    [Senate Hearing 108-440]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 108-440, Pt. 4

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2005

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2400

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
    PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 4

                                    AIRLAND

                                   ----------

                             MARCH 11, 24, 30, 2004

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                             2005--Part 4  AIRLAND

                                                     S. Hrg. 108-440, Pt. 4

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2005

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2400

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
    PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 4

                                    AIRLAND

                                   __________

                             MARCH 11, 24, 30, 2004

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 CARL LEVIN, Michigan
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
    PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado               JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               JACK REED, Rhode Island
    SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
    JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada                  BILL NELSON, Florida
    JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri            E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
    SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
    LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina    EVAN BAYH, Indiana
    ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina       HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

                        Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director

                 Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director

                                     ______

                            Subcommittee on Airland

                        JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama, Chairman

    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
    PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
    JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri            EVAN BAYH, Indiana
    SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
    ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina       MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
                              Army Transformation
                                 march 11, 2004

                                                                       Page

    Bolton, Hon. Claude M., Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army for
      Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.........................     6
    Casey, GEN George W., Jr., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, United
      States Army....................................................    17
    Curran, MG John M., USA, Director, Futures Center, Headquarters,
      U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)...............    23

                      Navy and Air Force Aviation Programs
                                 march 24, 2004

    Young, John J., Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
      Research, Development, and Acquisition; Accompanied by VADM
      John B. Nathman, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
      Warfare Requirements and Programs; and Lt. Gen. Michael A.
      Hough, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters......    72
    Sambur, Hon. Marvin R., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
      Acquisition; Accompanied by Lt. Gen. Ronald E. Keys, USAF,
      Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations,
      Headquarters...................................................    83

                             Army Aviation Programs
                                 march 30, 2004

    Cody, LTG Richard A., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
      and Plans, U.S. Army...........................................   134
    Bergantz, MG Joseph L., USA, Program Executive Officer for
      Aviation.......................................................   143
    Sinclair, BG Edward J., USA, Commanding General, United States
      Army Aviation Center and Fort Rucker...........................   144

                                     (iii)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2005

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2004

                                   U.S. Senate,
                               Subcommittee on Airland,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                              ARMY TRANSFORMATION

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m. in
    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
    Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Dole,
    Lieberman, and Clinton.
        Majority staff members present: Ambrose R. Hock,
    professional staff member; and Thomas L. MacKenzie,
    professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
    professional staff member; and Creighton Greene, professional
    staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell and Sara R.
    Mareno.
        Committee members' assistants present: John A. Bonsell,
    assistant to Senator Inhofe; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
    Senator Sessions; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator
    Lieberman; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Sessions. The subcommittee will come to order.
    We're not real sure what our afternoon schedule is going to be.
    They had earlier predicted some votes at 2:15, but I've not
    received confirmation, and it was just a prediction. Our plan
    certainly should be to go forward to hear the testimony of our
    distinguished guests and to make some opening statements. We
    will probably have time to complete our work, but we may be
    interrupted as we go forward.
        The Subcommittee on Airland meets today to receive
    testimony on the fiscal year 2005 President's budget request
    for Army transformation. I welcome this distinguished panel
    today.
        First, I would like to take a moment to recognize our
    ranking member, Senator Lieberman. He is a thorough expert on
    national defense, a man of great integrity and insight, who's
    listened to by both sides of the aisle whenever he speaks on
    these matters. It's a pleasure for me, Senator Lieberman, to
    work with you. I value your insight and your commitment to this
    country.
        I want to recognize, also, the men and women of our active,
    Reserve, and National Guard components, supported by civilian
    employees and contractors, who have been successful in
    executing military operations around the world in the ongoing
    war on terrorism. This is proof of the training, equipment, and
    readiness that you have provided them. Their service and
    sacrifices, and the sacrifices of their families, are deeply
    appreciated. I've talked with a number of families who have
    lost loved ones in Iraq and Afghanistan, families from Alabama.
    I've visited our soldiers at Walter Reed, and I know, as you
    do, the real, personal sacrifice that is being made.
        Today's hearing is the first of two hearings we will have
    on Army programs. Our focus this afternoon will be
    transformation. On March 30, we'll have a hearing on Army
    aviation, specifically focusing on the termination of the
    Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter program. It's
    something that I've had an interest in and supported over the
    years, and I know Senator Lieberman has as well. We will be
    talking about that and have a full opportunity to discuss it.
        The Airland Subcommittee has supported the Comanche program
    in previous budget requests, and we are concerned with the
    impact of the termination on the future Army capabilities. I
    have, based on what I know today, decided that this termination
    is justified, but we will be going into it in more detail as
    time goes by, and we want to be sure, if there is a
    termination, that the funds that were allocated to that program
    will be used to improve Army aviation.
        For fiscal year 2005, the Army requests $98.5 billion, $2.7
    billion more than appropriated in fiscal year 2004, and
    supports the continuation of the Army transformation efforts.
    Adjusting for the Comanche termination, the Army requests $12.8
    billion in procurement, including $905 million for the Stryker
    vehicles, for the fifth of six Stryker brigades, and $2.7
    billion for Army aviation programs, and $9.3 billion in
    research, development, tests, and evaluation (RDT&E), including
    $3.2 billion for Future Combat Systems (FCS), a $1.5 billion
    increase over the amount appropriated in fiscal year 2004. FCS
    is one of the key programs for the Army transformation to the
    future force, and we have several questions regarding this
    program.
        As I noted earlier, today's hearing will focus on Army
    transformation. With the new chief of staff, the three axes of
    Army transformation--the Objective Force, Interim Force, and
    Legacy Force--have morphed into a current force that is
    organized, trained, and equipped for joint, interagency,
    multinational, full-spectrum operations, and a future force and
    operational force that will be based on network-centric
    capabilities. This is the Army's fourth year of transformation,
    and we are interested in hearing the progress the Army has made
    to date, particularly since they signed the $14.5 billion
    contract for the system development and demonstration phase of
    the program.
        The subcommittee will not only focus on Army
    transformation, but also on programs supporting Operation
    Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and
    other deployed Army forces. We are interested in hearing your
    views on the chief of staff's plan to restructure active and
    Reserve components to create a modular force that is intended
    to provide joint and expeditionary capabilities to the
    combatant commanders.
        I support this initiative and believe the Army has taken a
    prudent approach to addressing issues related to high-demand,
    but low-density units and rotational requirements; however,
    there are still unanswered questions related to both near- and
    far-term requirements and how the Army intends to fund the
    restructure.
        We also ask you to address the impact of Operations
    Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom on the current modernization
    plan, including costs associated with the plan. We understand
    the Army will use operations and maintenance funding to reset
    equipment as it is redeployed from Operation Iraqi Freedom. But
    we also understand that the Army has unfunded requirements in
    the procurement accounts for equipment attrited during the
    current operations. I am concerned that current operations will
    create resource challenges that can affect, adversely,
    transformation.
        The Army has made tremendous progress in its transformation
    initiative, and, even with Comanche's termination, this budget
    request appears to support the continued development of systems
    for Army transformation.
        Secretary Bolton, General Casey, and Major General Curran,
    we welcome you here to the Airland Subcommittee. I want to
    commend each of you for your outstanding leadership that you've
    provided and continue to provide in these challenging times. We
    look forward to your testimony.
        Before I yield to my esteemed colleague, we have a special
    guest today. We welcome Cindy Curran, Major General Curran's
    wife. Good to see you. Thank you for being here with us.
        Senator Lieberman.

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN

        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. The presence of
    General Curran's wife will make our questioning no less
    withering. [Laughter.]
        But it's nice to have you here, Mrs. Curran.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for your leadership
    of this subcommittee and for your service to our country. It
    has been really an honor to get to know you. I must say, when I
    first came back, Senator Warner said that I had been away
    without leave. I told him that I actually felt as if I had been
    actively deployed. [Laughter.]
        But, in any case, it is an honor to return to the Senate
    with people like yourself, and to work together in the best
    tradition of our country across party lines to do what is right
    to protect our national security and to support the men and
    women in uniform. You've set a high standard for that, and I
    look forward to working with you this year in pursuit of the
    goals that I know we share.
        Mr. Chairman, over the last 5 years, now in my sixth year
    on this subcommittee, I've been privileged to serve as both
    chair and ranking member. In that time, I've worked with my
    Republican colleague, strongly supporting the effort to
    transform the Army into a force more relevant to the new
    strategic environment that we are now facing. I've also had
    concerns, as this has gone along, about how the Army was
    attempting to effect that transformation, and particularly
    concerned about what I saw and, I'm afraid, still see as the
    failure to adequately fund the effort.
        In short, I've been concerned, and remain so, that the Army
    not be pressured to mortgage the future for the present. That
    goes to the affordability of the Army plan to modernize what
    used to be known as the Legacy Force, to field the Interim
    Force, and develop and field the Objective Force by 2010.
        Over the 4 years that General Shinseki led the Army, I
    supported fully the development of both the air and ground
    components of transformation to the Objective Force and fully
    supported his view that those programs should be the Army's
    highest priorities. But I must say that I was concerned about
    the Army spending that $10 billion to field the 6th Stryker
    Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) for the Interim Force, because I
    worried that the Army might move more quickly and less
    expensively to field an interim capability, and with nearly the
    same degree of effectiveness.
        Once it was clear that the resources provided would not be
    sufficient, the Army chose to take some risk in the Legacy
    Force. It was something we talked about quite openly here
    because of the limitation on resources that the Army was being
    given, cancelling scores of programs, and underfunding many
    more, including the digitization required to field the tactical
    internet to all but the counterattack corps. Some of this was
    based on what we hoped at the time would be a strategic pause
    to make the risks tolerable. But, of course, it ended up being
    short-lived, and we have felt, since Afghanistan and Iraq, some
    of the consequences of the underfunding, such as insufficient
    sets of individual body armor, uparmored high-mobility
    multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), aircraft survivability,
    equipment and battlefield identification systems. Obviously, I
    applaud General Schoomaker, General Casey, and all of you for
    your efforts to get such equipment to the current force as
    quickly as possible--I know that you've done that in many of
    the cases I've mentioned--and to deal with other capability
    shortfalls in the force.
        However, like his predecessor, General Schoomaker is now
    being forced to make some tough choices, and one of those is
    the one that Senator Sessions referred to: the termination of
    the Comanche, which we will hold a separate hearing on, on
    March 30, so I don't want to go into it in detail here. But,
    for quite a long time, what the Army told us--and I thought it
    was a strong argument--was that the Comanche would be the
    Army's future air combat vehicle and complement the ground FCS.
    I know--and I've heard the arguments--that the operational
    environment is now different than envisioned when Comanche was
    conceived, and the joint systems can help fill the Comanche
    void. But my concern really is that the primary reason for the
    termination was budgetary. Just as there were risks associated
    with underfunding the Legacy Force in recent years, there is
    risk associated, I want to suggest today, with underfunding
    Army transformation for the future.
        The Army has vigorously argued that the future was its
    highest priority, and I believe that, and we put some resources
    there. But even in the context of a Defense Department budget
    that some inside Congress and some outside Congress feel is
    excessive, we're pressuring you to do a lot for the current
    force and the future force, and you're finding it hard to do it
    all.
        Today, we want to look at the bigger picture of how the
    Army's ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in the
    larger war on terror have affected these modernization and
    transformation plans. As Army units rotate back from Iraq,
    there will be huge equipment costs as they are reset for
    follow-on contingencies. The bulk of the cost will be in the
    operation and maintenance accounts as equipment is repaired and
    serviced. Now, are there going to be additional acquisition
    costs? Of course. To replace combat losses, the Army has
    estimated that the total reset cost from the first rotation of
    forces in and out of Iraq, and the continuing rotation in and
    out of Afghanistan, will be in the range of $5 billion, largely
    unfunded. There are also going to be some acquisition costs to
    add equipment as the Army moves to create the additional 10 to
    15 active brigades in its structure and reorganize the
    remainder in the active and Reserve components to achieve a
    degree of modularity in design.
        Like the Chairman, I'm quite encouraged by these plans.
    They make a lot of sense to me. But there is a cost, of course,
    and the cost of creating the 15 additional active-duty brigades
    I've seen estimated at over $20 billion. We've seen no estimate
    for the cost of restructuring existing brigades in the Reserve
    components.
        Now, the Army Chief of Staff believes he's going to be able
    to complete the restructuring as the Army resets the force, and
    that the cost of doing so will be largely covered through
    supplemental appropriations. Whether that will be so remains to
    be seen. Unfortunately, recent history is not totally
    encouraging. Even though the Army received approximately $42
    billion of the $65 billion in fiscal year 2004 supplemental
    appropriations, it still has had to deal with nearly $3 billion
    in unfunded war-related requirements.
        For the fiscal year 2005 budget request, the Army has
    submitted a nonfunded priorities list of $6 billion, including
    $2.4 billion for the modularity requirements, and $1.2 billion
    for fiscal year 2004 reset shortfalls. Some in the Army have
    further estimated a fiscal year 2005 supplemental requirement
    of nearly $50 billion. The resulting shortfall could have a
    serious impact, again, on our Army transformation funding in
    the future, and potentially force the Army to delay or, at
    worst, terminate the FCS in order to meet current force
    requirements.
        This is a reaction to reality. It is not that I'm blaming
    anyone. In part, it's our doing. We have to figure out--and
    that's what I think the chairman and I are saying--how best, in
    this resource-constrained active-deployment reality that we're
    living in, we can support what you're doing.
        I remain concerned that the Army will sacrifice the future
    for the present. As pressing as the present is, we have to
    figure out a way to make sure that you're not forced to do
    that. Because I fear the result of that maybe that we will have
    personally modernized a current force that will end up being
    the future force. Clearly that partially modernized current
    force is necessary to do what we're doing now. But nothing
    stays static, we're going to be facing more sophisticated
    threats in the future, and we have a responsibility to help you
    fulfill your responsibility to be ready to face those threats.
    That, I hope, is what this Airland Subcommittee can do in this
    session.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. Those views
    and concerns are matters we need to take seriously, and we
    appreciate that.
        Senator Dole, it's great to have you with us. We thank you
    for your interest and your strong commitment to matters of
    defense and your regular attendance at our committees.
        Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
    distinguished panel for appearing here today.
        The global strategic environment, as we all know, is a
    complex and dangerous landscape. With the proliferation of
    technology and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), we're
    currently witnessing a fundamental change in the security
    environment. In the future, our potential adversaries will be
    significantly more capable of threatening our national security
    at home and abroad. As a result, we must remain ever vigilant,
    with an eye to the future as we resource our military to
    develop future capabilities.
        Our Army has been, and continues to be, vigilant. As a
    result, it is relevant and it is ready. Through its ongoing
    transformation, our Army will be ready to defend our national
    security well into the future. I commend the Army for being
    proactive and for the tough resource-allocation decisions it
    has made to produce a feasible transformation plan.
        Meanwhile, our Nation is at war, and we must do everything
    possible to support our brave men and women as they valiantly
    maintain the security of the American people. I look forward to
    hearing how we, on the Senate Armed Services Committee, can
    assist the Army in executing its transformation while it
    remains engaged in 120 countries worldwide. Thank you for being
    here today.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Dole. Well said.
        We will hear from each of you now. You could maybe discuss
    how you would like to divide your time. If we could stay around
    15 minutes, that would be good. But if you have something you
    want us to hear, I hope that you will say it.
        I'd just reiterate: we're at a point where we support
    future combat force, and the question we are having is, what
    equipment and technologies do you need to make it a reality?
    Then, do you have enough money to do it, or will you be able to
    have those resources on hand when the date in question arrives?
    That's part of what we're wrestling with. It's one thing to
    have a vision, but if you don't have the gas to get you down
    the road, we won't make it there.
        Secretary Bolton, we're delighted to have you with us, and
    we appreciate so much your service. Maybe you could start us
    off.

    STATEMENT OF HON. CLAUDE M. BOLTON, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
          THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY

        Mr. Bolton. Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairman Sessions,
    Senator Lieberman, and distinguished members of the Airland
    Subcommittee, for this opportunity to discuss Army
    transformation.
        This is a time, as you've already indicated, of tremendous
    change. We are most grateful for your wisdom, your guidance,
    and steadfast support.
        I respectfully request that my written statements be made a
    part of the record for today's hearing.
        Senator Sessions. We will do that. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Bolton. In the interest of time, I will truncate my
    opening comments. I believe you have perhaps four charts to
    address one of the statements in your opening comments, both
    the chairman and Senator Lieberman.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Sessions. I'm not sure I have that.
        Mr. Bolton. Then I'll just talk to it.
        We went across the berm just under a year ago in Iraq. The
    Army soldiers did an outstanding job, as did the other
    Services. We got to Baghdad in record time and concluded that
    phase of the operation. We then took our soldiers out of
    Abrams; we took them out of Bradleys, and we started the
    stabilization operation and put them into HMMWVs. The enemy
    adapted to that, and our soldiers increasingly came in harm's
    way from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and from other
    weapons. We responded to that first with the small arms
    protection inserts (SAPI) plates. These are the inserts that go
    into the flak vests, and I will tell, just over a year ago we
    were producing about 2,000 sets per month. Today, we are
    producing 25,000 sets per month. There are 163,000-plus sets in
    country. By this time next week, everyone in Iraq and
    Afghanistan will have those vests and the SAPI plates. We will
    continue that, looking toward a goal of 840,000 sets.
        Now, that's a testament to how rapidly we can turn things
    around, but, more importantly, our industrial base, because
    when we were at 2,000, we were looking at basically two
    contractors. Today, we have six contractors. If we look at
    HMMWVs, when we took our troops out of the Bradleys and Abrams
    and put them into HMMWVs. Those HMMWVs were not designed for
    the IEDs we encountered during the stabilization operation.
    Today, we have ramped up to 170 vehicles per month. These are
    new HMMWVs, armored HMMWVs. By May, we will be at 220. By July,
    we will have the total of uparmored HMMWVs of 4,149 vehicles.
    By this October, all of those will be over there to marry up
    with vehicles we have gotten from other places around the
    world. We will keep that production as we go toward 5,000
    vehicles. Once again, a testament to industry, that when we
    started this over a year ago, we were producing somewhere on
    the order of 20 to 30 vehicles a month; now we're up to 220 in
    the month of May. That's a testament, also, to how rapidly we
    can turn things around.
        Now, who's doing this? A workforce that I'm very proud to
    lead and to represent--a workforce of 1,600 military, some of
    whom are in-theater today, working with the combatants to
    understand what they need and to provide that to them in as
    little as 72 hours--not months, not year, but hours--and also
    providing to soldiers equipment that they need, that they said
    they needed. If you have been over there, you see we now have
    arm pads, knee pads, and different sights for night vision and
    for the gun. We did 27,000 last year, we'll do 120,000 this
    year, and we'll continue that operation.
        That workforce has been reduced over the last 10 years, and
    certainly since the fall of the Soviet Union, by nearly 50
    percent; 1,600 military, 50,000 civilians are left today. Over
    the next 2 years, half the civilians are eligible to retire.
    Needless to say, that causes me some concern, and we're
    starting to work that.
        Let me close this and turn the mike over to General Casey
    by saying the following. In 1971, a new lieutenant, who was in
    a war called Vietnam was flying in the Air Force, the best
    aircraft they had available, called the F-4. He went into that
    war well-trained and well-led. He left that war a little wiser,
    having lost seven of his colleagues, to include his boss. He
    realized, at that time, that while he had the best training and
    the best leadership, he did not have the world's best aircraft.
    He dedicated the rest of his time, from that point to today, to
    ensuring that every warrior had the equipment that he or she
    needed to be the world's number one. That lieutenant sits
    before you today, trying to realize the dream of making sure
    that our soldiers are, indeed, the best-equipped, the best-led,
    the best-motivated. I can tell you, for sure, they have all of
    that, and we're working day and night to make sure that
    happens.
        On behalf of those men and women, I thank you and all the
    committee members, for your steadfast support. These charts
    here, on the SAPI plates and up-armored HMMWVs--your support in
    passing the fiscal year 2004 supplemental did that. It saved
    lives, and I thank you very much.
        Let me turn the mike over now to our Vice Chief of Staff,
    General Casey.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Bolton follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Hon. Claude M. Bolton, Jr.

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
    you for this opportunity to report to you on Army transformation. It is
    my privilege to represent the Army leadership, the military and
    civilian members of the Army acquisition workforce, and the soldiers
    who rely on us to provide them with world-class weapon systems and
    equipment so they can successfully accomplish any mission at anytime,
    anywhere in the world.
        This is a time of tremendous change, and we are most grateful for
    your wisdom, guidance, and strong support. Over the last year, our Army
    has met the demands of the global war on terrorism, with more than
    330,000 troops deployed around the world in more than 120 countries.
    Our Army was instrumental in the defeat of Saddam Hussein and the
    subsequent liberation of more than 46 million people from oppression
    and despair. Our Army remains a central and critical participant in
    Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
    Although these and other operations have stressed the force, our
    soldiers have responded magnificently.
        We are most grateful, too, for your continued support of our Army's
    transformation. The goals of Army transformation are to provide
    relevant and ready forces that are organized, trained, and equipped for
    full spectrum joint, interagency, and multi-national operations and to
    support future force development. Our future force is the operational
    force the Army continuously seeks to become--a strategically
    responsive, networked, precision, capabilities-based, maneuver force
    that is dominant across the range of military operations envisioned for
    the future global security environment.
        The primary goal of Army transformation is moving from the
    capabilities of the current force into the future with the development
    of the future force. Optimized for strategic versatility, this lighter,
    more agile force will dominate land operations and greatly expand the
    options available to the Joint Force. Developments in technology and
    our pursuit of network-centric warfare will allow the Army to break our
    ties with the Cold War formations that relied on the principle of mass
    and the build-up of large forces. We will possess unprecedented
    situational awareness that will enable Army formations to maneuver with
    greater precision and dispersion. We will know where the enemy is and
    where our own people are, and we will be able to impose our will on the
    enemy at the time and place of our choosing. As the Army develops the
    future force, it simultaneously is accelerating select future doctrine,
    organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities
    capabilities into our current force. This process will be fundamental
    to our success in enhancing the relevance and readiness of our Army and
    prosecuting the global war on terrorism. Similarly, the operational
    experience of our current force influences the development of future
    force capabilities.

                     BALANCING CURRENT AND FUTURE READINESS

        Balancing risk between current and future readiness remains a
    critical part of our Army's transformation process and one that
    requires continual assessment to ensure that plans and programs are
    aligned with overall requirements. Without question, the issue of
    current operational readiness is our Army's highest priority. During
    the last several years, our Army decided to accept a reasonable degree
    of risk to the readiness of our current force to permit investment in
    capabilities for our future force. This risk came in the form of
    reductions in and limitations to modernization and recapitalization
    programs. As part of the past four budget submissions, our Army made
    difficult choices to cancel and restructure programs, shifting
    resources to the development of transformational capabilities. Some of
    these investments have already produced results; for example, the new
    Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) formations now being fielded, the
    first of which is currently deployed on the battlefield in Iraq. Others
    are helping to develop emerging technologies and capabilities that will
    be applied to our force throughout the coming decade.

                                    PROGRAMS
    Stryker
        While at war, the urgency to accelerate the development and
    fielding of new and enhanced capabilities to our fighting forces in the
    field has never been greater. The rapid fielding of the Stryker vehicle
    demonstrates our Army's ability to meet a combatant commander's urgent
    needs.
        In 2003, our Army deployed our first SBCT, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd
    Infantry Division, to Operation Iraqi Freedom, delivering its enhanced
    capabilities to the Joint Force in record time: 4 years from broad
    concept to deployment. Exceptional support from Congress and the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), along with close collaboration
    between the Army and industry made this achievement possible.
        Stryker brigades are our Army's first truly network-centric force,
    filling the capability gap between light- and heavy-force units with an
    infantry-rich, mobile force that is strategically responsive,
    tactically agile, and lethal. Improved battlespace awareness and
    battle-command technologies embedded in our SBCTs enhance combat
    effectiveness and survivability by integrating data from manned and
    unmanned air and ground-base sensors and providing real-time,
    continuous situational understanding.
        This spring, our second SBCT at Fort Lewis, Washington, will become
    operational. Our third SBCT, in Alaska, will be available in 2005.
    Continued support from Congress and OSD will ensure that subsequent
    brigades in Hawaii, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania are fielded between
    2004 and 2008.

    Army Aviation Modernization
        A comprehensive review of Army programs has led to several
    strategic decisions regarding Army aviation. Because of lessons learned
    and experiences gained by the Army's recent 2\1/2\ years of combat in
    the global war on terrorism, as well as the operational environments
    envisioned in the foreseeable future, it is clear that the Army must
    provide the most effective survivability enhancements to our rotary and
    fixed-wing aircraft as soon as possible. We must upgrade, modernize,
    and rebuild our attack, utility, and cargo helicopter fleets, and
    replace our light observation and scout/attack helicopters as rapidly
    as possible.
        With the termination of the Comanche RAH-66 helicopter program and
    the resources for 121 Comanche aircraft reallocated (through fiscal
    year 2011), our plans are to restructure and revitalize Army aviation
    to meet current and future needs. The Army plans to accelerate air crew
    protection and Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) fielding
    initiatives to meet the evolving threat and provide every aircraft with
    the best possible equipment; modernize 1,400 aircraft to extend
    aviation capabilities beyond 2020; acquire nearly 800 new aircraft to
    build modular active and Reserve component aviation formations;
    accelerate the unmanned aerial vehicle program to extend battlefield
    awareness and strengthen manned-unmanned teaming; transform Reserve and
    National Guard aviation; and leverage the technology base and knowledge
    gained through the Comanche program for new joint aviation initiatives.
    The net result of this reallocation will be the new procurement,
    upgrade, recapitalization, or modernization of more than 70 percent of
    the rotary winged fleet.

    Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
        The Army is the first service to successfully pass initial
    operational test and evaluation with a UAV system. That system, the
    Shadow Tactical UAV, went from program initiation to a full-rate
    production decision in just 33 months. We now have four systems
    superbly supporting ground forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom that have
    flown more than 4,000 mission hours in theater. Twelve systems are
    fielded with 8 to operational units and 4 to the training base and an
    additional 12 will be fielded in fiscal year 2004. Ground commanders
    consider these essential for their Brigade Combat Teams to provide on-
    call and responsive surveillance, force protection, and reconnaissance.
    Hunter is our interim extended-range/multi-purpose UAV that supports
    the Division/Corps. Finally, Raven is a small UAV that weighs just four
    pounds and is easily transportable in a HMMWV. It currently supports
    ground forces in Operation Enduring Freedom where terrain
    considerations and small unit needs dictate this type of responsive
    lightweight small UAV. The Army is procuring 185 of these systems in
    fiscal year 2004 and equipping small units in Iraq and Afghanistan over
    the next several months--an excellent example of responsive acquisition
    and rapid equipping.

                                 PATRIOT/MEADS

        Patriot is the only fielded U.S. system capable of defeating
    Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBMs). The Army strongly supports
    continued fielding of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 upgrade to our
    soldiers. The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) is a
    cooperative program with Germany and Italy and is a ground-based
    terminal defense program. MEADS is intended to be a highly mobile,
    tactically deployable system to protect the maneuver force from short
    and medium range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and other air
    breathing threats. Beginning in fiscal year 2004, the Patriot and MEADS
    programs were combined to efficiently utilize the resources available
    to both programs.

    Munitions
        A key block in the foundation of our Army's capability is the mix
    of munitions needed to provide overmatch and dominant land operations
    against hostile forces. From bullets to grenades, artillery rounds to
    missiles, from precision point target to area suppression, our charge
    is to provide a mix of munitions across Army, Joint, and International
    Forces that address training needs, the multiple targets and the myriad
    of environmental conditions faced by our soldiers. The Army is the
    single manager for conventional ammunition across the Services and has
    numerous joint and international munitions programs (Joint Common
    Missile, Excalibur, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System) in
    development. Managing the health of current stockpiles while planning
    for their replacement is essential for the success of current and
    future forces.

    3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment Modernization (3ACR)
        The Army will continue recapitalization and upgrade of the Abrams
    Main Battle Tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle in support of 3ACR
    modernization. This effort will provide 3ACR with an embedded digital
    capability commensurate to the 1st Cavalry Division and 4th Infantry
    Division with fielding projected for fiscal year 2006.

    Future Capabilities
        Our Army plans to field a number of systems this decade that will
    provide a foundation for the transformation of our current force
    capabilities into those needed by our future force. Once fielded, these
    systems will perform as an interdependent system of systems that will
    significantly enhance joint warfighting capabilities. The following are
    some of the key transformational systems that our Army will begin to
    field during the next 6 years.

    The Network
        The situational dominance of our future force will depend upon a
    comprehensive, ever-present, and joint-interoperable command, control,
    communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) architecture that will enable the Joint Force
    Commander to conduct fully interdependent and network-centric warfare.
    This network will provide the backbone of our future force and the
    future Joint Force, enabling the maneuver commander to effectively
    coordinate battlefield effects. Some of the more important systems
    within the network include the following:

             Warfighter Information Network--Tactical (WIN-T). WIN-
            T will be the communications network of our future force,
            optimized for offensive and joint operations, while providing
            the combatant commander the capability to perform multiple
            missions simultaneously.
             Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). JTRS is a family
            of common, software-defined programmable radios that will
            become our Army's primary tactical radio for mobile
            communications.
             Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A). DCGS-A
            is the Army component of the future Department of Defense (DOD)
            integrated, ground-based, ISR processing architecture composed
            of common hardware and software components enabling joint, net-
            centric operations.
             Aerial Common Sensor (ACS). This ISR system and
            platform will use robust sensor-to-shooter and links (such as
            DCGS-A ground stations) to provide commanders at every echelon
            the tailored, multi-sensor intelligence required for joint
            operations.

    Future Combat Systems
        The materiel core of our future force's maneuver unit of action
    (UA) is the Future Combat Systems (FCS), comprised of a C\4\ISR network
    and 18 manned and unmanned systems that are centered around the
    soldier. FCS will provide our soldiers greatly enhanced situational
    awareness, enabling them to see first, understand first, act first, and
    finish decisively. FCS will operate as a system of systems that will
    network existing systems, systems already under development, and next
    systems to be developed to meet the needs of the FCS-equipped UA. The
    network will enable improved intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance, enhanced analytical tools, joint exchange of blue and
    red force tracking down to the tactical level, battle command, real
    time sensor-shooter linkages, and increased synergy between echelons
    and within small units. FCS will be capable of generating networked
    lethal and non-lethal effects that achieve overmatch integrated with
    other Army, joint, national, and multi-national assets to bring those
    capabilities to the small unit level. In May 2003, FCS moved on
    schedule into the systems development and demonstration phase. Our Army
    is aggressively managing our FCS development effort and intends to
    achieve initial operational capability by the end of the decade.

    Army Science And Technology
        The Army Science and Technology (S&T) program provides our Army
    superiority in both human and materiel systems arenas--preventing
    technological surprise. The Army S&T program retains a dynamic
    portfolio of investments that are responsive to warfighter needs today
    and into the future. The priority for Army S&T is to pursue paradigm-
    shifting technologies that can alter the nature of the military
    competition to our advantage in the future and, where feasible, to
    exploit opportunities to accelerate the transition of proven technology
    to our current force.
        The Army S&T program exploits technology developments from the
    other Services, defense agencies, and commercial industry as well as
    international communities. The S&T program focuses on technology
    relevant to our Army and joint capabilities. It synchronizes
    operational concepts development and acquisition programs through
    transformational business practices that speed technology fielding to
    the soldier. The Army's S&T program is balanced to satisfy the high
    payoff needs of the future force while seeking rapid transitions for
    critical capabilities to our current force.

    Accelerated Acquisition And Fielding
        We have adapted and continue to improve our acquisition and
    fielding processes. In 2002, as soldiers reported equipment shortages
    in Afghanistan and elsewhere, we implemented the Rapid Fielding
    Initiative (RFI) to ensure that all of our troops deploy with the
    latest available equipment. Equipment fielding schedules were revised
    to support unit rotation plans, and procurement and fielding cycles
    were radically compressed.
        In coordination with field commanders and our soldiers, a list of
    more than 40 mission-essential items, including the Advanced Combat
    Helmet, close-combat optics, Global Positioning System receivers,
    soldier intercoms and hydration systems, were identified for rapid
    fielding. Laying the foundation for acquisition transformation, RFI
    already has equipped nine Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). In fiscal year
    2004, RFI will upgrade a minimum of 11 BCTs and 6 enhanced separate
    brigades serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, we are
    accelerating fielding of select future capabilities to our current
    force. These items include thermal weapon sights, enhanced night vision
    goggles, Interceptor Body Armor, the Future Combat Rifle, and a new
    sniper rifle. It is the strong support of Congress that enables our
    Army to put this improved equipment in the hands of our soldiers.
        Support from Congress has also enabled our Army to institute a
    Rapid Equipping Force (REF) initiative to work directly with
    operational commanders and find solutions to operational requirements.
    These solutions may be off-the-shelf or near-term developmental items
    that can be made available quickly. For example, REF established a
    coordinated effort to supply our forces with immediate solutions to
    counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threats. Currently, IED teams
    are on location providing expertise and materiel solutions to safeguard
    our soldiers. We are acting aggressively to improve the armor
    protection of our armored and light-skinned vehicles. Other examples of
    REF products are the Well-Cam and PackBots. The Well-Cam is a camera,
    attached to an ethernet cable and a laptop, that enables soldiers in
    theater to search wells for weapons caches. PackBots are operational
    robots used to clear caves, buildings, and compounds so soldiers are
    not put in harm's way unnecessarily.
        RFI and REF provide timely support to our relevant and ready forces
    and to combatant commanders, and facilitate Army transformation.

    Chemical Demilitarization
        The United States remains the world's leader in safely destroying
    stockpiled chemical weapons covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention.
    Late last year, we completed a significant task with the closing of the
    chemical weapons destruction facility at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific.
    Over the last decade, we successfully destroyed 4 million pounds of
    nerve and blister agents configured in more than 412,000 individual
    items without any serious workplace incidents or releases to the
    environment. Today, we continue to destroy these aging, outdated
    weapons at three additional stockpile sites: Tooele, Utah; Anniston,
    Alabama; and Aberdeen, Maryland. The Anniston incineration facility
    just came on line in August of last year, and it has already
    successfully and safely destroyed more than 19,000 individual
    munitions. We are implementing state-of-the-art destruction
    technologies at each site, and we are proud of our record in
    maintaining the highest caliber of workplace safety and environmental
    protection as we continue with our mission at these sites.
        Within this calendar year, we will have three more operational
    facilities, one each in Umatilla, Oregon; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; and
    Newport, Indiana. This means that by the end of the year, the chemical
    demilitarization program will have six operational facilities located
    across four time zones. We will have four incinerators and two
    neutralization plants operating, and thousands of employees working
    around the clock, to eliminate the risks posed to the communities by
    the continued storage of these weapons.
        In addition, the non-stockpile program has made significant
    progress in destroying recovered chemical weapons that are not part of
    the national stockpile. In fact, the non-stockpile program recently
    announced that it has destroyed more than 80 percent of the former
    production facilities, all of the class III items and is making
    significant progress against other non-stockpile materiel. The program
    has designed and implemented new transportable technologies that allow
    the Army to analyze recovered munitions without opening or disturbing
    them, as well as transportable treatment systems that allow on-site
    destruction of chemical agent, eliminating the need to transport agent-
    filled weapons to another facility. These new technologies greatly
    enhance the Army's ability to respond to new discoveries of chemical
    munitions.
        Our challenge this year is to ensure that we maintain vigilance in
    protecting worker and community safety, and that we protect the
    environment at each stockpile and non-stockpile site. This challenge
    will be unprecedented, given the scope of activities that will be
    ongoing each day for the next few years at sites across the country,
    but I am confident that our program team will meet these challenges as
    they have every day since this program began.
        The U.S. Army is the only organization in the world that has
    successfully destroyed so many, and such a variety of, chemical
    weapons, and has demonstrated that it can do so safely. We intend to
    continue to lead the world in the development and use of state-of-the-
    art technologies to eliminate the threats posed by chemical weapons.

                        COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

        On May 21, 2003, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the
    Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for the Office of
    Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, later to become the
    Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq. On January 14, 2004, the
    Deputy Secretary of Defense further assigned responsibility for
    Acquisition and Program Management Support for CPA to the Secretary of
    the Army. The Army is the lead Service, helping the Iraqi people build
    a stable and democratic country.

    Contracting Support
        The Army, as executive agent, provides contracting and program
    management support both in Iraq and in the United States. We are
    charged with procuring all non-construction items and services to meet
    the humanitarian needs--the basic needs--of the Iraqi people as well as
    the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq's infrastructure. To
    date in total, more than 1,500 contracts valued at more than $9.7
    billion have been awarded. Of that total, more than 1,300 contracts
    totaling $1.3 billion have been awarded by our contracting office in
    Iraq. These contracts were awarded for the repair and renovation of
    schools, banks, railway stations, clinics, mosques, and water treatment
    plants. These contracts were awarded to provide police and fire
    fighters with uniforms and equipment; hospitals with badly needed
    supplies; electrical power system equipment; rescue equipment; and
    buses. In addition, our contract awards are helping to build
    playgrounds, youth centers, emergency housing, and roads, sewer, and
    irrigation systems.
        Again, of the overall total of over $9.7 billion, contracts awarded
    within the United States total $2.5 billion for more than 200 contracts
    for restoring Iraqi oil; shutting down and repairing oil wells; fire
    fighting; explosive ordnance demolition; restoring Iraqi electricity;
    radio installation throughout Iraq; laptops; and emergency medical
    personnel in each of Iraq's 18 governorates.
        On January 6, 2004, the Army released seven design/build
    construction solicitations. Proposals were received in February and are
    under evaluation. These 7 solicitations will result in 10 contracts in
    support of electrical, public works and water, water resources,
    transportation, communications, and security projects. Contracts will
    be awarded using best value evaluation methodology based on technical,
    management, past performance, and cost factors.

    Program Management Office
        Led by Admiral (Retired) David Nash, the Program Management Office
    (PMO) for rebuilding Iraq is located in Baghdad with a support office
    located in the Pentagon. As the requirement focal point for all Iraqi
    reconstruction contracting, the PMO is responsible for oversight and
    implementation of the $18.4 billion appropriated by the U.S. Congress
    to support the reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure. The
    construction sectors are oil, electricity, public works and water,
    security and justice, transportation and communications, and buildings,
    education, and health.
        Overall, $12.6 billion will be spent towards actual construction
    over the next few years, and $5.8 billion will be spent on providing
    equipment, supplies and material to help support the construction.
    Computers are needed to monitor and control electrical and water
    systems; vehicles are needed to transport materials or to support
    system maintenance; uniforms and supplies are needed to support the
    police and civil defense corps; and supplies are needed to support
    schools.

                                     PEOPLE

        The Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) is dedicated to supporting the
    warfighter with world-class capabilities. We provide professional
    development and unsurpassed education, training and acquisition
    experiences to our acquisition, logistics, and technology workforce
    that will support the fight, improve the force, and build the future.
        With over a decade of downsizing activities and the anticipated
    retirements of 25 percent (eligible to retire based on 55 years of age
    and 10 years of service) or more of Army acquisition workforce
    personnel in the next 5 to 10 years, human capital strategic planning
    for the Army acquisition, logistics, and technology workforce is
    critical in order to proactively plan for the future acquisition
    workforce. Loss or diminishment of this highly skilled acquisition
    workforce will seriously impact warfighting capability and readiness
    unless dramatic steps are taken. The Army is using its human capital
    strategic planning process to define the current acquisition workforce,
    the required future acquisition workforce, and identify the actions
    that we need to take to make sure we have the right acquisition
    professionals where and when we need them in the future. Such planning
    will allow us to look at how many people we need with various technical
    skills and allow the leadership to prioritize needs based on our fiscal
    constraints. We have implemented process improvements that enhance
    productivity and facilitate transformation efforts and we continue to
    pursue acquisition excellence to make further productivity gains.
        The Army acquisition community has partnered with DOD to develop
    aggressive marketing and recruiting strategies to attract and retain
    private sector talent to replace retiring workforce personnel and
    reinvigorate the current acquisition workforce to ensure that vital
    defense systems are developed and maintained. Within the Army, senior
    leaders have been given the authority to approve recruitment bonuses,
    relocation expenses, and retention allowances; authority to approve
    repayment of student loans; authority to approve advanced-in-hire
    rates; and authority to direct hire for certain civilian occupational
    series/grades. These authorities should assist Army supervisors/
    managers in addressing the potential talent loss. In addition, we are
    hiring recent college graduates, as well as qualified retired members
    of the Armed Forces in an effort to solve this situation.
        The Army's acquisition, logistics, and technology workforce is a
    critical resource that requires unique education, training, and
    experience in order to perform vital acquisition functions. Acquisition
    personnel perform highly technical and specialized work in areas such
    as engineering, contracting, and logistics--skills essential for
    ultimate success on the battlefield.
        The AAC is launching its own transformation effort after 13 years
    of initial development and acquisition mission execution.
    Transformation of the AAC is embedded within the Army's transformation
    in order to enable the AAC to conduct its mission. The AAC will align
    and horizontally integrate its transformation with the overall Army
    Campaign Plan; establish an Army acquisition core capability that
    develops, tests, fields, buys, inserts, and supports materiel and
    service solutions across full spectrum military operations, from all
    out war to defense of the homeland. Additionally, the AAC will develop
    flexible acquisition officers and civilian leaders that possess a
    diverse and well-rounded background in the supporting functions and
    phases of acquisition who are prepared to lead any complex, multi-
    functional acquisition command, agency, organization, or team.
        The acquisition workforce is responding with great enthusiasm to
    our ongoing overseas operations. Currently, there are more than 680
    individuals from our Program Executive Offices who valiantly serve our
    Nation in Southwest Asia. Of that number, roughly 300 members of the
    acquisition workforce--military, civilian, and contractors--are serving
    in Iraq.

                                   PRODUCTION

        The industrial base has responded magnificently to meet urgent
    needs in our ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Providing body
    armor for our soldiers has been a great illustration of government
    challenging industry and industry responding superbly. Over the past
    year, industrial capacity for individual body armor has expanded 14-
    fold. From the production of raw materials through the industrial
    process to the fielding to soldiers, industry has stepped-up
    unwaveringly to the challenge, giving our soldiers life saving, bullet-
    stopping capability for the first time on the battlefield.
        The other exceptional example of industrial response has been in
    adding armor to our tactical vehicles. As with body armor, we learned
    that the threat to rear echelon and patrolling soldiers was potentially
    lethal. We immediately began ramping up production of the more heavily
    armored HMMWVs and adding armor to the fielded vehicles. Our arsenals
    and depots have been key in our ability to respond to this threat. With
    two steel mills in Ohio producing armor steel plates and the Army's
    arsenals and depots making kits, we expect to have all HMMWVs in
    country improved with better plate steel armor protection by the end of
    July. This response by the industrial base workforce is truly
    remarkable.
        RFI, as mentioned previously, is another excellent example of
    industry's commitment to the soldier at war. In Iraq, we see the enemy
    evolving in its response to our efforts to maintain peace. The enemy is
    becoming more sophisticated in its attacks. Beginning with truck bombs
    and suicide bombers, we now see remotely controlled mines and well
    planned assaults. Industry is playing a key role here in the rapid
    fielding of countermeasures to keep up--and keep ahead of a very
    determined enemy. Because of RFI, we equip soldiers wherever and
    whenever necessary, providing improved force protection, mobility,
    situational awareness, and lethality.
        Over the last 3 years, we have tripled the output of small caliber
    ammunition. We boosted production from 350,000 rounds per year to 1.2
    billion rounds, almost all of it coming from the government-owned,
    contractor-operated plant in Missouri, the Lake City Army Ammunition
    Plant. We recently awarded contracts to Olin Corporation and to Israeli
    Military Industries, and we plan to expand the production capacity at
    Lake City. The increased consumption of ammunition, is a result of the
    Army's decision to better train all soldiers in marksmanship.
    Industry's response has once again been exceptional.
        The health of the defense industrial base is key to the Army's
    ability to continue to provide innovative technology and
    technologically excellent systems and equipment. Production is
    primarily dependent on the privately-owned network of prime contractors
    and subcontractors. The Army also retains a small number of arsenals
    and ammunition plants.
        In the future, the weapon systems and equipment that we buy must
    respond to the evolving threats. We, along with our industry partners,
    must be agile enough to anticipate requirements and expedite
    contracting and fielding. In addition, we must take advantage of
    lessons learned and adjust the entire process to correct mistakes or
    materiel weaknesses.

                                   CONCLUSION

        The real winner in our successful acquisition and sustainment of
    weapon systems and equipment is the soldier. We serve the soldier. The
    most technologically advanced platforms are useless without the
    intellect, dedication, and remarkable sense of duty of the American
    soldier. The soldier remains the centerpiece of our combat systems and
    formations and is indispensable to the Joint Team. Adaptive, confident,
    and competent soldiers, infused with the Army's values and warrior
    culture, fight wars and win the peace. Working with Congress, we will
    keep the Army ready to meet today's challenges and continue to make
    significant strides toward the fielding of our future force.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Secretary Bolton.
        General Casey, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, we are so
    proud of your service, and that of General Schoomaker, and the
    vision you have and the determination you have to make our Army
    second to none, as it already is, and make it even better.
        Secretary Bolton, thank you for your comments and your
    personal observations. We have a high obligation and
    responsibility to produce, for the people that go into harm's
    way, the very best. We've got to be proud of what we've
    accomplished in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, in such a
    short period of time, but we know the enemy will adapt, and we
    have to continue to adapt. Your remarks were right on target.
        General Casey.

       STATEMENT OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, VICE CHIEF OF
                       STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

        General Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lieberman,
    Senator Dole. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
    today to discuss the Army's transformation, which, as you
    rightfully put, Mr. Chairman, is really about making the best
    Army in the world better and even more capable for their
    challenges of the latter half of the 21st century.
        I would like to talk to you today about our plans to meet
    our current worldwide commitments while we simultaneously
    transform to a more agile, versatile joint and expeditionary
    force. But I would like to start, though, by thanking the
    committee for their continued support of the men and women in
    uniform and our great civilians, who make up the Army, and for
    your continued support of Army transformation.
        What I will try to do here is to focus and try to give you
    a little context to put what Secretary Bolton talked about and
    what Mark will talk about here, to give you a context to put
    that in.
        Senator Dole already mentioned the 320,000 soldiers
    deployed around the world in 120 countries, so we're actively
    engaged in meeting our Nation's operational requirements. The
    vast majority of these troops are in the Central Command
    (CENTCOM) area of operations, and engaged in combat operations.
    Currently, we have the equivalent of eight Army divisions
    either deploying to or returning from their missions. This is
    the largest movement of forces since the end of World War II.
    Couple that with the mobilization of over 150,000 combat-ready
    National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers, and you can see that
    this is really an unprecedented time in our Army's history.
    Today is not business as usual for your Army.
        Now, with all of this operational activity, it may not seem
    like the best time to undertake fundamental change across the
    Army, but we think it is just the opposite. It is an
    opportunity that we can't pass up. We've looked at our
    commitments and have highlighted the stressors on our forces,
    and we've embarked on a series of near-term initiatives to do
    three things: first, to reduce the stressors on the force;
    second, to improve our capabilities; and third, as I mentioned,
    to transform into a more versatile, agile joint and
    expeditionary force in this decade. We intend to do that while
    remaining focused on our long-term goal of a strategically
    responsive, networked-capabilities-based, precision-maneuver
    force that is dominant across the spectrum of combat. What
    we're doing now, we intend to set us up for the future force
    that we've already talked to you about in the past.
        Now, let me just talk for a moment on some of our near-term
    initiatives. First of all, we're balancing the capabilities
    between our Active and Reserve Forces. We will remove about
    100,000 forces. Second, we're reorganizing our combat
    formations, Mr. Chairman, into modular brigade-based formations
    to make them more self-sufficient and to facilitate force
    packaging. We intend to increase the number of active brigades
    from 33 to 43 by fiscal year 2007, and to convert our 34
    National Guard brigades to modular formations. This process has
    already begun down at Fort Stewart, Georgia, with the 3rd
    Infantry Division (ID). To do this, the President and Secretary
    of Defense have approved our request to grow the Army by 30,000
    beyond its statutory end strength, under the authority of title
    10, section 123(a). We ask for your support in doing this.
    Third, we're initiating a force-stabilization program that will
    increase unit readiness, reduce personnel turbulence, and make
    life more predictable for our soldiers, units, and families.
    Under this program, units will form, train, and stay together
    for about 3 years, enhancing unit cohesion and, thereby, unit
    effectiveness. Soldiers will be assigned to installations for 6
    to 7 years, instead of the normal three that we see now. This
    will improve their predictability and allow them to grow some
    roots in the community. So rebalancing, modularization, and
    force stabilization will yield an Army that has the right
    capability to respond rapidly and decisively to future
    challenges in this decade, while facilitating our transition to
    a future force embodied in the FCS.
        We continue to work hard to balance the current and the
    future that you talked about, Senator Lieberman. Our short-term
    modernization efforts continue and are bearing fruit, as
    evidenced by the recent fielding and deployment to Iraq of our
    Stryker brigade, which went from concept on paper to combat in
    about 4 years, which is a great testament to your all's support
    over here. We have also, as Secretary Bolton mentioned, made
    significant improvements in our acquisition and fielding
    processes to get the best equipment possible in the hands of
    our soldiers as quickly as possible.
        We'll continue to tackle the tough choices, such as
    cancelling the Comanche program, again, that Senator Lieberman
    mentioned. I would say that we need your support to use those
    Comanche resources to fix Army aviation.
        The fiscal year 2005 budget request will enable us to
    provide the combatant commanders with the requisite land-power
    capabilities to prosecute the global war on terror, to
    facilitate homeland defense, and to meet our other worldwide
    commitments. It covers our transformation program, base
    operations, and 15 critical recapitalization systems. It does
    not address the ongoing missions in Iraq and Afghanistan nor
    the recovery from those missions.
        Your support of this budget and the war-related costs of
    our ongoing operations is critical if our units are to continue
    their remarkable performance and be ready for future
    contingencies.
        Thank you very much for your time. I look forward to taking
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Casey follows:]

              Prepared Statement by GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Chairman Sessions, Senator Lieberman, members of the subcommittee--
    I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Army's
    transformation and our plans to meet current worldwide commitments,
    while we simultaneously transform to a more flexible, capable, joint
    and expeditionary force.
        I thank the members of the committee for their continued
    outstanding support to the men and women in uniform who make up our
    great Army. Your concern, resolute action, and deep commitment to
    America's sons and daughters are widely recognized throughout the ranks
    of our Service.
        We are also grateful for your continued support of the Army's
    transformation. The goals of Army transformation are to provide
    relevant and ready future forces that are organized, trained, and
    equipped for full spectrum joint, interagency, and multi-national
    operations. Our future force is the operational force the Army
    continuously seeks to become--a strategically responsive, networked,
    capabilities-based, precision, maneuver force that is dominant across
    the range of military operations envisioned for the future global
    security environment.

                                CURRENT POSTURE

        With over 320,000 soldiers deployed in 120 countries worldwide, the
    Army remains actively engaged in support of the Nation's operational
    requirements. Approximately 165,000 of our soldiers are overseas on 12-
    month, unaccompanied tours, and the vast majority of these troops are
    engaged in combat operations in the U.S. Central Command Area of
    Operations. Currently, the equivalent of eight Army divisions is either
    deploying to or redeploying from our overseas missions, including
    Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in Southwest Asia, the
    Stabilization Force and Kosovo Force in the Balkans, and the
    Multinational Force and Observers mission in the Sinai. This
    constitutes the largest movement of U.S. forces since World War II.
    Couple that with the mobilization of more than 150,000 combat-ready
    National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers, and you can see that this is
    an unprecedented moment in the Army's history.
        The Army is the dominant land campaign force for our combatant
    commanders. Our centerpiece is the American soldier. Today, these great
    soldiers are performing extraordinarily well in tough combat and
    stability operations around the world. They understand their missions
    and willingly undertake their roles with pride and determination. They
    make a difference every day.

                              THE ONE ARMY CONCEPT

        Side by side, the active component, Army National Guard and Army
    Reserve have proven that they are a combat-capable and ready team. Our
    Reserve components have shared a substantial portion of the Army's
    mission since September 11, 2001. Our successes would not have been
    possible without our Reserve component soldiers.
        Currently, we are in the process of deploying three more enhanced
    Separate Brigades: the 39th Infantry Brigade from the Arkansas National
    Guard with the 1st Cavalry Division; the 30th Infantry Brigade from the
    North Carolina National Guard with the 1st Infantry Division; and the
    81st Infantry Brigade from the Washington National Guard to Coalition
    Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), and large numbers of combat support and
    combat service support soldiers from across the country. These units
    are well-equipped, well-trained, and well-prepared for their missions.

                          THE ARMY'S CORE COMPETENCIES

        As the Army fights the global war on terrorism and remains
    committed to transforming, we are focused on two core competencies: (1)
    training and equipping soldiers and growing leaders; and (2) providing
    relevant and ready land power to combatant commanders as part of the
    Joint Team. It is clear that the Army must be an agile and capable
    force with a joint and expeditionary mindset. We must be versatile,
    strategically deployable, and prepared for decisive operations whenever
    and wherever required. We must be lethal and fully interoperable with
    other components and our allies, as well as flexible, informed,
    proactive, responsive, and totally integrated into the joint,
    interagency, and multi-national context. Our management and support
    processes must reflect and support these same characteristics.

       MITIGATING STRATEGIC RISK THROUGH INCREASED LAND-POWER CAPABILITY

        Our Nation and Army are at war. Our extensive commitments have
    highlighted stresses to our forces. To mitigate risk, our Army has
    embarked on a series of initiatives. I would like to address several of
    these initiatives today, because it is important to understand how the
    Army is transforming itself as we provide trained and ready forces to
    combatant commanders.
        First, we are rebalancing capabilities between our active and
    Reserve component forces to improve our strategic flexibility. Second,
    we are reorganizing our combat formations into modular, brigade-based
    formations to make them more self-sufficient and to facilitate force
    packaging. Third, we are initiating a force stabilization program to
    increase unit readiness, reduce personnel turbulence, and make life
    more predictable for our soldiers, units, and families.
        These efforts will yield an Army that has the right capabilities to
    respond rapidly and decisively to future challenges.

                              REBALANCING OUR ARMY

        Being an Army at war provides focus and insights as we rebalance to
    meet the challenges of the emerging operational environment. We
    recognize that we must provide our Nation with full-spectrum, ground
    combat and support capabilities that can defeat adaptive enemies
    anywhere in the world.
        Our challenge is not necessarily that we have too few soldiers.
    Instead, it stems from the fact that our formations, designed for the
    Cold War, must now meet the requirements of the global war on terrorism
    and other operations, which will persist for years to come. To meet the
    challenges of the future, we are rebalancing more than 100,000 spaces
    in our active and Reserve components--converting them to relieve the
    burden on the low density/high demand units, e.g., military police.
        We accelerated this process after September 11, 2001, to alleviate
    the stress placed on our most-needed units. In compliance with
    Secretary of Defense's guidance to minimize involuntary mobilizations
    within the first 30 days of a contingency, we made further progress in
    2003. We expect Army rebalancing measures to continue with the same
    momentum in 2005 and beyond. Our National Guard and Army Reserve have
    been, and will continue to be, integral to the planning and
    decisionmaking process for this effort.

                                   MODULARITY

        In addition to rebalancing our forces, we are creating a brigade-
    based, modular Army to enhance responsiveness and to increase our joint
    and expeditionary capabilities. Webster's defines modularity as
    ``composed of standardized units for easy construction or flexible
    arrangements.'' Although this may seem to be an oversimplification of
    what the Army is doing, it is precisely our concept.
        The basic maneuver element in the modular Army will be the unit of
    action, similar to today's brigade. Units of action will be flexible,
    self-contained, and capable across the entire operational spectrum.
        The Army intends to increase the number of active component
    brigades from 33 to 43 by fiscal year 2007; at that time, we will
    decide whether to continue the process to achieve 48 brigades. During
    the same time period, Army National Guard brigades will reorganize into
    34 brigade-size units using the same modular design as the active
    component.
        The Chief of Staff has approved the initial modular design of the
    3rd Infantry Division and its transformation is under way. Following
    rigorous training, to include rotations through our combat training
    centers at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and Fort Irwin, California; the
    division will be reset for potential deployment anywhere in the world
    as early as the first quarter of fiscal year 2005.

                              FORCE STABILIZATION

        The challenges associated with current operational requirements
    place significant stress on our existing force structure, both active
    and Reserve. The approval of a temporary end strength increase affords
    us the opportunity to implement permanent initiatives aimed at
    mitigating that stress to the force.
        The force stabilization initiative consists of two complementary
    policies: unit-focused stability and home basing. Under home basing,
    soldiers will remain at their initial installation for 6 to 7 years--
    well beyond the current 3-year average. Unit-focused stability will
    allow soldiers to arrive, train, and serve together for roughly 36
    months, enhancing unit cohesion, training effectiveness and readiness.
    During the unit's operational cycle, soldiers can expect to complete an
    operational deployment rotation of 6 to 12 months. Overall, with force
    stabilization, units will have more reliable training and deployment
    schedules, and soldiers and families will get a greater sense of
    predictability.

                              FUTURE CAPABILITIES

        Our modernization efforts continue and are bearing fruit, as
    evidenced by the recent fielding and deployment to Iraq of our first
    SBCT. Our second SBCT will become operational this spring, and the
    third in 2005. Three more SBCTs will be fielded through 2008.
        Further, we constantly seek to achieve the right balance between
    the current and the future force, even when that entails making tough
    choices, such as canceling the Comanche program. Though it was a
    difficult decision, we believe it was unquestionably the right one. By
    reallocating funds originally intended for Comanche the Army can buy
    almost 800 new aircraft, upgrade or modernize an additional 1,400
    aircraft--modernization for almost 70 percent of our fleet--and outfit
    our aircraft with the survivability equipment they need. In fiscal year
    2005 alone, the Army will convert 19 Apaches to the Longbow
    configuration, upgrade 5 Black Hawks to the UH-60M configuration,
    purchase 27 new UH-60Ls; buy 4 new CH-47Fs; convert 16 existing CH-47s
    into F and G models; and procure 160 new, higher-power CH-47 engines.
    In addition, our Army will start a Lightweight Utility Helicopter
    program, under which we will acquire 10 new, off-the-shelf aircraft in
    fiscal year 2005. We need your support to use the Comanche resources to
    fix Army aviation.
        Additionally, the Army plans to field a number of systems this
    decade that will provide a foundation for the transformation of our
    current force capabilities into those needed by our future force. Once
    fielded, these systems will perform as an interdependent system of
    systems that will significantly enhance joint warfighting capabilities.
    The following are some of the key transformational systems that our
    Army will begin to field during the next 6 years.

                                  THE NETWORK

        The situational dominance of our future force will depend upon a
    comprehensive, ever-present, and joint-interoperable C\4\ISR
    architecture that will enable the Joint Force Commander to conduct
    fully interdependent and network-centric warfare. This network will
    provide the backbone of our future force and the future Joint Force,
    enabling the maneuver commander to effectively coordinate battlefield
    effects. Some of the more important systems within the network include
    the following:

             Warfighter Information Network-Tactical. WIN-T will be
            the communications network of our future force, optimized for
            offensive and joint operations, while providing the combatant
            commander the capability to perform multiple missions
            simultaneously.
             Joint Tactical Radio System. JTRS is a family of
            common, software-defined programmable radios that will become
            our Army's primary tactical radio for mobile communications.
             Distributed Common Ground System-Army. DCGS-A is a
            single, integrated, ground-based, ISR processing systems
            composed of joint, common hardware, and software components. It
            is part of the Department of Defense DCGS family of systems.
             Aerial Common Sensor. This ISR system and platform
            will use robust sensor-to-shooter and reach links (such as
            DCGS-A ground stations) to provide commanders at every echelon
            the tailored, multi-sensor intelligence required for joint
            operations.

                             FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

        The core of our future force's maneuver unit of action is FCS,
    comprised of 18 manned and unmanned platforms that are centered around
    the soldier and integrated within a C\4\ISR network. FCS will provide
    our soldiers greatly enhanced situational awareness, enabling them to
    see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively. Our FCS
    platforms will offer the Joint Force networked, lethal direct fire;
    indirect fire; air defense; complementary non-lethal fires and effects;
    and troop transport capability. In May 2003, FCS moved on schedule into
    the systems development and demonstration phase. Our Army is
    aggressively managing our FCS development effort and intends to achieve
    initial operational capability by the end of the decade. FCS is
    essential to the Army transformation.
        The recent termination of the RAH-66 Comanche program was a
    strategic decision to fix Army aviation now and improve our future
    capabilities, leveraging both the technology base and the knowledge we
    gained from the Comanche program. We will use the savings from the
    Comanche program to modernize aircraft and extend aviation capabilities
    beyond the 2020 timeframe, acquire almost 800 new aircraft (through
    2011) to build modular active and Reserve component aviation
    formations, and transform U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard
    aviation by replacing over 850 aging aircraft and standardizing active
    and Reserve component aviation systems. As importantly, we will also
    accelerate aircrew protection and aircraft survivability equipment
    fielding initiatives necessary for both ongoing and future operations.

                      ACCELERATED ACQUISITION AND FIELDING

        We have adapted and continue to improve our acquisition and
    fielding processes. In 2002, as soldiers reported equipment shortages
    in Afghanistan and elsewhere, we implemented the RFI to ensure that all
    of our troops deploy with the latest available equipment. Equipment
    fielding schedules were revised to support unit rotation plans, and
    procurement and fielding cycles were radically compressed.
        In coordination with field commanders and our soldiers, a list of
    more than 40 mission-essential items, including the Advanced Combat
    Helmet, close-combat optics, Global Positioning System receivers,
    soldier intercoms and hydration systems, were identified for rapid
    fielding. Laying the foundation for acquisition transformation, RFI
    already has equipped nine brigade combat teams (BCTs). In fiscal year
    2004, RFI will upgrade a minimum of 18 BCTs and 8 enhanced separate
    brigades serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, we are
    accelerating fielding of select future capabilities to our current
    force. These items include thermal weapon sights, enhanced night vision
    goggles, improved body armor, the Future Combat Rifle, and a new sniper
    rifle. It is the strong support of Congress that enables our Army to
    put this improved equipment in the hands of our soldiers.
        Support from Congress has also enabled our Army to institute a
    Rapid Equipping Force (REF) to work directly with operational
    commanders and find solutions to operational requirements. These
    solutions may be off-the-shelf or near-term developmental items that
    can be made available quickly. For example, the REF established a
    coordinated effort to supply our forces with immediate solutions to
    counter improvised explosive device (IED) threats. Currently, IED teams
    are on location providing expertise and materiel solutions to safeguard
    our soldiers. We are acting aggressively to improve the armor
    protection of our armored and light-skinned vehicles. Other examples of
    REF products are the Well-Cam and PackBots. The Well-Cam is a camera,
    attached to an ethernet cable and a laptop that enables soldiers in
    theater to search wells for weapons caches. PackBots are operational
    robots used to clear caves, building, and compounds so soldiers are not
    put in harm's way unnecessarily.
        RFI and REF provide timely support to our relevant and ready forces
    and to combatant commanders, and facilitate Army transformation.

                                  THE SOLDIER

        The soldier remains the centerpiece of our combat systems and
    formations and is indispensable to the Joint Team. Adaptive, confident,
    and competent soldiers, infused with the Army's values and warrior
    culture, fight wars and win the peace. As a warrior, every soldiers
    must be prepared to engage the enemy in close combat; the modern
    battlefield has no safe areas. Our Army trains our soldiers to that
    standard, without regard to their specialty or unit. Our soldiers are
    bright, honest, dedicated, and totally committed to the mission. The
    soldier--fierce, disciplined, well-trained, well-led, and well-
    equipped--ultimately represents and enables the capabilities our Army
    provides to the Joint Force and the Nation.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Our Army's commitment to the future is certain. We will continue to
    provide our Nation, the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the
    combatant commanders a unique set of core competencies and
    capabilities. We remain dedicated to training and equipping our
    soldiers and growing leaders. We will continue to deliver relevant and
    ready land power to the combatant commanders and the Joint Force.
        Our soldiers continue to perform magnificently around the globe.
    Simultaneously executing the global war on terrorism, implementing our
    modularity and transformation initiatives, and setting the force will
    be a challenge. However, it is also an opportunity to reshape ourselves
    for the future that we cannot pass up.
        Your support of this budget and for our ongoing operations,
    specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan, is critical if our units are to
    continue their remarkable performance and to be ready for future
    contingencies.
        We appreciate your dedication to your military and to America's
    sons and daughters, who are serving selflessly throughout the world to
    make America safe and free. Thank you again for the opportunity to
    discuss our Army and I look forward to answering any questions you may
    have.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, General Casey.
        Major General John M. Curran is Director of Futures Center,
    Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and has
    spent some time in Alabama, for which we're grateful. We
    appreciate your leadership, and we're delighted to hear from
    you at this time.

    STATEMENT OF MG JOHN M. CURRAN, USA, DIRECTOR, FUTURES CENTER,
     HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)

        General Curran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lieberman,
    Senator Dole. I'm pleased to be here to discuss how we are
    accelerating change in the Army and the impacts of our actions
    on current and future forces.
        As Director of the Futures Center at the TRADOC, I welcome
    the opportunity to testify before you and appreciate your
    interest in our endeavors.
        I respectfully request that my written statement also be
    made part of the record here today.
        Senator Sessions. We'll certainly do that.
        General Curran. Sir, the role of the organization I lead is
    to be the Army's architect of the future. Our soldiers, both
    today and in the future, depend on us to develop a more agile,
    mobile, lethal, and survivable force. We, in the Futures
    Center, are leading the effort to build a campaign-capable
    joint and expeditionary Army. The Army is accelerating changes
    to the current force to adapt to the existing and emerging
    operational environment. Simply stated, we are meeting the
    challenges of transforming an Army that is at war.
        As the architect of the future, TRADOC's Futures Center is
    the nexus of Army innovation, with a great degree of influence
    on how the Army thinks, acts, trains, and fights. While
    relatively new, the Futures Center is the lead action agent to
    develop the future force. We enable soldiers in the current
    fight by determining capability gaps and, whenever feasible,
    integrating discrete future-force capabilities that add
    significantly to the current force. Many picture these spirals
    as materiel solutions, but our efforts span the breadth of
    doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and
    education, personnel, and facilities.
        Now, we recognize that we cannot do this alone. Futures is,
    in fact, a team sport. Partnering with the Department of
    Defense (DOD), joint and interagency communities, other
    Services, industry, academia, our allies, and with our Army
    family, is critical to our success. Chief among our partners is
    U.S. Joint Forces Command, with whom we have built a rapport
    and trust that underpins really a great team, a joint team.
        To fully realize the contribution of Army capabilities to
    the joint fight, we now work through the Joint Capabilities
    Integration and Development System (JCIDS), to articulate Army
    capability requirements instead of just focusing on systems.
    The Army's future force will evolve to meet joint, rather that
    Service-defined, capabilities.
        Now, this represents a sharp break from the bottom-up,
    systems-focused approach we used during much of the Cold War.
    Army transformation is a continuous process. The goal is to
    spiral future force capabilities into the current force so that
    over time our Army continues to meet the requirements of the
    emerging joint operational environment.
        One of the most obvious dimensions of change will be in how
    we organize to fight. Lessons learned from current operations
    highlight areas for force-design improvement. Future force
    organizations will be organized differently than today's
    formations. We will continue on our Stryker brigade path and
    reorganize our non-Stryker force into a modular brigade-based
    Army that provides combatant commanders with better
    alternatives in the near term and bridges to the FCS's equipped
    force designs.
        As you probably know, the 3rd ID will roll out the first
    provisional heavy unit of action this month, as a standing
    combined-arms brigade. The division will take this redesign to
    the National Training Center this spring to mature the
    organizational design and refine its tactics, techniques, and
    procedures. Army National Guard brigades will also convert to
    this common modular design. Both current experience and
    emerging operational imperatives confirm our judgement that the
    FCS-equipped unit of action is the organizational template
    capable of meeting the regional combatant commanders'
    requirements of the future. By accelerating the transformation
    of the current force towards a force with many of the
    characteristics of the FCS-equipped future force, we will
    accelerate our transformation in areas such as doctrine,
    training, and leader development.
        FCS-equipped formations will be part of a joint team, a
    joint team that is decisive across the full spectrum of
    conflict in all types of operations, against all threat
    capabilities, and in all terrain and weather environments.
    These formations, enabled with improved situational
    understanding, will balance the need for strategic
    responsiveness and battle-space dominance, resulting in a
    campaign-capable joint and expeditionary force.
        The human dimension is, and will remain, the most critical
    dimension of war. The soldier is indispensable to the joint
    team, the most effective, flexible, and adaptive asset we have.
    When we enhance the soldiers' lethality, protection, and
    situational awareness, we enable individual initiative and
    competence to win battles, wars, and the peace. The Army's
    transformation supports our soldiers today and will provide our
    Nation with a more capable future force for an uncertain
    future.
        We are engaged in the biggest challenge an Army can face,
    transforming while at war. Our guideposts are clear: experiment
    extensively with our joint-Service counterparts, never be
    content with only materiel solutions, aggressively use spiral
    development to get elements of the future force into the hands
    of our soldiers on today's battlefields, and ensure our
    innovation results in ``born joint'' capabilities that
    contribute to successful mission accomplishment at any point on
    the globe across the spectrum of conflict.
        We will need the full support of Congress to underpin our
    success, and I thank you, on behalf of our soldiers, for the
    support we receive.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Major General Curran follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by MG John M. Curran, USA

        Senator Sessions, Senator Lieberman, and distinguished members of
    the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss how we are
    accelerating change in the Army and the impact of our actions on
    current and future forces. As Director, Futures Center, U.S. Army
    Training and Doctrine Command, I welcome the opportunity to testify
    before you. I appreciate your interest in our endeavors. My intent is
    to assure you that our efforts support our soldiers today and will
    provide the Nation with a more capable force for an uncertain future.
        Much has changed since this subcommittee met a year ago tomorrow to
    hear testimony from the Army's leadership. One year ago, we were on the
    brink of war with Iraq. The hearing centered on the challenges the Army
    faced for modernization, recapitalization and the lessons learned from
    the war in Afghanistan. Since the defeat of the Iraqi Army, the U.S.
    Army achieved Milestone B for the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program,
    fielded and deployed a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), maintained a
    strong presence to fight the insurgency in Iraq, deployed almost every
    available combat formation, institutionalized transformation by
    establishing the Futures Center, and positioned the Army for continued
    transformation into a modular force.
        The role of the organization I lead is to be the Army's architect
    of the future. We take our business very seriously. Our soldiers, both
    today and in the future, depend on us to develop a more agile, mobile,
    lethal, and survivable force. We are leading the effort to build a
    campaign capable, joint, and expeditionary Army. The Army is
    accelerating changes to the current force to adapt to the existing and
    emerging operational environments. Simply stated, we must transform an
    Army that is at war.
        TRADOC is the primary point of entry into the Army's future force
    development. Among TRADOC's core competencies are the ability to
    prepare the Army for joint operations and serve as the architect of the
    future. We develop or capture innovative ideas and carry them through
    experimentation and fielding to expand the Army's capabilities. Chief
    among our partners is the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), with whom
    we have built a rapport and trust that underpins a great team. The
    Army's future force will evolve to meet joint rather than Service
    defined capabilities.
        As the architect of the future, TRADOC's Futures Center is the
    Army's reconnaissance force. We are continually assessing the future,
    and this assessment is driven by real-time guidance and direction from
    policy documents like the National Security Strategy and the
    Transformation Planning Guidance. The Futures Center is the nexus of
    Army innovation with a great degree of influence on how the Army
    thinks, acts, trains and fights. While relatively new, the Futures
    Center is the lead action agent to develop the future force. We have
    subsumed the mission and roles of the Objective Force Task Force, and
    we are building on the foundation of their success. We are also
    enabling soldiers in the current fight by determining capabilities gaps
    and integrating discreet future force capabilities that add
    significantly to the current force. Too often, we picture these spirals
    as materiel solutions, but our efforts span the breadth of doctrine,
    organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel
    and facilities. This is a very challenging mission, but we are uniquely
    postured to do the job.
        At the same time, we fully recognize that we cannot do this alone--
    ``Futures'' is a team sport. Partnering with the Department of Defense,
    Joint and Interagency communities, other Services, industry, academia,
    our Allies and the Army family is critical to our success.
        To fully realize the contribution of Army capabilities to the joint
    fight, we now work through the Joint Capabilities Integration and
    Development System (JCIDS) to articulate Army capability requirements.
    JCIDS is the top-down process involving functionally-focused teams
    centered on developing required capabilities and effects rather than
    systems. The process involves regional and functional combatant
    commanders early on in the development process to ensure their
    requirements for combat and combat support forces are being realized.
    It represents a sharp break from the bottom-up, systems-focused
    approach used during much of the Cold War.
        TRADOC executes the JCIDS process by analyzing Army warfighting
    concepts derived from strategic guidance, the Joint Operations Concept
    and subordinate joint operating, functional and integrating concepts.
    These concepts describe how the future force will operate, the
    conditions and environment in which it must operate, its required
    capabilities in terms of missions and effects, and its defining
    physical and operational characteristics. We analyze these required
    capabilities to isolate the tasks, conditions and standards that the
    force must perform. We assess these tasks to determine gaps in
    capability that pose sufficient operational risk to constitute a
    capability need requiring a solution.
        We then perform an operationally based assessment of potential
    doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel,
    and facilities (non-materiel) or materiel approaches to solving or
    mitigating one or more of the capability needs we've identified. Non-
    materiel changes, product improvements to existing materiel or
    facilities, joint or other Service's capabilities or adoption of
    interagency or international solutions that solve or mitigate the
    capability need are recommended to Army senior leadership. Only when
    these solutions do not solve the capability need will TRADOC recommend
    a new materiel start and continue the JCIDS process into the Defense
    Acquisition System.
        The Army as a Service and a joint partner is an integral
    participant on committees and boards that manage the JCIDS process.
    More importantly, we see these groups as critical entry points in the
    process where Army programs are validated as we attempt to spiral
    improvements into the current and future force. As we interact with the
    joint community and our sister Services, our focus is to bring issues,
    potential programs and concepts to the Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council (JROC) as soon as possible to determine how they provide new
    warfighting capability. The scope of analysis of shortfalls does not
    simply look at the materiel side of the equation--the hardware of
    weapon systems. This is ``old think,'' a past practice that no longer
    works within JCIDS.
        We look at all Services' doctrine, organization, training,
    materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF)
    alternatives for solutions. Further, the JCIDS process provides the
    analytical foundation that allows members to understand the realities
    for advancing a new program or deciding to change some other element of
    the DOTMLPF equation to address the shortfall. We are
    institutionalizing the new JCIDS process into Army thinking--it is no
    longer a bureaucratic hurdle, it is the way that partners engage in
    bringing value to the whole team.
        To accelerate change and rapidly integrate future force
    capabilities into the current force, TRADOC leads the Army's concept
    development and experimentation effort; focused on four areas:

            --  Developing coherently joint Army operational concepts and
            capabilities,
            --  Testing prototype capabilities,
            --  Providing actionable recommendations to inform DOTMLPF
            decisions, and
            --  Integrating a broad community of practice.

        Transformation has no endstate--it is a continual process. We will
    have intermediate objectives along the transformation path, but we will
    not reach a point where we declare that we have in fact fielded the
    future force. The goal is to continually strive to spiral mature
    capabilities into the current force so that over time our Army more
    closely resembles the vision of the future force. We aggressively use
    live, virtual and constructive experimentation. Out of these
    experiments, we derive actionable recommendations to reduce future
    force development risk. Aggressive prototyping and testing satisfies
    current and future force operational needs by deploying compelling
    technology today.
        The Army is currently exploring five prototype areas:

            --  SBCT--a focus on further SBCT and unit of action (UA)
            development.
            --  Air Assault Expeditionary Force--a focus on networked
            lethality at the small unit level.
            --  Unit of Employment--a focus on incrementally fielded unit
            of employment (echelon above brigade) capabilities and
            integration with emerging USJFCOM prototypes like the Standing
            Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ).
            --  Modular Force Redesign--a focus on unit organizations to
            increase agility and effectiveness.
            --  Squad Redesign--a focus on squad organizations to increase
            lethality and maneuverability

        Institutionally, we have adapted our structures to build a broad
    community of practice with a series of fora that harness the widest
    range of intellectual capital. In 2003, for the first time the Army and
    JFCOM entered into a partnership and co-sponsored Unified Quest (UQ03),
    the Army's premiere transformational wargame. This joint wargame
    explored not only Army concepts, but joint and inter-Service concepts
    in a future force whose capabilities must be ``born joint''. This leap
    in transforming our military through application of spiral concept
    development also creates an environment where both JFCOM and TRADOC can
    examine several unique embedded experiments that are specific to each
    organization. Following in the footsteps of UQ03, this year's wargame,
    UQ04, will set a new precedent-breaking path by extending the exercise
    play from that of UQ03. Game organizations will examine scenarios that
    involve major combat operations, stability operations, transition to
    post-conflict and network-centric command structure in the year 2015.
        We are also engaged with our sister Services in their wargames like
    the Navy's Unified Course 04, the Air Force's Unified Engagement VII,
    and the Marine Corps' Joint Urban Warrior. We complement this work with
    insights gained from our Army battle labs, which span the range of
    capabilities from air and missile defense to special operations. Forces
    that participate in developmental and readiness exercises augment our
    judgments by providing field perspectives as they go through after
    action reviews once the exercises are complete.
        Going beyond wargaming, the Army and other Services are beginning
    to enhance joint interdependence through enhanced joint training
    exercises. JFCOM's Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) exercise
    trains America's Joint Force. The JNTC links Service training
    facilities and ranges into a real-time, joint training environment
    around the world effectively bridging communications to apply the full
    range of multi-level joint capabilities into joint exercises. These
    exercises bring to bear the mutual supporting relationships of the
    Services and allow exploration of the seams and gaps existing today in
    operational settings.
        This wealth of knowledge gained through all of the examples I've
    discussed has challenged us to make adjustments to ensure we capitalize
    on what we learn. We have quarterly executive level reviews to examine
    progress to date and make adjustments to the way ahead. We have monthly
    meetings at the joint level on broad concept development and
    experimentation issues which guide joint work at all levels. There is a
    constant exchange of information in face-to-face meetings at all levels
    that is robustly augmented by a high level of online collaboration.
    This continuous process of collaboration and interaction forms the
    architecture for transformation efforts.
        We work hard at analyzing the gaps between future capabilities
    called for by the Joint Operations Concept and efforts underway in our
    prototyping and concept development programs today. We incorporate an
    Intelligence Community evaluation of potential future enemies and
    future challenges. We constantly review operational lessons learned
    like the Army's and JFCOM's Operation Iraqi Freedom ``Quick Looks,''
    individual unit lessons learned, and combatant commander assessments.
    We support this work by a robust analytical process that assimilates
    innovative practices--including best commercial practices,
    collaborative environments, modeling, simulation, and electronic
    business solutions.
        We couple the analysis with Army-wide judgments to create a
    holistic snapshot of where we need change.
        Our snapshot of capabilities gaps for the current force is exactly
    what it implies--today's best judgment of shortfalls to guide our
    prototyping, experimentation, and concept development. The snapshot
    will change as our enemy adapts his operational methods to engage us in
    asymmetric ways and we gain experience in how to continue to achieve
    our mission in spite of those new tactics. We are looking at numerous
    areas including providing:

             Improved soldier protection in counterinsurgency
            environments
             Prototype network-enabled battle command
             Responsive, networked, precision fires
             Protecting the force in noncontiguous battlespace
            operations
             Improved nonlethal capabilities
             Improved Joint Urban Operations
             Expanded human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities
             Increased ability and speed of analysis and
            information dissemination
             Increased ability to sustain a high operational tempo
             Improved Special Operation Forces and conventional
            forces integration
             Improve joint intra- and inter-theater lift

        These examples of capabilities gaps inform both our concept
    development and prototyping efforts, which are simultaneous, parallel,
    and supporting. The plans we develop must be completely nested in what
    JFCOM is doing. This comprehensive task capitalizes on the broad Army
    community of practice from our battle labs, operational units, research
    labs, and materiel developers. The end product will resemble what those
    who coined the term ``Joint Interdependence'' envisioned--an
    understanding of the differing strengths and limitations of each
    Service's capabilities, clear agreement about how those capabilities
    will be committed in a given operational setting, and absolute trust
    that, once committed, they will be employed as agreed. The outcome is a
    Joint Force significantly stronger than the sum of its individual
    parts, one that will always be successful in fighting the Nation's wars
    when called upon.
        At the heart of the Army's vision of the future force are new
    operational concepts. These concepts are inherently joint, but will
    nonetheless have tremendous impact on every dimension of our Army. One
    of the most obvious dimensions of change will be in how we organize to
    fight. At the same time, our current operations illustrate many
    opportunities for force design improvements. Reorganizing our force now
    provides combatant commanders with better alternatives in the near
    term. Further, we believe that accelerating several changes envisioned
    for the future force into the current force, centered on modularized
    brigade combat teams, is the way ahead to maintain the high benchmark
    of success demanded of us, both in the near term and in the future.
        What led us to conclude that brigade, division, and corps
    structures, so successful for so many combat operations, must change?
    We've learned in the harsh combat conditions of Afghanistan and Iraq
    that change is both essential and possible for us to improve as a
    robust member of the U.S. joint warfighting team. There are now
    opportunities for a new level of joint interdependence that can weave
    major land, sea and air operations into a coherent joint fabric and
    push ``jointness'' down to the lowest possible tactical levels. To
    engage enemies that employ varying operational techniques, the regional
    combatant commanders require ground forces that are scalable, available
    early in a campaign and complementary to other joint capabilities. The
    elements of time, geography, and the disposition of our adversaries
    require operations that are nonlinear, noncontiguous and less
    hierarchical. We must employ improvements in weapons and techniques
    across all warfighting dimensions to make engagements more precise and
    lethal. These challenges, however, require more than just materiel
    solutions--we need new formations.
        The Army is deploying evolutionary organizations on the
    battlefields I've just described. We have a Stryker Combat Brigade Team
    deployed in Iraq providing daily insights into adjustments we can make
    in our future force redesign efforts. The 3rd Infantry Division (ID)
    will roll out the first provisional heavy UA this month as a standing
    combined arms brigade. The division will take this redesign to the
    National Training Center this spring to mature the organizational
    design and refine its tactics, techniques, and procedures. The 3rd ID
    will create three more heavy UAs by July 2004. The Army will begin
    building the first two Infantry UAs in the fall beginning with the 10th
    Mountain Division and the 101st Airborne Division. All active component
    divisions will tentatively complete conversion by fiscal year 2007.
    Army National Guard (ARNG) brigades will also convert to these common
    modular designs; the ARNG and Army staff are working on the sequence to
    do this as quickly as possible. This will enable the Army to rapidly
    tailor forces to meet the combatant commanders' requirements, and
    employ flexible, smaller formations distributed across an extended
    battlespace.
        Both our current experience and emerging operational imperatives
    confirm our judgment that the FCS-equipped UA is the organizational
    template capable of meeting the regional combatant commander's
    requirements of the future. By accelerating the transformation of the
    current force toward a force with many of the characteristics of the
    FCS-equipped future force, we will accelerate our transformation in
    areas such as doctrine, training, and leader development. Such a force
    will be agile, lethal, networked, precise, rapidly deployable, modular
    and born joint. The modular Army we are building today is the bridge to
    the FCS-equipped unit of action.
        FCSs are comprised of a family of advanced, networked air- and
    ground-based maneuver, maneuver support, and sustainment systems that
    will include manned and unmanned platforms. FCSs are networked via a
    command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance
    and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) architecture, including networked
    communications, network operations, sensors, battle command systems,
    training and both manned and unmanned reconnaissance and surveillance
    capabilities that will enable improved situational understanding and
    operations at a level of synchronization heretofore unachievable.
        FCSs will operate as a system of systems that will network existing
    systems, systems already under development, and new systems to be
    developed to meet the needs of the FCS-equipped UA. The network will
    enable improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR),
    enhanced analytical tools, joint exchange of blue and red force
    tracking down to the tactical level, battle command, real time sensor-
    shooter linkages, and increased synergy between echelons and within
    small units. It will also enable the UA to connect to unit of
    employment, joint capabilities, and national assets making these
    capabilities available to the small units of the UA. FCSs will enable
    the networked maneuver UA to develop the situation in and out of
    contact, set conditions, maneuver to positions of advantage, and to
    close with and destroy the enemy through standoff attack and combat
    assault as articulated in the UA operational and organizational plan.
        The FCS-equipped maneuver UA is not just a unique Brigade Combat
    Team, built around a family of systems, but a new concept for fighting
    those systems. This formation will be part of a joint team that is
    decisive across the spectrum of conflict, in all types of operations,
    against the complexity of threat capabilities, in a variety of terrain
    and weather environments. The UA balances the capabilities for
    strategic responsiveness and battlespace dominance, resulting in an
    expeditionary force with campaign qualities. It can perform tactical
    and operational maneuver by land, air, and sea. The UA can be tailored
    with additional capabilities for specific missions during a campaign.
    It employs its revolutionary C\4\ISR architecture to expand or contract
    its span of control and integrate unit of employment (the next higher
    Army echelon) or Joint Task Force supporting capabilities to accomplish
    missions. Its significantly improved ability to collect and process
    information using organic and external joint and Army supporting
    sensors and sources ensure that commanders will possess the timely,
    accurate intelligence necessary to achieve decision superiority. The UA
    improves the ability of soldiers and leaders to achieve lethality and
    survivability overmatch. Like our current forces, the foundational
    centerpiece of the formation remains soldiers and leaders, enabled by
    technology, within mounted and dismounted small unit fighting teams.
        As the Army's ``Architect of the Future,'' the Futures Center will
    continue to provide a warfighter perspective to the integration of
    DOTMLPF actions to enable the Army to achieve FCS-equipped future force
    capabilities by the end of this decade. We collaborate with the FCS
    Program Manager (PM) and the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) to ensure
    simultaneous and parallel future force, UA, and FCS developments are
    properly synchronized and integrated to meet the user's requirements.
        The FCS program requires a continuous and consistent refinement of
    requirements. The JROC approved the FCS Operational Requirements
    Document in April 2003. At that time, the JROC approved seven Key
    Performance Parameters (KPPs), which were then included in the
    Acquisition Program Baseline: Joint Interoperability (which we will
    convert to the new Net Ready KPP standards), Networked Battle Command,
    Networked Lethality, Transportability, Sustainability/Reliability,
    Training, and Survivability. We are currently completing our analysis
    of these KPPs to add and refine metrics; the refined KPPs will go back
    to the JROC by September 2004 to support a Milestone B review with the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in November this year.
        Since entry into System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase,
    TRADOC has worked collaboratively in a ``One Team'' structure with PM
    FCS and the LSI to develop and refine the program threshold and
    objective system of systems specifications, which represent the
    requirements baseline for the program. We are currently working with
    our partners to complete design trade studies, which will support
    selected design decisions this spring.
        This effort demands an unprecedented level of sustained TRADOC
    involvement by its best experts at the Futures Center and the Army's
    institutional schoolhouses. TRADOC is committed to providing user
    support to the program that is characterized by innovation, forwarding
    thinking, collaboration, cooperation, and team play. This support is
    distributed across the command, but integrated using the Unit of Action
    Maneuver Battle Lab (UAMBL), the TRADOC System Manager (TSM) for FCS,
    and the Futures Center. We are also assigning TRADOC user personnel to
    collocate with PM FCS and some LSI and subcontractor facilities
    involved in FCS developments to ensure rapid user feedback on design
    issues as they arise during SDD. TRADOC is also committed to supporting
    the One Team in the day-to-day management of SDD. TRADOC has designated
    subject matter experts from throughout the command to serve on each of
    fourteen Integrated Product Teams (IPT). TRADOC also provides colonels
    and general officers to serve on program change control boards, giving
    us real time visibility and participation in resolving issues affecting
    cost, schedule, and performance. The Futures Center and UAMBL are
    partners with the PM and LSI in major program reviews; we also support
    the OSD IPTs which prepare the Army for OSD-level reviews. We fully
    support our program partners in focusing FCS development at the system
    of systems level, with front-end prioritization of architectures,
    engineering, and integration. We believe this revolutionary acquisition
    process is key to achieving future force capabilities.
        TRADOC has networked its battle labs to conduct extensive
    experimentation during the SDD phase to provide real time user feedback
    to the FCS program as the family of systems are designed and developed.
    The Futures Center is strengthening its collaboration with Joint Forces
    Command to ensure joint integration. It is also strengthening TRADOC's
    links to the Marine Corps Combat Developments Center to ensure that
    Army and Marine Corps FCS common requirements are synchronized when the
    FCS program transitions to become a Joint Program Office.
        While experimentation, analysis, studies, and technology inform us
    about what the future force will use to fight the next war effectively,
    it is the individual soldier who is the centerpiece of our focus. War
    is a test of wills; the human dimension is its most crucial dimension.
    The soldier is indispensable to the joint team--the most effective,
    flexible, and adaptive asset we have. Our philosophy of equipping the
    soldier instead of manning the equipment is enduring. When we enhance
    the soldier's lethality, protection and situational awareness, we
    enable individual initiative and competence at the point in which
    battles, wars, and the peace are won.
        In summary, we're taking on the biggest challenge an Army can face:
    transforming while at war. We must rapidly adapt to a future we did not
    perfectly anticipate and we must do this with forces deployed globally.
    Our guideposts are clear--experiment widely with our joint and Service
    counterparts, never be content with only materiel solutions,
    aggressively use spiral development to get elements of the future force
    into the hands of the soldier on today's battlefields and ensure our
    innovation results in ``born joint'' capabilities that contribute to
    successful mission accomplishment at any point on the globe across the
    spectrum of conflict. The window of opportunity to do this is finite;
    we must not tire in our efforts. We will need the full support of
    Congress to underpin our success. The Army's transformation supports
    our soldiers today and will provide our Nation with a more capable
    future force for an uncertain future.
        Thank you.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you very much. Those were good
    statements. We appreciate them very much.
        Secretary Bolton, on the basic question of what you need,
    you've indicated, in your statement--which I appreciate very
    much, it is a thorough analysis of where we are and where we
    need to go. You might summarize for us what are some of the
    items that will be in this new force, like the unmanned aerial
    vehicles (UAVs) and things of that nature. How are we coming
    along with those? Are we falling behind as a result of a
    shortfall in resources? What would it take to keep us on track?
        Mr. Bolton. Let me answer the last question first. We're
    not falling behind. We went through a major milestone review
    last May, the 14th of May, right on time.
        Let me just give you an idea how important that is. The
    process or the system--and I'll describe that here shortly--is
    the most complex undertaking, in terms of the program, the DOD
    has ever done. This rivals what we did in the 1960s as a
    country for the space program. It rivals what we did in the
    1940s with the Manhattan Project.
        We have a system of systems called the FCS. This system of
    systems has in it unmanned vehicles, so it can relieve the
    pressure on the soldier by offloading things that we would
    normally put on his back, and put that onto a mobile robot.
    That robot can also have arms on it, so we can fire mortars and
    so forth. It will have a cannon, non-line-of-sight (NLOS)
    cannon. It will have airborne assets, unmanned. It will have,
    most importantly, something that we are just now seeing in the
    Stryker brigades that we saw with the 3rd ID; we called it Blue
    Force Tracking, the ability to network all of these sensors,
    all of these vehicles together, so that the soldier, for the
    first time, has the ability to know where the enemy is, to see
    what that enemy is doing, to act against that enemy, and to
    defeat that enemy.
        Why is this necessary? The combatant commanders, formerly
    the commanders in chief, have a basic requirement of the land
    force, the Army, and that's to be able to move a brigade-worth
    of combat capability anywhere in the world in 96 hours; a
    division, anywhere in the world in 120 hours; and then half, or
    five of our active divisions, in 30 days.
        Now, I've told folks, we don't have to do this FCS; we can
    meet those requirements of the combatant commanders today. But
    here's some provisos. First, you need to tell me where we're
    going to be fighting 5 years from today. Two----
        Senator Sessions. We'll have to ask Senator Lieberman
    precisely where that will be. I'm not capable. [Laughter.]
        Senator Lieberman. Can you give me a few moments?
    [Laughter.]
        Mr. Bolton. Second, I need to preposition. Third, I need
    all of the airlift and all of the sealift. Then I might be able
    to hit those prerequisites of the combatant commanders. The
    truth is, that's not going to happen. So we're going to have to
    get lighter, which is what the FCS is. Any vehicle is sized to
    fit inside a C-130 box. That doesn't mean we're going to
    transport it in C-130s all the time, but it does force us, in
    the design phase, to make capability that is smaller, lighter,
    so we can transport it faster to meet the combatant commanders'
    requirements. If you're lighter, you don't have all the armor.
        Now, my armor colleagues cringe a little bit when I tell
    them, ``We're going to put you in 20-ton, not 70-ton,
    vehicles.'' Not a lot of armor there. They're used to that. I
    have to prove to them, over the next 5\1/2\ years, you're
    survivable, as well as capable, on the battlefield. How do you
    do that? I'm going to tell you where the enemy is, and you're
    going to be able to act and put a rock, an armament, on his
    head before he can react to you. We see that today in the
    Stryker brigade. We see that as the 3rd ID went across the
    berm, and they could see where they were, the blue force, and,
    as our intelligence improved, where the bad guys were. So we
    have 18 of these systems in this FCS--unmanned vehicles,
    airborne- and ground-based, armored vehicles, infantry
    carriers, reconnaissance vehicles--18 different systems, plus
    this network wrapped around the soldier.
        Now, in this phase--and we started this system design
    development phase on May 14 last year--we will spend just under
    $15 billion to do all of this. We are on track today. We will
    have a preliminary design review about this time next year. We
    have demonstrated the basics of the network, which is the heart
    and soul of this. If I don't have this, I will not be able to
    survive on the battlefield. We've demonstrated the NLOS cannon.
    Here, last year--and there were some doubters--can you take a
    large gun, a 155 Howitzer, and shoot it from a platform that's
    only 20 tons? There were a lot of folks that said, ``You can't
    do that.'' But we already demonstrated that. We delivered that
    vehicle, the demonstrator, to Yuma in August 2003. We shot 240
    rounds-plus out of it. We have moved the vehicle, and it has a
    band track on it right now. But it may be tracked, it may be
    wheeled; we'll figure that out over the next 18 months--75-
    kilometers. Firing rate, we had a goal of six rounds per
    minute. We're just over that now. As a demonstration, it works
    fine. Now we need to go on to the next phase for the NLOS
    cannon, and there's a lot of work to do there. I know there
    will be questions on that. But we're on track to make that
    happen. The senior leadership of the Army--that includes the
    Secretary, the Chief, myself, and the Vice--have all said that
    has our top priority, because that is the future.
        To give you another idea, in closing, some folks assume
    that this is a vehicle. It's a wheeled vehicle, it's a track
    vehicle, it's an aircraft, it's a gun, it's all of that. While
    we won't change the Army overnight, that is not going to happen
    in 2010, when we have our initial operational capability, or in
    2012, when we have the full operational capability, which is
    basically a brigade size; it will happen maybe 10 to 15 years
    from now as we slowly replace the entire Army with the FCS. We
    are talking about changing an entire Army.
        As General Curran aptly put it earlier, this is not just
    materiel solution. We are changing what we do in doctrine, we
    are changing how we organize, we are changing how we train
    people--how we lead them, and, of course, we are changing
    materiel to allow the soldier the ability to see where the
    enemy is, to act on that enemy, and to defeat the enemy before
    the enemy ever realizes it.
        I hope that sums it up.
        Senator Sessions. Well, that's well said, and I just wanted
    to say that what I like about what you're doing. The attitude I
    sense in the Army is that we can do better, and we're going to
    do better; but the fact is, we've demonstrated, in every
    conflict in recent years, that our capabilities--command and
    control, training, motivation--exceed that of any military in
    the world, and we can be proud of that.
        Senator Clinton, we're glad that you've joined us, and
    we'll call on you in a minute. We'll go next to Senator
    Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
    three of you for your excellent testimony.
        Let me begin with some questions about the restructuring
    and the addition of the brigades. I understand the Army
    restructure is to create a modular brigade-based Army that is
    more responsive to combatant commanders' needs. I want to ask
    you--and maybe we can start, General Casey and General Curran,
    however you want to do it--How will this change the operational
    capability the Army provides to the combatant commanders,
    number one? What's the impact of this transformation to
    modularity on future requirements?
        General Casey. Why don't I start this off, and then I'll
    pass it over to Mark, there, Senator.
        The impact this will have on the forces and how we provide
    forces to combatant commanders, as we mentioned, we are focused
    on transforming ourself into a joint and expeditionary Army
    that still maintains its campaign capabilities. By that, we're
    not trying to be like the Marine Corps. We're joint, and we're
    expeditionary. We want to be able to get there quickly. But
    then when we get there, we, the Army, bring to the combatant
    commander the ability to conduct sustained land operations,
    battle after battle after battle, to help him accomplish his
    objectives.
        These modular organizations will, one, allow us to tailor
    force packages more rapidly. For example, we believe that these
    now divisional headquarters that we have with three brigades--
    when we deploy one brigade, we have to break up the division.
    So we have the brigade doing a mission, but now the rest of the
    division is not as capable. General Schoomaker likes to talk
    about it as his window-washer. The windowwasher on the
    skyscraper has a squeegee that's about this long, and he does a
    very nice job on this. But then when he gets the job to do
    window panes, his squeegee doesn't quite fit in the panes, so
    he's got to either break his squeegee or take a rag out of his
    pocket; so they have to improvise. These modular brigades are
    how we fight. They will be organized so that they have all of
    the capabilities they need to be self-sufficient so they can
    operate for combatant commander independently and plug right
    into a joint task force, or they can work as part of one of our
    divisions that is also supporting a combatant commander. We
    think it will give the combatant commander much more agile
    forces and much more versatile forces.
        I'll pass it over to Mark to see if he wants to add
    anything.
        General Curran. Thank you, sir.
        When you dive down into the modular brigade design, you
    find some additional capabilities that you wouldn't find in our
    BCTs today. First of all, these organizations are designed
    combined-arms, organic. The artillery, the armor, and the
    infantry are all combined as part of the brigade, and they are
    organic to the brigade. With our stabilization efforts and our
    growth patterns we have for our new brigades, these members of
    this new modular brigade will stay together longer, so team
    cohesion will be a significant advantage.
        Third, these brigades have a much more robust staff. Now,
    what does that do for the combatant commander? Well, it
    provides a combatant commander with a combined-arms formation
    that can operate independently longer because it has the staff
    capabilities to do it. It doesn't have to rely as often on a
    higher echelon or higher command for the staffing functions. It
    also will have the ability to reach back to sanctuary or to
    home station, or to a home-station operation center to be able
    to use the staff that is there that doesn't have to be deployed
    into theater to provide it with the reach-back capabilities or
    staffing functions.
        Probably the most significant is the improvements in
    reconnaissance-surveillance that is nested within the brigade.
    Within these brigades, there is a reconnaissance-surveillance
    squadron or battalion ground reconnaissance, military census,
    collections capability, tactical UAVs, small UAVs, that provide
    much better situational awareness to this brigade. It provides
    its own organic--if you compared it to a brigade combat team
    today, you would find that they only have a company or a
    platoon's worth of scouts or reconnaissance. So we really
    beefed up the reconnaissance, but we haven't increased the
    number of killing systems within the brigades to any large
    extent. The lethality of these brigades is actually going to be
    increased because of the ability to find and fix the enemy with
    this increased reconnaissance capability, plus the ability to
    leverage joint fires--much more capable at leveraging joint
    fires because of the more liaison that is built within the
    staff with the Air Force to provide lethal fires. Finally,
    there's more infantry in it than you will find in the heavy
    infantry brigade.
        Here we've created a modular brigade that is going to be
    more capable for the combatant commander and doesn't require as
    many plugs or as much support from a higher echelon as you
    would find in our brigades today.
        Now, how does that relate to the future?
        Senator Lieberman. The size will be the normal size of a
    brigade?
        General Curran. Sir, the size of the modular brigades runs
    around 3,700 for the heavy brigade; about 3,000 for the
    infantry brigade or light brigade. That is compared to today's
    BCTs, depending upon how they're task-organized, what kind of
    plugs they get from other areas, and could be as high as 4,000
    or perhaps a little bit higher.
        As we look to the future now, and to the FCS-equipped unit
    of action brigade, it's sized at about 2,900 or a little less,
    but it's equipped with a FCS that Secretary Bolton spoke about.
        Senator Lieberman. So it's smaller because it's better
    equipped and it's more productive, in a sense.
        General Curran. Sir, it is more networked. It has greater
    information capabilities to be able to provide situational
    understanding to that force than what you would have today.
    Now, we are in the modular design, applying as much as network
    capability as we can, given just existing capabilities. But
    when you move to the future, it's going to be even greater. But
    the real issue about modularity today, these brigades we are
    creating, is that they act as a bridge to the future design and
    construct. They are more like the FCS-equipped unit of action
    than what you would find in today's brigades. As we move to the
    end of the decade and we start to bring on the FCS-equipped
    unit of action into the next decade, we will have organizations
    that are already designed more similar to the organizations
    that they will be fighting in the FCS. This will pay us big
    dividends in doctrine, organization, and leader development. We
    will have soldiers who have already been operating in brigade
    organizations that are similar to what they will go to in the
    FCS. They will have already started to work with network-
    enabled capabilities and a greater reconnaissance capability,
    with UAVs leveraging joint fires, joint information,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, General.
        Let me ask one more question--I don't want to take too much
    time--and give Mr. Secretary or General Casey an opportunity to
    respond to my broader concern about the resource constraints
    and how we help you meet both the demands of the current
    situation for the current force, and not do so in a way that
    compromises the future force. Just as in recent years I've been
    concerned that we may have been taking risks in the short term
    to make bigger investments in the longer term. Now I'm worried
    that--again, because we were at war--we're investing in a kind
    of modernization or fixing of the current force. It's going to
    cost us so much that we're not going to be able to invest in
    the transformation, that I think we all support, to the future
    force.
        Mr. Bolton. Let me give you a general answer to that to
    illustrate how we're doing this already and have been doing it
    for at least 18 months. When our new chief came aboard, he
    asked that we take a look at technologies ready today. He did
    not want to wait for the FCS. He fully supports that and will
    start working with that in 2010. But if there's technology
    today, put it in the force today.
        Starting in Afghanistan, I sent a colonel to Afghanistan,
    one of my folks, a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of
    Technology, and said, ``Your job is to be with the soldier. You
    know the technology we have that is ready today. Find out what
    they need today.''
        One of the first things we did over there is put robots in
    caves. We wanted to see whether or not there were weapons down
    in those wells, and we found some. Some of the Afghani citizens
    were not happy when we came in to search houses. The doors were
    locked; we blew the locks off, we searched the house, and now
    the lock is broken. They're not wealthy people, and so how do
    you replace the lock? In a short period of time, we found ways
    of opening those locks without breaking them, doing the search.
    Coming out with that particular activity has resulted in
    getting, in as little as 72 hours to as long as 90 days,
    current technology in the hands of the combatants today.
        Along with that, I turned to the chief, and I said, ``We
    need to build for you the spiral.'' You're talking about you
    want to spiral current technology into the future force, but
    the 90 days out to a year, and so we're starting to do that.
        We have a person who works for me, a one-star; his job is
    to take a look at the soldier and find out what the soldier
    needs. I mentioned some of this in my opening statement. We
    call it the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI). Each soldier now
    is getting the elbow pads, the knee pads, better night-vision
    goggles, translators, and a few other things--a new helmet, so
    that when you drop down to shoot the rifle, you can actually
    see what you're doing. Others say, ``Well, gee, why haven't we
    done this before?'' He has about 300 different projects that we
    put under him that were managed--my words now--on an ad-hoc,
    unfocused fashion. Now they are focused.
        But that, back to your point, is changing our current force
    to the future force. We watch it very closely. We manage the
    money that goes into that very closely. Last year, we outfitted
    27,000 soldiers. This year, it's 120,000, and we'll keep that
    going until we outfit everyone. It is a constant balance
    between what do I need for the future, what do I need for
    today, and the resources available. That is why, since I've
    been in this position, now going into the third year, we have
    terminated some 30 programs. We've done that well, based upon
    the feedback I've gotten from Congress, industry, and the Army.
    That's to put funds where we need it for the current force, as
    well as the future force.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
        General, did you want to add?
        General Casey. To get to your broader question, Senator.
        Senator Lieberman. Go ahead.
        General Casey. You're exactly right. I mentioned in my
    opening statement that we're constantly balancing the current
    and the future. Clearly, the pendulum has swung, as you
    indicated, from the future more back toward the current.
    However, we are going into this up front with an assumption in
    our mind that we must maintain program stability for the FCS
    because that is our future. So that is one of our base planning
    assumptions. Right now, in this budget, we are sticking with
    that and we intend to stick with it because, as you pointed
    out, it is our future. If we give up on that, we might have a
    more modernized current force, but it's not the force we're
    going to need in the future.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much. Again, we look
    forward to working with you. We have seen extraordinary
    demonstrations of American power used in protection of our
    freedom and in pursuit of our national values over the last
    dozen years. Sometimes some people in the world resent us for
    our strength, but ultimately people depend on us, and it's all
    that you do. So we thank you for it, and look forward to
    helping you continue to do it in a way that is really
    unprecedented in human history, and bless you for that.
        Thank you.
        General Casey. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Dole.
        Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are now
    recognized as essential elements contributing to the Army's
    success. In support of the Army's transformation, General Blum
    has highlighted the National Guard's plan to transform in step
    with the active component. However, the 5th Battalion, 113th
    Field Artillery, of the North Carolina National Guard is among
    22 other artillery battalions that will not be upgraded with
    the high-mobility artillery rocket system until after 2012.
    General Casey, to what extent does the Future Years Defense
    Program (FYDP) support a simultaneous transformation of the
    National Guard and active component?
        If I could mention one other question, as well, for you to
    respond to: Will National Guard units and the active component
    field the FCS concurrently? If not, will there be a lack of
    modularity between the Active and Reserve Forces until all
    components have transformed?
        General Casey. Thank you, Senator.
        As we look at the Guard and Reserve, and what both Steve
    Blum and Ron Helmley have done, they've developed very
    aggressive plans to transform both the Guard and Reserve. One
    of the overriding considerations is that we will work toward
    modular formations in both the Guard and the Reserve so that we
    will be able to plug-and-play Guard under active, active under
    Guard. You're going to see some of that in Operation Iraqi
    Freedom (OIF) when we have the National Guard divisions that
    will have active-component brigades underneath it.
        We are, right now, working with the Guard and the Reserve
    on the equipping of these forces, and we are doing that as part
    of the program we're building for 2006 to 2011. We're not
    finished on that.
        I will tell you that we won't be able to give everybody all
    of the best equipment. That is just a given. There's just not
    enough new equipment to go around, and we can't afford it all.
    But I think you know there are--our 6th Stryker brigade is
    going into the National Guard in Pennsylvania. To the best of
    my knowledge--and you can help me with this--we have not made
    decisions on the FCSs, and when and which unit, Guard units,
    that will go into.
        General Curran. Sir, that's correct. We haven't made
    decisions on the active units yet.
        General Casey. We're just not that far along. But one of
    our basic premises is modular formations--active, Guard,
    Reserve--the same.
        Senator Dole. The Army's transformation plan incorporates a
    significant restructuring and rebalancing of the force. This
    appears to be a complex multidimensional realignment of forces
    and capabilities between the Service components, military
    occupational specialities, and the civilian workforce. Has the
    Army finalized a plan for rebalancing capabilities between the
    active and Reserve? I think you've just addressed parts of
    this.
        Does the FYDP provide the resources to equip, train, and
    organize the Reserve component forces affected by the
    rebalancing plan? When can we expect to see the details of the
    Reserve components restructuring plan?
        General Casey. We're probably 90 days or so away from
    having the final details of that, but we will complete that as
    part of our work on this program. It needs to be locked by
    about the July time frame, so, as I said, about 90 days. We
    will come up and lay out for everyone the impact on the Guard
    units and Reserve units in each of the States.
        Senator Dole. The Heritage Foundation recently published a
    study by Dr. Carafano that stated, ``breaking the division down
    into smaller independent commands will likely require more
    support troops than are in the current division design.''
    General Casey, could you give us your assessment of how the
    modular design, based on units of action, will affect the
    overall support structure within the Army? How will the
    transformation of the support structure alleviate some of the
    logistics shortfalls experienced in OIF?
        General Casey. Okay, I'll take that, and I'll pass it off
    to Mark here for a second. Clearly, we had some economies of
    scale when we kept what we called the enabling forces--the
    logistics, the signal, the artillery, the engineers--at
    division level. Under modularity, those are all pushed down
    into the brigades. Keeping at the division level allowed the
    division commander to what we call ``weight,'' to give
    additional resources to his main effort, for example. So at the
    brigade level, we will probably see small increases in the
    numbers of support forces that are required to fill up those
    brigades; however, we believe, when we look at our logistical
    system, that we think we can get it down to the three-echelon
    logistics system, rather than a four- or five-level system that
    we have now. The brigade will be the tactical level. They will
    be self-sufficient, as I mentioned earlier.
        The next level will be at probably what we call the corps
    level that will link into the theater level and into the
    tactical level with the brigades. We think that theater level
    has got to be a joint theater level because you don't see a
    requirement for an Army theater of war anymore. It will be a
    joint theater of war. We think there are going to be some
    efficiencies in our logistical formations once we're able to
    work with the other Services and come to an agreement on what
    this joint logistical footprint looks like in the theater.
        Senator Dole. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    gentlemen, for the tremendous job you're doing carrying on
    these many functions simultaneously.
        General Casey. Did you have something you wanted to add?
        General Curran. I was just going to add, because General
    Casey hit really the high points, that we have a task-force-
    focused logistics. It's one of our Army task forces that the
    chief has initiated, and they are delving into the improvements
    we can make from the lessons learned from OIF, from what we're
    doing in modularity to improve our logistics focus leading to
    higher-echelon, joint-logistics capabilities. That's what we
    would like to see. Additionally, one of the things we learned
    from OIF is that in order to provide the logistics at the speed
    at which you have, you have to enable the logisticians with
    information systems that permits them to do their job. We are
    working that very hard, too, to bring that capability as a part
    of this modular effort.
        Senator Dole. Thanks very much.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Clinton. If you would like to
    make an opening statement, please do.
        Senator Clinton. No, that's fine, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    I don't have enough voice to make both an opening statement and
    ask questions.
        I wanted to pick up where Senator Dole was leading because
    she has articulated very well some of the questions that I
    have. Maybe we could put it into more of a practical example,
    which might help me understand the modular concept as you're
    describing it because I'm very intrigued by it. It sounds as
    though not only have you given a lot of thought to it, but
    certainly, as you describe it, with full organic and
    independent capability, and with this ability to be networked
    and really be part of the joint theater. I mean, obviously,
    that makes an enormous amount of sense.
        Let's, for the sake of discussion, assume that one of these
    new modular brigades, say, a heavy brigade, is in a conflict
    similar to OIF, and they've crossed the border of an enemy
    country, and they're moving on whatever the target is. Now,
    that modular brigade, which is self-contained, as you have
    described it, General, how would that, as you envision it, deal
    with both the supply chain and logistical problems that you
    have discussed? I appreciated, when General Schoomaker
    testified before us, his assessment, which went along with some
    of the after-action reviews, that there were some real
    logistical glitches. You're now about the business of trying to
    figure those out. On the one hand, how does this modular
    brigade perform differently or more effectively in conjunction
    with whomever on the supply/logistical end?
        Then suppose this new modular brigade gets to a target
    objective and holds ground where all of a sudden you need
    military police (MPs) and civil affairs until something else
    occurs. Just kind of give me a more practical, down-to-earth
    explanation as to how we can be modular, smaller, more
    productive, and deal with these continuing challenges we have.
        Either General Curran, General Casey, or Secretary Bolton:
    I'm just really curious, because the concept is so attractive,
    but if I could just understand it better.
        General Curran. If you would permit me, I would like to
    address the last part of your point first. The brigade has
    moved, as you've stated, through a major combat operation,
    secured its objective, and is now transitioning into a
    different mission.
        Senator Clinton. But that happened so quickly.
        General Curran. It does happen very quickly. The rest of
    the modularity story is not just about these modular maneuver
    brigades, heavy and light. The rest of the modularity story is
    that there will be support units of action, or brigades, that
    are in a force pool nested at what we call the ``unit of
    employment level,'' division corps or Army of today. These
    pools of capabilities--MP, aviation, fires, psychological
    operations--will be resident and available to be tailored with
    the brigade.
        As we talked about, we're changing a number of our
    positions within the Army, reducing the amount of artillery,
    and moving to more resident MPs, civil affairs, and
    psychological-operations capabilities within the organization.
    They will fill out and round out the support units of action.
    The support units of action are also modular in design. A
    combatant commander can pick and choose from this pool. ``I
    need this many maneuver units of action. I need this many
    protection support units of action or brigades,'' which would
    include MPs and engineers. ``I need this many sustainment units
    of action.'' From the force pool, the combatant commander will
    be able to tailor the force to meet the needs.
        If we take OIF as an example, one of these new modular
    brigades is part of the 3rd ID. It's marching on to Baghdad. It
    arrives at Baghdad in the force flow. You could have additional
    support units of action that are following to flow into theater
    to meet up with that brigade. When it transitions to that new
    mission, it already will have some embedded capability. It has
    MPs and it has engineers already nested within the modular
    design. What we're speaking about now is really a transition to
    a stabilization mission, a peace mission. These will all be
    nested in modular capabilities at a higher echelon, but in a
    force pool that the combatant commander can draw upon.
        I wanted to take that part, anyway.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Bolton. Senator Clinton, if I could add another
    example, and really it's what our sister Services are already
    doing. The Navy, for a number of years, if not decades, have
    used carrier battle groups, which bring together certain
    capabilities to effect some type of capability that the
    combatant commander wants--will have X-number of Aegis
    cruisers, destroyers, attack boats or submarines, carriers, a
    mix of aircraft, and so forth.
        Back in the mid-1990s, the Air Force went to the
    expeditionary air forces, which then took fighters, cargo,
    tankers, and other assets, both airborne and space-borne, and
    put them in packages. The Army is doing a similar thing. But
    here, the scale is a little bit larger, particularly when you
    get onto the ground and particularly in stabilization
    situations.
        As Mark has already pointed out, there are groups that we
    will modularize to take care of stabilization, whether that's
    contracting, setting up infrastructure, the civilian policing
    forces, opening up hospitals, libraries, mail service, and
    roads, and so forth. Once again, it's the combatant commander,
    who will drive this initially, to say, ``This is what I want,
    and it's up to us to figure out which modules we're going to
    put together to meet that.''
        I agree with you, this is an interesting concept. It's
    exciting, and I'm glad to be part of it because some of my
    folks will be some of the first on the ground to take care of
    the infrastructure when we go into stabilization.
        Senator Clinton. General Casey.
        General Casey. Let me see if I can try it this way. Maybe
    if I compared it to the capabilities of a brigade moving on a
    mission today, compared to what a modular brigade would do,
    that would help out.
        If, today, a brigade formation moves, it would have a
    reconnaissance company, a small unit, about 75 to 80 folks, and
    their job is to go out and find the enemy and develop the
    situation. The modular brigade would have a battalion, about
    600 people, doing the same thing. The current brigade may get
    some time from a division-level UAV to look out in front of
    them. If they're really lucky, they may have some small UAVs
    that they can use. In the modular brigade, the reconnaissance
    squadron would have its own UAVs that they would use to develop
    the situation in front of them. The target acquisition
    battalion or element with the artillery would have their own
    UAVs to develop targets for the artillery to shoot at. Instead
    of sharing time, they have their own, and they have their own
    in a way that facilitates the commander seeing the battlefield
    at the same time, getting his targets for him.
        In the current headquarters, you have attachments showing
    up--your civil affairs, your MPs. They don't normally train
    together. Those folks are all built into the new headquarters
    of the modular brigade.
        In the current brigade, you probably will have an Air Force
    liaison officer and a few small air liaison teams that you
    share down to the units. In the current modular brigade, you
    would have a joint fires planning cell, with all of the
    appropriate connectivity to reach back into the joint fire
    system. So much better able to see the battlefield, and to
    bring joint fires and joint effects into play.
        The other thing is, because it has its own enablers, it can
    operate over a much wider piece of ground. When the division
    commander is trying to control all of his elements, they
    generally have to stay in close contact, or at least maintain
    contact. So it's a little more structured.
        These modular brigades are designed to operate in a
    nonlinear fashion.
        Senator Clinton. It sounds, too, that you've pushed a lot
    of authority down to the combatant commander.
        General Casey. That's exactly right.
        Senator Clinton. Which makes a lot of sense. When we
    visited with a lot of the commanders when I was there with
    Senator Reed, giving them maximum authority to be able to
    operate was one of the best things that we did. It was kind of
    by default in a way because there was so much unexpected that
    people ran into.
        Do you think, General, it would be possible to give us some
    sort of a visual display of this, with sort of the terms and
    the interconnections? It would be helpful to really lay it out
    because it is an incredibly creative concept, which I'm very
    intrigued by. I don't pretend to understand it, but you did the
    best you could to explain it, for which I'm grateful.
        General Casey. A picture is definitely worth a thousand
    words.
        Senator Clinton. A picture is worth a lot. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Those were some interesting questions.
    Along with the commander at the brigade level, I came away from
    the Iraq experience with the belief that the area commander
    needs more ability to contract with local people directly. Of
    course, that means he has to have money in the pocket, some
    money to be able to do things. Most environments into which we
    seem to be coming into, you have a situation in which there is
    some stability on the scene. In the brigade, would you have any
    capability? Would anyone comment on that--for enhanced ability
    to actually have resources to dispense on short notice, to
    utilize local people to do things that are important?
        Mr. Bolton. Yes, sir. In fact, we call them contingency
    contracting officers. Depending on the situation, a lot of
    times those officers are on the ground before the main unit
    shows up, to do exactly what you're talking about, to get with
    the locals, figure out who can bring rocks in to set up a
    landing zone and so forth. They're fully trained, and sometimes
    they even carry cash with them to start setting those up. It
    was exactly that way in the operation that we did in
    Afghanistan. You didn't see them, but they were there, starting
    to set up that infrastructure. Then as things stabilized, we,
    of course, sent in more folks.
        That was particularly true in Iraq. When our soldiers had
    taken the capital, we sent, almost 24 or 48 hours later,
    someone over there to start looking at the contracting. I then
    took a colonel out of West Point to ask him to go over there
    and start setting things up while I looked for someone to go
    over there permanently. We have put those contracts in place,
    first for the military, and now we're doing that work for the
    Coalition Provisional Authority, as well.
        Senator Sessions. Do you think, in this future concept,
    that you will have institutionalized that process better, so it
    can be more natural, and maybe people can be even trained in
    the pitfalls and advantages of contracting locally?
        Mr. Bolton. The contracting officers we send are first-
    branch qualified. These are soldiers; they're not folks we just
    took off the street from somewhere and put a uniform on them.
    They understand what it means to be a soldier. I don't accept
    folks until they've been in the Army for about 8 years. Thus
    they're qualified first in arms in whatever their branch is,
    and then they're trained as contracting officers. What we will
    do, as part of modularity and working with TRADOC, as we build,
    particularly the support elements is ask: How do we get our
    folks in there? What lessons have we learned over the last few
    years, as well as previous conflicts? What do we expect in the
    future? This is slightly out of my lane, but I work with my
    counterparts in Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and special
    operations--we also have the same thing there. They
    occasionally need contracting officers, and my folks are down
    there to help them. We will learn lessons from them as well.
        But, to your point, we intend to do it much better in the
    future by being part of the modularity.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        General Curran.
        General Curran. Sir, in the modularity design at the unit-
    of-employment level, there is a contracting cell that has been
    mapped into that organization. What you saw in Iraq was an area
    commander, a division that is being mapped into the unit of
    employment-x (UEx) of today.
        The other point I would make--and I should have made this
    when I was answering Senator Dole's question on the logistics
    side--is that it's interesting to note that this notion of
    modularity goes back at least to 1995, when TRADOC began
    writing some doctrinal literature about modularity. The first
    people to pick up on the modular design were the logisticians.
    In fact, if you go back and look at our tables of organization
    and equipment (TO&Es) today, you'll see that at echelons above
    division, the logistics community have gone to a modular
    design. Already, on the logistics side, there are modules of
    logistics capabilities that have already been built into the
    TO&Es of our forces. Contracting would be one of those.
        Senator Sessions. I just wanted to drive home the point
    that I came away from the Iraq experience and the Afghan
    experience, from my observations, with a strong belief that a
    major contractor, like Bechtel, might be necessary to bring a
    power plant or an oil refinery up. They're not out in some
    village 200 miles, 500 miles away, as the soldiers are already
    there. They know right then what needs to be done. It gives
    them a certain credibility and enhances their respect in the
    community if they can say, ``We're going to fix this, and we'll
    pay you to fix this.'' I hope you would think about that.
        Let me ask a few more questions: Maybe one of you choose to
    answer this, and if others would like to contribute--the Army
    has requested 3.2 billion for the FCS development. The FCS is a
    network system of systems comprised of 18 systems, as you
    noted. However, there are more than 150 complementary programs
    which must be funded. In support of the Army's future force, we
    often hear that Army transformation is more than equipment.
    What is the Futures Center's role in the FCS development?
        General Curran, do you believe the user, represented by
    TRADOC has an adequate voice in the FCS development? I think
    that is important. I asked General Casey the other day. You
    have all of this theory and these ideas. We want to be doggone
    sure the average soldier knows how to access it and utilize it.
    Is that part of what you'll be working on?
        General Curran. Sir, it is. The relationship that TRADOC,
    as the user's representative, and the Futures Center have with
    both the program manager (PM), and the lead system integrator
    (LSI), is hand-in-glove. If you noted, from our remarks, that
    Secretary Bolton, in his opening remarks on his discussion of
    FCS, could speak eloquently about the required capabilities
    that that program is bringing on. That is an indication of the
    marriage we have between the requirement, people, us, the users
    representative TRADOC, and with the acquisition community that
    is bringing this program together.
        Specifically, we meet, in some cases weekly to monthly, in
    integrated concept teams between TRADOC, the PM, and LSI, that
    are working every piece-part of the FCS organization. The user
    representative is involved nearly daily with the PM and LSI in
    bringing these capabilities to the forefront. The decisions
    that need to be made with trades and those types of issues are
    brought to the user representative, because the user is the one
    who has identified and documented what the required
    capabilities are, the operational requirements doctrine that
    outlines what this family of systems is to bring as a
    capability to the Army. I would just tell you that I am very
    confident that the user is being well-represented with the PM
    and with the LSI in making sure that the required capabilities
    that we need, foresee, and update, are handled by the PM and
    the LSI.
        Mr. Bolton. Mr. Chairman, if I could add to that,
    absolutely spot on. As we're developing the requirements that
    were documented over 2 years ago, if you had gone to Fort
    Monroe to TRADOC headquarters, or out to Fort Knox, the armor
    school, you would have found in those rooms, as our TRADOC
    colleagues were writing the requirements, Doctrine Requirement
    Centers, acquisition types, testers, logisticians, funds
    managers, contractors, and others, all in support of writing
    this document. That team continues throughout. The only way we
    can make the requirement of having an initial operational
    capability (IOC) in 2010 is to keep that team together. That
    team helped us get through that milestone last year--a record-
    setting milestone, by the way--and it continues today.
    Quarterly, we have a board of directors meeting. The user is
    there, all the other folks I just mentioned, and other PMs who
    manage things and systems that we need to have a FCS link to
    everything. They are there and adjusting their programs and
    what their contractors are doing so that we can all be ready to
    go in 2010. It is a tremendous effort.
        That aside, one of the first meetings I had with the former
    chief, General Shinseki, was a meeting to talk about some
    element of the FCS. At the end of that meeting, I commented to
    him, ``In the years that I've been in this part of the
    business, I had never seen senior-level attention this early in
    a program.'' Normally, we have very good people, junior
    officers or civilians, who lock a program in, do good work, and
    then we bring in the colonels and the flag officers about 5
    years down the road after they've locked in about 80 percent of
    the program. Here we have the senior leadership in the Army
    working the issues up front and then working on the
    requirements. I think that is unprecedented, but shows a
    commitment on the part of the Army and everyone else to get
    this done.
        Now, our job as a team is to get it done and to go anyplace
    we have to go so that in 2010 we can deliver to the soldiers
    the capability they need. It is an extraordinary effort.
        Senator Sessions. Well, I would agree that the top people
    need to be involved because they have a lot to offer. I asked,
    at a school system in Alabama that has tremendous academics, in
    a small town, why it was competing with the best high schools
    in the state. I asked this young principal. He said, ``The
    superintendent.'' I said, ``Well, what does he do?'' He said,
    ``He meets with all the principals every morning, and we
    discuss what's going to be taught, curriculum.'' When you have
    your top people talking to the bottom people about how to win
    wars, how to fight and win, and what it takes to get it to
    them, that's better than having bureaucrats up here and
    everybody else working it. It's a good idea.
        Let me just briefly ask you a question about this. Last
    December, Boeing and the Science Applications International
    Corporation (SAIC) as LSI, received a $15.8 billion contract
    from the Army to oversee the FCS program through the system
    development and demonstration phase. What steps has the Army
    taken to work with, but also monitor, the Operating System
    Incorporated (OSI), to ensure that FCS stays within cost,
    achieves key performance parameters, and meets the schedule?
        Mr. Bolton. On the latter part, we have a measurement
    system. We call it ``Earned Value Management System''--not new.
    We do this all by contract; so while the contractor uses that
    on a daily basis to see what progress they're making on the
    work that I've asked them to do, the PM would typically get a
    monthly summary, and then quarterly I get the whole thing. I've
    told my PMs there are certain things I'm looking for on that
    program to chart progress. Thus far, we're doing very well on
    that. If we're doing well there, then it tells me we're meeting
    the objective, and the objective is to hit a certain
    requirement at a certain time at a certain cost.
        In addition, this LSI is a new concept for a program this
    large for the Army, and so we've had considerable thought about
    that before we did it. We have looked at it several times
    afterwards. We have an independent group right now out at
    Boeing, almost as we speak here, and at SAIC, to tell me, ``Is
    this concept the right concept? Can we do it better?''
        Now, why are we doing the LSI? The LSI, in my terms, is a
    general contractor. Take a house, for example. You go out and
    you pick the very best general contractor you can. You go to
    him with a blueprint of the house you want that you got from an
    architect. That's your requirement. You have so much money, and
    you want it done in a certain period of time. Then you let him
    pick the best trades, the best subcontractors, to get the job
    done. You periodically go out there and check on him.
        That's what this LSI has been asked to do. You have a
    requirement coming from TRADOC. You have a certain amount of
    funding. You have a time element. Now, go pick the very best
    contractors to get the job done.
        We went to another transaction authority because I wanted
    the very best in this country. That included folks who normally
    do not do business with the DOD. This other transaction
    authority, which allows us to put a contract in place without
    all of the rules and regulations that I would have to live,
    using the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)--that is what
    we have. We have the best. Big contractors, for sure, but we
    also have some small contractors. As an example, iRobot. Most
    folks haven't heard about iRobot. But if you were at the trade
    center the day after September 11, you would have found some
    big contractors, like Raytheon, using imaging, and you would
    also have found iRobot, with small robots, looking for
    survivors. They're on our team now to help us with the unmanned
    vehicles and also helped us in Afghanistan last year.
        I've talked personally with the senior leadership of Boeing
    and SAIC. I've told them that this is the way we ought to go.
    But both of us have to understand how this is working for the
    benefit of the soldier, as well as the benefit of the
    shareholders. I'm totally confident that I have their
    commitment to doing this and doing it right.
        Senator Sessions. This has potential, and we've seen some
    good come out of that. But it is critical that we not assume,
    because we've got a contractor, we can go away, and the house
    is going to end up like we want it. The missus may not be happy
    when it's over. So the intensity of management and the holding
    their feet to the fire and watching to make sure schedules are
    met are important.
        Alabama has the third-largest number of National Guardsmen
    and women activated. Just last week, the adjutant general (TAG)
    told me that their recently deploying units received all the
    gear that they needed at the maximum-on-the-ground (MOG)
    station except for one soldier, who was so big it wouldn't fit,
    and he didn't get to go. But maybe we're making progress with
    regard to making sure that everybody is fully equipped. As a
    matter of fact, I know we are.
        General Casey. You can report to any constituents that any
    soldier going into Iraq for this OIF II rotation will cross the
    border with his full body armor on.
        Senator Sessions. Very good. Senator Lieberman mentioned
    setting the force as the Army units rotate back from Iraq.
    There is going to be a lot of damage and a need and some cost
    involved in resetting that force. We understand that most of
    the cost will be in the operation and maintenance account as
    equipment is repaired and serviced; however, we also understand
    there will be additional procurement costs to replace combat
    losses.
        General Casey, can you give us a sense of how many
    helicopters, trucks, and other equipment will require repair or
    replacement, and where does the Army intend to get this
    equipment? What's the status? We have heard some comments that
    there are boneyards for equipment in the theater that need to
    be fixed. As we learned from the last Gulf War, that was an
    expensive process to get our equipment back in first-rate
    shape. Would you like to comment on that?
        General Casey. Yes, Senator, I will. Let me just give you a
    sense of the combat losses, and then I'll transition to the
    reset and close out with Army prepositioned stocks, which I
    think will get at the boneyard question you had.
        We've lost a total of 41 aircraft, 8 M-1 tanks, 12
    Bradleys, and 76 HMMWVs, as an example of the combat losses.
    Those will all have to be replaced. We believe, I think
    rightly, that all of these losses, as well as the resetting
    requirements, are war-related expenses. We will seek to pay for
    them through the provisions of supplementals that are devoted
    to the war-related expenses.
        For the reset, we have had a triage team there in-theater
    examining the vehicles. There were basically two levels--
    actually, three levels of reset for ground equipment--and an
    additional one for air. The first is what we call 10-20
    standards, which is basically a service, like you take your car
    in and get a quarterly service. That's what that is. The next
    level was what we called ``delayed desert damage,'' and that's
    a more intensive inspection to make sure that we have captured
    all of the problems on the vehicle or system that has been
    caused by spending a year in a harsh environment like Iraq. The
    third level is sending it back to depot for an overhaul. What
    we've been doing is inspecting the vehicles there in-theater,
    and, instead of sending it back with the unit, if it needed to
    go to depot, it goes straight back to depot. Then the fourth
    level--this applies just to aviation--what we call the Special
    Technical Inspection and Repair (STIR) program.
        General Curran. We call it reset now.
        General Casey. No one could remember what STIR stood for,
    and now we call it reset, and that's not an acronym. That's
    basically a program--probably it's right between the service
    center and a complete overhaul--but it gets into all of the
    engines, parts, and things, and inspects them for desert
    damage. We make sure that we're not missing anything in our
    aviation fleet as we go forward, Army prepositioned stocks.
        Senator Sessions. On the harsh conditions, how much more
    degradation have the aircraft sustained as a result of that
    than they would in normal operations?
        General Casey. I would yield to the senior aviator at the
    table.
        Senator Sessions. He should know.
        General Curran. The damage that they've experienced has
    been significant because of the fact that the major combat
    operations did not last a long time, and that we were able to
    ultimately get our platforms onto some hard stand to operate
    from; it started to reduce that. But every single aircraft that
    is coming back is going through a reset. Based upon what the
    team found when they went over there, we seem to be falling
    pretty much in line with what we expected we would have to do
    to the aircraft.
        The other part of reset, though, includes taking some
    preventive measures of the aircraft that are deploying over in
    OIF II with putting on what we call a ``desert kit.'' This
    includes better barrier filters and some additional kit that
    we're putting on the aircraft so that they do not receive as
    much damage from the harsh environment as they would if they
    didn't have these capabilities. We think the desert kits will
    save us a lot of engines. While those aircraft were operating
    over there in the desert sand, we will save some engines in
    that.
        Senator Sessions. It's the sand that does a lot of the
    damage?
        General Curran. Predominantly sand, yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Secretary Bolton, have you done any
    studies or planning with regard to some of the major reset
    expenditures as to whether or not you could also update the
    equipment and aircraft to a higher level of modernization at
    the same time while you're doing one? Have you done a study, or
    would that be a good idea maybe to study now? Because some of
    them are going to take a lot of work, and we may see we could
    upgrade them at the same time.
        Mr. Bolton. Well, that had already been one of our
    intentions. That is, we brought equipment back, if we have an
    opportunity during the reset, to replace those parts with parts
    that are more reliable and upgrade it. That has been nothing
    new; we try to do that as a normal course of business. If those
    are also going back to the desert, as General Curran just
    indicated, then are there things we can do to ease the burden
    on the troops in the field once it gets back over there? Desert
    kits are one. On the ground vehicles, we can put pre-filters on
    the air filters to filter out some of that powdery sand before
    it actually gets ingested in the engine. We will take a look at
    all of those. But you're absolutely right, when we have the
    opportunity, we will upgrade those parts.
        General Casey. Senator, can I get to your boneyard question
    there?
        Senator Sessions. Please.
        General Casey. We have two of our prepositioned sets still
    in use in Iraq. That's our float prepositioned number three,
    and our on-the-ground stocks, number five. Over a third of
    those are still actually in Iraq being used by units. The
    boneyard you referred to is at the prepositioned site there in
    Kuwait. We have some 9,000 vehicles that are part of these two
    sets that have been used and returned in varying states of
    repair. About a month or 6 weeks ago, we asked our Army
    Materiel Command to put a team out there to get us an
    assessment of what it's going to take to put all of this back
    together. That is in process. I would expect to have something
    in another 30 days here.
        But, again, I point out to you, both of those sets are very
    much in use with the forces in Iraq, and we will probably use a
    good portion of them to set a stay-behind equipment fleet there
    in Iraq, so we could just get to the point where we rotate
    people in and don't have to keep shipping equipment.
        Senator Sessions. Well, that would make some sense to me. I
    know the unit out of Foley, Alabama. I was there when a
    National Guard unit departed, and they were taking all their
    equipment. You wonder if there's equipment there that they
    wouldn't have to take.
        General Casey. We weren't able to get it done for this
    rotation.
        Senator Sessions. Tell me about this. I know you've been
    working on it. I know Secretary Rumsfeld and General Schoomaker
    have really taken an intense interest in this rotation. It's a
    huge deal. I know a lot of it falls on you; maybe all falls on
    you. I haven't heard any big complaints, so I guess that's a
    good sign. So far, what can you tell me? How is it going?
        General Casey. It's going very well. It has been a huge
    effort. It's a quarter of a million people going back and
    forth. It includes the mobilization of about 70,000 guardsmen
    and reservists, who have all been equipped, trained, prepared,
    and shipped over, in addition to the active components. You
    will recall the three enhanced separate brigades that are going
    over. We made it a point to give them the very best equipment
    available, this RFI. We gave it to them before we gave it to
    the Active Forces. I just happened to be up in Fort Lewis,
    Washington, when this 81st Brigade was going through the
    warehouse getting their stuff. The looks on these soldiers
    faces when they saw they were getting the best that money could
    buy, they realized they were into something serious. So well-
    equipped, well-trained, all of those three combat brigades have
    been through rotations at our Joint Readiness Training Center
    or National Training Center, where they replicated the
    environments they were going into in Iraq. The mobilization has
    gone, in my view, very well. The U.S. Transportation Command
    (USTRANSCOM) has done a magnificent job managing the rotation
    of forces. We are over the hump here. Last week was really the
    peak week of movement back and forth, and we're really on the
    downhill side.
        The demobilization also continues to go well. We set a
    standard at the beginning. Ten days from the day a soldier sets
    foot on the ground in the United States, they're off active
    duty unless they have some medical problem that requires them
    to stay longer. Right now, our average is about 7 or 8 days, so
    that is also working very well.
        I, like you, judge not hearing anything as being good news,
    but we monitor this very closely from the Department of the
    Army staff.
        Senator Sessions. Well, you did one big thing, really
    important, which was realizing it was a big deal, and you put a
    lot of time and effort and foresight into it. Otherwise, it
    would not have gone as well as it has. That's good planning.
        I would just say, on behalf of the Guard and Reserve, I
    spent 10 years in the Army Reserve, and we have a lot of great
    friends still there, and still a lot of National Guardsmen from
    my State. They want to serve. They do not feel they're victims.
    They want to be utilized well, and they didn't want to come
    home. They wanted to do something worthwhile. They don't want
    to be called up to piddle around. My little observations about
    that is, if we could keep those deployment times down, 9
    months, 6 months, 9 months, and do the premobilization as much
    at home station as possible, so that a soldier is away from his
    family closer to 6 months than 13 months, that is a huge
    difference--a huge difference for the employer. That means you
    have to move more people and has certain cost in it. In
    addition, in an active combat situation, you have to do what
    you have to do. But in a post-combat hostile environment, to
    move to that direction would be something that would play well
    with our Guard and Reserve.
        For the most part, we have done well with giving them good
    work to do, and I certainly believe they have done an excellent
    job.
        General Casey. If I could, both of the Guard and the
    Reserve, Steve Blum and Ron Helmly, are developing rotational
    packages so that they'll be able to tell their guardsmen or
    reservists which package they're in. That will allow them to
    figure out when they're next up for rotation. We're working
    very hard to get this down to about once every 5 or 6 years.
        We'll be able to show you that in about 60 days, and it
    will be a paradigm shift that will allow us to bring
    predictability for the guardsmen and reservists into this
    environment of steady-state mobilization we're in.
        Senator Sessions. Very good. I know, Secretary Bolton, you
    talked about, at the beginning, force-protection issues and the
    importance of that. Is there anything you all would like to add
    about assuring the American people that we're doing what we can
    to make sure that the soldiers have as much protection as we
    could possibly get for them?
        Mr. Bolton. Well, we rely heavily upon the commanders in
    the field to tell us what's going on. We've put PMs,
    acquisition types, in the field with the combatants. As I
    mentioned earlier, their job is to report back what do they
    need, and to get it to them as quickly as possible. We will
    pull out all stops to make sure that the men and women have the
    protection that they need, both uniform and DOD civilians.
    We've done a very good job along those lines.
        There are, as I've said to industry, two issues in my mind.
    One is a tactical one, which means get the stuff and the
    protection there now. We're doing it, both land-based and
    airborne systems. When this phase is finished, we have a
    strategic phase, because I'm going to come back to you and ask
    a very simple question. The question is, how do we do what
    we've done over the last 12-plus months in 30 days, the next
    time this happens, and work through all of the hurdles between
    now and then? Because, surely as we're sitting here, we will do
    this again, and some man or woman, one of our soldiers, will
    need something that we didn't anticipate. Things change. The
    enemy changes, very adaptive. Thus how do we compress this
    time? It's just another step in trying to make sure that our
    men and women have the very best throughout the entire
    engagement.
        We're committed to that, and I'm very happy with what has
    happened in responding to what the soldiers need on the
    battlefield.
        General Curran. Senator, if I might add. As we look to the
    future and the FCS, survivability is one of the key performance
    parameters within that program. It is a holistic look at
    survivability. It is not just the platform, but it's the whole
    system of systems and its survivability, and how much
    protection is provided to the force. Within our logistics
    arena, we are also looking at our HMMWV and cargo fleet, what
    the required capabilities are going to be in a noncontinuous,
    nonlinear battlefield, as we know today and into the future.
    We're addressing survivability protection for the soldier in
    the future as we are doing it today, as Secretary Bolton spoke
    to.
        Senator Sessions. We would like to see this reset. I might
    ask you again about how we're coming with the reset situation.
    As I understand, there is money in the account to begin this.
    Our depots are not at full capacity, from what I understand. I
    hope that we're not allowing this to build up too much in hopes
    for a supplemental or something to come down, and we can take
    it all out of there. I think Senator Lieberman will be coming
    back, and I wanted to ask about the safety of our personnel,
    and will we be doing any after-action studies about that?
        I have a friend, Sergeant Larry Gill; his father was a
    police officer, and he's now a police officer in Alabama. He
    was a marine in Lebanon when the embassy was bombed, one of the
    first war-on-terrorism attacks, and received a Purple Heart.
    Then he went over with a Guard unit and was pretty badly
    injured in the lower leg from a grenade. It seems like there's
    a number of lower-leg injuries, and you wonder about things.
    Can we come up with better uniforms that have more protection?
    Maybe it won't guarantee protection in a severe attack, but
    could minimize damages. He's had a number of operations, and
    he's back at Walter Reed now. Every little bit helps. Have we
    given any thought to other more creative ways that we could
    make our soldiers safer?
        Mr. Bolton. Yes, sir. I mentioned, in my opening remarks,
    that the SAPI plates are protecting the torso from injuries
    that would have killed soldiers formerly. As you've just
    pointed out, soldiers are being injured, arms and legs and so
    forth. A bit over a year ago, we struck a relationship between
    the Army, academia, and industry to work nanotechnology--to
    work down at the atomic level with materials. One of the aims
    was to take a look at the materials we currently use in the
    body armor and see if we can't reduce the thickness of it.
    Don't reduce the capability; if anything, increase the
    capability, but reduce the thickness.
        I'm happy to say we're making great progress along those
    lines. A week or so ago, at one of our conferences, we
    demonstrated one of the materials, where you could take a
    similar thickness--and this is about the thickness of a couple
    of T-shirts. You take an icepick and the normal Kevlar
    material, and you would go right through it. With this
    material, I don't care how strong you are, you cannot go
    through it. What I've asked the folks to do is to take the
    inch-thick thickness of the SAPI plate, reduce that to the
    thickness of your shirt, and now put it over the entire
    soldier. That's one of the areas that I think we're going to be
    able to work. That will give us the torso, will give us the
    arms, and will give us the legs. It won't give you 100 percent
    against all the threat but will greatly reduce some of the
    problems we've had and injuries we've had. That's one area.
        The other is the vehicle itself, looking at lighter-weight
    composites. One of the problems we had with the armored HMMWV:
    great protection, but you've added a lot of weight, in some
    cases, as much as 7,000 pounds worth of weight. If you look at
    the original HMMWV, it was not designed to carry that. Now, the
    ones coming out that are manufactured are heavier and bigger
    suspensions and so forth. One of the concerns we have from some
    soldiers who are there is that they want to be on the
    offensive, and I would be, too. If we have an up-armored HMMWV,
    on the one hand, you're protected; on the other hand, you can't
    get after the bad guys. So how do we design a vehicle that
    allows you to be protected and, at the same time, have a lot of
    response? We're looking at materials that can give equal or
    better protection, but also lighter for the vehicle.
        On your first point, and that's lessons learned, the
    leadership we have in the Army--and this goes across the joint
    staff and the other Services, at least in my experience--is,
    for the first time, really getting all of the information, or
    most, on a real-time basis, with due consideration to security,
    back to us quickly. We see that in the Army and how we've been
    able to do the RFI and equipping, getting the information and
    getting things to the soldier in a short period of time. Taking
    the lessons learned--we just had a group over there take a look
    at the helicopters that have been shot down, what caused it,
    what can we do, providing that information and field feedback
    real-time to the pilots over there, and sharing that
    information.
        We have developed, over the last year, a concept in the
    Army we call the uniform scientist. Their job is to eventually
    be with the soldiers full time--there are some cringes from my
    colleagues sometimes when I characterize this--in the future,
    and I call it the ``Spock syndrome.'' Anyone who has seen the
    television or the movie ``Star Trek'' knows there's a science
    officer onboard. The science officer's job is to know the
    technology of that fleet better than anybody else, and, to as
    large a degree as he can, understand the enemy's technology,
    and then, on real-time, advise the commander what to do. That's
    what we're training our folks to do, and we started that over a
    year ago.
        The difference between what I intend to see happen and that
    particular television show is, I want you reporting back to the
    States what's going on, as well, so we can fix the things
    before we send the troops over and do that in real time.
        So a long way of answering the question, we are taking
    those lessons learned seriously. We are working with the
    science and technologists to provide us better equipment as
    soon as possible.
        Senator Sessions. General Curran, do you want to comment?
        General Curran. Sir, if I could add, we in the Futures
    Center have been charged to look at how to spiral matured
    capabilities into the current force, to address critical
    capability gaps in the current force as they perform their
    mission. In that process, we leaned heavily on operational
    needs statements that come out of theater, out of lessons
    learned that came from the 3rd ID, that came from all the
    forces that are participating in OIF, through our Center for
    Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, through Joint Forces
    Command--joint lessons learned. We're pulling from those joint
    lessons learned and packaging those to determine the list of
    priorities of what are the most critical capability gaps that
    exist in the current force.
        When you look at that list today, the top of the list is
    soldier protection. Second is probably network capabilities.
    We've really focused on the top 10 or so. Through the
    partnership between our Research and Development Command and
    with Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
    Logisitics, and Technology (ASALT), we give that list to them,
    and so they're out actively searching for what matured
    capabilities they have that could address that gap. Then
    through the vice chief of staff and through the G-3, we've
    established a rapid-equipping force that can quickly, if they
    can get it in in 30 days--and that's almost a criteria; I don't
    want to use this capability unless it's for a very quick turn--
    get that kind of capability into the force. We've used that in
    addressing things like IEDs. We have done it for a number of
    other aspects of using a rapid-equipping force to get that in.
    TRADOC's role is to identify what the gaps are. We're almost in
    daily contact with leaders in the field and working that. We
    are using the students at Fort Leavenworth and in our
    schoolhouses, who have just returned from theater, and even
    canvassing them to say, ``While you were over there, it's fresh
    in your mind, tell us what kinds of capabilities you could have
    used to do your job better.'' We are collecting that
    information. It is really information technology that is
    allowing us to stay so connected, and we're leveraging that
    because, as the Secretary said, the sharing of information and
    lessons learned is moving at much faster pace, and it needs to.
    We need to leverage that information technology to make that
    happen.
        Senator Sessions. Well, I will just say this to you. One of
    the things that is most commendable about American military is
    our intense work on after-action reports and our willingness to
    learn from mistakes. That is something to be valued and
    cherished. Too often, the old mentalities is you could never
    admit a mistake; you couldn't talk about problems that
    occurred. I believe we've moved beyond that. That is why we
    continue to seem to do better each time we're in a hostile
    environment than the time before. I really salute you for that.
        We have a number of questions that I would like to submit
    to you in writing.
        This has been a very good exchange. I believe we are on the
    road to a continuing improvement. In your statement, Secretary
    Bolton, you used the phrase ``in the continual
    transformation.'' It will never end. It will always be a
    continual transformation. I do respect and value your
    decisions. If you have something new that will work now and
    will ultimately be part of the FCS, why should we wait? Why
    don't we have it in there now? We use it, we get familiar with
    it, and it actually protects or enhances the combat capability
    of our soldiers.
        Thank you for your excellent testimony. Your written
    statements will be a part of the record. We will keep the
    hearing open for questions from other members. Senator
    Lieberman wanted to get back, but I understand he has been held
    up on the floor and will not be able to make it.
        We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

         Questions Submitted by Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman

                              ARMY REORGANIZATION

        1. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Casey, we
    understand that between fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2011, the Army
    estimates the total cost for modularity to be $20 billion, including an
    fiscal year 2005 shortfall of $2.4 billion identified as part of the
    Army's unfunded priorities list. The Army has not provided an estimate
    of the costs associated with converting National Guard enhanced
    separate brigades. How does the Army intend to fund the fiscal year
    2005 shortfall?
        General Casey. The Army plans to fund the fiscal year 2005
    shortfall with supplemental dollars in fiscal year 2005. It has been
    listed and detailed as our priority on the unfunded requirements list
    for fiscal year 2005.

        2. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Casey, is this
    restructure funded in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)? If not,
    how does the Army intend to fund the restructure?
        General Casey. Modularizing the Army is not currently funded in the
    FYDP. To fund modularization without placing additional risk to current
    operations or future force transformation, the Army requires assistance
    to cover the costs of modularity.

        3. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Casey, what are
    the decision criteria for going to 48 active component brigades vice
    the 43 currently planned and approved by the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense?
        General Casey. The decision criteria for going to 48 active
    component brigades will be based on the defense strategy and its 1-4-2-
    1 force sizing construct, regional combatant commander requirements,
    and the level of operational commitments we face in fiscal year 2006,
    to include the need to generate forces in support of the Force
    Stabilization concept and to sustain a forward rotational posture of
    engagement. The Secretary of Defense will make the final decision to go
    to 48 brigade units of action in fiscal year 2006, based on these
    factors and projected requirements.

        4. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Casey, as we
    understand your plan, the Army intends to use existing platforms to
    equip the additional active and Reserve component brigades. If you are
    using existing resources, what makes these new brigades more lethal?
        General Casey. The lethality of a unit is derived from more than
    the number of combat systems it contains. It is derived through the
    application of available firepower, either organic or joint fires, and
    enablers such as command and control systems, and multi-source
    intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities. Improvements in command
    and control capabilities and joint integration have multiplied the
    effectiveness of small, agile land forces and changed the character of
    tactical and operational warfare. Consequently, modular units of action
    (UAs) will have a number of embedded enablers that will lead to more
    timely and precise engagements that yield a desired outcome. Increases
    in the number of sensors and reconnaissance platforms allow these units
    to find more of the enemy sooner, and direct more firepower against
    them from a greater variety of sources. The UA is a more flexible,
    adaptive, and self-contained entity, allowing for a more focused
    package of capabilities that can be applied against a wide array of
    enemy threats. The Army's vision for the future includes improvements
    not only in combat systems design but also improvements in soldier and
    leader training and development, systems integration, cross-service
    integration, and command, control, communication, computer, and
    intelligence capabilities, which will all enhance force lethality.

        5. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Casey, are there
    equipment shortfalls associated with this restructure? If so, what are
    they and how do you intend to fund these shortfalls?
        General Casey. Transforming the Army to a modular design will
    result in different organizational requirements for equipment.
    Invariably, the Army will experience some shortfalls. Minimizing these
    shortfalls is accomplished by starting with a disciplined requirements
    process backed by sound analysis, which ensures that we provide the
    right quantities and types of equipment to modular units. Although we
    are still analyzing modularity requirements across the force, much work
    has been done to date and an emerging equipping strategy has been
    developed that is designed to maximize combat capabilities across the
    force at the lowest possible cost.
        The first step is to look across the current organization and
    determine where equipment can be harvested in support of the modular
    design. For example, we have found that as we transform artillery
    units, almost 75 percent of the total demand for artillery computers
    can be satisfied by cross-leveling within the units that are
    transforming. In addition to cross-leveling internally, we have also
    found that there is some excess equipment external to the transforming
    units (including pre-positioned sets and depot stocks) that can be used
    to resource the modularity effort.
        Once we have cross-leveled all available existing stocks, our next
    step is to refurbish non-operational equipment (where possible) and
    then use that equipment to fill shortfalls. Depot stocks of the Q-36
    Firefinder Radar, for example, can be rebuilt for a fraction of the
    cost of new procurement.
        A good deal of the equipment required by modular units has already
    been programmed for in previous planning periods; adjustments in
    fielding schedules will ensure that those units transforming receive
    the right equipment at the right time. When production schedules make
    that impossible, the Army will selectively authorize ``in lieu of''
    items that provide the unit with a ``good enough'' capability until we
    can issue the proper piece of equipment. Eventually, the unit will
    receive new equipment, but the Army intends to use new procurement as a
    last resort wherever possible.
        Transforming the Army to a modular design is a process that will
    extend from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2007. Since much of
    the effort will fall before our current fiscal year 2006-2011
    programming period, and because the Army is already under considerable
    fiscal pressure due to ongoing operations, we may have to ask for
    external assistance with those resourcing challenges that cannot be
    solved by the approaches discussed above. That request for assistance
    will likely take the form of a supplemental request where the Army asks
    for the minimal amount of new funding required to achieve core
    essential capabilities.

        6. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Casey, what is
    the estimated cost to reorganize the Army National Guard to ensure its
    brigades are similarly designed?
        General Casey. The estimated cost associated with the Army National
    Guard Brigade Combat Team (ARNG BCT) modular conversion as captured in
    the fiscal year 2006-2011 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) is $7.944
    billion for 33 BCTs. This cost reflects personnel, training,
    installation, as well as equipping requirements. In terms of equipping,
    the cost reflects those requirements termed ``critical,'' which equates
    to Base Table of Organization and Equipment (BTOE), combined with
    authorized substitute items of equipment, as well as some items of
    modernization.
        The BTOE documents the minimum essential personnel and equipment
    requirements for accomplishing the wartime mission. The BTOE does not
    assure parity of equipping with the active component force, nor does it
    assure complete interoperability of the total force. The programmed
    costs do not reflect the costs associated with the emerging requirement
    for the units of employment (UEx) given that the organizational design
    has yet to be completed. There are eight UExs to be fielded into the
    Army National Guard. The UExs are intended to replace one for one the
    eight current divisional headquarters that exist within the ARNG.
        The end state for ARNG is 34 brigades. Of these brigades, 33 are
    being programmed for funding within modularity. The 34th ARNG brigade
    or the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), the 56th SBCT Pennsylvania
    ARNG, is being funded separately as part of the Army's commitment to
    the SBCT program.

        7. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Casey, what is
    the planned time line for Army National Guard reorganization?
        General Casey. In 2005, the following units will be converted: 30th
    Armored Brigade, North Carolina; 39th Infantry Brigade, Arkansas; 81st
    Armored Brigade, Washington; and the 34th Infantry Division
    headquarters, Minnesota.
        In 2006, the following units will be converted: 116th Armored
    Brigade, Idaho; 155th Armored Brigade, Mississippi; 256th Infantry
    Brigade, Louisiana; 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Tennessee; 1st
    Brigade, 34th Division, Minnesota; 56th Brigade, 36th Division, Texas;
    35th Infantry Division headquarters, Kansas; and the 42nd Infantry
    Division headquarters, New York.
        In 2007, the following units will be converted: 41st Infantry
    Brigade, Oregon; 48th Infantry Brigade, Georgia; 218th Infantry
    Brigade, South Carolina; 2nd Brigade, 28th Division, Pennsylvania; 55th
    Brigade, 28th Division, Pennsylvania; 37th Brigade, 38th Division,
    Ohio; 28th Infantry Division headquarters, Pennsylvania; and the 38th
    Infantry Division headquarters, Indiana.
        In 2008, the following units will be converted: 49th Brigade, 36th
    Division, Texas; 149th Brigade, 38th Division, Kentucky; 2nd Brigade,
    40th Division, California; 3rd Brigade, 42nd Division, New York; 50th
    Brigade, 42nd Division, New Jersey; 86th Brigade, 42nd Division,
    Vermont; 39th Infantry Division headquarters, Texas; and the 40th
    Infantry Division headquarters, California.
        In 2009, the following units will be converted: 29th Infantry
    Brigade, Hawaii; 32nd Infantry Brigade, Wisconsin; 45th Infantry
    Brigade, Oklahoma; 53rd Infantry Brigade, Florida; 92nd Infantry
    Brigade, Puerto Rico; 2nd Brigade, 34th Division, Iowa; and the 29th
    Infantry Division headquarters, Virginia.
        In 2010, the following units will be converted: 76th Infantry
    Brigade, Indiana; 207th Infantry Brigade, Alaska; 1st Brigade; 29th
    Division, Virginia; 3rd Brigade, 29th Division, Maryland; 26th Brigade,
    29th Division, Massachusetts; and the 66th Brigade, 35th Division,
    Illinois.

                              FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM

        8. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton, last
    December, Boeing and Science Applications International Organization
    (SAIC), as the Lead System Integrator (LSI), received a $14.8 billion
    contract from the Army to oversee the Future Combat System (FCS)
    program through the system development and demonstration phase. There
    may be a few concerns regarding overall FCS program management. For
    example, it appears that the LSI has awarded one of the most important
    parts of FCS, the network software, to themselves. Do you believe the
    current firewall provides adequate safeguards to assure that the Army
    and taxpayers receive the benefits of competition and innovation?
        Mr. Bolton. All FCS firewalls, including Boeing subcontract
    firewalls were reviewed in detail by Tank-Automotive Armaments Command,
    Army Materiel Command, Department of the Army (DA) legal departments
    and PM FCS acquisition personnel. The reviews concluded that Government
    Sensitive Information (GSI) and Competition Sensitive Information
    (CSI), and resulting information were held in strict confidence and
    with suitable safeguards. The U.S. Army's Office of General Counsel by
    direction of 17 June 2003 from Acting Secretary of the Army, R.L.
    Brownlee conducted a review to ensure that sufficient firewall
    safeguards were in place under the FCS for Boeing and it major
    subcontractor, SAIC. Although PM FCS was not provided a written copy of
    the report, PM FCS is aware of no concerns expressed as the result of
    this report. The Warfighter-Machine Interface (WMI) is the only
    software application awarded to Boeing entity, The Boeing Company;
    Mesa, Arizona. As the Army Acquisition Executive, I personally
    witnessed the process in action during the source selection and was
    continuously apprised of its progress. At least three independent
    reviews of the process were conducted and found that the process had
    integrity. The Army is satisfied that the process worked.

        9. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton,
    describe in detail any firewall protections you have in place for both
    LSIs and, more specifically, outline how those protections will be
    managed over the life of the program.
        Mr. Bolton. On the FCS Program, Boeing, as the LSI, has procedures
    and practices in place to address potential conflicts of interest that
    might emerge as a result of operating in the dual roles of source
    selection authority and competitive bidder. Boeing has implemented an
    organizational conflict of interest mitigation plan, including the
    creation of firewalls around certain types of information. Boeing's
    established firewall procedures cover Government Sensitive Information
    (GSI) and Competition Sensitive Information (CSI). Boeing requires all
    employees/managers who may be involved in the FCS program to
    acknowledge that they will fully comply with the applicable firewall
    restrictions should they have access to GSI or CSI. Additionally all
    employees/managers involved in the evaluation of competitive
    subcontract source selection must sign a separate confidentiality form.
        Under the FCS program, the Army recommended that Boeing require
    Firewall provisions in subcontracts where access to GSI and CSI will
    occur. These subcontract firewalls establish thresholds to adequately
    safeguard information on all levels. In accordance with the Department
    of Defense best business practices, ``firewall'' procedures of the LSI
    and of the major suppliers are documented in writing and reviewed by
    the Army to ensure that proper strict segregation of information is
    maintained and that a level playing field is preserved.

        10. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton, we
    understand the FCS contract uses ``Other Transaction Authority (OTA)''
    rather than traditional Federal Acquisition Authority contracting
    rules. Can you explain why the Army is using OTA in the management of
    the contract and how it intends to manage the program with this
    authority?
        Mr. Bolton. An OTA was chosen because it provides a continuation of
    the philosophy used for FCS CTD; a logical extension of effort in
    transition from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to the
    Army and maximizes the flexibility to implement the FCS functional
    allocations and to make trades. The Army intends to transition from an
    OTA to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) contract for production and
    deployment activities.
        What is an 845 Other Transaction?

             Legally binding contractual agreement outside the FAR
             Basic contractual requirements met--meeting of the
            minds, legal purpose and exchange of consideration
             Provisions are based on sound business judgment and
            the needs of the specific acquisition--not imposed on a one-
            size-fits-all basis
             Not authorized for production at this time
             Typically cost reimbursement structure--profit allowed
             Variant specifically authorized by statute for
            prototype procurement

        11. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton and
    General Casey, we understand that there are more than 150 complementary
    programs which must be funded in support of the Army's future force and
    FCS. Some of these programs are more important than other programs. For
    instance, the FCS network depends on the Joint Tactical Radio System
    and the Warfighter Information Network-Terrestrial for the
    communications architecture. Many of these complementary programs are
    not under the jurisdiction of the FCS program management office. What
    steps has the Army taken to ensure these complementary programs are
    synchronized with the FCS program?
        Mr. Bolton and General Casey. As part of the joint Army-OSD review
    and analysis process leading to a successful FCS Milestone B decision
    in May 2003, it became clear that, for the FCS program to succeed,
    other existing programs with systems essential to the system-of-systems
    employment concept for the FCS-equipped UA needed to be synchronized
    with FCS program development and fielding timelines. Accordingly, the
    Army, in coordination with OSD, has developed complementary systems
    management processes across multiple organizational levels. Within the
    FCS program, the Project Manager, Unit of Action (PM-UA) has partnered
    with the LSI to integrate complementary programs into the overall FCS
    program. Two types of arrangements are used as the primary mechanisms
    for ensuring synchronization when the FCS program identifies an
    existing or developmental program as having applicability to FCS--
    associate contractor agreements (ACAs) and memorandums of agreement
    (MOA) or subordinate MOAs (SMOA). To secure contractor-to-contractor
    synchronization, the LSI develops ACAs with the prime contractor for
    each identified complementary program. To ensure government-to-
    government synchronization, Program Executive Office, Ground Combat
    Systems (PEO-GCS) develops MOAs with other Program Executive Offices
    (PEOs) responsible for respective complementary programs and PM-UA
    develops SMOAs with program managers (PM) responsible for respective
    complementary programs. Within the Army, the Deputy Chief of Staff, G8
    and Military Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
    Logistics, and Technology) have established a complementary systems
    management and oversight process documented in a memorandum of
    agreement (MOA) signed in August 2003 [This is currently under revision
    to include the TRADOC Futures Center as ``tri-chair'' at every level of
    the synchronization effort]. This MOA established an Army Complementary
    Systems Synchronization Integrated Process Team (IPT) to synchronize
    the network, survivability, lethality, sustainability and training
    aspects of FCS with 1-, 2-, and 3-Star General Officer Steering
    Committees (GOSC) for review and approval of synchronization
    recommendations. Synchronization IPT recommendations that include
    adjustments to complementary program funding, scheduling, or
    performance requirements are provided to the Army Acquisition Executive
    (AAE) for review or resolution prior to implementation. Within OSD, FCS
    Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) reporting is now grouped
    together with key complementary system program DABS reporting to the
    DAB [i.e., FCS is now grouped together with Joint Tactical Radio
    Systems (JTRS), Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, Distributed
    Common Ground Station-Army]. If an FCS-UA Complementary System
    synchronization issue resides external to the Army and cannot be solved
    at the PEO level, the Army's Complementary Systems Synchronization IPT
    will meet with additional members included to represent their
    respective services/OSD organizations, as required. Once alternatives
    are assessed, the Synchronization IPT presents its recommendations to
    the AAB in preparation for convening an Overarching IPT (OIPT) or joint
    OIPT, depending on the issue, to assess and present a recommended
    course of action (COA). If the COA can be effectively instituted at the
    OIPT level, the DAB will be notified of the decision. If consensus
    cannot be reached, the OIPT will recommend convening a special DAB to
    bring the issue to closure.

        12. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton and
    General Casey, can failure to fund these programs derail any future
    system of system reviews for the FCS program?
        Mr. Bolton and General Casey. The Army recognizes the importance of
    key complementary programs to the development and fielding of FCS--
    especially those supporting the FCS Network. Perturbations in any of
    these programs, whether due to resourcing adjustments or other causes,
    could incur unique impacts to the FCS Program, to include possible
    schedule impacts, requiring individual assessment and resolution.
    Accordingly, the FCS Program has established a robust risk mitigation
    strategy for those critical technologies and complementary systems that
    are on the FCS critical development path. The FCS Program is mitigating
    these technical risks through employment of a formal risk management
    process with OSD/DA oversight and through documentation of customer-
    supplier relationships with FCS technology suppliers through written
    Technology Transition Agreements (TTA).
        The FCS Risk Management Program Plan lays out the methodology and
    processes used to manage programs for both FCS core critical
    technologies (CT) and FCS complementary programs (CP). Risk mitigation
    plans (RMP) have been developed, or are in the process of being
    developed, that address both technology maturation risk and system/
    system-of-systems integration risks into the FCS Family of Systems
    (FoS) and the greater UA at the system-of-systems level. Where
    applicable, these RMPs contain technology ``off ramps'' or
    ``tollgates''--specific decision points and criteria where decisions
    would potentially be made to use alternate, less risky (and potentially
    less capable) technologies and technology development and integration
    strategies--or, in the case of complementary programs, alternative
    complementary programs. Decisions to use these ``off ramps'' or
    ``tollgates'' will be made based upon cost, schedule, performance, and/
    or technology maturity criteria, and are included in many of the on-
    going trade studies. The FCS program will execute the off ramps, as
    needed, when building the program technical baseline. However, the
    overriding consideration to any decision to execute an ``off ramp'' is
    to understand that the focus ultimately is not on these technologies or
    CPs and their respective alternatives (taken individually)--but in how
    each impacts the overall performance of the FCS system-of-systems
    construct.

        13. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton and
    General Casey, the FCS network is the key aspect of the program that
    will make the current and future units of action more lethal and
    capable. Unfortunately, the two programs which will provide the
    communications backbone for the network, the Joint Tactical Radio
    System, and the Warfighter Information Network-Terrestrial, are not
    part of the FCS program. Are these two programs fully funded in the
    fiscal year 2005 budget request?
        Mr. Bolton and General Casey. The Joint Tactical Radio System and
    the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical are fully funded in the
    fiscal year 2005 budget request.

        14. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton and
    General Casey, recently, an Army general stated that the Army and
    industry must do everything possible to give FCS capabilities for
    soldiers fighting terrorism now rather than waiting until 2010 when the
    Service will field the first FCS-equipped unit. What are the costs
    associated with accelerating these technologies, and are they funded in
    the fiscal year 2005 budget request? How will this effect the FCS
    program?
        Mr. Bolton and General Casey. Our materiel acquisition leadership
    understand the need to accelerate FCS and other future force
    technologies quickly into the current force to improve overall
    capabilities now rather than waiting until 2010. As such, on a case-by-
    case basis, we do intend to look at the capability gaps that are
    emerging from current operations and take steps, where possible, to
    take FCS developing technologies and platforms and insert them where
    they, in fact, could fill these capability gaps early. Currently,
    because we are still in the process of identifying those FCS
    technologies and systems with the most potential for acceleration, we
    have not yet developed specific acceleration costs. As a result, these
    costs could not be included in the fiscal year 2005 budget request.
    Once technologies are identified for acceleration, we will take a
    holistic approach to determining what adjustments may need to be made
    to the FCS Program or other Army development programs to both
    accelerate designated technology and platform maturation as well as the
    fielding of these capabilities early to the current force.

        15. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton,
    General Casey, and General Curran, we understand that the Army and the
    LSI are currently conducting trade studies for the final design of the
    FCS. When does the Army intend to make the final decision regarding
    these trade studies and at what point do these decisions impact the
    program schedule?
        Mr. Bolton and General Casey. Trades have been scheduled and
    prioritized based on need to support program decisions. Objective 3 is
    to have all identified trades completed by Preliminary Design Review
    (April 2005); some which do not have significant design implications
    could stretch slightly beyond.
        General Curran. The Army and LSI are not conducting assessments of
    ``final designs'' at this time. We continue collaborating on design
    concepts leading to a few long-lead decisions needed by the Army, and
    to produce threshold design concepts for use at the design concept
    review to be conducted this summer. The Training and Doctrine Command
    (TRADOC) is an active participant and on track to support this effort
    and all associated technical and program reviews. The Department of
    Defense acquisition philosophy and FCS program describe a consistent
    and continuous definition of requirements. The FCS program is using the
    Joint Requirements Oversight Council-approved Operational Requirements
    Document (ORD) as the baseline for requirements. We are now updating
    the document based upon thresholds that were collaboratively developed
    by the Program Manager and LSI. Trade-off analysis and studies and
    trade-off determinations will influence the feasibility of these
    requirements thresholds. Future updates and the continued refinement of
    requirements will be timed to support key program milestones such as
    the Preliminary Design Review next year; the Design Readiness Review
    (Critical Design Review), in 2006; and the Initial Production Decision
    (IPD), 2008. ``Lock-in'' of requirements occurs at IPD with the
    capabilities production document (CPD) for the production of systems
    for the first FCS-equipped unit of action.

                                    STRYKER

        16. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton and
    General Casey, last year there was some doubt surrounding the
    Department's support for the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) 5 and
    6. However, the Secretary of Defense recently approved an Army plan
    which enhances the aviation, fire support, computer networks, and
    sensor capabilities of SBCTs 5 and 6, and retrofits brigades 1 through
    4 with newer technology as it becomes available. Are these enhancements
    funded in the fiscal year 2005 budget request and the FYDP? What is the
    cost? If not, how does the Army intend to fund these enhancements?
        Mr. Bolton. The Army's enhancements for SBCT 5 and 6 are designed
    to make the brigade more combined arms capable and joint interoperable.
    Sensors and shooters are key. Enhancements will augment capabilities in
    the areas of aviation, fires, network communications, and sensors. For
    aviation, the Army's original proposal was to field a package of 12
    Comanche helicopters to SBCT 5. With the recent cancellation of the
    Comanche program, the aviation addition to the SBCT enhancements is
    being revisited. In the area of fires, the Army is fielding the
    Lightweight (LW) 155 mm howitzer to SBCT 5 in fiscal year 2006, SBCTs
    1-4 in fiscal year 2008, and SBCT 6 in fiscal year 2009. The LW 155
    provides a lighter, more deployable, more mobile, more responsive,
    self-locating, digital firing platform that will fire precision
    munitions (Excalibur). Network communications enhancements include the
    fielding of Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART-T)
    Satellite Communications terminals to each SBCT between fiscal year
    2005 and fiscal year 2007, 53 Tactical Operations Centers (TOC) to TOC
    JTRS for each SBCT that will be fielded between fiscal year 2007 and
    fiscal year 2009, and the single Shelter Switch Base Band Node (SSS-
    BBN), Wide Area Network (WAN) that will be fielded to SBCTs 5 and 6 in
    fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007. The research, development, test,
    and evaluation (RDT&E) and initial procurement for a 10-meter sensor
    mast for the brigade were also added. The mounted mast increases the
    SBCT's capability for target acquisition and identification from
    concealed positions. On December 8, 2003, the acting Secretary of the
    Army, Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8,
    briefed the Secretary of Defense on the Amy's proposed enhancements for
    SBCTs 5 and 6 as described above. The Secretary of Defense approved the
    Army's plan for the enhancement of the 5th and 6th SBCTs and authorized
    the Army to spend fiscal year 2004 funds on these brigades.
        The cost of these enhancements of SBCT 5 and 6 are fully funded as
    described in POM for fiscal years 0205-09. The retrofits of SBCT 1-4
    are also funded for LW 155, SMART-T, and JTRS. The SSS-BBN and mounted
    mast enhancements for SBCTs 1-4 are being addressed in POM 06-11.
        General Casey. The Army's enhancements for SBCT 5 and 6 are
    designed to make the brigade more combined arms capable and joint
    interoperable. Sensors and shooters are key. Enhancements will augment
    capabilities in the areas of aviation, fires, network communications,
    and sensors. For aviation, the Army's original proposal was to field a
    package of 12 Comanche helicopters to SBCT 5. With the recent
    cancellation of the Comanche program, the aviation addition to the SBCT
    enhancements is being revisited. In the area of fires, the Army is
    fielding the LW 155mm howitzer to SBCT 5 in fiscal year 2006, SBCTs 1-4
    in fiscal year 2008, and SBCT 6 in fiscal year 2009. The LW 155
    provides a lighter, more deployable, more mobile, more responsive,
    self-locating, digital firing platform that will fire precision
    munitions (Excalibur). Network communications enhancements include the
    fielding of five SMART-T Satellite Communications terminals to each
    SBCT between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2007, 53 TOC (Tactical
    Operations Center) to TOC JTRS for each SBCT that will be fielded
    between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2009, and the SSS-BBN, WAN
    that will be fielded to SBCTs 5 and 6 in fiscal year 2006 and fiscal
    year 2007. The RDT&E and initial procurement for a 10-meter sensor mast
    for the brigade were also added. The mounted mast increases the SBCT's
    capability for target acquisition and identification from concealed
    positions. On December 8, 2003, the Acting Secretary of the Army, Chief
    of Staff of the Army, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, briefed the
    Secretary of Defense on the Army's proposed enhancements for SBCTs 5
    and 6 as described above. The Secretary of Defense approved the Army's
    plan for the enhancement of the 5th and 6th SBCTs and authorized the
    Army to spend fiscal year 2004 funds on these brigades.
        The cost of these enhancements of SBCT 5 and 6 and the retrofit of
    SBCT 1 thru 4 is $962 million.
        All of the enhancements for SBCTs 5 and 6 are fully funded as
    described in the POM for fiscal years 2005-2009. The retrofits of SBCT
    1-4 are also funded for LW 155, SMART-T, and JTRS. The SSS-BBN and
    mounted mast enhancements for SBCTs 1-4 are being addressed in POM 06-
    11.

                               MOBILE GUN SYSTEM

        17. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton and
    General Casey, we understand the Army has procured almost half of its
    Stryker vehicles under a low-rate production contract and will make a
    full-rate production decision this spring for the infantry combat
    vehicle variant. The Mobile Gun System (MGS) variant is currently in
    testing. Can you provide us with an update on the current status of MGS
    testing and whether the MGS will meet the Army requirement?
        Mr. Bolton and General Casey. MGS testing is currently on track to
    support a low rate initial production decision by September of this
    year. The limited user test we had planned to conduct in September 2003
    was postponed because of user concerns with system performance. We have
    since rectified these issues, with the exception of auto-loader
    reliability, which we expect to finish and demonstrate this week.
    Following the correction of these issues, the MGS successfully
    completed the first of a two-part force development exercise, which
    consisted of a live-fire exercise at Fort Lewis, Washington, in
    January. The next part is a force-on-force exercise scheduled for the
    end of this month at Fort Polk, Louisiana. We expect the MGS to perform
    well in this exercise. In addition, production qualification testing is
    over 50 percent complete and is ongoing at Aberdeen Proving Grounds,
    Maryland; and Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona; as we speak. We expect to
    complete this testing in July 2004. To answer the second part of your
    question, the basic requirement for the MGS is to put a hole in a
    concrete wall through which infantry can pass. The MGS has shown that
    it can do this.

        18. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Curran, has the
    Army explored alternatives that would meet the requirements for MGS
    should the platform fail testing?
        General Curran. We continue to have full confidence in the MGS.
    However, an alternative that would meet the requirements for MGS,
    should the platform fail testing, is the use of an Anti-Tank Guided
    Missile (ATGM) variant with a Tube-Launched, Optically-tracked, Wire
    guided (TOW) missile with bunker busting munition. This ATGM variant is
    currently in use in Operation Iraqi Freedom and proving to show some
    measure of success against the aforementioned target types. Additional
    analysis will be needed to refine this alternative should the need
    arise.

                  LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

        19. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Curran, the
    deployment of the first SBCT in northern Iraq not only provides a
    unique capability for the Central Command but also provides the Army
    with an opportunity to test both near- and far-term operational
    concepts. Can you give us a sense of how lessons learned from Operation
    Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are influencing near- and far-term operational
    capabilities and requirements for SBCTs?
        General Curran. The Stryker has demonstrated its ability to be a
    highly reliable combat vehicle. It has been able to rapidly reach its
    destination and deliver soldiers rested and able to execute dismounted
    operations. With the organic equipment issued in the SBCT it is capable
    of interacting with all Army forces. Additionally, the SBCT in Iraq has
    been asked to cover an area of 450km x 150km which exceeds the expected
    doctrinal distance of 100km x 100km. Accordingly, this increase in
    battle-space has created a communication connectivity challenge. The
    planned enhancements/retrofits aligned with networks and sensors will
    focus on improving command, control, and communications thus,
    mitigating this challenge in the far-term.
        We continue to analyze the organizational construct to glean
    lessons to be spiraled either into other current force units, or into
    the future force. Examples include positive impacts of robust
    reconnaissance assets and increased situational awareness at lower
    tactical levels. We are also looking hard, from a Stryker platform
    perspective, at metrics such as the operational readiness rate and the
    mean miles between failure because of the unit's high operational
    tempo. Additionally, insights drawn from Operation Iraqi Freedom
    provide anecdotal underpinnings and support for many Future Combat
    System-equipped unit of action concepts and requirements such as Blue
    Force Tracking. Improvements will continue to be made based upon what
    we learn and will be applied accordingly to current or future force
    designs.

        20. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Curran, how
    will these same lessons learned inform the design of the FCS-equipped
    unit of action?
        General Curran. The Army maintains an in-theater presence through
    the Center for Army Lessons Learned to capture lessons learned.
    Additionally, through interface with many stakeholders, including U.S.
    Central Command, we are able to draw insights from both Operation
    Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. So far, the lessons
    learned have served to anecdotally underpin or support many future
    force unit of action and FCS concepts and requirements. Additionally,
    lessons learned have also influenced some refinement of concepts and
    requirements such as how to detect and neutralize improvised explosive
    devices, and our approach to mine detection concepts and requirements.
        Within the Training and Doctrine Command, the Futures Center, Unit
    of Action Maneuver Battle Lab, and others are reviewing lessons learned
    for application to concepts, Operational and Organizational plans,
    requirements documents, and operational architectures that support the
    unit of action integrated processes to identify gaps in concepts and
    requirements. Lessons learned have already informed the design of the
    future force and will continue to be examined for application to the
    future force.

                            RESURRECTION OF PROGRAMS

        21. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton and
    General Casey, last year the Army cancelled 24 systems and restructured
    another 24 more in order to fund Army transformation. With the Army at
    war, new Army leadership has decided that the cancellation of programs
    in the current force had gone too far in some instances and has chosen
    to resurrect some of those programs. Chief among these is the M1A2
    System Enhancement Program (SEP) tank. Are there other programs that
    the Army is also considering resurrecting?
        Mr. Bolton and General Casey. No. The Army is not considering
    further ground system modernization/recapitalization beyond 3rd Armored
    Cavalry Regiment (3ACR) modernization efforts.
        The Army is currently executing affordable Abrams Tank and Bradley
    Fighting Vehicle (BFV) programs that provide selected armored forces
    within the Counterattack (CATK) Corps (4th Infantry Division, 1st
    Calvary Division, and 3ACR) with superior technology and a digitally
    enhanced warfighting capability. Most recently, the Army decided to
    continue recapitalization of the Abrams Tank in support of the 3ACR
    modernization. 4ID and 1CD will be equipped with M2/2A3 BFV, while 3ACR
    will be equipped with the M2/3A2 OIF BFV configuration. Procurement
    funding supporting 3ACR modernization is fiscal year 2004 through
    fiscal year 2006. MIA2SEP and M2/3A2 OIF fielding for 3ACR will occur
    in 1QFY2006 through 2QFY2007.

        22. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton and
    General Casey, how does the Army intend to solve the combat
    identification problem to prevent or minimize fratricides?
        Mr. Bolton and General Casey. We have fielded thousands of quick
    fix combat identification devices to the deployed forces supporting
    Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF), and we
    continue to work hard in the development of more advanced combat
    identification solutions. One of our primary concerns is the capability
    of solutions to work in a joint, multifaceted operational environmental
    (ground-to-ground, air-to-ground, ground-to-air, and air-to-air). We
    recently conducted a three-star general officer level Army/Marine Corps
    board including participants from all Services to review combat
    identification. Based on their recommendations, we are beginning a
    joint effort with the Marine Corps to determine the best solution set
    and investment strategy for the future combat identification needs of
    both Services. Our view continues to be that the cornerstone of an
    effective combat identification solution is a combination of improved
    situational awareness and target identification. Technology is
    important. We are making significant investments in combat
    identification in the technology base, but other elements, such as
    doctrine, training, tactics, techniques and procedures, organizations,
    and leadership are also important pieces. The joint effort we have
    undertaken with the Marine Corps will consider all of these elements.
    Regarding OIF/OEF, we have redirected significant funding from other
    Army programs over the past two years to provide thermal and infrared
    combat identification devices to forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. These
    devices enable forces equipped with forward-looking infrared (FLIR) and
    night vision devices to identify other friendly forces. Our budget
    request includes funding to continue fielding these devices to new
    force rotations deploying to the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters. We are
    also leveraging the combat identification capabilities of digitized
    systems and improved optical systems. We have integrated the Force XXI
    Battle Command Brigade and Below system with satellite-based blue force
    tracking to provide situational awareness information for key leaders
    in Army, Marine Corps, and coalition ground units in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. Fratricide prevention training has been ingrained into
    institutional, individual, and collective unit level training
    environments. To sharpen soldier visual identification skills, we have
    issued an interactive vehicle-recognition training device called
    Recognition of Combat Vehicles (ROC-V). ROC-V is a computer-based
    training system that soldiers may use to improve on individual vehicle
    identification skills. We consistently upgrade and expand the library
    of vehicle images in ROC-V. The fielding of improved optical systems
    that incorporate advanced FLIR technology, such as Second Generation
    FLIR, Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3), and
    Thermal Weapon Sights (TWS) enable soldiers to detect and visually
    identify ground targets with greater fidelity and at greater ranges
    than was ever possible in the past. We will continue to give this
    problem the highest priority until we have the right set of solutions
    in the hands of soldiers.

        23. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton and
    General Casey, will the Army resurrect the Battlefield Combat
    Identification System program that the Army cancelled in prior years?
        Mr. Bolton and General Casey. The Army does not plan to resurrect
    the Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS) program. The BCIS
    program was cancelled primarily due to affordability concerns
    associated with the following factors: cost of the basic hardware (B-
    Kit); cost to integrate the system on vehicles (A-Kit), particularly
    the Abrams and Bradley; and the large number of vehicles we would have
    to equip to ensure that the system would be effective from an
    operational standpoint. While we have no plans to resurrect the BCIS
    program, we continue to have interest in the millimeter wave technology
    that was developed in the BCIS program, and continue to pursue a
    millimeter wave-based combat identification concept, along with other
    technology concepts, in the technology base. This millimeter wave
    technology base effort, called Battlefield Combat Identification Device
    (BTID), was initiated in 2001 prior to the cancellation of the BCIS
    program as part of a Coalition Combat Identification Advanced Concept
    Technology Demonstration (CCID ACTD). The CCID ACTD is focused on
    developing combat identification solutions that are more affordable
    than BCIS and which are interoperable without NATO allies. BTID
    prototypes are currently undergoing government technical testing in the
    CCID ACTD and will undergo operational demonstrations in fiscal year
    2005 along side similar millimeter wave candidates developed by the
    United Kingdom and France. Our fiscal year 2005 budget request includes
    technology base funding required to support the United States share of
    the operational demonstrations, as well as research, development, test,
    and evaluation funding to support cost-reduction efforts on BTID.
    Results from the operational demonstrations will be used by the Joint
    Forces Command to render joint military utility assessments on each
    nation's system. The assessments will assist in the Army's
    determination of any future efforts on BTID.

        24. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton and
    General Casey, does the Army intend to continue to limit
    recapitalization and selective modernization of equipment to two
    divisions and the armored cavalry regiment of the counterattack corps
    or will that program be extended to the rest of the force?
        Mr. Bolton and General Casey. Yes. The Army continues to limit
    recapitalization and selected modernization efforts. The Army is not
    considered further ground system modernization/recapitalization beyond
    the already identified two division and the 3ACR modernization efforts.
        Most recently, the Army decided to continue recapitalization of the
    Abrams Tank in support of 3ACR modernization. 3ACR will be equipped
    with the MIA2 SPOE tank commensurate with the 1st Cavalry Division
    (1CD) and 4th Infantry Division (4ID). 4ID and 1CD will be equipped
    with the M2/3A2 Operation Iraqi Freedom BFV configuration. Procurement
    funding supporting 3ACR modernization is fiscal year 2004 through
    fiscal year 2006. MIA2 SEP and M2/3A2 OIF fielding for 3ACR will occur
    in the first quarter fiscal year 2006 through the second quarter fiscal
    year 2007.

              CURRENT AND FUTURE ARMY REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES

        25. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton,
    General Casey, and General Curran, in your professional judgment, does
    the Army's current requirements determination and prioritization
    process meet the needs of the Army? If not, how do you intend to
    address your concerns?
        Mr. Bolton and General Casey. Yes, the Army develops and
    prioritizes its warfighting requirements utilizing the processes
    outlined in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.
    The Army's requirements determination process will provide a current
    and future army capable of success in any contingency from humanitarian
    assistance to full tactical operations in joint and combined
    environments. The Army's process will be responsive to the urgent
    material requirements of the deployed warfighter, as well as project
    the full set of doctrine, training, leader development, organizational,
    material, and soldier requirements for the Army to be mission capable
    in current and future operations.
        General Curran. Yes, it does. Within the TRADOC, the Army Futures
    Center will lead the Army in developing all aspects of doctrine,
    organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
    and facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions to meet the requirements of a
    modularized Army.
        To fully realize the contribution of Army capabilities to the joint
    fight, we now work through the Joint Capabilities and Integration and
    Development System (JCIDS) to articulate Army capability requirements.
    JCIDS is the top-down process involving functionally-focused teams
    centered on developing required capabilities and effects rather than
    systems. TRADOC executes the JCIDS process by analyzing Army
    warfighting concepts derived from strategic guidance, the Joint
    Operations Concept and subordinate joint operating, functional, and
    integrating concepts. These concepts describe how the future force will
    operate, the conditions and environment in which it must operate, its
    required capabilities in terms of missions and effects, and its
    defining physical and operational characteristics. We analyze these
    required capabilities to isolate the tasks, conditions and standards
    that the force must perform. We assess these tasks to determine gaps in
    capability that pose sufficient operational risk to constitute a
    capability need requiring a solution.
        Our challenge is to identify desired warfighting capabilities and
    balance the application of resources between current modernization and
    the future force. Through the Futures Center we develop a broadly based
    integrated vision of future requirements, both Army and joint. We
    integrate the development of Army and joint doctrine for needed
    capabilities, and support the Army in resource development and in the
    acquiring the DOTMLPF means of producing capabilities. Current and
    future combatant commanders require that these capability and
    prioritization decisions be made in a joint context, informed by our
    Nation's goals and objectives. The Department of Defense, with the Army
    in full support, continues to fine tune the planning and programming
    processes so that prioritization decisions support both current and
    future operations, and most importantly, in a joint context. We are
    aggressively seeking analysis, backed with the best joint
    experimentation, combined with threat assessments to drive our
    decisionmaking processes.

        26. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton,
    General Casey, and General Curran, what impact have the lessons learned
    from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom had on near- and
    far-term requirements?
        Mr. Bolton and General Casey. The Army has systematically captured
    all emerging requirements from OIF/OEF operations and is currently
    analyzing them across all Doctrine, Training, Leader Development,
    Organizational, Material, and Soldier (DTLOMS) domains. All
    requirements will be operationally based, and joint capabilities
    focused, as they are developed to support the combatant commander's
    operational capabilities gaps. A material requirement will only be
    developed for a capability gap only after all DTLOMS solutions are
    deemed unable to solve the required capability.
        General Curran. The Army maintains an in-theater presence through
    the Center for Army Lessons Learned to capture lessons learned.
    Additionally, through interface with many stakeholders, including U.S.
    Central Command, we are able to draw insights from both Operation
    Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The SBCT provides a good
    example of the impact of lessons learned. The Stryker has demonstrated
    its ability to be a highly reliable combat vehicle. It has been able to
    rapidly reach its destination and deliver soldiers rested and able to
    execute dismounted operations. With the organic equipment issued in the
    SBCT it is capable of interacting with all Army forces. Additionally,
    the SBCT can conduct information and voice information exchange with
    other services command, control, communications, computers,
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) equipment at
    varying levels depending on distance.
        We continue to analyze the SBCT organizational construct to glean
    lessons to be spiraled either into other current force units, or into
    the future force. Examples include positive impacts of robust
    reconnaissance assets and increased situational awareness at lower
    tactical levels. We are also looking hard, from a Stryker platform
    perspective, at metrics such as the operational readiness rate and the
    mean miles between failure because of the unit's high operation tempo.
    Finally, insights drawn from Operation Iraqi Freedom provide anecdotal
    underpinnings and support for many Future Combat System-equipped Unit
    of Action concepts and requirements such as Blue Force Tracking.
    Improvements will continue to be made based upon what we learn and will
    be applied accordingly to current or future force designs.
        So far, the lessons learned have served to anecdotally underpin or
    support many future force UA and FCS concepts and requirements.
    Additionally, lessons learned have also influenced some refinement of
    future force concepts and requirements such as how to detect and
    neutralize improvised explosive devices, and our approach to mine
    detection concepts and requirements.
        Within the Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Futures Center,
    Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab, and others are reviewing lessons
    learned for application to concepts, operational and organizational
    plans, requirements documents, and operational architectures to
    identify gaps in concepts and requirements. Lessons learned have
    already informed the design of the future force and will continue to be
    examined for application to the future force.

        27. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. Secretary Bolton,
    General Casey, and General Curran, have these lessons learned had an
    impact on Army priorities?
        Mr. Bolton and General Casey. Certainly, Since September 11, 2001,
    the Army's top priority has been to win the global war on terrorism.
    The experiences from the last 2\1/2\ years have refined specific
    priorities, to which the Army has responded. As we prepared for
    Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army established priorities for
    supplemental funding to address urgent operational needs, such as
    Interceptor Body Armor, the Rapid Fielding Initiative, and Blue Force
    Tracking. Since then, our focus has shifted to the stabilization effort
    in Iraq and force protection, such as Uparmored High Mobility Multi-
    Wheeled Vehicles, Aviation Survivability Equipment, and Add-on
    Ballistic Vehicle Armor. In each of these areas, the Army has adjusted
    its priorities within its base budget to expand and accelerate fielding
    of these key programs. Major high priority initiatives captured in the
    Army Focus Areas--the Soldier, Modularity, Active Component Rebalance,
    and Force Stabilization-Zero provide the changes necessary for the Army
    to successfully execute the global war on terrorism while ensuring our
    ability to provide the commanders of tomorrow with Joint and
    Expeditionary Forces with campaign qualities.
        General Curran. Yes. Generating more combat power, and thereby
    increasing rotational forces, is the Army's top priority. The lessons
    learned from recent and ongoing operations highlight the need to
    address this priority. Accordingly, the Army is creating modular
    brigade sized organizations to increase combat power and move us in the
    direction of Future Combat Systems equipped units of action. The Army
    is also implementing lessons learned to improve the training and design
    of future Army Aviation forces.
        Lesson learned encouraged us to reinvigorate training to ensure all
    soldiers embrace the warrior ethos. Lesson learned informed the
    rebalancing of Active and Reserve Forces to enhance the capabilities of
    both. Lessons learned are helping us to reset the force in order to
    best prepare for the future during this time of dynamic activity and
    change. Lesson learned guide us in our continuous improvement of leader
    development and education systems to better train, educate and grow
    leaders that are the centerpiece of a joint and expeditionary Army with
    campaign capabilities. Finally, lessons learned from OEF and OIF have
    highlighted both opportunities and needs for enhancing current forces
    while providing insights for future force development.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

                                  END STRENGTH

        28. Senator Inhofe. General Casey, a lot of controversy has
    surrounded the discussion of adequate end strength. As I understand the
    proposal from the administration, you plan to dramatically reorganize
    the Army while fighting this global war and do all of it with a
    temporary increase of up to 30,000 active duty soldiers. You plan to
    convert up to 10,000 soldier jobs to civilian jobs and you plan to pay
    for all of this with supplemental funding, which is never assured until
    it is passed. I am concerned that we are trying to do too much with too
    few resources. I have been told by several leaders in the Pentagon
    during my time in Congress that underfunding defense is easier to deal
    with than volatile up and down funding that leads to wasted money over
    time. Are we setting the Army up for this unsure, volatile funding by
    relying on supplementals to pay for reorganization and temporary troop
    increases?
        General Casey. The increase in authorized end strength is directly
    related to the global war on terrorism and is being made under
    emergency authority. Because the increase is temporary, we believe the
    supplemental appropriations are a proper funding approach. We are
    funding the military to civilian conversions from the base budget. We
    understand that we are taking on a lot and that there is potential for
    volatile funding conditions, but we cannot afford not to undertake
    these efforts now. The temporary increase and military to civilian
    conversions give us the flexibility to reorganize our combat
    formations. They are essential to our efforts to win the global war on
    terror and provide the combat ready ground force that the joint team
    needs.

        29. Senator Inhofe. General Casey, how confident are you in the
    accuracy of the cost estimates you project for the reset and
    reorganization of your forces? Are we going to see you cut
    modernization programs to pay for this reorganization over time if you
    get the cost estimates wrong?
        General Casey. The Army Staff, commanders in the field, and our
    training and doctrine community are working hard to get this right. We
    are fairly confident in our estimates and are continually fine-tuning
    them as plans evolve. We plan to use supplemental funding to pay for
    this effort to the degree it is related to the global war on terrorism.
    Clearly, reset is part of that effort. Reorganizing these units at the
    same time makes good fiscal sense and prepares them for any future
    missions for which we need them. We're constantly balancing the needs
    of the current force with the future. Modernization programs are key to
    our future force, and we do not intend to cut them.

                                FORCE STRUCTURE

        30. Senator Inhofe. General Casey, as part of your plan to
    restructure the Guard and Reserve you are going to reduce the force
    structure and keep the end strength. This sounds like a good plan. Do
    you plan to keep the Reserves fielded with the latest equipment under
    this new plan so that we do not create a have and have not situation?
        General Casey. The Army has maintained a high operational tempo
    because we are a fully engaged, ready, relevant, and reliable force
    supporting the Nation's global war on terrorism. Since recent world
    events indicate that the Army will continue to be engaged in and
    support a wide variety of contingency operations, equipment
    modernization and sustainment efforts must be a high priority in order
    to continue to successfully meet the full spectrum of operations. The
    Army's Reserve components provide essential support and critical
    expansion capability to enable the Army to sustain itself over any
    duration across the full spectrum of military operations. The increased
    operational tempo throughout all Army components and the limited new
    equipment procurement funding requires that the Army prioritize new
    equipment procurement to best meet the current and emerging world
    threats. Balanced modernization is part of the overall strategy for
    weighing current requirements against the need to transform continually
    to meet the changing world threats. It is critical that new equipment
    programmed for the Army Reserve is procured and distributed as planned.
    New equipment procurement funding is limited, but the Army will
    continue to equip and modernize its Reserve components along a timeline
    that ensures equipment remains interoperable and compatible with the
    active component and to keep pace with the Army's ongoing
    transformation efforts through new equipment procurements, the
    redistribution of equipment from the active component, and the
    recapitalization or rebuilding existing systems.

                              FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM

        31. Senator Inhofe. General Curran, during my trip to California
    last week I saw your plans for the FCS. I am very impressed with the
    direction the Army is headed. My only concern is with survivability.
    How do you plan to provide adequate protection of soldiers in support
    vehicles in this new system?
        General Curran. Survivability of FCS is framed in the FCS
    Survivability key performance parameter (KPP) as a holistic approach
    that includes, but is much broader than ballistic protection. The KPP
    approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council states:
        Increment 1: The FCS Family of Systems (FoS) must provide essential
    protection to mounted and dismounted soldiers through the best
    combination of ground and air systems. Rationale: FCS-equipped unit of
    action characteristics of tactical dispersion and rapid offensive
    maneuver demand superior FCS FoS survivability against lethal and non-
    lethal threats. Integrated survivability of the FCS FoS must provide
    essential protection to soldiers while they perform their mission of
    seeing first, understanding first, acting first, and finishing
    decisively. Soldiers and leaders must be able to see themselves, the
    enemy, and the environment. The holistic system of systems
    survivability concept uses active and passive capabilities to see the
    enemy, maneuver out of contact, and destroy the enemy at extended
    ranges or in close contact. Cornerstone enabling capabilities include
    networked battle command, integration of signature management, active
    and passive protection systems, Land Warrior, early and long-range
    acquisition and targeting, network lethality, obscurants, dash speed
    and degradation of enemy detection and targeting.
        The focus is on protection of soldiers through active and passive
    capabilities. The holistic system of systems survivability concept uses
    active and passive capabilities to provide manned FCS crews as much, if
    not more, protection than current systems with the exception the
    passive defense capabilities of the M1 Abrams tank; however, the M1 is
    not invulnerable, either. The FCS ORD and the FCS Program system-of-
    systems specifications include specific thresholds for Manned Ground
    Vehicle (MGV) ballistic threats. Each FCS manned system must provide a
    best combination of detection avoidance, target acquisition avoidance,
    hit avoidance, ballistic protection, and kill avoidance. Specific
    metrics include protecting crews and passengers from life-threatening
    incapacitation resulting from: 14.5mm; 30 mm against frontal 60-degree
    arc; rocket-propelled grenade (RPG); ATGM; and high-explosive/high-
    explosive anti-tank (HF/HEAT), as a threshold capability, and kinetic
    energy (KE) effects, as an objective capability.

        32. Senator Inhofe. General Curran, the combat vehicles like Non-
    Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) have what seems to be adequate armor
    protection but the resupply vehicles that bring the beans and bullets
    to the front line don't. Why?
        General Curran. The future joint operational environment will be
    non-contiguous and have no ``front lines.'' Essential to the
    survivability of our forces will be superior situational awareness and
    decisionmaking, based on advanced C\4\ISR capabilities embedded at all
    levels. Blue Force Tracking during Operation Iraqi Freedom provides a
    glimpse of the power of a networked force.
        Survivability is much broader than ballistic protection; the focus
    is on protection of all soldiers, including those who ``bring the beans
    and bullets.'' Adequate armor protection is only one part of
    survivability. Extensive, passive, heavy armament protection of all
    manned platforms is neither feasible nor affordable for a balanced,
    effective force. The Army has been and will remain a hybrid force with
    a mix of platforms for maneuver and support forces and protection for
    each will be addressed. The design of future forces consists of a
    careful balance of transportability, lethality, interoperability and
    survivability.
        The FCS remains the material centerpiece of the Army's future force
    commitment and will reduce the presence of soldiers required to perform
    sustainment functions. However, even if FCS meets all expectations, we
    will remain a hybrid force for the foreseeable future, and we continue
    to seek ways to improve all of the platforms we will operate. What we
    seek in the future is to prevent the past disparity in protection
    between vehicles designed for combat and those intended for support.
    Solutions will exist across the doctrine, organizations, training,
    material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities.
        Throughout, soldiers will remain the centerpiece of our formations.
    Embedding the warrior ethos during initial military training is an
    example of a non-material solution to improve soldier protection. The
    effects of changes in organizations, material, doctrine and facilities
    are additive. Those of training are multiplicative. Those of leadership
    are exponential. Simultaneous consideration of current and future
    requirements will be the integrating mechanism in all our change
    processes. Change is already underway at the Combat Training Centers
    (CTC). In very short order, the threat environment has been transformed
    to reflect the complexity and ambiguity experienced by our deployed
    forces, not only at the Joint Readiness Training Center, but also at
    the National Training Center.

                            NON-LINE-OF-SIGHT CANNON

        33. Senator Inhofe. General Casey, after the cancellation of
    Crusader in 2002, Congress passed a law that required the fielding of
    an NLOS-C system no later than 2008. Plans that I have seen do not
    field a cannon in the traditional sense of fielding by 2008. They show
    a pre-production model being produced in 2007 as part of a prototype
    unit.
        But neither the current budget for fiscal year 2004 nor the
    President's budget request for fiscal year 2005 seems to fund this
    strategy. The current acquisition contract has no provisions in it to
    produce such a unit. I am told that a letter recently sent to Congress
    asks the committees to consider the production of a prototype to be the
    ``fielding'' mandated by law. The current program plan, contract, and
    funding seem inconsistent with each other and the law.
        It seems to me that asking the committees to change what the law
    means by ``fielding'' is counterproductive and will only delay the
    program. Shouldn't the Army be devoting its resources to resolving the
    technical issues and actually complying with the law, rather than
    trying to change what the law means?
        General Casey. The objective of the FCS program is to field an
    integrated combat capability at the unit level as opposed to developing
    individual systems. Central to this approach is the integrated
    development and acquisition of sensors, unmanned air and ground
    systems, and manned combat systems working together and connected by a
    network that provides increased combat effectiveness. The Army and the
    entire FCS development team are engaged in executing the integrated
    schedule and work plan that will achieve the objective of fielding
    transformational integrated capabilities in the shortest possible time.

        34. Senator Inhofe. General Casey, why aren't the resources needed
    to do this included in the President's budget for fiscal year 2005?
        General Casey. The NLOS-C is an integral and vitally important part
    of FCS. Accordingly we have made it the lead system of the FCS family
    of manned ground vehicles. It is the Army's position that embedding
    NLOS-C funding within the overall FCS program as approved by Congress
    in the fiscal year 2004 budget, enables the FCS system-of-systems
    approach. This plan includes completing requirements and functional
    reviews in 2004, completing preliminary design in 2005 and pre-
    production design in 2006, leading to assembly and delivery of the
    initial pre-production NLOS-C in fiscal year 2007. The Army's three
    primary manned ground vehicle industry partners for FCS--Boeing,
    General Dynamics, and United Defense--support this approach.
        The NLOS-C funding profile, to include fiscal year 2005, is in
    accordance with the above strategy. Again, if this approach is not
    acceptable to Congress, the Army's only recourse is to seek
    congressional relief from the law.

        35. Senator Inhofe. General Casey, is there a way to satisfy the
    requirements of the law in regard to this stage of the program without
    changing what the law means?
        General Casey. No. To separate NLOS-C from the overall FCS
    development, at this time, would be detrimental to the complex
    integration effort so critical to the success of the FCS program. The
    NLOS-C design would not be compatible with the integrated
    architectures, to include sustainment, developed specifically for the
    unit of action. In order to fully field a system in the traditional
    sense would cause the creation of a new cannon program.

        36. Senator Inhofe. General Casey, what are your plans for the
    funding stream for the NLOS-C?
        General Casey. The funding stream necessary to support development
    of the NLOS-C as part of FCS system-of-systems development effort
    within the FCS development and demonstration phase is in accordance
    with the fiscal year 2005 President's budget.

                                STRYKER BRIGADES

        37. Senator Inhofe. General Curran, I am going to Iraq to see the
    Stryker brigade. I supported the development of the system. However, I
    have been concerned that the brigade does not have a self-propelled
    artillery piece. The system in place is towed while the rest of Stryker
    is self-propelled.
        Before Secretary Rumsfeld would support the last two Stryker
    brigades he challenged the Army to go back and enhance the capability
    for the 5th and 6th Brigades. The Army submitted a report that included
    Comanche as one of the proposed enhancements. With Comanche gone, it
    seems the addition of a self-propelled artillery system would be a
    capability. Is there a plan to provide an upgrade in capability to the
    Stryker brigade?
        General Curran. Planned enhancements to the Stryker brigades will
    incorporate still-developing technologies in the areas of aviation,
    fires, network communications, and sensors. The first enhancement will
    be to the communications networking in order to enhance satellite
    communications by offering high-speed compatibility and
    interoperability with the joint forces. Another enhancement will be to
    improve sensor capabilities within the Stryker brigade by adding 10-
    meter masts on Stryker vehicles. The masts will allow soldiers to
    employ the sensor system from a concealed position and identify targets
    up to 10 kilometers away. The next generation enhancements to
    communications and sensors will improve soldiers' abilities to conduct
    command and control, communications, logistics, target acquisition and
    intelligence.
        Further, Stryker brigades 1 through 4 will each have 12 M-198 155mm
    howitzers. Army's current plan is that Stryker brigades 5 and 6 will be
    enhanced with 18 of the new lightweight 155mm howitzers followed by
    retrofits to SBCTs 1-4. The Army does not currently plan to provide a
    self-propelled howitzer capability within the Stryker brigades.
    Rotations for both Stryker brigades 1 and 2 to our National Training
    Center and Joint Readiness Training Center validated that the current
    in-lieu-ofs (M198 howitzers) provide the necessary fires capability
    required for the Stryker brigades. Most important, the Army continues
    to review performance of the Stryker brigades in order to identify
    necessary enhancements, as evidenced by the decision to apply selected
    enhancements to brigades 5 and 6, then retrofit the fleet. We will
    continue to do so in the future.

        38. Senator Inhofe. General Curran, which enhancements are funded
    and which enhancements are not funded?
        General Curran. The Army's enhancements for SBCTs 5 & 6 are
    designed to make the brigade more combined arms capable and joint
    interoperable. Sensors and shooters are key. Enhancements will augment
    capabilities in the areas of aviation, fires, network communications,
    and sensors. For aviation, the Army's original proposal was to field a
    package of 12 Comanche helicopters to SBCT 5. With the recent
    cancellation of the Comanche program, the aviation addition to the SBCT
    enhancements is being revisited. In the area of fires, the Army is
    fielding the LW 155mm howitzer to SBCT 5 in fiscal year 2006, SBCTs 1-4
    in fiscal year 2008, and SBCT 6 in fiscal year 2009. The LW 155
    provides a lighter, more deployable, more mobile, more responsive,
    self-locating, digital firing platform that will fire precision
    munitions. Network communications enhancements include the fielding of
    five SMART-T Satellite Communications terminals to each SBCT between
    fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2007, 53 TOCs to TOC JTRS for each
    SBCT that will be fielded between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year
    2009, and the SSS-BBN, WAN that will be fielded to SBCTs 5 and 6 in
    fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007. The RDT&E and initial
    procurement for a 10-meter sensor mast for the brigade were also added.
    The mounted mast increases the SBCT's capability for target acquisition
    and identification from concealed positions. All of the enhancements
    for SBCTs 5 and 6 are fully funded as described in POM 2005-2009. The
    retrofits of SBCT 1-4 are also funded for LW 155, SMART-T, and JTRS.
    The SSS-BBN and mounted mast enhancements for SBCTs 1-4 are being
    addressed in POM 2006-2011. On 8 December 2003, the acting Secretary of
    the Army, Chief of Staff of the Army, and Army G-8 briefed the
    Secretary of Defense on the Army's proposed enhancements for SBCTs 5
    and 6 as described above. The SECDEF approved the Army's plan for the
    enhancement of the 5th and 6th SBCTs, and authorized the Army to spend
    fiscal year 2004 funds on these brigades.

        39. Senator Inhofe. General Curran, doesn't something like the
    NLOS-C make sense as part of the enhancement package? It would give
    more crew protection and a much smaller crew size as well as increased
    lethality. Why can't an early version of NLOS-C be part of that
    enhancement?
        General Curran. Although the capabilities of the NLOS-C will be
    exceptional, and are appealing as a component of the Stryker brigade,
    fundamental to all our design efforts is the need to field effective
    systems of systems. The NLOS-C is an important component of the FCS and
    shares common FCS characteristics in areas such as communications and
    sustainment. The technical and support characteristics of the Stryker
    units are different than the characteristics of the NLOS-C system.
    Mixing the two types of systems, NLOS-C and Stryker, within one
    organization would reduce the capabilities of their respective families
    due to incompatibilities in force structure, sustainment, and
    communications. The Army would face significant demands on resources in
    order to redesign NLOS-C and Stryker platforms to make them compatible
    within their respective families of systems. In order to balance risk
    across the Army, early versions of NLOS-C will not be part of Stryker
    brigade enhancements.

        [Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2005

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 2004

                                   U.S. Senate,
                               Subcommittee on Airland,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                      NAVY AND AIR FORCE AVIATION PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m. in
    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
    Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Sessions, McCain,
    Chambliss, Lieberman, and Pryor.
        Majority staff members present: Regina A. Dubey, research
    assistant; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; and
    Thomas L. Mackenzie, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
    professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
    member; and Peter K. Levine, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell, Sara R.
    Mareno, and Bridget E. Ward.
        Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
    assistant to Senator McCain; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
    Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
    Chambliss; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman;
    and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Sessions. All right. We will commence our meeting,
    and we will have some other Senators join us before the
    subcommittee is concluded.
        Today, the Airland Subcommittee meets to receive testimony
    from a distinguished panel of witnesses to discuss those
    aviation programs which this subcommittee has oversight
    responsibility. We are pleased to have John Young, the
    Assistant Secretary of Navy for Research Acquisition and
    Development; Dr. Marvin Sambur, the Assistant Secretary of the
    Air Force--we are glad you are here. Vice Admiral John Nathman,
    Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements--it
    is good to see you. Lieutenant General Michael Hough, the
    Deputy Commander of Marine Corps for Aviation; and Lieutenant
    General Ronald Keys, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force
    for Air and Space Operations.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for taking time out of your schedule
    to be with us. We do have an oversight function, and we need to
    talk about some of the significant programs that are ongoing.
        Tactical aircraft from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
    Force have delivered spectacular performances in Operation
    Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Air
    supremacy was never challenged in these operations, giving our
    ground forces freedom to maneuver, while also being able to
    call on our air assets to deliver precision-guided munitions
    (PGMs). These weapons have allowed our aircraft to stand off,
    beyond the range of lethal surface-to-air defenses. Instead of
    multiple aircraft being required to destroy a single target,
    now a single aircraft has the capability to destroy multiple
    targets.
        I want to extend my sincere appreciation to the brave men
    and women who have flown these missions, and to all those who
    support them. In fact, we seek not just air superiority but air
    domination. It is key to our whole defense strategy, it seems
    to me, and I am glad that we will have the opportunity to
    discuss whether or not we can maintain that.
        With the exception of the new F/A-18 Super Hornet, which
    first saw combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom, these missions
    were flown with legacy aircraft, most designed in the 1970s.
    New aircraft are in varying stages of development to replace
    these aircraft. The F/A-22 Raptor is in low-rate production and
    is preparing to begin its initial operational test and
    evaluation.
        The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is in system design and
    development. Further on the horizon are the joint unmanned
    combat air systems (JUCAS), whose concepts are being explored
    by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). One
    of the capabilities that is key to enabling not only our
    tactical aircraft, but also our long-range strike and mobility
    aircraft, is the aerial refueling delivered by a fleet of
    tanker aircraft. The subcommittee is interested in hearing
    about the progress of our programs' production rates to restock
    our inventories of precision-guided weapons, and progress to
    capitalize our fleet of tanker aircraft.
        In a hearing later this month, on March 30, the
    subcommittee will review the status of Army aviation programs.
    Last year, when this subcommittee received testimony, we were
    told the F/A-22 was going to begin its initial operational test
    and evaluation in October 2003. At that time, production
    deliveries of the aircraft were behind the contractual delivery
    dates by eight aircraft, and the aircraft was experiencing
    software stability problems. The JSF was starting its design
    reviews. The Navy and Air Force were on independent tracks in
    concept exploration for unmanned combat aerial vehicles
    (UCAVs). The subcommittee was aware that the Air Force was
    negotiating a proposal to lease KC-767 tanker aircraft, but no
    proposal had been submitted. So much has changed in this past
    year, and this hearing will be an opportunity to bring us up-
    to-date.
        So thank you, again, gentlemen, for your service to your
    country. I have been thoroughly impressed with the intensity of
    interest, time, and effort everyone in the Defense Department
    has given to supporting our men and women in uniform in combat.
    You are making incredible sacrifices, also, to make sure that
    those soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have the finest
    equipment as soon as possible.
        I want to thank Senator Lieberman for his service as the
    ranking member on this subcommittee. He has a long history of
    dedicated service to the Senate. He has the respect of Senators
    on both sides of the aisle, and he is an expert and most
    knowledgeable on defense matters, and been most supportive of
    defense matters. It has just been a pleasure for me to work
    with him and to learn from him.
        Senator Lieberman.

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN

        Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind
    words. I wish you had had a vote in the Democratic presidential
    primaries. [Laughter.]
        But getting back to the subject----
        Senator Sessions. You are right about that.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you. It has been a great honor to
    work with you, in truly bipartisan fashion, on this
    subcommittee to support our national security and the people
    who protect us every day.
        I want to join you in expressing gratitude to the witnesses
    for being here today, but also, through them, to pay tribute to
    the extraordinary heroism, professionalism, and effectiveness
    of the coalition Armed Forces presently engaged in Iraq. All
    those who are serving our country in the Middle East right now
    really represent the bravest and the brightest that our country
    has to offer. It makes our future a lot safer and better than
    it would otherwise be.
        It is against that backdrop of active duty, of continued
    bravery and exemplary performance, that you have convened this
    session, Mr. Chairman, of the Airland Subcommittee, to discuss
    the present and future of our aviation programs. It is an
    exciting and inspiring backdrop, indeed, and it does remind us
    every day, as I know it reminds those who are our witnesses
    today, of the importance of what we do. In this case, we have
    the honor and the opportunity in this subcommittee to begin,
    for the Senate and Congress, deliberation on matters that
    ultimately will result in lives saved, though that may be years
    down the road, in conflicts, some of which we can foresee today
    and others that are beyond our imagination. So this is
    important work that we are honored to be involved in.
        To that end, I appreciate the opportunity to speak to,
    listen to, and ask some questions of the witnesses. I want to
    mention a few of the areas that I am interested in. Some
    overlap with what the chairman has said.
        I do note, with dismay, that the testing of the F/A-22
    Raptor has been delayed yet again. I have been a strong
    supporter of this program as long as I have been here in the
    Senate. Last year at this time, the Air Force was predicting
    that the program, which is so essential to our continued
    American air superiority, would start operational testing and
    evaluation in October of last year. Since that time, there have
    been continuing problems with the F-22 in two major areas.
    First, delayed aircraft deliveries have slowed the progress of
    the development testing leading up to the initial operational
    test and evaluation. Second, problems with the aircraft's
    software have apparently proven harder to correct than
    anticipated. I want to hear from our witnesses today about how
    we are doing on both of those programs, and I hope that we will
    have some good news.
        Third, I am troubled that the JSF may have hit a snag since
    last year. The concerns that were expressed at the comparable
    hearing about a potential weight problem apparently have become
    real, and I do want to talk about that. It is also not
    encouraging that we are only 2 years into the system
    development and demonstration phase of the program, and are
    presented with a cost increase that is estimated from $33
    billion to more than $40 billion for development of the JSF.
    Such price inflation also usually means, unfortunately, that
    there will be increases in recurring production costs. In the
    threat environment we are operating in and the always
    constrained resource environment, we have to ask some important
    questions about that.
        Whichever the case, I really would urge the Services and
    the contracting team to do everything it possibly can--I am
    speaking here of the JSF--to fix the problem now, in such a way
    that it will not create a bow wave of further complications as
    we approach delivery dates. Hasty weight-reduction fixes that I
    have seen in my time here have been responsible for substantial
    cost increases in other aircraft developments later in the
    programs. I do not think any of us want to see that history
    repeated in the JSF program, which really is a very exciting
    transformational airplane.
        Was it Benjamin Franklin who said, ``Haste makes waste?''
    But if not, it should have been. [Laughter.]
        But the point is that we really need you to get this fixed
    now, and then go forward together to develop this extraordinary
    airplane.
        Once again, I thank you, and I look forward to your
    testimony.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Very good. We do have some questions to
    ask about those programs, and I thank you for those comments.
        Let's see, I believe Secretary Young and Secretary Sambur,
    you were going to present the statements. If you would do that,
    then we will ask some questions.

      STATEMENT OF JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
    NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION; ACCOMPANIED BY
    VADM JOHN B. NATHMAN, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR
      WARFARE REQUIREMENTS AND PROGRAMS; AND LT. GEN. MICHAEL A.
       HOUGH, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION, HEADQUARTERS

        Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lieberman, it is a great
    privilege to appear before the subcommittee to discuss the
    status of Navy and Marine Corps aviation programs and the
    fiscal year 2005 budget request. Admiral Nathman, the Deputy
    Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and
    Programs, and Lieutenant General Hough, the Deputy Commandant
    for Aviation, are with me today on behalf of the Department of
    the Navy.
        Your Navy and Marine Corps team, as you noted, has
    performed in an exceptional manner in Operations Enduring
    Freedom and Iraqi Freedom that, last year, underscored the high
    return on your investment in combat readiness, our people, and
    our unique maritime warfighting capabilities. The fiscal year
    2005 request includes funds for 108 aircraft, reflecting our
    continuous successful efforts to increase the number of
    aircraft we are purchasing to recapitalize our fleet. Within
    these efforts, it is also important to improve how we buy
    aircraft and combat systems to recapitalize tactical aviation.
        Congress' steady calls for jointness and discipline in
    acquisition in support of new initiatives has enabled the
    Department of the Navy to take a different approach to
    contracts. I would like to emphasize some key examples.
        Congress' support of multi-year contracts for the F/A-18E/
    F, KC-130J, and the E-2C have allowed us to stabilize budgets
    and work with our industry partners to control costs. The
    Department has also worked to link incentives to performance in
    order to measure and reward performance and focus management
    attention on problems. Such incentives have helped the H-1
    upgrade program recover from the Nunn-McCurdy breach. In new
    contracts, we have also worked to shift fees to the later
    phases of a program when we can appropriately measure and
    reward results.
        Secretary Sambur and I have worked together successfully on
    the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), JSF, C\4\I systems, and
    other programs to create jointness in common programs between
    the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.
        The fiscal year 2005 President's budget request balances
    continued recapitalization by obtaining new capabilities, and
    reducing operating costs, while simultaneously sustaining the
    legacy fleet of aircraft that are performing magnificently in
    current operations. We have also sought to fully fund our
    aircraft production programs, while adding funds to develop
    important new capabilities, such as JSF, the advanced Hawkeye,
    the E/A-18G, and the multi-mission maritime aircraft (MMA).
        The JSF, as you noted, will provide our Naval Forces with
    greater survivability, commonality, range, and capability. The
    air system preliminary design review was completed in June
    2003. The first F-135 production engine successfully began
    tests in October 2003. The short takeoff and vertical landing
    (STOVL) lift system will begin testing in April 2004. Over 70
    percent of the production drawings have been released for the
    first conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) air vehicle. The
    Department decided to allocate approximately 1 additional year
    to the design effort in order to refine the three variant
    designs and deliver greater capability to the warfighter.
        The V-22 flight-test program is proceeding with discipline,
    and continues to successfully demonstrate that platform's great
    capability.
        The budget also provides funds to sustain the P-3 fleet and
    its high operating tempo, while also moving ahead with the
    development of the MMA to replace the aging P-3 fleet.
        Finally, the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS)
    Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) system will provide a multiple
    sensor, persistent maritime ISR capability that will allow us
    to operate and monitor maritime and littoral areas. The
    Department has determined that at least three candidates can
    potentially meet the BAMS requirement, so the Navy is
    proceeding with a competitive program. All of these programs
    contribute to an integrated warfare strategy, which relies on
    knowledge, persistence, and precision to bring combat power to
    bear on an adversary at rates faster than the enemy's response
    and reaction times.
        Even as we plan for the future, we are also focused on the
    challenges of today. In support of the 1st Marine Expeditionary
    Forces (IMEF) return to Iraq taking place as we speak, the
    acquisition team has worked with IMEF to install aircraft
    survivability equipment on helicopters, to add armor kits to
    vehicles, and to provide systems to address the improvised
    explosive device threat.
        Secretary England directed the establishment of a
    formalized process, we call ``Operation Respond,'' to rapidly
    react to additional technological and materiel requirements
    generated by the deployed Marine Corps. A senior Navy and
    Marine Corps team, co-chaired by Lieutenant General Hanlon and
    myself, will review and coordinate technical and materiel
    solutions for deployed units' problems, and utilize the
    expertise throughout the Department of the Navy to expedite
    solutions to counter these threats.
        Mr. Chairman, out of respect for the subcommittee, I will
    stop, leaving much more to say. You and the members of the
    subcommittee have been key factors in all of this progress. I
    offer my great thanks on behalf of myself, the Department, and
    the sailors and marines who will rely on the equipment we
    acquire. Congressional support for the Navy and Marine Corps
    aviation plan is essential to achieving the vision we have, and
    I thank you for your consideration of our requests.
        [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Young, Admiral
    Nathman, and Lieutenant General Hough follows:]

       Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. John J. Young, Jr., VADM John B.
               Nathman, USN, and Lt. Gen. Michael A. Hough, USMC
        Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
    for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of
    the Navy's fiscal year 2005 Acquisition and Research, Development,
    Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) programs.
        Your Navy and Marine Corps Team's outstanding performance in the
    global war on terrorism and Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi
    Freedom (OIF) last year underscored the high return on your investment
    in our combat readiness, our people, and our unique maritime
    warfighting capabilities. Your return on investment included the lift
    for 94 percent of the Nation's joint warfighting capability and more
    than 8,000 naval combat sorties in support of OIF. It demonstrated the
    latest technology in surveillance, command and control and persistent
    attack operating from sovereign U.S. territory and exploiting the vast
    maneuver space provided by the sea.
        The global war on terrorism, OEF and OIF demonstrated the enormous
    contributions Naval Forces make to the effectiveness of joint and
    coalition forces. Analyses of these conflicts indicate that the
    warfighting concepts, capabilities development process, and advanced
    technologies we are pursuing in our Naval Power 21 vision are on the
    right vector. Experimentation with forward deployed Expeditionary
    Strike Groups has increased credible global combat capability with
    which to fight the war on terror and project power. We have leveraged
    OIF experience to implement the Fleet Response Plan (FRP)--increasing
    the number of Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) deployed or readily
    deployable. The Navy and Marine Corps Team now faces a rare inflection
    point in history with technological infusions and several new ship
    classes coming on line within the next few years. This year, we will
    pursue distributed and joint networked solutions that could
    revolutionize our capability. With the fiscal year 2005 budget request
    we intend to:

             Shape the 21st century workforce and deepen the growth
            and development of our people, and
             Accelerate our investment in Naval Power 21 to
            recapitalize and transform our force and improve its ability to
            operate as an effective component of our joint warfighting
            team.
            developing transformational joint seabasing capabilities
        The Naval Power 21 vision defines the capabilities that the 21st
    century Navy will deliver. Our overarching transformational operating
    concept is seabasing; a national capability, for projecting and
    sustaining naval power and joint forces that assures joint access by
    leveraging the operational maneuver of sovereign, distributed, and
    networked forces operating globally from the sea. Seabasing unifies our
    capabilities for projecting offensive power, defensive power, command
    and control, mobility and sustainment around the world. It will enable
    commanders to generate high tempo operational maneuver by making use of
    the sea as a means of gaining and maintaining advantage.
        Sea Shield is the projection of layered defensive power. It seeks
    maritime superiority to assure access, and to project defense overland.
        Sea Strike is the projection of precise and persistent offensive
    power. It leverages persistence, precision, stealth, and new force
    packaging concepts to increase operational tempo and reach. It includes
    strikes by air, missiles, and by maneuver by Marine Air Ground Task
    Forces (MAGTF) supported by sea based air and long-range gunfires.
        Sea Base is the projection of operational independence. It provides
    the Joint Force Commander the capability to retain command and control
    and logistics at mobile, secure locations at sea and enables
    Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and Ship-To-Objective-Maneuver (STOM).
        FORCEnet is the operational construct and architectural framework
    for naval warfare in the joint, information age. It integrates
    warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms and weapons
    into a networked, distributed combat system.
        Sea Trial is the Navy's recently created process for formulating
    and testing innovative operational concepts, most of which harness
    advanced technologies and are often combined with new organizational
    configurations, in pursuit of dramatic improvements in warfighting
    effectiveness. Sea Trial concept development and experimentation (CD&E)
    is being conducted in close coordination with the Marine Corps combat/
    force development process and reflects a sustained commitment to
    innovation. These efforts tie warfare innovation to the core
    operational challenges facing the future joint force.
        Sea Enterprise is the flagship effort for freeing up additional
    resources to support military transformation initiatives through
    streamlining naval business processes. Involving the Navy headquarters,
    the systems commands and the Fleet, Sea Enterprise seeks to improve
    organizational alignment, refine requirements and reinvest savings to
    buy the platforms and systems needed to transform the naval
    contribution to the joint force.
        As a means of accelerating our investment in Naval Power 21, we
    employ the Naval Capability Development Process (NCDP) and
    Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS). The NCDP and EFDS take a
    concepts-to-capabilities approach to direct investment to achieve
    future warfighting wholeness. The NCDP takes a sea-based, offensive
    approach that provides power projection and access with distributed and
    networked forces featuring unmanned and off board nodes with
    penetrating surveillance via pervasive sensing and displaying that
    rapidly deliver precision effects. The EFDS assesses, analyzes and
    integrates MAGTF warfighting concepts, and requirements in a naval and
    joint context to support the overarching operational concept of Joint
    Seabasing. Both processes are designed to incorporate innovative
    products of service and joint concept development and experimentation
    (CD&E) and science and technology (S&T) efforts.
        The fiscal year 2005 budget request reflects the investments that
    will most improve our warfighting capability by developing and
    investing in future sea based and expeditionary capabilities for the
    Navy and Marine Corps.

                               AVIATION PROGRAMS

        The fiscal year 2005 President's budget request balances continued
    recapitalization in obtaining new capabilities and reducing operating
    costs while simultaneously sustaining the legacy fleet aircraft that
    are performing magnificently in current operations. Taking advantage of
    multi-year procurement (MYP) to achieve significant savings in
    procurement accounts, the Navy has entered, or will soon enter numerous
    MYP contracts that will define the future of weapons systems and
    further investment. The Department's fiscal year 2005 budget request
    will utilize MYP arrangements for the F/A-18E/F (both airframe and
    engine), the KC-130J and the E-2C to maximize the return on our
    investment. Our proposed plan will procure 44 tactical, fixed wing
    aircraft (42 F/A-18E/F, and 2 E-2C), as well as 8 MV-22, and 9 upgraded
    UH-1Y/AH-1Z helicopters. This plan also continues the development of
    the F-35, the E-2C Advanced Hawkeye, the EA-18G, Multi-mission Maritime
    Aircraft (MMA), and the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) and initiates the
    Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
    development.
    Sea Shield
        Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA)/P-3C
        Current P-3 aircraft are flying in excess of 150 hours per month in
    support of OEF and OIF. This high flight utilization requires special
    structural inspections to keep the aircraft safely flying and the Navy
    has developed a comprehensive sustainment, modernization, and re-
    capitalization plan for the force. The fiscal year 2005 budget request
    reflects $56.9 million for Special Structural Inspections (SSI) and
    Special Structural Inspections--Kits (SSI-K), which will allow for
    sustainment and continued operation of approximately 148 aircraft. The
    fiscal year 2005 budget request also reflects $53.8 million for ASW
    Improvement Program (AIP) to continue to meet COCOM requirements. To
    replace these critical aircraft, the Navy is procuring an MMA. The
    program is completing component advanced development (CAD) and in
    December 2003 received proposals for the System Development and
    Demonstration (SDD) contract from both competitors (Boeing with 737
    commercial derivative and Lockheed-Martin with Orion 21 military
    derivative). Evaluations of these proposals are ongoing to support down
    select to final system provider and contract award after Milestone B in
    May 2004. The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $496 million for
    continuation of SDD of MMA. Our comprehensive and balanced approach has
    allowed for re-capitalization of these critical assets.
        MH-60R and MH-60S
        The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $409 million in procurement
    and $79 million in RDT&E for the replacement and upgrade of Light
    Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) MK III SH-60B and carrier-based
    SH-60F helicopters to the new configuration designated as MH-60R.
    Procurement quantity was reduced to mitigate delays in developmental
    and operational testing. Testing identified stability issues with the
    Multi-mode Radar (MMR) and software performance issues with MMR/IFF
    Interrogator, electronic support measures and acoustic systems. Fiscal
    year 2005 funding will fully support a revised procurement profile.
        The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $400 million in procurement
    and $81 million in RDT&E funds for the MH-60S, which is the Navy's
    primary combat support helicopter designed to support Carrier and
    Expeditionary Strike Groups. It will replace a number of legacy
    platforms with a newly manufactured H-60 airframe. The MH-60S program
    entered into a full rate 5-year MYP contract with the Army in September
    2002, for up to 237 aircraft. The fiscal year 2005 budget request
    supports the recently awarded MH-60 Common Cockpit MYP. The $423
    million contract delivers common cockpits for both MH-60R and MH-60S
    aircraft, saving the Navy up to $63 million.
        AIM-9X
        The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $35.2 million for 157
    missiles. AIM-9X was deployed to operational sites last summer after a
    successful LRIP 4 decision. Test asset availability that slowed the
    Operational Test was overcome, and the operational evaluation (OPEVAL)
    completed in late summer. The Full Rate Production decision is
    scheduled for March 2004.
    Sea Strike
        F/A-18 E/F
        The F/A-18E/F is a significant step forward in improving the
    survivability and strike capability of the carrier air wing. The Super
    Hornet provides a 40-percent increase in combat radius, 50 percent
    increase in endurance, and 25 percent increase in weapons payload over
    our older Hornets. Three Super Hornet squadrons deployed during OIF as
    Fleet transition of the F/A-18E/F continues. The latest squadron to
    stand up is based with the carrier air wing forward deployed in Japan.
        The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $2.98 billion for 42 F/A-18 E/
    F aircraft for the first year of the second 5-year MYP contract (fiscal
    year 2005 to fiscal year 2009). The Super Hornet has used a spiral
    development approach to incorporate new technologies, such as the Joint
    Helmet Mounted Cueing System, Advanced Targeting Forward Looking
    Infrared (ATFLIR), Shared Reconnaissance Pod System (SHARP) and
    Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) data link. Last
    year, the ATFLIR successfully passed the Full Rate Production (FRP)
    decision, while the Advanced Electronically Scanned Antenna Radar
    system received Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) authority and the
    SHARP pod completed a successful early operational capability (EOC)
    onboard U.S.S. Nimitz with VFA-41.
        F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
        Our recapitalization plan includes the JSF, a stealthy, multi-role
    fighter aircraft designed jointly to be an enabler for Naval Power 21.
    The fiscal year 2005 budget request contains $2.2 billion for
    continuation of SDD on the JSF. The JSF will enhance the Department of
    the Navy's precision strike capability with unprecedented stealth,
    range, sensor fusion, improved radar performance, combat ID and
    electronic attack capabilities compared to legacy platforms. CV JSF
    complements the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G in providing long range strike
    capability and much improved persistence over the battlefield. STOVL
    JSF combines the multi-role versatility of the F/A-18 and the basing
    flexibility of the AV-8B. The commonality designed into the JSF program
    will reduce acquisition and operating costs of Navy and Marine Corps
    tactical aircraft and allow enhanced interoperability with our Allies
    and sister Services.
        The JSF has completed the second year of its development program,
    and the program continues working to translate concept designs to three
    producible variants. The JSF development activities for propulsion,
    subsystems, avionics, and autonomic logistics have gone well. The Air
    System Preliminary Design Review was completed in June 2003, and the
    F135 First Engine to Test was successfully completed in October 2003.
    The airframe design effort, however, is taking longer and is more
    complex than had been originally anticipated. Additional design work is
    required to address technical issues, primarily weight projections,
    resulting in a SDD cost increase, SDD schedule delays, and a 1-year
    slip to starting LRIP to fiscal year 2007 vice fiscal year 2006. These
    technical issues have put pressure on our ability to meet several
    performance specification requirements as well as some [M.A.1] Key
    Performance Parameters. We believe current issues are solvable within
    normal parameters of design fluctuation and we are re-planning JSF SDD
    to make sure we succeed. Specifically, our SDD plan recognizes that
    STOVL performance is absolutely vital. As such, we are focused to
    ensure STOVL viability for our warfighters; aggressively pursuing trade
    studies to improve performance by reducing weight; and aggressively
    pursuing propulsion enhancements to improve performance. An independent
    review team is also examining the program to make sure we are following
    the correct path.
        V-22
        The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $918 million for eight
    MV-22s and $304 million for continued testing and evaluation. The V-22
    Osprey resumed flight-testing in May 2002, and it has flown in excess
    of 1,500 hours. Flight-testing continues along an event-driven schedule
    and is going well. In August 2003, OSD directed the Services to reduce
    the number of aircraft from 20 to 17 in fiscal year 2006. Subsequently,
    the aircraft procurement ramp should increase by approximately 50
    percent per year and use the savings accrued from the production
    adjustments for reinvestment into program interoperability improvements
    and cost reduction initiatives.
        CH-53X
        The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $103.1 million RDT&E to begin
    the SDD phase of the CH-53X program. The Marine Corps' CH-53E continues
    to demonstrate its value as an expeditionary heavy-lift platform, with
    significant assault support contributions in Afghanistan, the Horn of
    Africa, and Iraq. Vertical heavy lift will be critical to successful
    21st century operations in anti-access, area-denial environments
    globally, enabling force application and focused logistics envisioned
    within the joint operating concepts. The CH-53E requires significant
    design enhancements to meet future interoperability requirements,
    improve survivability, expand range and payload performance, improve
    cargo handling and turn-around capabilities and reduce operations and
    support costs. An independent Analysis of Alternatives determined that
    a ``new build'' helicopter would be the most cost-effective solution.
    The Operational Requirements Document that will guide the development
    of this aircraft is in review. The CH-53X series aircraft will address
    our emerging heavy-lift requirements.
        F/A-18 A/B/C/D
        The fiscal year 2005 budget request contains $19.9 million for the
    continuation of the upgrade program for our F/A-18As. The Marine Corps
    continues to upgrade Lot 7-11 F/A-18As (with a program objective of 76)
    to Lot XVII F/A-18C aircraft capability as well as digital
    communications and tactical data link. The Marine Corps anticipates
    programmed upgrades to enhance the current capabilities of the F/A-18C/
    D with digital communications, tactical data link and tactical
    reconnaissance systems. This upgrade ensures that our F/A-18s remain
    viable and relevant in support of Tactical Air (TACAIR) Integration and
    Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. The Marines expect the F/A-18A to
    remain in the active inventory until 2015. The Marines are also
    exploring the feasibility of placing the Litening targeting pod on the
    F/A-18D aircraft. When combined with data link hardware from Predator
    UAVs, this pod provides real time video to the ground commander and
    serves as an interim solution to support real world operations until
    the ATFLIR pod is operationally fielded in sufficient numbers. This new
    start notification has been sent to Congress.
        Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM)
        The fiscal year 2005 budget reflects $13.4 million in RDT&E to
    continue the development of the IDECM Block III (ALQ-214 w/the ALE-55
    (fiber optic towed decoy)) that will support an fiscal year 2006
    OPEVAL. Additionally, $99 million in APN is included for the
    procurement of 38 ALQ-214 systems, and $9 million in procurement of
    ammo, Navy and Marine Corps (PANMC) for the procurement of 400 ALE-50
    towed decoys. ALE-55 procurement is scheduled for fiscal year 2006.
    Congress added $9 million to RDT&E, N in the fiscal year 2004 budget
    for the IDECM program. This funded resolution and testing of (then)
    remaining technical issues. As a result, OPEVAL was completed and the
    IDECM Block II OPEVAL Report was signed October 3, 2003, with both a
    finding of ``Operationally Effective and Operationally Suitable'', and
    a recommendation for fleet introduction. Initial operational capability
    (IOC) is planned for September 2004. Full Rate Production deliveries
    begin in fiscal year 2005.
        EA-18G
        The E/A-18G is the Navy's replacement for the EA-6B Airborne
    Electronic Attack aircraft and represents an entirely new way of
    looking at legacy aircraft replacement. Leveraging existing production
    capabilities at Boeing and Northrop Grumman, the Navy is using the F/A-
    18E/F MYC to buy an additional quantity of `F' Aircraft, and marrying
    those airframes with Northrop Grumman's in-production Improved
    Capabilities (ICAP)-III Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) system to
    produce the E/A-18G to replace the aging EA-6B aircraft. This allows us
    to deliver the next generation Airborne Electronic Attack capability at
    reduced cost and in the shortest possible timeframe. The Marine Corps
    is examining a range of possibilities that will provide the needed
    capability.
        The fiscal year 2005 budget request reflects $359 million for SDD
    leading to Critical Design Review currently planned for April 2005.
    During fiscal year 2004, EA-18G efforts focused on risk reduction and
    development activities concerning the integration of EA-6B Improved
    Capabilities (ICAP III) electronic attack technologies into the F/A-
    18E/F air vehicle. The EA-18G was approved to enter SDD on December 18,
    2003, as an ACAT ID program. A total quantity of 30 systems will be
    procured in LRIP with a planned fiscal year 2009 IOC and fiscal year
    2012 FOC. The EA-18G will replace carrier-based Navy EA-6B aircraft by
    2012.
        AH-1Z/UH-1Y/Existing Marine Corps Helicopters
        The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $241.8 million APN funds to
    procure 9 UH-1Y/AH-1Z aircraft and $90.4 million RDT&E funds to
    complete the H-1 Upgrades test program. The Engineering and
    Manufacturing Development phase of the H-1 Upgrades Program to
    remanufacture 180 AH-1W and 100 UH-1N helicopters into state-of-the-art
    AH-1Z and UH-1Y models is progressing well. The development program is
    over 90 percent complete and the aircraft are meeting all Key
    Performance Parameters. Cost and schedule performance projections are
    tracking well to the Performance Measurement Baseline. LRIP Lot I was
    approved in October 2003, with the contract awarded to Bell Helicopter
    in December 2003. The technical performance of the flight test remains
    strong with the five flight test aircraft completing over 1,500 flight
    hours during combined contractor/government testing at Patuxent River,
    MD, and completing the Block ``C'' modification that added the Helmet-
    Mounted Sight/Display and active elevator. The program is on track for
    a second Operational Assessment in March 2004, followed by an LRIP Lot
    II decision planned for August 2004.
        The Marine Corps continues to support its fleet of existing of UH-
    1N, AH-1W, CH-53E, CH-53D, and CH-46E helicopters with numerous
    enhancements and Operational Safety Improvement Programs (OSIPs). As an
    example, the fiscal year 2005 budget requests $56.4 million for the CH-
    46E T-58 Engine Reliability Improvement Program; this program will
    restore the capability of these engines to their original power
    specifications and reduce maintenance requirements.
        AV-8B
        The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $12.3 million RDT&E funds to
    support development of the Tactical Moving Map Display and the Engine
    Life Management Plan and $20.8 million APN funding for procurement of
    Open Systems Core Avionics Requirement (OSCAR) and Engine Life
    upgrades. The AV-8B we fly today is not the same aircraft that we flew
    10 years ago. Over the last decade, the Harrier has gone from a daytime
    air-ground attack aircraft to a night/adverse weather precision strike
    platform. The AV-8B Remanufacture Program not only updated the Harrier
    to a more capable and more reliable aircraft, but also provided an
    additional 6,000 hours of airframe life, making the AV-8B one of the
    newest airframes in the fleet. Today's AV-8B includes a night-attack
    avionics suite (Navigation FLIR, digital moving map, color displays,
    night vision goggle lighting), APG-65 multi-mode radar, a more powerful
    and reliable Pegasus (408) engine, and the Litening targeting pod. The
    AV-8B OSCAR program, currently in LRIP, will also add new Mission
    Systems and Warfare Management Computers, open systems architecture and
    commercial software and JDAM capability. Our AV-8B Harriers have flown
    extensively in support of Special Operations Forces in OEF, as well as
    during OIF last year. AV-8Bs demonstrated the expeditionary flexibility
    of short take-off/vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft while becoming the
    most forward deployed tactical aircraft in theater. Several Harriers
    employed Litening targeting pods with real-time video downlink
    capability that provided visual target verification by ground
    personnel. The Litening pods' inherent capability to laser designate
    targets for precision munitions also marked spots on the ground with
    infrared energy.
        EA-6B
        The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $51.7 million for Wing Center
    Section modifications and $53 million for procurement of 10 Improved
    Capability (ICAP) III systems. The aging EA-6B has been in ever-
    increasing demand as the Department of Defense's (DOD) only tactical
    radar jamming aircraft that also engages in communications jamming and
    information operations. This demand has been particularly evident
    during OIF and OEF. Safety considerations, due to wing center section
    and outer wing panel fatigue have driven aircraft inventory (aircraft
    available to the fleet) from 95 to 71. Aircraft inventory is projected
    to return to above 90 by the first quarter of fiscal year 2006.
    Congress provided a $85 million supplemental in fiscal year 2004 that
    has accelerated the procurement and installation efforts to replace
    both wing center sections and outer wing panels. Priorities for this
    platform are current readiness and successful fleet introduction of
    ICAP III selective reactive jamming system. The Marine Corps expects to
    fly the EA-6B ICAP III until transitioning to a new electronic attack
    aircraft yet to be determined.
        Precision Munitions
        Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs) are where the effects of decisive
    power ``from the sea'' are realized most clearly. From more than 870
    Tomahawks fired from more than 35 surface and subsurface combatants to
    thousands of other Navy PGMs deployed in OEF and OIF, PGMs provided key
    Navy combat strike power and lethality.
        The Navy made investments in PGMs to ramp-up production for OEF/OIF
    and subsequently support ongoing replenishment of needed wartime
    expended inventories. Due to the effectiveness of the Navy PGMs and the
    ways in which they were employed in combat, we did not use as many as
    we had expected. Therefore, we now find ourselves able to reduce the
    procurement rate for refilling our required inventories.
        The fiscal year 2005 budget request will continue to enhance the
    Navy's warfighting capability by supporting ongoing production
    programs, improving existing PGMs and establishing new programs. All of
    these PGM programs will facilitate continued domination in the maritime
    environment, support in-land operational forces and enhance the overall
    department strategy to deter and dissuade potential adversaries while
    supporting our allies and friends.
        Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW). The fiscal year 2005 budget requests
    $9.5 million for development and integration of the Selective
    Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SASSM), and $74.6 million for
    procurement of 216 JSOW-A missiles and $64.8 million for procurement of
    173 JSOW-C missiles. The fiscal year 2005 budget request supports
    continued production of the combat proven JSOW-A submunition variant
    and continued development of the new JSOW-C penetrator variant. We
    approved JSOW-C for LRIP in June 2003 and plan for Full Rate Production
    approval in 2004.
        Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM). The fiscal year
    2005 budget request of $61.5 million supports ongoing development of
    the next generation anti-radiation missile. It should be noted that
    recently, the AARGM successfully demonstrated its ability to ignore a
    friendly radar site yet destroy an enemy radar site that had shut down
    in an effort to avoid attack. Additional funding in the fiscal year
    2005 budget request enables acceleration of the IOC from fiscal year
    2010 to fiscal year 2009.
        Joint Common Missile (JCM). The fiscal year 2005 budget requests
    $82.8 million for JCM development. The fiscal year 2005 budget request
    reflects increased support for the development of the JCM that is
    planned for use by Navy, Marine Corps and Army aviation assets to close
    a capability gap in precision point attack for fixed-wing and rotary-
    wing aircraft against time critical, moving and short-dwell relocatable
    targets. The Milestone B decision is planned for March 2004.
        Other Direct Attack PGMs. The fiscal year 2005 budget requests
    $151.2 million for procurement of Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)
    Kits and $60.2 million for procurement of Laser Guided Bomb (LGB) Kits.
    The fiscal year 2005 budget request for other PGM hardware such as the
    JDAM and LGB kits reflects adequate support for the production of these
    essential combat-proven weapons.
      Tactical Tomahawk
        The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $256.2 million for 293
    missiles, an increase of $64 million and 75 missiles over the amount
    projected for fiscal year 2005 in the fiscal year 2004 budget. Tactical
    Tomahawk represents a tremendous improvement over the successful Block
    III Tomahawk cruise missile. The state-of-the-art components allow
    reduced response time, multiple pre-planned outcomes, and improved
    lethality and navigation improvements through innovations in
    manufacturing and production techniques. We have committed to replenish
    our precision-guided munitions inventories, and we will utilize a
    multi-year acquisition strategy to maximize the quantity of Tomahawk
    missiles procured. The Full Rate Production decision is on track for
    June 2004. Additionally, we are in the final stages of our second
    remanufacture program, converting all available older Tomahawk
    airframes to the latest Block III configuration. This effort will be
    complete in May of this year and will yield an additional 456 missiles.

    Sea Base
        KC-130
        The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $324 million for four KC-130J
    Hercules aircraft. These aircraft will be procured as part of an
    existing Air Force MYC. The Marine Corps has taken delivery of 13 KC-
    130J aircraft and has an additional 25 planned for procurement within
    the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). The KC-130 fleet once again
    proved itself as a workhorse during operations in Iraq. The KC-130J
    provides a major enhancement to this proven platform, extending its
    range, payload, and refueling capabilities. Bold steps in simulator
    training and joint flight instruction place the KC-130J program on the
    leading edge of the transformation continuum. Additionally, we have
    continued to ensure the tactical capability of our existing KC-130F, R
    and T series aircraft by installing night vision kits and upgraded
    Aircraft Survivability Equipment.
        C-40
        The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $65.4 million for one C-40
    (Boeing 737-700C). This aircraft replaces the aging C-9 providing
    intra-theater logistics support. The Navy has taken delivery of six
    with two more on contract. An additional six are planned for
    procurement in the FYDP.

    FORCEnet
        E-2C and Advanced Hawkeye
        A critical enabler of transformational intelligence, surveillance
    and reconnaissance, the E-2C Advanced Hawkeye (AHE) program will
    provide a robust overland capability against current and future cruise
    missile-type targets. The AHE program will modernize the E-2 weapons
    system by replacing the current radar and other system components to
    maintain open ocean capability while adding transformational
    surveillance as well as theater air and missile defense capabilities.
        The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $248 million to procure one E-
    2C and one TE-2C as the second year of a 4-year MYP. This effort will
    keep the production line viable while the E-2 AHE, formerly known as
    the Radar Modernization Program, continues spiral development toward an
    IOC in fiscal year 2011. Congressional notification of full funding and
    economic rate was sent in January 2004. The MYP contract was awarded on
    January 22, 2004. A critical enabler of transformational intelligence,
    surveillance and reconnaissance, the E-2C AHE program will provide a
    robust overland capability against current and future cruise missile-
    type targets. The AHE program will modernize the E-2 weapons system by
    replacing the current radar and other system components to maintain
    open ocean capability while adding transformational surveillance as
    well as theater air and missile defense capabilities. The AHE program
    successfully entered the SDD phase in June 2003. Further, open
    architecture standards are being integrated into our E-2C aircraft and
    the AHE program to improve interoperability with DOD systems.
        Aerial Common Sensor (ACS)/EP-3
        The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $25 million for joint
    requirements for ACS aircraft development. ACS is a joint program with
    the Army that will replace the EP-3E aircraft. It will provide a
    transformational multi-intelligence platform capable of providing
    strike support and Direct Threat warning to the warfighter. The ACS is
    in a competitive source selection between Lockheed-Martin's Embraer
    145-CS and Northrop Grumman's Gulfstream 450 RC-20 and a source select
    decision is scheduled for May 2004. The Navy will report to a Milestone
    Decision Authority for an Interim Program Review in October 2004.
        Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
        The global war on terrorism continues to place emphasis on the
    importance of UAVs. The fiscal year 2005 budget request reflects our
    commitment to a focused array of UAVs that will support and enhance
    both surveillance and strike missions with persistent, distributed,
    netted sensors. The Navy's UAV programs are focused on two areas.
        Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV. The fiscal year 2005
    budget requests $113.4 million for development of the BAMS UAV. The
    BAMS UAV program will meet the Navy requirement for a persistent
    intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability as well
    as address the growing ISR gap and the shortfall in maritime
    surveillance capability. The BAMS UAV System will be a force multiplier
    for the Fleet Commander, enhancing situational awareness of the battle-
    space and shortening the sensor-to-shooter kill chain. BAMS UAV will
    work as an adjunct to the new MMA to provide a more affordable,
    effective and supportable maritime ISR option than current ISR aircraft
    provide. The BAMS UAV System is intended to be a Navy fleet asset for
    tactical users such as the ESG, the CSG and the Joint Forces Maritime
    Component Commander (JFMCC).
        Fire Scout UAV. The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $42.9 million
    to continue development of the Fire Scout UAV. The Fire Scout is a
    vertical takeoff and landing tactical UAV (VTUAV) designed to operate
    from all air-capable ships, carry modular mission payloads, and operate
    using the Tactical Control System and Tactical Common Data Link. The
    Fire Scout UAV will provide day/night real time ISR and Targeting as
    well as communication-relay and battlefield management capabilities to
    support core Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) mission areas of ASW, MIW, and
    ASUW for the Naval Forces. Upgrades will include four-bladed rotor,
    increased payload capacity, and weaponization to address small surface
    threats. Upgraded Fire Scout capability will be fielded with LCS Flt 1
    in fiscal year 2010. The Navy Fire Scout program plans coordination
    with the U.S. Army Future Combat System program.
        Marine Corps UAV. The Marine Corps continues to examine options for
    the sustainment and eventual replacement of its aging Pioneer fleet.
    Pioneer flew more than 2,350 hours in support of Operation Iraqi
    Freedom I, highlighting the criticality of these systems for our Marine
    forces. Requirements for vertical unmanned aerial vehicle (VUAV) are
    being developed in consonance with Ship to Objective Maneuver concepts
    from Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and with lessons learned from
    recent operational experience.
        Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (JUCAS). The Department is
    committed to a JUCAS initiative, developed in partnership with the Air
    Force. The Navy and the Air Force have defined a common set of science
    and technology requirements that recognizes the unique needs of each
    Service. This work will support a competitive acquisition strategy for
    a JUCAS program.

    Other Significant Capabilities
        T-45
        The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $254 million for eight T-45
    aircraft. The request also includes full funding for the Required
    Avionics Modernization Program (RAMP). A performance-based logistics
    contract was awarded to L3 COM Corporation for the airframe and Rolls
    Royce for the engine in July 2003. This enhanced performance-based
    logistics concept will provide cost wise readiness and save the DOD
    approximately 10 percent over the previous contract.
        Presidential Helicopter Replacement Aircraft (VXX)
        The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $777.5 million RDT&E for SDD
    efforts on the VXX program. The goal of this accelerated program is to
    introduce a new Presidential airlift aircraft by end of calendar year
    2008. The VXX program will utilize an evolutionary acquisition approach
    through a two-part incremental development to meet this need. The goal
    of the VXX development is to deliver a safe, survivable, and capable
    vertical lift aircraft while providing uninterrupted communications
    with all required agencies. To support the accelerated VXX program, the
    Department will award a SDD contract in the third quarters of fiscal
    year 2004.
           sea trial and sea enterprise in action: operation response
        In support of the I Marine Expeditionary Force's (I MEF) return to
    Iraq scheduled to begin March 2004, and in support of deployed Marines
    in Afghanistan, the Secretary of the Navy directed the establishment of
    a formalized process and action team, ``Operation Response,'' to
    rapidly respond to technological and materiel requirements generated
    from deployed marines. A senior Navy-Marine Corps team co-chaired by
    the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and
    Acquisition) and the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development will
    review and coordinate technical and materiel requirements for deployed
    units and utilize the technical and engineering expertise throughout
    the Department of the Navy and industry to expedite the best solutions
    available to counter rapidly evolving threats. This process will
    leverage and expand the current roles and capabilities of our
    established requirements generation and materiel development and
    acquisition commands in order to better respond to innovative enemy
    threats.

    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
        The Marine Corps will be rapidly fielding a number of systems to
    provide enhanced ISR capabilities in the theater of operations. These
    systems include Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), such as Dragon Eye and
    an ONR developed vehicle, Silver Fox. A recent demonstration of the
    Scan Eagle UAV went very well and I MEF is preparing an Urgent Needs
    Statement for the system. The Marines also plan to employ aerostat
    balloons and possibly smaller, Army Rapid Equipping Force-derived
    platforms to provide persistent ISR coverage.

    Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)
        The Navy and Marine Corps aviation has partnered with industry to
    expedite the application of ASE on the Marine Corps rotary and fixed
    wing aircraft deploying to the CENTCOM area as part of the MEF's
    Aviation Combat Element (ACE). Rotary wing aircraft will have the
    requisite ASE installed by industry teams prior to their departure,
    enroute on ships, upon arrival in-theater, or shortly after their
    arrival in-theater. KC-130 aircraft, which were not planned to receive
    ASE upgrades, will now receive some ASE upgrades initially shortly
    after they arrive in-theater and additional design work is being
    completed for full upgrades to be applied while in-theater.

                                    SUMMARY

        Our Naval Forces are unique in their contribution to the Nation's
    defense. Versatile naval expeditionary forces are the Nation's first
    responders, relied upon to establish the tempo of action, control the
    early phases of hostilities, and set conditions for decisive
    resolution. America's ability to protect its homeland, assure our
    friends and allies, deter potential adversaries, and project decisive
    combat power depends on maritime superiority. The transformation of
    Naval Forces is dedicated to greatly expanding the sovereign options
    available worldwide to the President across the full spectrum of
    warfare by exploiting one of our Nation's asymmetric advantages--
    control of the sea. The transformation of our Naval Forces leverages
    enduring capabilities for projecting sustainable, immediately
    employable joint combat power by facilitating the accelerated
    deployment and flexible employment of additional joint capabilities
    through a family of systems and assets afloat. Our fiscal year 2005
    budget request seeks to accelerate our investment in Naval Power 21 to
    transform our force and its ability to operate as an effective
    component of the joint warfighting team. Congressional support of this
    plan is essential to achieving this vision--I thank you for your
    consideration.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Secretary Young, and we thank
    you, Admiral Nathman and General Hough, for your work.
        Secretary Sambur.

    STATEMENT OF HON. MARVIN R. SAMBUR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
     AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION; ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. RONALD E.
    KEYS, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS,
                              HEADQUARTERS

        Dr. Sambur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
    Lieberman, for this opportunity to discuss with you and your
    Subcommittee the acquisition plans and status of our tactical
    weapons systems programs. I am particularly delighted to
    present a brief excerpt of my written statement, which, with
    your approval, Mr. Chairman, I hope to be made part of the
    official record.
        Senator Sessions. We will make that a part of the record,
    and Secretary Young's.
        Dr. Sambur. Thank you.
        The purpose of my statement is to provide some examples of
    the success we have achieved during the past year, both on
    selected acquisition programs, as well as in our agile
    acquisition initiatives. In the F/A-22 Defense Acquisition
    Board (DAB) this week, the acting Under Secretary of Defense
    for AT&L was ``very encouraged'' by the program's progress, and
    saw, ``no impediment to entering IOT&E in the April time
    frame.'' The program completed phase one of its operational
    testing on February 20. While the Air Force's Operational Test
    and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) has not formally completed their
    analysis, the AFOTEC commander characterized the jet's
    effectiveness as ``very impressive.'' In particular, during
    recent training missions with simulated air-to-air engagement,
    a force of Raptors has been clearing the skies of adversaries
    in a matter of minutes. In trials pitting four F/A-22s versus
    eight F-15Cs, all adversaries were killed before a single
    missile could be launched from any of the F-15s, and that is
    our current number-one fighter.
        The program has also made tremendous strides improving
    avionics software stability. Avionics startup is no longer an
    issue, and total system reboots that plagued the program last
    year no longer occur. Overall stability has improved more than
    tenfold with the stability measure of effectiveness now
    exceeding the required threshold of 5 hours. The development
    program is nearing completion, and there are just a handful of
    final details required before beginning Initial Operational
    Test and Evaluation (IOT&E).
        While the F/A-22 production delivery rate is not yet to our
    satisfaction, we are implementing numerous producability
    improvements that have pointed us in the right direction and
    have resulted in a more credible replanned schedule. Having
    said that, we closely manage and monitor aircraft deliveries on
    a daily basis, to include how quickly the contractor is
    implementing the identified manufacturing improvements. We are
    very confident Raptor production will recover to the original
    schedule before Lot-4 deliveries.
        To add to the good news, we have reached verbal agreement
    on Lot-4 production for 22 jets, exactly on the required target
    price curve--that's good news--showing that program stability
    and management attention pay big dividends.
        On the munitions side, the Air Force successfully
    demonstrated the power-up, data-transfer, launch- and impact-
    accuracy of 80--that's eight-zero--independently targeted 500-
    pound JDAMs from a single B-2 bomber. In practical terms, this
    translates into the ability to destroy an entire enemy airfield
    in a single pass, or to attack up to 80 independent, individual
    targets on a given sortie. The JDAM program currently exceeds
    performance requirements, is under budget, and is on schedule
    to meet the Chief's required asset-availability date of
    November 2004. In addition, the JDAM program recently achieved
    the 3,000 kits-per-month milestone necessary to sustain peak
    consumption and replenish stock. This represents a twofold
    increase in production rate in a little more than 1 year.
        I am proud to report that JDAM and several other mission
    programs were also recognized last year with quality,
    acquisition, and engineering awards, including the William J.
    Perry Award and Aviation Week's 2004 Quality Center Award.
        I would like to shift gears and take a minute to highlight
    some of our acquisition initiatives. The goal for acquisition
    is simple: deliver what we promise when we promise. To that
    end, we are institutionalizing increased collaboration among
    the various acquisition entities so as to create an integrated,
    more effective acquisition enterprise. These policies have
    touched the requirements phase, the testing phase, and even
    that of development, technology development.
        Most significantly, late last year we took the first step
    in cementing true collaboration with the Air Force Materiel
    Command by moving the majority of our program executive offices
    to the field and assigning the Program Executive Officers
    (PEOs) responsibility to the Product Center commander. This
    movement and reassignment have clarified lines of
    responsibility and increased the speed and credibility of our
    acquisition programs. In accomplishing this realignment, the
    chain of acquisition authority flows through the PEO directly
    to my office, as the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition. By
    geographically co-locating the PEOs at the point where most of
    these programs are executed, we are enhancing our ability to
    deliver on acquisition promises.
        Finally, I would like to highlight some successful
    interactions I have had with Service counterparts in creating
    an environment of jointness. For example, as Secretary Young
    has said, we have worked together to merge two of the joint
    tactical radio systems developments into one. This merging
    should lead to assured interoperability and lower overall cost
    to both Services. In addition, just last week the Air Force
    hosted another major armament summit at Eglin with senior
    acquisition and operational leaders from all Services. Through
    collaborations such as this, we are seeking ways to ``join the
    swords,'' to make our armaments developments truly joint.
        In closing, I wish to reiterate that the Air Force
    acquisition has had a very successful year. I thank you, and I
    look forward to answering your questions, with General Keys,
    who is with me from the Acquisitions Operations part of the Air
    Force.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Sambur follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Dr. Marvin Sambur

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Thank you for this opportunity to discuss with you and your
    subcommittee today, the Air Force's Tactical Weapons Systems. I am also
    happy to report to you in this written statement, some of the successes
    and outstanding efforts of your Air Force Professionals as we strive to
    improve the way we do business, while transitioning critical technology
    to warfighting capability. General Keys and I are proud to come before
    you today and discuss our plan for maintaining the United States Air
    Force as the dominant air force in the world. We seek your committee's
    support. Together we can achieve the mutual commitment necessary for
    those critical programs that ultimately deliver on the promise of
    warfighting capability that ensure victory when necessary.
        Throughout the past year, we have made progress toward achieving my
    vision of a more efficient and effective acquisition process. Despite
    numerous challenges, we succeeded in developing new capability for, and
    in many instances transitioning that capability to, the joint
    warfighter. As I will shortly describe, my staff and I continue to seek
    ways to improve our approach to the acquisition process,
    institutionalizing an enterprising paradigm and enjoying individual
    successful outcomes along the way. In this manner, we do our part in
    serving our Nation's defense.
        We have continued to play a starring role in the Air Force core
    competency of turning technology into warfighting capability. The
    challenge, which we confidently embrace, remains doing so amidst the
    often-unpredictable dynamics of world events, business interests,
    technology maturation, and public support. Despite these challenges, I
    can assure you that we in the Air Force stand as committed as ever to
    meet those challenges of today, as well as tomorrow, and to follow the
    direction provided by our Secretary of Defense.

                            AGILE ACQUISITION UPDATE

        During similar testimony last year, I told of a mandate given me by
    the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force to change the way we
    in Air Force Acquisition do business. Our programs have all-too-often
    suffered from development cost and schedule overruns, which have in
    turn led to fielding delays, fewer production quantities, and even
    reduced capability. I identified and presented several root-cause
    factors that I believe can lead to poor program execution and
    subsequently laid out a series of policies instituted to address these
    underlying causes. These areas included unstable requirements, lack of
    test community buy-in, inadequate systems engineering, unstable
    funding, and faulty cost estimates. By getting a handle on these
    problems, our intent was, and still is, to bring back stability and
    credibility to our modernization efforts.
        The goal is simple, if difficult: deliver what we promise, when we
    promise. I am pleased to report on our progress this past year in
    addressing the areas identified above.

                           STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATION

        During similar testimony last year, I emphasized the importance of
    establishing and fostering collaboration as an enabling theme in our
    quest to achieve ``Agile Acquisition.'' We believe that greater
    cooperation among stakeholders in defining priorities and key
    requirements, especially as they inform development of a capability-
    based acquisition strategy, is of paramount importance. For the first
    time ever, during the past year the Acquisition and Operations
    communities collaborated on simultaneous revisions to regulations
    governing their respective portions of the capabilities acquisition
    system. High Performance (Integrated Product) Teams (HPT) with members
    from all stakeholder organizations were formed to work on these
    efforts, synchronizing all the policies and making clear along the way
    that speed and credibility are the underpinning of what we do. The goal
    was simple: a seamless, collaborative process that smoothly implements
    the DOD 5000 series and the Joint Capabilities Integration and
    Development System (CJCSI 3170.01C). As might have been expected, we
    found that the very exercise of bringing these regulations into harmony
    has served to open vital lines of communications and collaboration that
    we expect to pay dividends in the future.
        In fact, General Keys and I have jointly signed out a policy
    statement that further stipulates how this collaborative environment
    will be put into practice. System acquisition management plans and
    acquisition strategies will be routinely developed using the HPT
    process. The responsible acquisition organization will convene the same
    HPT that initially developed the required operational capability to
    subsequently generate acquisition courses of action (COA) (COAs should
    contain: cost, schedule, contract strategy, spiral approach, etc.).
    Ultimately, we will call on Major Command (MAJCOM) commanders to commit
    to the COA that best addresses warfighter needs. We expect this
    environment to foster a mutual understanding of what is required, and
    what is possible.
        In January, I further operationalized the program execution end of
    this collaboration by instituting Capabilities Program Execution
    Reviews (CPER). The goal here is to provide timely information on
    program issues so that MAJCOM commanders can make informed decisions.
    During these CPERS, which will be held twice a year with each MAJCOM,
    we will identify program execution issues and develop corresponding
    options. We'll provide a proposed action and relate impacts to the
    master capabilities as identified in the Capabilities Review and Risk
    Assessment. The decision to institutionalize the CPER process was the
    result of positive feedback from last year's pilot sessions with Air
    Combat and Air Mobility Commands.
        A key aspect of the collaborative environment that has already been
    alluded to is an overall approach to straight talk that I have dubbed,
    ``Expectation Management.'' With the belief that ``surprises'' can be
    kept in check when all stakeholders maintain realistic expectations, I
    have directed my Program Executive Officers (PEO) to identify program
    changes in a timely fashion, no matter what their source, communicate
    those changes to leadership and then drive new expectations. We can no
    longer allow changes in funding, requirements, or even schedule without
    documentation and stakeholder agreement on just what the effects on the
    program will be. Under the Expectation Management policy, we will no
    longer ``just work it out later.'' When fact-of-life changes occur, we
    will honestly assess the impact, document it, and along with all
    stakeholders, collaboratively agree on a way ahead.
        In addition to the operator-acquirer collaboration already
    discussed, we have also this past year fostered similar collaboration
    with the test community. Major General William Peck, Commander Air
    Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC), and I have
    signed out a policy that calls for ``Seamless Verification'' of our
    modernization programs. Seamless Verification is designed to eliminate
    the seams between contractor, developer, and operational testers. It
    requires the warfighter, contractor, developer, and operational tester
    to collaboratively develop, test and evaluation activities with the
    goal to produce efficient schedules and reduce risk of program failure.
    These requirements are being codified into the test community's
    Capabilities Based Test and Evaluation instruction in the same fashion
    as was done with the acquisition and operational instructions discussed
    above. The Small Diameter Bomb acquisition will be a pilot program for
    Seamless Verification.
        Having turned policy into action, I expect these collaborative
    environments to produce real results as we execute the task of
    capability-based acquisition. It would not by itself develop technology
    any quicker, but should reduce the risks associated with
    misunderstanding and unrealistic expectations.

                              SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

        Last year, I identified the need to re-instill an adequate systems
    engineering foundation within the acquisition process. Systems
    engineering is one of the bedrocks of acquisition management because it
    ensures that contractor-proposed solutions are consistent with sound
    engineering principles. It is all the more critical because of the Air
    Force-adopted spiral development approach to acquisition that
    incrementally delivers weapon system capability quickly and hedges
    technology risk. We must have the capability to smoothly proceed from
    one spiral effort to the next. I implemented a process to ensure
    Milestone Decision Authorities adequately review the proposed approach
    to systems engineering prior to approving Acquisition Strategy Plans. I
    also demanded that system-engineering performance be linked to contract
    award fee or incentive fee structures.
        To be clear, the system engineering approach used by the AF and our
    industry partners must focus on an end state that quickly delivers
    high-quality, best value products (capabilities) that fully meet the
    warfighters' need, and are designed to easily and inexpensively
    accommodate growth of capabilities in subsequent increments. In January
    of this year, I signed out Increment 2 of our new ``Revitalizing Air
    Force and Industry Systems Engineering'' policy. The intent of this
    latest move is to institutionalize key attributes of an acceptable
    system engineering approach and outcome across the combined AF/Industry
    enterprise. For example, we have generated appropriate language that
    should be included into key acquisition documents such as
    solicitations, award fee plan/incentive fee contracts, and other
    contracts. I have further directed that this language, which is
    intended to be an example and not boilerplate, be incorporated into
    governing acquisition instructions. Our hope is to see meaningful
    progress within the next 18 months.

                        PROGRAM STABILITY AND EXECUTION

        While funding stability is an age-old problem that in many cases is
    beyond our control, there are measures nonetheless that we have
    undertaken to improve our ability to manage the instability and also
    ensure accountability for program execution. One way of better dealing
    with instability, for example, is through informed decisionmaking. As I
    have already discussed, increased collaboration, expectation
    management, and formal exchanges like the CPER should allow us to
    collectively make decisions that provide the best use of limited
    resources, given the annual ebb and flow of funding profiles. Another
    way of handling instability more efficiently and credibly is through
    improved acquisition program management.
        I have spent a great deal of time this past year working with the
    Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command, General Gregory Martin, on
    a plan to realign and relocate our Air Force PEO. I am very proud to
    report that this plan, which is designed to clarify lines of
    responsibility and increase the speed and credibility in acquisition
    programs, is proceeding on schedule. In October of last year, we took
    the first major step of Phase 1 of this realignment when the PEO for
    weapons moved from the Pentagon to Eglin Air Force Base. Major General
    Robert Chedister, who is also the commander of the Air Armaments
    Center, is now the PEO, backed up by an acquisition execution deputy.
    Similar moves were subsequently made for the Aeronautical and
    Electronic Systems Centers at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH and Hanscom AFB,
    MA respectively. Phase 1 of this realignment is now complete and the
    PEOs are responsible for the PEO programs as well as those smaller,
    previously designated ``Designated Acquisition Commander'' programs,
    that have been mapped into their portfolios. There are important
    details still remaining to be worked, but we have already gained a lot
    of momentum in the right direction: improved ability to manage limited
    resources and improved accountability for program execution.
        Assisting us in working out these details now is an overarching
    game plan, or Concept of Operations (CONOPs), that General Martin and I
    agreed to last December. This CONOPs will govern the acquisition roles
    and responsibilities between the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
    the Air Force for Acquisition and the Air Force Materiel Command. The
    very success of efforts such as the ones already discussed often finds
    itself in the details, and the agreed-to CONOPs will go a long way
    toward fostering the kind of mutual support and can-do effort that will
    ultimately make Agile Acquisition a success.

                            IMPROVED COST ESTIMATING

        A final area that I introduced during testimony last year was the
    problem of faulty cost estimates. I had implemented a policy whereby
    acquisition programs be designed to a 90-percent confidence level.
    Since, we have convened two Integrated Product Teams (IPT) to consider
    how we might go about achieving that improved confidence level. Within
    our contracting division, we are considering how better-incentivized
    contractors might produce more realistic proposals. Also, in
    conjunction with the Air Force's Financial Management Directorate, the
    Government Most-Probably Cost IPT also seeks methods to establish and
    sustain better budgets through incentivized cost estimates. Clearly, in
    order to improve our credibility with the warfighter and facilitate
    better investment decisions, we need to produce better cost estimates
    up front. I look forward to receiving the results and recommendations
    of these IPTs in the next few months.

               LEVERAGING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T) INVESTMENT

        The Air Force remains committed to an S&T program that enables us
    to achieve our vision of becoming an integrated air and space force
    capable of rapid and decisive global engagement. By continuing our
    investment in transformational technologies that support a reduced
    cycle-time, spiral development acquisition process, the Air Force will
    retain its dominance of air and space in future conflicts, against both
    traditional and asymmetrical threats. It is a part of the Air Force's
    proud legacy to be on the cutting edge of technology, and S&T programs
    have historically been a major contributor to its superior warfighting
    capability.
        During this past year I entered into an agreement with the
    Commander, Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), Major General Paul
    Nielsen, to improve the timeliness of advanced technology transition
    from the laboratories into acquisition programs. Similar to the other
    agreements I have discussed, this one begins with new levels of
    collaboration and communication. It calls on the AFRL to establish a
    broad-based initiative to focus and accelerate its technology efforts
    in support of warfighting capabilities. The initiative includes a
    capability-based investment strategy, systems engineering,
    collaborative portfolio reviews, and an annual assessment of the
    progress and results of this initiative.
        Steady investment and rapid transition will support the current
    preferred acquisition strategy of spiral development. Most, if not all,
    of the programs to be discussed below, unmanned aerial vehicles,
    propulsion systems, munitions, aircraft structures and materials, have
    all been touched by Air Force S&T. Under Agile Acquisition, the goal is
    to bring these technologies to warfighting success stories faster and
    more efficiently than ever.

            TECHNOLOGY TO WARFIGHTING SUCCESSES (SELECTED PROGRAMS)

    F/A-22
        We are extremely pleased with the progress of the F/A-22 program
    this past year. With its revolutionary combination of stealth,
    supercruise (i.e., cruise above 1.5 mach without afterburner),
    maneuverability, and integrated avionics, the F/A-22 is living up to
    its promises. The advertised capability is here now--it is no longer
    just a test program. Our focus is clearly on providing proven
    capability to the Nation's warfighters soon.
        One year ago, we had 16 missile shots completed. Today, after over
    5,000 flight test hours there have been 47 successful missile shots (12
    guided, 35 separations), and both the flight envelope and weapons
    envelope are cleared for Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E)
    start. The program has made tremendous strides improving avionics
    stability--the issues today are not the same as they were a year ago.
    Total system reboots no longer occur. The program incorporated full
    functionality required for operational test and simultaneously improved
    overall stability more than tenfold. The development program is now
    nearly complete with all necessary events to proceed into IOT&E; and we
    now anticipate a full-rate production decision in December 2004.
        At this time last year, we had only delivered 3 production
    aircraft, compared to 13 to date. While deliveries have lagged, we know
    much more about the manufacturing processes than we did a year ago.
    Experience gained with these 13 production Raptors allowed both Air
    Force and Lockheed-Martin production experts to complete an end-to-end
    production process proofing and schedule re-baseline in December 2003.
    The joint government and contractor team addressed leadership,
    manufacturing processes, tooling, and parts reliability. They
    identified 171 quality corrective actions, 120 tool improvements, 17
    major producibility improvements, and corrective actions for 68 high
    failure rate parts. The time needed to implement these improvements is
    built into the re-baselined delivery schedule, and we are about 40
    percent through the implementation plan. As we continue through Lot 2
    and Lot 3 final assembly, we will fully realize the benefit of these
    improvements. We now have a credible schedule, and the Air Force is
    confident we will recover to schedule before Lot-4 deliveries--December
    2005 initial operational capability (IOC) will not be impacted.
        In fact, Raptors are now operating in three locations. Ten jets
    assigned to Edwards Air Force Base (AFB) are wrapping up developmental
    test and are well into operational test. At Nellis AFB, five Raptors
    are developing operational tactics and techniques. At Tyndall AFB four
    jets, and counting, are training pilots today. Additionally, the first
    operational jet will arrive at Langley AFB in November of this year.
    Through a year of perseverance and teamwork, IOC is now clearly within
    visual range, and the Air Force is now postured to deliver this
    transformational capability as anticipated.

                                      F-35

        Acting in concert with the F/A-22 will be the F-35 Joint Strike
    Fighter (JSF). The F/A-22/F-35 force mix will balance affordability,
    capability and force structure--critical capabilities for the Global
    Strike concept of operations--to ensure sufficient quantities of
    advanced fighter aircraft to give the U.S. dominant force across the
    full spectrum of conflicts.
        Over the past year, the JSF program has experienced some
    challenges, most notably achieving weight goals, but the government-
    industry team has taken aggressive measures to ensure program success.
    In fact, the Conventional Take-off and Landing, and Carrier Variants of
    the aircraft are still projected to meet all of their Key Performance
    Parameters, while plans are already in place to ensure success with the
    Short Take-off and Vertical Landing variant.
        In spite of these challenges, the F-35 acquisition program has also
    achieved several milestones during this past third year of System
    Development and Demonstration (SDD). These include the Air System
    Requirements Review, the Integrated Baseline Review, and the Air System
    Preliminary Design Review. In addition, the program was ahead of
    schedule for the First Engine To Test milestone, and we have over 200
    hours of successful operating time on 2 test engines.
        As the Air Force assumes responsibility for execution of the JSF
    program later this year, it will apply all of the appropriate Agile
    Acquisition initiatives to effectively address and overcome weight
    issues. With all that is riding on the department's largest cooperative
    development program, we will deliver.

                 JOINT AIR-TO-SURFACE STANDOFF MISSILE (JASSM)

        The JASSM is a ``kick down the door'' type weapon to be used in the
    early stages of a war to neutralize enemy's defenses and war
    infrastructure by targeting high value, fixed and relocatable targets.
    Last year, there was concern among some members about JASSM's
    performance during test that ultimately resulted in a reduction in
    fiscal year 2004 production funding and direction to maintain Low Rate
    Initial Production (LRIP).
        Since then, all JASSM test programs, developmental and initial
    operational test, have been successfully completed. All issues
    identified during these tests have been or are being addressed.
    Furthermore, the Air Force is confident that all fixes have been
    verified in testing or will be verified with follow-on test. In fact,
    AFOTEC rated JASSM ``Effective and Potentially Suitable,'' with the
    major issue affecting suitability being mission planning time. The
    introduction of a PC-based tool is in work and will reduce the mission
    planning time and meet requirements. As a result of this past year's
    success, the Air Force believes all criteria to enter full rate
    production have been met; however, a final decision will be made after
    release of the Beyond LRIP report and its subsequent receipt by
    Congress.
        Also of note, last year witnessed the start of a JASSM-Extended
    Range (ER) program. JASSM-ER is a solid example of the preferred spiral
    development approach that delivers incremental capability to the
    warfighter sooner than later. JASSM-ER will increase the range
    capability to greater than 500 nm without changing the outer mold-line.
    In fact, with a contract award in February of this year, Phase 2 is
    already underway, leading to ground and flight test in fiscal year
    2005.

                  B-2 AND JOINT DIRECT ATTACK MUNITION (JDAM)

        In September 2000, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed the
    development and integration of a 500 lb. JDAM capability on the B-2
    Spirit using ``Smart'' Bomb Rack Assemblies (SBRA). The SBRA program is
    a key warfighting enabler that improves the B-2's persistent precision
    engagement capability. It increases the B-2 guided weapon capability to
    80 independently targeted, smart weapons.
        Last fall, the Air Force successfully demonstrated the power-up,
    data transfer, launch, and impact accuracy of 80 independently targeted
    500-lb. JDAM munitions at the Utah Test and Training Range. In
    practical terms, this translates into the capability to destroy an
    enemy airfield in a single pass or attack up to 80 targets on a given
    sortie. More significantly in light of today's testimony is this
    program has exceeded performance requirements, is under budget, and is
    on schedule to meet the Air Force Chief of Staff's ``Required Assets in
    Place'' deadline of November 2004.
        The JDAM program also reached a milestone of its own recently.
    During recent operations, JDAMs were being used at rates up to 3,000
    per month. In order to prevent exhaustion of Air Force inventories, the
    JDAM program was challenged to increase its production rate from a pre-
    September 11 rate of approximately 750 per month, all the way to 3,000
    kits per month. Last month, the JDAM production line achieved a monthly
    output rate of 3,000 units. This happily reflects the determination and
    effort on the part of our highly successful contractor-government
    acquisition team and in turn, the principles of Agile Acquisition. For
    these sustained efforts, the government-industry JDAM team was recently
    named winner of the 2004 William J. Perry Award by the Precision Strike
    Association at its Winter Roundtable meeting and recipient of Aviation
    Week's 2004 Quality Center Award. The Perry award is presented annually
    to the public or private sector for outstanding leadership or technical
    achievements resulting in significant contribution to precision strike
    systems. The Aviation Week award identifies and celebrates quality,
    manufacturing excellence, R&D innovation and other best practices in
    the civil, military and space sections.

                           SMALL DIAMETER BOMB (SDB)

        SDB will provide fighter and bomber aircraft with a tactically
    significant standoff attack capability from outside of point defenses
    against fixed targets, while increasing loadout and minimizing
    collateral damage. Last year I reported that the SDB acquisition
    program was in the middle of a competitive 2-year concept development
    phase. As promised, that effort culminated in a highly successful down-
    select decision in September of last year. SDD is now well underway and
    the program is on schedule to enter LRIP in May 2005.
        The program down-select decision and subsequent negotiations
    provided great news for the warfighter because the result was a weapon
    system average unit cost that met warfighter cost goals and an overall
    acquisition program that is meeting its other requirements. The success
    of last year's negotiations will allow the Air Force to consider a
    second developmental spiral of the SDB to provide a moving target
    attack capability.

                                  GLOBAL HAWK

        A key enabler to the tactical engagement, Global Hawk utilizes
    conventional technology operating at altitudes up to 60,000 feet for up
    to 30 hours to achieve on-demand, long-dwell Intelligence, Surveillance
    and Reconnaissance coverage of up to 40,000 sq nm per day. During OEF
    and OIF, Global Hawk flew 79 combat sorties and collected over 21,800
    images. In OIF, building on lessons learned from its previous
    deployment, Global Hawk flew 5 percent of the high-altitude
    reconnaissance sorties, yet accounted for 55 percent of the air defense
    equipment time sensitive targets. It is remarkable warfighting
    capability for a weapon system that has not yet reached IOC. In fact,
    following extremely successful demonstrations in their two countries,
    Australia and Germany are entertaining plans to acquire their own
    Global Hawks.
        The Global Hawk program acquisition strategy also exemplifies the
    preferred spiral development strategy. The successful capability in use
    today will be subsequently upgraded to include increased payload, a
    signals intelligence collection capability, and the multi-platform
    radar technology insertion program (MP-RTIP) for enhanced Ground-Moving
    Target Indication/Search and Rescue capability (GMTI/SAR).

                                    PREDATOR

        First deployed in 1995 for operations over Bosnia, Predator
    continues to be employed as the most responsive sensor throughout OEF
    and OIF. We now have over 75,000 flying hours on this system with over
    22,000 this past year alone. OIF was Predator's first ``networked''
    operation. By using both in- and out-of-theater control stations with
    beyond line-of-sight aircraft control, we provided the Combined Forces
    Air Component Commander (CFACC) additional capability and redundancy to
    simultaneously control five aircraft over the battlefield, three of
    which were controlled via reach-back from the United States. This
    combined reach-back operation allowed our units to increase their
    operational flexibility, more efficiently manage manpower, minimize
    forward footprint, and reduce our high operations tempo. Moreover, of
    interest to some members, Predator has extended its success this past
    year by providing tactical imagery directly to ground combat forces and
    by providing targeting information to AC-130 gunships. As has been
    noted in previous hearings, this capability can greatly enhance force
    protection, situational awareness and our ability to rapidly engage
    targets.
        By arming MQ-1 Predator A we now have a very long endurance
    platform that can find and engage time critical targets. Additionally,
    we have recently begun enhancing the aircraft to perform better at
    higher altitudes, increase aircraft endurance, and increase available
    payload electrical power.
        Most noteworthy is our development of the MQ-9 Predator B `Hunter-
    Killer' aircraft which will be capable of automatically cueing and
    prosecuting critical emerging time sensitive targets with a self-
    contained, hard-kill capability to include precision-guided munitions.
    This will provide a persistent, armed reconnaissance, multi-mission,
    remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), operating higher and faster than the
    MQ-1 and with a greatly increased payload capacity.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Over the past year, we in Air Force Acquisition have made great
    strides in institutionalizing the changes we believe are necessary to
    achieve the vision of Agile Acquisition: delivering what we promise
    when we promise. This stems from our ongoing commitment and
    contributions to the Air Force's core competency of transitioning
    technology to warfighting. Given the ever-present need to invest our
    limited resources efficiently and effectively, we must succeed in our
    endeavors.
        I appreciate the support of this committee and today's opportunity
    to make part of the record some of the great things that are happening
    in Air Force Acquisition.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you very much, Secretary Sambur and
    General Keys. We thank you for your service and your assistance
    with this presentation.
        Last year, we did, in this committee, cut two Raptor
    aircraft, and we questioned the schedule and how far behind
    they were. This was restored in conference, although there was
    a modest reduction in funding, $160-some-odd million. When you
    were testifying last year, Secretary Sambur, you were
    projecting that the F/A-22 would not begin its dedicated
    initial operational testing until October 2003, a delay that
    was necessary to work on software stability issues. The
    subcommittee understands that those have been recently solved,
    and you indicated in your statements that they are. How
    confident are you that this is what we need? Are we where we
    need to be, or do you expect further improvements in the
    software?
        Dr. Sambur. We will have further improvements. We are above
    the threshold with the latest software release. We are making
    one more release before the start of IOT&E, and we expect the
    software stability to increase even further.
        Right now, on the metrics that you want from us, the mean
    time between critical software anomalies, we are close to 20
    hours. When you look at another metric that says the total mean
    time between avionics anomalies were approximately 6.1 hours,
    which is above the 5-hour threshold.
        Senator Sessions. So we are comparing apples to apples.
        The threshold that was expected, the 5 hours, has been
    exceeded, according to----
        Dr. Sambur.--factor of four. The threshold that you have
    asked us for is the mean time between critical anomalies, type
    one, when you have to shut down the system, and that is almost
    at 20 hours. When you look at all anomalies, we are at 6.1
    hours mean time between those events, which is still above. So
    we're very confident. As I read in my statement, the acting
    Under Secretary for AT&L was ``very encouraged,'' and he also
    indicated that there was no impediment to starting in April. We
    did miss the October date, but we were always, as we said
    before, event-driven. We're pretty confident about this April
    date.
        Senator Sessions. All right. Now, I understand the Defense
    Acquisition Board met Monday?
        Dr. Sambur. Monday.
        Senator Sessions. They determined the readiness to enter
    the test phase. Where are we on that? What can you tell us
    about that?
        Dr. Sambur. As I indicated, the AFOTEC director said, from
    an effectiveness point of view--and I gave you some examples--
    he was ``very impressed.'' There are some issues with
    maintainability and sustainability that we have to finalize. We
    have to, for example, really define the trajectory that is
    required during IOT&E. The key performance parameters talk
    about sortie generation, for example, at the hundred-thousand-
    hour point. However, we will not be there at IOT&E, and there
    needs to be some metric to guide us. We are in the process of
    formulating those metrics.
        We will get there in the April time frame. We just need to
    finalize those metrics, do some more training for the pilots
    and for the maintainers, and do this last software lot that I
    talked to you about just recently.
        Senator Sessions. Now, is there a specific event that
    allows official testing to begin?
        Dr. Sambur. Now, that is a decision that we will make in
    the Air Force in consultation with AT&L, but it involved the
    metrics----
        Senator Sessions. AT&L is what?
        Dr. Sambur. Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. That is
    the Department of Defense (DOD) OSD-level of management
    oversight. They have asked us to, first of all, certify that we
    are meeting the avionics stability that is required.
        Senator Sessions. You have not done that yet.
        Dr. Sambur. We need to get a few more hours. The measure I
    talked about before is over three or four jets. We will now do
    this analysis over several other jets to give you a certified
    number. That is within a matter of weeks. There should not be
    any difference between the jets, but we want to make sure that
    the stability is there, and we want to be able to come back and
    certify that the numbers that I just talked to you about are
    truly what we're achieving. We are also looking to make sure
    that we have the right training for the pilots and for the
    maintainers to start IOT&E so we can be successful. We do not
    want to start something and fail. We want to be event driven
    and start something that will pass first.
        Senator Sessions. Maybe Senator Lieberman also would like
    to inquire about that.
        I would note that last year you testified we were eight
    aircraft behind, and you produced a new delivery schedule----
        Dr. Sambur. Right.
        Senator Sessions.--that would catch up to the contractual
    deliveries by this June, although we have seen a lot of
    improvement. The committee staff has gone to Georgia to see the
    facility and was impressed. I was supposed to be there, with
    Senator Chambliss, but the weather got me, and, in a matter of
    minutes, we could not take off and be there. We understand that
    things are improving on the production line, but the deliveries
    are still behind, as I understand it, seven aircraft. The
    projected date for catching up has now slid to December 2004.
    This is at least the fourth schedule given to us by the Air
    Force in as many years, yet we are still a significant number
    of aircraft behind. What is the schedule? How confident are you
    about it?
        Dr. Sambur. You picked it exactly right. We are as
    frustrated as you are, and we are certainly making sure that
    Lockheed is doing everything possible to put in the
    producability enhancements necessary to get us back on
    schedule. We created for you a more confident schedule. The
    last couple of deliveries, we have been very close to that
    schedule. The last one, we have missed it a little bit. We are
    constantly trying to manage that. We are as concerned as you
    are.
        Senator Sessions. Let me see if I can get this straight
    now. When we say, by your goal, December 2004, does that mean
    you will eliminate the entire backlog and be on schedule?
        Dr. Sambur. That is to be on schedule with the original
    schedule.
        Senator Sessions. Catch up the seven that you are behind.
        Dr. Sambur. Catch up the original schedule.
        Senator Sessions. That is a big leap. Is that really a
    practical thing to expect?
        Dr. Sambur. Actually, things are starting to move in the
    right direction. What has happened here is, not only have we
    looked at producability improvements, but also Lockheed Martin
    actually brought back a whole host of experienced manufacturing
    pros, who were with them at the beginning with the F-16. They
    brought back several people from retirement who had a
    tremendous skill base, who are actually managing the program on
    a day-to-day basis now. These people have the expertise to turn
    this around. They have demonstrated the expertise. But, more
    importantly, we have put in place processes that were lacking
    before that will get us back there.
        We have put together a more credible schedule. Is it
    perfect? Is it exactly the schedule that will be exactly
    pinpointing every delivery? I do not think so. But is it moving
    in the right direction? Yes. Will we make every delivery?
    Again, I do not think so. But will we get back on schedule by
    the beginning of Lot-4? We are quoting a number of about 95
    percent confidence on that. The reason for that is that we have
    actually added margin in the schedules; we have actually looked
    at past performances to try to extrapolate, so we are
    reasonably confident that we will get there at the end of the
    day. We are not reasonably confident that every delivery will
    happen on time, but we are reasonably confident that we put in
    place the right processes, and we now have the right management
    team, both within the Air Force and at Lockheed Martin to
    really turn this program around.
        We have demonstrated that on the development program. Last
    year, we were in horrible shape, as you read in your statement.
    Now we have really turned that around. The software stability
    was less than 1 hour on--the number I am talking about is now
    almost 20. There has been improvement.
        Senator Sessions. That was a very troubling thing last
    year.
        Dr. Sambur. It was.
        Senator Sessions. I remember. That is a remarkable
    improvement.
        Dr. Sambur. Exactly, troubling. As your staff has
    indicated, if you go to the factory there, you can see an
    amazing improvement, amazing improvement in the attitudes of
    the people, even in the cleanliness of the facility. It is just
    dramatic.
        We will get there. Will we be perfect? No. But we will get
    there at the end of--or at the beginning of Lot-4.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks again
    to all of you.
        Secretary Young, I wanted to take up an aviation program
    that we have not talked about today. It is of national and
    local significance in my case, which is the decision that you
    announced yesterday to delay a decision on the presidential
    helicopter. Obviously, Sikorsky is actively interested, since
    the helicopter has been made there since the late 1950s. I
    wonder if you would just take a moment to describe why the
    decision was made. Does it indicate any fundamental concerns
    about the program? What is the time frame now in which you hope
    to make the final decision?
        Mr. Young. We have always recognized, from the beginning,
    that this program is very challenging. The requirements to
    enhance the survivability, achieve the range and payload that
    the White House desires, and also provide the communications
    suite that is necessary for the President to remain connected,
    is a pretty daunting challenge in a helicopter.
        Having said that, there is great urgency to replacing the
    fleet right now, which does not adequately support the
    President. We embarked on an aggressive program; we issued our
    request for a proposal, in December, and had targeted award of
    a contract at the end of April.
        As we have gotten the initial proposals, we have recognized
    that industry understands our requirements, but we need greater
    dialogue with them on where are the trade spaces, and what
    aspects of those requirements are driving costs and schedule.
    We need to be more confident that they can deliver the product
    they have outlined. You are potentially aware that both
    helicopters to meet the requirements have to change the engine
    variants in the helicopters, so there are substantial things
    that need to be done. In a bigger context, we typically would
    take on the order of 12 months from a release of an RFP to a
    contract award, usually in programs like JSF and DDX, supported
    by 2 to 3 years of demonstration efforts and probably
    engineering models. We do not have that behind us on VXX. We do
    have existing risk-reduction contracts that we plan to extend
    and augment to work through several of the issues on the
    survivability equipment, the cockpit equipment, analysis of the
    engine changes and how comfortable we are with their ability to
    do that, and achieve the performance they have advertised.
        All of these things make me uncomfortable, consistent with
    what I said at the beginning, that we can award a contract and
    sign that contract to terms and conditions and with incentives
    that everybody can go into with a high confidence we can
    deliver to. So I would finish by saying, at the end of this
    year I will be more comfortable about recommending to you, to
    the White House, and to Secretary Rumsfeld that we can make a
    defendable and high-confidence source-selection decision and
    lay out a program that we can deliver for the cost we tell you.
        Senator Lieberman. Okay, so you hope to be in a position to
    make a decision by the end of the year.
        Mr. Young. Yes, sir. We had asked the program executive
    officer and the program manager to talk to us about what things
    need to be done in this extension of the risk-reduction program
    and see how that ties with letting the companies update these
    initial proposals and the additional data and definition we
    need to make the decision and proceed.
        Senator Lieberman. Very good.
        I appreciate that. Here, again, there obviously is a
    pressure of time, because of the current threat and the
    security environment we are in, we want to make sure that this
    is the best possible. But you have to do it right. So we will
    be following that carefully.
        Secretary Young, the Marine Corps variant of the Joint
    Strike Fighter, the STOVL, I gather may now be coming in
    overweight by as much as 3,000 pounds. Obviously, weight is
    much more of a concern for these aircraft, since the added
    weight for the STOVL flight profile will probably reduce the
    payload or the range, or both. I wanted to get your assessment.
        First, am I right that it is now coming in that much
    overweight? Second, what is your overall assessment of the
    current situation regarding the weight, generally, on the Joint
    Strike Fighter?
        Mr. Young. You are exactly correct, Senator. The bottom-up
    number-four estimate projects the STOVL could be a little over
    3,000 pounds heavy. The company and the program office have a
    path to reduce that weight. Within that weight, there is also a
    margin that they hope to not realize, but we have some margin
    that is not all known weight. We have a plan to go down a path
    and achieve a weight that could be as much as 2,300 pounds
    over.
        Senator Lieberman. Excuse me for interrupting--this is a
    substantial percentage of the overall weight of the plane,
    right?
        Mr. Young. The empty target weight for the STOVL is 32,850
    pounds, and we are on a path that could lead us to be 2,300
    pounds over that.
        Senator Lieberman. Right. Now the concern is it may be 10
    percent over. Is this because we have added requirements as we
    have gone along?
        Mr. Young. Candidly, I do--we have not changed the
    requirements. Requirements-creep is a very fractional issue
    here, both in terms of dollars and weight. I think what I have
    said to try to arrange this in my own mind is that--from the
    concept demonstrators that flew at roughly weights of 27,000 to
    29,000 pounds with limited structural life and no avionics--we
    projected to, in 4 years, and at only about 3,500 to 4,000
    pounds more weight, have a full-up operating plane with a 30-
    year life. We were more optimistic, maybe, than we should have
    been in time and in design. So we have had to allow ourselves
    an additional year to work on those designs and try to get the
    weight down closer to those IFC capabilities.
        I want to emphasize, the CTOL and the CV variants are
    somewhat heavier, a little over 1,400 pounds, roughly, both of
    which meet their key performance parameters, and both of which
    are green, maybe with a little margin, in some cases, on their
    specifications. STOVL cannot be bought at its current weight,
    and we have to take the time. It was right to make a decision,
    to work all the designs to reduce the weight to get more
    capability and growth margin for the future. So a team is
    attacking them in sequence. CTOL, the lessons we learned on the
    conventional takeoff for the Air Force, will be applied to the
    STOVL Marine variant, and hopefully all three planes will come
    in at lower weight and have greater growth margin.
        Senator Lieberman. Going back to something I said in my
    opening statement, is it fair to say that you are committed to
    doing this on an event-based schedule, as opposed to calendar
    driven? I know there is always pressure to go as fast as you
    can, but to get this right?
        Mr. Young. The first executive-level illustration I could
    give you is that we could have held the CTOL and CV schedule,
    and there would have been some goodness, and possibly less cost
    in that. The decision was made to get greater capability and,
    as you said, let success in achieving weights and maturity of
    the design drive the program to its appropriate points for
    first flight, and the low-rate production, and other steps.
        Senator Lieberman. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you if there
    are lessons that you feel we have drawn from some of the
    problems we have had with the Raptor, with the F/A-22, in terms
    of development, and getting it through development and into
    testing, that will help us with the Joint Strike Fighter
    program.
        Basically so we do not make the mistakes and missteps.
        Mr. Young. The dominant responsibility lies with Lockheed
    Martin, and the company is aggressively trading lessons learned
    between the two programs. I would further highlight the
    specific examples that people have learned from all tactical
    aircraft programs. We have margin and time for software
    development. We have approximately 40 percent of the initial
    1.8 million lines of software in tests now to support the A-1
    flight test. The first engine to test occurred in October.
    There were delays in several other programs on getting a first
    engine to test. The STOVL lift system will go to test this
    April, next month.
        So we have started to do things earlier in the process,
    including paying attention to software and other issues that
    are long poles in the tent, so to speak. The program--this
    program, relative to almost any other program in the
    Department--has well-laid-out structure, as you both noted.
    Last year, we knew we had to continue to work weight. We are
    continuing to do that. The team is achieving some success. We
    need some more time to get an optimal product, because this
    program will be three Services and over 2,000 airplanes.
        A hasty fix might not be the right fix, so we are at,
    unfortunately, a cost-making decision to get it right.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. It is the right
    decision.
        Secretary Sambur, in 1997 the Air Force, long before you
    were where you are now, testified to this subcommittee that
    annual operating and support costs for the F/A-22 would be
    about 50 percent cheaper than those for the F-15C that it was
    intended to replace. I feel a responsibility periodically to
    ask, how are we doing on that prophecy? In other words, what
    are your current estimates of what it will cost to operate the
    F/A-22 aircraft?
        Dr. Sambur. I will have to get back to you for the record.
    I do not have the exact number. We will get back and give you
    the exact number for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In fiscal year 2001, the Air Force completed an FA/-22/F-15
    comparative operation and sustainment (O&S) estimate. This estimate
    calculated the F/A-22 Average Annual Cost per Squadron to be 28 percent
    less than the F-15C. The Air Force is updating this O&S estimate to
    support the fiscal year 2006 PB build. Later this year, the Air Force
    will also calculate a new Service Cost Position (SCP) to support the F/
    A-22 Full Rate Production (FRP) decision. As part of the SCP, the Air
    Force will re-compute the F/A-22 O&S predicted average annual cost per
    squadron. The Air Force plans to complete an analysis comparing the F/
    A-22 to the F-15 O&S average annual cost per squadron prior to the FRP
    decision in December 2004.

        Senator Lieberman. Fine. I would welcome that.
        Let me ask you a different kind of question, Secretary
    Sambur. In the statement you have submitted for the record, you
    refer to your realignment of the program executive officer
    structure within the Air Force, in which you have the Warfare
    Center commanders double-hatted as the program executive
    officers. I want you to speak--to take a look at what you have
    done, in the historical context, which is to say that
    Goldwater-Nichols removed the system's command officials,
    including the Warfare Center commanders, from the acquisition
    chain of command, in order to streamline that chain of command
    and to have the program executive officer spending full time on
    the important acquisition programs of the Services. It is not
    to say that everything in Goldwater-Nichols was perfect and
    never should be changed, but this does look like a step away
    from that vision. I wanted to ask you to comment on it, and,
    more specifically, whether you are concerned that the attention
    of the program executive officers is going to be diluted by
    their day-to-day activities, to the detriment of Air Force
    acquisition management.
        Dr. Sambur. You ask a very good question. When we made the
    initial attempt at doing this, I was very much concerned about
    exactly the issues you talked about. But what I made sure of
    is, at the end of the day, the PEOs, or the center commanders,
    were reporting directly to me for acquisition, and acquisition
    was defined as their dominant task. The base support and
    training and ops was really aligning to a deputy underneath
    them, so their dominant attention, the center commanders', was
    on acquisition. The reason we did that was to break, in a
    sense, the conflict between having the people that were doing
    the program reporting to a center commander who was not in the
    acquisition loop. By getting him now in the acquisition loop,
    and being accountable primarily for acquisition, we got
    everybody's attention. That was the real benefit of this.
    Everybody is now working together on a common goal.
        Senator Lieberman. Were you aware of the Goldwater-Nichols
    history?
        Dr. Sambur. Probably not in the details.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes. Take a look at it, if you would.
        Dr. Sambur. I will.
        Senator Lieberman. As you continue to evaluate the changes
    you have made, I hope you will keep that in mind. I will be
    interested in hearing from you periodically about how it is
    working.
        Dr. Sambur. I will do that.
        Senator Lieberman. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions,
    but I am going to yield; and if you have a second round, I will
    get back to them.
        Senator Sessions. We certainly will.
        I wanted to follow up a little bit on the weight problem
    for the STOVL on Joint Strike Fighter. As I see the numbers on
    the chart I have, it shows a 3,400-pound overweight.
        Mr. Young. It is a bottom-up four-number estimate.
        Senator Sessions. That's about----
        Mr. Young. A couple of months ago, I think.
        Senator Sessions.--a little more than 10 percent. Right,
    now taking 10 percent out of a aircraft is a chunk. Is that
    realistic, to think we can achieve that? How serious a problem
    is that?
        Mr. Young. It was serious enough that we took the time to
    work the design. The company has tabled options that can take
    all of that weight out, and potentially even get them below the
    IOC weight. You have to assign a risk to whether they can
    achieve those weights or not. As I have pointed out, there are
    700 to 800 pounds of planned growth in those numbers. There is
    a path to take weight out of the program. We really need to
    spend time--you had initial layouts, and now we are doing
    detailed designs of parts. An engineer decides to make a part a
    certain thickness, and then you can build that part, test it,
    stress it, and decide whether you can take some weight out or
    not. Then as we have designed this plane to be produced, people
    have made some conservative assumptions to make sure it is easy
    to assemble. We need to go back and look at those assumptions
    and see if they have added significant weight for the ease of
    producability at the expense of performance.
        We do not want to under-design the plane. I want to be
    clear about that. Secretary England and Secretary Roche's
    guidance to us is to be careful, and then think through where
    we are at the end of that. Those decisions will get as much
    weight out as we can, and then look at how we are going to
    operate the jet. There are certain things we can make choices
    about, like takeoff at higher horizontal tail and flap
    settings, and recover--or fly successfully at a slightly
    heavier weight. Then we look at requirements adjustments or
    other things.
        That is the last thing on the list.
        Senator Sessions. So that is all well and good, but I guess
    what I am saying to you is, do you remain confident that this
    is a matter that is not going to be a significant roadblock to
    the eventual effectiveness of this aircraft?
        Mr. Young. Performance potential of the aircraft is
    significant, and the company has paths that are very credible
    and laid out in detail so we can achieve that weight. We need
    to spend some time, and I assure you we will.
        Senator Sessions. Who is eating the cost of this? Is it the
    contractor or the Defense Department that is having to pay the
    cost of getting this overweight down?
        Mr. Young. It is a cost on the contract, sir, and the
    Defense Department is paying the costs. Frankly, the Defense
    Department was a key--made the decision to extend the program
    for a year and take the time to get the designs to a better
    performance level and lower weight.
        Senator Sessions. I am not sure I got my answer. Now, you
    are confident that we need to plan on this aircraft being in
    the inventory, to do what the STOVL is expected to do, and it
    is just a matter of a delay, some delay, in working out this
    weight problem.
        Mr. Young. I hesitate to guarantee you, but we have laid
    out very detailed plans to adjust this design. We have options
    to change how we operate the plane so that STOVL will be
    extremely effective for the Marine Corps.
        Senator Sessions. Secretary Sambur, you will be taking over
    this program soon. Do you have any comments to add?
        Dr. Sambur. I would just add to what Secretary Young talked
    about, that this is a multi-faceted approach. As you correctly
    surmised, taking out 10 percent of the weight is really a
    Herculean task. We are looking at other things, such as
    increasing the engine capabilities, looking at concept of
    operations (CONOPs) changes, and all of these facets. We have a
    program plan that will get us to the ultimate goal, which is
    not weight, but meeting the key performance parameters. Weight
    is an indication of being able to meet that. But, in and of
    itself, there are other ways of getting there.
        So the ultimate goal is meeting the key performance
    parameters. Weight is one of the aspects of getting it, but
    there are other things we can do--engine and performance
    enhancements, CONOPs changes.
        Senator Sessions. Right. Now, we have already gone from,
    what, $33 billion to $40 billion, a $7 billion increase in
    development costs for the program. Is this a big part of that?
    Can we expect to see more cost as a result of this?
        Dr. Sambur. I will just tell you that my experience on the
    F/A-22 has indicated the most stressing part of the program is
    when you enter integration, and that is yet to come. We have
    tried to do everything to minimize the impact of that, but that
    is always the most difficult part of the program when you start
    putting everything together. The software has to go together,
    all of the aspects, and that is yet to come. So I would tell
    you that we have tried to give you a legitimate estimate of the
    cost impact, but there may be more to come.
        Mr. Young. Could I emphasize that in making that decision,
    though, some key points that you may have heard were funded
    assuming that 50 percent of the things that could go wrong went
    wrong, and 50 percent did not. In adding this additional year,
    and agreeing to spend additional funds, we now funded 80
    percent of the things going wrong that could go wrong, and we
    only have to be lucky on 20 percent.
        We have added, based on the lessons of F-22, additional
    inefficiency assumptions, if you will, about how fast we can
    generate software code, as well as adding additional funds and
    time for the generation of software code. So in several of the
    risk areas that we have seen, as I said, on other tactical
    aircraft, they were addressed by this painful decision to
    increase the price and extend to $40 billion--and the program a
    year.
        Senator Sessions. All right. Just briefly, let me ask you,
    the Defense's cost-analysis improvement group estimates it will
    take $11.7 billion to basically convert the F-22 to an attack
    aircraft. Is that figure correct? Does the Air Force concur
    with that, Secretary Sambur and General Keys?
        Dr. Sambur. No. We have actually built into the F/A-22
    program a series of spirals. The next three spirals, up to
    spiral 3B, which includes JDAM, small-diameter bomb, radar and
    sensor improvements, have already been budgeted and are in the
    program. We are budgeted at $3.5 billion. The fourth spiral
    contains a lot of wish-list types of items, things that we are
    dreaming about, we may not ask for. So the $11 billion number
    that has been quoted really contains--you can go into a house,
    and you want to put everything under the sun in here. We are
    not thinking of doing anywhere near that.
        The plane, at the end of IOC, is a very capable air-to-
    ground aircraft. It will have subsonic JDAM. When we finish
    spiral 3B--and General Keys can add to this--we will have a
    incredibly good plane. You might want to add to that, General
    Keys.
        General Keys. No, we believe the program, as it is budgeted
    now, gives us an airplane that will be a world-class air-to-air
    and air-to-ground platform. That money is in there. Now, beyond
    spiral 3B, the money is not in it. We have a number of programs
    that we are looking at, to increase the sensors, increase some
    of the capability of the weapons, but we have not yet put them
    into the program.
        Senator Sessions. You do not expect $11 billion above this
    number.
        General Keys. I do not think we have budgeted for that.
        Senator Sessions. Now, General Keys, you might share with
    Senator Chambliss and Senator McCain--and I will yield the
    floor here to Senator Chambliss--briefly follow-up on Secretary
    Sambur's comments about how well the F/A-22 is performing as a
    combat aircraft.
        General Keys. I have talked to the pilots who are flying
    the airplane. When you talk to them, they have nothing but a
    big smile. The airplane is working well. The avionics were well
    above the minimum required threshold for avionics stability.
    When they flew, in all of the engagements that I have talked to
    them about flying, these adversaries, they die, and die before
    they even get a missile off.
        The airplane is easy to fly. It is flying well. We have
    turned a number of the force three times a day with only four
    airplanes, which says something about--at this stage in
    maturity--how well the airplane is working. So, from an
    operational standpoint, we see this airplane as being
    everything we expected it to be. We are lusting after the air-
    to-ground capability as we get through IOT&E.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Chambliss, I am sorry I missed my
    visit down to Georgia. I was ready to get on the plane, and
    they would not let me.
        Senator Chambliss. We intended to let you be the first
    Senator to fly an F-22. [Laughter.]
        Secretary Sambur and General Keys, you were talking about
    the operation of the F-22. I have had the same experience
    talking to those pilots. They are nothing but excited about the
    way this weapons system flies and operates. I understand you
    did some simulated flights, combat flights, against the F-15,
    which has been ``the'' airplane that has allowed us to, early
    on, capture air superiority in every conflict it has been
    involved in. Could you tell us what happened when you simulated
    the combat with the F-22 against the F-15?
        Dr. Sambur. I had put a portion of that in my oral
    statement, and General Keys can add some background. But what I
    did say in my oral statement was that a four-ship F/A-22 versus
    eight F-15Cs, all of the F-15Cs were killed in a matter of
    moments, and they did not get one single missile off. That has
    been the experience. They did not even see the F/A-22s. It was
    almost as if they were down and out in the first round of a
    fight, with the first punch. So very significant.
        As I characterized the AFOTEC commander when he talked
    about effectiveness during phase 1, his quote was ``very
    impressive.''
        General Keys.
        General Keys. I cannot add much to that. Again, it is
    everything that we desired it to be, everything we have
    designed it to be. The performance that we are seeing in the
    hands of our pilots is absolutely astounding.
        Senator Chambliss. In spite of it being a great weapons
    system--and I have been a fan of it since I have been a Member
    of Congress--the cost of it keeps escalating. I know some of
    that is due to problems we have had; some is due to delays in
    production; some has been due to the reduction in the number of
    overall purchases. But where are we today, relative to cost?
    Because with the tight budget times we have, tell us where we
    are.
        Dr. Sambur. Okay, I can comment on that. We have just
    completed, verbally, the negotiations for Lot-4. We have a
    target price curve that we are hoping to meet in order to
    achieve the full complement within our budget of F/A-22s. We
    were able to settle with Lockheed Martin exactly on that target
    price curve, which means that the stability that you have given
    us in Congress, in terms of maintaining the funding, and the
    management attention that you have been asking us to give, is
    paying off. We are actually achieving the price reductions and
    producability enhancements that we expected. If we continue
    along this trend, with the OSD budget we will get the 277
    aircraft, and we may even do better.
        Senator Chambliss. But what is our per-copy cost in Lot-4?
        Dr. Sambur. There are different ways of characterizing it,
    but the flyaway cost, the recurring flyaway cost, without
    engines, is about $110 million. With engines, you add another
    $20 million; it's about $130 million. If you talk about flyaway
    costs including tooling and all of the other attributes, I
    think it is in the $150 million range. But it is exactly on the
    budgets that we predicted.
        Senator Chambliss. Okay. The Defense Acquisition Board, I
    know, met on Monday to review the F/A-22 program, and
    particularly relative to the avionics stability and
    functionality during the OT&E phase 1, and made a decision to
    move forward, that all the testing is on track.
        Dr. Sambur. What they actually said was that there are no
    impediments for an April delivery. They were very
    ``encouraged,'' was the words of Mike Wynne, the Under
    Secretary for AT&L, with the progress. He just wanted to make
    sure that we certified to Congress that we are achieving the
    milestone, the criteria of 5 hours mean time between critical
    avionic instability events, which, I mentioned before, we are
    about four times that threshold. We will certify that. Plus, we
    need an additional bit of training for the pilots and the
    maintainers. We are definitely on track for April. As Mike
    Wynne indicated, there is no impediment, and we do not think
    there is any impediment. We think we will get there, and we
    will be within the cost that we projected. That is good news,
    as well.
        Senator Chambliss. Last, there was a problem last year
    relative to the avionics stability. Where are we with regard to
    that issue and any other problems that may have been incurred
    in the last 12 months?
        Dr. Sambur. Last year at this time, there were a number of
    avionics stability issues. First of all, when you turned on the
    system, there was a fairly significant probability that it
    would not start up. Now our probability is 100 percent that it
    will start up. At the DAB that you mentioned, it specifically
    made the point that startup is no longer an issue on this
    program.
        In addition, the stability between events, critical events,
    where you have to reset the program, is no longer an issue.
    There are no major resets. You have anomalies in the software,
    but it comes back. We have no reset issues where the pilot has
    to intervene in the scenario.
        So we are making extremely good progress, and we are
    encouraged.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, what is the status now of
    the tanker situation?
        Dr. Sambur. We are on course, and we are strictly, and I
    mean----
        Senator McCain. We are what?
        Dr. Sambur. We are on course, there are no activities with
    respect to any of the tanker negotiations. We are strictly--and
    I mean strictly--adhering to all of the OSD guidance with
    respect to the tanker program.
        Senator McCain. Meaning that an analysis of alternatives
    (AOA) will be conducted?
        Dr. Sambur. The AOA will be conducted in accordance with
    the OSD guidance, yes.
        Senator McCain. When do you expect that to be completed?
        Dr. Sambur. We are looking at a August 2005 date.
        Senator McCain. So you would disagree--or would you agree
    with this statement? ``The plan we have for the 767 is valid.
    The options are contracted, and it's operationally viable. The
    options of re-engining old 707s gives us a re-engined 50-year-
    old Eisenhower air tanker, not viable, from my perspective, or
    the ability to go look at something out there that is outside
    the boundary--outside the boundaries of a 767 airplane.'' Yes?
    You would not agree with that statement? Or would you agree
    with that statement?
        Dr. Sambur. I would say that, Senator McCain, we are living
    exactly within the dictates of the AOA. We have an option to
    look at----
        Senator McCain. That is----
        Dr. Sambur. We are within the dictates of the OSD guidance
    on the AOA.
        Senator McCain. The reason why I mentioned that, General
    Moseley made those statements just a short time ago. Is that
    standard procedure, where a high-ranking Air Force officer
    comes over here and testifies in direct contradiction to what
    you just said when I asked you the status of the tanker deal?
        Dr. Sambur. I do not think I can comment on that. All I can
    tell you----
        Senator McCain. He works for you, does he not?
        Dr. Sambur. No, he does not work for me.
        Senator McCain. I see.
        Dr. Sambur. All I can tell you is that, from the
    acquisition point of view, we are strictly--strictly--and I
    want to emphasize that--living within the OSD guidance, we are
    on course, and we are faithfully following the guidance with
    respect to the AOA.
        Senator McCain. Secretary Young, for a tanker that would be
    used both Service-wide and NATO-wide, should that tanker be
    capable of refueling receptacle- and probe-equipped receive
    aircraft on the same mission?
        Mr. Young. Admiral Nathman is really the appropriate person
    to answer your question.
        Senator McCain. Admiral?
        Admiral Nathman. On the same mission? Not necessarily, sir.
    That's one of the issues we have. The Air Force has to have a
    certain amount of liquidity or a certain amount of room,
    understanding that you frag inside your air tasking order what
    tankers are going to support which aircraft.
        Senator McCain. Let me tell you, on June 25, 2002, the
    interim Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Fallon,
    conditionally signed off on a Joint Requirement Oversight
    Council memorandum on Air Force refueling aircraft operational
    requirements document, ORD, in concurring with the ORD,
    stipulated the following, ``Critical. Change sentence to read:
    The aircraft must have the capability to refuel two receivers
    simultaneously.'' His rationale was, ``Dual drogues maintain
    the current refueling capability of the KC-10 and KC-135
    aircraft for probe-equipped aircraft.'' Do you agree with that?
        Admiral Nathman. Yes, sir, I do. I want to explain my
    previous statement, sir.
        Senator McCain. Yes.
        Admiral Nathman. What I meant by that was, the aircraft
    would have the capability. You would not necessarily load or
    task organize each aircraft to have that capability. It would
    be smarter, in some cases, in terms of operational availability
    of those aircraft, that they had the ability--if you were
    doing, let's say, a trans-Atlantic escort of F-15s, you would
    configure the airplane a certain way. If you got into the
    mission area, you would configure the airplane for dual
    capability. So a Navy aircraft, a Marine Corps aircraft, or an
    Air Force aircraft could refuel from those particular aircraft.
    That is what I meant by my earlier statement. So we stand by
    the order that our threshold is to have the dual capability.
    That is important.
        Senator McCain. It is your understanding that that was not
    part of the ORD for the tankers.
        Admiral Nathman. No, sir. My understanding was part of the
    ORD for the tankers would have dual-mission capability.
        Senator McCain. Actually, it was taken out.
        Dr. Sambur, I do not like to keep re-plowing old ground,
    but I am still intrigued by your communications with Boeing
    Aircraft. A former colleague of yours has been fired and is now
    under investigation. A lot of interesting things happened,
    including messages that were sent to you that were immediately
    dispatched to the Boeing lobbyists. There was a message sent to
    you on Tuesday, April 15, 2003, and it is to you from Mr.
    Wynne. It says, ``Marv, some good news, some bad news. Good
    news,'' et cetera, ``about OMB in discussions with,'' and then
    he goes on, ``we'll reset the baseline, and so here's our
    current strategy.'' Within minutes, you transmitted that to
    Boeing. Within minutes.
        Dr. Sambur. Can I explain?
        Senator McCain. Sure.
        Dr. Sambur. Mike Wynne and I had a strategy to let Boeing
    know--if you read the rest of that e-mail, it says, at the
    bottom of that, ``We will give Boeing one last chance to lower
    their price, or else it's all over. It's the end of the day.''
    Mike Wynne and I deliberately wanted to make sure that Boeing
    understood, no matter what political clout that they had, if
    they did not give us, not only a good deal, but the best deal,
    we were not going to go forward. If you read the bottom of that
    e-mail, it specifically says we will give Boeing one last
    chance.
        Senator McCain. Why did Mr. Wynne have to go through you?
        Dr. Sambur. Because they were not listening to anyone. They
    felt that, at that particular point in time, that they had the
    political power with respect to this deal. So we wanted to make
    sure, in the building, which we always did, that we were going
    to get not only a good deal, but the best deal for the
    taxpayers, and we wanted Boeing to understand that.
        That we, within this building, were going to pull the plug
    unless they lowered their price and gave us the best deal. You
    have e-mails--because I know you--your assistant, your staffer,
    has shown me them--where I told Boeing that unless they
    guaranteed to us that we were getting the best deal, it was no
    good; it was off.
        Senator McCain. I have never seen that, but----
        Dr. Sambur. Oh, he has it----
        Senator McCain.--I do have an e-mail here, Dr. Sambur, that
    says, ``Jim''--that's Mr. Albaugh, Jim, the first name basis
    with the lobbyist--``Jim, Please treat as sensitive. I
    documented your visit to create a sense of urgency. Marv.'' Any
    objective, Marv, Jim and Marv are communicating with each
    other, the lobbyist and the Secretary in charge of the deal? It
    is just----
        Dr. Sambur. Jim Albaugh is the executive vice president of
    Boeing.
        Senator McCain. Yes.
        Dr. Sambur. The new modern management technology is that
    you have a cooperative, collaborative environment with the
    people you deal with. That gives----
        Senator McCain. Really?
        Dr. Sambur. Collaboration is the way things are best done.
        Senator McCain. Dr. Sambur, I have been around too long to
    buy that line. The fact is that all of these cumulative e-mails
    indicate you had an unsavory, close relationship with the
    employees of Boeing Aircraft. You are stating that you were
    going to get the best price. OMB, GAO, and somebody else all
    assess your deal to cost $5.7 billion more to the taxpayers of
    America, the deal you were trying to push through----
        Dr. Sambur. Can I comment on that?
        Senator McCain.--the one--let me finish and then I will let
    you comment on it. The one that even after the Secretary of
    Defense said they were going to be on hold, you sent out an e-
    mail--and I will show this to you--``We should sign the deal
    today.''
        Dr. Sambur. Let me comment first on that e-mail. If you
    read the originating part of that e-mail, I was specifically
    asked by OSD to comment on two items. The two items were which
    was the preference, because if you remember, after the
    Secretary of Defense made his statement about potentially
    pausing, he also indicated he would ask his staff for comments
    and opinions as to whether to go forward.
        Senator McCain. No, he did not say he was thinking about
    it. He said, ``The deal is on hold,'' Dr. Sambur. He did not
    say ``tentatively thinking about it.'' He said, ``The deal is
    on hold.'' Then you wrote, saying, ``Let's sign the deal
    today.''
        Dr. Sambur. Senator----
        Senator McCain. That is fact.
        Dr. Sambur.--that is not----
        Senator McCain. That is just fact.
        Dr. Sambur. Senator, I happen to have the e-mail that
    actually says----
        Senator McCain. I happen to have e-mails, too.
        Dr. Sambur. Do you have the originating e-mail from Dr.
    Spruel from OSD that says, ``Please feel free to give us your
    opinion''?
        Senator McCain. No, because you refuse to give us those e-
    mails, Dr. Sambur.
        Dr. Sambur. How did you get this e-mail?
        Senator McCain. Get the e-mails to us, and that way we
    would be able to make an objective judgment. The Air Force has
    refused to give us your internal e-mails.
        Dr. Sambur. Our e-mails will show that we were dedicated
    to----
        Senator McCain. How could we know unless you give them to
    us?
        Dr. Sambur. That is an issue beyond my paygrade, sir, to--
    --
        Senator McCain. Would you be glad for us to have the e-
    mails, Dr. Sambur? Personally?
        Dr. Sambur. You are asking me personally? I have nothing to
    hide, because you will see what they mean.
        Senator McCain. Would you like for us to have the e-mails,
    Dr. Sambur?
        Dr. Sambur. Personally?
        Senator McCain. Yes.
        Dr. Sambur. Again, I will answer this from my personal
    point of view. I will be glad to show you the e-mails, because
    it does portray the Air Force as always intending to get the
    best deal. But there are other issues besides my personal
    comments here that have to be taken into consideration.
        Senator McCain. One thing that is clear, Dr. Sambur, is,
    the Air Force was not getting the best deal. One thing that is
    totally clear is, the taxpayers were going to be ripped off to
    the tune of $5.7 billion, by objective observers. Not me. The
    Office of Management and Budget, the General Accounting Office,
    and other objective observers. That was----
        Dr. Sambur. Can I comment?
        Senator McCain.--that was what the deal was, Dr. Sambur.
    Thank God we had a hearing in the Commerce Committee and had
    this investigation going in the Commerce Committee, and these
    aspects come to light of what happened, and the changes that
    were taking place in Boeing. Unfortunately, no changes have
    taken place, so far as I can see, in the way the United States
    Air Force does business, and that is very sad. Now you can
    respond.
        Dr. Sambur. Thank you. The $5 billion that we are talking
    about only occurs if we were willing to pay, up front, for all
    of the aircraft. That is the same way as saying you can save a
    lot of money if you are willing to spend all of the cash up
    front for your house and you do not spend the mortgage. You
    have to remember----
        Senator McCain. I will be glad to provide for the record--
    that is just simply not a factual statement. But go ahead.
        Dr. Sambur. How is it not a factual--the $5 billion is
    based upon the assumption that if you pay for all of the
    tankers up front, just as if you pay for a house--a $500,000
    house, if you pay cash up front, you save money over a mortgage
    payment. The important point to remember is, in order to pay
    for these tankers up front, we would have had to take $10
    billion out of our budget for other things. The rule of thumb
    is that for every dollar you subtract from funding, you have to
    put $3 back in, in the future. That means that $10 billion we
    have taken away from other programs, we would have had to put
    $30 billion in to make those programs whole.
        Senator McCain. You can argue with whoever you want to, but
    this is from the Under Secretary of Defense, Ken Krieg. He
    says, ``We find that leasing provides no inherent economic
    efficiencies relative to direct purchase of tankers, and,
    therefore, are more expensive in the long run.'' So it is just
    foolishness, Dr. Sambur, for you to hold a position that is
    contradicted by every outside governmental entity with
    responsibilities.
        My time is expired, Mr. Chairman, and I hate to keep----
        Senator Sessions. Well, I know.
        Senator McCain.--going through this, but it is the most
    disgraceful conduct that I have seen in 44 years of serving
    this country. I have never seen anything like this. After we
    think that we got things on track here, the Vice Chief of the
    Air Force comes over and says something in direct contradiction
    to the Secretary of Defense's policy. I ask him why, and he
    said, ``Well, that's my personal opinion,'' without being asked
    what his personal opinion is. So if I get a little frustrated,
    Mr. Chairman, you can understand. This is not the way we are
    supposed to do business, and that--the Congress of the United
    States, and specifically this committee, exercising its
    oversight responsibilities--they will not give us the
    communications within the United States Air Force. Yet when
    these nominees come before us, they sign a piece of paper that
    says, ``Will you provide this committee with all
    communications, upon request?'' ``Yes.'' But we do not get
    them. Now Dr. Sambur is claiming that he has e-mails that will
    prove his case. How do we know that? How do we know that if we
    do not get them?
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. I will just say a couple of things.
    First, a lot of money is involved. I thank Senator McCain for
    raising the issue. When the dust settles, we will probably have
    a wiser proposal when this analysis of alternatives comes
    through than we have had before. If you take it as a policy
    that you want these aircraft on short order, virtually
    immediately, it is going to cost you more. In the crazy budget
    system we operate on here, you have to--probably a lease was
    the only way to do it. But I am inclined to believe that was
    not, in the long-run, in the interest of the taxpayers.
        Senator McCain. Could I remind you, Mr. Chairman----
        Senator Sessions. Yes.
        Senator McCain.--they can only produce so many airplanes a
    year. We could not purchase all of these airplanes all at once,
    because they produce a certain small number every year. That is
    another fallacy of Dr. Sambur's statement that----
        Senator Sessions. I respect your view on it, and we are
    going to come out better in the long run. I do recognize, Dr.
    Sambur, that it is higher than your paygrade, the concern over
    producing, to the United States Congress, all the Defense
    Department's internal e-mails concerning the procurement
    program. That is a matter that deserves some careful thought.
    But, in general, you need to be forthcoming to the authorizing
    committees.
        Senator Chambliss. Mr. Chairman, before you leave that
    issue can I just say whether you agree or disagree on the lease
    issue, Senator McCain's right about this. If we cannot demand
    correspondence that supposedly substantiates their position
    that we are debating and questioning, then something is wrong
    in the system, and maybe legislation ought to be passed to cure
    that.
        Senator Sessions. Before they write you your paycheck, they
    want to see all your e-mails. It is a matter of seriousness
    that--it is not blithely to be entered into, for the Secretary
    of Defense to say, ``Well, whatever e-mails we have in the
    Department of Defense, everybody in Congress can have a copy
    of.'' I have been there. I have subpoenaed documents before,
    and I know that you normally have to have, under a subpoena, a
    basis for the subpoena. You have to maintain the secrecy of the
    documents and assurance of that. So maybe at some point this
    could be observed in a way that maintains some confidentiality,
    but I am a little bit sympathetic with those in the Department,
    based on my experience as a Federal prosecutor who has
    investigated cases like this. They would not want everything
    they do turned over to----
        Senator Chambliss. Classified documents--Senator, that
    would be, right. But when we are----
        Senator McCain. Senator Sessions, could I mention that----
        Senator Sessions. Go ahead.
        Senator McCain. This is obviously an issue of great
    controversy. There has been the retirement of the chief
    executive officer of one of the major corporations in America.
    This issue has become controversial to a degree that we have
    the right to know all the facts. We are not asking for every e-
    mail ever sent within the DOD; we are asking only for the
    communications that went on that address this specific issue.
    Why is that? The e-mails that we got from Boeing are directly
    related to many of the individuals in the Department of
    Defense, including Dr. Sambur, who defends himself by saying,
    ``We have e-mails that will prove that that was wrong.'' But
    yet he will not show it to us.
        Finally, in the nomination process, the form says, ``Will
    you provide communications to this committee, upon request?''
    Answer: ``Yes.'' We ought to change the form, or change what we
    do.
        Again, Mr. Chairman, we do have oversight responsibilities.
    This is a $20 billion deal. This was not--this is not chicken
    feed here.
        Senator Sessions. I agree with that.
        Senator McCain. According to objective observers, the
    taxpayers were going to be abused to the point of $5.7 billion.
    This is a serious issue.
        But there is also another thing that is more serious about
    this, and that is this relationship and this revolving door
    that is going on now between the Defense Department and
    lobbyists. It is a serious issue. All of this--all these e-
    mails, they are all on a first-name basis with each other--
    Marv, Jim, Mike. It is really concerning and should be
    concerning to all of us. I intend to pursue this aspect of the
    issue.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. I think you should. You are to be
    congratulated for raising the issue and pursuing it. We are
    going to be better off having not gone forward with the plan as
    originally proposed. I would designate you the $5 billion man,
    so far, on behalf of the taxpayers. [Laughter.]
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
    witnesses.
        Senator Sessions. With regard to the Defense Department
    official who went to Boeing and has resigned, is there an
    investigation of that?
        Dr. Sambur. Yes, there is an investigation.
        Senator Sessions. By Federal prosecutors or IG?
        Dr. Sambur. There is an IG. I do not know how far it has
    advanced.
        Senator Sessions. IGs have an obligation to refer any
    uncovering of wrongdoing to a Federal prosecutor at some point.
        Let me just ask you on this. Now we are in limbo about this
    thing. We are proposing to eliminate or retire 68 KC-135E
    aircraft. They continue to perform at good rates. The KC-135R
    is operating at a mission-capable rate of 82 percent, and the
    old KC-135E is at 75 percent, which is not much different than
    full-aircraft average. They are refurbished, and there is a
    desire to go on for a new aircraft, because they are over 40
    years old. I know that. But would we not be making a mistake if
    we continued to retire so many of these aircraft? Should we not
    slow down until this matter is cleared up somewhat?
        Dr. Sambur. Mr. Chairman, I would like the operations
    individual to answer that, because it is more applicable from
    him.
        Senator Sessions. General Keys?
        Dr. Sambur. Yes.
        General Keys. Yes, sir, the way we look at it is this, the
    135E, when you look at 75 percent on a mission-capable rate,
    you also have to take into consideration how many of those
    airplanes do you actually have on a ramp, because that is how
    many that you have on your ramp that you can actually fly. So
    there is a certain number of that fleet that is not available
    because it is in depot. So when we get down to real numbers,
    you are--of the total fleet of 135Es that you own, it is about
    64 to 68 percent that are--flyable.
        Now the question becomes that in order to keep these things
    flyable, I have to put more money into them. Eventually, I am
    going to have to put new pylons in the airplanes, just because
    of the corrosion, to keep them safely flyable. If, on the other
    hand, I take the 135E fleet down, which we are getting to the
    point that we believe that that is the prudent course, I lose
    about 11 percent of my tanking fleet. If I take the money, the
    people, plus-up my crew ratios, I can fly my Rs now to the
    point that I am losing about 4 percent of my total tanking
    capability. Our belief is that that is the prudent course of
    action at this point.
        Senator McCain. Could I just ask, Mr. Chairman, as follow-
    up to that, have you done a corrosion study?
        General Keys. We should have the corrosion study--I think
    it is due this May.
        Senator McCain. But you have not done a corrosion study?
        General Keys. We have done an internal one. We were asked
    to do another study.
        Senator McCain. The internal one was not a complete study?
        General Keys. Sir?
        Senator McCain. The internal one was not a complete study?
        General Keys. That was the assertion, and that is why we
    are doing another.
        Senator Sessions. I thank Senator McCain for raising that
    issue and asking for that, the more complete study, to be done.
    That is important. Yes, I know there is some corrosion, but we
    do not seem to have too much of a problem in getting these
    aircraft back in first-rate service, at least a lot of them--
    you would identify those that have serious problems.
        We probably need to slow down a little bit on a
    decommissioning of the----
        Senator Lieberman. Can I ask one--with apologies to Senator
    Pryor--because you have touched on something really important
    here, and it obviously follows on Senator McCain's questions.
    The question I have is, how many of the KC-135Es are in the
    depot now? How many would be there in fiscal year 2005? General
    Keys, do you know?
        General Keys. Okay. Right now, in depot status, the 135Es,
    we have 22 of them in depot. We have another 30 that are unit
    possessed, but they are not mission capable. So we have 50 that
    are----
        Senator Lieberman. I should have said this while Senator
    McCain was in the room. Just in case the Boeing agreement does
    not go forward. [Laughter.]
        This is a concern, is it not? Your answer about the 135Rs
    is quite correct. What I would worry about is, in our
    intensified conflict situation where we would need a surge
    capacity, might we not need some of those K-135Es? Assuming the
    Boeing agreement does not go forward, at least not in a timely
    way.
        General Keys. Of course, we have to look at that, looked at
    going both ways. If we have to go east and west, for example,
    swing the force because that tanker air bridge is very
    important. It is important to enabling our long-range strike
    assets. Again, we believe that separate from how we
    recapitalize the tanker force. There is an agreement that we
    will need to recapitalize our tankers at some point, some point
    fairly in the near future. But separate from that point is the
    question of the airworthiness of these KC-135Es, and how much
    money does it take for me to continue to keep them FMC? They
    are maintained by our ARC forces, and they are doing a great
    job.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Keys. They are old airplanes, but it takes a lot of
    maintenance man-hours per flying hour, and we put a lot of
    money into depot in order to get these airplanes through depot.
        Dr. Sambur. Senator Lieberman, may I add just one more
    little thing to that?
        Senator Lieberman. Sure.
        Dr. Sambur. The Es right now are on flight restrictions. In
    order for them to be relieved of those flight restrictions, we
    have to do a major replacement on the struts. That is a
    considerable sum of money. You have to weigh whether or not you
    want to put in a lot of money on 43-year-old planes. If we do
    the struts and re-engining, that, in and of itself, is $40
    million per plane, for the re-engining and re-strutting, which
    is a considerable amount of money for 43-year-old planes.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you. Thank you both.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator Pryor.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I must tell you
    that I do concur with what Senator Chambliss said a few moments
    ago. Regardless of your view of the Boeing contract, there must
    be a way for us to get the information that we want to get. We
    can do it in a discretionary way if we need to.
        Senator Sessions. There might be something that can be
    worked out. Just a broad blanket, produce everything that we
    have ever done, you have me nervous. But the IG has access to
    it. If any Federal investigation by a prosecutor gets involved,
    they will have access to all internal e-mails.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Sambur, I
    bet you do not want to talk about Boeing anymore, so let's talk
    about Lockheed Martin. How does that sound? [Laughter.]
        Dr. Sambur. Sounds fair.
        Senator Pryor. I have some questions for you about the F/A-
    22.
        Dr. Sambur. Okay.
        Senator Pryor. The Air Force announced, I think it was
    yesterday, that we agreed, with Lockheed Martin, to buy the
    fiscal year 2004 F/A-22s. I believe it was for less than $110
    million per aircraft. Is that right?
        Dr. Sambur. There are various ways of looking at this.
    There is a flyaway cost----
        Senator Pryor. Okay, and that is what I was going to ask
    you about.
        Dr. Sambur. Right.
        Senator Pryor. Explain that to the subcommittee, please.
        Dr. Sambur. $110 million--they are giving me a cheat-sheet.
        Senator Pryor. That is good. I need those from time to
    time.
        Dr. Sambur. $110 million is basically the aircraft itself.
        Senator Pryor. Okay.
        Dr. Sambur. When you look at the flyaway costs, you have to
    include the engines, which is approximately $20 million. Plus,
    the way it is calculated. They amortized tooling costs and all
    these other issues associated with production into the cost.
    When you look at it that way, you are in about the $150 million
    range. The reason why the $110 million was quoted is it is a
    standard that we are trying to hold Lockheed Martin's feet to
    the fire. That is the aspect of the target price curve. If we
    achieve that target price curve, then we are able to get the
    number of F/A-22s that we want, and it gives us a measure of
    how effective they are, in terms of producability and meeting
    their price objectives.
        Senator Pryor. Okay. I guess I was just a little bit
    confused about the announcement, because when I read $110
    million per aircraft, I think that means $110 million per
    aircraft. But really we are still at the $150 million figure,
    basically, when you add everything up. Is that right?
        Senator Sessions. We have to have an engine, do we not?
        Dr. Sambur. But it is a way of holding, as you mentioned,
    with Lockheed Martin--we are holding their feet to the fire,
    because it is very important that we maintain this target price
    curve.
        Senator Pryor. Right.
        Dr. Sambur. As I mentioned before, we were able to do that
    because you, in Congress, have given us stability in funding.
    When you have stability in funding the vendors will be able to
    take certain risks that they would not do if there was an
    instability in this program.
        Senator Pryor. Right.
        Dr. Sambur. So the stability you have given us has really
    paid off, and your demand on us giving management attention to
    this program has also paid off in dividends. You were not here
    at the beginning, but we talked about the good news with
    respect to our march on IOT&E, how avionics stability is
    getting there, how the effectiveness of the plane has been
    characterized as very impressive.
        Senator Pryor. Great. Is it fair to say that the cost of
    the program is holding steady? Are we seeing some savings in
    the program, given the stability that Congress has given you?
        Dr. Sambur. It would be fair to say that our budget
    estimates for development are holding, that the production--
    that by achieving the price--target price curve, next year we
    are hoping to get 24 planes. If you do not take funding away
    from us, we will achieve that 24. If funding is taken away from
    us, it adds instability, and the number may be significantly
    less. But what it does say to you is that if you give us the
    funding, we will get 24 next year.
        Senator Pryor. Right. Also, while we are on the subject of
    the F/A-22, I understand that the Air Force has been looking at
    the development of a bomber version of that. I think it is FB-
    22. Is that what that is going on?
        Dr. Sambur. That is the number.
        Senator Pryor. Give me a status report on that, or tell
    this committee what is going on with that.
        Dr. Sambur. Basically--and then I will let General Keys
    elaborate on that--but we have actually just formed an
    Integrated Product Team (IPT) within the Air Force to look at
    long-range----
        Senator Pryor. What's an IPT?
        Dr. Sambur. Integrated Product Team or IPT. We speak
    acronym-ese. [Laughter.]
        After awhile, it sounds like English.
        Senator Pryor. Right.
        Dr. Sambur. We formed this group to look at long-range
    strike. Within long-range strike, one of the interim solutions
    is the FB-22. Having set that up, I can give you General Keys,
    who can give you some particulars. But we have not really made
    a decision as to where we are going.
        General Keys. A lot of pieces to it. When you look at the
    long-range strike, you are looking all the way from current
    bombers to the future of hypersonics, those kinds of systems.
    What we are looking at is, we have a certain current long-range
    strike system--the B-2, the B-1, the B-52. At some point, we
    have to start recapitalizing and looking at the future of long-
    range strike. Now the question is, can I bridge the force that
    I have by incrementally bringing them into the net, making them
    more capable, doing some maintenance and logistics upgrades to
    the airplanes, and use them as a bridge force to get me to the
    point where a new long-range strike system happens to be
    appears, whether it is manned, unmanned, whether it is a
    hypersonic or whether it is a conventional kind of airplane, or
    do I need something in the middle, as a bridge force?
        Since you are already building an airplane, naturally one
    of the things that would come up would be, what if you made
    this airplane bigger, put different wings on it, and called it
    an FB-22?
        Senator Sessions. Just modified----
        General Keys. That is easy to say. It may become expensive
    and hard to do.
        Senator Pryor. So, in other words, talking about modifying
    an existing design, to see if you can do it?
        General Keys. Yes, sir. So those are just a number of the
    things that are being looked at in an analysis of alternatives
    of long-range strike systems. How do we get to where we need to
    be? What do we do for the bridge force in the interim?
        Senator Pryor. Are you in a position today to estimate how
    much time and money it will take to develop an F-22, if that is
    the route we go, or are you all just too early in the process?
        General Keys. I think way too early.
        Senator Pryor. Way too early?
        General Keys. Way too early.
        Senator Pryor. The last question I had was for Secretary
    Young. I must tell you that sometimes when I talk to folks that
    deal with the military, they say they are--it is too slow in
    dealing with them and trying to get in to supply the military.
    Also, sometimes they see what we are paying for systems, and
    they think it is too much. There are various examples of that.
    We do not need to go into that right now.
        I know that you have been involved in Operation Respond,
    and I would like to hear from you about that and how that is
    going so far and what is coming of that, if you do not mind.
        Mr. Young. The starting point of it was when Secretary
    England visited General Conway at Camp Pendleton. As the
    Marines prepared to launch, General Conway, General Mattis, and
    General Amos' comments were the materiel establishment had
    responded very well to their needs, and all their vehicles
    would have an armor kit. The helicopters going in country would
    have survivability equipment. They would also have other tools,
    communications and other systems, to deal with IEDs.
        To further institutionalize that, Secretary England asked
    that we stand up this Operation Respond. We set up a Web site,
    where marines in the country can identify a problem and send it
    back asking for help. We have a group of people to look at
    whether there are technology-system solutions we can bring to
    bear on their problem. There is a council that is clearing
    those ideas, so we do not overwhelm the marines. We work with
    the leadership to tell them what we would bring in country and
    give them a choice to say, ``Test it here in our labs and
    warfare centers before it comes in country.'' In many cases,
    General Conway's been forward-leaning in saying, ``I will take
    equipment and give you a real-world test environment.''
        We are meeting on roughly a weekly basis right now, hearing
    what reports and things we need to do. One of the first things
    we received from the Marine Corps concerns ballistic goggles.
    They feel they could use better equipment, because they are
    encountering IEDs and blasts. We're in the process of trying to
    respond very quickly in order to provide those items. We are
    also looking at augmentation of body armor, an additional armor
    kit that can be added to the limbs and extremities, to provide
    better protection than they have. We are working right now to
    identify dollars, and make sure that General Conway and his
    team want it. We are going to proceed with that. We are going
    to keep that flow. Secretary England is adamant, saying that
    this is a war, and we are going to respond to troop needs,
    because the safety and effectiveness of the marines in country
    is the penultimate challenge before the Department of the Navy.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Now I will recognize Senator Lieberman. Dr. Sambur, you
    deserve some historical perspective here. This whole idea of
    the lease proposal came out of Congress, did it not?
        Dr. Sambur. Exactly.
        Senator Sessions. It was not in the Armed Services
    Committee, but the appropriators. The Appropriations Committee,
    they directed this proposal that this lease arrangement be
    entered into. It has been shown not to be economically wise.
    Also, it has some problems with that classical approach to
    acquisition in Congress. In the long run, for the record, you
    did not come up with this idea and propose it, to begin with,
    did you?
        Dr. Sambur. No. No.
        Senator Sessions. Okay.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Dr. Sambur. We were responding to the legislation from
    Congress.
        Senator Sessions. It actually was mandated by Congress?
        Dr. Sambur. Mandate from----
        Senator Sessions. Yes.
        Dr. Sambur.--to specifically--and this is what is so
    puzzling--to specifically look at the Boeing 767.
        Senator Sessions. All right.
        Dr. Sambur. So they told us to do it, and now they are
    criticizing us for doing it.
        Senator Lieberman. Welcome to Washington. [Laughter.]
        Senator Sessions. I will give credit to Senator McCain, who
    fought it when it was proposed in Congress.
        Senator Lieberman. It is true. I know that this was not
    your idea. I am just wondering whether anybody in the room with
    John McCain today would claim parentage of the idea. That would
    be another question, whoever did come up with it.
        This has been a good hearing, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
    it. It is what Congress should do with oversight--in our
    oversight responsibility. I hope you all appreciate that we
    appreciate what you are doing. Part of our responsibility in
    this relationship is to ask these questions. So thank you very
    much.
        I just have one, and it is about the EA-6Bs----
        Dr. Sambur. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman.--which are very much in demand, an
    extraordinary role in providing jamming support for almost all
    aircraft strikes, including those for stealth aircraft. The EA-
    6Bs are aging, too.
        Secretary Young, in your prepared testimony, you spoke to
    the plan that the Navy has to replace the EA-6Bs with a variant
    of the F/A-18E/F, which will be called the EA-18G, two-seat
    aircraft, not the four-seat, as the EA-6B is. I wanted to ask
    you, since these are so important and have been in so much
    demand--in light of the Joint Strike Fighter delays that we
    have talked about, are you comfortable that this new program,
    the EA-18G program, will be able to deliver capability in time
    to replace the aging EA-6B aircraft?
        Mr. Young. Admiral Nathman may want to add comments. We
    signed the contract in December for the System Development and
    Demonstration phase. I visited St. Louis ahead of that a few
    months earlier. They have a well-laid-out schedule as a
    specific agreement between the acquisition community and the
    requirements community about what items of capability, weight,
    and power will go on this aircraft and what we might have to
    trade if we encounter problems. But the fact that they have
    identified to that level of detail, we know what needs to be
    done. The aircraft are included in the F/A-18 multi-year, so we
    have a very solid acquisition program to go forward and deliver
    that capability. It is time-phased with when the EA-6Bs go out
    of the force. The fundamental effort is for the acquisition
    team to continue to execute the program.
        Senator Lieberman. I wonder if I could ask, maybe Admiral
    Nathman and Secretary Sambur, General Keys, or General Hough,
    what the plans are for replacing the Marine Corps and Air Force
    parts of the EA-6B fleet.
        Admiral Nathman. Sir, I will let General Hough talk
    specifically to the Marine Corps requirement on that issue.
    What I would add, on the EA-18G, is, if you look at it in terms
    of risk, often folks ask for what your risk-reduction plans
    are, and you are building, now, this aircraft on a proven
    aircraft, the Super Hornet airframe.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        Admiral Nathman. You are incorporating this advanced crew
    station, which allows you to integrate, I believe strongly,
    along with the avionics world that we are going to see in the
    ALQ-99, so you can go from four- to two-crew--that is the
    advanced crew station--that is being proved on the current
    Super Hornet. You are going to, as it were, an improved ICAP
    jamming system and integrated ALQ-99, so you are seeing proven
    systems put on a proven airframe. It is really an integration
    issue. It is very aggressive, because what we saw--we really
    appreciate the support we have gotten from Congress and from
    this committee for the EA-6B--is that it is very clear we have
    to walk away from that airplane as fast as we can to avoid
    overinvestment in that airframe and engines and, frankly, some
    safety issues that we saw in the engines several years ago.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes.
        Admiral Nathman. So we have overcome those issues because
    of your support, but it is time for us to move on. I see, in
    that airplane, one, it very clearly supports our CONOPs; two,
    it has a lot of proven systems, which give us a lot of
    confidence about the risk that we have in those programs. That
    is our view, because that is the Navy CONOPs, that we will
    provide all around jamming in an electronic attack. The 18G
    also comes with a striking capability, and I do not think we
    should forget that. We have, basically, a HARM improvement,
    called ARGM, which makes a very effective jamming, as well as
    killing system. So we are moving from an electronic attack, in
    terms of suppression, to actually a lethality, to killing
    things. That is where we use the term Destruction of Enemy Air
    Defenses.
        It is very supportive of our CONOPs; it is integrated; and
    we are trying to be as aggressive, Senator, as we can, with
    that aircraft.
        Senator Lieberman. That is great. Thank you.
        General Hough? How about the Marine EA-6B.
        General Hough. Sir, in concert with my sister Service, the
    Navy, we are going to steam along with the EA-6B. We have four
    squadrons of five each, expeditionary squadrons, as you well
    know. With the Navy fielding the Growler, we will be the last
    ones flying EA-6Bs, in the hopes that there will be 20 good
    ones left to forge ahead. Now, that does not resolve the
    problem, as you well know, because with my other sister
    Service, the Air Force, 2 years ago under the tutelage of OSD,
    they asked us to sit down and come up with, ``what's your plan
    here?,'' instead of, ``my way or the highway,'' or ``doing it
    your own way,'' or ``why don't you plan the force?'' You have a
    system approach to leverage off each other. Knowing full well
    that we didn't have the capability of C\4\I and some other
    things that we had to take a look at, and some studies that
    were being done down at OSD, we agreed to come together again
    next year and sit down. At that point, now that we know EA-6B
    is only getting older, the Growler is being fielded, the Air
    Force, Navy, and Marine Corps will sit down and come together
    with a plan so that by 2012-plus, before 2015, we have an
    integrated plan that is strategic in nature and serve us all
    well.
        Senator Lieberman. Obviously, one that will not leave a gap
    in the----
        General Hough. That is correct. That is what we are looking
    for. Because the Growlers----
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Hough.--the EA-6B. The Marine Corps will continue
    to fly the four expeditionary squadrons. With the capabilities
    the Air Force brings to the table, we have to sit down next
    year and come up with a plan that is moderate risk, can be
    achieved in the time frame, so that we have this capability to
    meet the threats that are resident in the 2012 time frame.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, General.
        Secretary Sambur, General Keys, do you want to add anything
    for the Air Force?
        General Keys. Just to pile on, we believe it is a system of
    systems, and we look at the Growler, for example, as part of
    that system. We are looking at the B-52, which we have planned
    now to put jamming pods on the B-52 where those external fuel
    tanks are. We believe we can get the power and antennas and the
    technical kinds of receive suites in there that will make it an
    excellent standoff jammer. Then, of course, the Compass Call,
    we are upping the block-up grade rate on the Compass Call,
    which will give it more capability. It primarily is a C-2 sort
    of jammer. Then looking at the miniature air-launched decoy,
    with a jamming feature in it, because we believe the wave of
    the future is a lot of these unmanned systems--small unmanned
    systems seeded into the areas. So now that we take that entire
    system and put it together and operate, and that is the point
    of sitting down together to make sure that, as we, in our
    minds, concocted this brilliant plan, that we have not left
    some gap in there that some frequency is not going to be
    covered, or something is going to require a stand-in jammer
    that we have only covered standoff, et cetera. So we believe
    that the plan is going to work.
        Senator Lieberman. Very good. Thank you all.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Now, I just briefly want to ask about the joint unmanned
    combat air systems. In the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2001, the Floyd Spence Act, we established a
    goal that within 10 years, one-third of U.S. military
    operational deep-strike aircraft would be unmanned, which is a
    dramatic event. My question to you is--and, of course, this is
    now being done as a joint operation. DARPA is involved with it,
    and managing it. What are your--Secretary Young and Sambur,
    would either one of you comment--what responsibility do you
    have and what input do you have into the development of the
    unmanned air systems?
        Dr. Sambur. We have been sharing our requirements with
    DARPA to make sure that the Air Force's need for a low
    observable is definitely a part of what they are trying to
    develop. We have given them several other requirements, and we
    are basically in a stage of monitoring them. Correct me if I am
    wrong, John--in 2007, the Services come into the picture. We
    will then give operational assessments of the suitability of
    this J-UCAS group, the Air Force's needs, and the Navy is
    doing----
        Senator Sessions. Do you want to add on that, Secretary
    Young?
        Mr. Young. There was an EXCOM set up. I was not able to go
    to the first one. Some decisions were made in light of the
    funding situation.
        Senator Sessions. EXCOM is what?
        Mr. Young. Executive committee. I apologize, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Mr. Young. When we embarked on this strategy, a year or so
    ago, conscious of the committee's mandate, the Navy actually
    was able to pull itself forward, partner with the Air Force
    exactly the way Secretary Sambur talked about, and leverage the
    work that had been done on the X-45. That has migrated into
    this Joint-UCAS program. But at this point in time, it appears
    the decisions are that the Navy variants having carrier
    capability may move later in the program, so the acceleration
    we had achieved earlier may not be achieved right now. We need
    to have an opportunity to spend some executive time
    understanding why these changes are being made and whether they
    serve the Navy's interest.
        Senator Sessions. Is this one-third within 10 years? Is
    that a pie in the sky, or is that something that is achievable?
    Maybe I will ask the uniformed officers.
        Admiral Nathman. It is pie in the sky, sir. You have a
    goal. Maybe you ought to look at the goal, why we reached that
    goal.
        There is a lot of attraction and pull from the standpoint
    that people pitched unmanned as being inexpensive; and so we
    always hear the word ``inexpensive unmanned,'' and I do not
    believe that is the case. Why? What we are looking to leverage
    in the battle space, in terms of deep ISR, intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance, or deep electronic attack, it
    requires the airframe to be very low observable and have
    autonomous capability. You add those capabilities in there,
    because you are removing the other calculator, a computer, and
    it is called the pilot. So you lower the risk to a man, or a
    human, but you incur other risks, in terms of the total
    integration of your system.
        Part of the discovery is that we are seeing in this joint
    interim capabilities review with the Air Force a fairly
    expensive thing to do. When we look at the deliverables inside
    the operational assessment which we will get from DARPA--so it
    is really to look at the ability to deliver on those CONOPs and
    how doable it is.
        We will have a much better feel for the total price of that
    kind of system, before you turn it into a program, and will the
    concept of ops really work the way we want it to, before we
    commit to really big programs.
        So I, for one, would say that we are not going to reach the
    goal, and we have to look at why we think that goal is
    attractive to us, based on the ability to afford it, as well as
    the different challenges of being autonomous or manned. What
    are those particular advantages?
        So there are some cases where unmanned has a great leverage
    on the battle space, in terms of long time on station, and that
    is worthwhile paying that price. But is it worth the total
    trades that you have to make, in terms of affordability? That
    is the next challenge we have. The goal sometimes has to be
    looked at.
        Senator Sessions. General Hough, did you want to comment,
    or General Keys?
        General Hough. Sir, it is actually similar. We tend to bite
    off a heck of a lot here thinking that this is a great CONOPs;
    it sounds terrific. But when you enter the high-risk arena, you
    are onto the unknown unknowns that we have never faced because
    we have never been there before. I would liken it to the fact
    that the first time they gave me a computer at Naval Air
    Systems Command, we sat on them for 3 years because we did not
    have an Internet to play with. It took 20 years to get that
    Internet. So a tremendous amount of integration, C\4\I, a lot
    of thinking through this. It will bring a tremendous
    capability, but it is a ways off. The original date is pie in
    the sky.
        General Keys. We have a lot of experience with the Predator
    and the Global Hawk, bringing on the Predator B. So our
    decision point really is, once we get to this operational
    evaluation, in 2007, where we bring the airframes together and
    we see if they can do the things that we want them to do, they
    have to earn their way onto the battlefield. There are some
    attractive features of these airframes--the fact that you can
    make them more stealthy, you can make them survive for a long
    time. The question is, how much are you willing to pay to
    strike probably fixed targets deep, and what kind of payload
    can these things have, and what kind of range are they going to
    have, and are they going to be air-refuelable? That makes them
    more persistent, and they can go deeper, but that also makes
    them more expensive, probably, more complicated. So those are
    the things we have to wrestle with.
        We know a lot about simple UAVs. We all do--Predator and on
    down, and even the Global Hawk, but from an ISR standpoint, and
    limited strikes. So we are pressing. There are some economies
    to be made there, but there are going to have to be some hard
    tradeoffs. You could say 30 percent of the deep-strike force
    has to be UAVs, but that is the 117 mission, that is the B-1
    mission, the B-2 mission, F-15E mission. So those need to come
    off the table then. We have to be confident that these UAVs
    will do the job. I think there is--they may. We are willing to
    see.
        Senator Sessions. I thank you for that, because Congress is
    pretty serious about it. I thank you, Admiral, for your
    frankness about where you see us heading. Congress does believe
    that we can utilize unmanned aerial vehicles more. We know
    there has been a reluctance in the Department of Defense to
    embrace that. You will continue to see pressure to go further
    and quicker. You should get serious about it. I know you are.
    But be serious, and pursue it with a positive attitude, and see
    how far we can go with it.
        Senator Pryor, do you have anything else?
        Senator Pryor. No, thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Lieberman?
        Senator Lieberman. No, thank you.
        Senator Sessions. It has been a very worthwhile hearing. It
    is good to see these programs moving along on a pretty good
    course, seems to be getting on track. We have to deal with the
    Joint Strike Fighter, and the weight program, and a few other
    issues. But, all in all, if we can conclude these acquisition
    efforts, we will maintain air dominance and that is what we
    have to do.
        If there is nothing else, we will have a few days to offer
    any additional questions we may have. If there is nothing
    further, we are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

                              JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

        1. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, two of the key lessons learned
    from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom are that
    aircraft ``reach'' and ``persistence'' matter. What factors cause the
    U.S. Air Force (USAF) variant of the F-35 to have over 130 nautical
    miles less range (and thereby less reach and persistence) than the Navy
    variant?
        Dr. Sambur.The range difference between the Navy version of the F-
    35 (CV) and the Air Force version (CTOL) is the result of three
    factors:

            1. Mission Profile: The variants are modeled using Service
            specified mission profiles as identified in the Operational
            Requirements Document. The CTOL profile (specified by the Air
            Force) is more demanding (lower altitude, higher airspeed) than
            the optimal altitude and airspeed CV profile (specified by the
            Navy).
            2. Wing Design: The CV, which is required to land on an
            aircraft carrier at nominal speeds of 145 knots, has a larger
            wing. This larger wing provides the CV better cruise
            performance than the CTOL.
            3. Fuel Capacity: Due to the larger wing, and the fact that the
            CV has no internal gun, the CV carries 1,600 lbs. more internal
            fuel than the CTOL.

        Of note, the CTOL range requirement of 590 nm allows the USAF
    access to a majority of areas of interest around the world without
    sacrificing aircraft performances, and exceeds current F-16 capability
    by approximately 100 nm.

        2. Senator McCain. Secretary Young and Secretary Sambur, I
    understand that in addition to a 1-year delay, $5 billion has been
    added to development costs of the F-35 mostly to address the weight
    issue in the F-35 Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL). Can we
    still afford to have the F-35 STOVL remain the second in the cue
    despite these cost and schedule overruns in this variant of the F-35
    program? Please fully explain your answer.
        Mr. Young. The weight challenge for JSF impacts all variants. The
    STOVL variant is impacted the most due to the Key Performance
    Parameters (KPP) related to short takeoff (STO) and vertical landing
    (VL) aboard L-Class ships. Much of the anticipated design improvements
    for weight reduction for STOVL are expected to be common across all
    variants, most specifically the CTOL variant. Concurrent with the
    weight reduction efforts in the STOVL airframe, we believe the most
    efficient and cost effective way to demonstrate success in the overall
    program is to press ahead on CTOL development (with STOVL second). This
    allows the detail design teams to reap maximum benefits in common
    weight reduction that are equally transferable to not only the STOVL
    variant, but eventually to the CV variant too. Additionally, other
    lessons that can be learned from CTOL detailed development are equally
    transferable to the STOVL variant. There are risks other than weight
    reduction in STOVL development that benefit significantly from CTOL
    development in advance of STOVL design. As a result, delays and cost
    increases are actually minimized by keeping the same development order
    among the three variants. STOVL variant is a key element in the Navy
    and Marine Corps TACAIR integration plan, and we are focusing upfront
    effort to ensure STOVL viability for our warfighters.
        Dr. Sambur. As the JSF Service Acquisition Executive, the Navy is
    providing a coordinated response to this question.

        3. Senator McCain. Secretary Young and Secretary Sambur, I
    understand that the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) STOVL is having
    difficulty meeting four key performance parameters (fuel mission
    radius, flat deck short takeoff, ski jumps short takeoff, and bring-
    back). What efforts are you undertaking in conjunction with the Joint
    Program Office to mitigate these challenges?
        Mr. Young. The JSF Program office has extended the JSF System
    Development and Demonstration (SDD) program approximately 18 months to
    provide time to get the airframe design improvements in place. We
    expect the design improvements will reduce aircraft weight to a point,
    when combined with optimized operating procedures, where the JSF will
    deliver suitable performance again in the areas of combat radius, short
    takeoff, ski jump short takeoff, and vertical landing bringback. We are
    re-planning JSF SDD to make sure we succeed. Specifically, our SDD plan
    recognizes: (1) STOVL performance is absolutely vital; (2) we are
    focusing upfront to ensure STOVL viability for our warfighters; (3) we
    are aggressively pursuing trade studies to improve performance by
    reducing weight; and (4) we are aggressively pursuing installed
    propulsion enhancements to improve performance.
        Dr. Sambur. As the JSF Service Acquisition Executive, the Navy is
    providing a coordinated response to this question.

        4. Senator McCain. Secretary Young and Secretary Sambur, from
    December 2002 to December 2003 the JSF has experienced nearly a $7
    billion cost increase and a 12-month program slip. What key factors
    have contributed to these dramatic cost and schedule changes, and what
    confidence do you have that the program is now on track?
        Mr. Young. The JSF development activities for propulsion, vehicle
    systems, mission systems, and integrated testing development are on
    schedule and performing well. The airframe design effort, however, is
    taking longer and is more complex than had been originally anticipated.
    Additional design time is needed to mature the airframe design to
    address projected performance issues that emerged during the past year.
    Consequently, the fiscal year 2005 President's budget request reflects
    extension of the SDD schedule, additional SDD funding, and a 1-year
    delay for the start of Low Rate Initial Production  (LRIP). The largest
    contributor to the $7 billion increase is in the extension of SDD by 18
    months. The increase also includes added costs for anti-tamper
    requirements and software risks.
        The Department is finalizing the details of a program replan. We
    have replaced the CDR with an Integration Maturity Review scheduled for
    April 2004, which will be followed by a series of Airframe CDRs for
    each variant that will take place over the next 2.5 years. This
    approach allows us to conduct additional trade studies with the goal of
    reducing weight and regaining performance. The Department has formed an
    independent review team to look at the complete program, including a
    near-term engineering view, assessing the present design, with specific
    emphasis on weight, aircraft structural design, and other technical
    risk areas. Then in a broader review, the independent review team will
    evaluate the program's overall system engineering processes, from
    design through supportability perspective.
        Dr. Sambur. As the JSF Service Acquisition Executive, the Navy is
    providing a coordinated response to this question.

                                     F/A-22

        5. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, what percentage of the 277 F/
    A-22s do you intend to purchase under the low rate initial production
    (LRIP) authorization before an operational evaluation has been
    conducted? Based on your projection and knowing that LRIP purchases
    typically constitute about 10 percent of the total buy, how do you
    justify the increased procurement you have planned for F/A-22, despite
    the added cost and schedule risk?
        Dr. Sambur. By the time the Initial Operational Test & Evaluation
    (IOT&E) concludes in September 2004, the Air Force will have a total of
    74 Raptors (PRTV 1 through Lot-4) on contract, which amounts to 27
    percent of the projected 277 aircraft profile. While this exceeds the
    10 percent ``rule of thumb,'' the Air Force assesses the overall risk
    for incurring additional costs as low due to the extensive risk-
    reducing testing completed to date, including over 5,500 flight test
    hours, 2 lifetimes worth of fatigue testing, and completion of the
    first phase of Operational Test and Evaluation.

        6. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, I understand that the F/A-22
    is behind schedule and that you anticipate catching up by December
    2005. Given that the program is behind schedule and above cost, does it
    make sense to increase the number of aircraft you intend to buy this
    year (from 22 in last year's budget to 24 this year)? Please explain
    your answer fully.
        Dr. Sambur. In December 2003, the Air Force and Lockheed-Martin
    concluded a comprehensive scrub of the Raptor production program,
    resulting in 383 production improvement initiatives. The net result is
    that the program now has a high confidence, re-baselined delivery
    schedule in place. This revised delivery schedule includes the time
    needed to implement these initiatives and the program office now has
    real-time visibility into the production metrics via a new web-based
    information system. The Air Force is confident deliveries will return
    to the original contract schedule in Lot 3, well before December 2005.
    Based on this confidence, and the additional costs that would  be
    incurred if the production rate were fixed at 22, it is prudent to
    maintain an orderly ramp-up toward full rate production, with 24
    aircraft in Lot 5 (fiscal year 2005).

        7. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, the March 2004 General
    Accounting Office (GAO) report states that it will cost $11.7 billion
    to put the ``A'' in the F/A-22 and that another $40 billion may be
    required to support this program through full rate production. In your
    recent testimony to this subcommittee, you refuted this conclusion by
    stating that you had already included about $3 billion in the
    President's budget request to support ground attack capabilities.
    Please provide the justification for why the F/A-22 is the right
    aircraft for the ground attack role given current and projected
    threats, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of the F/A-22 platform.
        Dr. Sambur. Senator, as you are aware, the ability of aircraft to
    penetrate a complex and integrated air defense system to deliver a
    weapon on target is contingent upon many factors. These include
    awareness of the threat, avoidance of the threat, minimizing exposure
    to the threat, and if necessary, the suppression and or destruction of
    the threat. In the past, it has taken complex mission planning, coupled
    with a substantial support package with many aircraft to address each
    of these factors; often with high risk to the aircraft and aircrews
    involved.
        For the first time, attributes that can overcome or mitigate these
    challenges can be rolled up into one aircraft--the F/A-22. Using a
    blend of integrated avionics, stealth, superior maneuverability,
    sustainable high speed, and combination of weapons, the Raptor has the
    ability to penetrate and operate in an advanced surface-to-air missile
    and air threat environment to deliver ordnance on target, with limited
    exposure and little additional support. The F/A-22 is right for the
    air-to-ground role because these characteristics make the Raptor lethal
    and survivable in the most robust threat environments. No other
    aircraft, present or future, provides the Joint Force Commander with
    the total capabilities and survivability of the F/A-22.

        8. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, please provide your analysis
    justifying the requirement for the number of F/A-22s the USAF will
    require.
        Dr. Sambur. The study ``Sustaining Air Dominance'' validated the
    Air Force requirement as at least 381 aircraft. This study is
    classified, but we will make it available for your review.

        9. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, please provide a detailed list
    of current and future weapons/munitions that the Raptor will carry and
    what sensor/software changes will be required for the attack version of
    this tactical aircraft.
        Dr. Sambur. The F/A-22 that the warfighter will receive prior to
    initial operational capability (IOC) will have inherent air-to-ground
    capabilities using the AIM-120, AIM-9M, GBU-32 (1,000 pound JDAM), and
    the 20mm cannon. The aircraft has already demonstrated capability with
    air-to-air weapons, and ongoing JDAM testing will be completed prior to
    IOC.
        In Spiral 2, the JDAM envelope will be expanded to enable
    supersonic delivery of the weapon. A software upgrade will accompany
    Spiral 2 to improve pilot-vehicle interface and radar performance.
        In Spiral 3A, a robust set of capabilities will be added to the
    Raptor. Sensor upgrades planned for Spiral 3A include adding air-to-
    ground modes to the 4th generation active electronically scanned array
    (AESA) radar and adding Link-16 datalink transmission capability. The
    new 4th generation AESA radar mode will provide high definition and
    synthetic aperture radar ground mapping and aided target detection.
    Spiral 3A will also incorporate small diameter bomb (SDB) on the
    Raptor. A software upgrade will accompany Spiral 3A to incorporate
    these capabilities.
        Spiral 3B will expand on the capability added in previous spirals.
    For weapons, Spiral 3B plans to improve SDB capability and incorporate
    AIM-9X onto the Raptor. Additionally, ground moving indication
    capability will be added to the radar. As in previous spirals, a
    software upgrade will be included.
        Beyond Spiral 3B, the list of candidates are still being
    considered. Some possible candidates include adding side-mounted
    arrays, advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons, and moving
    target attack capability. These capabilities are projected beyond the
    FYDP, and they are still being definitized.

        10. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, please comment on what
    additional burden  will  be  placed  on  the  tanker  fleet  by
    providing  an  attack  capability  in  the F/A-22.
        Dr. Sambur. Senator, there should be no additional burden placed
    upon our tanker fleet due to the additional capability of the Raptor.
    Since the aircraft carries its weapons internally, the air-to-ground
    mission will not change the aircraft flight characteristics--there will
    be little distinction between fuel requirements for an air-to-air
    mission and an air-to-ground mission.

                                    TANKERS

        11. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, where do we stand with
    respect to the 20/80 tanker proposal? Specifically, has the USAF
    renegotiated the unit cost of these tankers, down from $138.5 million
    to a figure closer to $120.5 million, that is, the figure determined to
    be ``fair and reasonable'' by the Department of Defense's own
    contractor--the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)?
        Dr. Sambur. The KC-767 program is currently paused per the December
    1, 2003, memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense. At the time
    of the memorandum, the price to purchase a KC-767 was $13 million in
    fiscal year 2002. IDA's value was only an analytic estimate--the Air
    Force has a fixed price after negotiating with Boeing for over a year,
    with limitation of profit controls and most-favored customer clauses
    that are both auditable. The controls were seen by the OSD leasing
    panel headed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) and OSD Comptroller as giving the
    Department of Defense (DOD) a good deal. If profits exceeded
    limitations, the excess is returned to the taxpayers.

        12. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, how much will reconfiguring
    the tankers under the 20/80 program with a multipoint simultaneous
    refueling capability (a ``WARPS'' system) cost the taxpayers? Develop
    your answer fully to include figures for total program costs and per
    unit costs.
        Dr. Sambur. The KC-767 is more capable than the KC-135E in cargo
    capacity, passenger capacity, available offload, and has the ability to
    refuel ALL Air Force, Navy, and Allied aircraft on the same mission
    regardless of boom or drogue configuration from delivery of the first
    plane. Currently, the USAF has no estimate of the cost for engineering,
    to procure the pods, and to modify and strengthen the wings. The new-
    design refueling pods require aerodynamic testing and engineering to
    ensure proper performance. Italy is planning to procure these pods for
    their Boeing 767 Global Tanker Transport Aircraft (GTTA). The pods for
    us are planned for inclusion in the second spiral of development of the
    USAF KC-767. Out of the more than 600 current KC-135 and KC-10 tankers,
    only 40 aircraft are configured to accept 35 pod sets. It should be
    noted that none of the current pod-equipped aircraft will be retired by
    the time the initial 100 KC-767s are planned to enter service.

        13. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, will the lease of up to 20
    tankers be structured around a ``special purpose entity,'' as under the
    original proposal? If so, what additional costs will be incurred by the
    taxpayers for leasing the tankers as opposed to buying the tankers
    outright?
        Dr. Sambur. The lease of 20 planes will be structured around a
    ``special purpose entity.'' The structure is quite common in commercial
    markets. It facilitates investor confidence because it gives investors
    more direct insight into how their money will be used. In the event of
    manufacturer bankruptcy or other financial trouble, the investors are
    at less risk when the lease structure uses a special purpose entity (in
    contrast to a direct lease by the manufacturer). Interest rate
    financing is a function of investor confidence. To the extent that this
    common commercial practice of using a special purpose entity increases
    investor confidence, interest rates will be lower and this reduces the
    Air Force's total bill.
        The costs to establish the special purpose entity are borne by
    Boeing since they are responsible for paying transaction costs. We do
    not have direct insight into these specific costs since they are a
    Boeing responsibility.
        There are lease specific costs involved with the construction and
    permanent financing of the tanker lease. Lease costs are best compared
    to purchase costs on a net present value (NPV) basis, as required by
    OMB. NPV analysis is the standard both within the Department of Defense
    and the commercial sector for making business decisions--such as this
    decision to lease or purchase airplanes. In our report to Congress in
    July 2003, we demonstrated that lease costs were within 1 percent of
    purchase costs in net present value terms. The magnitude of the
    difference is less than 1 percent under a lease 20/purchase 80
    scenario.

        14. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, do you agree with Acting
    Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
    (AT&L) Michael Wynne's statement that the USAF will obtain budget
    authority for the acquisition of the tankers at the time of order--not
    at delivery?
        Dr. Sambur. When the pause is lifted by the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense, the Air Force will comply with the Department's direction
    on the path forward. We will budget consistent with the congressional
    authorities that we have been given. We will put a program in place
    that meets the warfighter's need for tankers, but which also fits
    within the Air Force budget.

        15. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, do you intend for the
    contracts for this proposal to be executed before or after an Analysis
    of Alternatives (AOA) has been completed?
        Dr. Sambur. When the pause is lifted by the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense, the Air Force will comply with the Department's direction
    in executing contracts. The AOA is anticipated to complete in August
    2005.

        16. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, the AOA Guidance requires
    that the tanker program be supported by a valid capabilities document.
    To that end, the Guidance requires that the USAF generate a new Mission
    Needs Statement (MNS) and Operational Requirements Document (ORD), now
    called an Initial Capabilities Document and Capabilities Development
    Document. Different name, same idea. If the Office of the Inspector
    General concludes that Boeing established or modified the requirements
    of the original tanker ORD, do you concur with the position that the
    contract cannot be executed until a new ORD is performed?
        Dr. Sambur. It would be inappropriate for me to speculate on the
    findings of the Inspector General or future directions from the Defense
    Department leadership. Once the program is released from its current
    paused status, we will comply with the instructions directed by the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense.

        17. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense promised that I will get a copy of the new contracts and a
    briefing on them in a timely manner--before they are executed. Will you
    personally ensure that this will occur?
        Dr. Sambur. The program is currently paused. When the pause is
    lifted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force will
    comply with the Department's direction on the path forward.

        18. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, I imagine that the contracts
    here will have cancellation ceilings exceeding $100 million. In that
    context, do you agree that the DOD will comply with statutory
    requirements that call for 30 days written notice to defense committees
    of the proposed contracts and cancellation ceilings? Please explain
    your answer fully.
        Dr. Sambur. Due to the Office of the Secretary of Defense's
    directed pause in KC-767 program execution, we have not yet defined the
    terms and conditions of a prospective multi-year procurement contract.
    If the Air Force is directed to proceed by OSD with a multi-year
    contract, we will fully comply with congressional authorities and
    applicable requirements of 10 U.S.C. 2306b, the Federal Acquisition
    Regulation and its supplements. With regard to any cancellation ceiling
    provision that establishes a liability in excess of $100 million, we
    will ensure that, ``. . . the head of the agency . . . shall give
    written notification of the proposed contract and of the proposed
    cancellation ceiling for that contract to the Committee on Armed
    Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the
    Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the
    House of Representatives, and such contract may not then be awarded
    until the end of a period of 30 days beginning on the date of such
    notification.''

        19. Senator McCain. Secretary Young and Admiral Nathman, the MNS
    for tankers states: ``New design, and/or procurement of air refueling
    [tanker] aircraft must be compatible with all U.S., NATO, and allied/
    coalition forces receiver-type aircraft. Air refueling [tanker]
    aircraft shall be capable of refueling receptacle and probe-equipped
    receiver aircraft on the same mission, as well as refueling multiple
    aircraft simultaneously.''
        On June 25, 2002, then Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
    Fallon conditionally signed off on a Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council Memorandum on Air Refueling Aircraft (ARA) ORD by stating that
    ``it is a critical requirement for any air refueling tanker to have the
    capability to refuel two receivers simultaneously.'' In concurring with
    the ORD he stipulated to the following, which I quote:

             ``Critical: Change sentence to read: `The aircraft
            must have the capability to refuel two receivers simultaneously
            (Threshold).' ''
             Admiral Fallon's rationale: ``Dual drogues maintain
            the current refueling capability of the KC-10 and KC-135
            aircraft for the probe-equipped aircraft.''

        Is it still a critical Navy requirement for any new refueling
    tanker to have the capability to refuel two receivers simultaneously,
    as Admiral Fallon suggested? I would like both of you to answer my
    question as to the Navy's position as stated previously by Admiral
    Fallon when he conditionally signed off on the ORD on June 25, 2002,
    and as is also represented in the MNS, which Admiral Fallon noted in
    his response.
        Please provide the information within 2 weeks of notification with
    respect to this question.
        Mr. Young and Admiral Nathman. Our requirement remains that any new
    tanker be capable of refueling two receivers simultaneously. The Tanker
    Mission Needs Statement validates that requirement and Admiral Fallon's
    previous statements are consistent with this requirement and,
    additionally, underscores that the simultaneous capability should exist
    today in all of the ``big-wing'' tanker fleet's aircraft types.

        20. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, are you aware that the USAF
    MNS and the Navy, Marine Corps, and our allied and coalition partners
    have a critical requirement for any air refueling tanker to have the
    capability to refuel receivers simultaneously? If so, then why would
    you have endorsed a plan to deliver Boeing 767 tankers that will not be
    capable of simultaneously refueling two receivers when Boeing has
    demonstrated this capability in Boeing 767 tankers delivered to both
    Italy and Germany?
        Dr. Sambur. Senator McCain, the Air Force recognizes the valid
    requirement for a simultaneous air refueling capability within the Air
    Force tanker force. As a result, the ARA ORD, which was approved by the
    JROC, included the simultaneous refueling capability requirement as a
    Spiral 2 threshold. A Spiral 2 threshold is a requirement that could be
    deferred until later deliveries.
        While Boeing plans to deliver tankers to Italy with a simultaneous
    refueling capability, the development and testing are still ongoing.
    Also, you should note that the Italian aircraft will not meet all the
    USAF requirements. Germany did not procure any Boeing 767 tankers, but
    actually procured four Airbus 310 tankers, which do not have a boom and
    therefore cannot refuel any USAF aircraft. Regarding simultaneous
    refueling capability, the Air Force currently possesses the capability
    through 20 KC-135 and 15 KC-10 aircraft. The Air Force is retaining all
    of these aircraft and will continue to support the Navy/Marine aircraft
    with these assets. Future analysis will determine how many future
    aircraft need the simultaneous capability. Additionally, all KC-767
    aircraft will have the capability to refuel both Air Force and Navy/
    Marine receivers on the same sortie--a significant capability over the
    existing KC-135 fleet.

        21. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, on February 24, 2004, Acting
    Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) Wynne transmitted to you Guidance for
    Conducting an AOA on Recapitalizing the KC-135 Fleet. This Guidance
    clearly strives for transparency, objectivity, and a clear methodology
    that takes into account joint requirements. None of these elements were
    present in the original ORD for tankers. This was because, as these
    documents indicate, Boeing ``modified and established the requirements
    to prevent an AOA from being conducted.'' In other words, the ORD was
    changed not to reflect current tanker capabilities and joint Service
    requirements, but to improperly tailor the requirements to accommodate
    a specific type of aircraft, namely the Boeing's KC-767A. Apparently,
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense has realized this and has issued
    new guidance to the USAF directing them to conduct a new initial
    capabilities document. I understand that the Air Force will also
    conduct a capabilities development document. Both of these are intended
    to supercede the original MNS and ORD, respectively. If the original
    ORD is so fundamentally flawed that it cannot support the USAF's long-
    term plan to recapitalize the KC-135 fleet, how could you possibly
    expect it to be valid enough to justify the current 20/80 deal?
    Similarly, how do you expect to finalize the current tanker proposal if
    it is neither supported by a new AOA nor a valid capabilities-based
    document? Please explain your answer fully.
        Dr. Sambur. Senator McCain, the ARA ORD was written by the
    warfighter, fully vetted through the Services and combatant commanders,
    and ultimately approved by the JROC. As the ARA ORD proceeded through
    the normal requirements validation process, it underwent multiple
    levels of review. The KC-767 tanker will meet the warfighter's
    requirements defined in the ARA ORD and is the initial step in
    recaptializing the air refueling fleet. The AOA will provide the Air
    Force with additional analysis--necessary to continue recapitalizing
    the remaining KC-135 fleet.

        22. Senator McCain. Secretary Young, Admiral Nathman, and General
    Hough, if you learned, immediately before executing a contract for a
    given program, that the ORD that was used to validate that program was
    in fact invalid because a contractor improperly modified or established
    the requirements of the ORD, would you execute that contract or would
    you consider this a compelling reason not to execute the contract for
    that program?
        Mr. Young and Admiral Nathman. We would not award a contract if the
    requirement it intended to address was invalid. The fact that a
    contractor may have had some involvement in developing a requirement,
    however, does not automatically mean the requirement is invalid. In
    fact, it should generally have no impact on the validity of the
    requirement. Approving operational requirements is clearly an
    inherently governmental responsibility and, ultimately, is always
    performed by government personnel. Contractors do not approve
    requirements. If we were advised of potential issues with a
    requirements document immediately before award of a contract, we would
    generally postpone award until we could get the organization
    responsible for its establishment to validate the requirement. In some
    instances, we might proceed with contract award--it would depend on
    such factors as the nature of the potential issues, the urgency of the
    requirement, the likely impact on the contract of a post-award change
    in requirements, and whether proceeding with contract award, in the
    face of the improper behavior, would cast doubts on the integrity of
    the procurement system.
        General Hough. A warranted contracting officer is the only
    individual with the authority to obligate the Government and award and
    execute a contract. The contracting officer is legally bound to comply
    with all applicable statutes and regulations. In the scenario you have
    provided, there are potentially multiple violations of statutes or
    regulations that may preclude contract award or execution. Any
    substantive determination regarding the legality of any contractual
    action is contingent upon the application of the law to the facts. In
    the absence of specific facts, it would not be prudent to recommend a
    course of future action.

        23. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, on April 3, 2003, you
    testified before this subcommittee that the Air Force would not conduct
    an AOA for tanker aircraft before executing the Boeing KC-767 tanker
    lease for three reasons:
        First of all, you said ``we [Air Force] have made a compelling case
    as `Why to lease [Boeing 767 tankers].' '' However, on June 20, 2003,
    OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) Ken Krieg wrote to
    Secretaries Wynne and Zakheim, ``We find that leasing provides no
    inherent economic efficiencies relative to direct purchase of tankers
    and is, therefore much more expensive in the long run.'' In fact, Mr.
    Krieg went on to state in his memo that leasing would cost $6 billion
    more than a direct purchase. Do you still agree that the Air Force has
    made a compelling case to lease the Boeing 767 tankers?
        Dr. Sambur. Subsequent to the June 20, 2003, memorandum, the
    Department of Defense, including PA&E, reviewed and supported the final
    findings in the ``Report to the Congressional Defense Committees on KC-
    767A Air Refueling Aircraft Multi-Year Lease Pilot Program'', dated
    July 10, 2003. The report stated, ``the Department of Defense
    determined that the net present value of the multiyear lease option and
    a traditional purchase option results in a NPV favoring a purchase of
    $150 million.'' The Air Force supports the KC-767 program to lease 20/
    buy 80 aircraft. The Air Force has an urgent and compelling need to
    start recapitalization of the KC-135 tanker fleet. The proposed lease
    gets this process started quickly and the currently negotiated
    contracts offer an affordable path. When the pause is lifted by the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force will comply with the
    Department's direction on the way ahead.

        24. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, second, you said ``. . . we
    are concerned about the safety, about the corrosion of Es [KC-135Es].''
    You went on to say, ``I know there has been an Air Force study a couple
    of years ago [KC-135 Economic Service Life Study (ESLS)] that seems to
    indicate that there is life expectancies of these KC-135s that is far
    greater than we are now telling you. But the actual finding is that the
    corrosion is very serious. It is much more serious than the study ever
    anticipated.''
        However, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) disputes your
    claim. It has told us that, since the ESLS, the Air Force has not
    conducted a thorough corrosion assessment. In that context, the fact is
    that no data and analysis invalidates the conclusions of the ESLS (and
    Tanker Requirements Study), which indicate that the need to
    recapitalize the fleet is not urgent. If the very thorough KC-135 ESLS
    [which was drafted by Boeing, Headquarters USAF, USAF Active Duty,
    Reserve, and Air National Guard participation, and Tinker Air Force
    Base logistics center] was so wrong, then why did the USAF have to
    doctor corrosion documents that were sent to this committee?
        Dr. Sambur. The KC-135 Economic Service Life Study was compiled
    using fiscal year 1999 cost data. Since then, more accurate cost data
    has become available, for example the cost estimate for the E model
    engine strut repair was estimated at $1 million per aircraft in 1999,
    but the actual costs are nearly $3 million per aircraft. Regarding the
    corrosion documents (copies of placards on display during a tour of the
    Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center KC-135 line) that were provided to
    the Committee at the request of a professional staff member, Secretary
    Roche stated in his letter 27 February 2004, ``You can be assured that,
    far from any assertions to the contrary, factual data--and only factual
    data--were presented to the PSMs during that trip. As those placards
    featured `Tinker-only' information, and because our installations and
    logistics professionals strive to present a complete and timely picture
    of our fleet, they amended the placard file by omitting the `Tinker-
    only' occurrence factors. Above all, they wanted to eliminate the
    possibility that the data at Tinker could be misunderstood as `fleet-
    wide' corrosion data . . . the Tinker professional wanted to avoid the
    confusion that may have resulted from incomplete data. After the PSM
    requested the exact files shown on the tour, those files were provided
    along with highlighted, auxiliary notes to ensure that those placards
    could be seen in their proper context.''
        While corrosion is an issue, the greater issue is that this 43
    year-old fleet continues to age. As we sustain aircraft longer than we
    ever have, we are learning how to sustain them at the same time. As
    these systems have aged we have encountered grounding situations such
    as two incidents between 1999 and 2000 when stabilizer trim actuator
    problems affected 139 aircraft in the first incident and 161 in the
    second one. Additionally, the E models are currently under flight
    restrictions due to their engine struts. The likelihood of finding more
    of these surprises or unknowns increases with time. We do not know how
    an aircraft manufactured with 1950s technology will stand up to 45, 50,
    or 60 years of operation. We can analyze, model and predict, but there
    are and will continue to be more unknowns . . . unknowns that we cannot
    allow to ground the backbone of our air refueling capability.

        25. Senator McCain. Secretary Sambur, finally, you said ``. . . we
    are going forward with the lease because it is the most affordable way
    of getting assets in the shortest possible time.'' Do you feel that in
    light of the five ongoing investigations and criminal cases on the
    Boeing 767 tanker lease/procurement that this is still the best option
    for the USAF to pursue? Your statement suggests a pressing urgency to
    recapitalize the KC-135 tanker fleet that is not supported by USAF
    budget requests or studies. Since the Boeing 767 tanker lease/
    procurement has never been included in the President's defense budget
    request alongside other competing requirements, it suggests that tanker
    recapitalization has never been a pressing concern for the USAF.
    Furthermore, the conclusions of the KC-135 ESLS, which examined the
    cost of ownership (projected sustainment and operational costs) and
    availability of the aircraft to the warfighter, did not support your
    position, so I request that you base your answer on statistically
    derived, well-formulated conclusions rather than anecdotal evidence.
        Dr. Sambur. As you are aware, the KC-767 program is currently
    paused per a December 1, 2003, memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense. It would be inappropriate to speculate on the findings of
    ongoing studies and investigations. What is clear is that the KC-135
    fleet's average age is 43 years old--we had an event in 1999 that
    grounded 40 percent of the fleet and the KC-135E are presently under
    flight restrictions. The need to begin recapitalization is clear and
    present. Costs to support this aging fleet are rising and the risk of
    operating a fleet of over 500 aging aircraft has become unacceptable.
    We fully support the decision by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to
    pause this program. We will be prepared to follow the direction from
    the Department of Defense, which will have the added benefit of the
    assessments to which you refer.
                                     ______

             Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

                C-17 AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT AND AGING C-5 AIRCRAFT

        26. Senator Clinton. Secretary Sambur and General Keys, in recent
    testimony on March 10, 2004, before this committee's Seapower
    Subcommittee, General Handy, the Commander of U.S. Transportation
    Command, spoke of the need to continue the C-17 program beyond the
    current 180 airplanes. New York is very interested in this news for
    several reasons. Not only is the State of New York among the top five
    suppliers to the C-17 program, but also our Air National Guard Unit at
    Stewart Air National Guard Base (ANGB) in Newburgh is equipped with
    aging C-5 aircraft that could possibly be replaced with new C-17s.
    Further, General Handy described today's strategic airlift system in
    the DOD as not being capable of meeting the minimum requirements of
    Mobility Requirements Study--2005 (MRS-05) which is 54.5 million ton-
    miles (MTM) a day. In addition, he stated that the new strategic
    airlift study commencing next year will no doubt produce a
    significantly higher MTM requirement.
        What is the USAF's plan for procurement of additional C-17 aircraft
    above the current authorized and appropriated 180 aircraft to ensure an
    adequate airlift force, and does this plan address both the active and
    Reserve components, consistent with the total force concept?
        Dr. Sambur and General Keys. Our current modernization plan
    includes procuring 180 C-17s as well as modernizing as many of our C-5s
    as is required to meet validated air mobility requirements. Results
    from future studies and analyses, such as the Mobility Capabilities
    Study (MCS), may indicate an increase in strategic airlift
    requirements. However, the current plan stands at 180 C-17s. Our future
    plans include maintaining the partnership that exists between the
    active and Reserve component in both associate and unit equipped
    relationships. We will continue to rely heavily on the air mobility
    contributions of our Total Force partners.

        27. Senator Clinton. Secretary Sambur and General Keys, what is the
    USAF's transition plan for C-5 bases such as Stewart ANGB (the only Air
    National Guard unit qualified to operate and maintain the C-5), and
    what are your current plans for replacing the C-5s at Newburgh with C-
    17s as part of your total force modernization efforts?
        Dr. Sambur and General Keys. Our Total Force Modernization Plan for
    C-5 units, including Stewart, involves programs to modernize C-5
    avionics and other aircraft systems, to include installing new engines.
    This will maintain a unit's ability to be an integral and valuable
    Total Force contributor to our Nation's overall air mobility capability
    far into the future. Currently, there is no plan to transition the C-5
    unit at Newburgh to C-17s.

        28. Senator Clinton. Secretary Sambur and General Keys, what is
    222+, which we often hear as the desired number of C-17s?
        Dr. Sambur and General Keys. Our current airlift force structure
    plan is based on the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS)-05, completed in
    January 2001. The study indicated that 180 C-17s and 112 C-5s was the
    appropriate airlift fleet mix to maintain moderate risk and meet
    requirements. The new National Military Strategy (NMS) with the 1-4-2-1
    construct has different assumptions and drives new requirements. The
    ``222+'' indicates that 222 or more C-17s may be needed to mitigate
    risk, increase operational capability/flexibility, and achieve an
    appropriate lift capacity. The actual requirement will become more
    clear when the MCS completes in 2005.

        29. Senator Clinton. Secretary Sambur and General Keys, what
    combination of C-17s and modified C-5s will be required in the future
    force structure concept?
        Dr. Sambur. Our current airlift force structure is based on the
    MRS-05, completed in January 2001. The study indicated that 180 C-17s
    and 112 C-5s was the appropriate airlift fleet mix to maintain moderate
    risk and meet requirements. The new NMS with the 1-4-2-1 construct had
    different assumptions and drive new requirements. Taking into account
    the increasing support needed outside the primary warfight (i.e.
    Homeland Defense, Special Operations, Support for other Combatant
    Commands), the future force structure may change. The actual
    requirement, and future force structure, will become clearer when the
    MCS completes in 2005.

                         RETIREMENT OF LEGACY AIRCRAFT

        30. Senator Clinton. Secretary Sambur and General Keys, as legacy
    aircraft are retired from the Reserve component, what is the USAF's
    plan to replace those aircraft and ensure that those flying wings are
    maintained as part of the future force structure of the USAF?
        Dr. Sambur and General Keys. We are retiring legacy aircraft due to
    the increasing costs associated with maintaining those legacy aircraft.
    The previously briefed Air Mobility and Tanker Roadmaps highlighted our
    plan to recapitalize our tanker and airlift fleets while maintaining
    the proper mix of Active Duty and Reserve component flying wings.
    Additionally, the Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve are engaged in daily
    discussions regarding how best to transform our Air Force while
    maintaining and/or enhancing the significant contributions of the Air
    Reserve components.

        31. Senator Clinton. Secretary Sambur and General Keys, in the
    midst of the upcoming base realignment and closure (BRAC) round, what
    impetus drives the USAF to retire legacy aircraft when a pathway
    forward for modernization is not clear?
        Dr. Sambur and General Keys. We are retiring legacy aircraft at the
    same time we are quantifying requirements to acquire additional airlift
    and air refueling capability because of the increasing costs associated
    with maintaining those legacy aircraft at usable levels. As legacy
    aircraft continue to age, logistics support costs continue to increase
    to a point that it is wiser to invest in modernizing airlift and air
    refueling capabilities. The Air Force realizes the need to remain
    flexible to meet ever-changing global challenges in a fiscally
    constrained environment. However, we cannot delay efforts to modernize
    the legacy fleets, as some already average over 40 years of age.

        32. Senator Clinton. Secretary Sambur and General Keys, the
    retirement of legacy aircraft without the concurrent stationing of
    modernized aircraft will place certain installations at a military
    value disadvantage for BRAC 2005 and skew the BRAC analysis. Please
    provide your insights on this topic.
        Dr. Sambur and General Keys. I do not believe it will. Military
    value is the primary consideration in making base closure or
    realignment recommendations. That military value is based upon the
    value of the installation consistent with the selection criteria, not
    necessarily the unit that is currently assigned. In fact, most
    installations will have equipment and/or mission changes over the next
    20 years. The role of the BRAC process is to determine what
    infrastructure we need to keep to accommodate current and future
    missions.

                 FUTURE USAF TANKER REQUIREMENTS/STAGING ISSUES

        33. Senator Clinton. Secretary Sambur and General Keys, any future
    tanker acquisition program will include a review of two key elements,
    aircraft utilization rates and basing. Future tankers will have
    tremendous flying capabilities and will be capable of flying virtually
    all day long. The airlines do this to maximize profitability. The USAF
    could also do this, especially by fully utilizing capable bases like
    Niagara Falls Air Reserve Base to be airline type hubs or staging
    bases. For example, Niagara has the billeting, ramp, runway, fuel
    facility, et cetera, where this could be done efficiently and at a
    tremendous cost saving to the government. Niagara could easily support
    an active duty detachment in support of the staging concept. Because of
    the tremendous capabilities of any modern tanker aircraft, do you have
    a plan to increase the sortie generation rate of any future tanker?
        Dr. Sambur and General Keys. Senator Clinton, sortie rate (sortie/
    day) is the number of sorties per aircraft per day that can be
    scheduled and confidently executed. Increased sortie generation in
    conjunction with increased availability is one method for providing
    additional tanker support to the warfighter. By recaptalizing our aging
    tanker fleet, the Air Force seeks improvements in both areas. Although
    wartime sortie generation rates are classified in the USAF War and
    Mobilization Plan, the Air Force does intend to increase the sortie
    generation rate on future tankers. As written in the ARA ORD, the Air
    Force requires sustained sortie rates at least 8 percent greater than
    the current KC-135 sortie rate for the air refueling.

        34. Senator Clinton. Secretary Sambur and General Keys, as a result
    of the high demand for refueling sorties in the Northeast, what is the
    feasibility of integrating the future tanker into the Reserve
    component?
        Dr. Sambur and General Keys. Currently, a strong Air Reserve
    component tanker presence exists in the Northeast with 50 Air National
    Guard (ANG) KC-135 E-models across 6 locations. This is in addition to
    32 active duty KC-10s. Initial delivery of the follow-on tanker will be
    to the active duty to ensure maximum utilization on a daily basis. As
    we continue recapitalization of the KC-135 fleet, the follow-on tanker
    will be fully integrated across all mobility forces, including the Air
    Reserve component. The detailed basing plan will be founded upon
    analyses currently being conducted.

        35. Senator Clinton. Secretary Sambur and General Keys, would the
    concept of staging the future tanker at the three Northeast Tanker Task
    Force sites (Bangor, ME; Niagara, NY; and Pease, NH) be the optimal way
    to support the Atlantic Air Bridge, which supports operations in Europe
    and Southwest Asia?
        Dr. Sambur and General Keys. Yes, staging tankers as we currently
    do at these three bases--combined with the proximity of other east
    coast and European locations--optimizes Atlantic Air Bridge operations.
    This, along with established infrastructure to support staging
    operations, makes for the most efficient support to the war fighter.
    The Air Force continually reviews our global air refueling
    requirements. Any future tanker assets would be fully integrated into
    an operational concept that ensures the Northeast Tanker Task Force
    could continue its outstanding job supporting the European or Southwest
    Asia's combatant commander air refueling needs.

                                   FIRE SCOUT

        36. Senator Clinton. Secretary Young and Admiral Nathman, I have
    learned that the Navy has cut the number of Fire Scout UAVs to be
    purchased from the $36.5 million in the fiscal year 2004 budget from
    eight to two. Congress directed the Navy to purchase eight vehicles
    with these funds. Can you explain this change in direction?
        Mr. Young and Admiral Nathman. The nonrecurring design and
    development effort for Fire Scout has not been completed and the
    funding provided in fiscal year 2004 was not sufficient to complete the
    nonrecurring engineering and procure eight air vehicles at the same
    time. Furthermore, in view of the Army choosing the upgraded version of
    Fire Scout for their Future Combat System Class IV UAV, the best use of
    the funds was to complete the design modifications that meet both Navy
    and Army requirements for a common air vehicle that would accommodate
    Service unique missions. Two Fire Scout air vehicles will be procured
    along with the nonrecurring engineering efforts. The benefit will be
    lower production costs for both the Navy and Army with a potential
    savings for common maintenance and support.
        The CNO's fiscal year 2005 Unfunded Program List of March 1, 2004,
    identifies critical programs not funded in the fiscal year 2005
    President's budget request. Included in this list is $48 million for
    the Fire Scout program. The additional money would fund the procurement
    of six LRIP Fire Scout air vehicles and associated payloads and support
    equipment. This equipment, in conjunction with equipment already
    procured, would provide two complete Fire Scout VTUAV Systems for
    testing on the Flight 0 LCSs.

        [Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2005

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 30, 2004

                                   U.S. Senate,
                               Subcommittee on Airland,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                             ARMY AVIATION PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met pursuant to notice at 2:00 p.m. in
    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
    Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Sessions and Lieberman.
        Majority staff members present: Ambrose R. Hock,
    professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
    member; and Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
    professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
    member; and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger and Sara R.
    Mareno.
        Committee members' assistants present: Arch Galloway II,
    assistant to Senator Sessions; and Frederick M. Downey,
    assistant to Senator Lieberman.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Sessions. The Airland Subcommittee will come to
    order.
        Today the Airland Subcommittee meets to receive testimony
    on the Army's amended fiscal year 2005 budget request for those
    aviation programs for which this committee has oversight
    responsibility. I would like to thank our distinguished panel
    for taking time out of their busy schedules to be with us.
    Welcome.
        Lieutenant General Cody, it is a pleasure to see you again,
    the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Major
    General Joseph Bergantz, Program Executive Officer for
    Aviation; and General Edward J. Sinclair, Commanding General,
    United States Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker. It is good to
    see you again, General Sinclair.
        We are delighted you are here and thank you for your
    testimony.
        As we meet today, Army aviation is operating at
    extraordinary tempo in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places in
    the world. Soldiers operating these systems have performed
    magnificently, as one would expect from our armed services. In
    the hands of well-trained soldiers, aviation systems have been,
    and will continue to be, relevant combat multipliers.
        Over the past several years, the Airland Subcommittee
    supported the Army's transformation and development of its
    future combat systems. We also supported the Comanche armed
    reconnaissance helicopter. However, we have also expressed our
    concern regarding the ability of the Army to fund this
    transformation. Frankly, we never understood fully how all the
    budget demands were going to be met as we moved towards
    transformation.
        On September 30, 2003, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA)
    directed a top-to-bottom review of Army aviation as one of his
    16 focus areas. The CSA's guidance was to make Army aviation a
    capabilities-based maneuver of armed optimized or joint fight
    with a shortened logistics tail. Last month, the Army announced
    the initial results of the Aviation Task Force. A significant
    recommendation was to reallocate Comanche funds to improve the
    overall capabilities and health of the aviation force.
        Comanche represented 40 percent of the current aviation
    budget and 47 percent of the aviation budget in the extended
    planning period. By reallocating approximately $14.6 billion
    over 2004 through 2010, the Army is now able to restructure
    Army aviation to meet current and future requirements.
        While the Comanche's termination may be the right decision
    for the Army, and though some would disagree, your testimony
    today will help this subcommittee understand the rationale for
    the termination and the near-term and long-range impacts on
    Army capabilities. The main assumption I would use, as you
    explain the long-range impact, is that all the $14.6 billion
    will remain solely for Army aviation.
        The subcommittee is also interested in hearing about the
    progress of other aviation programs, such as the Apache Block
    III upgrade, the UH-60M Black Hawk program. We are interested
    in the Army's aviation restructure, evolving doctrine, and
    training to include Flight School 21 and the Army's attempt to
    modularize its aviation force. We are concerned with the
    requirements associated with that modularity and how the Army
    intends to fund this important decision.
        Last but not least, we want to discuss the Army's progress
    on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). I am very interested in
    their role in the transformed aviation force and within the
    future combat systems based units of action. To that end, I
    hope I hear how your acquisition and training plans are
    evolving, as well as the collaborative work you are doing with
    other Services.
        Thank you again, gentlemen, for your service to America,
    for those who work with you to give tireless hours that have
    helped us maintain air dominance, helped us provide the highest
    degree of technology and mobility to our soldiers, making them
    more lethal to the enemy and at less risk themselves.
        I want to thank Senator Lieberman for his leadership on
    this subcommittee. He clearly understands our national defense
    issues. He has been a student of it. He believes in this
    country and wants to see it strong, vibrant, and a positive
    force in the world.
        Senator Lieberman.

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN

        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, for your kind
    words. It continues to be an honor for me to work with you on
    behalf of our national security and our men and women like the
    three honorable gentlemen before us today, who carry it out. I
    thank you for this partnership, and I thank the witnesses for
    all that they have done to protect America and all we stand
    for.
        For a number of years, I have watched the Army struggle
    with its aviation modernization program. Here is what the
    overall modernization program--as the chairman indicated, the
    Army confronted the vexing problem of how to transform for the
    future, while maintaining current readiness. The central
    problem has been what it so often is around here and in life,
    insufficient funding to do both. But that is exactly what the
    Army tried to do.
        The Army strongly advocated for Comanche as the aviation
    centerpiece of its transformation effort, calling it, among
    other things, the quarterback of the battlefield of the future.
    But while claiming that the Comanche was its highest aviation
    priority, unfortunately the Army, regularly, was forced to
    under-fund the program as it struggled to recapitalize and
    modernize its existing and aging aviation fleet.
        As a result, the Comanche program was restructured six
    times in its 2-decade history, the last time 2 years ago--less
    than 2 years ago, in fact. Ironically, it seemed to me that the
    last restructure solved the program's problems. It was on-cost
    and on-schedule in meeting or exceeding every milestone
    objective. But because of budget pressures, the recent success
    of the Comanche program did come at the cost of the remainder
    of the Army aviation force, which was itself, underfunded.
        For instance, the Army limited the procurement of Black
    Hawk helicopters, relying on annual congressional additions to
    keep the production line open. With the overdue retirement of
    the H-1 Huey utility helicopter, the Army, and particularly the
    Army National Guard, found itself short of helicopters for the
    Reserve component.
        More troubling, I have watched in dismay over the years as
    the Army was pressured to delay, and even recently terminate,
    its effort to upgrade aircraft survivability equipment, taking
    risks that we should not have put you in a position to take.
    Now comes the decision on Comanche to terminate it, which to me
    was a shocking decision, shocking in the sense it was
    unexpected because the budget submitted just 3 weeks before had
    included $1.2 billion for the Comanche program.
        Of course, with it came the decision to move the funding to
    correct long-standing problems in the rest of the aviation
    force, which makes it certainly look more like a fiscal
    judgment than a judgment based on a recognition of a changed
    operational environment.
        So, today I want to ask some questions and hear about the
    analysis that led the Army leadership to make this decision,
    and particularly the analysis that indicated that Comanche is
    somehow less relevant today. I must say, as I come into the
    hearing, that part of the analysis that I have heard on
    previous conversations I find troubling, which is that the
    conflict in Iraq demonstrates that the characteristics of
    Comanche are less necessary or less relevant.
        But obviously, the next battle may look a lot different
    than the battle in Iraq. The new enemy may have radar and more
    sophisticated defensive and offensive capability against
    helicopters, that will make critically necessary the stealth
    capability Comanche, and only Comanche, would give our
    commanders. In fact, in Kosovo, we faced radar-guided missiles.
    So, it is not just the putative battlefield of the future
    against a sophisticated great power like China or Russia, in
    which we would have to worry about that.
        So, my questions are as follows: What now is the vision for
    Army aviation for the future? Does the aviation component of
    Army transportation now rely solely on the recapitalization and
    limited upgrade of existing platform and the purchase of non-
    developmental or less sophisticated light utility and armed
    reconnaissance helicopters? How does the Army intend now to
    acquire the capabilities that Comanche was supposed to provide
    and we may well need the next time we go to war?
        I must say, here, that seeing that the Army is going to
    pursue a joint multi-role helicopter in the future is not, at
    least for me, an adequate answer; not only because it is so far
    in the future but also because I wonder what indications we
    have had yet that the other Services are interested in such a
    project.
        Assuming that there will be enough commonality in
    requirements to make such a helicopter feasible may not be an
    accurate assumption. If it is not, with the same budget
    pressures the Army faces today, will the Army itself then find
    itself forced again to fund an expensive new helicopter
    program? How does the Army intend, finally, to ensure that the
    $6.9 billion previously invested in Comanche is not wasted,
    that there is a process whereby technologies developed in the
    Comanche program, if it is to be terminated, will be
    transferred to planned upgrades to the existing force or
    returned to the tech base for further development?
        Those, Mr. Chairman, are some of the important questions
    that I hope we will address today. Again, I thank the witnesses
    for being here. This is an important hearing. I thank you, Mr.
    Chairman, for your continued outstanding leadership.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. You raise
    some very important questions and I am glad you are a member of
    this committee. I think they are questions that we need to
    answer. I know you have thought about those questions, and we
    will be getting into some of that in more detail as time goes
    by.
        General Cody, I believe you will start with a statement;
    and then we will hear from the others as you choose.

     STATEMENT OF LTG RICHARD A. CODY, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
                  FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS, U.S. ARMY

        General Cody. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your
    concurrence, what I would like to do is have a small opening
    statement, then defer to General Bergantz and General Sinclair
    for their statement. Then what I would like to do, with your
    concurrence, is, based upon the questions that you and Senator
    Lieberman have teed up, I have four slides that will get to the
    heart of some of the issues. If I could brief those and then
    take questions, it might help us all.
        Senator Sessions. That will be fine. You have given us a
    witness statement that is impressive; so, we will make that
    part of the record.
        General Cody. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Senator
    Lieberman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
    today to provide an update on the state of Army aviation, which
    I think is very critical. I am going to show you, I hope, as
    well as my esteemed colleagues, how we intend to meet our
    current operational requirements, while simultaneously
    transforming Army aviation to the future force that not only
    entails Army aviation but also the modularity and the FCS-
    equipped future force.
        I would like to thank the committee for your support and
    for the faith you have shown throughout the global war on
    terrorism for our American sons and daughters, as they
    selflessly and tirelessly serve our Army and our Nation at war.
    It is important to me as a father. I have two sons who just
    returned from Iraq, who are Apache pilots with the 101st, and
    they, too, enjoy your support.
        This is a historic time for our Army and our aviation
    force. The contributions of Army aviation to combating and to
    fighting terrorism, to defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda in
    Afghanistan, to ousting Saddam Hussein, and to preserving peace
    in the Balkans is and continues to be a vital resource for our
    combatant commanders. We are applying three times as many hours
    in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation
    Iraqi Freedom (OIF), as compared to our annual home rates.
        The environment and operational tempo have placed
    incredible wear and tear on our fleet. While we have asked a
    lot of our aviation systems in the past 2\1/2\ years, we have
    also asked a heck of a lot of our pilots, and especially our
    crew chiefs, who have maintained these great aircraft.
        In recognition of this, Mr. Chairman, you have already
    discussed that with General Schoomaker, our Chief of Staff, and
    included Army Aviation Re-Look as part of his focus areas.
    General Sinclair and General Bergantz were part of that task
    force.
        The task force looked at about 108 recommendations, which
    were a result of a very comprehensive review, to include, as
    Senator Lieberman pointed out, the Kosovo campaign, of which I
    was part of, Task Force Hawk, in 1999 when we discovered some
    cracks in the capabilities of our fleet, as well as training
    and as well as our modernization accounts. The task force took
    a look at across the full spectrum of seven major Army studies
    as they went through this, and it was very comprehensive.
        We owe it to our soldiers now who are out there in the sand
    and the dirt, fighting in harm's way, to take those 108
    recommendations and reset Army aviation, not only for this
    fight but also for the future. Our mission is to be ready and
    relevant when called upon. The future operational environment
    demands that we have trained, standardized, and modular units
    in aviation that can fight not only with our modular units in
    the Army but also as a joint force. We need to be able to
    leverage the joint fires and the joint force that this great
    Nation has.
        Based upon our current and projected aircraft inventories
    and optimization of the force as a key parameter, we are going
    to restructure the current, nonstandard aviation formations we
    have. We will form up 11 active duty, 2 Reserve component
    multi-functional aviation brigades, and 6 aviation
    expeditionary regiments in the Army National Guard. The
    aviation designed incorporates lessons learned directly from
    recent operations and corrects deficiencies in our current
    structure; it also moves the Army aviation structure to mirror
    what we are doing with our modularity and our FCS unit of
    action force.
        By reallocating the money from Comanche, about $14.6
    billion, during fiscal year 2004 to 2011, that would have
    bought 121 Block I Comanches, the Army will be able to
    restructure and enhance our $100 billion investment in the
    total aviation force.
        The net result of this reallocation in 2004 through 2011 is
    the procurement of over 900 new aircraft, about 850 that were
    not in the budget; the recapitalization of more than 1,000
    aircraft; and the modernization of 1,400 aircraft to increase
    their capabilities; but more importantly, to bring some of
    those fleets up to the full potential because of lack of
    modernization dollars in the past.
        We have also targeted, as number one, survivability
    equipment, as well as maintainability and supportability. This
    represents a revamp in the modernization and recap of over 70
    percent of our rotary wing fleet. But most importantly, this
    reallocation will fund enhanced aircraft survivability across
    the fleet that we need so desperately.
        In short, we are fixing all aspects of Army aviation from
    the way we organize, from the way our formations will look. We
    are researching how we want to look and fight in the future.
    This is no small undertaking, as we are engaged in the global
    war on terrorism. We have the right soldiers, the right
    leaders, and certainly the right support from Congress to be
    able to get this done.
        Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Cody follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by LTG Richard A. Cody, USA

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Chairman Sessions, Senator Lieberman, distinguished members of the
    committee, we appreciate the opportunity to appear here today to
    provide an update on the state of Army aviation and how we intend to
    continue meeting current operational requirements while we also prepare
    for the future.
        We are witnessing historic times in our Army and our aviation
    force. As a former Division Commander for the 101st Air Assault
    Division and now as Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, I can testify that our
    Army in general, our aviation leaders, and soldiers are well-trained,
    ready, and committed. I thank this committee for your resolute support,
    concern, and faith in America's sons and daughters, who serve our Army
    and our Nation. I believe you all would agree that while aviation
    hardware and other systems are vital components of our Nation's
    defense, our most precious and irreplaceable assets are the great
    Americans operating and repairing them.
        General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), directed a
    top-to-bottom review of Army aviation in August of last year. The
    Chief's guidance was to make Army aviation a capabilities-based
    maneuver arm optimized for the joint fight with a shortened logistics
    tail. An Aviation Task Force was formed with a select group of aviation
    professionals under the leadership of MG James Thurman, Aviation Task
    Force Director; MG Joseph Bergantz, PEO-Aviation; and BG Edward J.
    Sinclair, Commanding General, United States Army aviation Center and
    School, who are in attendance today. Although the Task Force is still
    working through many of the details associated with the 108
    recommendations required to transform this force, I will provide an
    overview of some key initiatives the Army will implement to prepare the
    force for ongoing responsibilities and to pace aviation transformation
    relative to the rest of the Army. But first, I would like to discuss
    the context and present state of our aviation force and briefly
    highlight lessons learned from current operations.

                   CURRENT AVIATION FORCE AND LESSONS LEARNED

        Army aviation currently has over 450 aircraft deployed in Bosnia
    (SFOR-13), Afghanistan (OEF-5) and Iraq (OIF-2). Since September 2001,
    the operational tempo for Army aviation is the highest it has been
    since the height of the Vietnam conflict. We are flying three times as
    many hours in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation
    Enduring Freedom (OEF) as compared to annual home station rates and the
    majority of those hours are under combat conditions. The contribution
    of Army aviation to combating terrorism, defeating the Taliban, ousting
    Saddam Hussein, and preserving the peace on the Sinai, Korean
    Peninsulas, and in the Balkans is and continues to be a vital resource
    for our combatant commanders. However, this success has not been
    achieved without a price.
        The Army has lost 44 aircraft (an additional 23 are pending repair
    analysis) in hostile and non-hostile incidents since 1 October 2001,
    and a total of 38 aviation soldiers have given their lives in service
    to their nation and to the accomplishment of these missions. These
    losses have not been without purpose. They have informed us for the
    future and have placed an unprecedented sense of urgency in improving
    our capabilities, systems, and doctrine.
        Army aircraft and aircrews have performed superbly at an
    unparalleled pace in one of the harshest, most unforgiving environments
    on the planet. The environment and operational tempo have placed
    incredible wear and tear on our fleets. We have initiated an aggressive
    campaign to reset our deployed aviation systems to a higher state of
    readiness than when deployed. The Army is planning to expend $1.6
    billion (fiscal year 2004) to reset 1,054 aircraft as well as aviation
    support equipment. Reset includes special technical inspection and
    repair at unit locations and depot repairs for crash and battle damage
    aircraft. The impacts of desert-induced damage led us to fund
    approximately $55 million (fiscal year 2004) in Desert Kit improvements
    including aircraft engine inlet barrier filters, auxiliary power unit
    inlet barrier filters, OH-58D hydraulic filters, ALQ-144 filters, rotor
    blade protection and aircraft covers. All deploying aircraft will also
    receive these upgrades. The magnitude and impact of this initiative is
    that nearly 60 percent of the Army's tactical aircraft fleet is
    currently either in reset or deployed.
        At the end of the day, our mission is to be ready and relevant when
    called upon. As recently witnessed for OIF and OEF, there may not be
    sufficient time to train before we go. Therefore, we need to have
    trained, standardized and modular units that are fully connected to the
    combined arms team and joint forces.
        Our aviation leaders and troopers performed admirably, adjusting to
    ad-hoc task organizations during OIF and OEF. Today our aviation
    structure is designed to support five different active component
    divisional organizations (air assault, airborne, heavy division, light
    division, Korea) and two different Reserve component structures.
    Specific divisional structures led us to specific, but different
    aviation organizations. For example, we have 18-ship Apache battalions
    in heavy divisions, but 21-ship battalions at Corps and 24-ship
    battalions in the 101st Air Assault Division. We quickly discovered
    that 18-ship Apache battalions did not provide enough aircraft for
    continuous close support to maneuver commanders in non-contiguous
    operations. Additionally, aviation forces were lift deficient at almost
    every level. Our units were extremely taxed accomplishing intra-theater
    cargo and troop movement. Even though the U.S. Air Force provided
    continuous intra-theater lift support, Reserve component C-23 Sherpas
    were activated to augment CH-47 Chinooks. Sherpas, however, are
    payload-challenged in terms of performance and internal dimensions.
    More utility and cargo capacity was required to support the long
    division maneuver from Kuwait to Baghdad. Heavy Divisions consisted of
    only 16 UH-60 Black Hawks for general support. With limited intra-
    theater lift and Corps assets already overloaded, there were minimal
    cargo assets to augment divisional supply requirements.
        The future demands more standardized modular formations, standard
    operating procedures (SOPs) and joint training. Disparities in types,
    numbers, mission and SOPs for aircraft and their assigned units impede
    flexibility that is traditionally a hallmark capability of Army
    aviation. Standard basic building blocks are the first step in creating
    modularity. Second, these standard units must use similar SOPs. The
    whole concept is standardized and modular units that can ``plug and
    play'' with other units. Finally we must train more aviation at Combat
    Training Centers (CTC) to further strengthen our combat arms
    capability. Every OIF commander I have talked to has stated that the
    CTC prepared them for this war. The Army's CTC program is vital to the
    future; however, we must strive to include more jointness in our
    training activities.
        The Army must also improve on combat safety. For aviation, that
    includes improving the power margins required to fly at extreme
    altitudes similar to those in Afghanistan as well as avoid or operate
    in ``brown-out'' conditions that occur in desert environments like
    Kuwait and Iraq. There are materiel improvements that we intend to
    incorporate on our current aircraft such as ``fly-by-wire'' systems
    that provide hands-off recovery and/or landing in obscuration and low
    visibility conditions similar to those found in today's commercial
    jets.
        The distances covered in today's warfight will only grow in the
    future. Our operations require satellite-based communications that can
    span the maneuver distances and varied terrain to effectively operate
    in a net-centric system-of-systems construct.
        Of further concern is the synchronization and impact of bandwidth
    and frequency spectrum on what will eventually be a proliferation of
    Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems (UAVS) on the future battlefield. In
    Iraq, forces had a difficult time operating UAVS due to limitations in
    the bandwidth and limited frequency spectrum. The Army will take a
    holistic approach to the development and utilization of UAVS. Next
    month, the Army will deploy a UAVS Task Force to the USCENTCOM Theater
    to study methods and procedures for more effective integration of UAVS
    into Army and Joint operations.
        With continuing lessons learned in our ongoing combat operations,
    let me stress that the Army still has the best aviation forces in the
    world thanks to this committee and the dedication and hard work of
    outstanding commanders and soldiers who are accomplishing the mission.
    But, we still owe them the very best equipment and training this nation
    can provide, now and into the future.

     ARMY AVIATION AS A CAPABILITIES-BASED MANEUVER ARM OPTIMIZED FOR THE
                    JOINT FIGHT AND LOGISTICS TAIL SHORTENED

        The mission to transform Army aviation into a capabilities-based
    maneuver arm optimized for the joint fight with a shortened logistics
    tail requires a structure that is more modular and tailorable to
    support a range of missions and/or units. In addition to organizational
    and structure changes developed from lessons learned in current
    operations, Special Operations Aviation (SOA) capabilities were
    reviewed to determine what could be migrated into the conventional
    aviation force. Examples of previous SOA capabilities migrated into the
    regular force include night vision goggles, aviation life support
    equipment, and crashworthy fuel tanks. The Aviation Task Force also
    studied active and Reserve component responsiveness in order to
    optimize force readiness for deployability, limit Reserve activations
    and enhance unit and soldier stability. Finally, we looked at current
    and planned systems to determine their relevancy and synchronization in
    meeting Future Force requirements to include interoperability with the
    Future Combat Systems (FCS) and joint tactical warfighting.
        Army aviation is a unique combat element with requirements that
    extend across all joint functional and operating concepts. We analyzed
    required capabilities from joint doctrine down to the company level.
    This enabled us to focus on the development of basic building blocks
    for units. These company building blocks permit the creation of a truly
    capable aviation Unit of Action (UA) with standardized formations.
    Based on current and projected aircraft inventories and with
    optimization of the force as a key parameter, we will restructure the
    current non-standard aviation brigades into 11 active and two Reserve
    component multi-functional Aviation UAs. These multi-functional
    aviation UAs will support four to five brigade combat teams. The
    aviation UA design incorporates the lessons learned from recent
    operations and corrects deficiencies in our current structure by moving
    aviation assets closer to the warfighter.
        The aviation UA is able to organize by task, purpose, and mission.
    This provides several advantages over the current force structure. The
    new organization now includes robust reconnaissance, attack, air
    assault, utility, and cargo capabilities. It also includes organic
    aviation maintenance support in the aviation support battalion (located
    today at the division support command). Combat medical evacuation
    aircraft are directly organic to the aviation brigade commander to
    better support our forward forces. Further, it will be much easier to
    task-organize across divisions in order to meet the maneuver
    commander's air requirements.
        AH-64 Apache battalions in the new aviation structure are all 24-
    ship organizations. Black Hawks are increased from 16 to 30 aircraft to
    provide every division the capability to conduct, at a minimum, a
    battalion-sized air assault in one lift or sortie as well as increase
    overall aerial logistics capacity. Aerial cargo support was also moved
    closer to the warfight by shifting CH-47 Chinooks from corps to the
    divisional aviation brigade. Additionally, a new fixed-wing Operational
    and Organizational (O&O) document is in the staffing process that
    proposes increasing tactical (TOE--Table of Organization and Equipment)
    aircraft, reducing administrative support (TDA--Table of Distribution
    and Allowances) aircraft and significantly increasing intra-theater
    lift potential.
        The aviation UA will contain the Class IVa UAVS that will enhance
    manned-unmanned teaming and add more reconnaissance and surveillance
    capabilities to the maneuver UA. At least $300 million will be added to
    our UAVS programs to accelerate this critical capability.
        We learned from SOA about their utilization of robust liaison teams
    habitually attached to the Special Operations ground forces they work
    for. In turn, we developed a brigade aviation element (BAE) organic to
    every ground maneuver unit equipped with long-range joint
    communications packages to better synchronize and deconflict airspace
    for responsive planning and execution of combat operations.
    Additionally, starting this year the Army will field an interim
    standardized logistics automation system migrated from SOA to fill an
    automation void and improve aviation maintenance.
        Logistics will be our ``Achilles heel'' in the future if we do not
    transform it correctly now. The Army requires future force systems that
    have predictive, embedded diagnostics and prognostics--similar to those
    in new cars that tell you when an oil change or maintenance is
    necessary. Common Transitional System--Aviation (CTS-A) with Aircraft
    Maintenance Aid Concept (AMAC) interface are aviation logistics
    automation systems that will serve as critical sustainability enablers
    for the future. Aviation maintenance must also transform to support
    standardized and modular concepts. Our logistics transformation
    initiatives include tooling Reserve component Aviation Classification
    Repair Activity Depots (AVCRAD) for full integration into the National
    Maintenance Program mission. The non-linear battlefield will require
    transitioning to two-level condition-based maintenance, meaning
    defective parts are replaced on the system when forward deployed and
    defective parts are repaired off the system in rear areas or in the
    U.S. Condition-based maintenance also means repairing equipment only
    when it breaks or is predicted to break. This concept reduces spare
    parts requirements, maintenance equipment, forward stationed
    maintainers and ultimately, the logistics footprint. We must also
    pursue spares commonality to further reduce logistics and supply
    distribution overhead. Procurement of sets, kits, and outfits (SKO),
    special tools, test equipment, and ground support equipment (GSE) will
    further enable our transition to two-level condition-based maintenance.
    However, modularity also implies that maintainers must also be
    proficient warriors. Every member of the Army team is a soldier first
    and must be proficient in combat skills regardless of unit type. The
    nature of warfare in the future demands this.
        As I mentioned earlier, there is no substitute for demanding and
    realistic training. Leader development and individual/crew training is
    the foundation for everything we do. Our training strategy during this
    period of change is to fully implement Flight School XXI to produce
    more competent and trained flight crews. We will procure and field six
    additional Aviation Combined Arms Trainers (AVCATT) suites to conduct
    collective combined arms training, and we will leverage our simulations
    capability by upgrading or fielding additional AH-64 training devices.
    To complement our revised training strategies, we will apply over $1.3
    billion to our munitions accounts to resource our unguided training
    munitions ($1.1 billion Hydra 2.75'' Rockets) and to bridge the gap
    between the Hellfire missile family ($180 million) and the forthcoming
    Joint Common Missile (JCM).
        Recent lessons learned have informed us concerning our doctrine,
    tactics, techniques, and procedures. Our aerial gunnery (Field Manual
    1-140) techniques and procedures are being updated to include the
    ``running and diving fire'' engagement technique. The United States
    Army Aviation Center and School is now qualifying all AH-64 pilots on
    night vision goggles and there is increased training emphasis on
    aircraft survivability equipment. As a result of preliminary findings
    from our Aircraft Shootdown Assessment Team (ASDAT), we have initiated
    maneuvering flight training. A comprehensive review of UAV doctrine is
    also underway at the United States Army aviation Center and School.
    Tactics, techniques, and procedures for aviation in Military Operations
    in Urban Terrain (MOUT) have been revised and continue to be refined.
    Lastly, we must revise our current Army aviation employment doctrine as
    we transition to multi-functional brigade (UA) and Army National Guard
    (ARNG) Aviation Expeditionary Regiment structures under the modularity
    concept.

                          ARMY AVIATION MODERNIZATION

        On 23 February of this year, the Army leadership announced initial
    results of the Aviation Task Force. A significant recommendation was to
    reallocate RAH-66 Comanche funds to improve the overall capabilities
    and health of the aviation force. Terminating Comanche was neither an
    easy decision nor one made without considerable Task Force and
    leadership analysis. It was the right decision from both an operational
    and investment perspective that was made in the context of the changing
    operational environment, numerous studies in the last 25 years, and
    what we have learned from recent and ongoing operations.
        Comanche is unquestionably one of the most sophisticated aviation
    platforms in the world today. The Comanche team of engineers, software
    developers, testers, and fabricators epitomize American ingenuity and
    represent the world's finest. We anticipate multiple opportunities to
    horizontally integrate leading Comanche technologies into current and
    planned programs. For example, we envision harvesting the Radar
    Electronics Unit, Integrated Communications, Navigation and
    Identification Avionics (ICNIA), radar warning receiver, and fly-by-
    wire technologies. The Comanche Image Intensification TV (I2TV) system
    is also under consideration.
        The central issue to this difficult decision was that Comanche
    program growth accounted for 40 percent of the current aviation budget
    and up to 47 percent in the Extended Planning Period (EPP). By
    reallocating approximately $14.6 billion (fiscal year 2004-2011) that
    would have bought the initial 121 Block I Comanches, the Army is able
    to restructure and enhance our $100 billion investment in the total
    aviation force to meet current and future requirements.
        There will be contract termination costs associated with this
    decision. Military and industry representatives are working diligently
    to determine the exact figure. Preliminary estimates are between $480
    million-$680 million; however, the process will take some additional
    time since we must work with 400+ subcontractors that have contracts
    valued in excess of $100,000. The Army will disseminate the termination
    costs when determined and finalized.
        Termination of Comanche reflects the Army's recognition of new and
    changing global security challenges and national security requirements.
    The result of this reallocation will be a new buy of almost 900
    aircraft over the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to build modular
    tailorable forces and provide our Reserve component with more modern
    systems. The Army will accelerate modernization to include aircraft
    survivability equipment (ASE) for all airframes. This includes
    modernization of 1,400 aircraft to increase capabilities,
    survivability, and maintainability beyond 2020. The Army will buy 368
    armed reconnaissance helicopters, initially upgrade 284 AH-64Ds to the
    Block III configuration with an ultimate objective of 501, and procure
    303 light utility helicopters. This will enable us to completely divest
    880 obsolete UH-1 Hueys and OH-58A/C Kiowa Warrior helicopters and to
    return UH-60 Black Hawk aircraft from our support and testing
    communities back to operational units. These FAA certified, commercial
    off-the-shelf (COTS), light utility aircraft will provide
    administrative support at our training bases and will also be assigned
    to Army National Guard units to conduct state missions, assist in
    counternarcotics operations, and to respond to homeland security
    requirements.
        The identified intra-theater lift shortfalls will be addressed
    through the procurement of approximately 25 Cargo Fixed Wing aircraft,
    additional procurement of 20 CH-47 aircraft, and recapitalization
    acceleration for 19 CH-47D aircraft. The plan also provides for new
    procurement of at least 80 UH-60 L/M Black Hawk aircraft to increase
    lift capabilities for our Aviation and Maneuver UAs.
        The net result of reallocating aviation resources includes
    procurement, recapitalization, and modernization of 70 percent of the
    rotary wing fleet plus enhanced ASE. In conjunction with our sister
    services we will begin development of joint vertical lift platforms
    that provide commonality and revolutionary capabilities in the future.
    In the meantime, Army aviation will take a huge step towards the future
    with balanced and integrated capabilities, modular and tailorable
    formations, and cohesive and highly lethal units that are deployable,
    versatile and able to operate in the joint warfight.
        As the Army modernizes the fleet, priority of fielding new,
    recapitalized or remanufactured aircraft is based upon operational unit
    rotations and support to the global war on terrorism. Following current
    operations and the global war on terrorism, units with shortfalls are
    the next priority. The Army's policy is to provide deploying units in
    both the active and Reserve components with the newest and best
    available equipment. Overall, this reinvestment should provide no net
    loss of business and revenue in the rotorcraft industry.

                     AVIATION SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT (ASE)

        ASE and aircrew protection is Secretary Brownlee's number one
    aviation priority. The Army equips the AH-64, UH-60, CH-47, OH-58D, and
    fixed-wing Special Electronic Mission Aircraft (SEMA) with A-kits to
    accept ASE consisting of detectors, Infrared Red (IR) and Radio
    Frequency (RF) jamming devices, and chaff and flare munitions to
    counter RF and IR threat systems. All active Army, National Guard, and
    Army Reserve deployed aircraft, are equipped with ASE. Additionally,
    protection against direct fire from small arms weapons is provided by
    armor panels, most frequently located in crew compartments and
    sensitive areas of the aircraft (such as the engine). On 9 January
    2004, an Army G3 Policy Board approved the acquisition of Aircraft
    Ballistic Protection Sets (APBS) for deployed cargo and utility
    helicopters that will ensure an enhanced degree of protection
    throughout the cargo/passenger compartment.
        Currently, the Army is modifying the OIF utility fixed-wing fleet
    to accept ASE while upgrading in theater and deploying CH-47s with the
    ALE-47 Flare/Chaff Dispenser to counter anticipated anti-aircraft
    threat missile systems. On 14 January 2004, the Chief of Staff approved
    an accelerated ASE acquisition plan that will initially focus on
    upgrading to the next generation Common Missile Warning System (CMWS)
    and Improved Countermeasure Munitions Dispenser (ICMD) for OIF/OEF
    deployed and deploying helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. This effort
    will commence by upgrading CH-47s, followed by selected fixed wing
    aircraft, UH-60s, and AH-64s. Over the POM period, the Army's
    modernized aviation fleet will be modified to accept an advanced
    countermeasure system consisting of CMWS/ICMD and a Multi-Band LASER
    Jammer. With respect to training, the Army formed an assessment team to
    review in-theater missile/helicopter incidents. The goal of this team
    is to develop lessons learned for incorporation into Standard Aviation
    Programs of Instructions and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)
    adhered to by Army aviation units.

                     AVIATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T)

        The Army aviation science and technology (S&T) program fuels
    revolutionary aviation development, expands scientific knowledge in the
    area of manned and unmanned helicopters, and matures and demonstrates
    new technologies in support of the future force and Joint Vision 2020.
    Based on the Army Transformation Plan, this effort has been focused on
    investigating and developing technologies applicable to unmanned
    systems and to support selected opportunities for manned systems. The
    Army has a unique responsibility within DOD as the service lead for
    rotorcraft S&T investment. Under DOD Project Reliance, the Army has the
    responsibility to address the rotorcraft S&T requirements of all
    services and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in the areas that
    are not service or command unique.
        The aviation S&T program invests in three areas: basic research,
    applied research, and advanced technology development. The Army invests
    in world-class expertise in academia, industry and other government
    agencies, as well as in state-of-the-art equipment in the area of basic
    research.
        A highlight of basic research is investment in the Rotorcraft
    Centers of Excellence at Pennsylvania State University, Georgia
    Institute of Technology and the University of Maryland. Basic research
    is conducted by the Aviation and Missile Research, Development and
    Engineering Command (AMRDEC) Aeroflightdynamics Directorate (AFDD)
    located at the Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA and by the Army
    Research Laboratory (ARL) Vehicle Technology Directorate at the Glenn
    Research Center, Cleveland, OH and the Langley Research Center, Langley
    Air Force Base, VA.
        The Army aviation applied research program provides the enabling
    technology and baseline for aviation development. This research
    includes enabling technologies for manned and unmanned rotorcraft in
    propulsion, rotors, drive train, and structures. A highlight of the
    program is the expansion of knowledge in air system autonomy and
    manned-unmanned teaming. The applied research program also invests in
    the National Rotorcraft Technology Center. The Center is a partnership
    of government, industry, and academia for developing air vehicle
    designs and other rotorcraft technologies. The program is executed at
    AFDD at the Ames Research Center, the Langley Research Center, and the
    ARL Vehicle Technology Directorate at the Glenn Research Center.
        A key element of the aviation applied research program is the
    longstanding partnership the Army has established with the National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). This partnership, first
    established in 1965, has resulted in an exemplary, highly integrated
    national technology program that is fully coordinated with industry and
    devoid of duplication of facilities and programs. All fielded United
    States military rotorcraft, and derivations that have established our
    commercial base, can be traced back to this Army/NASA partnership. DOD/
    Army rotorcraft and the Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) UAVS
    technology development strategy depends on the continuing partnership
    with related NASA technology programs.
        The VTOL UAVS potentially bring unprecedented agility,
    maneuverability, and lethality to the Future Force, while reducing
    signatures and logistics burdens. The transformational nature of the
    UAVS, both in capabilities and new paradigms, has energized the
    aviation field (in industry and academia) to truly ``think outside the
    box.'' The benefit to the DOD and the Army will be revolutionary
    warfighting capabilities, as well as enhancements to the current force.
        The aviation advanced technology development program is focused on
    UAVS, with an emphasis on demonstrations to provide the warfighter with
    the menu of technology for development and integration into the force.
    The demonstration programs will mature technology into realistic and
    robust prototypes. Technologies that enable autonomous flight, higher
    aerodynamic airframe loads, and increased maneuverability possible with
    UAVS will be demonstrated. A highlight of this effort is the Airborne
    Manned-Unmanned System Technology (AMUST) and the Hunter-Standoff
    Killer Team (HSKT) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD).
    These programs constitute the major effort to demonstrate manned-
    unmanned teaming. The program also invests in propulsion, drive train
    and structure technologies that enable UAVS application and have
    technology transfer opportunities to manned airframes. The advanced
    technology development program is managed by the AMRDEC Aviation
    Applied Technology Directorate (AATD) at Fort Eustis, VA.
        Another notable highlight of the advanced technology development
    program is the Army-Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
    partnering on UAVS platforms for lethality, surveillance and
    communications relay. The Army is pursuing increased lethality for the
    Future Force through the Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft (UCAR)
    program (an armed VTOL UAVS) designed to team with manned or unmanned
    systems. Increased surveillance capability is being pursued through the
    A-160 Hummingbird Program, a medium altitude, long endurance VTOL
    sensor and communications platform, and the Organic Air Vehicle (OAV),
    a ducted fan VTOL UAVS that can be carried by the soldier and/or
    launched from a vehicle.
        The investment by the Army in aviation S&T is guided by the
    requirements of the Future Force. Our investment in advanced technology
    development will grow in the coming years to meet the challenges of
    those requirements. The Army is confident that the aviation S&T
    investment represents a prudent program that meets the DOD and Army
    Transformation goals.

                                   CONCLUSION

        In closing, I have been very impressed and pleased with the
    performance of Army aviation in our recent and ongoing operations. But
    we can get better. We have to get better. Strengthening Army aviation
    and investing for a successful future reaffirms to our soldiers, our
    sister services, and the Nation, that only the best equipment and
    capabilities put into the hands of the finest soldiers in the world
    will be brought to bear in protecting our way of life, defeating
    terrorism, and the fight for freedom over tyranny.
        Thank you for allowing me to share our work and participate in this
    session. We look forward to answering your questions.

        Senator Sessions. All right. You say the procurement of 800
    new aircraft for the fleet in general, plus the modernization
    of 1,400?
        General Cody. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Then 1,000, you mentioned another 1,000
    aircraft, or was that part of the 1,400?
        General Cody. We are going to recapitalize more than 1,000
    aircraft. We are going to modernize and put new systems and
    modernize about 1,400 airframes. The total buy, in 2004 through
    2011, will be over 900 aircraft; I will show you that in the
    charts.
        Senator Sessions. We will probably get into that in more
    detail in a minute and the merits of that. But let me ask you:
    How does this, General, overall vision affect your vision of
    Army aviation? With regard to utilizing Army aviation in the
    field, how will it change? How will it impact a commander's
    ability to utilize these forces, as compared to what they would
    with Comanche?
        General Cody. With Comanche what we were buying was an
    aircraft that had low visibility in low observable technology.
    I do not want to get into the specifics of it because of the
    classification of this briefing, but it is not a stealth
    aircraft. I have been part of several different programs in my
    test pilot days that dealt with those type of capabilities.
    Comanche was going to bring to the table a much lower
    observable radar cross-section than the current helicopter
    fleet but it was not wholly immune to radars.
        Comanche had the sensor systems and the reconnaissance,
    surveillance, and target acquisition systems teamed with
    Apache, teamed with our ground force, and teamed with our joint
    force, as well as the manned and unmanned teaming of UAVs to
    cover the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
    requirements of the force.
        With this change, what we are doing is we are going to take
    the Apache Longbow to full Block III. In the 2004 to 2011 time
    frame, 284 Apaches will go to Block III, and in the extended
    planning period, (fiscal year 2012-2020) 501. The only
    difference in capabilities between Comanche risk capabilities
    and Apache Longbow was the low, observable piece of the Apache
    compared to the airframe of the Comanche termination.
        Senator Sessions. All right. So, you do not expect that to
    impact significantly----
        General Cody. No, sir.
        Senator Sessions.--a warfighter----
        General Cody. Now we have run several runs----
        Senator Sessions. I guess I should allow General Bergantz
    and General Sinclair to go forward. I am sorry I butted in
    there, but thank you for that.
        General Bergantz.

      STATEMENT OF MG JOSEPH L. BERGANTZ, USA, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE
                          OFFICER FOR AVIATION

        General Bergantz. Chairman Sessions, Senator Lieberman, it
    is a pleasure to be here to speak with you today.
        From a programmatic and a material developer standpoint,
    many positive actions are being taken in the near term to
    improve Army aviation programs with the funding harvested from
    the Comanche termination. For quite some time, Army aviation
    frankly struggled with a funding bow wave that could not be
    satisfied within our available resources.
        The Army is redirecting Comanche resources now to fully
    address and fully fund the acceleration of aircraft
    survivability equipment, procure light-armed reconnaissance
    helicopters, light utility helicopters, and some fixed-wing
    cargo aircraft. We are also going to enhance the current
    production and fielding of the Apache, the Black Hawk, and the
    Chinook. We will invest in aviation munitions programs and
    increase the resources for unmanned aerial vehicles, both
    existing and new ones.
        The Comanche termination has caused some internal issues,
    all of which are being addressed. First and foremost, the Army
    wants to complete the termination of the Comanche contract and
    harvest any residual fiscal year 2004 funds that we can, to
    include de-obligating and redirecting the funds to other Army
    aviation efforts.
        Second, reference assignment of personnel, the reassignment
    of government personnel is nearly complete while we have
    maintained a necessary small cadre of program personnel to
    complete the termination activities.
        Third, a set of Comanche technologies exist that the Army
    would like to migrate to other platforms. These include the
    image intensification TV, the radar electronics unit, the fly-
    by-wire flight control system technology, the radar warning
    receiver, the T-802 engine, and the integrated communications
    navigation identification avionics (ICNIA) technology, along
    with its associated downsized antennas.
        The intent is to carry these technologies through the end
    of fiscal year 2004 and then migrate them with their funding
    tails to the recipient platforms for fiscal years 2005 and
    beyond.
        Program Executive Offices for Command, Control,
    Communications, Tactical (PEO C3T) and myself are currently
    doing a 30-day study on the ICNIA to see which piece parts we
    want to bring forward from that. We will conclude that in the
    short time. Then we will bring those results of that study
    forward to the G3 and G8 for resolution.
        That concludes my remarks, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        General Sinclair.

     STATEMENT OF BG EDWARD J. SINCLAIR, USA, COMMANDING GENERAL,
           UNITED STATES ARMY AVIATION CENTER AND FORT RUCKER

        General Sinclair. Chairman Sessions, Senator Lieberman, I
    sincerely appreciate the opportunity to appear and provide an
    update of the point of view of the commanding general at Fort
    Rucker and the United States Army aviation Center, representing
    the aviation soldiers worldwide.
        As Lieutenant General Cody mentioned, we are at a dynamic
    time in our Army and the same remains, if not more so, for Army
    aviation. The aviation branch is determined and resolute in
    transforming to meet the future needs of our Army. Our mission
    is to ensure every single aviation soldier is trained and
    equipped to fight our Nation's war. As General Cody discussed
    equipping our force, I will provide some thoughts on training
    our force.
        As you are well aware, Fort Rucker, Alabama, is the home of
    Army aviation. We execute all initial flight training for U.S.
    Army aviators. The through-put for our initial entry rotary
    wing pilots is 1,200 per year. In addition to initial entry
    rotary wing pilots, we also train about 3,500 graduate-level
    pilots from the Army, Marines, Air Force, several governmental
    agencies, and 39 allied countries.
        In the past, we trained our aviation forces on tactics,
    techniques, and procedures that were developed for use on the
    planes of Europe. It was common for us to use the capabilities
    and standoff created through the superior technology of our
    aviation systems to engage a threat and win. Army aviation saw
    a drastic change, though, when we deployed into Afghanistan. We
    saw an enemy that used terrain and environment to their
    advantage.
        The skill sets we taught our flight crews were no longer
    the skill sets that maximized our survivability. We realized
    that technology alone did not create or provide the edge we
    needed to ensure future successes. Furthermore, our operations
    in OIF, coupled with the lessons learned during OEF, provided
    us the definite data points to adjust our flight schools
    programs of instruction. Recently, a Fort Rucker-led team,
    known as ASDAT, which stands for Aircraft Shoot-Down Assessment
    Team, deployed to Iraq at the request of the combatant
    commanders to investigate the cause of recent Army aviation
    aircraft losses. This team's invaluable insights and lessons
    learned were briefed to the Army senior leadership, as well as
    the tactical commanders.
        Our significant effort to capture lessons learned has
    already begun to generate the necessary changes our branch must
    undergo to remain relevant and lethal on the battlefield. I
    will highlight a few of these.
        First, the base of maneuvers: our flight crews' training
    was restricted to certain limits pertaining to the aircraft
    maneuver. For instance, during a normal flight period, an
    aviation student could not exceed a 60-degree bank in the
    aircraft. While an instructor might demonstrate maneuvers
    greater than 60 degrees, the student was never allowed to
    execute them.
        While this might be considered safe, we were not providing
    the appropriate or necessary skills to our aviators. During
    operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, our crews often had to
    exceed these maneuver restrictions, but often much greater
    maneuvering limits had to be exceeded to avoid enemy fire.
        Another lesson learned was running and diving fire. Lessons
    learned in both OEF and OIF demonstrated the need to execute
    running and diving fire in our reconnaissance and attacked
    aircraft. What that means is that crews are now being trained
    in a different set of skills than their predecessors. This
    change was driven because of extreme heat and high altitude
    operations that severely reduce the power margins of our
    helicopters and their ability to sustain a hover.
        Our crews were driven to adapt to the conditions and use
    running fire techniques to decrease these power requirements.
    Further, the running fire proved much more survivable than
    exposing helicopters in sustaining hover mode in a desert
    environment. We are now training this at Fort Rucker to all
    aviators completing the attack helicopter reconnaissance
    aircraft transitions.
        We also changed our night-vision goggle training for Apache
    pilots. Lessons learned resulted in adding night vision goggle
    (NVG) qualification training to all Apache AH-64 pilot
    training. Qualifying our attack pilots supplied with NVGs gives
    the crews the necessary redundancy to successfully complete
    their combat missions. Pilots graduate today using the best of
    both infrared and imaging supplying technology, reducing the
    level of risk associated with their combat missions.
        Two more examples of this drive to improve our warfighting
    programs and instruction are the survival, evasion, resistance,
    and escape training known as SERE Level-C, and our dunker
    training. In December, we ran our first students through the
    aviator underwater egress trainer. This state-of-the-art
    facility was completed in November and reflects a conscious
    decision to infuse survivability training into our helicopter
    aircrews. Prior to this development of this facility, the
    execution of this training for each operational aviation unit
    in the Army was required to send aviators to places like
    Jacksonville and Pensacola, Florida, to train under U.S. Navy
    supervision. As you might imagine, this requirement for egress
    training, while vital to survivability, was difficult for the
    field to acquire.
        Fort Rucker now certifies every aviation student prior to
    graduation in this dunker. Likewise, the addition of SERE
    training arms our air crews with additional skills required to
    combat enemy forces in the event of capture. We have all seen
    the benefits of this SERE training, which CW3 Dave Williams, a
    prisoner of war (POW) during OIF, applied this training when he
    was captured by the Iraqis.
        On a collective training side, Fort Rucker is transitioning
    to Flight School 21 model. We are instituting a push towards
    the increase in collective warfighting training scenarios. This
    change in training focus is enhanced by each student having
    more time in their go-to-war aircraft. Go-to-war aircraft are
    defined as advanced aircraft they will fly once they arrive in
    a unit, being a Chinook, Black Hawk, Kiowa Warrior, or Apache.
        With this advancing training model, we are now having the
    luxury that each Flight School 21 will have the exposure to
    complex missions that he will face when he arrives at his first
    unit. We execute this collective training by sending students,
    aircraft, and instructors to operations with the infantry
    school at Fort Benning and at the Florida ranger camp.
        We are conducting air assault operations and close combat
    attack operations with these students. Further, we are
    incorporating the air traffic services students into these
    scenarios, so they can have the opportunity to provide air
    traffic services that they would normally apply in a tactical
    field environment.
        In the future, we will incorporate unmanned aerial vehicles
    into a manned/unmanned teaming and integrate them into these
    scenarios. The infusion of these different assets in training
    venues, in a realistic tactical scenario, enhances our
    soldier's skills and prepares him for combat.
        We also make great use of our state-of-the-art simulation
    facilities as we replicate combat operations in a collective
    and joint environment at a reduced cost. We continue to be the
    training center for each deploying aviation unit for the
    requirement for sustained combat operations, as units deploy to
    Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
        As you can see, we are moving out to ensure that the
    Aviation Warfighting Center at Fort Rucker is contributing to
    the evolving missions and the joint fight as we transform Army
    aviation.
        On behalf of everyone of the 58,000 Army aviation soldiers,
    I would just like to thank you for your support and what you
    have done for us each and every day. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, General Sinclair.
        I see the chart has appeared. Anybody want to explain that
    one?
        General Cody. Yes, sir, with your permission.
        Senator Sessions. Proceed, General Cody.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Cody. What I would like to do is go through a
    couple of charts that, based upon your questions, Mr. Chairman,
    and Senator Lieberman's, I think that will get to the heart of
    the issue.
        This is a chart which I briefed the President on when we
    went and took the decision to him to tell him what was going
    on. Basically, when we started the task force, we did not tell
    the task force to go look at trades. We told the task force to
    take a holistic look at Army aviation through a functional area
    analysis, and come back and tell us what needs to be fixed.
        We did not have anybody sitting off to the side, saying,
    ``well, if you do this, we can trade this.'' We did not give
    them that. So, they came back and they said, ``these are things
    we need to fix in Army aviation.'' When they gave that to us,
    then I put a small team together to take a look at our
    investment accounts, the training, technology, doctrine, leader
    development, organization, materiel, and everything else.
        What we came up with, at the end of the day, is the balance
    in 2004 and 2011, which is $14.6 billion, 121 Comanches, versus
    this $12.9 billion at the time, it is now a little higher, to
    fix Army aviation. What they told us was, and they knew this,
    that the IR threat from now until we can see out to about 2015,
    is the most significant threat that we cannot deal with unless
    we fix aircraft survivability equipment on our aircraft. There
    was nothing new from what we found out from Task Force Hawk,
    except that the proliferation of these missile systems are out
    there. None of our aircraft that were shot down were shot down
    by missile systems that we knew were out there but not to that
    level.
        Senator Lieberman. Excuse me, General. IR is infrared?
        General Cody. Infrared, yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. As in heat-seeking?
        General Cody. That is correct.
        Senator Lieberman. That is what we are facing in Iraq?
        General Cody. That is correct, sir. It is the same as what
    we are facing in Afghanistan and in Kosovo, as well as the
    radar systems in Kosovo, the Serbian radar systems.
        The next thing they came back to us and said, ``we have
    several helicopters in our fleet that, over time, we have not
    brought to their full potential, one of them being the Apache
    Longbow.'' The Longbow Block III was not funded. When you take
    a look at all the things that Block III Longbow can carry, they
    came back to us and said, ``it does not make any sense not to
    bring Longbow up to its full potential for the future
    battlefield to fight in a joint air/ground team environment
    that we know we are going to have to fight'' not so much the
    Afghanistan fight or the Iraqi fight, but for the future
    battlefield.
        They also said, ``we need to take a look at our
    reconnaissance helicopter manned and unmanned mix, UAVs. We
    need to resource them and put them into the organization of
    aviation.'' The aviation branch at Fort Rucker is the component
    now for UAV training and operations maintenance and all that.
        We had, on the books for years, a light utility helicopter
    that we never resourced. They recommended to us that, as we
    take a look at the homeland security mission set for the
    National Guard, and when we take a look at how we are moving to
    a more modular Army coming out of armies, corps, divisions, and
    brigades, and going to Units of Employment Y (UEy), Units of
    Employment X (UEx), and brigades, there is still a requirement
    out there for a light utility helicopter; so, they recommended
    that.
        We are retiring the Vietnam-era UH-1s and Cobras and the
    OH-58 As and Cs. We have no replacement aircraft to be able to
    cascade to the National Guard. They recommended that we go out
    and buy--as Senator Lieberman said, we have been living off of
    what Congress has been giving us every year. They said if we
    are going to fix Army aviation and continue to employ the
    National Guard formations the way we are, we have to get more
    Black Hawk helicopters in the fleet. So they recommended, as
    well as fully funding the M-model, which is the newest Black
    Hawk helicopter, fully funding that program.
        Chinooks; we do not have enough Chinooks. We do not--in
    fact, we are working now to work through the CH-47 F-model and
    the MH-47 G-model. But with the number of Chinooks we have
    right now, to be able to give the National Guard the requisite
    number they need, again their homeland security missions,
    homeland defense, as well as for the warfight, we were short
    some 56 Chinooks that we needed for our programs.
        We have a niche gap in intra-theater combat service
    support. Right now we have some 40 Sherpas. We have 16 of those
    Sherpas, C-23s, out there. They are a good aircraft but they do
    not meet the requirements right now that we have. They
    certainly will not meet the requirements for a more modular
    joint expeditionary Army that we are going to put in the battle
    space. They recommended that we go back and review the cargo
    fixed-wing fleet and what capabilities we need to have, and
    they made some recommendations to us.
        They talked about common cockpits and fly-by-wire. Common
    cockpit, and this is what we took from the special operations
    community, where their Black Hawks and their Chinooks have the
    common displays and common software. We, for some reason, were
    not going down that road. We were going to build the M-model.
    We were going to build the Foxtrot model Chinook, two utility
    cargo helicopters without the same cockpit. They recommend we
    not do that and we fully fund a common cockpit program, not
    only for training but also for logistics in the out-years, as
    well as for integrating the air/ground team as we continue to
    invest in the C\4\ISR.
        Fly-by-wire: we have suffered several aircraft losses to
    the brown-out conditions in Afghanistan and in Iraq. We will
    not get to the level of control to assist the pilot to be able
    to safely land those aircraft in those type of conditions until
    we go to a fly-by-wire system.
        Senator Sessions. Can you explain that or is that----
        General Cody. I will let my air support--I will get it
    about 50 percent right.
        General Bergantz. Just briefly, sir, the fly-by-wire system
    takes a lot of the older mechanical drive systems out that were
    bell cranks, and cables, and that sort of thing that controlled
    the rotor system and replaces it with wires, basically. It is a
    fly-by-wire. So, you are sending electronic signals over the
    wire to an actuator out there that makes the blades go up and
    down and do those sorts of things.
        You make it triply redundant by putting in basically three
    sets of wires there. So you have the redundancy and there is no
    single point failure. But when you do that, it makes it a much
    more reliable system. It gets rid of a lot of weight, which
    increases your performance. It makes life easier on the
    maintainer, because it gets rid of a lot of parts in there, the
    bell cranks, the cables, and so forth that he used to have to
    worry about replacing and so forth.
        General Cody. We think this is going to be--we will lead
    off, of course, with the UH-60 M-model, but then we will be
    looking at cascading this technology into other aircraft.
    Comanche had fly-by-wire. In fact, I am one of the few pilots
    that have flown Comanche.
        General Bergantz. Right. Comanche, in fact, is the first
    rotor craft that had fly-by-wire.
        General Cody. It is absolutely the best flying helicopter
    the industry ever built for us. I'm surprised when the
    cancellation came out that they didn't have several quotes from
    General Cody saying it's the best aircraft they ever built,
    because I go on record as saying that it is.
        Senator Lieberman. There is still time. [Laughter]
        General Cody. I believe I just did.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you. We have that on the record.
        General Cody. But the capability of putting fly-by-wire in
    is really going to save us helicopters and for the investment.
    So, they came back----
        Senator Sessions. That will be a Comanche technology that
    you will be able to----
        General Bergantz. Yes, sir. That is one of the ones I
    mentioned that we will carry forward.
        General Cody. That is one of the ones we will carry
    forward. We also have some shortages in our rocket strategy, in
    our acquisition of rockets. We have used up quite a few rockets
    in this fight, as well as in the Afghan fight. We had some gaps
    until we bring on the new rockets, as well as gaps in our
    Hellfire line, as we go forward to the joint common missile. We
    have fixed our Army aviation munitions.
        The UAV requirement: the study said we need to have UAVs in
    the aviation brigade formations. We also need to take a look at
    the manned and unmanned teaming of UAVs, level three and level
    four. Level three, you will hear people talk about. That means
    if you are flying a helicopter, you can throw a switch, and you
    can drive the package of the UAV that is flying out ahead of
    you 50 miles or 100 miles. So, you now control the sensor
    system.
        Level four means you not only control the sensor system,
    but you also control the helicopter. We will be able to put
    level three and level four on the Apache Longbow Block III. We
    will be able to put at least level three on our Army aviation
    command and control system (A2C2S) Black Hawks and level three
    on our light-armed reconnaissance helicopter.
        All of this on this side of the fence, on this side was 121
    Block I Comanches. As we did our analysis that General Sinclair
    talked to you about what was shooting down our helicopters, if
    the Comanche was flying today in Iraq, those same missiles that
    took down those nine aircraft would take down the Comanche,
    because Comanche does not have an active IR system for IR
    missiles. Once you start putting IR active systems on an
    aircraft that was built for a radar cross-section, you start
    getting into those quick trade-offs of what your radar cross-
    sections look like. I cannot go much farther than that in this
    type of setting.
        That was one of our problems. So, we are faced with buying
    121 Comanches knowing that we were going to have to upgrade it
    to the IR threat that we know that was out there. We would
    still have this problem in 2011, because we did not have any
    money in the Army to be able to take care of all of this.
        That is where we came up with the decision. I do not think
    it was a business decision, because--in some cases it was but
    in other cases, I am not sure--in fact, I know after I have
    looked at this for a long time, knowing what I know now,
    knowing what I know going into the future, I am not sure that I
    would pursue buying Comanche the way it was structured because
    it provides a niche capability.
        Fifteen years ago, we sent Apaches after radar sites to
    start off the first Gulf war. Today, I do not think we would
    send a Comanche against those radar sites because we have other
    joint systems that can deal with that type of threat that we
    did not have back in 1990/1991.
        As great an aircraft as Comanche was, it was starting to
    get squeezed into a niche capability that we kept holding on to
    for low observable, never achieving stealth, at quite a cost.
    It was going to really affect our ability to have Army aviation
    as a joint and air/ground team member on the next battlefield.
    So, that is why we made the decision.
        What I want to do real quickly, because it goes to the
    other point, I want to show you how we looked to build a
    capabilities base once we went to this. We looked across all
    our aircraft fleet and we said, Okay, we have to redesign the
    air/ground.
        So, what we basically did was we said in the attack role,
    the basic mission unit, we wanted to have a troop or a company
    of either 8 Apaches or 10 light-armed reconnaissance aircraft
    as a building block. For the assault mission, we said 10 Black
    Hawks; for the general support mission, 8 Black Hawks; for the
    heavy assault and cargo, 12 Chinooks; and for 12 medical
    evacuations (MEDEVACs).
        We looked across, and we wanted to say we need to have
    modular, tailorable and more sustainable formations so we could
    push them down. Once we did that, we looked at where all our
    helicopters were. We had them in formations above division and
    above corps. So, we said we are going to take all those
    helicopters out of corps and take all the helicopters above
    corps, and we are going to make our formations more robust at
    the division level so they can fight with the ground teams.
        So what we did, we took the 11 different aviation brigades
    in the Army, and we said this will fix the National Guard. We
    have two National Guard divisions that are part of the
    warfight. They will be heavy divisions, as we design them. We
    also have six active duty divisions that, when we redesign
    them, will be heavy divisions.
        So, we designed an aviation brigade that gives them two
    attack helicopter battalions of 48 Apaches, a Black Hawk
    battalion of 30 Black Hawks, a general support battalion that
    gives them 8 command-and-control UH-60 helicopters, and 12 CH-
    47 Chinooks and 12 MEDEVACs. We put the MEDEVACs into the
    aviation brigade.
        We also gave the aviation brigade its own sustainment. In
    other words, the intermediate two-level maintenance for
    aviation and maintenance we put in there. We created space for
    the Class IV UAV. So, this is what the aviation brigade will
    look like.
        In comparison, when the 3rd Infantry Division crossed the
    berm last year, their aviation brigade had 18 Apaches, 16 Black
    Hawks, and 24 Kiowa Warriors. This is a much more robust
    formation. We will build 11 of these formations.
        For the National Guard divisions, the other six divisions
    themselves, we created expeditionary regiments. They will have
    the same building block as what we built for the baseline.
    Because we are short of aircraft, they will have the same
    building blocks, but will be short a company across the board,
    except in the UH-60. We have optimized them for homeland
    security, homeland defense, stability support operations
    (SASO), Balkans, and Afghanistan. If we put them in the heavy
    warfight, we will backfill them with modules from the active
    component (AC).
        They are structured here at the support, and they are
    structured at the brigade. They are all the same. So, this is a
    much more tailorable and adaptable formation to be able to do
    that.
        So, we are breaking the paradigm here of reinforcing active
    duty activation with National Guard. Aviation in this case, for
    these types of units, we will actually chop AC units to them.
        When we look at our light division, 25th Infantry Division
    and the 10th Mountain Division, we used the same design except
    we're resourcing them with light attack aircraft versus the
    Apache, but they have the same formation.
        For the 101st and the 82nd, our two vertical envelopment
    divisions, as we transform those two divisions here in the next
    3 years, we are retaining the air assault division with four
    maneuver brigades. We will retain the 82nd Airborne as an
    airborne division with four maneuver brigades.
        The delivery of these assets, primary delivery of the
    combat formations for the 101st will be by helicopter. That is
    why they will get two of these brigades. The 82nd will be
    primarily delivered by parachute or by some other means. We
    gave them the same tactical mobility by giving them a full-up
    aviation brigade, which is much larger than the brigade they
    have right now.
        But the beauty of all this is, for the 18th Airborne in
    particular, they can cut these brigades to any of the divisions
    when they employ them. If the 82nd went to combat next week,
    they could take two of these brigades with them because they
    are all the same formation.
        So, that is where we moved to. We think we have this thing
    about right.
        Senator Sessions. You can draw on the National Guard?
        General Cody. The National Guard has signed up for this;
    yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. But you would be able to draw on them
    parts or whole as you chose?
        General Cody. Yes, sir. I will use the 10th Mountain as an
    example right now. They are Apaches in Afghanistan rather than
    two battalions of light attack aircraft. We can take one Apache
    battalion to try and give it to them, and it would not change
    this formation. We have the right support mechanisms.
        Senator Sessions. All right.
        General Cody. So, let me recap for you. Then I will get off
    the stage here, and I will answer your questions.
        What does this all mean on how we redid this? About 903 new
    aircraft for the AH-64 will take Block I aircraft, 284 will go
    to Block III in this cycle 2004 to 2011. We will take another
    217 after 2011 to build it up to 501 for the objective.
        The CH-47, we are going to buy 24 new ones, recap 19, and
    accelerate to the F-Model and G-Model lines starting in 2005.
    The UH-60s, we are going to buy 90 new ones in 2004 through
    2011; 51 L-Models and 39 M-models, as well as 9 MEDEVACs.
        Regarding the armed reconnaissance helicopter, we have a
    requirement that is coming into the building from the Training
    and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). We think it is about 368
    aircraft we need between now and 2011, and then sometime in the
    next 2 or 3 years, we will reevaluate that number. We know
    between now and 2011, with the formations we have, this will
    fill up those brigades with the light-armed reconnaissance
    helicopter, and then we will be able to divest ourselves of the
    OH-58 Kiowa Warrior.
        On the light utility helicopter, we need 322 new aircraft.
    What that allows us to do is to backfill the UH-1s that are
    being divested, but also, more importantly, there is about 144
    what we call TDA, Training Distribution and Allowance Aircraft
    which support our garrison and training units not combat
    aircraft, in places like our combat training centers and our
    test centers, MEDEVAC for CONUS that they will be able to
    displace Black Hawks so we can put them in the Guard formation.
    Then the rest of those aircraft will go into the Guard OH-58
    battalions for their homeland security to replace the
    Reconnaissance and Interdiction Detachment (RAID) aircraft.
        So, that is what this does. What is not on here is $390
    million we have in the program for procurement of UAVs. We have
    a team going down range to Iraq in April. Some will come from
    General Sinclair's aviation center and the others from TRADOC,
    the future center. I am sending my requirements people, and
    General Bergantz is sending his. It will be a team to go down
    range for about 4 weeks and take a look at the IGNAT UAV
    Predator-type class UAV we have in the country now that are
    flying.
        It will look at the Hunter UAV. It will look at the Shadow
    200 UAV and the Raven UAVs, those four types of UAVs, and then
    will come back and generate the requirements of what type of
    UAVs we want to put in these formations.
        Senator Sessions. All right. Thank you, General Cody. That
    was a good presentation. It will give us some feel for how we
    are going to be configured and how we will go to war with
    aviation.
        General Bergantz, I know you and--I assume the senator will
    be back. Maybe we can talk some more about that Comanche later.
    But I do recall being at Fort Rucker last year. It was the 4th
    of July, maybe. The wife of a senior helicopter trainer said,
    ``Well, I'll tell you what I think.'' Comanche had been
    mentioned. She continued, ``No, I'll tell you what my husband
    thinks.'' I said, ``What is that?'' She said, ``He thinks you
    could upgrade the Apache Longbow, and you don't need the
    Comanche.''
        That had not been our position, the official position, of
    the Army. I guess we have invested a lot in it. It is always
    better to bite the bullet sooner rather than later, but we
    cannot say this is real soon that we are biting the bullet.
        What can you say in defense of the criticism that can
    rightly be raised, that if this is so, why did we not know it
    sooner?
        General Cody. I will take it first, while these guys try to
    figure out how to back me up. First off, let us remember that
    Comanche, when the acquisition decision memorandum was signed
    for 650 Block I Comanches, it was to replace the aging Kiowa
    Warrior fleet, because we had a helicopter in the Kiowa Warrior
    that was really a gap measure until we could get Comanche on
    board. What Comanche brought to the table was its electro-optic
    sensor system (EOSS), its sensor suite, its communications
    package, the Longbow radar system that picked up targets, as
    well as being an extremely agile and fast aircraft.
        So, that is what it was going to do in Block I. It was to
    replace the Kiowa Warrior for the reconnaissance, surveillance,
    and target acquisition. Then in the Block II and Block III
    upgrades of it, they were looking at a newer engine and a newer
    transmission so that the Comanche could carry more armament and
    be almost as lethal in terms of carrying combat loads as the
    Apache in the out-years.
        That is what, as we looked at the trades, we kept coming
    back to as part of the problem: we never brought the Longbow to
    its full potential. The Longbow carries almost--well, it
    carries 16 Hellfires on any given day. That is an airframe that
    does not really care that much, because it is a pretty stout
    aircraft.
        We also looked at if we are going to keep Longbow out for
    that many years, what is our recap strategy going to be. So, we
    went through all those space trades, and that is how we came to
    the conclusion that with a light-armed reconnaissance aircraft,
    that was more deployable we would fill one of the required
    voids. I forgot to add this. That was one of the other things
    that came out of Task Force Hawk, as well as getting into
    Afghanistan, as well as some of the other contingencies that
    have popped up that were on our radar screen, was how do we get
    a light-armed reconnaissance aircraft into the fight as fast as
    our new, more deployable, more responsive ground forces?
        Comanche is larger than the Cobra and a little smaller than
    an Apache. We started taking a look at all those type of
    trades. We felt we could fill the gap of retiring the Kiowa
    Warrior by bringing on a more air transportable, smaller,
    certainly less expensive, easier to keep close to the ground
    troops light-armed reconnaissance helicopter. With UAVs and a
    fully potential Block III Longbow Apache, we saw no
    degradation.
        Now, we have had the mobile battle labs run several
    iterations now of future battles, where we used to run it with
    Comanche and the FCS force. Now we have run them with Apache
    Longbow and a surrogate, less capable aircraft. With UAVs and
    joint fires and Longbow AH-64D Block III, we are seeing no
    degradation right now to the fighting capability on the high
    end of the FCS-equipped force.
        Senator Sessions. You refer on your chart to the light-
    armored reconnaissance aircraft. How does the viability of that
    aircraft play into the picture and your decisionmaking process?
        General Cody. I will kick that one down to General
    Sinclair. He was on the task force, and he could talk a little
    bit about it.
        General Sinclair. Sir, the light-armored reconnaissance
    aircraft will prove to have reconnaissance capability for--
    especially in the light infantry divisions to go out and find
    the enemy. Then it still has the capability and has the weapons
    capability to go ahead and destroy a smaller force. It is not
    going to be the true punch force that you look for from
    Apaches. But it will have the survivability, the ability to
    conduct reconnaissance, the sensors on it that can detect
    forces, be able to designate targets for artillery and for
    Apaches and, probably more importantly, for the joint fighters.
        Senator Sessions. How has it been performing? How many
    more? Are these the new 322s you are projecting to buy?
        General Sinclair. 368, sir.
        Senator Sessions. 368?
        General Sinclair. Yes.
        Senator Sessions. 368. How has it been performing?
        General Sinclair. Sir, right now we do not have an aircraft
    identified. We are looking right now, looking at----
        Senator Sessions. This is new, not in the inventory?
        General Sinclair. Correct, sir. We are looking at different
    options for it.
        Senator Sessions. How long are we looking at?
        General Bergantz. We anticipate that the proposals will
    start to come in. We will go ahead, now that General Sinclair
    has completed the interim concept development (ICD) work and is
    in the building being approved, then we will be able to go out
    with a request for proposal (RFP) and compete this. Then what
    we will do is come back in and figure out which is the best
    platform that meets the requirements that were laid out in each
    document.
        As we narrow down and winnow down the contenders through
    the source selection process, it may be that there are only a
    couple out there that can actually do what we want the set of
    requirements to be, the capabilities that we want. If that is
    the case, it may make it simpler than if there are five or six
    of them.
        General Sinclair. Our plan is that the first unit----
        Senator Sessions. This has to be rapidly acquired. I guess
    my question is: How rapidly is rapidly?
        General Sinclair. We plan to have these----
        General Cody. The first unit equipped is fiscal year 2007,
    sir.
        General Bergantz. Right, and to have the majority of them
    all bought by the end of the POM period.
        Senator Sessions. All right. On the conversion of 501
    Apaches to Block III configurations leaves 203 A model Apaches
    in the fleet for National Guard. So, how is that going to work
    out for us?
        General Cody. Sir, based on the 2006 to 2011 program we
    have put about $175 million in the Apache line for either
    upgrade or transition to D models for those A model aircraft we
    have in fiscal year 2008. Right now, industry is looking at
    rotor blades, rotor systems, newer engines, the 701-D engine,
    as well as new transmissions. We have money to do a focus recap
    of the A models, so we keep the National Guard Apaches in much
    better condition--we are not going to go back and do like we
    did to the National Guard the first time, where we gave them
    the Cobras and did not put any money in them.
        We have $1.9 billion in a focus recap of the Apache A model
    line, as well as $175 million starting in 2008 for upgrades
    and/or a transition to the D or to whatever upgrades industry
    comes back and tells us is possible.
        Senator Sessions. Will this have the kind of modularity
    capability that you are looking for?
        General Cody. It is not the optimum. I mean, quite frankly,
    we would like to have all the Apache D models be Block III. But
    we think it is more than prudent, right now, to get ourselves
    through this bow wave in terms of training and in terms of what
    can get off the production line during this time frame, and
    this is reflected in our amended budget.
        But the most important thing is we have put money into
    making sure that these A models stay fully up with the changes
    we will make in any type of drive train on the Longbow.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to you,
    General Cody, and your colleagues.
        Look, I appreciate the kind words you had for the Comanche.
    You are in a position to know, having flown it. This gets to my
    concern that the decision to terminate ultimately was a
    budgetary decision. It is not that there is anything scandalous
    about that. It is just that it makes me worry about what we
    have sacrificed. It is not scandalous in the sense that there
    are budget limits. But as I look at this chart, fixing Army
    aviation, what is in the balance? A lot of the programs on the
    side that now will be funded, as a result of the termination of
    Comanche, look a lot like programs that we have heard described
    here as Army needs over the last decade or so.
        So in some sense maybe this means that the Army has been
    pushed to finally make a really tough decision because of the
    resource shortfall that is not your fault but it is what
    successive administrations and Congresses have given you. My
    concern is that we have sacrificed. In some ways we are
    modernizing, but we are not transforming. I know that the
    orientation of the Army, the desire of the Army, is to
    transform. So we are now proposing, you are now proposing, the
    termination of a truly transformational helicopter and using
    the money to modernize and fix some problems with Army aviation
    but perhaps, again, at the risk of having us unprepared for the
    future threat environments.
        So, let me begin with that general question. The bottom
    line is: Is this not ultimately a budgetary decision that you
    were forced to make?
        General Cody. Let me take that on, Senator Lieberman.
    First, we looked very hard at this. One could make the case
    that this is a Fram oil filter, on the left-hand side of that
    chart, that came due.
        Senator Lieberman. That this is a----
        General Cody. Fram oil filter that came due.
        Senator Lieberman. Fram.
        General Cody. I testified in 1999 that it was out there
    from Task Force Hawk. Due to shortages of modernization dollars
    of about $5 billion each year in the accounts, it still
    lingered out there. It became more of a problem for us with the
    amount of aviation we had in OIF and OEF--over 800 aircraft
    flying three times the operation tempo. We have lost 45
    already, and there is another 24 that we think we will lose
    once the estimates come back. This certainly weighed in the
    balance of making the decision.
        Transformation is about battle command, about seeing first,
    understanding first, and being able to act first. When we
    looked at Comanche and did the trades, we said, okay--what are
    the capabilities we need for the transformational force? Do we
    have other ways to mitigate? Such as taking this helicopter
    that has low observable technology, certainly great technology
    in terms of sensor to shooter linkages, in terms of equipment
    packages on board?
        What we asked ourselves is, can we bring Longbow, can we
    bring a light-armed helicopter, and can we bring the linkages
    to the air/ground team of the FCS-equipped force? Can we get
    the sensor packages? Can we mitigate with the new technologies
    that we are now seeing on the battlefield? You were not here
    when I discussed the fact that we are studying, right now, the
    four types of UAVs we have employed in Iraq. We are sending a
    team in there.
        When we looked at it across the board, we said the
    transformation piece of this is not so much the platform, it is
    more about seeing first, understanding first, and being able to
    act first. We came to the conclusion that we had some
    transformational technologies and some transformational changes
    in the way we set up our battle command systems to deal with
    these platforms and employ these platforms and that we would be
    okay.
        I believe that Comanche provided us a niche capability in
    2011 because of its low observable technology. I also believe
    that we will probably lose a lot of that advantage if we would
    try to optimize it for an active infrared (IR) threat that is
    getting bigger, which means we would only fly it at night.
    Because if the testing said if we put this active jamming
    system on this fuselage that was designed, and all of a sudden
    your radar cross-section balloons on you, we would probably
    have made the decision on that $50 million helicopter not to
    put the active jammers on, which would have driven us to not
    risking that aircraft in the daytime. Now, we really have a
    niche capability because we cannot fly the air/ground team 24
    hours a day.
        So, all these things came into play. I think we have it
    right. However, at the end of the day, today we had a problem,
    about $12.6 billion and it was going to be a problem in 2011 no
    matter what. That is how we came to the conclusions.
        Senator Lieberman. Let me focus on one part of that answer.
    It is the idea, the estimate, that the threat from infrared is
    rising more than from radar-guided missiles. I understand we
    faced that in Iraq and in Afghanistan. But we also, as I
    indicated earlier, faced the radio controlled and radar threat
    in Kosovo. My presumption was that in the more sophisticated
    conflict environments of the future, we would be more likely to
    face a threat from radar, as opposed to infrared or heat-
    seeking.
        So, I know I heard you set a date that the task force
    estimated that the greater threat would be from the infrared,
    sometime--what? 2015, did you say?
        General Cody. About 2015, look at the threat out there,
    because we are dealing with the suite of integrated radar
    frequency--we are bringing suite of integrated radio frequency
    countermeasures (SIRFC) on to deal with radar for our Special
    Operations Forces (SOF), as well as for the Apache and for the
    Black Hawk. So, we are concerned about the radar threat, and we
    are dealing with active and passive measures.
        But also, when you have radar missiles and radar systems,
    you have to turn them on. We have several very capable joint
    systems that we did not have 10 to 12 years ago in our sister
    Services to deal with these radar systems in a much better way
    than sending helicopters against them. That does not mean that
    helicopters will not have to deal with that threat here. We
    have money in the budget, taking a look at IR missiles and how
    we are going to deal with that, not only with the Apache but
    also with other aircraft systems.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes, that was my worry. I presume we
    want to maintain a deep attack function for the helicopters.
        General Cody. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. If we start to rely on some of the other
    joint systems, are we going to limit that function?
        General Cody. No. That is why the unit unmanned and manned
    teaming of UAVs and the different type of mission packages,
    Senator Lieberman, that we are going to put on our UAVs is
    going to help us with the survivability of our airframes in the
    future against a radar threat. I probably do not want to go
    much further than that, here. But that is one of the things we
    are looking at, as well as the systems we are going to put on.
        Let me just check. Colonel Rife is one of my smart guys.
        What are we doing with SIRFC right now?
        Senator Lieberman. Come on up so you are on the mike.
        General Cody. Yes. Just come right up here.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks.
        General Cody. He is also a great Army aviator.
        Colonel Rife. Sir, we have looked at the system, and we are
    continuing right now with the tech development. We are working
    with PM-AES to make sure that we sustain the tech base on it.
    We put enough in it to look at the A-kitting (software wiring)
    for the initial modernized aircraft airframes. But right now,
    the acceleration in the IR, as General Cody said, is a
    priority.
        Senator Lieberman. So the bottom line, again resource
    constraints, is it fair for me to conclude that we are putting
    considerably more money in the foreseeable future into
    defending against the IR threat than we are?
        Colonel Rife. Yes.
        General Cody. We are because of two reasons. One is because
    of the threat; but two, because the technology right now to get
    the systems to defeat the radar threat is just not there.
        Senator Lieberman. The best evidence that we have, to the
    extent that you want to testify to it in open session, is that
    the IR threat will be a greater threat in the years ahead, 5,
    10 years ahead rather than later?
        General Sinclair. Yes, sir; I think it is through the 2015
    time frame. We think that will definitely be the bigger threat.
    I know that we cannot use Afghanistan and Iraq as a sole basis
    because there are other threats out there. But as General Cody
    said, the ones that are there, we will have the joint
    interdependence with other forces, as we execute those
    missions.
        Senator Lieberman. Am I making a mistake in considering the
    IR threat to be less sophisticated than the radar? That is my
    nonprofessional view.
        General Sinclair. I think that is not a good assumption. I
    think the IR threat, especially when you look at some of the
    developments--the SA-18, for example, is a very capable system.
        Senator Lieberman. Right. Did you want to add anything,
    General?
        General Cody. I was going to say that I am very concerned
    about the sophisticated IR threat.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes.
        General Cody. I am real concerned about it. That is why we
    made this the number one thing. We are also doing other
    suppression and passive measures on all our fleet to deal with
    this IR threat above and beyond using active systems. I have
    seen the technology, and we are going to be bringing that
    forward here very quickly to our fleet.
        Senator Lieberman. Okay. Let me now pursue the question of
    how you intend to ensure that the almost $7 billion invested in
    Comanche is not lost. Let me focus on the parts of the programs
    that are salvageable. We have talked about some of them. But at
    the risk of--let me just do it. I want to mention some from
    your statement and ask what the plans are to keep them alive.
    This is the--``We anticipate multiple''--I am reading from the
    statement--``to horizontally integrate leading Comanche
    technologies in the current and planned programs. For example,
    we envision harvesting''--and I am going to read each of them
    off and ask you to tell me what the plans are at this point--
    the radar electronics unit.
        General Bergantz. Yes, sir. That is a program that the fire
    control radar on the Longbow Apache was depending on the
    Comanche to help miniaturize and make it a more reliable
    system. There presently are two boxes on the Apache program, a
    low-power RF box that generates a wave form and a programmable
    signal processor. Both boxes weigh about 80 pounds each.
        What Comanche was doing was consolidating those into one
    box and getting the weight down under 120 pounds. So, it was a
    pretty significant effort. It was making it on the same form
    factor, a two-level maintenance type of a system. It was a
    remove-and-replace-a-bad-card system that went into one of
    these centralized boxes on the Apache--pull it out; put in a
    new card; and then send the old card back to a depot somewhere.
        General Cody. The fire control computer is significant.
    One, it is able to pick up about 256 targets with a sweep to
    include radar-type targets if they are emitting and everything
    else. It also processes it and tells you--and you can
    prioritize it as a pilot. So, your first 16 priority targets
    will pop up on a screen.
        Longbow has that now. Comanche was going to have the
    Longbow radar. But as Joe said, they are a much smaller
    package, are more reliable and easier to maintain. We do not
    sacrifice that when we go to 501 Block III Longbows. You will
    have the capability to be able to pick these targets up,
    especially if they emit.
        Senator Lieberman. So, is part of the transfer of funding
    going to guarantee that transfer of technology to the Longbow?
        General Cody. Yes, sir.
        General Bergantz. Right.
        Senator Lieberman. That is in the budget now?
        General Cody. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. Okay. Let me go to the next: integrated
    communications navigation and identification avionics (ICNIA).
        General Bergantz. Yes, sir. The ICNIA system is a system
    that is akin to joint tactical radio system (JTRS) that the
    ground forces are working on. They were working for the JTRS
    for the rest of the aviation development work. What we intend
    to do there is to look both at the box itself, which once again
    is a reprogrammable radio that can transmit on 12 different
    channels, 7 of them simultaneously. So, it does the same sorts
    of things that JTRS does.
        We want to take a look at that and see which piece parts of
    that, if any, we can pull forward into the JTRS program; or
    perhaps this could even be a replacement for the JTRS, and we
    could get it sooner. We are taking a look at both options.
        Senator Lieberman. So again, is that money taken care of to
    carry out that transfer?
        General Bergantz. Right. What we left on the contract is
    through the end of fiscal year 2004, the money is to keep these
    efforts--these six that I mentioned, sir--going. Then, as we go
    through our deliberations and figure out which ones we want to
    carry forward to other platforms, we will take the tails and
    put into the other platforms.
        Senator Lieberman. So, the same for the radar warning
    receiver and the fly-by-wire technology?
        General Bergantz. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. How about the Comanche's Image
    Intensified Television (I2TV) system?
        General Bergantz. Right. That is another. The I-squared
    system, the image intensification system, was somewhat better
    on the Comanche, because it had taken and looked at some of the
    problems that the Apache had been dealing with, so it was
    solving those by putting in a new chip and so forth. That is
    migrate-able also to the Apache Block III helicopter.
        Senator Lieberman. I take it that you have funds committed
    to it to help migrate it?
        General Bergantz. I think it does right now.
        Senator Lieberman. Does it?
        General Bergantz. Through 2004 it does.
        General Cody. It does through 2004. As we deal with the
    Apache MTADS, which is the Modernized Target Acquisition
    Display System, and we look to upgrade the Apache, which we
    have money in, the Apache sensor suite. If this works, then we
    will put that in the Apache pilot navigation system, as well as
    the target acquisition system.
        Senator Lieberman. Let me go to a different part of the
    termination, which is: What is your range of estimate Comanche
    termination costs, which is obviously important to us generally
    in terms of the budget, but then important to the folks at
    Sikorsky and Boeing?
        General Bergantz. Yes, sir. Let me take a whack at that.
    Our budget this year was roughly about $880-some million. Of
    that, about $380 million of it was sunk cost, those that had
    already been logged, paid, and so forth. So, that left us about
    $530 million to finish out the remainder of where we were in
    the fiscal year when this happened.
        We had a $123 million special termination clause on the
    contract, which means that the Army has to be prepared to pay
    that, if it happened in the fiscal year at a sufficiently late
    time, where there was not enough money to draw out of the
    remaining funds. In this case, we believe there is sufficient
    money available to take it out of the remaining funds to pay
    the $123 million, which should be a cap of what the termination
    costs end up being, no more than that.
        So what happens now is, on May 18, we issued a termination
    for convenience letter to the prime contractors, Boeing and
    Sikorsky. It takes them a certain amount of time working with
    the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) folks to figure
    out what the bills are that have yet to be paid. Those include
    things like termination of long-lead parts that had been
    ordered, relocation fees for people to have to be moved around,
    severance pay, all those kinds of things.
        So, it is going to take them some time, and they have
    contractually up to a year to settle that. What we are trying
    to do now is figure out how we can accelerate that in some
    manner, so that we could possibly recoup some fiscal year 2004
    funds.
        Senator Lieberman. So again, the maximum range on that, by
    your estimate, would be?
        General Bergantz. I think right now I am saying we had $550
    million left. If you take the $123 million out, which we could
    have to pay up to that amount, there could be as much as $437
    million left. But right now, we are not counting on any of that
    money because it depends on how long this gets dragged out.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes.
        Senator Sessions. Was that contract? Was that $123 million
    part of the----
        General Bergantz. That is the special termination clause on
    the contract.
        Senator Sessions. In the contract?
        General Bergantz. In the contract, yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. You probably know that there are numbers
    floating around that are much higher than that, that go into
    the billions. Frankly, I mention them to you. I presume you
    have heard them. I am not in a position to be able to evaluate.
    But if you have heard them, when you hear them, what do you
    say?
        General Bergantz. I have not heard them, sir; but I will--
    if I hear them--I will tell them that is not accurate. Maybe I
    am misunderstanding it. We have $6.9 billion invested at----
        Senator Lieberman. Yes; understood.
        General Bergantz. That is true; we have spent that amount
    of money.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Bergantz. But to finish out the contract, we were
    incrementally funding it with research and development (R&D)
    funds every year. So, we are only obligated for what we have on
    this fiscal year 2004.
        Senator Lieberman. Is there a process for doing the kind of
    cost benefit analysis of subsystems regarding that termination
    cost? In other words, to evaluate how much has been spent to
    date and if, on a particular system, the termination costs get
    to be high enough that you begin to wonder whether it is worth
    going ahead and buying the system? Does the process allow for
    that?
        General Bergantz. Yes, sir. A couple of the efforts that we
    had talked about carrying forward fell into that neck of the
    woods. The T800 engine, we were very close to finishing up the
    FAA qualification on the 802 variant of that. So, it made
    sense. It was one of those kind of trades where you could
    finish up; you could terminate it, stop it right then, and it
    would cost like $12 million. Or you could spend maybe $10
    million to finish up the qualification work that was done, have
    the qualification, and convert that to a fixed price contract
    that would deliver us--I believe we are going to get 10
    engines.
        So, that is what we elected to do, actually keep that
    going, finish up, get a qualification out of it, get some
    engines out of it, and then be able to use those in the future,
    perhaps for a UAV or perhaps for one of these other systems
    that is being competed.
        Senator Lieberman. Just a last question on this round, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Again on the fixing Army aviation chart, this is a multi-
    year program. My question is: Does the Army have a commitment
    from OSD to maintain that additional funding for Army aviation
    requirements over that period of time?
        General Cody. Yes, sir. I briefed the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense, and I briefed the Secretary of Defense before we went
    to the President. We led off by saying this is about fixing
    Army aviation, not about canceling Comanche. We got a solid
    commitment from both the DOD leadership and the President, as
    well as from the Office of Mangement and Budget (OMB) when we
    went over and laid out what we wanted to do.
        But more importantly, inside the Army--because you know how
    we work budgets--I have signed a memorandum for record, with
    the Army's G8, that lays out the Army campaign plan through
    2010 where every bit of these dollars go. We have commitment
    from the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the
    Army. It takes a Chief of Staff of the Army decision that he
    probably has to take forward above him to move the money
    around. I do not believe that we will have problems retaining
    it. This is the first time I have seen that happen.
        But we understand the concerns. We are concerned because we
    know how we got here. There were trades made every year over 10
    or 12 years.
        Senator Lieberman. Okay. Thanks, gentlemen. I am going to
    yield back to Mr. Chairman. I have just a few more questions,
    whenever you are done.
        Senator Sessions. If you would like to go right now?
        Senator Lieberman. It is totally up to you.
        Senator Sessions. Please, finish up.
        Senator Lieberman. Okay. These are kind of offshoots of
    where we are now.
        Senator Sessions. I know this is an issue you have followed
    closely for a number of years.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. This is an opportunity to----
        Senator Lieberman. I have a load of questions. I am going
    to submit a lot of them in writing to you. But I do want to ask
    a few here.
        What are the operational implications of having three
    different attack helicopter models, for example, the logistical
    implications? I know you talked about shortening the logistical
    tail. But if we are going to have three Apache variants, and
    reconnaissance aircraft, and a new light utility helicopter, it
    sure looks like we are increasing the different kinds of
    helicopters that we have to support from the training base to
    the battlefield.
        General Cody. We have looked at it, Senator, and, quite
    frankly, we are going to end up with less mission design series
    when we get through this than we have right now, when you count
    the OH-58 Alpha, the OH-58 Charley, the UH-1, the Cobra, the A
    model Black Hawk, the L model Black Hawk, the M model Black
    Hawk, the Block I AH64 Apache Longbow and the different models
    of Chinooks. When we get onto this program, we are going to be
    able to reduce it.
        But more importantly, what we did was we structured--when
    we restructured--and this was a total restructuring of our
    footprint in Army aviation. The 58,000 soldiers that General
    Sinclair talked about are going to be in different formations.
    By being able to restructure, we think we have the aviation
    intermediate maintenance unit and the aviation unit maintenance
    unit set up in such a way that we are going to be able launch,
    recover, and launch again these airframes much better than we
    are doing right now.
        Would it be nice to have a pure fleet of attack helicopters
    that could do everything?
        Senator Lieberman. Sure.
        General Cody. That is why we are putting money into the
    joint multi-role helicopter, so we can take a look. Would it be
    nice to have a Black Hawk that could do all of the missions?
    Yes. But the Black Hawk, in the case to the light utility
    helicopter (LUH), is a more expensive aircraft than we need to
    have out flying around at the National Training Center. We need
    one, but not a Black Hawk, because it is pretty expensive, as
    well as for the raid mission in homeland security.
        So, we think we are doing the right thing. I will defer to
    General Sinclair on the training piece because he is the one
    that has to train the fleet.
        General Sinclair. Senator, it will obviously be a challenge
    with the number of aircraft. But again, as General Cody said,
    the way we restructured our maintenance into two-level
    maintenance and combining some of the functions, we have worked
    very hard to establish a new maintenance structure that can
    operate across that full gamut of these different types of
    aircraft.
        Also, we have put several, I think $293 million, into
    providing the right sets, kits, and outfits to maintain these
    aircraft, which we never invested in the proper way we should
    have before. So, that will be a big improvement, also.
        On the light utility helicopter, that is going to be FAA-
    certified parts and commercially maintained. So, I think that
    actually is one we will out-source and have maintained, get the
    parts through a commercial source. So, the maintenance burden
    of that will be very light.
        Senator Lieberman. Let me ask just the last couple of
    questions, which in some ways comes from the last one I asked
    about the joint multi-role helicopter program. What is the
    developmental time-line that the Army has in mind for this? At
    this point, obviously, this is concept now. What missions would
    such an aircraft perform and what helicopters would it replace?
        General Cody. First, the money, Senator, I think goes in,
    in 2008, our portion. It is concept right now. All new systems
    in DOD have to be born joint through the Joint Requirements
    Operation Capabilities Board. We are talking about the time
    frame of probably development starting in 2015, as the
    replacement for the Black Hawk, and the attack helicopter.
        In the special operations regiment, which I used to
    command, you have the Black Hawk, the K model, that does the
    assault. But we also have the defense armed penetrator that
    does the attack role. It was not designed that way from the
    get-go. We probably would have saved a lot of money had we
    designed it up front to be multi-role.
        So, there are some of the things we are looking at. That is
    one airframe for light--or not light but assault and attack.
    Then for the joint arena--the other joint program is the heavy-
    lift joint aircraft that we are looking at. There, we do know
    that there is great interest by the Navy, the Marines, as well
    as us, for a replacement of the CH-47, again in about the 2020
    time frame, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. Maybe I missed it, but is there a stated
    interest in the other Services in the joint multi-role
    helicopter at this point?
        General Cody. I believe the Marines--let me take that for
    the record, sir, so I can be more accurate with you. I know we
    have discussed it. OSD clearly has interest and I have talked
    to Mr. Wynne. There is interest there, however, we have not
    culled this out between the Services. I need to take that for
    the record and get back to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Current interest in the joint multi-role helicopter is limited. The
    Joint Warfighting Concepts will define the requirements for the next
    generation of attack, reconnaissance, utility, and heavy lift
    helicopters. We are still very early in the stages of defining the
    requirement for this type of helicopter. As we continue to outline our
    helicopter requirements for the future both in the attack/
    reconnaissance roles and heavy lift support we see growing interest
    from other Services. Clearly both we and the Marine Corps will require
    similar capabilities in a future multi-role helicopter.

        Senator Lieberman. That is fine.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all of you. Look, these are
    tough decisions. There is a lot on the line. I asked them
    because we have the same goals here. I want to make sure that
    we achieve them in the best way for the Army and for the
    country. So, I thank all three of you. I look forward to
    continuing the conversations. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Very good. Talking about the Black Hawk,
    has the decision to buy LUHs for the National Guard impacted
    your Black Hawk requirements?
        General Cody. No, sir. In the formations the National Guard
    will have, as I showed you, they will have 30 Black Hawks in
    their assault formations. What the LUHs are going to enable us
    to do with the National Guard is, by putting the first 140-
    some-odd that we buy, displace Black Hawks that are in our
    tables, our TDA outfits, like the national training centers,
    our MEDEVAC, and be able to displace those Black Hawks that are
    being used right now for the warfight and cascade them to fill
    the National Guard formations.
        The rest of the LUHs will be replaced in the OH-58 A and C
    RAID craft. So, that is what it does to assist us to do that.
    Also, we think it optimizes them for the homeland security and
    homeland defense mission sets with the right sized aircraft.
        Senator Sessions. General Bergantz, from what I understand,
    the Army intends to upgrade and recapitalize a number of
    existing UH-60A Black Hawks to the model M, as well as rebuild
    the remainder of the A models, but that they will not be
    upgraded. Last year, because of development and production
    issues, Congress worked with the Army to restructure the
    program and transfer the $100 million from procurement to RDT&E
    and delay the program by 1 year. It appears that the Army is
    prepared to move forward with the program.
        Do you believe this program is now ready to enter
    production?
        General Bergantz. Yes, Senator Sessions. There are
    different pieces of the program. There are 193 A model Black
    Hawks that we intend to recapitalize, bring them in and put new
    parts on them and all that sort of thing, but not make them
    into L models. Now eventually, over time, they will start to
    come back in on the back end of the A and L to M model
    remanufacture line up in Connecticut; that will happen.
        But in order to keep their half-life at around 10 years, we
    intend to do these 193 aircraft at the Corpus Christi Army
    depot to refresh them and keep them going. Then the remainder
    of the aircraft, about 988 A models, those are our older
    aircraft. Those would start to go into the A to M remanufacture
    line first. Then L models would go in later, and we will start
    to remanufacture those into Ms.
        To get up to our final requirement of Black Hawks, we will
    have to buy probably another 80 or so new M models. We are in
    the process of buying new L models right now. As General Cody
    pointed out on the chart he showed you there, we were going to
    buy an additional plus 90 roughly more Black Hawks into all
    this.
        Senator Sessions. The amended budget request adds Comanche
    funding to the UH-60M. I think you have answered that.
        Let me ask a little bit more about the UAVs. You had your
    chart, and it had a dotted line for the UAV out there?
        General Cody. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. So, we are not real sure where that is.
    First of all, what role would you see a UAV play?
        General Cody. Sir, first, that dotted line is because we
    are expediting the fielding of the Shadow 200 UAV baseline to
    every brigade combat team that is in combat. Over time, once we
    continue the fielding of 41 baseline systems, which is what I
    believe we are fielding to the aviation brigade commander will
    have his two platoons of UAVs. They may be as big as the
    Shadow. That is what this team is going to go over and assess.
        The role of that UAV platoons will be to go out in front of
    the aircraft, conduct screen missions, reconnaissance missions,
    communications relay missions on deep attacks, as well as other
    types of missions that will enhance the aviation brigade
    commander's ability to mix and match his attack and
    reconnaissance systems. I envision a UAV on an air assault to
    be able to clear the route or to do other things and make
    people think that is the route we are using. There are all
    types of mission sets that we intend to use the UAV for.
        Would you like to discuss it?
        General Sinclair. Sure. That is just on the aviation side.
    We are looking at UAVs for logistical resupply for possible
    MEDEVAC missions. So, we are looking across. We are truly doing
    a holistic look at every conceivable way that we could use UAVs
    in the future, but as General Cody said, I think
    reconnaissance, attack, radio relay are the primary ones, with
    the reconnaissance being primary for the immediate future. In a
    manned/unmanned team, it really becomes critical as we tie that
    with our aircraft.
        Senator Sessions. Where will that training take place?
        General Sinclair. The initial manned/unmanned training, we
    are anticipating, will take place at Fort Rucker. We have a
    restricted airspace just to the northwest by Troy; I think I
    showed you on the map one time. So, that will be the manned/
    unmanned.
        The individual UAV pilot training right now is still
    scheduled to continue at Fort Huachuca because of their space
    limitations.
        Senator Sessions. What about the opportunity to work
    jointly on this? Where are we on that?
        General Cody. We are working jointly now on UAVs. The Air
    Force has deployed four of the Predator B systems in support of
    General Sanchez and General Abizaid. So we are using the sensor
    suite for whatever missions the commanders in the field need
    over there. We are looking at some of the other UAVs that the
    Marines are using. We are teamed with the Navy on the Fire
    Scout UAV and we are looking at that.
        But in the joint world, what we are really looking at is
    the sensor suite and the ability to pass the situational
    awareness and situational understanding that the UAV brings to
    the whole joint team. That is being dictated to us by the joint
    requirements boards.
        So, when we talk about ``jointness'' in terms of systems,
    it is not really the platform. It is the sensor suite and how
    it can send you through data links to the ground commander, or
    to an aircraft, or to a Navy fighter, or to a Marine fighter,
    or whatever. That is the over-arching battle command
    architecture that the sensor suite will be able to ride on and
    pass that information.
        Senator Sessions. Do you expect to be able to coordinate a
    JDAM with a UAV immediately? Will that be an instantaneous
    virtual communication?
        General Cody. We have the capability right now, Mr.
    Chairman, to check, identify, and to do that. We have that
    capability. Have we trained to it? Have we practiced to it? No.
    That is part of what the assessment team we are sending over
    will be able to do.
        The same is for Army UAVs. We are going to put some Viper
    Strike on our Hunter UAVs. General Metz, the commander of III
    Corps at CJTF-7, has requested and is sending an operational
    needs statement to us. We have 25 of the Viper Strike weapons
    that we are ready to put onto our Hunter UAVs, which is very
    similar to what the Air Force is doing with our Hellfires on
    their Predator Bs. So, we have that capability and that
    technology now, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Briefly, the fixed wing aircraft, we
    understand that the Army intends to initiate a CXX cargo fixed-
    wing procurement to address shortfalls in the intra-theater
    lift identified during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Have you
    consulted with the Air Force? Is that not primarily an Air
    Force requirement? What is your thinking on that issue?
        General Sinclair. Sir, we have studied that very
    extensively, especially based on the optempo that was required
    on especially our CH-47s. I will just use the example from
    Mosul, Iraq, to Kuwait which was 1,200 kilometers. We were
    sending four Chinooks a day just to haul supplies back and
    forth because of the availability of intra-theater airlift.
        There has been discussions with the Air Force on this
    capability. It is seen as a niche capability for the Army, a
    limited capability to provide the intra-theater airlift for
    sustainment operations for a short-term duration, especially
    early on in operations as the Air Force will continue to flow
    forces into theater.
        Senator Sessions. Is this a decision basically because
    someone has decided that intra-theater lift is an Army
    responsibility? Or is it that the Air Force capabilities do not
    fit the demand you have?
        General Cody. We have the Sherpa now, Mr. Chairman, 40 of
    them. What we have, though, is we have 40 aircraft that of
    course were not designed for the aircraft survivability. Of
    course, we only have so many Chinooks and this is the scenario
    that General Sinclair talked to you about, where you have maybe
    one or two pallets worth of critical stuff for the Army, but
    certainly not critical enough to tie up an entire C-130. That
    is why we say it is a niche capability.
        It has to have short takeoff and landing capability because
    of denied access and stuff like that, where we will be putting
    our combat teams. So, when we took a look at--and we have had
    several studies that said we need it, very similar to the way
    we needed the Caribou and other assets we had in Vietnam, and
    then when we looked at the additional homeland security
    requirements of moving RAID teams around and other assets that
    the National Guard would come up with in support of their
    homeland security mission, we saw this as an aircraft bigger
    than the Sherpa but smaller than the C-130.
        So, that is where we started shaping and taking a look at
    the optempo of more modular forces, more dispersed about the
    battlefield. As we did that, we kept coming up with a shortfall
    where our Chinooks and our Black Hawks could not carry it. We
    would be in areas where you could not put a C-130 in. Nor would
    you want to because of the size of the C-130, for some of the
    critical stuff that we would haul through these formations we
    had. It is a niche capability but one that we need.
        Senator Sessions. There is no doubt that an Army or Marine
    combat unit has needs, often times immediate needs. Maybe they
    are not huge but they are critical to their munitions or their
    communication systems that you have to get in there.
        What about the Marine Corps CH-53X units of heavy lift
    program? Has an analysis of alternatives been done? Do you
    anticipate doing that to work through how to get what you need
    to the warfighter?
        General Cody. Yes, sir. That will be done by the joint
    requirements process. As we work our initial capabilities
    documents through, they will do an alternative analysis look
    across the joint force before the approval of our requirements
    documents. It will go through that lens.
        Senator Sessions. Very good.
        Senator Lieberman. Mr. Chairman, I have asked all the
    questions that I wanted to ask.
        Senator Sessions. We are going to have some written
    questions that we will submit to you for sure. But we thank all
    of you for your service. I know the Comanche was a tough call.
    Somebody had to make it soon or you could not go on much
    longer. So, you have made that. It certainly has been saleable
    to a lot of us in the sense that we did not know where we were
    going to get the money to do the things that you needed to do
    to modernize the fleet and to enhance it. But at the same time,
    we know we lost something in capability. We hope, and I trust
    your judgment, that it is not a major loss in capability. In
    fact, the overall plan will enhance our effectiveness.
        Thank you for your testimony.
        If there is nothing further, we are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

      Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions and Senator Joseph I.
                                   Lieberman

                              COMANCHE TECHNOLOGY

        1. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody and General
    Bergantz, the Comanche termination follows by less than a year a
    decision by the Army to restructure the program. Since the restructure,
    it appeared that the program was on track and capable of delivering a
    helicopter. What actions do you intend to take to ensure that the $6.9
    billion invested in Comanche to date is not completely wasted? For
    instance, the Comanche's well-tested engine is a prime candidate for
    use in a forthcoming armed reconnaissance or light utility helicopter
    (LUH) variant, isn't it?
        General Cody and General Bergantz. The Defense and Army acquisition
    executives directed the Comanche project manager to evaluate the
    Comanche technologies under development and recommend continuance of
    the ones that are affordable and transferable. To determine which
    technologies are candidates for continuation the project manager
    identified objective systems that could use selected technologies, and
    determine the short term (fiscal year 2004) and long term (2005 and
    beyond) continuation/integration costs to complete the development and
    integration for that objective system. Finally, the project manager
    must coordinate with the user to determine the priority of the
    particular capability to determine overall affordability. The project
    manager recommended and received approval from the Army acquisition
    executive for continuation of identified technologies.
        The Comanche engine for use in the light utility helicopter is not
    a good example, the contractor, LHTEC, has self-terminated his effort.
    The government is currently working to settle this contract and issue a
    formal termination notice.

        2. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody and General
    Bergantz, are there any parts of the program that are salvageable and
    transferable to other Army aviation programs? Please provide a list of
    Comanche technologies you expect to migrate to other platforms by
    platform and the anticipated date for incorporating the technology.
        General Cody and General Bergantz. The following technologies will
    be transferred to other Army aviation platforms:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 System               Receiving Platform         Date
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Radar Electronics Unit..........  Apache............  1st quarter fiscal
                                                           year 2005
    Image Intensification TV........  Apache............  1st quarter fiscal
                                                           year 2005
    Fly-by-Wire.....................  Apache and Black    2nd quarter fiscal
                                       Hawk.               year 2005
    Communications Antennae.........  Across the
                                       aviation fleet.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        3. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody and General
    Bergantz, what other technologies do you believe you can return to the
    technological base for further development and possibly future
    application?
        General Cody and General Bergantz. We do not currently have any
    technologies identified for transfer to the technology base. The
    acquisition development process requires that each technology funded in
    the systems and technology funding lines must achieve a certain level
    of technological maturity before being integrated on a development
    platform. All technologies used in the Comanche were developed,
    validated, and prioritized into the Comanche program. Some of these
    technologies will transfer to other aviation platforms, but all the
    technologies on the Comanche are too mature to be returned to the tech
    base.

        4. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody and General
    Bergantz, what is the process for doing so, and what level of funding
    has been allocated for that purpose?
        General Cody and General Bergantz. The project manager coordinated
    with all Program Executive Office (PEO) aviation project managers,
    identified technologies that were at the proper maturity level, and
    aligned with candidate platform mission requirements. These
    technologies were funded through fiscal year 2004 by the Comanche
    program. Fiscal year 2005 funding must be provided by the gaining
    platform. Also, the Comanche project manager held a technology fair at
    Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. He invited all other system managers to this
    event and briefed them on the technologies of Comanche that were
    available. The project manager also briefed the Deputy Assistant
    Secretary for Science and Technology on all available technologies for
    his consideration. No specific funding was allocated for continuation
    of technologies beyond fiscal year 2004; the Comanche budget for fiscal
    year 2005 and beyond was redistributed to other aviation program
    entirely. These programs will fund the continuation of technologies
    that they inherit.

        5. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody and General
    Bergantz, please provide a list of those Comanche technologies that
    will not be migrated to other platforms and the reason why these
    technologies cannot be migrated to other platforms.
        General Cody and General Bergantz. There were many unique
    technologies being developed for Comanche. Most of them are not being
    transferred due to the high cost of integration into a system for which
    they were not designed, and others are not a high enough priority for
    an existing system. Some of the more significant technologies not being
    transferred include:

             The Comanche passive low observability technology will
            not be transferred. The reduced radar cross section and low
            infrared signature features are not economically transferable
            to existing platforms.
             Regenerative nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
            filters (pressure swing absorber) in the environmental control
            system is not being continued because existing and planned
            aircraft either do not have environmental control systems or
            they are not compatible with a regenerative filter of this
            type.
             270 volt DC electrical power system including the all-
            electronic control system (no mechanical circuit breakers) is
            not being continued because existing and expected new systems
            will have conventional electro-mechanical systems of either 28
            volt DC or 115 volt AC primary power systems.
             Advanced composite structures development is not being
            continued because all the (new) Army aircraft are expected to
            have metal structures.
             Subsystems power unit/APU is not being continued
            because this type of power unit that operates continuously
            during flight is not used on other systems.
             Composite rotor hub and blades development will not be
            continued because no existing or new system is expected to use
            composite dynamic components except for blades that already
            exist on some systems.
             Fault detection/fault isolation (FD/FI) is not being
            continued because current aircraft electronic architectures do
            not support this capability and none of the new aircraft
            systems are expected to be able to support it at the levels
            planned for Comanche.
             Wide field of view (FOV) helmet mounted display system
            and wide FOV night vision pilotage system are not being
            continued because other systems do not have a 52-degree FOV as
            does Comanche. Changing the other systems to a wider FOV would
            not be practical due to extensive redesign/cost.

        6. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody and General
    Bergantz, do you have a process for determining whether it makes more
    sense to complete the development of certain subsystems vice paying the
    termination costs? For example, we understand that $77 million has been
    spent to date developing the subsystem power unit (SPU) which provides
    electrical and hydraulic power to mission essential systems, including
    to the environmental control system that provides nuclear, biological,
    and chemical protection, rather than paying termination costs for
    approximately $10 million and 1 year of work that SPU could be
    qualified and available for corporation into a variety of military
    applications.
        General Cody and General Bergantz. Yes. The project management
    office and the prime contractor reviewed all major developers to
    determine the current status of their development, the requirement
    within Army aviation for their specific technology, and the cost to
    continue their effort compared to the cost of termination. The decision
    to continue or terminate was based on the following:

            1. The development activity of a technology was continued if
            the technology was to be migrated to another aviation platform
            and funding for migration was available.
            2. The development activity of a technology was continued if
            the cost to complete a given contract was less than costs
            associated with termination.

        If one of the above criteria were not satisfied, the effort was
    terminated.

                           APACHE ATTACK HELICOPTERS

        7. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Sinclair, is the
    Apache now intended to be a multi-role helicopter and also do
    reconnaissance missions?
        General Sinclair. The Apache attack helicopter was designed and
    fielded to fill the Army's attack helicopter requirements. It continues
    to perform well in that role in combat operations around the world.
    Reconnaissance is a mission that is performed by every soldier in
    today's Army and from that reference point Apache crews do perform
    reconnaissance; however, the aircraft was designed primarily for the
    attack mission profile. There are not a sufficient number of Apache
    helicopters to fill both attack and reconnaissance roles. Procurement
    of the Block III Apache for a multi-role versus a more affordable
    reconnaissance platform would quickly prove to be a cost prohibitive
    plan.

        8. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Sinclair, how
    does this change the requirement for reconnaissance helicopters?
        General Sinclair. The Apache attack helicopter does not change the
    need for a reconnaissance platform. There is documentation going back
    to the 1981-1982 Army Aviation Mission Area Analysis culminating in
    Defense Planning Guidance 2004 Studies reflecting a critical shortfall
    in Army aviation's ability to conduct the armed recon mission. The OH-
    58D Kiowa Warrior, developed and fielded in the 1980s was an interim,
    partial solution to bridge recon capabilities until the Comanche
    helicopter was fielded. With the termination of Comanche a significant
    capabilities gap in manned aerial armed recon continues to exist as the
    OH-58D reaches the end of system life expectancy. The Army intends to
    fill this gap with the light-armed reconnaissance helicopter.

        9. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody, General
    Bergantz, and General Sinclair, while it is impossible to have the
    entire Army--active and Reserve--in completely modernized aircraft, one
    would think that, in the interest of ``plug and play'' modularity,
    there should not be widely differing capabilities among them. However,
    that will be the case with three different versions of the Apache. Why
    would you not choose to upgrade all attack helicopters to a similar
    Longbow configuration, even if less capable than the Block III, in the
    interest of standardization, modularity, and pure fleeting, vice
    upgrading only one third of the fleet to the Block III configuration?
        General Cody, General Bergantz, and General Sinclair. The Block III
    Apache Longbow is the configuration that is compatible with the Army's
    Future Force. The current aviation transformation plan has programmed
    the upgrade of the entire 501 AH-64D aircraft fleet from Block I and II
    aircraft to Block III. The first increment will transform 284 Block I
    aircraft to Block III from 2007 through 2012. This initiative reduces
    the number of Apache aircraft configurations from three to two.

        10. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody, General
    Bergantz, and General Sinclair, what are the operational and logistical
    implications of three different attack helicopter models? How would it
    affect the modularity concept?
        General Cody, General Bergantz, and General Sinclair. The current
    logistical implications of three different attack helicopter models are
    inherently expensive and cumbersome to manage. It requires intense
    management for the Army to successfully implement the modularity
    concept dictated by the Army Campaign Plan. The biggest single factor
    that drives the Army to pursue Block III is to provide an affordable
    attack platform that remains relevant to the Army in the Future Force.
    Apache is scheduled to implement open system architecture (OSA) on the
    Block III model. If OSA is not implemented the obsolescence costs
    associated with keeping Block I/II aircraft relevant to the future
    force are anticipated to be cost prohibitive.

        11. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody, General
    Bergantz, and General Sinclair, conversely, what are the implications
    for aviation in the network-centric future force if only 284 Apache
    Longbows are upgraded to the digital Block III configuration?
        General Cody, General Bergantz, and General Sinclair. The current
    Army campaign plan upgrades all AH-64D aircraft to a Block III
    configuration. If only 284 attack aircraft are upgraded it will limit
    the number of attack battalions available to integrate with the future
    force. This would hamper the ability of the Army's attack fleet to
    participate in simultaneous operations around the world.

                           LIGHT UTILITY HELICOPTERS

        12. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody, General
    Bergantz, and General Sinclair, we understand the Army will procure the
    LUH in fiscal year 2005 and will field it to the Army National Guard
    units to displace UH-60s. What is the Army requirement for an LUH?
        General Cody, General Bergantz, and General Sinclair. The Army has
    a requirement for 322 LUHs that will be procured fiscal year 2005-2011.
    The Army National Guard (ARNG) will receive 204 LUHs and 118 will go to
    active component (AC) units. In the ARNG, the LUH will displace 60 UH-
    1s, 125 OH-58NCs and provide a growth of 19 aircraft above current
    structure. The 118 LUHs going to the AC will displace 23 UH-60s
    currently supporting the National Training Center and the Joint
    Readiness Training Center, 77 UH-1s and 18 OH-58A/Cs.

        13. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody, General
    Bergantz, and General Sinclair, what role will the LUH play and what
    missions will it perform?
        General Cody, General Bergantz, and General Sinclair. The LUH is
    being procured to replace Vietnam era UH-1 and OH-58 aircraft scheduled
    for retirement in the fiscal year 2004-2005 time frame. The Army is
    retaining limited numbers of these legacy aircraft as a bridge to
    continue support for continental United States (CONUS) missions and
    limited roles in Europe. The LUH will perform medical evacuation
    (MEDEVAC) missions at the Army's three national training centers, Fort
    Rucker and in the four ARNG MEDEVAC companies with ``generating force''
    mission designated to backfill CONUS-based AC UH-60 MEDEVAC units at
    State-side installations. The ARNG will use the LUH to perform
    reconnaissance missions in support of CONUS counterdrug operations and
    other homeland security` requirements. In addition to MEDEVAC, the AC
    will use the LUH to provide general aviation support to the national
    training centers in both CONUS and Europe, as well as supporting
    research and development activities at our test centers in locations
    such as White Sands Missile Range and Aberdeen Proving Grounds.

        14. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody, General
    Bergantz, and General Sinclair, does the Army plan to deploy the LUH on
    contingencies, and, if so, how does it fit in the new modularity
    concept?
        General Cody, General Bergantz, and General Sinclair. The Army is
    studying the potential of deploying the LUH for contingencies in a
    permissive environment. An example of a permissive environment would be
    humanitarian assistance to a Central or South American nation. As part
    of the modular concept, the Army increased its total UH-60 requirement
    from 1,680 to 1,806 aircraft in order to support all of its wartime
    contingency needs. The Army used funds from the Comanche program to
    accelerate the procurement of 90 additional UH-60s to meet these
    requirements. The Army's robust UH-60 fleet eliminates the need to
    deploy LUH to hostile environments. There are 144 LUH aircraft in the
    ARNG that are included in the Army's new modular structure. These
    aircraft are in the reconnaissance and security battalions of the six
    ARNG division designated specifically for homeland security missions.
    If feasible, these are the LUHs that the Army may deploy in support of
    operations in permissive environments.

        15. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody, General
    Bergantz, and General Sinclair, what are the operational and logistical
    implications of deploying LUHs?
        General Cody, General Bergantz, and General Sinclair. The Army is
    studying the requirements for and implications of deploying the LUH for
    contingencies in a permissive environment. One of the expectations of a
    permissive environment is that the Army will have access to the same
    levels of commercial logistical support used to sustain the LUH fleet
    in the CONUS.

        16. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody, General
    Bergantz, and General Sinclair, why would it not make more sense to buy
    additional Black Hawk helicopters vice yet one more platform?
        General Cody, General Bergantz, and General Sinclair. The Army has
    increased its total requirement for Black Hawk helicopters from 1,680
    to 1,806 and is accelerating procurement of these aircraft to meet all
    of its deployable wartime contingency requirements. The UH-60 exceeds
    the capabilities necessary to perform the CONUS and European based LUH
    missions. The LUH offers much lower procurement and operating costs
    while meeting or exceeding mission requirements. The Army views LUH as
    a prudent and economical option to meet our homeland security, training
    and testing requirements, enabling the Army to focus its more capable
    Black Hawk fleet on wartime missions.

                            UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

        17. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody, we
    understand the Army is deploying the Improved GNAT (I-GNAT) unmanned
    aerial vehicle (UAV) to Iraq this week. As you are well aware, the Army
    version of the I-GNAT is a Predator UAV without the satellite over-the-
    horizon communications capability. One of the lessons learned from
    Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is that the Army needs a beyond line-of-
    sight capability in its UAVs. If that is indeed correct, why not equip
    the Army I-GNAT with that capability (from what we understand is a
    quick fix since the aircraft comes pre-wired for an airborne satellite
    capability) or look at acquiring the Predator B which carries 3,000
    pounds external weapons or sensor payload and has beyond line-of-sight
    communications capability? This platform would be an excellent addition
    to the U.S. Army aviation inventory.
        General Cody. For clarification, the I-GNAT is not an Army
    ``program of record.'' In fiscal year 2003 the Army was provided a
    congressional plus-up of $10 million for the purpose of procuring an I-
    GNAT system in order to develop the tactics, techniques and procedures
    (TTPs) essential for the Extended-Range/Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) UAV
    program. Because of increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and demand
    for UAV capability in OIF, the Army deployed the I-GNAT to complement
    the Hunter UAV unit from V Corps that arrived in theater to replace two
    Hunter units, which re-deployed from theater and were being reset. This
    I-GNAT system (three air vehicles operated primarily by contractors)
    complements the V Corps Hunter unit, which is in theater now. According
    to the Project Manager (PM) UAV, the cost to integrate a satellite
    communication (SATCOM) capability in the I-GNAT system, which the Army
    procured with the fiscal year 2003 congressional plus-up, would be
    $11.3 million; this would double the cost of the system. A beyond line-
    of-sight communications link is one of the requirements in the ER/MP
    Operational Requirements Document (ORD), which was approved by the Army
    Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) in December 2003. The Army's
    intent is to run a ``best-value'' competition for ER/MP and we expect
    the Predator to be one of the systems to participate in this
    competition. The Army's next UAV in this class will have a beyond line-
    of-sight capability. The Army believes that a competition is an
    essential part of the acquisition strategy.

                      JOINT MULTI-ROLE HELICOPTER PROGRAM

        18. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody and
    General Sinclair, we understand the Army intends to initiate a program
    to develop a joint multi-role helicopter. The Marine Corps is committed
    to the V-22 and has initiated a CH-53X heavy lift helicopter program.
    Why do you think the Marine Corps would be interested in a joint multi-
    role helicopter? Have you had any discussions with Marine Corps
    officials concerning such an aircraft?
        General Cody and General Sinclair. The Marine Corps V-22 is a troop
    transport aircraft, while the CH-53X is a cargo transport aircraft. The
    joint multi-role helicopter that the Army envisions would be designed
    to provide a single system to accomplish reconnaissance, and attack
    currently performed by Kiowa, and Apache in the Army, and the Super-
    Cobra in the Marine Corps. The concept is to develop multi-service
    requirements and capabilities, and optimize the platform and mission
    equipment package design with state-of-the-art weapons, sensors, and
    survivability equipment to provide a common multi-role platform for the
    Services to conduct these missions. While we have not communicated
    directly with the Marine Corps, we have worked with the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense on a joint rotorcraft roadmap for future
    development.

        19. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody and
    General Sinclair, what developmental time line is the Army considering
    for the joint multi-role helicopter?
        General Cody and General Sinclair. Currently we are planning on
    initiation of joint multi-role helicopter program in fiscal year 2009.
    Our expectation is a 5-year development (SDD) followed by a 5-year
    production and deployment period. However, these are very rough
    planning timeframes. A more accurate timeline will be developed when we
    have an approved set of requirements on which to base our planning.

        20. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody and
    General Sinclair, conceptually, what missions would such an aircraft
    perform, and what existing helicopters would it replace?
        General Cody and General Sinclair. We are still in the conceptual
    stages of this program and do not have a current validated requirement
    for the joint multi-role helicopter. However, we do envision an
    aircraft capable of performing both the attack and reconnaissance
    missions in all operational environments. We see an aircraft equipped
    and designed to conduct security type of operations as we see today in
    Iraq or if needed conduct attack operations as we witnessed during the
    early stages of the war by the 101st Air Assault Division. Eventually,
    we see this aircraft replacing the AH-64, the Marine Corps Cobra, and
    our armed reconnaissance helicopters.

        21. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody and
    General Sinclair, does the Army now have any renewed interest in a
    Joint Transport Rotorcraft?
        General Cody and General Sinclair. The Army has conducted a study
    on the employment of the future force that requires the aerial movement
    of forces to operational depths. We envision a Joint Transport
    Rotorcraft as one of the options to accomplish this mission. The Army
    currently has the Air Maneuver and Transport operational requirements
    document (ORD) in staffing which potentially could be a solution to
    this requirement.

                                LOGISTICAL TAIL

        22. Senator Sessions and Senator Lieberman. General Cody, in your
    written statement you say your plan shortens the logistical tail.
    However, it would appear that three Apache variants, yet another
    reconnaissance aircraft, and new light utility aircraft, in fact,
    increase the different types of helicopters you have to support from
    the training base to the battlefield. It seems that this aviation plan
    would lengthen the logistical tail if the Army deploys all of those
    types of helicopters. Why do you say it would shorten the logistical
    tail?
        General Cody. Presently there are three variants of the Apache: the
    AH-64A models (primarily located in the Army National Guard) and two
    variants of the Longbow (Block I and II configurations). The Army plans
    to upgrade all Longbows to the Block III variant. This will reduce the
    total Apache variants to two: the AH-64A models in the Army National
    Guard and Block III Longbows primarily in the active component. The new
    reconnaissance helicopter will retire the Vietnam-era OH-58D Kiowa
    Warrior, reducing logistics requirements for scout aircraft. The LUH
    program will be a low-cost, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) procurement
    that the Army plans to sustain using Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)
    certified parts. The aircraft will be used for administrative and
    training center support, medical evacuation, and homeland security
    missions. As such, it is designed for deployments within the United
    States and limited to other deployments in permissive, non-hostile
    environments. The Army plans to procure 322 LUH in order to retire 880
    OH-58A and UH-1 helicopters and, in doing so, significantly reduce our
    logistic requirements. Our long-term Aviation Logistic (AVLOG)
    Transformation Strategy is a holistic approach that seeks to reduce the
    aviation logistics tail by transitioning from the current maintenance
    intense system to a proactive condition based maintenance (CBM)
    approach by fiscal year 2015. This transition to CBM is a multifaceted
    approach, which employs multiple tenants such as commonality,
    technology integration, automation, retooling, and restructuring units
    for modular maintenance support. Details of the AVLOG transformation
    include plans to pursue a common engine for its Apache and Black Hawk
    helicopter fleets, a common avionics architecture system (CAAS) cockpit
    for its Chinook and Black Hawk fleets, plus integrate fly-by-wire
    technology and improved drive train technologies into future aircraft
    fleets. This commonality will reduce the variety of spares required on
    the battlefield and reduce strategic transportation requirements. In
    addition, the Army is capitalizing on advancements in technology.
    Beginning in fiscal year 2005 the Army will field a new standardized
    Aviation Maintenance Management Information System and system
    architecture to aviation units. This enhanced Unit Level Logistics
    System-Aviation (ULLS-A) version 6, will be fielded to units
    commensurate with transformation to the Multifunctional Aviation
    Brigade (MFAB) structure. ULLS-A will bridge the technology gap pending
    release of the Global Combat Support System-Army, scheduled for 4th
    quarter, fiscal year 2008.
        The Program Executive Office-Aviation has teamed with the Program
    Manager, Digital Source Collection (DSC) to integrate cockpit voice
    recorders and flight data recorders, as well as health usage monitoring
    systems (HUMS) capable of providing embedded diagnostics and
    prognostics on aircraft platforms. The application of HUMS will provide
    valuable aircraft flight regime and usage data enabling the U.S. Army
    Materiel Command's, Research, Development and Engineering Command
    (RDECOM) to develop appropriate component replacement timelines, that
    will enable item managers to better forecast when and where parts are
    need. We are resourcing the aviation classification repair activity
    depots to support the National Maintenance Program. This initiative
    invests $84 million in fiscal year 2005-2006 in the procurement of
    depot level repair tools to increase the Army National Guard aviation
    classification repair activity depots (AVCRADs) repair capability in
    both peacetime and war. Additionally, we are restructuring Army
    aviation with robust modular aviation maintenance organizations. We are
    reorganizing aviation maintenance organizations from the current three
    levels of maintenance, which employs redundant echelons of pass-back
    aviation maintenance, to tailored, more robust and mobile aviation
    maintenance units. This modular maintenance concept allocates
    personnel, tools, and equipment resources where they are most
    effective. This change will result in two echelons of robust aviation
    maintenance consisting of a field and sustainment echelon. The field
    echelon of maintenance is resident in each aviation unit of employment
    (UEx) or MFAB. The MFAB will have one organic aviation support
    battalion, capable of performing aviation intermediate maintenance
    (AVIM) and individual battalions will have an aviation support company
    (ASC) comprised of modular aviation support platoons, which provide
    aviation unit maintenance (AVUM) support to flight companies. The
    second echelon is the sustainment base, which is comprised of the
    AVCRAD, the organic aviation depots and also includes the original
    equipment manufacturers. The goal is to eliminate redundancy where
    possible while retaining core capabilities. These long-term efforts
    will culminate in significant reductions to the aviation logistics tail
    beginning in fiscal year 2006.
                                     ______

                   Question Submitted by Senator John McCain

                         COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE RADIO

        23. Senator McCain. General Bergantz and General Sinclair, it is my
    understanding that the Services, and in particular the deployed forces,
    have a critical need for additional combat search and rescue (CSAR)
    radios. Further, reports from the field indicate that the Global
    Positioning System (GPS)-112 and PRCs currently fielded have been doing
    extremely well in CSAR missions with downed aircrews. With the delay in
    the Combat Survivor Evader Locator (CSEL) development, testing, and
    slip in the approval for production, do you need additional off-the-
    shelf CSAR radios to satisfy your urgent mission requirements?
        General Bergantz and General Sinclair. The AN/PRC-112 CSAR radios
    have performed very well in CSAR missions with downed aircrews and
    Special Operations Forces. Because the Army did not procure the total
    required quantity of this radio, we were forced to redistribute radios
    from the training base to deploying forces. This redistribution has
    enabled the Army to adequately meet urgent CSAR radio requirements
    pending the production of the CSEL radio.
        The CSEL radio recently completed the Multi-Service Operational
    Test and Evaluation (MOTE). The Air Force Operational Test and
    Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) rated CSEL as operationally suitable and
    effective. These results support a favorable full rate production
    decision expected in the June-July 2004 timeframe. In anticipation of
    this decision, the Army Strategic Planning Board (ASPB) recently
    approved the CSEL fielding plan. The fielding plan prioritizes units
    based on the Unit of Action (UA) modularity initiative and deployment
    schedules. Initially, the fielding plan will leverage on-hand low rate
    initial production (LRIP) quantities pending full rate production
    deliveries. The 3rd Infantry Division will be first unit equipped in
    August 2004. In conjunction with fielding the CSEL, the Army will
    simultaneously redistribute the AN/PRC-112 to other units. This
    approach ensures that units will have a CSAR radio capability provided
    by the CSEL or the AN/PRC-112.
        Unfortunately, the Army is unable to procure the total CSEL
    requirement of 18,531 radios. Based on current funding, the Army will
    procure approximately 43 percent (8,816 radios) of the required
    quantity. The result is that until such time as the Army can increase
    CSEL procurement, the forces will have a combination of CSEL and the
    AN/PRC-112. While the radios are interoperable in the line-of-sight
    (LOS) voice mode, there are training and sustainment implications with
    maintaining two CSAR radios.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

                    IDENTIFIED INTRA-THEATER LIFT SHORTFALLS

        24. Senator Inhofe. General Cody, in your statement, you justify
    reallocating resources from the Comanche program to procure
    approximately 25 cargo fixed wing aircraft. Specifically, you have
    based this decision on ``identified intra-theater lift shortfalls.''
    Where were the shortfalls in the global war on terrorism which justify
    this new fixed wing requirement not currently met by C-130s? Can you
    provide empirical data, which justify this requirement?
        General Cody. The requirement for the Army future cargo aircraft is
    based on the transport of critical, time sensitive supplies and
    personnel to forward deployed units. It will be a joint use airframe
    that will transport heavy, outsized and palletized cargo from the SPOD/
    APOD over a non-secure, asymmetrical battlefield. It is not in
    competition with the C-130 but is additive and compatible to the C-130
    and its existing intra-theater mission. The Army currently utilizes the
    C-23 Sherpa to conduct this mission but it has proven to have severe
    limitations in high/hot conditions and is not an effective cargo
    aircraft. The requirement to support these ever increasing logistics
    demands to forward deployed troops, over extended distances, require
    increased air delivery that is not available. There is currently a
    shortage of strategic lift (MRS-05) and with Service requirements
    growing will continue to put strain on the availability and timeliness
    of intra-theater support. Three combatant commanders have specifically
    identified the need for increased intra-theater support and in one case
    the need for an airframe that has short take-off and landing
    capabilities (STOL). The smaller cargo aircraft that Army is looking at
    to replace the C-23 has that STOL capability and will be compatible
    with the C130 and the CH-47 logistics delivery systems.

        25. Senator Inhofe. General Cody, how well did U.S. Transportation
    Command (USTRANSCOM) meet the combatant commander's (COCOM) intra-
    theater airlift needs?
        General Cody. USTRANSCOM met our inter-theater requirements;
    however, it could not meet the intra-theater requirements generated by
    the high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and size of the area of
    responsibility (AOR). This OPTEMPO required the Army to pull prime
    tactical helicopters assets to perform routine daily re-supply mission.

        26. Senator Inhofe. General Cody, what fixed wing aircraft are you
    planning to buy to meet this need?
        General Cody. The specific airframe has not been identified as Army
    is still evaluating what vendors can meet the requirements. The future
    cargo aircraft (C-)XX cargo) will be a twin engine propeller cargo
    aircraft that has the capability to carry 18,000 lbs. internal, 300
    knots airspeed, short takeoff and landing (STOL), 2,400 nautical mile
    range, three 463L (standard United States Air Force) pallets, 30,000-
    25,000-foot service ceiling and capable of casualty evacuation
    (CASEVAC) for return trips. It will be roughly half the size of the
    C130 but have commonality with that asset to supplement its mission.

        27. Senator Inhofe. General Cody, have you already developed a
    Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for this new requirement in the
    Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)?
        General Cody. The funding from Comanche to procure 25 systems in
    the POM is only a portion of the overall cargo program. Planned funding
    is currently in the POM for 37 systems. There is additional funding in
    the out years to continue procurement of this aircraft towards a total
    requirement of 128 aircraft. Part of the funding from Comanche
    termination was applied towards this program because of the growing
    need in Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom for intra-
    theater support.

                REQUIREMENTS OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        28. Senator Inhofe. General Cody, General Bryan Brown, Commander,
    U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), has previously stated that
    he needs additional resources. How are you planning to reallocate
    Comanche resources to meet his specific requirements at USSOCOM?
        General Cody. The Comanche funding was redistributed only to major
    force program (MFP) 2 (Army) programs. The Army did not fund any MFP-11
    requirements (Special Operations Forces (SOF) specific) from the
    Comanche funding. However, the reallocation of Comanche funding will
    address (both directly and indirectly) some SOCOM requirements. For
    instance, the Army identified $74 million to fund a SOCOM-identified
    shortfall in aircraft survivability equipment. Additionally, the Army
    is investing in a common cockpit for the UH-60 and CH-47. Since this
    cockpit is based on SOCOM's cockpit, this will now become a common
    program between Army and SOF. The positive impact for SOF is that given
    this increased production requirement will reduce costs for SOCOM.
    Additionally, SOCOM will benefit from the Army's investment in CH-47F
    procurement, aircraft survivability equipment, standardized maintenance
    program, hydra rockets, flares, UH60-M, and increased platform
    commonality across all systems.

        29. Senator Inhofe. General Cody, what kinds of capabilities do we
    need to add to enhance the Special Operations Forces (SOF) mission?
        General Cody. We need to continue to fund SOF aviation requirements
    for Army common aviation survivability equipment (ASE) and ammunition,
    especially in precision rockets. Additionally, I see a growing need for
    SOF aviation to have a multi-purpose cargo fixed wing aircraft that
    will support full range of operations to include transport of critical
    personnel and equipment.

                      CURRENT FORCES AND FUTURE INVESTMENT

        30. Senator Inhofe. General Cody, many members have asked questions
    of the Army during the past several years about the balance of
    maintaining the current forces and investing in the future. The Army
    has invested tremendously in Future Combat Systems (FCS), and some feel
    they have neglected some of the so-called legacy systems. What are your
    thoughts on this balance?
        General Cody. We are in the process of adjusting the balance
    between our current and future forces to reflect the realities of an
    Army at war as we build our fiscal year 2006-2011 program. Our past
    assumptions about a ``window of opportunity'' for transformation and
    the processes developed for a Cold War Army are no longer relevant to
    the current security environment. The Army continually seeks to balance
    resources and effort between the current and future force. Since 11
    September 2001, the Army has put a great deal of emphasis on the
    current force, while continuing to transform. To support the global war
    on terrorism, we have spent in excess of $5.5 billion over fiscal year
    2003-2004 addressing emergent central force requirements. We are in the
    process of resetting over 950 helicopters, 5,700 tracked vehicles, and
    46,000  wheeled vehicles from our current force that took part in
    Operation Iraqi Freedom. The recent termination of the Comanche program
    will enable us to procure a mix of approximately 800 light utility,
    armed reconnaissance, UH-60 Black Hawk, and CH-47 Chinook helicopters;
    provide aviation survivability equipment for the current fleet; and
    invest in aviation logistics automation to improve sustainment
    operations. However, the Army remains committed to transforming our
    equipment, organizations, training, doctrine, soldiers, and
    installations. We have already seen numerous benefits of past efforts
    to transform our force, from digitized battle command systems
    distributed throughout the force to our first Stryker Brigade Combat
    Team that is currently engaged in Operation Iraqi Freedom. We continue
    to find opportunities to spiral future force technologies to the
    current force. Through a continuous cycle of innovation,
    experimentation, experience, and change, the Army will improve its
    capabilities to provide dominant land power to the joint force now and
    in the future. We are fully committed to fielding Future Combat Systems
    units of action this decade. These forces will contribute significantly
    to Army capabilities and complement the enhanced current force we are
    generating today. The end result will be a joint and expeditionary Army
    with campaign qualities.

        31. Senator Inhofe. General Cody, what are your plans for
    maintaining today's forces and investing in the future?
        General Cody. The Army continually seeks to balance resources and
    effort between current and future forces. Over the past 30 months, the
    Army has put a great deal of emphasis on the current force, while
    continuing to transform. Today's Army is committed throughout the world
    as we fight the global war on terrorism. Our commitment to the current
    force success can be seen as we provide what is needed to keep our
    forces manned, trained, equipped, and sustained. We are committed to
    completing reset 10/20 delayed desert damage maintenance and aviation
    special technical inspection and repair for equipment that is returning
    from current operations. Despite the demand on our current force, we
    remain dedicated to our future force. Our commitment to the future
    force can be seen in our research, capabilities, and system support
    programs. We have already seen numerous benefits of past efforts to
    transform our force, from digitized battle command systems distributed
    throughout the force to our first Stryker Brigade currently engaged in
    Operation Iraqi Freedom. We will continue to find opportunities to
    spiral future force technologies to the current force while using
    current force lesson learned to inform the future force.

        32. Senator Inhofe. General Cody, how does Army aviation tie into
    joint fires?
        General Cody. Army aviation plays an integral role in the
    employment of joint fires. With the use of Apache and Kiowa Warrior
    sensors such as forward looking infrared radiometer (FLIR), fire
    control radar (FCR), and thermal imaging system (TIS) to locate and
    identify hostile targets combined with their advanced designation
    systems (laser and global positioning system (GPS)), Army aircraft are
    able to designate for the employment of joint air and surface fires.
    Army aviation routinely conducts Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) missions
    at the lowest command levels in support of the ground maneuver
    commander. JAAT missions integrate the combined capabilities and
    effects of Army aviation, close air support, and indirect fires at a
    single point on the battlefield, providing massed synchronized joint
    fires to overwhelm and destroy enemy forces.
        Army aviation in the future force will provide supporting and
    complementary fires, and other maneuver support at extended distances,
    or in conditions that preclude timely and effective use of ground
    systems. Aviation crews will employ their sensors in cooperative
    engagements for timely and accurate fires, to include joint naval or
    air fires. Additionally, the integration of Army and Joint Non-Line of
    Sight (NLOS)/Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) fires by an armed
    reconnaissance aircraft, coupled with its contribution to situational
    awareness, will enable massing of effects without massing units.
    Aviation will provide man-in-the-loop terminal control of joint
    precision effects even after launch, supporting the employment of
    improved precision munitions and their effects.

                             ORGANIZATION OF UNITS

        33. Senator Inhofe. General Cody, the Air Force organizes many of
    its wings into a concept called associate/Reserve wings where they
    blend active, Guard, and Reserve personnel into one wing. What do you
    think of applying a similar concept to the Army's high demand/low
    density units?
        General Cody. The Army has similar opportunities and unit programs.
    Our multi-component units include elements from two or more of the
    three components (active, Guard, and Reserve). In these units, we take
    advantage of skills derived from civilian occupations that have
    military application. Many of these units exist in our high demand/low
    density combat service support (CSS) structure. The size of the unit,
    mission complexity, and equipment requirements impact the viability of
    this option. Larger units with more complex mission sets require more
    collective training which the Reserve components generally do not have
    the time to conduct prior to mobilization. This makes a multi-component
    unit as a whole less deployable and responsive. Therefore,
    implementation of this concept proves too difficult for most combat and
    combat support units of battalion or greater size in terms of
    developing into cohesive and effective fighting forces. Additionally,
    Army missions are more enduring than the Air Force missions. As a
    result, Army units are less likely to have the opportunity to change
    teams or crews as readily as the Air Force does with its flight crews.
    This concept works well for small, modular units, with discrete
    missions that directly correlate to civilian skills. The Army will
    continue to employ the multi-component program where it works, for
    these types of high demand CSS skill sets. It is less conducive for
    larger units with complex missions involving direct combat due to the
    extensive and specialized collective training required.

                          VERY IMPORTANT PERSON FLEET

        34. Senator Inhofe. General Cody, I think you are aware that each
    of the Services, to include the Reserve and Guard, has a very important
    person (VIP) fleet of fixed wing aircraft. Additionally, each Service
    has an independent tasking agency or operations center. Do you think
    USTRANSCOM ought to have COCOM of the operational support airlift
    (OSA)/VIP fleet?
        General Cody. USTRANSCOM is currently scheduling all Army OSA fixed
    wing aircraft with the exception of the three long-range and three
    short-range aircraft assigned to the Headquarters, Department of the
    Army at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland. The Office of the Secretary
    of the Army schedules these aircraft. The aircraft are in direct
    support of the Army's most senior leadership and when requested, the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense, Congress, and when approved by
    Office of the Secretary of Defense, other Federal agencies on a
    reimbursable basis. This is the most effective and efficient scheduling
    process to provide short turnaround, mission tailored support to the
    Army's senior leadership.

        35. Senator Inhofe. General Cody, especially now, as the Army is
    transforming, don't you think that each of the Service's independent
    (fixed wing) OSA/VIP fleets could be consolidated into a single
    (possibly joint) organization reporting directly to Joint Operational
    Support Airlift Center (JOSAC) under USTRANSCOM?
        General Cody. Such central scheduling provides no advantage over
    the current process of intra-service coordination at the seat of
    government. This process provides maximum flexibility to each
    Department to support their significantly different Title X
    responsibilities. This independent scheduling process coupled with an
    informal but highly effective intra-service coordination agreement
    allows each Department to support our leadership, and when
    operationally necessary to assist our sister Services, the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense, Congress, and other Federal agencies.

        36. Senator Inhofe. General Cody, at a minimum, shouldn't JOSAC
    have command and control (C2) over the Service's OSA/VIP fixed wing
    fleet?
        General Cody. The current process allows each Service to budget its
    own operational requirements. Placing command and control under JOSAC
    would provide no discernible advantage to the military departments, nor
    does JOSAC schedule outside continental United States (OCONUS) missions
    whereas the individual VIP fleets are staffed to accomplish both short
    and long-range missions when cost effective. Since the terrorist
    attacks of 11 September 2001, the Army has had an extremely high
    operational tempo with many short notice requirements to move the
    Army's senior leadership both CONUS and OCONUS. Having scheduling
    authority over our small detachment adds to the flexibility to meet
    these enormously vital mission needs in the shortest possible amount of
    time, and still guarantee immediate recall capability to our most
    senior leaders. The independent scheduling of small fixed wing
    detachments gives the Services a critical advantage in the worldwide
    efforts on the global war on terrorism. This is essential since the
    Secretary of the Army is the sole arbiter in cases of competing
    requirements. This authority of the Secretary and the knowledge that he
    will resolve scheduling conflicts is a tremendous incentive to resolve
    the conflict at lower levels of authority. This flexibility would
    disappear with command and control relinquished to the United States
    Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).
                                     ______

              Question Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

                       PROCUREMENT OF FIRE SCOUT VEHICLES

        37. Senator Clinton. General Cody, General Bergantz, and General
    Sinclair, with cancellation of the Comanche program, the Army will be
    increasingly dependent upon the use of unmanned vehicles to perform
    missions that traditionally were performed by manned aircraft. The FCS
    program has selected the Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff and Landing
    Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle (VTUAV) for its Class IV requirement, and
    it is also being considered for the Class III requirement. Since Fire
    Scout is now in low rate initial production for the Navy, do you
    support accelerating the procurement of Fire Scout vehicles for FCS and
    increasing the quantity of Fire Scout systems to be purchased?
        General Cody, General Bergantz, and General Sinclair. The FCS
    Program of Record, as approved by the Under Secretary of Defense
    (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), is structured to meet the
    Army's transformation objective to achieve Initial Operational
    Capability (IOC) of the first Increment I FCS-equipped Unit of Action
    (UA) in 2010 with Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2012. Currently,
    the FCS Program's Fire Scout Class III/IV UAV development effort and
    fielding plan, in coordination with the Navy, support achieving this
    objective. Thus, there is no Army requirement to accelerate procurement
    of Fire Scout for the FCS Program nor to increase procurement
    quantities.
        Additionally, the Navy Fire Scout UAV now in LRIP is the RQ-8A.
    However, both the Army and the Navy are procuring the RQ-8B which
    includes a different main rotor and upgrades to the transmission among
    other improvements. Furthermore, the intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (ISR) and target designation (TD) mission payloads and
    tactical communications relay mission payloads being fielded with the
    Navy Fire Scout are not the same as those being developed for the Fire
    Scout FCS Class III/IV UAV. Unique ISR, TD, and communications payloads
    as well as manned-unmanned teaming capabilities are required in order
    to ensure that the Fire Scout FCS Class III/IV UAV is a seamlessly
    integrated capability on the FCS Network, currently under development
    in the FCS Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. As such,
    accelerated fielding of the Navy Fire Scout would not meet FCS Class
    III/IV UAV required networked-capabilities.

        [Whereupon, at 3:47 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]