[Senate Hearing 108-440]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-440, Pt. 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2400
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 2
SEAPOWER
__________
MARCH 3 AND 10, 2004
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Seapower
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina JACK REED, Rhode Island
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Future Navy and Marine Corps Capabilities and Requirements
march 3, 2004
Page
Young, Hon. John J., Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition; Accompanied by Vice
Adm. John B. Nathman, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Warfare Requirements and Programs; Vice Adm. J. Cutler Dawson,
Jr., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources,
Requirements, and Assessments; Lt. Gen. Robert Magnus, USMC,
Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, Headquarters; and
Lt. Gen. Edward Hanlon, Jr., USMC, Commanding General, Combat
Development Command............................................ 5
The Posture of the U.S. Transportation Command
march 10, 2004
Handy, Gen. John W., USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command; Accompanied by Major Gen. Ann E. Dunwoody, USA,
Commander, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command; and
Vice Adm. David L. Brewer, USN, Commander, Military Sealift
Command........................................................ 43
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
FUTURE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS CAPABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Talent (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Talent, Collins, and
Kennedy.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearing clerk.
Majority staff members present: Ambrose R. Hock,
professional staff member; and Thomas L. MacKenzie,
professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Sara R. Mareno and Pendred K.
Wilson.
Committee members' assistants present: Derek J. Maurer,
assistant to Senator Collins; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to
Senator Talent; and Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator
Kennedy.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. TALENT, CHAIRMAN
Senator Talent. Senator Kennedy is on his way and asked
that we go ahead. When he comes, of course, he can give his
opening statement.
I'll go ahead and convene the hearing of the Seapower
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I
understand we have one joint statement, which Secretary Young,
you're going to give that?
Mr. Young. I will make an oral statement and we have one
combined written statement for the record, Senator Talent.
Senator Talent. Okay. That's right, you mentioned that
yesterday to me. You're going to do an oral statement and then
we'll just put the written statement in the record without
objection.
I'll go ahead and give my opening statement and then I'll
introduce everybody all at once, since you're not individually
going to make opening statements.
Today the Seapower Subcommittee welcomes the distinguished
panel of witnesses representing the Department of the Navy for
the purpose of translating how requirements traditionally based
on a qualitative and quantitative threat are now being based on
capabilities that proposed systems bring to the naval force.
While this process intuitively can maintain capabilities
against what many may consider a diminished threat, it can also
greatly widen the range of capabilities that are considered
necessary, especially in this current environment where the
threat is less well defined in the areas of capabilities,
quantities and perhaps most importantly motive. With potential
enemies who are not necessarily aligned with a particular
nation-state, our Armed Forces are tasked with bringing
capabilities to bear to defeat these enemies anywhere, any
time.
Perhaps the first question that needs to be addressed is
the size of the force. How many ships, aircraft, and ground
forces are necessary for the Navy and Marine Corps to bring
their capabilities to bear? What process is being used to
define the capabilities of these ships, aircraft, and ground
forces? How does the new Fleet Response Plan, with its
objective of presence with a purpose, provide the Nation with
assured presence at the right place at the right time? These
are some of the questions we would like the witnesses to
address today.
Traditionally, analytic models and methods have been used
to define and refine requirements using engagement mission and
campaign level models. These models replicate the platforms,
sensors, weapons, and tactics of well-defined threats. If the
threat is no longer well-defined, however, what changes to
these analytic processes are required to define the
capabilities we seek to achieve in our new developmental and
procurement systems?
The United States is highly dependent on its maritime
strength, and one other area of concern is the health of our
shipbuilding industrial base. If we were to lose the industrial
capacity to maintain a fleet suitable to guarantee presence
throughout the world it would be impossible to regenerate the
necessary industrial capacity for at least a decade.
I want to thank Senator Kennedy for his steadfast
leadership on this subcommittee. I know he is interested in
these subjects as well as how they effect particular programs
and platforms. For years as both Chairman and ranking member,
he has led in advancing the maritime strength of America.
I will go ahead and introduce the witnesses and then when
Senator Kennedy comes, we can just interrupt and let him give
us his opening statement.
Our witnesses are the Honorable John Young, Jr., the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
Acquisition. Mr. Secretary, thank you for coming today. I've
appreciated our conversations on this subject as well.
Vice Admiral John Nathman, who is the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs. Vice Admiral
Cutler Dawson, who is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Resources, Requirements and Assessments. Lieutenant General Bob
Magnus, the Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources with
the Marine Corps. General Ed Hanlon, who is the Commanding
General of the Combat Development Command of the Marine Corps.
Thank you all for being here.
While Senator Kennedy gets his opening statement ready, I
think it is very important for us to do our oversight properly.
For us to know what analytic processes and models you are using
in determining the kind of capabilities that you want the Navy
and the Marine Corps to have. If we are going to gradually or
otherwise evolve away from a numbers-based type method for
estimating what kind of naval strength we require, well then we
need to know what processes are being used so we can do our
oversight. Have the assurance that you all are moving according
to a plan that we can measure, so that we can do our job.
That's really what this hearing is about. I'm sure we will
get into some individual programs and platforms as well. I know
that I intend to and I imagine Senator Kennedy intends to as
well.
Senator Kennedy, I said some very nice things about you
before you got here----
Senator Kennedy. Oh, did you?
Senator Talent.--but it's in the record. [Laughter.]
Senator Kennedy. They're in the record, or do you want to
say them again?
Senator Talent. Absolutely. [Laughter.]
I certainly appreciate how much you have done over the
years to advance naval strength and naval power and to fulfill
our functions as a committee and as a Congress. I'm pleased to
have you give your opening statement, for the record.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY
Senator Kennedy. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman
and my colleague Senator Collins. There are many areas of
difference on Capitol Hill, but I think in this subcommittee we
have a remarkable comity and working partnership in not only
this committee, but I think with the armed services. I thank
you very much for your leadership and also the ability to work
with you. We worked together in the conference on a variety of
different issues. Certainly as the chairman you have developed
an extraordinary command and understanding of these needs that
we have in our force projection. I want to thank you for all of
your courtesies and the chance to work with you and a warm
friend, Senator Collins, a member of this subcommittee.
I want to welcome all of our representatives of the
Service. Once again, to indicate to them we never can do it
enough, how much we are grateful to them and their leadership
and the men and women they represent.
We are always mindful of those that have given their lives;
we are up to 13 now in Massachusetts. I've had the opportunity
to attend some of the funerals and wakes of extraordinary young
men and women with extraordinary families.
I also had the chance to go out to Walter Reed Hospital on
a couple of different occasions and visit those brave
individuals who are the casualties and see both the
extraordinary personal courage of those individuals and their
incredible desire, to the extent possible, to remain in the
Service, rejoining their units. I mean it's an absolutely
inspirational kind of circumstance. A great tribute, I think,
to the way that they're being led and the value that the
Services are giving to those individuals. They always have ways
of trying to deal with some of the kinds of questions--and I
might submit some questions on this.
One of the perplexing issues of those that we've had, the
boys that have been killed in Massachusetts, is the difficulty
in recovering their wills. All of them are required to fill out
their will when they go into the Service. None of the families
have been able to recover them. This is an aspect of closure
for families. I mean these are the kinds of incidental things--
we probably won't get into today. But there are some of these
individual kinds of issues that are perplexing families and
they have been raised with me. They're not the particular
subject of this hearing, but I think it's useful to hear at
least some of these concerns. I'll follow-up with you, the
Members, the leaders, and the commanders on those issues.
I want to say that we meet this afternoon on Navy and
Marine Corps future operational capabilities and requirements.
Some may put the primary emphasis on the ships or aircraft; we
should pay attention an important matter of ensuring
capabilities to support the national security strategy. In the
world that we live, which continues to be one of uncertainty
and unrest, the decisions we make this year have direct effect
on the forces and capabilities that future combat commanders
will use to protect our interest.
Without adequate modernization we could be faced with a
situation, that would be forces without the necessary
capabilities. We could be in a position of trying to support
theater combatant commanders' requirements with forces that
either too small or lacking in capability to meet their needs.
We all know that our men and women in the Armed Forces will
respond admirably in any crisis, as they've been doing to
support the operation in Afghanistan and in Iraq. This leads us
to the subject of today's hearings, the future Navy and Marine
Corps.
The subcommittee must ensure that we are all getting the
most from our investments. We owe it to the taxpayer, but more
importantly, to the sailors and marines. Over the long term we
cannot count on the unceasing heroic performance from sailors
and marines to make up for inadequate or inappropriate
investment. We may have to change our approaches in some areas,
but we will still need to ensure that we do not lose the very
real advantages that our Navy and Marine Corps so skillfully
provide, as evidenced by their outstanding performance in
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF).
So, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the
testimony.
Senator Talent. I thank the Senator. Senator Collins, do
you have an opening statement?
Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me salute you and Senator Kennedy for your
strong support of our Navy and for the commitment that you've
given to the subcommittee. I also want to thank our panelists
who have devoted their lives to our country as well.
I am pleased that we will have an opportunity today to
discuss one of the most important issues in military
acquisition, and that is shipbuilding. It's been very important
to have a robust fleet. We have seen the critical role that our
Navy has played in the global war on terrorism, and I am
committed to making sure that the Navy and the Marine Corps
have the resources needed.
So, thank you.
Senator Talent. I also want to welcome the panelists, thank
you for giving us your time. I have looked forward to this
hearing. I think we will raise general and specific issues that
will be helpful to everybody.
Secretary Young, you're going to speak on behalf of this
distinguished panel. Everybody is looking to see that you do a
good job representing them. So go ahead, and give us your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION;
ACCOMPANIED BY VICE ADM. JOHN B. NATHMAN, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR WARFARE REQUIREMENTS AND PROGRAMS; VICE
ADM. J. CUTLER DAWSON, JR., USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS FOR RESOURCES, REQUIREMENTS, AND ASSESSMENTS; LT.
GEN. ROBERT MAGNUS, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR PROGRAMS AND
RESOURCES, HEADQUARTERS; AND LT. GEN. EDWARD HANLON, JR., USMC,
COMMANDING GENERAL, COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
Mr. Young. It's probably a daunting challenge, but Mr.
Chairman, Senator Kennedy, Senator Collins, it is a privilege
to be here today to appear before the subcommittee to discuss
the Navy and Marine Corps shipbuilding programs in the fiscal
year 2005 budget request.
I would like to, on behalf of all of us and Secretary
England, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and the
commandant, thank you and the subommittee for your great
personal and strong support for Navy and Marine Corps programs.
The fiscal year 2005 request includes funds for nine ships
reflecting the continuous and successful efforts by the
Department of the Navy to increase the number of ships we are
purchasing. Within these efforts, it's also important to
improve how we buy ships, and I'd like to emphasize a few
points in this area.
On Virginia-class, the Department reached agreement with
our industry partners and, through the support of Congress,
signed a Virginia-class multi-year contract which included
incentive, that rewards and measures performance, a realistic
cost target, and terms that strongly incentivize on, or below,
target cost performance. The Virginia-class multi-year contract
is essential to stabilizing this program at low procurement
rates. Regarding the CVN-69 carrier refueling overhaul, in a
remarkable action, the Department reached agreement with our
industry partners to renegotiate an existing contract for the
refueling overhaul. This contract converted some fixed profit
to incentive fee, linking the profit to discrete milestones and
adjusted the share-lines to again incentivize on-target
delivery.
CVN-70 was another refueling, but the refueling of CVN-70
was delayed 1 year to take advantage of the fuel life available
in that carrier. This decision led to a comprehensive
evaluation of the carrier program resulting in decisions to
enhance maintenance actions on the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy, dock
the U.S.S. George Washington, and slip the CVN-21 one year.
These efforts helped stabilize the workload at Newport News.
More importantly, all of these decisions reflected in
unprecedented collaboration between the acquisition team, the
fleet, the requirements community represented here at the
table, and our industry partners. These efforts sought to
balance capability, cost, industry workload, and other factors
in the shipbuilding program.
The next step beyond the existing programs is research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding of lead
ships. We are working this alternate method of funding ship
construction and the fiscal year 2005 budget request reflects
funds to begin construction of the lead surface combatant ship
(DD(X)) and the lead Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) using RDT&E
funds. This approach mirrors the approach used in every other
weapons development program. Indeed, tactical aircraft programs
are developed using RDT&E funds to establish the production
process and build multiple pre-production aircraft.
These steps are important to establishing a production
process that can be efficient for the ship class, just as it is
for the aircraft production run.
Further, we need the ability to adjust the lead ship budget
modestly in order to avoid the detrimental effects of prior
year completion bills. Under the current process, we give a
program manager a block of money to spend carefully for 5 to 7
years, building a sophisticated new ship that has never been
built before. The program manager, just as you or I, is likely
to be very cautious about investing for the class, conserving
his funds to make sure he or she can deliver the lead ship. We
need to relieve this pressure and allow appropriate budget
adjustments to be made to ensure the development of a
successful construction process for the class.
Steps such as these, endorsed by Congress, were essential
to programs like C-17, and reflect the procedure again used in
every other development program. With improved buying
practices, we then need to proceed to efficiently and
effectively deliver capability. As the subcommittee has rightly
observed, the capabilities of ships we are buying today are
dramatically different from the capabilities of ships even a
few years ago. Further, efforts are under way to provide even
greater capability; let me offer a couple of examples.
Until 1990, we relied on Ticonderoga-class Aegis-equipped
cruisers with Standard Missile-1 and Standard Missile-2
variants to provide air defense capability that could cover an
area roughly 25 miles in radius from the ship. Today, an
Arleigh-Burke Aegis equipped destroyer with SM-2 Block three
and Block four missiles provides air defense capability to
cover an area that exceeds 50 miles in radius from the ship.
In the future, the acquisition community and requirements
community are working together to deliver the Extended Range
Active Missile (ERAM). This is a missile that will allow an
Aegis-equipped destroyer to defend against threats at ranges--
greater than 100-mile radius from the ship, including over land
targets. Beyond that, with the Advanced Hawkeye, ERAM, and
Aegis together, we will be able to defend beyond and below the
radar horizon addressing threats before end game maneuvers,
enhancing our layered defense ship self-defense opportunities.
Let me talk for a moment, if you would, about striking
capability. During Operation Desert Storm it is estimated that
32,000 ``dumb bombs'' and 900 precision-guided munitions (PGM)
were expended. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, 235 ``dumb bombs''
and 5,222 PGMs were expended. During Operation Desert Storm,
carriers provided about 70 sorties per day, per carrier or
about 420 sorties per day off of 6 carriers.
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, carriers generated 90 sorties
per day, per carrier or about 450 sorties per day off the 5
carriers. The Navy has established a goal for CVN-21 of
generating 160 sorties per day with a surge capability to 220
sorties per day, all of which will likely be able to kill
multiple targets at 50 percent greater range using the F/A-18E/
F and the Joint Strike Fighter.
These numbers provide some example of far greater
capability than today's naval platforms provide as often
outlined by Secretary England, Admiral Clark, and General
Hagee.
I'm grateful to the subcommittee for the chance to offer
just a few examples of how the Department is changing it's
approach to acquisition, approach to requirements, and approach
to delivery of capability. We all look forward to any questions
you have.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Young, Vice Adm.
Nathman, Vice Adm. Dawson, Lt. Gen. Hanlon, and Lt. Gen. Magnus
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. John J. Young, Jr.; Vice Adm. John B.
Nathman, USN; Vice Adm. James C. Dawson, USN; Lt. Gen. Edward Hanlon,
Jr., USMC; and Lt. Gen. Robert Magnus, USMC
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of
the Navy's fiscal year 2005 shipbuilding programs.
Your Navy and Marine Corps team's outstanding performance in the
global war on terrorism and Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) last year underscored the high return on your investment
in our combat readiness, our people, and our unique maritime
warfighting capabilities. Your return on investment included the lift
for 94 percent of the Nation's joint warfighting capability. It
demonstrated the latest technology in surveillance, command and
control, and persistent attack operating from sovereign U.S. territory
and exploiting the vast maneuver space provided by the sea.
The global war on terrorism, OEF, and OIF demonstrated the enormous
contributions naval forces make to the effectiveness of joint and
coalition forces. Analyses of these conflicts indicate that the
warfighting concepts, capabilities development process, and advanced
technologies we are pursuing in our Naval Power 21 vision are on the
right vector. Experimentation with forward deployed Expeditionary
Strike Groups has increased credible global combat capability with
which to fight the war on terror and project power. We have leveraged
OIF experience to implement the Fleet Response Plan--increasing the
number of Carrier Strike Groups deployed or readily deployable. The
Navy and Marine Corps team now faces a rare inflection point in history
with technological infusions and several new ship classes coming on
line within the next few years. This year, we will pursue distributed
and joint networked solutions that could revolutionize our capability.
With the fiscal year 2005 budget request we intend to:
Shape the 21st century workforce and deepen the growth
and development of our people, and
Accelerate our investment in Naval Power 21 to
recapitalize and transform our force and improve its ability to
operate as an effective component of our joint warfighting
team.
developing joint seabasing capabilities
As a means of accelerating our investment in Naval Power 21, we are
employing the Naval Capability Development Process and Expeditionary
Force Development System (EFDS). The Naval Capability Development
Process and EFDS take a concepts-to-capabilities approach to direct
investment to achieve future warfighting wholeness. The Naval
Capability Development Process takes a sea-based, offensive approach
that provides power projection and access with distributed and
networked forces featuring unmanned and off board nodes with
penetrating surveillance via pervasive sensing and displaying that
rapidly deliver precision effects. The EFDS assesses, analyzes and
integrates Marine Amphibious Ground Task Force (MAGTF) warfighting
concepts, and requirements in a naval and joint context to support the
overarching operational concept of Joint Seabasing. The fiscal year
2005 shipbuilding budget request reflects the investments that will
most improve our warfighting capability by investing in future sea-
based and expeditionary capabilities for the Navy and Marine Corps.
shipbuilding programs
Our fiscal year 2005 budget request calls for construction of nine
ships: three Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers; one Virginia (SSN
774) class submarine; one San Antonio (LPD 17) class amphibious
transport dock ship; two Lewis & Clark (T-AKE) class auxiliary cargo
and ammunition ships; one DD(X); and one Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). If
approved, this would increase to 38 the total number of ships
authorized and under construction. The fiscal year 2005 budget request
represents an increase of two ships over the seven ships in the fiscal
year 2004 program. In addition, we have requested funding for advance
procurement of the 8th and 9th Virginia class submarines, Economic
Order Quantity (EOQ) material procurement for the 8th, 9th, and 10th
Virginia class submarines, advance procurement for CVN-21 construction
and CVN-70 refueling complex overhaul (RCOH), continued funding for
SSGN Engineered Refueling Overhaul (ERO) and conversion, continued
funding for LHD-8, funding for Ticonderoga class cruiser modernization,
and the service life extension for five Landing Craft Air Cushion
(LCAC) craft.
These shipbuilding programs are the leading edge of our naval
transformation to the Seabasing concept, which is modularly constructed
on four capability pillars. Those pillars are Sea Shield, Sea Base, Sea
Strike and ForceNet. Sea Shield is made up of those components that
provide protection and assured access to our forces. Sea Base is the
pillar of capabilities that allows naval forces to exploit the maneuver
space provided by U.S. control of the sea. Sea Strike includes all of
the capabilities within the force that provide offensive fires and
maneuver in a complementary synergistic fashion. This includes strike
aircraft, missiles, surface fires, and expeditionary maneuver elements.
ForceNet is the network that ties these disbursed platforms together
through command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) nodes to provide robust
battle space awareness, precise targeting, rapid and precise fires and
maneuver and responsive logistics. We have grouped our shipbuilding
programs into each of the four seabasing pillars based on their primary
weapon systems however each platform has the ability to perform
functions of other pillars as well.
Sea Shield
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Destroyer
The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $3.445 billion for the
procurement of the final three Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers.
These ships are part of a 10 ship, fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year
2005 Multi Year Procurement (MYP) contract awarded in 2002, which
finalized the DDG procurement profile and sustains our industry
partners until we transition to DD(X) production.
Ticonderoga (CG 47) Cruiser Modernization Plan
The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $166 million for
systems that will add new mission capabilities and extend the combat
system service life of the Ticonderoga (CG 47) class. The upgrade of
these ships will add new, and enhance existing, combat system
capabilities to improve compatibility in joint and coalition warfare
environments. Furthermore, these improvements will upgrade the quality
of life for our sailors and lower the operating costs for those ships.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
The LCS will be a networked, agile, mission focused, stealthy
surface combatant with capabilities optimized for responsiveness to
threats in the littorals. LCS will utilize core onboard sensors and
weapons combined with reconfigurable mission packages employing manned
and unmanned vehicles and modular sensors and weapons to execute
assigned tasks and operate as a node in a network centric battle force.
Primary missions for the ship will include littoral mine warfare,
littoral surface warfare and littoral anti-submarine warfare to ensure
access of friendly forces in littoral regions. The LCS program awarded
contracts to three industry teams in July 2003. The fiscal year 2005
budget request includes $352 million of RDT&E funding for LCS platform
and mission system development and initial ship procurement. The LCS
spiral development acquisition strategy will support construction of
multiple flights of focused mission ships and mission packages with
progressive capability improvements. Flight 0 is comprised of four
ships, with the first ship requested for authorization in fiscal year
2005 using RDT&E, N funds with detail design and construction
commencing in fiscal year 2005. Mission modules will deliver in support
of the Flight 0 seaframe delivery in fiscal year 2007. Flight 0 will
develop and demonstrate several new approaches to Naval warfare
including suitability of large-scale modular mission technologies and
new operational concepts in the littoral. The industry teams submitted
their proposals for final system design and detail design and
construction phase in January 2004. The down select to one or two teams
for final system design and detail design and construction of Flight 0
is anticipated in late spring 2004.
Virginia (SSN 774) Class Attack Submarines
With current construction progressing on schedule, the fiscal year
2005 budget request includes $2.5 billion for the seventh ship, advance
procurement for the eight and ninth ships of the Virginia class, and
Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) material procurement for the eighth,
ninth, and tenth Virginia class submarines. There are a total of 10
Virginia class submarines under contract. This year's ship will be the
second ship in the five-ship MYP. This MYP contracting approach
provides the Navy savings of $80 million per ship for a total savings
of $400 million compared to ``block buy'' procurement. These ships will
continue to be built under the teaming approach adopted by Congress in
1998, which maintains two capable nuclear submarine shipbuilders. In
accordance with fiscal year 2004 congressional direction, procurement
of two Virginia class submarines per year is delayed until fiscal year
2009.
Sea Strike
DD(X) Destroyer
The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $1,432 million in
RDT&E funds for DD(X) with $221 million for lead ship detail design and
construction. The Navy is 2 years into the competitively awarded DD(X)
design and technology development effort. The winning contractor has
organized a national team of industry experts to achieve the most
innovative and cost-effective solutions for development of the DD(X)
through spiral development of technologies and engineering, with
promising systems being employed on existing platforms and other future
ship classes. DD(X) will dramatically improve naval surface fire
support capabilities. Planned technologies, such as integrated power
system and total ship computing environment in an open architecture,
will provide more affordable future ship classes in terms of both
construction and operation. In a noteworthy partnership with industry,
the Navy shifted the DD(X) volume search radar to S-band, providing
increased capability and the future potential to support missile
defense operations.
SSGN
The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $517 million of procurement
funding for the continued conversion of the third Ohio class submarine,
and the engineered refueling overhaul of the fourth and final submarine
to be converted to SSGN. When completed, these submarines will provide
transformational warfighting capability carrying up to 154 Tomahawk
cruise missiles and support deployed special operating forces. The four
SSGN conversions will be executed utilizing a public-private
partnership conducting the work in naval shipyards, and are scheduled
for delivery in fiscal year 2007.
Sea Base
CVN-21 Class
The CVN-21 program is designing the aircraft carrier for the 21st
century, as the replacement for the Nimitz class nuclear aircraft
carriers. CVN-21 will be the centerpiece of tomorrow's Carrier Strike
Groups and a contribution to every capability pillar envisioned in Sea
Power 21. CVN-21 will be a primary force in Sea Strike with
enhancements such as a future air wing which will include the Joint
Strike Fighter and Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems. CVN-21's
transformational command centers will combine the power of FORCEnet and
a flexible open system architecture to support multiple simultaneous
missions, including integrated strike planning, joint/coalition
operations and Special Warfare missions. The CVN-21 based strike group
will play a major role in Sea Shield protecting United States
interests, while deterring enemies and reassuring allies. CVN-21 will
provide the United States the capability to quickly project combat
power anywhere in the world, independent of land based support.
Overall, CVN-21 will increase sortie generation rate by nearly 20
percent, increase survivability to better handle future threats and
have depot maintenance requirements that could support an increase of
up to 25 percent in operational availability. The new design nuclear
propulsion plant and improved electric plant together provide three
times the electrical generation capacity of a Nimitz class carrier.
This capacity allows the introduction of new systems such as
Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System, Advanced Arresting Gear, and
a new integrated warfare system that will leverage advances in open
systems architecture to be affordably upgraded. Other features include
an enhanced flight deck, improved weapons handling and aircraft
servicing efficiency, and a flexible island arrangement allowing for
future technology insertion. The fiscal year 2005 budget request
includes $626 million for continued development of CVN-21. The
Construction Preparation Contract, planned for 3rd quarter fiscal year
2004, will be for design, advance planning, advance construction, non-
nuclear advance procurement, and continuation of research studies to
further reduce CVN-21 manpower requirements and total ownership costs.
The construction contract is scheduled for award in 1st quarter fiscal
year 2007, with ship delivery in 2014. The program is currently working
toward a Milestone B review in 3rd quarter fiscal year 2004.
Nimitz Class
Refueling and Complex Overhauls (RCOH) provide a bridge between
maintaining current readiness requirements and preparing the platform
for future readiness initiatives in support of Sea Power 21 by
leveraging developing technologies from other programs and platforms
that support RCOH planning and production schedules for advantageous
insertion during this major recapitalization effort.
The Navy negotiated a modification to the RCOH contract for U.S.S.
Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) in December 2003. The renegotiated
contract provides incentives for Northrop Grumman Newport News (NGNN)
and the Navy team to work together to manage the completion of this
complex availability. The Navy and NGNN created a better incentive
contract structure to contain cost risk and maintain schedule. It is
expected that this improved acquisition model will be used in future
contracts for aircraft carrier construction and overhaul. U.S.S. Dwight
D. Eisenhower overhaul is scheduled to complete by November 2004.
The U.S.S. Carl Vinson (CVN-70) RCOH start was delayed 1 year to
November 2005. U.S.S. Carl Vinson will remain available for operations
until summer 2005. This added availability enables the Navy to maintain
a flexible defense posture and at the same time bring increased
capability to project credible, persistent naval combat power globally.
Other advantages for the move included maintaining a balanced and
stabilized industrial base for Navy ship maintenance in both public and
private yards and providing additional near-term funding for ongoing
recapitalization efforts. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes
$333 million in advance procurement funding for the U.S.S. Carl Vinson
overhaul.
Lastly, the Navy commissioned the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) in
July 2003, and laid the keel for the George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) in
September 2003.
MPF(F)
Most prominent in highlighting the value and power of the Nation's
naval expeditionary capability was the Marine Corps' participation in
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Success in this operation was due to our naval
dominance, our expeditionary nature, and our flexibility and
adaptability to defeat the challenges posed by enemy threats. Among
other naval assets, eleven strategically located Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships were unloaded in 16 days to provide
the equipment and sustainment required for two Marine Expeditionary
Brigades. Exploiting the operational speed, reach, and inherent
flexibility of seapower, the Navy-Marine Corps team achieved a rapid
buildup of sustained warfighting power that was combat ready to support
U.S. Central Command.
We continue to revolutionize this invaluable capability. We are
currently in the process of analyzing potential platform replacements.
The analysis of alternatives for MPF(F) is complete. Current guidance
requires MPF(F) to provide the combatant commander highly flexible
operational and logistics support for missions projecting power ashore
from a sea base, or during independent operations. Unlike current pre-
positioning ships, MPF(F) will greatly improve our forces' flexibility
by allowing operations that are fully interoperable with naval and
joint forces. MPF(F) represents the link between forward deployed
forces and their reach-back bases both in the continental United States
(CONUS) and overseas, and will be a crucial element to Enhanced
Networked Seabasing both for naval and joint forces. Unlike any other
prepositioning ship, the MPF(F) will not be reliant on a port facility,
greatly reducing our dependence on international support. The ability
to rapidly close and employ a large force dramatically increase the
flexibility and utility of the seabased force and present the combatant
commander with more response options than ever before. A formal report
of the results is expected in Spring 2004.
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)
Our fleet LCACs saw dramatically increased operational tempo
supporting worldwide operations during the past year, underscoring the
need for the LCAC Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). The program,
designed to extend the service life of LCACs to 30 years, had several
notable accomplishments during the past year: LCAC 25 was delivered on
time in November 2003, and LCAC 2 was delivered on time in February
2004. We awarded a contract to Textron Marine and Land Systems New
Orleans for the fiscal year 2002 and 2003 SLEPs (six craft total) in
December 2002 and all craft are currently on schedule. The award of the
fiscal year 2004 contract for four craft is anticipated in the second
quarter of fiscal year 2004. The fiscal year 2005 budget request
includes $90 million for SLEP of five craft. We are continuing with our
revised acquisition strategy to refurbish vice replace the buoyancy
boxes and will competitively select the fiscal year 2005 SLEP work. The
revised acquisition strategy will deliver the required LCAC capability
and service life while providing a cost savings of $104 million through
the FYDP for the program.
LPD 17
The San Antonio (LPD 17) class of amphibious transport dock ships
represents a critical element of the Navy and Marine Corps future in
expeditionary warfare. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes
$966 million to fully fund the construction of the seventh ship. Four
additional LPD 17s are included in the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP), with the final ship of the 12-ship class planned beyond the
FYDP. The fiscal year 2005 budget request reflects rephasing of one
ship from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2005 that will result in a
more efficient workload profile as well as a total FYDP savings of
approximately $40 million. Lead ship detail design is complete, lead
ship fabrication is approximately 85 percent complete, and the lead
ship was launched and christened in July 2003. Current efforts are
focused on managing schedule and cost. LPD 18 construction began in
February 2002. LPD 19/20 construction commenced in July 2001 and
October 2002, respectively. We awarded the contract for LPD 21 in
November 2003, named New York to honor the victims of the World Trade
Center attack, and plan to award the contract for LPD 22 in 3Q fiscal
year 2004.
LHD-8
In accordance with congressional direction to incrementally fund
LHD-8, the fiscal year 2005 budget requests $236 million for continued
construction. LHD-8 will be the first big deck amphibious ship that
will be powered by gas turbine propulsion, and all of its auxiliary
systems will rely on electrical power rather than steam. This change is
expected to realize significant lifecycle cost savings. The ship,
recently named Makin Island, had its keel laying ceremony on February
14, 2004.
LHA(R)
The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $44.2 million in R&D for
LHA(R). LHA(R) concept designs are being evaluated within the context
of Joint Seabasing and power projection. This ship will be the
centerpiece of the Expeditionary Strike Group, a contributor to the
Expeditionary Strike Force, and will carry expeditionary warfare
through the middle of this century. The ship will leverage the future
Sea Based environment and greatly enhance command and control
capabilities and at sea training for embarked forces. The resulting
design is planned to provide a transformational capability that is
interoperable with future amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Force
ships, high-speed vessels, and advanced rotorcraft like the MV-22 and
CH-53X, and the Joint Strike Fighter. This funding supports design
development leading to a planned ship construction award in fiscal year
2008.
Auxiliary Dry Cargo Ammunition Ship (T-AKE)
The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $768 million for the
seventh and eighth ships. The first four ships have been authorized and
appropriated and are under contract with National Steel and
Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) for construction. Exercise of the option
for the fifth and sixth ships occurred in January 2004. Lead ship
construction commenced in September 2003, with a projected delivery
date of October 2005. The second ship is projected to deliver in fiscal
year 2006, while the third and fourth ship deliveries are projected for
fiscal year 2007.
Cobra Judy
The Navy successfully contracted with industry to develop and build
a replacement for the aging Cobra Judy surveillance platform. Working
in partnership with industry and leveraging Missile Defense Agency
investments in radar technology, the Navy developed an innovative
strategy which accelerated the acquisition of this essential capability
while also creating the possibility to leverage the Cobra Judy program
to create a competition for the radar for the Navy's future cruiser,
CG(X).
completion of prior year shipbuilding contracts
I am pleased to report that the Navy experienced zero growth on
ship construction contracts over the last year. The management actions
instituted to address shipbuilding contract shortfalls have been
effective. Elimination of the prior year shipbuilding budget line is
within our grasp. We are continuously working to review the scope and
cost of ships under construction to avoid new bills. We are also
working diligently to set valid cost targets for new ships and
combining this with contract terms and conditions that reward good
performance. Congress provided $636 million in fiscal year 2004 to
address cost growth for ships contracted in 1999 and 2000. The fiscal
year 2005 budget request reflects $484 million to address similar
shortfalls, resulting in a prior year cost to complete remaining
balance of $46 million. However, we are still reviewing the projected
completion cost for CVN-77, a ship that was budgeted and contracted for
under previous procedures. To avoid future prior year completion bills,
it is essential that ships be budgeted at targets which reflect the
material and labor cost escalation experienced by U.S. industry.
summary
Our naval forces are unique in their contribution to the Nation's
defense. Versatile naval expeditionary forces are the Nation's first
responders, relied upon to establish the tempo of action, control the
early phases of hostilities, and set conditions for decisive
resolution. America's ability to protect its homeland, assure our
friends and allies, deter potential adversaries, and project decisive
combat power depends on maritime superiority. The transformation of
naval forces is dedicated to greatly expanding the sovereign options
available worldwide to the President across the full spectrum of
warfare by exploiting one of our Nation's asymmetric advantages--
control of the sea. The transformation of our naval forces leverages
enduring capabilities for projecting sustainable, immediately
employable joint combat power by facilitating the accelerated
deployment and flexible employment of additional joint capabilities
through a family of systems and assets afloat. Our fiscal year 2005
Shipbuilding Budget request seeks to accelerate our investment in Naval
Power 21 to transform our force and its ability to operate as an
effective component of the joint warfighting team. Congressional
support of this shipbuilding plan is essential to achieving this
vision--I thank you for your consideration.
Senator Talent. Great. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Let me pose an initial couple of questions to Admirals
Nathman and Dawson and then I'll defer to Senator Kennedy and
Senator Collins in case you need to go. You probably have a few
questions, we will get to you as quickly as we can.
Let me phrase what I think is the central issue here. Now,
the CNO has said that we need a 375 ship Navy, that's the right
objective for the Navy. Then the Department in rolling out the
budget request this year indicated that it was scaling up to a
level that would support a 300-ship fleet. As I read that,
that's including the 65 or so LCSs that we intend to buy.
So, it looks to me like we got a situation where CNO is
saying 375 with LCS and the Department is saying 300 with LCS.
What is the status of the 375 ship requirement?
Then is the ``presence with a purpose'' concept of
operations effecting this? In other words, what appears to be
the shift towards developing or relying more on surge
capabilities rather than forward presence effecting the Navy's
judgement about how many ships we need?
Admiral Nathman. Yes, sir. I'll try and take the first part
and I'll get help from Admiral Dawson where I get it wrong,
sir.
I think the targets, the setting was about 375 and included
LCS. The Department of Defense's number doesn't include LCS,
but let me get to that number here in a second.
The view was, particularly after September 11, that there
was a need for the Navy to look at its presence with a purpose
in a global sense. We needed to dramatically change the
striking power that we brought to sea when we were there,
because of these compelling issues you get into in terms of
timing, trying to make a difference, trying to be decisive on
scene, trying to shape the battle space quickly. Because this
is one of the things we're being driven into is this: can we do
things more quickly before things get out of control?
So, when you look at that, the Navy decided that we had to
look at more distributed expeditionary and striking forces
around the globe. We recognize that in support of the Marine
Corps we need to rebaseline our Amphibious Ready Groups into
Expeditionary Strike Groups to really provide the striking
power and the fires that the Marine Corps would need for the
mission and for the striking power for some of the decisive
capability we felt we needed on scene, since we're there.
We call that ``Global Concept of Operations (CONOPs)'' when
you add in the need then for nuclear-power cruise missile
attack submarine missile strike groups for missile defense
groups, you end up with a number that's around 375. That
represents the 37 striking groups that we feel meet the
compelling case for this presence with a purpose.
Now, what is missing in there is we also felt that one of
our compelling needs was the gaps that we have because our
fight is going to the world's littorals; it's not the blue
water fight. That left in 1992, it's gone. So, the compelling
issue was, what were our gaps in the littorals and what were
the anti-access challenges we had when we got into the
littorals? This is where we saw the importance of one portion
of the force being the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to go after
these anti-access, denied access capabilities that could
potentially be cheaply bought by certain countries.
So, the focus of LCS was not only a certain number but the
capability we're willing to put on LCS in terms of mine
warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare effects in
terms of control of the maritime battle space that we had
there. Those numbers combined then with the maritime pre-
positioning force which we see as truly a warship, because of
what it leverages for the Marine Corps and the Navy in terms of
Sea Basing. We roughly get to the number of 375, sir.
Senator Talent. Okay. I hear you telling me and Mr.
Secretary, tell me if this isn't the case. The Navy and the
Department are still committed to around 375, which would
include LCS?
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. Now, I had a conversation with the CNO
about numbers. He asked me a question that began to change my
thinking on this a little bit. He said, ``You know, in the mid-
1980s we had almost a 600-ship Navy,'' and now we don't. He
said, ``But would anybody argue that the Navy is not more
capable today than it was 20 years ago?'' I had to say, ``Well,
no, it obviously is more capable.''
Are you all thinking more in terms of trying to have as an
index of measurement of whether you have a Navy that can meet
the military strategy, defining it more in terms of
capabilities? Is there any process you're going through to
define different kinds of indexes for us so that we can join
you in this and do oversight the way we need to do it?
Admiral Nathman. Yes, sir. I think that's why I'm here
today. There wasn't an N-7 code 3 years ago and now there is,
and it was all about the CNO's angst over, what is our
capability? What is our analysis? What's our unification around
that work, around capabilities? I wanted to give you a quick
example about capabilities, Senator, that may change your view
about being threat-based versus capability-based.
If you build a force that's truly threat-based, you can
potentially over invest in different capabilities into each
different ship type or aircraft type, because the debate
becomes, why don't I put more capability into each different
platform because it may potentially face that threat. When you
do things on a capability-basis you look at the fight in a much
more integrated way. If you look at things in a much more
integrated way, you have opportunities to, what I would say,
more properly proportion your investment to provide the
capabilities you want and to distribute it in an integrated way
which may, I believe, lower the total cost of different
platforms. You get essentially, the same capability but you
potentially get it at a lot lower cost.
I'll give you an example of that. One of the things that we
have in our analysis is a very compelling case about ship
defense. That we have a great amount of layered missile defense
in terms of the air battle, and if you look at the individual
requirement documents that drive the self-defense capability to
those ships, you can potentially over invest in different
systems to protect that ship. But when you look at what an
enemy can potentially do when it has to go through these layers
of air defense to get to the individual ship, you may change
your mind then about how robust those particular systems have
to be. That's not to say we're not going to defend our ships in
terms of self-defense, but it means that you can make better
decisions about the total investment across the missile and air
defense challenges that we have.
So, our campaign analyses, our work is really about
replicating campaign analyses which are close to the combatant
commander's fights. So, they're high fidelity. Then looking at
very particular tactical situations which tend to stress what
the Navy brings, and in some cases the Marine Corps brings,
since the Marine Corps is integrated into these capability-
based situations, then what would you end up with in terms of
the challenges or gaps? This analysis is, I would say, is very
high fidelity analysis compared to 2 years ago. We are really
focused on what are our unique warfighting gaps, what are those
challenges, and then what is the integration of investment that
you want to spend and how do you want to spend it? So, I
believe it's the right approach.
It also allows you then to compete or to make your case
very clearly when it comes to the joint force discussion about
what are the key attributes of what a naval force ought to
bring to the fight.
Senator Talent. I'll get back to that in just a second, but
Secretary Young I saw you nodding your head. Let me ask you for
the record, is the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
still committed to the 375 ships for the Navy?
Mr. Young. Yes, sir. Our budgeted programs put us on a
track to 305 ships. They have been supported and endorsed by
OSD and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). In fact,
they have paid specific attention to our shipbuilding rates. We
are pleased with the nine this year and we are going to keep
working, hopefully as I said, to be successful in increasing
those numbers, because the numbers have to be in a proper place
in the budget to sustain 375 ships.
Senator Talent. Okay. Three hundred and five plus LCS gets
you to around 375.
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. Admiral Dawson, do you want to add anything
to that?
Admiral Dawson. If I could add one thing, Senator.
As we look at our capability-based models, I'd like to
articulate the five things that we factor in there.
Senator Talent. Yes, that would be nice.
Admiral Dawson. We look at how we are most likely going to
conduct combat operations. The second thing we look at is the
potential rules of engagement that we may be faced with when we
go about those operations. The third thing we would look at
would be the bases and the access that might be available to
the naval force as they approach these operations. We were
greatly influenced over the last year on the access that we
were not able to get in Turkey, for example. The fourth thing
that we look at would be systems performance. We look at what
our new systems, that we hope to bring on in the future, will
bring us in the way of capabilities and how they fit into the
joint fight. That would bring me to the fifth point that we
look at. We look at our joint partner and our coalition partner
and what share that they will contribute as we arrive at what
we might need. We then look at the peace-time employment.
That's the wartime scenario. Then we look at the peace-time
employment of the combatant commanders and how they need us to
provide that presence with a purpose around the world.
Senator Talent. I have more, but I want my colleagues to
have an opportunity, so I'll recognize Senator Kennedy for
questions he may have.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to try to understand the numbers. We
were in a gradual declining numbers as I understand from 316
ships headed south for around 275 ships. My question is, if the
Navy can't even afford the 316 ships now, why should we expect
the Navy be able to afford roughly 25 percent more in the
future?
Admiral Nathman. Well, sir, I think part of our answer is
we have a model already for that that's been pretty successful.
On the aircraft side we moved as rapidly as we could out of F-
14s, because of their very high operating cost. We felt like if
we could move out of that faster, we could use the savings in
operations and support of a very high cost aircraft like the F-
14, and then use it to invest in the Super Hornet.
So, that's kind of our model right now in a way. We have
older ships that are capable, but they become compelling in
terms of the sustainment of those particular ships. Do those
particular ships provide the overwhelming capability that we
should protect, or should we look at opportunities to divest as
it were in older ships that take a lot of manpower? We can see
repair cost increasing and then the overall long-term support
of those ships in terms of availabilities or overhaul. Can we
then leverage those savings to move on to the new capabilities
that we want?
So, we looked at some of those ships and we made the
decisions on those based on those capabilities, although
they're effective, they're becoming obsolete and they don't go
towards the gaps that we see in our warfighting capability
analysis, which is the littoral gap and mine warfare and anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) and small surface combatant forces.
So, I believe that drives us in many cases, and we do have
to make affordability decisions in that debate, sir.
Senator Kennedy. How would we deal with the threat if the
Navy is going to be able to support only about the 300 ships,
maybe a few more, perhaps even fewer than that, but would the
Navy still want the fleet to include the 50 or 60 LCS?
Admiral Nathman. Absolutely, sir. First of all, you have to
pick the right warfighting ship and so the LCS goes after our
gaps. So, I think that's the compelling case for LCS, it goes
after the gaps. The more compelling case for LCS might be also
the cost of the ship relative to the ships that it's replacing,
both in terms of the pure acquisition side and the support
side.
So, we are looking now at costing, as I recall, of our
flight 0 with the modules on board. The flight one around $250-
$260 million which includes the modules. So that's a
significant savings in terms of what we outlay towards a
replacement like a straight stick guided missile destroyer.
So, I think we have to make these kinds of decisions and we
have to reshape our force, not only based on what our gaps are
but what our affordability is.
Senator Kennedy. Well, let me ask you, Admiral, I support
the new technologies for the Navy and the Marine team, but I
have some concerns about the Littoral Combat Ship, the program
just generally.
In this case, it appears the Navy has deviated from the
past practice in developing a new ship. Here the Navy looked
where it was weak, you mentioned mine warfare--we'll come back
to mine warfare in a minute. Shallow water, anti-submarine
warfare, defeating the so-called swarm boat attacks and created
a set of requirements about the short-falls. The Navy conducted
a serious analysis to show how well the LCS could handle a
threat. Yet as far as I can tell the Navy spent very little
time figuring out whether the LCS system is the best way of
dealing with a threat. For example, in dealing with Swarm boats
should we send small LCS vessels close to shore to fight it out
or should we develop enhanced weapons fired from helicopters or
fixed wing aircraft to handle the problem? There are all kinds
of other questions such as that.
I can understand the reasons we might want to acquire the
first few vessels to test and develop. Why should we leap into
a 50 or 60 ship program without the analysis that shows the LCS
is the most effective way to deal with the crucial problems?
Admiral Nathman. Yes, sir. That's a great question, sir. I
will tell you that in the last year and a half we put a great
amount of rigor and work into our analysis. Not to bias the
answer towards a Littoral Combat Ship, but to say, ``Does this
capability that we think we will provide, in terms of denied
access, that we want to put in the modules on Littoral Combat
Ship, does it in fact make a difference?'' We use tactical
situations to get down into very discrete looks at its ability
to rapidly clear mines in terms of the northeast Asia challenge
we may have. We looked at some very specific southwest Asia
challenges in terms of constraints on strait passages and mine
challenges there. We looked at a lot of specific ASW
preparation of the battle space that we could get from Littoral
Combat Ship with it's modules in ASW.
So we have some very compelling analysis about the value of
Littoral Combat Ship in terms of closing those key gaps. So, I
think that's a very important validation.
Secretary Young may want to comment on this, but the other
part of LCS is that if you feel like you have a compelling gap,
should you feel bound, or should the Service feel bound that we
should procure in a more traditional way. We may be looking at
years in terms of requirements development, CONOPs development,
what are the particular technologies that we could leverage? It
really says if you feel like you have a compelling gap, the
logic says right away that you have opportunities to spiral in
rapid development of these CONOPs before you make big
acquisition decisions in terms of your budget. Why not rapidly
develop these CONOPs, bring about some maturity in the modules
and then go out and in terms of spiral looks at the investment
and technology that enable you to go after the challenges that
you discovered.
So we think it is a very aggressive but very appropriate
acquisition scheme for the ships, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Well, I think you make a very compelling
case if the LCS is the only way to go. The question is whether,
as I understand for example, the unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV), unmanned surface vehicles (USV), and unmanned underwater
vehicles (UUV) could just as well be deployed from larger
vessels. In fact, the UUV that will conduct mine countermeasure
operations is exactly the same Remote Mine-hunting System
(RMS). The RMS that's now being installed on DDG-51 destroyers.
We've gone through the analysis with aircraft carriers,
concluded that larger is better, hence we have the Nimitz-
class; more efficient for conducting sustained operations.
However, in this case, without much evidence we're making
judgements that smaller is better.
Admiral Nathman. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. This is not necessarily that larger is
better in terms of mine sweepers but merely a point that is an
important burden of proof found that the analysis that you have
to date in terms of meeting those particular threats can best
be done by this system before we buy the 50 or 60 of them.
Mr. Young. Senator, maybe I could amplify your very point.
Many of the missed elements of the mission modules for LCS are
systems that are currently in development and were to be
deployed like RMS, AQS 20 a surveillance system, and RAMICS
which is a gun system to destroy mines, but we have limited
existing space and flexibility for them. The DDGs now are fully
tasked and so we had limited space, flexibility, and
opportunity to put additional missions on those ships. LCS
gives you a platform to carry the systems that we were
developing and need as you've pointed out to handle the mine
problem. It gives you a platform that's going to have 40 or 50
knots in speed, so it can move quickly to those locations. It
doesn't have to be tied to a carrier, which some portion of the
DDG infrastructure is tied to the carrier to help with air
cover. In fact, that is part of the CNO and Admiral Nathman's
CONOPs with this greater air defense capability in the
destroyer, more sorties can be devoted from the carrier to
strike missions and fewer sorties devoted to flying air cover
for the carrier.
The package of analysis says all these things, I believe,
very well. We're using, as you pointed out, the systems that we
were going to deploy on the platforms we have, but now we see a
much better and more effective way to put those systems in the
littorals. Then we find ourselves in situations like Iraq doing
literally thousands of maritime interdiction operations. We're
using a billion dollar destroyer with a 300-plus person crew to
interdict a ship when we have the opportunity with an LCS to
chase those ships down and interdict them with a ship that has
a very small crew.
Some of this addresses your other point, which is that we
have to reduce our operating cost and our manpower cost to
continue the process of recapitalizing the Navy. All the assets
you see us bringing to you in CVN-21, DD(X), and LCS are
smaller crewed ships that have speed and multi-mission
capability to be effective.
Senator Kennedy. Well, that may all be well and good, but I
mean you have these ships going all around as compared to
helicopters that can stop them, stop them in the water or
whatever. You've gone through this, but you've embarked on
another major system and the question is whether all the
alternatives have been thought through and considered as to
meeting the new threat. We've heard very well from the admiral
what those threats are. The real question is whether this is
the best way to deal with it.
This committee, for a long time has been interested in mine
warfare. The Chief of Naval Operations came to the job
promising to make readiness a first priority. I'm concerned the
CNO's priorities may not have followed through with mine
warfare. I'm told that the Navy has cut steaming days for mine
hunters for the fiscal year 2005 budget. Last year, as in the
past, mine hunters were funded for 28 days per quarter. This
budget reduces that to 18 days. While some reductions may come
from improvements and efficiency, it seems unlikely the Navy
can meet the same level of readiness with a 36-percent
reduction in training in 1 year. Admiral?
Admiral Dawson. Yes, sir. We will attempt to mitigate that
with simulation network and training that we'll do with our
mine forces. In some cases we do it netted in with ships that
are operating out of Norfolk and Ingleside and we'll do that
through simulation. But we also are setting ourselves up so
we'll have the investment to invest in these new modules and
these new capabilities that we are going to use that have a
much greater reach and be much more efficient as we look to the
future.
Admiral Nathman. Senator Kennedy, if you don't mind, if I
could pile on to that, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Please.
Admiral Nathman. We've heard the message loud and clear on
mine warfare and I'd like to tell you that in the last year and
a half there's been a lot of personal time here, staff time
invested around the transformational opportunities we have in
mine warfare.
If you look at the world as, if you're not on scene with
your mine sweeper and you have to transit, your timelines are
incredibly long. So, one of the views is, if you continue to
shape your mine-warfare capabilities around your current force
you'll never meet the timelines that our country feels are
appropriate to be decisive on scene.
That's why we put some of our mine forces forward, but the
real commitment here is to transform our mine capabilities so
we can use our organic capability in our Carrier Striking
Groups and our Expeditionary Striking Groups. Now, LCS is a key
part of that, because of the mine modules that we intend to put
in it. If you look at the investment in the MH-60, which can
lily pad off of LCS, and you look at the mine-warfare modules
that we believe are key to the anti-access capability of LCS,
you're going to have a rapid, distributed sea craft out there
with an extensive amount of mine counter-measure capability.
The other part of that transformational plan in terms of
being a full-up round already being there and knowing what the
battle space looks like, is a commitment to the understanding,
the intelligence preparation of the battle space. We see that
in sensors that we're going to put on the tactical unmanned
aerial vehicle (TUAV) on LCS. We see it in our submarine force
on the Long Range Mine Reconnaissance System, which we believe
has a great transformational opportunity in terms of
persistence of that capability in SSGN.
What you do, sir, is you shape the battle space in terms of
your knowledge of it and then you go after the mines you have
to clear instead of the approach we had before, which was brut-
force, I think there's a mine field I'll have to clear it for
the next 10 days. We believe these are keys to not only the
sensor investment but the sea craft investment in LCS. The
concept change of being forward and organic to rapidly change
your mine-warfare capabilities. That's the path we're on.
Senator Kennedy. Okay.
Admiral Nathman. A great amount of intellectual capital was
invested in that to sort of get that right.
Senator Kennedy. I might submit some other questions about
mine warfare. We're still looking 4 or 5 years down the road.
Admiral Nathman. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. We have some real issues.
Is that Admiral Costello I see right behind you? I just
recognized him. Does he agree with everything that all of you
are saying here this morning?
Admiral Costello. You're doing a good job, sir. [Laughter.]
Senator Kennedy. Okay.
Admiral Nathman. He's hit me on the back of the head twice.
Senator Kennedy. I've valued very much his service to my
understanding a lot of the issues in terms of the Navy and of
course he's been an outstanding leader for our forces. I
haven't had a chance to see him back. We welcome you back.
I want to thank you. There are the industrial base issues,
obviously, that are going to be related here.
My general concern is that we're going to sacrifice the
Navy's modernization, constant renewal, and upgrading
technologies for other kinds of purposes on this. I just don't
want to see that. That is a little separate from where we're
going with this new program, but I'm enormously concerned about
that; the role of the Navy. I think you've outlined--I'm
impressed by the thoughtfulness that you're giving to the
nature of the new threat that we're being faced with--how we're
going to get a handle on it from a technological point of view.
I'm sure training and all the rest goes along with it. But we
don't want to see a situation where the Navy wants to get a lot
of smaller ships because the Navy believes it will be postured
to compete for additional resources at OSD rather than buying
some other kinds of systems, which would have more value,
importance, and significance with regard to our national
security.
I'll submit some other questions, but I thank you very
much. Interesting. Thank you.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think we are having exactly the right discussion here
about numbers, the mix, and the capabilities of our fleet.
Often times this debate is framed in terms of numbers versus
capabilities, but the fact is that numbers are part of our
capability. That's why I think the point that the chairman and
the ranking member made about the size of the fleet is so vital
in this debate.
I remember in January 2002 going with a group of my
colleagues to Afghanistan and we also landed on the aircraft
carrier, the U.S.S. Roosevelt, which set a record for the
number of days at sea. I don't know whether that record still
stands, but it was certainly an impressive one. The crew was
very proud of having set that record, but they were all so
exhausted. The fact is, if you don't have enough ships, if the
fleet is too small it doesn't matter how much capability you
have--numbers are part of capability. I think we need to
remember that in this debate.
I very much appreciate the Navy's commitment to fully
funding the procurement of three DDGs in fiscal year 2005, but
I'm very concerned when I look at the impact on the size of the
fleet as well as on our industrial base. That right now there's
a gap with no major surface combatant being purchased in 2006.
I think that'll be the first time if it occurs--I'm certainly
determined to ensure it doesn't, that would ever happen in 20
years that we would not be purchasing a single surface
combatant ship.
Secretary Young, could you address your ideal situation? I
mean would you like to see a procurement in 2006 so that we
don't have a gap that would exacerbate the problem with the
numbers going in the wrong direction, as well as, have
potentially an irreversible negative impact on our industrial
base?
Mr. Young. In the September time frame, Senator, we spent a
lot of effort along the lines of Admiral Nathman's analysis, to
conduct an industrial analysis to understand if we had a proper
transition from DDG to DD(X). It becomes very important what
assumptions you make about whether people succeed in building
out the DDGs faster than planned, or they build to what we have
historically observed. I am convinced that we do have a stable
transition from DDG to DD(X). It is essential that DD(X) stay
on schedule in that transition. We really cannot afford to have
that ship be delayed or slipped. In that process, we could
likely improve that situation by considering advance
procurement in fiscal year 2006 for the second DD(X) or
something that solidifies the bridge between DDGs and DD(X).
There was a time when there were DDGs in the budget. We
indeed have options on the contract in 2006 and there was also
a potential DDG in 2007. Those ships sustain in the budget. So,
this look at the industrial base was important and tells us we
can manage through that transition, but there are steps that
could be taken to make that transition more smooth and less
risky for our industry partners.
Senator Collins. I think this is an absolutely critical
issue and I hope we can work together. I think the idea of
putting in some advance procurement money in 2006 would be
extremely helpful as well to make sure we don't have that kind
of gap.
Mr. Young. We internally keep studying this issue and have
studied multiple aspects. I mentioned in the opening statement
that the DD(X) and the LCS lead ships are research and
development (R&D) funded, largely to establish a production
process. I believe we would like to continue to evaluate the
merits of funding the second lead ship, produced in a different
yard, using R&D funds, that would let both yards have a process
so that they can build the class efficiently rather than
forcing the second yard, albeit building the second ship, to
not having a chance to make budget adjustments or early start
so they can set up their production process properly.
Senator Collins. I think there's a great deal of merit in
funding two DD(X)s out of the R&D budget so that you could
develop the manufacturing process in both yards. I look forward
to continuing to work with you.
I have a second question that I want to pursue with you,
Secretary Young.
When the Navy first awarded the preliminary design
competition for the DD(X) to Northrop Grumman, the Navy
committed at that time to having the competition for the next
stage; the detailed design and initial construction. As you're
well aware, Bath Iron Works in my State was very much looking
forward to the opportunity to bid on that construction
contract.
Now, I understand that the Navy and the Department have
decided to go in a different direction and not to have this
second competition that was originally envisioned and that we
were counting on. Instead, it's my understanding the Navy
intends to award to Northrop Grumman the construction contract
as well.
I have two questions for you if that is the direction
you're going in.
One, if competitors like Bath Iron Works are not going to
have the opportunity to bid, how will the Navy ensure a fair
process for allocating the work?
Second, and very much related to that, specifically if
we're not going to have the second competition that was
promised initially, what role do you anticipate Bath Iron Works
playing in performing this vital work?
Mr. Young. Senator, I'd like to assure you there was a
great deal of deliberation in the decision to change the
acquisition strategy, which I believe has now received approval
through OSD and would let the lead ship to be built at Northrop
Grumman Ship Systems. That decision is a change. There are
multiple reasons for the change.
I would allude back to something I said to you earlier. At
the time we had that strategy we had the likelihood of DDGs in
2006 and potentially in 2007. So, we had a much more robust
transition and an opportunity to run a competition for that
lead ship and not let time be the driver. With those DDGs not
in the budget, the DD(X) as I said, is now critical that it
stay on schedule.
Then you begin to assess the time required and the risk of
that competition. The risk of that competition grows too,
because I now have a National Team working together in
partnership; designers at Bath and designers at Ingalls,
working together to design the ship. Some amount of that energy
would be diverted into preparing competitive proposals for
those ships and that competitive process had the potential to
deteriorate the great team work we have, all of which I need to
have the best possible chance of keeping the DD(X) on schedule.
So, we made a hard decision, a carefully considered
decision to preserve the teamwork and seek to preserve the
DD(X) schedule, I would argue, for the sake of the industrial
base in the transition. In doing that, though, I recognize in
the comments I made earlier that we believe that transition is
not as robust as it could be. A step that we've discussed is
making sure both yards are prepared to transition to DD(X) and
that means both yards need to do some work on the lead DD(X).
I've discussed this with the lead of the National Team, the
head of Ingalls. They've indicated that they fully intend to
provide some initial module work on the lead DD(X) to Bath Iron
Works and have those initial modules built there so they can do
exactly what I've talked to you about, and that's begin to
establish a production practice. We intend for DD(X) to be
built in a substantially different way than DDGs. That's one of
the opportunities to reduce the acquisition cost of the ship.
The positive thing I can tell you is the National Team is
working together very well and the Ingalls side of the National
Team intends to use Bath even on the lead ship. Both members of
the team are prepared to build DD(X) to our current program
plans.
Senator Collins. I appreciate that commitment and that
update. It, obviously, would be unfair if Bath Iron Works is
not going to have the ability to bid on this contract and then
does not get a fair share of the work in an uncompetitive or a
non-competitive environment. So, I think that those assurances
are absolutely critical to making this work and to justifying a
decision to skip over the competition for the next stage.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Talent. I thank the Senator from Maine. Let me
follow up.
I had some questions about DD(X) and LCS. I'll just go to
DD(X) since we were just discussing that.
Now, my understanding is that the Navy's estimated the cost
at $1.2 to $1.4 billion per ship. Is that right, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Young. I'd have to----
Senator Talent. The $2.2 billion, rather--did I misplace a
numeral there?
Mr. Young. Well that might be closer to the lead ship cost.
Then over the class of the ship--depending on what year dollars
it could be in that range. I think it will be closer to the
$1.4 billion range over the class in prior year dollars.
Senator Talent. Yes, I was going to ask, because that range
seemed to me to be a rather wide range and I was going to ask
why such a wide range. But you think it's more $1.4 billion
over the class?
Mr. Young. Can I offer you some detailed information for
the record?
It's a 14,000 ton ship. Today's DDGs are about a $1.1
billion at 9,000 tons. Tonnage, complexity, the other factors
will, I believe, guarantee that ship is at least more than the
$1.1 billion DDGs and I'll get you the precise estimates for
the record.
Senator Talent. What I'm getting at, again where the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is at, which is $1.8 billion,
the cost per ton displaced would put the cost more at $2.2
billion. Are you comfortable that this is going to come in at
the cost level you think it's going to come in at?
Mr. Young. Well, if $1.8 billion is in then year dollars in
2010, I'd just like to get the inflation factors and tell you
that answer.
Senator Talent. Okay. Can you do that for the record?
Mr. Young. I mean $1.1 billion today in 2004 is probably
$1.3 or $1.4 in 2010. Then when you add the tonnage and the
additional systems that are on DD(X) it--the factors--it could
be a $1.8 billion ship in then-year dollars.
Senator Talent. Okay.
Mr. Young. It'd be better, though, for me to get those
numbers for you for the record, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Fiscal year 2005 President's budget request for the DD(X) lead and
follow ships construction:
DD(X) PROGRAM FUNDING
[In millions of dollars]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
PB05 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total \1\
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDT&E
Lead Ship Construction.......................................... 0 0 0 103 288 294 353 269 1,307
Detail Design/Nonrecurring \2\.................................. 0 0 0 118 349 252 127 87 933SCN
Ship Number 2................................................... 0 0 0 0 49 (AP) 2,004 0 0 2,053
Ship Number 3................................................... 0 0 0 0 49 (AP) 1,493 0 0 1,542
Ship Number 4................................................... 0 0 0 0 0 49 (AP) 1,729 0 1,778
Ship Number 5................................................... 0 0 0 0 0 49 (AP) 1,494 0 1,543
Ship Number 6................................................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 (AP) 1,695 1,744
Ship Number 7................................................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 (AP) 1,478 1,527
Ship Number 8................................................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,523 1,523
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Additional funding required in fiscal year 2010-2011 to complete construction of lead ship.
\2\ Non-recurring costs include Detail Design, transition to production of ship and mission systems, non-recurring test events, allowance for production
engineering, special tooling, jigs, and fixtures at the shipyard, arid a greater allowance for change orders.
Senator Talent. Has a hull been chosen?
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. Okay.
Mr. Young. It's a tumble-home hull and we've sized the hull
through some very deliberative discussions with the
requirements community at approximately the 14,000 ton level.
We've made some compromises, sir, to ensure we control cost
of this ship. The compromises are all over the board from the
size of the ship to a slightly smaller magazine for gun rounds.
We changed the rate of fire on the gun from 12 to 10 rounds per
minute and that made the gun mechanism significantly less
complicated, less heavy, and less costly. We continue to work
diligently to make proper cost trades to hold the cost of that
ship down, sir.
Senator Talent. Okay. Maybe for the record, you give me
those in detail?
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Reduced number of vertical launch missile cells from
128 to 80.
Reduced total gun magazine capacity from 1,200 to 600
rounds.
Reduced rate of fire of gun system from 12 to 10
rounds per minute.
Senator Talent. Now, on the whole issue of the schedule,
which Senator Collins testified or touched on. I'm worried
about the industrial-base issues, because we may have a gap
already as it is at Bath.
My understanding is that you're going to try a new software
design tool with DD(X). Is that true?
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. Are you concerned, given the experience in
the past with new software design tools, that that might mean
delay?
Mr. Young. Sir, I think the one experience that's relevant
in a lot of peoples' minds is LPD 17.
Senator Talent. Right.
Mr. Young. There was truly a new design tool that had
really not been applied to a warship or a ship of nearly the
complexity of LPD 17. There were significant growing pains.
Frankly, the design tool had to be developed and evolved while
the ship was being designed and that's exactly where you don't
want to be.
I think a more relevant example here is the Virginia-class
submarine which was designed with what I understand to be CATIA
4. It was fairly effectively used, has shipbuilding capability
and certainly CATIA 4 has gone through some growing pains to be
able to be used for Virginia-class. But the Virginia design-
build, the direct translation from design to production has
worked very well.
What is intended for DD(X), and this was the subject of an
Executive Committee meeting where all our industry and Navy
partners met, is that we will use CATIA 5 for DD(X). Those
choices reflect the reality that CATIA 4 may not be supportable
into the timeline we have for designing DD(X). We may get some
significant benefits in CATIA 5 and then people who have
trained on CATIA 4 have good skills and can easily translate to
CATIA 5. In fact I think you'll see potentially even some
Virginia-class designers helping Bath and helping the National
Team work on DD(X), but I think we feel comfortable.
There's always a slight risk, but I think it's not even
remotely the kind of risk we lived through on LPD 17 given
CATIA 5s evolution.
Senator Talent. I'm glad to see you understand the danger
with a gap to the industrial-base. I was pleased with your
answers to Senator Collins.
General Magnus, General Hanlon, I want to make sure you
guys get involved in this and you knew I was going to ask about
AGS for DD(X). Are you satisfied with where we're at now?
General Hanlon. Yes, sir. It is something that I speak
somewhat frequently with Admiral Nathman and Secretary Young
about. To answer your question, Senator, right now, yes, we
are.
Senator Talent. That it will meet the requirement for the
Marine Corps?
General Hanlon. As it stands right now--as I understand it,
yes, sir, it does. I mean it's the 10 rounds per minute that
the Secretary talked about. We'll certainly match up with the
battery equivalent that we use in the Marine Corps for that
same requirement, yes, sir.
Senator Talent. You guys continue to believe very strongly,
don't you, that you have to have fire support from the Navy to
meet your requirements, and you can't do this with naval
aviation? You can't do it any other way?
General Hanlon. Well, sir, I guess I would answer that
question by saying that the application of fires on the battle
field comes from--you have to have more than just a single
capability such as air-delivered. Certainly as marines we do
depend a great deal on our aviation-delivered fires, and we
also depend a great deal on our own organic artillery fires.
But we've always believed that naval surface fire support gives
us a very important capability, particularly early on in any
operation in the littorals. When you're in those very difficult
and tenuous opening hours, opening days of any kind of
operation where you're actually projecting power, sure.
Obviously, in World War II if you can go back in history, I
think it was our naval surface fire support that really ensured
victory both in Europe and the Pacific and it was used with
great effect. Quite frankly, with the kinds of capabilities
that I think that DD(X) in particular will bring with the AGS
and the kinds of rounds that are being developed for that
system. I think it will enable us to really reach targets deep
inland to support, particularly, our deeper ship-to-objective
maneuver that we'll be doing in the future.
So, I'm very pleased with it. I think the DD(X) from my
perspective is exactly the right ship for the right time. I
think it's going to help meet our requirements quite well.
Senator Talent. This kind of an exchange just raises the
whole question that I wanted to go into a little bit in this
hearing, even with numbers as a benchmark. In other words, how
far out on a margin of risk do you want to put our marines or
our soldiers or whatever.
When you measure the Navy in terms of capabilities you're
adding a second moving target to that. I'm not saying it's a
wrong thing to do, I really am buying into this analysis that
we have to start expanding how we think about naval power. It
makes all these questions even more indeterminate for you and
for us.
That really wasn't a question, it's a comment. Let me do a
couple more questions on LCS and then, I know Senator Kennedy
had some more questions that he wanted to ask.
Senator Kennedy. Senator? One second.
General Magnus. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add to what
General Hanlon has said.
We have worked very intensively with our shipmates,
particularly, over the last 2 years. Some real experience with
deep and unexpected combat operations at ranges that, quite
frankly, the United States and most other powers haven't seen
for generations. This is clearly a combined arms problem.
Referenced to earlier discussions about the Littoral Combat
Ship. Literally, we have to be able to not only get our forces
from the sea base to the sometimes very deep objectives, but we
have to ensure that they are shielded as they go through the
air and sea. So therefore it's a combined arms problem.
We rely explicitly upon the Air Force to provide certain
capabilities. This is not just the Marine Corps or just the
Navy/Marine Corps. So, we have taken a look over time and the
problem changes over time, the role of naval guns and naval
missiles. Early on in the fight, as General Hanlon mentioned,
the role of naval aviation with new aircraft like the Super
Hornet and the Joint Strike Fighter to come and the new
precision-guided munitions, persistent surveillance, and
increasingly capable and, quite frankly, safer weapons. Safer
for the crews that deliver them, safer for the troops that are
engaged in close combat on the ground.
So, we continue to look at this. As we evolve new gun
systems off new platforms, new command and control and new
persistent surveillance we're going to see this problem change
over time, but it remains and we believe it will remain a
combined arms problem. We work intensely on analysis on this
because we know these are very important questions for the
troops on the ground and they're also extremely large
investment decisions as we move into the future.
Senator Talent. Well, that's really why I asked it, because
so many of the recent operations have been very far inland, 100
miles inland where what you needed is smaller amounts of fire
support, very precise. What I was asking was have you looked at
the lessons learned and has that effected your thinking about
AGS? I hear you telling me, ``Yes, we have looked at the
lessons learned. We know it's a combined arms type thing.'' But
you still think we need the fire support of the two guns and
AGS?
General Hanlon. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. Or DD(X). Yes.
General Hanlon. Sir, I will tell you, in fact knowing you'd
probably ask the question, I even brought our lessons learned
book here, because I'm responsible for collecting that for the
Commandant. That's what we've been doing from Operation Iraqi
Freedom. One of the things that we looked at, in fact, was that
it was more than 100 miles, Senator. In fact, in some cases,
part of the 1st Marine Division, if you take from the time they
left the line departing in Kuwait till the time that they got
to Tikrit was like 500 miles. If either one of you had asked me
a question a couple of years ago, ``Did you think marines would
do that?'' I agree with General Magnus, it surprised even us
that we did that and we were able to do it as well as we did.
Clearly, in that particular campaign we relied primarily on
air-delivered and ground-delivered weapon systems. But had we
been in the position where the operation would have been where
we could have used a DD(X) type of vessel, particularly early
on, we certainly would have used those fires. Absolutely.
I think the thing that's significant about these newer
systems coming on, Senator, is that they do give us the deep
reach that we don't have today with our naval surface fire
support. So, that's why it's important.
Senator Talent. I know Senator Kennedy has a few more
questions. I'll go ahead and recognize him.
Senator Kennedy. Just a couple of areas. General Hanlon, on
these central themes and your presentation to the subcommittee
on sea-basing, we're very familiar with the previous Marine
Corps discussions of operation-maneuver-from-the-sea and ship-
to-objective-maneuver. We're also familiar with the previous
discussions of such concepts as mobile off-shore basing. So,
how does the sea-basing concept differ from the previous Marine
Corps strategies? From the mobile off-shore base concept?
General Hanlon. Sir, the way we operate today as marines is
primarily from our L-class amphibious ships and our maritime
pre-positioning squadrons, and have used them so successfully
in Operation Desert Storm and in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
They're great capabilities. Certainly we've seen that. But as
we looked into the future in talking about a capabilities-based
force, we just knew that we had to do things differently in the
future. I thought Admiral Nathman's comment earlier when he
said something--I think he said, ``Do things more quickly
before they get out of control,''--was a great comment that he
made, because this kind of goes to the heart of what I think
sea-basing is all about. It also touches a little bit, I think,
on what Admiral Dawson said when he mentioned the example of
trying to get the Fourth Infantry Division through Turkey and
the problems we had doing that.
It is our belief that one of the things that will be very
important for us to do, we'll have the requirement to move
combat forces into a theater of operations faster than what we
can do today. In fact, we're looking at timelines somewhere
from 10 to 14 days, a brigade size force. To be able to do that
without having to absolutely depend on airfield or seaports
given to us or offered to us by someone. We'll be able to use
the sovereignty and the CNO talks about this all the time; the
ability to use the sovereignty of the sea to be able to project
American power where we need to.
So the sea-basing, I think Senator Kennedy, really
dovetails very nicely on the previous work we've done with
expeditionary maneuver warfare. Sir, we've talked to you in the
past about where we went with operational-maneuver-from-the-sea
and ship-to-objective-maneuver. In order for us to do that,
sir, we needed to have a foundation. The foundation was this
new sea-basing concept, which is something that both the Navy
and the Marine Corps are fully committed to.
So that's what we're working on right now. It is a
significant change, sir. I mean it really is a significant
change, because it will enable us for the first time, really to
marry up these pre-positioning ships of the future with our L-
class ships while we're at sea. Be able to actually receive
marines or other joint troops at the sea-base, actually have
them fall in on their gear, actually have them go to the
objective that they're going to assault. Be able to sustain
them from that sea-base and to be able to bring them back to
re-calibrate and re-cock them for further operations. That's
something we cannot do today, sir.
We just feel that in the future, particularly with the
emphasis on force protection, that this becomes something
that's very important. Did that answer your question?
Senator Kennedy. Yes. I think that's very interesting. I
think that you're looking over Iraq now and this enormous
transition that's going to take place and the gathering of
these troops in these kinds of areas and the vulnerability that
they were going to have, and security issues. I mean that seems
to be an attempt to try and deal with some of those kinds of
issues. Which I think probably makes a great deal of sense.
General Hanlon. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Let me just finally ask about the
industrial base, Secretary Young. At the posture hearing
Secretary England said that, ``The updated surface combatant
industrial base study was finished. The Navy will be ready to
brief the study later this week.'' Well, today is later in the
week. [Laughter.]
Senator Kennedy. Is there anything you can tell us about
the results of the Navy's latest look at the health and
prospects for the surface combatant industrial base?
The previous study said that, ``The two ship yards, Bath
and Ingalls need three DDG-51s per year, plus additional work
to remain viable.'' The shipbuilding plan for 2006 shows no
DDGs and no DD(X) in fiscal year 2006. So, I suppose we're
going be interested in what's going to happen.
Mr. Young. Yes, sir. If the Secretary said it will be
briefed this week, it'll be briefed this week. [Laughter.]
I have a draft of it here, it's in final signature process
and I think we will get it out. I'll tell you that the study
says much along the lines of what we discussed today. That is
that the transition has the potential to negatively impact
workload at the surface combatant yards. That the transition--
we believe we can confidently manage the DDG, the DD(X)
transition it is critical for the DD(X) program to stay on
schedule to support that transition.
Senator Kennedy. I know there will be a lot of interest in
that and we'll have a chance to, I'm sure, go into that in
greater detail down the line.
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. It was very
interesting, very helpful. I thank our panel.
Senator Talent. I have a few questions, also. Let me go
ahead and take care of my questions regarding the CH-53X. I
guess this would be for General Magnus.
Evidently, as I understand it or as you were looking at a
service-life extension program (SLEP) or a remanufacture
program for CH-53 you're now going to build a new CH-53 with a
mix with MV-22s. It's going to be, as I understand it, a 76
percent to 24 percent mix of MV-22s to CH-53. Is my
understanding basically correct?
I'm kind of hanging on by my fingernails, so tell me if I'm
going to fall off or not here.
General Magnus. The exact mix is something in our study now
and we'll study over time particularly with lessons learned,
Mr. Chairman, from OEF and OIF where we found ourselves not 20
years in the future but in the here and now projecting larger
forces, deeper in sustained operations. So, again, we continue
to reflect just like with the naval fires, what does this mean
about our previous plan about the mix? Quite frankly, the
capability and the affordability of these different mixes.
But, Mr. Chairman, you're correct. We have taken a look at
the CH-53 program and Mr. Young may wish to offer some comments
on top of that.
But we've looked at essentially remanufacturing which takes
the given number of airframes that we have and we've already
retired our first CH-53s into the desert, because of the life
on the airframe. So, before we could actually get into a
SLEPing the few that we have then the numbers decline due to
peace-time attrition. We find that those airframes have to be
SLEP'd by 2012 but the numbers will continue to decline.
So SLEPing them, even with improved rotor heads, improved
electrical hydraulic systems, potentially new engines, taking a
look at the cost of that given that the inventory steadily and
relentlessly declines and yet we see an increased requirement
for heavy lift helicopters, the V-22 completely replacing in a
literally transformational way, the CH-46. Things like KC-130s
because of the deeper operations we realize that the numbers
are not there to sustain even a remanufacture program.
So, we have to go forward in the acquisition process to be
able to get the appropriate approvals for the consideration of
putting not the old CH-53 but a new CH-53 potentially back into
production.
Senator Talent. Okay. So, you're not committed to anything
like, at this point, a three to one mix of MV-22 and CH-53, or
is that where you think you're headed?
General Magnus. That is approximately the mix if we were to
sustain the present force structure and transition CH-46s into
MV-22s and CH-53s into the CH-53Xs. But as I said, Mr.
Chairman, it's not like we're coming up with dramatic
surprises, but the pressure on Marine aviation has made us much
more sensitive to the need for vertical lift. Not only from
sea-basing but vertical lift just to sustain operations ashore.
This has become in the last 1 to 2 years a very important and
daunting realization on the part of our shipmates and us in
terms of what kind of platforms do we need at sea to support
what kind of aircraft to project and to provide a persistence
to the forces as they operate, sometimes very deep and very
relatively high intensity operations. Although, they're not
necessarily the kind of operations we foresaw 20 years ago.
Senator Talent. All right, well I'm interested in your
analysis supporting the mix when you've completed that. It
sounds like it may be premature; you're headed there but you're
not there yet. I would be interested in it.
General Magnus. Mr. Chairman, we will provide you some
additional information for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The current Marine Corps Aviation Plan (AVPLAN) proscribes 22 MV-22
squadrons with 12 aircraft each (2212=264 aircraft). We are
converting 15 active duty CH-46 squadrons, 3 active duty CH-53D
squadrons, 2 Reserve CH-46 squadrons, and 2 Reserve CH-53E squadrons.
The AVPLAN also plans for 6 CH-53X (now Heavy Lift Replacement
(HLR)) squadrons of 16 aircraft each (616=96 aircraft). This
will convert six active duty CH-53E squadrons to HLR squadrons.
This produces a ratio of 264:96, or 2.75:1. Note that these numbers
of aircraft are less than the total procurement objective for both MV-
22 and HLR; they do not include aircraft needed to account for the
Fleet Replacement Squadron (Training Squadron), pipeline aircraft,
attrition, HMX, or Developmental/Operational Test.
The total numbers of aircraft, as outlined in the Programs of
Record, needed to support Marine Corps requirements are based on
numerous studies and analyses done by both internal departments and
external agencies/companies.
Senator Talent. Okay. Thank you. Does the fiscal year 2005
budget request reflect the decision to acquire new build CH-
53X?
General Magnus. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget
does not.
Senator Talent. Does not reflect that decision, because
you're not quite there yet? Okay.
General Magnus. That decision is still being worked within
the process of requirements and acquisition.
Senator Talent. Okay. On LCS, Admiral Nathman and Secretary
Young, let me get in the cost issue here, because I think
Admiral Nathman you said, ``$250 million, $260 million,''
that's where you think the ship is going to come in and that's
the frame and the modules? Did I understand that right or
Secretary Young if you--who ever wants to answer this.
Mr. Young. I tell you we've set a couple of different
targets. One is that the objective cost range for the ship is
$150 to $220 million and we'd like to be in the low end of that
range.
Senator Talent. Is that for the ship or the frame?
Mr. Young. For just the sea frame.
Senator Talent. The frame, yes.
Mr. Young. Then over some reasonable average procurement
unit cost we'd like the ship with the modules to cost about
$250 million. Those are goals we've set for ourselves.
Senator Talent. Okay. Well, this is kind of what I'm
talking about, because we didn't really do an analysis before.
Contradict me if I'm wrong, but before we made the decision to
go with LCS as opposed to some other way of meeting the
requirements, we didn't do all that thorough an analysis. My
gut is that you're absolutely right with this program. I have
been supportive of it.
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. But we didn't do the analysis then and now
it sounds to me like you're saying, ``You'd like it to come out
at a certain point,'' but what we need, don't we, is an
analysis of how much the modules are going to cost to do what
we're requiring them to do.
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. So, are you getting the cart before the
horse in figuring out what number you want before you do the
analysis?
Mr. Young. Well, we have identified what we think is the
composition of the first three core modules if you will. Mine
Warfare, ASW, and a Submarine Warfare and then the Surface
Warfare Module. Those module prices incorporate largely
existing systems from Fire Scout to RMS, the AQS 20 to RAMICS,
et cetera. So, we can cost those out with some precision today
and the very first modules we have a piece of paper we can
provide to you for the record that suggest those modules, I
think the Mine Warfare Module would cost on the order of $135
million today. The Surface Warfare module might cost in the
order of $45 to $50 million today. Those prices, the rates will
go down if the lead ship with the lead module in the worst case
would be $220 million plus $130 million would be $380 million.
But if the ship comes in at $150 million and the module is $130
million, we're close to our $250 million and we're going to try
hard to work to that goal.
[The information referred to follows:]
The projected cost of the three Flight 0 mission modules (Mine
Warfare (MIW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Surface Warfare (SUW))
are as follow:
MIW Module: $132.9 million
ASW Module: $89.6 million
SUW Module: $46.2 million
Senator Talent. Some of the modules are going to cost a lot
less than the $130 million?
Mr. Young. That's the highest priced module based on our
current estimate and configuration, $130 million, and that
price at volume or at a higher rate of procurement will come
down.
So, I think the goal is well within reach, reasonably set.
It will force continued discipline on the system which is
healthy.
Senator Talent. Okay. This is the first time I've heard the
$250 million figure. So, the total cost of the program, of
course adjusted and everything, will be 65 times that.
How many modules do you anticipate you're going to need?
Mr. Young. Maybe I should make sure Admiral Nathman has a
chance to comment on that.
In our program of record in the near term, through 2007, we
have budgeted funds to buy four ships and seven modules. Then
we're going to keep working through the operational doctrine to
tell us exactly what the right quantities of each set of
modules; mine warfare, ASW, and surface warfare, as well as the
proper ratio per ship to accomplish the mission.
Senator Talent. Would you anticipate that the total number
of modules will be in that same ratio as in the first five--
seven to four or do you know?
Admiral Nathman. I'll try and address that one, sir.
Let me give you just a kind of a quick example. Suppose you
had significant warfighting mine clearance issue with your LCSs
and they were forward. You might have five of them forward in
your squadron. You may chose to have one LCS run the TUAVs that
are looking for the mines because that might be a more
efficient way to look at it. While the other LCSs are actually
using the surface and the unmanned vehicles as part of that
mine module total capability.
So, you may be better off in terms of distributing those
modules inside those capabilities over those numbers of LCSs in
that squadron. So, you wouldn't necessarily outfit each
squadron. So, I think what we're into right now is detailed
work about the proportionality of the modules per LCS, the
ratio, as well as what's the best way to have those things pre-
positioned or to go forward. In some cases we believe strongly
that a lot of the helicopter equipage, which is a follow-on to
the MH-60, will now go on to LCS.
So, I think we have to get into some of those details. If I
could reclaim my number a little bit there, I was trying to
indicate where we felt the costing of these modules might go.
Secretary Young's point, we understand a lot of these things
are current capable capabilities that we have in terms of RMS.
So we can price them quite well. But there is a potential to
understand that if you saw an opportunity to change the
persistence of a particular module whether making smaller
investments and say its engine or its payload capacity, that
might be a very wise investment. So, there's got to be some
liquidity, I believe, in this investment.
Senator Talent. Well, I agree. I'm trying to be as
sympathetic as I can, but I mean we're talking about a new
ship, a new platform. We didn't have the analysis before.
Admiral Nathman. We have it now.
Senator Talent. We're not sure how many modules we're going
to get. You just mentioned the MH-60s, have you determined how
that's going to effect that inventory, whether we're going to
need more of those?
Admiral Nathman. That was the idea. Sir, we basically
already arrived at that, because we had the helicopters forward
but they lily pad, as it were, to the LCS.
Senator Talent. We have a very aggressive acquisition
schedule, and I appreciate decisiveness. Now the cost is pretty
liquid as well, and we have to have something to go by when we
authorize these programs.
So, at a certain point, and I would like it to be sooner
rather than later, we're going to have to start getting some
fixed numbers on some of these issues. With an understanding
that in the course of when you do your lean manufacturing
techniques and you take advantage of technology in the course
of building these ships that that number may come down or you
may want to make some variations. We just need to come to some
kind of an agreement for how we can do some oversight on this
that still allows you the flexibility you need to make this
ship as good as it can be.
Mr. Young. Could I offer a couple of comments?
The demand for these ships is pretty substantial.
Senator Talent. Right.
Mr. Young. We have three ships under lease that are smaller
versions or comparable in capabilities to what we seek in LCS.
I think the Marine Corps would say they've been wildly
successful. The Fleet Forces Command and Admiral Fallon would
say similar things. So, the demand and the push on the
acquisition system is there, we would like to change how we do
business and the fleet is asking for these assets. Those assets
that have been leased are easily costed in an open marketplace
at approximately $100 million. So, we believe that $150 million
target is very achievable.
We're in source selection on LCS right now, so we should,
by the end of May, sir, be able to tell you what LCS or LCSs we
want to buy. We're going to be able to offer you great fidelity
to the discussion you want to have with us.
Senator Talent. Let me just ask you about something that
came in this afternoon, you have two items relating to LCS; the
TUAV and the modules a $48 million item and a $74.7 million
item on the unfunded priority list. Are you familiar with that?
Admiral Dawson. The CNO's list, sir?
Senator Talent. Well, it is the CNO's unfunded program, I'm
sorry. I'm just wondering why anything on this ship is on the
unfunded priority list given the the importance of and the
aggressive acquisition schedule. Can you tell me what I'm
talking about, Admiral Dawson, or could somebody?
Admiral Dawson. The CNO wants to be as aggressive as he can
with this concept and he sees as an opportunity to get ahead of
our CONOPs problem by putting these modules out there to
improve the flight-zero demonstration and CONOPs validation. So
why not take the opportunity to, since we're going to have the
flight-zero ships, why not get the modules on there and get
ahead of that particular problem.
Senator Talent. These weren't funded. These are on the
unfunded list.
Admiral Dawson. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. For 2005?
Admiral Dawson. For 2005, yes, sir. He saw this as an
opportunity to try and do this faster.
Senator Talent. Yeah, well I don't understand why it would
be on the unfunded priority list then.
Mr. Young. Sir, in the interest of information exchange,
what's funded in 2005 is the mine-warfare module, which is one
of the highest priorities. In 2006 we have the first ASW
antisubmarine warfare and surface warfare module.
Senator Talent. Okay.
Mr. Young. I think what you'd be seeing given the CNO's
testimony to the subcommittee, I think even yesterday that he
wanted this, or this capability ``tomorrow morning'' as he
would like to pull the ASW and SUW modules forward.
Senator Talent. I see what you're saying. Your saying if we
don't get it in 2005 it will be on the 2006 funded priority.
So, that's why you were saying he's moving it up.
Mr. Young. It is budgeted in 2006, sir.
Senator Talent. Hopefully, he can get it anyway. I got it.
All right.
Admiral Dawson. What you'll see on that unfunded list are
those things that as we put together our program we just didn't
have the resources to get to. You'll see them next year.
Senator Talent. I get you. You're hoping to sneak it in
putting it on the unfunded priority. I get you. Well, we'll see
what we can do about it.
Mr. Young. Sir, I support the President's budget. I
absolutely understand. [Laughter.]
Senator Talent. Let the record show the witnesses made no
response to the comment that I made.
Do we need prototypes, prototype squadrons with LCS, are
you thinking along those lines to make certain that they'll
perform the way you want them to perform? Have your tests to
this point been adequate? What do you think?
Admiral Nathman. Where we are right now, sir, there is a
strong fleet linkage in this concept of sea trial of developing
the deployment concept for the size of those squadrons. The
proportionality of what's forward and what's in the rear. One
of the views of LCS is we should deliver a high availability,
these should come with a high availability. They should be able
to stay on scene for some time. It would be a mistake to have
these go back and forth across the Pacific Ocean frequently.
One, it's going to drive down the utility of the ship, it's
going to eat up hull life, so why not have them forward as much
as we can.
Senator Talent. Yes.
Admiral Nathman. So, we're kind of pinning around this
concept of keeping them forward, keeping them ready to go and
then putting them in terms of pre-cursor ops in front of the
Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Strike Groups to shape
the battle spaces that needs to be shaped. In some cases
prepare the battle space in terms of intelligence and other
cases actually do mine-warfare clearance or ASW precursor ops,
those kinds of things which lead the striking group.
So, that's the connection of Littoral Combat Ship to our
total force. It isn't just out there to be by itself. It's a
very coherent look at how the ship--how that then leads to some
basing concepts of being forward and in the rear. Do you want
those ships in the rear to act as a training squadron--but some
ought to be there, obviously, to replace, because some of these
are going to have to come back for their availabilities and
repair. In some cases like we see on all our ships, some
overhauling that provides for the sustainment of the force.
So, that right now we're doing strong analytic work in
terms of proportionality, but also dealing with Fleet Forces
Command and our experimenter, the Navy Warfare Development
Command up in Newport, Rhode Island to get this concept pinned
down.
So, I think we're awful close on that, and we have a lot of
contributors that you would expect from the different fleet
agencies to make sure that we have this concept right. But we
see it forward with a certain proportion of LCSs----
Senator Talent. So in view of this work you're doing now,
you don't think you need prototype squadrons?
Admiral Nathman. I think when they go forward, they're not
going to be proto-typical. So, I think they're going to do real
work.
Now, you're going to learn a lot in the spiral of your
demonstration and some experimentation, but the compelling need
is there. So, we feel like they should go forward and so why
slow down?
Senator Talent. Okay.
Admiral Nathman. You can learn as much by being forward as
you can by doing a lot of testing in the rear. So, I think
we're--we'd be comfortable--I'm probably setting policy for the
CNO, but I believe we would know that we need to be forward
with these and where we'd learn more about those ships.
Senator Talent. Enough good thinking beforehand and having
worked with the groups they'll be attached to so you don't need
it.
Yes, Secretary Young?
Mr. Young. I'll join Admiral Nathman by going out on a limb
here and tell you that I think this is analogous to what we are
doing with the Marine Corps right now. We have a team, we've
dubbed it ``Operation Respond.'' We have a war council with
General Hanlon that is seeking to identify tools, technologies,
and systems that can support the Marines so they are effective
and safe in Iraq. If we see something that can be deployed and
that they're willing to take with them, we're putting it there
with them.
It is Secretary England's first priority. He's willing to
get field experience with systems. I think the CNO is with him.
We have the two leased high-speed vessels (HSVs) that are doing
LCS like operations right now, so we are beginning to inform
ourselves on the CONOPs and the capabilities. The Marines are
working with a leased ship in the Pacific using it in a
slightly different way, more logistically. But all those pieces
of information are informing the CONOPs that Admiral Nathman is
building and I think lead all of us to feel like two things; we
will do more experimentation. We may do some of that
experimentation at home, but the capability is so useful to us
we would have these ships doing maritime interdiction in Iraq,
in the Persian Gulf, right now if we had them.
Admiral Dawson. Senator, if I could?
Senator Talent. Go ahead.
Admiral Dawson. I'd like to add to that having just come
last year from Norfolk with Second Fleet, we were very excited
down there that we'll get one of these LCSs. We'll integrate it
with our Carrier Strike Group and the training and the
operations that we're doing. Then we'll unleash the genius of
our people and we're going to discover things that even with
the prototypes that we had we never thought of before. As soon
as we get them that will be unleashed. That's what the CNO
wants to get them.
Senator Talent. Well, let's just hope we can get from here
to there without any major problems we can't overcome.
There's a vote on. I've basically finished my questions. I
will probably have some questions I can submit to you, General
Magnus, on the expeditionary fighting vehicle (EFV) and some
issues there. I covered most of what I wanted to. Thank you all
for your time. We all appreciate it so much, as well as your
service to our country.
The subcommittee is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
mine warfare capability
1. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Dawson, at the hearing I raised the
issue of the cut in steaming days for mine hunters in the fiscal year
2005 budget request. In prior years, the Navy funded mine hunters to
conduct 28 days of training per quarter. This budget reduces that
training to a level of 18 days per quarter. You indicated that more
training will be accomplished by using simulations. Could you identify
what new simulation capability or other training enhancements will
allow these important forces to maintain readiness to exercise this
important, perishable capability?
Admiral Dawson. Mine Warfare is looking at more efficient ways to
train our sailors in order to both save money and maintain readiness
levels. Pier side training and taking advantage of the classrooms and
simulators available at the newly expanded Mine Warfare Training Center
will be fundamental in helping us maintain readiness.
Within Navy schoolhouses, new Mine Warfare simulation capability
and training enhancements that will exist by 2005 include the AN/SQQ-32
(V2) and (V3) variable depth minehunting sonar system simulator. This
provides introductory and component level systems training for the
Mineman enlisted rating. The simulator is located at the Mine Warfare
Training Center, in Ingleside, TX, and will train approximately 80
personnel annually. There are four different Navy Enlisted
Classifications (NEC) associated with this training. This training also
has the potential to be used as a fleet asset for ``just in time''
training as well as for refresher skills training.
guided projectile delays
2. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Young, 3 years ago the Navy was
projecting that the extended range guided munition (ERGM) program would
achieve initial operational capability (IOC) in fiscal year 2004, a
slip of some 2 years from the original goal. Two years ago, the Navy
informed the subcommittee that ERGM will achieve IOC in fiscal year
2005. Now this year, we are told that ERGM will not achieve IOC until
fiscal year 2008. Why should the subcommittee have any confidence that
the Navy and the ERGM contractor team can meet this new schedule to
deliver this important capability to the fleet?
Mr. Young. Until recently, the ERGM program was schedule driven,
which did not allow adequate time to address technical problems
identified during testing. That approach, using strict schedule
adherence, is no longer the standard ERGM operating process. The
current proposed program plan for continuation of flight tests provides
additional schedule margin to allow time to address technical issues.
We will not field the ERGM round until it is fully tested.
For the most part, the ERGM design has been demonstrated to work
during testing. A few remaining technical problems were identified
during the last round of flight tests. Solutions to recent ERGM flight
test technical problems have been identified and are being implemented.
A rigorous engineering test and evaluation approach has been developed
to resolve these design deficiencies and validate the corrective
actions. Prior to proceeding with flight tests, a series of laboratory
and component level gun launch validation tests are being performed to
verify technical solutions. Using this new methodology, more subsystem
components will be subjected to validation testing to provide higher
confidence levels prior to the next set of flight tests.
3. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Young, what, if anything, do the
continuing ERGM problems tell us about the risk for fielding the
projectile for the advanced gun system in the DD(X) on time?
Mr. Young. What we learned from the ERGM program is the importance
of mitigating risk at every step of the development process for
fielding new ordnance. The Navy has implemented this philosophy as we
develop the Long-Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP), which will be
the principal round for the Advanced Gun System (AGS) aboard DD(X). The
LRLAP schedule provides for significant subcomponent build and test,
iterative build and test of the guided flights, and time to correct
problems should they arise. The LRLAP schedule also includes a land
based test plan that completes 3 years prior to DD(X) IOC. We also
reduce overall risk by building the projectile, magazine and the AGS
from the ground up. Unlike ERGM, where the projectile had to be
designed to fit an existing gun system, LRLAP, magazine and AGS designs
can be modified to reduce risk, improve overall system design, and
increase reliability.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
submarines
4. Senator Reed. Secretary Young, Admiral Nathman, and Admiral
Dawson, there are two less submarines between fiscal year 2007-fiscal
year 2009--how do you intend to get these subs back?
Mr. Young, Admiral Nathman, and Admiral Dawson. The 1999 Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Attack Submarine Study, which
supported the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, identified that a
minimum force level of 55 attack submarines is required to ensure the
combatant commanders maintain sufficient capability to respond to
urgent crucial demands without gapping other requirements of high
national interest. The current build rate falls short of supporting
that number. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is currently
evaluating SSN force structure and build rate issues and will report
their recommendations later this year.
5. Senator Reed. Secretary Young, Admiral Nathman, and Admiral
Dawson, you estimated that repairs to the U.S.S. Hartford would cost
about $9.4 million. Will this unexpected cost impact any of your other
programs?
Mr. Young, Admiral Nathman, and Admiral Dawson. At this time we do
not anticipate this cost to impact any program outside of Ship Depot
Maintenance. The repairs to U.S.S. Hartford are now completed at an
actual cost of $6.917 million.
The ship maintenance budget contains provisions for emergent repair
requirements, determined by historical costs and actual operating
months for each ship class. The impact the Hartford will have on ship
maintenance is dependent on what other emergent repairs develop during
the remainder of the fiscal year. If other emergent repairs exceed the
amount available, other maintenance work could be deferred.
6. Senator Reed. Secretary Young, Admiral Nathman, and Admiral
Dawson, what is and will be the submarines role in intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)? How vital is it?
Mr. Young, Admiral Nathman, and Admiral Dawson. The submarine is an
essential resource in our Nation's ongoing ISR efforts. The covert,
persistent nature of submarine platforms provides warfighting
commanders with the access and dwell time necessary to conduct the
long-term ISR of potential adversaries. It is this persistent ISR that
will provide us with the intelligence preparation of the battlespace
(IPB) needed to prevail in future conflicts. Additionally, the
submarine uniquely provides the ability to survey the undersea domain
in littoral areas. As we have seen in recent conflicts, the dependence
on maritime provisioning and the need to project power into the
littoral maritime environment requires unprecedented IPB in this area
to combat the assymetrical threats posed by submarines and mine-laying
operations.
7. Senator Reed. Secretary Young, Admiral Nathman, and Admiral
Dawson, in your opinion, how many submarines are needed for the ISR
mission?
Mr. Young, Admiral Nathman, and Admiral Dawson. Submarines are
multi-mission platforms that satisfy a number of combatant commander
critical mission requirements of which ISR is a part. The 1999 CJCS
Attack Submarine Study, which supported the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review, identified that a minimum force level of 55 attack submarines
is required to ensure the combatant commanders maintain sufficient
capability to respond to urgent crucial demands without gapping other
requirements of high national interest.
research, development, test, and evaluation
8. Senator Reed. Secretary Young, the Navy's justification for
reducing the naval force was based on the increase in new technology
that calls for less manpower. Is a $1.4 billion increase in research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) enough to move from legacy
equipment to the next generation of combat power?
Mr. Young. Most of our RDT&E funds are tied to acquisition programs
of record whose purpose is to move us to the next generation of combat
power. The fiscal year 2005 request fully funds these RDT&E programs to
achieve their targeted next generation capabilities. In addition, the
fiscal year 2005 request includes $1.7 billion for science and
technology programs that will move us toward advanced combat power for
the generation after next.
littoral combat ship
9. Senator Reed. Admiral Nathman and Admiral Dawson, the Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS) is being planned to have interchangeable mission
modules. What are the benefits of these modules?
Admiral Nathman and Admiral Dawson. Interchangeable and
reconfigurable mission modules are beneficial from both operational and
life cycle cost perspectives.
From an operational perspective, modular mission packages give the
Joint Commander maximum capability and flexibility. They offer maximum
capability because each LCS ship, when fitted with a given mission
package, will contain more advanced technological assets to bring to
bear in a particular warfare area than would be possible with a multi-
mission ship fulfilling the same mission. An LCS ship configured to
perform ASW, for example, will carry a remote MH-60R helicopter, three
Vertical Take-Off Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, an Unmanned Surface Vehicle
and an unmanned underwater vehicle (both equipped to search for
submarines), and other ASW equipment.
Modular mission packages allow maximum flexibility because the
Joint Force Commander can change the focused mission of each LCS based
upon changing requirements in theater. To change the focused mission of
an LCS ship, a modular mission package and a team of mission
specialists to support that package are sent to the ship. Within just a
few days, the focused mission of this ship has changed to match the new
threat. With LCS, a single ship can bring an unprecedented capability
in a particular warfare area--Mine Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare or
Surface Warfare--and can change that focus rapidly as theater
requirements evolve.
A ship that conducts only one focused mission at a time can be
smaller in size (and therefore less expensive to construct than a
larger multi-mission combatant). Moreover, since mission packages would
be shared among all the LCS ships in the fleet, we need only procure
that number of mission packages needed to meet anticipated theater
threats. For example, instead of buying an ASW suite for every surface
combatant in the fleet, with LCS, we need only buy a fraction of the
total force of LCS ships. (The precise number of mission packages to be
procured is part of the Force Structure Studies currently being
undertaken by the Navy).
The old paradigm of a fleet of large multi-mission surface
combatants, each equipped and manned to fight a number of warfare
areas, is swept away by a new concept: Plug in the mission you need,
with the mission specialists required, to meet the threat faced by the
Joint Force Commander.
10. Senator Reed. Admiral Nathman and Admiral Dawson, how and where
will the modules be changed?
Admiral Nathman and Admiral Dawson. For LCS Flight 0, mission
packages will be changed in port. This port could be in the Continental
United States, or anywhere overseas where our ships normally make calls
into port. A crane is the only off-ship equipment required to handle/
change mission modules. A threshold value of 4 days time for Mission
Package Change Out is required for Flight 0; the objective is 1 day.
For LCS Flight 1, our eventual goal is mission module change-out
capability at sea. This will be accomplished by continuing to drive
toward common unmanned vehicles that are inherent to the ship and do
not change with mission packages. Since these vehicles are the largest
part of each mission package, this would greatly reduce the amount of
equipment requiring movement during a mission package change-out
evolution. We are also looking at sensors and weapons that require
smaller footprints. These efforts will greatly improve staging and
change-out options, including the use of current Underway Replenishment
Ships, MPF(F), and Carrier Strike Group/Expeditionary Strike Group
ships.
11. Senator Reed. Admiral Nathman and Admiral Dawson, are you
considering whether Military Sealift Command ships can be fitted to
carry the modules?
Admiral Nathman and Admiral Dawson. Yes. For Flight 0, we have
evaluated numerous transportability requirements for the LCS modules
including use of Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships. MSC and other
ships that can handle a 20-foot standard container can support LCS
mission modules. For Flight 1, we are working to develop common
unmanned vehicles that remain on the sea frame and do not change with
mission packages. Our goal is to develop sensors and weapons with
reduced footprints, in order to allow for their movement via all
underway replenishment ships, including MSC ships.
maritime prepositioning future force
12. Senator Reed. General Hanlon, what capabilities does the
Maritime Prepositioning Future Force (MPF(F)) provide that you do not
have today?
General Hanlon. The envisioned capability improvements of MPF(F)
will allow the Navy-Marine Corps team to provide up to three Marine
Expeditionary Brigade sets of prepositioned warfighting capabilities to
unified combatant commanders to meet mission requirements, from the sea
without reliance on host nation support.
The Maritime Prepositioning Force has demonstrated that it is a
significant capability and has grown to become one of the key elements
of our Nation's maritime forward presence strategy.
Anticipating that access denial will continue to be a critical
determinant for overall strategic decisionmaking, actions conducted at
and from the sea, that have been traditionally conducted in host nation
ports/airfields, will substantially enhance our Nation's response
options.
MPF(F) will continue to provide essential prepositioned supplies
and equipment to our combatant commanders. Moreover, it will be an
integral part of a sea-based operational environment that promotes
significantly enhance interoperability among elements of the sea base.
Those elements include the Carrier Strike Group, Expeditionary
Strike Group, Maritime Prepositioning Group, Combat Logistics Force,
and other maritime forces. Those ``other forces'' can appear in several
forms including an Amphibious Force/Marine Expeditionary Brigade, U.S.
Army flotilla force, or afloat coalition forces.
13. Senator Reed. General Hanlon, what is the relationship between
MPF(F) and amphibious platforms? Why is it critical that you retain
both?
General Hanlon. While it is important to draw the distinction
between the MPF(F) and amphibious shipping, it must be emphasized that
they are two distinct entities possessing individual capabilities yet
inextricably linked to each other. In our view, MPF(F) and amphibious
shipping are neither interchangeable nor competing platforms. Our
Nation's anti-access strategy requires both capabilities. Amphibious
ships use the sea as maneuver space in support of forcible entry
operations and enable embarked forces to remain at sea for extended
periods to conduct forward presence missions.
Amphibious assault ships embark, deploy and employ maneuver forces
for conducting forcible entry operations in non-permissive
environments. They provide critical capabilities; the ``big deck''
amphibious ships are the centerpiece and principal MAGTF C2 and
aviation support platforms.
MPF(F) is a transformational component forming the back bone of a
future sea base. MPF(F) supports crisis response thru prepositioning of
equipment and sustainment, enabling the closure of up to a MEB sized
force onto a squadron of ships designed to be more operational than the
ships we have today, but not to the extent of our amphibious fleet.
MPF(F) will be designed for early force closure, amphibious force
interoperability, sustainment, and reconstitution and redeployment--
from a sea base.
The synergistic effect of MPF(F) and amphibious platforms is a core
capability of the seabase that must be maintained. Together they
provide a littoral presence and power projection capability without
rival.
14. Senator Reed. General Hanlon, what are the top three components
required to make seabasing a reality?
General Hanlon. As the core of Naval Transformation, seabasing will
provide the operational and logistical foundation to enable the other
pillars of Naval Transformation, namely Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea
Base, and FORCEnet. These components are key to making seabasing a
reality.
Seabasing, envisioned as a national capability, is our overarching
transformational operating concept for projecting and sustaining multi-
dimensional naval power and selected joint forces at sea. As stated by
the Defense Science Board in its August 2003 Task Force report:
``Seabasing represents a critical future joint military capability for
the United States.''
From a more functional perspective, force closure/arrival and
assembly, sustainment, and reconstitution and redeployment are three of
the key components that need to be developed to make seabasing a
reality.
Force closure/arrival and assembly pertains to closing the
force to the platforms with prepo'd equipment and making them
combat ready.
Sustainment includes the ability of the seabase to receive,
manage, and distribute required resources seamlessly. Selective
offload is a key component of the onload and offload of
maritime prepositioned equipment and supplies in support of
general purpose forces.
Reconstitution and redeployment allows for the recovery of
personnel and equipment, refurbishment and follow-on
redeployment depending on mission requirements.
The Marine Corps and Navy are committed to developing a seabasing
capability that will provide a critical joint competency for assuring
access and projecting power that will greatly improve the security of
the United States. The marked increase in our warfighting capability
will be apparent as we introduce new systems such as the MV-22 Osprey,
the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the
Lightweight 155mm Howitzer into our force structure, using them to
enhance the already potent combat power of our Marine Air-Ground Task
Forces as integral elements of our Nation's joint force.
[Whereupon, at 3:37 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Talent (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Talent and Kennedy.
Majority staff members present: Ambrose R. Hock,
professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
member; and Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell and Sara R.
Mareno.
Committee members' assistants present: Lindsey R. Neas,
assistant to Senator Talent; and Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to
Senator Kennedy.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. TALENT, CHAIRMAN
Senator Talent. Welcome, everybody. Today the Seapower
Subcommittee meets to receive testimony from the top leadership
of the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). I
will go ahead and give my opening statement and, if Senator
Kennedy, who I understand is on his way, has arrived, then we
will defer to him for his opening statement, and, if not, then
we will go ahead and begin with the witnesses' statements. Then
when the Senator gets here he can give his opening statement or
wait until his question period, whichever he would prefer.
We are pleased to have General Handy with us, who commands
USTRANSCOM and the Air Mobility Command. John, thank you for
coming today. Also, Vice Admiral Brewer, who commands the
Military Sealift Command--Admiral, thank you--and Major General
Dunwoody, who commands the Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command, formerly Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).
It is good to have you with us, General. It is hard for me to
keep up with the names, so I keep reminding myself. Thank you
for taking time out of your busy schedules to be with us today.
The strategic lift of personnel and material is a crucial
enabling ability that allows this country to project deterrent
and, when required, striking force to execute the National
Security Strategy. The United States Transportation Command is
responsible for the strategic lift.
Much has been accomplished in this country's ability to
transport large quantities of material around the world since
this was determined to be a limiting factor in the buildup for
the first Gulf War in 1990-1991. Learning the lessons of this
war, the United States has made significant investments,
particularly in sealift and in the maritime prepositioned
force, that greatly cut down on the time to quickly get the
bulk of material to the most likely theaters of operation. It
has been estimated that 95 percent of equipment in peacetime is
moved on the sea.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff delivered a report to Congress in
2002 known as the Mobility Requirements Study for 2005 (MRS-
05). This study determined that the problems with sealift had
largely been resolved, but that there was still a significant
shortage of strategic airlift. With the approval of a multiyear
procurement program for 60 additional C-17 aircraft, which will
bring the inventory up to 180 aircraft, and a modernization
program for the fleet of C-5 aircraft, much is being done to
address this shortage.
This study was done, however, using the two major theater
of war National Military Strategy (NMS), which has changed. In
its report last year, the Senate Armed Services Committee
directed that a report be delivered that would verify the
relevance of the numbers established by MRS-05 in light of more
recent events, of which we are all aware.
The committee has received this report and the report
postulates that the MRS-05 moderate risk strategic airlift
requirement of 54.5 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) is
understated. Specifically, the report estimates a more
realistic moderate risk requirement for strategic airlift with
the current National Military Strategy would likely fall in a
range between 57.4 and 60 MTM/D.
The report also highlights the need for an updated Mobility
Capability Study (MCS) which would define requirements in light
of the new NMS. The report concludes with the recommendation
that to meet the increased demand the C-17 production needs to
continue to a minimum of 222 aircraft and that an appropriate
number of C-5s be modernized.
Section 132 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004 would prevent the Secretary of the Air Force
from reducing the inventory of C-5 aircraft below 112 until an
evaluation of a C-5A aircraft, which has incorporated the
reliability enhancement and reengining program modification,
has been operationally evaluated.
In addressing the shortfall in strategic airlift, it is
crucial to get the mix of C-17 and C-5 inventories with their
unique capabilities correct.
The subcommittee is also aware that the Secretary of
Defense has designated the Commander of USTRANSCOM as the
distribution process owner who will be the single point of
contact for logistics and who must synchronize the entire
supply chain from factory to foxhole. We are going to be very
interested in how your command intends to implement this
guidance and is in fact implementing this guidance.
Again, we would like to welcome you here today and thank
you for your service and the service of all the men and women,
military and civilian, in your commands and the sacrifices of
their families. We have received your written statements and
they will be made a part of the record.
Since Senator Kennedy has not yet arrived, I think we will
go right to the statements of the witnesses. Again, I want to
welcome all of you. Let's begin with General Handy.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN W. HANDY, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND; ACCOMPANIED BY MAJOR GEN. ANN E.
DUNWOODY, USA, COMMANDER, SURFACE DEPLOYMENT AND DISTRIBUTION
COMMAND; AND VICE ADM. DAVID L. BREWER, USN, COMMANDER,
MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND
General Handy. Thank you, Senator Talent. I would first
start out by saying how pleased all three of us are to be
here----
Senator Talent. This is a joint statement, I am sorry. Just
go right ahead.
General Handy. That is right, sir.
I am certainly pleased to be here with my two component
commanders and, of course, as you pointed out, I am the air
component commander as well. We are thrilled to be here. We are
very anxious to entertain your questions. As you pointed out,
our statements have been submitted for the record and we would
like to get right to the questions. So thank you for inviting
us here, and we are ready.
[The prepared statement of General Handy follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. John W. Handy, USAF
introducing the united states transportation command (ustranscom)
As we enter a new year, our Nation remains globally engaged with
terrorist entities whose stated aims continue to threaten the freedoms
we, as Americans, all know and cherish. United States military forces
remain deployed worldwide to combat this menace. Simultaneously, we are
engaged in monumental nation-building efforts in southwest Asia,
multiple peacekeeping operations in locations worldwide, and on guard
against a continued threat on the Korean Peninsula. The heavy demands
on American forces highlight the dangerous and unstable world
environment existing today.
As a combatant command uniquely structured to execute a global
mission, USTRANSCOM provides air, land, and sea transportation for the
Department of Defense (DOD), in peace and war. USTRANSCOM provides the
synchronized transportation and sustainment which makes possible
projecting and maintaining national power where needed, with the
greatest speed and agility, the highest efficiency, and the most
reliable level of trust and accuracy. To accomplish USTRANSCOM's day-
to-day joint mission, we rely upon our component commands: the Air
Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC), the Navy's Military Sealift Command
(MSC), and the Army's (Military) Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command (SDDC) (formerly known as the Military Traffic Management
Command). The component commands provide mobility forces and assets in
a force structure supporting a seamless transition from peace to war.
USTRANSCOM functions as an integrated team, focusing the total synergy
of the entire Defense Transportation System (DTS), including both
military and commercial transportation assets.
USTRANSCOM's imperative is to provide consummate support to the
warfighter. Simply put, we have three wartime mission objectives:
1. Get the warfighter to the fight.
2. Sustain the warfighter during the fight.
3. Bring the warfighter home after the fight.
Today's regional combatant commanders rely more heavily than ever
on the strenuously tasked mobility forces as the number of missions and
challenges facing them continues to increase. It is important to note
that USTRANSCOM is only postured--from a force structure perspective--
as a one major war force. Regardless, USTRANSCOM supports not one, but
all other combatant commanders simultaneously, placing a premium on our
lift assets. Additionally, USTRANSCOM's ability to support multiple
competing demands is constrained by access and force flow dynamics. Our
limited transportation assets rely on an optimized force flow to meet
demands. In a dynamic political-military environment, requirements can
quickly exceed capabilities.
USTRANSCOM's approach to posturing and improving itself to meet
DOD's demanding distribution mission today and the increasing demands
of tomorrow requires flexibility. Three themes guide our course:
Theme One: Investing in the care and quality of
USTRANSCOM's most valuable resource--its people.
Theme Two: Continued transformation of key processes
leveraged by information technology to provide seamless, end-
to-end distribution management for defense.
Theme Three: Maintaining readiness and modernization
to perform our global mobility mission.
ustranscom in 2003 and 2004
The operational tempo (OPTEMPO) inherent in the build-up and
execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the continued prosecution
of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and the ongoing support to
Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) made 2003 a challenging and truly rewarding
period in USTRANSCOM's history. The statistics are mind-boggling:
between September 2001 and February 2004, USTRANSCOM moved 3,072,471
short tons of cargo, 1.79 billion gallons of fuel, and 1,189,968 troops
in support of OEF/OIF. Here is the big picture--in the largest and most
demanding test of our total lift capability since Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, USTRANSCOM delivered the necessary combat power to
Iraq faster and more efficiently than ever before. The men and women of
USTRANSCOM, in concert with our Service partners and commercial
teammates, have performed brilliantly.
Our military's freedom to operate overseas is possible only through
the continued defense of our homeland, and USTRANSCOM remains an
integral part of that defense, as it has been since the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001. AMC KC-135 and KC-10 air tanker aircraft,
representing active duty, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard
assets, have continuously supported Air Force combat aircraft
patrolling the skies of the Continental United States (CONUS) in
support of ONE and other routine duties.
AMC tankers flew 1,704 missions refueling 3,684 receivers while
supporting combat air patrols over our major cities and sporting
events, continuing one of the highest air refueling operational tempos
ever experienced within CONUS. Over 75 percent of these were Air Force
Reserve and Air National Guard missions flown by volunteer ``citizen-
airmen.'' Additionally, while today's actual number is classified, I
can tell you that the majority of the airlift on alert to respond to
any United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) deployment order
belongs to the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. Since the
beginning of fiscal year 2003, USTRANSCOM aircraft have carried 1,618
passengers and 461 short tons of cargo in the course of 29 airlift
missions in support of ONE.
While concurrently providing global support to all combatant
commands, we focused considerable effort and assets toward ensuring the
successful execution of OEF/OIF. OEF/OIF now ranks as the largest
passenger airlift in history. Only the Berlin Airlift (1948-1949)
exceeds it in terms of number of missions and tonnage flown, with OEF/
OIF airlift moving 882,609 short tons of cargo to date.
Airlift played an integral part in expediting critical shipments
and facilitating force maneuver. A spectacular example of this
capability began on the night of 26 March 2003, when AMC C-17 aircraft
successfully airdropped 1,000 paratroopers of the Army's 173rd Airborne
Brigade into Northern Iraq to bolster anti-Saddam Kurdish forces after
Turkey's refusal to permit the U.S. use of ports and forward bases.
This was the largest air insertion since 1989's Operation Just Cause in
Panama. Subsequent to the airdrop, C-17s executed a larger movement
over five evenings, flying 62 missions from Italy into airfields in
Northern Iraq. They deployed 2,000 additional troops, more than 400
vehicles, and 3,000 short tons of supplies and equipment, solidifying
coalition combat power on the northern front.
AMC air tanker crews were instrumental in the initial success of
OIF operations, completing 2,000 refueling missions through 1 May 2003
in support of strategic airlift and inter-theater deployments. To date,
AMC KC-135 and KC-10 crews had completed 4,768 refueling missions in
support of United States Central Command (CENTCOM) operations. Tanker
assets under the operational control of CENTCOM amassed over 9,000
sorties with more than 40,000 receiver contacts, offloading over 475
million pounds of fuel through the end of the fiscal year to sustain
critical CENTCOM warfighting operations. Additionally, OEF support in
the United States Pacific Command's (USPACOM) area of responsibility
(AOR) accounted for an additional 163 air refueling missions.
During the build-up for OIF, USTRANSCOM planners focused on
maximizing the utilization of sealift whenever possible and avoided the
reliance on airlift that characterized the initial phase of OEF in
2001. The total sealift tonnage greatly surpassed the tonnage airlifted
to Southwest Asia in support of OIF. With the cooperation of CENTCOM
leadership, USTRANSCOM achieved a more effective balance between
airlift and sealift in guiding mobility operations. This collaboration,
combined with the skills of SDDC port managers and MSC vessel
operators, resulted in the deployment of 910,000 short tons on 155
voyages between December 2002 and 1 May 2003. From 1 May 2003 to date,
an additional 68 voyages brought over 433,000 short tons to Iraq and
the surrounding area for a grand total of over 1.3 million short tons
delivered via sealift. Some 76 voyages redeployed more than 556,000
short tons during that same period. By striving to leverage sealift
first in deployment operations, CENTCOM and USTRANSCOM took advantage
of a sealift fleet greatly expanded and modernized since 1991.
In striking contrast to past practice, we successfully implemented
a ``force packaging'' strategy during OIF that synchronized the
movement of combat-ready modules of unit equipment (``force
packages''). This strategy allowed units like the Army's 101st Airborne
Division to quickly and coherently assemble upon debarkation overseas.
SDDC loaded the entire division, nearly 4,000 vehicles and 250
helicopters, on only 5 vessels that offloaded overseas in just a 12-day
period, adding striking power to the combatant commander's arsenal in a
fraction of the time required during Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm. It ensured the integrity and rapid availability of a combat-
effective fighting force far faster than the prior piecemeal movement
of unit equipment.
USTRANSCOM relies on its commercial transportation industry
partners and associated labor organizations to provide significant
transportation capability during contingencies. OEF and OIF are no
exception. Participation by commercial passenger airline and maritime
companies gave AMC, MSC, and SDDC a vital extra edge in moving forces
and equipment to support operations in Iraq. Chartered aircraft moved
78 percent of deploying troops during the build-up and 85 percent of
deploying troops during the major combat operations. On 8 February
2003, 51 passenger aircraft from 11 commercial companies activated
under Stage I of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). CRAF aircraft
deployed 254,000 troops on 1,625 missions through 18 June 2003 when the
aircraft were deactivated. Similarly, the number of ships under MSC's
operational control supporting sealift operations jumped from a
``normal'' of approximately 22 ships to a peak of 127, including 40
government-owned ships from the Maritime Administration's (MARADs)
Ready Reserve Force (RRF). This transition from a peacetime environment
to a contingency footing enabled USTRANSCOM to deploy the military
equipment and supplies needed to support OEF/OIF operations. In fact of
the total 1,189,968 passengers moved during OEF/OIF, 75 percent were
moved by commercial means, and 25 percent by organic airlift.
The large medium speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) vessel emerged as
USTRANSCOM's strategic sealift success story. Procured based upon the
lessons of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 18 LMSRs completed 38
total voyages during initial OIF deployment operations, lifting more
than 5.3 million square feet of cargo. This was approximately 26
percent of the total requirement. By comparison, one LMSR in OIF
carried the equivalent of six commercial charter ships during Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm. From another perspective, it requires 300
C-17s to deliver the amount of cargo carried by one LMSR. Of the 3.1
million short tons moved during OIF/OEF, 74 percent was moved by
surface, 26 percent by air (past 6 months, 85 percent moved by surface,
15 percent by air). Of that 74 percent moved by surface, 37 percent was
moved by commercial charter and liner service.
The intensive combat operations experienced during OIF
significantly increased the patient movement OPTEMPO in the CENTCOM
AOR. USTRANSCOM's Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center (JPMRC)
originally deployed to the theater supporting OEF. There they performed
as a patient movement management cell coordinating the movement,
aeromedical and otherwise, of sick and wounded personnel from the AOR
to higher levels of care in Europe and the United States. The JPMRC
maintained 100 percent in-transit visibility (ITV) of patients entering
the patient movement system via the USTRANSCOM Regulating and Command
and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES). Coupled with the ability to
utilize aircraft within the theater of operations or in-system to
quickly respond to casualty movement requirements, aeromedical
evacuation (AE) forces have successfully moved over 17,000 patients
from the CENTCOM area of operations to date. The JPMRC ensured the most
seriously ill or injured individuals quickly reached higher-level
medical care. More than 9,800 of those movements occurred between 19
March and 30 September 2003, with a total of 1,993 patient movements
during the 42 days of major OIF combat operations, 19 March through 1
May 2003. Not a single patient died while in the capable hands of
USTRANSCOM's AE professionals during that period.
Additionally, TRAC2ES has become the centerpiece of homeland
defense patient movement planning. With "lift-bed planning" capability,
TRAC2ES is key to managing large numbers of casualties that might occur
during natural disasters or terrorist attacks. Further development is
planned to integrate TRAC2ES fully within the National Disaster Medical
System.
USTRANSCOM continued its contributions to the OEF-related detention
of large numbers of al Qaeda, Taliban, and other detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba detention facility in support of the United States
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). USTRANSCOM airlift missions sustained
detention operations through the movement of over 7,000 passengers
(U.S. military personnel as well as over 100 detainees) and 133 short
tons of supplies throughout the fiscal year. Detainee missions required
intense security methods and the support of 45 air refueling missions
to move to and from Guantanamo Bay. In a twist from the previous year,
these missions included the repatriation of detainees released from the
facility once it was determined they no longer posed a threat to U.S.
interests. With the significant numbers of detainees remaining at
Guantanamo Bay, we continue to transport necessary supplies and
equipment via barge from Jacksonville, Florida, averaging 440 short
tons per week.
Despite the extraordinary focus required to conduct support
operations for ONE/OEF/OIF and other contingencies, USTRANSCOM
continued to support the rotation of U.S. forces participating in other
contingency and peacekeeping operations around the globe. Prior to the
completion of Operations Northern and Southern Watch at the initiation
of OIF combat operations, USTRANSCOM delivered over 13,400 passengers
and 3,300 short tons of cargo via airlift to locations in Turkey and
Kuwait. In Kosovo (KFOR) and Bosnia (SFOR), a combination of commercial
and organic airlift transported more than 18,000 passengers and 1,080
short tons of cargo to and from the area. Meanwhile, surface and
sealift components loaded and transported another 5,040 short tons in
support of these long-standing operations. Additionally, from July to
September 2003, USTRANSCOM airlift elements delivered 764 passengers
and 798 short tons of cargo to Senegal in support of Liberian
peacekeeping operations.
USTRANSCOM continued support to over 130 combatant command and
Joint Staff-sponsored exercises during fiscal year 2003. These are some
of the more notable ones. From February through April of 2003,
USTRANSCOM supported the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and
Integration (RSOI) exercise in the Republic of Korea via the airlift of
5,805 passengers and 597 short tons of cargo, and the sealift of an
additional 715 short tons. From February through July of 2003,
USTRANSCOM supported Exercise Cobra Gold in Thailand through the
airlift of 11,166 passengers and 784 short tons of cargo, and the
sealift of 21,142 short tons of supplies and equipment. From June
through September 2003, USTRANSCOM assets once again supported
deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, this time delivering 6,922
passengers and 615 short tons of cargo via airlift, and an additional
3,614 short tons of equipment via sealift for Exercise Ulchi-Focus Lens
(UFL).
The command also actively participated in the planning and
execution of several other key exercises instrumental to improving
DOD's ability to deploy and sustain forces. Exercise Turbo Intermodal
Surge (TIS) exercised deployment of unit equipment from home station to
deployed locations using commercial intermodal container systems and
container ships. Exercise Turbo Containerized Ammunition Distribution
System (CADS) exercised the movement of containerized munitions from
CONUS depots to installations overseas using commercial and DOD
intermodal systems. Finally, Exercise Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore
(JLOTS) demonstrated the capability to offload/onload vessels off-shore
for deployment/sustainment operations in a port-restricted environment.
JLOTS techniques and equipment utilized in Kuwait in support of OIF
were key to the successful deployment of munitions and sustainment
cargo, providing a ready solution to the restricted port environment
encountered there.
Not all operations were contingency or exercise-focused. AMC
aircraft flying in support of Operation Deep Freeze, the ongoing
National Science Foundation (NSF) research program in Antarctica,
delivered a total of 7,802 passengers and 2,310 short tons of cargo.
Four MSC-chartered vessels delivered an additional 12,745 short tons of
dry cargo and 14 million gallons of fuel for the NSF community. As a
side note, USTRANSCOM fully supports the United States Coast Guard's
(USCG's) efforts to enhance its ability to maintain the sea ice channel
to McMurdo Station through reliability improvement and service life
extension projects for its aging Polar Class icebreaker fleet. These
two vessels, the United States Coast Guard Cutter (USCGC) Polar Star
and USCGC Polar Sea, are critical to keeping the vital sea lines of
communication for sustainment open to Antarctica.
Humanitarian relief operations on Guam after Super Typhoon Pongsona
in December 2002 required a mixture of 24 military and commercial
airlift missions to deliver 108 passengers and 1,165 short tons of
humanitarian relief supplies. In February 2003, USTRANSCOM supported
recovery efforts after the tragic Space Shuttle Columbia mishap via six
total airlift missions. Finally, in October 2003, AMC C-130s configured
with the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System performed 60 drops (over
16,000 gallons of retardant) to help extinguish the California forest
fires, preventing further loss of lives and property in the region.
USTRANSCOM also continued high priority and time sensitive airlift
support for the President of the United States. AMC aircraft completed
a total of 234 airlift missions in support of the President, flying the
Commander in Chief to Mexico, the Azores, Northern Ireland, Europe,
Southwest Asia, Africa, the Western Pacific, the United Kingdom, and
Iraq.
people: ustranscom's greatest asset
To meet America's transportation challenges, USTRANSCOM must first
continue to develop and retain a talented and motivated mobility team.
USTRANSCOM's strength, readiness, and warfighting capability depends
upon these exceptional people and their extraordinary efforts to
execute USTRANSCOM's global mission every day. Throughout DOD, we must
remain sensitive to pay and quality of life issues and their associated
effects on our service members. Meeting the needs of our people leads
to increased readiness and higher retention and is absolutely the right
thing to do.
In addition to compensation considerations, OPTEMPO, personnel
tempo, and increased home station workload are other factors that
negatively impact our retention efforts. Our personnel spend a great
deal of time away from home. Those not deployed must work harder to
compensate for deployed personnel and training time lost to previous
deployments. Our peacetime workload is often as heavy for active duty
personnel as wartime, and is even more arduous for our guardsmen and
reservists. They must balance high OPTEMPO demands with the stresses of
civilian careers. USTRANSCOM and our components have taken steps, such
as using Army National Guard security forces to augment base security,
to mitigate the effects of the unprecedented peacetime OPTEMPO. We are
taking additional measures, such as increasing support manning and
aircrew-to-aircraft ratios to the new levels required. Nevertheless,
many members are leaving for more stable and predictable civilian
careers. Now is the time to correct the people-to-mission mismatch.
Another USTRANSCOM area of concern is the availability of a
sufficient number of qualified civilian mariners willing and available
to fulfill the additional requirements created by the activation and
long-term operation of MSC and MARAD surge sealift vessels. Volunteer
commercial mariners crew the surge vessels. The decline in U.S. flagged
fleet size, increased training requirements, and more attractive shore-
side employment have led to a decrease in the number of fully qualified
mariners. Fortunately, mariner availability was sufficient to
consistently ensure on-time vessel activation of the 50-plus ships
supporting OEF/OIF, to include Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), LMSRs, a
hospital ship, and numerous MARAD RRF ships. Since the entire surge
fleet was not activated and because no wholesale crew rotations were
required for OEF/OIF, there remains uncertainty regarding the ability
of the maritime industry and maritime labor unions to produce an
adequate number of fully trained and qualified mariners to fulfill the
additional requirements created by the full activation of all MSC and
MARAD surge vessels for a prolonged period. However, in the future,
there are no guarantees that sufficient mariners will be available when
needed.
USTRANSCOM, MSC, SDDC, and MARAD support the maintenance of a
viable U.S. mariner pool through enforcement of cargo preference
requirements, support for the Maritime Security Program (MSP), and
vigorous maritime training and education. MSC has initiated a
collaborative effort with USTRANSCOM and MARAD, in concert with the
maritime industry, to revalidate and compare the peacetime/wartime
requirements of mariner qualifications and availability in order to
specifically identify potential shortfalls. Initial comparison of
requirements against qualified mariners indicated potential shortfalls
of certain unlicensed mariners during a worst-case scenario if all
surge assets are activated for the long term (i.e., greater than 6
months), requiring a full rotation of all crew billets. Further,
MARAD's 2002 Mariner Survey regarding mariner ``willingness and
availability'' to sail when requested also predicts potential
shortfalls in both licensed and unlicensed mariners during a worst-case
scenario. As a result, we continue to urge the administration and
Congress to support programs to promote the expansion of the U.S.
merchant mariner pool.
Support for our people is required in other areas as well. The
increase in the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) in the past few
years, brought about through DOD's Housing Requirements and Market
Analysis Program and BAH Initiative, has had an extremely positive
impact on the quality of life of our military members and their
families. With these recent BAH increases, more service members are
finding it easier to locate affordable housing within their local
areas. Continued congressional support to ensure out-of-pocket expenses
are eliminated will help more service members locate affordable and
suitable housing within their communities.
The movement of service members' personal property in conjunction
with their reassignment is a major quality of life issue. SDDC is
currently developing the Families First Program, a comprehensive plan
to significantly revamp DOD household goods movements beginning in
October 2005. A significant change for service members under Families
First is their empowerment to determine which quality carrier will
accomplish their particular move. SDDC's method of distributing
household goods traffic to carriers will be based 70 percent on
customer satisfaction and 30 percent on cost, rightly placing the needs
of the service member first. Another advantage under the program is the
inclusion of full replacement value (FRV) for loss or damage to
personal property transported at Government expense, a significant
quality of life enhancement. Section 634 of the fiscal year 2004
Defense Authorization Act provides DOD with the authority to contract
with industry for FRV. Currently, agencies do not pay their employees
or military members for loss and damage beyond a depreciated amount
established by claims service regulations. As a result, personnel who
are frequently required to relocate their families suffer from
aggregate effects of uncompensated losses to their families'
possessions during the period of their government or military service.
SDDC will continue partnering with industry and the Services to ensure
further progress on this significant issue.
Recent command headquarters restructuring efforts, both at
USTRANSCOM and within our component commands, have led to numerous
personnel placement actions and other transition requirements. Mindful
of the turmoil such events can have on individuals' lives, both
military and civilian, USTRANSCOM is working to ensure all affected
employees receive the level of transition assistance, training, and
placement options they require to continue their government careers
successfully or transition to the private sector. We must be
particularly mindful of the value of our civilian employees.
Increasingly, we rely on civilian employees to make informed decisions
and take decisive actions in regard to evolving missions in the war on
terror (WOT). Motivated and talented people are key to our success, and
thus we must attract and retain the best civilian personnel, whether
they ultimately remain within the USTRANSCOM family, or contribute
elsewhere within the government at large.
Together, Congress and DOD have made great strides in our people
programs. This year's legislation must continue to reaffirm a
commitment to take care of our civilian employees, service members, and
their families as they, in like manner, commit to a career of service
to our country. As leaders, we must remain mindful of how important it
is that we win the battle for the hearts and minds of these talented
men and women and their families.
transformation and process improvement
Information Technology: Our Key Enabler
USTRANSCOM is an information-intensive command. Despite technology
advances, planes, trucks, trains, and ships only move so fast.
Similarly, geographic hurdles remain relatively fixed for our physical
assets. Hence, Information Technology (IT) is the enabler for
collaborative, dynamic decisionmaking and global command and control to
deliver the speed, effectiveness, and efficiency of USTRANSCOM's
operations; and, it is not IT alone, but the combination of IT with
supportive processes and organizational facilitators, that gives us a
real advantage.
USTRANSCOM is committed to information dominance. Actionable,
decision-quality information superhighways are the way ahead. Already,
the command uses its IT to direct execution, track delivery, pay
providers, and make the most effective use of transportation assets,
while routinely operating in austere environments half a world away.
Simply put, USTRANSCOM cannot execute its mission without robust IT.
One of USTRANSCOM's key responsibilities to the warfighter is to
ensure ITV of personnel, supplies, and equipment. USTRANSCOM uses the
Global Transportation Network (GTN) as the IT tool to provide ITV. GTN
provides the near-real time worldwide visibility of passengers and
material moving from origin to destination through the DTS, regardless
of the mode of transportation used. GTN uses information provided by 23
DOD source systems and more than 125 commercial carrier IT systems.
During OEF and OIF, the command extended that capability in support of
two major combat operations to include movement of passengers and cargo
within both theaters of operations. At the peak of OIF, GTN processed
over 5 million transactions per day, with over 14,000 daily customer
requests for information on strategic and tactical lift. Development of
the next generation of GTN, called GTN 21, is well underway towards an
early fiscal year 2005 initial operating capability. GTN 21 will
integrate transportation information that supports our command and
control mission requirement to direct, control, and execute operations
of assigned forces pursuant to global transportation management.
We will advance the current USTRANSCOM collaborative capability
through Agile Transportation for the 21st Century (AT21) initiatives
designed to introduce collaborative analysis and decisionmaking
capabilities in distributed, information-intensive environments. Those
environments will enable interactive visualizations to exchange
information; evaluate courses of action; and make more informed,
effective, and timely modal decisions.
In addition to implementing major improvements to our
transportation and command and control (C2) data systems, USTRANSCOM
recognizes and maintains a significant reliance on global
communications networks. Indeed, our success in developing world-class
information technology systems creates a need for more robust bandwidth
resources and end-to-end connectivity with transportation elements and
supported forces deployed throughout the world. Accordingly, USTRANSCOM
and its component commands continue to invest in major upgrades to
servicing communications and network infrastructures. These
modernization and transformation efforts address a range of fixed
terrestrial and space-based networks to include the ``last tactical
mile.'' We continue to implement radio-frequency automatic
identification technologies to support our goal of providing combatant
commanders detailed tracking information on the movement of cargo
throughout the transportation system. Further, we are making major
strides in expanding the bandwidth capabilities of our terrestrial
campus networks and achieving a level of redundancy to ensure full
continuity of operations.
On the contingency operations side, the command is also making
significant progress in addressing ``last tactical mile'' requirements
using innovative deployable satellite communications techniques and
systems. Our progress is clearly demonstrated as we enjoy unprecedented
success rates in capturing and disseminating cargo and passenger
movement information from our unimproved tactical air and seaports
supporting OEF and OIF. However, these successes do not come without
challenges and costs. Towards that end, USTRANSCOM fully supports
ongoing DOD programmatic efforts to expand terrestrial Global
Information Grid enterprise bandwidth and launch robust communications
and blue-force asset tracking satellite constellations.
In accordance with current mandates, USTRANSCOM developed and
implemented an enforceable enterprise-level architecture (EA) for the
DTS. The DTS EA is the principal tool for managing the command's
current operational processes, capabilities, and technology investments
as well as the required operational and technological initiatives for
the future. The latter is especially important as USTRANSCOM works hard
to move the DTS forward as the premier global distribution organization
in the world. We have had tremendous success, garnering several
prestigious IT awards in 2003 to include the Computerworld Honors
Program Laureates Medal for Outstanding Achievement in IT by a
Government Organization, E-Gov Digest/Federal Computer Week magazine's
Enterprise Architecture Excellence Award, and a nomination for the DOD
Chief Information Officer (CIO) Award. It is no longer solely a matter
of who has the best or most people and equipment, but rather who can
best gather, understand, and manage information. Because National
interests rely so heavily on force projection, timely and free-flowing
transportation information is vital. Thus, it is important that
USTRANSCOM continuously evolve and manage an integrated, forward-
looking, interoperable information systems capability for the entire
DTS and those who depend upon or interact within it.
Distribution Process Owner (DPO)
On September 16, 2003, the Secretary of Defense designated
Commander, USTRANSCOM, as DOD's Distribution Process Owner, charged
with improving the overall efficiency and interoperability of
distribution-related activities: deployment, sustainment, and
redeployment support during peace and war. In addition, the DPO serves
as the single entity to direct and supervise execution of the strategic
distribution system.
Prior to this designation, end-to-end distribution support to the
warfighter was marked by a multitude of process and information
technology challenges. Essentially, DOD distribution was a series of
stove-piped processes and information systems managed by many discrete
owners. Such segmentation caused inefficiencies and drove DPO
designation to promote enterprise solutions.
As a Department, we will bring our collective talents and ongoing
initiatives together to forecast requirements, synchronize the movement
of cargo and personnel from a source of supply to a designated
customer, and expeditiously respond to warfighter requirements. The
intention is to provide a ``factory to foxhole'' distribution system,
linking the entire global DOD supply chain.
The DPO's focus area extends from a point of sale to the first
retail activity in theater, as designated by the theater commander. In
addition, we plan to designate one IT backbone, establishing business
rules to link sustainment and distribution systems into a data
warehouse, where supply requisitions and movement requirements are
visible to distribution system customers.
In conjunction with our partners, we have already started the
process of transforming the distribution system. We have solicited the
ideas and active support of OSD, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders,
Services, and DLA in determining the road ahead. With those partners,
we have collaboratively determined the key issues, identified
appropriate lead, and have begun work through a series of joint service
teams to drive distribution process improvements.
For instance, we are effectively shattering the barrier between
strategic and theater distribution as one of our first ``quick wins.''
We deployed a first-ever CENTCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations
Center (C-DDOC) to the CENTCOM AOR within 90 days of determining there
was a need. We will use the lessons learned from this pilot to form the
basis for an enterprise approach to manage strategic and theater
distribution requirements and assets.
To drive consistent change, we have established a supporting
organizational structure to transform DOD distribution. The
Distribution Transformation Task Force, as the name implies, crosses
Service, combatant command, and agency borders, and extends from flag
officer to action officer level. Ultimately, this organization will
develop process and technology solutions that will transform DOD's end-
to-end distribution system.
We have a unique opportunity to use the capabilities and peer
influence that a combatant commander brings to the table to transform
our strategic distribution system into a single-faced, reliable,
visible, and simplified strategic distribution system. The warfighters
deserve no less.
Organizational Change
In 2003, USTRANSCOM optimized its headquarters organization to
better serve its customers while conserving precious time and
resources. Originally initiated as part of a DOD-mandated 15 percent
headquarters reduction effort, the command made the most of the
opportunity through prudent elimination of redundancy, divesting of
functions better accomplished elsewhere, and realigning functionally
within the headquarters along core business processes. USTRANSCOM
created a light, lean, execution-focused Operations Directorate (J3) by
redistributing non-execution related functions, processes, and
personnel to other command directorates and centers of gravity. This
reshaped organization allows us to better support the ongoing WOT while
posturing ourselves to accept transformational responsibilities. The
restructured J3 includes a Surface Cell leveraging subject matter
experts from SDDC, MSC, and USTRANSCOM in order to improve the
timeliness and effectiveness of surface modal decisions made by the
command. Our exceptional responsiveness in the recent build-up to and
prosecution of OIF is solid testimony to the success of our
reorganization efforts.
Over the past several years, USTRANSCOM's components have actively
transformed their own structures as well. SDDC's recent name change
reflects its new emphasis on joint distribution. The SDDC Operations
Center, with its enhanced ability to focus on directing terminal
operations at its 24 military ports around the globe, has made end-to-
end distributions a priority, thus supporting USTRANSCOM's overarching
task of improving the DOD distribution system.
Reorganization within AMC in 2003 returned the command to its
historical roots of executing global mobility operations and eliminated
functions redundant to the AMC staff. Highlighting the importance of
forward operations, AMC's two numbered air forces were redesignated as
Expeditionary Mobility Task Forces, providing direct, forward
leadership of critical mobility assets. Simultaneously, AMC reactivated
the 18th Air Force at Scott AFB to create a single commander charged
with the tasking and execution of all air mobility missions. The 18th
Air Force Commander maintains operational control of AMC's Tanker
Airlift Control Center and all AMC airlift wings and groups within
CONUS, Europe, and the Pacific, freeing the AMC Headquarters staff to
focus on training, organizing, and equipping the air mobility force.
Similar to the USTRANSCOM and SDDC changes, AMC's restructuring
optimizes the organization to support worldwide deployment and
distribution operations.
Financial Transformation
USTRANSCOM, in partnership with the Air Force and Defense Finance
and Accounting Service, is committed to transforming its business and
financial processes and systems enabling improved support to the
warfighter. As a part of DOD's Business Management Modernization
Program, USTRANSCOM submitted and the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) approved an initiative to improve outdated and unreliable
processes and systems for working capital and general fund financial
transactions. The objective is to provide a single financial system for
USTRANSCOM that is integrated, reliable, accurate, and timely. In
addition, Air Force general funds processes will be reengineered
allowing USTRANSCOM and AMC to effectively manage general and working
capital funds within the same system, further reducing redundancy and
promoting efficiency within the financial management system.
readiness and modernization: building for the present and future
Readiness: One Team--One Fight
USTRANSCOM readiness relies heavily on our mobility team partners
in the National Guard and Reserve. More than any other combatant
command, USTRANSCOM relies on its Reserve components (RCs) for
peacetime responsiveness and wartime capability. In every operational
arena--air, land, and sea--USTRANSCOM RCs provide most of the Command's
military wartime capability. Since USTRANSCOM cannot meet requirements
without RC support, it is imperative that the Command and its
components maintain RC mobilization ability and flexibility.
The Guard and Reserve provide approximately 56 percent of
USTRANSCOM's personnel. They also comprise 61 percent of CONUS land and
57 percent of airlift transportation capacity. In fact, the Air Reserve
Component (ARC) owns 53 percent of outsize/oversize airlift capability
(C-5s, C-141s, and C-17s), more than 62 percent of the KC-135 force,
and over 77 percent of the C-130 fleet.
RC support has been key to USTRANSCOM's peacetime responsiveness
and the Command's ability to meet its mission in the WOT. The
President's Executive Order authorizing partial mobilization (up to one
million reservists for up to 2 years) has proven crucial during OEF,
ONE, and OIF. Although thousands of our Guard and Reserve Forces
volunteered to support these contingencies, USTRANSCOM and its
components were required to mobilize thousands more, most of whom
deployed in support of air refueling, airlift, and force protection
missions.
To put this in perspective, in a typical year, AMC utilizes the
services of approximately 1,400 ARC volunteers over the course of
approximately 450,000 man-days to conduct normal operations. In fiscal
year 2003, AMC mobilized 27,532 ARC personnel to support contingency
operations, providing a total of 1,158,034 man-days over and above its
contingency volunteers. The importance of RC personnel is just as
pronounced in MSC and SDDC. MSC mobilized 111 RC personnel, a total of
16,498 man-days, in support of sealift operations in fiscal year 2003.
SDDC relies on its Reserve Forces for approximately 26,500 man-days in
a normal year, but used 326,310 man-days for 894 mobilized personnel
throughout fiscal year 2003 in response to contingencies. Even
USTRANSCOM Headquarters, in the midst of unprecedented OPTEMPO,
benefited from expertise provided by 144 reservists and guardsmen,
contributing 40,725 man-days of experience in the effort.
Antiterrorism and Force Protection (AT/FP) Readiness
USTRANSCOM aggressively advanced DOD's efforts in combating
terrorism and supporting homeland security. The command and its
components implemented key programs and collaborated on interagency
initiatives contributing to success in the WOT.
USTRANSCOM led the first-ever development of embarked security
teams on MSC common-user sealift vessels deploying in support of OIF
titled Operation Guardian Mariner (OGM). Supported heavily by Army and
Marine Corps forces and expertise, OGM ultimately mobilized 110 twelve-
man teams plus a command and control element to secure vessels
transiting chokepoints and ports within the CENTCOM AOR deemed at risk
for terrorist activities. USTRANSCOM subsequently expanded the scope of
OGM to provide security to common-user MSC ships globally. Recognizing
the success of OGM, the Secretary of Defense acted to further
institutionalize and perpetuate the program by designating the Navy as
Executive Agent for military sealift force protection beginning in June
2004, and USTRANSCOM is currently coordinating program transition
details with that service.
Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), or shoulder-fired
surface-to-air missiles, remain the most serious threat to our air
mobility aircraft. In cooperation with the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, we have developed computer-generated MANPADS
footprint graphics that display risks to airlift as they cycle through
airfields in high-risk locations. USTRANSCOM and AMC also have
partnered with outside agencies to mature and expand cargo-screening
technologies and develop powerful new tools that will ultimately detect
small amounts of explosives in packed cargo pallets without the use of
labor-intensive individual inspections.
Homeland seaport security continues to be one of the Nation's most
challenging force protection issues. In order to strengthen security
within our seaports and ensure our ability to deploy and sustain
forces, we have engaged on several fronts with MARAD and other National
Port Readiness Network (NPRN) partners. The result is an NPRN
Memorandum of Understanding which lays out specific procedures for
USTRANSCOM, MSC, SDDC, and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) in coordinating and
executing port and waterside protection of strategic sealift out-load
operations. The addition this past year of USNORTHCOM and the
Transportation Security Agency to the NPRN lends significant expertise
in this critical area. Additionally, our bilateral work with the USCG
was, in part, the impetus for their creation of new and extremely
valuable Mobile Safety and Security Teams (MSST) that provide increased
capability to protect the Nation's strategic ports from seaward
threats. Furthermore, these teams provide waterside security for MSC
vessels.
USTRANSCOM has launched information and intelligence-sharing
initiatives with all four commercial transportation sectors, air, road,
rail, and sealift, as well as with the Transportation Security
Administration, to leverage the unique capabilities within both the
commercial and defense sectors of the DTS and to collectively close
seams within the transportation system's security posture nationwide.
Antiterrorism legislation is a step in the right direction, but
coordination of the many users of our commercial ports is an enormous
undertaking.
Concerning our military ports, USTRANSCOM and SDDC worked to secure
emergency funding to further improve security at Military Ocean
Terminal Sunny Point (MOTSU), North Carolina and Military Ocean
Terminal Concord (MOTCO), California. These funds will build innovative
waterside protective barriers to help prevent a seaborne terrorist
attack against these valuable facilities. Contracts were awarded in
August 2003, and construction began in November 2003 for these
important security enhancements.
The Command's Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) program made
excellent progress during the past year. USTRANSCOM conducted
vulnerability assessments of 19 identified critical nodes in fiscal
year 2003, partially paid for through WOT funding. With continued
funding, now managed by the CIP Director in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security, we can continue this vital
work throughout fiscal year 2004.
The potential threat of Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) attack at home and abroad
further exacerbates USTRANSCOM's mission planning and execution.
USTRANSCOM is diligently working to enhance its capability to protect
personnel and facilities from CBRNE attack and, should such an attack
occur, to detect contamination and decontaminate facilities, equipment,
and personnel in order to facilitate mission success. AMC recently
participated in a Large Frame Aircraft Decontamination Demonstration at
Eglin AFB, Florida, the results of which are due for release later this
year. SDDC and MSC coordinated the procurement, distribution, and
training of the necessary CBRNE equipment to protect merchant mariners
on both government-owned and commercial cargo vessels transiting ports
within the CENTCOM AOR during OIF major combat operations. Both
organizations continue to train and exercise CBRNE protection and
response at port facilities via their units stationed worldwide. With
the global proliferation of such weapons, CBRNE defense planning will
continue to require our attention and requisite funding for the
foreseeable future.
Mobility Capability Study (MCS)
Our current transportation force structure was programmed to meet
the requirements established by the Mobility Requirements Study 2005
(MRS-05), based on the 1997 National Military Strategy (NMS). This
study was completed in 2000. As a result of the events of September 11,
the national military objectives have changed. Objectives delineated in
the draft NMS increase our overall air refueling, airlift, and sealift
requirements considerably. A proposed plan is for the MCS and OA-05 to
begin in June 2004, after the completion of OA-04, and conclude not
later than March 2005. The goal to complete this full end-to-end
mobility analysis within 10 months presents an ambitious challenge. The
scenarios proposed to support the MCS are centered in different regions
of the world that will highlight our global mission. Both the ``win
decisively'' and ``swiftly defeat'' scenarios will be developed in the
multi-service force deployment process and vetted in the OA process.
Readiness and Modernization Air Mobility
USTRANSCOM's number one shortfall is its aging and numerically
inadequate strategic airlift fleet. We have a significant gap in our
ability to meet the needs of DOD agencies, specifically the needs of
the regional combatant commanders. Our current strategic airlift
shortfall of 9.8 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) from the MRS-05 goal
of 54.5 MTM/D is due to a shortage in the number of aircraft available
and significant maintenance challenges specifically associated with our
fleet of C-5 aircraft. Consequently, a key USTRANSCOM modernization
goal is to retire the oldest and poorest performing C-5s, modernize the
remainder, and evaluate the continued procurement of C-17s.
The C-5 continues to be a critical component of AMC's airlift fleet
and is integral to meeting airlift mandates. However, the aircraft's
enormous capacity is hampered by unacceptably low reliability and
maintainability. Current Mission Capable (MC) rates for C-5A and C-5B
aircraft are 63.5 percent and 73.8 percent, respectively. In fact,
during the last 4 years, because of low C-5 MC rates, AMC has had to
assign two C-5s against many higher-priority missions to better ensure
reliability and/or on-time mission accomplishment. The net result is
fewer aircraft available for tasking and less operational flexibility.
AMC is addressing this critical capability shortfall with two major
C-5 modernization efforts: the Avionics Modernization Program (AMP),
and the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP). AMP
replaces all high-failure and unsupportable avionics and flight
instrument systems on the C-5 fleet. This replacement makes the C-5
compatible with international standards required for flight today, as
well as in tomorrow's increasingly restrictive Global Air Traffic
Management (GATM) airspace. AMP installs an all-weather flight control
system and Secretary of Defense mandated navigational safety equipment,
including a Terrain Avoidance Warning System (TAWS). RERP will replace
engines and pylons and upgrade the aircraft's landing gear,
environmental control system, and auxiliary power units--the C-5's most
unreliable systems. A number of independent studies have projected that
C-5 modernization efforts could increase the C-5 MC rate as much as
13.5 percent, while simultaneously reducing our cost of ownership.
Several studies have recommended an operationally effective mix of
RERPed C-5s and purchase of additional C-17 aircraft. America cannot
afford to lose the niche filled by the C-5 fleet's organic capability
or allow it to continue to atrophy.
USTRANSCOM's documented inability to meet the warfighter's
military-unique airlift cargo requirements led to the acquisition of C-
17s. To date, the C-17 program has delivered 113 of 180 authorized
aircraft. While the approved 180 C-17 multi-year procurement plan is a
big step in the right direction toward achieving needed capability, a
more capable, versatile, and reliable strategic airlift mix should
include C-17s and a correct number of fully modernized C-5s. This
combination of aircraft provides a much-reduced average fleet age at
the earliest date, while affording the needed flexibility to move
outsize and oversize cargo over long distances and into short,
unimproved runways. The C-17 has already proven exceptionally capable
and reliable in airlifting our forces to the fight, no matter where
that fight may be. It is the only aircraft capable of performing all
missions: strategic airlift, tactical airlift, airdrop (key to
strategic brigade airdrop), aeromedical evacuation, austere airfield
operations, denied access, and special operations. In a ``come as you
are'' world, we must continue C-17 investment. This versatile and
reliable platform is the ``sure bet'' for our future force.
AMC's venerable air refueling force is performing superbly in ONE,
OEF, and OIF. Operations today are increasingly air-refueling
dependent, and the force is delivering, but the strain is evident. Our
concerns grow daily. The Tanker Requirements Study 2005 (TRS-05)
supported our long-held position that AMC has a significant KC-135
crew-to-aircraft ratio shortfall. The current active duty and Reserve
component crew ratios of 1.36:1 and 1.27:1, respectively--inherited
from the KC-135's Cold War days--are simply inadequate to meet our
current contingency requirements. TRS-05 indicated a need for a 1.66:1
crew ratio averaged across all scenarios, with 1.92:1 needed to meet
the most demanding scenario. USTRANSCOM and the Air Force are working
in concert to resolve this issue through funding and force structure
initiatives. One proposal is to retire 68 of the oldest and most
unreliable KC-135E-model aircraft from the ARC and replace them with 48
of the more reliable KC-135R models from the active force, while
retaining the current crews. The resulting offset would be reinvested
in the remaining KC-135 fleet for improved crew ratios and maintenance.
A review of TRS-05, as well as the KC-135 Economic Service Life
Study (ESLS), further quantifies the future requirements on our 44-
year-old KC-135 force. TRS-05 reinforced the importance of our tanker
fleet and the ESLS identified the steady (1 percent per year) cost
growth and changing availability expected as we continue to operate our
1950s vintage KC-135s into the future.
To keep the KC-135 viable until a replacement tanker is brought
into service, AMC is modernizing the aircraft with the GATM program.
GATM, programmed for fielding between 2003 and 2016, adds increased
communications, navigation, and surveillance capability, ensuring that
our air refueling tanker aircraft have global access to ever-increasing
restricted airspace. Without GATM, tanker aircraft may be faced with
longer routes in non-optimum airspace resulting in longer flying times
and less fuel available for offload.
Additionally, 40 KC-135 aircraft will be modified to carry the
Roll-On Beyond-Line-of-Sight Enhancement (ROBE) package. This small,
removable payload, when installed, enables the KC-135 aircraft to act
as an airborne data link between battle directors and the warfighters
in theater or en route. This link gives all participants the ability to
deliver the required information to the right location, at the precise
time, and in an actionable format. The KC-135 ROBE-equipped tanker is
the first in a family of scalable, multifunction, automated relay
terminals (SMART) aircraft, a capability to be further developed and
integrated into the proposed KC-767 tanker.
There are several challenges facing the C-130 fleet. It consists of
approximately 700 aircraft composed of 20 different models. USTRANSCOM
operates 410 of 514 basic combat delivery C-130s through AMC. The
average active duty aircraft is 28 years old, the number of C-130s is
declining as individual aircraft reach the end of their service life,
and older onboard equipment across the remainder of the fleet is
rapidly becoming obsolete and cost prohibitive to maintain. To remedy
these problems, AMC proposes acquiring 150 new combat delivery C-130Js,
retiring an equivalent number of the least maintainable C-130s, and
modifying those with the longest remaining service lives to a common C-
130 AMP configuration. The core of the new common configuration is a
total cockpit avionics modernization incorporating GATM-required
upgrades to communications, navigation, and surveillance systems.
OEF originally highlighted the reengineered AE system, and lessons
learned have driven further refinements and improvements that paid
exceptional dividends during OIF's significantly higher patient
movement tempo. Small but highly capable AE teams deployed forward and
provided rapid casualty evacuation shortly after initial treatment.
More than 17,000 patients have been evacuated during OEF/OIF to date.
Within the CENTCOM AOR, over 95 percent of AE missions were flown using
C-130s and C-17s, while C-141s performed the majority of the inter-
theater AE missions.
Ongoing AE initiatives are integrating AE into operations,
including stage management, airlift control elements, Air Mobility
Control Centers, and theater Air Mobility Operations Control Centers.
AMC has initiated an AE concept of operations (CONOPs), fully
incorporating the AE mission into the mobility system to meet peacetime
and wartime AE mission requirements. This CONOPs creates efficiencies
through the use of multimission mobility aircraft with interchangeable
patient care modules, integral litters, and patient support pallets.
Use of multimission aircraft for the AE mission eliminates the added
time and expense of procuring, operating, and maintaining purpose-built
AE aircraft, and are needed as the last C-9 Nightingale AE aircraft
will retire from service in fiscal year 2005.
To help counter the worldwide proliferation of MANPADS, AMC has
already begun fielding the large aircraft infrared countermeasures
(LAIRCM) system on its C-17s and C-130s. The plan is to equip enough
airlift and tanker aircraft with this laser-based system to support at
least two small scale contingencies, while examining possibilities for
protection of CRAF commercial aircraft. We also continue to partner
with industry and other government agencies to develop systems that
will enhance situational awareness for aircrews as well as provide
improved protection from infrared and radar-guided threats in the
future.
Sealift Readiness and Modernization
Thanks to $6 billion in congressional funding for LMSRs, as well as
increased funding for RRF readiness and significant enhancements to
prepositioned ships during the past decade, our sealift force is vastly
more capable than ever before. Strategic sealift is critical to our
Nation's power projection strategy.
The 20th LMSR was delivered last year, completing one of the
largest strategic sealift acquisition programs in history, a program
clearly validated by superb LMSR performance in the OIF deployment/
redeployment process. Additionally, the increased readiness standards
and maintenance of our RRF have made it more efficient and better able
to meet lift requirements than ever before. The RRF today is a well-
maintained, ready force of 31 surge roll-on roll-off ships and 37
special-purpose sealift ships. MSC's surge sealift fleet, comprised of
8 FSS and 11 LMSRs, regularly supports joint exercises, while its
prepositioning ships provide forward-deployed combat equipment and
sustainment supplies to the regional combatant commanders. Although our
sealift force is more capable and ready today, we must address the
challenge of rapid force closure.
The latest assessment of mobility requirements as defined in MRS-05
indicates that the total sealift cargo requirement is 9.62 million
square feet, which has been the target capability for our organic
sealift program. Recent operations, however, have shown that our
current surge capability is only 6.81 million square feet. Lessons
learned from OIF have confirmed two major changes that contribute to
this reduced capability: (1) the actual mean stow factor on surge ships
is closer to 65 percent when deploying force packages rather than the
standard planning factor of 75 percent (reducing the lift capacity by
1.31 million square feet), and (2) the entire lift capacity of the RRF
was not used to transport surge unit equipment because of the
cumbersome and lengthy loading/unloading process for some of the ships
(further reducing capacity by 1.16 million square feet). Furthermore,
OIF confirmed that the capability to load, sail, and unload our
military's ``surge'' unit equipment in time for it to be effective for
the combatant commander is critical. Fast roll-on roll-off ships
(ROROs) are the most effective means of meeting this surge requirement.
The importance that the evolving NMS places on the requirement for
rapid force closure presents a new challenge to strategic sealift
mobility. With this in mind, the speed of half the fleet (by capacity)
is not capable of providing the global response from CONUS in the
timeframes that are being projected for 2010 requirements. To meet
future obligations, we must fund the fleet at appropriate levels
commensurate with the requirement, maintain program vigilance, and
establish a futuristic vision to sustain and recapitalize the required
levels of sealift readiness and capability for the long term. The
capability of today's surge fleet is well understood, and we look to
the MCS to establish the correct vision for required future sealift
mobility capabilities. Additionally, fiscal commitments toward the
research and development of high-speed strategic sealift are required
to help meet future sealift needs.
Infrastructure Readiness and Modernization
Another vital component of USTRANSCOM readiness is the ability to
project and sustain forward presence. Each transportation component
command has forward-based units and deployed forces around the globe.
SDDC operates at seaports worldwide, interacting with allied
governments, militaries, and local authorities. These forward-based
activities enable instant access to seaports, as well as to the lines
of communication radiating from them. The MSC forward deployed staffs
serve as focal points for MSC customers in their respective operating
areas and provide direct links to MSC ships for maintenance, logistics,
and other services. AMC maintains en route infrastructure worldwide to
facilitate establishment of vital air bridges for the airlift of
critical personnel and cargo in times of crisis. Modern infrastructure,
in CONUS and overseas, is critical to effective and efficient strategic
deployment.
As a predominantly CONUS-based force, infrastructure means more to
us today than ever before. Yet, we have fewer overseas bases through
which we can operate, and access to those bases is never guaranteed, as
experienced in Turkey's refusal last year to permit U.S. use of bases
to facilitate the OIF deployment. Similarly, the increasing OPTEMPO is
stressing this diminished base structure more than ever. Along with the
Services and regional combatant commanders, USTRANSCOM must continue to
monitor our global mobility infrastructure, keep up with needed repairs
and improvements, and remain prepared to operate in new or bare base
environments when required.
In CONUS, the Army has made substantial investments in its combat
equipment loading facilities at power projection platforms and its
containerization facilities at ammunition depots. These improvements
have significantly streamlined the loading of 41,404 railcars and
export of 7,447 ammunition containers throughout fiscal year 2003.
Overseas, the United States European Command (USEUCOM), CENTCOM,
USTRANSCOM, and the Joint Staff, through the European En Route
Infrastructure Steering Committee (EERISC), oversee infrastructure
requirements for the primary en route air mobility bases in USEUCOM to
support CENTCOM operations in Southwest Asia and staging operations for
Africa. Partnering with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the EERISC
has developed a comprehensive plan to improve the infrastructure at
those bases. The EERISC has identified, validated, and collaboratively
championed the need for more than $700 million in fuel hydrant, ramp,
and runway projects throughout the European theater to support mobility
requirements. Likewise, we are working with USPACOM and DLA to identify
and fix en route base shortfalls in the Pacific region in support of
Northeast Asia contingencies and staging for operations in Southeast
Asia. The USPACOM En Route Infrastructure Steering Committee (PERISC)
has identified and validated the need for over $500 million in
improvements throughout the region. DLA and Air Force budgets now
support all identified en route fuels projects. Significant
construction began several years ago and continues in fiscal year 2004,
but the infrastructure will not get well (i.e., fully meet the
requirements laid out in our war plans) until the end of fiscal year
2007, and then only if all funding and construction remains on track.
These European and Pacific en route projects are being implemented
primarily to support the MRS-05 established passenger and cargo
throughput requirements. However, additional infrastructure to support
the WOT is required and being studied by both the EERISC and PERISC.
Moreover, today's current operations, combined with existing studies,
further demonstrate the need for expanded hazardous cargo capabilities
at en route and theater airfields around the globe. To this end,
USTRANSCOM is working with combatant commanders, Joint Staff, and DLA
to implement a truly global en route infrastructure system.
Efficient cargo movement through aerial ports requires appropriate
materiel handling equipment (MHE). The Air Force's current fleet of 40K
loaders, wide body elevator loaders (WBELs), and 25K loaders is old,
deteriorating, and suffering from poor reliability and maintainability.
Fortunately, we are fielding 318 new Tunner 60K loaders to replace all
376 40K loaders and 147 of the 206 WBELs. To date, AMC has fielded 264
of these capable new loaders. They have a much-improved mean time
between maintenance, are compatible with all military and commercial
cargo aircraft, and can load six standard Air Force 463L pallets at a
time. The new Halvorsen (25K) loader is smaller in size and weight than
the old 25K loader, is transportable on C-130s, C-17s, and C-5s, and is
more reliable than its predecessor. USTRANSCOM has a requirement for
618 Halvorsen loaders, which supports unfilled authorizations, and
replaces the 1960s vintage 25K loaders and remaining 59 WBELs.
Currently 312 Halvorsen loaders are funded, leaving 306 unfunded for
subsequent Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission. Halverson
deliveries began in fiscal year 2001 with 236 delivered to date.
Readiness: Commercial Industry and Labor Teammates
Our readiness also depends on timely access to militarily useful
commercial transportation. USTRANSCOM's superb relationship with the
U.S. commercial transportation industry and supporting labor
organizations allows DOD to leverage significant capacity in wartime
without the added peacetime cost of sustaining comparable levels of
organic capability. For example, under full activation, CRAF provides
93 percent of our international passenger capacity, 98 percent of our
AE capability to CONUS, and 41 percent of our international long-range
air cargo capacity. The CRAF program affords peacetime business to
participating airlines in exchange for their pledge to provide
specified capacities in wartime. CRAF's ability to dramatically
influence operations literally overnight was never more apparent than
immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11. On 10
September 2001, USTRANSCOM had 27 organic military aircraft in service
on key express and channel movements. On 13 September 2001, after the
historic shutdown of the airways, we again had 27 aircraft in service
on those same routes. But this time, there were only 3 military
aircraft augmented by 24 commercial aircraft. Having unencumbered 24
military aircraft via the voluntary commitment and patriotism of our
CRAF partners, USTRANSCOM could immediately answer the call for ONE.
Our CRAF partners, both voluntarily and under activation, continue
to support critical wartime requirements and, in exchange, deserve as
predictable a safeguard of their capital investments as possible. In
this respect, the Federal Aviation Administration's Aviation War Risk
Insurance is vital to assure our CRAF carriers that they can recover
from significant loss or damage incurred in support of DOD. The CRAF
program demonstrates that all U.S. air carriers, large and small, are
key to a robust civil air industry. Therefore, we support the Fly
America statute (49 USC 40118) and what we refer to as the Fly CRAF
statute (49 USC 41106) as they serve to support and sustain this
critical national asset.
Because of the increasing requirements related to the deployment of
forces in preparation for OIF, USTRANSCOM activated the CRAF Stage I
passenger segment on 8 February 2003. Stage I remained activated
through 18 June 2003, when major combat operations had ceased and
initial force redeployments had occurred. Under CRAF activation, each
aircraft comes with four crews comprised of (non-reservist) U.S.
citizens, and the aircraft are dedicated to DOD. This combination
allows for greater security, scheduling flexibility, and responsiveness
to changing requirements. Additionally, activation removes all
questions about war risk insurance coverage as the non-premium war risk
insurance and DOD indemnification programs cover hulls, liability, and
crew insurance coverage for all DOD missions. For this activation, a
total of 51 aircraft and associated crews were activated. Their
associated carriers made the aircraft and crews available for their
first missions within 24 hours of the tasking, and these forces
significantly contributed to USTRANSCOM's ability to rapidly flow
manpower to the region.
The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) is the maritime
equivalent of the CRAF program. Under VISA, DOD has access to
commercial U.S.-flagged sealift capacity and intermodal infrastructure
in return for peacetime business preferences. Because pre-negotiated
contracts with the carriers permit early access to additional lift
capacity, the time required to close forces for the counterattack phase
of war operations can be significantly shortened. VISA participants
move over 80 percent of wartime sustainment cargo.
Force deployment requirements in support of OEF/OIF were met with
organic shipping assets and commercial shipping acquired through MSC
contracting initiatives. Therefore, activation of VISA was not
required. However, VISA could conceivably be called upon to meet
emerging sustainment requirements.
MSP, another critical element of our commercial sealift program,
provides assured access to sealift/intermodal capacity and a readily
available, highly trained and qualified work force of merchant mariners
employed in U.S.-flagged shipping. The recent authorization of the
Maritime Security Act of 2003 expands the current MSP fleet from 47 to
60 vessels. This increase allows the opportunity to better assure
access to U.S.-flagged ``low density-high demand'' assets (e.g., RO/RO
and heavy lift ships). MSP provides an underpinning for VISA by helping
to guarantee the continued presence of a minimal U.S.-flagged
commercial fleet operating in international commerce and that fleet's
availability to provide sustainment sealift capability in time of war
or national emergency. This guarantee is particularly critical should
the U.S. find itself in a position where it must act alone.
Additionally, this increase in fleet size should play a critical role
in expanding the U.S. mariner base. Currently, the MSP fleet accounts
for more than 900 crew billets that provide jobs to roughly 1,800
trained and qualified mariners. Finally, MSP provides financial
assistance to offset the increased costs associated with operating a
U.S.-flagged vessel. In return, participating carriers commit vessel
capacity and their intermodal transportation resources for DOD use in
the event of contingencies.
In concert with their commercial aviation and maritime
counterparts, our Nation's commercial longshoremen continue to play an
integral role in the DTS, facilitating SDDC marine terminal operations
at strategic seaports both in CONUS and overseas. Throughout the
massive deployment operations in preparation for OIF, between 400 and
500 longshoremen supported 24-hour operations at U.S. strategic ports
alone. Their herculean efforts made a tremendous difference in our
ability to load and deliver combat capability quickly and safely to
Southwest Asia.
Along the lines of the CRAF and VISA programs, USTRANSCOM is
currently investigating commercial assured access to surface
transportation assets, specifically, commercial chain tie-down rail
flatcars. Chain tie-down rail flatcars are the preferred and primary
method used to support large movements of military vehicles and
equipment from ``fort to port'' and vice versa within CONUS. Currently,
there is a shortfall of approximately 2,000 rail flatcars (commercial
and DOD-owned) to support MRS-05 surge requirements. The long-term
issue is that, even with a recent 10-year life extension, we will see
large-scale mandatory retirement of the chain tie-down rail flatcars in
the commercial fleet (slightly over 5,000 cars) beginning in 2014.
There is no current industry plan to recapitalize, based on the fact
that such flatcars are primarily used to move military equipment only.
USTRANSCOM and SDDC are working with the railroad industry to ensure
that sufficient rail transport capability exists, both now and in the
future, to handle the CONUS movement of equipment, ammunition, and
supplies as part of force deployment and redeployment operations.
transportation systems of tomorrow
The need for more responsive and flexible lift, getting it where it
needs to be, when it needs to be there, cannot be overemphasized. New
mobility platforms as well as enhanced infrastructure technologies and
process/organizational improvements are essential to meet the
challenge.
In conjunction with the Joint Staff, Services, and other combatant
commands, USTRANSCOM participated in a Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)-
directed study of future (2020) mobility platforms known as the
Advanced Mobility Concept Study. This study provided the initial
identification and prioritization of the future mobility assets
required to support DOD's transforming forces and operational concepts
for 2015-2020. The study recommended:
(1) OSD include appropriate direction in POM SPG-06 to
initiate research, development, testing, and evaluation on a
Shallow Draft High-Speed Vessel, Theater Support Vessel, Super
Short Take-off and Landing Aircraft, Global Range Transport,
and Joint Rapid Airfield Construction. OSD and the Services
will continue to address technical readiness, cost, port
analysis, and impacts on the current programming cycle.
(2) Conduct an excursion to the next Mobility Capabilities
Study that considers transformed forces and mixes of advanced
and current lift in the 2020 timeframe.
(3) Ultra-Large Airlifter (ULA) continue as a platform for
further related studies involving advanced lift platforms since
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is currently
funding its research as a multi-mission platform.
USTRANSCOM, working with industry, is actively exploring a wide
variety of future technologies and concepts for military and commercial
use. In terms of sealift, we are studying militarily useful high-speed
vessels (HSVs) that provide the potential to enhance intra-theater lift
capability. These shallow draft high-speed platforms allow access to a
greater variety of unimproved ports, providing enhanced anti-access
mitigation. Currently, HSVs are capable of transporting over 1,000
passengers and more than 500 tons of cargo at speeds in excess of 40
knots.
From an air mobility perspective, our interest lies in high-speed,
low-observable multimission strategic mobility aircraft with short
take-off and landing as well as autonomous approach capabilities. In
the future, it makes sense to look at a family of transport category
aircraft that could satisfy multiple needs. Variants of a common
airframe could be built to serve as a tanker, an airlifter, a
penetrating aircraft for the Special Operations Forces infiltration
mission, a gunship, or an intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance platform. This approach would have standardized
cockpits, engines, and systems to minimize overall development expenses
and reduce life-cycle costs.
We need a collaborative effort between the Joint Staff, Services,
and other combatant commanders to shape our planning, policy, and
procedures as technology moves from test and evaluation into
acquisition. All of the types of systems that I just mentioned would be
costly to develop, procure and operate. Much work remains to be done to
determine how much they would add to our overall military capabilities,
determine how costly it would be to pursue these individual systems,
and decide on the right mix of systems and capabilities in which to
invest. We must make decisions concerning future employment of this
technology that are consistent with the best interests of our overall
transportation system and our warfighters.
final thoughts from general handy
All that matters, and what each of us in USTRANSCOM is pledged to
do, is to provide absolute, complete, and total support to the
warfighter.
On any given day, the USTRANSCOM team of professionals provides
critical strategic transportation to a host of U.S. and international
agencies. Today, USTRANSCOM is simultaneously supporting every single
combatant commander performing real-world operations. No matter what
the mission assigned, the men and women who operate USTRANSCOM's air,
land, and sea components are first out the door. There are not many
headlines for what they do, but these dedicated professionals execute
their global military mission every day in defense of our country.
I am extremely proud of today's USTRANSCOM and honored to lead the
superb men and women who comprise our national defense transportation
team. USTRANSCOM will continue to provide the most effective and
responsive mobility capability the world has ever seen and, in light of
recent developments, will endeavor to create that same level of
efficiency and interoperability through a transformed DOD distribution
process.
You can rest assured that USTRANSCOM's crystal clear vision of the
way ahead will provide constantly improving, seamless, and responsive
support to the warfighters. America's military might moves with us, and
we are stepping out smartly.
Senator Talent. Well, I always appreciate brevity in
statements by witnesses----[Laughter.]
But I am not so sure you are not going a little bit
overboard. I am happy to do that, and your statement is
available for the record.
Let us then get to the questions I have. Again, when
Senator Kennedy comes, I can defer to him for his opening
statement.
In the report on the relevancy of the MRS-05 to the current
NMS that was just delivered to the committee, the report states
that there is a requirement to continue the production of C-17
beyond the current multiyear procurement. That procurement, of
course, will take us to 180 aircraft, and there is a minimum
requirement for 222 C-17s.
The report also states that the moderate risk strategic
airlift requirement of 54.5 MTM is understated and that the
range will more than likely fall between 57.4 and 60 MTM.
First of all, my gut sense is that that revised requirement
may itself be rather conservative. Do you want to give me a gut
sense of how you feel about that?
General Handy. Yes, sir. My view is until we can do a very
thorough MCS which would look at air, land, and sea, we truly
will not know the exact accuracy of any of those figures. I am
on the record as saying that, even with regards to MRS-05, done
in 2000, reported out in early 2001, it became immediately an
historical document because it could not predict September 11,
2001, it could not predict the global war on terrorism, and it
could not possibly predict the creation of U.S. Northern
Command and a litany of other things that have happened since
then.
All of those things have contributed to the challenge that
we face as logisticians to move the Nation's military,
supplies, and sustainment around the world. The thing that we
are most concerned with is accuracy of that analysis. Directly
to your question, I am very anxious to see what the analysts
can come up with in the year that the Office of the Secretary
of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation (OSD PA&E) and
the Joint Staff J-4 (logistics), with our help, are able to
look at air, land, and sea, to determine what is the
requirement. I say that based upon our experiences for 2002 and
2003 in Afghanistan and Iraq specifically.
Senator Talent. Given the changed assumptions, the new NMS,
and what we have learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), an
increase of only three to six MTM in the estimated requirement
just seems to me to be just extremely conservative,
particularly if we are trying to err on the safe side, because
one thing everybody agrees is that this military strategy is
not going to work without adequate lift.
General Handy. Well, and it certainly is air, land, and
sea, as all three of us and our staff know, and literally the
152,000 people that support USTRANSCOM in this business of
ours. One of the things that pains us all is the fact that when
it comes to our crunch, as we saw when General Tommy Franks was
trying to come up with his plan for a what-if Iraq, invariably
on our side of the table we were negotiating times, dates, and
force flow because we do not have the assets to do them in a
timely fashion.
When you look at the delta between this look at MRS-05 and
our experiences in 2002 and 2003, it has to be more than two to
three MTM/D. So from the combatant commander's perspective, I
remain very concerned about what is the real requirement and
the fact that we are in a Nation that cannot wait for things to
get delivered; we have to do it very quickly, very surgically
and safely.
Right now we are operating with a fleet that is incredibly
safe, but inadequate for the challenges that the Nation faces.
Senator Talent. Yes, I would have thought that the
requirement of 3 to 6 MTM/D additional would be justified just
by what we have learned from OIF, not even counting the change
in the NMS, which clearly puts a greater emphasis on lift than
the two theater war strategy did.
General Handy. The 1-4-2-1 strategy that we have right now
is more challenging for the transportation side of the house--
in fact, truthfully, the whole logistics side of the house--
than the two MTWs that we used to look at and upon which the
54.5 MTM/D is based.
Senator Talent. Is a new study under way, by the way,
addressing that, too?
General Handy. I am sorry, sir?
Senator Talent. Has the Department ordered the new study?
Is that under way?
General Handy. It is due to start this spring and will take
approximately a year. Our hope is that it can be done in that
amount of time. If we look at how long it took MRS-05, I fear
that it may take even longer than that. But our hope is a year.
Senator Talent. If indeed we are going, as I hope we do, to
implement, for example, another multiyear for C-17, we really
need to get going on planning for that before a year and a half
from now. Because, given the base issues and the production
line issues and the rest of it, we need to start sending that
signal sooner than that. Would you not agree?
General Handy. Senator, absolutely. The long lead moneys
for a second multiyear, if we can get that approval, they need
to be inserted in the fiscal year 2006 budget. So it is clear
that we will have the debates of the fiscal year 2006 budget
before we are able to look at the data from a completed MCS.
Our plea from a USTRANSCOM perspective throughout the
Department is to urge the MCS take place, that we also proceed
parallel with an endeavor to get the multiyear procurement for
the next block, which would at least get us to the MRS-05
number of 222 plus. That time allows us to keep the line open,
keep C-17s that we know we need headed our way. By the way,
they are coming at 15 a year, so this is not happening fast.
Getting up to 222 will take some time.
In the mean time, then we will know what the study says and
we can determine what the final number of C-17s is likely to
be.
Senator Talent. Because even under the current revised
study, they state a minimum requirement of 222.
General Handy. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. Even though it is minimum. Clearly we need
to get going. I am glad you agree with that.
Do you think there is an increasing need for C-17 intra-
theater airlift as well as inter-theater airlift?
General Handy. Yes, I do. In fact, we have used them
successfully in both Afghanistan and Iraq. At any time we have
felt that we had the need to insert them in the theater in
their intra-theater role or the Combined Force Air Component
(CFAC) commander had that same requirement, we would dedicate
them to the theater and they would exercise that intra-theater
capability quite successfully, or direct delivery from the
strategic lift directly into a place in either Afghanistan or
Iraq, so that it constitutes a combination of inter-theater and
intra-theater capability.
Senator Talent. I doubt that the intra-theater use was--I
should check on this--figured in the original air mobility
study. There is another use on top of what was originally
figured, which suggests that we need more.
By the way--and this is a cheap applause line for me
because I know what the answer is going to be--how well is the
C-17 performing? If you do not say it is performing
excellently, I am going to be the most shocked and dismayed
person in the Capitol.
General Handy. Certainly, as the combatant commander, in
all sincerity, we have some tremendous capabilities in this
command, there is no question about that. All the weapons
systems have performed magnificently for air refueling and
airlift, and I cannot forget my two partners on either side--
the whole team.
But on the air side, the C-17 has been the absolute
diamond. There is no question about it that this aircraft has
done the things that many people in my career said, ``You know,
General, you will never do this with the C-17, you will never
put it in the fight, you will never subject it to threats, and
you will never put it in a dirt runway in a combat zone in a
high-threat area.'' All those naysayers have disappeared.
I do not have those kinds of phone calls any more, because
this is an aircraft that we have done that with. We have put it
in the dirt at Rhino LZ in support of the Marines, in the dark
of the night in a combat zone, with a high threat environment.
We have continued to do things with this aircraft. The 173rd
Airborne Division drop into Bashur was a clear example of its
capabilities.
We continue to be very proud of what it does for the
warfighter in that theater of operations, and we will continue
to run it up front because it has those capabilities.
Senator Talent. Yes, it is a great aircraft.
I will pursue one other line of questioning, then recognize
Senator Kennedy. I will let him get settled. I may come back to
this, but let me just open this. I am very interested in the
new role as distribution process owner (DPO) that has been
given to USTRANSCOM. It puts you in charge of a process that
crosses other agencies and commanders' areas of responsibility,
including the Defense Logistics Agency and the combatant
commander.
Expound a little bit on the command relationships that you
think are necessary for you to be responsible for that process?
What are you doing to develop and enhance those relationships
in the course of the transition? What kind of time line are you
anticipating? Discuss for me, if you would, how the whole
process is going and how the relationships are being built?
I think it is a great idea if it is done smoothly and if
everybody is committed to it. Discuss that, if you would.
General Handy. Yes, sir. As you well know, September 16 of
last year the Secretary of Defense made that declaration in a
memo to the staff and to me personally out at USTRANSCOM,
giving us those distribution authorities. Obviously we did not
just wake up on the morning of the 16th of September and
realize those authorities. We had worked that with the
Secretary for almost 24 months prior, suggesting that the
traditional role of USTRANSCOM from port to port needed to be
improved because the management of the defense supply chain was
much more a challenging problem than anybody ever recognized.
Senator Talent. I am going to put in the record, I guess,
the graph from the briefing on this. You cannot see it, of
course, but you have seen it.
General Handy. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. The Department of Defense supply chain as
it existed before you began implementing this.
General Handy. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. Which you only have to take one look at to
realize that something needed to be done. It looks roughly like
the organization of the committees of the Senate, except that
somehow we make it work. Right, Senator? So I am going to put
this in the record, but please go ahead.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
General Handy. So with those authorities, which gave us the
process ownership--and that is a key part of that memo, we are
responsible for the distribution process, and that gets at the
heart of your question. Immediately if in this endeavor we did
not assume that logistics is a team sport, and in order to
fulfill that role as the process owner, we needed to rally the
entire team of logisticians.
In the buildup to that declaration, we have worked very
hard to get all of the partners--the Defense Logistics Agency,
the Service logisticians, and each of the major commands of the
Services--well informed about what we together believed we
could do, with the leadership of a combatant commander, which,
as that chart points out, no one is really in charge. So now
someone has been given that authority. When it comes to command
relationships, logistics flows horizontally and vertically
throughout all command relationships, and it is one thing that
all logisticians realized.
As we have pulled together and as we have teamed, we have
realized that by having a single point of authority we could
knock down a lot of the challenges, brick walls, and roadblocks
that traditionally had stymied each one of us individually. Now
there was a team captain to rally around, and that is
essentially the role we have played.
Then if you look at the theater, one of the first things we
suggested to General John Abizaid, I sent him a letter early in
December saying I would like to put a USTRANSCOM-like team in
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) with logisticians who had, in my
terms, a Ph.D. in logistics, and I support them with all of the
information technology (IT) they could possibly need,
everything that exists at USTRANSCOM we want to put down in
your theater. You decide where, and, in fact, your J-4, your
logistician, can command and control it.
Senator Talent. That is what I was going to ask. They are
under the authority of the combatant commander, is that
correct?
General Handy. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. Okay.
General Handy. What we are able to do is connect both ends
of that supply chain. It represents that umbilical from
USTRANSCOM right out to our customer, CENTCOM--not just the
combatant commander, but his staff and his subordinate
commanders.
The clarity with which they see the logistics challenge
within the theater gave us better than 20-20 visibility and it
highlighted for the theater commander the incredible visibility
that he had lacked up until that point. I tell folks that it
would, frankly, take us quite a bit of the day to talk about
them all, but it was not just low-hanging fruit, in the
military term. This was fruit that was laying on the ground
almost going rotten; it was just easy to pick up.
We saw within 24 hours of this team arriving in Central
Command's area of responsibility that they were already
reporting back successes, and it continued on a day-to-day
basis as we constantly talked with them, worked with them, to
create successes for the warfighter through the better
management of not only the distribution, but of the deployment
and redeployment management processes.
So I do not want to overstate it. Obviously I am passionate
about it. We and the team that we support and that support us
are absolutely dedicated to this endeavor, and it is so full of
goodness that you cannot help but get wrapped up in the
success. So we are very pleased, and we have not become afoul
of command relationships, which is the heart of your question.
It has bonded us dramatically. The other combatant commanders
have all voiced the opinion: ``You know, John, I do not know
what it is, this Deployment Distribution Operations Center
(DDOC) that you have, but I want one.''
I just came back from Korea and General Leon LaPorte begged
me to, as soon as we can turn our heads from CENTCOM, could we
please come to Korea and give them the same kind of capability,
and we intend to do that.
Senator Talent. We ought to ask the combatant commanders
(CINCs) just for the record just to put in their view of it to
this point. Maybe we will go ahead and submit that so we can
get it in the record and make it complete.
[The information referred to follows:]
USTRANSCOM conducted a quick survey of CENTCOM and United States
Forces Korea (USFK). The responses from both CENTCOM and USFK provide
overwhelming support for the regional DDOC. Feedback indicated that the
DDOC, which has been tested in both CENTCOM and USFK, is absolutely the
way we need to do business. The DDOC will make the combatant commander
even more effective and efficient in the functional areas of
deployment/redeployment, intra-theater distribution, and sustainment.
Senator Talent. Well, we may go a little bit more into that
in a little while.
General Handy. Okay.
Senator Talent. Senator Kennedy is here and I want to
recognize him. Why do you not do an opening statement and then
go into your questions?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome
all of our witnesses and thank you for calling the hearing.
The subject of the strategic lift is not a new one for our
subcommittee. We have taken significant actions over the years
in dealing with the strategic lift issues on a bipartisan
basis. The subcommittee played a significant role in
establishing the USTRANSCOM. We encouraged the DOD to focus on
strategic sealift issues and urged the Department to conduct
the MCS.
It seems unlikely, however, to undertake the original MRS.
We authorized the needed resources for strategic sealift
shipping. We not only helped restructure the C-17 at the point
when many were ready to cancel the program, but we helped
resolve the controversy surrounding it. We supported the
maritime prepositioning force enhancement (MPF(E)) program to
provide an additional ship for each MPF squadron.
Today's hearing continues the subcommittee's strong
bipartisan interest in the broader strategic lift policy issues
facing the Nation today. We understand the Department has
launched a new review of strategic lift needs, a study called
the MCS. It seems unlikely, however, that this review will lead
to major reductions in strategic lift requirements since our
recent experience would indicate the current strategic lift
capability needs to be enhanced. In fact, in response to our
committee's report on the National Defense Authorization Act of
Fiscal Year 2004, General Handy had submitted a report
indicating the conclusions of the MRS-05, regarding strategic
airlift needs understate the real requirements.
We look forward to hearing from General Handy about the
quick-look report. I also look forward to hearing from our
witnesses about how our strategic mobility force performed in
Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.
Now, General Handy, the committee report last year required
you to submit a report, your assessment of whether the
requirements--and I know our chairman got into some of this,
but we might go over some of the ground, but I have some
particular areas that I am interested in and want elaborated--
for strategic lift included in the MRS-05 remain valid or
whether they were too low or too high.
You submitted the requested report. If I may paraphrase,
that report concludes that MRS-05 requirements for airlift
understate the real need, C-17 production needs to continue
beyond the plan of 180 aircraft, and we need to upgrade an
appropriate number of C-5s. While the MRS-05 analysis indicated
a requirement of having 54.5 MTM/D in airlift, your report
indicates that the new requirements are likely to be 57.4 to 60
MTM/D.
Now, we have increased the planned buy of C-17 aircraft
from 120 to 180 aircraft, and your report indicates that we
need to buy at least 42 C-17s beyond that. If we kept all our
current C-5 fleet and buy the full 222 C-17s your report cites,
what would be our capability in terms of ton-miles per day?
General Handy. Senator, I would respond by saying that is a
number I believe is greater than the 60 MTM/D, if you add all
that up. But I am still more concerned about the requirement
that we have to move. What is the real requirement? What would
the MCS that the Department is about to launch, what is that
real number?
So our position until that number is determined is to ramp
up as many C-17s as we can and begin the Avionics Modernization
Program (AMP) and Reliability Enhancement and Reengineering
Program (RERP) on as many C-5s as we possibly can, not knowing
what the target is.
Senator Kennedy. Let me come back to that because you are
going to have to have advance lead funds for the C-17, I would
imagine, before that report is completed. Your report talks
about ``an appropriate number of C-5s.'' Why do you use--I know
it is in part classified, but the declassified, to meet the
current, C-17 production rates must continue uninterrupted and
an appropriate number--what are we talking--should be
modernized, that will meet the merge.
What are you hedging on in that?
General Handy. From my perspective, it is how many can we
get modified, how many C-5s can we ultimately run through? We
have currently funded all of the AMP and we are putting as many
dollars as we can against the RERP program. If you look at the
time it takes to run both those programs, the C-5A model
portion of the fleet may, in fact, age out from under me. I
remain concerned about how many can we ultimately get modified,
and that is the basis for that some ``appropriate number.''
We have to certainly take into account the time it is
taking to get to that endgame.
Senator Kennedy. Well, in the previous years the Air Force
had intended to modernize the avionics in all C-5s, C-5As, and
C-5Bs. This year the budget documentation indicates the Air
Force is going to stop the avionics after modernizing 55, and
the picture is even less clear with the RERP program.
General Handy. From a USTRANSCOM perspective, I have to get
all 112 remaining C-5s AMP'ed. So our pressure--and I
appreciate what the Air Force is doing, but it will always be
to get the AMP on every single existing C-5.
Senator Kennedy. What about the re-engining program?
General Handy. As many re-engined as we possibly can,
depending upon when the engineers come back with the test of
the tear-down bird at Robins right now, how well the test goes
on the two Bs and the A in the RERP, and whether or not that
modification is really going to do the things that the
operational requirements document says it must do. That will
determine how quickly we can get and how many we can get of the
C-5 fleet under the RERP.
Senator Kennedy. Okay. Where are we on that timeframe? We
gave you dates and times, but I cannot recall. Give us a sort
of a progress line on that, can you?
General Handy. It looks right now by engineering data the
tear-down at Warner Robins is going to take about 24 months.
Now, we have some preliminary data already, but it is way too
early to draw a conclusion. We continue to press the Air Force
as best we can for that analysis.
Senator Kennedy. Twenty-four months?
General Handy. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. It takes 24 months?
General Handy. It is a very detailed analysis of the tear-
down of the aircraft. They literally are taking it apart and
examining features of the aircraft that will give us that
insight into how well that will last into the future. I am very
hopeful that it will be positive. That is one challenge to us.
Then the RERP modification starts at the end of the AMP
modification. There is some overlap, but as soon as the AMP is
complete then we will start that test of the two Bs and the A
to determine if they are capable of being modified. The
contractor is convinced that they are. I am certainly hopeful.
We need them to be. But to get the mission capable (MC) rate up
to 75 percent across the fleet will be a significant challenge.
That endeavor will be somewhere in the 2010-2012 timeframe.
There is a lot of time that is going on between now and
then.
Senator Kennedy. Well, it is a lot of time, that is true,
because it is going to take a lot of time to get to the
delivery of these additional C-17s as well.
General Handy. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. I raise this because at the hearing in
2001, before the Department released the MRS-05, General
Robertson was asked about buying more C-17s and re-engining the
C-5 aircraft as a way of meeting the lift. He said: ``The re-
engining of the C-5 is the most cost-effective solution to
closing the gap on a MTM per daily basis. Basically, we project
it will cost about $48 million a copy to re-engine the C-5. A
new C-17 costs you somewhere in the vicinity of $150 to $175
million, depending on the terms of the new multiyear contract,
which is why we recommend both solutions. We have to re-engine
the C-5 and we have to continue to buy C-17s.''
That was pretty specific, pretty definite, and it also
demonstrated a hard view in terms of the economics. We are
looking at scarce resources. We want to do what needs to be
done, but we are also looking at the scarce resources. We are
looking at a budget that is hurting and we have some time lapse
here before we are going to get the delivery of these
additional kinds of planes. We have a very important need.
I am mindful of what you said about the new mobility study.
We discussed the quick-look report regarding likely changes in
the airlift needs based on later information than was available
to the Department in developing the MRS. I understand the Joint
Chief's plan to conduct, as you mentioned, a comprehensive
review of lift requirements, which is being called, as you
mentioned, the MCS.
This review will be the basis of assessing future strategic
lift modernizations, including how many C-17s. The Department
will need to make a decision whether to buy more than the
current planned 180 in the fiscal year 2006 budget. The
Department intends to begin the study this summer and complete
the work some time next spring. That is March 2005.
First of all, should we believe that the Department will be
able to complete the comprehensive mobility study within 8 to
10 months when the original MRS, the bottom-up review, and MRS-
05 all took substantially longer?
General Handy. Senator, I would say I share the concerns
and tone of that question. I have said for sometime now as the
combatant commander that we really and truly need to nail down
the real mobility capabilities requirement as soon as possible.
I would love to have had it before the fiscal year 2006 budget
discussions because I have to have long lead time in there. I
am concerned--I do not want to rush a study, but we absolutely
need to have it done, and I am hopeful that they can, with our
help, get the study done in that year that they have allocated.
But that, I have to confess to you, is a concern I have.
Senator Kennedy. Well, to the extent the MCS supports the
quick-look report and confirms we need more airlift, will the
study identify the best way to achieve the added capability?
General Handy. I do not know what the exact target of the
study will be in terms of the questions and answers they give.
What we have asked for is that the study not just look at air,
but air, land, and sea, because in our view it is quite
possible that sealift in some cases might be able to offset
some of the airlift requirements of the future. So it is how
many ships do we need, what is that capability; and then, of
course, within the air side, how many of the types of aircraft
do you need, C-17s, C-5s, or even improved C-130s.
All of those questions are ones that we hope to drive into
that study so that we have some good analysis to go forward on.
Senator Kennedy. Well, I think your answer is very
responsive. I did not know whether that was actually intended
to be included in that study or not. I see heads nodding behind
you, so I gather that is the case--that you will get the
balance in terms of air and sea in the study, but also you are
going to identify the best way to achieve it even within the
airlift capability?
General Handy. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. What is going to be the basis on which the
Air Force decides on whether to include the advance procurement
funds in fiscal year 2006 if you are not going to have the
benefit of the study?
General Handy. From the combatant commander's perspective,
the line closes in fiscal year 2008. If there is no long lead,
then we run the potential of incredibly increased costs. If the
study comes out, you find you need more than 180, if you did
not have the long lead in the fiscal year 2006 budget, now the
line is closed or closing and you have to infuse that many more
dollars to open it up or try to put it on life support. I think
that will be the key linchpin for the Air Force in the decision
of the C-17, at least to put the long lead in.
From USTRANSCOM's perspective, we are urging them to press
with long lead and at least have those dollars in the budget.
Senator Kennedy. General Dunwoody, the Army has been
planning to buy a Theater Support Vessel (TSV) to fill a
mission of providing intra-theater logistics. I understand the
Army has been participating in leasing a catamaran vessel that
the Army has been using to test operational concepts, including
using the leased vessel in the Persian Gulf.
Can you give us an update? Do you have any pictures on
that, or can you describe it perhaps? Oh, I have one right
here.
General Dunwoody: Senator, that has primarily been an intra
sealift asset, moving stuff around inside the theater. The Army
currently does have two leased. They plan and are committed to
funding the start of a new one, a research, development, test,
and evaluation (RDT&E) vessel, in fiscal year 2005, and they
are planning to develop a program objective memorandum (POM)
for five of them in fiscal year 2006 to 2009.
Their objective is to get 12 of these vessels on hand
through fiscal year 2011.
Senator Kennedy. I guess it says it is currently on a
scheduled 6- to 12-month deployment in support of operations.
You have been testing these different types of hulls, have you?
General Dunwoody. This is not a USTRANSCOM asset, Senator.
This is an Army asset.
Senator Kennedy. What is their range?
General Dunwoody. I would have to take that question for
the record, sir. That is not one of ours.
[The information referred to follows:]
TSV block I traveling at 36 knots will have a range of 1,250
nautical miles with a payload of 754 short tons (ST) and 354
passengers.
TSV block II traveling at 40 knots will have a range of 2,500
nautical miles with a payload of 1,050 ST and 354 passengers.
TSV block III traveling at 45 knots will have a range of 2,500
nautical miles with a payload of 1,250 ST and 354 passengers.
Blocks I, II, and II vessels traveling at 40 knots have an
unrefueled range requirement of 4,700 nautical miles unloaded with no
passengers.
General Handy. Senator, it might be helpful to know one of
the main ships they have leased is the Westpac Express. It is a
ferry, typically used in the Australian trade. They are
aluminum-hulled. They can hold about a battalion's worth of
equipment. They are intra-theater, as Ann said, generally small
sea states. They are aluminum-hulled; so their defensive
capabilities are somewhat limited. They are an idea that the
Army has to move intra-coastal and small size movements of
equipment and perhaps people.
Admiral Brewer. Let me jump in there, Senator.
General Handy. Our sealift side of it can tell you some of
the other graceful things about it.
Senator Kennedy. Yes, I was wondering why, when I was
preparing for this, it was the Army that was in charge of this.
Senator Talent. It is taking jointness maybe a little bit
too far.
Senator Kennedy. Then it was all explained to me and it
sounded very good.
Admiral Brewer. That has engendered a lot of conversation,
needless to say, between the Army and the Navy. Senator, the
high-speed vessel is new technology, runs at about 35 to 40
knots, carries--the Westpac Express, by the way, is leased by
the Marine Corps for the western Pacific--900 marines and 350
short tons, and routinely makes voyages of 1,000 miles or more.
In fact, they just went from Okinawa down to the Philippines.
Very good up to a certain point. They can be somewhat
economical as compared to airlift up to a certain point. I
think from the standpoint of experimentation, the Army is
looking at it from the standpoint of intra-theater. The Navy
has looked at it from the standpoint of certain warfighting
capabilities as well, maybe as a bridge towards the Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS), in terms of experimenting with that type of
hull form.
We just leased the Swift, which is a mine warfare
countermeasures ship, after the Inchon had her fire, and that
particular vessel right now is doing mine warfare things as
well as experiments for the Marine Corps.
It is really kind of leading-edge prototype technology.
Senator Kennedy. As I see, it has been leasing an
Australian hull, too?
Admiral Brewer. There are some ship builders in the United
States that are basically partnering with the ship builders in
Australia, so that perhaps in the future they will be U.S.-
built.
Senator Kennedy. Can you use it in the Atlantic as well?
Admiral Brewer. Yes, sir. The Swift went from Australia to
the Indian Ocean in record time. She has to carry a lot of gas.
She went all the way from the Indian Ocean, around the Horn of
Africa, around the Cape, into the Mediterranean Sea, and then
from the Mediterranean over to the Atlantic. She stopped a lot
for gas. I keep emphasizing that.
Senator Kennedy. Okay. Just a couple more, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Talent. Take your time.
Senator Kennedy. Admiral Brewer, what are your current
plans for recapitalizing on the Ready Reserve Force (RRF)? That
has been one of the great successes--the Ready Reserve. We
followed that very closely in this subcommittee. Those ships
have done an extraordinary job. At some time in the somewhat
near future we have to be thinking about those again. I would
be interested in what you might be able to tell us about it.
Admiral Brewer. Right now the RRF, of course, is managed by
the Maritime Administration (MARAD). What we are looking at is
capabilities within it. Clearly, we do not want any more break-
bulk ships because it takes so long to load those. We have some
ships that are getting up into age 50 years, and clearly we
will retire them.
But as General Handy said, the shape of the RRF will be
determined mainly by the MCS. MARAD clearly has some plans on
the table, but clearly we need to know what the new
requirements will be for the WD versus to swiftly defeat the
effort. We need to know what the war plans will require.
But we clearly know what we do not need. We do not need any
more break-bulk ships. During the war it would take up to 2
weeks to upload a break-bulk ship and another 2 weeks in
theater, as compared to a large, medium speed roll-on/roll-off
(LMSR), which is almost three times the size of a lot of these
ships, where we could actually upload a LMSR in 3 to 4 days and
download a LMSR in 2 or fewer days.
So therein from a requirements perspective shows you what
we do not need. We know those things we do not need. Now, what
we will need in the future we are going to have to determine.
Senator Kennedy. Anything that you want to say with regards
to the Gulf War that helped you figure that out, or any
conclusions you have reached?
General Dunwoody. Well, first of all, we literally moved an
Operation Desert Storm-sized force in almost half the time.
That is the first thing. Speed is clearly going to be something
that we will be looking at in terms of future capability. For
example, during the Gulf War the average speed of our vessels--
because we had to charter so many off the market--was 13 knots,
versus 17 knots during this particular war. That means we
closed in 5 days less, with a heck of a lot more capacity.
The RRF ships were in much better condition because
Congress gave us the money to help basically maintain them
better. We had a 98 percent availability rate within the RRF,
and of course the RRF was that big force that sat off the coast
of Turkey and delivered the 4th Infantry Division in such an
expeditious manner.
From that perspective, the LMSR was the Cadillac, if you
will, of this particular war. From that perspective, we are
very happy with what we had. But clearly, we do not know what
the future will hold. As warfighters, we already know you do
not fight the last war. So the MCS is going to be critical.
Senator Kennedy. It is enormously important for many
reasons, the last of which you certainly emphasized. We are
going to be looking at the base realignment and closure (BRAC),
too. They are going to have criteria, and they are going to
look at what they need and looking about in terms of making
judgments about many of these items, too. This is going to be
an important time in the next couple of years, making decisions
on these items.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Talent. I thank Senator Kennedy for his questions
and just encourage him, if he has any more, to feel free to
ask. This is our foray into reviewing lift, and it is one of
the important responsibilities of this subcommittee.
I really should have begun, not just by welcoming you all,
but by congratulating your command on the tremendous
achievements in OIF. Anybody who looked at what happened in
Operation Desert Storm and assumed that the United States would
not learn from that lesson and be able to deliver more and
faster in the next engagement made a big mistake. I am grateful
to you, and also for the jointness that you do represent.
I was going to ask Admiral Brewer about the Maritime
Prepositioning Force--Future (MPF(F)) and the MPF--Aviation
(MPF(A)). According to the shipbuilding plan submitted with the
budget request, the first MPF(F) ship is to be started with
research and development funds in fiscal year 2006, with two
follow-on ships funded in the National Defense Sealift Fund in
fiscal year 2009. Fiscal year 2009 also includes funding for
the first MPF(A) ship.
There has been a lot of discussion that these ships will
contribute greatly to the sea basing concept that is part of
the Sea Power 21 vision. Indeed, I do not know how we can do
the seabasing concept without these vessels. Is your command as
the end item user participating in the requirements process for
these ships?
Admiral Brewer. Yes, sir. We have been intimately involved
from the Center of Naval Analysis, the initial studies, to the
analysis of alternatives. We have been intimately involved in
it. We already operate the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS),
which basically once they offload the marines, 11 of which
during OIF went over to common user, to General Handy, we could
use those ships as well.
MPF(F) is clearly still in the developmental stage. But
what we have done is we have introduced through prototyping
technology we feel would be beneficial to that particular ship,
such as selective discharge systems. If you go to Wal-Mart, you
see stuff scanned as it goes through the register. Why not have
that same kind of technology when you are moving containers on
a ship?
In other words, a battalion commander can send a digital
signal from the beach saying: ``I want X container delivered to
me yesterday.'' Well, if he says that then this automatic
system goes down, scans, finds that container, pulls it out,
and puts it up on deck, and an aircraft picks it off of an
MPF(F)-type ship and moves it to the objective.
If he says, ``I want it maybe in a day or so,'' then it
goes over the side into a high-speed connector or some kind of
vessel and then goes into some port area. That is the kind of
technology that we are encouraging be inserted into MPF(F) from
our perspective.
Of course, more importantly, the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) will have to depend on civilian mariners to man these
ships. We are the force, the Military Sealift Command, that
will hire the mariners to man this particular ship, because we
really need sailors and marines shooting in the combat role,
wherein the mariners can fulfil the support role on these
vessels.
Senator Talent. With this new technology, the benefit
sounds like you will be able to keep track of your inventory
just like Wal-Mart does as well?
Admiral Brewer. Yes, sir, and that feeds into what General
Handy needs to have in terms of in-transit visibility (ITV), as
well as watching the consumption of this. Now, I do not want to
get too far into Ann Dunwoody's business, but when that
container hits the beach and the foxhole consumes it, that
order automatically comes back through the DPO process and gets
ordered either from the continental United States (CONUS) or
from some theater asset that can deliver the goods to that
particular warfighter.
Senator Talent. Do we have a network architecture adequate
to support that kind of keeping track of inventory real-time?
General Handy. We are far closer to that vision today than
we have ever been. Just to give you an example, on the air side
we have been running in Afghanistan and Iraq at the 95 to 98
percent visibility of things moving by air, and that is not
just knowing that a pallet is moving; it is everything on the
pallet right down to what is in the pallet.
We also have the same percent of visibility when we move
things by air intra-theater. When General Dunwoody moves them,
with Admiral Brewer's help, by sealift, our IT systems give us
that kind of clarity of containers and items in the container
all the way from the time we stow a ship until we unload a
ship.
The challenge for us as the DPO becomes from the airport
into the ground system and from the seaport into the ground
system to that forward point of consumption is creating the IT
systems, expanding and extending the IT systems so that we do
what Dave is talking about: When items are consumed at that
point of consumption, like a Wal-Mart or some other store, we
know that and the system automatically will report back the
consumption and the supply chain supports it.
Senator Talent. So you know right away, yes.
General Handy. That last tactical mile is the challenge
that we are undertaking with the Deployment Distribution
Operations Center (DDOC) in-theater today.
Senator Talent. It would relieve pressure on how much you
have to preposition if you had that kind of intelligence and
can resupply quicker.
Admiral, MPF(A). It is my understanding that MPF(F) is
going to preposition material for ground forces. Should I just
think of MPF(A) as doing the same thing for supporting aviation
assets? It is not as well defined in my mind. Could you
elaborate?
Admiral Brewer. No, sir, it is not. I really have not had
that much visibility in it. We have not really been that much
involved on the A side, but we have been involved on the F
side.
Senator Talent. Okay. Three years ago, General Robertson
testified that the Maritime Security Program should be
reauthorized and that annual payment for participating vessels
should be raised. This was done in the defense bill last year,
beginning effective in fiscal year 2006. The program will also
expand from 47 to 60 participating ships.
Now, I know the program comes under the Maritime
Administration in the Department of Transportation, but,
Admiral, I would be interested in your views on it. How
important is that program to you in augmenting sealift
capability?
Admiral Brewer. Oh, it is extremely important. We cannot
exist without it. As I said before, the RRF was extremely
critical to everything that we did. The activation of these
particular ships has been extremely critical in terms of
readiness. But more importantly--and I want to divert here for
a minute--ships do not run themselves; mariners run them. The
Maritime Security Program is providing us with a U.S. flag
fleet that will provide us with the mariners to man these
particular ships.
I have to commend some of the people sitting behind me who
represent the maritime trades, departments, and unions, because
without them we could not have fought this war. That is
extremely important.
Senator Talent. It is an amazing civilian-military synergy.
Admiral Brewer. Yes, sir. Without them it does not happen,
period.
Senator Talent. I do not know if there is a parallel for it
in the history of warfare. It is a tremendous synergy. I am
glad you said that for the record.
Admiral Brewer. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. General Dunwoody, let me ask you about
railcars for a second. One of the findings of the MRS-05 was
that rail flatcars need to be augmented by commercial means.
Your written statement identifies a shortage of 2,000 tiedown
flatcars if you are going to be able to meet the ship loading
schedules.
What is your assessment of the adequacy of our rail
delivery system as applies to the present NMS? How big on a
scale of 1 to 10 is this as a concern for you, and what are we
doing about it?
General Dunwoody. Mr. Chairman, I think, like the other
commodities, this needs to be revalidated in the MCS, both
railcars, ammo cars, sealift, and airlift capability. What we
found using the MRS-05 study was that we took measures to
mitigate this projected shortfall for railcars. What we found
was by controlling and consolidating the requirements for
railcars in our operations center, we were able to prioritize
and meet the demands of the customer. We experienced no
shortfalls during OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for
railcars.
I think again it goes back to revalidating that
requirement. Prior to us consolidating, all the installations
put demands on the system and they were not synchronized. With
everyone deploying at one time it was not a matter of
availability; it was a matter of prioritizing what we had.
Senator Talent. Would you say the same thing about
containerization, that we need to revalidate those needs as
well, because MRS-05 concluded that that capacity was
inadequate. So should we conclude, in view of our suspicion
that that study has understated our requirements, that maybe
that need is even greater?
General Dunwoody. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman, and I would say
that again to mitigate that we let a contract with one of the
largest container leasing companies to provide assured access
to ammo containers and we were able to lease over 5,000 ammo
containers and again experienced no shortfall during OIF and
OEF.
Senator Talent. A couple more questions. This is for all of
you. Your written statement mentioned several exercises
conducted to improve our ability to deploy and sustain forces,
including Exercise Turbo, Intermodal Surge, Turbo Containerized
Ammunition Distribution System, and Joint Logistics Over the
Shore (JLOTS). Expound for us and for the record, if you will,
a little bit about the lessons learned from the conduct of
these exercises and the initiatives your commands are taking as
a result?
General Handy, you want to start, but I would ask all of
you to comment on that.
General Handy. Certainly, sir. Certainly from a USTRANSCOM
perspective these exercises prove a lot of facets of our
ability to be very flexible, dynamic, and highly capable in
supporting the warfighter. There are perhaps in my mind two
singular thrusts that are very important, and my teammates here
can expound, as you point out: greater containerization. In
other words break-bulk, as Dave said, makes no sense at all. So
greater containerization, and to the extent we containerize
cargo and move it from ship to shore in the case of sealift is
clearly a major part of these exercises.
JLOTS for its contribution proves that, in the case where
you do not have an adequate port facility, you can go from ship
over the shore in to support the warfighter. We need to
continue to improve and demonstrate that rather significant
capability.
Sort of a subordinate piece of that is ammo
containerization, getting ammo out of break-bulk modes and
ammunition and ammunition stocks into containers, which is
another aspect of these exercises and one that we have made
tremendous progress. If you, having said that, look back at
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm as perhaps our last
benchmark and then how we operate today, there is a dramatic
change, as David pointed out, in just process and procedure and
containerization and how we do things, just simply stated.
These exercises in the interim have helped us prove process
and procedures so that the warfighter knows and that our
components, our executive agents, come forth with the moneys to
support us when we need things.
Having said that from my perspective, I will turn it over
to these two to add their perspectives.
Admiral Brewer. One of the things that happens is it gives
you the opportunity to make the next technological leap or the
next tactical or strategic leap. For example, JLOTS: one of the
things we learned is the offshore petroleum distribution system
is clearly dated, it is ineffective, it is too close to the
shore, and it is too vulnerable. These are the ships that tilt,
if you will, and try to push gas ashore.
Fuel is extremely important. We have delivered over one
billion gallons of fuel so far during the global war on
terrorism to support Afghanistan and Iraq. So fuel is extremely
important. If you get into a situation where you cannot push
gas ashore, either through the ports or offshore, you are in
trouble.
What we have done as a result of these exercises is come up
with a different concept for doing that where we actually have
a ship that comes in that is a pumping station, where any
commercial tanker can pull up to it, hook up, and pump gas into
it and through it in to the shore from a much greater distance
and it less vulnerable. By the way, we can pick up and move in
case that area becomes vulnerable.
That is a classic example of the kind of lessons learned,
if you will, and things that we learn during these particular
exercises.
Senator Talent. It would seem to be an obvious target for
some kind of asymmetrical threat----
Admiral Brewer. Absolutely.
Senator Talent. If you have a huge platform and it is your
only means of transferring and getting fuel ashore, it would be
an obvious target.
Admiral Brewer. Yes, sir. It takes hours and sometimes days
to even set it up. I have watched it happen. You sit there and
you push the ``this is nuts'' button and say we need something
different. That is what these exercises do for us.
Senator Talent. How did you put that, Admiral? You push the
``this is nuts'' button.
Admiral Brewer. Do not put that in the record, sir.
[Laughter.]
Senator Talent. We can leave it out of the record, but we
will remember it. You described something I do three or four
times a day, push the ``this is nuts'' button. That is great.
Go ahead.
Admiral Brewer. Those are the kinds of things. Then, in the
turbo activations and things of that sort, of course, we
exercise our ships and find out how fast we can get them ready.
For example, we determined that, even though our ships are in a
reduced operating status of what we call 4 days, they actually
activated within 3.8, 3.5 days. So why? Because we exercised
them. We did these turbo activations. Our crews were ready. We
brought the unions in very early in the war. They knew exactly
what the requirements were, and the people showed up and we
were ready to go.
Senator Talent. Thank you. That was very instructive. It
seems to me what you are doing would bear on requirements in
what we do with the new LCS, because the more of your logistics
that you have to have close to that shore and the more
vulnerable it is, the more we are going to have to task that
new vessel. By moving that further out and making it less
vulnerable, you have made the job easier for that ship as well.
Admiral Brewer. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. It is again the whole jointness and
connectivity of these exercises, which you all see in logistics
minute by minute. It is fascinating and a little frightening
also.
Yes, General, do you have a comment?
General Dunwoody. Mr. Chairman, I just would like to add a
couple things. Using Operation Desert Storm as the benchmark,
as General Handy mentioned, some of the huge success stories
were in process changes and this time around delivering force
packages and capabilities to the warfighter versus stuff, which
we did in Operation Desert Storm.
For an example, one combat arms battalion during Operation
Desert Storm normally flowed on seven vessels and closed in a
period from the first vessel hitting Southwest Asia (SWA) to
the last 26 days. That is one battalion. A combat service
support (CSS) battalion took 26 vessels normally and flowed and
closed in a period of 36 days. If you can imagine the
warfighter receiving this stuff on that side, if you recall
from Operation Desert Storm, large tactical assembly areas, a
large footprint, and a long time to reception, staging, onward
movement, and integration (RSO&I), link up capability.
This time, the entire 101st Airborne Division--and I will
use them as an example of an investment that we put in our
LMSRs--was loaded by force packages, brigade combat teams,
rolling off the vessels, flowed in five vessels and closed in a
period of 12 days. As Admiral Brewer said, now you are
delivering capability, reducing that RSO&I, reducing the
footprint for the warfighter, keeping that on this side of the
ocean, and flowing equipment.
Right on top of that would be the container ITV piece. As
you recall from Operation Desert Storm, again a large footprint
in the area of responsibility, 40,000 containers there stacked,
20,000 we sent back because we did not know what was in them.
Now, with ITV only 3,500 containers at one time stacked up in
the port. We have been able to track those containers. Again,
keeping the footprint down or keeping it on this side, because
we have instituted new business rules, frustrating cargo on
this side of the ocean without knowing the content data or
using the systems General Handy has talked about that we
developed for ITV.
Again, giving confidence to the warfighter. Two huge
changes that we had since Operation Desert Storm are the
ability to save money by identifying containers and sustainment
on vessels versus having to fly it over there which is much
more costly.
Senator Talent. Any challenges that these exercises
revealed for you, General? The number one challenge that you
emerged thinking you want to tackle?
General Dunwoody. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, the huge
success story is the designation of USTRANSCOM as the
distribution process owner. In each one of these exercises, we
have got to take advantage of how do we now implement the new
rules, regulations, rules of engagement, as a combatant
commander that takes on this new role.
You have to leverage each one of these exercises. Otherwise
it is real easy to do the exercise just like we did last year
and not try to make a difference and implement new rules of
engagement for improving our processes.
Senator Talent. I think I just have a couple more. In fact,
let us get to vulnerability a little bit. First of all,
following up on something Senator Kennedy asked, he was
inquiring about C-5 with you, General Handy. Certainly I agree
that we need to as expeditiously as we can figure out what that
mix needs to be.
Now, he made the point to you, which I think in a general
sense is very valid, that how do we know how many C-17s we are
going to need until we know what we are going to do with the C-
5s, and, therefore, it makes it difficult because we do have to
make decisions in terms of advanced procurement for a new
multiyear.
But we are all pretty much in agreement that whatever the
end number is with C-17, whether it is only the 222 or whether
it is 250 or whether it is above that, we need more than we
have now. That is not something that we expect any further
analysis to change. I have not talked to anybody who believes
that.
So we are looking at at least another 42, perhaps more. But
whatever we do with C-5, we are going to need to raise the
requirement at least to 222; would that be your opinion?
General Handy. It certainly is, Senator. I would be remiss
in this line of questioning, even to include that of Senator
Kennedy, as we focus on the cost differences between the two
programs, not to point out, it is the capabilities issue and,
as we addressed, what is the requirement that you have to move?
In that requirement there is outsize, oversize, bulk, and even
small packages and people.
If you look at that requirement, the issue we face is which
aircraft has the capability to do the things you want done, and
that becomes the critical part of the decision when you say,
``How many do we ultimately need?'' The position we are in
right now is we need every C-17 and C-5 that we can get our
hands on because the requirement far outweighs our ability to
get the job done.
As we refine the MCS and we look at that requirement, then
with more clarity we can determine not only what the number of
C-17s would be, but what would be the number of modified C-5s,
because, as the combatant commander, each of these weapons
systems brings unique capabilities. The C-5 has extraordinary
capability to lift huge volumes of cargo to major hubs forward
in a theater of operations, but the C-17, while it cannot haul
as much, is a capability that gets large volumes of cargo
directly into the fight in a high-threat environment, in the
dirt, and in the areas with small strips and less improved
runways.
Each of those are capabilities that we need and they are
not as many people outside those of us who are involved in this
debate realize competing capabilities; they are capabilities
that each in their own measure you need.
Senator Talent. I wanted to establish that because,
although obviously there are some missions where you could use
either aircraft, it depends in part on certain assumptions you
make: how likely is it that we are going to have long runways,
strong ramps, and places where a C-5 can go? It would be good,
I think, to get this mix and to make whatever assumptions we
are going to make and to look at them and then to figure out
how effective the C-5A platform with the engine modifications
is going to be and how much maintenance it is going to take.
We ought to try to pin this down. I take it you agree with
that? You are not disagreeing with that, is that correct?
General Handy. No, sir. I totally agree.
Senator Talent. Let me ask you a little bit also about a
threat to C-17 and, in fact potentially even to other kinds of
airliners from manportable air defense systems (MANPADS), the
new laser system to counter that threat. What is the status of
that? What are we doing to protect our air mobility assets? Are
these programs being executed as quickly as you think they can
be? Because it strikes me that this is a threat that we need to
deal with. These MANPADS are all over the place.
As I understand it, this laser system is pretty effective
in countering them. Tell me where we are.
General Handy. I am certain you must be referring to our
Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) system. It
indeed is a laser capability. Right now we have it on what we
call a lite version; that is one laser mounted in the tail of
our C-17 aircraft. That is the only aircraft we have them on
now.
It is designed to take care of a rear-aspect shot for the
most part. That tends to be the area that we see the attacks
taking place. Both the C-5 and the C-17 and, in fact, the DHL
airliner that have been hit by MANPADS out of Baghdad were both
reported to be from a rear-aspect, meaning shot from the ground
as the aircraft passed over. So the missile approaches the
aircraft from behind.
Senator Talent. That would make sense. By the time they
could get ready and shoot, you would be going away. But you
need more than just one, do you not?
General Handy. Absolutely.
Senator Talent. To be able to fully protect the aircraft?
General Handy. That is where I am headed; the full LAIRCM
is in fact the tail and one on each side, roughly where the
crew door is on a C-17 or the crew door on a C-5. It takes
three systems to give you that full aspect capability. Even
then, technically there could be some blind spots, depending
upon the angle of bank of an aircraft or climb or descent.
Having said that, at least getting the LAIRCM Lite on our
C-17s gives us the capability with a system that has proven in
tests to be incredibly accurate. What the system does is
essentially send a laser beam out to the detected missile
coming at you, confuse it, and send it off.
Senator Talent. A jammer, in essence?
General Handy. Exactly, essentially that is what it does,
without getting into the technical aspects.
Senator Talent. Are you telling me that the intention would
be to try and equip as many as possible with the one site and
then go on and add because you feel that gives you pretty good
protection?
General Handy. Based upon our experiences and the lessons
in Iraq, we broke from an original program of a few lite and
then going to a full-up LAIRCM modification on the C-17s and C-
130s to a lite modification, which will give us that one-ball,
one-laser capability on the tail of C-17s, as quickly as we
possibly can to protect us from the--it is no longer an
emerging threat.
Senator Talent. It is a real threat.
General Handy. It is a current, alive and well threat, I am
afraid.
Senator Talent. The partial success may just encourage more
of it in the future.
General Handy. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. Well, that is all I have. I do want to
thank you all again for giving us so much of your time. The
hearing went on a little bit longer than I wanted, but I
thought we covered all the ground. We may have some--in fact
will have--at least a few more questions for the record.
But thank you all again for your service. Thanks to those
who serve with you and under you, and thanks for your time
today. We appreciate it.
The subcommittee is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
strategic airlift capability
1. Senator Kennedy. General Handy, during the hearing we discussed
the potential for achieving a strategic airlift goal of 57.4 to 60 MTM/
D. This is the goal that your quick-look assessment of the MRS-05
indicated would probably be the new moderate risk goal. I asked you
about what effect on meeting this MTM/D goal would be if we were to buy
222 C-17 aircraft (as your report suggested) and retaining 112 of the
C-5 aircraft in inventory. You indicated that you thought this force
structure would exceed the MTM/D goal.
Please provide a more precise estimate of the capability of the
strategic airlift fleet under the following conditions:
A. buying 222 C-17 aircraft and retaining 112 C-5 aircraft,
with all C-5 aircraft upgraded under the C-5 RERP;
B. buying 222 C-17 aircraft and retaining 112 C-5 aircraft,
with none of the C-5 aircraft upgraded under the RERP;
C. buying 222 C-17 aircraft and retaining 112 C-5 aircraft,
with only the C-5B aircraft upgraded under the RERP; and
D. buying 222 C-17 aircraft and retaining only the C-5B
aircraft, with those C-5B aircraft upgraded under the RERP.
General Handy.
A. The organic airlift capacity of a C-17 fleet of 222 and a
C-5 fleet of 112, with all the C-5s upgraded would be 37.2 MTM/
D equating to a total MTM/D capacity (including Civil Reserve
Air Fleet (CRAF) contribution of 20.5 MTM/D) of 57.7 MTM/D.
B. The organic airlift capacity of a C-17 fleet of 222 and a
C-5 fleet of 112, with none of the C-5s upgraded would be 34.4
MTM/D equating to a total MTM/D capacity (including CRAF
contribution of 20.5 MTM/D) of 54.9 MTM/D.
C. The organic airlift capacity of a C-17 fleet of 222 and a
C-5 fleet of 112, with only the C-5Bs upgraded would be 35.2
MTM/D equating to a total MTM/D capacity (including CRAF
contribution of 20.5 MTM/D) of 55.7 MTM/D. The preceding
numbers assume a fleet of 52 RERPed C-5s and 60 un-RERPed C-5s.
The 2 extra C-5s (there are only 50 B model aircraft) are due
to the assumption that the 2 C-5C models would be kept and
modified due to the unique and important capability they
provide.
D. The organic airlift capacity of a C-17 fleet of 222 and a
C-5 fleet of 52, with all the C-5s upgraded would be 29.7 MTM/D
equating to a total MTM/D capacity (including CRAF contribution
of 20.5 MTM/D) of 50.2 MTM/D. The preceding numbers assume a
fleet of 52 RERPed C-5s. The 2 extra C-5s (there are only 50 B
model aircraft) are due to the assumption that the 2 C-5C
models would be kept and modified due to the unique and
important capability they provide.
c-5 retirements
2. Senator Kennedy. General Handy, the Air Force plans to retire 14
of the current fleet of 76 C-5A aircraft. The Air Force announced this
intention when announcing the master airlift re-stationing program that
was required when the C-17 program was expanded. Can you specify what
criteria the Air Mobility Command is using to decide which C-5A
aircraft will be retired?
General Handy. The Air Force, along with the C-5 System Program
Office (SP) and Air Mobility Command (AMC), analyzed structural repair
data, maintenance records, crash damage information and readiness data
to determine which 14 C-5As to retire from the inventory. Final
determination of specific aircraft was based upon age and average
maintenance man-hours expended. The first 11 C-5SAs selected were the
first production aircraft. These aircraft were manufactured using
different processes than the remaining C-5As, resulting in unique
structural differs, requiring separate spares, and increased days in
depot. The remaining three aircraft selected had accrued the most
maintenance man-hours per year from 1997-2001.
intra-theater airlift
3. Senator Kennedy. General Handy, the Army has announced an
intention to buy C-27 aircraft as part of the Comanche helicopter
cancellation. While this aircraft would not provide as much intra-
theater lift capability as the C-130 aircraft, it would provide some
capability. How would your plans for providing intra-theater support to
combatant commanders include the contribution of any potential force of
Army C-27 aircraft?
General Handy. The Army has not announced a decision on a specific
aircraft purchase at this time; although, USTRANSCOM understands the
Army is looking to replace its 44 C-23 aircraft with a similar
capability. The C-23 aircraft are used by the Army as a service organic
mobility resource and are not presently tasked by USTRANSCOM. Should
the Army acquire a replacement aircraft similar to the C-23, USTRANSCOM
has no current plans to treat this new aircraft in a different manner.
force structure projections
4. Senator Kennedy. General Handy, your MCS will be important for
determining USTRANSCOM's future. The DOD is currently establishing its
best estimate of force structure requirements for the next 25 years as
part of the analysis supporting a possible BRAC process for fiscal year
2005. Will the Department have the benefits of any results from your
MCS analysis as it establishes the assumed force structure that will
drive the BRAC process?
General Handy. The MCS is scheduled for completion in March 2005.
Analysis from that study will be available to inform the BRAC process.
[Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]