cells must give off little or no signature and offer the
    SOF user an extended operating capability (months) without suffering
    degradation or requiring re-supply.

    Sensors
        We are pursuing a family of unmanned, semi-autonomous and/or
    autonomous systems (air, sea, land, and, in the future, space) ranging
    in size from tactical to micro and nano, which will use persistent
    intelligence and denied area access technologies to meet the needs of
    SOF operators. These systems must be simple to operate, possess a small
    manning and logistical footprint, and withstand the rigors of various
    climates and operating environments.

                               SOCOM ACQUISITION

       The nature of the global war on terrorism forces a technology
    developer to move quickly to understand the operator's needs and to
    satisfy them with state of the art technology. To facilitate this
    process, our professional staff maintains constant liaison with our
    component commands and visits deployed forces to ensure that we
    understand the need in the context of the mission. Often, prototype
    equipment is made available for user evaluation before designs are
    finalized. The use of concept-based experimentation and demonstrations
    to ensure that the product we are providing is, in fact, the best
    solution to an identified deficiency is an integral part of our
    approach to S&T development. This includes early hands-on prototype
    assessments conducted by uniformed SOF operators. These assessments
    typically provide invaluable feedback concerning factors such as
    weight, ergonomic design considerations, military utility, and the ease
    with which the system can be employed, learned, and sustained. Such
    feedback saves considerable expenditure of scarce resources by
    identifying problem areas at the prototype stage rather than during
    production. To accomplish this, the Command has a Special Operations
    R&D Support Element (SORSE) to assist in the development of new
    equipment. SORSE includes operators who are fully qualified in a wide
    variety of combat skills. As noted above, it is their early and expert
    involvement that allows us to streamline development and to produce
    fieldable equipment in minimum time.
        We are often told that SOF items of personal equipment (helmets,
    boots, etc.) are in high demand by the other Services. In fact, we use
    Service equipment to the maximum extent possible. When mission
    requirements dictate special gear, we first seek to modify the standard
    item and, if that is not possible, we turn to commercial vendors to
    meet the requirement. In all cases, we work closely with the MILDEPs to
    ensure that whatever we field is sustainable.
        Special operations elements are deployed throughout the world as
    our first line of defense against the global war on terrorism. Much of
    the legacy equipment we use to ensure a redundant mission capability is
    wearing out and we are now faced with the choice of modernizing or
    simply sustaining the current capability. To help us with the decision
    process, we are continually seeking transformational options, those new
    equipment or equipment concepts that will truly enhance our
    capabilities and allow us to address new missions and execute existing
    tasks better.
        SOCOM is a highly professional organization in which training is a
    way of life. Maintaining the capabilities of deployed forces provides
    unique challenges, so we pursue technology to assist us with training
    sustainment. Recent advances in ruggedized language systems and
    computer-based training are being effectively used by our deployed
    forces, but more needs to be done in this area.
        The core capabilities of SOF typically require leading-edge
    technologies to meet the requirements for rapid deployment, precise and
    decisive employment, and sustainment while operating far forward of
    conventional support structures.
        The focus for SOCOM's S&T investment strategy, therefore, is how to
    effectively apply and invest available resources to achieve those SOF-
    peculiar capabilities. Much of the basic and advanced research efforts
    behind our S&T program requirements are similar to those of the MILDEPs
    or OGAs. Therefore, cooperation and coordination with ongoing MILDEP,
    Defense Agency, and OGA technology development programs plays an
    important role in SOCOM's technology development strategy. We
    aggressively interact and coordinate with other S&T organizations. This
    includes participation in reviews, cooperative developments, collocated
    liaison personnel, Service advisors, and information sharing. We are
    putting in place new Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) with the MILDEPs to
    further enable a mutual focus on key cooperative efforts and
    transitions. We are proud of the progress we have been able to make
    delivering advanced technology into the hands of the SOF operator, but
    we can and will do better. We could not have been, and will not be,
    successful without the continued support of the larger R&D community.
        As the opportunity presents itself, we suggest modifications to
    those R&D community projects of interest to encourage them to move in a
    direction that could also satisfy a SOF need. R&D efforts that are kept
    in-house are those that contribute most directly and specifically to
    SOF core tasks and that are least likely to be realized or supported by
    the MILDEPs, Defense Agencies, or OGAs. We highly value the close
    partnerships we currently enjoy with the MILDEP laboratories, Defense
    Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), Defense Agencies and other
    national laboratories, as well as academia and industry.
        SOCOM also strives to ensure that our materiel capability solutions
    are based on requirements identified by our SOF warfighters in the
    field. Concurrent with the development and fielding of new equipment
    will be the development of changes in SOF doctrine based on that
    equipment, the development of training programs to ensure that our
    operators know how to use and maintain their equipment, and the
    initiation of sustainment programs to keep their equipment operational.

                               EXAMPLES/SUCCESSES

        The SOCOM Acquisition and Logistics Center (SOAL) exhibited
    exceptional adaptability in response to the demands of sustaining
    forces during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi
    Freedom (OIF). The SOAL has been responding to combat mission needs and
    urgent deployment acquisition requests from deployed and deploying
    units. Our efforts have resulted in the rapid fielding of numerous
    equipment items and systems to satisfy the requirements of SOF
    elements. The support of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
    and Congress, who provided supplemental resources, was the key to our
    ability to rapidly field those requirements without having to break
    other programs that are also important to SOCOM mission accomplishment.
        The Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Advanced Concept
    Technology Demonstration (ACTD), a joint U.S. Army/Marine Corps/SOCOM
    program, identified the Pointer unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system to
    satisfy a multi-Service requirement. Operator evaluations fed into an
    R&D cycle, and the developer made significant improvements to the
    Pointer system. The Pointer system continued to grow through the MOUT
    ACTD and a number of upgrades were made to the system to meet SOF
    requirements. A Combat Mission Needs Statement (CMNS) was received in
    December 2001 and initial deliveries began in March 2002. A second CMNS
    delivered 20 more systems into the hands of SOF operators in October
    2002. The ACTD program office formed a cadre to train SOF operators in
    the tactical employment of the system concurrent with operational
    testing. The training cadre deployed to Afghanistan in November 2002 to
    conduct additional training, perform intermediate level repairs, and
    implement a software upgrade to the system. SOF user feedback on the
    Pointer system was used to refine later iterations of the Pointer
    system and assist the contractor in developing its successor, the Raven
    UAV. The Raven UAV leveraged all of the lessons learned through
    developing and fielding Pointer and packaged it in a system less than
    half the size of Pointer. The first Raven was delivered in May of 2003.
    In December 2003, a third CMNS was issued by SOCOM, this time for the
    procurement of Raven systems. These systems are successful because of
    the constant user feedback that fed our R&D process over the last 3
    years. The success of these systems also illustrates the inherent
    utility of the spiral development and evolutionary acquisition
    processes available for our use.
        People are SOF's greatest asset. Rapidly applying medical
    technology to save lives is a top priority. An excellent example is our
    one-handed tourniquet. This tourniquet provides SOF with a vastly
    improved capability to self-provide immediate trauma care for combat-
    induced wounds. The requirement for such a device was forwarded by SOF
    operators to SOCOM's Biomedical Initiative Steering Committee (BISC)
    which supports the Special Operations Medical Technology (MEDTECH)
    program. The BISC focused on accelerating fielding of the tourniquet.
    SOCOM, through the BISC, worked closely with the U.S. Army Institute
    for Surgical Research and SOF operators, to develop and evaluate
    multiple prototypes. We were able to field prototype tourniquets to
    deployed SOF operators in 2002.

                         TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION PROCESS

        We have learned from both the experiences of the MILDEPs and our
    own early experiences that transitioning new technologies into
    fieldable equipment is a difficult challenge that, if not solved,
    denies needed capabilities to our SOF users. Within our structure, we
    are addressing this challenge by transforming our technology transition
    process to function like ``an interstate instead of a traffic jam.'' In
    SOCOM, as throughout DOD, technology development is an integral part of
    the acquisition process. Our Advanced Technology Directorate is
    collocated with our program executive officers (PEOs) and other
    acquisition professionals. This collocation enables continuous
    collaboration, as well as the early agreements and necessary planning
    for successful technology transition. This process, coupled with our
    close cooperation with the user, enables us to adequately plan for the
    resources required to support the new capability.
        As we look to the future, we will continue to rely heavily on the
    MILDEPs, defense agencies, OGAs, academia, and industry partners to
    leverage their intellectual and development capabilities. We will use
    technology roadmaps built upon SOCOM's Technology Thrust Areas (TTAs)
    drawn from Special Operations Technology Objectives (SOTOs) reflecting
    the commander's refocus on the global war on terrorism to guide our
    research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) efforts. In
    addition, we will continue the judicious use of ACTDs to focus on
    system of systems approaches to reduce sensor to shooter lag time. We
    will strengthen our collaboration with the MILDEPs through efforts such
    as the Army's Future Force Warrior (FFW) program to develop and
    demonstrate revolutionary capabilities for the individual soldier and
    small team using a holistic and synergistic approach.; Navy projects to
    improve intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in denied
    littoral areas; and Air Force programs such as the Air Force Research
    Laboratory's Battlefield Air Operations kit to develop technologies to
    better locate, identify, designate, and transmit target information.

                                   CONCLUSION

        In closing, S&T programs are crucial to Secretary of Defense
    Rumsfeld's goal to provide transformational capabilities to the DOD. I
    believe the successes the DOD has enjoyed in science and technology are
    significant.
        Now, and in the future, SOCOM will continue to pursue technologies
    that improve its ability to execute the global war on terrorism, while
    remaining ready to deal equally with the demands of both our
    warfighting and peacetime roles, missions, and responsibilities.
        It has truly been an honor for me to come before you today to tell
    you about our successes and the future S&T focus at SOCOM in support of
    the ``quiet professionals.'' Most of all, thank you for your continuing
    support of our SOF warfighters.

        Senator Roberts. We thank you very much, Dr. Uhler.
        We now have General Thomas D. Waldhauser.

    STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. THOMAS D. WALDHAUSER, USMC, COMMANDING
       GENERAL, MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING LABORATORY; VICE CHIEF,
                        OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH

        General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator Roberts.
        Chairman Roberts, Senator Reed, distinguished members of
    the subcommittee, it is my privilege as the Commanding General
    of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory and as Vice Chief of
    Naval Research to address you today.
        Prior to September 11 and the global war on terror, naval
    S&T worked diligently and productively on delivering
    technologies to the operating forces through the well-
    constructed R&D process.
        This approach certainly has merit for supporting the
    deliberate development and fielding of future warfighting
    capabilities. As we noted, however, this approach was not
    always responsive to some of the emergent needs of those tasked
    to fight in the harsh and challenging environments of locations
    such as Afghanistan and Iraq.
        Nevertheless, the ``business as usual'' mindset has
    changed. To adapt, the S&T community has had to take its
    traditional approach to technology push and requirements pull
    and make them equally capable of timely and responsive support.
    This also gave the S&T community the opportunity to be even
    more relevant.
        My experience during the early days of Operation Enduring
    Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan clearly laid out to the S&T
    community critical needs such as updated aircraft, electronic
    countermeasures, dust palliatives that mitigate unsafe dust
    levels in austere environments, persistent intelligence, as
    well as reliable over-the-horizon and on-the-move
    communications.
        For the S&T community, OEF served as a real-world
    laboratory for what it takes to fight on an extended
    battlefield with dispersed locations in support of the global
    war on terrorism.
        During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), it was my experience
    that the S&T support was making an incredible shift from the
    traditional approach of delivering capabilities to the
    warfighter through expectations and formal programs of record
    to one that also accommodates a more proactive and responsive
    methodology.
        My formal statement gives several examples of this process.
        As marines head back to Iraq, the level and commitment and
    desire from the S&T community to support those going back into
    theater remains unchanged. Moreover, standing working groups
    and cells within the Office of Naval Research and the Marine
    Corps Warfighting Laboratory now work in tandem with
    operational forces, the Marine Corps Systems Command, and the
    Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development Center in Quantico
    under the leadership of the deputy commandant for combat
    development in defining requirements, identifying capability
    gaps, and determining potential technology solutions and
    finally delivering necessary capabilities to the warfighter.
        In summary, the more traditional approach to S&T support to
    the warfighter has been energized and has become somewhat more
    responsive. At this time, however, we must ensure we continue
    not only to satisfy emergent needs in the global war on terror,
    but also to continue to judiciously invest in higher-risk,
    long-term discovery and invention.
        Thank you for this opportunity this morning and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Waldhauser follows:]

            Prepared Statement by Brig. Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, USMC

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Chairman Roberts, Senator Reed, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee; it is my privilege to serve as the Commanding General of
    the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory at the Marine Corps Combat
    Development Center and as the Vice Chief of Naval Research at the
    Office of Naval Research. Thank you for the opportunity to share my
    views on the important issues associated with naval science and
    technology (S&T) as they impact the global war on terrorism and the
    Marine Corps' operational abilities to successfully wage that war. I
    would like to address the contribution of naval S&T based upon my
    experience as an operational commander and from what I have observed
    and learned since recently assuming a leadership role in naval S&T. To
    put my thoughts in context, I would like to lay out how S&T supported
    the warfighter prior to the global war on terrorism, and then discuss
    how I saw this support adapt from the period of Operation Enduring
    Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan to Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and
    since that period how I see naval S&T supporting the warfighter today
    and into the future.

                          PRE-GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

        Prior to the global war on terror, naval S&T worked diligently and
    productively on delivering technologies to the operational forces
    through the well constructed research and development (R&D) process,
    gleaning technology opportunities through basic research, discovery and
    innovation, and exploitation and deployment into formal programs of
    record within the systems commands. The requirements process was
    generated through universal needs statements articulated periodically
    by the operational forces and vetted through a concept based
    requirements system. Both the Navy and Marine Corps conducted
    aggressive concept based experimentation in partnership with the
    operational forces. The identification of operational requirements and
    the servicing of these through the combat development process worked
    well, but were often protracted. The tendency was to respond to
    requirements of the operational forces using a requirements pull
    methodology. This approach was probably appropriate for supporting the
    deliberate development and fielding of future warfighting capabilities.
    As was soon seen, however, this approach was not particularly
    responsive to the emergent needs of the men and women who would be
    asked to fight the global war on terrorism.

                          POST-GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

        Business as usual changed rapidly and permanently as a result of
    September 11 and the initiation of the global war on terrorism. While
    S&T clearly still needed to conduct basic research, which could
    identify cutting edge technologies for the future warfighter, it was
    also recognized that S&T needed to focus attention on today's
    warfighters engaged in current operations. To adapt, the S&T community
    has had to take its traditional approach to technology push and
    requirements pull and make them equally capable of timely and
    responsive support as well as deliberate support.
        The global war on terrorism presented the S&T community with new
    challenges; but more importantly the global war on terrorism has given
    the naval S&T community the opportunity to be even more relevant to the
    warfighter. I think it would be useful for us to briefly look at S&T
    involvement in our two most recent operations: OEF and OIF.

                           OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

        From my perspective, OEF was a ``come as you are'' operation. I was
    the Commanding Officer of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU),
    forward deployed to the Northern Arabian Sea after the attack of
    September 11. This Marine unit was the initial conventional force on
    the ground in Afghanistan. As such, there was little opportunity for us
    to identify S&T needs or for emerging S&T to be pushed. What OEF did
    provide was a tremendous number of needs that could be supported by
    emerging S&T. OEF clearly laid out to the S&T community critical needs
    such as aircraft electronic countermeasures, effective dust palliatives
    to mitigate unsafe dust levels in austere operating environments, more
    pervasive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) at the
    tactical level, as well as reliable over-the-horizon and on-the-move
    communications. For the S&T community, OEF served as a real world
    laboratory for what it takes to fight on extended and dispersed
    locations in support of the global war on terrorism and battlefields of
    the future. Additionally, OEF underscored the need for a streamlined
    processes for the S&T provider as well as the combat developer to fast
    track the needed capabilities to the warfighter.

                            OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

        Based upon my experiences in OIF working with the British Royal
    Marines, and as part of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), again as
    the commander of the 15th MEU, I believe there was a real sea change in
    the manner in which naval S&T was approached. What I observed in OIF,
    and what I have learned since assuming my current position, validates
    that S&T support is making a credible shift from the traditional
    approach of delivering capability to the warfighter through
    experimentation and formal programs of record to one that also
    accommodates a more proactive and responsive methodology. Operators,
    combat developers, and technologists are now working more closely in
    S&T working groups, focusing on the delivery of viable cutting edge
    technologies to the warfighter.
        To illustrate how the S&T community has responded to the challenges
    of the global war on terrorism, I have selected a few examples of
    successful efforts resulting in the rapid fielding of advanced
    capabilities provided to the operating forces as a result of
    warfighting requirements that leveraged technology.
        The Marine Corps' Dragon Eye unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is a
    great example of how ``technology push'' can work. Originally conceived
    of as part of an effort by Office of Naval Research and Marine Corps
    Warfighting Lab to enhance small unit organic surveillance, the Dragon
    Eye combines advanced technologies in hand held computer devices,
    batteries, electric motors, wireless data communications, and optics.
    This combination has yielded a man-portable, easy to use UAV that can
    move with combat forces and provide overhead imagery directly to a
    battalion or smaller sized unit. The success of this UAV, and the
    initial response from the operating forces lead to a plan to build and
    field these systems. The subsequent onset of OIF, caused us to re-
    prioritize available funds and complete the initial fielding in time to
    support our marines during combat operations in Iraq. Twenty Dragon Eye
    aircraft deployed with elements of the 1st Marine Division during OIF.
    After action feedback from the war confirmed the value of a man-
    portable small unit level UAV and the Dragon Eye UAV is now a program
    of record with initial full fielding starting in May 2004. Moreover,
    marines presently returning to Iraq are relying on this capability to
    provide them with intelligence gathering observation.
        As part of naval S&T's long-term investment in urban combat
    innovations, the critical need for squad level communications became
    apparent to enable small units to rapidly coordinate the complex
    tactics of building-to-building and room-to-room combat. Our British
    partners in this effort suggested we try a commercial off-the-shelf
    radio called the Personal Role Radio (PRR). Low-cost development of
    this commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) item enabled this to be
    interoperable with our newest small unit tactical radios and we now
    have communications systems that support units down to the lowest
    tactical level. Responding to a request by 1st Marine Division, who
    participated in the PRR experiments, radios were purchased for the
    deploying infantry units. The PRR will now be part of a Marine Corps
    wide fielding program. As I can personally attest, this simple and
    highly effective addition to the equipment of the marines in Iraq was
    an extremely relevant and timely addition.
        A third example of successful transition of an experimental system
    to combat forces in Iraq focuses on the individual rifleman. The
    Advanced Combat Optic Gun (ACOG) sight exploits what hunters and
    competitive marksmen have known for years. A quality optic on a quality
    rifle will enable an average shooter to regularly hit a target at
    greater distances. After conducting experiments with the ACOG, which
    confirmed the advantages of this sight, the S&T community provided the
    test sights along with additional sights purchased to support marines
    deploying to Iraq. The response from marines in combat confirmed that
    plans for full fielding this device are right on target.
        Another great example of how the development of experimental
    prototypes can be rapidly transitioned to operating forces to meet
    contingency requirements is seen with the Pre-First In Command and
    Control (Pre-FICCS) project. The Office of Naval Research and the
    Marine Corps Warfighting Lab had previously conducted tactical
    experiments with this system. Pre-FICCS offers the commander a highly
    mobile and fully operational level command and control suite. The
    configuration can be as a small as two Highly Mobile Multipurpose
    Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs). Comparable conventional command and control
    suites are many times larger and considerably cumbersome to move. When
    faced with the deployment to Iraq, the S&T community made this system
    available to I MEF. This turned out to be a crucial technology that
    enabled the MEF commander to rapidly establish forward command and
    control that could keep pace with the rapid advance during OIF.
        Although the normal interest in what the S&T community provides the
    warfighter deals with advanced equipment, the same organizations are
    also involved with non-material solutions that in some cases provide
    even broader and more significant changes to the way we fight. The
    Marine Corps Warfighting Lab has dedicated an effort to develop
    advanced tactics, techniques and procedures aimed specifically at the
    challenges of urban combat. After a strenuous series of experiments
    conducted during the late 1990s, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
    developed a comprehensive revision of our tactical urban doctrine as
    well as a supporting training program to compliment this effort.
    Initial units that participated in these experiments and conducted
    these revised urban tactics, used the skills extensively in the
    villages and cities of Iraq. To ensure our marines now returning to
    Iraq have the absolute best training available, the Marine Corps
    Warfighting Lab is sponsoring an intense training effort for all of the
    units returning to Iraq that will better enable them to conduct
    stability and support operations in urban terrain.
        Most recently, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab has re-oriented our
    main experimentation program titled Sea Viking to support marines
    deploying for OIF-II. In its original form, Sea Viking aimed at the
    transformational capabilities the Marine Corps will need to operate on
    the dynamic battlefields of the future.
        Although the re-deployment to Iraq of Marine forces scheduled to
    conduct the Sea Viking experiments changed the immediate Sea Viking
    goals, this presented another opportunity for the S&T community to
    provide direct support to deploying forces while still maintaining the
    transformational momentum of the Sea Viking program. One of the central
    technology areas being pursued by Sea Viking involves on-the-move
    command and control of dispersed forces operating on an extended
    battlefield. Sea Viking experiments planned to use a surrogate command
    and control system called the Experimental Tactical Communications
    System (ETCS). ETCS is based on the commercial IRIDIUM satellite
    telephone network. S&T development has modified this commercial system
    to achieve a tactical networked architecture that supports voice and
    data communications extending to any user, worldwide. A portion of this
    architecture will provide portable unit, individual vehicle, or
    individual marine position location information that is interoperable
    with current command and control systems.
        By revising the Sea Viking program, the Marine Corps now plans to
    deploy ETCS with elements of the I MEF returning to Iraq, while still
    maintaining the integrity of the Sea Viking long-range experiment
    goals.
        The S&T efforts I have addressed are only a small representation of
    the tremendous work that a number of people and organizations
    successfully undertook to support the warfighter in OIF.
        While the context of OIF has changed, (some refer to it as OIF-II,)
    the level of commitment and desire of the S&T community to support
    those going in harms way remains unchanged. For example, standing
    working groups and cells within the Office of Naval Research and at the
    Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory work in tandem with the operational
    forces, the Expeditionary Force Development Center and the Marine Corps
    Systems Command, under the leadership of the Deputy Commandant for
    Combat Development in defining requirements, identifying capability
    gaps, determining potential technology solutions and finally delivering
    sorely needed capabilities to the warfighter. Examples of these range
    from counter improvised explosives devices (IEDs) technology to
    explosive resistant coatings. These types of efforts are outlined in
    weekly S&T support to OIF-II situation reports that are disseminated
    widely within the Department of the Navy. Additionally, the Iraqi
    Freedom Combat Assessment Team the Marine Corps deployed to Iraq to
    leverage and act upon lessons learned includes S&T personnel. This team
    is only one way the Naval Services are insuring that there is an open
    line of communications between deployed warfighters an the S&T
    community.
        In summary, as an operator I see this as a good news story. The
    more traditional approach to S&T supporting the warfighter has evolved
    into a more proactive, responsive and supportive process, which will
    pay great dividends to today's warfighter as well as tomorrow's
    warfighter. While my comments today have principally focused on how the
    S&T community has become more responsive to the warfighter, I think it
    is important to note that these efforts would not have been possible
    had it not been for the long-term vision and commitment of those
    professionals involved in planning and executing S&T programs. We
    leverage today their past work and while we have focused on their many
    successes it must also be noted that S&T development is inherently
    risky. Every fielded success probably has a matching effort that ended
    up in the dustbin. Consequently, we must ensure that especially today
    we not only satisfy the emergent needs of the global war on terror, but
    also continue to judiciously invest in higher risk, long-term discovery
    and invention.

        Senator Roberts. We thank you, General.
        We turn now to General Charles A. Cartwright. General, you
    are recognized.

      STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. CHARLES A. CARTWRIGHT, USA, DEPUTY
     COMMANDING GENERAL FOR SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, UNITED
       STATES ARMY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING COMMAND

        General Cartwright. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
    on behalf of the soldiers and civilians of all the Army labs,
    thank you for this opportunity to appear here today. I would
    like to thank each of you for the tremendous support you
    continue to provide for our men and women in uniform wherever
    they serve.
        Scientists and engineers from all our labs are deployed
    around the world to provide the combatant commanders and their
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines immediate access to labs
    and centers to rapidly bring technology solutions and equipment
    improvements to the warfighters.
        Providing the right technology to the warfighter faster is
    our primary focus in supporting operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan and around the world.
        Our laboratories and R&D centers have rapidly responded to
    immediate warfighters' requirements. You only saw two here this
    morning.
        Other innovations include speech and language translation
    with DARPA, a ground standoff mine detection system, electronic
    countermeasure systems that provide protection for convoys and
    fixed sites, M1A1 grill rear doors, and Stryker slat armors.
        This has all been made possible by teams from our
    laboratories, centers, depots, arsenals, and industries in
    fabrication testing and installation rapidly to the field. We
    provided these and many more items that are required to fill
    the critical capability gaps for the warfighter.
        The command has increased on-the-ground visibility
    throughout the deployment of civilian and military S&T
    assistance teams to Iraq and Afghanistan to assist our S&T
    teams already assigned to the combatant commands.
        These technologists on the point for the soldier have the
    flexibility to quickly reach back to the command's laboratories
    and centers to solve requirements in nearer time.
        In supporting the development of the Future Combat System
    (FCS), we have changed how we have done business in the past to
    move quickly, spiraling new and emerging technologies into
    systems being developed and fielded to our current operating
    forces. This is having a direct impact on the current as well
    as the future force.
        Capabilities at the 50 to 70 percent level, versus the 90
    percent level, are now considered acceptable to provide an
    immediate solution to our forces. A sample of some of these
    technologies is the suite of sense-through-the-wall systems, a
    lightweight counter-mortar radar system, change-detection using
    high resolution and overhead imaging, and close-in active
    protection systems, just to mention a few.
        While this new command is changing how the Army
    accomplishes its research, development, and engineering
    activities, we have also taken significant steps in making sure
    we work in partnership with the combatant commanders, the
    combatant developers, and the testing community to determine,
    provide, and test solutions to warfighters' needs.
        We have developed ties with other Service laboratories,
    DARPA, DOE laboratories, and universities to leverage their
    resources. This joint approach is helping us ensure a clear
    path to the success in our future warfighting missions.
        Today the Army is both at war and continuing development
    along the Army's campaign plan. As we move from our current
    force to the future force that is strategically responsive and
    dominant at every point on the operational spectrum, the
    Nation's S&T assets are essential to that success.
        We must provide the technology solutions essential to the
    current and future warfighting needs across that spectrum for
    both joint and Army operations.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify
    before this subcommittee. I'll be happy to answer any questions
    from you or the members of the subcommittee.
        [The prepared statement of General Cartwright follows:]

          Prepared Statement by Brig. Gen. Charles A. Cartwright, USA

        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on behalf of the
    soldiers and civilians of U.S. Army Research, Development, and
    Engineering Command (RDECOM), thank you for this opportunity to appear
    today. The men and women of RDECOM are deployed around the world to
    provide the combatant commanders, and their soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    and marines immediate access to labs and centers within RDECOM to
    rapidly bring technology solutions and equipment improvements to the
    warfighter.
        To see our activities in context, it is important to understand the
    operational environment we face now and in the future. The nature of
    future warfare is expected to look less like Operation Desert Storm and
    more like what has been played out in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, and
    more importantly, the attack on the United States on September 11,
    2001. In the old paradigm, we balanced the Soviet Union's superiority
    in quantity with our superiority in quality. In the new paradigm, we
    must have superiority in both quantity and quality. We can expect
    symmetry at the strategic and operational levels of warfare but
    asymmetry at the tactical level, as our enemies cannot win
    conventionally. As we are seeing currently, there will likely be a
    blurring among the strategic, operational and tactical levels. We can
    also expect increasingly sophisticated opponents exploiting all types
    of weather conditions and terrain (with urban increasingly likely) and
    employing both military and paramilitary conventional and
    unconventional forces. In both current and future warfare, we face the
    leveraging by adversaries of the global proliferation of weapons
    technology.
        To meet the technological challenges of the current and future
    operational environment, the RDECOM was established in October 2003 as
    a Major Subordinate Command of the Army Materiel Command (AMC). RDECOM
    includes the Army Research Laboratory (ARL), Army Research Office
    (ARO), Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) and seven
    Research, Development and Engineering Centers (RDECs). They are the
    Aviation and Missile RDEC (AMRDEC), Natick Soldier Center (NSC),
    Armament RDEC (ARDEC), Communications and Electronics RDEC (CERDEC),
    Tank Automotive RDEC (TARDEC), Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
    (ECBC) and Simulation Training and Technology Center (STTC). A major
    part of the RDECOM's mission is to plan and execute the majority of the
    Army's science and technology (S&T) programs. The RDECOM is structured
    to enhance synergy across technology organizations, eliminate
    redundancy, improve the capability to do program and system
    integration, and improve the prioritization of programs. The RDECOM has
    three major objectives: (1) get emerging technology to the warfighter
    faster; (2) integrate research, development, and engineering across all
    areas of the Army, other Services, universities, and all other sources;
    and (3) demonstrate the agility to rapidly take advantage of
    technological opportunities no matter where they may arise. To achieve
    these objectives requires new and innovative approaches to all aspects
    of the development of technology for the warfighters.
        RDECOM is decisively and aggressively engaged in supporting current
    operations. The command created the Agile Integration Demonstration and
    Experimentation (AIDE) organization, which functions not as a brick and
    mortar institution, but as a vital collaboration center to accelerate
    the delivery of technological solutions for warfighter requirements.
    The AIDE organization succeeds by helping the individual labs and
    centers, as well as the Program Managers (PMs), Program Executive
    Officers (PEOs), and the Rapid Equipping Force (REF).
        RDECOM's AIDE deploys Science and Technology Assistance Teams
    (STATs) into theaters of operations and charges them with the role of
    liaison between the warfighters and the labs and development centers
    across the Army. Their role is to not only keep RDECOM informed of
    warfighter emerging requirements, but to also be our forward eyes and
    ears for scientists and technologists in our working centers.
    Additionally, the AIDE's Field Assistance in Science and Technology
    (FAST) teams, which are assigned to combatant commands, keep the
    scientists and engineers in RDECOM informed and orchestrate quick
    responses to the warfighters' needs. RDECOM also has numerous
    scientists, engineers and contractor personnel deployed in the theater
    of operations who are working side by side with solders to maintain and
    operate equipment employing new technologies that are being used in
    support of Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF).
        Some examples of how the command is supporting current operations
    today are: ARL/TARDEC has implemented an expedient solution in which
    Army scientists and engineers designed a novel configuration of steel
    bars and steel armor that can be added to the doors of the High
    Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) to protect crews from
    rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) attacks as well as small arms fire;
    4,800 HMMWV application armor kits are in production by the Army's
    depots and arsenals and being deployed in theater, along with M1A1 rear
    grill door armor and Stryker ``bar armor.'' The Defense Advanced
    Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and ARL developed the Pacbots
    (portable backpack robots) deployed to Afghanistan to clear caves and
    buildings. TARDEC, with cooperation from Utah State University,
    developed omni-directional under vehicle inspection systems to foreign
    devices and contraband; and CERDEC developed and fielded an electronic
    countermeasure (ECM) system that provides force protection in convoy,
    fixed site and check point missions against booby traps and remotely
    detonated weapons. By modifying an electronic warfare (EW) technology
    that has been fielded to defeat certain weapons, the research and
    development (R&D) community has created a number of systems that can be
    used by our soldiers to prevent the enemy from being able to use their
    improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the vicinity of our operations.
    We are getting these new devices to the field as quickly as possible
    and will continue to do so while continuing to employ advances in
    electronic technology that will allow us to defeat the changing threat
    as our adversaries rapidly adapt. NSC developed Phraselator for fixed
    phrase speech translation from English to Dari, Pashto, or Arabic for
    use by special operations, civil affairs, military police (MPs), and
    medical personnel. ECBC developed chemical detection lab in Baghdad.
    AMRDEC integrated the Hellfire missile on a Predator Unmanned Aerial
    Vehicle (UAV). CERDEC developed a Well Camera System that is an
    alternative to lowering a soldier into a well to identify hidden caches
    of weapons and munitions; CERDEC developed and fielded two prototypes
    of the Ground Standoff Mine Detection System (GSTAMIDS), which is a
    remotely controlled vehicle-mounted mine detection system using a
    commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) vehicle (Meerkat) controlled by a
    follow-on vehicle (Buffalo). ARL developed a new sniper detection
    system for use in Iraq.
        In addition to supporting current operations, RDECOM is heavily
    involved in moving future technologies into the current force. The
    RDECOM supports PM Future Combat Systems (FCS)/Lead Systems Integrator
    (LSI) by inserting advanced technology as it becomes available to
    increase FCS capabilities, using a spiral development acquisition
    approach. However, it is transitioning a number of technologies that
    are in development for PM FCS LSI, for use in current operations. Also,
    RDECOM supports the Army Chief of Staff's Focus Area effort through
    interaction with the Future to Current Task Force. The Task Force is
    working to provide future capabilities to an army that is in combat
    today: providing some of the FCS-like technologies that have been in
    development for the last 4 years. It is vital that we focus a portion
    of our S&T on deliverable, affordable products within shorter
    timeframes while the remainder continues to develop our ``next
    generation'' capabilities. The key enabler for this is to take shorter
    technology jumps and transition incremental improvements to the soldier
    rather than wait decades for revolutionary materiel and doctrinal
    changes. Sometimes a 70-percent solution that is available now can be
    better than a 99-percent solution that will be ready for fielding 3
    years from now. For example, the First Strike Ration prototypes out of
    NSC were demonstrated under a previously completed Science Technology
    Objective (STO), but deployed to OEF and consumed by elements of the
    75th Ranger Regiment. After receiving constructive comments from the
    deployed soldiers, the NSC team improved the nutrient-laden ration,
    deployed the rations again, and now receives continuous requests for
    them.
        Another example of moving technology forward is the Suite of Sense
    Through the Wall (STTW) system, which will provide mounted/dismounted
    soldiers with the capability to detect, locate and ``see'' personnel
    with concealed weapons and explosives who are hidden behind walls,
    doors and other visible obstructions. This capability has direct
    application to the operating forces requirements for military
    operations in urban terrain (MOUT), prisoner/checkpoint screening or
    hostage recovery operations.
         An additional example where RDECOM is inserting advanced
    technological equipment for the warfighter is with the Lightweight
    Counter Mortar Radar (LCMR), which provides the capability of 360
    degree detection of mortar fire out to ranges which are beyond the
    effective range of most mortar weapons and locating the firing weapon
    with accuracy sufficient to engage with combat air support. The radar
    weighs approximately 120 lbs and disassembles for transport. The radar
    reports target locations to a Personal Data Assistant (PDA) that can
    communicate with the radar wirelessly so that the radar operator need
    not remain with the radar. The PDA also provides radar control and
    receives and displays system status and fault messages.
        IED Change Detection is being developed by CERDEC to detect IEDs
    along travel routes using high resolution aerial/overhead imagery. It
    uses day and night sights and is currently mounted on manned and
    unmanned aviation systems. The data is sent to a Change Detection Work
    Station, where a warfighter views day-to-day thermal or TV imagery that
    is collected by the airborne asset. This system helps an operator to
    identify and locate ``new'' environmental changes on a route which
    could indicate the presence of IEDs or landmines.
        The Active Protective System (APS) is the hit avoidance portion of
    the manned FCS platform against anti-tank threat munitions prior to the
    threat munitions making physical contact with the platform. The
    Integrated Army Active Protective System (IAAPS) is an integrated FCS
    system that uses soft kill electronic sensors and countermeasures
    (jammers and decoys) and a hard kill active protection system (physical
    interruption) to protect a vehicle from direct fire and top attack
    threats with growth potential for kinetic energy (KE) threat defeat.
    RDECOM is developing the following two APS programs for integration
    into the current force in order to increase survivability of our
    warfighters.
        The Full Spectrum Active Protection (FSAP) Close-In Layered Shield
    (FCLAS) is a cross-technology solution integrating radar, digital
    signal processing and explosives in a small, self-contained interceptor
    ready for loading into a smoke tube or an upgraded FCLAS tube. It
    detects, tracks, and defeats RPGs.
        The Close-In Active Protection System (CIAPS) consists of a radar
    staring in all directions that can detect an incoming threat at very
    short range and launch one of an array of pre-positioned interceptors
    to intercept and destroy the threat shaped charge warhead before it
    hits the protected vehicle. It is effective against anti-tank guided
    missiles (ATGMs) as well as RPGs and can defeat threats launched from
    very short range.
        The command not only collects lessons learned from the FAST and
    STAT Teams, but each RDEC also has teams that deploy with the soldiers
    to gather on-site operational lessons learned. For example: One of the
    NSC's programs is called the Operational Force Interface Group (OFIG),
    which is in place to gather soldier feedback on equipment. The OFIG
    conducts numerous visits to operational units, after redeployment,
    where they survey hundreds of soldiers about their equipment. The OFIG
    also has teams that deploy to the area of operations to gather soldier
    feedback on problems with equipment. The NSC also has a ``Greening
    Program,'' which allows engineers, project officers and scientists the
    opportunity to participate in a field training exercise with a unit for
    a 4- to 5-day period.
        In order to ensure that the RDECOM has knowledge of and access to
    the best technologies in the world, the command has established
    International Technology Centers (ITCs) throughout the world. As
    regional representatives, the Command's ITCs understand and anticipate
    U.S. technology requirements and initiate proactive, innovative
    approaches to expanding contacts with foreign military R&D
    organizations, foreign commercial industry and foreign universities
    involved in S&T. Based on their discoveries, to include non-
    developmental items (NDI), they recommend to the laboratories, RDECOM-
    AIDE, PEOs, PMs and the REF, potential opportunities for cooperative
    projects, commercial contracts, university studies, etc., that will
    leverage international S&T in support of Army Campaign Plan.
        RDECOM has established a formal relationship with the TRADOC
    Futures Center (FC). This relationship insures the integration of
    technology into holistic Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material,
    Leader Development, and Personnel (DOTMLPF) solutions for the
    warfighter. The RDECOM becomes the entry point for the FC for all AMC
    S&T products through multiple channels that includes resident liaison
    officers assuring that the FC is cognizant of emerging technology
    enablers and the potential to deliver capabilities to the warfighter.
    The FC/RDECOM team provides a decisionmaking framework for Army
    leadership by analyzing S&T developments linked to operational
    capability to validate the S&T investment. The command plays an
    integral role with the FC in addressing shortfalls in future operating
    capabilities (FOCs) and providing the technologies to assure that
    warfighter capability goals are met. The command's technology
    integrated product teams (IPTs), including strong FC participation,
    insure that all pursued efforts will result in operationally relevant
    solutions to warfighter requirements and that the warfighter
    requirements are met. The focus for this new command has been in the
    power and energy, lethality, robotics, modeling and simulation,
    countermine, supportability, survivability, networking, nanotechnology,
    and biotechnology areas.
        The role of RDECOM is to provide a single integrated strategy
    toward the research, development and engineering of materiel solutions
    addressing user requirements. One major player in the strategy is that
    of experimentation. The linking of experimentation insures that RDECOM
    technology demonstrations are operationally relevant, while providing a
    venue to develop operational concepts for new technologies in FC
    experiments. By adhering to a Code of Best Practices for
    Experimentation, and institutionalizing the system engineering
    processes and disciplines throughout the RDECs, RDECOM provides a broad
    base of consistent and innovative approaches to developing the DOTMLPF
    solutions for the warfighter today and tomorrow. Using a variety of
    tools, ranging from hardware platforms, through virtual simulations, in
    either stand-alone or integrated mode, the centers perform a variety of
    experiments, from discovery, through hypothesis testing, and
    demonstration, leading to a developed and refined military capability.
    One of the tools that the command will use is the Modeling Architecture
    for Technology, Research, and Experimentation (MATREX) STO, that is
    developing a persistent, secure, distributed, and reusable environment
    where models can be ``plugged'' into an established architecture as
    needed and then ``played'' for engineering analysis, evaluations,
    supportability, and technology trade-offs in support of Army
    transformation. The MATREX will be a key enabler of Simulation and
    Modeling for Acquisition, Requirements, and Technology (SMART)
    initiatives throughout the command and the Army that will enable the
    Army to field equipment to the warfighters more speedily. Together with
    the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Army Test and
    Evaluation Command (ATEC), RDECOM plays a vital role in experimentation
    and development, from concept to fielding.
        But most importantly, we have worked closely with the Air Force and
    Navy R&D community and the national labs to ensure we are on a clear
    path to success in our warfighting missions in the 21st century.
        Today the Army is both at war and continuing its efforts towards
    transformation. As we move from our current force to the future force
    that is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the
    operational spectrum, the Nation's S&T assets are essential to success.
    We must provide technology solutions essential to current and future
    warfighter needs across the full spectrum of Army operations. Our
    diverse S&T programs will enable the Army to support evolving and
    emerging capabilities.
        The RDECOM fields the technologies which sustain America's Army as
    the premier land force in the world.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to testify before the
    subcommittee. I would be happy to answer any questions you or the
    members of the subcommittee may have.

        Senator Roberts. Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
    gentlemen for your testimony this morning and for your presence
    here.
        A key aspect of success and rapidly transitioning these
    technologies through the current operation has been the ability
    to find the money to develop and produce the needed systems.
        I wonder if each of you might share the various mechanisms
    that you're using to find the money to move things out of R&D
    and into the field.
        Dr. Uhler.
        Dr. Uhler. Yes, sir. As I mentioned, what we tend to do is
    pay a lot of attention to what's occurring in the other
    military departments and the laboratories within government, as
    well as where industry is. We aggressively participate in their
    planning processes and we also try to look and see what's
    occurring in industry and academia.
        When we see a good idea--and this isn't just from our
    technologists that are doing this, this is also from our
    operators who are constantly exposed to interaction with their
    counterpart forces around the world--we take a quick look at
    that. We go out and buy it. We bring it in. As I mentioned, we
    test it quickly and then we get it in the hands of our
    operators for further evaluation.
        The advantage we have is that our operators are highly
    trained, mature, and skilled compared to the normal types of
    folks that are in the other Services because they spend more
    time training and they have a limited focus in their objective.
        Consequently, we can take some calculated risk in fielding
    this to them sooner than going through the full-blown
    development, testing, and evaluation process. That's where we
    tend to collapse the time needed to field capabilities.
        We can take a relatively commercial item and bring it in.
    If it looks really useful, we can field it very quickly by
    using our own in-house testing and give it to the field
    operators. We make modifications as they demand from there.
        Senator Reed. What funding sources do you use to under----
        Dr. Uhler. We use our existing R&D and S&T funding that we
    have. We've been fortunate to be well-supported in our budget
    requests by the committee. So it's done well for us.
        Senator Reed. General Waldhauser, do you have any comments?
        General Waldhauser. Sir, at the warfighting lab, one of our
    main functions is to go ahead and test and evaluate these new
    technologies for the operator. So once we determine perhaps
    that there is something there that could work and may be of use
    we coordinate with the operating forces, we also coordinate
    with those who would be involved in a transition later on, if
    required, and work through the Office of Naval Research and
    with our own program and resources in the Marine Corps to move
    money around, if necessary, to do that.
        So far in the time I've been in the job, my experience has
    been that this has gone fairly well. We have not had any major
    problems in doing that.
        Senator Reed. General Cartwright.
        General Cartwright. Sir, in the Army, there are a couple of
    means to look at answering your question. First, a combatant
    commander comes in with what's called an operational needs
    statement. He goes into our G3, who runs what in the Army we
    call the Army Strategic Programming Board.
        Those funds there, sir, are operational global war on
    terrorism funds and it looks at how to fill an immediate need
    and whether it can be applied to our rapid equipping force,
    i.e., I can turn a solution around in 90 days, or do I reach
    inside one of the labs for this 50 to 70 percent solution and
    deploy those in small numbers.
        The second thing is, through Dr. Sega's help in the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), working with the combatant
    commanders helping us identify both money and critical
    capabilities--particularly I'll use the improvised explosive
    device (IED) change detection, which they're funding right now,
    to be able to field those needs. The testing is actually done
    by those combatant commanders, in conjunction with those
    combatant commanders, to field those things.
        The third way to look at it, sir, is the Army has put a
    huge investment into FCS. When we say ``system,'' it's really a
    unit. It's called a unit of action. That unit of action--one of
    the chief's goals for task forces when he came in, was task
    force modularity. That was to look at how to move the current
    Army more to the future Army as it stands now.
        That investment in FCS--we're seeing some of the systems I
    mentioned this morning--and the light-weight armor that you see
    to my right over there, we're pulling those technologies out of
    the FCS and applying those to current needs today. So I use
    those funds that we're doing with FCS or, as we say, you pull
    them off the bench and apply those to warfighting needs at this
    time.
        The third thing is we're learning from our brothers in
    SOCOM how to really get at how to do agile development and
    fielding with the combatant commander and turn solutions
    around.
        As I mentioned, we have S&T advisors on the combatant
    command staff. We actually have today 31 scientists--both
    military and civilian--deployed at the division, at corps
    levels in the area of responsibility (AOR) who are providing us
    both a capability and a need of how to turn those solutions
    around.
        Those solutions, sir, we either take out of the work we're
    doing for FCS or the doors and the kit that we did on HMMWVs,
    we take that out of the S&T dollars and then are repaid back
    through the global war on terrorism as that becomes available
    through the Army Strategic Programming Board that's run by our
    G3 in the Army.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        General Cartwright, one of the most obvious needs has been
    armoring of these HMMWVs both with the kits and with acquiring
    more armored HMMWVs.
        Do we yet have enough of the kits to provide for all of our
    requirements?
        General Cartwright. Sir, as the chief said before the full
    committee last week, the requirements have grown to about
    11,000. This kit to your right is only one of the solutions.
    We're pulling up-armored HMMWVs from all over the world and
    shipping them to the AOR.
        We're also using industry kits that were all tested to the
    same requirements to meet both small arms, RPG, and IED
    threats.
        The kit that you see to your right, sir, by the end of May,
    we will produce about 6,300 of these. In fact, today there are
    a little over 1,300 of these kits. It was started in December
    and we are already installed in-theater with these kits to move
    to the requirement to do that, sir.
        Senator Reed. Just focusing for a moment on this, and
    there's probably a hundred other items that we could focus on,
    what lessons have you learned from this experience about the
    industrial base, about our ability to surge the production,
    about the manufacturing technologies program and making sure
    that we can produce these things? Are there any initial
    lessons?
        General Cartwright. Sir, as you well know, starting up an
    industry is tough. The RHA that's used on this, they run the
    mills twice a year. If you don't have your orders in, you don't
    get it. They're actually running 24/7 on special runs to be
    able to do that.
        On the electronics industry, sir, as long as we can pull,
    and we're pulling a lot of commercial technologies right now,
    particularly in the surveillance arena from the commercial
    industry, I have a fairly strong industrial base out there.
        The piece we've learned is how to be agile in all of our
    processes, whether it be funding, authorities, or how do I meet
    the requirement or that capability that's coming into me today
    that says I need this now. It may be more than a couple hundred
    thousand dollars.
        The Department is learning from SOCOM, and with help from
    Congress, how to become the agile, expeditionary force that
    will go into any part of the world at any point in time and be
    able to meet that threat that we are going to meet.
        An industrial-based issue, particularly in electronics, is
    that what we use today may be a threat tomorrow. So what I'm
    using today, I now have to defeat tomorrow. In the electronics,
    it's fairly good. It's when I particularly want to get into the
    heavy industries is where they start up mills, just from the
    sheer start-up costs, sir.
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much indeed. I'm sure
    this subcommittee would like to hear more about the lessons and
    also anything we can do to facilitate your flexibility and your
    ability to be rapid in your response.
        Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Roberts. Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, welcome.
        Dr. Uhler, I am directing these questions primarily to you,
    but I would hope that General Waldhauser and maybe General
    Cartwright would also chime in and talk about this a little
    bit.
        I'm comfortable with the concept of spiral development with
    missile defense and whatnot. I appreciate General Cartwright's
    response to some questions I had that he responded to already
    with Senator Reed.
        I guess the follow-up question is, and you've talked a
    little bit about lessons learned, but are you sharing your
    successes and failures with other people in acquisition
    activities and acquisition officials throughout the DOD,
    including the space acquisition community? Are you
    communicating back and forth on your lessons, both the
    difficulties that you run into as well as successes?
        Dr. Uhler. Yes, sir. In fact, one of the first meetings I
    had when I was appointed to this position was with Mr. Wynne.
    One of the things we talked about was the fact that he
    encouraged us to keep taking advantage of the capabilities we
    have with this new look at spiral development and evolutionary
    acquisition and to continue to bring to him and the rest of the
    community the methodologies that we've used.
        One of the things he also said that he was interested in us
    doing was attending the semiannual conferences that he convenes
    to exchange those types of lessons. It's where he gets the
    whole acquisition community together down at the Defense
    Systems Management College at Fort Belvoir and we talk through
    these. He invites the acquisition executives from the three
    military departments and also from SOCOM, and that is a good
    exchange.
        I also have done speaking engagements and am committed to
    do more at the Defense Systems Management College for their new
    students in their program management course, explaining to them
    how we do these types of capabilities and changes within SOCOM.
        At the same time, I have a good relationship with my
    counterparts in both the S&T community and the acquisition
    community and other military departments. So we do, in fact,
    share our lessons learned and our experiences.
        One of the things that's so nice about the collaboration
    that we enjoy with them is that the authorities that you all
    gave us to function like a military department were for SOF-
    peculiar equipment.
        What we tend to do is again look at what the Services have
    developed for their own common items of equipment in terms of
    helicopters, for example, and then we add to their basic air
    frame and capability those things that we need for our special
    operations mission.
        As a result of that, we're continually talking about what
    modifications we're making based on their common production
    line and depot facilities. That gives us another interchange
    mechanism that is very effective on showing how we can help
    each other do business.
        Senator Allard. In your statement, Dr. Uhler, you mentioned
    your command's updated acquisition priorities included the
    divestment of legacy systems that are not desired for the
    global war on terror.
        My question is, does the 2005 budget describe the legacy
    systems being terminated or are we to expect additional program
    budget information or reprogramming requests to terminate
    additional systems?
        Dr. Uhler. Actually, I'll put a slightly different twist on
    that. What we really have done is, as we laid out the fiscal
    year 2005 budget, we said certain systems are going to finish
    their development, move into production, and at the end of
    production, they will go into sustainment.
        So, as those systems which are currently being used in the
    field reach the point where we can say we now have a better
    product and no longer need to continue to field those systems,
    we will do so.
        In fact, that's what's reflected in the fiscal year 2005
    budget, and you'll see more of that in the out years as we
    bring those systems to fruition, have replacements for them,
    and use that money that's freed up to reinvest in the new
    systems.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Roberts. Senator Clinton.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        This question is for all three of you, and it's a problem
    that we have been struggling with. This issue concerns the
    Reserve and National Guard units' training and equipment and
    access to technologies, because with this higher operations
    tempo (OPTEMPO), we have seen and heard disturbing reports
    about reservists and Guard members not receiving adequate
    equipment, or at least not the equivalent of Active-Duty
    Forces.
        What I'm wondering is, have there been any lessons learned
    about how we can better equip and train on the newest
    technologies the Guard and Reserve units that are called into
    active duty, General Cartwright?
        General Cartwright. Yes, ma'am. The Army is using a couple
    of initiatives. One is called the Rapid Fielding Initiative,
    which started about a year ago. Under the chief's direction, it
    will equip every unit with the exact same equipment, whether it
    be active or Reserve. Those units deploying on OEF-II now,
    whether they be from the Guard, Reserve, or active component,
    will have the exact same equipment, whether it be knee pads or
    rifles.
        As far as training goes, one of the lessons we have
    learned, ma'am, is we have what we call, in conjunction with
    the combatant commander, an IED task force. That IED task force
    has actually gone to every Guard brigade and done training on
    IEDs.
        Both here and before the unit crosses into Iraq, they'll
    get training on what the tactics, techniques, and procedures
    should be. They train on how to be able to do that before they
    go into theater. Those are two of the initiatives in the
    lessons learned that we're doing.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you.
        General Waldhauser.
        General Waldhauser. Ma'am, I can't speak directly on the
    equipment side of the house, but I can talk about the training
    to a certain degree.
        The Warfighting Lab, in conjunction with coalition partners
    and other agencies within the Marine Corps, has put on a
    training evolution in southern California for all battalions
    going back to Iraq. This has to do with cultural sensitivity,
    IED awareness, and how to work in the environment that the
    marines will find themselves in very shortly.
        I would say that the Reserve units, the battalions that are
    going back with the marines, have participated in that
    training. They've essentially received the same training that
    the active-duty units have.
        Senator Clinton. General, would you mind submitting to the
    subcommittee an answer with respect to equipment?
        General Waldhauser. It's now taken for the record, and I'll
    do that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Waldhauser did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        Senator Clinton. Thank you.
        General Cartwright, I know that General Kern has visited
    Watervliet Arsenal. Since the War of 1812, Watervliet Arsenal
    has played a vital role in arming our military. It is our
    Nation's only manufacturing facility for large-caliber cannons
    in volume.
        At that same facility, Benet Labs performs scientific and
    engineering activities that range from basic research through
    design for production and engineering support for the
    production of its design team.
        This collocation of the arsenal and Benet Labs allows for
    complete life-cycle management from idea through research,
    engineering, prototype testing, and finally full-scale
    production. There isn't, so far as I know, any other collocated
    facility, and certainly no other arsenal, that has this kind of
    resource.
        When I visited Watervliet and Benet Labs, obviously there
    were a lot of questions about their future. I was impressed by
    what I saw there and I certainly have been impressed by the
    role that they've played in the last 2 years. I think that
    having that facility available and open and operating, no
    matter what conditions we confront, is essential to meeting our
    security needs.
        Are you familiar with Benet Labs and Watervliet Arsenal,
    General?
        General Cartwright. Yes, ma'am, I am.
        Senator Clinton. What are your thoughts on their future
    role?
        General Cartwright. Ma'am, I'll speak only to Benet since
    they are one of my labs that's actually owned up there. I'll
    give you a couple examples of the work Benet is doing right
    now.
        One of the things they're doing is looking at tank tubes,
    particular the Abrams tank tube. Over a life cycle, the tube
    will actually bend. One of the technologies they're looking at
    is going to actually use a process to re-straighten the
    barrels, which would be applicable for anything from large
    caliber to small arms, to be able to restraighten barrels.
        The second technology they're looking at in cooperation
    with Lawrence Livermore is a process called laser peening. It
    actually allows the metal to be harder. You shoot the laser at
    the metal and it allows it to be harder than it actually is and
    it lasts a lot longer. Those are two of the pieces that Benet
    Lab is doing.
        So it's not only supporting the arsenal, but it's looking
    at using them across a lot of the products--particularly laser
    peening. I can use it for tank tubes or tori tubes, but could I
    use it for fan blades on jet engines.
        Senator Clinton. So that could be part of a
    transformational recapitalization strategy with respect to a
    number of items?
        General Cartwright. Yes, ma'am. We're looking at that
    across all the labs, and it goes back to the chief's direction
    as to how do I take future technologies and put them to current
    use today, because we can't wait until 2010 to bring the
    technologies in. I need the technologies now.
        We're looking at that across all our labs, the industries,
    and the arsenals to say, how do I bring those in today? Because
    the old 90-percent solution is a day gone by when I can give
    the soldier a capability they need.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you.
        Senator Roberts. The thought occurred to me that at Fort
    Riley, Kansas, we have the best tank firing range in America. I
    guess maybe relocating all that to Kansas wouldn't be what the
    answer is then.
        Senator Clinton. I think a memorandum of understanding and
    partnership would be the--jointness is what I think it would
    represent.
        Senator Roberts. Well, everything has to be joint today, so
    I would certainly take that under consideration.
        I have two quick questions. Well, they're not quick, but
    let me make the observation that our ability to maintain what's
    called battlefield superiority obviously requires control of
    the information systems against increasingly sophisticated
    adversaries employing computer network attacks.
        You go to almost every one of these demonstrations back
    here and they're all highly computerized, and we just talked
    about a computer database with a problem at the FBI and the
    Border Patrol.
        Would any of you like to talk a little more about efforts
    underway to combat this potential weakness?
        The exercises that I've attended, some with Senator Reed,
    are very impressive. This new technology is very impressive.
        Usually one of my first questions is, what if the satellite
    goes down? What if you have an adversary who is very skilled in
    regards to combating our information technology?
        Where are we in terms of efforts underway? We are so
    reliant on these kinds of systems. If that is taken away by
    somebody wearing jeans, a Madonna T-shirt, whatever the latest
    brand of tennis shoes would be, and maybe a ball cap, where
    we're all outfitted in a high-tech way to combat that and they
    take it down, what do we do? What are we doing S&T-wise to
    offset that? Anybody?
        General Cartwright. Sir, you're correct. About the only
    thing that doesn't have software in it now is a bayonet.
        Senator Roberts. I'm sorry. I didn't hear that.
        General Cartwright. About the only thing that doesn't have
    software in it is a bayonet. If you look at the next generation
    of weapons, particularly rifles, they will have software in
    them.
        So information assurance is key, whether it be the computer
    on your desk today that you get your e-mail on in a classified
    or an unclassified method, or whether it's the soldier on the
    battlefield using reach-back systems to order those spare parts
    or to be able to destroy or neutralize an enemy's system.
        There are several ways we're doing that. There are S&T
    objectives that we're doing. There are actually 6.3-Advanced
    Technology programs in our labs now to combat that, and as you
    well know, a lot of the information assurance.
        I tell people that engineers recreated a wheel thousands of
    years ago in the engineering world. In the software world,
    we're about 50 years old in the art of learning this. I say
    learning it because every day it changes. A lot of it has to do
    with the ability I call, ``the attack and defend.'' To be able
    to defend yourself, you have to know how the attacker will
    attack you.
        Now, there are both classified and unclassified programs
    that we'll work on to take care of that, but the issue becomes
    how smart I am in protecting my own systems. That knowledge, a
    lot of times, comes from learning the attackers and the methods
    they're going to use.
        A lot of the systems we use today use commercial software
    in the reuse business because that's how you cut down the time
    needed for developing the new software. There are programs to
    ensure that the commercial software you get and that source
    code will do exactly what you want them to do, when you want
    them to do it.
        It is an area that is going to get more complex, because
    the other thing I would tell you is we've seen policies grow in
    the last couple of years in the areas of information security,
    information operations, and data fusion.
        That's my real worry. Do policies affect how we protect the
    battlefield? As I said, the only thing that's not going to have
    software in it is going to be a bayonet.
        What I may use on the tactical battlefield is also
    applicable in the civilian world, and we have to be very
    careful that we don't cross that boundary in protecting our own
    soldiers. A soldier on a battlefield now can reach back and
    touch your computer with the reach-back capabilities,
    particularly in the logistics world of being able to order that
    spare part in real time.
        Senator Roberts. Any other comments by any other of the
    witnesses?
        General Waldhauser. Sir, I have nothing significant to add
    to that, but I'd like to take that one for the record.

        General Waldhauser did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained in committee files.

        Senator Roberts. All right. Dr. Uhler.
        Dr. Uhler. From our perspective, our situation is a bit
    less complicated than that of our sister Services. We focus on
    smaller unit operations.
        We tend to rely to a large extent on the best practices and
    the technology that's coming out of the military departments
    and also the DOD agencies.
        We spend a lot of time also worrying about low probability
    of intercept, low probability of detection for communications
    capabilities. We have a lot of alternate means to circumvent
    those types of situations if we do discover a vulnerability or
    suspect that there are problems with our situation.
        So we think we're in fairly good shape just following that
    practice right now.
        Senator Roberts. Well, some of those answers could be
    answered in a classified presentation, which we hope to have if
    we can fit it in with a very busy schedule.
        The year was 1999. I was privileged to chair the Emerging
    Threats Subcommittee when it was first formed by Senator
    Warner, Senator Lieberman, and Senator Coats. I think I made a
    statement--well, I know I made a statement that given the
    attack on the World Trade Center, that if the attacker had
    known or the terrorist had known where the grid was or had a
    copy of the grid of the towers there, that 6,000 people
    wouldn't come out suffering from smoke inhalation. They
    wouldn't have come out.
        Now, at that particular time when I said that and quoted
    Osama bin Laden and then asked people what really kept them up
    at night, that was the lead question and that's what I'm going
    to ask you.
        I had no idea that somebody would be using--I don't think
    any of us did--aircraft as missiles. I'm not saying that we
    were that prescient, except that virtually every panel we had
    before us kept warning over and over again that something like
    this could happen.
        So my question to you today is, when you look out 10 to 20
    years in the future, what is the technological challenge and
    future threat that concerns you the most? In other words, what
    keeps you up at night?
        As you look down the road, not only at what we're going
    through now, but also the rapid change and the revolutionary
    change that we have in technology and the change in threat now
    with the global war on terrorism, what's the one thing that
    really is of concern to you in this field?
        We'll start in reverse order with General Cartwright.
        General Cartwright. Sir, it's the ability to be able to
    defeat a technology that we may use in our everyday lives. It
    deals with your question of information security. We may have
    the greatest technology in the world that we use every day in
    our lives, but the next day the bad guy has figured out how to
    use that against me.
        To take that technology down, I might take that technology
    away from every one of us. How we work through that ability to
    be able to take that down may also affect how we do our
    everyday lives.
        Technology is turning so fast. You have nano and you have
    biotechnology coming on faster. In fact, I looked at a uniform
    yesterday that was built out of nano materials. I got in it. A
    guy put a hose against me. I was perfectly dry.
        Do we understand what those technologies are going to be,
    and then if we start using them and the bad guy uses it against
    us, how do I take that down and not affect our everyday lives
    that we all take for granted that we grew up with and that we
    live with?
        That's probably my greatest fear, sir. I have civilian
    scientists and military scientists and engineers that are
    coming in now that are just doing absolutely great things. They
    love it. They love it because of the support from this
    subcommittee and OSD and everybody because we're actually
    giving them real projects. The advance of this technology
    coming so fast really has them excited.
        But we're going to use that in our everyday lives and the
    bad guy is going to use it too. I don't want to take that
    technology away from anybody when he starts using it against
    me.
        Senator Roberts. Sobering thoughts.
        General, any comments?
        General Waldhauser. Sir, I would answer the question this
    way. I think presently the people we work with, the S&T
    community, the universities, the laboratories, everyone is
    extremely excited to make a contribution.
        My concern is, over the long-term, the ability to maintain
    the level of support we have right now in the community, to
    maintain the contributions that are being made, and to be able
    to harness what exactly is out there. What is the art of the
    possible? I think we have to be able to do that for the long-
    term. There has to be some type of incentive to keep the ground
    swell of support that we see right now. We have to maintain
    that for the long term, 10 to 15 years from now, because the
    technologies change so rapidly, the threats change so rapidly.
        We have to have the momentum on our side so that next time
    around, wherever or whenever that may be, whatever threat
    emerges or whatever technology solution is there, we have to be
    able to rapidly harness that effort and then move forward to
    find the solution.
        Senator Roberts. So basically you're telling us that the
    goal of providing at least 3 percent of the DOD budget to S&T
    should be attained, and then you wouldn't have to worry so much
    about a particular surge requirement where you'd probably have
    to rely on a supplemental or whatever it is?
        In other words, you want a consistent and constant funding
    commitment not only during times when we are obviously involved
    in personnel tempo, OPTEMPO, and the global war on terrorism,
    and we're stretched all over the world, but also during other
    times as well?
        Am I sort of paraphrasing what you're saying?
        General Waldhauser. Yes, sir. If we have a relatively level
    commitment when something arises, the ability to find a quick
    solution would be that much easier as opposed to having to ramp
    up if we did not have a constant effort over time.
        Senator Roberts. So we'd have 11,000 of these units in
    theater right now. That's probably not the best example in the
    world, but at least it's the one I remember.
        Dr. Uhler, do you have any comment?
        Dr. Uhler. Yes, sir. When you think about the kinds of
    missions our SOF can be called upon to do, they can be sent
    anywhere in the world on an instant notice and encounter the
    full range of sensors and threat weapons that exist. So my
    biggest concern is how do we make those individuals not only
    invisible, but also invulnerable to those various types of
    environments in which they must operate?
        They don't have the support structure associated with them
    that the larger units do and so, again, these individuals are
    our most important asset. How do we protect them and how do we
    keep them from being seen and injured?
        Senator Roberts. Okay. We thank you for being here and we
    thank you for your contributions and your perseverance. We will
    go to the next panel.
        I would like to welcome our second panel. We have with us
    Dr. Ron Sega, who is the Director of Defense Research and
    Engineering; Dr. Thomas Killion, who's the acting Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology and
    the Chief Scientist; Rear Admiral Jay Cohen of the United
    States Navy, the Chief of Naval Research; and James B. Engle,
    the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science,
    Technology, and Engineering.
        Gentlemen, if you can summarize your comments, we would
    appreciate it, and we'll begin with Dr. Sega.

    STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD M. SEGA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND
                              ENGINEERING

        Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, Senator Allard, thank
    you for the opportunity to appear before you today to talk
    about the S&T program for the DOD. Thank you for allowing my
    written testimony to be submitted for the record.
        S&T remains postured to support both the near-term global
    war on terrorism and the transformation of the DOD. We're
    excited about the capabilities and possibilities that continue
    to be opened by S&T throughout the Department.
        Secretary Rumsfeld stated in last month's fiscal year 2005
    budget testimony that the Department and Congress have a common
    challenge, to support the troops and to make sure they have
    what they will need to defend the Nation in the years ahead.
        The Department's S&T program is vital to support our troops
    and is simultaneously developing the capabilities for our
    future forces. While there are still many challenges, I believe
    the S&T program has been productive over the last year and the
    increasing emphasis on accelerating transition of technology is
    showing positive results.
        The president's budget request for fiscal year 2005 is up
    approximately 1.5 percent in real growth from the President's
    budget request in fiscal year 2004.
        As the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, I
    serve in the role of the Department's chief technology officer
    and have established five priorities. In the written testimony,
    there are many examples and I will forego some of those.
        Number one, to integrate the DOD S&T and focus on
    transformation, and to establish three cross-cutting
    initiatives for the Department. There are many initiatives
    within each of the Services as well.
        The National Aerospace Initiative will help us enable high-
    speed and hypersonic flights and have access to space, space
    technology, and the Energy and Power Technologies Initiative
    will enable a more electrical force by creating new ways of
    power generation, energy storage and conversion and management
    of electrical power.
        The Surveillance and Knowledge Systems Initiative is
    enabling command, control, communications, computers,
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR).
    Senator Roberts, it gets to the question you have on
    information assurance. This is very important. For a network-
    enabled, network-centric approach to the future, the network
    has to be there.
        We are also working on sensing knowledge management and
    communications in that initiative. You'll hear from the
    components, the Services, and some of their transformational
    activities in their work in the global war on terrorism.
        Number two, address the national security science and
    engineering workforce. We've begun addressing this need. It
    establishes things such as increasing the number and stipend in
    national defense graduate fellowships and also working with
    freshman initiatives and K-12 programs.
        It's just a start. We are currently examining future
    workforce needs to ensure that we have the best technical
    talent available for national security R&D.
        Number three, expand the outreach to the combatant commands
    and Intelligence Community. We've strengthened our ties with
    the combatant commands. In fact, we have a liaison officer from
    my office currently at Central Command (CENTCOM) forward in
    Doha, Qatar as we speak to continue that linkage.
        We've redone the joint warfighting S&T plan. This year for
    the first time, we've aligned with the joint functional
    concepts. The chapters are cosponsored by the joint staff or
    combatant commands and it is tying and aligning our program
    with the needs of the warfighter.
        We're testing more technical capabilities through a variety
    of mechanisms. The one you're probably most familiar with is
    the advance concept technology demonstration (ACTD).
        We're also increasing our collaboration in S&T planning
    with the Intelligence Community. I think that has been a
    positive initiative.
        Number four, to enhance technology transition. The
    relevance of research and engineering efforts hinges on the
    rapid and effective transition of technology to fielded
    military forces.
        The Department partnered with Congress to establish a quick
    reaction special projects program. It is critical that this
    program continue and expand. It allows the execution year
    flexibility to meet new needs and new technical opportunities.
    It's important for the value and as an effective mechanism in
    this near-term technology transition.
        The three components include the Quick Reaction Fund, the
    Technology Transition Initiative, and the Defense Acquisition
    Challenge Program. All, I believe, are working well and we
    appreciate your support.
        Other mechanisms, and we have a whole host to address
    different situations, include the ACTDs and Title III as two
    other examples.
        Number five is to accelerate the technical support for the
    war on terrorism. As General Cartwright had just alluded to,
    there is an integrating function that we established on
    September 19, 2001, called the DOD Combating Terrorism
    Technology Task Force.
        The leadership, technical leadership of the Services,
    agencies, and subject-matter experts, and then shortly after
    that, folks outside of the DOD, have come together to look at
    technologies, move forward quickly, and match those with the
    needs of the combatant commanders.
        We had three phases, one to address issues in Afghanistan,
    the next for preparing combat operations and potential needs in
    Iraq, and the third phase is concentrated primarily on force
    protection.
        Some of the areas included in that you see in this room.
    Others include other aspects of intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (ISR), electronic countermeasures, language
    translation aids, and automated biometrics.
        In conclusion, the technology development results are
    largely achieved through long-term stable investments in S&T.
    Although the fiscal year 2005 President's budget request does
    focus on transformational technologies, it also maintains the
    flexibility to respond to near-term operational requirements
    and technology opportunities. The balance has been and remains
    important.
        I believe the DOD's successes in technology and
    transformation are significant, and I appreciate the
    opportunity to come before you today and tell you about them.
    We appreciate the support the Senate Armed Services Committee
    has provided the Department.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Sega follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Dr. Ronald M. Sega

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before you today to talk about the science and
    technology (S&T) program of the Department of Defense (DOD). S&T
    remains postured to support both the near term global war on terrorism
    and the transformation of DOD. We are excited about the capabilities
    and possibilities that continue to be opened by S&T throughout the
    Department. Secretary Rumsfeld stated in last month's fiscal year 2005
    budget testimony that the Department and Congress have a common
    challenge: ``to support the troops and to make sure they have what they
    will need to defend the Nation in the years ahead.'' The Department's
    S&T program is vital to the support of our troops and is simultaneously
    developing the capabilities for our future forces. While there are
    still many challenges, I believe the S&T program has been productive
    over the past year, and the increasing emphasis on accelerating the
    transition of technology is showing positive results.
        As the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, serving in the
    role of the Department's Chief Technology Officer, I have established
    five priorities. These priorities facilitate the Secretary of Defense's
    goals. Our research and engineering goals are to:

            - Integrate DOD S&T and focus on transformation
            - Enhance technology transition
            - Address the national security science and engineering
            workforce
            - Expand outreach to the combatant commands and Intelligence
            Community
            - Accelerate technical support to the war on terrorism

        Taken together, these priorities provide a sound strategic roadmap
    to support the transformation of the DOD, and where technology can
    help, address the immediate challenges of the global war on terrorism.
    We have strengthened the programmatic oversight processes over the past
    year to better ensure that the goals and objectives of the Department
    are met. We have revised the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology
    Plan (JWSTP) to better integrate and align our S&T program with the
    needs of combatant commands and the joint functional concepts. We have
    instituted focused reviews of the Defense Advanced Research Projects
    Agency (DARPA) activities to ensure the best integration of the DARPA
    research and results into the Department's coordinated research and
    engineering program. We have expanded reviews with the components to
    assess technology maturity and enhance technology insertion in support
    of defense acquisition programs.

                 INTEGRATE DOD S&T AND FOCUS ON TRANSFORMATION

        This goal strives for an integrated program across the DOD Services
    and agencies that is aligned with transformational goals of the
    Department. Two enabling elements for this goal--how much the DOD
    invests in S&T, and into what technologies the Department invests its
    S&T dollars.
        The fiscal year 2005 President's budget request is a solid budget
    proposal for S&T programs. The DOD request for S&T in fiscal year 2005
    is $10.553 billion, or 2.62 percent of the overall DOD request. The
    budget request achieves about 1.5 percent real growth in S&T, when
    compared to the fiscal year 2004 President's budget request. The
    Department's S&T investment has increased from $7.8 billion to $10.5
    billion in the last 3 years of the President's budget requests.
        We are mindful however, that additional funding, without focus,
    will not ensure transformation. We have focused the budget request on
    several important technology areas that should enhance transformation
    and deliver critical military capabilities, and in addition, provide
    technology solutions to support the global war on terrorism. The fiscal
    year 2005 President's budget request continues the direction of
    aligning S&T dollars to support the Department's six critical
    operational capabilities as outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
    These capabilities are: protect bases of operations, deny enemy
    sanctuary, project and sustain US forces, enhance space operations,
    assure information operations, and leverage information technologies.
    Additionally, we continued with three broad, cross-cutting initiatives
    that address the development of DOD critical transformational
    technologies. These three initiatives have matured over the past year.
    They are the National Aerospace Initiative (NAI); Energy and Power
    Technologies, and Surveillance and Knowledge System (SKS). Finally, we
    continued to identify potential technologies for acceleration in
    support of initiatives for force protection of our remarkable men and
    women deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq.
        An important point to emphasize is the continuing importance of
    basic research to enable the development of future military
    capabilities. In the past 20-30 years, basic research has spawned such
    advances as the Global Positioning System (GPS), Stealth, and Night
    Vision devices. The pace of technology development is increasing so the
    generation of new ideas through basic research remains a high-payoff
    component of the S&T program. The fiscal year 2005 President's budget
    request for basic research is $1.3 billion. Although the investment
    level for basic research remains constant, the payoff continues to
    produce significant discoveries, sometimes on a critically shortened
    time-scale. For example, the success of the thermobaric weapon is
    directly linked to the basic research in DOD. The thermobaric weapon
    went from basic research through operational testing in 90 days. Basic
    research also closely links the DOD with universities that provide a
    great breadth of leading edge research, some that can be applied in the
    very near-term. For instance, the technology used to decontaminate the
    Senate offices and Federal facilities in the aftermath of the anthrax
    attack come from an ongoing university-based basic research project.
    The university linkage is also key in the education of the future
    defense workforce.

                             COMPONENT INITIATIVES

        The Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) is a complex
    transformational initiative that networks combat and support vehicles,
    unmanned air and ground systems, and soldiers together as an integrated
    system. As this system matures, it will provide a revolutionary
    capability to move, shoot, communicate, and defend. A technology
    solution called ``ZEUS'' is a good example of enhanced technology
    transition in support of the global war on terrorism. ZEUS involves a
    high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) mounted laser
    neutralization system for unexploded ordnance. ZEUS is currently
    fielded in Afghanistan. This technology has neutralized 10 different
    types of ordnance totaling 210 targets. The improved standoff range for
    ordnance neutralization enhances the safety of our troops.
        The Air Force's major transformational projects derive from the
    envisioned joint battlespace infosphere capabilities. Those would
    provide technology for applications ranging from decision quality
    information to demonstrations of small and micro satellites that could
    dramatically enhance our ability to conduct enduring space operations.
    This movement to the transformational aspects of space and information
    is central to the Air Force's investment profile, and will support the
    entire Department.
        The Navy's transformational programs include the electric ship
    which is an ``umbrella'' program to integrate an array of technologies
    that could provide an integrated propulsion, support, and weapons suite
    to maximize the capability of future naval operations. For the global
    war on terrorism, the Naval Research Labs developed and prototyped
    Dragon Eye, a successful project currently deployed in Iraq. Dragon Eye
    is a lightweight, person portable unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with a
    changeable sensor package. One such package allows for the collection
    and detection of chemical, biological, and radiological agents and
    provides a stand-off surveillance capability.
        Our investment in DARPA continues to emphasize high-risk, high
    payoff research and development in a number of strategic thrust areas,
    as outlined in the DARPA Strategic Plan. I would like to highlight a
    DARPA-Service collaborative project that is supporting transformation
    in the Department and should ultimately provide a unique surveillance
    capability. The Organic Air Vehicle (OAV) is a small, man-portable UAV
    that can fly and hover using a large horizontal fan. The UAV has been
    tested in 9-, 15-, and 29-inch diameter versions--and each can carry
    different payloads. This vehicle is being developed as a component of
    the Army's FCS. DARPA's programmatic agility, when linked with Service
    programs, accelerates technology development and transformation.

                           CROSS-CUTTING INITIATIVES

        One of the joint transformational technology initiatives is the
    NAI, which consists of research and development (R&D) in hypersonic
    flight technology, affordable and responsive space access, and an
    increased focus on space science and technology enablers.
        NAI provides an integrated technology roadmap for the DOD to
    increase our capability in several mission areas such as high speed/
    hypersonic flight, access to space, and space technologies. For
    example, hypersonic capability could provide an air breathing option to
    conduct strikes from strategic distance in a short amount of time,
    reducing vulnerability of future systems, and help to deny enemy
    sanctuary. In the fiscal year 2005 budget, the Department increased
    hypersonics funding primarily in support of the Air Force-DARPA Single
    Engine Demonstrator (SED). The objective of the SED program is to
    flight test the Air Force Hypersonic Technology (HyTech) scramjet
    engine using endothermic hydrocarbon fuel accelerating a vehicle from
    boost (approximately Mach 4.5) to approximately Mach 7. The NAI also
    has the potential to capture American interest in aerospace technology,
    while providing needed technical capability for the warfighter.
        A second transformational technology thrust is Energy and Power
    Technologies. This thrust involves a coordinated investment across the
    DOD to improve power from systems such as microbatteries for soldiers
    to massive generators for ships. This initiative is investing in
    technology that could develop batteries with over five times the energy
    density, fuel cells that are reliable and safe to use in the
    battlefield, and capacitors that will decrease size needed to store
    electricity on ships by a factor of 5-10. The initiative is also
    focusing on ``electric'' weapon systems such as high power microwaves,
    lasers, and electromagnetic guns that will provide greater options for
    our forces.
        The third cross cutting initiative is SKS. SKS is a broad-umbrella
    program to develop capabilities to achieve information and decision
    dominance through integrated communications, command, control, and
    computers and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems
    (C\4\ISR). This initiative seeks to bring about major improvement in
    sensing, communications and networks, knowledge management, and
    information security to provide superior decisions on shorter time
    scales than can be made by potential adversaries. Instead of treating
    each component separately, SKS has the goals of detecting objects in
    the area of interest (battlespace) through enriching sensors (optical,
    radar, acoustic, etc); moving the sensed information to present a
    coordinated picture of the area of interest; using advanced software to
    make sense of the information; and presenting this knowledge-based
    result to assist decisions. By using such an integrated approach, the
    goal is to allow our forces to react faster and smarter than potential
    adversaries. The initiative should continue to make the vision of
    network centric warfare a reality.

                         ENHANCE TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

        The relevance of research and engineering efforts hinges on the
    rapid and effective transition of technology to fielded military
    forces. In partnership with Congress, we established the Quick Reaction
    Special Projects (QRSP) program, a flexible continuum of technology
    transition projects that moves products from the DOD to the warfighter
    quickly. The QRSP includes three technology transition projects: the
    Quick Reaction Fund (QRF); the Technology Transition Initiative (TTI);
    and the Defense Acquisition Challenge Program (DACP). We leverage the
    Foreign Comparative Test (FCT) and the advanced concept technology
    demonstration (ACTD) programs to get the best technologies to the joint
    warfighters in the shortest time possible.
        The QRF meets critical warfighter technology requirements that
    cannot wait for the traditional 2 year budget cycle. In fiscal year
    2003 we started six projects, three of which have already deployed to
    support the war on terrorism in Iraq. We have continued rapid
    technology insertion from the QRF in fiscal year 2004. This year, funds
    were provided for the development of a HMMWV mounted wideband microwave
    based integration system, called PING, to identify concealed weapons.
    PING has seen positive results in testing. We also used the funds to
    demonstrate and test ordnance disposal robots, a capability that has
    saved lives in Iraq.
        Last year we initiated the congressionally-directed TTI. TTI
    provides bridge funding for critical technologies that have recently
    been evaluated for procurement and enables the Services to speed
    transition to acquisition programs of record. For example, the water
    purification pen provides warfighters the ability to purify water in
    unsanitary conditions. It is now available via the General Services
    Administration (GSA) catalog for purchase from all government agencies.
    This technology transition was accomplished 18-24 months earlier than
    the normal acquisition process due to our ability to use TTI, and is
    being used today by warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Under the direction of our new Comparative Test Office, the DACP
    and the FCT program inject the very best domestic and foreign
    technologies into existing capabilities, supporting the Department's
    spiral development strategy. Through the FCT program, we significantly
    enhanced the Army's Automatic Chemical Agent Detector Alarm (ACADA).
    The advanced power supply for this sensitive Chem/Bio detector was
    obtained from the United Kingdom. The power supply improved unit
    reliability and significantly reduced equipment weight. Over 22,000 of
    these detectors are deployed worldwide, protecting forces in
    Afghanistan, Iraq, and even those of us sitting here in the Capitol
    region.
        In the DAC program, we selected 23 proposals from nearly 300
    submittals. One example is an especially promising technology which
    provides hemoglobin substitute for blood transfusions project known as
    the Restore Effective Survival in Shock (RESUS). We believe RESUS has
    the potential to dramatically increase the survivability of our troops.
    This remarkable polymerized hemoglobin is compatible with all blood
    types, can be stored for 3 years without refrigeration, and is pathogen
    free. The support Congress has provided to the QRSP program has enabled
    execution year flexibility to support new needs of the operational
    force and new technology opportunities.
        The ACTD program is our flagship technology transition process for
    matching innovativeng technologies with joint and coalition operational
    concepts. This program earned a reputation for anticipating emergent
    threats and fielding transformational capabilities for combatant
    commands. Sometimes referred to as our ``try before you buy'' approach,
    ACTDs look for the 80-percent solution to jump start the acquisition
    process through fielded, hands-on demonstrations. For example, we
    successfully demonstrated the high-speed lift capability of the Theater
    Support Vessel ACTD in real-world operations during Operation Iraqi
    Freedom (OIF). Our Language and Speech Translator ACTD enabled us to
    quickly decipher confiscated documents which led to the location of
    several high profile Iraqi leaders. These and many other successful
    ACTDs draw the thanks of warriors engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom
    (OEF) and OIF.

        ADDRESS THE NATIONAL SECURITY SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING WORKFORCE

        The third goal is a broad national strategic issue involving the
    availability of scientists and engineers who are American citizens.
    Warfighting capabilities demonstrated on the battlefield since
    Operation Desert Storm are derived from the Department's technological
    capabilities developed within DOD R&D laboratories, industry, and
    universities. These capabilities were built on the intellectual capital
    and competitiveness of the scientists and engineers, educated years
    earlier, who conceived the scientific ideas and engineering
    applications that became our present warfighting capabilities. We
    produced stealth technology, the global positioning system, night
    vision devices, precision weapons and pioneered the development of the
    internet through the ``ARPANET'' with the U.S. technical talent
    educated primarily in the 1960s and 1970s.
        We now see warnings that America's advantage in defense-related
    scientific and engineering intellectual capital is eroding. The
    significance of this problem is outlined in the Report of the U.S.
    Commission on National Security in the 21st century (Hart-Rudman
    Report) which stated: ``Second only to a weapon of mass destruction
    (WMD) detonating in an American city, we can think of nothing more
    dangerous than a failure to manage properly science, technology, and
    education for the common good over the next quarter of a century''. The
    decreasing numbers of experienced scientists and engineers in the DOD
    draws from the available pool of high quality scientists and engineers
    who are U.S. citizens. The numbers of U.S. citizens in graduate schools
    studying defense related disciplines has decreased in the last decade
    according to National Science Foundation, National Science Board and
    National Academy of Sciences reports.
        We are responding to this issue. A science and engineering
    workforce initiative is needed to reinvigorate our national security
    R&D capability to ensure that we have the best qualified and motivated
    scientists and engineers engaged in national security R&D. To begin to
    address these issues, over the past year the Department has increased
    the individual stipend and total number of National Defense Graduate
    Fellowships. In addition, we are continuing to examine our future
    workforce needs to ensure that we will have the best technical talent
    available for national security R&D.
    Expand Outreach to the Combatant Commands and Intelligence Community
        We are enhancing the connectivity between the combatant commands
    and the Intelligence Community and the DOD technology community. Over
    the past year, we have revised our S&T strategic planning approach,
    leading to a wholly revised ``Joint Warfighting Science and Technology
    Plan'' that was cooperatively developed by the combatant commands,
    Joint Staff, and S&T executives. We have also initiated several
    technology net assessments in partnership with the Intelligence
    Community to reduce the possibility of technology surprise in the
    future and better inform our S&T investment plans.

                   ACCELERATE SUPPORT TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM

        Maturing and fielding technology continues to be our most important
    near term goal. Within a week of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the
    Department established the DOD Combating Terrorism Technology Task
    Force (CTTTF). This Task Force is still ongoing, and is in its third
    major phase. The first phase accelerated technologies for homeland
    defense and the initial war in Afghanistan; the second phase delivered
    technology in support of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The current
    third phase is identifying and accelerating technology for deployed
    force protection. The Task Force is comprised of S&T senior leaders
    from all DOD components, flag-level officers from the Joint Staff and
    selected combatant commands, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the
    Department of Energy (DOE), and now the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS). The CTTTF continues to provide a valuable forum to examine the
    technology alternatives to address immediate operational needs to
    support the global war on terrorism.
        Phase I, in the fall of 2001, resulted in such capabilities as the
    BLU-118B (thermobaric weapon) with applications to caves and tunnels, a
    backscatter gamma ray system to inspect cargo in closed containers, and
    a nuclear quadripole resonance system that can detect small quantities
    of explosives. We also sponsored a rapid study to determine radiation
    levels needed to kill anthrax spores--knowledge that supported the
    detailed response to the anthrax attacks of 2001.
        In Phase II, the CTTTF reacted to a broad set of operational issues
    that emerged leading up to and including support for OIF. Technologies
    were accelerated to fielding for several specialized, unique weapons
    which focused on specific, anticipated threats. Notable among these was
    the AGM-114N Thermobaric Hellfire which built upon previous efforts
    supported by the CTTTF in development of thermobaric weapons which were
    employed in Afghanistan in OEF. The CTTTF sponsored the Passive Attack
    Weapon to rapidly transition an Advanced Technology Development
    prototype program to production, fielding 230 weapons in 160 days. This
    effort included weapons production, development of operational tactics,
    delivery aircraft certification, field testing, certification, and
    deployment.
        In the current Phase III, the Task Force's focus has been directed
    at OIF force protection capabilities. While specific details on
    programs are classified, actions are underway to mitigate effects
    stemming from terrorist use of weapons such as Improvised Explosive
    Devices (IEDs), mortars, and rocket propelled grenades. Key focus is on
    detection and defeat of IEDs and on predictive analysis capabilities.
        The CTTTF will continue to serve as a conduit for matching the
    identification of new challenges in the global war on terrorism with
    available technologies developed both by the DOD, through commercial
    sources, and with other departments of the Federal Government. A key
    element of this effort is the need to have in place a process and
    funding to quickly identify, and then field, in militarily significant
    numbers, a series of new capabilities. The nature of the current
    operations indicates that the opponents, while often using low
    technology weapons, are very adaptive. We need the processes and
    flexibilities to anticipate, respond to, predict, and mitigate their
    adaptation cycles if we are to be successful in this long-term
    struggle.

                                   CONCLUSION

        The sustained investment in S&T over the past decades has enabled
    the Department's development of needed new capabilities. To enable
    transformation, this investment should continue. Technology development
    results are largely achieved through long-term, stable investment in
    R&D. Not every technology needs to be transitioned immediately, but a
    strong R&D base is critical. Although the fiscal year 2005 President's
    budget request does focus on transformation technologies, it also
    maintains the flexibility to respond to near term operational
    requirements and technology opportunities. The balance has been, and
    remains important.
        In closing, the S&T program and the objective of Secretary Rumsfeld
    to provide transformational capabilities to the DOD are absolutely
    intertwined. I have mentioned only a few examples within the DOD S&T
    program. I believe the DOD successes in technology and transformation
    are significant, and I appreciate the opportunity to come before you
    today to tell you about them. We appreciate the support the Senate
    Armed Services Committee has provided for the Department's S&T program.
    Thank you.

        Senator Roberts. We thank you, Dr. Sega.
        Dr. Killion, please proceed.

      STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS H. KILLION, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT
       SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY, CHIEF
                               SCIENTIST

        Dr. Killion. Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the
    subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the
    fiscal year 2005 Army S&T program and the significant role of
    S&T in supporting the warfighter today and achieving the Army's
    transformation. I previously submitted a written statement and
    request it be accepted for the record.
        I want to thank the members of the subcommittee for your
    important role in supporting our soldiers who are now at war
    and for your support of the Army's S&T investments that will
    sustain the preeminence of our future forces. Your continued
    support is vital to our success.
        We are a Nation at war. Army S&T is charged to provide
    America's Army with sustained over-match in land combat. To do
    so, the Army S&T program retains a dynamic portfolio of
    technology investments that is responsive to the warfighters'
    needs both today and for the future. The Army's S&T program is
    balanced to provide high payoff capabilities for the future
    force while seeking rapid transition of critical capabilities
    into the current force. In my remarks, I will focus on four
    themes briefly. We're supporting our soldiers today. We are
    delivering on the technologies we promised for our FCS and the
    future force. We've maintained our commitment to a robust basic
    research program for our future transformational capabilities,
    and our success depends upon a workforce that has the necessary
    expertise and understanding to support the Army's needs.
        Army S&T is fully committed to providing our soldiers with
    the tools they need to survive and prevail in current
    operations. I wish to recognize the support that the Army is
    receiving from our sister Services and from OSD in rapidly
    transitioning technology to help our soldiers. I can personally
    testify to the offers the Army has received from my
    counterparts, Admiral Cohen and Mr. Engle, and to the
    leadership and resources provided by Dr. Sega. Everyone is
    committed to protecting our soldiers' lives with whatever
    technology we can bring to the fight.
        As you heard from General Cartwright in the previous
    session, there are numerous examples of technologies we have
    introduced into the global war on terror, including Interceptor
    Body Armor, the HMMWVs' Expedient Armor Kits and the Stryker
    ``Bar Armor.'' Others include the Chitosan bandage, as
    demonstrated earlier from Medical Readiness and Materiel
    Command (MRMC), to rapidly staunch arterial bleeding. The Zeus
    laser system for neutralizing mines and unexploded ordnance and
    the Forward Area Language Converter (FALCon) system for
    automatically scanning and translating foreign documents for
    intelligence exploitation.
        We continue to explore gaps in current capabilities for
    which we can provide technological solutions. With regard to
    the FCS, it remains the highest priority for Army S&T. We have
    about one-third of our budget invested in technologies to make
    FCS a reality.
        In May 2003, the FCS program passed acquisition milestone
    B, transitioning from S&T into a System Development and
    Demonstration (SDD) program.
        S&T continues to play an important role in the FCS program
    by providing specific critical technology solutions for
    Increment I and beyond.
        As part of the Milestone B decision, the Program Manager
    (PM) identified 31 critical technology areas that needed to be
    addressed. The technologies that address most of these areas
    come from the Army S&T community and through our collaboration
    with DARPA. We are committed to the continued maturation and
    demonstration of these technologies for delivery to the Lead
    System Integrator (LSI) prior to the FCS preliminary design
    review in 2005. Some examples include the 120 millimeter
    lightweight cannon, Robotic Follower and Semi-Autonomous
    Robotics for the soldier ``mule,'' Active Protection Systems
    against chemical energy weapons and tactical wireless network
    assurance use algorithms.
        Instead of simply ``hurling technologies over the transom''
    to the PM for additional development, we have entered into
    detailed Technology Transition Agreements (TTAs) with the PM
    and the LSI to ensure that S&T will deliver the products in the
    timeframe they are needed for integration into this system of
    systems. I believe that the implementation of this TTA approach
    will be a very valuable by-product of the FCS experience; it's
    a management tool that helps us bridge the gap that will often
    exist between the end of an S&T program and the actual
    transition of the technology into an acquisition program.
        The bottom line is that we are delivering on the
    technologies we promised for FCS, helping to make it a reality
    by the end of this decade.
        We've also maintained our commitment to basic research,
    which produces new knowledge to fuel revolutionary advances and
    leap-ahead technology for the future.
        Technologies in the field today, such as night vision
    devices, advanced munitions, various types of armor, and
    medical vaccines and treatments, owe their existence to
    fundamental research we conducted in the past. Research that we
    are conducting today in areas such as nanoscience,
    biotechnology, quantum computing, and immersive environments
    will enable unique and, in some cases, unforeseeable
    capabilities for the future Army. Few people would have
    anticipated that the basic research investment in atomic clocks
    in the 1950s would result in the GPS on which we all rely so
    heavily today.
        Finally, I mentioned earlier the support we are providing
    to current operations. That support certainly depends on the
    technological innovations that we are able to provide to the
    warfighter. More importantly, however, I believe it depends on
    the expertise and commitment of our scientists and engineers.
    Their understanding of the Army's needs, knowledge of the
    threat, and recognition of technological opportunities makes
    them uniquely qualified to bring relevant technical solutions
    to the battlefield. Perhaps the most important contribution the
    S&T community continues to make is sending its scientists and
    engineers into theater to see the real-life conditions, assess
    the problems, and develop rapidly deployable solutions for the
    warfighter.
        In General Cartwright's testimony, he described the design
    of Expedient Armor and Bar Armor for HMMWVs, Strykers, and the
    Abrams tanks. These innovations were developed and tested very
    rapidly due to close collaboration between the scientists and
    engineers in our Army Research Lab. They take it to the R&D
    Engineering Center, the Army Test and Evaluation Command and
    the PMs office and our industry partners. Individuals such as
    these, working with our soldiers, are what truly enables us to
    maintain and enhance our land combat advantage for today and
    tomorrow.
        The Army must maintain a diverse S&T portfolio to be
    responsive to the current and future warfighter needs. The S&T
    community seeks technological solutions that can be
    demonstrated in the near term, investigates the feasibility of
    new concepts for the mid-term, and explores the imaginable for
    the uncertain, far-term future. In closing, I would like to
    thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before
    the subcommittee. I will be happy to answer any questions you
    and the members may have.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Killion follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Dr. Thomas H. Killion

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to describe the fiscal year 2005 Army science and
    technology (S&T) program and the significant role S&T is playing in
    support of the warfighter in our current force and in achieving the
    Army's transformation to our future force capabilities.
        We want to thank the members of this subcommittee for your
    important role in supporting our soldiers who are now at war and for
    your support of today's S&T investments that will sustain the
    preeminence of our future soldiers. Your continued support is vital to
    our success.

                          ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

        We are a Nation at war. Challenged to maintain the technological
    and tactical advantage over our enemies by developing and exploiting
    both lethal, and when possible, non-lethal means. This creates a
    serious challenge for the Army. Army S&T is charged to provide
    America's Army with sustained overmatch in land combat. To do so, the
    Army S&T program retains a dynamic portfolio of technology investments
    that is responsive to the warfighters' needs of today and the future.
    The Army S&T mission is to conceptualize and develop future leap-ahead
    technologies that are necessary to maintain a superior land combat
    capability unmatched anywhere in the world while exploiting
    opportunities to accelerate the transition of proven innovative
    technologies to enhance the capabilities of the current force. The
    Army's S&T program is well balanced to provide high payoff needs of the
    future force while seeking rapid transitions for critical capabilities
    into the current force.
        The Army continues in its commitment to transform into a lighter,
    more lethal force. However, we are an Army at war and are continually
    challenged to achieve this transformation as quickly and as efficiently
    as possible. As General Schoomaker so eloquently states, transformation
    is an ongoing process that we must work at each and every day. The S&T
    investments in the fiscal year 2005 President's budget pursue
    technologies that can be matured and rapidly transitioned to system
    development and procurement to enable future force capabilities as soon
    as possible. We also fund an agile basic research program focused on
    enduring Army needs as well as opportunities to further transform the
    Army.
        We are not an Army alone; we are an integral member of the joint
    warfighting team. The S&T program is focused on developing technology
    relevant to the needs of the Army and the joint forces. It remains
    synchronized with operational concepts development and acquisition
    programs to ensure rapid transition into the field. The Army S&T
    program continues to exploit technology developments from the other
    Services, defense agencies, and commercial industry as well as
    international communities to assure that our soldiers get the very best
    technology as soon as possible. The future force Army will provide the
    Joint Force Commander with a versatile, full spectrum decisive land
    combat power while requiring significantly reduced logistics support.

                S&T CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

        Army S&T has supported the development of technology that has
    produced several benefits for the soldier in Iraq and Afghanistan.
    Perhaps the most important contribution that the S&T community
    continues to make is sending in-house scientists and engineers with the
    expertise and experience in critical technologies into the theater to
    see the real-life conditions, assess the problems, and develop rapidly
    deployable solutions for the warfighter. This community is committed to
    getting effective and usable technology into the hands of the
    warfighter--saving lives and enabling successful missions. While you
    have heard many examples of technology that has come out of S&T in
    support of the current operations, such as the Interceptor Body Armor,
    the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Expedient Armor
    kits, and the Stryker ``Bar Armor'' in previous testimony, I want to
    take the time to highlight a few contributions that often aren't
    reported but are clearly contributing to our continued success. These
    are examples of technologies that play an important role in getting the
    job done. One example is the Chitosin bandage. It is a Food and Drug
    Administration (FDA)-approved bandage designed by the Medical Research
    and Materiel Command (MRMC) to stop severe arterial bleeding within 2-4
    minutes of application. This bandage's adhesive nature and enhanced
    clotting capability provide wound pressure and bleeding control to
    external hemorrhages. This bandage has been deployed to both Special
    Operations Forces (SOF) and conventional forces in theater and has been
    utilized successfully on a variety of injuries ranging from gunshot
    wounds to landmine injuries. Bottom-line . . . it saves lives.
        Another example is the Forward Area Language Converter (FALCon), an
    optical character recognition and machine translation system on a
    portable computer for foreign languages in theater. It was designed and
    developed by the Army Research Laboratory and provided to the
    Intelligence Community as a quick and reliable way to translate and
    analyze captured documents. FALCon can translate up to 47 languages,
    including Arabic and Asian languages, and is being used in both Iraq
    and South West Asia.
        Finally, the Army deployed a prototype directed energy system to
    Afghanistan consisting of a commercial kilowatt class laser mounted on
    a HMMWV developed by the Space and Missile Defense Command. This system
    was successfully used in neutralizing surface mines and unexploded
    ordnance.

                          FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS (FCS)

        Supporting the FCS remains the highest priority for Army S&T. We
    have about one-third of our budget ($600 million) invested in
    technologies that will provide our ground combat forces of this decade
    and the next with the dominant, full-spectrum combat power they will
    need to carry out their missions swiftly, efficiently, decisively and
    as safely as possible, no matter where they are asked to fight. FCS
    will be a multi-functional, multi-mission, reconfigurable system of
    systems designed to maximize joint interoperablity, strategic and
    tactical transportability, and commonality of mission roles, including
    direct and indirect fire, reconnaissance, troop transport,
    countermobility, non-lethal effects and secure, reliable
    communications. In May 2003, the FCS program passed Acquisition
    Milestone B, transitioning from S&T into System Development and
    Demonstration (SDD). The Project Manager (PM) for FCS continues to use
    the Boeing-led Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) team to identify and
    integrate technologies from the Army, the Defense Advanced Research
    Projects Agency (DARPA), and other Service and industry programs to
    develop an FCS that will satisfy the capabilities described in the
    approved Operational Requirements Document.
        FCS has adopted an Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy, which will
    allow the Army to increase the capabilities of the system of systems
    over time through spiral and incremental development processes. The
    initial instantiation of FCS (Increment 1) will be designed to provide
    certain ``threshold'' capabilities. The subsequent versions will
    deliver increased functionality to achieve ``objective'' capabilities
    as quickly as possible. Army S&T continues to play an important role in
    the FCS program by providing specific critical technology solutions for
    Increment 1. As part of the Milestone B decision, the FCS PM identified
    31 critical technology (CT) areas that needed to be addressed. The
    technology solutions to address most of these areas come from the Army
    S&T community in collaboration with DARPA. Eighteen S&T programs that
    were not quite as mature as desired by the May 2003 decision to enter
    SDD were identified in the PM FCS risk mitigation plans as being
    essential for Increment 1. Army S&T is committed to the continued
    maturation and demonstration of these technologies for delivery to the
    LSI prior to the FCS Preliminary Design Review in 2005. Some examples
    are: 120mm Line of Sight/Beyond Line of Sight Cannon, Mid-Range
    Munition, Robotic Follower and Semi-Autonomous Robotics for the Soldier
    ``Mule,'' Active Protection against Kinetic Energy weapons, and
    Tactical Wireless Network Assurance algorithms.
        We continue to mature and demonstrate these critical enabling
    technologies, providing the promised products on schedule for
    integration into FCS. Instead of ``throwing technologies over the
    transom'' to the PM for extensive additional development, we are
    entering into Technology Transition Agreements (TTAs) with the PM and
    LSI to ensure that S&T will deliver these products within the timeframe
    they need for integration into the system of systems. I believe that
    the implementation of the TTA approach will be a very valuable by-
    product of the FCS experience--a management tool that will help us
    bridge the gap that often exists between the end of an S&T program and
    the actual transition of the technology to an acquisition program.
        In addition to the efforts supporting Increment 1, S&T now has
    moved our main emphasis to developing capability-enhancing technologies
    for the Increment 1 spirals and for Increment 2. Dr Tether and I have
    agreed to continue the Army/DARPA FCS partnership for fiscal years 2004
    through 2007. We have identified a set of focus areas that represent
    some of the greatest challenges for the FCS and future ground combat,
    namely: Networked Battle Command On The Move, Autonomy With Intent,
    Find the Enemy, and Affordable Combat ID. We have agreed to co-fund
    about 15 high risk-high payoff programs at DARPA to find technology
    solutions that, when spiraled into FCS, will provide the next leap
    ahead in capabilities.

                              FUTURE FORCE WARRIOR

        Another major S&T investment is the Future Force Warrior (FFW). FFW
    will provide capabilities to the individual soldier that are achievable
    only at the platform-level today. Through networked connectivity to the
    FCS-equipped maneuver unit of action (UOA), FFW will enable
    revolutionary lethality, mobility, survivability, and sustainability
    for the individual soldier while reducing logistics demands. By the end
    of 2007, the FFW program will demonstrate increased individual soldier
    lethality and survivability through netted communications and fires
    while reducing the soldier's physical, fighting load from over 90 lbs
    to less than 50 lbs. The program develops a lightweight, low-
    observable, enhanced-armor protective fighting ensemble that includes
    lightweight, high-efficiency power sources; embedded physiological
    monitoring and limited medical treatments; embedded training; and
    networked sensors to enable unparalleled situational understanding.

                                 BASIC RESEARCH

        The Army's basic research program produces new knowledge to fuel
    revolutionary advances and leap-ahead technology that enable Army
    transformation. The program invests in world-class expertise
    (government, academic and industry) and state-of-the-art equipment. It
    balances its investment between in-house Army specific research and
    leveraging external scientific research that can be used for military
    applications. For example, few people would have anticipated that the
    basic research investment in atomic clocks in the late 50s would have
    resulted in the Global Positioning System (GPS) that is so prevalent
    today.
        Army in-house basic research focuses on military-unique problems,
    providing the underlying understanding that will enable technology
    development for the current force and future force technologies such as
    novel penetrators, lightweight durable armor, and energetic materials.
    In-house exploration research helps maintain ``smart buyer''
    capabilities essential to the Army; utilizes Army unique facilities;
    and supports researchers in areas critical to the Army
        The Army maintains an extramural basic research program that is
    balanced between its two major components: (1) the single investigator
    program that invests in the brightest minds at our leading universities
    and is a key source of next-generation of scientists and engineers with
    an understanding of military problems; and (2) larger scale
    partnerships with universities and industry to take advantage of
    commercial investments and the cutting edge research at outstanding
    universities in areas critical to the future force. The external basic
    research program gives leverage to the power of academia and industry;
    focuses world-class research on Army challenges; allows flexibility to
    capture new discoveries; and, complements internal efforts. The Army
    continues to exploit the opportunities created by these organizations
    to accelerate development of transformational capabilities to a
    lighter, smarter, faster force.
        The Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT) at the University of
    Southern California continues to be an excellent example of how these
    centers attack Army problems with new and different views. ICT
    leverages academic and Hollywood expertise to perform fundamental
    research in simulation environments and virtual human depiction for
    training, mission planning and rehearsal. It has worked with the
    Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC), Infantry School at Fort
    Benning to develop cognitive leadership training aids that leverage
    both Microsoft's X-Box game console (Full Spectrum Warrior) and
    ``gamer'' PCs (Full Spectrum Commander). In fact, Full Spectrum
    Commander is currently being adapted for Afghan National Army training
    in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
        The Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies (ISN) at the
    Massachusetts Institute of Technology focuses and adapts nanotechnology
    research to significantly enhance soldier survivability. Investment
    areas are nanofibers for lighter materials, active/reactive ballistic
    protection (to solve the energy dissipation problem), micro-
    climatemicroclimate conditioning, signature management, biomonitoring/
    triage and active control components.
        Last month we opened the Institute for Collaborative
    Biotechnologies (ICB) at the University of California, Santa Barbara.
    The ICB integrates biosciences with the physical and engineering
    sciences to provide an understanding of the biological construction of
    novel materials such as biologically-derived, functional electronic,
    magnetic and optical materials; integrated multi-modality sensing;
    biologically-derived network concepts; and, sense and respond actuation
    capabilities. This will influence the development of technology that
    improves military capabilities in the areas of precision strike,
    signature management, network design and implementation and
    ``identification of friend or foe.''
        Collaborative technology alliances are industry-led partnerships
    between industry, major universities, historically black colleges and
    universities/minority institutions (HBCU/MI), and government. The
    strategy takes advantage of the large industry investments in areas of
    high importance to the Army such as communications and networks;
    robotics; advanced sensors and decisions architectures; and power and
    energy. This collaboration combines the practicality of industry with
    the creative research capabilities of universities and the operational
    knowledge and warfighter expertise of Army laboratories to leverage
    state of the art technology for the soldier.
        Centers of Excellence support the advancement of technologies
    directly related to the enduring needs of the Army by funding
    universities where state-of-the-art research programs are coupled with
    broad-based graduate education programs to increase the supply of
    scientists and engineers in the areas of interest. This strategy
    focuses critical mass of effort on enduring challenges.

                       MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (MANTECH)

        The Army MANTECH Program is designed to improve readiness and
    reduce total ownership cost of Army systems through the implementation
    of new and enhanced manufacturing technologies. In 2002, the Army
    focused its MANTECH efforts to address high priority projects that will
    enable affordable production and sustainment of the FCS and future
    force in four major investment areas: armor; electronics/power systems;
    munitions; and sensors. The Army MANTECH Program places a strong
    emphasis on transitioning technology, directly involving the technology
    developers, acquisition program managers and industry.
        The Army's newest Center of Excellence, the Flexible Display Center
    (FDC), was established on February 10 at Arizona State University at
    Tempe (ASU). ASU will partner with industry, other universities, and
    the government to advance flexible display technology and
    manufacturing. The Army's goal is to have rugged, low-power flexible
    displays provide enhanced information and situational awareness for the
    soldier and vehicle platforms. The FDC will provide the innovative R&D
    for materials, devices, and manufacturing processes to solve critical
    challenges in the performance and fabrication of flexible displays. The
    payoff to the Army is a transformational capability for a lighter,
    smarter, faster future force.
        A good example of the return on investment that the Army MANTECH
    program has achieved is the Enhanced Manufacturing Processes for Body
    Armor Materials project that ended in May 2001. This effort helped
    reduce the cost of the composite plates that go into the Interceptor
    Body Armor vest from $850/plate to $500/plate. Through December 2003,
    500,000 plates have been produced for the Army and the Marine Corps.
    For a total shared investment in the MANTECH program of $1.5 million,
    we have realized a total of $175 million in cost avoidance. With the
    Army's plan to field Interceptor Body Armor to all of its deployed
    forces, we expect this cost savings to significantly multiply.

                                   CONCLUSION

        The Army must maintain a diverse S&T portfolio to be responsive to
    current and future warfighter needs. The S&T community seeks
    technological solutions that can be demonstrated in the near-term,
    investigates the feasibility of new concepts for the mid-term, and
    explores the imaginable for the uncertain, far-term future. In closing
    I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify
    before the subcommittee. I would be happy to answer any questions you
    or the members of the subcommittee may have.

        Senator Roberts. We thank you for your testimony.
        Admiral Cohen, please proceed.

       STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JAY M. COHEN, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
                                RESEARCH

        Admiral Cohen. Good morning, Chairman Roberts, Senator
    Reed, Senator Allard, it's a great honor and privilege for me
    to appear before you this morning.
        I will keep my comments very short because your questions
    are far more important than anything I might have to say.
        Senator Roberts. You're not going to show us what's behind
    that----
        Admiral Cohen. We're going to keep that the mystery of S&T.
        Senator Roberts. Is that classified or is that----
        Admiral Cohen. It is not classified.
        Senator Roberts. Not classified. All right.
        Admiral Cohen. It's just self-serving.
        Senator Roberts. What about what's sitting on that chair
    with the hole in it?
        Admiral Cohen. What's sitting in that chair, sir, is the
    result--you've already heard in the testimony this morning of
    the cooperation that is going on led in large measure by Dr.
    Sega amongst the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Army, and the Air
    Force, but also the other DOD agencies.
        After the tragedy of Khobar Towers, the Defense Threat
    Reduction Agency (DTRA) came up with a coating that they were
    able to apply to the inside of masonry structures. I know
    you've seen pictures of that being tested. That is the coating
    that you see right there. It can be applied in different
    thicknesses. It's called explosive-resistant coating.
        After the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, where 17 of our
    sailors were so tragically killed, we looked with DTRA at
    applying that to the inside of the hulls of our ships, not on
    the outside, but on the inside. We determined that if we had
    that, we could prevent penetration of the hull material that we
    currently use by an explosion about the size that occurred on
    the U.S.S. Cole. We might have grotesque deformation, but we
    would not have penetration.
        Senator Roberts. Now, does the U.S.S. Cole have that on it
    now?
        Admiral Cohen. It does not. We are looking very hard at
    using this under the existing insulation and Navy leadership,
    Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), et cetera, and the ship
    builders are looking at this.
        Senator Roberts. Have you outfitted any ship with this yet?
        Admiral Cohen. We have not outfitted any ship with it yet.
    We're looking to put it on X-Craft, which is the congressional
    experimental high-speed vessel, which is aluminum. As we're
    moving to aluminum, this technology becomes even more
    attractive. But what we have done--and I don't know if you had
    a chance to see the video. I know Senator Dole had a chance to
    see it.
        Senator Roberts. Right.
        Admiral Cohen. But what we have done, working with the Army
    at Aberdeen, in addition to their kits that they're using for
    the vertical protection from the IEDs and the shards, is we've
    looked to apply this underneath, just like undercoat, on the
    HMMWVs. I'm going to keep this unclassified so that against
    mines and other threats, we would protect the soldiers and the
    marines who are on convoy duty. As you saw from that video, the
    results are the HMMWV is destroyed. But with this on the
    bottom, the passenger compartment is maintained intact.
        Now, this also had 50 caliber bullets shot at it and you
    can see the effect it had. Those bullets are retained. Now,
    this is heavy. It's expensive. But this is the value of S&T
    being rapidly deployed.
        Senator Roberts. I apologize to my colleagues and I
    apologize to you for interrupting your prepared remarks.
        But how on earth are you going to keep that HMMWV traveling
    at 50 miles per hour through a hot zone with that kind of
    weight?
        Admiral Cohen. Well, you're looking at a complex structure
    there. I will tell you that the Army is very focused on this--
    and Dr. Killion will correct me if I'm wrong here--and they
    will not go below a thousand pound load carrying capability in
    their HMMWVs.
        The kit that you see, the four doors and the side
    protection, adds between 600 and 800 pounds. We're looking to
    limit this to under 200 pounds, which would still fit in the
    window, and I'm focused more on our deploying marines right now
    who may have slightly different standards on this in the field
    than the Army does. But we are already seeing the ball joints
    and the springs failing much earlier than we had ever
    anticipated.
        So you push the balloon here, because you don't know the
    logistics problem it's going to create. But I will tell you as
    an aside, I am prepared to go to Chrysler, Ford, General
    Motors, Dean Kamon, and others and have them look at everything
    we know about nano, everything we know about structural
    integrity, all of the modeling simulation we've done, the
    appliques and the sandwich approach, and let's see if we can
    design a HMMWV-like vehicle knowing what the future holds for
    us in the global war on terrorism with suicide bombers, et
    cetera, so that we can better in the future deploy our sailors
    and marines in that environment trading the platform for the
    person.
        The South Africans have a large vehicle that's called the
    Water Buffalo, I believe. It's way too big for a HMMWV kind of
    vehicle, but it shows promise in the intelligent design against
    these asymmetric threats.
        Senator Roberts. Again, I'm sorry I interrupted, but I
    think it's very valuable that you point out the hands-on or the
    actual event occurrence and what you face with technology. As
    you improve one particular area, you have to, as you pointed
    out, fill out that other balloon.
        Please proceed with your comments.
        Admiral Cohen. Yes, sir. I was going to say that I'm just
    an old naval line officer and, in fact, I'm getting older. But
    4 years ago when I was ordered--and they were called naval
    orders--to be the Chief of Naval Research, I did not have,
    although I have a postgraduate degree, an S&T background. I'm
    just an old submariner.
        But I can tell you, Senators, that in the time I have been
    privileged to be the Chief of Naval Research, and it is unique
    in all of our Services, I have learned the value of sustained
    investment in basic research at a critical level.
        I have learned that it is only the Federal Government, with
    its great resources and the staying power year to year, that
    enables the discovery and invention that generates the
    innovation that powers our economy and empowers our fighting
    men and women in the defense of our freedoms. I thank you and
    the American taxpayer for that investment. It is absolutely
    critical.
        Now, the question is always asked, what do those science
    projects do for me today? We've talked about atomic clocks. The
    previous speakers had an opportunity. You asked very insightful
    questions.
        In late November, the Secretary of the Navy, Gordon
    England, came to me and said, ``we're going to deploy more than
    40,000 marines in March and April to Iraq.'' He said,
    ``Admiral, I want you to put out a very broad net, not just
    Naval Research, not just Naval Research Lab, not just the other
    Services, I want you to go to academia. I want you to go to
    industry. I want you to go to other departments of the
    government. I want you to go international.''
        I provided what's now called ``the Sears catalogue'' by
    your staff, and they have it, and I will just hold it up. We
    have many of the logos--you're nothing without a logo--that
    show literally the hundreds of groups that we went to.
        On December 12, my birthday, we set up at the Naval
    Research Lab right here on the Potomac, the quadrangle there.
    We made it like Tikrit. It was 35 degrees. Secretary England
    came. He brought Navy and Marine Corps leadership.
        Instead of giving a quad chart and viewing graph briefs, we
    demonstrated the cutting edge S&T from industry, from other
    Services, international, et cetera. Some of it worked. Some of
    it didn't work. That's S&T. I get paid to take risk. I have the
    privilege of failing occasionally in my job.
        Based on that meeting, Secretary England has been holding
    biweekly meetings with Navy and Marine Corps leadership to
    ensure, number one, that our marines have the capability to
    provide their mission as they go to Iraq, but also to ensure
    that they have the maximum protection that our technologies can
    provide to the marines.
        You saw some of that in the demonstration at the back of
    the room. I'm so proud to be part of the Navy, Marine Corps,
    civilian, and uniform leadership that values our fighting men.
    Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Cohen follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by RADM Jay M. Cohen, USN

        Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
    for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of
    the Navy's fiscal year 2005 naval science and technology (S&T) budget
    request.
        The last year has demonstrated how new technology and new
    operations have transformed the nature of the battlefield and the speed
    of operations. I want to highlight some of the contributions from the
    naval S&T portfolio that have delivered new capabilities to our fleet
    and force. These are examples of how Congress' sustained and stable
    investment in science and technology in the past delivers the
    technological superiority for our sailors and marines today.
        Let me tell you about some of the S&T success stories from
    Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). You will remember that I came before
    this subcommittee a few years ago and brought a prototype for
    demonstration of the Dragon Eye, a small unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV),
    for small unit tactical reconnaissance. The Dragon Eye is small, light,
    easy to transport, and easy to fly. This UAV has transitioned into the
    Marine Corps Force and will accompany the First Marine Expeditionary
    Force (I MEF) when it deploys to Iraq later this year.
        We have long supported the development of unmanned underwater
    vehicles. The Remote Environmental Monitoring Unit (REMUS) is a low-
    cost autonomous underwater vehicle. Originally designed to conduct
    coastal surveys in support of science, it was adapted for military use
    with support from the Office of Naval Research and the U.S. Special
    Operations Command (SOCOM). Capable of performing rapid environmental
    surveys, REMUS also functions as an underwater mine reconnaissance
    device for the Navy's Mine Countermeasure Program. A half dozen of the
    REMUS autonomous underwater vehicles went with the Navy Special
    Clearance team to the Arabian Gulf to help clear the ports of Umm Qasr
    and Az Zubayr. Equipped with side scan sonar, REMUS was used to
    systematically survey 2.5 million square meters of waterways. This was
    the first time that an unmanned underwater vehicle was used in
    conjunction with other mine countermeasure units in a wartime
    situation. The team had the first REMUS in the water within several
    hours of arriving in Umm Qasr.
        Another UAV used in OIF is the Silver Fox. Built as a small
    tactical UAV, Silver Fox uses off-the-shelf avionics and can fly
    autonomously using differential Global Positioning System (GPS).
    Weighing only 22 pounds, it can be launched by hand or catapult from
    various platforms. Once airborne, Silver Fox uses an infrared and high-
    resolution color zoom camera to relay reconnaissance information
    instantaneously to a remote laptop computer. Powered by a 0.91 cubic
    inch engine, this fixed-winged aircraft can reach speeds close to 65
    miles per hour and operate at an altitude of 1,000 feet with a range of
    up to 150 miles. We are working to increase the flight endurance beyond
    the current 10 hours. We are using the 4 pound payload capacity for
    small state-of-the-art detection systems. Silver Fox's 5-foot fuselage,
    detachable wings, and tail fins fit into a supersized golf bag making
    storage and transportation simple and efficient. Unlike other UAV
    systems, which require a skilled radio-control operator or pilot,
    Silver Fox is easy to fly and allows the operator to program routes
    into a laptop computer.
        Those are some of our highlights for the near-term--``Today's Navy
    and Marine Corps.'' Naval S&T is a sustained journey from discovery to
    deployment in which innovation (invention) and experimentation
    (validation) transform the operating forces. This is a continuous
    cycle, so I would like to discuss the ``Next Navy and Marine Corps''
    (roughly the forces that will emerge over the next 5 to 15 years), and
    finally the ``Navy and Marine Corps After Next''--which we will see in
    15 to 30 years.
        A great deal of our transformational effort is lodged in the Future
    Naval Capabilities (FNC). S&T enable Navy transformation by achieving
    the FNCs' goals. The key to successful transformation is the strong
    business partnership among scientists, industry, requirements,
    acquisition, and warfighters.
        We have focused a major portion of our S&T portfolio on FNC for the
    ``Next Navy and Marine Corps.'' Approximately two-thirds of our 6.3
    (Advanced Technology Development) funds and about 40 percent of our 6.2
    (Exploratory Development) funds are invested in the FNC. The FNC
    process delivers maturing technology to acquisition program managers
    for timely incorporation into platforms, weapons, sensors, and process
    improvements. Each of the current 12 FNC focus areas is planned and
    reviewed by an integrated team with representation from the Office of
    Naval Research, a Program Executive Office (PEO), the Navy and Marine
    Corps requirements community, and the fleet/force user community. This
    gives us constant validation of the relevance of the technologies, and
    strong buy-in and commitment to transition plans. We have recently
    strengthened alignment of the FNC process with the naval capabilities
    development process, which establishes our program requirements and
    priorities in Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and FORCEnet.
        The current FNCs, in no priority order, are:

             Advanced Capability Electric Systems--The future of
            naval warfare is electric. Warships will have revolutionary
            power plants that permit new hull forms and propulsors, reduce
            manning, streamline logistics, power advanced sensors, and
            enable future high energy and speed-of-light weapons. We have
            already successfully transitioned the Aircraft Electrical
            Servicing Station, a solid state, re-programmable, reliable,
            high quality deck edge power source for aircraft servicing, and
            the Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Targeting Vehicle, which
            demonstrates key hybrid electric components such as Li Ion
            Battery Pack, power electronics, and in-hub wheel motors in an
            integrated system demo. In fiscal year 2005 we will transition
            work on our Ships Service Fuel Cell to the DD(X) program. Fuel
            cell technology has the potential to significantly reduce fuel
            consumption, and can also provide distributed power generation,
            improving the ship's ``fight through'' ability. This FNC is
            aligned most closely with Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea
            Basing.
             Autonomous Operations--This program is pursuing a
            dramatic increase in the performance and affordability of naval
            air, surface, ground, and underwater autonomous vehicles--
            unmanned systems able to operate with a minimum of human
            intervention and oversight. The Autonomous Operations FNC gives
            us a great potential to operate effectively in what would
            otherwise be denied areas. It contributes to Sea Shield and Sea
            Strike. In fiscal year 2005, for example, we will transition
            the Modular Mission Payload Architecture to the Fire Scout
            Vertical Tactical UAV. The prototype system is being used to
            control the ISR payload on the Spiral 1 Spartan USV, which is
            currently deployed on the U.S.S. Gettysburg in the Middle East.
             Fleet/Force Protection--We have very capable ships,
            aircraft, and ground combat vehicles. It's our business to
            ensure that they don't fall to the sorts of asymmetric threats
            our enemies pose. This FNC, aligned with Sea Shield, is working
            to develop effective organic means of protection: weapons,
            sensors, countermeasures, stealth and damage control. It has
            already transitioned the initial phase of the ES Detection of
            Low Probability Intercept (LPI) Periscope Detection Radars
            project to Office of Naval Intelligence as part of their
            Cluster Pennant Program. In addition, this S&T program is
            transitioning as an upgrade to Naval Sea Systems Command's
            (NAVSEA) AN/BLQ-10 Submarine ES System.
             Knowledge Superiority and Assurance--Information
            technology is as crucial to naval superiority as it is to any
            other aspect of contemporary life. This program is developing
            our ability to distribute integrated information in a dynamic
            network with high connectivity and interoperability. It will
            ensure knowledge superiority, common situational understanding,
            and increased speed of command. This FNC is a key enabler of
            FORCEnet. It recently provided a prototype Image Processing and
            Exploitation Architecture tool to the I MEF for deployment on
            UAVs in Iraq and Afghanistan. This tool provides a geo-
            referenced composite picture of imagery that builds over time
            as UAV sensors conduct searches of areas of interest. The
            picture provides a substantial enhancement to standard imaging
            techniques that only provide a view of what the sensor sees at
            any particular point in time. The Knowledge Superiority
            Assurance FNC has also provided tools that significantly
            improve our ability to process signals intelligence and weather
            information in-theater. In fiscal year 2005, this FNC plans
            several transitions to significantly improve time-sensitive
            decisionmaking, apertures, networking, interoperability, and
            the next generation common picture.
             Littoral Antisubmarine Warfare--This program is part
            of our shift in emphasis to littoral, expeditionary operations.
            The antisubmarine warfare (ASW) challenge in coastal waters is
            a tough one so, we are focusing scientific efforts on enhancing
            our ability to detect, track, classify, and engage enemy
            submarines by using a layered tactical ASW approach. We do this
            by first countering enemy submarines near shore, followed by
            addressing threat submarines prior to their torpedo launch, and
            then countering any threat torpedoes after launch. Each layer
            by itself will effectively address its individual objective;
            and when the layers are viewed in their entirety, it offers an
            effective ``system-of-systems'' approach that we believe will
            adequately address the ASW problem. A number of products have
            transitioned to acquisition systems including Sonar Automation
            Technology processing techniques that provide automated
            detection and classification operator alerts to submarines and
            surveillance platforms, reducing operator workload and
            increasing performance capability. Sea Shield is benefiting
            from the products of this FNC.
             Littoral Combat and Power Projection--This FNC has two
            major thrusts: Expeditionary Logistics (aligned with Sea-
            Basing) and Littoral Combat (essential to Sea Strike). This FNC
            focuses on deploying uniquely capable combat and logistics
            systems necessary to deploy and sustain the fleet and the force
            without building up a large logistical infrastructure ashore.
            This year, the Expeditionary Logistics Program successfully
            tested a set of automated Logistics Command & Control/Decision
            Support Tools essential to the Marine Air Ground Task Force
            (MAGTF). They have set the stage for transition of a Ground
            Logistics Command and Control Combat Service Support
            ``Toolkit''. The toolkit will provide proactive rapid request
            support for personnel, equipment, and services, logistics
            mission planning and execution support, after-action assessment
            tools, and situational awareness projection onto the Marine
            Corps common operating picture. Littoral Combat FNC plans a
            fiscal year 2005 transition of the EX-45 Stabilized Gun Mount
            which will use advanced software to sense and compensate for
            motion about train and elevation axes. The gun mount which
            additionally houses an Embedded Video Tracker is compatible
            with the MK-19 40mm, M2 .50 caliber and M240G 7.62 weapon
            systems. The stabilized, adaptive mount coupled with an auto-
            tracking feature will significantly enhance warfighting
            capability in both surface vessel and vehicular applications.
            Also planned for transition in fiscal year 2005, the
            Expeditionary Decision Support System (EDSS) software
            application is designed to support operations ranging from
            amphibious landings to combat operations ashore. Resident
            within the application are scheduling engines, computational
            models, performance algorithms, and the ability to
            collaboratively access common databases. EDSS's high degree of
            military utility has garnered substantial warfighter interest
            and as a result has deployed with Marine Expeditionary Units
            (MEUs) and Naval Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) in support
            of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and OIF. The Direct
            Reporting Program Manager Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (DRPM
            EFV) will transition the secure wireless local area network
            (LAN) and related technologies to enhance the information
            exchange between individual EFVs, between EFVs and dismounted
            troops, as well as between EFVs and the ships and operations
            centers with which they operate.
             Missile Defense--This program is focused on technology
            enabling and supporting lethal engagements of theater missiles,
            manned and unmanned aircraft at extended ranges in defense of
            naval forces and assets afloat and ashore. Products being
            worked will offer ways to expand the battlespace rapidly,
            identify contacts accurately, and engage threats effectively
            and efficiently. This year, as part of the Composite Combat
            Identification project, the Missile Defense FNC will transition
            advanced algorithms to correlate real-time track files with
            signals intelligence data and other information files resident
            in the EP-3E ARIES II surveillance aircraft. When this
            capability is operational, derived identification information
            will be provided to fleet tactical users in real-time. As part
            of the Reactive Materials Warhead project, test results and
            warhead design parameters of a first generation reactive
            materials warhead will be available with the goal of high
            lethality against cruise and ballistic missile targets. In
            September, there will be an important demonstration at the
            Combat Systems Engineering Design facility of our Distributed
            Weapons Coordination capability. These automated battle
            management algorithms will provide real time priority threat
            evaluation considering all air threats and all defended assets,
            at sea and ashore. Recommendations of Preferred Shooter will
            also be developed considering location, current weapons load
            and optimal end-game geometry for both ballistic missile
            defense and defense against ``air breathing'' threats. In early
            fiscal year 2005, we will complete development and testing of
            highly mobile X-band radar technology in the Affordable Ground
            Based Radar project as a risk reduction concept demonstration
            for the Marine Corps Multi-Role Radar System (MRRS). The
            Missile Defense FNC is a strong contributor to the Sea Shield
            and FORCEnet pillars of the Navy's Sea Power 21 operational
            concept.
             Organic Mine Countermeasures--Because they are cheap,
            and able to seed the battle space with a menace far out of
            proportion to their numbers, mines have been and will continue
            to be deployed against us by terrorists and their state
            sponsors. We're working to give our forces an organic--that is
            to say, an inherent--and stand-off ability to detect,
            characterize, and neutralize mines wherever they may be
            encountered. Closely aligned with Sea Shield, this FNC has
            transitioned several important products. One of them, the REMUS
            autonomous underwater vehicle, in now in the hands of our
            operating forces in Iraq where it helped clear the rivers to
            speed supplies to troops. It was also pressed into service in
            the weeks immediately following September 11 to help secure
            ports on both of our coasts. I might mention that REMUS emerged
            from a basic oceanographic research program--another piece of
            evidence that overnight successes are long in preparation.
             Time Critical Strike--We are substantially reducing
            the amount of time it takes to hit critical mobile targets,
            like theater ballistic missiles launchers, command centers, and
            weapons of mass destruction. One of this FNC's products, the
            Affordable Weapon System, a loitering cruise-missile-like
            system that can carry a variety of payloads, is currently
            transitioning to the acquisition community for development this
            year. Time Critical Strike is aligned with Sea Strike.
             Total Ownership Cost--This FNC uses advanced design
            and manufacturing processes to significantly decrease the cost
            of buying, operating, and maintaining Navy systems while
            promoting increased system readiness. We are working to reduce
            total lifecycle costs during design and manufacturing as well
            as increase savings realized from reduced manning and better
            environmental compliance. Aligned primarily with Naval
            Enterprise, this FNC has transitioned a number of programs to
            the user community. The Total Oil Monitoring System is designed
            for real-time, online applications and will transition to Navy
            surface ships to monitor critical machinery. The Rapid Cure
            Ship Tank Coatings Program has been demonstrated in 14 ship
            tanks and voids. Aircraft corrosion sensors, developed under
            the Corrosion and Corrosivity Monitoring System Program have
            been installed on an H-60 helicopter for flight testing. The
            Turbine Engine Technology Program delivered a thermal barrier
            coating with significantly reduced thermal conductivity that
            was selected for inclusion in the F135 (Joint Strike Fighter)
            engine. In fiscal year 2005, we will transition a Portable Wide
            Area Non Destructive Inspection Imager that maps surface
            corrosion and subsurface defects without removal of paint.
            Payoffs include faster, more reliable aircraft inspection,
            improved prognostics, longer aircraft life, lower repainting
            costs and improved safety.

        The relatively mature technologies managed in FNCs do not spring up
    overnight. In many cases they are the result of long term investments
    in research and invention programs in 6.1 and early 6.2 funding
    categories. We focus our research and invention investments on areas
    where the Navy is the only significant U.S. sponsor (such as Ocean
    Acoustics and Underwater Weaponry), and on S&T Grand Challenges whose
    solution would provide significant advances in naval capability (such
    as Naval Materials by Design). A stable, long-term discovery and
    invention program is essential to keep our pipeline full of enabling
    technologies and to attract the Nation's best scientific talent to
    focus on naval problems.
        Finally, I would like to talk about the ``Navy and Marine Corps
    After Next''--the fleet and force we will see in 15 to 30 years. We are
    continuing to support our Grand Challenges and the National Naval
    Responsibilities as well as our Innovative Naval Prototypes. The Naval
    S&T Grand Challenges are large, difficult, challenges that, if met,
    could give us decisive capabilities 15 to 30 years in the future. We
    encourage the Nation's scientific community to achieve breakthroughs in
    difficult but achievable scientific challenges like Naval Battlespace
    Awareness, Advanced Electrical Power Sources for the Navy and Marine
    Corps, Naval Materials by Design, and Multifunctional Electronics for
    Intelligent Naval Sensors. The National Naval Responsibilities are
    fields in which the Department of the Navy is the only significant U.S.
    sponsor. These include fields like Naval Engineering, Ocean Acoustics,
    and Underwater Weaponry. If the Department of the Navy didn't invest in
    them, it is unlikely that anyone would. It is vital to keep such fields
    healthy, not only for the sake of our own capabilities, but to avoid
    technological surprise as well.
        I am excited about what I call Innovative Naval Prototypes. These
    are the capabilities that promise to fundamentally change how we
    prepare for and fight wars. Examples include: the Free Electron Laser,
    the Electromagnetic Railgun, hypersonic missiles, the x-craft, and
    superconducting electric drive motors. The Secretary of the Navy and
    the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) are committed to making the
    electric ship our ship of the future and we are providing the S&T. We
    are well down the path to building the electric propulsion and weapons.
    The 36 megawatt motor effort is underway and we are using the lessons
    learned from ongoing testing of the 5 megawatt motor. The Free Electron
    Laser is progressing to its next demonstration at 10 kilowatt. In
    addition, we are working collaboratively with the other services, as
    directed by Congress, on electromagnetic rail gun technology for the
    future.
        Construction is underway on the high speed, experimental vessel
    called Littoral Surface Craft--Experimental, or ``X-Craft.'' This high
    speed aluminum catamaran will test a variety of technologies that will
    allow us to improve our capabilities in littoral, or near-shore,
    waters. The X-Craft will be used to evaluate the hydrodynamic
    performance, structural behavior, mission flexibility, and propulsion
    system efficiency of high speed vessels. X-Craft will eventually be
    fitted with an advanced lifting body component. The lifting body
    component is a streamlined underwater appendage that will dampen low-
    speed ship motions, increasing the operational envelope for helicopter
    and small craft operations. Liquid polymers will be used on the surface
    of the lifting body to evaluate drag reduction.
        The X-Craft will be the first Navy purpose built ship to
    demonstrate mission flexibility. Mission flexibility will be
    demonstrated through interchangeable ``mission modules'' housed in the
    X-Craft's large Mission Bay in standard 20-foot container boxes. The
    Mission Bay will be capable of housing 12 containers, permitting the
    vessel to be quickly reconfigured to support a variety of potential
    missions, including battle force protection, mine countermeasures,
    amphibious assault support and humanitarian support. A multi-purpose
    Stern Ramp will allow X-Craft to launch and recover manned and unmanned
    surface and subsurface vehicles up to the size of an 11 m Rigid-Hull
    Inflatable Boat (RHIB). From its flight deck, X-Craft will be able to
    support 24-hour-a-day operations for up to two MH-60S helicopters.
        In conclusion, the Nation's return on investment is clear. Naval
    transformation depends on a long-term, stable and sustained investment
    in S&T. We validate through a cycle of ongoing experimentation and
    validation so we can transition new capability to the warfighter.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

        Senator Roberts. Secretary Engle, you're next.

    STATEMENT OF JAMES B. ENGLE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
           AIR FORCE FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ENGINEERING

        Mr. Engle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
    subcommittee, and staff. I also very much appreciate the
    opportunity to be here today and to testify on the 2005 Air
    Force S&T budget.
        The United States Air Force is continuing to transform to a
    capability-based and focused expeditionary air and space force.
    We are doing this through the development of our concepts of
    operations (CONOPs) for each of the seven major tasks that the
    Air Force must accomplish to support the combatant commander.
        Our goal is to make the warfighting effects and the
    capabilities we need to achieve them the drivers for everything
    we do. In fact, we are specifically focused on this area in our
    S&T program.
        We have taken the effects and the capabilities required by
    the seven concepts of operations and the transformational goals
    and mapped them to the long-term challenges and the short-term
    objectives identified in the congressionally-directed S&T
    planning review we completed in 2002.
        Let me just briefly highlight some of the most exciting
    work we're doing in this area that's relevant, I think,
    particularly to the testimony on transitioning work that we're
    doing to our warfighters.
        We have increased our investment in space communications
    technology considerably. The objective here is to identify,
    develop, and demonstrate wide-band technologies needed to build
    a space-based laser communication network that can provide
    higher data throughput.
        Along with the movement of information, protection and
    assurance of that information to the commander in the field is
    equally important. Our work at Rome Labs in New York is world
    class in this particular area, in both computer network defense
    and attack as well as assurance of information to the
    warfighter.
        We have completed and transitioned the initial breakthrough
    work on laser eye and sensor protection developed at our Human
    Effectiveness Directorate at Brooks City-Base in Texas and the
    Materials Lab at Wright-Patterson. These efforts have been
    rated world class by our Air Force Scientific Advisory Board.
        Also world class is the space weather research being done
    at Hanscom up in Massachusetts. We will put the Communications/
    Navigation Outage Forecast System (C/NOFS) satellite in orbit,
    which will help us provide the warfighter with a space weather
    forecast.
        We're also very proud of the work that we're doing on the
    research for the protection of facilities and equipment that
    Admiral Cohen spoke about. We've done considerable work on
    elastomeric coating polymers, which are coating this thing
    right here. We are, in fact, putting the polymer that's been
    developed under the DTRA on the Pentagon. Right now, as we
    refurbish the Pentagon and other buildings, it's incredibly
    effective in this particular capacity with a very thin coating.
        In addition, we're continuing to explore the use of these
    kinds of polymers embedded in fabrics for less-rigid
    structures, such as tents and field equipment, for protection
    of our forces in the field.
        Another exciting effort that we see in the near term
    demonstrated back here is the Vehicular-Mounted Active Denial
    System (VMADS) being jointly developed with the U.S. Marine
    Corps. It is a defensive millimeter wave system used for
    perimeter defense that we have developed down at Phillips Lab
    or at our Directed Energy Lab in Albuquerque.
        It is a directed energy weapon and it omits that nonlethal
    feeling, Mr. Roberts, that you had to experience three times
    while they were photographing you; just to make sure we have
    the right photograph. It is very effective. If any of you would
    like to have a demonstration of the full body blast, let me
    know and we can arrange that.
        We are working hard for our SOF by reducing the weight and
    integrating the kit that they use. We call this equipment the
    Battlefield Air Operations Kit, and improvements are being
    realized by using very rapid spirals to speed development,
    prototyping, testing, production, and fielding.
        As a result, our special tactics warriors will soon have a
    digital machine-to-machine capability that helps them quickly
    connect to the right aircraft with the right munitions on board
    guided precisely to the right target at just the right time.
        These new automated processes help reduce the time it takes
    to target the terrorist threat, while at the same time reducing
    human error in the targeting process.
        We're also working hard to defend against Man-Portable Air
    Defense Systems (MANPADS), and that's also demonstrated in the
    back. I think that is some of our most exciting work, which I
    think we're going to see fielded more and more, not only within
    our force structure, but internationally as well.
        In addition, Closed-Loop Infrared Countermeasure (CLIRCM)
    multi-spectrum missile warning system is coming online soon and
    will be the next generation. We are rapidly trying to get that
    mature and into the field as well.
        We strive to focus on those technologies that we believe we
    will need to transition over the next 10 to 15 years,
    principally in our program. But as Dr. Sega and the rest of my
    colleagues have pointed out, because of the operational
    necessity of today we have found very effective ways to take
    the work that is the basis of our technology and transition it
    quickly to our warfighter.
        At the same time, we have to balance that against the long-
    term and make sure that we have that tech-base viable in the
    10- to 15-year period. One of the most important methods to
    determine if you're investing in the right things is to maybe
    dissect some legacy systems and see if the technologies you've
    invested in in the past have found their way into the
    developmental or operational systems we have today.
        One excellent example is the F/A-22 aircraft. A wealth of
    technologies have been transitioned into this aircraft and they
    can be traced back to an investment of approximately a billion
    dollars in the Air Force S&T over the years. Examples of these
    transitioned technologies include low observable materials,
    advanced two-directional thrust vector nozzles, new supercruise
    non-afterburning turbine engines, fly-by-wire integrated flight
    controls, solid state active transmit and receive radar, and
    thermoplastic composite structures, just to name a few.
        Additionally, a number of information-related technologies
    have transitioned into operational use, including the highly-
    effective information data wall that we're currently using in
    Afghanistan and Korea, multi-layer communications securities
    being used by several government agencies, software-defined
    reprogrammable radios, and secure communications that are
    adaptable for coalition operations.
        In conclusion, the Air Force is fully committed to
    providing the Nation with the advanced air and space
    technologies required to meet America's national security
    interests around the world and to ensure we remain on the
    cutting edge of system performance, flexibility, and
    affordability.
        The technical advantages we enjoy today are a legacy of
    decades of investment in S&T. Likewise, our S&T in warfighting
    capabilities of the future will be substantially determined by
    today's investment in S&T.
        To meet all of the demands of our laboratory, the Air Force
    is working to increase our S&T funding. Our fiscal year 2005
    President's budget request is for $1.9 billion. This includes
    $1.4 billion in core S&T, which represents an increase of over
    $80 million or almost 5 percent real growth compared to the
    President's budget of fiscal year 2004.
        As we face the new millennium, our challenge is to advance
    technologies for the expeditionary air and space force as we
    continue to move aggressively into the realm of space
    activities.
        The Air Force S&T program provides for the discovery,
    development, demonstration, and timely transition of affordable
    transformation technologies that keep the Air Force the best in
    the world.
        As an integral part of the DOD S&T team, we look forward to
    working with Congress to ensure a strong S&T program tailored
    to achieve our vision of a superior air and space force.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to
    present testimony and thank you for your continuing support of
    the S&T program.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Engle follows:]

                      Prepared Statement by James B. Engle

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, and staff, I very much
    appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the fiscal year 2005
    Air Force science and technology (S&T) program. The United States Air
    Force is transforming to a capabilities-focused Expeditionary Air and
    Space Force. We are doing this through the development of the concept
    of operations for each of the seven major tasks the Air Force must be
    capable of accomplishing to support our combatant commanders. Our goal
    is to make the warfighting effects and the capabilities we need to
    achieve them the drivers for everything we do. This is especially true
    in our S&T program. We have taken the effects and capabilities required
    by the seven concepts of operations and mapped them to the long-term
    challenges and short-term objectives identified in the congressionally-
    directed S&T Planning Review completed in February 2002. Not
    surprisingly, we have a high correlation between our S&T programs and
    the capabilities required by these concepts of operations. This is
    because the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) closely links the
    technologies reflected in its S&T plan to warfighter capability needs.
        The United States Air Force is committed to an S&T program that
    enables us to achieve our vision of becoming an integrated air and
    space force capable of rapid and decisive global engagement. By
    continuing our investment in transformational technologies that support
    a reduced cycle-time, spiral development acquisition process, the Air
    Force will retain its dominance of air and space in future conflicts,
    against both traditional and asymmetrical threats.
        Innovation is a vital part of our heritage and is key to ensuring
    the Air Force will meet the challenges of tomorrow. Transforming our
    warfighting capabilities towards this end will involve continued
    innovations in how we train our forces and how we think about employing
    our forces to defend our Nation, as well as continued advances in our
    technology. We must be prepared to counter regional instabilities, the
    worldwide availability of advanced weapons, and other emerging and less
    predictable acts of terrorism against our Nation and allies. We are
    developing transformational technologies that permit flexible forces to
    operate far from home, on short notice, and for extended time periods.
    However, we must also be able to afford transformational innovations
    once we develop them in order to re-capitalize the Air Force to fulfill
    our vision. To meet warfighting capability objectives, we invest in the
    most promising and affordable technologies in order to win decisively,
    protect our forces, and minimize collateral damage.

                    S&T BUDGET/SENIOR LEADERSHIP INVOLVEMENT

        We continue to be faced with the reality of a fiscally-constrained,
    but operationally-demanding environment. The high operations tempo
    (OPTEMPO) the Air Force has sustained in support of peacekeeping
    operations and conflicts, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, has placed a
    great burden on our people and the supporting logistics.
        In spite of these rigorous demands, the Air Force is working to
    increase S&T funding, while maintaining a balanced S&T portfolio. The
    Air Force fiscal year 2005 President's budget request for S&T is $1.9
    billion--this includes $1392.8 million in ``core'' S&T efforts, which
    represents an increase of over $80 million or almost 5 percent real
    growth compared to the President's requested amount for similar
    ``core'' S&T efforts in fiscal year 2004. The most significant change
    in the S&T President's budget request results from the integration of
    programs that were devolved last year from the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense (OSD) to the Air Force S&T program. This includes the
    University Research Initiative program and the High Energy Laser Joint
    Technology program.
        The Air Force understands the concerns of Congress regarding the
    level of support for these devolved programs and continues to work hard
    to ensure these programs support the diverse multiple military
    objectives inherent in joint programs. Furthermore, the OSD continues
    to provide policy guidance and oversight for these efforts.
        In a separate action last year, the Seismic Research Program for
    detection of nuclear explosions was transferred back to the Air Force
    from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). We continue to work
    with the OSD, the Air Force Technical Applications Center, and the Army
    to invest in a seismic research program that addresses operational
    nuclear explosion monitoring needs. Under the guidance of the OSD-led
    intergovernmental steering committee, the Air Force is funding research
    to increase the understanding of seismic wave propagation at regional
    distances of less than 2,000 kilometers.
        One area in which the Air Force has increased its investment is in
    space communications technology with initiation of the transformational
    communications technology development program. This program will
    identify, develop, and demonstrate the wideband technologies needed to
    build a space-based laser communications network that could provide
    higher data throughput to transform our military satellite
    communications infrastructure.
        Warfighter and senior Air Force leadership involvement in the
    planning, programming, and prioritizing of Air Force S&T continues to
    be a priority. For example, the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air
    Force, along with the Air Force Service Acquisition Executive and the
    Air Force Materiel Command Commander, conduct a full portfolio review
    of the S&T program similar to the former S&T summits. In addition, the
    Integration Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment process involves
    several levels of senior Air Force leadership, including the chief and
    all the four stars, and further promotes a greater understanding within
    the Air Force of the S&T program and its link to warfighting
    capabilities. The Capabilities Program Execution Review provides a
    forum in which the commander of each major command is afforded a
    focused look at his portfolio and an opportunity to resolve issues at
    the system/program level and provide insight to the S&T program.
    Finally, the Applied Technology Councils (ATCs), which are discussed in
    greater detail later in this statement, bring together acquisition
    product centers, logistics centers, major user commands, and laboratory
    personnel to review and discuss S&T efforts--ATCs foster top-level user
    involvement in the transition of technology from the laboratory to the
    system developer to the operational user.

                                 TRANSFORMATION

        The Air Force continues to transform from a Cold War to a post-Cold
    War air and space force. As we do so, we must prepare for new forms of
    terrorism, attacks on our space assets, attacks on our information
    networks, cruise and ballistic missile attacks on our forces and
    territory, and attacks by adversaries armed with chemical, biological,
    radiological, nuclear, or high explosive (CBRNE) weapons. To address
    this post-cold war reality, the Air Force has established a process of
    transformation by which it will achieve and maintain the ``advantage
    through changes in operational concepts, organization, and/or
    technologies that significantly improve its warfighting capabilities or
    ability to meet the demands of a changing security environment.''
    Critical to this transformation is the ability to mature and translate
    a vision into actual operational capabilities in order to prevail in
    conflict and avert technological surprise.
        When examining the concept of combat transformation, it is
    important to note several fundamental points. First, transformation is
    not the result of a one-time improvement or change, but rather a
    continuum of sustained and determined efforts. Second, meaningful
    transformation requires integrating expanding capabilities with those
    of the other Services and non-military elements of national power.
    Third, transformation is more than new ``gee-whiz'' technologies. It
    includes adapting existing capabilities and using them in new ways,
    changes to the organizational structure to increase effectiveness, and
    changes in doctrine and concepts of operations to include training and
    tactics that determine force deployments. Fourth, transformation should
    not be achieved at the expense of ongoing operations in support of the
    Department of Defense (DOD) strategy of maintaining adequate readiness
    and infrastructure, conducting critical recapitalization, and
    attracting quality personnel. To achieve rational transformation there
    must be a careful balance between these requirements, which all compete
    for limited resources.
        To institutionalize transformational changes, the Air Force will
    capitalize on three core competencies. One, developing airmen to ensure
    they receive the education, training, and professional development
    needed to provide a quality edge second to none. Two, integrating
    operations to enhance combat capabilities that are pivotal to
    maximizing the air and space environment. Three, the technology-to-
    warfighting vision of translating technology into operational
    capabilities. These three core competencies are the foundation of
    success and will ensure we remain dominant in air and space operations.
        Transformation further translates into Air Force operational
    concepts--more commonly known as Concepts of Operations (CONOPs). Air
    Force CONOPs provide the long-term roadmaps to get the right
    capabilities at the right time and place for the joint warfighter.
    Implementation of these CONOPs require new and sometimes revolutionary
    changes to existing CONOPs and organizations, and refocusing technology
    developments. The CONOPs form the basis of the Air Force investment
    strategies for technology development, system acquisitions, and support
    decisions. The Air Expeditionary Task Force is an overarching CONOP
    that uses the capabilities provided by the following six supporting
    CONOPs:

             Global Strike provides the capability to maintain
            battlespace access for all required joint/coalition operations;
             Space and Command, Control, Communications, Computers
            and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C\4\ISR)
            provides persistent space and air situational awareness and
            executable decisionmaking information to the Joint Forces
            Commander;
             Global Response provides intelligence and strike
            systems to attack fleeting or emergent, high-value or high-risk
            targets by surgically applying power anywhere on the globe
            within hours;
             Homeland Security leverages Air Force capabilities
            with joint and interagency efforts to prevent, protect, and
            respond to identified threats;
             Nuclear Response provides the deterrent ``umbrella''
            under which conventional forces operate and, if deterrence
            fails, avails a rapid scalable response; and
             Global Mobility provides the capability to enable
            rapid, timely, and effective projection, employment, and
            sustainment of power in support of global interests.

        The Air Force goals to achieve transformation include information
    superiority, air and space superiority, precision engagement, global
    attack, rapid global mobility, and agile combat support. The Air Force
    S&T program has been planned and focused to support the Air Force
    CONOPs and goals. The Air Force Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment
    (CRRA) process supports the CONOPs by identifying and analyzing current
    and future capabilities, capability shortfalls, health risks, and
    opportunities. Part of the CRRA process is to provide information on
    these identified technology gaps and shortfalls to the S&T program
    planners to provide direction and focus to the S&T capability planning
    process. The CRRA process is transformational as it concentrates on
    desired battlespace effects vice specific air and space platforms.

                                   WORKFORCE

        The Air Force scientist and engineer (S&E) workforce is another
    area where senior Air Force leadership involvement plays a pivotal
    role. Both Secretary Roche and General Jumper are deeply involved in
    shaping our future S&E workforce. Air Force civilian and military S&Es
    are highly motivated and productive, but we need to be vigilant in
    continuing to recruit and retain the best and brightest individuals.
    The Air Force is unique in that approximately 20 percent of its
    laboratory S&E government workforce is active duty military. It is from
    this cadre that we draw the technical competence needed in our military
    Service leadership to operate an ever more technical force. In
    addition, this gives us a direct link to the warfighter, which in turn
    helps us to focus technology development on warfighting capability
    needs. Some of these military S&Es come directly from operational
    commands, while others will serve and support combatant commanders in
    operational commands later in their careers.
        The Air Force is committed to shaping its S&E workforce with the
    vision to enhance excellence and relevance of S&T into the 21st century
    and appreciates the support Congress has already provided. This
    challenge requires the Air Force to maintain a dominant edge in
    warfighting capabilities and also requires us to provide clear
    direction and growth for our S&E workforce. However, we, as do others,
    find it a significant challenge to recruit and retain S&Es. The Air
    Force has several initiatives, both civilian and military, that address
    recruitment and retention issues.
        Civilian initiatives include the recruitment of college students
    with critical S&E skills via recruiting incentives, a robust marketing
    effort, and a co-op central funding program that hires college students
    while still in school. Central funding for recruiting bonus and
    retention allowances for journeyman level S&Es also promises to provide
    much needed assistance with civilian recruitment and retention.
        On the military side, we're employing the Airman Education and
    Commissioning Program and the Technical Degree Sponsorship Program to
    recruit additional S&Es into the military workforce. We are in the
    process of examining the impact of bonus programs such as the Critical
    Skills Retention Bonus on retention and will assess future Air Force
    requirements for this and similar bonus programs.
        The Air Force is committed to its S&Es and published a ``Concept of
    Operations for Scientists and Engineers in the United States Air
    Force'' last year. We also baselined the requirement for the Air Force
    S&E workforce and, upon analyzing this baseline requirement, found that
    while our military and civilian authorizations were about right, our
    actual demographics were seriously short in some key areas. We continue
    to shift our focus towards retaining the workforce we have and infusing
    it with the vitality of new S&Es to meet tomorrow's need. During the
    next 7 years, we are investing nearly a third of a billion dollars to
    support the retention and reshaping of our technological workforce. As
    we replenish our S&E workforce, we are providing career guidance and
    mentoring that will enable us to meet our 21st century challenge. Once
    the National Security Personnel System is implemented it could also
    produce positive results in shaping our S&E workforce. Again, we
    express our thanks to Congress for your continued support.

                           MAXIMIZING OUR S&T DOLLARS

        We will continue to leverage technology to achieve new levels of
    combat effectiveness. Our strategy is to pursue integrated technology
    capabilities that support our warfighter's highest priority needs. In
    addition to transformational technologies, we must also pursue the
    fundamental enabling technologies that will improve tomorrow's Air
    Force. As technological superiority is increasingly a perishable
    commodity, we work hard to optimize our S&T funding, by not only
    ``inventing the future'' ourselves, but also by speeding the transition
    of new technologies to our warfighters.
        One way of identifying technologies for rapid transition to the
    warfighter is through our ATCs and the Advanced Technology
    Demonstrations (ATDs). The councils are composed of two- and three-star
    generals from AFRL, our logistic centers, our acquisition product
    centers, and our major user commands who formally prioritize proposed
    ATD programs. We hold an ATC meeting with each major command twice
    every year and have commissioned 34 ATDs that have transition funding.
    The ATC process is extremely important in linking the S&T program to
    the system developers, the logisticians, and, finally, the operational
    user. This process facilitates technology transition to operational use
    and secures user commitment for resources to do systems design and
    development and fielding of the technology. Currently about 50 percent
    of our Advanced Technology Development (6.3) budget is committed to ATD
    programs.
        Since deployed technology may remain in use for decades, the Air
    Force S&T program not only focuses on enhancing performance, but also
    on sustaining our fielded warfighter capabilities. Emphasizing
    affordability from the very beginning through training of our
    management, and science and engineering staff, as well as through an
    in-depth review of technology development efforts, increases our
    potential to reduce the costs of technology early in the system
    development process and throughout a product's life cycle.
        We maintain an excellent balance of military, civilian, and
    contractor expertise, which allows us to be very selective about
    investing in high payoff technological opportunities. We constantly
    seek opportunities to integrate Air Force planning and leverage our S&T
    funds by cooperating with other Services, agencies, the private sector,
    and international partners. For example, we rely on the Army as the
    lead Service for defensive chemical-biological technology development.
    The Air Force also has inter-agency efforts, such as our program in
    aging aircraft, which is focused on detection and management of
    corrosion and fatigue in aging structures. It is closely coordinated
    with the civilian aging aircraft research programs at the National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA). Our partnership with the industrial and
    university research base is very strong. In fact, we outsource over 70
    percent of our S&T funding to universities and industry. Finally, the
    Air Force is involved in international cooperative technology
    development efforts for S&T, such as the non-destructive inspection,
    tactical missile propellants, and aircraft battle damage repair efforts
    conducted with the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, among others.
    Another example of international cooperation is the multi-domain
    network management program with Australia and Canada. This program is
    developing the technology concepts and tools for creating and managing
    secure computer networks with our coalition partners.

                                LEGACY PROGRAMS

        Over the years, the best and most reliable way to judge whether you
    are investing in the ``right'' technologies is to look at legacy
    systems that are in development or operational use and see how the
    technologies you invested in previously have transitioned into these
    ``products.'' An excellent example is the F/A-22. A wealth of
    technologies that transitioned to the F/A-22 can be traced back to an
    investment of approximately $900 million in Air Force S&T over the
    years. These technologies include efforts such as low-observable
    materials, advanced two-directional thrust vectoring nozzles, new
    supercruise non-afterburning turbine engines, airframe design, mission
    integrated transparencies, solid state active transmit and receive
    radar, thermoplastic composite structures, and fly-by-wire integrated
    flight controls. In the space arena, examples of technologies that have
    transitioned into space ``products'' include radiation-hardened
    electronics to protect our satellites from the harmful effects of
    radiation; longer life, lighter weight lithium ion batteries; compact,
    more efficient solar cells for more effective processing of sunlight
    into electrical power; composite bus structures that are lighter weight
    and stronger; hall thrusters for orbit change and orbit maintenance;
    and enhanced antenna designs that provide for more efficient
    communications. In addition, a number of information-related
    technologies have transitioned into operational use including the
    highly effective information data wall that is currently being used in
    Afghanistan and Korea, multi-layer communications security being used
    by several government agencies, and software defined reprogrammable
    radios for secure communications and adaptable for coalition
    operations.
        Some technologies, such as those being implemented as spiral
    upgrades to the Battlefield Air Operations (BAO) Kit that is used by
    Air Force ground controllers who call in air strikes, were rapidly
    transitioned into use during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The BAO Kit
    is one of the Secretary of the Air Force's top priorities and continues
    being developed in several different acquisition spirals as the
    technology matures. The technology transitioned from S&T into
    developmental and operational products is extensive and provides the
    confidence that S&T funding is being wisely invested. The Panoramic
    Night Vision Goggles (PNVGs) are another prime example and provide
    operators a significantly wider field of view than the ``soda straw''
    view of earlier goggles. Technology transition into operational use is
    the ultimate metric for assessing the value of our S&T investment.

                              WORLD CLASS RESEARCH

        The quality of our program is assessed by the Air Force Scientific
    Advisory Board (SAB) through yearly reviews. The SAB conducts an in-
    depth review of half of the S&T program each year, covering the entire
    program over a 2-year period. Twelve technical areas have been
    identified as world-class research during the last cycle of reviews--
    let me highlight a few of these areas that were identified as world-
    class.
        The Directed Energy Directorate's Starfire Optical Range at
    Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, is leading the adaptive optics
    research for use in large ground-based telescopes to image satellites
    and propagate laser beams through the atmosphere. This will enable
    high-quality, ground-based observations of space objects and
    propagation of laser beams through a turbulent atmosphere. Satellite
    images using this technology can provide real-time status information
    that cannot be obtained in any other manner.
        Our Propulsion Directorate's Hypersonics Technology (HyTech) work
    at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is acknowledged by the SAB as
    world class and is the cornerstone of future hypersonic capabilities,
    such as destroying time-critical targets and responsive access to
    space. Our HyTech program has continued to advance the state-of-the-art
    in scramjet engines and completed the first ever ground test
    demonstration of a scramjet producing positive net thrust begun in
    2001. In February 2003, HyTech tested a flight weight scramjet ground
    demonstration engine operating at Mach 4.5. While the 2001 Performance
    Test Engine used copper heat-sink hardware and weighted 1,500 pounds,
    the 2003 ground demonstration engine used JP-7 fuel to cool the
    scramjet engine walls and weighed less than 150 pounds. This marked
    another first for the HyTech program--demonstrating the structural
    durability of a hydrocarbon fueled, actively cooled scramjet. Testing
    at Mach 6.5 has been completed. United States industry developed this
    particular engine in collaboration with Air Force scientists and
    engineers.
        Another SAB-rated world-class research program is the Warfighter
    Skill Development and Training efforts worked by our Human
    Effectiveness Directorate at Brooks City-Base, Texas. Specific research
    areas include Integrated PNVG and Distributed Mission Training. The
    Integrated PNVG will improve situational awareness and terrain
    avoidance at night through its wider field of vision and improved
    resolution. It will also provide protection from laser target
    designators, laser rangers, and laser threats through compatibility
    with existing laser eye protection technologies. Distributed mission
    training will provide an integrated set of training, simulation, and
    mission rehearsal technologies that will improve warfighter
    capabilities and mission readiness by enhancing operator and team
    performance skills. Technologies will increase operational readiness by
    providing more effective methods and approaches to train and assess
    personnel. These technologies will contribute to a more highly trained
    and flexible cadre of personnel at a reduced cost.
        Working closely with operational users and the Human Effectiveness
    Directorate at Brooks City-Base, AFRL researchers in the Materials and
    Manufacturing Directorate at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio,
    continue to develop and transition new laser eye protection
    technologies that provide aircrews with improved eye protection. The
    world-class multi-disciplinary approach anticipates future threats and
    needs, and assures that next-generation hardening technologies will
    address the agile laser threat. The Laser Eye Protection program is
    enabling aircrews to conduct day and night air operations without
    visual jamming or personal injury. The Materials and Manufacturing
    Directorate also conducts world-class research to improve the
    affordability, durability, and performance of advanced aerospace metals
    by integrating modeling and simulation into all aspects of the program.
    The potential cost savings when qualifying metallic materials for
    insertion into Air Force weapon systems are significant. Revolutionary
    work on thermomechanical process modeling and probabilistic
    micromechanical modeling of failure and durability will change the way
    materials are developed and implemented in air and space applications.
        Our research in Electro-Optical Warfare at Wright-Patterson Air
    Force Base, Ohio, will allow future laser-based sensor systems to
    penetrate moderate cloud cover, obscurants, and camouflage. This will
    provide improved target detection and identification for our weapon
    systems. ``See and Avoid'' sensors will ease restrictions on unmanned
    air vehicle (UAV) operations in civilian airspace and allow autonomous
    operation in conjunction with manned aircraft. These technologies may
    also be applied as low-cost missile warning sensors to affordably
    protect military and commercial aircraft from surface-to-air missiles.
    Also, experimental research in infrared countermeasures is developing
    threat adaptive techniques for robust defeat of current and future
    infrared weapons and sensors.
        Space Weather research at Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts, is
    another SAB-rated world-class technology development program. We
    continue to develop a modeling capability that specifies and forecasts
    space weather from the Sun to the ionosphere. In conjunction with this
    modeling capability, our Solar Mass Ejection Imager, launched in
    January 2003, is greatly increasing our ability to forecast solar-
    induced ionospheric disturbances that adversely impact communications
    systems and spacecraft.
        At Edwards Air Force Base, California, the Propulsion Directorate
    is working on world-class research in polynitrogen propellants. The
    goal is to enable high performance monopropellant rocket propulsion
    systems with revolutionary performance. By improving the specific
    impulse of the propellant, we will have environmentally benign exhaust
    and reduced signatures. This could potentially improve storage,
    manufacturing, and rocket engine size.

                              COMBATING TERRORISM

        While the traditional focus of S&T has been on developing long-term
    capabilities, the Air Force S&T program also contributes to the current
    needs of the Nation and our troops deployed in hostile areas. One
    example of an Air Force project receiving a great deal of attention
    since September 11 is the Elastomeric Coating Polymer, which the Air
    Force developed to protect key buildings and installations from close
    proximity explosions, such as air dropped weapons or truck bombs. This
    easy-to-apply spray coating provides greater structural integrity of
    exterior walls and prevents dispersion of debris as well as separation
    of wall elements. In addition to protecting lightweight shelters, this
    polymeric coating is currently being applied to the interior of the
    outer walls of the Pentagon.
        Another transformational effort is the Vehicular Mounted Active
    Denial System (VMADS). The VMADS is being jointly developed with the
    U.S. Marine Corps and is a defensive millimeter wave system with many
    potential applications, including perimeter defense. It is a directed
    energy weapon that emits a non-lethal, non-damaging beam, which heats
    up the skin of a potential adversary when in close proximity to the
    system. The resulting temporary pain causes the person to flee.
        Yet another effort of significant interest is something called
    PING. PING is a standoff, microwave-based interrogation unit that has
    reliably identified AK-47s, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), and
    suicide bomber apparatus in field demonstrations. PING operates by
    illuminating potential threats and then categorizing the return
    reflected off metallic objects found in a crowd of people using a
    laptop computer and specialized software to determine specific weapon
    types. Metallic substructures on weapons resonate at unique, natural
    frequencies that permit automatic identification of concealed weapons.
    The PING demonstration unit is vehicle-mounted and can be positioned up
    to 100 meters away to monitor persons or groups of people entering a
    checkpoint for concealed weapons. The unit can also be remotely
    operated. This Air Force S&T program has been briefed to the Army and
    we are optimistic that PING will rapidly transition into operational
    use.
        In the war on terror, Air Force Special Tactics Combat Controllers
    are changing the very nature of warfare. By performing operations deep
    in enemy territory, they help determine who the terrorists are, where
    their weapons are located, and who the innocent civilians are. Then,
    they precisely control the elements of airpower to defeat the terrorist
    threat, while taking care to spare innocent civilian casualties and
    minimize collateral damage. Then, these same Special Tactics Combat
    Controllers are there to provide instant battle damage assessment. We
    call these deep engagements BAO.
        The Air Force is accelerating new technology to these special
    tactics warriors in the form of significant improvements to their BAO
    Kit of equipment. As a result of this Air Force enterprise, our special
    tactics warriors will soon have a digital machine-to-machine capability
    that helps to quickly connect the right aircraft, with the right
    munitions, guided precisely to the right target, at just the right
    time, to achieve the desired effect. This new automated process helps
    to reduce the time it takes to target the terrorist threat, while at
    the same time reducing human error in the targeting process.
        Working collaboratively with the special tactics warriors, the Air
    Force ``BAO Tiger Team'' has also partnered with a national team of
    industry to field significant enhancements of increased capability,
    while reducing the weight and size of the individual BAO Kit equipment.
    They are performing these improvements by developing, prototyping,
    testing, building, and fielding these BAO Kit improvements in very
    rapid spirals. These new BAO capabilities will help to save American
    lives, and the lives of innocent civilians. BAO provides a
    revolutionary and highly effective way to combat the terrorist threat.

                         TRANSFORMATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES

        There are many other Air Force technology areas that deserve
    special mention. Let me highlight just a few examples. As mentioned
    earlier, there's our transformational communications technology
    development program, whose laser communications technology efforts
    promise to increase data transfer rates at least ten-fold compared to
    current radio frequency communications systems. Additionally, laser
    communications use a narrow beam, which decreases the likelihood of
    intercept and increases resistance to jamming. While laser
    communications have a high potential to revolutionize satellite
    communications, there are technical challenges to overcome such as
    precision pointing and tracking, weather constraints, and adapting the
    equipment for use in space. We continue to work on the technology
    challenges and are implementing the results of our recently concluded
    study to determine the best architecture for implementing laser
    communications technologies to complement and integrate with radio
    frequency-based systems.
        To increase aircraft survivability and operational efficiencies,
    the Air Force is developing the F/A-22 and F-35--Joint Strike Fighter,
    aircraft that can carry and employ weapons from both external and
    internal weapons bays. To increase the number of weapons the flight
    vehicle can fit into its internal weapons bays, part of our investment
    strategy focuses S&T funding on developing and demonstrating smaller
    precision weapons.
        One of the small munitions currently being flight demonstrated at
    Eglin Air Force Base is the Low Cost Autonomous Attack System (LOCAAS)
    technology program. The LOCAAS is a 100-pound class powered munition of
    which the primary target set is moving and relocatable targets. This
    ATD program will demonstrate the effectiveness and military utility of
    this type of munition for the Lethal Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
    (SEAD), Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Attack Operations, and Armor/
    Interdiction mission areas. LOCAAS will integrate a laser radar
    precision terminal seeker with autonomous target recognition
    algorithms, a multi-modal warhead, Global Positioning System (GPS)/
    Inertial Navigation System (INS) mid-course guidance, and a miniature
    turbine engine with a fly-out range of 100 miles.
        In fiscal year 2005, the Air Force will conduct a cooperative
    program with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) using the small
    diameter bomb. A test program on the RAAF F-111 aircraft in Australia
    is scheduled for the first quarter of the fiscal year 2005. This will
    be an important test for both nations--the U.S. is able to test
    munitions release at supersonic speeds and Australia benefits from the
    test results. These results could enable maturation of the
    computational simulation codes for separation of symmetric and
    asymmetric miniature weapons, providing for a reduction in the risk and
    cost of weapons certification efforts for aircraft with internal
    weapons bays such as the F/A-22, the F-35--Joint Strike Fighter, and
    unmanned combat air vehicles.
        To continue the trend of miniaturization of space platforms, the
    Air Force is also conducting the Experimental Spacecraft System (XSS)
    series to demonstrate increasing levels of microsatellite technology
    maturity. Following the successful XSS-10 mission in January 2003, we
    plan to launch the XSS-11 microsatellite in late 2004. XSS-11 will
    demonstrate fully autonomous operations and provide experience with
    command and control in proximity operations to another space object
    over several months. If successful, this could provide the capability
    to repair, refurbish, and perform maintenance operations from unmanned
    microsatellites.
        One of the most transformational and quickly deployable
    technologies available today is command, control, and communications
    technology, also known as information technology. This technology is at
    the heart of our Moving Target Indicator Exploitation program, which is
    developing web-enabled automated tools to exploit data from current and
    future sensor systems such as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack
    Radar System (JSTARS). The effort is focused on four technology areas:
    ground moving target tracking; motion pattern analysis; behavioral
    pattern analysis; and sensor resource allocation and scheduling, which
    provide the capability to track moving targets and get the information
    to the operations center.

                           BREAKTHROUGH TECHNOLOGIES

        In recent years, we have all come to appreciate the success of
    unmanned vehicles. We hear over and over again the tremendous
    operational advantages that systems such as Predator and Global Hawk
    are bringing to warfighters from all Services. Over the first two
    decades of the 21st century, advances in micro UAVs will provide
    significant additional capabilities to our Armed Forces. Micro air
    vehicles utilize advances in microscale aerodynamics, electronic
    miniaturization, munitions, and propulsion to package sensory and
    weapons payloads into highly reliable, on-demand systems. These systems
    will provide unprecedented levels of situational awareness in the most
    severe threat environments. Whether we are operating in urban
    environments, sensing biochemical dispersion through the atmosphere, or
    looking over the next hill, our troops will have the awareness needed
    to fight and survive. These systems will provide the persistent
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in high threat
    environments needed by our troops on the ground and our airmen in the
    air. When called for, swarms of these vehicles will cooperate together
    to generate both lethal and nonlethal effects.
        In the next 50 years, advancements in nanotechnology will provide
    the greatest change in how man operates since the invention of powered
    flight itself. Nanotechnology is a science and a series of disciplines
    that works at the atomic and molecular level to create structures,
    materials, and devices through improved molecular organization. By
    working with elements at the level of nanometer scale, we have access
    to the building blocks of nature. This will fundamentally change the
    way materials and devices will be produced in the future. The ability
    to synthesize nanoscale building blocks with precisely controlled size
    and composition and to then assemble them into larger structures with
    unique properties and functions will revolutionize segments of the
    materials and device industry. The benefits that nanostructuring can
    bring include lighter, stronger, and programmable materials; reductions
    in life cycle costs through lower failure rates; innovative devices
    based on new principles and architectures; nanosensors and
    nanoprocessors; and use of molecular/cluster manufacturing, which takes
    advantage of assembly at the nanoscale level for a given purpose.
        Another significant breakthrough technology that will change the
    way we develop systems is our work in biotechnology. Biology has
    developed unique materials and processes that may be exploited in non-
    biological systems. Our research is focused on studying the science
    necessary to incorporate biological components and organisms into Air
    Force systems. For example, in biomemetics, we research the adaptation
    of natural biological sensor in reptiles. The natural infrared sensors
    in reptiles do not need to be cooled. We hope to adapt this biological
    process to Air Force sensor applications that normally require
    cryogenic cooling.

                             TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

        The majority of Air Force S&T is contracted with industry and
    universities. This promotes relationships between the S&Es conducting
    the research and lays the foundation for technology transition. Strong
    connections between the technology supplier and the end user help speed
    transition of technology to the warfighter. In addition, the various
    transition programs in which the Air Force participates further cement
    this foundation. Air Force technology transition efforts include ATD
    projects, Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contracts, and
    Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) among others.
        The ATCs discussed earlier were initiated in fiscal year 1999 to
    foster top-level user involvement in the transition of technology from
    the laboratory to the system developer to the operational user. As
    noted, these councils review and approve Air Force ATD projects and
    ensure that the major commands plan for the transition of successful
    technology by tying approved ATD projects to planned Major Command
    Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) funding.
        Another Air Force technology transition tool is the CRADA--an
    agreement between a government laboratory and a non-Federal party under
    which the laboratory provides personnel, facilities, equipment, or
    other resources (but not funds) with or without reimbursement and the
    non-Federal party provides funds, people, services, facilities,
    equipment, or other resources to conduct specific research and
    development efforts that are consistent with the agency's mission.
        These efforts along with many other programs, such as Dual-Use S&T,
    Independent Research and Development (R&D), Mentor-Protege, Personnel
    Exchanges, etc., are mutually beneficial to the Air Force and the
    contractors and universities with whom we collaborate. Technology
    transition is a key component of the Air Force S&T program and is vital
    to our pursuit of national security requirements.

                               SECTION 253 STUDY

        Section 253 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2002, Public Law 107-107, directed the Air Force, in cooperation
    with the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences,
    to carry out a study to determine the effect of S&T program changes of
    the past 2 years. The Air Force Science and Technology Board (AFSTB) of
    the National Research Council prepared a written report, which the
    Secretary of the Air Force forwarded to Congress as directed. The
    findings contained in this report indicated that overall the Air Force
    has made considerable progress during the past 2 years in strengthening
    its S&T program. The AFSTB noted that great progress has been achieved
    in increasing the visibility of the S&T portfolio within the Air Force,
    but challenged us to continue working to stabilize funding levels,
    strengthen our workforce, and reestablish the ``development planning''
    process. As the report indicated, however, we have already begun many
    initiatives targeted towards strengthening these areas and will
    continue to pursue them in the future. In fact, at almost $2 billion,
    the fiscal year 2005 President's budget request for Air Force S&T is
    funded at a level to achieve the distinctive capabilities supporting
    Air Force Core Competencies. In addition, we have also taken steps to
    strengthen our scientist and engineer workforce through various
    recruitment and retention initiatives. Finally, the Air Force has
    shifted from a threat-based approach to a capabilities-based approach
    to making investment decisions and providing for requirements
    generation planning. This transformation will be key to our ability to
    determine what is necessary to support our defense strategy in the
    years to come. ``Development planning'' will be a vital and fully
    integrated part of the Air Force's new capabilities-based planning
    process.

                                   CONCLUSION

        In conclusion, the Air Force is fully committed to providing this
    Nation with the advanced air and space technologies required to meet
    America's national security interests around the world and to ensure we
    remain on the cutting edge of system performance, flexibility, and
    affordability. The technological advantage we enjoy today is a legacy
    of decades of investment in S&T. Likewise, our future warfighting
    capabilities will be substantially determined by today's investment in
    S&T. As we face the new millennium, our challenge is to advance
    transformational and enabling technologies for an Air and Space Force
    as we continue to move aggressively into the realm of space activities.
    The Air Force S&T program provides for the discovery, development,
    demonstration, and timely transition of affordable technologies that
    keep our Air Force the best in the world. As an integral part of the
    DOD's S&T team, we look forward to working with Congress to ensure a
    strong Air Force S&T program tailored to achieve our vision of a
    superior Air and Space Force.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you again, for the opportunity to present
    testimony, and thank you for your continuing support of the Air Force
    S&T program.

        Senator Roberts. We thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
    you gentlemen for your testimony. You've all highlighted the
    critical role that S&T plays in the defense of the Nation.
        Dr. Sega, you pointed out that the President's request was
    an increase from his last request, but it's a decrease from the
    money you had last year, am I correct?
        Dr. Sega. That's correct, sir.
        Senator Reed. That raises the question, do we have money?
    Are you still committed to the DOD goal of 3 percent funding
    for S&T programs?
        Dr. Sega. The goal of S&T investment at 3 percent of the
    total obligation authority (TOA) remains a goal of the
    Secretary of Defense.
        Senator Reed. How fast will we reach that goal if we're
    going backwards with this budget request?
        Dr. Sega. I can't answer that.
        Senator Reed. Dr. Killion, again for the record, is the
    position of the Army that 3 percent is a number you support?
        Dr. Killion. We support the goal of 3 percent. In fact, the
    Army has significantly increased its investment in S&T over the
    last several years. It's actually approached that goal in the
    President's budget.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Admiral Cohen.
        Admiral Cohen. Navy leadership, both civilian and
    uniformed. You have testified to the value of S&T, but they
    have not committed to any percentage for S&T. I will tell you
    that the Marine Corps exceeds 3 percent. People say, well, they
    have a small budget in S&T, but to them it's a big budget.
        Senator Roberts. Well, they've had to put up with baling
    wire for so damned long, it's about time.
        Admiral Cohen. Yes, sir. They've done very well. I'm
    married to a Marine Corps junior and she got marine and
    submarine confused. I don't know how that happened. But she
    keeps me on the straight and narrow.
        For the Navy, I'm very pleased to tell you that the fiscal
    year 2005 budget that you have in front of you stops the
    decrease in the Navy line that we saw both in fiscal year 2003
    and fiscal year 2004. As we look through the Future Years'
    Defense Plan (FYDP), that is sustained.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Engle.
        Mr. Engle. Senator, we support the 3 percent overall as a
    DOD goal for S&T investment. I would quibble slightly in that
    the contribution from each of the various components or
    Services plus DARPA make up the total 3 percent.
        As the Air Force looks at it, we see that our share of that
    3 percent is probably less than a 3 percent number. Our goal is
    to hit about 2.4 percent of our TOA, which would probably fit
    nicely into an overall DOD goal of 3 percent.
        So we are moving in the right direction. Right now we're
    not at 2.4 percent, but we have committed to try to migrate in
    that direction with the goal of hitting 2.4 percent in the 2007
    time frame.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        We all recognize that with additional resources, you could
    do additional things. Could you provide a list to the
    subcommittee of those unfunded priorities that you have in a
    priority list as best you can? I think everyone is agreeing to
    that for the record. Thank you very much.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Dr. Sega. The Department of Defense supports the President's fiscal
    year 2005 budget request. The science and technology (S&T) program is
    balanced to meet near-, mid-, and far-term needs to provide options for
    responding to a full range of military challenges both today and into
    the uncertain future. The Department's investment in S&T develops the
    technology foundation necessary to produce transformational
    capabilities. We are working with the military departments and defense
    agencies to ensure sufficient funding is directed toward projects that
    advance the six QDR transformation operational goals. Some of the
    technologies that support the QDR are the National Aerospace
    Initiative, the Energy and Power Technologies, Surveillance and
    Knowledge Systems, Future Combat Systems, Objective Force Warrior,
    Electric Ship, High Speed Sea Lift, and Directed Energy Weapons, and
    Advanced Space Systems.
        Dr. Killion.
            List of Army Science and Technology Unfunded Priorities
        Close In Active Protection System $23.3 million.
        Admiral Cohen.

        Mr. Engle. Yes, like many areas in the Air Force, we could wisely
    invest additional funding in our S&T program if it were available. One
    of the most important efforts currently ongoing within our S&T program
    continues to be the work we're doing to enhance the Battlefield Air
    Operations (BAO) Kit equipment carried by the Air Force Special Tactics
    Controllers who perform critical operations deep in enemy territory.
    Using very rapid spirals to speed development, prototyping, testing,
    production, and fielding, the Air Force continues to work to realize
    significant enhancements to these kits, while reducing weight and size.
    The following list is a representative summary of high priority S&T
    efforts, including enhancements to the BAO Kit, for which the Air Force
    could use additional funding in fiscal year 2005. A more detailed,
    comprehensive list has been provided to the Senate Armed Services
    professional staff as requested.

                            [In millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               Effort
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    BAO Kit Enhancements.......................................      $14.482
    Integrated Striker Targeting and Connectivity..............       10.000
    Directed Energy for Airborne Demonstration.................       12.100
    Space Force Enhancement....................................       37.000
                                                                ------------
      Total....................................................      $73.582
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        One of the other areas that is so critical is the
    scientific and engineering workforce. You've all either
    explicitly or implicitly referred to that in your testimony.
        Again, for the whole panel, what unique role can you play
    to help ensure the scientific and engineering workforces? Are
    there any particular areas of endeavor in science, a particular
    field of science or engineering that requires more attention?
        Dr. Sega.
        Dr. Sega. Senator, that's a great question and one that we
    are in the process of assessing in more detail.
        The trends in terms of individuals receiving especially
    advanced degrees, physical sciences and engineering, in our
    country and overseas are being examined and the needs inside
    for the DOD and defense-related work are being looked at.
        There are key disciplines that would probably share the
    greatest need. For example, in some of the energy-related
    disciplines for high-power, the needs for directed energy for a
    more electric force requires expertise and background and
    education in high-power switches, power supplies, capacitors,
    those types of things.
        Subdisciplines of electrical and mechanical engineering
    materials would be important. We would suspect that we would
    see a base that we want to address, areas in nuclear
    engineering, nuclear physics, areas of high-speed flight,
    hypersonic flight, the aerodynamics, the propulsion, and
    aerothermal considerations.
        We are at the point now of going through and identifying
    with more rigor where the demand is versus the potential
    supply. In our case, much of the work needs U.S. citizens to
    accomplish it.
        Senator Reed. When do you anticipate finishing this report
    or study?
        Dr. Sega. That question is properly referred to Dr. John
    Hopps, who is the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
    Laboratories and Basic Sciences, an office that we stood up,
    one of the only offices stood up since being in this position,
    to focus on laboratory, space, and sciences workforce and
    education.
        Senator Reed. Can you provide us with your findings at a
    more appropriate time?
        Dr. Sega. We will.
        Senator Reed. Admiral Cohen, do you have a comment?
        Admiral Cohen. Senator, the short answer is we play a
    critical role in this area. The young people in this country
    today are turning away from science and math. When you ask them
    why, they say because it's hard. The statistics speak for
    themselves.
        Probably $1 million I spend each year as Chief of Naval
    Research that I am most proud of is the monies that we provide
    through our Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) units,
    69 of them, all around the country, for rising juniors, rising
    seniors, and graduate students to come work in our
    laboratories, the Naval Research Laboratory and all of our
    warfare centers, including the Naval Underwater Warfare Center
    in Newport. They work alongside our scientists and engineers
    who take them on as mentors. Many of them take them into their
    homes.
        Now, we don't expect all of them to come into government
    service. About 20 percent are. We're in our third year of doing
    this and when you look at that group of young Americans, you
    don't have to worry about diversity. We get them from all over
    the country. You're looking at the face of America. It's really
    uplifting.
        In the junior highs and high schools, we send our Reserve
    officers who are located all around the country to be involved
    with science fairs. We work with Dr. Bob Ballard and the JASON
    Group, as well as the National Science Foundation, to try and
    inspire the young people of the importance of S&T.
        I was raised on Mr. Wizard. We need a better name for Bill
    Nye, ``The Science Guy.'' It sounds a little geeky to me, but
    Rita Colwell and I have had that discussion. So we play a
    critical role and this is critically important for the future
    of this country.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Admiral.
        Mr. Engle, your comments.
        Mr. Engle. Just briefly, Senator Reed.
        The Air Force is very concerned about this issue. Secretary
    Roche and General Jumper, when they came to office a few years
    ago, saw this, I think, primarily because of Dr. Roche's
    background in industry--and the difficulty of finding talent in
    the engineering career fields particularly--and brought that
    and highlighted it inside our service.
        We have, over the last 2 years, focused our senior
    leadership on this problem, expended a considerable amount of
    money to try to make sure that we are well-postured with the
    scientists and engineering talent we need to continue what is
    probably one of the most high-tech organizations on Earth.
        One difficulty, which I resonate with my colleague, Admiral
    Cohen, is that we, as the Services and DOD, with John Hopps'
    good work notwithstanding, we can't do this alone. This is
    really a national problem.
        We need to invigorate our youth in the areas of science,
    mathematics, and engineering. We need to build a cadre of young
    people that can grow up and feed not only the DOD but, as Dr.
    Hopps would tell you, interdepartmental demand for scientific
    and engineering talent. This is, I think, something that we
    really need to focus on nationally.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Dr. Killion.
        Dr. Killion. Just as an example similar to the Junior NROTC
    program that Admiral Cohen talked about, one of the things the
    Army did last year was stand up a program called E-
    CyberMission, which was intended to go out via Web-based
    competition and excite our youth in the seventh and eighth
    grades in interest in science, math, and engineering to come up
    with projects. We competed it nationally and actually brought
    the regional winners here locally for an awards ceremony that
    included the Chief of Staff of the Army, and my boss, Mr.
    Bolton, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
    Logistics, and Technology.
        We're continuing that. One of the things that the chief
    said at the awards ceremony last year, because we had cut it
    off at eighth grade, was that we're going to expand it to ninth
    grade the next year because he got so much feedback from the
    eighth grade participants that they really wanted to continue
    this year.
        It's an early entry into getting our young people excited
    about science, math, and engineering, something we vitally need
    to do. It's important for us in the Army. It's also a
    contribution that we can make to our communities out there to
    help them and help our future industrial base.
        We have other programs in high school, like our science and
    engineering apprenticeship program. We have a very strong
    program going up here at Walter Reed Army Medical Center where
    we bring young people from disadvantaged areas in the
    metropolitan area in to serve in the laboratory and learn
    important skills and get exposed to where the opportunities
    will be in the future.
        So I think we have some very vital programs in that area.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Roberts. Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        When you're in combat, it certainly brings into focus your
    shortcomings and your merits, your various military equipment
    and tactics.
        The Third Armored Calvary Division, which is stationed in
    Fort Carson, will return home later this summer and that
    calvary regiment has been subjected to the full spectrum of
    small arms fire, I believe, from IEDs to RPGs, and other
    shoulder-fired weapons.
        My question is, could you describe your priorities and
    investments in the fiscal year 2005 budget for advanced armor
    and crew survivability technologies? A follow-up question: Can
    we or are we fast-tracking these technologies for introduction
    to the armored vehicle fleet?
        Dr. Sega. I'll start and just introduce it knowing that
    most of the knowledge and the work is being done in the
    Services.
        On October 16, Secretary Wolfowitz sent a letter to Members
    of Congress on the issue of force protection. He had asked me
    to lead the task force and just facilitate bringing in the
    input of the technical community as well as those that
    represent the warfighting community, the combatant command, and
    the joint staff.
        From CENTCOM a prioritized list of items came in this
    letter, totaling about $335 million, to do in a rapid fashion.
    In that was included the armor, the protection pieces to
    include the Interceptor Body Armor and up-armoring HMMWVs. It
    included aspects of surveillance to include lightweight
    countermortar radars, aerostats, and UAVs. It also included
    some detect and defeat technologies, including electronic
    countermeasures and detection types of things.
        So in this fiscal year, we are accelerating work in force
    protection technologies and bringing them to the field. I think
    that's a good news story.
        One request that we would have for Congress, and we're
    working together as a team, requires some of the reprogramming
    from current budgets, whether it is the standard budget or that
    of the supplemental, to augment and move towards some of the
    force protection technologies. We appreciate expeditious
    movement of reprogramming actions when they apply in this area.
        That's an introduction, and I'll pass it along.
        Dr. Killion. Actually, Dr. Sega introduced a number of the
    areas. We can certainly provide a more detailed lay-down in
    terms of the specific investments if you're interested in that.
        But just to give some of the highlights, I would include
    improvements, for example, in Interceptor Body Armor. We have
    ongoing programs that continue next year in terms of providing
    the same level of protection at a reduced weight burden for the
    individuals. So you could get about a 25-percent reduction in
    the weight associated with those plates. It may not seem like a
    lot, but it is important to somebody who's carrying that weight
    around with him in all of his operations when he has to move
    around and wear those protective devices.
        In terms of protection for vehicles, some of the early
    warning capability that Dr. Sega mentioned, we're continuing to
    work that through our Communications and Electronics Research,
    Development, and Engineering Center (RDEC). We are exploring
    active protection systems, devices that can intercept and
    deflect or destroy incoming rounds to protect our vehicles and
    installations.
        Lightweight armor, new versions of armor. That Armor
    Survivability Kit is an expedient solution. The best we can do
    near term is an affordable capability that meets the weight
    burden associated with non-up-armored HMMWVs. As Admiral Cohen
    was talking about, we have a limit on how much weight we can
    put on them without ending up breaking the axles or making them
    less mobile than we want them to be. That kind of new armor
    we're looking at is ceramics to provide equivalent or higher
    levels of protection and is a byproduct of the work that we're
    doing for the FCS. We're working on lighter-weight vehicles for
    the future.
        Another example is the change detection capability. We are
    looking at taking advantage of some work that was done under
    the Joint Area Clearance ACTD and applying software into our
    tactical and manned aerial vehicle system which will allow us
    to fly along a route and then later fly the route again and
    automatically identify where there have been changes along that
    route, where we might be able to show that somebody came out
    and placed a device along that route. Therefore, we would have
    better advanced warning that there might be some kind of device
    out there, so we could go out and examine it.
        So there are a variety of investments. It would probably be
    best to follow-up, if you'd like, in terms of giving you a
    specific profile.
        Admiral Cohen. Senator, for the naval forces, we have
    traditionally followed a philosophy of active protection and
    defense in depth, destroy the enemy before they come close
    enough to destroy you.
        We've talked a little bit about the applications of some of
    those underlying technologies with our Army and Marine Corps
    brethren, and I am the Chief of Naval Research, so we do have
    the Navy and the Marine Corps.
        We had previously briefed a product called Quick Clot. This
    is now commercially available. In OIF, the application was just
    carried in your pocket. We lose most of our soldiers who are
    not killed immediately by bleeding out in that golden hour when
    we might get them to a field hospital. We believe this has
    saved 17 or 19 lives during OIF.
        So looking at that golden hour, you've heard statements
    here about the improvements in body armor and it's been on ``60
    Minutes.'' The ceramic armor that Natick labs and the Army have
    worked on so well has really reduced the number of fatalities
    that we're seeing in Iraq and the ongoing operations today.
        The unintended consequence of that is a significantly
    increased number of amputees, because we're protecting the
    body, but we're losing the arms or the legs. I have classmates,
    and I know many of you have friends and associates from the
    Vietnam War and other conflicts, where you don't want to see
    them in a T-shirt because they have leg tendons in their
    forearm, but it's their forearm.
        I don't want to raise any hopes here. But a month ago, we
    started through the Naval Research Lab working with Naval Air
    Technical Data and Engineering Service Command (NATEC) and
    working with anyone who will come to the table for an
    initiative along the lines of when you get in an airplane to
    fly it, you put on a flight suit. Well, our young kids in Iraq
    are suffering these IED injuries by making patrols in HMMWVs
    and four-by-four convoys, et cetera. We've talked about ISR and
    the need for that, et cetera.
        But under the rubric of what can you do to better protect
    the person and win that mission scenario, we're looking at
    leggings and stockings made out of what could be some exotic
    materials. It may not prevent the cuts. It may not prevent the
    shrapnel. But it may prevent the arm or leg from being blown
    off so that we then have the ability during that golden hour to
    take that soldier, take that marine to the field hospital and
    save the appendage.
        Now, I'm not promising anything here. But I'm telling you,
    you push that balloon. We did it with the body armor. Now we're
    having the amputees. I'm absolutely committed to this and so
    that's something that the Navy can do working with our other
    Services.
        Senator Allard. Okay. Let me move on to the next question
    here. A lot of our sources have been reporting that countries
    of concern are turning more and more to burying their
    facilities and defense installation as well as offensive.
        We've looked at--the subcommittee, which I've chaired and
    Senator Reed is on there too--various nuclear options on how
    you go after these deeply buried targets.
        My question to you is, are you looking at non-nuclear ways
    of us getting after these deeply buried targets?
        Dr. Sega. Senator Allard, the short answer is that we are
    working on a variety of penetration options for buried
    structures. Depending on the details, the type of penetration
    munitions varies. But work is ongoing and there are several
    activities--maybe Secretary Engle could pick up on this--of our
    work in terms of providing additional options for deep
    penetration munitions.
        Mr. Engle. Yes. I guess we're doing quite a bit in this
    area. Our principal customer, as you probably are aware, is
    Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Admiral Ellis, who has been given
    this mission for prompt global strike and hard and deeply
    buried targets is a big part of that.
        There are some hard physics involved here in that you can
    dig deeper and bury yourself to a point where there's not a
    whole lot of things that we can build that will get that far
    down and do the job. But we have some fairly effective ways to
    penetrate. Again, we can certainly provide details for those on
    a classified level.
        There are some large devices that we've looked at as well.
    Big Blu is one that might have come to your attention that
    we've looked at pretty heavily. It is a large explosive device.
        Then there are some other tactics that you can take to deal
    with these. If they are hardened and deeply buried and you can
    figure out how they communicate out and turn that off,
    sometimes that solves the problem for you. Then they can just
    live down there for as long as they'd like and really not
    affect the outcome of the combat.
        What we have looked at is some very good technology that
    helps us understand the connectivity of the communications
    systems that the enemy might use that emanates from those
    hardened bunkers, whether they're deeply buried or not, quite
    frankly.
        There's also some work that we have done with some radar
    systems that look like they might be able to affect
    communications systems in deeply buried places with kinetic
    effect. That's something that we're looking at.
        I guess there are a broad array of technical approaches in
    this area, but I will tell you quite frankly, it is very
    difficult if you want to blow up something several hundred
    meters under the ground and know that it's blown up. This is a
    very difficult task technically.
        Senator Roberts. Senator, as Senator Reed and you and I
    have discussed, this is an extremely important topic to follow-
    up on in the classified portion of the hearing that we hope to
    have in the remaining days of this Congress. It's extremely
    important and I certainly appreciate you bringing it up.
        Senator Allard. Thank you. One more question, if I might,
    Mr. Chairman, just real briefly.
        There's a gap between taking these research concepts and
    then actually bringing them into some kind of weapons
    development system.
        My question is, how would you assess the success of your
    Technology Transition Initiative and the Quick Reaction Special
    Project to bridge this gap? Do you require any special
    authorization from this subcommittee to sustain or improve
    these technology transition tools?
        Probably Dr. Sega would be one of the best to answer to
    this.
        Dr. Sega. Senator Allard, we appreciate and thank Congress
    for providing the funds for the Quick Reaction Special Projects
    Program which includes the Quick Reaction Fund. As of today, we
    have committed or expended all of that fund for fiscal year
    2005 based on needs.
        A lot of good ideas and people are ready to go on
    technologies, principally in the force protection area. The
    Technology Transition Initiative, one good example of that is a
    small water pen that was developed and there were some
    residuals that were provided in the field in Afghanistan. It
    works really well. The Technology Transition Initiative was
    applied to that to accelerate the production of those and the
    Defense Acquisition Challenge program also is an effective
    mechanism for transition.
        There are certain technologies that you can move quite
    rapidly and the base that our panel has talked to in terms of
    S&T being stable, strong, and in a place where you can draw
    from is critically important.
        We have an acceleration from the discussion of this
    Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force in September 2001,
    the thermobaric weapon. It converted a Blu 109 2,000-pound bomb
    with a different fill. Well, in September, it was still at the
    basic research stage.
        Through the month of October, the team did work at Indian
    Head to identify a leading candidate. By November, we had done
    aesthetic testing in Nevada, a collaboration between the Navy,
    the Air Force, and the DTRA, and there was a flight test on
    December 14, 2001. So 90 days start to finish on that one.
        Then Congress provided quick reaction munitions funds in
    fiscal year 2002, $15 million. Thirteen million dollars of that
    went to a thermobaric hellfire application. So advanced was the
    technology that another generation flew off four different
    variances and went from R&D to being built and deployed, and
    they were used in OIF.
        Now, there's further application of that technology
    forward. So there's two examples where we have been able to
    accelerate the technology development and then a transition and
    an initial order of the Marine Corps for thermobaric hellfires.
        The Defense Acquisition Challenge program allows a
    mechanism for some of the spiral development into the programs
    of records which are longer. I think we're making progress. I
    also think we have a long way to go.
        Senator Allard. You don't need any legislation?
        Dr. Sega. I believe that the mechanisms we currently have,
    not only those three but also the Quick Reaction Special
    Projects, provide that crucial speed piece of near-term
    execution in some areas we couldn't anticipate really in
    submission of the budget. There's no need, so we wouldn't have
    guessed when the budget process was going.
        Some new technologies arise that we would not have
    anticipated. It is important to us to have flexibility during
    execution here.
        Other programs that are a little further off on the
    horizon--more like 2 to 5 years--are the ACTD process and areas
    where we do not have the adequate base. In those programs, we
    use some of the ``Defense Procurement Act, Title 3'' mechanism.
        So there are several mechanisms to employ new technology
    transition. I think we're okay regarding the mechanisms. But if
    someone disagrees, please say so.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Roberts. Dr. Sega, you stated that one of your
    primary goals both last year, and I think you referred to it in
    your testimony here this morning, was to improve the outreach
    and the coordination with the Intelligence Community.
        Now, having some interest in that, we are taking a look in
    the Intelligence Committee at the pre-war intelligence on post-
    war Iraq.
        I guess my question is, are you benefitting--and by
    ``you,'' I mean the S&T programs--from intelligence
    requirements in accelerating the technologies that are needed?
    Both accelerating and the anticipation of what you might need
    like we see with the new armor add-ons over here, and
    countermeasures for future threats. Is there a Grand Central
    Station arrangement between you and the 14 agencies that
    compromise the Intelligence Community?
        I would add that some of the intelligence that we gleaned
    or that was predicated or that was provided to the policymakers
    and to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and to the
    Pentagon, one would expect would be obvious, we expected a wave
    of humanitarian problems. Actually, that did not occur. We had
    a lot of infrastructure degradation and a lot of sabotage, but
    that other event did not happen.
        I know that some expected a lot of flag waving and thanks
    in regards to public demonstrations. I think that went on for
    about 24 hours until we got to the current situation.
        But if, in fact, the terrorists worldwide were using their
    favorite ploy, i.e., truck bombs, explosives, mortars, RPGs, so
    on and so forth, it would appear to me that the Intelligence
    Community and the S&T community ought to fit together not only
    in terms of anticipation, but also lessons learned, and
    anticipate what we might need a little better down the road.
        I'm not--well, I won't get into the inquiry that we are
    conducting, but I think we could sure as hell do better. I'm
    concerned about that. If you would, please comment for me on
    your relationship with the Intelligence Community and how
    that's working out both in terms of anticipation and in terms
    of accelerating what you need.
        Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman, we have made that a priority and
    we're making progress on it. From about the second week of the
    advent of the Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force in
    2001, they have been part of that process.
        We have developed the surveillance and knowledge systems
    initiative with the Intelligence Community as part of the road-
    mapping process of what S&T efforts should go on.
        We are working toward coordinating the program and sort of
    synching up when we need to have the pieces ready to coordinate
    in the budget process. So we do have funding coordination, if
    you will, on the programs that----
        Senator Roberts. Who are you coordinating with? Is that
    DOD? Is that CIA? Is that FBI? Is this a whole shooting match
    or what--who do you deal with in regards to these kinds of
    priorities and the laundry list that you are putting together?
    I don't mean that as a pejorative.
        Dr. Sega. I understand that. I have to admit it's not well
    institutionalized and we're working on----
        Senator Roberts. Should it be institutionalized?
        Dr. Sega. I would have to think more about how we would do
    that and what the pros and cons and the mechanisms of----
        Senator Roberts. If any of you have any ideas on that, if
    you could provide that to the subcommittee, or if you want to
    say something right now, please feel free to do that.
        Dr. Sega. Sir, there is the structure called the Science
    and Technology Intelligence Coordinator (STIC). I may have
    gotten the term wrong. From that, there is a list of critical
    areas, critical technologies. Myself and Secretary Cambone have
    brought together the technology and intelligence folks to take
    a look at assessments as we look at knocking off, if you will,
    this list of items, these technologies.
        Senator Roberts. Well, you went down some of those earlier
    in your comments in terms of your priorities. But it just would
    seem to me as we're going through--we used to do that. We
    pushed and pushed and pushed on the subcommittee to have joint
    exercises. There was a lot of objection to that because of
    limited budget dollars and what the Services want to do.
        Well, we have two dandies right now, one in Afghanistan and
    one in Iraq, and maybe one in Haiti by the time we're through
    with it. So it just seems to me that if there's ever a time
    where we could--I don't know if we need to say
    institutionalize, but maybe we ought to create--is STIC
    recognized as this Grand Central Station that I am referring
    to?
        It's one thing to try to get the 14 different agencies in
    the Intelligence Community to take down their stovepipes and
    have better coordination. I think we've achieved a great deal
    on that since September 11, especially.
        Then the thought occurs to me that that obviously would
    apply in regards to the priorities of the S&T community on
    lessons learned and where we go and what we provide the
    warfighter as soon as we possibly can, anticipating what we
    would need based on the best intelligence that we have.
        Dr. Sega. Within the last few months, under the National
    Security Technology Council, a subcommittee has been formed on
    national security R&D. I co-chair it along with Dr. Don Kerr
    from the CIA. That includes an interagency group beyond the CIA
    and DOD that has interagency participation and that's under the
    Office of S&T Policy (OSTP) sponsorship. So there is that
    interagency mechanism.
        What I referred to earlier on these assessments was more
    detailed. For example, nanotechnology is looked at to better
    inform our S&T investments for DOD needs, but also to help
    inform what investments we should be making for R&D for the
    intelligence function as a customer.
        Senator Roberts. Okay. I'm sort of an event-oriented
    person. I think most Senators are. I'm not a chart guy,
    although we do have awards for the best chart when we get into
    that. But the lights don't go off or you lose Members.
        But in the event-oriented thing, and this is how things
    work around here, I think, to a certain extent, you read in the
    fountain of all knowledge, The Washington Post, where it's
    going to take the FBI and the Border Patrol 4 years to get
    back-up technology and better coordinate it so that they can
    work together on the fingerprinting necessary for Border
    Patrol. Four years? Yet we have a device back here at PIER 2.3
    that can provide an amazing kind of identification security.
        It would just seem to me rather than horsing around for 4
    years trying to get your fingerprinting computer base worked
    out so you can share it, why wouldn't you just move to
    something like this and do it?
        We're already having application of this kind of
    technology, and I'm not trying to sell this product. But it
    seems to me that they have a very unique advantage or service
    that can be provided at this particular time. How do you plug
    that in with your intelligence?
        I know the CIA has a great interest in this product. I know
    the marines already have it and they want more. Yet I have read
    in the paper that there may be six different reasons why this
    wouldn't work in regards to the example I'm using.
        It seems to me there has to be a better coordination
    between the Intelligence Community, including the FBI, and I
    know that's outside your circle that you're working in in
    regards to Secretary Cambone, et cetera.
        That's a rambling road speech. That's really not a
    question.
        Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman, let me give you an example of,
    though it may not be systematic across the board at this point,
    which I do not believe it is, but there are some examples where
    there are models that are working and the details we may follow
    on in a different session.
        But in terms of looking at explosive devices, currently in
    Iraq and in the CENTCOM theater they go to a combined
    explosives exploitation cell. I believe that's in Baghdad. I
    believe it has representation from the Intelligence Community,
    but I could be wrong on that.
        The next stop is at the Terrorist Explosive Device Analysis
    Center in Quantico. I've been down there to look at that. The
    primary management of that facility with defense dollars is
    FBI. So there's a level of exploitation of the explosive
    device.
        Then it goes to the proper places, whether Services or
    others, to understand how it works and then understand how to
    potentially defeat it.
        So as a limited example, there is a coordination process to
    run something quickly through from start to finish. But in a
    systematic sense, I've given you a couple coordination points
    and activities. I've probably mentioned almost half a dozen at
    this point.
        Senator Roberts. Well, we'll follow-up on that. I apologize
    for taking time here. We're getting toward the noon hour. But
    I'm very happy to learn that and I think that would be very
    valuable information for members of the subcommittee and the
    full committee. I was not aware of that in regards to Quantico.
        Obviously, what we're experiencing in Iraq in regards to
    the dangers there applies directly to homeland security and
    what we're facing on the domestic front.
        So I appreciate your commentary and we might have staff get
    together and you can better inform us and educate us as to how
    those channels are working now.
        Senator, do you have any additional questions?
        Senator Reed. No, I do not.
        Senator Roberts. Unless somebody has anything else that is
    absolutely important, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you so
    much.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts

                                   S&T BUDGET

        1. Senator Roberts. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, and Mr.
    Engle, the Department of Defense's (DOD) budget requests and statements
    from DOD officials clearly emphasize applied research. What is the
    departmental view of the role of basic defense science and technology
    (S&T) and what is the guidance with regard to future budgets for these
    programs and for the larger S&T portfolio?
        Dr. Sega. New military capabilities and operational concepts emerge
    from basic research. Basic research is a long-term investment with
    emphasis on opportunities for military applications far into the
    future. Additionally, it contributes to our national academic and
    scientific knowledge base by providing substantial support for all
    science and engineering and the education of our future scientists and
    engineers. Basic research investments over a long period of time have
    contributed significantly to new warfighter capabilities--low
    observables (stealth), lasers, infrared night vision, and
    microelectronics for precision strike, to name a few. Many of these
    advances were unpredictable. No promising avenue of research should be
    neglected. Although areas of emphasis may change, it is important to
    maintain a balanced portfolio in order to deal with unforeseen
    developments. Investments in basic research should help prevent
    technological surprise by our adversaries. We have consistently
    supported investment in basic research that, at a minimum sustains 0
    percent real growth. The overall fiscal year 2005 budget request for
    S&T funding exceeds 0 percent real growth by 1.8 percent. The Secretary
    has established a long-term goal to fund S&T at 3 percent of the total
    Defense budget. This goal is becoming difficult to achieve because the
    projected top line of the total DOD budget is increasing more rapidly
    than the programmed increasing rate of S&T funding.
        Dr. Killion. The Army's basic research program seeks new knowledge
    and understanding to achieve revolutionary advances in technology that
    can be translated into transformational warfighting capability. The
    program invests in world-class expertise (government, academic, and
    industry) and state-of-the-art equipment.
        The Army maintains a diverse S&T portfolio that has three major
    components: (1) exploiting basic research to (2) accelerate technology
    opportunities in applied research and (3) transition technology to
    systems through the advanced technology development programs.
    Investments within these three accounts work synergistically to provide
    the most capable technology solutions to satisfy our warfighting
    requirements. As we develop technology for the future force we are also
    seeking opportunities to transition advanced technology to the current
    force that is engaged in the global war on terrorism.
        Admiral Cohen. The majority of the Navy's S&T portfolio is divided
    into two areas: (1) discovery and invention; and (2) exploitation and
    deployment.
        The strength of the Office of Naval Research (ONR) is its basic
    research (6.1) investment in discovery and invention. ONR's fiscal year
    2005 budget request for basic research funding is $477 million. Navy's
    basic research investment funds long term research in the enabling
    technology for warfare areas such as command, control, communications,
    computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR);
    underwater weaponry; underwater acoustics; naval architecture; and
    expeditionary warfare. They are absolutely critical to maintaining our
    future naval battlespace supremacy.
        We rely on the expertise of the naval research enterprise at the
    Naval Research Laboratory and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory,
    other government labs, as well as academic institutions, to pursue long
    term, high risk, high payoff, basic research.
        Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), used to develop the fiscal year
    2005 President's budget request for S&T, supported 3 percent annual
    real growth. However, the Navy S&T accounts reflect the balance of
    priorities among the competing requirements of the fiscal year while
    attempting to be responsive to the DPG.
        The most critical element of support for long-term, high risk
    scientific research is to provide stable investment funding. The Navy
    fiscal year 2005 6.1 budget meets the DPG goal to provide no less than
    0 percent real growth for basic research.
        Mr. Engle. The Air Force depends on and fully supports its basic
    research program to provide for future long-term warfighting
    capabilities. Air Force core basic research is funded at $217.3 million
    in the fiscal year 2005 President's budget--an increase of almost $13
    million or almost 5 percent real growth over the fiscal year 2004
    President's budget. Total basic research funding within the Air Force
    also includes the University Research Initiative and High Energy Laser
    Research, which were devolved to the Air Force from the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (OSD) in fiscal year 2004. Basic research funding
    stemming from these devolved programs is also up from the fiscal year
    2004 President's budget by almost $11 million or almost 8 percent real
    growth. We expect to maintain at least 0 percent real growth in future
    years. Overall, core funding for the total Air Force S&T portfolio has
    increased over $80 million or almost 5 percent real growth in the
    fiscal year 2005 President's budget when compared against similar
    funding in the fiscal year 2004 President's budget. We do not expect
    any significant changes to the current fiscal year 2005 President's
    budget funding in the upcoming budget cycle.

        2. Senator Roberts. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, and Mr.
    Engle, what is the correct funding balance, by percentage, within the
    S&T accounts between basic (6.1), applied (6.2), and advanced
    technology development (6.3)?
        Dr. Sega. Determining the correct funding balance of S&T investment
    is not a precise science; rather, I believe it is a strategic decision.
    The Department's investment in S&T develops the technology foundation
    necessary for our modernization effort, and fosters the development of
    ``leap ahead'' technologies that produce transformational capabilities.
    DOD must continue to invest broadly in defense-relevant technologies
    because it is not possible to predict in which areas the next
    breakthroughs will occur. The traditional guidelines have been to fund
    basic research at approximately 15 percent, applied research at
    approximately 35 percent, and advanced technology development (ATD) at
    approximately 50 percent of the total DOD S&T budget. This breakout has
    had success in leading to the discovery of new scientific knowledge and
    maturing these scientific discoveries into technology demonstrations
    that provide options for future military capabilities.
        Dr. Killion. The Army is committed to a strong S&T program that
    does not rely on specific investment goals within the S&T accounts. I
    think specific percentage targets would be too rigid. We need to
    maintain the dynamic portfolio management that we are using to
    accelerate the pace of our transformation through technological
    advances. As knowledge is gained in the basic research program we
    increase focus on areas of dramatic payoff. When our warfighting
    customers have the system development and acquisition resources, we
    increase investments in ATD to speed transitions of selected technology
    based upon our soldiers' needs. We balance the need to sustain
    investments over time to achieve ``breakthroughs'' in science with the
    need to seize on opportunities for rapid technology transitions as they
    present themselves. In this way we are being responsive to the dynamics
    of the science and technology environment and the business environment
    of resource allocations beyond the S&T program.
        Admiral Cohen. The S&T investment portfolio is driven not by
    arbitrary percentages within the S&T accounts, but by a careful
    strategy of investment in promising research and technology at whatever
    stage it may be. As the Chief of Naval Research, my goal is to balance
    the Navy's S&T portfolio between two broad investment areas: (1)
    discovery and invention; and (2) exploitation and deployment.
        Discovery and invention focuses on discovering and understanding
    new phenomena that may hold promise for the ``Navy after next.'' This
    includes all of our 6.1 investment and a portion of our 6.2 investment.
    Our investment in nanotechnology in the 1980s is an example of our
    support for long term, high-risk, high-payoff basic research. We are
    just at the beginning of delivering the benefits on nanotechnology,
    such as nano-coatings for submarine pumps. I believe it is crucial for
    the 6.1 budget to be stable to protect the long term basic research
    that develops the bold ideas that transforms warfare 10 to 30 years in
    the future.
        Exploitation and deployment, primarily 6.3 and a portion of 6.2,
    funds the transformational effort supporting ``The Next Navy and Marine
    Corps.'' Our future naval capabilities program, in close cooperation
    with the requirements, fleet/force, and acquisition communities, is
    transitioning components and systems to solve operational challenges.
    The other major effort in exploitation and deployment is our Innovative
    Naval Prototypes, large scale, high-risk, long term projects that may
    change warfare. Ongoing programs include development of the
    electromagnetic gun, the free electron laser, and electric ship
    propulsion.
        Mr. Engle. The Air Force maintains a balance between
    transformational and enabling technology developments in support of the
    warfighter. Air Force S&T is funded at a level to achieve the
    warfighting capabilities that support Air Force core competencies. This
    includes funding of approximately 18 percent or $345.5 million for
    basic research, 42 percent or $786.2 million for applied research, and
    40 percent or $763.7 million for ATD. Historically, this division has
    proven successful in providing transitionable technology at a pace we
    can afford to acquire, while preserving the scientific base for future
    warfighting needs. Currently, we are skewed slightly to the 6.3
    funding, which reflects the Air Force's interest in getting technology
    into the hands of the warfighter because of the urgency of current
    events.

                             DARPA'S STRATEGIC PLAN

        3. Senator Roberts. Dr. Sega, the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2004 contained language directing the Secretary of
    Defense to set up ``appropriate means for review and approval'' of the
    Defense Advanced Research Project Agency's (DARPA) strategic plan. What
    means for review have been established and what role will the Director,
    Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), play in DARPA's strategic
    plan?
        Dr. Sega. As the DDR&E, I have oversight responsibility over DARPA.
    The initial DARPA strategic plan was actually published in February
    2003 and was coordinated and vetted through the DOD and then approved
    by me prior to release. I have instituted a top-to-bottom review of
    DARPA program with my office directors. We also have instituted a
    detailed review of the DARPA's internal budget to ensure consistency
    with DOD goals. Finally, I will review and approve DARPA's strategic
    plan prior to submission to Congress in response to 10 U.S.C. 2352.

                     CURRENT PROGRAM AND SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT

        4. Senator Roberts. Dr. Sega, the DOD's S&T programs have an
    important role to play in providing enhancements for current and future
    programs and systems. Please briefly outline such efforts in the
    following areas: blue-force tracking; force protection; and secure
    networks. In addition, could you please briefly outline the DOD's
    coordination efforts for S&T in all unmanned systems activities?
        Dr. Sega. In my testimony I outlined and discussed five research
    and engineering priorities that directly impact current and future
    programs and systems, including: Integrating S&T with a focus on
    transformation; enhancing technology transition; addressing the
    national security science and engineering workforce; expanding outreach
    to the combatant commands and intelligence community; and accelerating
    technical support for the war on terrorism.
        The Secretary of Defense places high priority on Joint Blue Force
    Situational Awareness (JBFSA), formerly referred to as ``blue force
    tracking.'' Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi
    Freedom (OIF) amplified the role of JBFSA in support of battlespace
    awareness, command and control, force application, and logistics for
    the coalition forces. The JBFSA Overarching Integrated Product Team is
    formulating the investment strategy and program roadmap in coordination
    with the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
    Functional Capabilities. The JBFSA Advanced Concept Technology
    Demonstration (ACTD) is providing the prototype enterprise architecture
    and common operational picture for theater commands to improve
    detection, tracking and identification of all blue and friendly forces.
        Our near-term force protection initiatives are focused on
    activities of the Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force (CTTTF) to
    rapidly accelerate technologies to mitigate effects stemming from
    terrorist use of weapons such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs),
    mortars, and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). The CTTTF matches
    emerging laboratory technologies with operational challenges in the
    global war on terrorism. A number of ACTDs impact force protection. For
    example, the Counter Bomb/Counter Bomber ACTD detects either suicide
    bombers or command initiated terrorist conventional and non-
    conventional explosive devices. The Active Denial System (ADS) ACTD
    will demonstrate long-range, anti-personnel, non-lethal force options
    to commanders using a powerful millimeter wave transmitter on
    stationary and mobile platforms to heat the skin and cause pain in
    threat personnel.
        Our initiatives to secure our networks and protect information
    include integration of emerging commercial technologies, exploration of
    new software capabilities and developing capabilities for managing
    network infrastructure, implementing autonomic response to cyber
    attack, and segregating information for releasability based on content
    and role of the user. There are a number of ongoing activities across
    the spectrum of communications and networking, including the active
    Network Intrusion Defense (ANID) ACTD which provides rapid correlation
    and visualization of cyber events, collaboration between ad-hoc virtual
    teams of experts and autonomic execution of pre-planned responses where
    appropriate, consistent with operational activities. Additionally, the
    Coalition Information Assurance Common Operational Picture (C-IA COP)
    ACTD is instituting a view of network status and health as it pertains
    directly to operational plans and activities by integrating defense
    cyber warfare tools with network management capabilities and processes.
    The Content Based Information Security (CBIS) ACTD is developing a
    revolution policy engine implementation which will enable information
    protection within a common shared network space while permitting role-
    based access to releasable information to those network users who have
    clearance and authorization. These are specific examples of many
    activities in this important area.
        For unmanned systems, the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) Unmanned Aerial
    Vehicle (UAV) Planning Task Force's UAV Roadmap consolidated the
    Services' and components' developmental activities related to UAVs and
    provided a path for future technology investment. This document is used
    to review the UAV S&T activities and to optimize areas for cooperation
    between programs and projects. Within USD(AT&L), there is excellent
    coordination between the offices responsible for the oversight of
    unmanned systems development, enabling the leveraging of S&T efforts.
    An example of this leveraging is the fiscal year 2004 Joint Unmanned
    Systems Command and Control (JUSC2) ACTD, developed primarily to
    support ground-based robots by the Joint Robotics Program Office, will
    be used to demonstrate the integration of surface and airborne unmanned
    systems.

                       RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN NATIONALS

        5. Senator Roberts. Dr. Sega, traditionally research conducted
    within the 6.1 basic and 6.2 applied research accounts has been viewed
    as fundamental in nature and therefore not subject to restrictions on
    publication or on participation by foreign nationals. Is the DOD
    reviewing this policy with a view toward possibly issuing a new
    security directive to clarify when such restrictions are appropriate
    and when they are not?
        Dr. Sega. The DOD is not reviewing its policy allowing foreign
    nationals to participate in fundamental research programs nor is DOD
    reviewing its policy that fundamental research findings are freely
    published and shared broadly within the scientific community.
        In 1985 President Reagan established the national policy on
    openness in American fundamental research with National Security
    Decision Directive (NSDD) 189. DOD supports NSDD-189. Fundamental
    research is exempt from the export license requirements in both the
    International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Export
    Administration Regulations (EAR).
        While the DOD continuously reviews security policies, our policies
    with respect to fundamental research are not under active review at
    this time. We are reviewing and clarifying our policies with respect to
    the ITAR and the EAR to make clear when export licenses are required
    for the sharing of technical information with foreign nationals. With
    rare exceptions, both the ITAR and EAR provide export license
    exemptions for fundamental research.
                                     ______

                 Question Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins

                          LIGHTWEIGHT COMPOSITE METALS

        6. Senator Collins. General Cartwright, how can lightweight
    composite materials help the Army meet its needs in developing its
    future force, and how do you believe the proposed Center of Excellence
    at the University of Maine can help the Army meet its objectives?
        General Cartwright. The Army has great interest in affordable
    composite materials because they have improved properties over many
    materials currently in use. Key material properties of composites could
    be exploited in applications such as lighter weight structural
    components in vehicles to achieve longer component life and reduced
    vehicle fuel consumption, and improved ballistic protection with
    reduced weight burden.
        The Army is aware that the University of Maine has proposed the
    establishment in Maine of a U.S. Army Center of Excellence on Advanced
    Structures and Materials in Construction. Currently, higher Army
    priorities and funding requirements associated with current military
    operations mean that discretionary funding is insufficient to implement
    such a Center of Excellence focused specifically on structures and
    materials in construction. However, the Army does have an existing
    Center of Excellence for Materials to conduct research on metals,
    ceramics, polymers, and composites. This center is affiliated with the
    Army Research Laboratory through cooperative agreements awarded
    competitively. The University of Maine may respond to the Broad Agency
    Announcement expected in June 2005 for the Center of Excellence's next
    5-year contract.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

                                   FUEL CELLS

        7. Senator Levin. General Cartwright, do you see fuel cells playing
    a key role in the development of future Army ground vehicles?
        General Cartwright. We see fuel cells as an emerging technology
    with potential benefits for specific applications where the fuel cell
    represents a ``best fit'' when compared with other current and emerging
    power technologies. Fuel cells have certain inherent advantages such as
    low noise, high efficiency, high energy density and a potential for low
    maintenance that are very attractive. However, the technology also has
    inherent challenges such as high unit cost, low power density, and
    special fuel requirements. When fuel cells are fielded as power
    subsystems, consideration must be given to the overall size, weight,
    and volume of the entire weapon system as well as the infrastructure
    required. If pure hydrogen is required to feed the fuel cell, a number
    of issues must be addressed including safety concerns associated with
    on-board storage and transportation. Additionally, if high energy
    density hydrocarbon fuels are used, they must first be desulfurized and
    converted to hydrogen. This reforming process adversely impacts the
    overall efficiency of the system.
        Considering these limitations and given the current state of the
    technology, the Army's first step is to concentrate on the development
    of low- to mid-power systems where acoustic silence and high energy
    density are essential. Fuel cell auxiliary power units (APUs), both
    stationary and mobile, show near-term promise. APUs can be used to
    provide supplemental energy during periods of vehicle silent watch.
    Both cost and complexity are high for fuel cells. As we continue to
    obtain data through our lab testing, we must also concurrently keep an
    eye on the business case in order to make a meaningful capability
    transition for the soldier.

        8. Senator Levin. General Cartwright, what is your plan for
    developing Army fuel cells for stationary and ground vehicle purposes?
        General Cartwright. The Army is formulating a strategy for
    developing the necessary power and energy components and systems to
    achieve the levels of power and energy required to ensure that future
    systems will be more efficient, survivable and lethal. Fuel cell
    development is part of the plan. The first and most important step is
    to identify appropriate applications.
        Currently we are working jointly with the other Services, other
    Government agencies, the Department of Energy (DOE), DARPA, the
    National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal
    Aviation Administration (FAA), industry, and academia to develop fuel
    cell systems that can function in an integrated environment.
        In addition, the Tank-Automotive Research, Development, and
    Engineering Center's (TARDEC) National Automotive Center has conducted
    numerous demonstration projects for fuel cells in cooperation with
    commercial industry partners. These will continue to be evaluated for
    both combat and non-combat applications. The Portable and Mobile Power
    S&T program includes fuel cell work for both vehicle APUs and battery
    rechargers for soldier power. This ongoing program is being
    restructured and coordinated with a new program, to include
    investigating small vehicle prime power. The Army also oversees a
    number of other projects, including work in Small Business Innovation
    Research (SBIR), Small Business Technology Transfers (STTR),
    Multidisciplinary Research Program of the University Research
    Initiative (MURI), and the P&E Collaborative Technology Alliance (CTA)
    for developing fuel cell components as well as for logistic fuel
    reforming.
        For installation scale applications (e.g., power for buildings),
    the Corps of Engineers, in cooperation with Research, Development, and
    Engineering Command (RDECOM), is installing Solid Oxide Fuel Cells
    (SOFC) and Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) fuel cells at several Army
    and DOD sites. This work will yield meaningful performance and
    reliability data to support transitioning fuel cells that will provide
    energy security for fixed sites and forward base camps of the future.

                                 ENERGY SOURCES

        9. Senator Levin. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, what efforts are
    underway to develop the energy-efficient installation of the 21st
    century?
        General Cartwright. The Army is following DOD policy to invest in
    cost-effective renewable energy sources, design energy efficient
    structures, and regionally consolidate Defense requirements to
    aggregate bargaining power to secure energy at lower cost. The Army is
    doing all we can to reduce costs and ensure that the program goals are
    achieved. We defer to Dr. Sega for the DOD position.
        Dr. Sega. It is DOD policy to invest in cost-effective renewable
    energy sources, energy-efficient construction designs, and regionally
    consolidate defense requirements to aggregate bargaining power to get
    better energy deals. Energy management on DOD installations is focused
    on improving efficiency, eliminating waste, and enhancing the quality
    of life while meeting mission requirements. Accomplishing these
    objectives will reduce costs and ensure that the program goals are
    achieved. The DOD energy program for facilities is decentralized with
    DOD component headquarters providing guidance and funding, and regional
    commands or military installations managing site-specific energy and
    water conservation programs. The funding of energy projects is multi-
    faceted, using a combination of Federal appropriations and private
    funds. Installations are responsible for maintaining awareness,
    developing and implementing energy projects, ensuring that new
    construction uses sustainable design principles, and meeting energy
    goals.
        In addition, there is a DOD-wide science and technology initiative
    in Energy and Power Technologies (EPT) that has potential payoffs in
    this area. This EPT initiative is broad-based and focuses on enabling
    technology supporting energy generation, storage and use. For instance,
    the initiative invests in batteries, advanced fuel cells, ultra large
    capacitors, high-efficiency electronic components, and so forth. We
    anticipate that many of these technology components will also benefit
    the energy efficient installation of the 21st century.

        10. Senator Levin. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, how will such
    efforts develop a hydrogen infrastructure, utilize alternative energy
    sources, and utilize advanced vehicle propulsion?
        General Cartwright. The Army is developing a 21st century base
    concept that includes a provision for ``energy security.'' As such, the
    Army is investigating facilities and resources that can be used to help
    jump-start selected alternative energy projects in coordination with
    other government agencies and industry. The 21st century base will most
    likely include facilities to generate hydrogen, which would enable use
    of efficient fuel cell powered administrative and non-tactical
    vehicles. In some cases, the Army may be able to provide infrastructure
    and facilities for testing concepts that would be problematic to
    execute in the short term if attempted elsewhere. Additional
    cooperative work with industry and other government agencies is planned
    to evaluate base hydrogen infrastructures, reforming of fuels and/or
    utilization of natural gas. Other alternative energy projects,
    including integrating wind, solar, fuel cell or other capabilities into
    mini-grids, are being considered to help to reduce dependence on more
    traditional energy supplies.
        Dr. Sega. The DOD is committed to creating opportunities to install
    renewable energy technologies and purchase electricity generated from
    renewable sources to enhance energy flexibility when it is life-cycle
    and cost-effective. In 2002, funding was set aside by Congress to
    assess the renewable energy potential of U.S. military installations.
    DOD created a Renewable Energy Assessment Team, led by the Air Force,
    to explore solar, wind, and geothermal energy resources at military
    installations. In fiscal year 2004, additional funding was set aside to
    further this effort, which is scheduled to be complete in November
    2004. Also, the DOD, in partnership with the DOE, is using several
    military bases as demonstration sites for fuel cell-powered
    administrative vehicles development under DOE's FreedomCAR program. In
    addition, DOD has stationary fuel cell systems installed and
    operational at over 30 military bases across the country. Military
    bases provide an ideal environment for the controlled demonstration of
    fuel cell vehicle and stationary power applications, where the DOD has
    benefited by obtaining extensive practical experience in operating this
    advanced energy source.
        In addition, there is a DOD-wide S&T initiative in EPT that has
    potential payoffs in this area. This EPT initiative is broad-based and
    focuses on enabling technology supporting energy generation, storage
    and use. For instance, the initiative invests in batteries, advanced
    fuel cells, ultra large capacitors, high-efficiency electronic
    components, and so forth. We anticipate that many of these technology
    components will also benefit the energy efficient installation of the
    21st century.

                                HYBRID VEHICLES

        11. Senator Levin. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, what
    investments are being made in fiscal year 2004 to develop hybrid
    vehicles?
        General Cartwright. The Army has several major S&T objective
    programs specifically aimed at developing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV)
    technology for Future Combat Systems (FCS) vehicles in Increment 1 and
    for future spirals. In these programs we are developing components
    (including advanced power electronics, electric motors, batteries,
    switches, and inverters) and HEV architecture that will provide greater
    power and energy at reduced weight and volume. This will enable
    vehicles to perform more efficiently and achieve greater lethality,
    survivability, and agility. Our fiscal year 2004 investments in these
    enabling technologies total $59.8 million in applied research, ATD and
    manufacturing technology (MANTECH) and $2.1 million in congressionally
    directed efforts.
        In addition to efforts supporting FCS, Army S&T is partnering with
    the automotive industry to address HEV and hybrid hydraulic
    technologies for current and future tactical vehicles. The Future
    Tactical Truck System (FTTS) ACTD focuses on integrating HEV technology
    into current and future light, and medium/heavy tactical vehicles and
    evaluating/quantifying the military utility of HEV technology. The FTTS
    ACTD is a $50 million effort over 4 years. Contract awards are
    anticipated in the July-August 2004 timeframe for vehicles that will be
    used to conduct the performance evaluations and military utility
    evaluations.
        Finally on the acquisitions side we have been looking at HEV
    technologies for high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs).
    Due to need to support ongoing warfighting operations this effort has
    been put on hold.
        Dr. Sega. For tactical vehicles, the DOD continues to focus our HEV
    efforts through two main programs--the HMMWV acquisition program and
    the FTTS ACTD program. The HMMWV electric propulsion effort, identified
    in the August 2003 report to Congress titled ``The Feasibility of
    Fielding Hybrid Electric Vehicles in the Defense Fleets,'' has been
    deferred as a result of HMMWV upgrade efforts to support ongoing
    warfighting operations. The ongoing ACTD effort will feed the follow-on
    HMMWV electric propulsion effort. The FTTS ACTD is the primary funded
    Tech Base effort within DOD in pursuing the demonstration of hybrid
    vehicles. The goals and designs for tactical vehicles are components of
    this program. Field testing of vehicles, to demonstrate hybrid electric
    propulsion performance, is planned to begin in 2005. Lower level
    efforts include the Joint Marine Corps/ONR/DARPA Reconnaissance,
    Surveillance, and Targeting Vehicle (RSTV) program and the Army
    National Automotive Center Dual-Use Tactical Truck Hybrid projects.
        For combat vehicles, the Army is aggressively pursuing hybrid
    electric drive as a prime candidate for the FCS Increment 1 propulsion
    system. The FCS Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) has let several
    subcontracts for the development, test, and evaluation of hybrid
    systems to assess the cost-benefit of these systems in achieving
    desired capabilities.

        12. Senator Levin. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, what agreements
    are in place or planned for the testing, demonstration, transition, and
    acquisition of these systems?
        General Cartwright. The leading power pack concept being considered
    by the FCS LSI is a HEV design. Component and subsystem technology
    deliveries for the FCS HEV architecture are detailed in Technology
    Transition Agreements among the program manager (PM) unit of action
    (UOA), and the vehicle subcontractors who are part of the LSI industry
    team, and the RDECOM.
        U.S. Army Tank Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) will be
    procuring a limited number of HEVs for the FTTS to be used in the
    military utility assessment in the near future. Award(s) is expected in
    the July 2004 timeframe.
        Under the FTTS program, the ACTD Implementation Directive calls for
    hardware deliveries beginning in January 2006, with a military utility
    assessment scheduled for the March through September 2006 timeframe.
        The effort to upgrade the HMMWV fleet that was described in the
    report to Congress last year has been put on hold in order to do other
    medications to accomplish more urgent upgrades in support of the war.
        Dr. Sega. The only current agreements regarding the demonstration
    and transition of HEV technologies exists within the Army's FTTS ACTD
    program. General Cartwright addresses this program in his response.
        With respect to planned agreements to acquire these systems, the
    DOD's investment in hybrid electric (HE) technology programs exist at
    both the component and system levels in an effort to advance HE
    technologies and provide a more successful transition into acquisition
    programs. Current and future efforts in developing advanced power
    electronics, electric motors, and energy storage devices will enable HE
    technology to overcome transition hurdles. Improvements in on-board
    energy and power densities enable a more viable propulsion alternative
    for integration into military platforms, thereby achieving desired
    operational capabilities. This work also benefits the commercialization
    of HEVs by increasing the knowledge base, industrial base, and
    ultimately, making the technology more affordable for the users.
        In addition, the future demand for increased electrical power to
    satisfy the emerging energy needs of advanced weapons and survivability
    systems makes the successful demonstration, transition and acquisition
    of HE technologies even more critical for future systems. The DOD's EPT
    initiative promotes the tri-service advancement of HE technology. These
    systems, along with an architecture that can accommodate the insertion
    of advanced technologies such as fuel cells and high temperature
    superconducting devices, will provide the infrastructure for the future
    military fielding of HE platforms.

                           ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

        13. Senator Levin. Dr. Killion, active protection is a key part of
    the FCS. What efforts are underway to address close in active
    protection from kinetic threats as well as RPGs?
        Dr. Killion. Army S&T is working on several synergistic approaches
    to address the various types of threats to our medium and light
    vehicles and we are attempting to determine what the right combination
    of lightweight armor and type(s) of Active Protection Systems (APS) are
    best for the different platform classes. The close-in threats you
    mention are particularly difficult to counter because of the close
    proximity of their employment (in the case of the chemical energy (CE)
    munitions) and the short response times required to defeat them
    effectively (i.e., fractions of seconds for both CE and kinetic energy
    (KE) munitions).
        The Integrated Survivability ATD (IS ATD) program is addressing
    both CE and KE threats launched from distances beyond line of sight.
    With respect to CE threats, we have successfully demonstrated defeat of
    RPGs, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and tank fired high explosive
    anti-tank (HEAT) rounds using either an electronic warfare system or
    countermeasure (CM) launched to intercept the threat. We have done this
    with the protected vehicle both static and moving. This technology is
    being transitioned to PM FCS for application in Increment 1. Now we are
    beginning to focus on defeating tank fired KE threats. Proof-of-
    principle testing has demonstrated that a number of different warhead
    approaches may be available to either break or deflect the threat KE
    round at an acceptable distance from the vehicle. The IS ATD is
    expected to demonstrate KE defeat from a static system in 2005 and
    demonstrate an on-the-move system in 2006. Concurrently the IS ATD is
    designing and demonstrating armors since, after a successful intercept,
    a significant amount of residual debris may still impact the vehicle.
    It is important to note that use of APS will not eliminate the need for
    armor; but it will help reduce the amount of armor required.
        The Army currently has two different efforts to address CE threats
    launched at distances of less than 50 meters. The Full Spectrum Active
    Protection Close in Layered Shield (FCLAS) program is in the early
    stages of development. The system comprises a mortar-launched munition
    and a warhead that integrates a tracking and a fusing (detonator)
    radar, digital signal processor, and explosive CM into a small, self-
    contained interceptor. The interceptor can be launched from vehicle-
    mounted tubes similar to smoke launchers. Multiple systems would be
    placed on the protected vehicle to achieve full 360-degree coverage.
    The preliminary FCLAS system design is complete and the contractor is
    currently awaiting component delivery to build a full up system. The
    next round of FCLAS range testing is scheduled for November 2004.
        The Close-in Active Protection System (CIAPS) program uses a suite
    of vehicle-mounted staring sensors to detect incoming RPGs and ATGMs
    and launches a CM to defeat the incoming threat. The system has
    multiple CM launchers to provide full azimuth coverage. The program has
    developed a prototype system mounted on a light armored vehicle. Live-
    fire range testing of this prototype system is being conducted at this
    time.

        14. Senator Levin. Dr. Killion, how much is being invested in this
    area in fiscal year 2004 and requested in fiscal year 2005?
        Dr. Killion. The Army is spending $13.3 million in fiscal year 2004
    and $46.1 million is budgeted in fiscal year 2005 to address vehicle
    survivability against CE and KE threats through the three efforts.

        15. Senator Levin. Dr. Killion, is a formal program being developed
    to advance these efforts given their high operational priority?
        Dr. Killion. We are making great strides in each of these APS
    programs and are investigating the viability of applying the individual
    close-in APS systems (from FCLAS and CIAPS) or some combination of
    solutions (from the IS ATD) on current platforms as well as in the FCS.
    However, before we commit to any formal strategy for developing and
    deploying APS, we must develop a confidence in their performance and
    explore the tactics, techniques, and procedures that would ensure that
    the risks to personnel and materiel are manageable. We are actively
    working these issues, but at this time there is no planned System
    Development and Demonstration (SDD) for either FCLAS or CIAPS.
                                     ______

               Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

                           SEMICONDUCTOR CAPABILITIES

        16. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, DOD has recognized that cutting-
    edge and domestically produced advanced semiconductors and components
    are essential to our network centric warfare and defense
    transformation, and therefore to our national security. As your
    Department is aware, world semiconductor processing leadership is now
    being systematically transferred to China, with design and research and
    development (R&D) leadership widely expected to follow. DOD has put in
    place a ``trusted foundry'' approach to assure a secure supply of
    domestic integrated circuits that can meet DOD's current needs. While
    the trusted foundry approach mitigates the near term urgency of
    diminishing supplies of domestic circuits, it remains a short-term
    solution. As recognized in the October 10, 2003, directive of Deputy
    Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, DOD needs to make major progress on
    initiatives to retain U.S. semiconductor R&D leadership and a healthy
    U.S. industry sector. As the Deputy Secretary's directive suggests,
    funding key research initiatives and maintaining a healthy U.S.
    commercial integrated circuit industry is critical to sustaining the
    technological leadership the U.S. must have for intelligence and
    security reasons.
        In light of the Deputy Secretary's directive, what specific R&D
    initiatives, funds and programs will you commit to, in order to retain
    domestic semiconductor capabilities and ensuring a healthy U.S.
    industry base?
        Dr. Sega. The DOD continues to explore innovative approaches to
    ensure access to cutting-edge microelectronics. The Trusted Foundry
    Pilot program will satisfy immediate and near term requirements. Long
    term solutions are being explored, such as the recently initiated
    Defense Science Board (DSB) study to address the multitude of complex
    issues governing the health, stability, and technological future of the
    U.S. semiconductor industry. The Department has also initiated a SBIR
    theme to leverage cutting edge transformational technologies to address
    inspection and measurement of ``trust'' in microelectronic components
    of known or uncertain pedigree.
        The DOD is pro-actively advancing the technology at two U.S.-based
    foundries utilizing research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
    funds to meet critical needs for radiation hardened electronics. The
    DOD S&T programs, such as DARPA's Radiation Hardened by Design effort,
    will continue to address this important need. The Department will keep
    Congress informed of the progress.
        The DOD continues to increase its investments in militarily
    relevant advanced electronics S&T such as wide band gap devices, focal
    plane array sensors, maskless lithography and spintronics. These S&T
    investments are focused on enhancing future defense capabilities and
    may also provide benefits to the commercial sector.
        The DOD maintains a dialogue with leaders from industry and
    academia to foster support for educational programs for training the
    next generation engineers. Since 1999, the DOD has been supporting
    microelectronics research as part of its Government Industry Co-
    sponsorship of University Research (GICUR) program. The program has
    supported ground-breaking research with a long-term horizon, as well as
    education and training in selected areas of strategic importance. The
    current program is managed as part of the DARPA Focus Research Center
    Program involving four major university-based microelectronics research
    centers (with the participation of more than 30 major research
    universities). These centers are at the forefront of research at the
    subnanometer scale focusing on providing solutions for the future
    generations of electronics.
        The electronics S&T investment strategy for the DOD will
    incorporate the findings of the DSB study with the results of ongoing
    S&T activities within our SBIR programs, DARPA, and the Service
    laboratories, as well as our efforts with the U.S. microelectronics
    industry, to achieve the objectives of the Deputy Secretary of Defense
    for secure defense electronics.

                                 LAB WORKFORCE

        17. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, when the National Defense
    Authorization Act became law on November 24, 2003, DOD research
    personnel were excluded from the National Security Personnel System
    (NSPS) established for the DOD, to continue to provide the flexibility
    granted by section 342 of the National Defense Authorization Act of
    Fiscal Year 1995 and section 1101 of the Strom Thurmond National
    Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1999. The research labs were
    given flexibility to establish innovative human resources systems
    necessary for scientific and technical excellence. The congressional
    intent for this was confirmed by the passage of section 1101 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, chapter 99,
    section 9902(c), where the labs are to be excluded from NSPS until
    after October 1, 2008. Moreover, the law states that after that date
    the labs may be included in NSPS only if the Secretary determines that
    the flexibility provided by NSPS are greater than those already
    provided to the labs.
        In a January 6 letter, Senators Voinovich, Collins, DeWine, and
    Sessions, along with myself, expressed our concern regarding DOD's
    intent to standardize the personnel flexibility currently enjoyed by
    the labs under a Best Practices Initiative that mirrors the not yet
    established NSPS, which would undercut broad initiatives and authority
    the labs already have. The February response from Dr. David Chu insists
    on moving the defense laboratories to the Best Practices Initiative,
    despite congressional disapproval of this position as summarized in the
    January 6 letter. This move clearly violates congressional intent.
    Implementing Best Practices, an integral part of NSPS, on the lab
    personnel is contrary to the section 9902(c). What are your intentions
    regarding efforts to include the labs in NSPS?
        Dr. Sega. The ``Best Practices'' personnel demonstration system
    will not be imposed on any of the labs. However, if the labs want to
    take advantage of some of these flexibilities, we will work with them
    to implement the improvements. We will continue to utilize and improve
    the flexibilities and features of the laboratory personnel
    demonstration systems until 2008. At that time, a comparison will be
    made with the flexibilities available under NSPS to consider potential
    conversion options, if appropriate.

                          BASIC RESEARCH FUNDING (6.1)

        18. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, Federal funding for basic research
    (6.1) in S&T is vital for our Nation's national security and economic
    growth. It is through our investment in basic research that we ensure
    our ability to remain competitive and maintain a strong defense in an
    increasingly globalized economy. As southeast Asian nations
    aggressively pursue global leadership with targeted R&D subsidies and
    industrial policies, it is crucial that our defense capabilities remain
    at the leading edge of technology. This can only be sustained by
    continued investment in basic research. How does your 5.3 percent cut
    in 6.1 relative to fiscal year 2004 appropriated levels support our
    ability to remain ahead of other nations in defense technology?
        Dr. Sega. Our technological capabilities relies on a strong 6.1
    program that is well integrated into an equally robust RDT&E program.
    The 6.1 investments provide new knowledge and understanding that
    transition to new defense technologies within 6.2 and 6.3. Ultimately,
    other RDT&E programs incorporate those technologies into products or
    processes for military systems. While there are abundant scientific and
    technical opportunities to be exploited with additional 6.1 resources,
    there also must be a good balance in the investments among all of the
    components of RDT&E if research results are to be translated in a
    timely way into technologically superior, fielded systems. The amount
    requested for 6.1 in fiscal year 2005 reflects our carefully considered
    judgment on the best programmatic balance within available RDT&E
    resources. The fiscal year 2005 President's budget request for DOD 6.1
    is 0.2 percent higher in real terms, after adjusting for inflation,
    than the DOD request for fiscal year 2004. I urge your support for the
    full amount requested for 6.1 in fiscal year 2005.

                                 GICUR PROGRAM

        19. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, for the second straight year the
    administration has chosen not to provide funding for the GICUR program,
    and only requests $10 million in DARPA for the Semiconductor Technology
    Focus Centers program. While a small program, this program leverages
    funding from the industry primarily the semiconductor industry which
    provides $3.00 for every one provided by the government to support
    critical fundamental research being conducted at selected universities
    around the Nation. My understanding is that if the research being
    supported by this program is not done now, it could have impacts upon
    our ability to continue to increase computing capacity in the future,
    which will in turn have detrimental consequences for both our economy
    and national defense. The administration's limited funding of this
    program also is inconsistent with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz's
    directive of October 10 to DOD to develop efforts to support
    semiconductor research leadership. What effect will this have on
    advancing and retaining the domestic semiconductor research, design,
    and manufacturing base that DOD will depend upon in the future?
        Dr. Sega. The GICUR program is a joint effort with the
    Semiconductor Industry Association. Since 1999, DOD has provided funds
    totaling approximately $35 million, while industry has provided
    matching funds of approximately $74 million, or industry has provided
    approximately $2.00 for every DOD dollar provided.
        The research being performed in the five national semiconductor
    technology research centers (involving about 35 major research
    universities) is critical to the U.S. leadership in this important
    industry. These university research centers perform research that
    focuses on providing solutions to overcome the projected difficult
    technological challenges that are expected to occur as deep sub-
    nanometer dimensional scales are reached in the 2005-2010 time frame.
    The Focus Centers are developing solutions and paths around and beyond
    these technical challenges.
        If the research being performed by our universities is curtailed or
    eliminated, there will be a major impact on the ability to provide
    critical research results needed to solve the problems associated with
    future generations of nanoelectronics systems. Not only will the
    research be impacted, but there will also be an impact on the education
    of future scientists and engineers in critical technical areas of
    interest to DOD. This will significantly impact the future U.S.
    leadership position in electronics and computers.
        DOD, through DARPA, plans to continue to support this very
    important initiative.

        20. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, what role does this unique
    partnership of government, industry, and academia play in training
    future scientists and engineers in this critical field?
        Dr. Sega. During the entire period of the GICUR program, the
    microelectronics research program has provided support for significant
    numbers of university faculty, post-doctoral researchers, graduate
    research assistants, and undergraduates. This program is one of the
    sources of support for research in silicon-based microelectronics and
    nanoelectronics. It has also been a resource for the training of
    graduate students.
        In fiscal year 2003, the DDR&E Basic Sciences Office initiated an
    undergraduate research assistantship program. DOD provided $1 million
    per year in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 to support this
    undergraduate education program. The intent was to provide support for
    a minimum of 5 years. Industry provided approximately $600,000 each
    year to augment the DOD funds. This program is focused on attracting
    undergraduate students to these technical areas and to get them
    interested in pursuing graduate programs in microelectronics. The
    combined approach of attracting and supporting undergraduates and
    graduate students should impact the education of scientists and
    engineers in this critical S&T area.

        21. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sega, how has the GICUR program and
    basic semiconductor research in DOD contributed to the developing of
    new defense capabilities?
        Dr. Sega. Semiconductor integrated circuits are at the core of
    nearly every defense and weapon system today, and future platforms are
    likely to have even greater dependence on advanced semiconductors. In
    this program, we are conducting research and developing technologies
    that will impact future generations of integrated circuits. Researchers
    in the Focus Center program are developing solutions to the future
    technological challenges facing the semiconductor field, to enable
    faster and lower power transistors, greater computational and signal
    processing functional power, higher performing mixed signal circuits,
    and much more. The interesting thing in this program is that we are
    partnering with the semiconductor industry and the equipment industry
    in sponsoring and managing the program. Highlighted below are a few
    examples of program successes:

             Developed design concepts allowing robust operation of
            deep submicron transistor circuits in noisy and radiation
            sensitive environments of interest to the Department.
             Invented and patented an interconnect method that
            allows revolutionary, wafer-level packaging and test of multi-
            thousand Input/Output (I/O) integrated circuits for the next
            generation Digital Signal Processing (DSP), microprocessor, and
            Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) chips.
             Developed platform-based design concepts that enable
            rapid design of reprogrammable ``system on a chip'' products
            which are being adopted as standard operating practice within
            the design community.
             Identified critical metrics for the performance of 10
            nm transistors for future generations of ASICs which includes
            non-classical silicon devices, carbon nanotubes, and molecular
            and quantum dot structures.

        At the same time, we have an excellent path for transition and
    exploitation of the good ideas and concepts that are developed in the
    course of the program. Future defense capabilities will be impacted as
    Focus Center technologies are developed and transitioned to production,
    where they will be used to make fundamentally higher performing
    integrated circuits that will give our systems their tactical and
    strategic advantages over those of our adversaries.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

                        CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

        22. Senator Reed. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, given that
    terrorists are trying to develop or acquire chemical and biological
    weapons, chemical and biological defense have become more important. I
    note that the fiscal year 2005 R&D funding request for chemical and
    biological defense, which is intended to develop badly needed improved
    technology, is down $146 million from fiscal year 2004, and down $78
    million from 2003. How can we provide the needed level of S&T
    investment and technology development if we are reducing our funding
    levels?
        General Cartwright. RDT&E funding for the Chemical and Biological
    Defense Program is under the oversight of OSD as directed by Public Law
    103-160. Army S&T defers to OSD on this question.
        Dr. Sega. The primary difference between funding amounts for fiscal
    year 2003 through fiscal year 2005 as reflected in the fiscal year 2005
    budget request is that fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 have
    received congressional adjustments. The table below shows that the
    RDT&E budgeted core program submit has been relatively stable since
    fiscal year 2003. The fiscal year 2005 budget reflects an actual
    increase of $30 million compared to the fiscal year 2003 core budget
    submit and a $39 million decrease compared to the fiscal year 2004 core
    submit program. These differences reflect RDT&E changes as programs
    transfer from RDT&E to production.

        23. Senator Reed. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, since chemical
    and biological defense technologies are developed in a joint program
    office, how do you work to transition these technologies into the hands
    of combatants in the various Services?
        General Cartwright. The Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical
    and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD) is responsible for the acquisition of
    technologies to meet the system specifications, delivery schedules, and
    quantities needed by the warfighter as portrayed through the Joint
    Requirements Office (JRO-CBD). Army S&T defers to the JPEO-CBD on this
    question.
        Dr. Sega. The JPEO-CBD is the primary organization responsible for
    the acquisition of CB technologies to meet the needs (e.g. system
    specifications, delivery schedules, and quantities) of the warfighter
    as specified in capabilities documents developed by the JRO for
    Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense (JRO-CBRN).
        The JPEO-CBD contains seven joint program offices; Collective
    Protection, Decontamination, Individual Protection, Guardian,
    Contamination Avoidance, Medical Systems, and Information Systems,
    collectively managing 67 product lines. Each product manager is
    responsible for coordinating work with the Services to: (1) procure
    products within the defined JRO requirements, (2) test products to
    specification in both developmental and operational testing
    environments as defined by the Services, (3) test products for
    interoperability with existing battlefield systems, (4) develop the
    necessary training and doctrine to support fielding, use, and
    maintenance of the equipment, (5) provide guidance to the Services on
    operation and support costs and (6) field equipment to the warfighter
    within the required schedule.

        24. Senator Reed. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, what types of
    chemical and biological protective gear and sensors have you sent over
    to Iraq and Afghanistan and which of them are new? What have you
    learned from this experience?
        General Cartwright. The JPEO-CBD has responsibility for this area.
    Army S&T defers to the JPEO-CBD on this question.
        Dr. Sega. The attached list provides the chemical and biological
    protective gear and sensors that were sent to Iraq in support of OIF.
    OIF data is the most readily available information and provides the
    most current lessons learned for the services. The JPEO-CBD sponsored a
    detailed OIF after-action survey that was conducted by the U.S. Army
    Natick Soldier Center. This systematic Joint Service survey sampled
    1,569 service members who had personal experience with 29 different CBD
    materiel systems during OIF. Detailed results are documented in a March
    17, 2004 report. The report identifies the number of survey
    respondents, common themes, good and bad points, and user suggestions
    for each system. It is organized around the six joint project managers
    (JPMs) in the JPEO-CBD who have life-cycle responsibility in the areas
    of individual and collective protection, contamination avoidance,
    decontamination, medical countermeasures, and CBD specific information
    systems. Based on technical analysis of the survey, action is being
    taken, where appropriate, to improve tactics, techniques, operational
    procedures, training and/or equipment issues.
    Chemical and Biological Protective Equipment and Sensors Supplied for
            Operation Iraqi Freedom
        Chemical and Biological Protective Equipment
             M40A1 Mask (Army, Marines, limited use Air Force and
            Navy)--Protective mask for individual warfighter. Protects
            against all known chemical and biological agents and
            radiological particulates.
             MCU-2A/P Protective Mask (without blue tint eye lens)
            (Air Force/Navy)--Head eye respiratory protection for ground
            forces.
             Protective Mask Carrier (Army, Marines, Air Force, and
            Navy).
             M7 Voice Amplifier for M40 Mask (Army, Navy, Marines).
             M42 Mask (Army)--Protective mask for combat vehicle
            crewman. Protects against all known chemical and biological
            agents and radiological particulates.
             M45 Mask (Army/Special Operations Command (SOCOM))--
            Protective mask for aircrew and special operations personnel.
             Aircrew Eye and Respiratory Protection (AERP) (Air
            Force)--Protective mask for aviators
             M48 Mask (Army) Protective mask for Apache aircrew *
             A/P22P-14(V) (Navy/Marine Corps)--Chemical-Biological
            Aviator Mask. Protects against all chemical and biological
            agents and radiological particulates.
             M41 Protective Assessment Test System (PATS) (Army,
            Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps)--Mask Fit Validation Testing
            Equipment.
             Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology
            (JSLIST) (Army, Marines)--Two piece garment, with integrated
            hood, that provides protection from chemical and biological
            contaminants.
             Saratoga Suit (Marines, Navy)--A legacy two-piece
            chemical protective suit with integrated hood.
             Chemical Protective Undergarment--Part of the Army
            Aviation Ensemble.
             Aircrew Battle Dress Uniform (ABDU) (Army)--Two piece
            garment that provides aircrew with protection from chemical and
            biological contaminants.
             CWU-66P (Air Force) Single piece garment that provides
            aircrew with protection from chemical and biological
            contaminants.
             Black Vinyl Overboot (BVO) and Green Vinyl Overboot
            (GVO) (Army/Marines/Navy/ Air Force).
             Chemical Protective Footwear Cover (CPFC) (Marines,
            Navy).
             25 mil butyl gloves and 7 mil butyl gloves (Army,
            Marines, Navy and Air Force).
             Chemically Protected Deployable Medical System (CP
            DEPMEDS)--Provides Army DEPMEDS Combat Support Hospitals with a
            capability to sustain operations in a nuclear, biological, or
            chemical (NBC) environment by integrating environmentally
            controlled collective protection elements into the hospital. *
             Chemical Biological Protective Shelter System
            (CBPSS)--Provides a mobile, contamination free environment for
            forward medical treatment units. *
             Collectively Protected Expeditionary Medical System
            (CP EMEDS)--Provides the Air Force air-transportable
            expeditionary medical facility with a capability to sustain
            operations in an NBC environment by integrating environmentally
            controlled collective protection elements into the hospital. *
             Collectively Protected Small Shelter System (CP SSS)--
            Provides CB agent protection inside the AF Small Shelter System
            shelter to create a ``shirt-sleeve'' environment. *
             Collectively Protected Hospital Surgical Expansion
            Package (CP HSEP)--Provides a surgical wing expansion to the
            Air Force EMEDS air-transportable expeditionary medical
            facility with the capability to sustain operations in an NBC
            environment by integrating environmentally controlled
            collective protection elements into the wing. *
             Collectively Protected Hospital Medical Expansion
            Package (CP HMEP)--Provides additional beds with integrated
            environmental collective protection elements to the Air Force
            EMEDS air-transportable expeditionary medical facility,
            allowing it to sustain operations and treat additional patients
            in a NBC environment. *
             Interim Collective Protection System (ICPS) for the
            Modular General Purpose Tent System (MGPTS)--Provides a
            positive pressure, filtered air, toxic free shelter for
            protection against chemical or biological weapons attacks and
            radioactive particles. *
             M20/M20A1 Simplified Collective Protection Equipment--
            Provides a clean-air shelter for use against chemical or
            biological weapons attacks and radioactive particles.
             M291 Skin Decontamination Kit
             M17 Decontamination System
             M295 Equipment Decontamination Kit
        Chemical and Biological Sensors
             M8 Chemical Agent Detector Paper
             M9 Chemical Agent Detector Paper
             Automatic Chemical Agent Detector and Alarm (ACADA)
             M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit
             M21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL)
             Chemical Agent Monitor
             Improved Chemical Agent Monitor
             M8A1 Chemical Agent Alarm System
             M272 Water Testing Kit
             M93A1 Fox Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
            Reconnaissance System
             Biological Integrated Detection System
             Joint Portal Shield Biological Detector
             Dry Filter Unit (DFU) Biological Detector *
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * Denotes systems--those with initial operational capabilities in
    fiscal year 2000 or later.

        25. Senator Reed. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, both the
    National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) have significant investments in S&T to meet chemical and
    biological threats, ranging from sensor systems to vaccines. How do
    your organizations connect with these non-DOD entities to coordinate
    activities and promote rapid technology transition?
        General Cartwright. The President defines executive branch
    responsibilities and authorities for homeland security in Homeland
    Security Presidential Directives (HSPD). The President's Homeland
    Security Council (HSC) was established in HSPD-1, The Organization and
    Operation of the HSC. The HSC promotes coordination and cooperation
    across the executive branch. This includes rapid technology transition
    of weapons of mass destruction countermeasures. The HSC, through HSPD-
    4, The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),
    and with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy,
    established and operates interagency R&D working groups on
    countermeasures to weapons of mass destruction. Senior representatives
    from the DOD--the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs--
    Health and Human Services and Homeland Security, for example, meet
    regularly in a working group focused on development and availability of
    medical countermeasures to biological threats.
        Scientist-to-scientist interchanges are promoted across the
    executive departments' laboratory systems, such as in sensor systems
    technologies between the Army's Edgewood Chemical and Biological
    Command and the National Laboratory scientists working on Bio Watch for
    urban monitoring. There are substantial efforts underway to leverage
    and share critical infrastructure and scientific resources. For
    example, the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services,
    Agriculture, and Homeland Security participate on a Board of Directors
    for the National Interagency Biodefense Campus that is located at Fort
    Detrick, Maryland. Fort Detrick was the DOD's biological weapons center
    until our unilateral renunciation of biological weapons in 1969. Since
    then, its unique facilities and system infrastructure for safely
    conducting high security, biocontainment R&D has been used by the DOD
    for discovery, development, and testing of medical countermeasures to
    biological agent threats. Excess laboratory capacity was turned over to
    the National Cancer Institute for discovery, development, and testing
    of medical products for the war on cancer. The Department of
    Agriculture maintained its Foreign Weed Science biocontainment
    laboratories at Fort Detrick. The DHS has joined with these other
    departments to exploit this infrastructure for biosecurity and
    biological defense programs. This is a preferred location, pending
    completion of environmental, cost, feasibility and related analyses,
    for the establishment of the Homeland Security National Biosecurity
    Analysis and Countermeasures Center that will house the BioThreat
    Characterization Center and the National Bioforensic Analysis Center.
        In addition, the Army currently supports the DHS's portfolio
    managers in the development of their technology roadmaps, especially in
    the areas of sensors, vaccines, and chemical/biological protection.
    Army representatives are currently co-located with DHS representatives
    to provide timely information and coordination in the development of
    policies and priority definition.
        Dr. Sega. The DOD and non-DOD entities, including the NIH and DHS,
    continue to coordinate and promote science and technology activities
    and rapid technology transition in the formal intergovernmental setting
    of the President's National Science and Technology Council (NSTC).
    NSTC's Committee on Homeland Security and National Security, (co-
    chaired by DOD and DHS representatives, Michael Wynne and Charles
    McQueary, respectively), is our primary venue for interaction. The
    committee structure is further complemented with various subcommittees:
    National Security Research and Development, Radiological/Nuclear
    Countermeasures, International, Chemical/Biological/Radiological
    Countermeasures for Health, Standards, and Interagency working groups
    for WMD Medical Countermeasures and Biometrics. Further, the DOD,
    coupled with these and other non-DOD entities, continues to promote
    technology transition in this and many other focus areas through
    project-level sharing in activities such as those of the Technical
    Support Working Group (TSWG). There is also an initiative to identify
    medical countermeasure areas of common interdepartmental (DHS,
    Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and DOD) interest where
    we can collaborate, by establishing a Memorandum of Understanding that
    facilitates cooperation and collaboration.

                             TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

        26. Senator Reed. General Cartwright and Dr. Sega, what else could
    you do to improve coordination and technology transition? How do you
    work to ensure that, where appropriate, the technologies your
    organizations are developing are available for use by first responders
    and other non-DOD personnel?
        General Cartwright. RDECOM currently has initiatives that represent
    an effort to identify, select, and promote promising new, advanced, and
    leading edge technologies, as candidates for early technology transfer
    and insertion into military programs. Currently a number of our
    laboratories have specific support agreements in specialty areas such
    as chemical and biological protection with organizations such as the
    Department of Justice and the NIH. The Army does not have any
    agreements that leverage some of our most critical technologies such as
    communications, sensors, and command and control from a system
    perspective. These critical technologies and systems are currently in
    use by soldiers in urban and civil applications in Afghanistan and
    Iraq. This is allowing the Army to create new standards that can be
    utilized by first responders and other non-DOD personnel.
        To better focus and direct the very broad technology base
    represented by the RDECOM laboratories, the RDECOM commander has
    recently stood up a DHS working group chaired by his Deputy Commanding
    General for Operations. This working group is the single point of
    access for all activities wishing to obtain RDECOM technologies for the
    purposes of DHS/DOD technology transfer and will maintain a database of
    products and leverageable efforts which can be made available to
    appropriate first responder representatives.
        The Army has specific support programs where major customers such
    as the New York City Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and
    the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PA NY/NJ) have requested
    assistance for them with large system integration efforts, but these
    are handled in an ad hoc fashion and there is no well defined method
    for states to gain easy access to Army expertise.
        A new mechanism we are implementing to get technologies developed
    by the Army labs to the developers faster is Technology Transition
    Agreements (TTA). The TTA would be appropriate between an Army S&T
    organization and an outside agency's acquisition office/program. A TTA
    is intended to formalize and document the needs and timelines for the
    critical technologies being developed by the S&T community. The TTA
    documents exactly what is to be delivered and when it will be
    delivered. The TTA would give the acquisition office/program a format
    to succinctly define and formalize the transfer of technologies once
    the need was established. Transitions to first responders and other
    non-DOD organization could be handled in a similar manner.
        Dr. Sega. The DOD has an active technology transfer program to
    ensure technologies developed are available, where appropriate, for use
    in the private sector. In general, we use a variety of tools including
    Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (over 2,000 in fiscal
    year 2003) and Patent License Agreements (over 350 in fiscal year 2003)
    to work with the private sector in jointly developing technologies for
    use or in licensing the private sector entities to use DOD-developed
    technologies. Our annual report to Congress, which was signed on June
    8, 2004, and forwarded to Congress, gives specific examples of
    technologies and products which have been made available through our
    technology transfer program. We have ongoing efforts at many of our
    local activities to transfer technologies for first responder use. One
    example is the Homeland Security Technology Office at Kirtland Air
    Force Base in New Mexico. The mission of this office is to share Air
    Force technologies and knowledge with the local first responder
    communities. We have also reviewed how best to accomplish this on a
    Department-wide basis and have established a partnership intermediary
    at the University of Pittsburgh. This partnership arrangement has
    allowed us to establish a DOD Technology Transfer Center of Excellence
    for First Responders at the University. This center will be working
    with established activities such as the Office of Law Enforcement
    Technology Commercialization, the Emergency Response Technology Program
    at the National Technology Transfer Center, the DHS, and regional first
    responders groups to ensure the user group needs are being satisfied
    with the technologies we are transferring.

        27. Senator Reed. Dr. Sega, how much fiscal year 2003 and fiscal
    year 2004 money has been proposed or approved for reprogramming thus
    far to support the transition of technologies to Iraq and Afghanistan?
        Dr. Sega. Last October, the DOD approved a decision to develop and
    field Rapid Reaction/New Solution (RR/NS) technologies to support force
    protection, primarily to counter IEDs in the area of operation. The
    cost of this effort is $70 million. We received $35.1 million in fiscal
    year 2003 funds ($9.9 million Below Threshold Reprogramming (BTR)) and
    $25.2 from a Prior Approval Reprogramming (fiscal year 2004-2006 PA)
    which has been approved by Congress. Of the fiscal year 2004 funds, $9
    million will be absorbed within the Quick Reaction Special Projects
    program. An additional $1.8 million was provided from a BTR. Part of
    the remaining fiscal year 2004 $24.119 million (fiscal year 2004-2014
    PA) reprogramming received congressional approval on April 24. Only
    $15.819 was approved by Congress due to the $8.1 million decrement for
    the ADS by Senator Stevens. Of the $70 million required, $61.9 million
    was provided for this work.

        28. Senator Reed. Dr. Sega, what has been the source of that
    funding, and what are the consequences on the programs that are the
    sources of that funding?
        Dr. Sega. The funding requirement for the RR/NS is $70 million. The
    funds came from fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 funds as follows:

             Fiscal Year 2003 funds

                    -- $25.2 million came from a Prior Approval
                    Reprogramming Fiscal Year 2004-2006 PA approved by
                    Congress on March 1. Of that amount, $19.5 million came
                    from reducing the number of sites (from 95 to 90) where
                    the Global Information Grid (GIG) Bandwidth Expansion
                    effort would be implemented. The reduction of sites was
                    less a priority than the requirements to increase
                    protection for U.S. and coalition forces.
                    -- $9.9 million was realigned via a BTR from numerous
                    programs to minimize the impact.

             Fiscal Year 2004 funds

                    -- $9 million was absorbed within the Quick Reaction
                    Special Projects program.
                    -- $1.8 million was provided from a Below Threshold
                    Reprogramming from numerous sources where the impact,
                    similar to fiscal year 2004-2006 PA, was minimal.
                    -- $24.119 million was to come from fiscal year 2004-
                    2014 PA reprogramming which received congressional
                    approval on April 24. However, only $15.819 million was
                    approved due to the $8.1 million decrement for the ADS
                    by Senator Stevens. Funding in this reprogramming
                    action became available due to inflation rates being
                    lower than previously budgeted.

                              OPERATIONAL TESTING

        29. Senator Reed. Dr. Uhler, General Waldhauser, and General
    Cartwright, the Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
    (DOT&E) is responsible for approval and oversight of operational
    testing prior to deploying new systems, to ensure these systems work in
    battle. In his last annual report to Congress, he warned that if we
    circumvent a rigorous acquisition process, ``. . . our warfighters may
    get weapons without knowing their operational capabilities and
    limitations.'' As you develop technologies to rapidly field to the
    warfighter, how do you ensure proper operational testing is done?
        Dr. Uhler. The Operational Test and Evaluation Division within
    SOCOM has the staff responsibility to independently report to the
    Commander, SOCOM, findings and assessments regarding operational
    testing of SOCOM equipment and systems. Further, these independent
    assessments are provided to the appropriate milestone decision
    authority for consideration in making acquisition decisions through the
    issuance of either System Production Certifications or Fielding and
    Deployment Releases.
        Operational Test and Evaluation within SOCOM is governed by SOCOM
    Directive 71-5, Operational Test and Evaluation. SOCOM Directive 71-5
    addresses Combat Mission Need Statement/Urgent Deployment Action (CMNS/
    UDA) test requirements.
        Each acquisition program has a standing Test Integrated Working
    Group (TIWG), made up of members from the program office, supporting
    operational test activity, the SOCOM operational test office, the
    requirements office, and depending on the system, user representatives.
    Early user tests and operational assessments for SOCOM systems are
    conducted by partner operational test activities from the Services and
    national test assets.
        The use of Test and Evaluation Master Plans (TEMPs) or System
    Acquisition Master Plans (SAMPs) guide the conduct of a system's test
    program. It is the SOCOM policy that equipment, including that being
    fielded under CMNS/UDA authority, is not released to Special Operations
    Forces (SOF) units without an operational assessment, verified by the
    SOCOM Operational Test and Evaluation Division. This also applies to
    systems and hardware developed through the ACTD Technology Insertion
    and Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT) programs.
        These measures ensure that proper operational testing is done and
    each system's capabilities and limitations are identified.
        General Waldhauser. To clarify part of the question, the DOT&E is
    responsible for approval and oversight of Major Defense Acquisition
    Programs, and those programs he chooses to specially designate for
    oversight. We are unaware of any Marine Corps experimental programs
    under DOT&E oversight.
        As demonstrated recently by the Small Unit Remote Scouting System,
    aka ``Dragon Eye'' UAV and the PTS-180 ``Viper'' laser range funding
    system, experimental or non-traditional programs can be transitioned
    quickly from experimental demonstration to systems of record, while
    preserving the need to independently and objectively verify suitability
    and effectiveness for the acquisition decisionmaker. The Marine Corps
    Operational Test and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA) provides the
    Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) with an objective evaluation of
    those requirements. Because the experimental programs cannot be
    evaluated against traditional requirements documents, MCOTEA has
    attempted to enumerate the performance and suitability characteristics
    of the system to assist the decisionmaker in assessing the risk of
    fielding the system to the operational forces. The ``Dragon Eye''
    system has been a template for success in testing and evaluating
    experimental systems with an immediate tactical need in the operational
    forces. Another area MCOTEA has been able to contribute test oversight
    is the observation and documentation of special armor plating for
    deployed vehicles. In addition to reducing the procurement risk to the
    MDA, MOCTEA can also provide an invaluable database of information to
    the warfighter in terms of employment considerations based on system
    performance. This also helps in the development of tactic, techniques
    and procedures. If provided the necessary resources, MCOTEA is capable
    of providing independent documentation of performance and reliability
    for a broad range of experimental programs.
        General Cartwright. The streamlined procedures discussed are not
    intended to field systems but are, instead, addressing critical
    operational needs with immediately available solutions. These efforts
    are more aptly characterized as experimentation with soldiers actively
    participating and providing user feedback. Prior to sending any
    materiel into theater, the operational commander must agree that the
    materiel answers a critical need and the Army Test and Evaluation
    Command (ATEC) must determine the materiel to be safe. Once deployed,
    ATEC may continue to evaluate the materiel by conducting an operational
    assessment using a task force concept that places evaluators in-theater
    with the operational units that received the materiel. This feedback is
    extremely valuable to the developers, especially if it is gathered in
    an operationally relevant environment, and can cut months, or even
    years, off from the developmental schedule. Additionally, it serves to
    focus and refine the requirements documentation processes and reduces
    the likelihood of discovering significant performance issues during
    formal operational testing when it eventually occurs. Successful
    efforts become candidates for handoff to the Program Executive Officer
    community for insertion in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and
    eventual fielding.

        30. Senator Reed. Dr. Uhler, General Waldhauser, and General
    Cartwright, the concepts of ``spiral development'' and ``capabilities-
    based acquisition'' are being implemented throughout the DOD. The idea
    is to keep requirements flexible to get new technologies to the
    warfighter quicker. With such flexible requirements, how do you know
    what you are deploying is ``good enough''?
        Dr. Uhler. SOCOM has inherently embraced the concepts of spiral
    development since our beginnings in 1987. Our development community
    works hand-in-hand with our warfighters to understand their needs and
    translate them into achievable requirements. We begin by defining the
    most technically feasible implementation of the solution that can be
    achieved in the shortest timeframe with respect to the approved
    requirement and then augment it with an evolutionary (spiral)
    development plan to achieve the 100 percent solution. After initial
    fielding, we continue to work with our user to incorporate their
    feedback and continually enhance the product to achieve the maximum
    capability for our user. These evolutionary cycles of development allow
    risks to be taken for products used specifically by our SOF. This
    benefits our warfighter and allows SOCOM to quickly react to real world
    material deficiencies.
        General Waldhauser. Currently, the evaluation of the ``good
    enough'' measure of performance is established against the approved
    requirements or capabilities. However, in some cases, the experimental
    programs provide a capability where none previously existed. In those
    cases, the capability is documented and quantified so that decision
    maker can adequately evaluate the capability against the procurement
    and support costs for the system. In other cases, the experimental
    capability replaces, improves or enhances an existing warfighting
    capability. In that situation, the MCOTEA can quantify the performance
    and suitability increase (or decrease) that is offered by the new
    system, if the choice is made to conduct a baseline comparison test.
    The decisionmaker can then use this information to reduce the risk of
    the decision. Each of the Service Operational Test Agencies is in the
    process of transforming their test process to respond to capabilities
    based testing versus requirements based testing. Adding experimental
    programs to this new methodology is a natural fit in the evolution of
    operational testing.
        General Cartwright. Rather than limiting us to search for
    ``perfect'' solutions, flexible requirements are what enable us to seek
    the ``good enough'' capabilities, especially for our current force.
    Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), as the warfighters'
    representative, provides key insights and sets the threshold
    requirements utilizing professional military experience and judgment
    available through the proponent schools, concept and capability
    developers, and professional experimentation forces. TRADOC, Army Test
    and Evaluation Command (ATEC), and RDECOM have established a teamed
    approach that provides a framework for Army leadership to determine
    ``good enough'' by analyzing experiment-ready technology to meet
    warfighter needs, linked to operational capabilities. The linking of
    experimentation and technology demonstrations insures that the
    demonstrations are operationally relevant and provide a venue to
    develop operational concepts for new technologies. RDECOM has
    established technology Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) that look across
    the command, services, industry, academia, and international
    organizations to provide enabling technology enablers to the
    warfighter. These IPTs have strong warfighter participation from TRADOC
    headquarters and proponent personnel. Again, this teaming assures that
    only ``good enough'' operationally relevant experiment ready solutions
    are put forward for incorporation into the Doctrine Organization
    Training Material Leavership Personnel Facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions
    for consideration by decision authority for release to the warfighter.

        31. Senator Reed. Dr. Uhler, General Waldhauser, and General
    Cartwright, what criteria are used during operational testing to ensure
    the system works well enough, and who approves the criteria?
        Dr. Uhler. Test and evaluation within SOCOM is governed by SOCOM
    Directive 71-5, Operational Test and Evaluation. SOCOM Directive 71-5
    addresses CMNS/UDA test requirements. Criteria used during SOCOM
    operational testing and assessments are derived from the requirements
    documents. Measures of effectiveness and suitability--the test
    criteria--are directly related to validated capabilities requirements.
    For CMNS/UDAs, the criterion for minimum acceptable system performance
    is the successful attainment of the key performance parameters/critical
    operational issues of the requirement.
        Independent assessment of system operational effectiveness,
    operational suitability and safety of use is conducted by the SOCOM
    Operational Test and Evaluation Division. Concurrence to field
    equipment and systems to SOF is addressed by issuing either a System
    Production Certification (SPC) or a Fielding and Deployment Release
    (F&DR). These documents are signed by the Chief, Operational Test and
    Evaluation, the Director of Logistics, and the system's responsible
    SOCOM PEO.
        General Waldhauser. For traditional acquisition systems, the
    criteria under testing are derived directly from the approved
    Operational Requirements Document or Capabilities Documents, the
    Operations and Organizational Concepts, and from the Operational Mode
    Summary/Mission Profile. Criteria are directly cited from those
    approved requirements documents, and in some cases derived from those
    documents in a group setting by all the stakeholders.
        The new capabilities based system defines the requirement in the
    Initial Capabilities Document, the Capabilities Development Document
    and the Capabilities Procurement Document. MCOTEA has not yet tested a
    system based on these requirement documents.
        Approval of the criteria for testing is achieved in several
    documents. The entire test strategy is published and approved in the
    Test and Evaluation Master Plan. This document is signed by all the
    stakeholders, and by the DOT&E for oversight programs. Additionally,
    MCOTEA, using a proposed test scope letter, informs the MDA of
    anticipated operational test content and requests concurrence on this
    scope as adequate to support pending acquisition decisions. The test
    plan is completed in a teamed environment, and is approved by the
    Director of MCOTEA for programs not on oversight, and by the DOT&E for
    oversight programs.
        In the absence of requirements documents, the MCOTEA establishes a
    test planning group, and works with representatives from the combat
    developer, the material developer, the functional advocate and
    representatives directly from the operating forces to establish
    meaningful criteria for evaluation in a capabilities based test. This
    process is not nearly as exhaustive or defendable as the deliberate
    requirements process, but facilitates a much more rapid test and
    evaluation of a capability that has been determined to be of reasonable
    risk and benefit by the Warfighting Lab.
        General Cartwright. Testing criteria are derived from the
    Operational Needs Statement (ONS) submitted by the deployed commanders.
    Specific criteria are developed by an IPT assembled from the
    operational commands; the PEO/PM that has, or eventually will have,
    fielding responsibility; RDECOM; and TRADOC.

        32. Senator Reed. General Cartwright, what is the status of the
    proposal to establish a limited liability company at the Aberdeen Test
    Center?
        General Cartwright. In response to legislation allowing for pilot
    programs to be established at select DOD Test and Evaluation Centers,
    Aberdeen Test Center proposed a Limited Liability Company (LLC). The
    LLC would consist of Aberdeen, academia, and private industry.
        Public Law 107-314 Sec. 241(e)(3)(A), dated December 2, 2002,
    provided that ``Not more than one public-private partnership may be
    established as a limited liability company.'' Further legislation was
    drafted to define the parameters of the LLC. There were several
    concerns with the proposal forwarded to the Department of the Army and
    the proposed legislation was subsequently rewritten. The rewritten
    proposal, which went from DOD to the Office of Management and Budget
    (OMB), was captioned 10 USC Sec. 2374c, Centers for Research,
    Development, Test and Evaluation Excellence: public-private
    partnerships. Based on recent discussions with the Army Business
    Initiative Council (BIC), it appears that OMB has not concurred with
    the proposal and sent the proposed legislation back to DOD.

                                    TRAINING

        33. Senator Reed. Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, and Mr. Engle, how
    are you working to ensure that our next generations of military leaders
    are well-trained and well-versed in S&T?
        Dr. Killion. The Army believes it is vital that military leaders
    understand not only what S&T can do for the warfighter today, but how
    S&T investments help sustain U.S. land combat dominance today and for
    the future. The Army has taken several steps to ensure Army leaders
    have an understanding of S&T. First, the Defense Systems Management
    College has incorporated information on Army S&T goals, plans, and
    investments in their courses available to senior Army Acquisition Corps
    leaders. Second, the Army created a uniformed scientists and engineers
    program through which selected Army leaders with advance degrees are
    provided hands-on professional development training at the Army's
    laboratories and Research, Development and Engineering Centers (RDECs).
    Third, the Army's RDECOM sends representatives to the Combined Arms
    Center at Fort Leavenworth to participate at seminars to inform Army
    leaders about the role S&T plays in enhancing Army capabilities.
    Finally, the Army's TRADOC, which is responsible for developing and
    implementing professional military education and training across the
    Army, plays a key role in the Army S&T community through their futures
    center and participation in S&T planning processes.
        Admiral Cohen. My highest priority, as the Chief of Naval Research,
    is to be the Navy's and Marine Corps' advocate for the S&T. It has been
    a tremendous challenge. At every opportunity, I argue for a stable,
    sustained investment to support long-term, high-risk transformational
    breakthroughs.
        In addition, I have several initiatives that also serve to educate
    the Navy and Marine Corps about the benefits of S&T:

             The Naval Fleet/Force Technology Office puts
            scientists and engineers in the fleet and force, with the
            customer, to use their expertise to solve current and future
            operational challenges with S&T. These advisors not only work
            with the current naval leaders but also interact heavily with
            more junior personnel, tomorrow's leaders, to educate them
            about the possibilities that S&T can provide.
             Naval research leaders and program officers work daily
            with Fleet/Force personnel to develop longer term capability
            based options requiring a concerted S&T investment to achieve.
            This involvement not only helps develop a better product but
            also provides insight for the fleet/force to the processes
            needed to mature cutting edge technology.
             Tech Solutions aligns Department of the Navy S&T
            resources to enable rapid technology-based solutions to
            problems that have a detrimental effect on the ability of the
            fleet/force to train, operate, and fight. Due to the rapid
            delivery, fleet/force personnel are able to see tangible
            results of S&T.

        Finally, my experience is that our young military leaders know the
    benefits of S&T and are our best advocates. The current war on terror
    has resulted in several technologies being accelerated, at the request
    of the warfighter, in order to field a new capability or address a
    shortfall.
        Mr. Engle. Under the Air Force's new Total Force Development
    construct, we are making progress in developing senior leaders with
    technical expertise. Our Scientist and Engineer Development Teams, in
    conjunction with the Air Force Senior Leader Management Office, are
    responsible for implementing Total Force Development. They are
    identifying general officer and colonel leadership positions that
    require science, engineering, and technology backgrounds plus the
    supporting base of personnel needed to grow these future leaders. With
    this requirement identified, we have put in place career development
    guides which will help us develop future technically competent leaders.
    A critical part of these development plans is advanced education. To
    meet this need, under our Vector Blue Initiative, we are increasing
    opportunities available to our officers to pursue advanced technical
    degrees that will make them competitive for future technical leadership
    positions.

                             ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

        34. Senator Reed. Admiral Cohen, there is continuing concern about
    the use of sonar by the Navy and its effects on marine mammals. Is the
    Navy making investments to develop alternative undersea imaging and
    sensing technologies so that military requirements can be met in a more
    environmentally-friendly way? What areas of research require investment
    so that we can develop these capabilities?
        Admiral Cohen. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is making
    investments to investigate the development of a full complement of
    technologies to effectively implement anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in
    all places throughout the year and under all operating conditions;
    however, active acoustics is and will remain a necessary part of that
    complement. Effective ASW requires a mix of imaging and sensing
    technologies, including active acoustics. This is primarily because the
    marine environment, which changes with location and time of year, very
    strongly affects any given technology. In addition, the way submarines
    operate affects the use of any given technology. Fortunately, the mix
    of possible technologies complements each other to some degree. For
    example, acoustic technologies work well in many places during the
    winter while non-acoustic technologies work well in many of the same
    places during the summer. Active acoustic technology often works well
    against submarines operating deeply submerged while non-acoustic
    technology often works well against submarines operating near the
    surface.
        ONR is investing in the development of more effective passive sonar
    as well as the development of non-acoustic capabilities, including
    magnetic and optical sensors, with the goal of reducing reliance on
    active acoustics as a means of anti-submarine force protection. ONR is
    also developing more effective active sonar technology that the Navy
    hopes will reduce adverse effects on marine life through reduced source
    levels, alterations in signal characteristics and focusing of emitted
    sonar beams. ONR research into the interactions of marine life and
    sonar sounds will help guide our search for reduced environmental
    impact from active sonar, while preserving and enhancing the
    effectiveness of this vital fleet protection asset. Taken together,
    these programs should enable the U.S. Navy to keep up with the
    challenges posed by advancing foreign submarine technology while
    simultaneously reducing the potential risks to marine life from active
    sonar.

                                   LANDMINES

        35. Senator Reed. Dr. Killion, the administration recently
    announced a new policy of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines
    which details how we plan on using those weapons in future conflicts.
    In the past, the Army has invested in technologies that would produce
    mine systems that would meet Army requirements as well as being
    consistent with the rules of the Ottawa Treaty governing landmine use.
    Congress has also urged the Army to develop these kinds of systems as
    part of the FCS. What is the status of the development of these
    intelligent, Ottawa-compliant landmine systems?
        Dr. Killion. Funding in Program Element 0603606A Project 683, Anti-
    Personnel Landmine Alternatives, has been used to evaluate and develop
    distributed surveillance unattended sensors (autonomous, seismic,
    acoustic, and day/night imaging sensor systems) and communication,
    command, and control systems (ad-hoc, wireless, networked inter and
    intra-field sensor communications, and information management tools) to
    be used with man-in-the-loop over watch fires. These evaluations have
    included soldier-in-the-loop live-virtual modeling and simulation
    experiments to evaluate new concepts and doctrine. Output of the
    simulation experiments have been used to determine specifications and
    requirements for the distributed networked sensor systems.
        The new U.S. landmine policy, announced on February 27, 2004,
    commits DOD to end the use of persistent mines (both anti-personnel and
    anti-vehicle) and endorses the continued use of self-destructing/self-
    deactivating mines of both types. In compliance with Fiscal Year 2003
    Appropriations Committee Report language directing ``that the Army
    clearly define the requirements for a next generation intelligent
    minefield and ensure compliance with the Ottawa Treaty,'' DOD will
    consult with the Appropriations Committee concerning the impact of the
    new policy. Coordination for this consultation is in progress.

        36. Senator Reed. Dr. Killion, how much are you investing in these
    technologies in this budget request?
        Dr. Killion. Approximately $2,949,000 in fiscal year 2005.

        37. Senator Reed. Dr. Killion, what significant technical
    challenges remain to producing a system that meets Army requirements
    and is compliant with the Ottawa Treaty?
        Dr. Killion. Significant technical issues exist and will remain
    since the Army requirements for an Anti-Personnel Landmine Alternative
    system and the parameters of Ottawa are not congruent. PE 0603606A,
    Project 683, Anti-Personnel Landmine Alternatives does focus on the
    following significant challenges related to remote networked sensor
    surveillance systems for man-in-the-loop over watch fires and command-
    detonated munitions:

              (1) Improving low cost, low power unattended imaging and non-
            imaging sensors to enable more reliable identification of
            combatant-noncombatant;
              (2) Developing low power, long range, antijam communications
            technologies; and
              (3) Developing automated, networked sensor field dispensing
            techniques and developing the hardened low cost sensors and
            communications devices required for such dispensers.
                                     ______

             Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

                        AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORIES

        38. Senator Clinton. Mr. Engle, the Information Directorate of the
    Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) develops systems, concepts, and
    technologies to enhance the Air Force's capability to successfully meet
    the challenges of the information age. I was disappointed that your
    testimony did not include a discussion of your vision for the Air Force
    Research Laboratories in Rome, New York. Can you give a description of
    the role that Rome Labs will play in the AFRL's future?
        Mr. Engle. The Rome Research Site in Rome, New York, continues to
    play a pivotal role in the Air Force's achievement of the warfighting
    capabilities needed to support our core competencies and will continue
    to do so. The Rome Research Site has long been a key contributor to the
    Air Force S&T program and to the Nation as a whole. One of the most
    transformational and quickly deployable technologies available today is
    command, control, and communications technology, also known as
    information technology. This technology is at the heart of our Moving
    Target Indicator Exploitation program, which is developing web-enabled
    automated tools to exploit data from current and future sensor systems
    such as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).
    Perhaps one of the most exciting technologies to come out of our lab at
    Rome is the information data wall. This data wall has proven highly
    effective and is currently being used in Afghanistan and Korea. In
    addition, several government agencies use multi-layer communications
    security developed at Rome and software-defined reprogrammable radios
    for secure communications and adaptable for coalition operations have
    also transitioned into operational use.
        The Information Directorate at Rome is at the center of a growing
    national resource focused on communications technology. We believe the
    future for this enterprise is to lead the way for our national security
    needs in information technology and use this expertise to continue to
    grow this vital Center of Excellence in the Rome area.

                          LABORATORY PERSONNEL ISSUES

        39. Senator Clinton. Dr. Sega, the DOD intends to convert employees
    at the Defense laboratories excluded from the NSPS by congressional
    action into the Best Practices Initiative through a regulatory action
    and then convert them again into the NSPS personnel system at some
    future date. What are the implications of such a double conversion on
    the lives and careers of our scientists and engineers?
        Dr. Sega. We value our scientists and engineers in accomplishing
    the mission of the laboratories, their lives and careers are certainly
    of paramount importance to the Department. It is because of the value
    placed on our scientists and engineers that we are working to establish
    the most flexible personnel framework possible. The DOD will not impose
    the ``Best Practices'' personnel demonstration system on any of the
    laboratories.

        40. Senator Clinton. Dr. Sega, what are the costs of the conversion
    of the laboratory demos to the Best Practices Initiative?
        Dr. Sega. While ``Best Practices'' will not be imposed on the
    laboratory demonstrations, some labs may voluntarily choose to
    implement some of the flexibilities found in Best Practices. Salary
    costs would not be affected if the labs were to adopt any of the
    flexibilities found in Best Practices--employee base salary would be
    preserved. Unlike the General Schedule system, the lab demonstrations
    do not provide periodic within-grade increases to basic pay. Thus, if a
    lab chooses to implement these features of Best Practices, there is no
    need to ``buy in'' lab demonstration employees--that is, to pay them a
    percentage of the next within-grade increase, based on the time each
    employee has already served toward the next increase. Another point to
    consider is that there are costs not operating under a single personnel
    framework, which entail the maintenance of redundant payroll and
    personnel data, policies, and administration.

        41. Senator Clinton. Dr. Sega, has any independent analysis been
    performed that has indicated that the Best Practices Initiative will
    improve the ability of the affected organizations to perform their
    missions?
        Dr. Sega. Many private and public analyses have been accomplished
    over the last four decades to examine the defense laboratory structure,
    and as an integral part, assess the laboratory personnel framework. The
    flexibilities available in Best Practices are based upon a review of
    use and impact of the flexibilities available and independent analysis
    performed by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). OPM's evaluation
    let us know what was working in the demonstration projects and what
    could be improved.

                             INFORMATION ASSURANCE

        42. Senator Clinton. Mr. Engle, as indicated by other witnesses
    during the hearing, information security is becoming a growing concern
    for both forces deployed overseas as well as our military activities at
    home. Please highlight the efforts that the Air Force S&T program is
    making to address our information security requirements. How are the
    products and innovations stemming from Air Force research being
    transitioned for use by the DHS and the private sector?
        Mr. Engle. The Rome Research Site in Rome, New York, is the center
    of expertise for command, control, communications, and intelligence
    (C\3\I) technology development, including information security
    requirements. The Information Support Server Environment (ISSE) Guard
    initiated by the Air Force in 1990 to meet the needs of the Air Force
    and also of the U.S. Intelligence Community, has become an enabling
    information security development effort and is a prime example of how
    the Air Force S&T program is addressing information security
    requirements. ISSE Guard provides for the multi-level security needed
    in or between information networks. Since its inception, the ISSE Guard
    solution has been a mix of best-of-breed commercial items combined with
    government-sponsored/developed software needed to satisfy military and
    intelligence requirements. ISSE Guard has been installed and is being
    used in a variety of Service/Defense agencies, such as the U.S. Air
    Force Technical Applications Center, U.S. Space Command, National Air
    Intelligence Center, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (formerly
    the National Imagery and Mapping Agency), U.S. Central Command
    (CENTCOM), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Navy Warfare Development
    Center, U.S. Army South, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
    (ODCSINT), among others.
        The Information Directorate at the Rome Research Site works with a
    large customer/collaborator group, including the DARPA, the
    Intelligence Community, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and other
    Services. In addition, the nearby Griffiss Institute is a collaboration
    of industry, academia, and government in the area of information
    assurance. While our mission at Rome is in support of Air Force
    warfighting capabilities, some of the technologies being developed may
    also benefit other organizations and the private sector. The close
    working arrangement that the Information Directorate enjoys with these
    various organizations facilitates the transition of information
    technologies into operational use by both government and the private
    sector. In fact, the Joint Defensive Planner (JDP) developed by the
    scientists and engineers at Rome is currently being used for homeland
    defense. This program automates the defensive planning process and
    functions with Service operators who are separated geographically. The
    JDP program allows planners at widely distributed locations to use
    common planning software and databases to exchange concepts, overlays,
    and analyses of options. The JDP program can support multiple clients,
    interface with other Service tactical planners, and enable access to
    the JDP application through the Web.

                                  SBIR PROGRAM

        43. Senator Clinton. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, and Mr.
    Engle, the budget materials submitted to Congress include a negative
    assessment of the DOD SBIR program. What is your assessment of the
    value of small business research and the SBIR program as part of the
    overall DOD S&T strategy?
        Dr. Sega. Small business research and the DOD SBIR program play an
    important role in developing and maturing needed technologies in
    support of the DOD S&T program. The negative assessment to which you
    refer is the OMB assessment which focused on commercialization of SBIR
    technology. This is only one of the goals of the SBIR program. The four
    goals are to: stimulate technological innovation; increase private
    sector commercialization of Federal R&D; increase small business
    participation in federally funded (DOD) R&D; and foster participation
    by minority and disadvantaged firms in technological innovation. We are
    committed to increase our tracking of commercialization in the future
    to improve our OMB assessment. However, we place as much importance on
    the other goals of the program, and believe that SBIR is meeting all
    the intended goals.
        Dr. Killion. Small business research and the Army SBIR program play
    a critical role in developing and maturing technologies needed to
    support the Army's S&T strategy. My staff provides guidance to the Army
    SBIR PM to ensure that solicited topics are current, relevant and
    aligned with the strategy. The current SBIR budget of $228 million will
    be invested in Phase I and Phase II proposals selected for award that
    support future force and FCS objectives. Through SBIR and other similar
    small business research programs, we have learned that the very best
    ideas do not necessarily come from the laboratories of large
    corporations or even from our government laboratories. Most often,
    innovative technologies are invented by creative individuals and small,
    entrepreneurial companies whose workers truly think ``outside the
    box.'' With the strong participation from the Army S&T community, there
    is a greater chance of SBIR successes that will achieve current Army
    research goals, thereby leading to increased opportunity for
    incorporation into the acquisition process.
        Admiral Cohen. I believe that this is in response to the Government
    Performance Results Act (GPRA) rating from OMB on the overall DOD SBIR.
    Please recognize that all information was not available to OMB at the
    time of the evaluation.
        The Navy's SBIR program is working extremely well. A number of SBIR
    technologies have been integrated into the Navy's ongoing programs. A
    number of Navy SBIR small businesses have been acquired by large
    businesses and several products that are being used in the IRAQ which
    are a result of the Navy's SBIR program. Some examples:

             Flight certification of Silver Fox is underway and
            training of marines has been scheduled with the goal of
            providing this UAV capability to I Marine Expeditionary Force
            (MEF) in Iraq. As soon as higher resolution sensors can be
            integrated into Silver Fox an upgraded version will also be
            provided.
             A Persistent Area Surveillance System that includes a
            360 degree camera that was demonstrated on 12 Dec 2003, has
            been identified for possible deployment to Iraq to provide
            surveillance of high interest areas.
             LogisTech, Inc.--Provides platform protection from
            corrosion. Has received over $500 million in DOD PHASE III
            funding to date. Now provides product to Iraq.
             SAVI Inc.--Solved the problem of total asset
            visibility for DOD. Developed a ``smart'' barcode label. On the
            surface, it looks like a barcode you see at the grocery store.
            Beneath the surface, however, a radio frequency identification
            (RFID) chip and an antenna system carry product information,
            which can be captured by an special reader. Used for DOD
            container shipments overseas.
             Science and Applied Technology (now AKT Missiles)--
            Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) development,
            design, demonstration and transition to SDD and production a
            multi-sensor fuzed weapon system to defeat advanced surface to
            air threats employing countermeasure techniques including
            counter shutdown. Over $750 million in sales over 10 years. The
            company has grown from less than 10 employees to over 200.

        The Navy's SBIR/STTR Program is a mission oriented program that has
    a dual use component. One of the metrics that we use internally to
    judge the success of the program annually is a comparison of SBIR funds
    in a given year to the Phase III (non-SBIR funds) provided to Navy SBIR
    companies by Navy acquisition programs. For example, in fiscal year
    2003, the Navy SBIR program had $200 million for award of contracts to
    small businesses in Phases I & II of the SBIR program. The Navy
    acquisition programs provided Navy SBIR participating companies in
    excess of $275 million.
        Likewise, in fiscal year 2002 the Navy SBIR program had $156
    million and SBIR companies received in excess of $195 million in Phase
    III awards from Navy acquisition programs. These figures don't include
    funding received by the Navy SBIR participating companies from non-Navy
    DOD and other government agencies, prime contractors and the private
    sector. The accompanying chart highlights our success in this area.

        Dr. Engle. The Air Force is a strong supporter of the DOD SBI
    program. This program and the small business research it encourages
    play a vital role in the Air Force S&T program. Although the OMB has
    expressed concerns that, in some cases, the SBIR program funds
    companies with poor performance and overestimates commercial successes
    stemming from Federal funding by treating additional investment the
    same as product sales, these have not been significant issues for the
    Air Force. We are sensitive to the capabilities and contributions of
    small businesses as they interact with us in this program and we have
    efforts in place to increase their success. For example, the Air
    Force's Mentor-Protege program provides funding to small businesses
    that have successfully transitioned efforts to larger companies so that
    they can mentor other small businesses towards similar successes. The
    Air Force has also deployed an e-business solution called the SBIR
    Shopping Mall, which links small businesses that have or are completing
    SBIR efforts with large businesses, Air Force product development
    offices, and logistics centers. The Air Force also has a history of
    funding those efforts that contribute to both military and commercial
    capabilities and have successfully transitioned to SBIR Phase III,
    which is the phase in which commercialization occurs.
        The National Science Foundation estimates that small company
    investment in research and development in the U.S. is about $40 billion
    for 2003. The SBIR program provides DOD and the Air Force a valuable
    tool to leverage this national innovation engine. Phase I and II of
    this program allow us to solicit and exploit this vast investment in
    the U.S. Although the management of this program requires significant
    effort to ensure return on investment, the payback is worth it. As
    already stated, the Air Force is a strong supporter of the DOD SBIR
    program and its contributions to the Air Force S&T program. However,
    one change to the way we currently do business could potentially
    improve the SBIR program and, in the process, address OMB's concerns. I
    believe we could improve transition of SBIR efforts to military systems
    and/or commercialization success by raising the ceilings for SBIR Phase
    I and Phase II efforts. Raising these ceilings will provide additional
    funding to mature technologies and should improve the transition of
    efforts to SBIR Phase III or commercialization.

        44. Senator Clinton. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, and Mr.
    Engle, the assessment also indicates that the administration will
    ``seek to get highly successful awardees to enter the mainstream of
    defense contracting.'' What are your plans to execute this plan?
        Dr. Sega. The DOD has two initiatives to facilitate the rapid
    transition of SBIR technologies, products, and services into DOD
    acquisition programs. First, we require the services to solicit letters
    of interest from their DOD acquisition' programs in order to
    demonstrate interest in transitioning the successful projects to
    defense acquisition contracts. At this time, approximately half of the
    SBIR projects have received statements of interest. Second, we have
    developed a Phase II Enhancement policy under which we provide a Phase
    II company with additional SBIR funding if the company can match the
    funds with non-SBIR funds from DOD acquisition programs or the private
    sector. Generally, enhancements will extend an existing Phase II
    contract for up to one year and will match up to $250,000 of non-SBIR
    funds. These initiatives have been extremely effective in attracting
    DOD acquisition and outside investor money as well as attention to SBIR
    projects. We strive to increase the awareness of SBIR projects in the
    acquisition community through these initiatives and we believe that
    this will enable small businesses to compete within the mainstream of
    defense contracting.
        Dr. Killion. The Army has established two formal initiatives
    recently to facilitate the rapid transition of SBIR technologies,
    products, and services into DOD acquisition programs. First, at least
    50 percent of the SBIR topics that are solicited must be either co-
    authored by an acquisition program official or include a memorandum co-
    signed by the laboratory topic author and a DOD acquisition program
    official, stating that if the technology is successful, the acquisition
    program would be interested in providing non-SBIR funding during or
    after phase II to integrate the technology into the program. This year,
    over 75 percent of Army topics were endorsed in this manner by an
    acquisition official. Second, under the Phase II Plus Program, the Army
    provides up to $250,000 in matching SBIR funds to expand an existing
    Phase II that attracts investment funds from a DOD acquisition program
    or a private sector investor. Phase II Plus allows for an existing
    Phase II Army SBIR effort to be extended for up to 1 year to perform
    additional research and development. Since its inception, the Phase II
    Plus Program has selected and funded 110 projects and continues the
    Army's emphasis on enabling the development and commercialization of
    dual-use technologies and products. These two initiatives have been
    extremely effective in attracting DOD acquisition and outside investor
    money to SBIR projects to support the Army S&T strategy. We strive to
    increase the awareness of past and present Army SBIR projects in the
    acquisition community through conferences, brochures, and Web sites,
    and by facilitating networking efforts of the small businesses.
        Admiral Cohen. With the Navy's SBIR program this is occurring in
    several ways:

        (1) SBIR small businesses that have developed technology that is
    beneficial to the Navy/DOD have been purchased by the large prime
    contractors. Such acquisitions allow new small businesses to engage in
    SBIR. Below is a list of some of those small businesses that have been
    acquired:

             DSR, Inc.--Multi-Purpose Processor (bought by General
            Dynamics) provided lower cost and improved performance of
            weapons systems with commercial off-the-shelf equipment. Over
            $200 million in Navy Phase III--partnered with Lockheed Martin.
             Microcom, Inc.--Improved Transponder. Funded as second
            source and bought by Loral--now L3 Communications.
             Science and Applied Technology (now AKT Missiles)--
            Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile Development.
             Solopsis Corporation developed Cooperative Engagement
            Capability (CEC). Purchase by Raytheon.
             Darlington Incorporated developed Combined Wide Area
            Network (COWAN) Technology purchased by EDO Corporation.

        (2) Small Businesses are teaming with large businesses or selling
    product directly to the government. Below is an example of large
    business interested in Navy SBIR:

            ``Raytheon, with 2002 sales of $16.8 billion, is an industry
            leader in defense, electronics, space, information technology,
            and business and special mission aircraft. The company has
            launched a unique SBIR partnering initiative through its
            Integrated Defense Systems (IDS) business to leverage both Navy
            and Raytheon resources. The initiative championed by IDS
            President Dan Smith, uses the Navy's SBIR capacity to generate
            new technologies to help fill gaps in Raytheon IDS' own annual
            technology roadmap for a dozen-odd defense programs--including
            the Navy's revolutionary DD(X) and other new platforms. . .''
            Quote from ``Transitions'' Volume 1, Issue 1, the Navy SBIR
            Newsletter.

        (3) Currently the Navy provides an opportunity for all small
    businesses that are awarded a Navy SBIR Phase II to enter the Navy's
    ``Transition Assistance Program'' (TAP). This is a 9-month program
    designed to provide small SBIR firms (which are typically scientific or
    technically oriented) some business acumen. The 9 months are culminated
    at the Navy Opportunity Forum on 3-4 May 2004. The small companies
    brief their technologies to venture capitalists, Navy/DOD acquisition
    program managers, and Navy/DOD prime contractors. The outcome of the
    presentations provides a unique opportunity for large and small
    businesses to work together.
        Mr. Engle. The Air Force fully supports the administration's plan
    to encourage successful SBIR awardees to actively participate in the
    mainstream of defense contracting. We believe this could make a
    meaningful contribution to the U.S. industrial base by increasing the
    number of trusted sources available to support Air Force contractual
    needs. There are several efforts currently underway to assist small
    businesses, including extended intellectual property rights that can
    extend well after the end of Phase III vice the normal 5-year period,
    an extended Phase II program that uses SBIR funding to help transition
    promising Phase II efforts that aren't quite ready for Phase III, and
    the Mentor-Protege program under the Air Force's Small and
    Disadvantaged Business Utilization office that provides funding to
    small businesses that have successfully transitioned efforts to larger
    companies so that they can mentor other small businesses towards
    similar successes. The Air Force's SBIR Web site also provides a
    ``shopping mall'' of current SBIR efforts to provide insight to the
    larger companies and hopefully generate interest in the various efforts
    ongoing within these small businesses. This Web site also links to the
    U.S. Small Business Administration SBIR/STTR Web site for an even
    broader look at what's currently ongoing.

        45. Senator Clinton. Dr. Sega, Dr. Killion, Admiral Cohen, and Mr.
    Engle, do you plan to establish and fund more formal Phase III programs
    for SBIR contractors who have successfully executes Phase II SBIR
    contracts?
        Dr. Sega. Phase III is the goal of every SBIR effort, and
    represents the commercialization phase of the program. In Phase III,
    the successful company markets the products or services developed in
    Phase II, either to the government or in the commercial sector. As you
    are aware, no SBIR funds can be used in Phase III. The two initiatives
    described in the previous answer help facilitate the transition of
    small business research from Phase II to Phase III. We believe these
    projects will successfully market and compete for follow-on contracts,
    without separate funding.
        Dr. Killion. Phase III is the goal of every Army SBIR effort, and
    represents the commercialization phase of the program. In Phase III,
    the successful company markets the products or services developed in
    Phase II, either to the government or in the commercial sector. As you
    are aware, no SBIR funds can be used in Phase III. Besides the two
    initiatives described previously to help facilitate the transition of
    small business research from Phase II to Phase III, the Army maintains
    data on successful Phase II and Phase III projects which is maintained
    on a Web site for ready access. The Army also publishes this data in a
    yearly commercialization brochure that is disseminated widely
    throughout DOD and the small business community. This visibility helps
    to facilitate the transition of successful Phase II projects. Also, the
    Army established a Venture Capital Initiative recently with the mission
    to discover, invest in, and support companies and programs developing
    innovative mobile power and energy technology with potential
    application to U.S. Army needs. This program uses a range of investment
    approaches, including making equity investments, project partnering,
    research sponsorship, licensing arrangements, and others. It also acts
    as a bridge between the Army and the innovation community
    (entrepreneurs, established companies, universities, researchers, and
    venture capitalists) to develop business relationships. The Army aligns
    all SBIR projects with the S&T strategy that is supportive of Army
    acquisition programs, thereby creating a Phase III market for the small
    businesses that participate in the Army SBIR Program.
        Admiral Cohen. The Navy views SBIR as an important component in its
    toolbox for developing technologies/products to perform its mission.
    Some acquisition programs such as PEO--submarines have a formal method
    of providing incentives to prime contractor's awards to incorporate
    SBIR awardees. However, the majority of acquisitions have not used this
    method but rely more on the Navy's SBIR program to ``show them.''
        The Navy's SBIR program attempts to connect its SBIR topics to
    acquisition programs in the Navy. Approximately 80 percent of the
    topics in the Navy section of the DOD solicitation are associated with
    a mission need associated with the sponsoring Navy acquisition program.
    We rely on the guidance of the Navy SBIR technical monitors to provide
    guidance to the small business relative to which acquisition programs
    may be interested in a company's technology and the Navy TAP to provide
    the small business the tools to enable them to make contacts in the DOD
    acquisition/prime contractor community.
        One of the metrics that we use internally to judge the success of
    the program annually is a comparison of SBIR funds in a given year to
    the Phase III (non-SBIR funds) provided to Navy SBIR companies by Navy
    acquisition programs. For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Navy SBIR
    program had $200 million for award of contracts to small businesses in
    Phases I & II of the SBIR program. The Navy acquisition programs
    provided Navy SBIR participating companies in excess of $275 million.
    Included below is a chart highlighting our past success.

        Mr. Engle. The Air Force is a strong supporter of the SBIR program
    and encourages small business contractors to participate in this highly
    effective program. Our principal objectives are to stimulate
    technological innovation by small businesses, to increase small
    business participation in meeting Federal R&D needs, and to increase
    the commercialization of technology developed through Federal R&D
    efforts. Phase III is the phase in which this commercialization occurs
    and the Air Force has a history of funding those efforts that
    contribute to both military and commercial capabilities and have
    successfully transitioned to Phase III. We plan to continue to fund
    Phase III efforts when it can be demonstrated that there are Air Force
    benefits to be derived from these investments.

        [Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2005

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 2004

                               U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
                                      and Capabilities,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

     DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
      AND THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
                                    DEFENSE

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Pat
    Roberts (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Roberts, Reed, and
    Akaka.
        Majority staff members present: Elaine A. McCusker,
    professional staff member; Paula J. Philbin, professional staff
    member; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    minority counsel; William G.P. Monahan, minority counsel; and
    Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger and Nicholas W.
    West.
        Committee members' assistants present: Darren Dick,
    assistant to Senator Roberts; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant
    to Senator Cornyn; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
    Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka; and Andrew
    Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Roberts. The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
    Capabilities will come to order. The subcommittee meets today
    to receive testimony on the defense nuclear nonproliferation
    programs of the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Cooperative
    Threat Reduction (CTR) programs of the Department of Defense
    (DOD).
        We welcome our witnesses: the Honorable Paul M. Longsworth,
    who is the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation within the National Nuclear Security Agency
    (NNSA) under the DOE; and Ms. Lisa Bronson, who is the Deputy
    Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and
    Counterproliferation. The programs for which you are each
    responsible are critically important to the national security
    of the United States. In a major address on this topic at the
    National Defense University (NDU) on February 11, the President
    indicated, and I am quoting here: ``The greatest threat before
    humanity today is the possibility of a secret and sudden attack
    with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear
    weapons.'' He was referring, of course, to the threat of
    weapons of mass destruction (WMD) getting into the hands of
    terrorists.
        The President proposed to expand the U.S. and international
    nonproliferation efforts both in the former Soviet Union (FSU)
    and in other countries. Speaking of CTR, he said: ``Under this
    program we are helping the FSU states find productive
    employment for former weapons scientists. We are dismantling,
    destroying, and securing weapons and materials left over from
    the Soviet WMD arsenal. We have a lot more work to do there.''
        The President also called on the international community to
    cooperate on nonproliferation beyond the FSU. He said: ``We
    will retain the WMD scientists and technicians in countries
    like Iraq and Libya. We will help nations end the use of
    weapons-grade uranium in research reactors. The nations of the
    world must do all we can to secure and eliminate the nuclear,
    chemical, biological, and radiological materials.''
        Now, the reason I went into that in some detail is that I
    do not think the speech received the press it deserved in
    regard to the international effort to address this very key
    question. I know we are getting a lot of press about the events
    of the day in Iraq and the events of the day in an even
    numbered year, but in regards to the NDU speech I think the
    President certainly highlighted what needs to be done.
        In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2004, the DOE and the DOD were given the authority to use
    nonproliferation and CTR funds outside the FSU.
        We look forward to your testimony regarding your current or
    anticipated nonproliferation activities in new countries. For
    instance, the DOE has just announced a program aimed at funding
    science projects for former Iraqi WMD scientists. We are
    prepared to continue this discussion in closed session as
    necessary.
        The fiscal year 2005 budget request demonstrates the
    administration's continuing commitment to these threat
    reduction and other programs. I strongly share that commitment.
    The vast majority of these programs have been successful, but
    there have been some unfortunate past instances where the
    United States taxpayer dollars were invested in projects that
    never came to fruition.
        I am sure you would agree that continued support for these
    very critical programs requires both that the American people
    understand how they contribute to U.S. national security and
    that the programs be managed well to ensure that the American
    taxpayers are getting the maximum return on their investment.
        In that spirit, the subcommittee looks forward to your
    testimony in support of your fiscal year 2005 budget request
    for these very important nonproliferation programs. I thank you
    for your service, I thank you for your time and effort. I thank
    you for taking time out of your busy schedule to appear before
    this subcommittee.
        I will now turn to my distinguished friend and colleague,
    Senator Reed, for his opening remarks.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me
    join you in welcoming Administrator Longsworth and Secretary
    Bronson. Thank you very much for being with us today. I want to
    thank the chairman for scheduling this hearing on an
    extraordinarily critical and timely subject.
        Preventing the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological
    technology, materials, and weapons is vitally important to our
    Nation's security and to international stability. Our witnesses
    today are responsible for many of the important
    nonproliferation and threat reduction programs that are
    actively engaged to address the dangers presented by nuclear,
    chemical, and biological weapons. These are challenging
    problems.
        I want to particularly thank the people in the DOD and the
    DOE who have been working the field on these programs, often in
    very difficult circumstances, over the last 10 years. They are
    committed Federal and contractor employees who understand the
    importance of what they do.
        The cooperative efforts in Russia have been ongoing for
    over 10 years and, while much has been done, much remains to be
    done. For example, the effort to destroy Russian chemical
    weapons is finally aggressively under way. This effort is a
    truly cooperative effort, with substantial funding and support
    being provided by Russia, the United States, and the
    international community.
        To be successful, however, the program will require the
    continued support of the administration and Congress. For
    example, the authority of the President to waive certain
    certifications needed to keep this program on track will expire
    in fiscal year 2004. I believe the DOD will be seeking
    permanent authority to allow annual waivers of the
    certifications. Permanent authority is important to ensure that
    the program runs smoothly from year to year. I hope that we
    will be able to support the President's request in this year's
    National Defense Authorization Bill.
        Both the DOE and the DOD have expanded their programs in
    the republics of the FSU outside of Russia, expanding the work
    with countries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia,
    Ukraine, and others. It is important to building strong
    relationships with the United States. While what is required in
    each country is unique, there are opportunities to address
    chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) issues.
    I look forward today to discussing what your organizations are
    doing to expand the work in these countries.
        In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2004, the DOD was authorized to conduct CTR activities outside
    the FSU and the DOE was authorized to conduct materials
    protection control and accounting activities outside of the
    FSU. We would like to hear what each of you might do utilizing
    this authority.
        There are still challenges to be met, including the
    plutonium reactor shutdown program, mixed oxide fuel program,
    biosecurity and bio early warning programs, and the resolution
    of the current standoff between Russia and the United States on
    liability issues. I would very much like to get your thoughts
    on these and other challenges today.
        Again, welcome. We look forward to hearing from you.
        Thank you, Senator Roberts, again for holding this hearing.
        Senator Roberts. Senator Akaka, do you have any opening
    statement to make here?
        Senator Akaka. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you for calling this hearing.
        I welcome our witnesses. The programs you administer I feel
    are very vital to our national security and I am concerned the
    President or his people may not be giving you the priority that
    you deserve.
        I have a longer statement that I would request to be made
    part of the record, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Roberts. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

        Thank you Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing. I welcome our
    witnesses. The programs you administer are vital to our national
    security, but I am concerned the President is not giving them the
    priority they deserve.
        The Department of Energy (DOE) plays a vital role in maintaining
    the security of our country.
        In that regard, I am pleased to see that the Off-Site Source
    Recovery Project has been transferred from DOE's Office of
    Environmental Management to the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA), where there will be a greater focus on safety
    and security. I am also pleased that the funding level for this project
    is now more in line with the importance of its mission. I have
    introduced legislation, S. 1045, on this program which was incorporated
    into the pending energy bill. I am pleased to see that DOE is taking
    action to secure domestic radioactive sources.
        However, when it comes to the administration's approach to nuclear
    weapons, I have a number of concerns.
        The time and resources being devoted to research and development
    (R&D) of new weapons technology, such as the Robust Nuclear Earth
    Penetrator (RNEP) and new low-yield nuclear weapons, are taking away
    from other nonproliferation and threat reduction programs.
        As I have said before, these weapons systems are not needed and
    will require an ongoing funding commitment that we cannot afford. On
    the one hand, the administration is asking for an increase in funding
    for nuclear weapons by 5.4 percent. While on the other hand, the
    resources for programs critical for preventing the spread of nuclear
    weapons to terrorists is only increased by 1.1 percent, with cuts to
    some key programs.
        The President's budget priorities are sending the wrong message to
    would-be proliferators. We seem to be telling states that when it comes
    to nuclear weapons development, ``do as we say, not as we do!''
        When the administration seeks funding both to increase our test
    readiness and for new weapons research, while reducing the budget for
    nonproliferation programs, why should other countries not see that as a
    green light to develop nuclear weapons?
        We can't have it both ways.
        The U.S. cannot expect other nations to agree to give up their
    weapons while we seek to develop a newer, more usable nuclear arsenal.
        Moreover, the failure by the administration to accelerate the
    Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program is disturbing. Last spring,
    a Harvard study noted that a dramatic acceleration of the CTR program
    is clearly needed. The CTR and other DOE nonproliferation programs are
    the primary means we have to prevent weapons, weapon-usable materials,
    and the expertise in the former Soviet Union (FSU) from falling into
    the hands of terrorists.
        Just yesterday, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee,
    the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet said, ``Russian
    weapons of mass destruction materials and technology remain vulnerable
    to theft or diversion. We are also concerned by the continued eagerness
    of Russia's cash-strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace,
    and nuclear industries to raise funds via exports and transfers--which
    makes Russian expertise an attractive target for countries and groups
    seeking weapons of mass destruction and missile-related assistance.''
        We cannot afford this risk.
        We should heed the advice of experts at Harvard and the Central
    Intelligence Agency (CIA) and develop an accelerated plan to take
    control of nuclear material at the most vulnerable sites worldwide.
        By not doing this, the President is leaving the door open for
    terrorists to steal nuclear weapons.
        We must close that door.
        I welcome our witnesses, and I look forward to their testimony.

        Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, I am concerned that the
    President's budget priorities are sending the wrong message to
    would-be proliferators. We seem to be telling states that when
    it comes to nuclear weapons development, ``Do as we say, not as
    we do.''
        When the administration seeks funding both to increase our
    test readiness and for new weapons research, while reducing the
    budget for nonproliferation programs, we ask ourselves why
    other countries should not see that as a green light to develop
    nuclear weapons. In a way, we cannot have it both ways. The
    U.S. cannot expect other nations to agree to give up their
    weapons while we seek to develop a newer, more usable nuclear
    arsenal.
        Moreover, the failure by the administration to accelerate
    the CTR program is disturbing. Just yesterday in testimony
    before the Armed Services Committee, the Director of Central
    Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet said, ``Russian weapons of mass
    destruction materials and technology remain vulnerable to theft
    or diversion. We are also concerned by the continued eagerness
    of Russia's cash-strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical,
    aerospace, and nuclear industries to raise funds via exports
    and transfers, which makes Russian expertise an attractive
    target for countries and groups seeking weapons of mass
    destruction and missile-related assistance.''
        At this point we need to really consider whether we can
    afford this risk.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Roberts. Thank you, Senator.
        We now recognize the Honorable Paul M. Longsworth, who is
    the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation,
    NNSA, within the DOE. If you have to repeat that to everybody
    in regards to what you do, you probably spend a great deal of
    time doing that.
        Paul, your entire statement will be made part of the
    record. Every golden word will be ensconced for memory and
    shining the light of truth into darkness, so you feel perfectly
    free to summarize if you so wish. We recognize you at this time
    and thank you again for appearing.

       STATEMENT OF PAUL M. LONGSWORTH, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
      DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
                  ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Mr. Longsworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
        I do want to thank you for holding this hearing today. It
    is a pleasure to be back here before the subcommittee to
    discuss the important activities that we conduct in the
    nonproliferation arena.
        Before discussing specific activities, I want to first
    again thank this committee for its continued support for the
    very important efforts that you have all laid out. On behalf of
    the men and the women and the scientists and technicians that
    carry out this work in these far-flung locations, I want to say
    thank you on their behalf as well.
        In my oral statement I would like to briefly describe the
    specifics of our nonproliferation activities, address the
    critical components of our 2005 budget, and highlight some key
    accomplishments we have made. Mr. Chairman, as you have
    requested, I will discuss some of the challenges that we face.
        You quoted the President's speech and I think it bodes
    restating. He said at the NDU in February that, ``The greatest
    threat before humanity today is the possibility of a secret and
    sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological or
    nuclear weapons. America and the entire civilized world will
    face this threat for decades to come.'' The President went on
    to say that, ``We have to address this challenge with open eyes
    and unbending purpose.''
        I would say that that is what the programs in the Defense
    Nuclear Nonproliferation Office do. We carry out programs in 70
    countries across the world to prevent the spread of WMD and in
    many cases we are reversing the capabilities to support WMD
    programs. Our mission has seven principal components: We
    conduct cutting-edge nonproliferation and national security
    research and development (R&D); we secure nuclear weapons and
    North Korea and radiological materials at potentially
    vulnerable sites in Russia and throughout the world; we reduce
    the overall quantities of nuclear and radiological materials;
    we bolster border security overseas; we support international
    nonproliferation and export control regimes; we help downsize
    the nuclear weapons infrastructure in the FSU; and we work to
    mitigate the risks and consequences at nuclear facilities
    worldwide.
        By addressing key elements of the proliferation spectrum,
    these activities play an essential role in stemming
    proliferation of WMD.
        While our nonproliferation programs are international in
    scope, our activities also support the global war on terrorism
    by removing the raw materials that a terrorist might use to
    attack the U.S. or our interests abroad. In all of these cases
    our programs directly strengthen U.S. national security.
        Our mission goals form the crux of a multi-layered
    capability that reduces the incentive for terrorists and drug
    states to obtain WMD and reduce the access and the wherewithal
    to obtain such weapons. All of our program efforts are designed
    to bolster national security in the United States. We do not
    conduct foreign aid. We carry out projects that directly
    enhance U.S. national security interests.
        Our fiscal year 2005 budget is $1.35 billion. That is
    roughly a 1 percent increase over 2004, but it is a 60-percent
    increase over the 2001 appropriation. Some would argue that our
    budget is flat-lined. I think they would be wrong.
        We have moved into an era of global burdensharing. In 2002,
    President Bush proposed that the G-8 member nations join
    together to form a global partnership to step up proliferation.
    The President committed the U.S. to spend $10 billion initially
    in Russia over 10 years on such an initiative. Since then our
    partners in the G-8 have committed to spend up to $10 billion
    over 10 years to match the U.S. funding.
        The President has now proposed an expansion of the global
    partnership, both in terms of donors and recipient nations, to
    address proliferation threats worldwide. This burdensharing
    must be accounted for when we do an overall assessment of how
    much funding is going into nonproliferation programs globally.
        Let me just briefly walk through a few budget highlights in
    our fiscal year 2005 request. In the area of fissile materials
    disposition, this is by far our largest program. It accounts
    for about 43 percent of our total budget. The President's
    request includes $649 million for this work, of which $549
    million is for plutonium disposition.
        The fiscal year 2005 budget request seeks funding to begin
    construction of both the U.S. and the Russian mixed oxide (MOX)
    fabrication facilities in 2005. We are currently targeting May
    2005. We must resolve liability with the Russian Federation
    soon in order to meet that schedule, but this request reflects
    the U.S. commitment for proceeding with plutonium disposition.
        In the area of plutonium reactor shutdown in Russia, not
    only are we pursuing the disposition of weapons-usable
    plutonium, we are also working hard to get Russia to shut down
    its last remaining plutonium-producing reactors. They have
    three remaining reactors. We are on a schedule now to shut
    those down by 2008. We will shut down two by 2008 and we hope
    to shut down three by 2011. This is a program that actually was
    transferred from the DOD to the DOE.
        By shutting off these reactors, we will reduce the
    production of 1.2 metric tons of new plutonium each year. So
    every year that we do that sooner is another 1.2 metric tons of
    plutonium that will not be created.
        We expect to complete design by the end of 2004, and by
    that time we will have a firm, validated cost estimate for this
    project.
        In the area of material protection, control, and
    accounting, the President's request includes $238 million,
    which includes efforts to secure Russian warheads, plutonium,
    and highly-enriched uranium (HEU). It also includes our Second
    Line of Defense and Megaports programs, which are intended to
    detect illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological
    materials at border crossings, airports, and seaports. The
    objective of that program is to detect and stop weapons-usable
    material before it arrives at the U.S. border.
        In some smaller areas, which are by no means unimportant,
    we have requested an increase for the Off-Site Source Recovery
    Program. This recognizes the serious global threat that
    radioactive source materials might be used in radiological
    dispersal devices. This is a new effort for the NNSA and we are
    assuming responsibility for this program after it was
    transferred to us from the Office of Environmental Management.
    We estimate the initial program funding will be $5.6 million,
    with a projected cost of about $40 million over the next 5
    years.
        If you allow me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to walk through
    a few of the accomplishments we have achieved. I think these
    are important to go through because we are not very good at
    tooting our own horn. I think the folks that do this work
    throughout the world have achieved many laudable successes.
        I will start with the most obvious one. It is in Libya. The
    DOE played a key leading technical role to support the
    operation to verify Libya's pledge to dismantle its WMD. In
    North Korea, we are participating in the six-party talks on a
    technical level and we are beginning to develop the tool kit
    that will be necessary to support the complete, verifiable, and
    irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons
    program when that occurs.
        In the area of materials protection, control, and
    accounting (MPCA), we have accelerated the time line for
    securing the 600 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material
    at 55 sites in Russia and Eurasia, and we have accelerated that
    schedule by more than 2 years. From 2002 to 2003, we tripled
    the amount of new fissile material that is under safeguards and
    secured in Russia, and are operating at about the same pace
    this year.
        With the Russian Navy, we have completed 77 percent, or
    about 30 sites, of the 39 Russian nuclear navy sites where they
    store warheads, and we will be finished with that we think at
    the end of 2005. We are expanding our work with the Strategic
    Rocket Forces (SRF) to secure warheads at their sites. We have
    added three additional sites this year and hope to add
    additional sites in the near future.
        In the area of our Second Line of Defense program, we are
    continuing to install radiation monitors at sites throughout
    Russia and we plan to install this year 25 new sites in
    Kazakhstan and 25 sites in the Ukraine. Worldwide, we expect to
    be at 165 locations with nuclear trafficking detectors by the
    end of fiscal year 2005.
        In addition, we are very close to completing installation
    of radiation detectors at the largest seaport in Europe, the
    port of Rotterdam. That will be completed by mid-summer. We
    expect to conclude other letters of intent and agreements with
    other countries, most notably China, which has three very large
    ports, and we hope to do those in the April-May time frame.
        Under our Russian highly-enriched fuel return program, we
    have repatriated HEU fuel, fresh fuel, from Yugoslavia,
    Romania, and Bulgaria. This material in total was sufficient to
    make several nuclear weapons.
        Finally, in our R&D program, an often overlooked part of
    our program, we continue to have a 100-percent on-time payload
    delivery record for nuclear explosion monitoring satellite
    capabilities.
        So we have accomplished a lot, but there are many
    challenges and I would like to walk through those just briefly.
    Liability is the largest challenge we face right now. We are in
    a disagreement with Russia about what is an appropriate level
    of liability protection for U.S. workers and the U.S.
    Government. American contractors must have adequate liability
    protection in Russia and elsewhere, and we are urging the
    Russian government to seek a quick ratification in the Duma of
    the CTR umbrella agreement that contains full liability
    protections for U.S. work.
        CTR ratification will facilitate agreement on a number of
    other critical nonproliferation programs which are currently
    not being renewed until that agreement is ratified, most
    notably the mixed oxide fuel program and the Nuclear Cities
    Initiative (NCI).
        Transparency is another area that is a challenge. Achieving
    adequate transparency is an ongoing problem for many U.S.
    nonproliferation initiatives within the Russian Federation.
    Assuring that we are in fact securing the materials and
    facilities intended to be secured is challenging. It takes
    technology and it takes access. The NNSA is continuing to work
    bilaterally and multilaterally to ensure that our mutual goals
    are met in this area.
        I mentioned access. That is an ongoing problem. Our
    nonproliferation programs often require access to other
    countries' most sensitive facilities. In Russia, considerable
    progress has been made accessing the less sensitive sites, but
    we continue to be blocked from some of their most sensitive
    sites that have ongoing defense activities.
        We have established a working group that the Secretary and
    his counterpart, Minister Rumyantsev, formed to break down
    those barriers, and we believe it is working pretty well. It
    goes without saying that reaching agreement on access at these
    sites is a major challenge and will require patience and
    steadfastness on our part.
        Finally, concluding contracts and agreements is a complex
    process that often delays our work in Russia as well. Even
    though there is agreement in principle to undertake a given
    nonproliferation program, actually implementing the program
    requires time. The Russians have a fairly large bureaucracy.
    They inherited it from the Soviet era. It did not go away, and
    we face normal bureaucratic challenges there.
        Some of the solutions are: First and foremost, Secretary
    Abraham has developed a close working relationship with his
    counterparts in Russia in order to identify and address
    roadblocks to our progress very quickly. This has worked very
    well and he has committed to work with Mr. Rumyantsev's
    successor once they meet.
        To summarize, I would just like to draw your attention to
    the progress that our programs have made in recent years and
    the programs that have been accelerated and adapted to meet the
    complex and unpredictable security threats that we face. In his
    February 11 address, President Bush outlined the path forward
    to better strengthen the global nonproliferation regime, to
    control exports, and to further restrict access to nuclear
    technologies. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
    will continue to address these myriad of threats across the
    proliferation spectrum and we will do that in concert with our
    other Federal agencies.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Longsworth follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Paul M. Longsworth

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this subcommittee, for the
    opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the activities of the
    National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Defense
    Nuclear Nonproliferation. Before discussing our specific activities, I
    want to express how critically important I consider your contributions,
    both past, present, and future, to the United States' efforts to
    prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Of course, it
    goes without saying that our ability to address the myriad of
    proliferation threats that confront us requires that the U.S. Congress
    fully understand those threats, and that its Members are confident that
    the money they are authorizing and appropriating to NNSA's programs is
    being used effectively and efficiently to both meet and exceed the
    goals to which this funding is directed. Your continued support for our
    programs demonstrates the committee's long-standing commitment to
    furthering nonproliferation throughout the world. I appreciate your
    strong support and I look forward to our continued work together.
        There have been concerns raised in the past that our
    nonproliferation programs are akin to an aid program to Russia rather
    than a focused element of our Nation's agenda to prevent WMD
    proliferation. As it is a cooperative effort, U.S. and Russian
    nonproliferation objectives are not mutually exclusive, and substantial
    progress has been made. I hope this presentation will help to ease
    these concerns by drawing attention to the critical role our programs
    play in stemming the spread of WMD throughout the world, and enhancing
    our national security.
        In his recent speech at the National Defense University (NDU) in
    February, President Bush stated, ``The greatest threat before humanity
    today is the possibility of secret and sudden attack with chemical or
    biological or radiological or nuclear weapons . . . America, and the
    entire civilized world, will face this threat for decades to come.'' To
    meet this challenge, the President asked that we confront it ``with
    open eyes, and unbending purpose.''
        The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has expanded and
    accelerated its programs to address this proliferation threat. We now
    work with more than 70 countries to prevent the spread of WMD, and we
    are continuously adapting our activities to meet today's complex and
    unpredictable proliferation threats posed by ``rogue'' states and
    terrorist networks.
        I would now like to briefly describe the specifics of our
    nonproliferation activities, address critical components of our fiscal
    year 2005 budget request, highlight key accomplishments we have made,
    and outline current challenges that we face.

                                    MISSION

        Today, we are faced with a number of proliferators, rogue states,
    and terrorist networks that threaten United States and international
    security by actively pursuing WMD capabilities, technologies, and
    expertise. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation plays a
    prominent role in responding to these WMD proliferation threats. We
    recognize the broad scope and complex nature of this threat, and
    understand that our programs must identify and address potential
    vulnerabilities within the nonproliferation regime before terrorists or
    rogue states exploit them.
        Our mission is to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of
    WMD, while mitigating the risks associated with peaceful nuclear energy
    operations. We implement this mission by:

             Conducting cutting-edge nonproliferation and national
            security research and development (R&D);
             Securing nuclear weapons and nuclear and radiological
            materials at potentially vulnerable sites in Russia and across
            the globe;
             Reducing overall quantities of nuclear and
            radiological materials;
             Bolstering border security domestically and overseas;
             Supporting international nonproliferation and export
            control regimes;
             Downsizing the nuclear weapons infrastructure of the
            former Soviet Union (FSU); and
             Mitigating risks at nuclear facilities worldwide.

        By addressing key elements of the proliferation spectrum, these
    activities play an essential role in strengthening United States and
    international security. Our efforts are making the world more secure.
    But the nonproliferation regime still faces serious challenges from a
    few rogue states and terrorist threats seeking the capability to obtain
    WMD, and from those states that facilitate such activity or often
    appear indifferent to it. Lastly, we continue to receive reports of
    illicit efforts to acquire nuclear or radiological weapons technologies
    and materials.

                                     BUDGET

        The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program works to
    prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and materials to terrorist
    organizations and rogue states. For fiscal year 2005, the
    administration requests $1.35 billion to support activities to reduce
    the global WMD proliferation threat. Total dollars spent, however, is
    not the only measure for judging overall program effectiveness. It
    should be measured on accomplishments, which I will talk about later.
    This $1.35 billion is a 1 percent increase over fiscal year 2004, but
    it does not reflect the total funding for nonproliferation worldwide.
    We have moved into an era of global burdensharing. In 2002, President
    Bush proposed a new G-8 initiative on proliferation, and our partners
    have committed to spend up to $10 billion over 10 years to help
    decrease the proliferation threat, initially in Russia. The President
    has now proposed an expansion of the global partnership's donors and
    recipients, to address the proliferation threat worldwide. This
    burdensharing must be accounted for in the overall assessment of
    nonproliferation spending.
        One of the key obstacles we have encountered this year is a
    disagreement with Moscow regarding liability protection for plutonium
    disposition work performed in Russia. Even with the liability issue
    being worked on at high levels of the administration, lack of
    resolution to date has resulted in a 10-month delay in the start of
    construction of a mixed oxide (MOX) facility in Russia as well as a
    similar facility in the United States. The President's fiscal year 2005
    budget request seeks funding to begin construction of both the U.S. and
    Russian MOX facilities in May 2005, as we work to resolve the liability
    issue this spring. This reflects the U.S. commitment for proceeding
    with plutonium disposition.
        Not only are we pursuing the disposition of weapons-useable
    plutonium, we are also working hard to stop Russia from producing more
    plutonium that could be used for nuclear weapons. We have assumed the
    responsibility from the Department of Defense (DOD) for shutting down
    the last three plutonium production reactors in Russia and replacing
    them with fossil fuel plants by a targeted 2008 and 2011 timeframe.
    This will result in the cessation of Russia's annual production of 1.2
    metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium. Under the Elimination of
    Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program, we have selected the
    Washington Group International and Raytheon Technical Services to
    provide oversight for Russian contractors who will actually be
    performing the work at two Siberian sites. We are preparing preliminary
    designs for the planned fossil-fuel replacement plants and validating
    cost estimates for the program. As more of the engineering design work
    is completed, we will be better able to refine the overall cost and
    schedule for the replacement fossil-fuel plants. We expect to complete
    the detailed designs by the end of calendar year 2004, at which time we
    will be able to provide Congress with firm cost estimates.
        Given recent threats to the United States, it has become
    increasingly clear that protecting and securing nuclear materials and
    detecting nuclear and radioactive material at foreign ports, airports,
    and border crossings is a very high priority. Our budget request for
    Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPCA), which includes our
    Second Line of Defense programs and Megaports Program, is $238 million.
    Of that, $15 million will go toward moving ahead with our Megaports
    Program to train law enforcement officials and equip key international
    ports with radiation detection equipment to detect, deter, and
    interdict illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive
    materials. We are scheduled to complete work at ports in Greece and the
    Netherlands by late summer 2004. We have made a number of security
    improvements to nuclear Navy sites in Russia and we are now focusing
    resources on securing Strategic Rocket Force (SRF) sites.
        In addition to this work, we are also pursuing a dialogue with
    other countries, including China. We hope that these activities will
    lead to broader MPCA cooperation in the coming years.
        In fiscal year 2005, NNSA assumes responsibility for the Off-Site
    Source Recovery Project from the Office of Environmental Management.
    The requested program funding is $5.6 million, with a projected cost of
    about $40 million over the next 5 years to substantially reduce the
    risk of these source materials being used for radiological dispersion
    devices. The program works closely with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission (NRC) to prioritize source recovery.
        I would now like to detail our core mission activities and
    highlight some of our most recent accomplishments in each of these
    areas.

                                ACCOMPLISHMENTS

        The President's recent speech at the NDU included several
    nonproliferation measures designed to strengthen U.S. national
    security. Among his proposals, the President underscored the need to
    address the demand for the most critical elements of the nuclear fuel-
    cycle, enrichment and reprocessing, as well as a renewed, stronger
    approach towards the implementation of safeguards.
        The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is working directly
    with the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and with the Zangger
    Committee to strengthen the nuclear export control regime, that
    includes making the adoption of the International Atomic Energy
    Agency's (IAEA) Additional Protocol a condition of supply and banning
    the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Recognizing the
    need to work with emerging nuclear technology suppliers and
    transshipment states, we increased our work in the area of export
    controls by $6 million.
        Our work to secure nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, and
    radiological materials at potentially vulnerable sites in Russia and
    elsewhere is one of our most important missions. We are promoting the
    further safeguarding and physical protection of nuclear materials at
    nuclear sites worldwide, including the states of the FSU and in over 40
    countries with U.S.-origin material. The United States and Russia
    continue to accelerate cooperative nonproliferation efforts, and we are
    making progress. For example, we have accelerated the timeline for
    securing 600 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material at 55 sites
    in Russia and Eurasia by 2008. To date, we have upgraded the security
    of 41 percent of the material and compared to 2002, we tripled the
    amount of new material placed under comprehensive upgrades in 2003. We
    are also working internationally to consolidate and secure fissile
    materials and at-risk radioactive sources. We have upgraded security at
    13 nuclear facilities in Eurasia, holding 3.5 metric tons of weapons
    grade nuclear material, to meet international physical protection
    guidelines. Although our work continues to expand beyond the FSU, we
    are still working in the region to improve security at Russian Navy and
    SRF facilities--among the most sensitive facilities in Russia. We have
    expanded security upgrades of Russian Navy and SRF nuclear weapons
    sites and have secured 77 percent (30 sites) of the 39 Russian Navy
    warhead sites and initiated security upgrades at three Russian SRF
    sites.
        Downsizing the nuclear weapons infrastructure of the FSU remains an
    important activity. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, we have worked
    hard to reduce the potential for diversion of WMD expertise, materials,
    and technologies to terrorists and proliferant states. To meet this
    objective, we are working to redirect WMD scientists, engineers, and
    technicians to peaceful work and reduce WMD complexes by downsizing
    facilities and creating sustainable civilian alternatives. Through the
    Russian Transition Initiatives Program, we have engaged over 14,000
    former weapons scientists at over 200 institutes across the FSU in
    peaceful and sustainable commercial pursuits, attracting $162 million
    in private sector matching funds and over $140 million in venture
    capital and other investments, created 25 new businesses in the closed
    cities, and facilitated the downsizing of Russia's nuclear weapons
    complex.
        Late last year, the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
    established the Nuclear and Radiological Threat Reduction Task Force,
    which represents another important step in combating the threats posed
    by radiological dispersion devices or ``dirty bombs.'' We created this
    task force to identify, secure, store on an interim basis, and
    facilitate the permanent disposition of high-risk radiological
    materials that could be used as a radiological dispersal device, both
    in the United States and overseas; and identify the most vulnerable
    research reactors worldwide and develop an action plan to mitigate
    these vulnerabilities. Working in close concert with foreign countries
    and the IAEA, this task force will ensure that the NNSA has the
    capability to address the full spectrum of radiological threats,
    including locating and securing vulnerable radiological materials
    overseas, and recovering and securing unwanted and abandoned
    radioactive materials within the United States that pose security and
    health risks.
        Bolstering border security as a second line of defense is another
    important component of our strategy. To implement this core mission, we
    develop and employ nuclear detection equipment at key border crossings,
    airports, and ports, including major seaports or ``megaports,''
    worldwide. We also work hard to assist and train customs officials at
    home and abroad to detect the illicit trafficking of nuclear and
    radiological materials as well as identify dual-use commodities that
    might be used in WMD programs. Our hard work and cooperative efforts
    are paying dividends. For example, we have installed radiation
    detection equipment at 39 sites in Russia to detect, deter, and
    interdict the trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. Russia
    has also supplemented our cooperative border security efforts by
    upgrading and installing similar radiation detection equipment at many
    more of their prioritized border checkpoints. We maintain radiation
    detection equipment in more than 20 countries in the Baltics, Central
    and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Mediterranean. We launched
    our Megaports Initiative at the Port of Rotterdam, which we are
    currently equipping with detection equipment at this international,
    high-traffic ``megaport.''
        We are not alone in our efforts. The international community and
    recipient countries have responded with strong support to advance our
    mutual nonproliferation interests. The G-8 Global Partnership has
    committed $20 billion over the next 10 years to work on
    nonproliferation issues in Eurasia. We are working cooperatively with
    our G-8 partners to leverage the funding that we have committed to
    Russia and the work in which we are involved. In another program, we
    are working with India and Pakistan to help them cooperatively work to
    find means to stop cross-border infiltration and avoid conflict.
        Our cutting-edge R&D program improves the United States' ability to
    detect and deter WMD proliferation and strengthen nuclear treaty
    regimes such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Our R&D
    programs serve as the technical base that provides operational
    agencies--including the DOD and the Intelligence Community--with
    innovative systems and technologies to meet their nonproliferation
    missions. For example, we have tested laser-based remote sensing
    systems to detect and characterize effluents from suspect WMD
    production facilities, and are designing miniature synthetic aperture
    radar sensors to fly on board unmanned aerial vehicles. Our technology-
    base programs yielded several radiation detection systems now being
    used by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and evaluated at the
    test bed that we established at the Port Authority of New York and New
    Jersey. We have developed and produced nuclear explosion monitoring
    sensor payloads for deployment on Global Positioning System (GPS) and
    Defense Support System satellites, began designing the next-generation
    of space-based sensors, and are developing new tools to lower the
    threshold for detecting the yield of any nuclear explosion by two
    orders of magnitude. We continue to seek out improved solutions to
    emerging proliferation problems, and to coordinate our efforts with our
    U.S. Government partners.
        Strengthening international nonproliferation and export control
    regimes is another essential cornerstone of our efforts. We support
    U.S. nonproliferation treaties, initiatives, and agreements and work to
    strengthen international safeguards to detect clandestine nuclear
    programs and diversion of nuclear material from declared programs. By
    working with our international partners, we have accomplished a great
    deal to further the world's nonproliferation regime. Some of our recent
    accomplishments include Secretary Abraham's signing of the Statement of
    Intent on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Nonproliferation
    and Counterterrorism with Chairman Zhang Huazhu of the China Atomic
    Energy Authority this January in Beijing. Also in January, NNSA
    Administrator Brooks testified before Congress to urge prompt action on
    the Additional Protocol between the United States and the IAEA, to
    strengthen our hand in seeking other states' acceptance of strengthened
    international safeguards. In addition, we opened a Cooperative
    Monitoring Center in Amman, Jordan that will serve as a regional forum
    to discuss technical solutions to proliferation and other regional
    security problems. We are spearheading changes to Nuclear Supplier
    Group Guidelines to make the prevention of nuclear terrorism an
    explicit export control objective.
        To reduce stockpiles and available quantities of nuclear materials,
    we are working with Russia to irreversibly blend-down at least 500
    metric tons of surplus highly-enriched uranium (HEU). At the end of
    2003, over 200MT had been eliminated. We are also working with our
    Russian counterparts to shut down the three reactors in Russia that are
    still producing weapons-grade plutonium, and we are coordinating with
    them to return Russian-origin spent fuel to Russia. We further reduce
    quantities of weapons-usable HEU by converting research reactors in the
    United States and abroad to use low-enriched uranium (LEU) and working
    to eliminate 174 metric tons of HEU in the United States. The Office of
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation also is working proactively and
    cooperatively with Libya and international partners to dismantle
    Libya's WMD infrastructure. Currently, we are playing a leading
    technical role in the support of the operation to verify the
    dismantlement of Libya's nuclear program, and are playing a similar
    role in preparing for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible
    dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. In 2003, we
    helped remove 17 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU from Bulgaria and
    returned it to Russia for safe storage. We also worked with Russia and
    the IAEA to return approximately 14 kilograms of fresh Russian-origin
    HEU from Romania to Russia to be down-blended and used for civil
    nuclear purposes.
        Our final core mission objective is to mitigate risks at nuclear
    facilities worldwide. To reach this goal, we are providing assistance
    to Russia and Eurasian countries to establish enhanced emergency
    response programs, and we are working cooperatively with Russia to
    improve the safety and security of its nuclear weapons during
    transportation and storage in connection with dismantlement. We are
    focused on improving nuclear emergency management practices worldwide
    by working with the IAEA and other western countries. For example, we
    worked to strengthen the IAEA's notification capability in the event of
    a nuclear emergency and are assisting Ukraine, Russia, and Japan in
    establishing emergency management training programs.

                                   CHALLENGES

        Preventing the proliferation of WMD materials, technology, and
    expertise is a major undertaking, and developing a multi-layered
    approach to address these threats has not been without its challenges.
    In implementing our nonproliferation programs, liability issues,
    transparency, access, and concluding contracts and agreements will
    remain challenges in the years ahead. Since our nonproliferation
    programs are cooperative in nature, the progress we make is largely
    dependent on complex negotiations with Russia and other countries.
    Consequently, we will continue to face challenges in our work,
    particularly in Russia. I will now discuss these challenges in more
    detail.

                                   LIABILITY

        Resolving liability issues with the Russians remains a key
    challenge. American workers and contractors must have adequate
    liability protection in Russia and elsewhere. We are urging the Russian
    government to seek quickly Duma ratification of the Cooperative Threat
    Reduction (CTR) umbrella agreement that contains full liability
    protections. CTR ratification will facilitate agreement on a number of
    our critical nonproliferation programs, including the construction of
    U.S. and Russian MOX facilities to dispose of 34 metric tons each of
    surplus plutonium and continuing cooperative projects under the Nuclear
    Cities Initiative (NCI).

                                  TRANSPARENCY

        Achieving adequate transparency is an ongoing problem for many U.S.
    nonproliferation initiatives with the Russian Federation. Assuring that
    we are, in fact, securing the materials and facilities intended has
    been challenging. The NNSA will continue to work both bilaterally and
    multilaterally to ensure that our mutual goals are met and that
    cooperative programs remain objective, are preventing the proliferation
    of WMD, and promote long-term self-sustainability.

                                     ACCESS

        Nonproliferation programs often require access to other countries'
    most sensitive nuclear facilities. In Russia, considerable progress has
    been made accessing less sensitive sites. While we have had some
    success, we must continue to work to gain access to Russia's more
    sensitive sites and facilities. A working group has been established by
    Secretary Abraham and Minister Rumyantsev to address this issue and is
    testing new procedures for access to more sensitive Minatom facilities.
    It goes without saying that reaching agreement on access to these sites
    is a major challenge and will require patience and steadfastness on our
    part. After access agreement is reached, we must assure that its terms
    are honored.

                            CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS

        Finally, concluding contracts and agreements is a complex process.
    Even after there is agreement in principle to undertake a given
    nonproliferation program, actually implementing such a program requires
    time to bear fruit. Achieving concurrence on written agreements to move
    forward is often the first challenge to overcome. As a recent example,
    the Russian interagency must digest an agreement to return Russian-
    origin spent fuel back to Russia and dispose of it to reduce the amount
    of global HEU. While we expect this review to happen in the near
    future, it is indicative of the substantial efforts that both sides
    must undertake. After the requisite agreements are in place and agreed
    to by both parties, objective and realistic milestones have to be
    developed before any contract can be awarded, and performance metrics
    established to address how those milestones will be met. Overall
    program success is incumbent on sound fiscal stewardship, and we
    believe that we are taking the necessary steps to effectively maximize
    program success rates.
        There are a number of steps we have undertaken to meet these
    challenges. First, the Secretary of Energy has developed a close
    relationship with the acting Minister of Atomic Energy and overcoming
    these challenges in the nonproliferation arena has been a priority.
    Secretary Abraham intends to continue to work constructively with the
    acting Minister or his successor. Second, at the working level, experts
    from our programs leverage over a decade of experience and
    relationships with their Russian counterparts to resolve contentious
    issues through sustained negotiations.
        The subcommittee's support is also critical to overcoming these
    challenges and to the overall success of our programs. Although I am
    optimistic that we will be able to work through these challenges, your
    continued support will play an important role as we create and
    implement solutions to overcome current obstacles.

                                   CONCLUSION

        To summarize, I would again draw your attention to the progress our
    program has made in recent years and the acceleration with which we
    have expanded our activities to meet the complex and unpredictable
    security threats of our time. In doing so, we have strengthened the
    security of our Nation and are making the world a safer place. Working
    in concert with other U.S. Government agencies, the Office of Defense
    Nuclear Nonproliferation will continue to promote high-level political
    commitment among our cooperative country counterparts to establish an
    effective, comprehensive capability that can proactively react to an
    evolving threat environment. Our focus is on stemming the proliferation
    of WMD materials, technology, and expertise, and we will continue to
    work diligently and responsibly to counter that threat.
        Mr. Chairman and members of this subcommittee, this concludes my
    prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you
    and members of this subcommittee may have.

        Senator Roberts. Paul, thank you very much for your
    statement.
        We now hear from Ms. Lisa Bronson, who is the Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and
    Counterproliferation. Lisa, the same goes for you as it did for
    Paul. Please feel free to summarize and please be assured that
    virtually every verb, adjective, and adverb will be in the
    record.
        Please proceed and thank you for coming.

     STATEMENT OF LISA BRONSON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
        FOR TECHNOLOGY SECURITY POLICY AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION

        Ms. Bronson. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator
    Reed. Thank you for inviting me to discuss the DOD CTR program.
    My written testimony submitted for the record reviews some of
    the important work accomplished during the last 2 years. I will
    not repeat it here this morning.
        Mr. Chairman, the achievements noted in my written
    testimony represent a reduction in the threat posed by the
    former Soviet WMD stockpile to the United States and its
    allies. Threat reduction has always been a key measure of how
    well CTR is doing. Another measure is how well we ensure that
    the taxpayers are getting value for the money they invest in
    nonproliferation through the CTR program.
        The Heptyl and Vodkinsk situations, which involve
    significant losses in CTR investments, reminded us that there
    is a third important measure of success for this program. That
    is the extent to which our partner countries truly cooperate in
    CTR.
        In his February 4, 2004, testimony before the full
    committee, Secretary Rumsfeld was asked why the President's
    fiscal year 2005 CTR budget request for $409.2 million is lower
    than that requested in fiscal year 2004. The question implies
    that the annual budget request is the single measure of
    progress and the single indicator of commitment. It is an
    important metric, but there are three others: actual threat
    reduction, value for U.S. investments, and increasing the
    recipients' stake in the success of specific projects. Measured
    against the aggregate of these four metrics, the CTR program
    continues to be a vital component in the U.S. Government's
    national security strategy.
        My written testimony describes the underlying rationale for
    our budget request. Mr. Chairman, we have reported to you in
    detail on the $106 million loss suffered by CTR in the so-
    called ``Heptyl situation,'' in which Russia did not tell us
    that liquid rocket fuel destined for a CTR-constructed
    neutralization facility had been diverted to commercial uses.
    We have also had extended discussions about the Vodkinsk
    situation, in which CTR invested nearly $100 million in designs
    and site preparation for a solid rocket fuel elimination
    facility that was abruptly blocked by local Russian
    authorities.
        These two situations delivered a severe blow to the
    credibility of our Russian partners and caused us to rigorously
    review how we do business. My written testimony describes our
    management changes in detail.
        Mr. Chairman, it could be argued that the array of
    management changes implemented over the past 2 years risks a
    slowdown in CTR project execution. With the recent losses in
    Russia, we had no choice. We are carefully balancing our three
    goals of threat reduction, value for taxpayers' investment, and
    increased participation by partner countries. In some cases,
    simultaneous achievement of all three goals creates extra steps
    in project execution. In our judgment, this results in a better
    program.
        During the past 2 years we have significantly improved our
    responsiveness to Congress. We have resolved the backlog of
    reports and notifications. Some 24 reports and notifications
    have been delivered in the past 2 years. For the first time
    since the inception of the requirement, the CTR annual report
    was delivered on time in early February of this year.
        In March 2003, we began a 6-month comprehensive project by
    project review of the CTR program, building on the overall
    administration review conducted in 2001. This rescoping review
    for Russia revalidated the contribution of all project areas to
    current threat reduction areas, with some important
    adjustments, described in detail in my written testimony.
        The importance of continuing elimination of submarine-
    launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and intercontinental
    ballistic missiles (ICBMs), as well as the silos and launchers
    from which they are removed, was revalidated. However, CTR will
    cease to regrade the silo sites once current commitments are
    fulfilled. This function will be turned over to Russia. We
    concluded that silo regrading, while an important safety
    matter, did not contribute to CTR's core threat reduction
    mission and could reasonably be assumed by Russia.
        CTR will continue to de-fuel nuclear-powered ballistic
    missile submarines (SSBNs), seal the reactors, and remove and
    eliminate the missile launcher components. However, the
    practice of cutting up the bows and sterns will be turned over
    to Russia. We concluded that the work on bows and sterns did
    not contribute to threat reduction because it is not essential
    to the disabling of the submarine as a whole and elimination of
    the launcher compartment. In addition, this is an area where
    Russia can reasonably be expected to increase its stake in the
    success of this project.
        The rescoping review for Russia will ultimately affect
    approximately $185 million. These funds will be reallocated to
    other CTR projects.
        As a result of our review of Ukrainian projects, we decided
    to cancel a CTR project that would have built a hydro-mining
    system to remove solid fuel from previously demilitarized SS-24
    missile stages and convert the byproduct to mining explosives
    that would be turned over to Ukraine for sale. This project was
    significantly over budget and presented further cost escalation
    risks. Technical aspects of safely storing the propellant
    byproduct and converting it into mining explosives were also
    unresolved after significant expense.
        All warheads and proliferable components have been removed
    from the 163 rocket motors, which are in safe storage built by
    CTR. Accordingly, the threat from these missiles has already
    been eliminated. We have offered Ukraine an alternative, less
    risky means of disposing of these motors. After understandably
    tough consultations, we recently received an expression of
    interest from Kiev.
        Overall, we assess that over $100 million in CTR activities
    previously programmed for Ukraine did not make a direct
    contribution to threat reduction. These funds will be
    reallocated to other CTR activities in Ukraine, including the
    bio-weapons and WMD proliferation prevention project areas.
        Mr. Chairman, reviewing, revalidating, and rescoping these
    project goals in Russia and Ukraine will help ensure that CTR
    remains focused on current threat reduction priorities. Our
    adjustments to project areas are designed to ensure that CTR is
    returning real nonproliferation value for the taxpayers'
    investments. Our insistence on increased Russian participation
    in certain ongoing projects is directed toward increasing
    Russia's stake and accountability in the CTR program.
        Of course, none of these works can go forward until we have
    completed the fiscal year 2004 congressional notification
    requirement of section 1304--Mr. Chairman, excuse me for a
    moment. Sorry, I lost my place. Let me begin again.
        Senator Roberts. I do that a lot. You go right ahead.
        Ms. Bronson. The pages stuck together. My apologies.
        Senator Roberts. You at least admit it. We do not admit it.
    [Laughter.]
        Ms. Bronson. Mr. Chairman, we estimate that there are
    approximately 40 institutes that were part of the Soviet
    biological weapons program. These institutes often contain
    extensive collections of dangerous pathogens. They face threats
    from within--underemployed experts--and from without--poorly
    secured facilities and weak inventory controls.
        We address this former Soviet biological weapons threat by
    balancing carefully the risks of proliferation against Russia's
    compliance with international commitments. In Uzbekistan,
    Kazakhstan, and Georgia, CTR's biological weapons proliferation
    activities continue. In addition, an agreement to support
    Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention (BWPP) work in
    Ukraine is nearing completion, and we hope to expand this
    project area to the Kyrgyz Republic later this year.
        Of course, none of the BWPP work can go forward with fiscal
    year 2004 funds until the congressional notification
    requirements of section 1304 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act are met. I do not anticipate problems meeting
    this requirement for Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and
    Georgia.
        However, Russia poses unique challenges in this area. We
    continue to be concerned with Russia's compliance with the
    Biological Weapons Convention. Keeping Russia's bioweapons
    technology, pathogen collections, and expertise out of
    terrorist hands strengthens U.S. national security. However,
    those national security benefits need to be carefully weighed
    against the inherent risks of engagement. The risk of misuse
    can never be reduced to zero, but we are using policy and
    implementation strategies to minimize this risk and allow us to
    focus on the goal of biological weapons proliferation
    prevention.
        In conclusion, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz wrote his Russian
    counterparts in mid-2003 to urge their prompt action on a
    pending CTR legal agreement. He told these senior officials
    that, ``We are reviewing all CTR project areas for consistency
    with U.S. nonproliferation goals, as well as good stewardship
    of U.S. resources.'' Secretary Wolfowitz's message captures
    what we have done with CTR since the Heptyl and Vodkinsk
    situations and through the course of the rescoping review.
        CTR has been reducing the threat of WMD since it began over
    a decade ago. We have revalidated that goal and the
    contribution of our activities to that goal in an exhaustive
    review. However, we have also been reminded that, even if we
    protect Americans from the threat of WMD proliferation, we must
    constantly improve our processes to ensure that Americans
    receive true value for their investment.
        One of the recent lessons in this regard is that the
    original concept of a cooperative program pays dividends by
    increasing our partners' stake in the success of the assistance
    activities they receive. Reemphasizing the ``C'' in ``CTR'' is
    an important way to keep this key U.S. threat reduction program
    on solid footing in its second decade.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to respond to any
    questions you might have.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Bronson follows:]

                       Prepared Statement by Lisa Bronson

                      COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, thank you for inviting me to discuss
    the Department of Defense (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
    program. It has been 2 years since this subcommittee received testimony
    on the CTR program, when Assistant Secretary J.D. Crouch II appeared
    before you on March 6, 2002. Today, I would like to review some of the
    important work accomplished since then.

             In December 2003, the Fissile Material Storage
            Facility at Mayak, Russia--some 7 years in construction--was
            completed and certified by Russian regulators. The Mayak
            project will consolidate and securely store more than 25 metric
            tons of Russian weapons-origin plutonium.
             In March 2003, construction on the Chemical Weapons
            Destruction Facility (CWDF) at Shchuch'ye began after 11 years
            of planning and negotiation. This facility will destroy all of
            Russia's nerve agent inventory, thus eliminating a significant
            proliferation concern. On March 18, 2003, Russia formally
            committed to destroy all of its nerve agent weapons at
            Shchuch'ye.
             As of December 31, 2003, six countries have pledged
            $69 million to CWDF infrastructure, helping to ensure that this
            key project can begin operations on schedule.
             In February 2003, Russia signed the Nuclear Weapons
            Storage Site Security Protocol, granting CTR unprecedented
            access to help consolidate and secure decommissioned nuclear
            warheads.
             DOD completed vulnerability assessments for six of
            these sites and began designing comprehensive security upgrades
            for each. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) will shortly
            designate the next 10 sites for security enhancements. In
            addition, CTR has procured and transferred to the MOD 123
            ``Quick Fix'' fencing and sensors sets for installation at
            nuclear weapons storage sites, including the 12 noted above.
            The Quick Fix sets are designed to provide interim security
            upgrades to individual weapons bunkers. In all, DOD expects to
            provide comprehensive security upgrades at more than 32 long-
            term nuclear weapons storage sites, including Quick Fix and
            more permanent measures.
             In 2003, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan signed legal
            agreements with us to provide the foundation for our Weapons of
            Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI).
            Kazakhstan and Ukraine are ready to sign similar agreements.
            Georgia and Kazakhstan supplied us with dangerous pathogen
            samples as our Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention
            (BWPP) program moved forward.
             In May 2003, we began destroying rail-mobile
            intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and
            missiles in Russia.
             In Autumn 2003, we delivered 60 small-arms training
            sets and 1,200 hand-held radios to support nuclear weapons
            storage security forces at all 60 sites we believe to be active
            or used for training.
             In December 2003, we completed and commissioned
            systems to enhance security at the Kizner and Planovy chemical
            weapons storage sites in Russia.

                           HOW IS PROGRESS MEASURED?

        Mr. Chairman, the achievements noted above represent a reduction in
    the threat posed by former Soviet WMD to the United States and its
    allies. Threat reduction has always been a key measure of how well CTR
    is doing. Another measure is how well we ensure that the taxpayers are
    getting value for the money they invest in nonproliferation through the
    CTR program. The Heptyl and Votkinsk situations, which involved
    significant losses in CTR investments, reminded us that there is a
    third important measure of success for this program. This is the extent
    to which our partner countries truly ``cooperate'' in CTR. CTR has
    never been traditional foreign assistance, and increasing the stake
    that recipient countries have in the execution of CTR projects has
    proven an essential measure of success.
        In his February 4, 2004, testimony before the full committee,
    Secretary Rumsfeld was asked why the President's fiscal year 2005 CTR
    budget request for $409.2 million is lower than the fiscal year 2004
    request ($450.8 million). There are a number of reasons for the modest
    decrease. The question implies that the annual budget request is the
    single measure of progress and the single indicator of commitment. It
    is an important metric. But there are three others: actual threat
    reduction, value for U.S. investments, and increasing recipients' stake
    in the success of specific projects. Measured against the aggregate of
    all four metrics, the CTR program continues to be a vital component of
    the U.S. Government's national security strategy. The President and his
    administration remain firmly committed to his 2002 pledge of $10
    billion over 10 years for nonproliferation and threat reduction
    programs in the former Soviet Union (FSU), including--but not limited
    to--CTR. Yearly programmatic requirements mean that some annual
    requests, as for fiscal year 2005, will be slightly below the $1
    billion average; others will be slightly above.
        It is important to acknowledge that, of the 62 CTR program areas
    Congress has funded since the program's inception, 51 of those areas
    are now complete. This reflects the large amount of former Soviet
    nuclear weapons inventory and infrastructure that CTR has helped
    eliminate or secure. Many of CTR's original array of projects are
    reaching completion. These include projects that were capital-intense
    in their early construction phases. CTR's fiscal year 2005 program plan
    includes only two ``infrastructure-heavy'' projects: the Shchuch'ye
    chemical weapons destruction project already under way, and
    infrastructure supporting nuclear weapons site security enhancement
    projects. Newer areas of CTR focus--biological weapons nonproliferation
    and WMD-PPI--do not require capital-intense construction projects to
    achieve their threat reduction goals.
        The fiscal year 2005 budget request for Strategic Offensive Arms
    Elimination in Russia--which accounts for strategic systems work--is
    the same as it was for fiscal year 2004: $58 million. No money is
    requested for this capital-intensive work in Ukraine for fiscal year
    2005 because our threat reduction goals have been accomplished and we
    have sufficient funds to eliminate the 163 remaining SS-24 solid rocket
    motors by detonation or burning, pending Government of Ukraine
    agreement on the technical approach and process.
        The change from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2005 is caused
    primarily by the initiation of construction at the Shchuch'ye CWDF.
    Construction of the CWDF began in 2003, requiring a boost in fiscal
    year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 spending. Consistent with similar
    construction projects, customized, long-lead equipment that will be
    inside the facility was ordered in 2003 and more will be ordered in
    2004. Thus, the construction spending plan for the CWDF, adjusted for
    delayed commencement, always included high spending at the onset of the
    project. Decreased spending on Shchuch'ye, reflected in the fiscal year
    2005 CTR request, tracks with completion of the capital-intense
    construction phase, not a decrease in commitment. In fact, the actual
    schedule to complete Shchuch'ye has been accelerated in accordance with
    President Bush's direction: we plan to complete construction by
    February 2007 and transfer custody to Russia by September 2008.
        The authority Congress has granted to the President to waive the
    conditions on the Shchuch'ye project has been critical to our progress
    on this essential nonproliferation and threat reduction project. We
    urge Congress to make that waiver authority permanent beginning in
    fiscal year 2005, to that we can continue to work with Russia both to
    resolve the concerns underlying the congressional conditions on the
    Shchuch'ye projects and to allow the earliest possible destruction of
    Russia's nerve agent.
        The aggregate fiscal year 2005 request belies the number of
    important new CTR projects that will move forward without large capital
    infrastructure investments. These include the WMD-PPI and projects
    designed to address potential biological weapons proliferation. A
    summary of the fiscal year 2005 budget request is attached.

                             MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES

        Mr. Chairman, we have reported in detail to you and other
    committees on the $106 million loss suffered by CTR in the so-called
    ``Heptyl situation,'' in which Russia did not tell us that liquid
    rocket fuel destined for a CTR-constructed neutralization facility had
    been diverted to commercial uses. We have also had extended discussions
    about the Votkinsk situation, in which CTR invested nearly $100 million
    in designs and site preparation for a solid rocket fuel elimination
    facility that was abruptly blocked by local Russian authorities.
    Although the two situations were very different, they collectively
    represented a severe blow to the credibility of our Russian partners
    and caused us to rigorously review how we do business.

             We asked the DOD Inspector General (IG) to review CTR
            from top to bottom. The last of the IG's four reports that
            responded to this request was issued last month. The IG's work
            has been instructive and our staffs ultimately developed such
            close working relationships that the IG accompanied one of the
            DOD teams that meet semi-annually with Russian counterparts.
             In 2002, we did a baseline risk assessment of all CTR
            projects for weaknesses similar to the Heptyl situation--
            reliance on good faith Russian promises or assumptions. Today,
            legal commitments have replaced good faith obligations whenever
            CTR-provided infrastructure or equipment is used to carry out
            elimination projects.
             Six of these new agreements already have been signed.
            Based on our ``post-heptyl'' approach, we are awaiting
            signature of two additional agreements by the Russian MOD
            before any new work on the associated projects (enhancement of
            additional nuclear warhead storage sites and nuclear warhead
            rail transport car replacement) will be initiated. New legal
            commitments are introduced as needed to respond to new
            assistance requests.
             Each new project proposal is considered only after
            methodical analysis of ``Heptyl-like'' risks. This is the
            potential for the recipient country to use CTR assistance for
            purposes other than those intended. If the risk can be
            mitigated by legal and implementation strategies, then the
            proposal can be reviewed on its merits. If the risk cannot be
            mitigated the project will not be pursued.
             The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
            Technology, and Logistics created the office of the Deputy
            Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical
            Demilitarization and Threat Reduction (CD&TR)) with special
            oversight over CTR implementation. CD&TR and the Defense Threat
            Reduction Agency (DTRA), implemented several management changes
            to reduce our risks. These changes follow DOD acquisition
            management processes to promote a disciplined, business like
            approach to mitigate risk:

                     First is the adoption of the Milestone
                    Decision Authority (MDA) system, which is modeled after
                    the Defense Acquisition Board process. The MDA is the
                    one person responsible for balancing requirements with
                    risks, and approving and overseeing cost, schedule, and
                    performance baselines.
                     Second, we evaluated all projects against
                    cost, schedule, and political risk, and assigned the
                    appropriate level MDA for each project. Each project
                    will have a baseline approved and monitored by a MDA.
                     Third, we adopted the Integrated Product Team
                    (IPT) system to include all the stakeholders in the
                    implementation process, so tradeoffs between risk and
                    requirements can be made in a cooperative and working
                    atmosphere.
                     Fourth, we adopted a new reporting system to
                    alert higher management of any issues related to cost,
                    schedule, and performance.
                     Finally, we are opening up more overseas
                    offices in the FSU to allow for better onsite
                    management. These include offices in Tblisi, Georgia to
                    support biological weapons proliferation prevention,
                    Perm, Russia for solid ICBM elimination, and
                    Shchuch'ye, Russia for chemical weapons destruction.
                    Other offices may be opened up as our work expands.

        Mr. Chairman, it could be argued that the array of management
    changes implemented over the past 2 years risks a slow down in CTR
    project execution. With the recent losses in Russia, we had no choice.
    We are carefully balancing our three goals of threat reduction, value
    for taxpayers' investment, and increased participation by partner
    countries. In some cases, simultaneous achievement of all three goals
    creates extra steps in program execution. Our judgement is that this
    results in a better program. For example:

             The program of semi-annual ``executive reviews'' with
            Russian agencies responsible for CTR projects has been a
            vehicle to streamline communication, if not actually expedite
            projects. The executive reviews have transformed the way we do
            business with Russia by putting a premium on regularized
            transparency, accountability and open dialogue. Since July
            2002, five executive reviews have been held and our teams
            report that their Russian counterparts have been progressively
            more responsive and better prepared.
             In 2003, the Russian Aviation and Space Agency (RASA)
            volunteered to pay for refurbishment of three open-burn
            stands--potentially a $65 million expense--to help keep the
            mobile missile elimination project area on track after the loss
            at Votkinsk. RASA also readily agreed to new legal commitments
            we proposed to limit our risks on other aspects of the mobile
            missile elimination project area. This was the first time
            Russia independently increased its stake in a threat reduction
            project's success.
             We are also improving our business practices within
            the U.S. In the past, the complicated process of releasing
            appropriated CTR funds for actual obligation took over 180
            days. This involved certification or waiver of eligibility for
            the recipient country and congressional notification. For 2004
            funds, a certification or waiver was executed for most CTR
            countries, including Russia, on November 7, 2003, only 37 days
            into the fiscal year. The waiver authority has proven an
            important threat reduction tool with respect to Russia, and as
            the waiver authority expires at the end of fiscal year 2005, we
            will urge that Congress make this authority permanent in the
            next legislative cycle (2006).

        Finally, we have significantly improved our responsiveness to
    Congress. During the past 2 years, CTR policy and implementation staff
    have worked very hard to resolve a backlog of reports and
    notifications--some 24 reports and notifications have been delivered.
    For the first time since the inception of the requirement, the CTR
    annual report was delivered on time in early February of this year.
    Congressional oversight of the CTR program is important and welcomed. I
    estimate that the CTR policy and implementation staff spent an average
    of 5,300 hours per year during the past 3 years responding to reporting
    requirements and audits. We appreciate the move by Congress to
    consolidate several of those reporting and notification requirements
    into a single ``CTR Annual Report.'' This allows us to provide the same
    amount of information in a more efficient manner.

                      THE FIRST PROJECT-BY-PROJECT REVIEW

        Since September 11, 2001, DOD has refined the CTR program to ensure
    that it effectively addresses new threats associated with the global
    war on terrorism, even as we continue to pursue the program's
    longstanding goals and project activities. In March 2003 we began a 6-
    month, comprehensive, detailed, project-by-project review of the CTR
    program, building on the overall administration review of non-
    proliferation and threat reduction assistance in 2001.
        We evaluated the Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination and Nuclear
    Weapons Transportation/Security project areas against several criteria:
    actual contribution to threat reduction, support to national strategy
    and the global war on terrorism, best value for taxpayers' money, and
    the extent to which our Russian and Ukrainian partners have had an
    increasing stake in, and responsibility for, a project's success. We
    chose these project areas because they included a number of activities
    that had been under way for many years--certainly prior to the changes
    in U.S. strategy brought on by the September 11 attacks. We did not
    review the chemical weapons destruction, BWPP, or WMD-PPI project areas
    because they are more recent projects that are clearly in line with our
    current nonproliferation priorities.
        The review resulted in the revalidation of a majority of Strategic
    Offensive Arms Elimination and Nuclear Weapons Transportation/Security
    projects in Russia including the rescoping of 20 projects. All current
    contractual and other commitments in Russia will be fulfilled. The
    review resulted in the revalidation of our general approach in Ukraine
    with extensive refinements to certain projects.
        We reviewed Ukrainian and Russian projects separately because of a
    significant difference in key acquisition milestones. The Ukraine
    review was completed in March 2003, approved by the U.S. interagency in
    April and briefed to Ukrainian officials in May. The Russia review was
    completed in August 2003, approved by the interagency in October and
    briefed to Russian officials in November.
    Russia
        The rescoping review for Russia revalidated the contribution of all
    project areas to current threat reduction efforts, with some important
    adjustments.

             Liquid-fuel missiles: The importance of continuing
            elimination of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
            and ICBMs as well as the silos and launchers from which they
            are removed was revalidated. However, CTR will cease to regrade
            silo sites once current commitments are fulfilled. This
            function will be turned over to Russia. We concluded that silo
            regrading, while an important safety matter, did not contribute
            to CTR's core threat reduction mission and could reasonably be
            assumed by Russia.
             Solid-fuel missiles: Most of the activity in this area
            is yet to begin, as mobile SS-24 and SS-25 missiles are just
            beginning to be decommissioned. The importance of eliminating
            these strategic systems, as well as their launchers, as rapidly
            as Russia will turn them over was reaffirmed. However, CTR will
            refrain from eliminating a number of SS-N-20 missiles that have
            already been decommissioned until Russia turns over additional
            nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) for
            dismantling. As a matter of policy, CTR always insists that
            launchers (silos, mobile launchers or SSBN launch compartments)
            be turned over for elimination if we are to eliminate the
            associated missiles. Eliminating the missiles alone could
            facilitate modernization of overall Russian force structure.
             SSBN dismantlement: CTR will continue defueling SSBNs,
            sealing the reactors, and removing and eliminating the missile
            launcher compartments. However, the practice of cutting up the
            bows and sterns will be turned over to Russia. We concluded
            that the work on bows and sterns did not contribute to threat
            reduction because it is not essential to the disabling of the
            submarine as a whole and elimination of the launcher
            compartment. In addition, this is an area where Russia can
            reasonably be expected to increase its stake in the success of
            this project area.
             Spent Nuclear Fuel. CTR will continue defueling SSBN
            reactors and securing the fuel in specially designed casks.
            However, the project to refurbish a building for long-term
            storage of the casks at the Mayak nuclear complex will be
            suspended once designs are complete. There is enough storage
            space at the shipyards where SSBNs are dismantled to
            temporarily store these casks pending final disposition by the
            Russian Federation. CTR is prepared to improve security at the
            shipyard storage areas if necessary. The Mayak refurbishment
            project was judged to be an unnecessary infrastructure
            requirement that did not contribute to threat reduction.
             Nuclear Weapons Security/Transportation. We
            revalidated the value of supporting Russian transportation of
            warheads to secure, central storage sites with improved
            inventory controls. However, CTR will turn over to Russia
            responsibility for the personnel reliability and emergency
            response support activities under this project area. These
            activities will be at low cost to Russia, and provide an
            opportunity to increase Moscow's stake in the success of this
            project. In addition, CTR will continue transferring
            responsibility for certain nuclear weapons storage site
            security projects to the Department of Energy (DOE). The DOD
            and DOE have worked closely on these complimentary efforts over
            the past 2 years. Among other issues, storage sites more
            closely associated with DOE activities were shifted to the DOE
            for security improvements. These sites were often sites linked
            to Russian naval facilities.

        The rescoping review for Russia will ultimately affect
    approximately $185 million. These are funds that will be reallocated to
    other CTR projects, or that will shift to DOE through the transfer of
    certain nuclear weapons storage security responsibilities.
    Ukraine
        As a result of our review, we decided to cancel the CTR project
    that would have built a hydro-mining system to remove solid fuel from
    previously demilitarized SS-24 missile stages and convert the byproduct
    to mining explosive that would be turned over to Ukraine for sale. The
    project was significantly over budget and presented further cost
    escalation risks. Technical aspects of safely storing the propellant
    by-product and converting it into mining explosives also were
    unresolved after significant expense. All warheads and proliferable
    components have been removed from the 163 rocket motors, which are in
    safe storage built by CTR. Accordingly, the threat from these missiles
    has been eliminated. We have offered Ukraine an alternative, less risky
    means of disposing of these motors. After understandably tough
    consultations we recently received an expression of interest from Kiev.
        We also cancelled CTR projects in Ukraine that would have
    neutralized fuel from air-to-surface missiles, and destroyed liquid
    rocket fuel tank farms and concrete aprons where strategic bombers once
    sat on alert. We concluded that these projects no longer supported
    CTR's central threat reduction and nonproliferation mission because
    this infrastructure, in its current form, could not be used for any
    threatening activity or proliferated outside Ukraine. The requirements
    to eliminate this infrastructure are not complex or expensive, and were
    judged readily assumable by Ukraine. We revalidated projects to destroy
    strategic bombers still in Ukraine, as well as several old nuclear
    warhead storage bunkers, the designs for which could be exploited.
        Overall, we assessed that over $100 million in CTR activities
    previously programmed for Ukraine did not make a direct contribution to
    threat reduction. Of that total, approximately $30 million had already
    been appropriated. These funds will be reallocated to other CTR
    activities in Ukraine, including the biological weapons and WMD
    proliferation prevention project areas.
        Mr. Chairman, reviewing, revalidating, and rescoping these project
    goals in Russia and Ukraine will help ensure that CTR remains focused
    on current threat reduction priorities. Our adjustments to project
    areas are designed to ensure that CTR is returning real
    nonproliferation value for the taxpayer's investments. Our insistence
    on increased Russian participation in certain ongoing projects is
    directed toward increasing Russia's stake and accountability in the CTR
    program.

                  BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION PREVENTION

        Mr. Chairman, we estimate that there are approximately 40
    institutes that were part of the Soviet biological weapons program.
    These institutes often contain extensive collections of dangerous
    pathogens. They face threats from within--under-employed experts; and
    from without--poorly secured facilities and weak inventory controls. We
    address this former Soviet biological weapons threat by balancing
    carefully the risks of proliferation against Russia's compliance with
    international commitments. In Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia,
    CTR's BWPP activities continue. In addition, an agreement to support
    CTR BWPP work in Ukraine is near completion and we hope to expand this
    project area to Kyrgyz Republic this year. CTR helps to reduce the
    biological weapons proliferation threat by:

             Consolidating and enhancing the security of dangerous
            pathogen collections at biological institutes to help prevent
            their theft, diversion, or accidental release;
             Eliminating infrastructure, equipment, and facilities
            previously used to perform biological weapons related research,
            testing, and production;
             Engaging former biological weapons scientists in
            peaceful pursuits by refocusing research priorities and
            projects, increasing transparency at biological institutes,
            promoting higher standards of ethical conduct, preempting a
            potential ``brain drain'' of scientists to rogue states and
            terrorist groups, and providing U.S. access to scientific
            expertise and pathogens to improve public health and enhance
            preparedness against biological threats;
             Implementing a Biological Weapons Threat Agent
            Detection and Response (TADR) project in Central Asia and the
            caucasus to access medical intelligence, consolidate pathogen
            collections into central labs, modernize diagnostic
            capabilities to minimize need for pathogen retention at
            vulnerable field stations, and develop a network of trained,
            ethical scientists to prevent, deter, and contain either a
            naturally occurring outbreak or a bioterrorist attack.

        Of course, none of this work can go forward with fiscal year 2004
    funds until the congressional notification requirements of section 1304
    (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004) are met. I do
    not anticipate problems meeting this requirement for Kazakhstan,
    Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Georgia. Outside Russia, cooperation on BWPP
    activities has been very good. We have had prompt agreement on the
    legal architecture to cover this CTR project area. In addition, a
    number of countries readily provided samples of dangerous pathogen
    strains native to their regions. DOD management and technical teams
    made nine trips in support of BWPP overall during 2003. Our teams
    traveled to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to discuss anticipated projects
    and toured three Uzbek and two Kazakh institutes to record observations
    and photographs to support future work. These teams also reviewed the
    ongoing threat and vulnerability analyses of these institutes and
    evaluated recommendations for emergency security upgrades proposed by
    the CTR contractor on these projects.
        Russia poses unique challenges in this area:

             We continue to be concerned with Russia's compliance
            with the Biological Weapons Convention.
             We are also concerned about the solvency of certain
            Russian laboratories being assisted by CTR.
             Russia has still not provided a sample of its altered
            anthrax strain. A research grant was made with the clear
            understanding that the altered anthrax strain would be provided
            to the U.S. The Russian government has obstructed the release
            of this strain. This is inconsistent with the spirit of
            cooperation against the bioterrorism threat to which Presidents
            Bush and Putin agreed in November 2001.
             We are also concerned that Russia has not been more
            forthcoming on developing an efficient legal architecture
            through which to provide CTR assistance. This assistance is
            currently provided through the International Science and
            Technology Center agreement negotiated by the Department of
            State. While it is possible to carry on CTR activities in this
            manner, it is inconsistent with CTR's strategy of using
            project-related implementing agreements.

        Sound implementing agreements are one of the ways we manage program
    risks that are inherent in CTR's work. We also took several important
    steps in 2002 and 2003 to manage the proliferation risks associated
    with Russia's collections of pathogens and biological infrastructure.

             In September 2002, the administration adopted
            interagency guidelines for U.S. efforts to engage the former
            Soviet biological weapons community, which take into account
            our concerns about Russia's failure to fully comply with its
            Biological Weapons Convention commitments. These guidelines
            help U.S. agencies support nonproliferation policy choices by
            providing project evaluation and selection criteria and by
            establishing a coordination mechanism for agencies involved in
            bio-related assistance to Russia.
             We refined and added to the internal DOD review
            mechanism that is designed to mitigate risks associated with
            Cooperative Biological Research (CBR) projects. A new CBR
            project proposal is reviewed by a DOD Advisory Board consisting
            of biodefense, counterproliferation, technology security and
            intelligence experts. Proposals are studied for dual-use
            potential, scientific and technical merit, relevance to
            national strategy, risk of diversion, and feasibility. These
            projects are also scrutinized using the MDA review process.
             The DTRA and the Department of the Army concluded a
            memorandum of understanding in January 2004 that will help
            ensure a supply of seasoned U.S. personnel to support CTR's
            cooperative biological research program. These personnel, under
            the auspices of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
            Infectious Disease (USAMRIID) will help to bring western
            standards of research transparency and conduct to the former
            Soviet biological weapons community. The experience of the
            USAMRIID personnel also helps limit the risk of CTR assistance
            being surreptitiously diverted for purposes inconsistent with
            international law.

        Keeping Russia's biological weapons technology, pathogen
    collections, and expertise out of terrorist hands strengthens U.S.
    national security; however, those national security benefits need to be
    carefully weighed against the inherent risks of engagement. The risk of
    misuse can never be reduced to zero, but we are using policy and
    implementation strategies to minimize this risk and allow us to focus
    on the goal of BWPP.

        WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION-PROLIFERATION PREVENTION INITIATIVE

        The WMD-PPI is designed to address the vulnerability of the FSU's
    porous borders to WMD smuggling. DOD intends to build capabilities of
    Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine to stem the potential
    proliferation of WMD.
        During 2003, the CTR staff began building the necessary legal
    framework for assistance to the four WMD-PPI recipient governments.
    Much progress has been made, with agreements signed between the DOD and
    Azerbaijan in January 2004, and between the DOD and Uzbekistan in
    October 2003. Ukraine has notified us that it is ready to sign, and we
    are in final negotiations with Kazakhstan. Discussion of requirements
    with these recipients is also at a mature stage, and obligation of
    funds will begin this year. We will provide equipment, training, and
    other support to help develop self-sustaining capabilities to prevent
    the trafficking of WMD materials across recipients' borders. WMD-PPI is
    being implemented in close coordination with other U.S. agencies to
    ensure it complements ongoing government assistance projects.
        Our plans include providing Uzbekistan the ability to detect
    radiological materials at key border crossings. This project area will
    be designed to transition into the larger DOE ``Second Line of
    Defense'' program once DOE is better positioned to assume
    responsibility. This activity helps WMD-PPI leverage pre-existing
    relationships in Uzbekistan during a period of increased DOD activity
    in the area.
        A key element of WMD-PPI will be a Caspian Sea WMD maritime
    interdiction project. We will provide surveillance radars and boarding
    and maritime interdiction equipment, to include small vessels, to
    Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to build their capabilities to police their
    own borders against illicit WMD trafficking. An essential aspect of
    this project will be inclusion of WMD-related training both for
    operation of the equipment as well as follow-on maintenance
    requirements. This is a capabilities-based WMD non-proliferation
    activity: CTR's goal is to do what is necessary to build the
    capability, and then eventually turn it over to Azerbaijan and
    Kazakhstan to execute as their contribution to the global war on
    terrorism and WMD. Our initial plan calls for a 5-year project timeline
    to create the necessary capabilities.
        In Ukraine, WMD-PPI will assume a larger place, along with the
    BWPP, now that strategic infrastructure projects have been cancelled or
    wrapped up more quickly. Notional plans include building Ukrainian
    capabilities to detect and interdict smuggled radiological materials in
    the Transnistria region.

                               EXPANDED AUTHORITY

        The administration appreciates the new authority granted the
    President to use up to $50 million annually in existing CTR
    appropriations outside the FSU. Section 1308 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for 2004 provides this important flexibility in the
    global war on terrorism. Enactment of this provision was a truly
    significant modernization of CTR's basic authorities. It allows our
    important work to go forward while improving readiness for a variety of
    contingencies in the global war on terrorism where DOD might bring
    special non-proliferation expertise to bear. On February 11, the
    President called for the expansion of the G-8 Global Partnership
    Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, of
    which CTR is an important part, to address WMD proliferation threats
    worldwide. He specifically mentioned retraining WMD scientists and
    technicians in countries like Iraq and Libya, and the need to secure
    and eliminate WMD and radiological materials worldwide. The ability to
    use CTR outside the FSU is an important tool to help realize the
    President's proposal; we urge Congress to maintain the new authority.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Mr. Chairman, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz wrote his Russian
    counterparts in mid-2003 to urge their prompt action on a pending CTR
    legal agreement. He told these senior officials that ``we are reviewing
    all CTR project areas for consistency with U.S. nonproliferation goals
    as well as good stewardship of U.S. resources. The amendment we have
    requested is reasonable and will facilitate the important cooperative
    nonproliferation work DOD has undertaken . . . through the CTR
    program.''
        Dr. Wolfowitz's message captures what we have done with CTR since
    the Heptyl and Votkinsk situations, and through the course of the
    rescoping review. CTR has been reducing the threat of WMD since it
    began over a decade ago. We have revalidated that goal and the
    contribution of our activities to that goal in an exhaustive review.
    However, we have also been reminded that even as we protect Americans
    from the threat of WMD proliferation, we must constantly improve our
    processes to ensure that Americans receive true value for their
    investment. One of the recent lessons in this regard is that the
    original concept of a ``cooperative'' program pays dividends by
    increasing our partners' stake in the success of the assistance
    activities they receive. Re-emphasizing the ``C'' in CTR is an
    important way to keep this key US threat reduction program on solid
    footing in its second decade.

                                   ATTACHMENT
                        FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST

    Russia: Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)
        The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $58.5 million for
    SOAE--unchanged from fiscal year 2004. SOAE assists Russia in
    eliminating strategic delivery systems and infrastructure. One of the
    larger project areas under SOAE relates to Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM
    and Mobile Launcher Elimination, where $29.1 million is requested for
    fiscal year 2005. Other funds eliminate SLBMs and liquid-fueled ICBMs
    and their launchers. The program supports placement of spent naval
    reactor fuel into casks for long term storage, destruction of the
    launcher section and sealing of the reactor compartment.
    Russia: Nuclear Weapons Storage Security (NWSS)
        CTR's NWSS program assists Russia with safe and secure storage for
    nuclear warheads. We requested $48.6 million in the fiscal year 2005
    budget for this program. All of the funds are directed toward the Site
    Security Enhancements project, which provides urgently needed security
    enhancements to the MOD nuclear weapons storage sites and select
    temporary transshipment points for movement of deactivated warheads.
    DOE provides comprehensive security enhancements to storage sites on
    all Russian Navy and some Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) bases. These
    activities are closely coordinated with DOE and other U.S. agencies.
    Russia: Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security (NWTS)
        We have requested $26.3 million for the NWTS program, which will
    provide safe and secure transport of approximately 1,500 nuclear
    warheads from deployed sites to dismantlement or enhanced security
    storage sites. This is a $3.1 million increase over the fiscal year
    2004 budget. This increase reflects an anticipated increase in railroad
    shipping tariffs and a need to replace aging warhead cargo railcars.
    Russia: Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) Construction
        In December 2003, CTR completed work on and transferred custody of
    the FMSF to the Russian Federation. This facility provides a secure,
    centralized storage facility for weapons grade fissile material. DOD is
    negotiating a transparency agreement to ensure the quality and quantity
    of material stored at the FMSF. DOD may require funding to design,
    construct, test, and certify a system to assess whether the contents of
    the fissile material containers to be loaded in the FMSF are of the
    desired quality and quantity.
    Russia: Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention
        Overall funding requested for the BWPP program in fiscal year 2005
    rose slightly from $54.2 million in fiscal year 2004 to $54.9 million.
    The BWPP funding request reflects the administration's firm commitment
    to combat biological weapons proliferation as part of the war on
    terrorism. DOD anticipates obligating approximately $20 million of
    fiscal year 2005 funds for BWPP activities in Russia.
    Russia: Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD)
        The budget request for the CWD program in Russia is $158.4 million,
    a decrease of $41.9 million. The reduction results primarily from the
    fact that we have passed the high point of the construction funding
    curve on the CWDF at Shchuch'ye. In addition, we will complete work on
    the Chemical Weapons Production Facility Demilitarization project at
    Volgograd this year.
        The CWDF saw a significant increase in fiscal year 2004 spending
    due to initiation of construction in March of last year. Since the
    design for the entire facility was over 80 percent complete, the
    construction drawing sets for many buildings were approved for
    construction. DOD has authorized construction of those buildings using
    the prior-year funding. The fiscal year 2005 funding level ($155.2
    million) continues to meet the President's direction to accelerate the
    CWDF consistent with the rebaselined schedule that calls for
    construction completion in February 2007 and transfer of custody to the
    Russian Federation by September 2008. Congress, in fiscal year 2002,
    conditioned all future funding for construction at Shchuch'ye on its
    certification of six conditions; the administration continues to press
    Russia on the two that remain unfulfilled: a full and complete
    accounting of the size of the Russian chemical weapons stockpile, and
    the completion of a practical plan for eliminating nerve agents.

                          NON-RUSSIAN FSU STATES: BWPP

        The budget request for BWPP increased slightly from the fiscal year
    2004 level of $54.2 million to $54.9 million. DOD anticipates
    obligating $34.9 million toward non-Russian FSU states in fiscal year
    2005, a significant increase from fiscal year 2004. This increase is
    due primarily to the expansion of the CBR project area and Biosecurity
    and Biosafety projects in the region, as well as continued
    implementation of the biological weapons TADR project in Uzbekistan,
    Kazakhstan, and Georgia. Ukraine and the Kyrgyz Republic have expressed
    interest in BWPP program activities and CTR staff are negotiating the
    necessary legal framework to support such assistance.

             For CTR's Biological Weapons Infrastructure
            Dismantlement and Restructuring program, DOD is requesting $1.7
            million for fiscal year 2005 to continue eliminating remnants
            of Soviet biological weapons-related infrastructure in Georgia
            and Kazakhstan.
             For CTR's CBR project area, DOD is requesting $7.1
            million for fiscal year 2005. This will continue projects in
            Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to help prevent the proliferation of
            biological weapons expertise, enhance transparency, improve
            standards of conduct of former biological weapons scientists,
            and leverage their extensive expertise. There is currently one
            project in Kazakhstan and two in Uzbekistan; CTR plans to
            develop new projects in both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as well
            as in Georgia. In addition, we hope to be able to move forward
            with this project area in Ukraine during fiscal year 2005.
             For CTR's Biosecurity and Biosafety project area, DOD
            is requesting $12.6 million for fiscal year 2005. We will
            continue projects in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia. We
            hope to initiate projects in Ukraine and the Kyrgyz Republic
            under this project area.
             For CTR's TADR project area, DOD is requesting $13.5
            million for fiscal year 2005. Under this project area, CTR
            promotes biosecurity and biosafety at biological facilities in
            Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia by strengthening dangerous
            pathogen detection and response networks, facilitating the
            discovery of the diversion or accidental release of biological
            materials and allowing the removal of dangerous pathogen
            collections from existing sentinel stations and consolidation
            of them in central reference laboratories. We hope to initiate
            projects in Ukraine and Kyrgistan.

                        NON-RUSSIAN FSU STATES: WMD-PPI

        As in 2003 and 2004, we are requesting $40.0 million in fiscal year
    2005 to support WMD-PPI, which is designed to enhance Kazakh, Azeri,
    Ukrainian, and Uzbeki capabilities to prevent, deter, detect, and
    interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and related materials. While this
    is not a security assistance program, DOD is coordinating with other
    U.S. agencies to finalize the overarching strategic plan for export
    control and border security assistance to these states. This initiative
    builds on the foundation created by the CTR Defense and Military
    Contacts program.
        In implementing the WMD-PPI, DOD has developed projects designed to
    produce comprehensive operational capabilities based on the interagency
    approved U.S. strategic plan and country/regional requirements. These
    projects will provide not only equipment and related training, but also
    self-sustaining operations and maintenance capabilities.

        Senator Roberts. Ms. Bronson, I thank you for an excellent
    statement. Thank you for summarizing your very important
    points, especially in regards to your emphasis on the
    cooperative nature of these programs.
        I am not going to get into a personal history of this, but
    this subcommittee was first formed on the suggestion of Senator
    Warner, Senator Lieberman, and Senator Coats, and I did have
    the privilege of chairing it at its first beginning. Obviously,
    the Nunn-Lugar program and the other programs have a life of
    their own in terms of value. But we have experienced serious
    problems and we have come up with some requirements, as a
    matter of fact, the requirements that basically saved the
    program from the criticisms that were being voiced in the
    House, and agreed to by the Russians and many delegations that
    would come here.
        Under the circumstances, I think that your comments are
    right on point.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for your testimony. Both witnesses and the
    chairman referred to the President's speech, and it was a
    sobering but also a very ambitious challenge to all of us. I
    wonder how the budget for this year measures up to the
    challenge and to the scope of the problem. I know, Secretary
    Bronson, you said it is only one measure of what you are doing,
    but as I understand it the DOD budget goes down by $40 million.
    There are significant cuts of programs, but deferral in some
    cases of programs that were anticipated to begin.
        Can you comment on how the resources match the nature of
    the challenge and also the President's commitment to do a great
    deal more about it? Secretary Bronson?
        Ms. Bronson. I would be happy to do that. While my written
    testimony goes through line by line our budget request, you
    have raised an important point. If you look at the size of our
    budget request in fiscal year 2003, we asked for $414.4
    million. Last year, for 2004, we asked for $448.6 million. This
    year, as you have correctly pointed out, we have asked for
    $409.2 million.
        The vast majority of that extra $40 million or so was
    specifically asked for in 2004 to help us with the Shchuch'ye
    chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF). In 2003 and 2004,
    we went ahead and we got over what I would refer to as the
    heavy infrastructure construction bump in this project. We are
    spending this year and we began to spend the money to go ahead
    and complete the construction and buy the capital-intensive
    equipment for that facility. We are not going to have those
    same kinds of up-front costs in 2005 and 2006.
        The amount of money we are requesting for the strategic
    offensive arms elimination is exactly the same as we asked for
    last year. The amount of money that we are requesting for BWPP
    activities is a bit more than we are for last year. The amount
    of money that we are requesting for an important new program,
    the WMD proliferation prevention initiative, is also more than
    we asked for last year.
        These two programs, the BWPP and the program for assisting
    the countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia to deal with
    their porous borders, these are not capital-intensive projects.
    These are projects where we can achieve results without the
    kinds of expenditure of money that we have to spend in a case
    like the CWDF.
        So I would urge close review of what we are trying to do
    and what we are trying to do with the money, in addition to
    scrutiny of the actual amount that we have asked for, Senator.
        Senator Reed. Well, I thank you. That is a very thoughtful
    response. I am going to turn to Mr. Longsworth in a moment. It
    strikes me too that in a situation where your theater
    operations have been expanded outside of the FSU, which would
    argue probably for more challenges and more money, also there
    is a refocusing on the war on terror, not just the traditional
    sort of dismantling of national weapons depots and national
    weapons systems like in the FSU. Also, the impression I have is
    that every time we turn around we discover the scope of this
    problem is much bigger than we ever thought, and also time does
    not seem to be on our side.
        We all will carefully look at the budget. It seems to me
    that we can and should do much more, but I thank you for your
    very careful and thoughtful response.
        Mr. Longsworth, I would ask you the same question,
    essentially.
        Mr. Longsworth. Our budget, has a 1-percent increase. As I
    noted in my testimony, that is augmented by the contributions
    from other G-8 nations, which are also spending increasing
    amounts of money in Russia. In our budget, I agree with what
    Ms. Bronson said--some of the things that will have the
    greatest impact on stemming proliferation are not high dollar
    activities. We have a $7 million increase in our export control
    program. That is a very small amount of money that pays big
    dividends in terms of detecting and creating a capability in
    other countries to detect and address proliferation that comes
    through their ports or across their borders.
        So it is not all about large capital projects. Some of
    these activities do not require large amounts of money to get a
    big bang. So we have focused on those. Our radiological
    dispersal device (RDD) program, where we are helping other
    countries to secure, consolidate, and in some cases dispose of,
    RDD-usable materials, again those are not large dollar amounts,
    but again it gets a big bang for the buck, no pun intended.
        Senator Reed. I am not going to touch that, Mr.
    Administrator.
        Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Let me focus on a specific area, and that is
    the emerging news from Pakistan about proliferation, about
    diversion of materials. Can you comment in general--we will
    start with you, Mr. Longsworth--about what you may be doing in
    Pakistan today?
        Mr. Longsworth. I think what the U.S. is doing I would
    prefer to defer to closed session.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Secretary Bronson, similar?
        Ms. Bronson. Yes, I think that is best discussed in a
    closed session.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        As I mentioned before, in your testimony, Secretary
    Bronson, you discussed the review of the CTR program which was
    completed in August to ensure that it effectively addresses new
    threats associated with the global war on terror. From a
    programmatic perspective, what does this mean? Were programs
    cancelled, postponed, transferred, or created? Is the CTR
    program going to shift its focus to support other
    administration initiatives?
        Can you fill us in on the programmatic effect of this
    review?
        Ms. Bronson. The programmatic effect with respect to Russia
    was that we revalidated all of the project areas that we are
    currently working on. This includes the project areas on liquid
    fuel missiles, solid fuel missiles, SSBN dismantlement, spent
    nuclear fuel, and nuclear weapons security and transportation.
        While we revalidated these project areas we rescoped
    certain specific aspects of them to make sure that the CTR
    money was used specifically to reduce the threat. For example,
    in the area of SLBM and ICBM elimination, we used to pay for
    the regrading of the silos after the dismantlement took place.
    For the most part, this is not an activity that contributes to
    actual threat reduction. So our judgment was, number one, that
    does not contribute to actual threat reduction; number two, it
    is a task that can be taken on by the Russians; number three,
    it is relatively inexpensive and within the Russians'
    capabilities. That is a more appropriate task for the Russians
    to do and we keep our money focused on the actual reduction of
    the threat.
        The same kind of rationale was in effect when we looked at
    the solid fuel missiles. For example, we are only going to
    dismantle the number of missiles that are related to the actual
    launchers that are also turned over for destruction, or the
    actual SSBN launch compartments that are turned over for
    destruction. That is because we want to be sure that we do not
    inadvertently contribute to the modernization of the Russian
    force. If we get launchers and missiles together, then we can
    be sure that we are actually contributing to the reduction of
    the threat, and this is another type of activity that was
    revalidated in our review.
        Another example is with the----
        Senator Reed. Excuse me for interrupting, but the thrust of
    my question was more about how this new focus on the global war
    on terrorism affects programmatic issues.
        Ms. Bronson. I misunderstood the question. I thought you
    were asking more about the rescoping. With respect to the
    global war on terrorism, what we have done over the last 2
    years is to look at two projects in specific. One is the WMD
    Proliferation Prevention Initiative (PPI). This is the
    initiative to go ahead and create infrastructure, training, and
    capabilities in countries like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan so
    that they can be partners in the global war against terrorism
    by doing a better job of policing their own borders.
        So what we have done in the last 2 years is gone ahead and
    complete implementing agreements with a number of countries in
    the regions. We have made in the area of five specific visits
    to the region for the purpose of assessing how we can improve
    their border security, how we can improve their training, and
    what kinds of equipment that these countries in the region
    would need to increase their ability to police their borders.
        Similarly, in the area of biological weapons proliferation,
    we have been working with a number of countries to enhance
    their ability to better detect either unusual outbreaks of
    disease or events that could be precipitated by biological
    weapons terrorism, so that they can be part of the overall
    network in combatting potential bioterrorism.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Let me just follow up with two specific questions about
    dismantling of SSBNs in the FSU. Recently there were some
    changes you made in these arrangements. Will that affect the
    overall number of submarines that we will propose to or will be
    able to dismantle? I understand also there has been a recent
    decision not to build a spent fuel storage facility. Will that
    impact the number of these submarines that can be dismantled?
        Ms. Bronson. The overall number of submarines that can be
    dismantled will not be affected by what we have done. The key
    rate-limiting step in the number of submarines that we can
    dismantle is the number of submarines that Russia is prepared
    to turn over to us.
        Senator Reed. But is there a relationship between what we
    do and their willingness to turn submarines over to us?
        Ms. Bronson. We have found no relationship between the two,
    Senator.
        Senator Reed. So even though we have made changes in terms
    of--as I understand it, previously there was a complete
    dismantlement of the submarine into scrap and now the proposal
    is just to remove the nuclear components, but not funding or
    allowing the dismantling, leaving basically the remaining part
    of the ship. That will not inhibit the willingness of the
    Russians to turn these ships over to us?
        Ms. Bronson. We briefed the Russians on this and when we
    briefed them they had no objection.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you.
        One final question and then I would like to recognize, on
    behalf of the chairman, Senator Akaka. I understand, Mr.
    Longsworth, that you recently announced a program to work with
    Iraqi scientists. Can you just describe in general details how
    this program will be structured? Are these nuclear weapons
    scientists or just scientists in general, and how will you
    address the perennial issue of liability?
        Mr. Longsworth. Let me start at the tail end of your
    question. It is interesting that with other countries we have
    not had the same liability roadblocks that we have had with
    Russia. Other countries are willing to accept the liability
    standard that we have asked for, again to protect U.S. workers
    and companies.
        Senator Reed. Can I just interject? It is my understanding
    that there are arrangements with Russia that have liability
    protections that are already up and running. But we are asking
    for more expansive protections in general now. I guess it begs
    the question, if we can get some programs up and running with
    one form of liability, why do we have to change the score?
        Mr. Longsworth. We have suspended several programs that had
    separate liability provisions in them, most notably the 1998
    Plutonium Disposition Agreement and the NCI agreement. The rest
    of our programs are attached to the CTR umbrella agreement,
    which has not expired yet, and Ms. Bronson can talk more about
    that.
        Today, our programs use CTR liability protections as their
    umbrella agreement.
        Senator Reed. Again, I diverted you for a moment. Just a
    quick point on Iraq and then I am going to cease work.
        Mr. Longsworth. Yes. This is a cooperative effort we are
    doing with the nations in the Persian Gulf region. This is not
    a U.S. initiative. This will not have a U.S. face on it. It
    will have an Arab face on it. We are cooperating with the other
    nations. They have formed an organization that will go into
    Iraq and, much the opposite of what we are trying to do in
    Russia--in Russia we are trying to make sure that scientists
    that leave the lab have some soft landing so that they do not
    go work for a rogue element. In Iraq it is the opposite. We are
    trying to bring the scientists back and give them legitimate
    work. So it is the inverse of what we are trying to do in
    Russia.
        But we will provide some funding. Regional partners will
    provide additional funding. The intent is to employ scientists
    that could support WMD programs. It is WMD across the board. It
    is not just nuclear, because you need physicists, you need
    chemists, you need engineers in all of those types of weapons
    programs. So this is something that will address WMD generally.
    Obviously, our principal interest parochially for our program
    is nuclear, but the people that we will employ could work in a
    broad range of WMD programs.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Roberts [presiding]. Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Longsworth, I want to tell you that I am pleased that
    the Off-Site Source Recovery Program is receiving more support.
    I am pleased about that. I have been urging this for a while,
    and I want to thank you for taking this on and bringing it to
    this point.
        You said in your testimony that, given recent threats to
    the United States, it has become increasingly clear that
    protecting and securing nuclear materials and detecting nuclear
    and radioactive materials at foreign ports, airports, and
    border crossings is a very high priority.
        Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir.
        Senator Akaka. Yet, the fiscal year 2005 budget request is
    $238 million, while the budget request for fiscal year 2004 was
    $249.5 million. So my question to you is, what part of the
    program will have to be sacrificed due to these cuts?
        Mr. Longsworth. Actually, it is an anomaly of the way
    budgets are presented. There was a significant add-on to our
    request in fiscal year 2004. So it looks as though the budget
    is decreasing. It is actually increasing if you normalize that.
    I believe we got almost a $90 million plus-up for Megaports.
        Our ability to absorb that funding is limited. We have to
    sign agreements with the host countries, we have to go do site
    surveys. All of these activities take time. Now, I will say we
    cannot engage in negotiations with a government unless we, with
    these foreign governments, have the obligational authority. So
    we do have to have the money in our account before we can sign
    an agreement with a foreign government.
        But I think we are spending at about the rate we can spend.
    I do not know that we can spend much more than we have already.
    Again, the reason it looks like it is a decrease is simply that
    we got a very large additional plus-up from Congress in fiscal
    year 2004. So fiscal year 2005 looks like it is decreasing, but
    the trend line is certainly up.
        So I guess the short answer to your question is nothing
    will not be done. In fact, we are able to accelerate because of
    that plus-up. Again, the people that work in this program--
    there is one woman who I think she has been home 1 week out of
    the last 10, and she is traveling all over the world getting in
    place these agreements with the governments. So we are
    accelerating that work significantly.
        Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, I am pleased that NNSA is
    working to stop Russia from producing more weapons-grade
    plutonium. But I am concerned about the budget cuts in this
    program as well. You know better than I the risk to Americans
    should terrorists obtain this nuclear weapons-grade material. I
    am certain you share my sense of urgency in this area, and my
    concern about what may happen in the event of thefts.
        I was just reading an account where in 1993, back there in
    Russia, some of the material was stolen. The person stole it
    because the person wanted money and sold it. So we are very
    concerned about this.
        So could you explain to me how the program can stay on
    target, considering the proposed reduction in fiscal year 2005
    funding?
        Mr. Longsworth. Again, I think the reduction--you think you
    are referring to the MPCA program. The Second Line of Defense
    program is actually embedded in that number. So when you hear
    about that budget line item, it includes not only securing
    material but also it includes the programs that will detect
    whether that security has failed so that you can detect any, as
    you said, any individual who is trying to steal and traffic the
    material.
        One of the reasons it looks like a decrease is what I
    mentioned before, that because that Second Line of Defense
    budget is embedded in that broader MPCA budget, it looks like
    it is decreasing.
        In addition to that, we have accelerated our warhead
    security work with the Russian navy, and that work is beginning
    to decrease because we are finishing. We are actually going to
    complete most of that work this year and probably completely
    done by the end of 2005.
        Those are major capital projects that we are just
    finishing. We are ramping up, and there is an increase for SRF
    sites that we will be adding. Again, I noted we added three
    sites. We hope to add some additional sites later this year.
        Overall I think we are working at a pace that is as fast as
    last year, and last year was three times faster than the year
    before. So we are working at a pretty good pace. We are about
    what Russia can absorb at this point in terms of funding.
        Again, I have often said, and the Secretary and Ambassador
    Brooks have said, we are not limited by funding right now; we
    are limited by Russia's ability to absorb the funding that we
    provide. Some of the challenges I mentioned, like access,
    liability and other things, affect Russia's ability to absorb
    funding.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you.
        Ms. Bronson, the CTR is an important program to prevent
    weapons and weapons-usable materials and expertise from falling
    into the wrong hands. Experts are calling for an acceleration
    of the program. Yesterday, DCI Tenet emphasized to us in
    testimony before the full committee his concern that terrorists
    are trying to obtain WMD, including nuclear material from
    Russia.
        I understand from your testimony that your fiscal year 2005
    budget of $409.2 million does not represent a decrease in
    overall funding for the program, and yet in your testimony it
    is noted that in fiscal year 2004 it was at $450.8 million. I
    am concerned that there is not enough money to accelerate the
    program in the way that is needed and the experts say that is
    needed.
        If these threats are real, Madam Secretary, why are we not
    accelerating this program?
        Ms. Bronson. I have spent many hours looking at how one
    could go ahead and accelerate this program. If I were to walk
    through each area, I can walk you through where we have looked
    at that and we have not been able to find places where we can
    accelerate.
        For example, in the area of the destruction of ICBMs and
    the destruction of ICBM silos, we can only destroy those as
    fast as the Russians will turn them over to us. In the area of
    SLBM launchers and in the area of SSBNs, we can only destroy
    them as fast as the Russians will turn them over to us.
        I would point out that in our budget the amount of money
    for strategic offensive elimination is the same as it was for
    last year. In the area of nuclear weapons storage security, we
    are asking for a little bit more than we asked for last year.
    Here there is an important problem, and the problem with
    nuclear weapons safety and security is that we cannot make any
    more progress until Russia signs the additional legal
    commitment that we asked them to sign so that we can protect
    the taxpayers' money.
        We gave the Russians that document in December 2002 and we
    still do not have it signed yet, and that is despite a
    tremendous amount of pressure that we have put on the Russian
    government. So we cannot accelerate that because the Russians
    will not go ahead and sign the agreement.
        In the area of nuclear weapons transportation security,
    last year we asked for $23.2 million. This year we have asked
    for more, $26.3 million. In that area as well, Senator, we have
    a commitment agreement that we provided to Russia in December
    2002 that they still have not signed. That commitment agreement
    is a commitment that they will only use the new cargo cars to
    support consolidation or dismantlement of nuclear weapons. We
    have to get a legal agreement that they will not use those
    cargo cars to modernize their force or for purposes that have
    nothing to do with threat reduction. So we cannot accelerate
    that until the Russians go ahead and sign that agreement.
        In the area of biological weapons proliferation, we have
    asked the Russians to go ahead and sign with us a specific
    biological weapons implementing agreement. The biological
    weapons area is the only area where we do not have a specific
    implementing agreement. To date the Russians have been
    intransigent and will not go ahead and sign that agreement.
        We are unable to go ahead and pursue additional funding to
    biological weapons proliferation issues with Russia until we
    get better assurances concerning their biological weapons
    compliance.
        Now, in the area of chemical weapons destruction I am
    pleased to report that, after we lost 4 years, in large part
    because of Russian behavior, we have been able to accelerate
    that schedule and gain back 29 of the months of the 4 years
    that we lost. So we are accelerating there, and in fact part of
    the money that we had for last year's budget is being used to
    accelerate the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction facility
    in accordance with the specific direction that we have from the
    President.
        In the areas of WMD proliferation prevention, we have two
    agreements signed, we have two more we hope to have signed in
    the next few months, and we are looking to go ahead and
    accelerate, consistent with good spending of money, the
    projects to go ahead and make those porous borders in the
    Caucasus and in Central Asia more safe.
        Senator Akaka. Well, I am glad to hear about those
    accelerations. I was just worried also about the remarks that
    were made by DCI Tenet that terrorists are trying to obtain
    WMD, including nuclear material, from Russia at the present
    time, and looked upon this as part of the possible
    acceleration.
        Also, what are we doing, and are we doing everything we
    can, to prevent fissile material from getting out of Russia;
    and also these other nuclear materials, as well as WMD?
        Ms. Bronson. Well, in December 2003 the fissile material
    storage facility in Mayak was finally completed. This facility
    will store securely more than 25 metric tons of Russia's
    weapons-origin plutonium. In addition, in 2003 we agreed on the
    principles to monitor the material that will be stored in that
    facility. We have been negotiating now for some 7 years a
    transparency agreement with Russia. It is our hope that we will
    complete that transparency agreement in the first half of this
    year.
        With respect to nuclear weapons security, we signed
    protocols in February of 2003. We visited six major storage
    sites to work on the security of those sites, and we will visit
    four more of those sites this year.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your responses.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Roberts. Thank you, Senator.
        I know each of your departments has taken steps to improve
    the effectiveness and the efficiency of the CTR programs, as
    you have just gone into in answer to the Senator's question.
    The DOD, for instance, has instituted a program to have semi-
    annual executive reviews with its Russian counterparts to
    identify and rectify the potential problems. As you have
    indicated, some of these issues have proved very persistent and
    difficult to resolve.
        Is there anything we might do in legislation that would
    help strengthen your position as you negotiate with the
    Russians on matters that continue to prove difficult in regards
    to access and liability, not to mention fungibility? What could
    we do to help you in that regard? Let me go back to the not so
    thrilling days of yesteryear, when the House had determined to
    pretty well cut this program out, and we put forth in this
    subcommittee basically some mandatory steps that the Russians
    had to fulfill, and in doing so convinced our House
    counterparts that it was a worthwhile program. Senator Lugar
    personally did a great job in terms of making that point and,
    as chairman of the subcommittee at that particular time, we
    thought we had made some real steps forward. But I know that
    there are a lot of problems that continue.
        As a result of putting in these contingencies or these
    mandatory requirements, we had a Russian delegation, several of
    them, come to Washington and thank us for doing that and saying
    that they would work certainly toward these goals and basically
    thanking us for saving the program.
        I must confess that my service on the Intelligence
    Committee has prevented me from doing the homework that I need
    to do, and I apologize for that, despite able staff, in regards
    to some of the more difficult issues. But I am perfectly
    willing and open to suggestion in regards to any legislation
    that might be helpful.
        Would you like to comment?
        Mr. Longsworth. Actually, I would----
        Senator Roberts. Or should we leave well enough alone?
        Mr. Longsworth. Well, no. Let me start with some of the
    problems that we face. I think we are concerned by a number of
    developments in Russia, and Russia today is not the Russia it
    was 5 years ago or 10 years ago.
        Senator Roberts. No, they are in a lot better shape.
        Mr. Longsworth. They are, and we are seeing their economy
    is doing fairly well. It is primarily resource-based, oil and
    gas exports. It is not robust, but it is growing. They have an
    ability to pick up some of these burdens, and in fact are in
    many cases in our programs, picking up some of the burdens of
    the efforts that we do on a cooperative basis.
        I think we are also concerned by the rise and the increased
    influence of the Federal security services with regard to
    programs that we carry out in Russia. Many of our access
    problems were laid to denials that come from the Federal
    Security Services.
        I think continuing to emphasize the importance of this
    work----
        Senator Roberts. Pardon me for interrupting. Where do we
    have programs where we do not have access?
        Mr. Longsworth. We have secured a large percentage of the
    material in Russia. We have secured a larger percentage of
    sites. The most sensitive sites are what we refer to as the
    serial production enterprises. These are their most sensitive
    sites. They have ongoing national security and nuclear weapons
    missions. Just as we would be very sensitive about allowing
    foreigners into our sites, those are the sites where we have
    the most difficult access. There are ways to work around it,
    but there are tedious details and it is very--there are tough
    negotiations on how to get in there.
        Senator Roberts. Well, we are not in closed session, but it
    seems to me that my memory comes somewhere in the neighborhood
    of bigger than about an 18-site bread box. I went to Obelinsk.
    I have been to one other so-called ``Secret City'' that was
    opened up through the NCI and other programs. I did not get
    over to see the Shchuch'ye chemical plant. Senator Lugar does
    that and has posed for a very powerful picture of, I think, a
    suitcase and some things that you could put in the suitcase if
    you were of a mind to do that, and it indicated the importance
    of the Shchuch'ye project, despite a General Accounting Office
    (GAO) report, by the way, that was very critical. That will be
    a question of mine down the road if you want to respond to it.
        But we simply could not get access. Of course, on the other
    side of it, we had a lot of problems in regards to
    transportation--how much the transportation would cost, who
    would get access, who would go, if you had to use a pole vault
    to get over the damn fence. That was not the case, but it
    almost was.
        So I guess what I am asking you is, just generally in terms
    of access, has it gotten better, worse? Where are we?
        Mr. Longsworth. For us it is about the same. It is always
    difficult. We do have a pilot at one of their most sensitive
    cities, just one, and it is going fairly well. We have a
    commitment that once that pilot is under way, about halfway
    through, they will identify the second site.
        This is a large breakthrough because these sensitive
    facilities have the greatest volume of material--a fewer number
    of buildings, but there is more material in those buildings. It
    is what I would refer to as kind of the last bastion of fissile
    material that we need and want to secure.
        So it is about the same. We do have a pilot that is
    successful, but even that has lots of fits and starts in that
    work.
        Senator Roberts. I basically interrupted you to answer my
    question in terms of legislation. We did put into legislation
    these requirements. I do not know whether we need to take
    another look at that under the current situation and get your
    advice and counsel. You could probably provide that for the
    record or if you had any, just any comments that you would like
    to make now.
        Mr. Longsworth. I would prefer to provide that for the
    record, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The administration's support for addressing the global threat of
    proliferation of WMD, both in states of the FSU and around the world,
    is reflected in the President's fiscal year 2005 budget submission,
    which requests $1.35 billion for this work. For more than a decade, the
    DOE, and now through its NNSA, has played a central role in the United
    States' effort to improve the security of under-secured nuclear
    warheads and weapon-useable nuclear materials in the Russian Federation
    and other independent states of the FSU. But the security of the United
    States, including the war on terrorism, urgently requires reducing the
    proliferation risk of nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological
    weapons and materials, warheads, technology, and expertise in countries
    beyond the borders of the FSU.

        Senator Roberts. All right, that is fine.
        They have not met two of the six congressional conditions
    for assistance, although, as you have indicated, they are
    close, ``they'' meaning Russia, to meeting the one that
    requires the submission of a practical plan for the chemical
    weapons destruction. I understand the administration will be
    seeking permanent waiver authority for Shchuch'ye in the fiscal
    year 2005 request.
        I go back again to the GAO report, which was not exactly
    glowing in regards to Shchuch'ye. I remember going over that in
    some detail and thinking that we needed to provide security
    more than we needed to commit the funding, with all the
    problems that were connected with that plant.
        If all that is correct, would you please provide the
    administration's rationale for seeking permanent waiver
    authority? Is it in any way problematic when Congress grants
    only annual waiver authority rather than the permanent waiver
    authority that the administration has requested previously?
        Ms. Bronson. Senator, you ask an excellent question. Let me
    begin by underscoring the absolutely critical role this
    subcommittee played in the development of those six conditions.
    Those six conditions in my view allowed us to get off of square
    one. They put sufficient pressure on the Russians, they put
    Russia on sufficient notice, and they were absolutely
    invaluable in our being able to move forward in this area.
        We do believe that we are going to receive a practical plan
    from the Russians later this spring, and that leaves us with
    the final condition which has not yet been met, which is to
    satisfy our questions about the actual numbers concerning the
    stockpile. I do not believe that we are going to be able to
    resolve those tough issues about the size of the stockpile down
    to the level of detail that is going to satisfy that condition
    this year. I am reminded of the opening comment that Senator
    Reed made this morning. The desire for a permanent waiver on
    Shchuch'ye is not to go ahead and remove the pressure from the
    Russians, but the desire for the permament waiver for
    Shchuch'ye is designed, as Senator Reed mentioned, to help us
    keep the program running smoothly from year to year.
        Senator Roberts. So it is the consistency issue that you
    are talking about?
        Ms. Bronson. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Roberts. With all the questions that we have about
    access, liability, fungibility, the heptyl plant, and the
    Votkinsk--help me with that pronunciation?
        Ms. Bronson. ``Vot-kinsk.''
        Senator Roberts. All right. It is $206 million that went
    down the drain. If the American people know about $206 million
    that ended up in a very futile situation--and you have gone
    over that in your testimony--a $106 million loss suffered by
    CTR in the so-called ``heptyl situation,'' in which Russia did
    not tell us that the liquid rocket fuel destined for a CTR-
    constructed facility had been diverted to commercial use. In
    other words, we build this facility, we think that we are going
    to be housing the liquid rocket fuel, which of course was the
    entire intent, and then we got into a big whoops--okay, we have
    this facility; bring us the rocket fuel; well, we do not know
    how to tell you this, but we do not have any; we have used it
    for commercial purposes.
        What in the hell are we doing with that facility now? Do we
    have a flag on it? What I am saying is that if you get into
    these kind of things and we do not have enough cooperation and
    we get into basically a screw-up like that, that becomes the
    headline in regards to CTR, despite all of the goodwill and the
    wishes and the speeches that we have made down through the
    years. Then you add in another $100 million, that is a $206
    million whoops. If you are a taxpayer you are going to say: I
    do not understand this, more especially with an improved
    economic situation in Russia.
        I am being the devil's advocate. What did we do with that
    facility? Did we paint it, or what did we do with it?
        Ms. Bronson. First of all, your comments are exactly right,
    Senator. What Russia did with respect to the heptyl situation
    was inexcusable. What we have gone ahead and done with the
    facility is we have made a decision to go ahead and take those
    parts of it that we can salvage and reuse for other parts of
    the program, so that we are going to try to get back as much
    from that investment as we can.
        But I am not going to kid you, Senator. We are not going to
    get that much back. So our goal has been to ensure that in
    every single project area that we are undertaking now or that
    we will ever undertake, we will not get ourselves into the
    situation where we rely on good faith assurances by Russia.
    Anything that we are relying on Russia to do or any assumption
    about their behavior must be turned into a legal agreement
    before we will go ahead and spend taxpayers' money in the
    future.
        Senator Roberts. I am concerned that, on the waiver
    authority, if we grant the permanent authority--explain to me
    again how that works? You have the permanent authority, but
    annually you come to Congress and say, yes? What are you
    telling us if you have the permanent authority as opposed to
    annual authority that we would grant?
        Ms. Bronson. If we have the permanent authority, each year
    as an independent determination, we would have to go ahead and
    assess how the Russians are doing on their six conditions that
    were laid out.
        Senator Roberts. Yes.
        Ms. Bronson. We would have an obligation to come and tell
    you whether or not we thought those conditions were met, and if
    the conditions were not met--including the one that I believe
    will not be met by the end of this year, which is the final
    accounting of the amounts. Then we would have the ability to
    each year make an independent judgment as to whether or not
    failure to meet that condition outweighs our security interests
    in going ahead and continuing to get that facility to a
    position--and I am talking about the Shchuch'ye facility--so
    that we can destroy the nerve agent, which is in a most
    proliferable form.
        The nerve agent that Shchuch'ye will destroy is in rocket
    form. It is in artillery shells. It is in our national security
    interest not to slow down the progress on getting that facility
    up and running so that we can destroy it.
        But each year the administration would have to go ahead and
    decide whether or not the value we would get from destroying
    those, the proliferation value from destroying those shells
    filled with nerve agent, outweighed the fact that the condition
    had not been met.
        Senator Roberts. Other than the funding for this program,
    what is it that this subcommittee, full committee, both the
    House and Senate, would have as a peg to hang our hat on in
    regards to the waiver authority and exactly what you are
    talking about, separating the wheat from the chaff? Okay, here
    is one requirement they have not met, but we do not want to
    shut down the whole thing because we are making progress in
    other areas.
        I am not sure about our decisionmaking in that process,
    which in my view should be mandatory. It was this
    subcommittee's effort that, first, saved the program from the
    House again; and second, that the Russians said, yes, we agree
    with this, we want to do it. It is my understanding that there
    has been very considerable contribution to the project, both
    from Russia and from international donors. So we see the value
    of it. But in terms of certification, I do not think you can
    certify a lot of this. I do not think it is possible.
        Ms. Bronson. Well, the one condition out of the six that I
    believe we are not going to be able to certify this year is the
    condition that calls for us to reconcile the books on the
    amounts of chemical weapons. You are correct, we are not going
    to be able to certify that that condition is met, and I do not
    see a clear way to resolving that.
        Now, there are a couple of things that I would just point
    out. Last year the authority for the presidential waiver ran
    out on September 30. The only way we were able to continue to
    spend money toward the acceleration of the construction of the
    CWDF was because we had a continuing resolution that allowed us
    to do that. We relied on the continuing resolution authority to
    continue to spend money up until the middle of November, when
    we finally obtained the waiver authority.
        The situation we are in right now is we can continue to
    spend money under the current presidential waiver authority up
    until September 30. If we do not get a permanent waiver or we
    do not get a renewal of the waiver, then you run the risk that
    everything will have to stop in terms of expenditure of funds
    on September 30.
        So there are two ways that this could work. If we had some
    kind of sense that the yearly waiver authority would be granted
    on time, that is not an unreasonable way to go. What would be
    better from a business standpoint would be to have the
    permanent waiver authority with the understanding that there is
    a clear obligation on the part of the administration to go
    ahead and make this determination and to report to Congress on
    the status of the conditions.
        Senator Roberts. We will take a hard look at it. I think
    probably the permanent waiver authority is the best way to go,
    but you can now certainly report back to your Russian
    counterparts that the pleasantly irascible chairman who put in
    the requirements to begin with is not very happy with their
    cooperation, and we might just yank this back on an annual
    basis and give you that authority.
        I am not sure that is the best approach, but you can at
    least send up some fireworks on that and see what happens.
        I understand the state of the art facility at Mayak is
    completed and ready to accept the fissile material for long-
    term safe and secure storage. The Inspector General, back in
    2003, expressed concern that the Russians had not really
    committed to storing a specific quantity or type of fissile
    material on the facility and that we had not reached an
    agreement on the transparency measures so that the United
    States can monitor the use of this facility.
        Any new information on that?
        Ms. Bronson. We have not finished the transparency
    agreement. We are going to send back our response to the latest
    Russian comments on the current draft of the transparency
    agreement. That will be done by the end of March. We will then
    send a team to go ahead and enter into the next round of
    discussions with the Russians on the transparency agreement
    this April.
        I am hopeful that by the end of the first half of this year
    we will have completed that transparency agreement with the
    Russians.
        Senator Roberts. Last year the project to refurbish or
    build two fossil fuel plants in Russia to enable eventual
    shutdown of three old Russian weapons-grade plutonium
    production reactors was transferred from DOD to DOE. Has that
    gone smoothly, and what steps has the DOE taken to ensure that
    once these alternative heat sources are up and running the
    Russians will actually shut down the reactors?
        In other words, are these projects actually proceeding on
    schedule and on cost?
        Mr. Longsworth. The transfer went fairly well. We just
    transferred the last $17 million from DOD to the DOE. As I
    noted in my oral statement, we hope to have a validated cost
    estimate for both new fossil plants by the end of calendar year
    2004, in December. Those will be the first validated numbers.
        The numbers that we received, the cost of the facilities
    that the Russians estimated, have never been validated. We have
    just completed a bottoms-up assessment. We are trying to
    interpret those numbers. But by the end of this calendar year
    we will know what it costs to build both of those facilities.
        In terms of the Russians' commitment to shut down, it is
    encompassed in an agreement that the Secretary signed with his
    counterpart in Russia that once the replacement plants are
    operational, the Russians have committed to shut down those
    reactors. We also, as soon as we begin work on the fossil plant
    itself, they have to begin implementing a shutdown plan. So
    once construction begins, that triggers the initiation of
    shutdown planning.
        I might also note that in the interim we have actually de-
    rated the power of those reactors such that they are not
    producing as much fissile material now. We have powered them
    down to about the lowest level we think that they can operate
    at and still provide steam and electricity. They are rated to
    produce one and a half metric tons a year. We have de-rated
    them so they are producing about 1.2 metric tons a year.
        All of these steps are positive, but we do want to move
    forward very quickly in getting those fossil plants built.
        Senator Roberts. Senator Reed asked a good question in
    regards to activities outside the FSU, and that sort of ties in
    with the President's speech before the NDU. Do you anticipate
    any circumstances under which the annual limit of $50 million
    for this purpose would be too restrictive?
        Mr. Longsworth. Yes, sir, I do. I can see a circumstance.
    Libya is a very good example. In Libya, we had a window of
    opportunity. We had to move very quickly, again cooperatively
    working with the Libyans, to implement their commitment to rid
    their country of WMD. Any inhibitor, that we would have to jump
    through a hoop or get a waiver, that just slows us down.
        When we first went in there, we were not sure that the door
    would be open for very long, so speed was of the essence. We
    did that work with the Libyans very quickly. I do worry, Mr.
    Chairman, in the future that if an opportunity came up such as
    that was presented by Libya that the inhibitors might slow us
    down and we might miss that opportunity.
        So I do worry about it.
        Senator Roberts. Where would you get the money from if in
    fact an opportunity actually occurred? I will use an example
    that is a non-starter, but say North Korea.
        Mr. Longsworth. Well, we hope North Korea is a starter.
        Senator Roberts. Well, I hope so, too. But, Kim Jong Il is
    not exactly the most cooperative person to be working with.
        Mr. Longsworth. Again, assuming in the future that we were
    invited in to begin the complete and verifiable, irreversible
    dismantlement of their programs, that would be a significant
    undertaking.
        Senator Roberts. You would just simply ask for a
    supplemental or to take the cap off, or what?
        Mr. Longsworth. Either of those things, yes, sir. The cap
    only applies to things that are not specifically authorized and
    appropriated. So if there is a specific authorization for work
    or a specific appropriation, then I believe our lawyers have
    determined that the cap does not--and I think your staff has
    agreed--that the cap does not inhibit those activities. It
    would only inhibit those activities that were initiated during
    a fiscal year.
        But again, I do worry about the cap, our losing an
    opportunity to do something quickly because we had to get a
    waiver or because we had to go through some approval process.
        Senator Roberts. I am through with my questions. Paul, do
    you have anything that you would like to sum up with? Or Lisa,
    do you have anything else to add before we move to the closed
    session?
        Mr. Longsworth. I would like to follow up one thing to
    summarize what our programs do, related to Senator Akaka's
    comments about what we are doing to stop the potential for
    fissile material to leave Russia. We have a comprehensive set
    of programs that not only secure HEU, plutonium, and RDD
    sources at the locations where they are, we then put detectors
    in place to detect whether they leave. We also have
    technologies that detect whether someone is violating treaties
    or to remotely detect proliferation.
        We view our program as a meshwork of programs that are
    self-supporting and provide defense in depth. All of our
    programs are geared toward stopping threats to the U.S. before
    they get to our borders. So just, to answer his question--he
    asked what we are doing--I think our entire program is focused
    on securing, detecting trafficking, and then eliminating
    through HEU blend-down programs, plutonium disposition, getting
    rid of permanently those materials that are useful for nuclear
    weapons.
        So I wanted to summarize. I think that is what our program
    does at the DOE.
        Senator Roberts. I appreciate that. Thank you both, and we
    will now move to a closed session.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

                          COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

        1. Senator Akaka. Ms. Bronson, as I stated at the hearing, I am
    concerned that the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program needs to
    be accelerated. I understand that getting cooperation from Russia is a
    key obstacle. However, I would like the program to continue looking for
    ways to accelerate in a responsible way. What would you do more of if
    you had the money to do so, including hiring additional staff to manage
    activities?
        Ms. Bronson. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for
    the CTR program coupled with prior year unobligated balances permits
    the elimination of strategic systems as rapidly as the Russian
    Federation authorizes their elimination. Since the hearing, agreements
    that the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation had been
    reviewing for over 12 months have been signed. Their signature permits
    security upgrades to continue for all nuclear weapons storage sites
    thus far identified by the MOD and we are urging the MOD to identify
    additional sites. The DOD security enhancement effort is carefully
    coordinated with the DOE nuclear weapons site security enhancement
    effort. Our joint efforts have permitted the schedule to be
    accelerated. The department has reprogrammed funds to  maximize the
    acceleration of the construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction
    Facility at Shchuch'ye. We are continuing efforts to secure dangerous
    pathogen collections at all locations where the USG has been granted
    access by the Russian Federation. The CTR program has sufficient staff
    and has a Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance (SETA)
    contractor with SAIC to support the DOD staff. DOD also has contracted
    with U.S. integrating contractors to expeditiously implement the
    program.

               BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (BWPP)

        2. Senator Akaka. Ms. Bronson, I am especially concerned with the
    proliferation risks associated with Russia's collection of pathogens
    and biological infrastructure. Infectious disease knows no boundaries.
    Do you have the resources you need, both in terms of budget and
    personnel to combat this problem in the most expeditious way?
        Ms. Bronson. Yes. I believe that we now have in place the necessary
    personnel and that funding is sufficient to combat this problem in the
    most expeditious way possible, consistent with the access that we have
    to sites in Russia.

            ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

        3. Senator Akaka. Ms. Bronson, we are providing more and more
    assistance to countries outside the former Soviet Union (FSU), yet the
    total budget is not increasing. I am concerned that initiatives in
    Russia are being short-changed. How are these things being prioritized?
        Ms. Bronson. Programs in Russia are not being short-changed. Our
    funding requests are based on our projected needs. The need is directed
    related to the rate the Russian Federation decides to remove strategic
    systems from the operational force and eliminate them and decides to
    grant access to nuclear weapons storage sites and dangerous pathogen
    collections. As I stated during the hearing, we had a heavy
    infrastructure construction bump for the Shchuch'ye CWDF in 2003 and
    2004. We are not going to have that same sort of up front costs in 2005
    and 2006. The funding for SOAE remains the same because the Russian
    Federation is removing strategic systems from the operational force at
    a uniform rate per year. Since my testimony, we have signed new
    agreements with the Ministry of Defense that permit security upgrades
    to continue for all nuclear weapons storage sites thus far identified
    by the MOD and we are urging the MOD to identify additional sites. The
    DOD security enhancement effort is carefully coordinated with the DOE
    nuclear weapons site security enhancement effort. Our joint efforts
    have permitted the schedule to be accelerated. We are continuing
    efforts to secure dangerous pathogen collections at all locations where
    the USG has been granted access by the Russian Federation.
        The funding for CTR activities in Russia relative to other
    countries has remained fairly constant. Prior to September 11, 2001,
    after which we increased our funding for BWPP and requested funding for
    WMD-PPI in Central Asia, we had been active in other countries
    eliminating their legacy nuclear systems, specifically in Ukraine,
    Kazakhstan and Belarus. Also, the CTR budget in the early years of the
    program was smaller than it is today.

        4. Senator Akaka. Ms. Bronson, what Russian programs will have to
    be cut in order to provide assistance to the other countries?
        Ms. Bronson. We have always requested sufficient funding to take
    care of all requirements we have in Russia and in other states of the
    FSU. As a result, we do not anticipate cutting any programs in Russia
    in order to provide assistance to the other countries.

                   MATERIAL PROTECTION CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING

        5. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, I am concerned that the $238
    million budgeted for the Material Protection Control and Accounting
    (MPCA) program is being spread too thin. Last years budget for this
    same program was $249.5 million. The budget includes $15 million for
    the Megaports program, which is currently focusing on ports in Greece
    and the Netherlands. What Russian programs will have to be cut to
    accommodate both the decrease in overall funding and the funding of
    programs outside the former Soviet Union and how are these priorities
    being set?
        Mr. Longsworth. The core mission of the MPCA program remains
    upgrading the security of nuclear materials. The fiscal year 2005
    budget request supports this priority mission. The core mission's
    portion of the request is $174 million, an $8 million increase over the
    fiscal year 2004 request, and a $4 million increase over the fiscal
    year 2004 appropriation. This budget request reflects plans for major
    expansion of efforts to secure sites in the Russian Strategic Rocket
    Forces (SRF) warhead sites, as well as accelerated efforts to secure
    weapons usable nuclear materials at sensitive Weapons Complex sites of
    Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom). The request also accounts
    for scope reductions due to completion of upgrades at several MinAtom
    facilities and the; Kurchatov Institute in fiscal year 2004. The
    request also includes funds for critical security activities in
    countries outside the FSU.
        The $238 million fiscal year 2005 budget request for MPCA is an
    increase over the fiscal year 2004 request of $226 million. The budget
    allocation in fiscal year 2004 was increased to $260 million primarily
    because Congress increased funding for the Second Line of Defense
    program. This increase provided additional resources for the Megaports
    initiative and the acceleration of Second Line of Defense activities in
    Russia and the FSU. Due to a large ($84 million) supplemental
    appropriation received for Megaports in fiscal year 2003, and because
    negotiations for implementation of Megaports are still underway in most
    countries, the fiscal year 2005 budget request only includes funding
    for one additional Megaport.

                        OFF-SITE SOURCE RECOVERY PROJECT

        6. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, as I said in my statement at the
    hearing, I am pleased that the funding for the Off-Site Source Recovery
    Program (OSRP) has been increased. However, I am concerned that more
    could be done to recover radioactive materials. The University of
    Hawaii is trying to decommission an irradiator facility that they no
    longer need for research. This irradiator contains cobalt-60 sources
    which belong to the Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE has agreed to
    recover these sources and dispose of them, but funding will have to be
    re-prioritized first. Other universities find themselves in the same
    position. I am concerned that these universities may not have the
    security and trained personnel necessary to maintain these facilities
    in a safe manner until the sources are removed. Would more funding
    speed up this process and what would you do to move this along, if you
    could, without cutting other key activities?
        Mr. Longsworth. The OSRP under the Nuclear and Radiological Threat
    Reduction Task Force is the National Nuclear Security Administration's
    (NNSA) program to address U.S. sealed sources. The OSRP has recovered
    over 8,000 sources since 1997, many of these from academic
    institutions. The OSRP identifies excess and unwanted sources, and
    recovers those sources placing them in secure storage at specific DOE
    sites. The OSRP works closely with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission to establish the recovery prioritization for excess and
    unwanted sources which are of concern for use in a radiological
    dispersal device. The OSRP continues to aggressively pursue the
    recovery of sources, and the program is planning to expand its scope
    and address additional isotopes of concern.
        Sources which are to remain in use at academic institutions and
    other locations, and require security in place fall under the purview
    of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS). The DOE stands ready to provide technical
    assistance as well as share the expertise that we have developed
    internationally for providing enhanced secure storage of in use
    radiological materials.

           ELIMINATION OF WEAPONS-GRADE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION PROGRAM

        7. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, I am pleased to see that the NNSA
    is working to stop plutonium production in Russia, but I am concerned
    about what seems to be a budget cut for the program. Your statement to
    the subcommittee said that you expect to have detailed designs and a
    cost estimate to Congress by the end of calendar year 2004. Will the
    program be able to stay on target with this reduced funding?
        Mr. Longsworth. The Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium
    Production (EWGPP) program's relative decrease from fiscal year 2004 to
    fiscal year 2005 reflects a +$15.3 million adjustment in fiscal year
    2004 associated with the reappropriation of unobligated prior-year
    balances that were transferred with the program from the DOD. Please
    see page 405 of the Fiscal Year 2005 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
    Congressional Budget Request for this adjustment, that page is also
    attached here as reference and for insert to the record.
        The reappropriation occurred because part of the funds transferred
    from DOD expired for additional obligation on September 30, 2003, based
    on the original appropriation of these funds. However, the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 providing for the
    transfer of the program from DOD to the DOE also entitled the
    transferred unobligated appropriations to be available for 3 fiscal
    years after and including fiscal year 2003.
        Without this adjustment reflecting reappropriation of EWGGP funds
    transfer from DOD, the fiscal year 2005 request is actually a slight
    increase over fiscal year 2004.
        No substantial fiscal year 2005 programmatic increase was requested
    as the program has sufficient funds for execution of all planned
    program and project efforts through fiscal year 2005, when including
    the $50.1 million fiscal year 2005 congressional request for the
    program.

             PREVENTING FISSILE MATERIAL FROM GETTING OUT OF RUSSIA

        8. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, when we discussed fissile
    material leaving Russia at the hearing, you stated that NNSA
    concentrates on a program that approaches this problem with a defense-
    in-depth strategy. This program includes, among other things, securing
    the materials at their current location and detecting trafficking. I
    have noticed what seems to be a trend to devoting increased emphasis to
    border protection rather than securing materials at their location. Can
    you explain to me why we are emphasizing border protection to a greater
    degree?
        Mr. Longsworth. Our efforts to secure material in place have not
    dwindled in any way. We continue to make good progress in our efforts
    to secure contracts for implementation of upgrades at Russian sites. We
    recognize, however, that we can never provide total assurance that our
    improvements will prevent material from being removed from a site. Our
    Second Line of Defense program provides another opportunity to detect
    illegal movement across Russian borders and beyond. In applying our
    defense in depth strategy, we are expanding the Second Line of Defense
    program beyond the borders of Russia to provide additional
    opportunities to stop such efforts.
        The $238 million fiscal year 2005 budget request for the Office of
    International Material Protection and Cooperation is actually an
    increase over the fiscal year 2004 request of $226 million. The budget
    allocation in fiscal year 2004 was increased to $260 million primarily
    because Congress increased funding for the Second Line of Defense
    program. This increase provided additional resources for the Megaport
    initiative and the acceleration of Second Line of Defense activities in
    Russia and the FSU. Due to a large ($84 million) supplemental
    appropriation received for Megaports in fiscal year 2003, and because
    negotiations for implementation of Megaports are still underway in most
    countries, the fiscal year 2005 budget request only includes funding
    for one additional Megaport.
        The MPCA budget request in fiscal year 2005 (excluding Radiological
    Threat Reduction and Second Line of Defense) is $174 million, an $8
    million increase over the fiscal year 2004 request, and a $4 million
    increase over the fiscal year 2004 appropriation. This budget request
    reflects plans for major expansion of efforts to secure sites in the
    Russian SRF warhead sites, as well as accelerated efforts to secure
    weapons usable nuclear materials at sensitive MinAtom Weapons Complex
    sites. The request also accounts for scope reductions due to completion
    of upgrades at several MinAtom facilities and the Kurchatov Institute
    in fiscal year 2004. The request also includes funds for critical
    security activities in countries outside the FSU.

        9. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, please explain to me how these
    priorities are being set. Has a study been done to show that this
    approach is more effective?
        Mr. Longsworth. Given our understanding that no one approach will
    provide 100 percent effective protection of material or prevention of
    illicit trafficking, we do not prioritize between the two approaches,
    but rely on the strengths of each to provide a more comprehensive
    protective strategy.
        With respect to the Second Line of Defense program, our primary
    efforts have focused on securing the borders of Russia with the
    understanding that the most significant stockpiles of vulnerable
    nuclear materials are stored within it. As we expand the Second Line of
    Defense program, we are focusing on those countries bordering Russia to
    create the next layer of defense. Our priorities are also influenced by
    our relationship with these countries and our ability to realistically
    implement our programs in cooperation with the host governments. In the
    future, we anticipate the program will expand beyond eastern Europe and
    the Caucasus region as we try to address smuggling pathways to
    countries with known terrorist networks that want to obtain nuclear
    material for use in their activities.

                        COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES

        10. Senator Akaka. Mr. Longsworth, since NNSA, the Department of
    State (DOS), and DOD all have a role in providing border control, I
    would like to know about your interagency coordination in this area.
    Can you provide me with your plan to assure coordination with the other
    agencies?
        Mr. Longsworth. The DOE/NNSA works closely with the DOD and the DOS
    and other agencies to coordinate programs and issues associated with
    threat reduction programs at all levels, ranging from project
    management working groups to White House policy coordinating committees
    to ensure our threat reduction activities complement and reinforce as
    opposed to duplicating efforts.
        In order to more clearly outline roles and responsibilities among
    the agencies, two Strategic Plans were recently adopted. The first, for
    Nonproliferation Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
    in Eurasia, was largely driven by the National Security Counsel (NSC)
    to address coordination among all relevant stakeholders (DOD, NNSA,
    Department of Commerce (DOC), and DHS. The NSC, particularly the
    Proliferation Strategy Sub-PCC, will provide broad policy oversight of
    agency efforts to implement this strategic plan and overarching
    guidance to ensure that assistance supports the U.S. National Security
    Strategy in a non-duplicative, mutually reinforcing manner consistent
    with agency strengths. The NSC approved this plan in early February.
        The second plan, on Interagency Coordination of Nuclear Detection
    Assistance Overseas, was coordinated by DOS and is being finalized.
    Subject to the guidance of the NSC, global export control and related
    border security assistance will continue to be coordinated through the
    State/Nonproliferation-chaired Interagency Working Group (IWG) on
    Nonproliferation Export Control Assistance. The DOS, DOD, DOC, DHS, and
    the Intelligence Community participate in this IWG. Given the increased
    funding for this type of assistance, it is even more important to use
    this coordination mechanism.
        All U.S. Government agencies that fund and/or implement export
    control and related border security assistance will coordinate their
    annual program plans with other agencies through this IWG. The State/
    Nonproliferation-chaired IWG performs a coordination and advisory role,
    but exercises no authority over agency programs. Any disagreements over
    agency efforts to implement this strategic plan through assistance
    programs that cannot be resolved at the IWG or by relevant agency
    members will be forwarded to the Proliferation Strategy Sub-PCC. The
    IWG will coordinate periodic reviews of the strategic plan to ensure
    its effectiveness and coordinated implementation and report its results
    to the NSC.

        [Whereupon, at 11:09 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2005

                                  ----------

                             FRIDAY, APRIL 2, 2004

                               U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
                                      and Capabilities,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                            COUNTERNARCOTICS PROGRAM

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Pat
    Roberts (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Roberts, Warner,
    Allard, Dole, and Reed.
        Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
    director.
        Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
    professional staff member; Paula J. Philbin, professional staff
    member; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
    professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
    staff member; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Bridget E. Ward and Nicholas W.
    West.
        Committee members' assistants present: Darren Dick,
    assistant to Senator Roberts; Derek J. Maurer, assistant to
    Senator Collins; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator Dole;
    Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; and Elizabeth
    King, assistant to Senator Reed.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Roberts. The subcommittee will come to order. The
    subcommittee meets today, on a Friday--and thank you for being
    here--to receive testimony on the status of Department of
    Defense (DOD) drug interdiction and counterdrug activities, in
    review of the fiscal year 2005 Defense Authorization Request
    and Future Years Defense Program.
        I want to especially welcome our witnesses: the Honorable
    Thomas W. O'Connell, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
    (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC));
    Brigadier General Benjamin R. Mixon, the Director of Operations
    for J-3 within the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM); and Rear
    Admiral Bruce Clingan of the United States Navy. He is the
    Deputy Director of Operations for U.S. Central Command
    (CENTCOM).
        When the subcommittee last held a comprehensive counterdrug
    hearing, clear back in April of 2000, narcotics were basically
    emanating from South America and were a significant and growing
    national problem. The damage to the health and the welfare of
    our Nation was enormous. At the time, Congress was debating
    support for Plan Colombia. As we meet today, narcotics do
    remain a significant problem, not only because of the harm they
    cause to our citizens, but because of the nexus between drug
    money and funding of terrorist activities all around the world.
        I believe we will hear from our witnesses today that Plan
    Colombia was a wise investment, a visionary step. Coca
    cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia is down
    significantly. The government is reasserting its authority all
    throughout the country and I believe is winning the war against
    the narcoterrorists.
        Unfortunately, narcotics cultivation, production, and
    trafficking is on the rise elsewhere, not only in South America
    but in Southeast, South, and Central Asia as well. The
    potential danger of these drugs in funding terrorist
    organizations and their activities cannot be overstated. It is
    a threat which must be effectively fought and confronted.
        It is important to note that the DOD counternarcotics
    efforts are part of the larger and comprehensive U.S.
    Government and allied partners effort to reduce the demand at
    home, interdict the movement of illegal drugs across our
    borders or in transit, and discourage any production abroad.
    Each of these areas are equally important and a coordinated
    effort is essential.
        Most attention of late has been focused on the global war
    on terrorism and continued military operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. Clearly these are the highest priority. But we
    must remember that effective counternarcotics activities do
    contribute to the war on terrorism, improve our national
    security, enhance our relations with other nations, and improve
    the readiness of our Armed Forces.
        The President's budget request for fiscal year 2005
    includes $852.7 million for counternarcotics activities. Now,
    this is approximately $57 million less than the appropriated
    amount for fiscal year 2004, and I do look forward to Secretary
    O'Connell's explanation for this decline. The DOD has had
    success in its counternarcotics efforts. Additionally, the DOD
    has been proactive in extending its efforts to areas of
    increasing concern.
        At the request of the administration, this subcommittee led
    efforts to provide new authorities to the DOD to assist
    countries in the Andean region as well as Central and South
    Asian nations in their efforts to eliminate or reduce narcotics
    production and traffic. Additionally, responsibility and
    authority to support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
    and domestic law enforcement agencies in their counternarcotics
    efforts has been assumed by the U.S. Northern Command
    (NORTHCOM). We look forward to our witnesses' testimony on how
    these authorities will be used and what progress has been
    achieved.
        General Mixon, we are all anxious to hear your testimony on
    the situation in Colombia. General Hill testified before the
    Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday and reported that
    great progress has been made by the Colombian armed forces. He
    also said that more planning and training assistance is needed
    to sustain this momentum and that a modest increase of U.S.
    Armed Forces above the current cap of 400 is required. We
    certainly look forward to your views on the Colombian military
    operations, exactly why the additional U.S. military assistance
    is necessary, and what challenges lie ahead.
        Admiral Clingan, CENTCOM has had its hands full with the
    military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of
    Africa. We have all been troubled by reports of increased poppy
    cultivation and opium production in Afghanistan. The Joint
    U.S.-British counternarcotics effort does not appear to have
    been successful in discouraging the narcotics production and
    trafficking.
        The fiscal year 2004 supplemental appropriation provided
    $73 million to support the counternarcotics efforts in
    Afghanistan and the surrounding nations. Your testimony on the
    effectiveness of efforts to date and what more needs to be done
    will be very helpful to this subcommittee.
        I thank our witnesses for your service, your leadership,
    and your perseverance, and I look forward to your testimony.
    Following statements and questions, we will move to room SR-
    232A for a brief closed session.
        I will now turn to my distinguished colleague and friend,
    the ranking member or vice chairman, if you will, of the
    subcommittee, Senator Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    join you in welcoming Secretary O'Connell, General Mixon, and
    Admiral Clingan.
        Secretary O'Connell is here with a huge burden since
    Secretary Rumsfeld has not yet replaced the Principal Deputy
    ASD (SOLIC)--that individual left the office last year--and the
    position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Counternarcotics Policy has remained vacant since October 2003.
    Therefore, Secretary O'Connell is doing yeoman's work without
    all the assistance he needs. We hope he can communicate again
    our concern to Secretary Rumsfeld about filling these
    positions. We know he is going to do a great job since he is a
    graduate of the University of Rhode Island, but there is no
    need to have him doing three jobs.
        The purpose of our hearing today is to review the DOD
    request for funding and authority for counternarcotics programs
    in fiscal year 2005. This includes international programs,
    especially in the Western Hemisphere and Southwest Asia, and
    military efforts to support the domestic counterdrug work of
    other Federal, State, and local agencies.
        We are also here to learn about how resources and
    authorities are currently being used in two of the geographic
    commands with a critical role to play in reducing illicit drug
    activities internationally, SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM.
        On the domestic side, the DOD has been providing valuable
    intelligence, surveillance, and other support to the other
    agencies manning our borders, ports, and shores. The National
    Guard, on top of their other duties, plays a critical role in
    such drug interdiction efforts.
        Outside of the United States, the DOD provides
    international support to stop illicit drug production and
    trafficking. Two areas of particular interest to this committee
    are Colombia and Afghanistan. In Colombia, some progress
    appears to have been made. In 2003 the air bridge denial aerial
    interdiction program in Colombia resumed, 2 years after the
    tragic shootdown of U.S. missionaries in Peru. We heard
    yesterday at a full committee hearing from General Hill,
    Commander of SOUTHCOM, that in the last year the Colombian
    military has successfully captured or killed narcoterrorist
    leaders, is increasing the territory controlled by the central
    government, and denying that territory to the narcoterrorists.
        Also in 2003, as the Department of State's (DOS) recently
    released international narcotics control strategy report notes,
    the government eradicated illicit crops at a record-setting
    pace. Unfortunately, the same report points out that Colombia
    remains a major producing country. Indeed, the Office of
    National Drug Control Policy in its January 2004 pulse report
    on trends in domestic drug abuse found that in 2003 crack and
    powder cocaine availability remained relatively stable across
    the United States and prices remained stable or declined in
    some cities.
        There are of course any number of factors to explain this.
    However, I hope that Secretary O'Connell and General Mixon can
    address these facts and the challenges of reducing coca
    cultivation and drug trafficking in Colombia and the Andean
    region, especially in the context of the DOD's request for
    authority to raise the cap on military and civilian personnel
    from 400 to greater numbers.
        In the meantime, we face an urgent and potentially
    worsening situation in Afghanistan. According to the DOS's
    recently released international narcotics control strategy
    report and the United Nations' (U.N.) latest global illicit
    drug trade report, Afghanistan has produced its highest amount
    of opium since 1999, about three-quarters of the world's
    illicit opium.
        Moreover, the U.N. report indicates that poppy cultivation
    could expand further in 2004. The U.N. Office on Drugs and
    Crimes estimates that the revenue from opium in Afghanistan is
    about $2.3 billion, equivalent to more than 50 percent of
    Afghanistan's estimated gross domestic product (GDP). The
    potential impact on security and President Karzai's control
    over the country is clearly jeopardized by this type of illicit
    activity. Indeed, just 2 days ago President Karzai told a
    donors conference in Berlin, in his words: ``Drugs in
    Afghanistan are undermining the very existence of the Afghan
    state.''
        The British have had the lead in counternarcotics
    activities in Afghanistan but obviously they need help. In
    recognition of these facts, the 2003 Iraq supplemental included
    $73 million for counterdrug efforts in Afghanistan. I look
    forward to hearing from Secretary O'Connell and Admiral
    Clingan--about the DOD's strategy and CENTCOM's plans for
    employing these counterdrug resources.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Roberts. I thank the Senator for his comments.
        We have been joined by the distinguished chairman of the
    full committee, which obviously gives evidence of the
    importance of this subcommittee hearing.
        I would repeat again what I said in my opening statement.
    We have all been troubled, as seconded by Senator Reed, by
    reports of increased poppy cultivation and opium production in
    Afghanistan and the fact that the joint U.S. and British
    counternarcotics efforts do not appear to have been successful
    in discouraging narcotics production and trafficking.
        The distinguished chairman has just returned from that
    area. The chairman is a great believer in going out and talking
    to the troops in regards to our various, very difficult mission
    areas that we have all over the world. Mr. Chairman, I think
    you have been to Iraq and to Afghanistan and Pakistan at least
    three times and perhaps more. I joined you on a couple of those
    trips. But I would ask if you had anything that you would wish
    to say prior to the witnesses giving their testimony. Welcome,
    sir.
        Senator Warner. I thank you, Chairman Roberts and Ranking
    Member Reed, for the opportunity just to say a few words.
        I was in the area of responsibility (AOR) in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, just a few weeks ago and you are quite correct in
    your mentioning of President Karzai. Both you and the
    distinguished Senator from Rhode Island addressed that he
    personally is injecting himself into this. He told us he used
    to figure, Senator Reed, that opium makes up 60 percent of the
    gross national product (GNP) estimated in Afghanistan.
        But he also told us--and we are not here to fault the
    British, but clearly the initial efforts in Afghanistan have
    gone in the wrong direction. Apparently they offered a program
    by which if farmers would cease and desist and stop raising
    poppies they would get a payment. Well, as your lifetime of
    experience in agriculture----
        Senator Roberts. Similar to the U.S. farm program, right.
        Senator Warner. The farmer down the road said: Wait a
    minute; I will start growing them, then get in line for the
    payments. Yes, it has a note of humor, but it has a tragic note
    of seriousness. These moneys are funding, as my distinguished
    colleague Senator Allard and I have discussed, the jihadists
    worldwide. Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah are profiting from
    the enormity of this sum of money.
        Also overlaying this, Mr. Chairman, we learned from General
    Jones, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commander
    of forces, that he personally, together with others, is looking
    toward expanding NATO's role in Afghanistan, and that is not
    the role of NATO, to deal with that drug situation. Until that
    situation is contained and is subject to a program which can
    lead to the cessation of this growth and production, I think
    NATO is not likely to further involve itself in Afghanistan.
    That concerns me a great deal, because I think it is important
    not only for NATO, but for the world to have larger
    participation in helping Afghanistan secure its freedom.
        Therefore, I did want to hear the admiral's testimony and
    will listen to it. As you said, yesterday General Hill, in
    discussing the troop cap request before Congress, now said
    there is a direct correlation between our additional
    participation and hoped-for additional curtailment of drugs
    from that area into our country. It is to the benefit of the
    United States to do everything we can to continue to choke off
    the flow from Central America and most particularly from
    Colombia.
        So I thank the chairman and the distinguished ranking
    member for holding this hearing, and I appreciate the
    opportunity to say a word or two.
        Senator Roberts. Well, we thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let the
    record show that it was through your leadership that this
    subcommittee was formed up quite a few years ago--I was going
    to say several years. I have had the opportunity and the
    privilege of being the chairman for quite some time.
        It is called the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
    Subcommittee. I think we had better change the name, because
    most of the threats have emerged. But we want to thank you for
    your leadership in that respect.
        Senator Allard, would you have anything to say at this
    time?
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I do have a brief comment. I
    was also on a trip in this last break to Iraq and Afghanistan
    and had an opportunity to visit with President Karzai. He
    expressed to me the very same concerns that the chairman of the
    Armed Services Committee expressed.
        I think this particular hearing is very timely and I would
    join you in welcoming our distinguished panel here this
    morning. I look forward to hearing what their insights and
    recommendations might be.
        Yesterday we heard related testimony from our combatant
    commanders and the testimony highlighted the increasing
    participation of terrorist organizations like al Qaeda,
    Hezbollah, and Hamas in the drug trafficking trade. Their
    involvement is not limited to the Middle East. Hamas and
    Hezbollah are now conducting business in our own back yard, in
    General Mixon's Latin America AOR. Indeed, profits from the
    illegal drug market are now funding jihadist political and
    military activities on a truly global scale.
        Two weeks ago I had the opportunity to visit with President
    Karzai and discuss specific drug-related concerns across
    Afghanistan. He emphasized the immediate problem of combating
    both the exploding poppy cultivation and drug trade as well as
    the profiteering by the narcoterrorists that directed the
    subversive and destabilization actions against President
    Karzai's government. Over the long term, however, we need to
    assist Afghanistan with establishing broad-based economic and
    agricultural alternatives to growing poppies and producing
    opium.
        Mr. Chairman, again I appreciate your calling this hearing
    so that we can better understand the risks surrounding the
    illegal drug trade and their relationship to terrorist
    activities throughout the world. Thank you.
        Senator Roberts. Senator Dole, would you have any comments
    you would like to make?
        Senator Dole. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed. I
    appreciate this opportunity to review a critical aspect of our
    homeland defense. The links between international narcotics
    trafficking and international terrorism have become
    increasingly clear and in the last years Congress has also
    recognized this connection. The granting of expanded authority
    to use counterdrug funds for counterterrorism missions in
    Colombia recognizes that there is no useful distinction between
    the narcotrafficker and his terrorist activity.
        I look forward to hearing about your priorities and
    operations. The war on drugs is often buried in the back pages
    and many of your successes will never be covered with much
    fanfare. But I applaud your dedication and particularly want to
    commend the men and women in your operation, who are meeting
    the challenges of this mission with a courage that makes us all
    proud.
        I would just add that during the 1980s, as Secretary of
    Transportation, I was privileged to serve as the first female
    departmental head of a branch of the armed services, the United
    States Coast Guard, and I was very proud of the work that the
    young men and women did there in drug interdiction. So I
    certainly look forward to hearing your testimony and continuing
    to work closely with you in the months and years to come.
        Senator Roberts. We thank the Senator.
        Secretary O'Connell, would you please proceed. Let me say
    that all of your statement, every golden word, will be made
    part of the record and you can certainly feel free to
    summarize, either through bullet points or the things that you
    really want to emphasize, if you so choose.

     STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS W. O'CONNELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
       DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

        Mr. O'Connell. Thank you, Chairman Roberts. I would like to
    thank the distinguished chairman, Senator Warner, for joining
    us this morning. Senator Reed, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee: It is my pleasure to appear before you today to
    discuss the DOD programs and policies that assist nations
    around the world in their battle against narcoterrorism. I will
    place my longer statement in the record, Chairman Roberts.
        Fighting narcotics is a complex process that requires
    coordination and funding from all levels of government
    agencies, local and State law enforcement, and the foreign
    countries we assist. We are increasingly aware of the linkages
    between terrorist organizations, narcotics trafficking, weapons
    smuggling, kidnapping rings, and other transnational networks.
    Terrorist groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
    Colombia (FARC) in Colombia, al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and
    groups around the world can finance key operations with drug
    money.
        The DOD, with our counterparts in the DOS and other
    government agencies, seeks to systematically dismantle drug
    trafficking networks, both to halt the flow of drugs into the
    United States and to bolster the broader war on terrorism.
        We thank you for the $73 million in funding added in this
    year's emergency supplemental to support our efforts in
    Afghanistan and neighboring nations. Our fiscal year 2005
    counternarcotics budget requests resources to sustain these
    efforts. To support similar efforts in Colombia, the DOD will
    soon be forwarding to Congress a request for reprogramming $50
    million during this fiscal year. I am pleased to report that
    the DOD will maintain this emphasis on Colombia by increasing
    our efforts in Colombia in fiscal year 2005 by $43 million.
        Our international counternarcotics support is predominantly
    in response to requests from our principal partners, the DOS,
    the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and includes
    deployments and programs to train and furnish intelligence and
    operational support for drug detection, monitoring, and provide
    equipment to partner counterdrug forces.
        Domestically, the DOD continues to work through NORTHCOM
    and the National Guard, with the DHS and law enforcement
    agencies, to coordinate the counternarcotics effort. The
    National Guard is an exceptional partner to law enforcement in
    domestic counternarcotics missions requiring militarily unique
    skills, including air-ground reconnaissance, intelligence
    analysis and analysts, and training for law enforcement
    agencies.
        The DOD is maintaining our National Guard support for law
    enforcement along the southwest border and adding linguist
    centers in California and Washington for additional support.
        In terms of the DOD's demand reduction efforts, our view is
    that illegal drug use is, of course, incompatible with a
    service member's sensitive and dangerous duties. The DOD's
    demand reduction policy sets minimum standards of testing rates
    at 100 percent, meaning each service member is tested at an
    average of once per year. Increased testing begins in fiscal
    year 2005, with a goal of reaching 100 percent testing by
    fiscal year 2006. This cost-effective drug testing, along with
    punitive consequences for members who are identified as drug
    users, will continue to deter drug use among military
    personnel.
        I would like to thank you, Chairman Roberts, Senator Reed,
    members of the subcommittee, for the tremendous support you
    have provided, and I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. O'Connell follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Thomas W. O'Connell

        Chairman Roberts, Senator Reed, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, it is my pleasure to appear before you today to discuss
    the Department of Defense (DOD) programs and policy that assist nations
    around the world in their battle against narcoterrorism. I value the
    work that you do and congratulate you on your continued leadership.
        Each year, my office expends a great deal of time, effort, and
    resources to keep drugs from crossing our borders. This is a complex
    process that requires coordination and funding from all levels of
    government agencies, local and State law enforcement, and the foreign
    countries which we assist. We recognize that a portion of the profits
    from drug sales either directly or indirectly support terrorist
    organizations--another reason we are working hard to reduce the supply
    of drugs around the world.
        Illegal drug use exacts a heavy toll on American society every
    year. It accounts for billions of dollars in direct and indirect costs
    including health care, lost revenue due to crime, social welfare costs,
    and lost productivity. While cocaine continues to be the single most
    serious drug threat, heroin, synthetic drugs, methamphetamines, and
    marijuana are also serious, and in some cases, increasing problems.
    Global and regional terrorists threatening United States interests can
    finance their activities with the proceeds from narcotics trafficking.
    Terrorist groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
    (FARC), al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and groups around the world partially
    finance key operations with drug money. The DOD, with our counterparts
    in the Department of State (DOS) and other government agencies, seeks
    to systematically dismantle drug trafficking networks, both to halt the
    flow of drugs into the United States, and to bolster the broader war on
    terrorism effort.
        Domestically, the DOD continues to work through U.S. Northern
    Command (NORTHCOM) and the National Guard with the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) and law enforcement agencies to coordinate
    counternarcotics efforts. The National Guard is an exceptional partner
    to law enforcement in domestic counternarcotics missions requiring
    military-unique skills, including air/ground reconnaissance,
    intelligence analysts, and training for law enforcement agencies. The
    DOD is maintaining our National Guard support to law enforcement along
    the southwest border, and adding linguist centers in California and
    Washington.

                          THE COUNTERNARCOTICS BUDGET

        In accordance with statutory authorities, we use counternarcotics
    resources as effectively and efficiently as possible to achieve
    national and DOD counternarcotics priorities. We focus on programs that
    fulfill statutory responsibilities and use military-unique resources
    and capabilities, and continue to advance the national priorities of
    the National Drug Control Strategy. Our counternarcotics authorities
    and funding are an effective combination that supports war on terrorism
    efforts and the implementation of the DOD's Security Cooperation
    Guidance.
        The DOD's July 31, 2002, counternarcotics policy guidance states
    that the DOD will execute drug detection and monitoring and other
    programs using military command, control, communications, and
    intelligence resources, as well as military operational planning
    capabilities. This year we have issued new Demand Reduction, Domestic
    Support, and International Support counternarcoterrorism policies have
    expanded upon this definition. We focus on counternarcotics activities
    that will contribute to:

             The war on terrorism;
             Security Cooperation Guidance;
             Military readiness; and
             National Security.

        In order to best characterize and describe the support DOD
    provides, the DOD defined four missions areas to encompass the scope of
    the DOD's program. These mission areas are:

             Demand Reduction: Drug testing, treatment, and
            outreach;
             Domestic Support: Active duty counternarcotics
            support, National Guard State Plans, National Guard schools,
            Aerostat radars;
             Intelligence and Technology Support: Signals
            Intelligence (SIGINT) collection and processing, intelligence
            support and analysis, research and development; and
             International Support: Detection and monitoring,
            intelligence support and analysis, equipment, training, and
            infrastructure.

        The DOD provides, through combatant commands, the military
    departments, and the defense agencies, unique military personnel,
    systems, and capabilities that support domestic law enforcement
    agencies and foreign security forces involved in counternarcotics
    activities, including efforts to counter activities that aid, benefit
    from, or are related to narcotics trafficking. This broad-scope support
    is provided primarily under the authorities contained in 10 U.S. Code
    Sec. Sec. 124, 371-374, 379-381, 2576, 2576a, Title 32 U.S. Code,
    Sec. 112, Section 1004, National Defense Authorization Act for 1991, as
    amended; and section 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
    1998, as amended.
        With finite funds and resources, multiple missions to address, and
    numerous requests for assistance, the DOD must establish priorities for
    its support mission. The areas that receive resources must be where DOD
    capabilities will provide the highest impact on the drug threat while
    at the same time contributing to the war on terrorism and enhancing
    national security. DOD's efforts will be continually evaluated based on
    the changing drug threat and participating nations' need.
        The Department's Central Transfer Account (CTA) program request of
    $852.7 million for fiscal year 2005 for the CTA reflects price growth
    of $11.4 million and a program decrease of $67.3 million over the
    fiscal year 2004 level of $908.6 million, which primarily reflects the
    fiscal year 2004 congressional increases to the DOD's
    counternarcoterrorism program. The DOD's fiscal year 2005
    counternarcotics budget will continue to fund, within fiscal
    constraints, an array of unique and effective programs that support the
    National Drug Control Strategy and Department goals.

                                DEMAND REDUCTION

        Illegal drugs are readily available to DOD members and their use is
    incompatible with a service member's security-sensitive and dangerous
    duties. During the past decade, use of prohibited drugs in the United
    States civilian community, especially by young citizens, has increased,
    prompting the President to establish a goal of reducing drug use by 25
    percent over each 3-year period.
        The DOD has assimilated the President's goal of a 25 percent
    reduction in drug use over 3 years into its strategic plan. The
    approach emphasizes prevention of drug use through pre-accession,
    random drug testing, anti-drug education, and treatment. Emphasis is
    placed on deterring drug use through cost effective drug testing with
    punitive consequences for members who are identified as drug users.
        In accordance with the DOD Demand Reduction policy, we plan to
    increase drug testing for all military members to a minimum average
    testing rate for each Service, the Army National Guard, and the Air
    National Guard of one test per member per year. This increase will be
    incrementally phased in through the out years. We also plan to increase
    drug testing for civilian employees in testing designated positions to
    a minimum average testing rate for each agency or component of one test
    per testing designated employee per year.
        A total of $19.4 million is for the National Guard State Plans and
    Service outreach programs, and the young marines outreach program, and
    $102.7 million is for the continued support of the DOD Demand Reduction
    Programs.

                                DOMESTIC SUPPORT

        Since 1989, domestic law enforcement agencies at the State, local,
    and Federal levels have requested military support for their respective
    counternarcoterrorism operations. Domestic counternarcoterrorism
    operations have historically included support for interdiction of
    cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamines coming into the United States;
    interdiction of illegal drugs transiting the United States;
    identification of domestic marijuana grows and methamphetamine labs;
    identification and arrest of drug manufacturers, traffickers and
    distributors; and the prevention of drug use among America's youth.
        We work closely with NORTHCOM and the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Homeland Defense on counternarcotics support to domestic
    law enforcement. The focus of this support is managed through Joint
    Task Force-Six in El Paso, Texas, which provides active duty and
    Reserve missions in areas of engineering support, aerial and ground
    reconnaissance, transportation, and logistics support and intelligence.
    These counternarcotics missions provide excellent training in real
    world situations and enhance domestic security.
        Additionally, the DOD is committed to improving information sharing
    between DOD and law enforcement agencies in support of
    counternarcoterrorism objectives. DOD is installing classified computer
    systems and networks in High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
    intelligence centers operated by National Guard intelligence analysts.
    Active duty and Reserve members are playing an integral role in
    arrival-zone detection and monitoring, cross-agency intelligence
    fusion, and the development of actionable intelligence.
        A total of $219.5 million supports Federal, State, and local drug
    law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) requests for domestic operational and
    logistical support, and will assist the DLEAs in their efforts to
    reduce drug-related crime. Of this amount, $151.1 million is for a
    portion of the total National Guard State Plans that supports domestic
    law enforcement efforts and the counternarcoterrorism schools; $20.3
    million is for Domestic Operational Support, such as NORTHCOM
    counternarcoterrorism support to DLEAs and Title 10 National Guard
    translation efforts; $32.3 million is for domestic detection and
    monitoring efforts (Tethered Aerostats); and $15.8 million is for
    command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence support,
    such as ADNET.

                      INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT

        The basic nature of the smuggling threat mandates the need for
    explicit intelligence if the DOD is to be effective in detection,
    monitoring, and interdiction operations. The DOD will continue to
    provide critical intelligence support to national policies designed to
    dismantle narcotics trafficking and international terrorist
    organizations benefiting from drug trafficking. These intelligence
    support programs make use of unique DOD capabilities, systems, skills,
    and expertise, and directly support the National Drug Control Strategy.
        Use of new technology continues to be instrumental in combating
    narcoterrorist activities. The DOD will continue to test, evaluate,
    develop, and deploy technologies that are used to collect and survey
    suspect narcoterrorist smuggling operations in air, land, or sea. Wide
    area surveillance will be a technology challenge as legacy systems such
    as Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar have surpassed lifecycle
    expectations and will require major hardware and software replacement
    to lower the risk of system failure. The program will pursue merging
    disparate data and sensor feeds into a common operating picture, to
    provide worldwide counternarcotics elements with counternarcoterrorism
    intelligence and operational awareness.
        Ringold translation support will be expanded to include additional
    languages critical to the global war on terrorism. Throttle Car is a
    critical data warehousing effort jointly funded by the DOD and the Drug
    Enforcement Agency (DEA). Capabilities will be increased to accommodate
    capacity increases and ensure readiness.
        A total of $103.3 million will be used for intelligence programs to
    collect, process, analyze, and disseminate information required for
    counternarcoterrorism operations. Technology programs increase the
    DOD's abilities to target narcoterrorist activity. A total of $58.6
    million is for counternarcoterrorism intelligence support and analysis;
    $21.1 million is for SIGINT collection and processing; $10.0 million is
    for Service and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) command and
    control programs; and $13.7 million is for counternarcotics technology
    efforts.

                             INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

        Financial, political, and operational linkages exist among
    narcotics trafficking, smuggling, and the global expansion of
    terrorism. Since September 11, 2001, the DOD has expanded its
    counternarcoterrorism mission to include targeting those terrorists
    groups worldwide that use narcotics trafficking to support terrorist
    activities. In order to support the war on terrorism, DOD
    counternarcoterrorism uses its resources in regions where terrorists
    benefit from illicit drug revenue and know-how, and is working to
    bolster already well-established counternarcoterrorism efforts in U.S.
    Pacific Command (PACOM), particularly in Southeast Asia where the U.S.
    and its Asian partners face a challenging combination of terrorism/
    extremism, drug trafficking, and the serious need for increased
    maritime security.
        In the CENTCOM area of operation, terrorists/extremists in
    Afghanistan and its neighboring countries exploit the abundance of
    illicit drugs to support their activities. The DOD is working to break
    the links between terrorism and drug trafficking. In Afghanistan, where
    drug traffickers have extensive links to terrorists/extremists, the DOD
    will provide substantial counternarcoterrorism support to the United
    Kingdom (U.K.)-led counternarcoterrorism efforts in Afghanistan, as
    well as developing Afghan border infrastructure and border police
    capabilities. In other countries in Central Asia and the Middle East,
    CENTCOM is currently expanding its counternarcoterrorism efforts to
    curb the transit of illicit drugs through international smuggling
    corridors. We thank you, therefore for the $73 million in funding added
    in this year's emergency supplemental to support our efforts in
    Afghanistan and neighboring nations. Our fiscal year 2005
    counternarcotics budget requests resources to sustain these efforts.
        A total of $40.8 million will be used for emerging threats support
    efforts in the CENTCOM, PACOM, and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) AORs
    to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail activities related to
    substances, material, weapons, or resources used to finance, support,
    secure, cultivate, process, or transport illegal drugs. $29.0 million
    supports operations in those AORs, including section 1033 support;
    $11.8 million is for AOR command and control support.
        Cocaine is the primary drug threat in the United States due to its
    high demand, availability, and expanding distribution to new markets,
    high rate of overdose, and its relation to violence. In 2002, there was
    an estimated 250 metric tons of cocaine consumed in the U.S. There were
    approximately 2 million people age 12 and older using cocaine in the
    U.S. in 2002. Each user consumed approximately 34 grams of cocaine a
    year.
        Cocaine consumed in the United States originates from coca plants
    grown in South America. The average potential production of cocaine
    produced in South America in 2002 was over 1,200 metric tons. Of this
    amount, approximately 879 metric tons of export quality cocaine
    departed South America. Approximately 540 metric tons of cocaine were
    exported to the U.S. and another 230 metric tons went to Europe. After
    cocaine seizures and consumption throughout the transit zone en route
    to the U.S., some 350 metric tons of export-quality cocaine were
    available in U.S. markets in 2002.
        Colombia produced approximately 680 metric tons of 100 percent pure
    cocaine in 2002. Coca leaf produced in other countries, primarily Peru
    and Bolivia, is transported across the border into Colombia to be
    processed into hydrochloride cocaine. The processed cocaine is then
    shipped/exported through other bordering countries or through the
    Caribbean and Eastern Pacific to the final destination. Over 500
    maritime shipments depart Colombia annually, equating to almost two
    shipments a day. Of the cocaine that enters the United States, 72
    percent passes through the Mexico/Central America corridor, another 27
    percent moves through the Caribbean, and 1 percent comes directly from
    South America.
        Colombia offers a unique window of opportunity with congressional
    approval of expanded authority and the aggressive leadership of
    President Uribe. The administration continues to support President
    Uribe in seeking a secure and democratic Colombia, including providing
    resources in support of Colombia's Plan Patriota.
        Supplemental funding ($34 million) in fiscal year 2003 was provided
    by Congress for DOD support to Colombia initiatives. With existing
    funds and the additional supplemental funding, SOUTHCOM increased
    support to the Colombian military, adding to their capability through a
    variety of programs. These programs provided critical support in
    logistics, mobility, light infantry operations, riverine operations,
    command, control and communications, at-sea interception, maintenance,
    security, base operations support, and intelligence collection and
    dissemination. Congress extended expanded authority to support
    Colombia's counternarcotics and counterterrorist efforts for fiscal
    year 2004.
        Interagency principals have planned to increase assistance for the
    Colombian military during fiscal years 2004 and 2005. SOUTHCOM
    developed a support package to provide needed assistance to the
    Colombian military. This funding will continue to support and expand
    upon programs already established during fiscal year 2003 and will
    focus on increasing the Colombian military's capability in mobility,
    logistics, operationalizing intelligence, planning assistance, medical
    evacuation and care, secure communications, and security. To support
    these efforts in Colombia, the DOD will soon be forwarding to Congress
    a request for reprogramming $50 million during this fiscal year. I am
    pleased to report that the DOD will maintain this emphasis on Colombia
    by increasing our efforts in Colombia in fiscal year 2005 by $43
    million.
        A total of $366.9 million will support efforts in the SOUTHCOM AOR,
    including detection and monitoring operations to assist U.S. law
    enforcement agencies to counter the flow of drugs in transit into the
    United States, and supporting nations (such as Colombia) in their fight
    against narcoterrorism. A total of $173.0 million is for detection and
    monitoring platforms and assets; $142.5 million is for operational
    support; and $51.4 million is for AOR command and control support,
    including Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S).
        The current troop cap limits the U.S. presence in Colombia to 400
    military personnel and 400 contractors. SOUTHCOM manages this on a
    daily basis, often canceling or postponing personnel travel to
    Colombia. To date, the impact has been small. However, in the coming
    year as the Colombian military will be conducting full-scale operations
    across the country, the personnel cap will begin to have a deleterious
    effect on the mission. While U.S. personnel will not be directly on the
    front lines, more training and planning assistance will be required for
    the Colombian military, since they will be directly engaged on a
    broader front to defeat the narcoterrorists. We should support this
    effort with manning that reflects the current and future situation on
    the ground. Consequently, the administration has requested an increase
    of the personnel cap to 800 military and 600 contractor personnel.

                                   CONCLUSION

        The DOD appreciates Congress' continued support of the
    counternarcotics program. I thank you, Chairman Roberts, Senator Reed,
    and the members of the subcommittee for the tremendous support you have
    provided. I look forward to answering your questions.

        Senator Roberts. We thank you for your statement and we
    thank you for summarizing. Without objection, your full
    statement will be made a part of the record.
        Admiral Clingan, would you please proceed.

     STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. BRUCE W. CLINGAN, USN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR
                  OF OPERATIONS, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

        Admiral Clingan. Chairman Roberts, Chairman Warner, Senator
    Reed, members of the subcommittee: Thank you for this
    opportunity to join you today to discuss CENTCOM's role in the
    DOD drug program, and in particular our efforts in Afghanistan
    to curtail narcotics production and trafficking.
        As many of you are aware, currently in Afghanistan there
    are more than 10,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and others
    conducting counterinsurgency operations and promoting stability
    and security. That 10,000 represents a small number of the
    service members currently deployed to our AOR, conducting
    counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, looking hard in the Horn
    of Africa to determine what kind of international terrorist
    networks are functioning there, and prosecuting the greater
    global war on terrorism in the 25 countries that comprise our
    AOR. Although the 10,000 soldiers in Afghanistan represent a
    small percentage of the Armed Forces we have in the AOR,
    clearly their contributions and the importance of their efforts
    are hard to overstate.
        We have a couple of objectives that we are after in
    Afghanistan. Not the least among them are setting conditions
    for economic reconstruction and for the ongoing political
    process. Countering the growing narcotics trade, which
    contributes to the criminal and terrorist activities that
    undermine efforts to achieve that stability, are important and
    a priority for CENTCOM and the coalition.
        In fiscal year 2004, Congress made available to CENTCOM $73
    million to further our counternarcoterrorism efforts in
    Afghanistan and the bordering countries. For CENTCOM, that
    represented a 300-fold increase in our budget for this effort--
    not 300 percent, 300-fold. So since October we have invested
    ourselves in concentrating on developing a comprehensive plan
    that will address the narcotics problem in Afghanistan, along
    with our partners in the United Kingdom (U.K.) and the other
    interagency units.
        This plan, which I have outlined in my prepared statement,
    is in execution now and on track to achieve some tangible
    effects in this realm in the third and fourth quarter of this
    year.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to address this
    subcommittee and I look forward to your questions, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Clingan follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Rear Adm. Bruce Clingan, USN

        Chairman Roberts, Senator Reed, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss
    illegal narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan, its relation to
    narcoterrorism, and the programs we are developing to help counter this
    problem in collaboration with other agencies and governments. We
    appreciate Congress' support of the Department of Defense (DOD)
    counternarcotics program in last year's supplemental appropriations
    bill, particularly in regard to our efforts related to Afghanistan.
        U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is currently focused on defeating
    transnational terrorism and creating secure and stable environments in
    Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the broader CENTCOM area of
    responsibility (AOR) encompasses the geographic and ideological heart
    of the global war on terror, a war without borders that spans all 25
    countries in the region. The overt war on terror began in Afghanistan.
    A stable, democratic, economically viable state there will provide an
    alternative to the terrorist vision of a future characterized by
    oppression and prolonged conflict.
        The narcotics problem in Afghanistan presents a special challenge.
    The international community and Afghan leadership, with the support of
    the United States and other coalition allies, is addressing this
    challenge. The United Kingdom (U.K.) has the international lead in
    Afghanistan and with key Afghan leaders, including President Karzai and
    Minister of Interior Jalali, is beginning to take action against the
    narcotics trade. This problem requires a comprehensive, sustained
    effort championed by the Afghan Government. Technical help and
    resources from the U.K., U.S., and the international community will
    greatly enhance the Afghan Government's effectiveness in combating this
    destructive trade.
        The CENTCOM counternarcotics program for Afghanistan and the
    surrounding Central Asian states is being developed in coordination
    with the Department of State's (DOS) efforts to improve law enforcement
    in Afghanistan and compliment the programs developed by the U.K. In the
    short term, we will focus our efforts on direct assistance to the
    Afghan Government that establishes a more effective counternarcotics
    capability.
        CENTCOM will focus the $73 million made available in the fiscal
    year 2004 supplemental for Afghanistan's counternarcoterrorism program
    to disrupt the illicit drug trafficking that supports terrorist
    elements in Afghanistan. These groups include Taliban remnants, al
    Qaeda operatives and leaders, other extremist elements like Gulbuddin
    Hekmatyar's Hizb-I-Islami, as well as Afghan criminal gangs and
    transnational criminal elements.
        The supplemental funding that Congress has approved will assist
    coalition, host nation, contractor, and other governmental agencies to:

             Monitor traditional overland smuggling routes from
            Afghanistan to the bordering nations through the construction
            of border control checkpoints and the employment of sensor
            technology;
             Equip Afghan counternarcotics units and law
            enforcement agencies to conduct interdiction operations against
            narcotraffickers;
             Provide Afghanistan with the communications
            connectivity necessary to rapidly respond to narcoterrorist
            threats with synchronized interagency operations;
             Establish an interagency counternarcotics Intelligence
            Fusion Center to gather, collect, process, and disseminate
            information leading to actionable intelligence. This will
            enhance operations by U.S. law enforcement officers, Provincial
            Reconstruction Team law enforcement liaison cells, coalition
            forces, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Crimes
            and Narcotics Center, U.K. law enforcement and intelligence
            agencies, and other governmental agencies represented in the
            region;
             Conduct an Afghan counternarcoterrorism public
            awareness program in concert with the DOS that helps the Afghan
            interior ministry develop a public affairs capability;
             Provide equipment and other support in concert with
            U.K. operations against narcoterrorist activities in
            Afghanistan; and
             Conduct Maritime Interception Operations and monitor
            vessels suspected of transporting narcotics and/or terrorists
            based on actionable intelligence.

        CENTCOM views narcotrafficking as a significant obstacle to the
    political and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan. The revenue
    generated from poppy cultivation provides resources for extremists and
    the smuggling infrastructure that supports narcotics trafficking
    facilitates terrorist transportation and logistics. Local terrorist and
    criminal leaders have a vested interest in using the profits from
    narcotics to oppose the central government and undermine the security
    and stability of Afghanistan. As a result, the DOD counternarcotics
    program in Afghanistan is a key element of our campaign against
    terrorism.
        As important as our contribution to the DOD counternarcotics
    program is, the underlying causes for the growth of narcotrafficking
    must be addressed. Farmers are hard pressed to cultivate cash crops
    that can provide revenue for their families and villages. Poppies are
    notoriously easy to grow, and their market value makes it difficult for
    legitimate crops to compete. Additionally, narcoterrorists prey upon
    farmers who do not produce, contributing to a lack of confidence at the
    local level in the capability of the central government to provide
    adequate security. We must not only target poppy production and
    trafficking, we must also implement holistic initiatives that enhance
    the economy and agriculture to provide alternatives to the opium
    growers if we are to be ultimately successful in eliminating narcotics
    proliferation in Afghanistan and the region.
        Thank you for the opportunity to share CENTCOM's strategy,
    objectives, and plans.

        Senator Roberts. We are going to set a record, Mr.
    Chairman, for summarized statements.
        Senator Warner. You know how to run a show.
        Senator Roberts. This is outstanding.
        We would now like to hear from General Mixon. Would you
    please proceed.

      STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. BENJAMIN R. MIXON, USA, DIRECTOR OF
                 OPERATIONS, J-3, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

        General Mixon. Yes, sir. It is good to see you again, sir,
    and Senator Warner, after spending a very long day with you
    last year in Bagram, Afghanistan, and Kabul, if you recall that
    evening where we loaded you on a C-130 aircraft late at night.
    You may not recall that. I certainly do, and it was an honor
    for me to escort you in Afghanistan.
        Senator Roberts. I remember that lunch.
        Senator Warner. Thank you for that recollection. I remember
    that.
        Senator Roberts. I am not sure I want to remember it again,
    but I remember that lunch. [Laughter.]
        Senator Warner. As a matter of fact, we had the same meal
    that you were providing the training of the Afghanistan army;
    is that not correct?
        General Mixon. Yes, sir.
        Senator Roberts. Yes, and they were very proud of that
    meal. It was a true Afghan meal.
        Senator Warner. That is right.
        Senator Roberts. I would recommend it for anybody who wants
    to----
        Senator Warner. Steady as we go. Thank you very much.
    [Laughter.]
        Senator Roberts.--enjoy Afghan cuisine.
        Please proceed, General.
        General Mixon. Sir, I am in a different environment now
    than I was in Afghanistan, but an equally important
    environment, as you pointed out.
        My statement is a little bit longer. If you would indulge
    me, I think it is important to outline for you what we are
    doing.
        Senator Roberts. Please proceed.
        General Mixon. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, distinguished
    members of the subcommittee: Thank you for allowing me a few
    minutes to make some opening comments. We at SOUTHCOM are fully
    committed to meeting DOD's responsibilities in the fight
    against drugs and narcoterrorists. We fulfil these
    responsibilities through detection and monitoring programs,
    close interagency coordination, and military support to partner
    nations. Our programs cover the entire SOUTHCOM AOR, including
    Central and South America and the Caribbean Basin.
        Our principal agent for the planning and execution is the
    National Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) located
    in Key West, Florida. JIATF-S is a one of a kind premier
    organization of excellence for multi-service, multi-agency, and
    multi-national support to the counterdrug mission. Their
    operations, in conjunction with SOUTHCOM, deliver an integrated
    approach to meeting DOD mission sets in the war against drugs
    and narcoterrorists.
        Our cooperation with the Central American countries
    continues to strengthen. During the last year, besides our
    daily interdiction efforts, we conducted 18 major surge drug
    counteroperations. The most significant narcotrafficking
    pattern centers on suspect air traffic transitting the Central
    American corridor. Using the Cooperating Nations Information
    Exchange System, we continue to make great strides in
    regionalizing the effort to identify, monitor, and respond to
    suspect air and maritime tracks in Central America.
        Through numerous maritime professional exchanges and our
    Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo helicopter deployment, SOUTHCOM
    and JIATF-S continue to develop the Central American partner
    nation abilities to accept, hand off, and effect interdiction
    and apprehension of illicit trafficking activities.
        We also remain strong partners with our Caribbean friends.
    Besides periodic multinational and bilateral counterdrug
    operations, we also remain committed to assisting in the
    maintenance, logistics, and training of their counterdrug and
    maritime forces.
        We continue our robust military cooperation with our South
    American allies, focusing on improving their capabilities to
    deal with the narcoterrorists and war on terrorism threats. We
    have deployed counterterrorist and counterdrug training teams
    to Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Chile, and Paraguay. Brazil,
    Ecuador, and Peru have recognized the threat of Colombia's
    narcoterrorists to their stability and are taking concrete
    steps to curtail it.
        Assisting Colombia in their fight continues to be in the
    United States' best interest and a top priority for SOUTHCOM.
    In close coordination with the DOS, we continue to provide a
    full range of support to the Colombian government, its security
    forces, and its people. This includes training and equipping
    both the military and police, assisting the ministry of defense
    in the development of modern budget and logistics
    organizations, assisting them in their narcoterrorist
    demobilization programs, and providing humanitarian assistance
    to populations that are most dramatically affected by this
    narcoterrorist war.
        Two of our most successful equipment and sustaining
    programs remain the extensive support we have provided to the
    Colombian army's counternarcotics brigade and the
    infrastructure security strategy program, which has
    dramatically reduced the number of narcoterrorist attacks on
    Colombia's northeastern rural infrastructure. We are also
    extensively involved in supporting the Colombian military's
    campaign plan.
        I would like to emphasize that all of our training and
    advising programs operate under strict rules of engagement that
    prohibit U.S. service members from participating in combat
    operations.
        The continuation of expanded authority is the single most
    important factor for us to continue building success in
    Colombia. This legislation has allowed us to use funds
    available for counterdrug activities to provide assistance to
    the government of Colombia for a coordinated campaign against
    the terrorist activities of its illegal armed groups. Granting
    of expanded authority was an important recognition that no
    meaningful distinction can be made between terrorists and drug
    traffickers in our region. All three of the terrorist groups
    operating in Colombia are deep into the illicit narcotics
    business.
        Another key legislative priority we support is the raising
    of the force ceiling, or cap, currently at 400 military and 400
    civilian contractors. We at SOUTHCOM seek authorization to
    increase the military numbers to 800. In fiscal years 2003 and
    2004 we have repeatedly had to curtail training missions to
    both the Colombian military and police, cancel intelligence and
    reconnaissance missions, staff visits, and limit other
    programs, ranging from medical exchanges to officer development
    programs.
        If granted this authority, we do not envision an immediate
    increase in military personnel. This increase will simply allow
    us the flexibility to enhance support as required while still
    complying with the rules of engagement.
        We have continued to support Colombia's air bridge denial
    program since its resumption in August 2003. Since the program
    restarted, there have been 14 aircraft forced down, 11 of those
    destroyed, and 7.9 metric tons of drugs seized. We are prepared
    to support the DOS's nonlethal program in Peru upon its
    resumption.
        Measures of effectiveness in this war are difficult to
    gauge. Using calendar year 2002 and 2003 data, which roughly
    corresponds to the inception of expanded authorities, the
    Colombian security forces have experienced dramatic successes
    on all fronts. I would like to cite a few of these examples.
    The 2003 homicide rate is the lowest since 1987, pegged at
    approximately 52 per 100,000 population. We are also proud of
    the capture of over a dozen mid-level members and one senior-
    level member of the FARC leadership, and the restoration of
    Colombian government presence in all of Colombia's 1,098
    municipalities.
        In conclusion, we are at a critical point in Colombia's
    history. Under the leadership of President Uribe, who enjoys a
    very high approval rating, the military and police have
    regained areas long held by the narcoterrorists. They have also
    dealt serious blows to the leadership of these groups and have
    embarked on a strategic offensive to dismantle the FARC.
    Colombia's citizens have regained hope and the security forces
    are imbued with a renewed sense of momentum and commitment. Our
    continued support to them at this point is critical.
        Thank you for the opportunity, and I would like to
    highlight the great work the men and women do in SOUTHCOM every
    day, and I appreciate the opportunity to make this statement
    and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Mixon follows:]

            Prepared Statement by Brig. Gen. Benjamin R. Mixon, USA

        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss
    the United States Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) role in assisting
    Colombia with its battle against narcoterrorism. Every day your
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians at
    SOUTHCOM are working hard and employing their skills to accomplish our
    missions in this vital endeavor. We are shoring up our own national
    security by addressing this challenge at this time and in this place.
    Simultaneously, we are laying the groundwork to promote and maintain
    future security and stability.
        Colombia is at a decisive point in its fight. We are seeing steady
    progress toward establishing security and stability in Colombia and we
    are confident the Government of Colombia will continue to do so under
    President Uribe. President Uribe is a man of vision, principle, and
    substance. He is inculcating his government and his Armed Forces with
    an aggressive spirit and belief they can win the war against the
    narcoterrorists and end the violence. But the momentum he has built and
    the progress Colombia has shown is reversible. Consequently, we must
    maintain our steady, patient support in order to reinforce the
    successes we have seen and to guarantee a tangible return on the
    significant investment our country has made to our democratic neighbor.
        To outline SOUTHCOM's efforts in this endeavor, I will discuss the
    status of SOUTHCOM's support of Plan Colombia, the progress we are
    seeing in Colombia, our activities with the Andean Ridge countries, and
    the way ahead. Assisting Colombia in their fight continues to be in our
    own best interest. A secure Colombia will benefit fully from democratic
    processes and economic growth, prevent narcoterrorist spillover, and
    serve as a regional example. Conversely, a failed Colombia, serving as
    a safe haven for narcoterrorists and international terrorists, would be
    a most unwelcome regional model. The center of gravity right now is in
    Colombia, and the future health of the region hinges upon what happens
    there. While this is Colombia's fight to win, we have the opportunity
    to tip the balance by augmenting their efforts decisively with our
    unwavering support.

                      SOUTHCOM'S SUPPORT TO PLAN COLOMBIA

        Plan Colombia is a 6-year plan designed to defeat the threat the
    Colombians face. This threat continues to come from the three largest
    illegal armed groups in Colombia, all named on the Department of
    State's (DOS) list of foreign terrorist organizations and two named on
    the President's list of drug kingpins: the Revolutionary Armed Forces
    of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United
    Self-Defense Forces (AUC). While these groups may retain fragments of
    their founding philosophies, they appear to have jettisoned ideology in
    favor of terrorist methods and narcotrafficking.
        Narcoterrorism threatens the stability of several nations in Latin
    America and the Caribbean and erodes the very fabric of democracy by
    spawning terrorism, corrupting public institutions, promoting criminal
    activity, undermining legitimate economies, and disrupting social
    order. The violence and corruption not only threatens our neighbors, it
    poses a direct national security threat to our homeland. Illicit drug
    abuse is certainly a multi-faceted problem, but our support to Plan
    Colombia is effectively addressing one of its most critical components.
        Our role at SOUTHCOM is to support implementation of the military
    aspects of the plan. The plan addresses the entire depth of Colombia's
    complex problem, however, and is by no means envisioned as a simple
    military solution. Various other U.S. Government agencies and
    departments received funding to support both military and non-military
    aspects of Plan Colombia.
        Colombia is just completing the fourth year of this 6-year plan.
    The first phase of their three-phased plan focused on the Putumayo and
    Caqueta Departments of southern Colombia, where approximately half of
    Colombia's coca cultivation took place and lasted from December 2000
    until December 2002. That phase consisted of challenging illegal armed
    groups, finding and destroying cocaine laboratories, and providing
    security for intensive aerial eradication of coca, the principal bill
    payer for narcoterrorism in Colombia. SOUTHCOM was responsible
    primarily for training and equipping a Counternarcotics (CN) Brigade,
    fielding Blackhawk and Huey II helicopters, and also training pilots
    and crews during the first phase. Secondary efforts provided for
    infrastructure upgrades, riverine training, and counterdrug
    intelligence support. In Phase II, the Colombians are expanding the
    size of the Armed Forces, working with neighboring countries for
    combined operations, building forests where coca once grew, and
    creating units comprised of campesino soldiers to help guard towns
    where government presence was formerly lacking. These initiatives
    support continued drug eradication and interdiction. Phase III of Plan
    Colombia culminates the entire plan by expanding the government
    presence and control nationwide. While it is still too early to predict
    the exact end state of Plan Colombia, the progress we are seeing is a
    positive development that promises to complete that plan and
    institutionalize its successes.

                                   CN BRIGADE

        The CN Brigade headquarters and its three battalions are the best-
    trained and equipped conventional units in the Colombian Army. Its
    mission is to conduct ground, riverine, and air assault offensive
    operations against narcoterrorist organizations and provide ground
    security for aerial eradications. U.S. military personnel conducted
    staff and light infantry training for almost 2,300 troops. In
    accordance with Plan Colombia, the CN Brigade was originally designed
    to operate in southern Colombia. The CN Brigade has had impressive
    results during drug interdiction operations in that part of the country
    by destroying coca processing labs, providing security to eradication
    operations, and seizing chemical precursors and coca leaf. Most
    recently, the CN Brigade captured Nayibe Rojas Valdarrama, aka
    ``Sonia,'' Chief of Finances and Logistics for the FARC Southern Bloc.
    Her capture has led to numerous other related arrests and has degraded
    the FARC's ability to conduct narcotrafficking.
        The Colombian military synchronized the deployments of the CN
    Brigade in Phase I with Colombian National Police and DOS eradication
    efforts. The Office of National Drug Control Policy found that
    Colombia's coca cultivation decreased by 21 percent in 2003 from 2002.
    Because of its success in the Putumayo and Caqueta Departments, this
    brigade is now also being used beyond its original scope in other parts
    of the country, most notably the Narino Department. We continue to
    provide sustainment training to the CN Brigade. In 2003, this unit
    transformed its organizational structure to become more flexible and
    deployable to plan and conduct offensive operations throughout the
    entire country.

                                  HELICOPTERS

        Since December 2000, the United States has provided air mobility to
    the first CN Brigade using a company of 28 UH-1Ns with a combination of
    Colombian and DOS contracted pilots. The UH-1N aircraft are based in
    Tolemaida with the Colombian Army Aviation Battalion and are forward
    deployed to Larandia for operations. The current operational focus
    remains providing air mobility support for counterdrug operations as
    well as selected counternarcoterrorism operations. Delivery of the 25
    Plan Colombia Huey IIs was completed in September 2002. These
    helicopters are also based at Tolemaida and currently focused on
    supporting pilot training and infrastructure security. All 14 UH-60L
    Blackhawk helicopters procured under Plan Colombia for the Colombian
    military began operations in January 2003 after a thorough program of
    pilot training. These helicopters also support the CN Brigade, pilot
    training, and infrastructure security. While the DOS is responsible for
    program oversight and funding for operations and contract maintenance
    for all of these helicopters, quality control is provided by a U.S.
    Army Technical Assistance Field Team. The Department of Defense (DOD)
    retains responsibility for training Colombian Army pilots, crew chiefs
    and aviation unit maintenance personnel to fly and maintain Blackhawk
    and Huey II helicopters. The maintenance programs are supplemented by a
    safety initiative that integrates risk management planning into air
    operations. Overall, these helicopters have given the Colombian
    military unprecedented mobility. This mobility allows an increasingly
    well-trained Colombian Army to maneuver across a rugged landscape, in
    parts of the country they have not operated in for years, resulting in
    greater operational effectiveness against the narcoterrorists.

                      ENGINEER AND INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT

        The Plan Colombia supplemental appropriation allowed us to complete
    large-scale infrastructure improvements that greatly accelerated the
    development of increased operational capabilities for Colombia's
    forces. In subsequent years, we have continued to provide necessary
    facilities to support our training and equipping programs. Among our
    more significant engineer projects were the expansion of both fixed-
    wing and helicopter facilities at Tres Esquinas, the establishment of a
    comprehensive helicopter pilot training school at Melgar and Tolemaida,
    improved port facilities at Buenaventura, development of riverine
    support and maintenance facilities at Tres Esquinas and La Tagua, and
    the development of helicopter operational and support facilities at
    Larandia. We are moving now to develop the logistics infrastructure
    needed to support Colombian forces as they move outward to re-establish
    government control throughout Colombia. We just completed and turned
    over a hangar that will improve the operational rate of the Colombian
    C-130 fleet by improving their maintenance program. Additionally, in
    September 2003, we awarded contracts to establish logistics support
    centers, motorpools, and maintenance facilities. As a direct result of
    the completion of these facilities, Colombian forces will be better
    able to conduct and sustain forward operations.

                        PROFESSIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

        Embedded within the training SOUTHCOM and U.S. forces provide under
    Plan Colombia is the institutionalization of human rights and the
    respect for law by the Colombian military. We have helped the Colombian
    Ministry of Defense institute legal reforms through the creation of a
    Military Penal Justice Corps, similar to the U.S. military's Judge
    Advocate General's corps. On July 29, 2003, the permanent facility for
    Colombia's new Armed Forces School of International Humanitarian Law,
    Human Rights, and Military Justice opened. This school teaches human
    rights and international humanitarian law to attorneys, commanders,
    officers, and sergeants. Additionally, hundreds of military, police,
    and civilian lawyers have received continued professional legal
    education beyond that provided at the school. The Colombian military
    legal corps, similar to the method used by our Armed Forces, is also
    becoming embedded with the field units of the Army in order to provide
    on the spot legal advice to commanders during operations.
        SOUTHCOM continues to support Colombian efforts to extend human
    rights training throughout its ranks. Colombia is fighting its illegal
    armed groups justly, in accordance with democratic values and human
    rights. This is instrumental in what we are collectively striving to
    achieve.
        Under President Uribe's ``Democratic Security Policy,''
    extrajudicial executions in 2003 were down 48 percent, assassinations
    were down 41 percent, homicides of trade unionists were down 68
    percent, and forced displacements were down 68 percent. Further, none
    of the units U.S. forces trained have been accused of human rights
    abuses. I am confident that President Uribe and the Colombian military
    have taken human rights to heart, unlike their adversaries, who commit
    the vast majority of human rights abuses. Alledged human rights abuses
    by Colombian security forces are now less than 2 percent of those
    reported and the institutionalization of respect for human rights
    continues.
        In 2003, as members of the illegal armed groups demobilized, over
    77 percent turned themselves into government forces. If they suspected
    that they would be subject to torture and abuse, they would have turned
    themselves into nongovernmental organizations and the Church as they
    did in years past, before human rights became an integral part of the
    Colombian military's ethos. The Colombian Government is not resorting
    to rural concentration camps, peasant roundups, massacres,
    disappearances or other tactics used by their enemies. Their
    professional ethos is also reflected in public opinion that lists the
    Colombian military as the second most respected institution in the
    country just behind the Catholic Church.

                      THE URIBE ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRESS

        Plan Colombia predates President Uribe by 2 years and will end
    coincidentally when he leaves office in 2006. While he has firmly
    embraced the plan, he has also brought to office new initiatives and a
    long-term vision that extends well beyond that 6-year plan. President
    Uribe won a landslide victory by running on a platform of aggressively
    defeating and neutralizing the terrorists in his country while
    asserting government control of national territory. After years of
    failed attempts to negotiate with illegal armed groups, to include a
    bold experiment that gave the FARC a safe haven in the southern part of
    the country, the people of Colombia had finally had enough of terrorist
    groups, especially after seeing how the FARC had used their safe haven
    to plot terrorist acts and establish drug base camps instead of
    developing their notional politics into a concrete reality.
        President Uribe faces enormous challenges, but he is using his
    mandate to put deeds behind his words. He has been in office for 19
    months, and turning the government from a conciliatory posture to an
    aggressively focused one has not been an easy task. We need to be
    steadfast in our support of him now to set the conditions for his
    longer-term success. The signs of his progress, which have built upon
    our support to Plan Colombia, are already becoming evident. Colombia
    developed a comprehensive national security strategy that directs all
    the tools at the government's disposal toward a common end of defeating
    the terrorists. The Colombians now spend nearly 4 percent of their
    gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. President Uribe has levied a
    war tax on the country's wealthiest citizens. He is increasing police
    end-strength to supplement those already planned for the military. The
    government has developed a plan to protect travelers along the major
    roadways. He is pushing the military and the police to gain control of
    areas and neighborhoods dominated by the narcoterrorists.
        The military has had growing operational success against the
    narcoterrorist organizations across the country, particularly against
    the mid-level leadership, and all indications are that they will
    continue to take the fight to the illegal armed groups over the next
    year. The firm resolve of the Uribe administration, backed by
    aggressive military operations, has resulted in increased desertions by
    enemies of the state. These desertions are promising, especially since
    the government provides a program under which those who leave the FARC
    voluntarily are put in protected housing and receive health care,
    education, and work training.
        Our Special Operations Forces (SOF) have trained the staff and
    soldiers of Colombia's best units, giving these units an added edge of
    operational effectiveness that is paying dividends. The Colombian Army
    has established its own Special Operations Command to coordinate and
    oversee difficult and complex operations against the most sensitive
    targets. The establishment and training of Commando and Lancero
    Battalions, modeled on our own Ranger battalions, has given the
    Colombians a unit that can strike high-value targets including enemy
    leadership. The Colombian military is also in the process of
    establishing a Joint Special Operations Command that will synchronize
    special operations among all branches of the Colombian military.
    SOUTHCOM's special forces component, Special Operations Command South,
    will provide training to this new unit. Currently, U.S. military forces
    are conducting deployments in 14 different locations in Colombia,
    providing training to 9 major Colombian military units. Additionally,
    Planning Assistance Training Teams are assisting the Colombian army's
    mobile brigades in operational planning. We have also trained the
    Colombian urban counterterrorist unit and continue to upgrade their
    capabilities and equipment.
        Our SOF also trained Colombian Armed Forces in Arauca to protect a
    portion of the 772-kilometer oil pipeline that had been a frequent
    target of FARC and ELN attacks. Pipeline attacks are down
    significantly. This training was just one part of a nationwide
    Infrastructure Security Strategy that protects critical facilities and
    reestablishes control in narcoterrorist influenced areas of the
    country.
        We continue to train Colombia's helicopter pilots, providing their
    forces a growing ability to perform air assaults that are key in the
    battle against dispersed enemies. We deploy intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance assets in-country that have provided timely,
    actionable intelligence to Colombian units. We are training their
    staffs with Planning Assistance Training Teams that increase their
    ability to plan and execute intelligence driven operations against
    illegal armed groups. We are working with Colombian Marines to
    establish a third Colombian Training Team that will work with units of
    the Riverine Brigade to increase the operational readiness and
    proficiency of Colombia's extensive riverine forces. We contracted
    logistics to help the Colombians maintain their own C-130 fleet and
    provided maintenance trainers to improve the operational readiness of
    their helicopter fleet. Toward that end, we are looking forward to
    establishing long-term solutions to readiness issues with the
    establishment of a National Maintenance Point for Colombia's
    helicopters, and a Logistical Automation System that will integrate
    supply and fiscal management for parts and materials for the Colombian
    military and National Police. We also are assisting in the training of
    the Colombian National Police Carabineros (Rural), who have recently
    established presence throughout the country.
        We continue to provide medical training and assistance to the
    Colombian military to improve their health services support to their
    combat troops. With our support, the Colombian military now has a well-
    established ``Combat Life Saver'' training course. Additionally, they
    have adopted our Forward Surgical Team concepts and doctrine and have
    moved ahead by establishing four deployable surgical teams.
        In civil-military relations, we are helping the Colombians to build
    a civil affairs capability that will enhance the communications between
    the Colombian military and government with the populace in previously
    ungoverned spaces. In the past year, with our support, the Colombian
    military has written and adopted a civil affairs doctrine that allows
    them to minimize the impact of their military operations on the
    civilian population, while at the same time synchronizing humanitarian
    assistance with their operations. In the departments of Arauca,
    Cudinamarca, Caqueta, and Guaviera--portions of the last three are in
    the former despeje--the Colombian military has provided basic medical
    care to over 20,000 civilians and rehabilitated a number of educational
    and medical facilities. In the next 6 months, they will conduct 39
    similar events in conjunction with other Colombian ministries. In
    addition, our civil affairs forces have worked with the office of the
    Minister of Defense to develop mechanisms that synchronize the
    interagency planning requirements needed to re-establish governance in
    previously ungoverned spaces. To this end, the Government of Colombia
    has establish a Coordination Center for Integrated Action. This
    interagency body--consisting of representatives from the office of
    President Uribe, the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Education, and
    others--develops policies and plans to ensure that as the Colombian
    military successfully reclaims terrorist controlled areas that the
    other bodies of government rapidly respond, establish presence, and
    provide the population with the government services they did not have
    while under control of the illegally armed groups.
        Beyond our coordinated military efforts, President Uribe has
    sponsored political, economic, and judicial reforms. These measures
    will assist the Colombian economy as well as free up resources for
    increased security measures. President Uribe aims to reduce the
    government bureaucracy, eliminate corruption, and enact fiscal reform.
    Economically, President Uribe's stance and the promised reforms have
    buoyed the country's confidence. The Government of Colombia has
    collected 18 percent more taxes compared to last year. Further, tax
    collection (as a percentage of GDP) rose from 16 percent in 2002 to 19
    percent in 2003. Colombia has raised over $1 billion via bonds since
    the new administration took office, and its stock market has increased
    by 50 percent this year. Likewise, President Uribe has sought to stamp
    out corruption and bolster judicial reform.
        This list is just a partial highlight of the coordinated effort the
    Colombian Government is making to solve its own problems. President
    Uribe has infused his government with energy, organization, and a sense
    of purpose. He is getting results now, and will continue to direct all
    his resources toward making Colombia a safe, prosperous, democratic
    nation.
        Under President Uribe, our country's significant investment in Plan
    Colombia is beginning to show substantial results. He is fully adhering
    to Plan Colombia and already looking well beyond it. Most notably a
    subsidiary campaign plan provides a long-term strategy and has been
    coordinated across the Colombian services, and the interagency. This
    campaign plan details the systematic defeat of Colombia's
    narcoterrorists. He is also building the systems that will eventually
    return Colombia to the ranks of peaceful and prosperous nations.
    President Uribe has only 2\1/2\ more years in office. Consequently, it
    is critical--especially this year and next--that he gets our unwavering
    support to set all his long-term initiatives firmly into place.

                                   WAY AHEAD

        We are seeing the pendulum swing in Colombia, and we will continue
    all of our planned training and support as well as seeking new
    opportunities to increase that support at this critical moment.
    Colombia is the linchpin in the narcoterrorist battle, but we must be
    careful not to win the battle in Colombia and lose the war in the
    region. As the Colombians make progress, their success will push
    narcoterrorists to seek safer areas in which to operate. Already, the
    FARC, ELN, and AUC operate across the porous borders of Colombia's
    neighbors, and the remote nature of many of these areas makes them ever
    more attractive as safe havens. While we are seeing increased
    coordination and cooperation among most of Colombia's neighbors, some
    of those countries also lack the resources to maintain territorial
    sovereignty in these ungoverned spaces. Thus, across the Andean Ridge,
    we are working with the bordering nations to increase cooperation
    further, fortify borders and strengthen capabilities.
        In an ongoing series of multinational exercises (UNITAS,
    Amphibious, and Panamax), we are training with the Colombian Navy in a
    combined operation. In Peru, we continue to sustain their riverine
    interdiction ability, as well as work with the interagency to support
    their eradication program and counternarcotics aviation. In Ecuador, we
    have supported their riverine capability and worked closely with them
    to complete the essential forward operating location at Manta. We are
    seeing a welcome acknowledgment of the Colombian border concern by
    Ecuador. In Bolivia, we have worked on their riverine capabilities as
    well and supported their eradication efforts. Additionally, we have
    already seen the Brazilians take up active patrolling on their own
    border with Colombia.
        As the lead DOD agent for implementing military aspects of U.S.
    policy in Colombia, SOUTHCOM will continue to maintain a priority
    effort against narcoterrorism. Key in most of our recent endeavors has
    been approval by the U.S. Congress of expanded authority legislation.
    This legislation has allowed us to use funds available for counterdrug
    activities to provide assistance to the Government of Colombia for a
    coordinated campaign against the terrorist activities of its illegal
    armed groups. The granting of expanded authority was an important
    recognition that no meaningful distinction can be made between the
    terrorists and drug traffickers in our region. The country's two
    largest terrorist groups--the FARC and AUC--are deep into the narcotics
    business; the smaller ELN also participates to an extent. Trying to
    decide whether a mission against a FARC unit was a counterdrug or
    counterterrorist one was an exercise in futility and hampered
    operational effectiveness on the ground. Expanded authority has
    eliminated the time-consuming step of first evaluating the mission
    based on its probable funding source and now allows us to bring to bear
    all our assets more rapidly. As just one example, it will allow assets
    controlled by Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) to continue
    being used to their full potential to provide real-time, actionable
    intelligence that is key in conducting effective operations against the
    narcoterrorists. Additionally, JIATF-S will take an increased role in
    counterillicit trafficking, as many materials other than narcotics use
    the same transit routes through our area of responsibility (AOR).
    Expanded authority for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, coupled with
    increasing the personnel cap, are the single most important factors for
    us to continue building success in Colombia. While our efforts are, for
    good reason, Colombia-centric, we are not letting others fall behind to
    become the next targets for terrorist groups. The cooperative counter
    narcoterrorist groundwork we are laying today will further our national
    security for decades to come.

                                   CONCLUSION

        We are at a critical time in Colombia's history. The elected
    government of President Uribe enjoys unparalleled approval ratings over
    75 percent. Under his leadership, the military and police are helping
    to regain control of areas long held by narcoterrorists. Colombia's
    citizens are taking a more active role in their nation's defense and
    providing actionable intelligence to the Colombian Armed Forces. There
    is a renewed sense of momentum, commitment, and hope as the Colombian
    people struggle to save their country, but there is also a finite
    window of opportunity beyond which public opinion and support will wane
    without significant progress.
        We are optimistic about the progress we are seeing in Colombia,
    though there remains an enormous amount of work to be done. We are at a
    critical point where the progress in eliminating conflict, reducing
    tension, and establishing democracy throughout the region could be at
    risk if we are not steadfast in our efforts. While our attention is
    drawn to another region of the world, we must keep in mind that we live
    in this hemisphere, and its continued progress as a region of democracy
    and prosperity is paramount to our national security.
        I would like to thank the chairman, ranking member, and the members
    of the subcommittee for this opportunity and for your continued
    support. The men and women of SOUTHCOM are working to their utmost to
    accomplish their missions for our great country.

        Senator Roberts. We thank you very much, General.
        Mr. Chairman, would you like to start off with any
    questions you might have?
        Senator Warner. I thank the distinguished chairman, but I
    think I would like to follow your subcommittee and perhaps do a
    little wrap-up here toward the end. So you and Senator Reed and
    your other two members should go ahead. I am privileged to come
    in on these meetings, but I do not mean to preempt your normal
    sequence of recognition.
        Senator Roberts. We will hand you the mop and the broom to
    get things cleaned up at the end.
        Secretary O'Connell, we have heard a great deal about all
    of the problems and the challenges in regards to our
    counternarcotics activities, both from the standpoint of the
    harm that it does, not only to our country but to those
    countries where the narcotics are grown, but more especially
    what this does in regards to financing terrorism around the
    world.
        I indicated in my opening statement that the President's
    budget has $852 million for counternarcotics activities. That
    is $56 million less than the appropriated amount for fiscal
    year 2004. Why?
        Mr. O'Connell. The central reason, sir, is that, as you
    correctly stated, the fiscal year 2005 request is at $852.7
    million. That is an increase over our fiscal year 2004 request
    and the primary reason for the two differences are: first, the
    congressional add-on that took place last year, which I believe
    was at $18.2 million; and then the $73 million supplemental
    which was added primarily for Afghanistan.
        Senator Roberts. Would you anticipate another request in
    the supplemental?
        Mr. O'Connell. Sir, I am on very dangerous ground. That is
    not my area. I do not--I make recommendations to the Secretary,
    which I have done, and where the supplementals go----
        Senator Roberts. We will not ask you to skate on that
    important but thin ice.
        Mr. O'Connell. Sir, I have to skate on that. I think you
    understand.
        Senator Roberts. All right. Let me ask a question, if I
    might, for Secretary O'Connell and Admiral Clingan. As has been
    stated by the chairman and Senator Allard and everybody that
    has been over there to talk to President Karzai, there was a
    big mistake made 2 years ago when farmers who were planting
    poppies were paid to destroy their crops. I did not mean to
    make a joke, but we used to have a farm program in this country
    where you paid farmers not to grow anything, but you did have
    acreage restrictions. I am not sure that was the case this time
    by any means. This obviously encouraged other farmers to plant
    poppies so that they would be paid.
        Could you give me an indication of what the current focus
    of the counternarcotics activities is in Afghanistan and what
    alternatives are being considered to curtail the poppy
    cultivation that can be offered to Afghan farmers?
        Mr. O'Connell. Chairman Roberts, your comments are exactly
    on the mark. We were witness to a mistake. Making alternative
    offers to the poppy growers was perhaps not a wise move.
        In response to your question as to what we are doing now,
    when we look at the $73 million----
        Senator Roberts. That was a British plan, was it not?
        Mr. O'Connell. Exactly, sir.
        Senator Roberts. Right.
        Mr. O'Connell. In fact, sir, the British do have the lead.
    I have been fortunate enough to have four very extended and
    frank exchanges with British officials. Some of them express
    displeasure at how we were holding up our end of the bargain
    and vice versa. But I think we are at a consensus now that, in
    conjunction with the Afghan government, the clearly delineated
    responsibilities of the Brits and the inclusion of efforts such
    as the Germans on the police side, the Italians on the judicial
    side, that we do have a coordinated effort under Karzai's
    decision that he will lead the eradication through his
    governors.
        We are going to take our funds, in conjunction with CENTCOM
    and, of course, the task force there, and try to put this
    counternarcotics effort into the context of the stability
    operations that are ongoing in the country. We are not going to
    go out and raid the farmers or raid the poppy growers. We are
    looking at how we: one, train law enforcement to do this job
    themselves; two, how we increase border security and cut down
    on the smuggling routes; three, how we can provide intelligence
    fusion as well as specialized intelligence support, identifying
    the labs and some selective signal intelligence support; and
    four, how we can provide increased transportation for the
    Afghan forces that are going to be conducting and are
    conducting raids on various labs.
        We put these together in conjunction with the stability
    operations and try to do these things concurrently. Is it a
    perfect plan? Will it work? I cannot answer those things. But I
    can say, Senator, that I am extremely hopeful that, one, we
    have a plan; two, the Brits are on board; three, we are working
    together; and four, I think CENTCOM has put together a solid
    first crack at this effort against poppies in Afghanistan.
        Senator Roberts. Let me change subjects and go to the troop
    cap. This is for General Mixon. We are now currently limited to
    800 personnel, that is my understanding, 400 military, 400
    contractors. Obviously, the administration is asking for an
    increase in this cap. You have indicated that that would be the
    case in regard to flexibility to respond if in fact that was
    needed for some new development.
        My question: Why do you not just sort of summarize why you
    think you need the additional U.S. military forces in Colombia?
    Many Members of the Senate, I can recall when this first
    started, had a lot of concern about this. Can you tell me for
    what purpose and length of time these forces will be used?
    Basically, in light of the heavy deployments elsewhere, are
    there sufficient forces, especially in regard to Special
    Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Army, available for this
    purpose?
        General Mixon. Yes, sir. If we break it down into broad
    categories of support provided, we would see this support being
    directed as required at planning and assistance teams that
    would work with their units that are participating in the
    military campaign that supports Plan Colombia; logistics and
    intelligence assistance that would be provided to them. As we
    become more involved in assisting the Colombians and the
    reestablishment of governments in their areas, particularly in
    the civil-military operations, assistance in that area.
        I would tell you that I would not see this going on
    immediately, as I said in my statement, but it would allow us
    the flexibility to increase that.
        In reference to your question on the current strain on the
    military forces, you are exactly right and we fully recognize
    that. Most of the support that we would provide would not be
    unit specific, i.e., organic units that are participating in
    combat, with the exception of some potential additional support
    that may be required with Special Operations Forces (SOF)-
    unique capabilities.
        Most of these are individuals who are qualified in the
    intelligence, logistics, and operational fields that we put
    together on an individual basis and form teams. We bring them
    to SOUTHCOM, form a cohesive team, and link them up with a unit
    that is participating in military operations.
        Senator Roberts. I am going to beg the indulgence of the
    subcommittee, and I apologize for this, but I want to add in
    that my daughter, whose name is Ashley, who works in Rome with
    the World Food Program, told me she was going to travel to
    Afghanistan to determine the criteria being met in regards to
    the World Food Program, the McGovern-Dole program where you set
    up a school, allow young women to attend the school, and then
    they are being fed various lunches.
        I said that she was not going to Afghanistan, being her
    father and a Senator. She indicated that she did not know why
    that was the case, and we went into quite a discussion. It
    ended with me saying that I would have her fired. That perhaps
    was a little strong, but I was very concerned. She said:
    ``Well, okay, daddy; it is okay; I did not go to Afghanistan; I
    went to Colombia instead.''
        She was in an area 3 days after the FARC was there and 2
    days prior to the paramilitary being there. During those 5 days
    they continued that program on a hill under a tree with a
    ramshackle building and were able to continue that schooling
    and the nutritional supplements that the World Food Program
    does provide.
        Are we doing any better with stability in regards to those
    areas so that those programs can work and we can make some
    progress, especially with the education of women, which I think
    is one of the biggest answers to terrorism that we can
    accomplish?
        General Mixon. Yes, sir, we are doing better, and we are
    seeing results as far as the local population and their
    acceptance of the Colombian military and their approval
    ratings. This was mentioned in General Hill's testimony
    yesterday.
        Also, for the first time in many years the Colombian
    civilian population is able to move around the countryside and
    around the roads and visit their families and their farms that
    are out in the countryside. So yes, sir, we are seeing progress
    in that area.
        Senator Roberts. I appreciate hearing that.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    gentlemen, for your testimony.
        Chairman Roberts has raised the issue of the effect of the
    operation tempo (OPTEMPO) on activities throughout DOD.
    Secretary O'Connell, could you comment on whether this OPTEMPO
    increase has affected your ability to discharge your
    counterdrug responsibilities?
        Mr. O'Connell. Thank you for the question, Senator Reed. I
    agree with General Mixon. Certainly the forces are under
    strain. But looking at my responsibility for the oversight of
    the 48, 49,000 United States SOF, it does not appear so at this
    time. In fact, we have been able to use forces that had been in
    Colombia previously in other operational areas. General Brown
    and I testified the other day before the Senate Armed Services
    Committee on posture, and I agree with General Brown that the
    force is not overextended at this point.
        In terms of the specific counternarcotics work done on the
    Special Operations side, we look primarily to SOUTHCOM, of
    course, and the Seventh Special Forces Group. I would just like
    to point out that the ability of the Colombian military, sir,
    to follow the advice and guidance of these wonderful Green
    Berets has made a difference of enormous proportions down
    there. The Colombian military is now going out into areas which
    were previously off limits. They are conducting ambushes, long-
    range reconnaissance, and direct strikes against the FARC, and
    I think we have all seen that that has had an unbelievable
    effect on the morale of the people of Colombia.
        To move back to one point that Chairman Roberts made in
    terms of increases on the cap, I would like to point out that
    because the Seventh Special Forces Group has been able to push
    the Colombian military out farther--and, Senator Reed, you
    certainly recognize this in view of your military service--we
    are talking now about considerably more terrain to cover. So
    the helicopter routes are longer, the medical evacuation
    requirements, the rearm, refuel, equip, the maintenance
    requirements, go up as you obviously have to address more
    territory. So that would go to the question of Chairman
    Roberts.
        But to answer your question, sir, the answer at this time
    is no.
        Senator Reed. Let me ask another variation on the question.
    Are you declining requests for assistance that previously you
    would entertain, requests from the Colombians, requests from
    the Afghani government through CENTCOM?
        Mr. O'Connell. Sir, not to my knowledge. I would defer of
    course to the combatant commanders, General Hill and General
    Abizaid. I will say, with respect to General Hill, we meet and
    talk very often. He is very much into not only the
    counternarcotics business, but also stability operations
    throughout his hemisphere. He is an astute leader. He
    understands very carefully his responsibilities. I think he is
    looking to the future, and he will apply our military force and
    training any place that it can be beneficial throughout the
    hemisphere.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Mixon. I would like to comment on that, sir.
        Senator Reed. Yes, sir. Go ahead, General Mixon and
    Admiral.
        General Mixon. We have never turned down a request from
    support since I have been there last July. However, the cap has
    caused us to have to shift support to make sure we did not go
    over the 400 cap. I would just like to make that point.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
        General Mixon. Senator Reed, if I could just add, sir. I
    think at least in the press there has been some misperception
    that this requested cap increase would be consistent with a
    deployment order, and that is not the case. I would hope that
    that message was delivered by General Hill yesterday.
        Senator Reed. Can I raise another question, General Mixon,
    about the cap since you brought it up. You want to go up to
    800, but do you have an estimate of what your sort of average,
    steady state deployment in country would be?
        General Mixon. Sir, today as we speak the number that we
    count against the Plan Colombia cap is 332. We had a high about
    30 to 45 days ago of 392, and we were making some adjustments.
        Senator Reed. Let us assume that the permission is granted.
    Do you think you will have close to 800 people on the ground at
    all times?
        General Mixon. I do not.
        Senator Reed. What is your estimate?
        General Mixon. We did a best case analysis of this before
    we went forward of if we were able to provide all of the
    support that we can envision over the life cycle of Plan
    Patriota, which is the military campaign plan, and we found it
    to be at 726.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Admiral, you have a comment?
        Admiral Clingan. Sir, in Afghanistan to my knowledge we
    have not denied any request for support specifically from
    President Karzai nor the minister of interior.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Secretary O'Connell, in October 2003, Secretary Wolfowitz
    promulgated a new international counternarcotics policy which
    essentially made a link explicitly between counternarcotics and
    counterterrorism. In his words, ``the Department's
    counternarcotics support should be oriented to the greatest
    extent feasible toward supporting the war on terrorism and
    Department security cooperation guidance.'' It seems terribly
    logical to me.
        We have given explicit authority in the case of Colombia
    for the DOD to use counterdrug funds to support Colombian
    efforts to fight a unified counterdrug, counterterrorism
    campaign. That is one case. To your knowledge, does the DOD
    plan to ask for additional authority to use counterdrug funds
    for overlapping counterdrug, counterterrorism?
        Mr. O'Connell. Sir, I am not aware of any. The combatant
    commanders may have specific commands.
        But if I could comment on the mechanism that has been
    provided for generally the central transfer account, which is
    the way we handle certainly the bulk of these counternarcotics
    activities----
        Senator Reed. I would like you to do that, Mr. Secretary.
    But Congress has funded this central transfer account
    counterdrug to fight drugs.
        Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir, exactly.
        Senator Reed. Is this now being used in other ways which we
    should be at least aware of?
        Mr. O'Connell. Sir, it is my belief that it has not been.
    Sir, it is extremely difficult to draw that precise line. But
    in our planning, in the reporting that we do back to Congress
    on what we spend this money for, we specifically aim at the
    counterdrug, counternarcotics areas.
        The point is, sir, that the central transfer account, the
    way it is structured, although it has been under increasing
    pressure due to things like inflation and other aspects such as
    closing down Roosevelt Roads, which has increased our maritime
    patrol costs, allows extraordinary flexibility. I think that
    the DOD has been very candid and very honest in how it has
    handled and allocated those funds.
        We, of course, look very carefully at any reprogramming. I
    would be happy to go into some of the bloodier specifics
    perhaps during our closed session when we get into contentious
    issues. But you have provided very flexible authorities and to
    the best of my ability, and I think certainly the combatant
    commanders realize and certainly the Secretary, we will focus
    that on the intended focus, the intended aim of the money, sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        I listened to the exchange between Senator Roberts and the
    panel with respect to Afghanistan, the drug policy. The initial
    approach was a British focus on labs and trafficking. We, with
    our strategy, have come in to strengthen security along the
    Afghan-Pakistan border. There is one sort of issue, though,
    that we have not spoken about directly. That is eradication. Is
    that going to play a role? Is that too contentious an issue
    within the context of the politics?
        Mr. O'Connell. No, I do not believe so, sir, because
    obviously eradication has to be part of a strategy. President
    Karzai has said he will lead the eradication through his
    governors and out into the provincial regions. We do not, in
    DOD, specifically do eradication, per se. There may be some
    support for eradication in terms of, let us say, provision of
    security while eradication is taking place.
        But no, sir; it has to be part of the strategy. I would ask
    Admiral Clingan if he had a comment on that.
        Senator Reed. Admiral.
        Admiral Clingan. The Secretary has it exactly right. We do
    not participate in any way, shape, or form with regard to
    eradication. But many of our efforts complement that process,
    in particular the law enforcement capabilities that we endeavor
    to enhance and those intelligence efforts can promote success
    in the eradication effort.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, gentlemen. My time has expired.
        Senator Roberts. Senator Dole.
        Senator Dole. General Mixon, counternarcotics operations
    rely heavily on SOF and National Guard assets. Are your
    operations requirements receiving adequate focus and are you
    being consulted in the Army's plan to rebalance its forces?
    What changes would you like to see in the force mix available
    to you?
        General Mixon. We are receiving the adequate focus that we
    need, Senator Dole, for our activities there. As the military
    is looking at its restructuring program, we have been sent
    those working papers and provided comment as a combatant
    commander on the organization of both the Guard and the Active
    Forces. So I feel very comfortable that we are in sync with DOD
    on their restructuring programs.
        Senator Dole. One other question. The military training of
    Colombian units that are vetted for human rights abuses is a
    key enabler, I understand, in the success of Plan Colombia.
    What role, if any, does the Western Hemisphere Institute for
    Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) play in the training? If a role
    is being played, in your opinion is this institute producing
    the caliber of military professional needed to achieve security
    and stability in Latin America?
        General Mixon. I am glad you brought up the human rights
    aspects of the support and the vetting. The vetting process is
    viewed very strictly at SOUTHCOM. In fact, we are the only
    combatant command that has an organization in our headquarters
    that focuses on vetting.
        As it pertains to WHINSEC, they primarily train individuals
    rather than units, and their training that they give
    individuals we believe has a heavy focus on the human rights
    aspects of military operations.
        Senator Dole. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Roberts. Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Mixon, your testimony today is indicating that as
    far as the Colombia plan is concerned, you see real and
    tangible results. We heard similar testimony from your superior
    yesterday. You have partly answered this question, but from an
    operational standpoint what part of that plan do you attribute
    the greatest success to, and then what part of that plan has
    been a disappointment? For what part would you consider some
    modification if you had to do it over again?
        General Mixon. Yes, sir. The part of the plan in my opinion
    that has been the greatest success is the close cooperation
    between the Colombian military and the Colombian civil
    agencies, such as the police and other agencies, to have a
    combined and joint effort. They full well know that in order to
    win victory for them in Colombia they must reestablish
    governance in these areas once the military actions are over.
    This is the first time in their history, at least to my
    knowledge, that they have worked closely together with all
    governmental agencies throughout Colombia to ensure that this
    goal is achieved.
        That is buttressed by President Uribe's leadership and all
    those agencies have his support, not only from the standpoint
    of the raising of taxes in Colombia and increased military and
    police structure, but also just his physical presence and his
    leadership.
        Disappointment? I have been in this job since last July. I
    have not seen a disappointment per se, but I would like to see
    the Colombian military become more joint in the way they use
    their capabilities, and they are doing that.
        Senator Allard. Do they have various branches like we do?
        General Mixon. They do have various branches. With our
    advice and assistance, their most recent campaign that is
    ongoing in what is literally the heartland of the FARC, they
    have established a joint task force with all of their
    components--army, navy, marine, and air force--under one single
    commander. This is the first time in their history that they
    have done that.
        So as I say, the lack of jointness has been somewhat of a
    disappointment. We see steady progress in that area.
        Senator Allard. So if we had another country emerge like
    Colombia, then what you would like to see happen is encourage
    more cooperation between the various law enforcement and
    military agencies, all of them coming together in a joint
    effort to implement their efforts against narcotics?
        General Mixon. Yes, sir, that is correct. If I could
    elaborate on that, what you just said. What we have tried to
    encourage all the militaries in our region to do is the same
    thing we are doing in the U.S. military and take a 21st century
    approach: identify the threats within their organization, their
    country, and reorganize themselves accordingly.
        Not all countries need a large military. They may need more
    police forces. For example, the gangs we are seeing forming in
    some of these countries; the police are the ones that need more
    force structure and more support versus the military. So we
    encourage them along those lines.
        Senator Allard. Now, one of the things that I have noted,
    it seems like when you have success in one area the drug trade
    moves someplace else. I do not know whether you can comment on
    this in an open session like this, but in which areas of the
    world do you see a potential for, once you move them out of
    Colombia and move them out of some of the areas we have had
    success in, where do you think they may go to next? If you
    cannot give us a specific geographic area that you may see
    where they would head, perhaps you could share with this
    subcommittee certain factors that you look at that put certain
    parts of the world on your watch list for possible inclusion in
    the drug trade.
        General Mixon. As far as growth in production, the two
    principal countries that we will continue to keep an eye on
    will be Peru and Bolivia. We know the history that Bolivia has
    had, and we also know the culture in Bolivia as far as coca is
    concerned. So we will continue to watch those countries in
    particular.
        Senator Allard. Bolivia at one time had a drug trade. Then
    it was brought under control, the way I understand it, and you
    think it is still at risk?
        General Mixon. It is still at risk. Particularly, the
    government, Senator, recently has experienced some turmoil in
    that area, and as we watch the various forces that are working
    there some of them have links to the Cocalera movement. We are
    very concerned about what is going on down there and we will
    keep a close eye on it.
        Senator Allard. Peru is also a concern?
        General Mixon. It is a concern. We will watch it.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I think those are the main
    things I wanted to pursue in my time. Thank you.
        Senator Roberts. Senator Warner, would you like to make any
    comments at this time?
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the ranking
    member. Mr. Chairman, we are fortunate, this subcommittee and
    indeed the full committee and Congress, that Secretary
    O'Connell accepted this post. It is a very important post. It
    was created and envisioned right in this room many years ago,
    and I participated in the deliberations and the legislation
    which established your office.
        If I may say, you bring to this office an extraordinary
    record of accomplishments: in uniform, the 82nd Airborne, SOF,
    intelligence officer, liaison with the British intelligence in
    Great Britain. We are fortunate you relinquished other, perhaps
    more lucrative, opportunities and accepted this one. You have
    the strong support of this committee.
        Mr. O'Connell. Thank you, Senator. That means a great deal
    coming from you.
        Senator Warner. Well, I appreciate that.
        I also think there is a direct correlation between the drug
    trade, wherever it is in the world, and terrorism. Particularly
    I am going to address my questions here to Afghanistan
    momentarily. But it is ever so clear there. Perhaps you have
    knowledge of it, but there may be evidence you could share with
    us that Osama bin Laden and the current operation of al Qaeda
    could be receiving funds from the poppy trade in Afghanistan.
        Before I proceed further, though, Mr. Chairman, members of
    the subcommittee, given the distinguished career of our
    Secretary, we should recognize our sympathies to the families
    of those members of the private sector contractors lost
    recently in Iraq. It was tragic. Many former U.S. military have
    gone on to really indirectly serve their country by working for
    private contractors. Those individuals are essential to the
    work that we are performing in Iraq, primarily the rebuilding
    of the infrastructure. It requires a certain amount of security
    and we are fortunate that these retired military people have
    stepped up.
        Is there anything further you could tell us about that
    incident here this morning for the record?
        Mr. O'Connell. Sir, not for the record, but I know we go to
    a closed session. We were talking with Senator Dole just
    recently. Of course, that company is home-based in her State.
    You are correct that many special operators go to work for
    firms like that.
        Senator Warner. When you say ``special operators,'' those
    following this proceeding might not pick up on that. These are
    U.S. military SOF like yourself.
        Mr. O'Connell. Many of them would have been Navy SEALs,
    would have been Army Rangers or marines or just people who were
    willing to go through the training and take on this type of
    job.
        It is becoming more and more frequent in our society. There
    is a high demand for that type of trained person. They take a
    very high risk. Certainly I agree with you, Senator; our hearts
    go out to not only all the military, but the civilian
    contractors that have lost their lives, not only in Afghanistan
    and Iraq but around the world. We have hostages in Colombia
    today, three Americans, that of course are on our minds all the
    time.
        With respect to your issue in Afghanistan, sir, can that
    country move forward with the basis of the economy being so
    tightly tied to narcotics? I think the answer is no. I think we
    all realize that. If, in fact, the numbers that have been
    kicked around are correct, and 60 percent of the GNP is coming
    in some way, shape, or form from the narcotics trade, then I do
    not think we are going to be successful.
        That is why I am encouraged by the approach that we have
    agreed to with the British government, with the Germans, with
    the Italians, and particularly the plan that CENTCOM I think
    will put into effect with good results. I am optimistic that
    this next year will be a signal change in how we approach the
    issue.
        A lot of it--you just returned from talking with President
    Karzai and going out into the countryside--is going to depend
    on whether the Afghan people can step up to their own
    governance. Are they willing to take the risks to be policemen?
        Senator Warner. On that point, just days after we departed,
    one of his principal ministers was gunned down. Is there a
    linkage yet established, perhaps with the narcotics business?
        Mr. O'Connell. Sir, quite frankly, I think the Intelligence
    Community has been less than precise on this issue. As we were
    talking about, coming over in the car, it is a bit like pickup
    sticks there. You pull one drug lord out or someone you feel is
    tied into the drug business and there are unintended
    consequences. You never know what militia that is tied into, if
    it is tied into the government, and what is going to be the net
    result.
        There are longstanding tribal rivalries and frictions, as
    you well know, there, sir. But I think as our intelligence
    effort picks up we are going to be able to identify those
    people who are, in fact, involved with processing, in fact
    involved with shipping, and hopefully get better insight into
    what portion of that money goes into supporting groups as, not
    only al Qaeda, but the Taliban and potentially other spinoff
    groups. But there clearly is a linkage.
        Senator Warner. Well, let us take just a minute to focus on
    the background, the history of this. We fortunately have
    yourself--and General Mixon, I know you have been through this
    very country where these drug operations take place in your
    assignment over there.
        You go back in history--the British Empire tried to conquer
    this region in the late 1800s and lost tens and tens of
    thousands of soldiers, and finally wrapped up and went home
    unsuccessful. That was followed by the Soviet Union that went
    in there and lost tens and tens of thousands of soldiers, and
    of course there was a very strong civil war in addition.
        But this is mountainous country. It is prevalent with old,
    historic trails that only a donkey can crawl over. This is not
    going to be an easy job, shutting this down, because this poppy
    growing has been going on for centuries. Am I not correct?
        Mr. O'Connell. Afghanistan, sir, is made by God for growing
    poppies.
        Senator Warner. I went into this in some detail. I have a
    modest interest in agriculture. This is the former chairman.
    But you can literally throw the poppy seeds on the ground and
    hardly scratch the earth and they take root, and they can
    survive under extraordinary drought conditions and produce a
    prolific crop.
        So this is a daunting and challenging task, and
    particularly against the history of others who have tried to
    bring into this region some conformity with the laws of man.
        But I congratulate General Abizaid. We are fortunate to
    have him as the combatant commander. He is an extraordinary
    man, and all of us here on the committee have dealt with him
    extensively.
        In the course of our meeting, we met with General Hillier,
    who is the commander of the joint forces over there, and he
    expressed great concern about this situation. I want to once
    again reiterate, I think it is very important that NATO come
    into this AOR and begin to work in it, take up greater
    responsibilities, but I do not believe that they are equipped,
    trained, or otherwise, or should they be the primary outfit to
    tackle this question of the drug trade.
        Now, looking through the testimony of the Admiral here, the
    U.K. has the international lead. Where was that established?
    What is the documentation? My recollection is it goes back into
    some U.N.--where was the authority for that derived, Admiral?
        Admiral Clingan. Senator, the penultimate authority escapes
    me at this moment. I do know that we have an agreement at our
    level----
        Senator Warner. You mean CENTCOM?
        Admiral Clingan. CENTCOM.
        Senator Warner. Has an agreement with?
        Admiral Clingan. With regard to the U.K., signed by Mr.
    Rodman, that establishes our relationship in regard to the U.K.
    lead nation efforts in Afghanistan.
        Senator Warner. I think that is fine, and I am sure that
    they have learned by experience. One or two of the programs
    they have initiated, I mentioned are not working. They are
    ready to take new initiatives. But they will continue then in
    the lead, is that correct?
        Admiral Clingan. Yes, they will.
        Senator Warner. The $73 million which the Congress of the
    United States in its wisdom--and I think it was a very wise
    move--provided to fund this program, does that money flow then
    to the U.K. directly or how does it transfer?
        Admiral Clingan. No, sir. That money will be obligated in
    accordance with a plan CENTCOM has developed in concert with
    ASD-SOLIC, in concert with the U.K., DOS, and DEA.
        Senator Warner. So it will be controlled entirely by us.
    But if they are in command and given the magnitude of that
    money, they have to have a voice in this matter. Was their
    voice listened to as this structure which you outline in your
    testimony--were they involved in this?
        Admiral Clingan. Our plan has been coordinated with them,
    sir.
        Senator Warner. Coordinated.
        Admiral Clingan. As it has been with the other interagency
    initiatives, to make sure that we do not duplicate efforts and
    that we in fact are moving ahead in complementary fashion.
        Senator Warner. All right. I am not in any way being
    critical. I am just trying to get a grasp of it. The U.K. is in
    charge. We have this program which you have outlined here, and
    it is in coordination with their leadership, and we are in
    support or working directly--or just how does it----
        Admiral Clingan. Our support to the U.K. effort happens in
    some specific realms. For example, in the operational realm, we
    currently provide them intelligence support, we provide them en
    extremis close air support should some of their teams come into
    contact with an enemy force that exceeds their capabilities. We
    can extract them from that type of situation as well.
        Senator Warner. That is a good example. I want to press on.
    Do you know what budget they have allocated to their effort? Do
    you know, Mr. Secretary?
        Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir, I can answer that. I believe I got
    these figures at the end of calendar year 2003. It was our
    estimate--and their records--that they allocated $114 million
    over the next 3 years for, among other things, alternative
    livelihoods, which we have already discussed, interdiction,
    institution building, and specific law enforcement.
        They have trained what we think and hope is going to be a
    fairly effective enforcement and interdiction unit. We are
    providing limited aircraft support to that unit. The U.K. has
    indicated that they will shift efforts in terms of helping
    support on the eradication side. Even though that is primarily
    an Afghan effort, they will be assisting the government in
    putting that program together.
        As I said, sir, I have met four times with British
    officials and I think we have a good way ahead in terms of
    intelligence sharing. I have reallocated funds from certain
    signals intelligence accounts and overhead imagery accounts
    that can assist the British as they are working against various
    labs.
        Senator Warner. But as old Harry Truman says, the buck
    stops on the British desk; is that correct?
        Mr. O'Connell. They are the lead agency.
        Senator Warner. They are accountable for the overall
    operation of this program, in which we have a very significant
    supporting role?
        Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Would you agree that that is correct?
        Admiral Clingan. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Now, do they employ just military or a
    combination of military and civilians?
        Mr. O'Connell. A combination.
        Senator Warner. Since there is a reference in here to the
    DEA, which apparently are working with----
        Mr. O'Connell. Excuse me, sir?
        Senator Warner. I beg your pardon. DEA is working with--you
    enumerate in here: ``This will enhance operations by U.S. law
    enforcement officers, provincial reconstruction teams, law
    enforcement, coalition forces.'' Everybody is, fortunately,
    pulling together to make this work. But the DEA is working as a
    part of our program?
        Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir, as part of our program. I met
    twice with DEA Administrator Karen Tandy and her intelligence
    operations and deputy chief specifically on operations in the
    Intelligence Fusion Center that we are setting up for better
    intelligence sharing. I wanted to give her complete visibility
    into our DOD intelligence capabilities that are going not only
    to support CENTCOM, but the British, to make sure she had full
    access.
        Additionally, they can bring a very large amount of
    information to the table on routes out of Afghanistan and how
    they go into Russia, as an example, through Iran, and into the
    U.K. Those three countries in particular are perhaps most
    affected by the poppy coming out of Afghanistan.
        So in terms of how the DEA works, they have been very
    forthcoming. I would also like to add, not only the DOS, but
    the Central Intelligence Agency's counternarcotics center has
    produced some very good products that I think will lay out for
    CENTCOM and the task force there the nature and scope of the
    problem, not only border issues, but cultivation issues, lab
    processing sites and terrorist financing.
        So I think we have a good effort under way, sir.
        Senator Warner. Well, when we were there we were briefed by
    General Hillier that just within 48 hours of our being there
    they rolled up a very significant plant which was refining the
    raw material before it was exported. Am I not correct in that?
        Mr. O'Connell. That is correct, sir, and we are hopeful for
    more in the future.
        Senator Warner. This momentum is now beginning to show
    clear results?
        Mr. O'Connell. I hope so, sir. I will defer to Admiral
    Clingan. I think the first eradication actually is starting
    today, according to statements that I have seen out of the
    Afghan government. They are actually on the ground in certain
    areas, I think particularly in the southeast, where eradication
    will start.
        Senator Warner. Admiral, this is your portfolio. Pick up.
        Admiral Clingan. Senator, momentum is building on two
    fronts. First is that the fielded forces have been given
    recently--as recently as early January and again this month--by
    CENTCOM clear direction on their role to play in regard to
    dealing with drugs, labs, and other things discovered in the
    course of their ongoing operations. So I think not only are
    they going to be unequivocally clear in their own mind what
    their obligations are when discovering those types of things,
    but we are going to enhance the reporting of it so that we get
    increased visibility. Specifically, discovery of drugs or a
    drug lab or paraphernalia associated with that drug trafficking
    trade is going to be a significant activity that gets reported
    immediately up the chain of command.
        So on the tactical level, momentum is building. On the
    programmatic level, we are excited by the $73 million made
    available to us by Congress and our efforts will span the eight
    items you have seen in my written testimony there. Importantly,
    those include stronger border control efforts and the
    Intelligence Fusion Center.
        Senator Warner. Any facts that you can share with us as to
    Osama bin Laden's linkage to this operation?
        Admiral Clingan. Sir, there is clearly linkage between
    terrorist organizations and the narcotics trade .
        Senator Warner. But he is just over the mountain,
    presumably, from where much of this is taking place.
        Admiral Clingan. Sir, there is no clear and specific
    linkage between bin Laden himself and the drug trade that I am
    aware of.
        His organization clearly benefits. One funding stream for
    al Qaeda is narcotics.
        Senator Warner. Well then, to me that is a linkage. I am
    not presuming that the dollars actually get into his pocket,
    but it gets into his organization's pocket.
        Admiral Clingan. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. That has been established?
        Admiral Clingan. Yes.
        Senator Warner. This is very helpful, Mr. Chairman. I just
    want to make certain that Great Britain understands that the
    buck stops there. We are giving them every conceivable support
    that we can to make this work, because in my judgment this drug
    situation is a serious roadblock to progress in moving forward
    with developing our goals in Afghanistan.
        To me, it could become a roadblock to further expansion of
    the NATO operation of responsibility. NATO envisions a plan
    where they are currently in that one quadrant up there, they
    are going to move to another quadrant and another and another,
    and perhaps in 18 months or so they will be taking over the
    majority of responsibility. Mr. Secretary, is that not the
    plan?
        Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir. There was a meeting that I believe
    terminated in Berlin yesterday where many of the NATO nations
    in the donors conference offered up various types of support,
    various accounts, various amounts. As that is sorted out--I
    think Lieutenant General Barno was there--we will be able to
    look at how those amounts are coming in, and I am sure the
    Afghan Government will look at what amounts can we integrate
    into our total counternarcotics strategy and anti-poppy
    strategy in Afghanistan.
        So there are positive developments, sir.
        Senator Warner. Do you share my view that this is a
    roadblock?
        Mr. O'Connell. Absolutely, sir. A country--and I do not
    know that anybody has ever been able to pin down the GNP of
    Afghanistan. I think that would be an economist's nightmare,
    but it is someplace between $4 and $14 billion. Most experts
    agree that around 60 percent of that GNP has some way of being
    tied to narcotics cultivation, development, processing, sale,
    and transport.
        Senator Warner. The emerging Afghan Government, their
    security forces are taking up a responsible role in this?
        Mr. O'Connell. Yes, sir. In fact, when you go back to the
    British efforts, they are training what we hope to be an
    effective police force that can go around the country.
        Senator Warner. Good. I thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for
    paying tribute on behalf of the subcommittee and the full
    committee to those who went through that very barbarous attack
    and the families of those who lost loved ones. That was a
    terrible tragedy, and I would certainly agree with Ambassador
    Bremer when he was addressing those who were still in the
    police training, that there was a choice for Iraq between
    barbarism like that--which is hard to understand, because it is
    hard to understand why people perform in such a manner, man's
    inhumanity to man--and individual freedom and stability.
        But I want to thank you for those comments. Like yourself,
    I have no illusions. It was in 1921--I forced the chairman to
    watch ``Lawrence of Arabia'' on our way to Iraq.
        Senator Warner. On the way home, I think it was.
        We had finished our trip through Iraq and Afghanistan. We
    were on the way home and you played it on the airplane. I
    remember it very well.
        Senator Roberts. Three hours and 15 minutes.
        Senator Warner. Right, and what was the last scene?
        Senator Roberts. Well, they rode to Damascus to achieve
    PanArabia, and it did not work out very well.
        Senator Warner. They turned it over to the Arabs, their own
    lands.
        Senator Roberts. Basically, what happened was that the
    Brits sat there and the power went off and the water went off
    and the hospitals did not work, and the tribes got to arguing
    again, and they all got back on their camels and went back to
    their tribal lands, and everybody scratched their head and
    said: What the hell was that all about? Churchill said that the
    people of Mesopotamia, i.e., the new Iraq--the British do bear
    that responsibility for really creating that country--
    represented ``an ungrateful volcano.'' If you carry it a little
    bit further and you read the remarks by King Faisal, who was
    the king for 10 years----
        Senator Warner. Of Iraq.
        Senator Roberts. --of Iraq, and you read his summation,
    which I will not because it is a rather negative summary of
    what he went through; it shows you the tremendous challenge
    that we have.
        Senator Warner. I just think that history should be the
    rear view mirror as we try and achieve our goals in both Iraq
    and Afghanistan. Remarkable chapters of history where these
    areas have been--people have tried to infuse some sort of
    democracy in them without success in years past.
        Senator Roberts. The fiscal year emergency supplemental for
    the $73 million, which has been referred to by the chairman and
    also by the Secretary, it is my understanding as of April 1
    that very little of that funding has been obligated. So we will
    have an opportunity to do the things that you have talked
    about, to study how best to spend those funds. You have already
    gone over your plan to ensure the money is obligated in a
    timely and effective manner in conjunction with the British,
    but I think that is very important.
        I just want to say one thing, and then I am going to turn
    it over to Senator Reed, and then we will go to the closed
    session. If you really look at SOUTHCOM and our neighbors to
    the south, the 31 nations under SOUTHCOM, if you look at how
    that area of the world affects our daily lives and pocketbooks
    in America; the immigration challenges that we have; the trade
    challenges that we have; the tremendous opportunity for bulk
    commodities and specialty crops here; the energy situation,
    with Mexico and Venezuela and people like Hugo Chavez--whose
    oil minister was the chairman of the Organization of Petroleum
    Exporting Countries two summers ago and turned the valve back
    and we got into increased gas prices--look at the terrorism
    funding; and then also look at the drugs--I do not think you
    can make a list any more important in terms of our national
    security and the well-being of our people.
        Yet it seems to me that, in an area with 360 million
    people, where the average age is 14, where the people are
    malnourished, that we were doing about the best job that we
    could. A lot of infrastructure was taken away during the Balkan
    conflicts, and then we have Afghanistan and Iraq and I do not
    think it has ever been put back. Talk about miles to cover and
    talk about things that we should be concerned with.
        There is assistance under the National Defense
    Authorization Act, Section 1021, that provides for the DOD to
    provide counternarcotics training, equipment, and assistance to
    seven additional countries in South America and South Central
    Asia, and also to renew the authority in Colombia which has
    been the subject of this hearing, and Peru.
        I just went down on a delegation with Senator Cochran and
    learned for the first time about the three-border area, what we
    call the wild, wild South or the wild, wild West or something,
    where there is virtually no law, and the proceeds of activities
    there obviously go straight to financing terrorism.
        I am still concerned that we--I do not want to call it
    benign neglect, but I think we ignore at our peril all of these
    problem areas that I have just gone into. I know all the rest
    of our missions around the world, more especially with the
    global war on terrorism, are extremely important and are of a
    high priority. But I worry about SOUTHCOM and what could
    develop.
        That is not in the form of a question. That is just an
    observation. If any of you would like to comment on that, why,
    feel perfectly free.
        Mr. O'Connell. I would agree, Senator.
        General Mixon. Yes, sir, I would comment on that if you
    would allow me, please. First of all, this was my first
    assignment as a member of SOUTHCOM in my 29 years of service in
    the United States Army, and I found it to be very interesting
    as I became a little smarter on the importance of the region. I
    was not aware of it myself, to be perfectly frank with you.
        Then as we did the analysis, as General Hill mentioned
    yesterday in his comments, we receive approximately 0.22
    percent of the DOD budget for operations in that region, and we
    currently have deployed in the region a little over 7,000 U.S.
    military throughout 29 countries. If you count that dollar
    investment, as well as the investment in numbers of U.S.
    military, from a military perspective that is a very small
    investment for a very big return on what is a very important
    region, as you point out.
        I have tried to study a little bit about Latin American
    history and what makes Latin America Latin America. It dawned
    on me as I studied that there are a lot of threats, and you
    mentioned them: the tri-border area, the financing of illegal
    groups, drugs, illegal gangs--you name it, they are all out
    there.
        But it became apparent to me that the biggest threat we
    have in this region is endemic poverty, and until we can deal
    with that and assist these countries in trying to deal with
    that particular situation, all these other problems have room
    to grow and fester like a sore wound. So that is an area that
    requires a multi-agency perspective and action.
        We focus on that in SOUTHCOM. We realize that there are not
    just military solutions to these challenges. It is an
    interagency effort. We work with the interagency group closely
    in all of these areas and see how we can best provide military
    support within our capabilities.
        So that would be my overall comment on the situation that
    you just mentioned, sir.
        Senator Roberts. Well, I point out that when General
    Wilhelm was the commander down there in SOUTHCOM, I think he
    counted Cuba and one other country, so maybe when I said 31 and
    you said 29 that there was some difference of opinion. But at
    that particular time they had just gone through a terrible
    hurricane and our National Guard folks were there in uniform
    building back bridges, building back infrastructure, helping to
    build schools, etcetera.
        I do not think we can do that now, with all the stress and
    strain on the National Guard and our Reserves. As you have
    indicated, with only 7,000 people we are going to pay the
    price. We have seen recent elections, and I am not going to get
    into any judgment on that other than the fact that President
    Lula and President Kirchner of Argentina and Brazil and then
    the lame duck situation in Uruguay--I do not think we can
    afford to go back to the Nicaragua days of the early 1980s and
    find ourselves in that kind of a situation.
        I see this thing tilting, for no better description, to not
    so much an anti-U.S. bias, but certainly a position independent
    of the United States. We see it in trade, where that whole
    trade round--why, Brazil and Argentina simply threw a monkey
    wrench into that. We have a lot of work to do. As I understand
    it, we have other priorities, but I worry about it.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner has raised the issue and has expressed all
    of our outrage about the ghastly attack upon the contractors.
    It raises some questions, Admiral. First, do we have an idea of
    how many of these type of security contractors there are? These
    are people who are armed and much different than someone going
    in to give advice about a project, like an engineer. But these
    are armed individuals whose job is to protect vehicles and
    properties and engage if they have to.
        Do we have an idea of how many of these we have in country?
        Admiral Clingan. Senator, thank you for the question. We do
    have an idea. In fact, I would hazard to say that we know
    specifically how many contract security detachment personnel we
    have. The precise number I am not aware of, but I can certainly
    find out.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        There are approximately 20,000 personnel employed by Private
    Security Companies (PSC) in Iraq and the number is expected to grow as
    reconstruction efforts accelerate. PSCs provide three distinct security
    services including personal security details for senior civilian
    officials, nonmilitary site security (buildings and infrastructure),
    and nonmilitary convoy security. These services are defensive in
    nature.
        The overwhelming majority of PSCs (approximately 60 PSCs employed
    in Iraq) are hired as subcontractors by companies engaged in the
    reconstruction efforts throughout Iraq. Each subcontracted PSC reports
    directly to their prime contractor, not the government. The prime
    contractors are directly responsible to the Chief of Mission for the
    performance of their contract. The exact number of PSC personnel is
    difficult to determine because such information is proprietary and may
    have privacy implications. Therefore, subcontracted PSCs and their
    parent companies generally do not make available details concerning the
    prices of their contracts, salaries, or number of employees.
        The DOD, DOS, and the Interim Iraqi Government continue to
    coordinate to issue uniform guidance regarding PSCs employed in Iraq in
    order to have a better accounting of the numbers of individuals
    undertaking the security mission for both the United States Government
    and the Interim Iraqi Government.

        Senator Reed. Your notion would be on the order of some
    thousands?
        Admiral Clingan. No, sir, significantly less. The contract
    Program Security Directive folks are primarily focused on
    providing security to the Coalition Provisional Authority and
    some other entities on a smaller scale than that.
        Senator Reed. The other issue the tragic incident this week
    raises is the coordination between military forces and these
    civilian security personnel, and also the standard operating
    procedures that both sides would follow. One of the questions
    that remains unanswered is that apparently this situation took
    several hours. It was an attack and then the crowd built up,
    etcetera. At no time did the American military units respond to
    try to recover the body or somehow disperse the crowds, or
    Iraqi security forces.
        This whole issue of operations I think is important. Can
    you comment upon that, Admiral?
        Admiral Clingan. Sir, in this forum I can say that we are
    continuing to investigate the circumstances surrounding that.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        Let me raise two other countries----
        Senator Roberts. On that point, I had hoped we learned that
    lesson in Somalia.
        Senator Reed. I concur.
        Two other countries. First, Pakistan. According to the
    International Narcotics Control Strategy report, Pakistan
    showed a remarkable rebound, unfortunately, in opium
    production, and it is a transit site for some of the opium
    leaving Afghanistan. Secretary O'Connell and Admiral Clingan,
    can you comment upon the situation in Pakistan with respect to
    this increased production, because it conjures up also the
    destabilizing effects of drug money getting into the hands of
    insurgents.
        Admiral Clingan. Senator, thank you for the question. We
    are concerned in CENTCOM in regard to narcotrafficking
    throughout the AOR and particularly southern Asia, which
    includes Pakistan. Part of our plan addresses the bordering
    countries surrounding Afghanistan, and clearly watching the
    border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan is an area that we
    will pay attention to in regard to enhancing border controls.
    That and the Stans in the north, those two areas are of
    considerable interest to us because of the comment that you
    made.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Mixon, we have forces in Haiti today and apparently
    Haiti also is at least a transshipment point, if not a
    production point. Can you comment upon the situation in Haiti
    with respect to drugs?
        General Mixon. Yes, sir, I can. First of all, it is a
    transshipment point. We do not have any indicators of
    production in that area.
        I would just comment that at the present time we have
    approximately 3,700 total forces in there, including all the
    multinational forces in that area. During the first 30 days of
    the operations in Haiti, we saw absolutely no flights going
    into Haiti as we had tracked over the past. However,
    unfortunately, during the last week we have identified at least
    one unidentified flight going into the area, which indicates to
    us a resumption of it as a transshipment point.
        It is our intention, it is General Hill's guidance to the
    JTF, that we will monitor that, working closely with JIATF-S,
    and we will do everything that we can do to shut it down as a
    transshipment point, given the fact that we are on the ground
    and present in Haiti. We will do that in conjunction with the
    other agencies that are involved.
        It is important to note that as a part of the JTF in Haiti
    we have formed our naval component around the U.S. Coast Guard.
    As of about 3 days ago, they have done close to 100 boardings
    of private and small vessels to assure that Haiti does not
    operate again as an open transshipment point. So we are going
    to take aggressive action in that particular area, because it
    will destabilize our efforts.
        Senator Reed. I guess the question that that begs is, we
    can do that now with 3,000 international personnel on the
    ground and with the Coast Guard flotilla out. What happens or
    what are we going to do to ensure when we leave that it
    continues to not be a transshipment point?
        General Mixon. We will continue to do operations, as we
    have done, in coordination with the DEA. JIATF-S, that is one
    of the areas that they monitor. Ideally, as we begin to reform
    the Haitian national police we can work with them to make them
    more effective, because really that is where we need to put our
    focus. In the past that has been part of the problem and, as we
    saw over the last year, there were strong indicators of Haitian
    national police involvement in the drug trade.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Now, let me follow up, General Mixon, because the request
    for increased personnel in Colombia raises some specific
    questions. I think you assured us that you will have sufficient
    support from DOD in terms of the individuals you need, so you
    are not going to be limited in terms of personnel available.
    That is correct, is it not?
        General Mixon. There will be a consideration, of course, as
    we request those additional personnel, but I think we will get
    their support when we do ask for those people.
        Senator Reed. How do you envision using these increased
    forces? Will they accompany units in the field? If they do, how
    far down? How far will they go into the areas of contact?
        General Mixon. Yes, sir. They will operate from secure
    bases. A specific level--the planning and assistance teams that
    we have operating in Colombia today, most of those team members
    came from within the components of SOUTHCOM that were not
    deployed and have not been deployed. In other words, we did not
    go out to the broader DOD.
        They operate at brigade level, with one exception. We have
    planning and assistance teams that operate in advice to the
    Lancero Battalion, which is a Ranger battalion equivalent. Even
    at that level, they stay in secure bases, providing planning
    and assistance.
        If those headquarters move into an area, it is the
    responsibility of the military group commander to ensure that
    they are moving to a secure base and through his approval is
    the point in time when the planning and assistance team can
    move to that base. But they are not allowed to leave the secure
    base. They are not allowed to go on combat patrols or
    participate in combat operations.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Part of the dilemma in Colombia has been the size of the
    Colombian military force and its capabilities. Is this request
    made in recognition of the progress that the Colombians have
    made in terms of having effective units that can go out and
    essentially use the skill and the services of these planners?
        General Mixon. Sir, that is exactly the point. Their
    military has grown and they are doing larger scale operations
    where more units are put in the field. Therefore, we see it as
    important to provide them the advice and assistance.
        I would tell you, to echo what General Hill said yesterday,
    the Colombian military and the Colombian Government clearly see
    this as their war to win. Whenever we look at their units and
    how they are doing operations and the support they may need, we
    always go to them first and say: This is what we recommend
    where we can help you. Sometimes they say: Yes, we would like
    that help. Sometimes they say: No, give us some time until we
    are ready to receive that support.
        My point is that they do not always come to us and rarely
    do come to us for the types of support we offer, but it is an
    effort done in conjunction with them and their military
    operations.
        Senator Reed. We discussed the situation in Iraq with
    contractors and Secretary O'Connell pointed out that there are
    contractors in Colombia. I will raise the same general
    question. What are the operating procedures to support these
    contractors, to know where they are in country, and to prevent
    a situation in Colombia like we saw in Iraq?
        General Mixon. Yes, sir. They operate under similar rules
    of engagement. However, the contractors that work for the DOS,
    that actually participate in the flying of some of the spray
    aircraft, some of the intelligence aircraft that support
    military operations, obviously are flying over hostile
    territory. We have lost two aircraft in the last year, year and
    a half. One resulted in the capture of three Americans who are
    still held hostage by the FARC.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Thank you.
        Senator Roberts. We thank you for your testimony and we
    will now, at your request, move to a closed session. Thank you
    very much.
        [Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]